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
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EDITOR : S. P. SEN

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THE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF HISTORICAL STUDIES

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EDITORIAL

Annual General Meeting :

The Twelfth Annual General Meeting of the Institute of Historical Studies was held in the Blue Hall of the Institute on 16th September, 1973. Dr. R. C. Majumdar, the eminent historian, presided over the function.

In presenting the Annual Report for 1972-73, the Director first referred to the sad and untimely demise of two members of the Executive Committee, Professor Nirmal Kumar Bose and Dr. Ashirvadi Lal Srivastava, and also of an old member of the Institute, Dr. A. D. Pusalkar. The whole gathering stood in silence for a minute in memory of the departed.

In presenting the Annual Report for 1972-73 the Director gave a fairly detailed account of the various activities of the Institute during the year under review. As he stated : "The year 1972-73 was a record of steady progress and development. It was particularly a year of solid achievement—release of the First Volume of the monumental project, *Dictionary of National Biography*, first undertaken in 1964." He referred with pleasure to the rise in the Membership of the Institute and its

increasingly all-India character. As he said, "there is not a single State from where we do not have at least a few members."

The following new Fellows were elected under Article V of the Constitution by the College of Fellows :

1. Dr. A. K. Narain,
Principal,
College of Indology,
Banaras Hindu University,
Banaras (U.P.).
2. Dr. Robert E. Frykenberg,
Department of History,
University of Wisconsin,
Madison-6,
Wisconsin, U.S.A.
3. Dr. E. T. Stokes,
Cambridge University,
Cambridge, U.K.
4. Dr. T. K. Ravindran,
Professor and Head of the Department
of History,
University of Kerala,
Trivandrum,
Kerala.

We welcome the new Fellows and hope to get from them the fullest co-operation in our work. It is gratifying to note that the Fellowship of the Institute is regarded as a great academic distinction all over the world.

The Director regretted that during the year under review discussion meetings could not be held as regularly as before but hoped that it could be held more regularly in the year 1973-74. In the Annual Report the Director gave a detailed account of the Tenth Annual Conference of the Institute held at the Kurukshetra University, Haryana, in October 1972, under the Presidentship of Dr. R. C. Majumdar. The list of papers presented is quite impressive as covering a large ground on both the themes selected for the Conference.

The Director next referred to the *Quarterly Review of Historical Studies* and expressed his gratification that, along with its academic standard, the journal was able to maintain its record of having the largest circulation among Indian historical journals. As he said, "We always have a good number of papers in the waiting file and the quality of the journal is also evident from the increasing number of books sent by publishers, both Indian and foreign, for review." He, however, regretted the increasing cost of paper, printing and postage, putting a heavy strain on the financial resources of the journal, and feared that if this trend of increased cost continued, we would be forced to revise the present subscription rate of the journal.

The Director next referred to the Library, which has one of the best collections of historical journals in the country. Regular additions are also made to our collection of books by the volumes sent for review or as gifts. He appealed to the Government of West Bengal in particular, to make a suitable additional grant to enable us to build up a good reference library.

During the year under review two interesting

publications of the Institute came out—*Modern Bengal: A Socio-Economic Survey* and *Historians and Historiography in Modern India*. It is gratifying to note that our publications are highly appreciated in academic circles and have a large demand in the market, both in India and abroad. An IHS publication now means a quality publication and is greatly prized by the reading public.

The Director next referred to the release of Vol. I of the *Dictionary of National Biography* at a Press Conference at New Delhi. The volume has received appreciative comments from most of the newspapers and also the reading public.

In the Annual Report the Director reported that the Government of West Bengal had entrusted the Institute with a new research project in recognition of its past record of work. The State Government had undertaken in 1963 a Project of compiling a Who's Who in the Freedom Movement in Bengal from 1905 to 1947. But the work remained incomplete and the Government of West Bengal sought the help of the Institute of Historical Studies in editing and completing the scheme. The Institute agreed to co-operate with the Government of West Bengal by undertaking the new task. It is gratifying to note that the Institute was given complete academic freedom by the Government in respect of the Project. As the Director stated: "This is the first occasion when the Institute was commissioned by a State Government to undertake a Project, sponsored and started by the Government itself. It shows the growing confidence in the country about the competence of the Institute to undertake a large historical research project It is a recognition from the Government which is well-earned and well-deserved."

In spite of its brilliant record of work during the year under review, the Director expressed his unhappiness over the financial position of the Institute, specially on the General side. As he complained, "The plain fact is that

unless we get external financial assistance to the extent of Rs. 15,000/- a year, the annual deficit cannot be avoided and in another few years, the total accumulated deficit will again reach a desperate figure." Regarding the experience with the Government of India, the Director regretted: "For the last three years the Government of India had sanctioned a General Maintenance Grant of Rs. 5,000/- only per year. We had appealed for an additional grant to meet our deficit but we were disappointed. In 1972-73 the Government of India had set up the Indian Council of Historical Research which (quite irrelevantly) is to act as an Advisory Body to the Ministry of Education in considering grants by the Ministry to any historical association. The composition of the ICHR and specially of its Research Project Committee is such that we cannot expect any support from that body. The Ministry of Education proposed to raise the Annual Grant from Rs. 5,000/- to Rs. 10,000/- several times, but every time the ICHR Research Project Committee opposed the move. Unless there is a change in the set-up of the ICHR or in the Ministry of Education it seems that we cannot expect in future anything more than what we had been getting in the past." The Director, however, reported that the Government of West Bengal had sanctioned a General Maintenance Grant of Rs. 5,000/- from the year 1972-73. This still falls short of our actual needs, and as the Director said in desperation, "all that we can do now is to try to increase our own financial resources through the sale of publications and increased membership fees."

This financial picture is most depressing and it is a pity that the Government of India, which is spending large amounts on new-fashioned institutions like the ICSSR and the ICHR, pleads lack of funds when appeals are made from small non-official organisations for financial assistance. As the Director bitterly complained, "What the Government really wants is to spend lavishly on its own institutions and projects and to plead want of money when

appeals come from non-official associations, as if the tax-payers are paying money only to maintain Government institutions and not to feel concerned about the fate of smaller non-official institutions. It leaves one with the impression that the Government is not interested in promoting independent academic bodies but in controlling all such bodies through Government-sponsored institutions and distribution of patronage among the friends of the Court."

Eleventh Annual Conference :

The Eleventh Annual Conference of the Institute of Historical Studies was held at the Shivaji University, Kolhapur (Maharashtra), from 17th to 20th October, 1973. The Conference was inaugurated by Shri S. K. Wankhede, Speaker of the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly, and presided over by Mahamahopadhyaya D. V. Potdar, formerly Vice-Chancellor of the University of Poona. It was attended by delegates representing most of the States and Universities in the country. While inaugurating the Conference Shri Wankhede referred to the rich historical heritage of Maharashtra and also the wealth of historical material preserved in the different Archives and Libraries of Maharashtra. The Acting Vice-Chancellor of the Shivaji University welcomed the delegates and spoke about the history and antiquity of Kolhapur and the progressive views of its rulers regarding education, social reforms, etc. The Director of the Institute gave a brief introduction to the different activities of the Institute and explained briefly the scope and significance of the two themes chosen for discussion at the Conference—*Historical Biography in Indian Literature* and *Sources of the History of Maharashtra*. The President, Mahamahopadhyaya D. V. Potdar, gave a learned address and advocated the need for spreading our existing historical knowledge through the medium of all modern Indian languages.

The Conference was quite succe

keeping with the past tradition of the Institute. The standard of papers was quite high and the discussions on the papers were most lively. Every paper-reading session, unlike at several other similar Conferences, was very well-attended and many of those present took an active part in the discussion on papers. It is a most gratifying feature about our Annual Conference where people come with all academic seriousness of purpose and give their best to make the Conference a success.

We take this opportunity to thank the Vice-Chancellor, Dr. A. G. Pawar, who had invited the Institute to hold its Eleventh Annual Conference at Kolhapur. Unfortunately, ill-health prevented him from being personally present at the Conference, but his inspiring leadership was evident in all the arrangements made by the University authorities for the Conference. Our thanks are also due to the Acting Vice-Chancellor, Principal Bhogishayana, who acted as the Chairman of the Reception Committee, to Shri S. K. Wankhede, who inaugurated the Conference, and to Mahamahopadhyaya D. V. Potdar, who presided over the Conference. We are also thankful to Dr. (Mrs.) Usha Ithape, the Registrar, and to Professor S. D. Kapse, the Local Secretary, and his departmental colleagues, who looked to every detail of the arrangements for the Conference. The delegates were happy and comfortable during their stay at Kolhapur.

We are giving below a full list of papers scheduled to be presented at the Conference. Some of the papers were not actually read as the writers were not present, but they will be included in the Volumes when published.

LIST OF PAPERS

Theme : Historical Biography in Indian Literature.

Ancient Indian Literature (Sanskrit).

—Dr. Kalyan Kumar Das Gupta (Calcutta University).

Indo-Tibetan Literature.

—Dr. N. N. Bhattacharya (Calcutta University).

Persian Literature in Medieval Period.

—Dr. J. N. Sarkar (Jadavpur University).

Bengali Literature.

—Dr. Amitabha Mukherjee (Jadavpur University) and Dr. Tarasankar Banerjee (Visva-Bharati University).

Assamese Literature.

—Professor S. N. Sarma (Gauhati University).

Oriya Literature.

—Dr. Gopal Chandra Misra (Sambalpur University).

Hindi Literature.

—Dr. H. S. Srivastava (Gorakhpur University).

Urdu Literature.

—Dr. M. S. Jain (Rajasthan University).

Punjabi Literature.

—Dr. Ganda Singh (Punjabi University).

Sanskrit Literature of Rajasthan.

—Dr. G. N. Sharma (Rajasthan University).

Early Medieval Rajasthani Literature.

—Dr. M. S. Ahluwalia (Himachal Pradesh University).

Modern Rajasthani Literature.

—Dr. R. P. Vyas (Jodhpur University).

Gujarati Literature.

—Dr. V. K. Chavda (M. S. University of Baroda).

Marathi Literature.

—Dr. A. R. Kulkarni (University of Poona), Shri J. V. Naik (Bombay University) and Shri Anil Samarth (Visva-Bharati University).

Tamil Literature.

—Mr. S. N. Padmanabhan (Madras Christian College).

Telugu Literature.

—Dr. (Miss) Sarojini Regani (Director, State Archives of A.P.).

Kannada Literature.

—Dr. H. V. Srinivasamurthy (Bangalore University).

Malayalam Literature.

—Dr. P. S. Velayudhan (Kerala) and Dr.

S. Gopala Krishnan (S. V. University, Tirupati).

Indo-Anglian Literature.

—Dr. Sukumar Bhattaeharyya (Visva-Bharati University).

Theme : Sources of Maratha History.

(Ancient Period).

—Dr. S. H. Ritti (Karnatak University), Dr. S. B. Deo (Nagpur University), Shri B. R. Kamble (Shivaji University) and Dr. L. B. Keny (Bombay University).

(Medieval Period).

—Dr. D. N. Chitnis (Poona University), Dr. G. H. Khare (Bharat Itihas Samshodhak Mandal, Poona), Shri Teotonio R. de'Souza (Poona University) and Shri N. G. Bhawre (Marathwada University).

The Legal Significance of the Practice of Money-lending in Maharashtra in the 17th Century with Special Reference to their Ancient and Modern Parallels.

—V. Govind.

(Modern Period).

—Shri M. D. Nalawade (Shivaji University).

Historical-Scientific Instruments as the Sources for the History of Modern Technology of Maharashtra.

—V. Govind.

(Archival Material).

—Dr. N. H. Kulkarni (National Archives of India, New Delhi), Dr. V. G. Khobrekar (Maharashtra State Archives, Bombay), Dr. V. G. Hatalkar (Bombay)—French Archival Material, Dr. V. T. Gune (Goa

Archives, Panaji, Goa) and Shri V. S. Kadam (Shivaji University)—Kolhapur Archives.

Dictionary of National Biography :

We are happy to report that Vol. II of the Dictionary of National Biography, covering names from E to L, came out in September 1973. It should have been out long ago, but for labour troubles in the press which ended in a lock-out for nearly three months. Like Vol. I, Vol. II has also been very well received by the reading public and it would not be an exaggeration to say that the DNB is the best-seller, in its price range, among all the Indian publications during 1972-73. We deeply regret the delay in the publication of Vol. II, but it was due to circumstances which we had not foreseen and over which we had no control.

Our experience with the previous press not having been happy, we have changed the printing press for Vols. III and IV. Vol. III, covering names from 'M' to 'R', was sent to press in October, and is expected to be out by January 1974. The work is progressing satisfactorily and we hope we shall be able to maintain the time schedule. Vol. IV will be sent to a different press in December 1973 and is likely to be published by April 1974. Those who have experience of printing such voluminous titles will appreciate the difficulties and problems which crop up from time to time and delay the progress of work. They will admit that the publication of four volumes of a monumental project like the DNB in less than two years is a record about which one can be reasonably proud.

In our next issue we shall give a list of names included in Vol. II of the DNB.

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**A FRESH LOOK AT HITLER'S ROLE IN THE
SECOND WORLD WAR**

JYOTIRMOY BANERJEE

(Jadavpur University, Calcutta)

The history of modern Germany presents certain curious aspects. Twice in the first half of this century Germany challenged the status quo in Europe guarded by the other great powers, and each time her desperate attempt was frustrated. But following each catastrophe which befell her power-position, the victorious powers went almost out of their way to help repair the damage.

This paper proposes to offer a theoretical model which is expected to be the key to the understanding of the subject under discussion. The model is related to the built-in logic of "the German situation." Perhaps the German word "Lage" is a better substitute for the word "situation," hence, it is proposed to characterize the model as the "German Lage." By the logic of the German Lage, primarily three inter-connected factors are meant here :

- (a) Germany's disadvantageous geographical situation (e.g., lack of a long coastline which determines a State's maritime strength, the potential threat of a war on two fronts due to her situation in Central Europe, the relatively limited availability to her of raw materials and foodstuffs, etc.) :
- (b) Her position in international politics (especially her relations at any given time with Britain, France, Russia and the U.S.A.) ; and
- (c) Her Macht ambitions (caused by a

belated achievement of nationhood, the glorification of such concepts as the State, power and war by Germany's prominent thinkers, Prussian militarism, and, consequently, the growing feeling that she had to find "a place in the sun").¹

The inter-relationship among these factors constituted the Lage. Given her naturally disadvantageous geographical situation, if Germany ever tended to pursue power-goals substantially higher than those set by Bismarck, her position in international politics would tend to deteriorate and become responsive to her geographical weakness.

In systemic language we can rationalize the Lage in the following manner :

If component three (Macht ambitions) is placed at a high level, it would act as an input to component two (situation in international politics). The output would be the deterioration of the position of component two, which now tends to be responsive, and to correspond to component one (weak geographical position). Feedback takes place when the variable component two and the constant component one, in their turn, act as inputs to component three, the output being the lowering of the latter to a level far below the one to be found at the beginning of this chain reaction.

- We can deduce a further empirically verifiable principle from the above analysis of the
- (c) Her Macht ambitions (caused by a

German Lage. Given high ambitions in terms of Machtpolitik as a constant, Germany's position in international politics would tend to be constantly unfavourable. When politics fails, armed conflict remains the only solution to the achievement of aims. This explains much of German militarism in the recent past.

The historian enjoys the benefit of hindsight, and, hence, it is not difficult for him to point out past mistakes. However, it goes to the credit of Bismarck, gifted as he was with the classic talents of the statesman, to have grasped the immanent logic of the Lage.² Hence, even at the peak of his power, he held German ambitions in check, and professed to remain satisfied with the notion of "Kleindeutschland" regarding the future status of Germany. It was also wise of Moltke, the senior, to confine himself to military tasks and not to question Bismarck's political leadership, despite the fact that their relationship was otherwise cool. And it is another peculiarity of modern German history that Clausewitz's famous dictum, "Der Krieg ist die blosse Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln,"³ was appreciated by and large only by the founding-fathers of the Reich of 1871, Bismarck and Moltke, the senior; subsequent German history presents an overall picture of military considerations gaining an upper hand over diplomatic ones. The consequence was that the fear of "Einkreisung" never left the Germans after Bismarck, and almost all of their politico-military planning in the subsequent decades placed it at the starting-point.

II

Bearing the theoretical model of the German Lage in mind, let us now proceed to examine Hitler's role in the Second World War. The point this paper proposes to make is that the tension between components one, two and three forced Hitler to make war on a number of European States which made him look like a modern Attila. It is, hence, the thesis of

this paper that "Situational determinants" shaped Hitler's policies to a decisive degree, pushing him on from one point of escalation to another, and finally leading him and his country to the "Goetterdaemmerung" of 1945.

