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
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CALCUTTA

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CONTENTS

	PAGE
EDITORIAL	183
JINNAH, MOHAMMED ALI (QUAID-I-AZAM) (1875-1948) —Dr. S. P. Sen	187
PANDIT JAWAHARLAL NEHRU (Editorial Addendum) —Dr. S. P. Sen	194
FROM HISTORY TO POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY : IBN KHALDUN, ISLAM AND THE ISLAMIC STATE —Warren L. Young	201
THE GOA ARCHIVES AND INDIAN HISTORY —M. N. Pearson	205
MURSHID QULI KHAN KHURASANI —Azmat Ali Beg	212
THE GERMAN NATIONAL CHARACTER : AN ESSAY —Jyotirmoy Banerjee	217
SALT SATYAGRAHA AND PANCHMAHALS —B. N. Gandhi	223
INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT AND WORLD WAR I : A STUDY IN INTERACTION —Anil Samarth	227
BOOK REVIEWS	236

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EDITORIAL

Annual Conference :

The Twelfth Annual Conference of the Institute of Historical Studies will be held at Shillong (Meghalaya State) from 7th to 10th October 1974 under the auspices of the North-Eastern Hill University, Shillong. Dr. Ganda Singh, M.A., D.Litt., former Professor and Head of the Department of History, Panjabi University, Patiala, and former Director of Panjabi Historical Studies, will preside over the Conference.

According to our usual practice we have one principal theme and a secondary theme for the Conference. The principal theme for this year's Conference is : *Social and Religious Reform Movements in the 19th and 20th centuries*. The subject will be dealt with according to region or State, as that will give a true and comprehensive picture for the whole country. There will be at least one paper for each State or region. For some of the States there will be two or three papers, covering all aspects and all movements. Unlike at some of the other all-India Conferences where papers may be sent by anyone, our practice is to select contributors and to request them for papers. This is done to ensure a high standard for the

papers. It is also our practice, in order to maintain uniformity of treatment, to lay down a broad pattern for the papers on any particular theme. For this year's principal theme the pattern laid down is given below :

- (i) State of the society at the beginning of the 19th century ; the inadequacies in the social system.
- (ii) How the awareness for reform was first roused.
- (iii) Some of the leading personalities in the reform agitation.
- (iv) Development of organised reform movements and institutions.
- (v) The reaction of the society in general.
- (vi) The extent of success or failure.

The following regions or States will be covered : Assam, Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Panjab, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Pondicherry, Goa, Meghalaya, Manipur, Nagaland and Himachal Pradesh. It is expected that a collection of separate papers on all these regions and States,

When published, will give a full and comprehensive picture of the social and religious reform movements for the whole of India. The volume will be a positive contribution to the study of the subject and first of its kind in Indian historical studies.

The second theme for the Conference is : *Sources of the history of Meghalaya*. The theme has been broadly divided into two periods : (i) Pre-British Period, and (ii) British and Post-British Period. Again in each period the theme has been divided into : (i) Sources of the History of the Khasis and the Jaintias, and (ii) Sources of the History of the Garos. For this theme we have invited papers from Historians, Economists, Political Scientists and Anthropologists. In view of the paucity of written historical source material, an inter-disciplinary approach is the most appropriate for a comprehensive study of the subject. For this theme again a standard pattern has been laid down :

- (i) Nature of source material in general.
- (ii) Classification of source material.
- (iii) A critical review of the extent and dependability of different categories of source material.
- (iv) Any problem or difficulty in using the source material.

Very little has indeed been written on the History of Meghalaya. It is expected that the papers on this theme will give an incentive to further studies on the History of Meghalaya and will particularly encourage the local scholars to reconstruct the history of their own region.

In addition to these two themes there will also be a Symposium on the *History and Problems of the North-Eastern Frontier Region of India*. The theme is interpreted in the broadest sense and will cover all the States and regions of North-Eastern India. This area has been sadly neglected by historians and it

is hoped that the papers presented at the Symposium will fill up the void in the present state of our knowledge about this vital region of the Indian Union. Here again we have attempted an inter-disciplinary approach and have invited papers from Historians, Economists, Political Scientists and Anthropologists. When the volume is published it is expected to be a definite contribution to the study of a sadly neglected region.

We expect to have about 28 papers on the *Social and Religious Reform Movements in the 19th and 20th centuries*, 12 papers on the *Sources of the History of Meghalaya* and 8 papers on the *History and Problems of the North-Eastern Frontier Region of India*.

The Conference is expected to be attended by about 150 members and delegates, representing all the States and most of the Universities and learned institutions in the country. We deliberately keep the number of participants small so as to ensure more active and fruitful discussion. Our practice is thus different from many of the other all-India Conferences where the number attending is much too large, with the result that the Conferences are reduced more to social gatherings than serious academic meetings. It is gratifying to note that at our Annual Conferences most of the participants take an active interest in the discussions. The attendance at all the sessions is always satisfactory, showing the seriousness of purpose with which those attending the Conference come.

The first three days of the Conference will be taken up for academic work and will be divided into six sessions. The fourth day will be set apart for excursions to places of historical importance in and around Shillong.

Arrangements for accommodation and meals at Shillong will be made by the Local Reception Committee. Dr. D. S. Chandran Devanesen, Vice-Chancellor of the North-Eastern Hill University, and Prof. Radhon S.

Lyngdoh, Speaker, Meghalaya Legislative Assembly, are Co-Chairmen of the Reception Committee. The Convener of the Committee is Dr. Hamlet Bareh, Reader in the Department of Continuing Education, North-Eastern Hill University. All enquiries regarding accommodation and other local arrangements are to be addressed to Dr. Hamlet Bareh. All enquiries regarding papers to be read at the Conference are to be addressed to the Registrar, Institute of Historical Studies.

The first circular about the Conference had been issued from the Institute's Office in July. Those who wish to attend the Conference but have not yet sent any intimation to the Institute's Office are requested to do so immediately. As arrangements for accommodation and meals have to be made long in advance, it would be inconvenient for the Local Reception Committee to make any arrangements unless an intimation is sent from the Institute's Office in proper time. So those who have not yet filled in the Blue Intimation Card should do so immediately. It may be added here that October is a busy tourist season at Shillong and it will be impossible for the Local Reception Committee to make any accommodation arrangement if intimation is received at the last moment.

The second circular about the Conference giving all the details will be issued early in September. The Local Reception Committee will also issue a circular early in September.

The Railway authorities grant fare concession to members of the Institute attending the Conference whose monthly income does not exceed Rs. 1,800. Membership Certificate will be issued from the Institute's Office from the first week of September on payment of membership fee for 1974-75. Railway concession will be available on production of the Membership Certificate.


Shillong is a very beautiful hill station, Capital of the State of Meghalaya. It has a

most pleasant climate in October. Gauhati in Assam has direct train connections with Calcutta and Delhi. From Gauhati it is only a three hours' journey by bus or taxi to Shillong. It is hoped that those attending the Conference in October will enjoy their stay at Shillong.

Dictionary of National Biography :

We are happy to announce that the printing work on Vol. IV of the Dictionary of National Biography is progressing very well. At this rate of progress we may expect the volume to be out in the early part of September. The publication of the 4th volume will naturally give us immense satisfaction as the culmination of ten years' hard and sustained labour. The Project was first undertaken in 1964, and at the time we did not really know the magnitude of its size. Anyway, we went on with our work with determination, and by 1971 we had completed collection of biographical material by the Research Fellows and writing of biographical sketches by the Contributors. Vol. I was sent to press in 1971 and was released in August 1972 on the occasion of the twenty-fifth year of Indian independence. Vol. II came out in July 1973 and Vol. III in May 1974. With the publication of Vol. IV in September 1974, the gigantic project, first of its kind in India, will be successfully completed. It is a matter of legitimate pride for all those connected with the Project.

Vol. IV of the DNB will contain nearly 300 biographical entries. Among the most noteworthy names included in the volume are : Swami Sahajanand Saraswati, Surendra Sai, Saif-ud-din Kitchlew, Sampurnananda, Pandurang Sadashiv Sane, R. Sonaram Sangma, K. Santhanam, Sachindranath Sanyal, Bhawani Dayal Sanyasi, Madhav Rao Sapre, Tej Bahadur Sapru, Swami Pragnanananda Saraswati, Harbilas Sharda, Sardul Singh Cavesheer, Jadunath Sarkar, Mahendralal Sircar, Peary Charan Sarkar, Swami Satyadev Paribrajak, S. Satyamurthy, Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, Rahimtoolah Sayani, Atul Prasad Sen, Keshab



Chandra Sen, Nabin Chandra Sen, Narendranath Sen, Rajanikanta Sen, Satindranath Sen, Surya Sen, Fakir Mohan Senapati, Chimanlal H. Setalvad, Amritlal Seth, Govinddas Seth, Balkrishna Sharma (Navin), Maharaj Lokram Nayanaram Sharma, Lal Bahadur Shastri, V. S. Sreenivasa Shastri, Shaukat Ali, T. A. K. Sherwani, Babu Shiva Prasad, Swami Shradhanand, Ravi Shankar Shukla, Shyamaji Krishna Verma, Sikandar Hayat Khan, Mahatma Budh Singh, Kunwar Singh, Rampal Singh (Raja of Kalakankar), U. Tirot Singh, Sachchidananda Sinha, Lord Satyendra Prasanna Sinha, Soomro Allah Bux, U. Soso Tham, H. S. Suhrawardy, Jugannath Sunkersett, Shri Narayana Guru Swamikal, Syed Mahmood, Syed Hasan Imam, Abanindranath Tagore, Devendranath Tagore, Dwarkanath Tagore, Prasanna Kumar Tagore, Rabindranath Tagore, Satyendranath Tagore, Purushottam Das Tandon, Master Tara Singh, Tanya Tope, K. T. Telang, Thakkar Bapa, Purushottamdas Thakurdas, Sardar Sewa Singh Thikriwala, Lokamanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Suryakant Tripathi (Nirala), Badruddin Tyabji, Sardar Udham Singh Shaheed, Brahmabandhav Upadhyaya, Sadhu T. L. Vaswani, Manakya Lal Varma, Iswar Chandra Vidyasagar, C. Vijayaraghavachariar, M. Visvesvaraya, Swami Vivekananda, Dinshaw Edulji Wacha, Walchand Hirachand, William Wedderburn, Indulal Yagnik, Mohammad Zafrullah Khan and Dr. Zakir Husain. This impressive list will clearly show the importance of the volume.

The rising costs of paper, printing and binding are naturally creating a grave worry for us. When we fixed the price of the DNB set

at Rs. 400, it was on the basis of the costs prevailing in 1971. During the last three years, the costs have gone up immensely, forcing us to think seriously about revising the price of the DNB set. We hope the public will kindly appreciate the reasons which are forcing us to revise the price.

In a pioneer project of the magnitude of the Dictionary of National Biography, covering the whole of undivided India and nearly 150 years, a few minor mistakes of facts or dates are bound to occur. We have been, no doubt, very very careful about accuracy and authenticity, but with all our best efforts it is not possible to ensure perfection in the first edition of the DNB. We do admit our limitations and welcome corrections or other suggestions from the readers of the DNB. In fact, we have already received letters from some readers pointing out some inaccuracies or inadequacies in some of the biographical entries. We hope to receive more such letters when all the four volumes are published and readers in different parts of India get sufficient time to go through the entries they are interested in. We have started a file under the caption "Corrections and Suggestions" and are going to preserve all the letters in that file. They will be very useful in making necessary corrections or changes in the biographical entries when we prepare the second edition of the volumes. We do appreciate constructive comments and suggestions from our readers and would request them not to feel hesitant in informing us whenever any inaccuracy comes to their notice or whenever they feel that an entry is not adequately informative.

JINNAH, MOHAMMED ALI (QUAID-I-AZAM) (1875-1948)

DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, VOL. II (E-L)

The most enigmatic, stubborn and prosaic among the leaders who shaped the destiny of Modern India, Mohammed Ali Jinnah was born at Karachi in 1875 or 1876. According to his school register at Karachi, he was born on 20 October 1875. But Jinnah always said that he was born on 25 December 1876 (Sunday). He came of a lower middle-class family, his father Jinnah Poonja being a small hide merchant. There is no truth in Sarojini Naidu's statement about Mohammed Ali Jinnah being 'the eldest son of a rich merchant reared in careless affluence'. The family originally came from Kathiawad (now in Gujarat), and had been converted from Hinduism to Islam some generations earlier. The Jinnahs belonged to the Khoja (followers of the Aga Khan) sect among the Muslims. Jinnah had two brothers, Ahmed Ali and Bande Ali, who remained quite obscure even when Jinnah was at the height of his reputation and influence, and three sisters, Fatima, Maryam and Shireen. Of them Fatima was his life-long companion, although she never had any active public life before her brother's death.

Jinnah was married twice. His first wife was Amal-bai, a Khoja girl from Kathiawad, whom he married in 1890 or 1891. She died shortly after when Jinnah was in England for higher studies. In April 1918 Jinnah married Ruttie Petit, an eighteen year old vivacious Parsee girl, the only daughter of the Parsee Baronet Sir Dinshaw Petit. The marriage, however, proved unhappy due to lack of understanding between the two. Within a few years they separated, and Ruttie died in the

prime of her youth. This unhappy marriage left a permanent mark on Jinnah's personality. An introvert and never caring for genuine bonds of friendship, he became even more self-centred from the twenties. He also scrupulously avoided the company of women since this time.

Jinnah was sent to a primary school at Karachi at the age of six. In 1885-86 he was at the Gokuldas Tejpal Primary School in Bombay. Returning to Karachi he studied for a few years at the Sind Madrasa High School and then at the Christian Missionary Society High School. In 1892 he was sent to England to qualify himself for the Bar, at the persuasion of an English exchange broker, Frederick Leighcroft. He was called to the Bar from the Lincoln's Inn in 1896. The four years in England he turned to good use by extensive studies in the British Museum, closely watching the British parliamentary system and taking an intelligent interest in public affairs.

Within a decade of his return to India Jinnah started taking an active interest in politics which, apart from Law, remained his dominating passion for the rest of his life. Jinnah's public career may be divided into four distinct periods: from 1906 to 1920, when he was a fighting nationalist, a great Congress leader and a believer in secularism and national unity; from 1920 to 1928, when he withdrew himself from the Congress but yet remained a believer in his earlier ideals; from 1928 to 1937, when he gradually changed his political complexion and came to identify himself more and more with the Muslim

League and its separatist ideas; and finally from 1937 to 1947, when he re-organised the Muslim League as a strong political force, raised the demand for a division of India and ended up in creating an independent Pakistan. The inner motives and forces behind these successive changes cannot be adequately explained by all the material on Jinnah available till now. Naturally different writers have offered different explanations. Perhaps the confusion will remain until Jinnah's private papers, carefully preserved by his sister Fatima, are available to historians. As it is, even the most sincere efforts cannot reveal the complete picture of the man, his mind and his career.

The earliest influence on Jinnah's mind was that of Dadabhai Naoroji. While a student in London, Jinnah sometimes attended political discussions at Dadabhai Naoroji's house, which gave him his first inspiration in nationalism. Later his active political career also started as the Private Secretary to Dadabhai Naoroji during the Congress Session in Calcutta in 1906. He was also deeply impressed by Surendranath Banerjea. As he himself wrote: "I learnt my first lessons in politics at the feet of Surendranath Banerjea." Another person who influenced him in his early public life was G. K. Gokhale whom he admired so much that he expressed his desire to be a 'Muslim Gokhale'. He and Gokhale went together to London in 1913, which brought the two even closer to each other. Jinnah was also attached to Sir Pherozeshah Mehta who recognised the young man's talents and entrusted him with the 'Caucus Case', an issue connected with Pherozeshah Mehta's election to the Bombay Municipal Corporation. Thus the young Jinnah was brought up in an atmosphere of secular nationalism. It was only in his later phase, from the thirties, that he came under other influences. Among these the most important were the writings of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and the appeals of the poet Iqbal which gave a new turn to his political life.

It was at the Calcutta Session of the Con-

gress in 1906 that Jinnah made his debut. He showed his total opposition to communal politics when shortly after, as a member of the Bombay Presidency Association, he signed its memorandum to Lord Minto against the proposal for separate communal electorates. In 1910 he was elected to the Imperial Legislative Council from the Muslim constituency of Bombay. It marked the beginning of his long and brilliant career in the legislature. It was also the first of the several contradictory features in Jinnah's public career—an opponent to separate electorate seeking election from a Muslim constituency. Except in 1913 when he was nominated, he was elected to the Central Legislature in 1915, 1923, 1926 and 1934. As a Parliamentarian he had few equals. His sharp intellect, legal knowledge, direct approach, logical argument and dauntless courage marked him out as one of the leading figures in the House.

Outside the legislature Jinnah was busy with his legal practice in Bombay and nationalist activities. His talents were early recognised by the leaders of the Muslim League. They invited him to attend the League Session in 1912, which he did without becoming a member. He also helped the League to draft a new Constitution which was later accepted in March 1913. It is significant to notice that the new League Constitution virtually embodied the Congress ideal of self-government by constitutional means and specifically mentioned the promotion of national unity and co-operation with other communities. It was all the handiwork of nationalist Jinnah.

In 1913 Jinnah went to London on a holiday along with G. K. Gokhale. He founded the London Indian Association as a meeting place for young Indian students. He also pressed the India Office in London to remove the grievances of Indian students in matters of admission to educational institutions and accommodation. It was on the eve of his departure for India in the autumn of 1913

that, at the pressing desire of his friends Mahomed Ali and Syed Wazir Hasan, Jinnah agreed to become a member of the Muslim League. But he made it categorically clear that his loyalty to the Muslim League would under no circumstances imply even a shadow of disloyalty to the larger national interest.

In May 1914 Jinnah went to London again as a member of the All-India Congress Deputation to discuss the reform of the legislature. His clear and lucid exposition of the Indian case which appeared in the *Times* attracted much attention. In 1915 Jinnah made constructive efforts to bring about greater unity between the Congress and the League. He persuaded the League to hold a Session in Bombay in December 1915 simultaneously with the Congress Session. It produced the desired cordiality between the two organisations, which was cemented later in the Lucknow Pact of 1916. In October 1916 Jinnah presided over the Bombay Provincial Conference at Ahmedabad, and in December of the same year he presided over the Muslim League Session at Lucknow. His principal achievement as the bridge between the Congress and the League was the Lucknow Pact of 1916.

During this period Jinnah was also associated with the Home Rule League. In 1917 he became the President of the Bombay branch of the Home Rule League. On 30 July 1917 he presided over a meeting of the Bombay Presidency Association to protest against the internment of Mrs. Annie Besant. In 1918 Jinnah showed himself for the first time as a leader of direct mass action when he led the anti-Willingdon demonstration in Bombay. To commemorate this heroic action the public of Bombay built a hall and named it after Jinnah. In the same year he was one of the nineteen Congress and League members who formulated a joint scheme of constitutional reforms. In 1919 he described the Rowlatt Act as the 'Black Act.' In his letter of protest to the Viceroy he wrote that the Rowlatt Act "clearly demonstrated" that the Imperial Legislative

Council was "a legislature but in name, a machine propelled by a foreign executive". With his protest note he also resigned from the Legislative Council. Till this point Jinnah was a firebrand nationalist as before.

The year 1920 marked a change in Jinnah's political career. He wholly disapproved of the non-cooperation movement and resigned from both the Congress and the Home Rule League. It is indeed difficult to explain the reason for this sudden turn, from what is known to us till now. He was a nationalist and remained a nationalist even after this break. He was no doubt not in sympathy with the new Congress technique of non-cooperation. But the leader of the anti-Willingdon mass demonstration of 1918 could not have been that wholly opposed to any mass agitation. At least he could have allied himself with the Swarajists who also did not approve of the Gandhian technique or he could have joined the Liberals as some of the old Congress leaders did. Can his total breach with the Congress be explained by a feeling of rivalry with Gandhi, a comparatively newcomer in Indian Politics and with whose views and ways of life the Westernised Jinnah could never agree? It is not improbable, for from this time onwards in all his dealings with Gandhi, Jinnah consistently expressed a strong feeling of opposition even when the vital interests of the Muslims were not involved. His unhappy marriage also may partly explain the sudden change in him. But more important possibly was the political disappointment of being side-tracked by the new leadership in the Congress. Jinnah, if anything, was a proud man, conscious of his talents, confident of his abilities and ambitious to play the role of a leader. As future events showed, it was a mistake on the part of Gandhi and the Congress leadership to treat such a man with indifference.

Even after this Jinnah remained a nationalist for a decade, although not a Congressman. He showed his old fire as a Member of the

Central Legislature to which he was elected in 1923. In 1925 he went to London in connection with the Army Indianisation issue. He sought to get over his personal tragedy by a greater concentration on his legal practice. Then slowly his mind swung to a different direction. In his speech at the League Session in 1926 he admitted that communalism did exist in the country. "By mere sentiment and time it cannot be removed." In 1927 he formulated his famous fourteen points putting forward in concrete terms his demands for the Muslims. The League under Jinnah's guidance boycotted the Simon Commission in 1928. But in spite of Jinnah's desire for a rapprochement with the Congress on the question of constitutional reforms, he was again disappointed at the All-Parties Conference held in Calcutta in 1928. It was a bitter pill for Jinnah when his leadership of the Muslims was questioned and this hit him to the quick.

Jinnah was, however, not yet prepared to give up his old ideals altogether and tie himself up wholly with the Muslim League. For the next few years he stayed in London and started practising in the Privy Council. At the Round Table Conference in London (1930-32) he tried genuinely to bring about a solution of the communal problem. But the idealistic attitude of the Congress leadership which simply would not admit the existence of any such problem and the 'ultras' among the Muslims who believed only in hard bargaining defeated Jinnah's efforts. It was not till 1934-35 that Jinnah succumbed to the temptation of an undisputed leadership of the Muslim League, as a counter-poise not so much to a 'Hindu' Congress as to 'Gandhi's' Congress. It was the fervent appeals of Iqbal which worked, followed by the visit of Liaquat Ali who impressed upon him the immediate need of re-organising and rejuvenating the Muslim League before the constitutional reforms were implemented.

Jinnah now seized the opportunity of playing the role of a leader. The Muslim League

was no doubt in a ramshackle condition at the time. The organisation was weak, its political programme nebulous, and its leadership divided, half-hearted and removed from the masses. Jinnah, fully conscious of his abilities, knew that he could put fresh life into the organisation and make it a strong political force as a counterpoise to the other great political organisation, the Indian National Congress. And he did his work well. Anyone who compares the condition of the Muslim League in the early thirties with that ten years later cannot but admire the singular organising ability of Jinnah. The Muslim League as a strong political force in India was entirely the creation of Jinnah.

Jinnah returned to India in 1934 and immediately plunged himself into the work of reorganising the League and turning it into a really Muslim mass organisation. He made extensive tours for the next few years all over the country, delivered innumerable speeches, tried to patch up differences among various groups in the Muslim community and carried the message of the Muslims' rights even to far-off rural areas. But as yet he did not show any fanaticism. On the other hand, he initiated an attempt to construct a bridge between the Congress and the League. Early in 1935 he carried on negotiations with the Congress President, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, which however came to nothing.

Then came the Government of India Act of 1935 and both the Congress and the League were poised for a contest in the general elections of 1937. As the President of the Central Election Board, Jinnah looked into all the election preparations of the League with meticulous care, seeking to gain mass support and issuing an election manifesto which could draw the Muslim masses to the party. In the elections while the Congress was jubilant over its thumping success in most of the Provinces, the League had even better reason to feel jubilant over its success in the Muslim constituencies considering the fact that only two years

earlier it was in a very sorry plight and hardly carried any political weight.

When the question of ministry-making came in 1937, Jinnah suggested Coalition Governments with the Congress in the Provinces. The Congress, most unwisely as later events were to show, spurned the suggestion in the first flush of electoral victory. The idealistic Nehru refused to see the clear signs of the time and to admit the potentiality of Jinnah. His reliance on the 'nationalist' Muslims to bring in Muslim support to the Congress was proved unrealistic by later events. Even Abul Kalam Azad felt unhappy at the attitude of Nehru and considered it as the beginning of the phenomenal rise of the Muslim League as a strong political force. Another blunder that the Congress leadership committed was to refuse the offer of Fazlul Haq, leader of the Krishak Praja Party in Bengal, to form a Coalition Government with the Congress. The blunder of the Congress was Jinnah's opportunity, and he at once agreed to a League-coalition with Fazlul Haq's party. In the Punjab also the Unionist Party leant on the support of the Muslim League. It was from this time that the Muslim League's influence started to increase in the two vulnerable areas in the east and the north-west which later created an irresistible demand for a separate state.

After 1937 there was a clear change in the tone of the Muslim League. It started with a protest against the supposed repression of the Muslims by the Congress Governments and a demand for adequate safeguards for minority rights and culminated in the Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League in 1940 where the demand for a separate and independent Pakistan was for the first time officially raised. It is sad to reflect that the Congress leadership after 1937 remained so indifferent to the storm that was brewing. They had their eyes fixed in one direction, namely, British Imperialism, and refused to give any importance to the plans and activities of the

Muslim League. The Lahore Resolution marked a definite parting of the ways, and Jinnah would not negotiate on any other basis than Pakistan. Even then everything was not lost and the Congress might have saved the substance of national political unity by admitting the right of self-determination of the Provinces as embodied in the Rajaji Formula of 1944. But few Congress leaders had the political sagacity of Rajagopalachari and the move came to nothing. During the Jinnah-Gandhi correspondence in September 1944, both sides entered into a hairsplitting argument over the 'two-nation' theory but failed to take a broader view. That was the last of the negotiations between the Congress and the League.

Events moved fast between 1945 and 1947. At the Simla Conference of June 1945, Wavell offered the political parties a share in the Central Government pending constitutional reforms after the end of the war. The two parties agreed to accept the offer but the negotiations foundered on the rock of the Congress refusal to accept the Muslim League as the only organisation of the Muslims. No doubt it was embarrassing for the Congress to ignore its own Muslim members (even its President at the time was a Muslim), but one may pertinently ask whether this was too heavy a price to pay for averting the division of India.

In the general elections of 1946 both parties mobilised their strength. The Congress won an overwhelming majority of non-Muslim seats and the Muslim League had equal success in the Muslim constituencies. The stage was now set for a showdown and no side-tracking of the main issue of 'division or unity' was possible. Yet, the Cabinet Mission tried it in August 1946 and almost succeeded. Both the Congress and the League accepted the plan, but when the Congress began to put its own interpretation on the 'grouping' clause, the League promptly withdrew its acceptance of the plan. Then instead of coming to a compromise with the League, the Congress accepted office in the

Provisional Government at the Centre, perhaps hoping that the British Government in their anxiety to find a settlement of the Indian question would throw the Muslim League overboard and transfer power to the Congress alone. Nehru little knew the mind of the British Government and the tenacity and fighting power of Jinnah. Jinnah's reply was the declaration of 'Direct Action' on 16 August 1946, which threw the whole country into an orgy of communal riots on an unprecedented scale. Jinnah had shown what he could do. The British Government went back on its earlier decision and came out with a new plan in June 1947 to partition the country. Jinnah had also panicked Nehru and the other leaders of the Congress (except Mahatma Gandhi who opposed it till he found that he was alone in the organisation) into a prompt acceptance of the partition plan. History will record that an idealist Nehru was hardly a match, in practical politics, for a stubborn and fighting Jinnah.

On 15 August 1947 India was divided and the new state of Pakistan was born, with Jinnah as its first Governor-General. But after his victory Jinnah virtually disowned the 'two-nation' theory by declaring that Pakistan would be a secular State and not a Muslim State. It is clear that he never genuinely believed in the 'two-nation' theory but adopted it only as a fighting technique to achieve his political objective. He had, however, little time to organise the new State or even to indicate the lines of its future development. He died on 11 September 1948, and political power fell into lesser hands who had neither the intelligence nor the tenacity of Jinnah. His untimely death spared him from the blame that would have fallen on him for all the later developments which made his Pakistan experiment a dismal failure.

Jinnah, as a person, was an introvert and a man of few words. He never relaxed in public or showed his emotions. He was business-like in his dealings and cared little for the

feelings of other people. He was rich and loved to live in style. In his dress, manners and ideas he was more English than even the English themselves. It was only in his later career that he occasionally donned Muslim dress, and that only as a means of mass contact. The heroic champion of the Muslims had, in fact, little personal interest in his religion or for the matter of that in any religion. In his social outlook he was progressive and strongly influenced by Western ideas. He gave English education to his sister, Fatima, and brought her out of the 'Purdah', much to the annoyance of the orthodox Muslims. He, however, never took any active interest in propagating social reforms among the Muslims. He had no communal bigotry and married a Parsee girl. But curiously, when his only daughter, Dina, married a Parsee turned Christian, he immediately disowned her.

Jinnah was a man who could be admired but not loved. One wonders whether he knew this difference between him and Gandhi.

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PANDIT JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

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EDITORIAL ADDENDUM

It is not possible to give within a short compass an adequate account of all aspects of the career and life of a personality like that of Jawaharlal Nehru. The Contributor of the biographical sketch has, no doubt, done his best to focus attention on the salient aspects. But in view of the special importance attributed to Jawaharlal Nehru in the public life of pre-independent and independent India, we feel it necessary to add a few more paragraphs on some aspects of his life and career which have not been adequately dealt with by the Contributor. The views expressed in these paragraphs are those of the Editor and not of the Contributor.

In recent times Nehru has been eulogised and raised to a unique position among India's freedom-fighters, next to, if not equal with, that of Mahatma Gandhi, not to speak of the earlier pioneers. The present adulation may be due to a variety of reasons. But in a work like the Dictionary of National Biography, these considerations have no place, and it is necessary to view the life and career of Nehru in the proper perspective, as it would be viewed by later generations. It is not our object to belittle the greatness of Nehru in certain respects, but at the same time in a scholarly and impartial work like the Dictionary of National Biography one should attempt to assess the personality and career of Nehru in their proper proportions and not magnified unduly by sentimental effusions or present-day political conditions. It is with that object in view that the following few paragraphs have

been added to the biographical sketch.

Nehru's career may be divided into two parts—pre-independence and post-independence periods. In the pre-independence period he started his public life with all the advantages that one could imagine—a rich father, a care-free economic prospect, an English Public School and Cambridge education, a zest for life and a special appeal to the youth as a radical intellectual. For about a decade, however, since his return to India, he made very little impression in public life. He first took an active part in the non-cooperation movement and that also as an ordinary soldier and not as a leader. He did not come into the limelight for leadership in any campaign like Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel with the halo of success of the Bardoli Campaign. In the Congress he was a backbencher for many years, being more known to others as the son of Pandit Motilal Nehru. No doubt, he slowly veered to the group of young radicals, critical of the hesitancy of the senior leadership of the Congress. Like Subhas Chandra Bose, he was one of the young radicals who clamoured for complete independence in 1928 and would not settle for anything less.

In the mid-thirties Nehru's socialistic zeal led him to be one of the founders of the left wing of the Congress, known as the Congress Socialist Party. The rise of the left wing was not viewed with favour by either Gandhiji or the other senior leaders of the organisation. Nehru, however, with all his socialist zeal,

never had the courage to go against the wishes of the Mahatma. Unlike the other radical young men, Jai Prakash Narain, Ram Manohar Lohia and others who stuck to the socialist principles even at the risk of the displeasure of Gandhiji and the Gandhian wing, Nehru was always careful to avoid any open clash. He was essentially 'Bapuji's obedient boy' first and a socialist and radical later. Even during the hectic days of 1938-39 when there was an open split in the Congress, following Subhas Chandra Bose's difference with Gandhiji and Gandhian methods, between the radicals and the old guards, Nehru fully supported Gandhiji and the Gandhian wing. This was not because he was genuinely convinced of the soundness of Gandhian principles, as he himself on many occasions made sarcastic comments on Gandhian ways of thinking as medieval, etc., but because of a blind personal attachment to Gandhiji even at the risk of a sacrifice of his radical and socialist leanings. Thus it was that he was more with the Gandhian wing of the Congress than with the Congress Socialist group after his initial days with that left-wing group.

In the next phase of his career after the Government of India Act of 1935, it was mainly Nehru's indiscretion and lack of political foresight which shaped the future course of events and led ultimately to the partition of India. In 1937, when the Congress was flushed with victory in the majority of Provinces, it was mainly because of Nehru that a chance of communal harmony was spoiled by his idealistic and doctrinaire intransigence. The Muslim League had proposed a Coalition Government with the Congress in the Provinces under the Provincial Autonomy scheme, but it was Nehru as President of the Congress who thoughtlessly spurned that offer and demanded the virtual liquidation of the Muslim League. As Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, one of Nehru's closest Muslim associates, remarked in his memoirs that it was a grave political blunder which eventually strengthened the Muslim League and encouraged it to demand a parti-

tion of the country. The political destiny of India would have been shaped in an entirely different way if Nehru had shown more political maturity and accommodating spirit, hoping for a real rapprochement between the two major communities in India. But Nehru could not rise up to the occasion. It was again because of Nehru's opposition that the proposal for a Coalition Government in Bengal between the Congress Party and Fazlul Haque's Krishak Praja Party was turned down unceremoniously. The blunder of the Congress was fully exploited by the Muslim League, which immediately formed a Coalition Government with the Krishak Praja Party. It is significant to note that in order to exclude any Muslim political influence in the U.P., Nehru deliberately threw away the two Muslim majority Provinces—Bengal and the Punjab—into the arms of the Muslim League. It was from this time onwards that the communal forces in Bengal and the Punjab became more and more strengthened, ultimately leading to the demand for Pakistan in 1940. History can hardly spare the man who played with a nation's destiny in such a thoughtless and indiscreet manner.

Nehru had never any softness for Subhas Chandra Bose either before or during or after the Second World War. Before the British victory and particularly before the coming to power of the Labour Party in England, he hardly ever appreciated the venture of Subhas Chandra Bose or the exploits and sacrifices of the INA. Yet, when all was over and the INA trial started in the Red Fort of Delhi, he took the leadership on behalf of the Congress (and indeed of the whole country) in organising the legal defence of the INA accused. He donned the Barrister's gown after nearly three decades, but that was more a political gesture. Nehru, after all, was not even a second-rank lawyer and the main brunt of the defence fell on Bhulabhai Desai whom the Congress had maligned because of the Desai-Liaquat Pact. The INA Trial was used by the Congress as a booster to its morale in the

ensuing General Elections in 1946, and Nehru very tactfully adopted Netaji's slogan 'Jai Hind' from this time onwards.

During the Constitutional negotiations which preceded the transfer of power in 1947, Nehru had a prominent hand. But on this occasion again, it was Nehru's indiscretion which ruined all chances of a settlement between the Congress and the Muslim League and the preservation of India's political unity under the Cabinet Mission Plan. When the Cabinet Mission Plan of preserving India's political unity and at the same time granting some concession to the Muslim League demand for Pakistan in the shape of grouping of Provinces had been accepted, either willingly or grudgingly, by both the political parties, Nehru as the newly elected President of the Congress made a most injudicious speech, holding out a threat that once the Constituent Assembly was convened, the Congress would be free to choose any particular part of the Cabinet Mission Plan and reject any other part. Even Azad was aghast at this sort of pronouncement.

The effect of this injudicious pronouncement may best be described in the words of Leonard Mosley: "And on 10 July (1946), after he (Nehru) had been elected President, he called the press together for a Conference to discuss his policy as the new head of the Congress. It was a moment in history when circumspection should have been the order of the day. There was much to be gained by silence. The fortunes of India were in the balance and one false move could upset them. Nehru chose this moment to launch into what his biographer, Michael Brecher, has described as 'one of the most fiery and provocative statements in his forty years of public life' Did Nehru realise what he was saying? He was telling the world that once in power, the Congress would use its strength at the centre to alter the Cabinet Mission Plan as it thought fit. But the Muslim League (as had the Congress) had accepted the Plan as a cut and

dried scheme to meet the objections from both sides. It was a compromise plan which obviously could not afterwards be altered in favour of one side or another. In the circumstances, Nehru's remarks were a direct act of sabotage. Whether he meant them to be so, in the mistaken belief that Jinnah and the Muslim League were not really a force to be reckoned with, or whether they were the ham-handed remarks of a politician who did not know when to keep his mouth shut will never be known."

Even Abul Kalam Azad commented on Nehru's Press Conference as "one of those unfortunate events which change the course of history." The immediate effect was the refusal of Jinnah to accept the Cabinet Mission Plan, as he feared that he could never trust the Congress to give a fair deal to the Muslims once the transfer of power was effected. There are moments when it is best to keep one's mouth shut, but Nehru obviously did not subscribe to that view.

In the final phase of the Constitutional negotiations after the arrival of Lord Mountbatten, Nehru all on a sudden turned a complete volte-face for which no rational explanation can be found. He had all along been opposed to the Muslim League and its Pakistan demand. From 1937 onwards it cannot be said that Nehru did all that was possible to accept the reality of the situation and to try to conciliate Jinnah and his Muslim League. He hardly considered this aspect of political strategy to be deserving of any serious attention. He always laboured under the delusion that in the constitutional struggle there were only two parties, the British Government and the Congress. He maintained that view even after the general elections of 1946 in which the Muslim League captured practically all the Muslim seats in the Legislature. He was encouraged in this feeling when he was called upon by the Governor-General, Lord Wavell, to form the Interim Government and to go ahead with

preparations for a Constituent Assembly in spite of the fact that the Muslim League refused to join either. Nehru, possibly, felt convinced that the British were so eager to quit India immediately that they would not hesitate to throw the Muslim League overboard and hand over power to the Congress alone. He hardly knew Jinnah and his political potentiality.

The Congress accepted office in the Interim Government, and Jinnah in reply gave the call for Direct Action on 16 August 1946. We need not go into the details of the events that followed. Suffice it to note that when the orgy of mob violence spread in different parts of the country and particularly in the Punjab, Nehru, the head of the Interim Government, was completely unnerved, and far from facing the situation boldly, he was panicked into an immediate acceptance of the Pakistan demand. From the evidence available till now, it is difficult to say with certainty why this change came over Nehru so suddenly and so mysteriously. Different sources have given different explanations, but perhaps the truth is yet to be revealed. One thing is certain, that he was completely unnerved by the orgy of communal violence in the Punjab and came to an immediate decision to accept a division of the country to avoid further bloodshed and brutality. He hardly knew that the division was to be followed by much more violence and brutality than before. There was possibly some other reason also, namely, the unwillingness of Nehru to go into political wilderness again. He was anxious to get independence immediately and refused to wait heading the Government of a free, though truncated, India again. To quote Leonard Mosley again: "But perhaps Pandit Nehru came nearer the truth in a conversation with the author in 1960 when he said, 'the truth is that we were tired men, and we were getting on in years too. Few of us could stand the prospect of going to prison again—and if we had stood out for a United India as we wished it, prison obviously awaited us. We saw the fires burn-

ing in the Punjab and heard every day of the killings. The plan for partition offered a way out and we took it.'"