We have stated that Germany's weak geographical position influenced her position in international politics and affected her Macht ambitions adversely. Nobody was more painfully aware of this than Hitler himself. But while Bismarck sought to neutralize the adverse effects of the hostile geography by cutting down Germany's Macht ambitions, and while Kaiser Wilhelm II was keen to find a solution in naval power and overseas colonies, Hitler was determined to strike at the root of the problem; he sought to change Germany's geography (component one) to accommodate her Macht ambitions (component three). Hitler wrote in his *Mein Kampf*:

"National security depends on the political strength of a State, and this strength, in its turn, depends on the military possibilities inherent in the geographical situation."⁴

The young and newly unified German State of 1871 was already feeling the urge to acquire colonies in the tradition of other great powers even under Bismarck. Although the "Iron Chancellor" had declared that Germany in her 1871 borders was a "saturated state" requiring no further expansion or territorial possessions overseas, he had to consent subsequently to the acquisition of Germany's first overseas colonies in the Cameroons, South-West Africa, Togo, East Africa, New Guinea, China, and elsewhere.⁵

However, Germany lost all her modest colonial establishments in other Continents following her defeat in the First World War, over and above the territorial losses she suffered in Europe. This fact made a deep impression on Hitler. Germany was clearly not destined to become a great sea power; British blockade and the paralyzation of the German surface

fleet during the war had proved that. The effects of the blockade had been almost disastrous; key raw materials and foodstuffs, a substantial amount of which had to be imported by sea, had become scarce creating a dangerous political situation within the country and threatening its war effort.⁶

Hence, Hitler concluded that the only way to achieve for Germany a durable and strong position was to give up the idea of acquiring overseas colonies altogether and to expand the territory of the Reich towards the vast expanses of the east. Here the German army would have a chance to employ its full strength. Thus expanded, the Reich would at once become immune to blockades since it would then be in possession of abundant raw materials and food. Combined with German technological and organizational talents, the latter would form mighty sinews of national power. In thinking on the lines of 'Drang nach Osten,' Hitler was reviving in essence the expansionist ideology of the old Pan-German Union (All-deutscher Verband), founded, significantly, a year after Bismarck's abdication.⁷

Thus, given high Macht ambitions (component three) as a constant, the key problem of geography had to be solved by the expansion of the Reich eastwards. But, in terms of the model of the Lage, the idea of this solution itself became part and parcel of component three, the realization of which would again be impeded by component one (i.e., the same geography)! Hitler was thus caught in this vicious circle; in attempting to break out of the circle and the deadly clutches of geography, Hitler needed to find a further solution, and this he thought he found in the "Blitzkrieg," the military short-cut to success. To examine the question why he specifically pinned his hopes on lightning warfare—this point, incidentally, is a corollary of another related thesis of this paper, namely, that Hitler was not prepared to wage total war,—a brief survey of the characteristic trends of strategic thinking in Germany from around the time of Napo-

leon's campaigns has to be undertaken at this juncture.

The Blitzkrieg was the outgrowth of the peculiar historical problem of the German Lage. Right from the time of Clausewitz down to the O.K.W. (the High Command of the Armed Forces) under Hitler, German strategic planning reflected the only type of war Germany could afford to fight against a superior coalition of powers, namely, a short war aimed at delivering swift and decisive blows to the enemy. This explains why Moltke, the senior, was so very enthusiastic about the development of the railways (rapid transport) and the telegraph (rapid communication), so much so that he is said to have considered the development of the railways as far more important than the construction of heavily fortified lines. While he and Waldersee considered Germany's eastern front as the decisive theatre of a future war, and accordingly drew up plans for concentrating Germany's main offensive blows there, Schlieffen at the turn of the century thought otherwise. An elaborate plan for a decisive thrust into France, using Belgium as a corridor in order to outflank the heavily defended French border facing Germany, was drawn up by him and finalized in the first decade of this century. It envisaged a gigantic enveloping movement to be executed by a powerful group of armies, while the German borders facing France and Russia were to stand drained. With France knocked out swiftly, the bulk of the German forces was to be thrown in the east. The development of the railways, thanks to Moltke's encouragement, made such a switch from one front to the other conceivable. Thus, whatever the differences in their respective emphases on the Schwerpunkt of a future war, the eagerness to seek rapid military decisions in war was a common characteristic of all strategic planners. As Goerlitz puts it so well:

"Thanks to Prussia's (and later Germany's) unfavourable situation, Clausewitz's conception of the war of decision and annihilation

influenced all strategic thinkers from Moltke to Schlieffen, and from Schlieffen to Ludendorff and Hitler."⁸

That the German armed forces were able to demonstrate in the initial phases of the Second World War the most dazzling techniques of modern warfare was largely due to this background of cold and dispassionate strategic planning. Another reason for the successful application of the Blitz warfare was the Diktat of Versailles which had banned all military experimentation and development in Germany. Given the constant component three of the model of the Lage, what the Germans could not do overtly, they sought to do it with greater zeal and characteristic thoroughness covertly, and in this they were led by von Seeckt, that remarkable prototype of the stiff, monocled Prussian general, who successfully sought co-operation from the other European outcast at the time, Soviet Russia, in setting up military training and experiment schools and facilities. All these historical reasons explain why the use of massed tanks and artillery in close co-operation with the air force, i.e., the Blitzkrieg was appreciated first in Germany, despite the fact that it was the Allies who had used the tank for the first time in the First World War, and that Lidell-Hart in England and de Gaulle in France were among the forerunners of the Blitz philosophy.

III

To return to Hitler's problem. His numerous campaigns in Europe can only be properly appreciated within the theoretical framework of the German Lage.

Hitler's chief objective was to gain Lebensraum in Western Russia as part of the German Volk's "Kampf ums Dasein" (struggle for existence). Added to the geopolitical reasons for the expansion were of course his well-known racial and ideological reasons, which only

strengthened the Nazi conviction of the need to expand, and, hence, need not tie us down here.⁹ But even if Russia were his only major objective of conquest, apart from the German populated areas of certain neighbouring States, the annexation of which, incidentally, had already been given the moral "green signal" under the principle of self-determination incorporated in the post-World War I arrangements, Hitler would not be given a free hand by England and her "Continental sword," France. On this point nobody had any illusions, nor did Hitler harbour any. His attitude to the key adversary, England, was at best ambivalent. It is clear from his writings, various speeches, and reactions to events that he would have preferred to avoid a clash with England, if the latter had agreed to let him alone. In his *Mein Kampf*, written in the inter-war period when Germany was weak, Hitler argued that in her role of the traditional balancer, England would actually help Germany recover her power as a counterweight to the predominant French power in the Continent.¹⁰ The only snag in his analysis was the conspicuous absence of the logical corollary which followed, namely, that if in the process of recovery German power outbalanced French power, England would unhesitatingly switch sides.

But deep down in his heart, Hitler the realist knew that given the policy-goals he had set for Germany, a clash with England was inevitable in the ultimate analysis. This would mean an automatic involvement of France on England's side. Hence, he felt, the only alternative left to Germany in safeguarding her western flank while ultimately concentrating in the east—as she must—was to destroy England's "Continental sword." Before crushing France, however, the lesser powers like Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland had to be taken care of, primarily for three reasons: firstly, the German populated areas of these States had to be incorporated in the Third Reich as part of the "Grossdeutschland" programme; secondly, to neutralize any pos-

sible flank threats from them while the German Army was busy fighting in the west;¹¹ and thirdly, to obtain more suitable jumping-off points aimed at Russia.

If we now turn to analyze Hitler's campaigns in Europe (the North African campaign was meant primarily to lend Italy a helping hand, and, hence, falls outside the scope of our present analysis) prior to the invasion of Russia, they reveal the singular fact that in order to achieve his prime objective of gaining Lebensraum there, Hitler had to fulfil a number of prerequisites dictated by component one of the German Lage, geography. Belgium was doomed anyway, because ever since Schlieffen German strategic planners preferred to use her territory as a corridor to the plains of Northern France, her neutrality being explained away by the characteristic Prussian principle: "Not kennt kein Gebot."¹² In addition, Holland had also to be taken to enable Germany to gain access to a longer sea coast as well as to set up forward air bases from which England could be blitzed, should the necessity arise. The infant German navy required the long Norwegian coastline in order to outflank a First World War-type British blockade, while the Luftwaffe had its eyes fixed on the air bases. But a more urgent reason—a "chance" factor—for the occupation of Norway was to secure Narvik before the British put it out of action as a port, as indeed the British had intended to do. The reason why both belligerents were interested in Narvik was that it was the vital point through which Swedish iron ore supplies were shipped to Germany. Thus, the series of Blitz campaigns conducted with amazing success by Germany in the north and west of Europe were due to interlocking reasons, but each of them reflected Germany's desperate attempt to master her disadvantageous geography.

The wars which followed in the Balkans were waged for a number of contingent reasons: to clear the British out of Greece (British intervention having been made immi-

nent inadvertently by the vain Italian attack on Greece) so as to deprive them of the opportunity to develop a Balkan front from their strong Middle Eastern positions, to counter Russian moves in the region (especially Russian pressure on Rumania), and, equally important, to protect the Rumanian oil fields (Ploesti) both from Russian threats and British bombing. Without Rumanian oil, Hitler's sole trump card, the Blitz machine, would be thrown to the four winds.

Each of the Blitzes was brief, swift, precise and annihilating, and, hence, successful. Yet, before Hitler realized it, German commitments had spread in all directions, although for the time being their pressure was not felt. With his northern, western, southern and south-eastern flanks secure, and with England completely driven out of Festung Europa—although the Luftwaffe failed to win air superiority over the British Isles—Hitler felt he could now turn his gaze upon his prime objective—Russia. The potential danger inherent in the situation created by Hitler in Europe became real as soon as his Blitz juggernaut ground to a halt before Leningrad and Moscow. From this point onwards, Hitler was no longer able to fight on his own terms or to establish any further *faits accomplis*. From this phase of the Second World War, a point of attrition developed from which there was no escape. The initiative slowly but perceptively passed over to the Allies, while Germany struggled on to hold on to her gains. America's entry into the war was decisive in sealing the fate of the Third Reich.¹³

IV

It can be asserted with certainty that Hitler was not prepared for a total war in 1939, 1940 and 1941, if only because he was aware that a total war involving attrition of economies over a long period would ultimately be disastrous for Germany. As A. J. P. Taylor has

rightly pointed out, he wanted the fruits of total war without having to wage it.¹⁴ His Blitz gambling succeeded remarkably initially, and despite the revelation of the weakness in the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain, it was felt that within the continent of Europe the German army and air force were without rivals. The U-boats were also initially inflicting unacceptable losses to British shipping and commerce, and there was no reason why Hitler would not congratulate himself on the results achieved by his Blitz machine at a relatively low cost, that is, till the end of 1941, when for the first time the German army reeled back under a major Soviet counter-offensive.

No doubt Hitler had severely underestimated Russian staying capacity. But even experts in other countries had a very poor opinion of the Red Army, especially after it had been seriously weakened by Stalin's ruthless purges following the Tukhachevsky affair; also, its performance in the war against Finland had been far from glorious. Added to these considerations was Hitler's racial 'Weltanschauung' which ascribed to, what was according to Hitler, a "Jewish Bolshevik state," inferior resistance capabilities. No wonder, then, that the Soviet T-34 tank came as a great surprise to the Germans as also later reports that fresh divisions were being thrown in.¹⁵

Shirer, among others, seems to subscribe to the view that Hitler was preparing for a total war. The same point is emphasized *inter alia* by Jaeger and Zipfel in their book on the Third Reich.¹⁶ However, Shirer himself quoted Gercke, Chief of the Transport Department of the Reich at the time of the outbreak of the Second World War, as saying that "in the transport sphere, Germany is at the moment not ready for war."¹⁷ Again, it is according to Shirer that as late as July, 1939, the West Wall was hardly anywhere near completion.¹⁸ Albert Speer, Hitler's brilliant Armaments Minister, whose integrity in the Nuremberg trials startled even the Allied representatives, writes in his recent informative memoirs :

"It remains one of the oddities of this war that Hitler demanded far less from his people than Churchill and Roosevelt did from their respective nations."¹⁹

He goes on to point out the discrepancy between "the total mobilization of labour forces in democratic England and the casual treatment of this question in authoritarian Germany."²⁰ Further, to quote the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey :

"The outstanding feature of the German war effort is the surprisingly low output of armaments in the first three years of the war, surprisingly low as measured not only by Germany's later achievement but also by the general expectations of the time and by the level of production of her enemy, Britain. In aircraft, trucks, tanks, self-propelled guns, and several other types of armaments, British production was greater than Germany's in 1940, 1941 and 1942.

The Germans did not plan for a long war, nor were they prepared for it. Hitler's strategy contemplated a series of separate thrusts and quick victories over enemies... ; he did not expect to fight a prolonged war against a combination of major world powers... measured by the standards of other belligerents, there was no 'total mobilization' and no long-term planning to bring the war effort to its attainable maximum."²¹

Total mobilization of resources and of the economy for war purposes was not initiated before 1942, i.e., after the Blitz in Russia had petered out. As Speer concluded in a report, dated 27th January, 1945 :

"Given a similar concentration of all our energies and ruthless removal of all impediments, we could have achieved in 1940 and 1941 the armaments production of 1944."²²

Production of munitions lagged far behind the figures reached during the 'previous war,'²³

and as late as May, 1942, transport still remained a major headache.²⁴

The machines of the German Blitz had not been designed on the basis of a long war of attrition. There was, for instance, no conception in German military thinking of the role of the air force as an independent strategic arm in itself. The only person who was in favour of developing a long-range, heavy bomber fleet, Wever, died prematurely. The accent of the Luftwaffe shifted to Udet's dive-bombers and other light and mostly tactical, ground-support bombers. The Germans never succeeded in bringing into operation a bomber like the American B-17 Stratofortress; they considered the air force as merely an extension of the artillery, a line of thinking arising out of their land-locked geography. The Luftwaffe, successful in its tactical function, failed in its strategic role of softening up Britain. The Me-109, an excellent fighter, lacked the range required of an aircraft cast in a strategic role. The Me-110, intended to be a strategic fighter, was more busy defending itself than the bombers flying under its escort! The V-weapons, produced belatedly like many other "miracle weapons", failed to make their impact on the course of the war.

In the realm of the army, the backbone of Hitler's Blitz, the types of tanks usually employed in battles reflected the very essence of the Blitzkrieg; they were characterized by light weight, speed and manouverability while this implied the sacrifice of armour.²⁵

The German navy in 1939 was nowhere near its British counterpart in comparison. The master plan for rebuilding the German navy to a respectable level, the so-called "Z-Plan", would materialize in 1945 at the earliest. The construction and employment of the famous "pocket battleships" revealed the "shock tactics" of the Blitzkrieg. As Porten remarks, when the war suddenly broke out, "The surface forces (of the German navy) were not expected to win control of the seas from the British

even by attrition, which had been the concept of the First World War. They were instead to disrupt enemy communications, depending on surprises and daring..."²⁶

Finally, the Blitz was successful initially, not necessarily due to Germany's numerical superiority in men and materials, but rather due to better strategy and tactics, organizational and technical skill, and morale.

It has been said that Hitler had plans for a world empire. There is no valid evidence for such a theory. He persistently rejected the navy's plea that Egypt be taken with a greater amount of effort, and that Iceland and certain other islands in the Atlantic be seized to pre-empt similar American action. He was also not keen, according to the Schellenberg memoirs, on establishing an Indian legion within the Wehrmacht, as proposed by Netaji Bose. Only subsequently, as the German troops entered the Caucasus and as Rommel kept pushing the British back to Egypt, was the idea of a grand Cannae in the Middle East toyed with and Bose's plan encouraged. But the reverses at El Alamein and Stalingrad between late 1942 and early 1943 led to the abandoning of such grandiose ideas.

V

To recapitulate briefly the salient theses of this paper :

Firstly, given the dilemma of the German Lage, Hitler sought to solve it by acquiring Lebensraum for Germany. In order to fulfil the necessary preconditions for achieving this objective, he felt compelled to undertake a series of round-the-compass Blitz campaigns in Europe, which must be defined as "pre-emptive attacks." This term would accurately underline the essentially subjective position of the Germans who felt that they were fighting for their bare survival. Thus, this paper rejects the popular notion that Hitler's wars were

"wars of conquest" *per se*. Admittedly, the distinction tends to get blurred, but this does not invalidate the result of our inquiry into the motivation of Hitler.²⁷ The unmistakable character of pre-emption in Hitler's campaigns analysed above is reflected in the writings and speeches of Hitler and his close associates, in the more serious accounts of the Third Reich, and in the memoirs and other documents. The material gains accruing additionally from the victims of pre-emption were pleasant by-products, rather than ends in themselves.

Secondly, A. J. P. Taylor rightly asserts that Hitler himself encouraged his popular Attila image to terrorize other powers into submis-

sion. Consequently, German military power was very definitely overestimated in the late 1930's.

Finally, the rationality of Hitler's pre-emptive policy prior to his attack on Russia may certainly be called into question; his excessive reliance upon a "bluff-and-Blitz" policy and his attempt to create a series of snap military *fait accompli* of doubtful durability may appear to have been totally reckless, unwise and catastrophic, but such normative considerations lie beyond the scope of this behavioural analysis. Also, irrationality of policy does not necessarily negate the latter's empirical validity.

REFERENCES

1. It is not a task of this paper to relate the well-known point that Nazism was but the logical culmination of the thought of Fichte, Hegel, Treitschke, etc., although this is far from being a conclusive argument.
2. I maintain this despite the post-World War II 'correction' of Bismarck's image by various German historians; they gave expression to their doubt as to whether the Chancellor had rendered any service at all to the German people by way of the unification of Germany. See Hans Kohn (ed.), *German History: Some New German Views*, London, 1954.
3. "War is the continuation of politics/policy by other means."
4. Hitler, A., *Mein Kampf*, (translated by James Murphy), London, 1942, p. 354. See also Hitler's 1928-manuscript, quoted at length in John L. Snel (ed.), *The Outbreak of the Second World War, Design or Blunder?* Boston, 1962, p. 101. Hitler says there: "Germany's situation in Europe today is such that she is far from allowing herself to hope that she may go forward to a condition of contemplative peace with her own political aimlessness. No such possibility exists for a nation located in the heart of Europe. Either Germany itself tries actively to take part in the shaping of life, or she will be a passive object of the life-shaping activity of other nations.... Whatever will not be a hammer in history, will be an anvil. In all its development up to now our German people has had a choice only between these two possibilities... the best parry is a trust." This passage sums up well some of the chief arguments of this paper.
5. According to Karl Renner, the Austrian Social-Democratic leader and later President of the Austrian Republic, the major European powers except Germany were already well ahead in their race for colonies: Britain had acquired territories 91 times her own size, Holland came to possess territories 62 times her own, Belgium—82 times, France—21 times, and Russia not only steadily expanded in Europe but also elsewhere and acquired 16 million sq. km. of territories in the Caucasus, Siberia, etc. See Michael Freund, *Deutsche Geschichte*, Guetersloh, p. 831.
6. In fact, Germany would have lost the First World War earlier had not her scientific ingenuity come to her aid. British blockade had cut off supplies of Chilean nitrate essential for the manufacture of explosives. The critical problem was solved by the Jewish Professor Haber who evolved a process whereby nitrogen could be extracted from air.
7. See Freund, "Der Kampf um den Platz an der Sonne", *op. cit.*, p. 826.
8. Walter Goerlitz, *History of the German General Staff, 1657-1945*, (trans.), New York, 1959, p. 62.
9. The Nazi ideology served and strengthened component three by providing an added rationale for it.

10. Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, *op. cit.*, Chapter XIII.
11. See the summary of the Hossbach memorandum in Friedrich Glum, *Der Nationalsozialismus*, 1962, Munich. Despite A. J. P. Taylor's minimization of its significance, Glum rightly attaches greater weight to it as reflecting Hitler's way of thinking.
12. "Necessity knows no law".
13. America was slowly but perceptibly getting into the war. She released "surplus" guns for sale to Britain following the fall of France in 1940, and concluded the "destroyers for bases" agreement with Britain the same year, while her naval units were used to escort British ships and to show increasing belligerency towards German submarines. The lend-lease programme of March, 1941, as well as the occupation of Greenland and Iceland in the next few months were sure signs that America's entry into the war was a matter of time.
14. See A. J. P. Taylor's arguments in *The Origins of the Second World War*, London and New York, 1961.
15. The role of such Soviet spies as Lucy Roesler and Richard Sorge in tilting the balance of military power in favour of the USSR is well established now.
16. William L. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*, New York, 1962, p. 625: "The war which Hitler was planning to launch would be total war and would require not only military mobilization but a total mobilization of all resources of the nation." (Jaeger and Zipfel (eds.), *Das Dritte Reich* (a documentary compilation), Hannover, 1963. The editors quote Hitler's bombastic speech before the Reichstag on Sept. 1, 1939, to emphasize the extent of Germany's preparation for war. But in that speech, Hitler was surely exaggerating when he went on to say that (die Wehrmacht) "ist heute die am besten ausgeruestete der Welt und steht ueber jedem Vergleich mit der des Jahres 1914". (The Wehrmacht is today the best equipped force in the world and stands far beyond any comparison with that of 1914). From Speer's account it is now clear that at least in the field of armaments, Germany during most of the Second World War lagged behind her own production capacity during the First World War.
17. Shirer, *op. cit.*, p. 666.
18. *Ibid.*
19. Albert Speer, *Inside the Third Reich*, (trans.) New York, 1971, p. 287.
20. Speer, *op. cit.*, p. 287.
21. Quoted in Telford Taylor, *The March of Conquest*, p. 34.
22. Speer, *op. cit.*, p. 674.
23. Speer, *op. cit.*, p. 672.
24. Speer, *op. cit.*, p. 297.
25. Daniel Vifroy, *War in the West*, Pennsylvania, 1942, p. 23. "At least half of these German tanks (employed in the Battle of France in 1940—author) were not superior in weight and protection to the French armoured cars."
26. Edward von der Porten, *The German Navy in the Second World War*.
27. Equally subtle distinctions are sought to be made, for instance, in analyzing Stalin's moves during the Second World War, especially in its early phase; was Soviet pressure on Finland, the Baltic states and the Balkans at the time 'defensive'—even 'pre-emptive' vis-a-vis Germany—or purely 'imperialistic'? The distinction may not amount to much in net effect, nevertheless, it is necessary for a proper appreciation of Soviet policy under Stalin.

THE KOT MASSACRE (1846) IN NEPAL

DR. SREE GOVIND MISHRA

(Bhagalpur University)

The Kot Massacre of 1846 was an important event in the history of Modern Nepal. It ended a long chapter of weak royal administration, feudal anarchy and fratricidal strife and began a new chapter of strong administration under the Rana oligarchy. The genesis of the Kot Massacre of 1846 could be traced much earlier. Bhim Sen Thapa was a strong and efficient Prime Minister of Nepal from 1804 to 1837. After the death of Girvan Juddha Vikram Shah in 1816, Rajendra Bir Vikram Shah became the King of Nepal. As the new King was a minor, Maharani Lalita Tripura Sundari, the widow of Ram Bahadur Shah (1777-1799), acted as the Regent from 1816 till her death on the 1st of April 1832.¹ So long as she was in charge, the court politics could not much affect the fabric of the administration. But after her death, two families—the Pandays and the Thapas—fought for control over the administration. Rajendra Vikram Shah did not prove a strong ruler. On some fabricated charges, Prime Minister Bhim Sen Thapa was imprisoned in 1837. However, he was released at the intercession of the Junior Maharani, Lakshmi Devi. But soon a fresh charge of poisoning was brought up against him. He was put in jail, and out of humiliation and disappointment he committed suicide on July 20, 1839.²

The Senior Queen now gained the ascendancy at the Court for a short period. Brian Hodgson, the British Resident at Nepal, did not appreciate her role in the administration. Her influence declined within two years. On November 1, 1840, her favourite, Runjung

Pandey, was dismissed from the premiership and Fateh Jung Choutria was nominated to the office. The Senior Queen had hoped that her eldest son would be nominated the Crown Prince by the King. But her hopes became dimmed by changes in Court politics about the middle of 1841. She decided to leave Nepal for India, but died on the way at Hetowra on April 6, 1841.³ Her death made the confusion in Court politics even worse. Now there were three distinct parties in Nepal. First, the feeble Raja (Rajendra Bir Vikram Shah); second, the Heir-Apparent; and third, the surviving Queen (Lakshmi Devi), who was working for her eldest son. In course of time Lakshmi Devi was in her full rights as Queen and was also invested with some political powers in January 1843.⁴ She thought that if Mathabar Singh could be appointed Prime Minister, her object might be fulfilled. So Mathabar Singh was recalled from India on the 17th of April 1843. On the 26th of December, Mathabar was nominated to the Premiership.⁵

But soon Maharani Lakshmi Devi found that Mathabar Singh would not help her in her game. So she planned for his assassination. On the night of the 17th of May 1845, he was summoned to the palace at 11 p.m. on the pretence that the Rani had fallen down the stairs and had seriously hurt herself. Mathabar Singh came to the palace in an unsuspecting mood and was shot dead.⁶ Lakshmi Devi then became the virtual ruler of the State. She exercised power through her favourite, Gagan Singh, who from being an obscure menial in her household had been suddenly raised to the

position of her confidential adviser. A weak King, an intriguing Queen with a lover and a dissembling Prime Minister could lead to but one result, another bloodbath. On the night of the 14th of September 1846, at 10 p.m., General Gagan Singh was shot dead in his own house.⁷

Gagan Singh's son, Captain Wazir Singh, immediately carried the intelligence to the Maharani, who was in her own apartment in the Hanuman Dhoka Palace. The Maharani was deeply grieved at the news and immediately went to Gagan Singh's house on foot, accompanied by four female attendants. She put Ganges water, *Tulsee* leaf and gold in the mouth of the dead General. She then directed his three sons, Captain Wazir Singh, Sher Singh and Kharagbur Singh, to arrange for the funeral, granting one lakh of rupees from the royal treasury to meet the funeral expenses.⁸ She then walked back to the Kot (Hall of Public Business) and sent for General Abhiman Singh Rana, whose house was at hand. She ordered him to have the bugle sounded for the attendance of all the civil functionaries and the troops with their officers. Then she sat down in the second storey of the Kot and vowed that until the man who had assassinated so faithful a Minister should be discovered and put to death, she would take neither food nor water.⁹

Jung Bahadur heard the signal and he understood the reason. He at once reached the Kot at the head of three regiments, accompanied by all his brothers and relatives armed with rifles and swords. He did not think it proper to go to the Kot unattended or unarmed. Having reached the Kot earlier, he took sufficient precaution for his safety. He gave strict injunctions to his soldiers not to allow any one to pass in or out without his express order. The Queen was surprised at this step and directed Jung Bahadur to explain his conduct. Jung Bahadur replied in this convincing way: "I beg to submit that I have taken this precaution in the belief that Your Majesty's life

is in jeopardy at the hands of the same people that have caused the death of Gagan Singh; for it is a well-known fact that he was a great friend of mine and a valuable officer of the State." The Queen was satisfied with the explanation.¹⁰ Jung Bahadur further said that he and General Gagan Singh were known to act together as her special servants, that one of them had been treacherously murdered by their enemies, and it was probable that he himself would not be long spared, and that in the end her two sons would also probably suffer.¹¹ After this he went out and instructed the officers of his three regiments to remain on the alert.

In the meantime General Abhiman Singh Rana went to inform the Maharaja of what had happened and conducted him to the Kot. All the officers had assembled in the Kot, in pursuance of the Maharani's orders, with the exception of Fateh Jung. The Maharani directed Kajee Bum Bahadur (Jung Bahadur's brother) to go and bring Fateh Jung. She at the same time ordered Abhiman Singh Rana to put Kajee Birkishore Pandey in irons, which was accordingly done. Then Birkishore was questioned as to who had assassinated Gagan Singh and whether he had not abetted the crime. He denied all knowledge of the matter. The Maharani, finding that Birkishore would confess nothing, gave her own naked sword to Abhiman Singh, desiring him to kill Birkishore Pandey.¹² The General taking the sword then asked for the Raja's orders. The Raja somewhat angrily replied that without enquiry and proof no one could put to death such an old and able servant of the State. General Abhiman Singh returned to the Maharani and, laying down the sword at her feet, said: "As one *Sarkar* ordered the execution upon suspicion and the other ordered that it should not take place without the proofs of guilt, he would do nothing."¹³ The Maharani observed that as the Maharaja had given her full power to act on all occasions, it was unnecessary to take his special order for everything that was to be done; to which Abhiman Singh replied, "To

yield obedience to a Rani when the Raja was present, was not in accordance with the rule of good government." He then left her presence.¹⁴

The Maharani then sent for General Jung Bahadur and asked if Kajee Bum Bahadur had brought Fateh Jung. He answered that they had not yet come, but the Maharani without waiting longer gave orders that all the Sardars and officers should assemble in the large western hall below, and that until they could name the murderer of Gagan Singh, none of them should be permitted to leave. The Raja, considering that without the help of Fateh Singh, who was an experienced and able man, no full and satisfactory investigation could be made, himself went to Fateh Jung Choutria's house. Sending Fateh Jung, Kharag Bikram Sah and other relatives with Bum Bahadur to the Kot, he next went to the British Residency at 2 a.m. and requested an interview with Captain Ottley to inform him about the situation.¹⁵ The officiating Resident did not think it proper to go out and meet the Raja at that late hour and sent an employee, Mir Munshi Deb Prasad, to meet the Raja. The Raja said to the Munshi: "See, things¹⁶ are turning on there as they have done at Lahore and the Ministers are continually put to death. Today some one has murdered General Gagan Singh, the faithful servant of my Rani, by treacherously shooting him in the chamber of prayer; at this moment all the civil and military functionaries and the troops are assembled at the Kot and the Maharani is engaged in investigating the matter. We shall see to whom the crime is brought home and as the Maharani is greatly distressed at the death of the said General, I am determined to see every possible exertion towards discovery and punishment. Let there be a good look-out kept tonight about the Residence premises." The Raja then asked the Munshi to accompany him to the Kot, in order to see and hear what passed there and be able to report the issue of the investigation to the officiating Resident. But the Munshi represented that there would be some delay in making

his horse ready and that as His Highness's business¹⁷ at the Durbar was of an urgent nature, not to be deferred, it would be better that he himself should follow in the morning. The Raja agreed and went away, desiring the Munshi to be sure to come the next morning. When the Raja got back to the Kot, the gutter in the street was flowing with the blood which came from the Kot. He was prevented by the people from entering the palace and proceeded to the Hanuman Dhoka Palace.¹⁸

On the approach of Fateh Jung Choutria and his party, General Jung Bahadur advanced from the Kot to meet them. After relating what had occurred, Jung Bahadur said to Fateh Jung that the Maharani violently suspected Bir Kishore Pandey and she caused him to be ironed and then ordered General Abhiman Singh Rana to put him to death. But the General did not obey the order which had highly incensed the Rani. Jung Bahadur then suggested that to appease the Rani and to bring matters to a peaceful end, it would be necessary to do away with both these persons. So Jung Bahadur sought his help and proposed: "that you may administer the affairs of the revenue and territorial departments (in their place), whilst I remain in my post of Jungee General (Commander of the Forces) and to act under your orders."¹⁹ In reply to this Fateh Jung said that nothing should be done without due enquiry and deliberation, and that they ought rather to exert themselves strenuously to discover the assassin of Gagan Singh than to destroy innocent persons, from which cause no good would come.²⁰

Fateh Singh then proceeded into the small Dalan on the north side of the Kot, and General Jung Bahadur went to attend the Maharani. Fateh Jung possibly reported to Abhiman Singh what he had heard from the General Jung Bahadur. Abhiman Singh by way of precaution asked the officers of his regiments to be vigilant and to keep their muskets loaded.²¹ When General Jung Bahadur saw, from the second floor of the Kot, that the soldiers of General

Abhiman Singh were loading their muskets, he reported the matter to the Maharani, who immediately came down with a drawn sword and entered the large western Dalan below. There she asked angrily Fateh Jung, Nur Nuree Bikram Sah, General Abhiman Singh Rana, Kaji Dulbhajan Pandey and the other Sardars and Officers assembled²²: "Who has killed my faithful general? Name him quickly." No one answered, but Fateh Jung requested her not to be precipitate and that he would settle the matter to her satisfaction. On hearing these words, she became more excited and attempted to use her own sword upon Bir Kishore Pandey. But Fateh Jung, Abhiman Singh Rana and Kaji Dulbhajan Pandey stopped her. Trying to pacify her, they went with her towards the second storey. At that moment, while the party was slowly following, shots were fired from the upper staircase, Fateh Jung and Kaji Dulbhajan Pandey fell down dead and Abhiman Singh Rana was wounded. The latter returned to the Dalan, "exclaiming that Jung Bahadur had done this treacherous act,"²³ and endeavoured to get out and join his regiments. But Colonel Krishan Bahadur Kunwar (brother of General Jung Bahadur), with one stroke of his sword, nearly cut him in twain and he fell down dead. At that time Choutria Kharag Bikram Sah, the son, and Sardar Bir Bahadur Sah, a younger brother of Fateh Jung Sah, with many more Choutrias, Kajees, Sardars and Captains were present in the Dalan. They immediately retaliated and there started a fight to the finish²⁴ between them and the forces under Jung Bahadur, supported by the Rani. In the thick of the fight Jung Bahadur was invested by the Maharani with the Wizarut and the command of the regiments in the capital. The Maharani called out in an imperious voice to the soldiers—"kill and destroy my enemies." The fighting now became a slaughter. Both sides fought desperately. The Massacre at the Kot was long and bloody. Most of the Chiefs and Sardars in the Dalan were shot or cut down.²⁵

There are differences of opinion as to the

exact number of persons assassinated on the night of the 15th September, 1846. According to Padam Jung, Jung Bahadur's third son, the names of fifty-five of the slain have been preserved. According to Percival Landon, more than fifty nobles and hundreds of lesser officials perished in the massacre. According to Tucker, nearly a hundred persons were killed at the Kot. According to Wright, thirty-two nobles of the country and upwards of a hundred of the lower ranks were shot down. According to the *Morning Post*, dated 16th April 1890, the Kot massacre was a miniature civil war. The letter written by Captain G. O. B. Ottley, Resident at Kathmandu, to Mr. F. Gurrie, Secretary to the Government of India, dated 24th September 1846, throws much light on the Kot massacre.²⁶

As regards the responsibility for the assassination, the Select Committee Proceedings of June 26, 1847, throw some light. According to these proceedings, the Rani gave the order for the slaughter of all the officers in the Kot. She also declared at the same time that she acted without the sanction of the Maharaja and the Heir-Apparent. There is little justification for holding Jung Bahadur responsible for this brutal massacre. Jung Bahadur only proved a more tactful politician than his other political opponents. Having guessed that the assassination of Gagan Singh would bring more calamity, he came to the Kot perfectly armed. As Jung Bahadur was prepared for any eventuality, he became the master of the situation. The chaotic condition of the country after the downfall and tragic end of Bhim Sen Thapa was responsible for the Kot Massacre. The genius of Jung Bahadur saved Nepal from utter destruction. The Kot Massacre brought order out of chaos and established political stability in the country. It brought a century of highly despotic and autocratic rule by the hereditary Prime Ministers, who wielded unlimited power over every sphere of administration in the country. With the nomination of Jung Bahadur as Premier of Nepal in 1846, began the rule of the Rana Oligarchy.²⁷

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POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN THE PRINCELY STATES OF RAJASTHAN

DR. R. S. DARDA

(Udaipur University, Udaipur)

Political movements, for the attainment of civil liberties and responsible government in the defunct Princely States of Rajasthan, may be traced back to the twenties of the present century although the first stirrings were in evidence in the first decade of the century. These movements helped develop political consciousness in the people of Rajasthan, which in turn paved the way for the establishment of representative government in the years to follow. A brief account of some of the important political movements in the first half of the 20th century is given in this paper.