It is difficult to say how far this was the correct version of the motives of Nehru in accepting partition. It is sad to reflect, however, that the earlier champion of the Nationalist Muslims had no scruple now to throw to the wolves the Nationalist Muslims in the NWFP and Sind, not to speak of the minorities in Pakistan, who had done so much to contribute to India's freedom struggle and whose sufferings and sacrifices for more than half a century had enabled Pandit Nehru to become the first Prime Minister of a Free India. Sardar Patel and Pandit Nehru were the earliest two converts to the Pakistan proposal in the Congress leadership. Both in the Working Committee meeting and in the AICC meeting there were loud protests against the acceptance of partition, but such was the lure of the Mountbatten plan of immediate independence among the higher ranks in the Congress that all protests against acceptance of partition were of no avail. History offers few parallels to such a complete volte-face in political strategy.

In the post-independence period Nehru's record can hardly be regarded as successful or remarkable. His choice as the first head of the Government of Free India was 'Bapuji's' gift to his 'obedient boy' rather than to any tangible contributions made by Nehru in the freedom struggle or his unquestioned pre-eminence among others who belonged to his rank of the Congress leadership. Rajagopalachari, Rajendra Prasad, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel or Abul Kalam Azad had at least equal claim to head the Government of a Free India. Nehru's choice as the first Prime Minister, however, did not surprise the public in general, who knew that he was Gandhi's special favourite, and all high positions in the Congress or in the Government were taken for granted to be for 'Bapuji' to bestow. Nehru, unfortunately, had no parliamentary, administrative or even local

experience. Hence it was that as Prime Minister his relations were not happy and cordial either with the first President, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, or with the Deputy Prime Minister, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. In fact, not only Ambedkar but almost everybody who resigned from his Cabinet later resented his dictatorial methods and his way of dealing with his Cabinet colleagues. Nehru never subscribed to the view that the Prime Minister was only a *primus-inter-pares* in the Cabinet.

Nor did Nehru show much ability as an administrator or a Parliamentarian. Most of his Parliamentary speeches (he spoke extempore even on very important issues) were dull, stale and verbose. As a Parliamentarian, he cannot be compared to Gladstone or Disraeli, nor even to Bhulabhai Desai or Shyamaprasad Mookerjee. As an administrator he relied more on his personal friends than those who were really responsible for running the machinery of the Government. The best concrete illustration was his handling of the situation when the three Service Chiefs resigned at the same time in protest against the policy of V. K. Krishna Menon, the Defence Minister and Nehru's closest personal friend. Nehru went all out in defence of his personal friend and publicly snubbed the three Service Chiefs, and this was the friend who was mainly responsible for India's debacle in the war with China in 1962.

Nehru was one of those who believed in speeches and not in action. Whenever there was a crisis to be faced and a firm decision had to be taken, he faltered and vacillated. Again the best concrete illustration was his handling of the Kashmir Question and his reference of the dispute to the UN. He committed another grave blunder in making a gratuitous offer of holding a plebiscite in Kashmir, for which there was no provision either in the Cabinet Mission Plan or in the Indian Independence Act of 1947. His later falling back from that position was easily exploited by the Pakistan Government in

influencing world opinion. Nehru's vacillation is again evident from the very widely known story that when Sardar Patel had secured his consent to the Hyderabad action, Patel left Delhi, instructing his Ministry officials that he could not be contacted for twenty-four hours, mainly out of a fear that at the last moment Nehru would vacillate and order a stoppage of the action against Hyderabad. While the integration of States in a record time stands to the eternal glory of Sardar Patel as an administrator and a statesman, Nehru's record can show hardly anything equal to it.

In internal matters Nehru believed in planning and the system of Five Year Plans was adopted under his guidance and sponsorship. But before he died, both he and the people of India must have realised that all the three Five Year Plans under his regime had failed miserably. The fault lay no doubt with bad planning by economists, but that again was due to the defective guidance given by Nehru and to his wrong emphasis on certain aspects of economic development. Instead of looking to the food production problem he started on grandiose plans of large scale industrialisation, which in the course of the first three Plans completely upset the assumptions and calculations of the planners about the development of Indian economy.

In foreign policy again, which was supposed to be Nehru's *forte*, Nehru's policy proved as much a dismal failure as his Planning policy. His policy of non-alignment might have been right up to a certain point, but not as a fixed permanent principle of foreign policy. Nor did he have the courage or determination to remain strictly non-aligned, e.g., his varying statements during the Soviet invasion of Hungary or his blind espousal of the cause of the Arabs against Israel or his sponsorship of China's application for U.N. membership even after the Chinese invasion of India.

It was Nehru's relations with China that bring out most conclusively the failure of his

foreign policy. For the Indian debacle in the War with China in 1962 a large part of the responsibility lay with Nehru. It was his obsession about British imperialism and the wrongs it had done to States on India's frontiers which led him to sacrifice the Tibetan buffer so easily. It was his blind faith in Sino-Indian friendship which made him close his eyes to the realities of the situation till he was rudely disillusioned in 1962. It was his ambition to play the role of a World statesman and make India's voice heard in all international issues that made him neglect issues which concerned India more directly. It was his unrealistic conviction that if India remained peaceful no other power would drag her into war which made him concentrate on economic development to the extent of totally neglecting defence preparedness. It was again his fond hope that the justice of India's stand in any dispute would be readily accepted by all non-aligned powers, specially the Afro-Asian powers, which made him neglect timely diplomatic moves to show up China's real intentions and to form an organised Asian opinion against China. In short, both in foreign affairs and in defence, India's policy, during the first decade after independence was wrong, unreal and weak, and India had to pay a heavy price for it in 1962. What made matters even worse after 1959 was the incredible muddle-headedness in deciding to confront the Chinese in the disputed areas along the border and yet refusing to admit the necessity of making suitable defence preparations for the showdown which, it was apparent by 1959-60, was inevitable.

The 1962 debacle had one historical lesson—it is not enough to have the right on one's side, one must also have the strength to assert it. It appears that the lesson has gone home and India's policy has undergone the needed change in the decade following 1962.

Nobody was more conscious of the failure of his foreign policy vis-a-vis China than Nehru himself, as the following broadcast to the nation on 22 October 1962 would clearly

show: "I do not propose to give you the long history of continuous aggression by the Chinese during the last five years and how they have tried to justify it by speeches, agreements and repeated assertions of untruths and a campaign of calumny and vituperation against our country. Perhaps, there are not many instances in history where one country, that is India, has gone out of her way to be friendly and co-operative with the Chinese Government and people and to plead their cause in the councils of the world, and therefore, it is shocking for the Chinese Government to return evil for good, and even go to the extent of aggression and invade our sacred land. No self-respecting country, and certainly not India with her love of freedom, can submit to this, whatever the consequences may be."

This Editorial Addendum should not be misunderstood as an attempt to belittle the greatness of Jawaharlal Nehru but should be read in the spirit in which it has been written. History is a hard taskmaster and is no respecter of persons. For a historian the only ideal is to find out the truth about any personality or event, irrespective of current sentimentalism or other considerations. In an authoritative work like the Dictionary of National Biography we have tried to give an impartial assessment of Nehru's life and career in the true spirit of a devotee of Clio and in total disregard of present-day sentimental or political considerations.—EDITOR

[Jawaharlal Nehru—An Autobiography;—The Discovery of India; Michael Brecher—Nehru, A Political Biography; Frank Moraes—Jawaharlal Nehru; Rafiq Zakaria—A Study of Nehru; Maulana Abul Kalam Azad—India Wins Freedom; Rajendra Prasad—India Divided; K. M. Munshi—I Follow the Mahatma; Subhas Chandra Bose—The Indian Struggle, 1920-42; Joachim Alva—Men and Supermen of India; B. R. Nanda—The Nehrus; J. S. Bright—The Great Nehrus; Darbara Singh—Indian Nation; Leonard Mosley—Last Days of the British Raj; Rupert Furneaux—Massacre at Amritsar; A. N. Brailsford—Subject India; Louis Fischer—The Great Challenge; Satyapal and Prabodh Chandra—Sixty Years of Congress; Pattabhi Sita-

ramayya—History of the Indian National Congress ; R. C. Majumdar—History of the Freedom Movement in India, in 3 volumes ; Coupland—Indian Constitutional Problem ; S. Gopal—The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin ; Hindustan Year Book, 1962 ; Nehru Calendar, 1965, Delhi ; The Span, May 1965 ; S. Gopal (Ed.)—Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Vols. I-III, already published ; Durga Das (Ed.)—The Correspondence of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel.]

FROM HISTORY TO POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY : IBN KHALDUN, ISLAM AND THE ISLAMIC STATE

WARREN L. YOUNG

(Churchill College, Cambridge)

Islam, submission to the Will of Allah, is essentially a life force in itself. All conditions of human existence are covered in its tenets, from Sha'aria law on personal status, to life built around the core of the five pillars : profession of the faith, prayer, fast, pilgrimage and poor tax, to the "*regime of law*" envisaged by ibn Khaldun as the Islamic state.

The political machinations of ibn Khaldun will not be gone into here, however. Suffice it to say, as Issawi does, that : "To one fatherland ibn Khaldun always remained true—Dar el Islam (the area of Muslim civilization)".¹

Now, at least one observer has noted that, due to a failure in placing ibn Khaldun's work in the proper perspective, especially with regard to religious questions, there exists a "tendency to exaggerate the independence and originality of ibn Khaldun's thought", as, while his political and sociological analysis is based upon an objective view of the processes involved in the evolution of political and social institutions and the State itself, "the axioms or principles on which his study rests are those of practically all earlier Sunni jurists and social philosophers". Following from a generalized view of society which earlier Islamic philosophers had developed, i.e., the concept of "human society" (*al-mujtama al-insani*), ibn Khaldun derives a somewhat more "dynamic" concept of "human associations" (*al-ijtima*), which, however, is not really funda-

mentally different from the earlier view.²

However, the originality in ibn Khaldun's work may be seen in his conceptualization of what lies at the core of Sociology, that is, that there exists fundamental laws and principles which govern human actions, which "while not as absolute as those governing natural phenomena, are sufficiently constant to cause social events to follow regular, well-defined patterns and sequences". Furthermore, ibn Khaldun asserted that while "societies are not static, i.e., societal forms change and evolve . . . , much the same set of social laws operates in societies with the same kind of social structure, however much the societies may be separated by space or time".³

In order to derive these laws, however, a great deal of empirical data must be collected, sequences determined, patterns observed, and conclusions drawn on their basis. Within the context of Islam, this empiricist and positivist approach does not, however, totally replace reflection upon the fundamental nature of reality. In fact, ibn Khaldun asserts that meditation and reflection can result in revelation of those aspects of reality that reason cannot explain.⁴

Ibn Khaldun's early training in, and writing about, the religious and philosophic sciences provide the background for his future career and his mature thought as expressed in the "History". The approach taken by ibn Khal-

dun to the study of society and the subjects he studied early in his career (about which he is quite hesitant to talk), bear some importance. It should be noted that ibn Khaldun was brought up in the traditional pattern that resulted from being scion of a distinguished family of civil servants and theologians, i.e., traditional Islamic education and, finally, the study of jurisprudence and the law.⁵ Thus, as Mahdi notes in his study of ibn Khaldun: "The most fundamental question that must be asked... is: What was the approach of the sciences he studied during this period to the all-important problem of the relation between revelation and reason in the study of society".⁶

The general nature of Islamic thought will not be gone into here, however. Suffice it to say that, in all its schools, fundamental precepts of the Faith and its approach to the social order, were not that different. While reform movements may have advocated either extreme orthodoxy or liberal interpretations of the law—to take into account changes in the social situation—the validity and universality of the Sha'aria was never questioned. This concept of universality also found its way into ibn Khaldun's philosophy, e.g.:⁷

The particular traditions including that of Medina could be studied as expressions of an underlying universal order of things, an order that could be ascertained by observation and valid reasoning. With the proper interpretation of the Qur'an and tradition, it could be found that the demands of the religious law do not on the whole differ from the demands of the natural order. In short, there is only one order, but it is revealed to Man in two ways: through divine revelation and through natural reason. As divine revelation could be misinterpreted, and, as human reason could err, these two ways may differ, but the difference remains accidental.

Thus, ibn Khaldun takes a somewhat orthodox

view of history, asserting that by too great an emphasis on "analogical reasoning and comparison", without taking into account changes in the socio-political situation between the observer's time and the time of what he was observing, one may fall "into an abyss of error".⁸

Ibn Khaldun's study of history and society, and especially the "Muqaddima" are, then, based upon the asserted complementarity between the natural and religious order, or, more correctly, their "oneness". Thus, while he develops "scientific theories" about the nature of society and its evolution "he did not, and could not introduce into his system anything that was logically incompatible with the Islamic standpoint".⁹

From this approach developed his view of the inherent duality in what he knew to be the leadership of Islamic society—applying it to society in general. This was that, under the rule of the Law, the complementarity of the political leader and the legal/juridical leadership asserts itself, or should assert itself, in order to maintain the existence of the community. The pre-eminence of the Law in this construction is its most important characteristic, for it has replaced the "wise ruler" in social affairs, that is, the Law is above the ruler, no matter what the situation.¹⁰

Again, regarding the originality in ibn Khaldun's work (that is, an "originality" which may seem to be to the casual observer somewhat at variance with the Islamic context within which he lived and worked), we may cite the example given by Gibb regarding ibn Khaldun's treatment of what can be called the development of the Social Contract. Gibb notes that ibn Khaldun "does little more than expand" the idea of the Social Contract and the development of political structure and stratification developed by the Islamic theologian ibn Taimiya, who died two generations before ibn Khaldun's birth, "and (gave) then greater precision by introducing his (ibn Khaldun's) conception of *asabiya*".¹¹

While the state and its development occupy the central position in his study of history, the fact that there exists an Islamic basis to his work, i.e., Sunnat Allah, emerges from his theory of history itself. The will of God is paramount as both the basis for casualty and natural law. Thus, he can conclude that "even the civil state exists as part of the divine purpose" and can classify states by the type of law that exists within them.¹²

Now, it is the "regime of law" that differentiates Islam from the other great Western religions, for the Prophet founded both a religion and a state—constructing a system of law for both. "Consequently, the religious leader of the Islamic community must concern himself with political power...", using it "as a means for propagating itself", and thus, the Islamic leader "must be the head of administration and the leader of the army" as well as being a religious leader. In other words, "in Islam it is doctrinally essential that religion should not merely have an external concern with worldly affairs... or clearly distinguish between affairs of the spirit and the affairs of the world", as this would not be sufficient. "Religion itself must be politicized. This is the historical basis which led Muslim philosophers and ibn Khaldun to reflect upon Islam and the Islamic community as a political regime".¹³

In ibn Khaldun's view, then, it was the Caliphate that was the "only perfect state—being based on the true practice of the Sha'aria, which furthers both the temporal and spiritual interests of its subjects"—the Caliphate being the incarnation of the compound nature—religious, political and military—of what leadership should be in the Islamic State. The Caliphate "type", then, is the highest stage of development of the state from which it can only decay and finally be destroyed—or "self-destruct", if we follow ibn Khaldun's evolutionary but cyclical view of history.¹⁴

In terms of the originality of this, however,

the basic problems that occupied ibn Khaldun's attention were studied by at least one Muslim author more than four centuries before his time. Masudi discussed in his earlier works not only the various systems of government, but specifically the support lent by religion (*din*) to royal power (*mulk*)—and vice versa, and the causes of political and religious decline. In another passage of the same book, Masudi notes the dependence of a nation's laws on these four factors: its religion, its economy, its innate character, and the influence of neighbouring peoples.¹⁵

A clear indication that ibn Khaldun intended to emulate al-Mas'udi is given in the passage below:

"Therefore, there is need at this time that someone should systematically set down the situation of the world among all regions and races, as well as the customs and sectarian beliefs that have changed for their adherents, doing for this age what al-Mas'udi did for his. This should be a model for all future historians to follow..."¹⁶

Al-Mas'udi's universalistic outlook and orientation affected ibn Khaldun's methodological and historiographical outlook and directed him towards the investigation of the non-Islamic world and particularly of the monotheistic religions of the East. "It was this historiographical approach which can be regarded as the very bond of affinity between these two historians, and though separated in terms of time by over four centuries, al-Mas'udi can rightly be credited with having been instrumental in influencing to a large degree ibn Khaldun's basic concepts of the historical process, in opening for him that window to the non-Islamic and pre-Islamic world to which ibn Khaldun has made so important a contribution of his own."¹⁷

It is interesting to note here the point that ibn Khaldun's "new" approach to history may derive from the fact that there is a lack of

political chronology in the Quran, thus enabling the Muslim historian to not operate under the precedent that the Bible (especially the old Testament) sets for the Christian historian, as regards recording history as political chronology. Mahdi, in his work *Ibn Khaldun's Philosophy of History*, notes that ibn Khaldun was highly influenced by Mas'udi and furthermore describes al-Mas'udi as being "the most important representative of the philosophically

oriented tradition in Islamic historiography," and stresses the fact that *Mas'udi shifted the emphasis from political chronology to world cultural history*... This, added to the point noted above, may prove to be the basis for enabling ibn Khaldun to develop his "new science". However, further research in this area is necessary, and new trends in research on this period in Islamic history have only been started in the twentieth century.¹⁸

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THE GOA ARCHIVES AND INDIAN HISTORY*

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The Historical Archives of Goa, Daman and Diu are one of the most neglected archives on the subcontinent. So far as I know I am one of only five people affiliated with an American or European university (the other four being C. R. Boxer, J. B. Harrison, A. R. Disney and the late I. A. MacGregor) who have spent any extended period of time in these archives, and few Indian scholars have followed up S. N. Sen's visit to Goa nearly fifty years ago. (The bibliography lists works by all the scholars mentioned in this paper.) The reasons for this lack of interest are difficult to set out, but in the case of Indian historians the main problem has been an inability to read Portuguese, a result of the lack of instruction in this language in the subcontinent. Financial considerations have also militated against Indians spending much time in Goa, as also has the fact that until 1961 Goa was foreign, and often hostile, territory.

As regards Western neglect of Goa, the basic problem has been ignorance, and the conservative predilection of historians to stick to the established Calcutta-Madras-Bombay-Delhi axis. Amongst some scholars who are reacting sharply to older Eurocentric historiography there has perhaps also been a feeling that to use European records, especially those of a rather disliked colonial power, is somehow not quite the same as using "real" Indian materials in "real" Indian languages. Goa is

also relatively inaccessible, and does not offer all the comforts of big-city life.

Most of these points will be taken up later, but I would like first to describe the size and scope of the holdings in the Historical Archives of Goa. There are between ten and eleven thousand volumes of documents, covering the period from 1515 to 1914. An additional body of materials is not yet bound and available for research. The sizes of the volumes vary considerably, but on average they are around 300 folios; often only one side of the paper is written on. As to the scope of these holdings, in temporal terms the bulk of them are for the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As an indication of the weightage towards especially these last two centuries, it may be pointed out that I read almost everything for the period 1515 to 1670, but the total number of volumes for this period was only about 160. For the sixteenth century, when the Portuguese Asian empire was at its height, the archives in Portugal are much fuller. In any case, most documents from Goa dealing with the sixteenth century have been published in one or other of the collections listed in the bibliography of this paper.

In terms of geographical coverage, the Portuguese territory of Goa is obviously treated in most depth, with fewer records for other Portuguese areas such as Daman, Diu, Chaul, Cochin, Coromandel, Ceylon, Malacca, Macao, Africa and the Persian Gulf. For non-Portuguese areas, the Portuguese were most interested in powers contiguous to themselves, in

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particular the five Deccan sultanates, especially Bijapur, and in the seventeenth century the Mughal Empire and the Marathas. The Portuguese were also vitally interested in sea trade, at least until their sea power was destroyed by the Dutch; there is thus a lot of material dealing with trade and Portuguese attempts to control and tax it. More detail on the sorts of things to be found in the Goa archives can be obtained from works listed in the bibliography. It is, however, appropriate to stress at this point that the Goa archives are in no sense a substitute for other bodies of materials. Anyone interested in the Portuguese in India, from almost any angle, must use not only the Goa archives but also the invaluable Portuguese chronicles, the missionary records, the Lisbon archives, and whatever indigenous records may be available.