Samp Sabha Movement :

In 1905-06, the aboriginal tribe of Dungarpur, Banswara, etc. under the leadership of Samp Sabha, demanded certain administrative reforms and the recognition of Bhil Panchayats. This irritated the State authorities of Dungarpur and Banswara and they adopted a policy of repression. When the Bhils of Vagar area assembled at Mangarh to celebrate a religious function, the military forces of the States of Banswara, Dungarpur and Udaipur (Kherwara unit) opened fire on the Bhils, which resulted in the death of 800 Bhils.¹

Movements of the Twenties :

In 1920 Mahatma Gandhi launched his famous non-violent Non-Cooperation Movement. The Movement caught the imagination of the people of Rajasthan. The political

leaders in the States of Rajasthan tried to stir up agitation in the region, and their efforts bore fruits, which resulted in the launching of a few Kisan movements in the States of Sirohi, Udaipur, Marwar, Bundi, etc. In 1924 the people of Jodhpur State organised processions, demonstrations and agitations against the State authorities for the redress of their grievances. The State authorities banned civil liberties. Some persons were exiled from the State and some were declared undesirable elements.² In Sirohi State, the Nav Paragana Mahajan Sabha launched a political agitation in 1924-25 to oppose forced labour and succeeded in its aim.³ In 1926 Jainarain Vyas and a few others started an agitation for the restoration of civil liberties and reforms in the Jodhpur State Administration.⁴ In 1927 the Tonga episode stirred the people of Jaipur against the Government. On 1st September, 1927, an inoffensive Tongawala was assaulted by a constable of the State Police, and the citizens who tried to remonstrate with the police against it were severely beaten. When people assembled in the evening in front of the police station, they were fired upon. As a protest against the police atrocities and firing, the people of Jaipur observed complete hartal for five days. Mass meetings were held on 2nd and 3rd of September in which resolutions for the grant of civil liberties were adopted.⁵ In 1929 Jainarain Vyas and his co-workers proposed to hold the Marwar State People's Conference at Nagor in Jodhpur State. All conceivable political, economic and social reforms were made the subjects of resolutions to be

moved at the Conference. Leaflets and booklets were distributed in the villages to awaken political consciousness among the masses.⁶ The Government of Jodhpur State banned the Conference.⁷ This roused Vyas to indignation, and in the March 1929 issue of the *Tarun Rajasthan* (of which he was the Editor) he made a bitter attack against the Maharaja and his Government. The agitators brought out a booklet entitled *Papa Bai Ki Pol* (Rule of Laxity) and distributed its copies among the masses. Vyas and a few of his co-workers were arrested and prosecuted.⁸

Movements of the Early Thirties :

In 1930 Mahatma Gandhi launched his famous Civil Disobedience Movement. Ajmer became the centre of the movement in Rajasthan.⁹ Processions and demonstrations became a daily feature. Political workers from the nearby States came to Ajmer in hundreds, participated in the movement and were promptly put behind the bars, e.g. Amritlal Sethi of Jaipur, Vijai Singh Pathik and Jeetmal Lunia of Jodhpur, Abin Hari of Kota and others. The movement continued for six months. Muslims and women also took part in it. In 1931, after the Gandhi-Irwin Pact, political workers were released. With their return to their native places, the philosophy of the movement spread among the people of the States of Rajasthan.¹⁰ Soon the Bal Bharat Sabha and the Marwar Youth League in Jodhpur State and the Praja Mandal in Jaipur State were established to infuse political consciousness in the masses.¹¹ On 12th of June, 1931, the Bundi State Police killed Ramnath Purohit. This aroused the indignation of the people. They observed nine days' strike in protest against the inhuman action of the police.¹² In 1932 the people of Udaipur City opposed the levy of new taxes and went in a procession to the palace of the Maharana. The procession was lathi-charged by the police. In protest the people observed complete strike for a week.¹³

Praja Mandal Movements :

Praja Mandals began to be established in

the States of Rajasthan as early as 1931. In that year K. C. Patni established a Praja Mandal in Jaipur, which did not make much headway. In 1934 the Marwar Praja Mandal was established at Jodhpur. In 1935 the Sirohi Praja Mandal was established in Bombay. In 1937 the Jaipur Praja Mandal was reorganised. In 1938 the Marwar Praja Mandal was reorganised and renamed as the Marwar Lok Parishad. Gradually Praja Mandals came into being in the States of Udaipur (1938), Shahpura (1938), Dholpur (1938), Kota (1938), Alwar (1939), Bharatpur (1939), Banswara (1940), Bikaner (1942), Dungarpur (1945), Kishangarh (1946) and Bundi (1946). The establishment of the Praja Mandals was not welcomed by the Darbars of the States. In many States the authorities refused to register the Praja Mandals as lawful associations on flimsy grounds. The attitude of the authorities in the States of Udaipur, Jaipur, Bharatpur, etc. forced the political workers of these States to launch mass agitations to win civil liberties and recognition of the Praja Mandals.

As soon as the Praja Mandal was established at Udaipur (24 April 1938), the Mewar Government declared it illegal.¹⁴ The representatives of the Mewar Praja Mandal approached the authorities to reconsider the step but the latter refused to budge. The police took away the signboard of the Mandal and Manikyalal Varma was asked to leave the city of Udaipur till further orders. The office of the Praja Mandal was shifted to Ajmer and peaceful efforts were made to persuade the Government to withdraw the order. Jammalal Bajaj wrote to Dharmanarain, Musahibealo of the State, but the Mewar Government showed no desire for a compromise. On 25th August, 1938, a final request was made to the Government. The reply was given in the form of two proclamations. By the first Mahkmakhas was authorised in the interest of public peace and tranquillity to ban the entry of any newspaper in the territory of Mewar. All religious, social and other meetings and processions of all kinds were also banned. By

the second proclamation it was declared that any person found helping unauthorised institutions and organisations would be dealt with by the police acting on their discretion. The Government also declared the Mewar Praja Mandal as an illegal association. Under such circumstances the Praja Mandal had no alternative but to fight for civil rights and started a civil disobedience movement on 4th of October, 1938.¹⁵ The first Satyagrahi, Ramesh Chandra Vyas, started from Ajmer and was arrested at Bhilwara. On 30th of October, 1938, Choudhary Narendrapal Singh and Prof. Narain Das were arrested at Nathdwara. Complete hartal was observed in Nathdwara for three days by the people to protest against the arrest of popular leaders. Section 144 was imposed and about 40 persons were arrested and criminal proceedings for rioting were instituted against them. The Satyagraha movement spread all over the Mewar State and continued for six months. About 238 persons were arrested at Udaipur, Nathdwara, Bhilwara and other places. Nearly 35 of them were sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment. Proceedings for rioting were instituted against nine persons and heavy fines were imposed on them. Nine persons were interned without trial, and on four others bans were imposed. The Satyagrahis were put in fetters. Women also played their part in the movement. A few women were arrested but were released after a short detention. On the advice of Mahatma Gandhi, the Satyagraha was suspended on 3rd March, 1939.

The Jaipur Raj Praja Mandal was gaining popularity among the masses, and by the beginning of 1938 a number of District Praja Mandal Committees came into being.¹⁶ The Government of Jaipur, fearing the popularity of the Praja Mandal and its programme of action, decided to curb its growing influence. Without losing any time the Government of Jaipur State imposed severe restrictions on associations whose activities were regarded as dangerous and subversive by promulgating the Public Societies Regulation (1938). Early in 1939 a more stringent measure called the Public Socie-


ties Act was imposed.

The Jaipur Raj Praja Mandal applied for recognition and registration as a lawful association, but the Government turned down the request. As a protest against this arrogant attitude, the Jaipur Raj Praja Mandal launched a mass civil disobedience movement under the guidance and leadership of Seth Jammalal Bajaj in the beginning of 1939. Bajaj was arrested on 1st February, 1939, and was expelled from the State. He was rearrested on 5th February, 1939, and was expelled again. When he tried to force his entry into the State for the third time on 12th February, he was arrested and detained in the fort of Moran. On the same day (12th February) some other members of the Jaipur Raj Praja Mandal were arrested. Processions and demonstrations were organised in different parts of the State. About 500 persons were arrested. On the advice of Mahatma Gandhi, the Satyagraha was suspended on 19th March, 1939. In August, 1939, the Jaipur Government released Jammalal Bajaj. A series of meetings took place between Bajaj and the Jaipur Maharana Mansingh II. As a result of these talks, the leaders were released, civil liberties were granted and the Praja Mandal was recognised.¹⁷

The Secretary of the Bharatpur Praja Mandal applied for the registration of the society under the Criminal Law Act in the beginning of 1939. But the Government of Bharatpur refused to register the Mandal, whereupon a popular movement was launched for the recognition of the Praja Mandal in March, 1939.¹⁸ The movement continued for nine months. About 475 people took part in the Satyagraha; 32 women and 202 men were arrested and convicted. In December, 1939, the State authorities agreed to the registration of the Praja Mandal and the Satyagraha was called off. Movements were also launched in Kota and Jaisalmer States to achieve the recognition and registration of Praja Mandals.¹⁹

August Movement of 1942 :

In 1942 the Praja Mandals of Bharatpur,



Shahpura, Alwar, Kota, Udaipur, Dungarpur and Sirohi lined up with the All-India August Movement. On behalf of the Praja Mandals the Presidents of the organisations addressed letters to their respective rulers and requested them to sever their relation with the British Government as desired by Gandhiji. The State Governments paid no heed to the ultimatum which led to the launching of Satyagraha movements. In Bharatpur State the Rajya Praja Parishad presented the Government with an ultimatum to grant a few demands immediately or to face a Satyagraha. On receiving the ultimatum, the State Government arrested the President and five other members of the Working Committee on 11th August, 1941. A mass movement was launched immediately after. Forest boundary pillars were uprooted and telegraph and telephone wires were cut off. About 56 persons were arrested and detained in jail. In September, 1942, the State suffered floods of an unprecedented magnitude. The Praja Parishad suspended the Satyagraha, at first for a fortnight and thereafter for an indefinite period.²⁰

In Shahpura State, the Working Committee of the Praja Mandal addressed a letter (16th August, 1942) to the Maharajadhiraj of Shahpura to sever his relations with the British Government. On 4th September a Satyagraha was launched in the State. Three persons were arrested.²¹ In Sirohi State also the Praja Mandal joined the August agitation in 1942 and launched a Satyagraha. Four Praja Mandal workers were arrested, of whom three were prosecuted under the Defence of India Rules and one was externed.²² In the State of Alwar also the Rajya Praja Mandal joined the August 1942 Movement. Processions and demonstrations were organised and on occasions complete hartals were observed in the Alwar City. Shobhan Ram Gupta, the President of the Praja Mandal, observed a sixteen days' fast in sympathy with Mahatma Gandhi's fast. Three lawyers gave up their legal profession.²³ In Dungarpur State, under the auspices of the Dungarpur Sewa Sangh, a mass meeting was

held on 5th September, 1942, in which the Quit India resolution was strongly supported. On 6th September, 1942, a procession was organised in Dungarpur town. A complete strike was also observed in schools and bazars (markets) of Dungarpur.²⁴

In the State of Udaipur Manikyalal Varma, after his return from the A.I.C.C. Meetings, sent a letter to the Maharana of Udaipur on 21st August, 1942, asking to sever his relations with the Paramount Power. On that very evening a public meeting was held. At midnight all the prominent workers of the Praja Mandal in Udaipur and in the various districts were rounded up. In the morning the news spread like wildfire. Students and citizens protested against such a drastic act. Processions and demonstrations were organised. On 23rd August, 1942, the Government banned all processions and public meetings, but to no effect. Students, young and old, women and children, all who had anything to do with the movement, were put behind the bars. The movement spread all over the Mewar State, Nathdwara, Bhilwara, Chittor, Chhoti-Sadri, Bhinder, Bijolian, Rakhabdeo, Rajnagar, Kapsan, Jahajpur, etc. The police resorted to lathi-charge at several places. About 500 people were arrested, including some women.²⁵

The Kota Rajya Praja Mandal too joined hands with the all-India August Movement of 1942. The Working Committee of the State Praja Mandal requested the Maharawal to sever his relations from the British Government, and to grant some administrative reforms in the State. In reply, the State Government arrested three Praja Mandal workers on 13th August, 1942. When the near relatives of the arrested persons went to see them, they were beaten. This aroused the indignation of the people. They raided the police station, put the police guards into cells, hoisted the national flag on the police station and seized the entire city. For three days Dewan Harilal Gosalia and the British army remained outside the city. On 15th August, 1942, ex-Dewan, Aap Onkar

Singh, intervened and as a result an agreement was arrived at between the State authorities and the people's representatives. Accordingly the city doors were opened for the army, and the administration of the city was handed over to the State authorities. Harilal Gosalia left the State.²⁶

Later Movements :

In 1944, civil liberty movement was organised by the Rajya Praja Mandal in the State of Bikaner. R. D. Goyal, G. D. Kaushik and D. D. Acharya were arrested by the State Government. This action of the State Government was condemned everywhere in Rajasthan. The date 26th October, 1944, was observed as 'Bikaner Daman Virodhi Divas' throughout Rajasthan.²⁷ In 1946, the Dungarpur State Praja Mandal launched a civil liberties movement in the State. The State Government resorted to force. The President and a few prominent workers of the Praja Mandal were arrested. The police made lathi-charge in which about 100 people received injuries. Women were also humiliated. On the effective

intervention of the Rajputana Regional Council of the All India States People's Conference, a settlement was arrived at between the State authorities and the Praja Mandal of Dungarpur in the last week of May 1946. The Praja Mandal agreed to suspend the Satyagraha and the State Government granted civil liberties and released all political prisoners.²⁸ In 1946 the Bundi State Praja Mandal observed the Responsible Government Day on 7th August.²⁹ In the beginning of 1947, the Bharatpur State Praja Parishad launched a movement for Civil Liberties and Responsible Government. In December 1947 the Banswara Praja Mandal launched a movement for the non-payment of land revenue in the State to achieve its aim of responsible government. Early in 1948 the Dholpur State Praja Mandal started political agitations to achieve responsible Government in the State.

All these movements helped in the growth of political consciousness among the people of the States of Rajasthan, and ultimately led to the establishment of representative institutions in the States soon after Indian Independence.

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GUERRILLA WARFARE IN MEDIEVAL INDIA

DR. JAGADISH NARAYAN SARKAR

(*Jadavpur University, Calcutta*)

Guerrilla warfare differs from conventional or regular warfare in almost everything—conception, organisation, armament, equipment, supply, strategy, tactics, leadership and command. The concept of modern communist revolutionary guerrilla warfare of the Chinese or Cuban stamp may be new. But orthodox guerrilla or irregular warfare is neither a communist invention nor a revolutionary movement nor yet a development of the present century. It has a long history. For centuries light, irregular troops, separate from but supporting the regular army in defence of the homeland, known as guerrilla fighters or partisans have fought against and harassed invaders and oppressors in widely separate countries in Asia, Europe, America and Africa. It was used against the Romans in Britain, against Britain during the American Revolution (under Francis Marion), against France in Spain and Portugal during the Peninsular War and in Russia during the Napoleonic War, by China against Britain in 1841-42 (Opium War) and 1850-64 (Taiping War), by the Boers in South Africa, by the Russians during 1918-20, by the Arabs against the Turks during World War I in the Middle East, by Abyssinia against Italy in 1935-36, by European countries occupied by the Germans, by Far Eastern countries occupied by the Japanese during World War II, by the Burmese, and in Vietnam, Algeria, Cyprus, Cuba and East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in the present century. The term 'Guerrilla War' means 'small war' and is derived from Spanish 'partides' or partisans. In international law "Guerrilla warfare consists in

hostilities conducted in territory occupied by the enemy, by armed bodies of men who do not form part of an organized army. As they lack the force necessary to meet the enemy in open battle their operations are to a large extent clandestine and sporadic. They are usually composed of the remnants of the defeated army and of inhabitants who organise themselves for the purpose of harassing the enemy and destroying his communications..." (Oppenheim). Partisan war is a weapon of a militarily weak nation against a powerful aggressor. Often branded as primitive, guerrilla war may, in fact, prove to be more sophisticated than orthodox war.¹ A distinction is sometimes drawn between guerrilla war and guerrilla type of warfare. Tribal war and steppe war belong to the second category. During tribal wars in early Islam the ordinary method of fighting was the raid—a sudden charge followed by prompt retreat and sudden return (*Karr u farr*, lit. return and fight).² Again, the mobile and frugal nomads of the Eurasian steppes, skilled in steppe warfare (*alat-i-jang-i-biyaban*) and mounted archery avoiding pitched battles and indulging in 'hit and run' tactics, always put the professional armies of civilized and settled powers like the Ghaznavids at a disadvantage, because the latter were unable to use their better tactical knowledge and fire-power.³

The fundamental principle of guerrilla warfare is to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy. The basic maxims of guerrilla warfare were best formulated by Mao-tse Tung

and these reveal the deep influence of Sun Tzu. These are six in number, viz. :

- (i) using *initiative, flexibility* (by dispersal, concentration and shifting of position) and *planning* (in conducting offensives within defensive, battles of quick decision within protracted war, and exterior-line operations within interior-line operations) ;
- (ii) co-ordination with regular warfare, in strategy, campaigns and battles ;
- (iii) establishment of base areas or strategic bases, in mountains, on plain and river-lake-estuary regions, though guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines is fought without a rear. Places occupied alternately by the enemy and the guerrillas are guerrilla zones which are transformed into base areas. This depends on certain conditions : (a) guerrilla leaders to build up an armed force in three stages : guerrilla units : guerrilla formations and regulars ; (b) the armed forces are to be used in co-ordination with the army ; (c) the masses are to be aroused and armed ; (d) the area must be extensive, mountainous areas being most suitable for base areas ; and (e) money and grain are to be supplied to the guerrillas.

The base areas have not only to be extended to shake enemy morale by confining him to a few strongholds and cities and along the main lines of communication, they have also to be consolidated by organising the people and training the units for protracted warfare. Expansion and consolidation should go together and be used alternately according to time and circumstances. The enemy and the guerrillas encircle one another respectively. The former encircles the latter in two ways : (a) by assuming strategic

offensive operating on exterior lines while the guerrillas are on the defensive operating on interior lines ; (b) by surrounding each guerrilla base area in his rear. On the other hand, the guerrillas also encircle each advancing enemy column by taking the offensive in exterior-line operations. All guerrilla base areas in the enemy's rear play very important strategic role in their efforts to "dominate the spaces".

- (iv) strategic defensive and strategic offensive (i.e., counter-offensive) by the guerrillas within the nationwide war. The enemy attacks the guerrilla base areas and then seeks to consolidate the occupied areas and wipe out the guerrillas. The latter should smash the successive advancing enemy columns while the main force launches repeated surprise attacks, especially in ambushes and encircles the enemy-occupied places. The enemy burns towns and villages as it retreats. But this deprives him of food and shelter in the next offensive. The guerrillas without relaxing, should destroy enemy communications and support the regulars, be vigilant and turn, if necessary, to strategic defensive. (This happened in Bijapur and Assam) ;
- (v) development of guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare, in a protracted war. Guerrilla units should be gradually transformed into regular forces by increasing the numbers and improving the quality in organization, arms, techniques and tactics ;
- (vi) correct relationship of command. This means centralised strategic command (i.e., state planning and directions and co-ordination with regular war) and decentralised command in details, i.e., campaigns and battles.