Something must be said about the mechanical problems and advantages of working in the Goa archives. Although some local records are in Marathi and Konkani, most documents are in Portuguese so that the first prerequisite is a sound reading knowledge of this language. Oral ability is much less important, though fluent Portuguese can help in contacting the Goan intellectual elite. For non-elite interviewing Konkani would be much more useful. By comparison with Indian languages, at least for a Westerner, Portuguese is easy enough to learn, and there is available a good glossary (by S. R. Dalgado) oriented towards Indian Portuguese.

The pre-nineteenth century documents at Goa are all handwritten, but this does not present a serious problem. Sixteenth-century Portuguese was usually written in a script which presents numerous differences from standard modern Roman script; as noted, however, nearly all the sixteenth-century documents are already published, and later documents are usually in clear hands. This advantage is, however, often nullified by the condition of the documents. Until P. S. S. Pissurlencar became archivist in the 1930s the

archives were sadly neglected and the documents were abandoned to the ravages of animals and the climate. Despite the careful restoration done under Pissurlencar's direction over the last thirty years, some of the earlier documents are very faded, worm-eaten and stained by water.

Pissurlencar's work consisted of organizing, binding and repairing most of the documents in the archives. Today they are arranged chronologically, within categories, such as "Customs Houses", "Communities of the Old Conquests", "Extinct Convents", "Decisions of the Financial Council", etc. Access to these volumes was, at least in 1968-69, remarkably simple, with only a verbal request being needed. Supporting letters of accreditation were necessary to gain initial access, but so far the leadening hand of bureaucracy has not weighed heavily on the Goa archives. Microfilming was permitted, using one's own equipment, on the front verandah, facing the attractive garden. There were no professional copying or microfilming facilities available.

Historians do not live by documents alone, but life in Panaji (formerly Panjim) can safely be recommended. The town is connected to Bombay by air, road, rail and sea, the last being a pleasant 24-hour voyage down the coast. This service is not operated during the monsoon months. Transport within Goa is on a par with any other provincial Indian town. The area's beaches are justly famed, as are the churches of Old Goa and the temples of Ponda. Western-style accommodation and food are more or less readily available. Apart from a very few holiday-makers, and a fluctuating "hippy" population, virtually no Westerners live in Goa. This is also an advantage, at least to the extent that it lets the Western researcher escape ascription to the academic-diplomatic-air-conditioned caste found in some larger Indian cities.

Two more academic problems must be mentioned here. First, it has to be recognized

that the Portuguese, at least those who produced documents, were often racially prejudiced. Indians are usually referred to as "gentiles", "Moors" or "Niggers", and as such were despised. Indeed, even the local Christians were discriminated against. This, however, is not a serious academic problem, for everyone despises someone else; historians presumably are used to allowing for the biases of others. But this Portuguese attitude did have one serious effect from the scholar's point of view. It dictated that most Portuguese thought it beneath their dignity to enquire into or describe Indian society, religion and culture. Indians, after all, were neither Europeans nor Christians, and so the Portuguese thought that they had nothing to learn from them. While there is extant an enormously detailed description of every Portuguese fort in Asia, with lists of every piece of artillery in every fort, and the salaries and duties of all the officials attached to them, there is nothing remotely comparable for Indian things and Indian people. Thus anyone using Portuguese records for Indian history has first to discount for the obvious racial bias, and second has to proceed more by inference than by using direct, detailed descriptions.

The second academic problem concerns the sorts of records which have survived in Goa. As noted, Goa itself is well served, but the same is not true of other Portuguese areas. For these, almost the only information comes from the letters sent home to the king each year by the viceroy. The viceroy's reports were based on letters he had received during the year from the various forts and trading posts, but these inter-Indian letters have not survived, with few and late exceptions. We also lack, for example, the books of the factors in these coastal areas, and the records of their customs houses. To give two more specific examples of lacunae, both related to my own research interests, no records have survived from Diu until late in the seventeenth century. In the sixteenth century nearly every Indian ship sailing to or from the Gulf of Cambay called

here to get a pass and pay customs duties. The records of this fort would thus be of enormous value in estimating the size of, and fluctuations in, Gujarat's overseas trade, the participants in it, and the products traded. Nor, except for a few passing references in missionary records and Persian chronicles, is anything known of the one hundred or more Portuguese who lived in Cambay in the late sixteenth century. These men were traders; they married local women and seem to have fitted into the prevailing Gujarati commercial scene very closely. The reminiscences of one of these traders would be extraordinarily interesting, but if these were ever written they no longer survive.

At this point it is appropriate to mention some past researches based on work in the Goa archives, and give some indications of other uses which could be made of them. The bibliography lists several older books on particular topics. These tend to be exclusively descriptive, but they often contain extensive quotations from documents, either in the text or in the ubiquitous "Documental Appendix". The publications of the late archivist, Panduranga Pissurlencar, are widely scattered and often difficult to obtain except in Goa itself. Residents of Calcutta should, however, find many of them in the library of the late Sir Jadunath Sarkar. Only a selection of Pissurlencar's works are listed in the bibliography of this paper. Most, but not all, of them deal with military and political history, and they all contain voluminous extracts from documents in the archives. In addition, he published several invaluable collections of documents *per se*. More recently C. R. Boxer, the great authority on Portuguese colonial history, has worked several times in the Goa archives. His article, "A Glimpse of the Goa Archives", is an excellent introduction to most of the more important runs of documents. His book, *Portuguese Society in the Tropics*, is concerned with the municipal councils of four Portuguese colonies, including Goa. It is, of course, primarily in the category of Portuguese colonial, rather than Indian, history.

My own eight months in Goa produced two articles and one dissertation. The dissertation analyzed the response from the merchants of Gujarat to Portuguese attempts to control and tax their trade. It was claimed that this response has important implications concerning the political position of these merchants in the pre-modern Islamic state of Gujarat. This dissertation was not, however, based only on materials from Goa. Published and unpublished Portuguese records from Portugal, and English, Persian and Gujarati sources were also used.

More relevant to this paper is my article, "Indigenous Dominance in A Colonial Economy. The Goa Rendas, 1600-1670." As it is based almost entirely on documents from Goa, some mention of its sources and findings seems essential here. The article analyzed the holders of government *rendas*, or tax-farming contracts, from 1600 to 1670. It was based on seventeen volumes of documents from Goa concerning these contracts, plus scattered references from other Goa documents and from the Lisbon archives. For the period there were ideally 782 holders of *rendas*. I found the names of 355, or 45.4 per cent, of these people, and in 327 cases, or 41.8 per cent, I also found the values of their contracts. These are obviously very large samples for seventeenth-century India. The communal breakdown of the holders was especially interesting, particularly as these *rendas* were let for what was a very considerable sum by seventeenth-century Portuguese Indian standards. Of all the contractors, 80 per cent were Hindus, and 62.7 per cent of these Hindus were Saraswat Brahmans. Saraswats in fact held exactly one half of all *rendas* let during this period. In terms of values the findings are roughly similar. A very small number of Portuguese held a few large-value contracts. The great bulk of the contracts, those of middle value, were mostly held by Saraswats, while the smallest in terms of value were held by non-Saraswat Hindus and Indian Christians. The implications of these figures with respect

to the nature of the Portuguese empire in Asia are presumably obvious. Despite religious, political and economic discrimination, the Portuguese empire was in fact dependent for its existence on the co-operation or at least acquiescence of a large and economically dominant Indian population. These wider implications are more fully dealt with in my article "Wealth and Power. Indian Groups in the Portuguese Indian Economy." This article stresses the political advantages which Gujarati *vaniyas*, Saraswat Brahmans, and other Indian groups were able to derive from their economic strength.

The potential uses of the Goa archives are numerous. They are clearly of prime importance for anyone interested in the Portuguese imperial effort in Asia, and especially in the lugubrious Lusitanian decline in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The imperial aspect of the most important period of this decline has been excellently covered by Anthony R. Disney. For Indian history, there is some political and military information on the five Deccan sultanates, and the Mughal expansion southwards in the seventeenth century. Many documents concerning these topics have already been published, but they have yet to be analyzed or synthesized with Indian accounts. The Portuguese were reasonably well-informed about events in the Deccan, mainly because they maintained spies at the important Indian courts in this area. More overtly, they sent frequent embassies to these courts.

Much more important, both in terms of quality and quantity, are the Portuguese records concerned with Maratha history. The Portuguese had intimate relations with Shivaji and his successors; indeed Goa was attacked by them, and the Marathas conquered the important Portuguese area of Bassein. Here again many of the relevant documents have been published by Dr. Pissurlencar, but again the information in them has yet to be used except for the construction of a narrative. It must, however, be kept in mind that, for

reasons already outlined, most of these documents on Deccani history are concerned exclusively with diplomatic and military history.

For extra-Goan economic history, the archives are useful primarily for sea trade. Here there are some very detailed accounts, such as the complete cargoes of two Gujarati ships captured in 1630 after they had loaded at Humuz. The cargoes and ships were sold at auction in Goa; notable in their contents were horses, rose water, silks, a red dye and a vast quantity of dates, but also sold were three "moorish daggers" and two bundles of broken glass (sold to the king of Portugal for Rs. 3). Forty carpets, mostly designed for use in palanquins, sold at an average price of about Rs. 105. For this same year we also have a complete list of the goods belonging to individual Portuguese sent home to Portugal on the three ships of that year. These ships carried an enormous variety of goods "splendid and trifling" but mostly the latter. One item stands out as overwhelmingly most important, and this was cotton cloths, nearly all from Gujarat, and totalling nearly four and one half million yards. Other topics in the area of sea trade include the spice trade, especially considerable detail on pepper, and the Portuguese attempt to control and tax Indian sea traders.

The documentation available for Goan history is large and wide-ranging. The difficulty here is that Goa, especially after the sixteenth century, can be considered atypical, and indeed insignificant, in terms of Indian history. This may be true, but perhaps some studies from the area would not be entirely irrelevant. We do, after all, have available here documentation on the first and last European colony in India. Thus such topics as culture contacts and abrasions, religious interactions and administrative forms can be surveyed from 1510 to 1961. Economic-communal studies, on the lines of my *rendas* article, could also be undertaken. There is a large and completely

untapped body of land and local government records in the Goa archives—about 1,260 volumes in all, mostly in Marathi and Konkani, and covering, with many gaps, a period from 1582 to 1887. In some cases it would probably be possible to trace the ownership and use of a piece of land from the sixteenth century to the present day.

Perhaps most interesting of all would be studies of castes in the Goa area, and here I would consider the Indian Christians to be one, or more accurately several, castes rather than a completely distinct group. To me it seems likely that the Saraswats were dominant, at least in economic terms, from the sixteenth century to the present day, but further research may show that this was not the case over this whole period. Anyway, the Saraswats were far from being a homogeneous group. A detailed study of their response to colonial rule over four centuries could be a fascinating topic. Students of *kayasthas*, and of Gujarati *vaniyas*, will also find their people alive and well in seventeenth-century Goa, while the survival of caste among converts to Christianity opens up another and fascinating area. It should also be noted that this sort of local history could be researched entirely in Goa, using both the archives and collections in temples. By repute these latter are rich, and certainly they are completely untapped, but the prerequisite here would be sound Portuguese, Konkani and Marathi, and possibly some Persian. The only account of Goan temple records with which I am familiar is that by G. H. Khare.

This paper has perhaps stressed too much the limitations of the materials in the Goa archives. In fact, I am convinced that they have been most shamefully underutilized. They will, I hope, in time come to be recognized for what they are: prime sources not just for the Portuguese areas, but, in conjunction with other materials, for most of south and western India.

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MURSHID QULI KHAN KHURASANI (WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO HIS DECCAN DEEDS)

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We do not have any detailed information in Indian sources, about the early life of Murshid Quli Khan.¹ We only know that he was a Turk by birth and a soldier by profession. At first he was a soldier in the army of Ali Mardan Khan, the Persian Governor of Qandhar. Murshid Quli Khan accompanied him when he surrendered the fort to the imperial officers and migrated to India. He soon came to the notice of the Emperor and got royal favours.² In the 9th regnal year of Shah Jahan's reign, he was appointed the *faujdar* of the *Daman-i Koh* of *Kangra*³ in succession to Khanjar Khan. When the government of Balkh and Bukhara was assigned to Prince Aurangzeb, he was appointed as *Bakhshi*⁴ of the forces deputed with him. In the 22nd regnal year, he was made *master of stables* in succession to Jan Nisar Khan and in the 24th regnal year he was promoted to the post of *Bakhshi* of *Lahaur*.⁵ When, in the 26th regnal year, Prince Aurangzeb was appointed Viceroy of the Deccan, Murshid Quli Khan was raised to the rank of 1,500 with 500 horses,⁶ and on being appointed the *Diwan* of *Balaghat*,⁷ he accompanied the Prince. As he rendered valuable services, his loyalty and ability became apparent, and, on the recommendations of the Prince, in the 27th regnal year, he was granted an increment of 500 and the title of *Khan*. In the 29th regnal year he received a further increase of 500 and was appointed the *Diwan* of *Painghat*, too, in succession to Multafat Khan and enjoyed that high post until the war of succession broke out.

The Mughal Deccan was divided into two administration zones—the *Painghat* comprising *Khandesh* and one half of the *Berar*, and *Balaghat* comprising *Aurangabad*, *Telingana* and the rest of *Berar*.

The revenue was not assessed on the *bigha* basis either by measurement or on the different classes of land and their production or even upon mutual arrangements, before the reforms of Murshid Quli Khan, in the spacious, fertile and opulent lands of the Deccan. The plough system was in vogue there. Abul Fazl refers to the prevalence of *Nasq-system* in *Berar*,⁸ but Sadiq Khan says that *crop sharing* and measurement were not known in the Deccan since ancient times.⁹ He further writes, "On the contrary, the established practice was that each of the villagers and peasants tilled as much land as they could with a plough and a pair of oxen and grew what type of crop they liked, whether grain or pot-herbs, and paid to the *Sarkar* (authorities) a little money on each plough, varying with the territory and the *parganas*. There was no further inquiry about or regard paid to the quality of crop."¹⁰

The period intervening between Aurangzeb's first¹¹ and second Viceroyalties of the Deccan was of decay, maladministration, inefficiency and deficits. Agriculture had languished and much cultivated land was turned into wasteland and revenue had fallen off due to neglect and default on the part of the administration.

When the country, for some time, was trodden by the armies of the Emperor of Delhi, the peasantry, on hearing the names of the Mughals and the new arrangements, feared, trembled and left their homes.¹² Further, a great decrease in rainfall was followed by a famine for several years.¹³ It was partly due to the frequent changes of the Governors. The short tenures as well as the incompetence of the Viceroys were the factors responsible, to a large extent, for the decline in the prosperity of the Deccan. During the course of eight years there were six Viceroys,¹⁴ till Aurangzeb again took over as Viceroy in 1653. During these short Viceroyalties, the Mughal Deccan had suffered mismanagement, confusion, financial strain, the succession of bad crops and agricultural calamities.¹⁵ The fact was that the actual realisation of revenue in the Deccan fell far below the standard estimate of three crore sixty lakhs of rupees per annum, but in the version of Abdul Hamid Lahauri the actual realisation was only one crore, even less than one-third of the estimate.¹⁶ Such great was the desolation that in spite of Emperor Shah Jahan's reducing the revenue of *Khandesh* from 30 to 40 crore of dams in the 4th regnal year, the country did not recover its normal condition.¹⁷

The continued deficit of the Mughal Deccani provinces was a strain on the imperial treasury. As the income from these provinces could not meet the expenditure, the deficit had become a normal feature. The attempt on the part of *Khan-i-Dauran* to send surplus income to the Emperor¹⁸ by making heavy exactions on the cultivators and levying extortionate payments from the *ryots* had made the countryside ruined and desolate.¹⁹ Instead of serving the imperial interest this Viceroy had brought ruin to the peasants and agriculture. Keeping in view the difficulties and the circumstances, Shah Jahan had given special instructions to Aurangzeb to improve and extend cultivation and enhance the revenue resources of the Deccan²⁰ so that it should not remain a burden on the imperial treasury but

should be self-sufficient in its requirements and expenditure. Shah Jahan made a number of efforts to remove this miserable state of affairs in the Deccan but the conditions did not improve until the assumption of the office of *Diwani* by Murshid Quli Khan.²¹

The importance of Murshid Quli Khan's tenure as *Diwan* was only due to his revenue reforms which, at first, were introduced in *Balaghat*. He thoroughly realised the disadvantages of the plough-system. Firstly, the system of crop-sharing was tried. In the letters of Aurangzeb, there is a clear mention of this system being applied to the entire territory of the Mughal Deccan including the *jagirs* of the nobles.²² Moreland calls it the type of 'differential sharing' and holds it to be derived from Persian experience in the administration.²³ According to the system a differential scale was applied to the revenue of the various lands in regard to irrigation facilities:—(1) from the crop grown in rainfall one-half of the produce was taken by the *Sarkar*; (2) one-third to one-fourth of the crop irrigated by wells was taken by the Government, keeping in view the cost of irrigation. As regards the fruits, the time of ripening was taken into consideration; (3) crops irrigated by canals had different rates.²⁴ According to the version of Sadiq Khan, the old system of plough-assessment remained in some parts of the *Suba*.²⁵

At a subsequent stage Murshid Quli Khan introduced the system of measurement as the basis of assessment.²⁶ Aurangzeb mentions in his letters that crop-sharing was very expensive.²⁷ So Murshid Quli Khan measured the area of most of the *parganas*.²⁸ He took pains to perform the job under his personal supervision to check partiality, injustice and corruption. "This honest and God-fearing *Diwan* often dragged the measuring chain with his own hands."²⁹ Accordingly, in *Berar* and *Aurangabad* 90 per cent of the villages and in *Khandesh* 50 per cent had been measured.³⁰ The statistical data of the measured area is as follows:³¹

Province	Total No of villages	Unmeasured villages	Measured villages	Measured area in bighas (daftari)
Khandesh	6,339	3,507	2,832	88,59,325
Berar	10,878	137	10,741	2,00,18,113
Aurangabad	8,263	718	7,545	2,34,73,295

(N.B. : Daftari bigha was exactly, or nearly exactly, two-thirds of the Bigha-i-Ilahi. (*Agrarian System of Mughal India*, p. 363))

Murshid Quli Khan had determined the *rai* (crop-rate) for every crop and fixed *Dastur* per bigha.³² So with the reforms of Murshid Quli Khan, the revenue at the fixed rate per bigha was assessed; the actual sown area was measured, the quality and the quantity of the crop from the seed time to harvest, and the market price of the produce were also taken into consideration in the matter of assessment.³³ It was named *jarib* or survey-system. The system continued for centuries and was known "Dhara of Murshid Quli Khan"³⁴ in the Deccan. As regards the mode of payment, the new system established payment both in cash and in kind.³⁵

Murshid Quli Khan called upon the *ryots* (peasants), who had given up the cultivation, to repopulate the villages and appointed efficient and honest officers to boost agriculture.³⁶ *Amins*³⁷ and *Muqaddams* appointed by him were brought under strict control. Holdings were measured, marked and recorded. Arable and rocky lands were distinguished. In case of death of the village-headman (*Muqaddam*) care was taken that his successor should be a man of honesty, integrity and one who would encourage cultivation.³⁸

Peasants in distressed circumstances were granted *Taqavi*³⁹ (loans for the purchase of bullocks, buffaloes and other necessities of cultivation). These loans were recovered in

instalments. Multafat Khan proposed to realise the advance within two years.⁴⁰ He (Multafat Khan) advanced the loans of Rs. 40,000 to Rs. 50,000 as *Taqavi* from the imperial treasury for financing the construction of *bandhs* (dams) in Suba Khandesh and Berar to irrigate the low-lying lands.⁴¹

The reforms of Murshid Quli Khan resulted in the prosperity of the region; improvement of agriculture, rehabilitation of the people and increase of revenue in Mughal Deccan. Bhim Sen stated that, in 1658, there was not a single piece of waste-land near Aurangabad, wheat and pulses were sold at 2½ maunds a rupee, *Jawar* and *Bajra* at 3½ maunds a rupee, molasses at half a maund and *Roghan-i zard* (yellow oil) at four rupees.⁴²

Murshid Quli Khan served the cause of Aurangzeb up to his last breath. When the Prince decided to proceed to the capital with a view to curb the high-handedness of Dara Shikoh, the *Diwan* (Murshid Quli Khan), whose determination and bravery were apparent, through his expression of goodwill, received preference over all faithful and devoted servants, and was promoted the *Chief Diwan of the State*⁴³ in succession to Mir Ziauddin Hussain Islam Khan, who in company with Prince Mohammad Sultan had left Aurangabad with the advance forces for Burhanpur. His rank was increased to 3,000.⁴⁴

On rajab 10,1068 A.H. (3rd April 1658 A.D.) the Prince crossed the Narbada at Akbarpur and on 22nd of the same month (15th April, 1658 A.D.) a battle was fought with Maharaja Jaswant Singh near Ujjain. At first, the Rajputs attacked the artillery of the Prince, whose command at this time had been assigned to Murshid Quli Khan. He, with Zulfiqar Khan, the commander of the vanguard, firmly defended the positions and after a very hard struggle, which culminated in great deeds of gallantry and self-sacrifice,⁴⁵ the faithful Diwan laid down his life and by this display of his loyalty won eternal glory.

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2. *Badshah-Namah*, Abdul Hamid Lahauri, vol. II, p. 158. He was appointed the governor of Punjab in 3rd R. year, p. 177; Superintendent of the artillery, etc., in the sixth R. year, p. 331, and the Superintendent of elephant stables, p. 362.
3. *Badshah-Namah*, vol. II, p. 471.
4. *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 688.
5. *Amal-i Salih*, Mohd. Salih Kamboh, vol. III, p. 124.
6. *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, vol. III, p. 493; but according to Mohd. Salih Kamboh it became 1500/500 after this enhancement in the 27th R. year. *Amal-i Salih*, vol. III, p. 174.
7. *Amal-i Salih*, vol. III, p. 151.
9. *Tawarikh-i Shah Jahani*, Mohd. Sadiq Khan. (MS. in the Department of History, AMU, Aligarh), f. 181a. (Foot-notes Nos. 10, 11 & 12 on page 4.)
10. *Tawarikh-i Shah Jahani*, ff. 181a-b.
11. Aurangzeb was appointed the viceroy of Deccan for the first time on 14th July, 1636.
12. *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, Khafi Khan, p. 732n.
13. *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, vol. II, pp. 305-306.
14. They were : *Khan-i Dauran* (May 1644-June 1645); *Jai Singh* (officiated till 17th July 1645); *Islam Khan* (July 1645-Nov. 1647); *Shah Nawaz Khan* (officiated till July 1648); *Prince Murad Bakhsh* (July 1648-Sept. 1649) and *Shaista Khan* (Sept. 1649-Sept. 1653). 'Islam Khan' was unable even to ride on horse-back due to his old age. *History of Aurangzeb*, Sarkar, vol. I, p. 177.
15. *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, vol. II, p. 166; *Adab-i Alamgiri* (a collection of the letters of Aurangzeb by Abu Fateh Qabil Khan, MS. in the Department of History, AMU, Aligarh), f. 30b.
16. *Badshah-Namah*, vol. II, p. 712.
17. *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, vol. II, p. 306.
18. *Badshah-Namah*, vol. II, pp. 376, 426.
19. *Khan-i Dauran*, boastfully, had made the remark, "Other governors had to get money from Hindustan; I am sending money there". *History of Aurangzeb*, vol. I, p. 180.
20. In the letter, in which Shah Jahan quoted the saying of a wise man, he expressed the hope that Aurangzeb will at least bring prosperity to the Deccan. *Aurangzeb and His Times*, Zaheeruddin Faruki, Bombay, 1935, p. 9.
21. *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, vol. III, p. 497.
22. *Adab-i Alamgiri*, ff. 35a-36a, 38b, 43a, 118a.
23. *Agrarian System of Moslem India*, W. H. Moreland, p. 186.
24. *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, vol. I, pp. 131-36; *Tawarikh-i Shahjahani*, ff. 182a-b; *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, vol. III, pp. 497-98.
25. *Tawarikh-i Shah Jahani*, f. 182b.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Adab-i Alamgiri*, ff. 38b, 118a; *Ruqa'at-i Alamgir* (a collection of the letters of Aurangzeb, composed by S. Najib Ashraf Nadvi & published from Aurangabad) letter No. 16/102.
28. *Tawarikh-i Shah Jahani*, f. 181a.
29. *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, vol. III, p. 496.
30. *Nuskha-i Dilkusha*, Bhimsen Burhanpuri (a MS in the Department of History, AMU, Aligarh), f. 7a; *Storia do Mogor*, Niccolo Manucci, tr. by W. Irvine, vol. II, p. 424; *Travels in India*, J. B. Tavernier, tr. by V. Ball, vol. I, p. 42.
31. The above statistical data have been derived from *Agrarian System of Mughal India*, Irfan Habib, p. 4.
32. The revenue was paid in kind and in cash while Sarkar says "... Under Murshid Quli Khan's Metayership settlement rent was now paid in cash and the recent receivers had to undergo heavy expenditure in watching and storing their share of grain." *History of Aurangzeb*, vol. I, p. 196.
33. *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, vol. III, p. 496.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 498.
35. *Tawarikh-i Shah Jahani*, f. 181a; *Muntakhab-ul-Lubab*, vol. I, p. 732.
36. *Tawarikh-i Shah Jahani*, f. 182a.
37. The *amin* was to assess the revenue. On the basis of his knowledge of the capacity of the peasants, village by village, he was to prepare *dual* or *jama* at the beginning of the year. He was to take a fresh affirmation of agreement with the assessed demand (*qabuliat*) from the peasants when the crop started to ripen. *Agrarian System of Mughal India*, pp. 222-223n.
38. Khafi Khan is slightly different from the version of Mohd. Sadiq. He says, "... He appointed intelligent, righteous and honest officials. He measured all the territory and named every part of the soil as *Raqbah*. Then he took into account the uncultivable land as *Nallah*, hills, etc., and the cultivable land. Then he appointed *Muqaddams* in the places where they did not exist or where the inheritors of those *Muqaddams* had expired. For this post also he selected people from the righteous and honest ones who really took interest in the

145006

- human welfare. He gave the *Khilats* and made them responsible for the development of cultivation. *Muntakhab-ul Lubab*, p. 732n, vide R. A. Alvi, *Murshid Quli Khan in Deccan* (article presented at Muzaffarpur in the session of the Indian History Congress in 1972), p. 7n.
39. *Tawarikh-i Shah Jahani*, f. 182a.
40. *Adab-i Alamgiri*, f. 53a.
41. *Ibid.*
42. *Nuskha-i Dilkusha*, ff. 25b-26a.
43. *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, vol. III, pp. 494-95.
44. The increase in his rank was with 1,500 horse. *Alamgir-Namah*, Mohd. Kazim, pp. 44, 54.
45. Derived from *Alamgir-Namah*, pp. 66-67.

THE GERMAN NATIONAL CHARACTER : AN ESSAY

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The subject poses first of all a set of methodological problems. The question which immediately comes to mind in the context of the expression 'national character' is whether the latter is a cognitive reality. The doubt is raised, firstly, as to whether there are certain characteristics and peculiarities in a given nation which manifest themselves in a fairly regular pattern through its reactions to evolving situations, and, secondly, even granting the existence of such behavioural regularity, whether the latter can be dubbed 'national character'. No conclusive evidence can be provided in the affirmative, despite the fact that the term 'national character' has not been in infrequent use.

It is not the purpose of this paper to enter the methodological debate. The burden of the paper is to reveal a fairly constant pattern of behaviour of the Germans as a collectivity over the ages past; considerations of the future lie outside its scope. The author proposes to call this constant and its causes 'national character' for the purpose of convenience. He is fully conscious of venturing into an uncertain sphere of knowledge; nevertheless, the existence of ample literature on the subject¹ stimulates his interest. It goes without saying that all conclusions reached in the process of this analysis can at best be impressionistic and tentative. But, then, it was Goethe who said,

Grau, teurer Freund, ist alle Theorie,
Gruen des Lebens goldner Baum.²

Since different methods of observation tend

to lead to different conclusions in the context of our theme, a further problem arises, namely, how to determine the 'character' of a nation, how to distinguish between the essential and the typical on the one hand, and the peripheral and the untypical characteristics on the other. The impressions of Alexander Herzen and Michael Bakunin about the German national character, for instance, differed radically from those gathered by Dostoevsky.³ Day-to-day observations are bound to be limited in scope, and tend to vary often widely—from one observer to another. However, despite their differences, many of them do tend to agree on certain common or similar points, and it is this common substratum which helps form certain reasonably valid generalisations. In addition, a multiple approach has to be adopted to gain a greater insight into the subject; this includes the study of the history, language, culture and civilization, etc., of the nation concerned. Consequently, this analysis has been made on the basis of studies on the subject undertaken by a number of writers, studies ranging from entirely personal reactions to the German milieu⁴ to more detached high-level generalisations.

We propose to set up a theoretical model of 'the German', as he has been, in the following pages. The image of our theoretical German (characterized in this paper in the singular) will perhaps be sought in vain in individual Germans, but to this it can be said that ours is the 'portrait', the Idea—in the Platonic sense—of the German, and not his 'photograph'. Also, in forming our image of the German,

we shall have to draw inter alia on his cultural achievements. It should be noted in this connection that 'German culture' has not been confined to the shifting political boundaries of Germany.

II

The earliest piece of work on the character of the Germans was Tacitus' 'Germania', written around nineteen hundred years ago, where he described, not without admiration, the peculiarities of the then wild and uncivilized Germanic tribes. A more recent work, equally well known, is Madame de Stael's 'De l'Allemagne' (1810). Although nearly two millennia separate Tacitus' work from Stael's, both throw up certain characteristic traits of the German, traits which have been confirmed by a host of other writers and commentators over the centuries, including those from Germany.⁵

What Tacitus characterized as "furor teutonicus", has been, in a strict sense, confirmed by others. The 'furor' is the result of an unbalanced psyche, and implies immoderation, the inability to halt. Gasset, a perceptive observer of the German national character, spells it out in the following terms:

"The German people have always had the tendency to become obsessed with a project (Sache)...without restraint or reserve..."⁶ It is a case for the psychologist to find out whether a 'psychological maladjustment' of the German caused his lack of balance. Suffice to say here that the 'furor' is a major trait of the German character and that it is related to the German's lack of self-assurance. As Stael remarks, the craving for knowing everything, going into every bit of detail, this restlessness is but a product of uncertainty.⁷ This trait of the German explains his 'blinde Treue' (blind faith) and his habit of 'Gehorsam' (obedience) vis-a-vis authority, his craving for being ruled over by a Bismarckian,

Hitlerite, or even an Adenauerian, strong man.⁸ It is remarkable that there has been little attempt in Germany to carry out a genuine revolution in the socio-political sense delimiting the powers of the State, and that even the Social-Democratic Party, originally inspired by the idea of Marxist revolution, soon turned 'evolutionary', the fact which thoroughly disgusted the uncompromising Russian Bolshevik revolutionaries.

But to return to the 'furor', our original postulate. It is this characteristic which succeeds in explaining the puzzling fact that the 'Volk der Dichter und Denker' (nation of poets and thinkers), which produced a Goethe and a Schiller, also gave rise to mass-extinction factories, the S.S. cult, and the Gestapo.

We may derive a set of characteristics from the furor. They help build the popular and stereotype image of the German—his thoroughness, his mania for work, and his organisational talent. Let us provide illustrations.

The voluminous scholarly works of the German as well as his mass-murder crematoria are astounding examples of his thoroughness. As to the second characteristic, Lessing's famous statement that he would prefer striving towards Truth to Truth itself reflects the joy of the German at achievement. And have not the two German States in our age confirmed the legendary 'deutschen Fleiss' (German industriousness)? Clemenceau once said that whereas others worked in order to live, the Germans lived in order to work.

Finally, German achievements in exact sciences and music, which presuppose a talent for rigid organisation and discipline, are the clearest examples for the third characteristic. The Prussian Civil Service, the Social-Democratic Party at the turn of the century, the Reichswehr, the Wehrmacht and Albert Speer's phenomenal organisational successes during World War II serve further illustrations.

The qualities sketched above are related to

a further one: the deadly seriousness of the German mind. It is this seriousness which brought him success, for instance, in the fields of machine-designing or metaphysics; but, since it also implies the lack of a sense of humour, it often makes his relationship with other nations clumsy (e.g., German foreign policy in general between 1891 and 1945).

It has been frequently the case with the German that his craving for thoroughness and systematization, coupled with his natural seriousness, has stimulated him to build theories, to reduce the mass of variables that constitute reality to a definite system. This theorizing habit of the German adds another aspect to his character—that of the pedantic 'Hochschullehrer' (high school teacher). No wonder, then, that the Germans have been outstanding for their monistic explanations and theories. An allied tendency has been to build theories on a universalistic scale, to adopt a Weltanschauung (world-view). Hegel's dialectical logic, Marx's class-theory, the idealization of the race by the Nazis, Freud's psychoanalysis, Nietzsche's concept of the 'Superman', the Geopolitik of Ratzel and Haushofer, and even Professor Morgenthau's 'political realism' bear ample testimony to these traits. It is this tremendous fascination for theorization as related to the Weltanschauung that teleological interpretations of history have flourished in Germany; it is the same quality which has given the world the most elaborate and in-depth constructions in the field of metaphysics.

III

The characteristics sketched above reveal only one aspect of the furor, while the other aspect consists of the capacity of the German to put his intellect upside down, to be, shall we say, seduced by the Irrational, and to gaze moodily into the Unfathomable. Despite Nietzsche's sarcastic characterization of this trait as simply beer-effect,⁹ there is, in fact, more to it, since it is quite obviously a product

of the furor teutonicus. It is this quality of being carried away by the Irrational that is known in German intellectual history as 'romanticism', and it is the most German of all German characteristics. The duality of the furor was already anticipated in Tacitus, work:

"A remarkable contradiction exists in their (the German tribes') nature; they like idleness, and yet cannot bear the quiet of peace."¹⁰

And what Stael calls the 'Innerlichkeit' (inwardness, subjectiveness) and 'Steelenpoesie' (the poetic attitude of soul) of the German¹¹ reflect the latter's romantic trait.

Heine, who was hardly favourably disposed towards German romanticism and yet was unable to escape its pull completely,¹² wrote in his "Deutschland, ein Wintermärchen":

"Franzosen und Russen gehoert das Land,
Das Meer gehoert den Briten,
Wir aber besitzen im Luftreich des Traums
Die Herrschaft unbestritten."¹³

Oswald Spengler elaborated the theme, already anticipated in Heine's verses, to the effect that the Sehnsucht (yearning), which was part and parcel of the German national character, had developed due to the inability of the Germans to find an appropriate role in history.¹⁴ However, it can be asserted with greater accuracy that although the Germans had their chance to find a meaningful role in history more than once, their lack of balance and humour muddled up everything. 'The nation of poets and thinkers' underwent a remarkable metamorphosis at an age of socio-economic transformation and a growing awareness of nationalism; it changed itself into the nation advocating 'blood and iron'. This radical swing, however, reflects merely a shift in the emphasis of the romantic obsession—from the realm of the intellect to that of the Realpolitik.

But let us now turn to consider briefly the historical background and significance of

romanticism, especially in its German version. It is, in a sense, putting the clock back to the Middle Ages when Catholic dogma represented the spiritual domain as divine and the material domain as evil. The Catholic culture at the time, hence, was based on material abstinence and spiritual striving as reflected in church music, paintings, architecture and literature. From 1517, the year of Luther's protest against the malpractices of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, the influence of the Catholic culture on the German intellect began to wane. The relaxation of dogmas unleashed tremendous intellectual energies in Germany which gave birth to German philosophy. The German, however, soaring in his thoughts to dizzy metaphysical heights, soon discovered the 'limitations' of pure rationalism. He, hence, reinstalled the cult of feeling, emotion and transcendentalism, and thereby revived the spirit of the Middle Ages. In this sense, his romanticism represented the revolt against Western rationalism and the cult of the intellect. As Thomas Mann characterizes it:

"The Germans are a nation of romantic counter-revolution against the philosophical intellectualism and rationalism of the Enlightenment, of a rebellion of music against literature, of mysticism against clarity."¹⁵

Romanticism, which has as its core Spengler's concept of the 'Faustian Spirit'—as distinct from the 'Apollonian Spirit' which reflects harmony between 'form' and 'idea' so as to reach classical perfection in positive reality—channelized a tremendous volume of the German's energy into highly creative ventures. The Faustian Spirit, through its restless striving after the Mystical, the Unknown and the Infinite, pursued in literature, for instance, beauty "with a feminine sensibility."¹⁶ In philosophy, it set off powerful currents of metaphysical thought. It directly contributed to the fruitful development of Indology as a branch of knowledge, thereby making the West aware of the rich cultural heritage of the East. Indology rapidly flourish-

ed in Germany, and soon outstanding German scholars like Bopp, the Grimm and the Schlegel brothers, and others came to evolve comparative philology as a new science and to establish the common linguistic bases of the Indo-European peoples.¹⁷

With that we now turn our attention to the German language as a suitable vehicle of romantic ideas. German is a rich language liberally endowed with ideas and expressions befitting the highest of speculative endeavours. Little wonder, then, that Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche, among a host of others, were possible only in German. As Karl Vossler points out:

"The modern German has become linguistically mature and conscious only through his mystics and romanticists. In contradiction and opposition to Roman and Romance formalisms of belief, thought and composition, the German national language has recovered itself in the Reformation, in mysticism and in romanticism."¹⁸

For Hugo von Hofmannsthal, poetic German appears "as a spiritual wonder, like the colour with Rembrandt, or the musical note in Beethoven's later works."¹⁹

The German language, like the character of the German, embodies extreme and contradictory qualities. At its worst, it can be so crude and primitive in thoughts and ideas as to be nearly barbaric. In fact, it is maintained that such logical languages as English and French cannot reach such extremes; hence, while Hitler's "Mein Kampf" in English translation appeared to be more civilized than it originally was, a Hegel or a Heidegger remains to this day beyond the reach of Romance.

Turning to music, to which German contribution has again been outstanding, we realize that, like the Gothic structure, it is vertical. Music, and especially characteristic German music, is the realm of the Irrational, the Emo-

tional, that of wonder and thrill, which comes into being in communion with the Unfathomable. Consequently, the German has been more of an instrumentalist than a vocalist, a connoisseur of music in depth.

On the political plane, the German in his Macht-intoxication, was hard to beat in his fascination for geopolitics, which was but an extension of his romantic fancy to the atlas. The romantic idealization of Machtpolitik and such geopolitical concepts as the Lebensraum, the Drang nach Osten, etc., set off the Second World War bringing unprecedented misery in its wake. The racial fanaticism of the Nazis was yet another face of the Janus of German romanticism. It is significant that the glorification of the Volksgeist (Folk Mind) and the supposedly 'Aryan' Nordic races reached the point of mass hysteria in Nazi Germany, while the other non-German Nordic peoples, allotted a rare seat of honour by the Nazis among all the races on earth, showed little enthusiasm for imitating their German cousins.