The higher levels must neither be negligent nor monopolise power. The lower levels must neither usurp authority nor lack initiative. Within unified strategy guerrilla warfare is to be carried on independently in dispersed operations. ⁴

In medieval India some of the basic principles of irregular, partisan or guerrilla warfare were known, though in an inchoate form, and as resistance movement, not as revolutionary movement. The *Sukranitisara* lays down : "One should subjugate the enemy through protracted processes by which provisions were cut short, food and fuel are diminished and the subjects are oppressed." ⁵ The word *Qazaqi* (from *Qazaq*, a Cossack, a partisan, light-armed soldier, highway robber) means guerrilla warfare, free-booting or brigandage. It was used in the sense of a loose attack, followed by retreat. ⁶ The Rajputs, the Ahoms, the Marathas, the Sikhs and the Deccanis, who were comparatively weak and ill-equipped militarily, adopted this form of warfare against the Mughals. Their tactics and principles were similar in some ways to those of modern guerrillas, though the latter are undoubtedly more ramified and developed than the former, and the ideological content of the latter was lacking in the former.

The medieval Indian guerrillas, like their modern counterparts, turned the conditions of terrain and climate and their own society against the enemy in order to obstruct him, but they themselves were not deterred by terrain or weather. Rugged or forest country was most favourable for security and surprise notwithstanding some difficulties in getting supplies and reaching targets. The geographical and social features in Rajputana, Assam, Maharashtra, the Punjab, Ahmadnagar and Bijapur favoured this sort of warfare. The medieval Indian guerrillas used initiative and flexibility by dispersal, concentration and shifting of position.

After the battle of Haldighat, Pratap Singh,

numerically inferior to the Mughals, resorted to guerrilla warfare which suited the country and the Bhils admirably. During their war in the time of Aurangzeb the Rajputs, unable to resist the Mughal artillery, manned by European gunners and 'hopelessly outclassed' on the plains, abandoned the low country and retired to the hills. ⁷ During the rainy season in Assam, comparable to the Russian winter, when "streams took the ways of oceans and *nalas* looked like rivers", the Mughal horse, the terror of the Ahoms, was paralysed in the flooded or muddy ground. The Ahoms were then emboldened to indulge freely in their harassing tactics against Mir Jumla's army. ⁸

Geography, race and circumstances made the Marathas adepts in enveloping and harassing tactics. Orme writes about them as follows : "The strength of their armies consists in their numerous cavalry, which is more capable of resisting the fatigue than any in India : large bodies of them having been known to march fifty miles in a day. They avoid general engagements and seem to have no other ideas in making war, but that of doing as much mischief as possible to the enemy's country . . . The rapidity of their motions leaves the prince, with whom they wage war, little chance of striking a decisive blow against them or even of attacking with effect any of their detachments . . ." Powerless against walled and provisioned cities and artillery-guarded camps, they used to cut off supplies but avoided a pitched battle (as was the Rajput practice). Their light cavalry 'more numerous than ants and locusts', acted as predatory horse (*ghanimi fauj*) like the light forayers of Scotland. Their efficiency depended on their mobility, speed, secrecy in movement and ability in quick dispersal and combination, avoiding pursuit (e.g., Shivaji's tactics at Dindori, 1670). Towards the end of the seventeenth century (c. 1690) they encamped in obscure and inaccessible places during the rainy months. Their bands did not hold together throughout the year but dispersed to their homes at the close of the campaigning season of six months

(October to April). Fortifying out-of-the-way places, they remained encamped in the shelter of woods and cut off Mughal detachments."⁹

During the fourth Abdali invasion (1736) the Sikhs, unable to meet the invader openly, undertook mass flights to hills, jungles or deep ravines which were inaccessible to the invaders.¹⁰

Complex mechanical devices or logistics are not essential for the success of the guerrillas. The problem of logistics is directly solved by the capture of enemy weapons, equipment and ammunition. They establish certain base areas or strategic bases in mountains, on plains and river-lake-estuary regions. But they fight behind enemy lines without a rear. Behind the enemy lines guerrilla warfare "cripples the enemy, pins him down, disrupts his supply lines, and inspires the regular forces and the people throughout the country". Strategically it reverses the normal process of fighting by avoiding battle. Tactically, it evades an engagement which is likely to be lost. But it must ever be dynamic. It is never static. The tactics of the guerrillas are distraction, surprise and mobility. Sudden, sharp, vicious and short are their attacks. The enemy is harassed and confused. Adept in the arts of simulation and dissimulation, the guerrillas' target is the mind of the enemy and the will of its leader rather than the bodies of its soldiers. Thus do they retain their initiative and seek to carry out the first law of guerrilla war—to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy. Its distinctive principle is 'hit and run' (or better 'tip and run'),—to distract, disturb and demoralise the enemy. 'Running away', to lure and trap the enemy, may in effect be offensive.¹¹

Some of these characteristics are traceable in the activities of the medieval Indian guerrillas. When Emperor Aurangzeb retired to Ajmer (March, 1680) the Rajputs in Marwar "made raids, cut off supply trains and stragglers and made the Mughal outposts extremely unsafe", and created "a terror of their

prowess". The Rathor bands spread over the country, appearing unexpectedly in different quarters and scoring a success wherever a Mughal outpost was weekly held, closing the trade routes, and keeping the land in perpetual turmoil. No great pitched battle was fought, but the Mughal general was distracted by the ever-present alarm and the necessity of reinforcing threatened points in time; his divisional commanders were worn out by their ceaseless marches and counter-marches in the vain attempt to clear the country of the elusive Rajput bands and keep the roads open for traffic. All parts of Marwar, Jhalor and Siwana in the south, Godwar in the east, Nagor in the extreme north, and Didwana and Sambhar in the north-east, were invaded by Ajit's partisans in turn, always by surprise, and sometimes oftener than once.¹²

Mirza Rajah Jai Singh's despatches during the Bijapur campaign (1665-66) show that the Deccanis evaded the charges of the Mughal heavy cavalry but harassed them by their 'Cossack' or guerrilla tactics, forming four divisions and fighting loosely. The Bijapuris made sudden and harassing raids on the imperial dominions and dislocated the latter, without coming face to face in a decisive engagement.

When charged by the Mughals, the Bijapuris used to abandon their camps, disperse to different directions and take to their heels. In accordance with "the usual practice of the Deccanis", they divided and sent a group to the right as well as to the left and other groups spread themselves in different sides. Thus by fighting behind the enemy lines and virtual encirclement they galled the imperialists severely from the two wings and the rear (27 December, 1665). Next day the Bijapuris came in two groups, one being in front and another behind. Subsequently they even pressed Jai Singh hard and made an onset on his person.¹³

The Ahoms were also superb in guerrilla

warfare. They would sally out of their forts only during night and make surprise attacks on the enemy, besiege them, if possible, and would retreat if repulsed. Never daring to face the Mughals under Mir Jumla (c. 1661-63) in an open engagement, they took recourse to guerrilla tactics, organising surprise raids and night attacks, hindering enemy supplies and killing any stray person searching forage or firewood. The Ahoms, avoiding a pitched battle, concealed themselves here and there, and, mustering from different sides, made night attacks on every *thana* and intercepted the transport of provisions by water from Lakhau to Garhgaon. By using 'blood-drinking' arrows the Ahoms made movements of the Mughals, even between Mathurapur and Garhgaon, impossible without the protection of a troop of archers. Subsequently, emboldened by the failure of Farhad Khan's mission, the audacious Ahoms now completely closed all the roads. None could come out of his *thana*; no help could be sent to it from outside. So Mir Jumla withdrew all *thanas*. The Ahoms launched successive night assaults on the capital Garhgaon.¹⁴

The Sikhs also adopted guerrilla tactics. Banda did not face the imperialists in an open battle. After his death the Sikhs continued to create disturbances, plunder caravans and withdrew to the hills and impenetrable forests. The armies of Nadir and Abdali, laden with spoils, were plundered in the rear by the light cavalry bands of the Sikhs.¹⁵

About 1690 the Marathas avoided pitched battles, except when they had to relieve a fort, nor did they stay long within easy reach of the Mughal armies. Palkhed was a classic example of what the predatory horse, when led by a genius, could achieve in the age before light artillery. During the Palkhed campaign (1727-28), Baji Rao, then the ablest exponent of the light foray tactics of the Marathas, plundered the Nizam's both flanks, disrupted the arrival of provisions and attacked the Deccani army when crossing a ravine or stream.

But he fled when fighting began and engaged in "Cossack-like" tactics.¹⁶

As in modern times, so in medieval India also, the basic secret of the progress of guerrillas, nimble as mosquitos, was ubiquity plus intangibility. In order to confuse the enemy they substitute for the principle of concentration that of 'dispersion' or 'fluidity of forces', operating in minute particles so as not to present a target, yet coagulating like 'globules of quicksilver' to overwhelm weakly guarded objectives.¹⁷ Speaking of Jai Singh I's campaign in the Bhima-Manjira region (February-June, 1666), the author of the *Alamgirnarah* describes the Bijapuri guerrillas in the same way as Liddell Hart does above. "As the elusive enemy could not be caught in one body, nor crushed once for all, but they scattered like quicksilver, and the imperialists who were encumbered with a camp and heavy baggage could not pursue them for any long distance." This is also corroborated by Jai Singh's despatches. Under the leadership of short-sighted Iliyas, well-known as Sharza and Siddi Masaud, Aziz and Dalil and others, the enemies invaded the imperial dominions and raised tumult; many of them took shelter in the fort of Bijapur. They did not make themselves prominent in any place. These methods practically paralysed the vast Mughal army. The Mughals now retreated to expel the Bijapuri raiding parties. Iliyas and his archers left the imperial territories and re-entered their own devastated taluqs.¹⁸

Again, guerrilla operations in medieval India were necessarily as decentralised as in modern times. Waged by the few, guerrilla war rests on the support of the many. The people support, care for, hide the guerrillas and spy for them. They act as their storehouse, repair-shop and as 'voluntary eyes and ears'. The people must be won over to aid the guerrillas by giving them intelligence and supplies and denying them to the enemy. So organization, instruction, agitation and propaganda are not less important than fighting. According to

Mao-tse Tung, guerrillas are to the people what fish is to the water. Thus do the guerrillas buttress the "menacing and majestic power" of a people's war.¹⁹

The part played by the people to help the guerrillas in medieval India may be judged from the following instances: In the rainy season in Assam, the Ahom guerrillas incited the villagers who had already submitted to the Mughals as at Dewalgaon. An Ahom host 10-12,000 strong retreated from Deopani after the fall of its leader. The ryots, who, professing obedience to the Mughals, were living in the environs of Garhgaon, Mathurapur and Abhoypur, began to desert their villages. During Aurangzeb's Rajput war, the entire country of Marwar was invaded by the partisans of Ajit Singh in turn, always by surprise and often more than once.²⁰ The Sikh leader Banda must have had considerable local support in the plains. About the activities of the Sikhs in 1714 Khafi Khan writes thus: "The violence (of the Sikhs) passed all bounds. The injuries and indignities they inflicted on Musulmans, and the destruction of mosques and tombs, were looked upon by them as righteous meritorious acts. They had built a fort at Gurdaspur in the Punjab, ten or twelve days' journey from Delhi, and extended its limits so that fifty or sixty thousand horse and foot could find protection. They strengthened the towers and walls of the place, took possession of all the cultivated land around, and ravaged the country from Lahore to Sihrind, otherwise called Sirhind.... The infidels on several occasions showed the greatest boldness and daring, and made nocturnal attacks upon the imperial forces." A modern writer thus describes their tactics: "Abdali failed to put down the Sikhs because they refused to meet him on his terms. They were everywhere and yet elusive.... Fighting the Sikhs was like trying to catch the wind in a net." The Sikhs were able to resort to these tactics because the people were behind them.²¹

One characteristic of modern guerrilla war-

fare, as laid down by Mao-tse Tung, is co-ordination with regular warfare, in strategy (e.g., harassing enemy's rear and hindering transport), tactics and battles (getting information, acting as outposts and sentinels).²² Let us see how far this was manifested during the medieval period. During the Mughal invasion of Bijapur in 1665-66 there were regular fightings besides guerrilla warfare. When charged by the Mughal captains, the Bijapuris dispersed and the Mughals began their return march to the camp.²³

The Maratha captains individually carried on a guerrilla warfare causing the greatest loss and disturbance to the imperial territories. The Mughals did not know what point to defend, nor where to find a vital enemy position for attack. Countless bands of mobile Marathas covered vast distances and attacked the most unexpected quarters. Universal unrest prevailed throughout the Deccan. Besides the (regular) divisions under the three generals numbering 60 to 70 thousand cavalry, and the King's own contingent of 10,000 there were roving bands of 15 to 20 thousand. They fought their way to Maharashtra, levying *chauth* from the imperial provinces, driving out the Mughal outposts, and strengthening their own forts and strategic points (*nake jaga*).²⁴

One important aspect of modern guerrilla warfare is the relationship between strategic defensive and strategic offensive. The enemy adopts converging attacks to wipe out the guerrillas. How far was this exemplified in medieval India, if at all? During Jai Singh's invasion of Bijapur, 1665-66, while the Bijapuris followed their Cossack tactics, the Mughals had to be always prepared for a dual task, making aggression on the Bijapuris and at the same time being on the alert to resist their sudden swoops. A single army found it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to keep its eyes now ahead and now behind. As Jai Singh wrote to Aurangzeb: "To me it is crystal-clear that two armies are neces-

sary for the purpose of protecting imperial territories.... When we advance for punishing the enemies of the empire and conquering territories of the hypocrites, another force should be left on this side (i.e., behind). The objective of both the armies is really for the purpose of the advance. Although it is probable that at the time when the imperial dominions are denuded of the victorious army, being engaged in devastating their territories, the accursed enemies might not turn their attention towards this side; yet if they do so, both the armies, those who are advancing and those with me, would fall upon them. In the event of the enemy's not turning to this side, both the armies would, in unison, punish them adequately. If they divide themselves and raise tumult on two sides, these two armies of ours would adopt remedial measures against them." Jai Singh is formulating here what may be described as principles of anti-guerrilla war, aiming at severing the guerrillas from their base and opposing the guerrilla with his own tactics.²⁵

The development of guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare, which has been stressed by Mao-tse Tung, cannot be perfectly illustrated during medieval India. But some approach towards it is traceable in the activities of Santaji Ghorpare (d. 1697). Towards the end of the seventeenth century he supplied 'the classic example of the early Maratha type of warfare'. Combining Parthian tactics with guerrilla warfare, he was a perfect master in making night marches and surprises, and also in covering wide distances quickly. With an inborn genius for handling large bodies of men he combined their movements over wide areas with an incredible accuracy and punctuality, paralleled only by Chengiz Khan and Timur. He could promptly change his own tactics in the light of every change in the enemy's plans and condition, and organise combined movements without the risk of failure.²⁶

Another feature of modern guerrilla war is

correct command. As guerrillas act independently command cannot be too highly centralised. But their activities must be co-ordinated. Hence command is to be centralised for strategic purposes and decentralised for tactical purposes. Leadership must be imaginative, intelligent and bold and at the same time unified. Here also only some resemblance can be traced in Maharashtra. After the execution of Shambhuji, Rajaram instructed the Maratha chieftains to ravage the country. The latter "hovered round the imperial armies and were exceedingly daring". Prominent among them were Santaji Ghorpare and Dhanaji Yadava, both experienced warriors commanding about 15-20,000 cavalry. Their leadership was accepted by other Maratha chieftains and the Mughals suffered great losses. Santaji's tactics succeeded partly because of his incredibly mobile troops and partly because his subordinates carried out his orders punctually to the minute. Demanding implicit obedience from his officers, he enforced the strictest discipline in his army on pain of severe punishments. Santa was thus able to crush Qasim Khan in November, 1695, at Dodderi.

"Santa more especially distinguished himself in ravaging the cultivated districts, and in attacking the royal leaders. Every one who encountered him was either killed, wounded or made prisoner; or if any one did escape, it was with his mere life, with the loss of his army and baggage. Nothing could be done, for wherever the accursed dog went and threatened an attack, there was no imperial *amir* bold enough to resist him, and every loss he inflicted on their forces made the boldest warriors quake." Accompanying the Maratha army for plunder, and recruited from various parts of India irrespective of race, religion or caste, the Pendharis resembled the Cossacks in their customs and movements.²⁷

These details would show that the medieval Indian guerrillas were aware at least of some of the principles of modern guerrilla warfare though the necessary conceptualization might

have been lacking. They used initiative, flexibility and planning. They made flexible use of troops by dispersal, concentration and shift-

ing of position. Some degree of co-ordination with regular war and guerrilla encirclement of the enemy were also then present.

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2. Ibn Khaldun, ed. Quatremere, II, 86; Levy, *Social Structure of Islam*, 428.
3. The civilized Chinese were at a disadvantage before the Tiu Kiu in the seventh century (617 A.D.). The Ghaznavid army under professional Turkish soldiers was worn down by the nomad Turkomans to whom the steppe was their 'father and mother' and who excelled the former as regards encampment, supply of drinking water, fodder for camels and lack of heavy equipage. Steppe warfare required lightness and mobility which the Turkoman riders fighting as a self-sufficing unit had. The Ghaznavids lacked mobility and depended on strong bases and towns for food, fodder and war materials. Without wasting time to reduce these, the ill-equipped nomad raiding parties devastated the agricultural areas of the countryside, starving the people and dislocated the caravan traffic to which Khorasan largely owed its commercial prosperity. Bosworth, *The Ghaznavids*, 246-8.
4. Sun Tzu, Griffith, pp. 66-69, Intro. Sec. VI, 45-56; Mao-tse Tung, *On War*, 69-93.
5. *Sukranitisara*, Tr. B. K. Sarkar, Ch. IV, Sec. VII, 11. 572-3; Kamandaka Niti, XVI.
6. Irvine, *Army of the Indian Moghuls*, 240. German partisans were called *bandites* or *bandits*. The Nizamshahis and Malik Ambar developed guerrilla fighting and predatory warfare (*bargigiri*): Radhesham, *History of the Kingdom of Ahmadnagar*, pp. 376, 280.
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14. Talish, *Fathiyya i ibriyya*, 75-78, 86-91; Assam Buranji (Sukumar Mahanta), 96-7; J. N. Sarkar, *Mir Jumla*, 241, 252-57; *Gait (new)*, 253.
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16. Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, V; *Mil. Hist.*, 143.
17. Mao & Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, Foreword by Liddell Hart, xiv.
18. *Alamgirnamah*, 1018; Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, iv, 142; *Haft Anjuman*, 85b, 86a. A people's war, like a kind of nebulous vapoury essence, should never condense into a solid body; otherwise the enemy crushes it. Clausewitz, *On War*, Vol. I, Bk. VI, p. 346.
19. Liddell Hart, *op. cit.*, xv. When backed by the sympathy of the masses, guerrilla warfare, "tends to be most effective if it blends an appeal to national resistance or desire for independence with an appeal to social and economic discontent, thus becoming revolutionary in a wider sense." *ibid.*; also p. 12; Nasution, 33-38.
20. Talish, 79-80; *Buranji from Khunlung and Khunlai*, 702-3; J. N. Sarkar, *Mir Jumla*, 254; Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, iii. 347.
21. Khafi Khan, E. & D. vii; Khuswant Singh.
22. Mao-tse Tung, *Guerrilla Warfare*, Tr. by S. Griffith, 69-77; Nasution, 17-22.
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27. Mao-tse Tung, 27, 81; Nasution, 51-54; Khafi Khan, ii, 446. Sarkar, *Mil. Hist.*, 159-62. Doderi is in Chittaldurg division of Mysore.

THE ANGLO-BHONSLE RELATIONS AND DISTURBANCES IN THE BENGAL-ORISSA BORDER AREAS (1751-1803)

DR. BINOD SHANKAR DAS

(Sambalpur University, Orissa)

The history of Anglo-Bhonsle relations from 1751 to 1805 reveals the gradual decline of the Bhonsle power over Orissa and the adjoining districts of Midnapur and the Jungle Mahals. The British grip over the south-western parts of Bengal was steadily consolidated as the Bhonsles maintained their precarious hold over Orissa. The process of the replacement of the Bhonsle by the British power may be studied in three stages. First, the period from 1751 to 1772 witnessed the anxiety of the Bhonsle rulers to exercise a centralised authority over the Orissa Governors. They considered Orissa and the adjacent territories of Bengal as the main source of revenue which they needed badly for maintaining their independent existence in Nagpur against the Peshwa and the Nizam. The Company's refusal to pay *Chauth*, its early revenue arrangements in the border areas and its monopoly business in tobacco, betelnut and salt in Bengal had an adverse effect on the economic life of the Maratha territories.

In the second stage (1772-1786) the Bhonsle rulers wasted their resources in domestic strife and in the contest against the league of the Nizam and the Peshwa. Warren Hastings, being determined to stand forth as the Diwan of Bengal, strengthened the frontier territories by chastising the zamindars of Mayurbhanj, Ghatsila and Singhbhum and conciliating the Maratha faujdars of Cuttack by a reward of 13 lakhs of rupees. He followed a conciliatory policy with the object of creating a British-subsidised Maratha power against the hostile Peshwa and his minister Nana Phadnavis. But

with the departure of Warren Hastings in February 1785, and the accession of a more independent-spirited Raghuji Bhonsle II in 1786, the English policy came to be changed. The reports of successive British Residents at Nagpur like Forester (1788), Leckie (1790), Blunt (1793) and Colebrooke (1790-1801) revealed the creeping degeneration at Nagpur and the inability of the Bhonsles to maintain a huge army when the scope of foreign adventures had been considerably narrowed down by the consolidation of the British power in Bengal and its expansion in distant parts of India.

The decline of the *Nizamat* and the consequent reorganisation of the *thanadary* system in Bengal had the effect of strengthening criminal elements in the frontier areas. Moreover, the economic crisis arising out of the complete suppression of the inland trade between Orissa and Bengal, gradual pauperisation of the independent peasantry leading to a rapid transplantation of population and the Company's revenue experiments in the frontier-districts resulted in sporadic agrarian unrests. These are often termed as frontier incursions or 'bargir hangama' which were finally stopped in 1803 by the conquest of Orissa and the introduction of revenue settlements there.

The above analysis may be explained in some details phase by phase. Alivardi Khan assigned to the Marathas in 1751 the surplus revenue of Orissa¹ to pay off the arrear salary of Raghuji's soldiers. He also agreed to pay Raghuji twelve lakhs of rupees as *Chauth* on condition that the

Marathas would not set their foot within the domains of Alivardi.² This surplus revenue of Orissa and the adjacent territories of Bengal and the agreed *Chauth* of twelve lakhs of rupees were the main sources of income of the Bhonsles for waging wars against the Peshwa.³ They ultimately exhausted their strength in these wars, creating a vacuum which afforded an opportunity to the Company to annex Central India.

In 1755, after the death of Raghuji I, Janoji joined in intrigues against the Peshwa and the Nizam which earned him the lasting enmity of both.⁴ In 1769 Nagpur was plundered and the Bhonsle was compelled to acknowledge his subordination to the Peshwa by the agreement of Kankapur.⁵ This humiliation he could not retrieve till his death in 1772.⁶ Heavy demands for money for the court and for the army prompted the Bhonsle to borrow from money-lenders.⁷ They strengthened their control over the faujdars of Orissa and sacked them whenever they failed to remit to Nagpur the revenue of Orissa and the *Chauth* of Bengal in time. On September 4, 1752, Mir Habib was murdered.⁸ Mirza Saleh, the next Governor of Orissa, was also forced to resign in 1759 as he failed to remit ready money to the Bhonsle's treasury.

Mirza Saleh, the Governor of Orissa, conciliated both Raghuji and Alivardi so long as they were alive. But his demand for *Chauth* to please his Maratha master provoked the anger of his Mahomedan overlord.⁹ He obstructed the British trade in Orissa for extorting money for the Marathas.¹⁰ This prompted the Company to conciliate the Mirza and to keep him in good humour. In return, Mirza Saleh gave them the right to trade duty-free.¹¹ Both he and his son, Dadar Ali, could not send the Bhonsle the promised *Chauth* of Bengal and the revenue of Orissa regularly during the troubled years 1757-60 which led to their dismissal.¹² At that time the Bhonsle ruler was in sore need of money to pay off his debts.¹³ Thereafter, the appointment of the faujdars of

Cuttack from Murshidabad was discontinued by the Bhonsle.

In 1760 Sheo Bhatt Sathe came to Orissa to realise the outstanding dues, went to Murshidabad to regain the fort of Barbati from Fathe Khan and to demand *Chauth* for Bengal.¹⁴ He even threatened to invade Bengal if *Chauth* was not paid. But Mir Qasim remained unconcerned.¹⁵ Sheo Bhatt proceeded to plunder Birbhum. The Company stationed troops at Midnapur and Burdwan to confront the Marathas.¹⁶ Sheo Bhatt retreated to Cuttack.¹⁷ Later on, he laid claim to Midnapur and the Jungle Mahal districts as parts of Orissa, and in 1761 in alliance with the Jungle Mahal Zamindars he sacked Midnapur.¹⁸ Johnston, the first Resident at Midnapur, in alarm asked for speedy relief from Calcutta.¹⁹ Sheo Bhatt then pushed forward detachments to Khirpai and Bishnupur and threatened Calcutta and Hooghly. On February 8, 1761, he was repulsed by the Company's troops, so that he failed to collect revenue from the tenants even of Pataspur which was a Maratha Pargana.²⁰

This incident compelled the Company in early 1761 to chalk out a plan for driving out the Marathas from Orissa and place it before Mir Qasim. The price of expulsion of the Marathas from Orissa was the revenue of the territories between Jaleswar and Cuttack which the Company demanded from the Nawab.²¹ Mir Qasim again remained silent.²² But being anxious to drive out the Company's officers from Bengal, he negotiated with Sheo Bhatt and even sent him a 'sanad' for Jaleswar and Midnapur.²³ Vansittart persuaded the Maratha faujdar not to join the Nawab on promise of early payment of all arrears of *Chauth*.²⁴ But the *Chauth* was never paid, Mir Qasim was eventually expelled from Bengal, and Sheo Bhatt in 1764 fell into arrears in remitting the stipulated amount to the Nagpur exchequer. Janoji dismissed him and appointed Chamna Sau.²⁵

Sheo Bhatt and his brother Bhaskar Pandit, the faujdar of Balasore, then raised the standard

of revolt against Janoji, being supported by the rulers of Mayurbhanj and Nilgiri.²⁶ He also negotiated with the Company and enlisted Clive's support temporarily.²⁷ But the Company's officers very soon turned their face against the rebels and even sent troops to suppress them.²⁸ The rebels continued to collect taxes from the cultivators and carried on incursions into the border areas till 1767 in league with the landed proprietors there.²⁹ The latter supported the rebels with a view to escape regular payment of enhanced revenue to the Company. In April 1767 the rebels sent their emissary Guzrat Singh to induce the Company's sepoys to join hands with them.³⁰ Verelst, the then Governor at Fort William, warned Vansittart, the Resident at Midnapur, against this Maratha move.³¹ Vansittart proposed to annex Pataspur, the stronghold of the rebel zamindars, to stop future disturbances in lieu of Belorachour, a territory of the Mayurbhanj Raja.³²

Since 1764 the Maratha faujdars of Cuttack changed their attitude towards the Company as they realised the hard fact that the *Chauth* of Bengal could not be collected from the Company. Chamna Sau permitted postal facilities to the Company within Orissa and Residents were allowed to reside at Cuttack, Balasore and Malud factories.³³ He also offered the Company a contingent of 5,000 horses against Shujaud-dowla.³⁴ The next faujdar, Bhawani Pandit, being determined to put down the rebel frontier Zamindars, endeavoured to conciliate the Company and even sent a secret letter to the Governor.³⁵ He also wanted to suppress Sheo Bhatt and his rebel brother with the help of the contingent of 5,000 horses sent by Janoji to collect *Chauth* forcibly from Bengal.³⁶

But the question of *Chauth* which was inseparably connected with that of the frontier troubles again cropped up,³⁷ since the frontier disturbances were mainly created by the ill-paid 'bargirs'. The Company contended that the Bhonsle was entitled to get *Chauth* only after the cession of Orissa to the Company, the rightful Dewan of the Subah of Bengal

including Orissa. But Janoji claimed 12 lakhs of rupees on the strength of the treaty of 1751 between Alivardi and Raghuji and the *farman* to him granted by Shah Allam II.³⁸ In 1768, Clive sent Motte on a mission to Nagpur "to sound the officers of Janoji's court whether he would cede Orissa for annual tribute" so as to "give a contiguity to the British dominions in India".³⁹ Motte met Bhowani Pandit and received an evasive reply. In the same year Clive deputed Mir Zainul Abedin to the Nagpur Court to negotiate for the cession of Orissa,⁴⁰ and complained against the faujdars of Cuttack. Janoji, desirous of settling the problem of *Chauth* without ceding Orissa, dismissed the faujdar and appointed Sambhoji Ganesh.⁴¹ Thus the faujdars were repeatedly changed but the question of the *Chauth* remained unsolved.

Janoji sent Udepuri Gossain to Calcutta in 1767 to resolve the deadlock.⁴² As the Bhonsle's financial distress had reached an acute stage, he had to borrow large sums from the money-lenders to pay up the arrear salary of his troops.⁴³ Md. Reza Khan proposed payment of 13 lakhs of rupees on condition of the cession of Orissa. But Udepuri Gossain insisted on the annual payment of 16 lakhs, the sum previously promised by Clive if Orissa was to be ceded.⁴⁴ An embassy, sent to Cuttack to examine the sources of the Orissan revenue,⁴⁵ submitted that a revenue of 16 or 17 lakhs of rupees could be collected under an efficient administration.⁴⁶ The Company could not agree to all the Maratha demands.⁴⁷ But Sambhaji Ganesh, the faujdar of Cuttack, held out an offer of the services of 50,000 Maratha horses if the Company desired to hire them.⁴⁸ He also allowed the British troops under the command of Major Achmuty to march through Orissa against Hyder Ali of Mysore.⁴⁹ The policy was significant. During the regime of Hastings, the Bhonsle was able to solve the problem of disbandment of his vast army by hiring them out to the Company when the Company needed trained troops in the wars against Hyder Ali and his allies. The Company did

not allow the opportunity to slip out as a rapid army mobilization through Orissa was a necessity on the eve of the First Anglo-Mysore War.

The friendly relations between the two powers could not last long as news of the Bhonsle's preparations to invade the Company's territories reached Calcutta.⁵⁰ Consequently, when the Peshwa attempted to crush Janoji Bhonsle and Sambhaji Ganesh, the faujdar of Cuttack, requested the Company to assist his master "at this critical juncture", the Company adopted a strictly neutral policy.⁵¹ Even the frontier Zamindars of Singhbhoom were refused any help by Vansittart, the Resident at Midnapur, in their internal disputes (July 1768).⁵² The refusal of the Company's assistance compelled Janoji to submit to the Poona Durbar. He recalled his Vakils from Calcutta, accusing the Company of duplicity and time-serving.⁵³

Sambhaji Ganesh then adopted a bellicose attitude against the Company. He sought the help of Damodar Bhanj, the Raja of Mayurbhanj, in April 1768, for sending an expedition against Bengal in case *Chauth* was not paid. His army consisted of 12,000 horses, 6,000 burkandazes and 6,000 men with firearms.⁵⁴ The Company's Government remained alert and posted spies at Cuttack to receive information till the end of 1770.⁵⁵ But the projected invasion ended in a failure. Some of the Maratha horsemen frequenting the Jungle Mahal district were expelled.⁵⁶ Vigorous steps were also taken to prevent the desertion of the Company's sepoys,⁵⁷ and the migration of the *molungies* (salt-workers) to the Maratha territories.⁵⁸

The Company's administration in the Jungle Mahals, including the establishment of police stations and frontier outposts, greatly affected the economy of the Bengal-Orissa border areas. It stopped the traditional inland trade between Orissa and Bengal. The salt merchants were prevented from carrying the cheap salt of Orissa to Patna through the Jungle Mahals on pretence of smuggling, and all contraband salts were confiscated.⁵⁹ The Zamindars belonging

to the Maratha territories were disallowed to collect *abwabs* in the Company's region.⁶⁰ The famine of 1770 in Bengal had its impact in Orissa. It led to a large-scale migration of population from the revenue-paying territories of the Company to the Maratha territories.⁶¹ The service-tenure holders like the *paiks* and the seasonal labourers like the *molungies* crossed the frontier and engaged themselves in the *Khalaries* (salt-producing lands) of the Maratha territories.⁶²

The seventies of the 18th century witnessed two important developments, the succession problem in the Bhonsle family and the administrative changes in Bengal resulting from the Regulating Act of 1773, which had considerable effect in remodelling the Anglo-Bhonsle relations of the period. Janoji Bhonsle died in May, 1772.⁶³ His successor, Mudhaji, wanted to extricate Nagpur from the hegemony of the Poona Durbar.⁶⁴ Being alarmed at the prospects of the Nizam's invasion he wanted to maintain a happy balance between Calcutta and Poona. The balance was, however, disturbed by the outbreak of the First Anglo-Maratha War. Warren Hastings succeeded in detaching the Bhonsles of Nagpur from the anti-British Confederacy⁶⁵ and follow a defensive policy.⁶⁶

Mudhaji followed a cautious policy.⁶⁷ Although anxious to make the Nagpur State independent of the Poona Durbar, he did not want to fall under the influence of the Company's Government either. He stiffened his attitude towards the Company when the Bombay Council wanted to prop up Raghunath Rao to the Peshwaship.⁶⁸ The British authorities also became suspicious about the real intention of the Bhonsle Raja.⁶⁹ When the Nizam formed an anti-British grand alliance,⁷⁰ Mudhaji was compelled to shoulder the unpleasant burden of sending an expedition to Bengal.⁷¹ Mudhaji's financial crisis reached an acute stage when his failure to pay off loans led the bankers to leave Nagpur.⁷²

The projected invasion of Bengal was also

ill-fated.⁷³ In the course of the march the Maratha troops suffered greatly due to lack of food and also to the commencement of the rainy weather. The Rajas of Dhenkanal and Sambalpur in Orissa turned hostile, and the army refused to accept Sena Bahadur Khandoji and Bhawani Kalo's orders to proceed. Hastings sent Capt. Baillie to Cuttack to gather information.⁷⁴ Coming to know of the worsening condition of the Maratha army approaching Bengal he opened talks with the Bhonsle's agent, Khandoji. Mudhaji wanted to keep the private wire open with the Calcutta Government without breaking his ties with the Poona Durbar. But Naro Pandit, the Peshwa's *vakil*, suspected the Bhonsle's agents as the secret allies of the Company.⁷⁵

From the beginning of 1781 two policies were urged in the Company's Government in relation to the Bhonsle Raja. The Company's Officers in Midnapur and the Jungle Mahals urged the Government to take strong measures against the Marathas and expel them from Orissa, so that the south-western part of Bengal could be effectively pacified, a land-route through Orissa to the Deccan could be made safe and a monopoly in the salt trade in Orissa could be established by checking inland smuggling. The Governor-General-in-Council, on the other hand, wanted to conciliate the Bhonsle and follow a policy of sowing dissension among the Maratha powers. He sent supplies of food to the Bhonsle's troops of the ill-fated expedition in the frontier and sought permission for the passage of a Company of European artillery and six battalions of Native infantry under Col. Pearse in January 1781 for the war against Mysore. Anderson was deputed to meet Chinnaji, the Cuttack faujdar, lest the approach of the British army might lead to "serious and alarming consequences."⁷⁶

Consequently, a treaty of alliance was signed between the Company and the Bhonsle and Hastings agreed to pay Chinnaji 13 lakhs of rupees for paying the arrear salary of his army.⁷⁷ Col. Pearse could proceed quietly to Ganjam⁷⁸

and Hastings succeeded in converting "an ostensible enemy into a declared friend."