The negative aspect of German romanticism, which reveals a sick collective mind, is described by Nietzsche as the tendency towards self-destruction. Paradoxically enough, Nietzsche himself appears to be the incarnation of German nihilism. Heine gives in this context a fitting imagery to German romanticism. He compares the latter with the Passionsblume (passion-flower), the distorted and sickly colour of which makes it appear, not ugly, but eerie, something which evokes the feeling of sweet pain, the almost masochist pleasure of Christianity.²⁰

It is a relevant point whether Luther, who was much of our German magnified, left a lasting mark on the German national character by means of his conservative revolutionary actions and preachings, or whether he himself was the supreme incarnation of the German national character. To this author it appears to have been a case of inter-stimulation. The father of Protestantism, Luther nevertheless

sided with the Princes in breaking the back of the only genuine revolution ever attempted in Germany, the peasant revolution, and made a dichotomy between internal and external realms of freedom, thus inspiring Hegel.²¹ The servility of the Germans may have come about partly as a result of Luther's conservative preachings in this connection. Characteristically, Luther would make hair-splitting doctrinal distinctions during the day with boundless energy, while in the evening he would moodily play the flute.

Attention should finally be drawn to Goethe's 'Faust' which can be considered to be a fitting analogy to the German national character, as it has been. Dr. Faust—the great scholar who gives up all intellectual striving and makes a compact with Mephistopheles, the Devil, so as to devote himself to sensual pleasures—symbolizes the degeneration of the Germans from the elevated position of the nation of poets and thinkers to the utter nihilism of the Third Reich.

IV

There is a theory which, in explaining romanticism and its cruder manifestations in Germany, asserts that the primitiveness and barbarism of the Germanic tribes left their mark on the German character as a result of the inability of the light of civilization to penetrate the thick oak forests east of the Rhine following the Roman legions' defeat by Arminius (Hermann) in the Teutoburger Forest. But there are certain obvious loopholes in this theory, e.g., why did not countries like Czechoslovakia or Finland, where Roman civilization had also arrived late, reveal the same magnitude of romanticism in its all-pervasiveness as Germany?

The question remains whether our portrait of 'the German' is still valid today. It can only be asserted that while certain characteristics of the furor (e.g., industriousness, organizational talent, etc.) remain in the two German

States, the worship of the Irrational is conspicuous by its absence—more or less. But, then, one needs more than two or three decades after the most catastrophic war in history to form a definite impression about its relevance or irrelevance. In an age of turmoil and rapid transition the character of a nation may change.

Arnold Toynbee implies in a recent article

that the balkanization of Germany would hold out the prospect of lasting peace in Europe.²² The Germans themselves seem to be veering round to this view under Willy Brandt's leadership. It remains, hence, only a point for speculation whether the negative traits of the German national character would reappear in some distant future.

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2. "Old, dear friend, is all theory, but evergreen is the eternal tree of life" ('Faust'). All translations are by the author unless otherwise indicated.
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4. This category includes 'direct observation' by the author who spent some time in Germany as a recipient of a language scholarship of the Goethe Institute, Munich.
5. Commentators from Germany include Oswald Spengler, Nietzsche, Heine, Thomas Mann, etc.
6. Gasset, see Schwarz, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-71.
7. Stael, *De l'Allemagne*, see Schwarz, *op. cit.*, p. 25.
8. The lack of self-assurance of the German is seen, for instance, in his post-war tendency to put all the blame for the crimes committed in the Third Reich on Hitler and to take up the repenting attitude of a misguided child.
9. Nietzsche, "Unzeitgemaeße Betrachtungen", quoted in Schwarz, *op. cit.*, p. 85.
10. Eich, *op. cit.*, p. 25.
11. Stael, *op. cit.*
12. Heine's famous verses smacking of romanticism are as follows :
Du bist wie eine Blume,
So hold und schoen und rein,
Ich schau dich an und Wehmut
Schleicht mir ins Herz hinein.
(You are like a flower| So charming and beautiful and pure, I look at you and melancholy
Creeps into my heart.)
13. "The earth belongs to the French and the Russians, / The sea belongs to the Britons, / But we have unchallenged control over the dream-land of the skies."
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SALT SATYAGRAHA AND PANCHMAHALS

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The Panchmahals district of Gujarat, even though it was educationally and economically backward, has contributed its mite to the nation's freedom movement. The establishment of a branch of the Home Rule League in the district in 1916 created some awareness of the political problem of the country.

But the holding of the first Gujarat Political Conference in 1917 at Godhra under the Chairmanship of Mahatma Gandhi constituted an important milestone in the political march of the district.¹

The political awareness of the district is gauged from the fact that when Shri Erachshah Navroji Gandhi, the Agent of the Burma Oil Co., Broach, purchased the cotton of a Bardoli Satyagrahi for Rs. 21 only in an auction, the kerosene merchants of Derol and Kalol in the district resolved on 13th June, 1929, not to purchase the oil of the Burma Oil Company.² The Panchmahals District Local Board under the chairmanship of Dr. Maneklal Shah passed a resolution moved by Shri Marutisinh Thakor to the effect that the Local Board extended its sympathy and support to the Bardoli Satyagraha launched against the unjustified increase in the land revenue and expressed its displeasure for the callous attitude of Mr. Smart, Commissioner, Northern Division, towards the people of Bardoli and Sardar Patel.³ Amounts were collected for the Bardoli struggle.⁴

political parties of India boycotted the Simon Commission which landed at Bombay on 3rd February, 1928. The Lahore Congress Session held in 1929 rejected Dominion Status and advocated the goal of complete independence for India. Its Working Committee which met at Sabarmati in February, 1930, empowered Gandhiji to launch a Civil Disobedience movement "at the time and place of his own choice." There was, at that time, great resentment in the country against the Salt Tax and hence Gandhiji decided to start the agitation against the same tax. On 12th March, 1930, Gandhiji with 78 chosen members of his Ashram set out from Sabarmati Ashrama on his famous Dandi March.⁵ From the district, one Chhotubhai Khusalbhai Patel of Malav (taluka Kalol) accompanied Gandhiji in the Dandi March.⁶

Shri Vallabhdas Modi, a merchant of Godhra, broke the salt law. He was convicted under section 47-C of the Bombay Salt Act for possessing contraband salt and was sentenced and punished with a fine of Rs. 100 and simple imprisonment for three months.⁷ Shri Pandurang Vanikar of the Bhil Seva Mandal was arrested at Godhra, when he led the second batch of Satyagrahis from Dohad.⁸ The police did not arrest any one from the Kalol batch led by Shri Rudraprasad either at Godhra or at Kalol.⁹

The Satyagraha of 1930 :

The Indian National Congress and all the

Mahatma Gandhi announced his intention of raiding the salt depot of Dharasana in the Surat District. Before he could reach Dhara-

sana, he was arrested at Karadi on 5th May, 1930. His arrest aroused the entire nation for the struggle for independence. Repercussions of the Dandi march were felt in Panchmahals.

In May 1930 volunteers from all over Gujarat participated in the raid. Mr. H. N. Brailsford, a British socialist who was in India in 1930, described the Salt Satyagraha as the "Kindergarten stage of revolution."¹⁰ The Government of India realizing the seriousness of this movement let loose the whole machinery of terror and suppression.

To express its displeasure for the police excesses towards non-violent volunteers at Dharasana and to congratulate the leaders of Gujarat for their intense zeal for independence and their services and sacrifices for the nation, the District Local Board adjourned its meeting on 27th May, 1930.¹¹

A batch of twenty-five volunteers from Godhra Taluka raided Dharasana on 3rd June, 1930, under the leadership of Shri Waman Rao Mukadam.¹² He was severely beaten up by the police¹³ and was sentenced to imprisonment for 1½ years.¹⁴ Shri Ramprasad B. Vyas, who received severe injuries due to police lathi-charge, was removed to Bulsar.¹⁵ The Kalol Taluka Batch was led by Shri Marutisinh Thakore. He was also severely beaten up by the police on 6th June, 1930.¹⁶ Shri Himmatlal Gupta of Sansoli of Kalol Taluka was belaboured by the police.¹⁷ Shri Sukhdevbhai Trivedi, Secretary, Bhil Seva Mandal, Dohad, who had proceeded to Dharasana as one of the volunteers, received injuries from the police lathi blows and was removed to hospital.¹⁸ Shri Krishna Harishanker Shukla, D. M. Dave, Mohanlal M. Shah, Himmatlal C. Shah, D. P. Patel and Chunilal C. Upadhyay participated in the Dharasana raid. From the district fifty-five volunteers were sent in two batches led by Shri Mukadam and Marutisinh Thakore.¹⁹

A batch of volunteers from Punjab under

the leadership of Shri Khadag Sing was detained by the police at the Godhra station, while on its way to Dharasana. The police drove horses into the crowd assembled at the station and consequently three persons were injured.²⁰

On 25th August, 1930, Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya addressed public meetings at Godhra and Kalol and at Halol on 26th August, 1930. He exhorted the people to adopt Swadeshi and non-payment of revenue to achieve the nation's independence.²¹

On 29th August, 1930, the District Local Board adjourned its meeting for half an hour to show its respect for the Board's member, Shri Waman Rao Mukadam, who was sentenced to imprisonment and resolved to hoist the tricolour flag on its building on September 5, 1930.²²

Malav Jungle Satyagraha :

As the Government had arrested only two persons for violating the salt law, the District Congress Committee sought permission from the Gujarat Provincial Committee to start Mass Civil Disobedience in the form of the Jungle Satyagraha. After receiving the green signal, on 17th September, 1930, the District Committee fixed up 26th September, 1930, for starting the Satyagraha at Malav in the Kalol Taluka. Before the commencement of the Satyagraha Maneklal M. Gandhi, Bakorbhai S. Patel, Marutisinh C. Thakor and Rudraprasad J. Desai were arrested on 23rd September, 1930.²³ But, as scheduled, the Satyagraha was started under the leadership of the District Congress President, Shri Laxmikant Shrikant. Above five thousand persons coming from Kalol, Vejalpur, Delol, Derol, Malav, Jantral, Kanod, Fatepuri and Sandhasal (Baroda State) participated in it.²⁴ But no arrests were made at Malav, though police officers with a large force were present at the site. Fourteen persons received injuries from the police lathi blows.²⁵ Shri Laxmikant

Shrikant was, however, arrested while he was addressing a public meeting at Kalol in the evening of 26th September, 1930.²⁶ Shri Shrikant was sentenced to five months' simple imprisonment, while the leaders arrested before the commencement of the Satyagraha were sentenced to five months' simple/rigorous imprisonment for instigating the people,²⁷ under section 107 of the Indian Penal Code. Shri Mansukhbhai Dipabhai Baria was sentenced to fourteen days' imprisonment for cutting the grass at Malav during the Jungle Satyagraha.²⁸ In all twenty-nine persons were arrested, out of whom 18 were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment or fine.²⁹

Non-Payment of Land Revenue :

The cultivators of Panchmahals also started the movement of non-payment of land revenue. Shri Kamleshanker L. Pandya took keen interest in this movement, started in Halol Taluka.³⁰ Shri Mansukhbhai D. Baria was sentenced to 4½ years' imprisonment for participation in this campaign. Members of his family were harassed so much by the police during his imprisonment that they migrated to the Baroda State.³¹ Babarbhahi Raghunath Darji and Girdharbhai Jethabhai Patel were arrested for displaying placards for directing the people not to pay taxes.³² Shri Pannalal Maneklal Parikh was sentenced to two months' imprisonment for instigating the people of Halol and nearby villages for non-co-operation.³³ The women of Mataria village (the Godhra-Taluka) were warned by the Collector to pay up the land revenue otherwise he would send the police for recovery. The villagers ignored the warning with the result that the standing crops of Mataria and Bodidra villages were confiscated by the Government.³⁴

Picketing :

During the movement Shri Thakkar Bapa toured the district pleading for the use of

Swadeshi and boycott of foreign cloth and against the use of wine.³⁵ Shri Somalal Shiroya of Godhra raised the troops of Volunteers and picketed the liquor shops and foreign cloth shops.³⁶ Shri Pannalal Parikh took out processions and picketed the shops of wine and foreign cloth in Halol and nearby villages.³⁷ Shri Ratilal Hargovan, Mulshanker Vrajlal and Chhababhai Bapubhai were arrested in Dohad for picketing the liquor shops and were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment.³⁸ That the agitation was successful was evident from the fact that the Government realized merely Rs. 5,474 in auction sale in 1931 from the Kalol Taluka as against Rs. 13,575 in the previous year and the sale fell to only 4,650 gallons in 1930 as against 8,335 gallons in the previous year.³⁹

In Kalol a procession was taken out under the leadership of Shri D. M. Dave on 13th January, 1931. Shri Dave and his twenty-one associates were arrested and kept in lock-up at Kalol for six days. Later on only Shri Dave and six others were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment for defying the Government Ordinance.⁴⁰

During this movement about 132 persons were arrested and convicted and sentenced in the Godhra Taluka,⁴¹ and forty persons from Kalol Taluka.⁴² Between January 6th and 30th September 1930, 14 lathi-charges were made in the district by the police and 215 persons were arrested, while 25 were severely beaten up in the lock-up.⁴³

On 5th March, 1931, the Gandhi-Irwin Pact was signed and according to one of its conditions the Civil Disobedience Movement was discontinued throughout the country.⁴⁴ The movement demonstrated the awakening of political consciousness among the people of Panchmahals, who were to participate still more actively when Civil Disobedience Movement was resumed once again in January, 1932.

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INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT AND WORLD WAR I: A STUDY IN INTERACTION

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World War I was a landmark in the constitutional evolution of India, though it was not the first international event which strengthened India's demand for self-government. Earlier, Japan's victory over Russia had added to her self-confidence. The United States' policy of preparing the Filipinos for self-government, Great Britain's policy of granting representative government to the Boers in South Africa, had been hopefully noted by the Indian nationalist leaders. It is true that for a long time the British Government had been utterly unsympathetic to India's constitutional aspiration. Consequently, the extremist group of the nationalist leaders had lost faith in the benevolent nature of the Government. By the first decade of this century the Government too realised that the movement was a logical outcome of the Western education which they themselves had so generously imparted to India. Thus the prophecy of Macaulay (10 July 1833) that "having become instructed in European knowledge, they (Indians) may, in some future age, demand European institutions"¹ had come true. In the period under review, the British Government was confronted with the task of keeping a balance between their appreciation of India's aspiration and the imperial interest. This paper is an attempt to analyse the changed attitude of the British Government in respect of the constitutional demands of India and the Indian response thereto, in the new context which World War I had produced. Thus, this paper has a limited scope so far as the constitutional move-

ment in India is concerned. It is not a general study in the process of constitutional evolution. It is actually a probe into the interaction of an international event and an aspect of the nationalist movement in India.

Since the second half of 19th century, India's demand for self-government had always been thwarted by the British Government with a series of arguments which they claimed to be logical but actually were prejudiced. One of such arguments was about India's incapability for self-government. The nationalist leaders took this as a humiliation, as a slur upon their intelligence, and they took it as a challenge. The British Government, with solitary individual exceptions, had almost a religious faith in the view that India was unfit for self-government. To them the very idea of granting a "colonial self-government" to India was a "hopeless absurdity."² Racial, social and historical factors were believed to be an insurmountable block to the idea of self-government in India, "even in the distant future."³ The proceedings of the Indian National Congress and the innumerable public speeches made by the nationalist leaders reveal that they had left no stone unturned to refute such a prejudicial view of the British Government. B. G. Tilak—a leader of the extremist wing of the Indian National Congress—went so far in his criticism as to say that the rule of one nation by another was in itself unnatural and that a good government was less desirable than an inferior native government.⁴ In this

connection, Mrs. Besant made it emphatically clear that India was not content to be any longer "a child in the nursery of the empire".⁵

From the beginning of the War one can distinctly see a change in temper and tone of India's constitutional movement. The mere fact that the Allies were avowedly fighting in defence of the rights of the small and weak nations against the large and strong ones, the frequent reference by the Allied Statesmen to such terms as democracy and self-determination, the strong world movement towards government by popular opinion, etc., all these combined to raise hopes for the future and at the same time to foment discontent about the existence of the British Government in India.⁶ The tone of request was changed into that of demand and constitutional concession became a legitimate and moral right. It has been aptly observed by Lajpat Rai that in 1917 India was no longer praying for concessions but was demanding her right.⁷ This tone of assertion was the net outcome of India's contribution, in the form of money and blood, to the War. As soon as the War broke out India loudly expressed her loyalty to the British Government and her strong determination to stand by the side of the Government.⁸ History shows that India not only kept her word but made a mark in all fields of the War, especially on the battlefield. The heroism of the Indian soldiers and the sacrifices of the people of India in general generated self-confidence and consequently strengthened her case for self-government. It changed India's attitude towards the British rule, towards the acknowledged superiority of the West.⁹ The fact that they could stand—and that too with valour and success—on a par with their rulers in the War, encouraged India's claim for "joint partnership on equal terms"¹⁰ and for "constructive constitutional activities".¹¹

In regard to her constitutional aspirations, India was no longer to be satisfied with the vague promises for constitutional concessions. Her aspirations had become crystal-clear¹² and

she wanted equally clear and expressed approval of the British Government to her ambition. In 1915, from the Presidential Chair of the Indian National Congress, Sir S. P. Sinha asked the British Government to "declare their ungrudging approval of the goal to which we aspire, to declare their inflexible resolution to equip India for her journey to that goal".¹³ In this matter the Muslim League too came forward and joined the Indian National Congress. They jointly demanded that the King-Emperor be pleased to issue a proclamation to the effect that it was "the aim and intention of British policy to confer self-government on India at an early date".¹⁴ The British tactics of playing on words were so much known to the Indian nationalists that B. G. Tilak positively warned his compatriots not to be vague in their demand lest the Government would nullify it "by the convenient interpretation and by imposing crushing conditions".¹⁵ Needless to say that the nationalist leaders had taken this precaution. Sir S. P. Sinha emphatically said that the form of government which India was pining for could not be anything short of "what the President Lincoln had so pithily described as government of the people, for the people and by the people".¹⁶ In 1916, while addressing the joint conference of the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League at Lucknow, Surendra Nath Banerjea demanded that the 'salvation of India is to be wrought upon Indian soil, by Indian hands, by Indian brains, and by Indian agency'.¹⁷ It is not surprising if the Extremist leader B. G. Tilak had declared that by self-government he meant to bring the Executive under the control of the Legislature to the extent of throwing open even the posts of Governor and Lt.-Governor to election.¹⁸ His advocacy was based on his view of the Home Rule, which was, "to be in my country what Englishmen are in England".¹⁹ Pandit Motilal Nehru threw light on their demand from the legal standpoint when he said, "we want freedom of thought, freedom of action".²⁰ The nationalist leaders did not stop there. They went a step forward and demanded that

they should have the right of determining the stages of getting the Responsible Government. In this matter Tilak's opinion was that the constitutional reforms must start from the Central Government and then come down to the Provincial Government.²¹

India did not have at the time any electorate worth the name. Therefore, to her repeated demand for self-government, the usual response of the British Government was 'Not Yet.' To this the famous Moderate leader Surendra Nath Banerjea sharply reacted with the words "Why not?" With utmost disgust he flung a series of interrogations at the Imperial masters: "Had they any electorates worth the name before the Reform Bill of 1832? Had Japan electorates when the Mikado conferred parliamentary institutions upon that country? Had the Filipinos any electorate, suitable or unsuitable, when the American Republic resolved to concede national independence to the people of Philippines?"²² It was the climax when he boldly guaranteed that the existing anarchism would disappear from India within 6 years, if self-government was granted to her. He was so much confident of his view that in case of its falsification, he was willing to undergo life-transportation.²³ Thus, we see that for the first time the nature and mode of asserting India's capability for self-government was overwhelmed by the spirit of equality and self-confidence. This added to the moral force of her demand which sounded more like an argument than a mere prayer. It was claimed that the constitutional movement was not only a political campaign but "a moral and spiritual mission in which the fate and destinies of humanity were involved".²⁴ Mrs. Besant declared—quite befittingly to her great renown as a Theosophist—that self-government was necessary for the "self-respect and dignity of a People" and that "other Government emasculates a Nation, lowers its character and lessens its capability".²⁵ She called the nation a *spark of Divine Fire, a fragment of Divine Life*. The impact of such spiritual nationalism on the unlettered masses of India was great.

One major effect was to implant in them a sense of the superior spirituality of India compared to the materialist West.²⁶

The most striking feature of India's constitutional movement in the period under review is that even the high tide of self-confidence and the feeling of spiritual superiority did not deviate her from her avowed allegiance to the British Government. It was proclaimed that India wanted self-government, not only in her own interest but also in the interest of the Empire, of the administration.²⁷ The nationalist leaders had resolved that the War—the calamity of England—must not be mistaken for India's opportunity to wrest self-government from the British, because it involved lawlessness and violence which was not in tune with their movement.²⁸ Even Lajpat Rai—who was suspected of having connections with the Ghadar Party—had clearly stated in November 1914 at New York that it was unwise and hazardous to seek foreign help to overthrow the British Government in India.²⁹ In this connection it is quite interesting to note that Hitler too was sanguine about the non-violent character of India's constitutional movement. He had realised that at that critical hour of Great Britain, India would not use the force of arms against the British.³⁰

Thus it is clear that India was not only eloquent about her loyalty to the British Government, but certainly she did mean it. Though the genuineness of her loud professions of loyalty cannot be doubted, it would be erroneous to take them for her genuine faith in the British Government. India had learnt by then that the British Government was expert in the "glib and oily art, to speak and purpose not". No more she was prepared to believe in the apparent "honesty of intentions" of the British. To her devoted audience Mrs. Besant pointed out that Indian labour was wanted for foreign firms, her capital would be drained away by the War-loans.³¹ Some Indians had even apprehended that if India failed to successfully assert her claim to

self-government, she would become the subject of the Greater Britain—of the Colonies—and would thereby fall a victim to “their declared superiority of white races and to their unblushing policies of government against all coloured races.”³² Indians had ample evidence to entertain such suspicions about the British intentions. One such evidence was furnished in March, 1915, when the House of Lords rejected the proposal for creating an Executive Council for the U.P. Immediately, with great excitement, it was questioned: Was this the reward of India's loyalty during the War? What then would be after the War?³³ Indians could not forget that in 1917 the amount (£100,000,000/-) and the form of India's contribution to War was decided by the Executive Authority without any consultation with the Legislature.³⁴ This was probably due to the failure of the British Government to take Indians into their confidence. This lack of confidence was revealed on another occasion also, when an Indian member of the Legislative Council of the Governor-General asked the Government about the tentative features of the Reform Scheme which was then under consideration. He was told that the Government was “unable to make any statement in the matter.”³⁵ Thus it is clear that India's declarations of unshaking loyalty and her sacrifices made in the form of money and blood during the War, were not responded to, so as to make her clear and confident of the intentions of the Government. Due to the element of doubt in the intentions of the Government about their constitutional aspirations the nationalist leaders were oscillating between hope and fear.

This was but one side of the shield. On the other side we see that the Imperial policy towards India was also undergoing a remarkable change. In the period under review, India's demand for Responsible Government—which was ridiculed as ‘hopeless absurdity’ in the *pre*-War period—was received in a different spirit. Mr. Ramsay Macdonald remarked on 6 August 1918, that it was ‘natural’, it was

‘inevitable’ and it was ‘good’. Further he said that if they gave an unwelcome greeting to it, then it was the “bankruptcy of their statesmanship and not the pride.”³⁶ No more did the British Government respond to India's constitutional demand with unsympathetic words—‘Not Yet’, because they realised that a vast country like India could not be held for ever by the sword and that they must raise India “to the position of Australia and Canada.”³⁷ Thus the Imperial Masters who were of the conviction that the “personal rule fitted India most” had revised their views. They clearly understood that when a community had been educated to a certain point, “attempts to maintain a patriarchal attitude merely result in revolt or ridicule.”³⁸ On 6 August 1918, Mr. Cotton pointed out that India's claim to Responsible Government was based on considerations of “right and justice, based also on the innumerable pledges that had been given to her.”³⁹

It was India's generous help to Great Britain in the crucial period of the War which hastened a revolutionary change (may be apparently) in the British attitude towards India. In the *pre*-War period it was held that at a critical hour India was bound to seek the help of Great Britain. But at the advent of the War, Great Britain had to seek bounteous help of India. Support and advocacy of some influential publicmen in England was an additional factor which helped to soften the British attitude towards India. It is true that some of these publicmen had been sympathetic to India's national aspiration even before the War, and thereby they had already incurred the criticism of the Government. It was due to them that in 1906, Lord Minto had considered the House of Commons to be “the greatest danger to the continuance of the British Rule in India.”⁴⁰ In 1918, we again get an official reference to the British Parliament but this time with a different connotation and in a different spirit. It was held that “Parliament's omission to institute regular means of reviewing the Indian administration” led to the

failure of the Government in the face of growing nationalism in India.⁴¹ Difference between the two remarks explains the changed outlook of the British. Interference of the Parliament which Lord Minto regarded as the “greatest danger” was later considered to be of great importance and of vital necessity. In its silent feature the latter comment was aimed at the bureaucracy in India. The bureaucracy which was much pampered and was generally held in high esteem in the *pre*-War period was decried as a somewhat “tempered military despotism.”⁴² The bureaucracy—which was once famous for efficiency—was criticised by Mr. Montagu as “too wooden, too iron, too anti-diluvion to be of any use for the modern purposes.”⁴³ Such an assessment of the Government of India led the Home authorities to be very careful about the appointment of a new Viceroy in 1916. Mr. Montagu was anxious to see a Viceroy who would be an energetic administrator rather than “a mock royalty surrounded by out-of-date and rather tawdry pomp.” Further he added, while writing to the Prime Minister on 22 December 1915, that he should be made Viceroy, “who knows India and who has enough adaptability to use his knowledge.”⁴⁴

The defects in the governmental machinery, combined with the odd situation created by the War, were pressing the Home authorities to set the house right. On 5 June 1919, Mr. Montagu viewed that the only possible substitute for “the Government by despatch was the Government by Vote.”⁴⁵ This view was the foundation on which the whole superstructure of India's constitutional status was to be erected. It was revolutionary by nature, because by that Indians were to be sent to polling booths for which they had always been considered unfit. The same view was at work when the famous announcement of 20 August 1917 was made. Under the pressure of circumstances the Home authorities realised that their announcement must be a substantial one in regard to India's pressing demand for self-government. Mr. Montagu, while writing to

Mr. Chamberlain on 7 August 1917, clearly stated that for them it was “a choice really not between using the word *self-government* and not using it but between an announcement and no announcement.”⁴⁶ Thus, the circumstances compelled the Home Government to be liberal, or at least to make a show of liberality, towards India; and the announcement of 20 August 1917 was made. By this announcement they committed to hand over ‘Responsibility’—however little it might be—to the Indians. Historical significance of the changed attitude of the British—of which the announcement was a visible expression—becomes more clear on the background of the Reforms of 1909. These Reforms, according to its author, were in no sense “a step towards Parliamentary Government.”⁴⁷ It is due to this reason that Surendra Nath Banerjea called the Reforms of 1909 as ‘shams’ and ‘delusions.’⁴⁸ Lord Islington, Under Secretary, endorsed the same view on 23 October 1918 and said that responsibility was the savour of popular government and that savour the Councils of India wholly lacked. Further he declared that their first object was to invest the Councils (of India) with responsibility.⁴⁹

India was no more considered incapable for Responsible Government, because it was realised that the only way to fit men for ‘responsibility’ was to place ‘responsibility’ upon them.⁵⁰ Thus the transfer of ‘responsibility’ to the Indian hands was meant to teach the Indians to vote. Mr. Montagu had clearly understood the difficulties which were likely to obstruct the implementation of the scheme. On 6 August 1918 he pointed out that unless the vote was of some value, unless it was to achieve something, Indians could not be taught to vote wisely.⁵¹ But he had resolved, and accordingly had informed the War Cabinet on 31 March 1917, that “the actual goal, however distant, however difficult of attainment” was to be the self-government, “with complete representative institutions.”⁵²

The difficulties involved in giving ‘complete

representative institutions' to India were about the franchise issue. Imperial masters always stigmatised India's demand for self-government as the cry of a 'microscopic minority'. Wide-spread illiteracy prevailing among the Indian masses was claimed to be an insurmountable difficulty in granting her the right of franchise. It had also been said that the constitutional movement of India could not register the sympathies and support of the millions of illiterate people. This view, due to the horrible consequences of the War, was bound to change. Because for the agricultural masses a very dangerous effect of the War was the disappearance of the silver rupee and the soaring price of the silver bullion. It had adversely affected the age-old hoarding habits of the countryside. In such depressed and perplexed state of mind they were bound to be on the side of the nationalist leaders who held out comforting promises for the future.⁵³ British Government also noticed that the rural population of India had become aware that it "was legitimate to bring their troubles to the notice of the Government." Thus it was realised that the peasantry of India—voiceless millions—"may not be vocal but they were certainly not voiceless."⁵⁴ The Chief Commissioner of Assam, Mr. Beatson-Bell, maintained that the peasantry of India was, "capable of exercising their civic and political rights as any peasantry in the world."⁵⁵ In support of this new and favourable assessment of the 'teeming millions' of India, there were some significant evidences. In the annual session of the Indian National Congress in 1917, Surendra Nath Banerjea had introduced to his audience a *Namasudra*, Bhegai Haldar, who had presided over meetings of his community and had registered support for the Home Rule Movement.⁵⁶ In 1918 also the annual session of the Indian National Congress was attended, for the first time, by 688 Kisan delegates.⁵⁷ Keeping the awakening of rural India in mind Sir J. D. Rees asserted on 5 June 1919 that "India is rural and the vote should be rural."⁵⁸ When the peasantry of India had claimed the serious attention of the British Government, the soldiers

who had offered blood for the British cause in the War, were not to fail in pushing their claims. Thousands of Sikh soldiers, who returned from the battlefield, had created a serious situation. It had become difficult for the Government, as Surendra Nath Banerjea put it, to treat the 'comrades in arms' as 'helot in politics.'⁵⁹ The soldiers had also become conscious of their political rights. When the Gharwal battalion was asked to put forward their demand—which was to be fulfilled as a reward for their bravery—they asked the Governor-General for a seat in the Legislative Council of the U. P.⁶⁰ This was a clear sign of their political consciousness and their active support to the constitutional movement of the country.

The most complicated and controversial point in regard to the franchise issue was that of the minority. A nation can be divided in majority and minorities groups with several criteria, such as the criterion of material interest, of language, of political complexion, of culture and of religion. In the period under review, we see that the criterion of religion prevailed above all and thus the minority issue became synonymous with the problem of the Muslims who formed the biggest and the most potential minority in India. An analysis of the historical factors that created, nurtured and widened the chasm between the Hindus and the Muslims is beyond the purview of this paper. In regard to the subject matter of discussion we may directly refer to the constitutional status of the Muslims during the period under review. The nationalist leaders held that the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909 were designed with a view to favour the Muslims who would take delight in gaining the constitutional advantages over the Hindus.⁶¹ Though on 6 January 1913 Lord Sydenham declared that the aim of the Morley-Minto Reforms was to secure the representation of "all important racial units and classes,"⁶² the truth behind it was different. On 28 May, 1906, the author of the Reforms of 1909, Lord Minto, had conveyed the real motto to Mr.

Morley. It was to secure "a possible counterpoise to Congress aims."⁶³ This imperial formula of 'divide and rule' was no longer to be a safe policy under the changed circumstances. Because, the union of the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League had claimed that they had overcome the religious fanaticism to a considerable extent. The Government began to feel that "division by creeds and classes means the creation of political camps organised against each other."⁶⁴ On 6 August 1918, Mr. Montagu admitted that the "Communal Representation" could never "get over racial antagonism and antipathies."⁶⁵ He had even earlier, i.e., on 5 June 1918, suggested that the racial antagonism could be overcome only "by setting to the population a common task to do together, to work out the prosperity of their country..... There is no better way of promoting democratic customs than by working them through democratic institutions."⁶⁶

Thus the British Government claimed to frame a liberal policy towards India. But the genuineness of the intentions behind all these loud proclamations was open to grave doubts. Criticism of the Communal electorate had claimed that no longer religion would be entertained in the political arena. But there is evidence to the effect that during the period under review the British Government positively tried to make the religious sentiment of the Muslims a political capital. During the War, Germany had imposed some restrictions on some of the religious practices of the Muslims in East Africa. Mr. Chamberlain, in this regard, informed the House of Commons on 12 April 1916 that he had telegraphed the Government of India a suggestion for the "widespread publication" of the issue.⁶⁷ This was meant to make the Indian Muslims more loyal to the British Government. Similarly we see that Lord Sydenham, on 6 August 1918, had dwelt upon the anti-Hindu feeling of the Madras Dravidian Association and that of the South Indian Islamic League.⁶⁸ Not only the inter-religious rivalries but even the minor

rivalries among the Hindus of the Bombay Presidency were entertained by Mr. Fisher on 28 October 1920.⁶⁹ The depressed classes of that Presidency—who amounted to 3 per cent of the population—had asked for an increase in the number of nominated members in the Legislative Council. Surprisingly enough—the Government which was so much attentive to the trifle clashes among the minor sects of Hindu and which had even maintained facts and figures of the population of several minor sects of Hindus—had not distinguished between the two major sects of the Muslims, i.e., the Sunnis and the Shias. On 17 May 1920, Mr. Montagu clearly stated that the Government had made no distinction between the Sunnis and the Shias.⁷⁰ Thus the British Government was keen in avoiding any sort of official reference to the internal, sectarian rift of the Muslims who had already shown signs of uneasiness due to the war in Turkey. Whatever might have been the motto behind that policy, it became clear that the Government did not give equal and impartial treatment to all communities of India. It also became clear that the Government which had made loud professions of progressive and liberal spirit, which had bitterly criticised the act of dividing the people into classes and groups, was not determined to stand by it. In the face of an adverse and critical situation the Government was prepared for a compromise at any cost. Otherwise, it would not have thought "to extend to the Sikhs the system of representation already adopted in the case of Muslims" only because "the Sikhs supply a gallant and a valuable element to the Indian Army."⁷¹ This was certainly an appeasement of India's martial race, an immediate response of gratitude and appreciation for their contribution to the War. But even this appeasement stood contrary to their declaration of highly democratic policy, according to which people were not to be divided into groups and classes by any criterion whatsoever.

In conclusion, we may say that despite some contradictions, British policy towards India

was certainly changing. Though in *pre-War* period there prevailed a view that India deserved liberal and democratic concessions, it could not influence the Government policy to a considerable extent because it was held by some individuals only. In the period under review a change in attitude became visible because, first, many Englishmen thought that the War was fought for democratic principles and this resulted in the adoption of a comparatively liberal attitude towards India. Secondly, in the heat of the War, Great Britain was found to become more conscious of her international prestige and by giving India a liberal and democratic treatment she was trying to enhance her prestige in the international politics. On 10 January 1919, Mr. Montagu had rightly informed Mr. Chelmsford that the appointment of Sir S. P. Sinha to the Parliament was to add "to our position *vis-a-vis* India in such countries like America." ⁷² Lastly, during the critical years of the War, the British realised that the Indian political scene was dominated by the Extremists and if they

delayed in giving liberal concession to India, Britain might lose the initiative and thereby lower her prestige.

Ironically, the War strengthened the self-confidence of the Indian nationalists. India became aware that she could be of great help even to the mighty English. Moreover, the era of prayer and petition was over and the Indians realised that even they could now dictate their terms to their Imperial masters, to a limited extent, if they so desired. The British Government, on the other hand, understood the value of India's co-operation. At the same time they thought it necessary to placate the Indian nationalists by giving concessions in the form of constitutional reform. However, it must be in consonance with the interests of the Empire. Frankly speaking, it was a sort of give and take business and the British Government adopted a show of liberalism possibly because they began to dread the idea of non-co-operation by Indian nationalists at that juncture.

Abbreviations used in the references :

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| 1. Progs : G.I. (L.C.) : Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the Governor-General of India. | 4. P.D. (H/L) : Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords. |
| 2. Progs : Bom. (L.C.) : Proceedings of the Legislative Council of Bombay. | 5. R.I.N.C. : Report of the Indian National Congress. |
| 3. P.D. (H/C) : Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons. | 6. R.I.C.R. : Report on Indian Constitutional Reform, 1918, Reprint, Calcutta, 1928. |

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| 3. Chirol, V., <i>Indian Unrest</i> , London, 1910, pp. 332-33. | 9. Spear, Percival, <i>India</i> , Michigan University Press, 1961, pp. 337-46. |
| 4. Tilak, B. G., <i>Maratha</i> , 13 January, 1907. | 10. R.I.N.C., 1914, p. 36. |
| 5. R.I.N.C., 1917, p. 86. | 11. Rushbrook Williams, L. F., <i>op. cit.</i> , p. 25 |
| 6. Rushbrook Williams, L. F., <i>India in the years 1917-18</i> , Calcutta, 1919, p. 32. | 12. See my paper : "Representative Government in India, during the Second half of 19th Century", <i>Indo-British Review</i> , Madras, Vol. III No. 2, October-December 1970, pp. 52-58. |
| 7. Rai, Lajpat, <i>An Open Letter to the Right</i> | |

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| 13. R.I.N.C., 1915, pp. 23, 25, 30; see also <i>Times of India</i> , 15 May, 21 June, 2 August 1917. | 39. P.D. (H/C), Vol. 109, p. 1182. |
| 14. <i>Times of India</i> , 30 December, 1916; see also 1, 2 January, 1917. | 40. Quoted, Merhotra, S. R., <i>India and the Commonwealth</i> , 1885-1929, London, 1965, p. 46. |
| 15. Tilak, B. G., <i>Kesari</i> (Marathi), 9 October, 1917. | 41. R.I.C.R., p. 21. |
| 16. Sinha, S. P., <i>Presidential Address of the I.N.C.</i> , Bombay, 1915, p. 3. (This is a separate bulletin which contains only Sir S. P. Sinha's speech.) | 42. Hardie, J. Keir, <i>op. cit.</i> , p. 80. |
| 17. <i>Speeches of Surendra Nath Banerjee</i> , Vol. I, Calcutta, 1970, p. 168. | 43. Quoted, Waley, S. D., <i>E. Montagu : A Memoir and an Account of His Visits to India</i> , Bombay, 1964, p. 127. |
| 18. R.I.N.C., 1917, p. 19. | 44. Quoted, Waley, <i>op. cit.</i> , pp. 83-84. |
| 19. <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 101. | 45. P.D. (H/C), Vol. 116, p. 2302. |
| 20. <i>Freedom Speaks : Being a Resume of the Ideals of the I.N.C.</i> , 1885-1945, undated, p. 19. | 46. Quoted, Waley, <i>op. cit.</i> , p. 134. |
| 21. R.I.N.C., 1917, pp. 102-3. | 47. R.I.C.R., p. 2. |
| 22. <i>Speeches</i> , S. N. Banerjee, vide p. 166-7. | 48. R.I.N.C., 1917, p. 95. |
| 23. <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 170. | 49. R.I.C.R., p. 52, also. |
| 24. <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 173. | P.D. (H/L), Vol. 31, p. 814. |
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| 28. Sinha, S. P., <i>op. cit.</i> , p. 6. | 53. Coatman, John, <i>India : The Road to Self-Government</i> , London, 1941, p. 42. |
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| 32. <i>Ibid.</i> , p. 112. | 57. R.I.N.C., 1918, Appendix F, pp. XXV to CXXVIII. |
| 33. Progs. G.I. (L.C.), 1914-15, Vol. I, 111, pp. 606, 609, 637. | 58. P.D. (H/C), Vol. 116, p. 2382. |
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| 37. Hardie, J. Keir, <i>India : Impressions and Suggestions</i> , London, 2nd Edn., 1917, Foreword by Philip Snowden, Foreword, p. XII. | 62. Progs : Bom. (L.C.), Vol. 51, p. 2. |
| 38. Maconochie, Evan, <i>Life in the Indian Civil</i> | 63. Quoted, Merhotra, <i>op. cit.</i> , p. 46. |
| | 64. R.I.C.R., p. 148. |
| | 65. P.D. (H/C), Vol. 116, p. 1154. |
| | 66. P.D. (H/C), Vol. 109, p. 2304. |
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BOOK REVIEWS

Essays in Indian History, Edited by Donovan Williams and E. Daniel Potts, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1973, pages 259, Price Rs. 35.00.