The departure of Hastings (February, 1785) and death of Mudhaji (May 9, 1788) gave a new turn to the Anglo-Bhonsle relations. With financial bankruptcy mounting up in Orissa, Raghuji II became the ruler of Nagpur. As the weakness of the central authority at Nagpur became manifest the Cuttack faujdars, like Rajaram Pandit (d. 1793) and Sadasiv Rao (1799-1803), assumed independent authority. The Poona Durbar induced Nagpur to demand *Chauth* for Bengal.⁷⁹ Macpherson sent Malet, the Resident at Poona, to conciliate the Bhonsle.⁸⁰ After the arrival of Cornwallis Forster was deputed to Nagpur to form a fresh alliance to have free passage of British troops towards Mysore through Orissa.⁸¹ The internal exhaustion of the Bhonsle, his financial stringency and his fear of Poona aggrandisement could not escape Forster's trained eye.⁸² He depicted Raghuji as cruel, deceitful and unable to pay his soldiers, and reported that the Bhonsle extorted money from the wealthy officers and bankers as his revenue was inadequate to meet the expenditure of his army.⁸³ Cornwallis realised the necessity of annexation of Orissa on the eve of the impending war against Mysore.⁸⁴

In his utter distress Raghuji allowed himself to be bought over by Nana Phadnavis who promised the Bhonsle financial help of ten lakhs of rupees for furnishing an equal number of men to the service of the Peshwa.⁸⁵ Forster in 1789 complained of frontier incursions of the Maratha 'bargirs' in the south-western part of Bengal. But Raghuji was disinclined to interfere in Orissa as long as he obtained regular revenue from Orissa. Cuttack was groaning under heavy taxation to meet Raghuji's financial demand, and the frontier incursions were inevitably connected with it.⁸⁶

Further deterioration of the Bhonsle's economic and political conditions may be studied from Capt. Blunt's Journal (January, 1795),⁸⁷

when Raghuji joined with the Peshwa at Ahmednagar with about 12,000 cavalry and 6,000 infantry and 15 guns against the Nizam. The Nizam was defeated at Kharda (March, 1795),⁸⁸ but the Bhonsle's power in Central India also collapsed. The army mutinied, Pindari troubles gained in strength and Orissa stopped regular payments.⁸⁹ In May, 1798, Wellesley realised the dangers of inaction in the face of the French menace and their alliance with Tipu. He sent Colebrooke to Nagpur for negotiating an alliance (March 18, 1799).⁹⁰ But the Bhonsle refused to accept the Subsidiary Alliance, following the usual delaying tactics.⁹¹

This gradual decline of the Bhonsle power and the simultaneous change in the British attitude towards the Nagpur Court had their repercussions on the agrarian economy in Orissa and in the south-western part of Bengal. A study in the structure of taxation throughout the Mughal and the Maratha periods would show the absence of any significant upward trend.⁹² But in the second half of the 18th century the diminishing value of money, the prevalence of numerous types of currency in circulation with the *batta* problem for conversion into standard rupee, the acute shortage of standard currency owing to its constant drain from Orissa and the consequent introduction of the system of remittance through *hundi* or letters-patent aggravated the economic crisis.⁹³

Another factor was the changed agrarian relations in the period. For the financial bankruptcy of the native zamindars of Orissa, besides the greed and rapacity of the faujdars' amlas, increased social and religious obligations of the landed proprietors, competitive tendency of squandering away of surplus agricultural profits into non-productive socio-religious expenditures led the landholders to borrow money from the neighbouring money-lenders even on usurious interest-rates.⁹⁴ Sale of estates following ejectment from the holdings led to the infiltration of a new type of landholders from

outside who subsisted on usury. They concentrated their surplus agricultural income on land-speculation and on increasing the size of units such as textile or salt producing units, without caring much for agricultural improvements through irrigation or incentive to agricultural labour, in order to compensate their losses incurred through increasing demands from Nagpur.⁹⁵

Moreover, the increasing pressure of population mainly from Bengal, withering away of domestic industries, gradual shrinkage of market outside Orissa and loss of tillage rights ultimately led to the inevitable consequences, i.e. pauperisation of the original producers.

The frontier incursions of the period were the manifestation of this gloomy picture of economic stagnation. That may be studied on the basis of three economic phenomena of the period: (1) heavy pressure of population on agricultural production with the relative shrinkage in other commodity-productions; (2) relative role of money and produce rents and increasing demand for the former for payment of rent and enhancement of the amount of the latter through *abwabs*; and (3) the increasing role of the money-lenders who advanced money to the proprietors and original producers which paved the way for the servitude of the cultivators. This decline in the economic status of the original producers may be examined in three types of the cultivators: one, peasants with land mainly on service-tenure or on non-revenue-paying land-grants but without any stock, like village paiks and zamindars' amlas and priests. They were dependent on a class of cultivators with stock but mostly without land. Therefore, the second class of cultivators cultivated others' lands as share-croppers. Thirdly, there were the multitudes of landless and seasonal labourers who were very often a migratory populace, had often alternative means of subsistence on village commodity productions and who had lost their small holdings through the usurious system of the money-lenders. These original producers sank into the

status of paupers in the coastal belt and the south-eastern borders of Orissa. They mainly strengthened the anarchical elements in the countryside. The rapid spread of gang-robbery had direct links with the failure of the *thana-dary* system of the impoverished landed proprietors and weakening of the central authority at Cuttack over the distant parts of Orissa and the border areas.

The frontier troubles which continued from the 60's of the 18th century, with the beginning of the British impact in the region, may be studied under three heads: (1) armed clashes among the landed proprietors for demarcation of areas;⁹⁷ (2) the frontier incursions committed by lawless elements and impoverished agricultural community who had been thrown out of employment partly due to the British systematisation of land-revenue and partly due to the Maratha pressure of *abwabs*;⁹⁸ (3) the conflicts arising out of large-scale migration of population and secret transportation of com-

modities through the long-prevalent, but later ruthlessly suppressed by the Company, inland trade within the 'Nimki' and 'Jungle Mahals'.⁹⁹

These frontier disputes reached an acute stage in the 80's of the century. The Company's local officers looked at these incursions cautiously and stationed troops at various strategic points.¹⁰⁰ The Calcutta Council was also anxious to persuade Cuttack, through negotiations, to maintain peace in the frontier and to secure a land-route through Orissa towards Madras. Since 1786 it became increasingly clear that Orissa could not be possessed except by force of arms when the complaints made by Forster and Colebrooke,¹⁰¹ and the proposals for exchange of frontier territories¹⁰² were all turned down. By the Treaty of Deogaon (December 17, 1803) the Bhonsle had to cede Orissa and parts of Midnapur to the Company. With this the Bengal-Orissa frontier incursions, popularly known as the 'Bargir Hangama' finally ended.

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HISTORY OF THE FREEDOM MOVEMENT

(A REVIEW ARTICLE)

DR. BISHESHWAR PRASAD

(Allahabad)

With the publication of the long-awaited last two volumes the History of the Freedom Movement in India, written by the eminent historian Dr. Tara Chand, has been completed. In the first volume the author has analysed the factors responsible for the decay of the Mughal Empire and the disruption of the political fabric of the country which facilitated the establishment of British dominion over India. He has correctly diagnosed the socio-economic *malaise* which had degraded the character of the rulers and the elite, and made the common man unresponsive and indifferent to the major changes in the political structure of the land. The purpose of the first volume is to serve as a "background to the unfoldment of the freedom struggle." The second volume reviews critically India's reaction to the British impact and "discusses the national ferment in its manifold forms." The forces helping the growth of national consciousness have been identified and the early stages of national movement have been clearly graphed so as to bring into relief the basic trends which determined its shape in the present century. The first two volumes thus have prepared the stage for the interplay of events which ultimately triumphed in wresting power from the British and regaining freedom for the country.

The third volume brings the story from the

Curzon's partition of Bengal to the close of the first non-violent non-co-operation movement launched by Mahatma Gandhi in 1920. The first chapter discusses the state of politics in Great Britain and its international position in the first half of the present century and throws light on the gradual decay of imperialism which facilitated the declaration of India's freedom in 1947. It is in this setting of English political power that the drama of India's freedom struggle was enacted. The next two chapters analyse the economic condition of India and highlight the stagnation which was evident on all sides. "Worsening condition of the agricultural sector" had brought in its wake the "mounting unemployment and under-employment, the obvious piling up of people on the land, the scarcity of productive instruments in general in relation to the people," as Danis pointed out. The "economic position of the large majority of agriculturists," as Gadgil observes, had worsened during the First Great War and the cultivation had grown "absolutely helpless." Very rightly the author infers that the condition of rural workers deteriorated so that "the bleak existence and miserable plight of great numbers of their countrymen naturally roused the indignation of the intelligentsia and added fuel to the fire of discontent and anti-British feeling." Yet there was a growth of an agricultural middle class whose wealth and influence had increased and which was in a position to affect the character of the national movement. The "same differential pattern of development" was evident in industry, so that

the "unorganised cottage industries" were "declining and disintegrating" while the organised large-scale factory industry was making "a slow and unequal growth." On the basis of statistics the author has concluded that while the per capita value of agricultural product was falling the "per capita income from industry and commerce was slowly rising." From this the inference is natural that "in the first half of the twentieth century the great majority of the people of India, viz., those dependent on agriculture were becoming progressively impoverished, while the small number of those deriving their livelihood from industry, trade and certain services were enjoying increasing income." The consequence of this economic reality in the sphere of politics was, in the words of the author: "The masses groaning under their misery sought some means of relief from hunger, fear and thralldom. The classes needed mass support to bring pressure upon Government for the removal of grievances.... The middle class extended their influence among their countrymen, urban and rural, intensified national solidarity and helped to build up the force of public opinion and to organise the instruments for carrying on the struggle." This is an objective assessment of the impact of economic forces on political national movement.

The fourth and the most valuable chapter is entitled 'the Philosophical Background' and reviews the ideas of the four great leaders on the non-Muslim side, namely Tilak, Tagore, Gandhi and Aurobindo Ghosh, whose thought in the fields of morality, society and politics helped to create public opinion and had tremendous impact on the trend of the national movement. These leaders "devised tactics for the campaigns of the struggle" and "deliberated upon the national and moral justification of ends and means." Their ideologies expressed the dual aspect of "war against foreign domination," namely, those of force and ideas. And as it was fought on both "national and moral planes, it was as much a war with an

external enemy as a battle within the mind." This is the justification of the chapters which distinguish the identities and diversities of thinking among the leaders of Hindus and Muslims. The author has probed into their minds and in these volumes has attempted to discover the factors which divided them and made for the impossibility of joint action to win independence on which demand "almost all factions and parties converged to agreement." There is also a certain unanimity in the thought of national leaders that they all laid greatest stress on non-violence. It is true that both Tilak and Aurobindo Ghosh did not rule out force as an instrument of struggle against foreign domination, but their emphasis was throughout on non-violent action. Ghosh was an ardent advocate of passive resistance, and gave a call for complete independence long before the Congress had resolved on it. Both Tilak and Aurobindo stood out for mass participation in the struggle for Swaraj and wanted to broaden out the "nationalist movement" from its "middle-class limitations." In their ideology there was no scope for any differentiation between man and man and their concept of equality implied a socialist state, as to them "socialist democracy is the only true democracy." The author's sympathy with the thought of Tagore and Gandhiji is manifest throughout. Gandhi's satyagraha was not a "sterile effort." The author rightly emphasises the twofold aspect of India's freedom fight. It was viewed externally as a "struggle to end domination and rule of a foreign power. But essentially it was a moral struggle." To the author, Gandhiji's Swaraj meant the breaking of the chains which bound the minds of men. These chains consisted of "fear, selfishness, distrust, cowardice and vices of various kinds." And Gandhiji's teaching and "his example revolutionised Indian character." In so far as the fight for freedom was a fight "within the mind and involved the moulding of a moral man, the ideologies of all the four leaders drove to the same end. The author has very objectively assessed the contribution of Gandhiji in the making of a

History of the Freedom Movement in India, Vols. III and IV, By Tara Chand, Publications Division, Government of India, 1972.

new India. In his words, "Cowardice and fear gave place to bravery and courage, the spirit of sacrifice and endurance of suffering for a cause began to prevail over selfishness, a new sense of self-reliance and self-respect emerged and India felt the glow of confidence in her destiny." With every fast and every campaign a thrill of suspense and hope passed through the length and breadth of the land and made the Indian hearts beat in unison. His words and deeds created an atmosphere of sanctity which uplifted and purified man. Again Gandhiji identified himself with the millions, he shared their joys and sorrows and he cast his life in their mould. For the first time it dawned upon the consciousness of India that the masses living in the hundreds and thousands of villages constitute the real India. "The princes, the rich, the educated held their influence, wealth and learning as a trust on behalf of the toilers in fields, factories and shops. Their welfare was the supreme end, their freedom the real Swaraj." This was the legacy which free India inherited. Have we lived up to it?

In two chapters the author has discussed Muslim thought and politics and the Muslim problem which called for solution. He finds great similarity in essentials in the basic ideas of Ram Mohan Roy and Syed Ahmad Khan who stood for "supremacy of reason in religious, moral and social affairs." But soon "reason's supremacy began to recede, feeling began to take its place in man's esteem. Faith assumed domination over intellect and criticism of religion was deprecated." In this sway of emotionalism developed the irreconcilability between the Hindus and Muslims which dominated the growth of the nationalist movement in the present century and prepared the soil for separatism. In the words of the author: "Emphasis upon the past of the two communities created the impression that they were two different nationalities, inhabiting two widely separated worlds. Thus the great illusion was created which was fostered and swelled by the strains of practical needs."

And the person who contributed most to the accentuation of differences and diversities was Mohammad Iqbal. His "impetus to emotionalism" led to "a paralysis of clear thinking in politics and an upsurge of unreason leading to violence." His "emphasis on the uniqueness of Islam and Islamic civilization" and "exclusive reliance upon the factor of religion" made "political accommodation with other communities almost impossible." And the author rightly concludes that "to no small extent the partition of India is due to his ideas and indoctrination." Iqbal's neglect of the basic problems of India, his bourgeois inclinations and frequent reminders to the war-like exploits of the Muslims made compromise, which is an essential pre-requisite of nationalism, impossible. Yet the author doubts if Iqbal contemplated the "partition of India and the establishment of a sovereign Muslim state." All that he proposed in 1930 was the creation of an autonomous region of Muslim majority in the north-west, "possessing full opportunity of development within the body politic of India." Another Muslim thinker Maududi totally rejected the idea of Hindus and Muslims unitedly living in a state with democracy and secularism as its basis. But there were many others who did not subscribe to separatism and were staunchly upholding the principle of united India, free from foreign domination and democratic in its structure. Hussain Ahmad advocated a republican state, federal in character, the Centre dealing with only a limited number of subjects such as defence, foreign affairs, communications, transport and finances. Abul Kalam Azad was the most outstanding among these liberal thinkers who strove for unity, brooking opposition and opprobrium of his co-religionists led by the reactionaries of the Muslim League advocating partition of the country in the later stages.

In the chapter entitled 'The Muslim Problem' the author has critically analysed the circumstances prompting the initiation of the scheme of separate electorates for the Muslims

and the emergence of the Muslim League. It is clear from his study that both these were the contrivances of the Government to counter the anti-Bengal Partition agitation, and Minto was primarily responsible for the mischievous formula. Unfortunately, except the *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, no nationalist journal or leader at the time give close attention to it. Minto was happy that he had pulled back the Muslims from joining the opposition and the Muslim leaders, whose complexion was entirely bourgeois, were pleased at this recognition of their separate identity. They were largely echoing the sentiments of Englishmen. The author has also exposed the hollowness of the Muslim demands and the grievances on which these were based. However, the events, both national and international, in the next decade led to the convergence of the two communities to a certain identity of interests. The Khilafat Movement brought them on the same platform and Gandhiji launched the non-co-operation programme, "tacking the objective of Swaraj to that of the Khilafat." Permanent Hindu-Muslim unity was the purpose of Gandhiji in thus identifying the national movement with the Khilafat agitation which was of a temporary nature. And when he withdrew the non-co-operation movement before the Khilafat question had been settled, the relations between the two communities were badly affected. The Hindus were alarmed by "the vehemence of the militant propaganda of the Khilafatists," the Muslims had no faith in the "secular concept of democracy," and thus the two drifted apart "to betake to exclusively communal courses." The author holds that the "causes of communal antagonism were deep" and unless a transformation was effected of the social, economic and political organisation of the Indian society" these would not be eliminated. But the process of harmonisation was "obstructed and slowed by the presence of the third party," the British rulers. The struggle for freedom was not halted but its path was blocked by the growing hostility of Muslims and increasing cry for separatism, marked by the resurgence of communal

dissensions.

In this background, the author has discussed the events of the first two decades of the present century, beginning with the Bengal Partition, vehement agitation to undo it, search for constitutional devices to contain the political ferment and closing with the non-co-operation movement and its withdrawal. He has critically analysed British policy in this period which lacked sympathy with Indian aspirations and was not prepared even to allow colonial self-government. The fiddling with constitutional changes was merely with the object of ensuring permanency of British rule in India. The revolutionary movement had been driven underground by repression, and the extremists were bracketed with the terrorists. But the political consciousness was growing in the country, economic factors were fanning discontent and the people were least prepared to restore faith in British promises and pretences. The Reforms of 1919 were therefore doomed to failure, more so because the bureaucracy lacked confidence in them. The increasing disaffection found expression in the non-co-operation movement, which failed to curb the will of the Government and could not adhere strictly to the path of absolute non-violence. Its withdrawal cast a gloom but it had brought immense gains, the most prominent of which was a "general awakening of the masses to their political rights, the total loss of faith in the government and self-confidence and spirit of self-reliance. Temporary setback could not deviate the national movement from the ideal set by Gandhiji which was an ordering of human affairs on the basis of truth and non-violence." He desired a society in which "all exploitation of man by man ceases." With this note the third volume ends.