Dr. C. C. Davies is a household name in the world of Indian historical research. *The Problem of the North-West Frontier*, 1932, and *Warren Hastings and Oudh*, 1939, established him as an outstanding scholar more than a quarter of a century ago. *An Historical Atlas of the Indian Peninsula*, which he produced in 1948, made him immensely popular among the Indian historians as well as the graduates and under-graduates of Indian universities. He also edited *The Banares Diary of Warren Hastings* in 1948 and *The Private Correspondence of Lord Macartney* in 1950. Apart from these works, an outstanding contribution of this great Oxford University scholar is the production of a galaxy of eminent historians on South Asia, who have produced some of the most serious and painstaking studies under his direction and have provided a new interpretation to many obscure and complex problems of history. This galaxy, *inter alia*, includes Professors S. Gopal, Kenneth Ingham, Muniruddin Chughtai, T. Raychaudhari, I. M. Habib and Donovan Williams.

Dr. C. C. Davies, it is interesting to note, started his career as a militaryman in 1915 and was twice wounded during his service in France in 1916-17. Professor C. H. Philips, in his 'Tribute,' writes about this transformation of a soldier into a historian: "In 1918 he proceeded to India as Captain where he served on the north-west frontiers through the Third Afghan War and between 1921-22 saw savage fighting in Waziristan. . . . With his historical imagination stirred by what he had seen in India, he proceeded on his return to Britain

to equip himself academically, taking a distinguished first degree in history in the University of Wales, then proceeding for a higher degree to Peterhouse, Cambridge, where he worked under Harold Temperley."

Essays in Indian History, a *festschrift* on the seventy-fifth birthday of C. C. Davies contains studies on various aspects of Nineteenth Century South Asian History, particularly India, such as *Gladstone and India*, *British Attitudes towards European Settlement and Colonization in India*, *General Sir Hugh Gough and the Punjab Campaign*, *Education in India and East Africa*, *Indian National Congress and the Muslims, 1885-1896*, *Missionaries and the Beginnings of the Secular State in India*, *Famine in India*, *Decline of the Marquess of Hastings*, and *India and the East Indies, 1807-1813*. Dr. Gulammohammad Refai's contribution on *Aurangzeb and Dara Shukoh: Conflict of Ideologies*, though well-documented, seems to be completely out of place from the point of view of chronology, quality and content. It is a long rigmarole, trite and meaningless. Making recondite and sweeping judgements, Dr. Gulammohammad Refai holds Aurangzeb responsible for changing the history of India "from secularism to communalism, and from cohesion to disintegration." According to the learned author what happened during the centuries following the death of Aurangzeb was but "a tragic epilogue of what had gone on previously." It is incomprehensible what the author means by making such imperspicuous remarks. Does he mean the integration of the Indian people during the British regime or the partition of India in 1947? Dr. Refai, making a comparative study of Dara and Akbar further remarks: "Dara was capable of reading, understanding, and compiling a book; Akbar was not." Obviously Dr. Refai does not know

what he is writing. Does he mean to say that Akbar, whose power of understanding and comprehension has never been challenged, was incapable of understanding a book solely because he was illiterate? Dr. Refai in a brief explanatory note about his essay says that it had not been possible to include his "findings" on the rise of "Hindu-Muslim Communalism as a Social Force during Aurangzeb's Reign" in this paper. Perhaps, that might be the reason for the odious comparisons and generalisations made by the author in his present study.

Based on the private papers of Gladstone available at the British Museum, London, *Gladstone and India*, by Professor S. Gopal studies the increasing interest of Gladstone in Indian developments. It is interesting to note that, as early as 1829, Gladstone wrote a poem on *Sati*, highlighting the voluntary nature of this socio-religious institution and practice. Gladstone wrote:

She sate resolved-in death
Seal'd with a spouse's blood a spouse's faith,
And strove, nor vainly strove her soul, to
prove
Tho' strong were torture, stronger yet was
love.

Paying a warm tribute to William Bentinck who abolished this practice of self-immolation in 1829, Gladstone wrote:

"Bentinck! 'Twas thine the bloodless
crown to win
Proud victor over deeds of death and sin!
Spirit of England's fame, no longer dim,
A voice of thunder, thou didst speak in
him;
Echoed the glad command from shore to
shore
And murder's ghastly flame ascends no
more."

According to Professor Gopal, Gladstone did not achieve much in India. The Viceroys

selected by him were men of slight calibre; and he himself was preoccupied elsewhere. Making a critical assessment of Gladstonian Liberalism in its impact on India, Professor Gopal concludes: "The experiment in Ripon's time to govern India in accordance with Gladstone's principles came, in practical terms, almost to nothing; but the immediate failure led to a later and more eventful triumph. For it kept alive the conviction that political and social advance in India should be a co-operative adventure of the rulers and the ruled."

Dr. John Riddy in his essay *Some Official British Attitudes towards European Settlements and Colonization up to 1865* examines the exile mentality of the Europeans in India, who felt as mere "sojourners in the land, only camping and on the march" due to British policy of not allowing Europeans to settle in this country. According to census reports of 1891, there were only 1,68,158 Europeans in India which included the service personnel, the mercantile population and the civil servants. It is unfortunate, however, that the author has based his studies mainly on the *Papers relating to the settlement of Europeans in India, 1854* and the *British Parliamentary Papers* and has almost completely neglected the contemporary Indian and British newspapers and periodicals, which, it is well known, discussed this problem at a considerable length and depth.

Muniruddin Chughtai's essay: *The Indian National Congress and the Muslims, 1885-96*, analyses the root cause of Muslim disapproval of the Congress programmes and policies, particularly the attitude of Sir Saiyad Ahmad Khan, who condemned the Congress movement as "seditious." There is nothing new in Dr. Chughtai's interpretation except his emphasis on 'Syed Mahmud-Theodore Beck' Scheme of 1896, as the basis of Muslim political movement for a separate Muslim State.

The Decline of Marquis of Hastings by Dr. Richard John Bingle makes out an interest-

ing case of how physical and mental exhaustion ultimately resulted in decline of Marquess of Hastings. According to the author, Hastings sometimes fell asleep in the Bengal Council and other members of the Council gave instructions to the Secretaries contrary to his previously expressed opinions.

On the whole, *Essays in Indian History* is a contribution to historical research on South Asia. It deserves serious notice and study.

B. M. SANKHDHER

Guru Gobind Singh, By J. S. Grewal and S. S. Bal. Punjab University, Chandigarh, 1967, Price Rs. 10/-.

This book was written on the occasion of the tercentenary of Guru Gobind Singh's birth. The authors are well-known scholars in the field of Sikh history, but the work is not as comprehensive as one might expect. Dr. R. R. Sethi remarks in his Foreword that "left to themselves they would have spent at least a few more years on the subject before publicizing the results of their researches." That opportunity will be available when the book goes through a second edition. In the meanwhile students of Sikh history must acknowledge their debt to the authors for the best book so far written on the life of the tenth Guru. They aimed at "discovering the historical Guru Gobind Singh," setting and later traditions and legends, and exploring authentic historical evidence in conformity with the established canons of historical research. The bibliography reveals the extent and depth of their acquaintance with source materials; the footnotes show how carefully they have used every piece of available information. Yet the totality of the Guru's achievement does not emerge clearly and fully perhaps because the authors had to complete their difficult task in haste.

The early years of the Guru's life are sketched in Chapters II-III. In the following

Chapters much space is necessarily devoted to the Guru's struggle against the Hill Rajas. The subject is a very complicated one, and there are questions which will not be answered fully and satisfactorily till the discovery of fresh evidence. As political issues were mingled with socio-religious and economic issues there is no simple explanation of the bitter hostilities which played a decisive role in the development of the Sikh community. The appearance of Mughal officials as allies of the Hill Rajas gave a new complexion to the struggle and converted it into an issue of imperial politics. The Guru's problem, according to the authors, was "to defend the claims of conscience against external interference" with the internal affairs of the Sikh *Panth* (pp. 112-113). The activities of the Sikhs in the Hill region could hardly be described as "internal affairs of the *Panth*." More elaborate and critical examination of Mughal policy would be desirable in order to place the Guru's sayings and actions in the proper perspective.

In Chapter VI, supplemented by Appendix C, the authors explain the creation of the Khalsa. It was, they say, the re-affirmation of the faith promulgated by Nanak (p. 126); but the underlying unity and continuity are not explained. The re-examination of Bute Shah's statement (pp. 182-189) throws new light on the character and purpose of the Khalsa.

The problem of the Guru's death is dismissed in one sentence: The assassin's motive "cannot be ascertained" (p. 237). The Guru's contributions to religious thought and literature deserve more adequate treatment.

The book contains 3 maps and 4 illustrations.

A. C. BANERJEE

Indo-Persian Relations: A Study of Political & Diplomatic Relations between the Mughul Empire & Iran (Sources of the History & Geography of Iran No. 32), By Riazul Islam,

Published by the Iranian Cultural Foundation, Teheran, with a foreword by Parviz Natel Khanlary, General Secretary of the Iranian Foundation, 1970, pages I-XXI, 287, with 6 plates and a map; Price not noted.

In our country there is a general absence of coordination between historical research and text-books. The progress in the former is not quickly reflected in the latter. The study of diplomatic history in medieval India is still in its infancy. Recently a few research studies in the shape of monographs and articles have been written on the subject. But usually writers of text-books take little cognizance of such studies. So foreign policy as such does not figure prominently in our text-books. The need of studying Indian history against the panorama of general Asiatic or world history cannot be over-emphasized. The proper understanding of Mughal-Persian relations requires a study of the wider Asiatic environment, the diplomatic background not only of the Mughals or the Persians but also of the contemporary neighbouring powers, the Ottoman Turks, the Uzbeks, the Ilkhanids of Khorasan and others. This, however, requires a critical and comprehensive study of sources relating to the history of all these peoples and their respective countries. The importance of the book under review will, therefore, be amply clear.

This work represents a revised and enlarged version of the thesis approved for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by the University of Cambridge (1957). It is the first comprehensive, critical and well-documented study of the relations between the Mughals and the Safavis from 1510 to the mid-18th century. It is based on a critical, synthetic and exhaustive use of different classes of sources. Mughal, Deccani, Safavid, Turani, viz., (i) Persian manuscripts, (ii) Persian printed books and their translations, (iii) collection of diplomatic correspondence (manuscripts and printed), (iv) Travel Literature and Jesuit accounts.

Besides various relevant modern works and articles in standard periodicals have also been laid under contribution (Appendix K and Bibliography, pages 238-269). The author's unpublished *Calendar of Documents on Indo-Persian Relations* is based on an extensive use of manuscripts in "the libraries of London, Cambridge, Oxford, Edinburgh, Paris, Vienna, Istanbul, Teheran, Mashhad, Karachi, Lahore and many other places", the total number of letters so calendered exceeding 450 (pages 270-71).

(Of the ten chapters of the book, chapter 1 traces the political background from Timur's death in 1405 down to the battle of Merv in 1510. The next six chapters (II-VII) deal with the relations of each of the first six Mughal emperors with the Safavis, focussing attention on the conflict over Qandahar. Nevertheless formal profession of friendship and exchanges of letters and missions continued fairly regularly. The book throws interesting and new light on Shah Tahmasp's relations with the 'discrowned fugitive' Humayun. We are told that alarmed by the Shah's displeasure and threats (on life), Humayun recited the contents of three papers presented by the Shah's Vakil, Qazi Jahan, signifying acceptance of Shiaism. Their contents are not stated but were "objectionable" to Humayun. It was after all a political move on the part of Humayun. All these chapters are highly informative and throw light on the question of balance of power in medieval Asia. The idea has occasionally been hinted at in this book but has not been fully emphasized. The beginning of the sixteenth century was a landmark in Islamic and World history. Four empires (Ottoman Turks, Mughals, Uzbeks and Safavis) rose almost simultaneously. The first three were Sunnis and the fourth was Shia. Their diplomatic relations were sometimes determined by strategic and political, economic and commercial as well as socio-religious considerations. The Uzbeks hostile to Persia, friendly to the Ottomans, and ever

watchful of the Mughals, played an important part in holding the balance of power in the area. It is also interesting to note that on several occasions the idea of a Sunni triple alliance or united front against Shia Persia was mooted but for some reason or other the idea did not materialise. An additional cause of Mughal-Persian rivalry lay in the conflicting ambitions of the respective rulers for exercising political suzerainty over the Shia Sultanates in the Deccan, Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and Golkonda. For Persia this was buttressed by religious considerations. But to the Mughals with their aggressive imperialism it was a question of extra-territorial loyalty of the last two Bahmanide offshoots to Persia which could not be tolerated.

Chapter VIII deals with the post-Aurangzeb period from 1707 with special reference to Nadir Shah's relations with the Mughal empire and invasion. The subject has been dealt with by Irvine, Jadunath Sarkar, Laurence Lockhart and Satish Chandra, but our author has thrown new light on the diplomatic aspects of the period which have not as fully emphasized by them as here. Special mention must be made of the Treaty of Shalimar, the mission of the *pansad bashis* and the abortive Mughal-Ottoman link-up against Persia. The last aspect certainly reveals a little known aspect of the diplomacy of an emperor, well-known as *Rangila*, and certainly portrays Muhammad Shah in a new and favourable light.

While the major part of the book deals with political and diplomatic relations, our author has not ignored the non-political or cultural and economic aspects of Indo-Persian relations. Though brief, Chapter IX dealing with Literature, Arts (painting and architecture) and Commerce is highly interesting. The author has added this chapter to complete the picture of Indo-Persian relations. He has rightly concluded that "the traffic in cultural influence was one way", viz., from Iran to India

and not vice-versa and has tried to explain why it was so.

The concluding Chapter (X) analyses the factors of amity and of conflict and sums up the broad phases in the political relations between India and Persia. At the end the author compares Mughal India with Safavid Persia: "Broadly speaking, the Mughal empire compares favourably with contemporary Persia in material civilization, in the patronage of humanities and in a liberal policy in religious and sectarian matters. The Safavid regime suffered from intolerance which led to cultural deterioration and intellectual impoverishment in Iran." But Persia was superior "in artillery and siege trains", the Mughals (except Kamran) never scoring a military success at Qandahar (page 186).

The Appendices, eleven in number (pages 187-238) deal with some important and controversial topics like :

- (a) Amir Timur and Khwaja Sultan Ali ;
- (b) Babur's conversion to Shiism and his Vassalage coins ;
- (c) Humayun's conversion to Shiism ;
- (d) The Persian Auxiliaries : Their commission and their relations with Humayun ;
- (e) Humayun and Bahram Mirza Safavi ;
- (f) Sher Shah Suri and Shah Tahmasp ;
- (g) Duration of Khan Alam's stay in Iran ;
- (h) Embassies to and from Princes ;
- (i) Formulation of Foreign Policy ;
- (j) Diplomatic Usage ; and
- (k) A Note on the Sources.

The author's narrative is clear and conclusions sound and reasonable.

The value of the book is considerably heightened by the inclusion of a highly critical note on the sources, a detailed bibliography, a good index and an excellent map showing 'Mughal Empire and Iran and neighbouring

countries' at the end of the book. The Table of Contents, however, has 'India' in place of 'Mughal empire'. The map, however, does not specify the period. There are six plates one of which is coloured.

There are a few points regarding which there is an element of doubt. Take for instance the statement that under Jahangir the frontier of the Mughal empire in the Deccan remained unchanged (page 116). Again the author has not given any reason why he considers the reviewer's inferences that Mirza Muqim was also accredited to Murad to be incorrect (page 122n). The reviewer feels that the inclusion of a few letters showing the exchange of missions and embassies between the four major powers and the Deccani Sultanates, of which the book is full, would have considerably added to its value.

The printing and get-up are good. There are, however, a few printing mistakes, besides those noted in corrigenda (page 272) ; 'hed' for 'had' (page 52) ; 'Abark' for 'Akbar' (page 55) ; 1697 for 1597 (page 55) ; 'form' for 'from' (page 76) ; 'practicee' for 'practice' (page 93) ; 'ilitary' for 'military' (page 103) ; 1659 for 1649 (page 115n. 4) ; Mendelso for Mandelso (page 122n) ; 'Abkhar' for 'Akhar' (page 244) ; Khafi Khan's Muntakhabut 'Fawarikh' for 'Lubab' (page 244). The reviewer's book 'Life of Mir Jumla' (1951), though noted on page 119n., does not find a place in the bibliography on page 266. The binding of the book is somewhat weak.

But these are only minor points. All in all the book is an outstanding one and will remain a standard work of reference until the discovery of fresh materials which is not very likely in the near future. The author is to be congratulated on producing this excellent work, which is really a contribution to little known diplomatic history of the period. The Iranian

Culture Foundation, Teheran, has laid the academic world under a deep debt of gratitude by publishing this book.

J. N. SARKAR

From Guru Nanak to Maharaja Ranjit Singh,
By J. S. Grewal, Guru Nanak University,
Amritsar, 1972, Price Rs. 20/-.

This volume of 195 pages contains 18 essays in Sikh history, each of which (as the author rightly says) "presents a few major points of some importance to the student of Sikh history." Taken together, they "provide some insights" into the history of the Sikhs from the days of Guru Nanak to those of Ranjit Singh.

There are 6 essays on Guru Nanak, one dealing with his life at Sultanpur, and the rest covering his religious views. Then follow 5 essays on Guru Gobind Singh. These may be read along with *Guru Gobind Singh* by J. S. Grewal and S. S. Bal. An entirely new ground is covered by 5 essays dealing with Sikh policy. The religious and political aspects of Sikh history have so far monopolised our attention, but a critical study of Sikh social and political order is overdue. The remaining two essays deal with "Cunningham as a historian of the Sikhs" and "Toynbee's interpretation of Sikh history."

Full discussion of any problem is precluded by the brevity of the essays, but there are many thought-provoking hints and suggestions which no serious student of Sikh history can ignore.

A. C. BANERJEE


The Present State of Sikh Studies, By J. S. Grewal, Christian Institute of Sikh Studies,

Baring Union Christian College, Batala, Punjab, 1973, Price 75 Paise.

This monograph contains a 15-page essay which was presented by Professor Grewal as the inaugural lecture at the formal opening of the library and seminar room of the Christian Institute of Sikh Studies at Batala in August, 1972. Most of the space is devoted to a brief review

of the writings on Sikh history since the days of Cunningham. While fully recognising the need of re-interpretation of the pre-British period of Sikh history Dr. Grewal draws our attention to the "immense possibilities" offered by the problems of Sikh society and religion after 1849.

A. C. BANERJEE



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