The fourth volume "depicts the most active phase of the freedom movement" in its last twenty-five years before 1947. In the twelve chapters the author has vividly brought into view the conflict between imperialist interests of Britain and the Indian demand for self-

realisation and freedom. Based on contemporary official documents, private papers of British officials, biographies, memoirs and writings of Englishmen and Indians, the book is the first clear and exhaustive treatment of the national movement which brought freedom to India. An important contribution of the author is the analysis of the Muslim demand for partition and the forces and circumstances which contributed to the division of India into two independent and perhaps warring states. He holds the view that "after 1858 politicisation of the Indian mind began in a milieu which was dominated by religious slogans and guided by sectarian beliefs and customs. The policy of the British rulers was to accentuate the biases of their subjects so as to widen their differences." For "the consolidation of the Indian people into a single nation was against the imperial interests." Hence disparities were emphasised and group consciousness encouraged by the rulers. Not only the division between Hindus and Muslims was highlighted but even the clash of interests between "Brahmins and non-Brahmins, Upper Castes and Depressed Classes" among the Hindus were "exploited." "In these circumstances the struggle for self-government was an endeavour to bridge the gulf which divided the communities and castes," and the story of the national movement, whose aim was to win freedom from domination, unfortunately, is that "of the attempts at political unification of communities." In this process while the modern economic forces helped progress towards the objective, "persistence of medieval notions of religious, social order and customs ... encouraged by the selfish interests of the British Government" retarded the pace. However, in the present century the resurgence movement made rapid strides despite the recurrent obstructions imposed by the foreign government whose concessions of constitutional reforms in 1909 and 1919 were directed towards deepening the differences among communities and emphasising "the vicious theory of two nations." "Self-determination was left to the hazards of reconciliation of the antagonistic parties," which

British diplomacy prevented. The pressure of the movement of civil disobedience, growing disaffection of the people and the decline in the international position of the United Kingdom, however, compelled the British to relinquish India, but not without partitioning it into two independent states. The fourth volume has narrated this story most graphically and analytically which exhibits the objectivity and thoroughness of a historian.

The most prominent architect of the freedom movement was Mahatma Gandhi. His approach was not "purely political". What he aimed at was "to purge Indian political life of corruption, deceit, terrorism and the incubus of white supremacy." He said, "I am not interested in freeing India from the English yoke. I am bent upon freeing India from any yoke whatever." This condition implied end of "all exploitation of class by class, the tyranny of a majority over the minority." In the society which he had in view "inequality would be replaced by equality, conflict by harmony and coercion by reason." To achieve these results Gandhiji depended on the masses whom he wanted to train to fight the battle for freedom. His approach was radically different from that of the educated middle class Indians who controlled the Congress and who "were too much enamoured of parliamentarianism and offices." Throughout these years of conflict with the British Government, Gandhiji's movement of civil disobedience was misunderstood and exploited for their purpose by the politicians. And it was in this fight for seats and offices that divergence between the Hindus and Muslims grew and the British rulers could employ their Machiavelian tactics to aggravate it. The progress of the national movement for freedom may clearly be divided into three distinct stages. The first is marked by growing differences between the two communities, division among the ranks of the Congress and futile attempts at constitution-making and compromise between the Hindus and the Muslims. The second stage began with the Civil Disobedience in 1930 when the Swarajist

experiment of non-co-operation from within had proved fruitless and the inability of the British Government to yield Dominion Status had led to the firm demand for complete independence. The most important event of this period was the fiasco of the Round Table Conferences and the imposition of the Act of 1935 with Provincial Autonomy and Federation as its prominent features. The civil disobedience had raised the masses and prepared the country to suffer for freedom and be self-reliant. The third stage commences with the inevitable frustration with the parliamentary experiment and the commencement of the Second World War. Complete rift between the Congress and the Muslim League, which adopted the cry of partition of the country and met with encouragement from the rulers in it, and mounting wave of coercion by the British along with attempts to conciliate the people with political offers characterise this period which culminated in the grant of independence. Dr. Tara Chand has traced the rise of national movement with the aid of official and non-official sources of documentary information revealed for the first time. His analysis of Muslim politics leads him to the inevitable conclusion that Pakistan was more the consequence of British intrigues than Muslim fervour for it. And British statements fully confirm this view. Also the inability of Jawaharlal Nehru to place his feet on reality and appreciate Muslim aspirations in his presentation of economic revolution and Gandhiji's presentation of "moral transformation of the Hindus and Muslims" failed to appease the venom of the Muslim League. The British exploited the situation for their purpose and when it became impossible for them to continue their domination over India they declared independence by decimating and dividing the country.

The volume is divided into twelve chapters. The first two bring the story down to the start of the Civil Disobedience Movement, and discuss the communal question, the genesis of differences and efforts at unity, the Swarajist

adventure, Indian demand for constitutional revision, conservative apathy, appointment of the Simon Commission and vehement opposition to it and the declaration of civil disobedience. The author has pointed out that the antedating of the Statutory Commission was not the result of Indian pressure but Birkenhead's keenness to prevent the Labour Party from selecting members who might sympathise with Indian demands or the Congress, for which he had supreme contempt, getting the credit. As regards the Commission the author rightly concludes that "it did not really want to concede the claim of self-government, and desired that the British should remain as the supreme arbiter of India's destiny." This inference is supported by the Commission's clinging to the principle of communal electorate despite the fact that it "breaks up the very foundation upon which the structure of responsible government is built." The next three chapters discuss the events related to the Round Table Conference and the operation of the constitution which emerged out of its deliberations, including a close analysis of the nature of provincial autonomy and the reactions it aroused in various circles in India, particularly among the Muslims. The author doubts the wisdom of Gandhiji's participation in the London Conference without prior settlement of the communal question in India. The change of Government in England also was an ominous sign, and the new Viceroy was frankly critical of his predecessor in yielding to Congress demands to get Gandhiji to attend the Conference. The Conservative opposition and Muslim intransigence whipped up by the British prevented the Round Table Conference from arriving at any compromise and the Dominion Status was doomed to failure. The author also feels that if the Conference were held in India, "most of the Indian delegates would have been cut to size and to some extent shielded from the evil counsels of powerful reactionaries in England. The overwhelming nationalistic atmosphere of India would have restrained them from the open pursuit of particularistic aims." It is clear from the corres-

pondence of leading British statesmen of the time that the Conservatives were not prepared to yield more than provincial autonomy at that stage and used the Muslims to fortify their hold over India. In this context Benthall's revelations are noteworthy that the Muslims offered support to the British in full measure for the price of finding jobs for them in European firms in Bengal. He adds: "the right wing of the Government made up its mind to break up the Conference and to fight the Congress. The Muslims who do not want responsibility at the Centre were delighted." Harold Laski's testimony is equally revealing. He failed "to bring the Mohanmadans to reason" for to their leader "religion was ultimate truth." Regarding communal settlement he wrote, "what with Tory imperialism on one side and India's extremism on the other, I fear that it is very unlikely." The failure of the Conference did not, however, halt the march towards ultimate freedom, for the Civil Disobedience evoked "qualities of fearlessness, self-reliance and sacrifice... providing the virtues which lie at the foundation of freedom." Government repression failed to break the will of the people and reversion to the position of 1930 was impossible.

The new constitution brought Provincial Autonomy which was put into operation by the Congress agreeing to form government and run the machine. The Federation part of it, however, was never tried. But the Congress participation in the provincial governments intensified bitterness among the communities and paved the way for partition. The Muslim League under Jinnah was initially co-operative and in his speeches before the elections he stood for "full national self-government", "complete freedom", "Unity and honourable settlement between Hindus, Muslims and other minorities." But Nehru's denial of participation to the League in the U.P. cabinet, except by merging its identity with the Congress created a new crisis and Jinnah's attitude towards national demand stiffened and the path was cleared for the Pakistan Resolution. In

1937 the rift became wide and Jinnah became the sole leader of the Muslims "which was due to the favour and support of the Government," which alarmed by Congress electoral success "refurbished its armour" and "sought to conciliate Muslims" and use them as "a counterpoise against the Congress" as well as other "fissiparous factors" like the Scheduled castes, non-Brahmins and Princes. The British now depended upon the Muslims and gave them a veto on constitutional progress, and with the power "Jinnah felt he could command whatever he wished." Approaching war made them reckless and in the next few years the stage was set for the partition of India, on the theory of two nations confronting each other. After discussing the working of the Provincial Autonomy and the progress of war in two chapters, the author critically reviews the background and implications of the Pakistan resolution. On the evidence of some prominent contemporaries he infers that "the author of Pakistan was not sure of what he was talking." There was little support for the cry in the beginning, the Muslim majority provinces being against it. But the events of war and Congress policies and practices made the British woo Jinnah more and more. Even Cripps' proposals favoured his approach. All this compels the author to infer that "the substantive cause which made it (the demand for Pakistan) effective was the will of the British rulers. They implanted the seeds of Muslim separatism, they nurtured the growth of the plant and they finally brought it to fruition."

In the chapter on Cripps' Mission, the author has exploded the myth of Muslim preponderance in the Indian Army which bogey was reared by Churchill, Amery and Jinnah to mislead the world and emphasise the need of doing nothing which might alienate the Muslims. Instead of the 75 per cent claimed by Churchill, the Muslim share in the armed forces in 1942 was merely 35 per cent. The author has also clearly exposed the insincerity of the British Cabinet in despatching Cripps' Mission and the frank opposition of the Vice-

roy to the proposals made by Cripps. It was merely to appease the Americans and was not intended to effect any substantial change in the Indian Government. Amery told the King that "its (declaration) bark is really more formidable than its bite. Beyond setting up a procedure for creating the future constitution-making body, it adds very little to what Linlithgow and I were agreed upon in July, 1940." Cripps exceeded his instructions and offered National Government functioning as a Cabinet with the Viceroy having a position analogous to that of the King in England. This was not acceptable to Churchill and the Viceroy who desired no change in the Viceroy's position. Cripps was nettled and he decided to return in haste. The responsibility for the failure of the Mission lies squarely on Churchill and Linlithgow and confirms the impression that no progress was intended. Churchill's "gesture of appeasement to the United States and to the Labour members of the War Cabinet" was a "gesture without meaning" and he was happy at its failure for he could lay the blame on the Congress. The next chapter deals with the 1942 movement, styled "Spontaneous Revolution" by the author who has condemned the authorities for cruelty in repressing it. A non-violent programme turned into a violent revolt because of the premeditated repression by the Government which left the people leaderless. The results of the movement, however, were beyond expectation. "It removed the illusion of the British that the empire was morally justified, that its beneficence... was recognised by the Indian masses." This "moral foundation" was knocked out by the civil disobedience movement, and they realised that "they were not wanted in India." The author writes that "Churchill and company were reluctantly obliged to realize that... they had to quit." But with the release of Gandhiji in 1944 his era was over and "the events of the last two years, following the aborted civil disobedience movement, signalled the dawn of a new stage in the struggle for independence. The method of civil resistance seemed to have made its utmost contribution

and exhausted its utility"; hence the nationalists conceived the need of revising the method. Violence grew in the atmosphere and became the weapon of struggle for freedom. This was most evident in the attitude of the Muslim League whose intransigence was intensifying day by day. Jinnah spurned Gandhiji's efforts at reconciliation and caused the failure of the Wavell Plan, which certainly had mented the apathy of Churchill. The Prime Minister had no intention to liquidate the Empire or let down the Muslim community. The author feels that "in accepting Wavell's offer the Leaders of the Congress seemed to show that they were tired of struggle and were anxious to arrive at a settlement on the terms proposed." On the contrary, Jinnah felt elated and welcomed the deadlock which enhanced his prestige with the Muslims. In the chapters on the Cabinet Mission and the Partition and Independence, the dramatic developments with the defeat of Churchill to the transfer of Power have been vividly described on the basis of documents recently brought to light. The failure of the Cabinet Mission plan and the mounting wave of violence in Bengal and Punjab made it evident that a united India was a day dream, for by that time Jinnah's Pakistan had assumed the colour of a completely independent sovereign state having no truck of any kind with the Hindu India. Mountbatten's appointment with full powers to negotiate and decide the constitutional problem hastened the achievement of this purpose and the new Viceroy won over Nehru by his "charm and advocacy" "aided by the valuable support of Lady Mountbatten." Patel and other Congress leaders, except Gandhiji and Azad, were reconciled to the inevitable, and independence was tagged with the partition of India. To a large extent Mountbatten was responsible for such an eventuality and giving a concrete shape to the vague aspirations of Jinnah. But for Gandhiji the end of the struggle for freedom brought no comfort. He was "not in Delhi on the day of Independence." The author has, in glorious words, characterised the position of Gandhiji. He

writes, "He loved freedom, but he valued truth, compassion, righteousness and non-violence more. For him independence and self-government were not identical with power, but with power under the control of virtue and morality. The independence which India achieved on August 15, 1947, left a void and caused a severe heartache. It had been won by sacrificing the ideal of national unity, by surrendering to communal passion, by succumbing to fear and hate, for the sake of power regardless of its end." And it is not surprising that Gandhiji was absent from the crowd of ministers, Princes and foreign dignitaries in Delhi, to be present with "the poor, the oppressed, the sick of the soil."

In his summing up Dr. Tara Chand finds the British primarily responsible for the communal rift which was accentuated by constitutional reforms from 1909 to 1935, by which time the "communal consciousness developed into the consciousness of nationality and the concept of political unity into that of federal unity. The ideas of nationality and federalism

were impaired by the jealousies aroused by provincial autonomous government of 1937-39, and they were shattered during the war, because of British hostility to the Congress for its attitude towards the war, and partiality for the Muslim League for its support. The War Cabinet's proposals of 1942 advanced the process a step further. Muslim nationality blossomed under Britain's warm sympathy into the idea of the Muslim nation, whose expression demanded full-fledged independence and sovereignty. These were conceded in substance by the Cabinet Mission and consummated by the Labour Government and its agent, the last Viceroy of India." The British had raised dykes to "keep the seas of freedom out", but these "were demolished by an immense tidal wave thrown up by many little-known tremendous forces rising out of the cavernous depths of the sea of humanity which engulfed the world and obliterated the familiar landmarks." The tale of freedom has been dramatically told by the eminent historian in these monumental volumes and will remain an abiding contribution to the literature on the history of the freedom movement in India.

BOOK REVIEWS

Agrarian Struggle in Bengal, 1946-47, By Sunil Sen, People's Publishing House, New Delhi/Ahmedabad/Bombay, 1972, XVI, 111, Appendices, Bibliography, Index, Map. Rs. 15.00.

The present work on the agrarian struggle in Bengal in 1946-47 has the value of chronicling events, about which records have already become scarce. Its added interest is that its author, now a professional historian, took an active part in the movement. Consequently, he has given us a history of the struggle which, though scholarly, is remarkably free from the staleness of the muniment room.

One of the most significant happenings in Bengal after World War II and before the transfer of power was the *tebhaga* movement which spread over a large area including the northern districts, parts of Mymensingh, Jessore, Khulna, the 24-Parganas and Midnapore. The Hajong peasants of north Mymensingh were also affected by this agrarian struggle which assumed the character of a widespread revolt of rent-paying peasants against the existing agrarian system. It was the struggle of the share-croppers for two-thirds share of the produce or the reduction of land rents from 50 per cent of the produce to one-third. It is worthy of note that this movement was organized at a time when the Zamindari system was still in force, there being practically no laws regulating relations between *Jotedar* and tenant.

The agrarian struggle had many aspects and it became mixed up with many other social and political issues. Finally, heavy was the hand of repression. Our political leaders also did not agree in determining the character of the movement or in analyzing its possible effects. But the struggle was by no means in vain. On the other hand, it profoundly influenced agra-

rian relations. It generated an urge for land reform in West Bengal and reforms of a sort were not long in coming. The abolition of the Zamindari system, the Bargadars Act, the Land Reforms Act—all these were directly or indirectly connected causally with the 1946-47 struggle.

We must welcome a study where a knowledgeable writer sets out to provide an interpretative account based partly on first-hand experience and partly on a re-working of already published but not readily accessible material. The story is clearly told and an attempt is made to explain the motivation of the various participants in the dramatic events.

The book is divided into seven chapters, with the first one summarizing the structural changes of the agrarian system based on the settlement of 1793. The role of the Kisan Sabha is examined in the following chapter. The difficulties into which the movement ran are also clearly analyzed. As one close to events, the author has succeeded in giving an account which is refreshingly different from those based on official sources only. His sympathies are plain enough as he deals with his "heroes", i.e., the peasants. Perhaps he could in the second edition of the work give us a fuller account by using the relevant material available in Bangladesh. As it is, the present work is highly deserving of the attention of the serious student of Indian affairs.

NILMANI MUKHERJEE

Nobility under the Sultans of Delhi, A.D. 1206-1398, By S. B. P. Nigam, Ph.D., with Bibliography and Index; Munshiram Manoharlal, Delhi 6, XV-223. First published in 1968. Price Rs. 25/-.

Numerous works have been written by European and Indian scholars regarding the political history of the Turko-Afghan period during the past two hundred years or so. More recently the administrative system and the institutional organisation of the Delhi Sultanate have also supplied the theme to several scholars like W. H. Moreland, I. H. Qureshi, K. M. Ashraf, P. Saran, U. N. Dey and others. In his Presidential Address in Section IV (Mughal India) at the Calcutta session of the Indian History Congress (1955), and also in his survey of medieval Indian Historiography, published in the *Quarterly Review of Historical Studies*, Vol. III, Parts I and II (1963-64), the reviewer, while making suggestions for filling up gaps in our knowledge, had emphasized the study of nobility in the medieval period as a desideratum. He is happy to find that the attention of several scholars has been turned towards this subject. Dr. Athar Ali has already studied the Nobility under Aurangzeb. And now in the present work under review, Dr. Nigam has attempted to study the institution of the nobility in the Sultanate period. It is a full-fledged analytical study of court politics, administration, military organisation and the role of religion in the State, all rolled into one.

The book consists of a Preface and 9 chapters. Lamenting the meagre relevant evidence for studying Turkish nobility which "not only shaped the destiny of Islam in India but has also been the principal decisive factor in Indian history since the close of the twelfth century" (Preface, VII), the author has explained in Chapter I (Introduction) the choice of the subject and dwelt on the sources in Arabic and Persian which are divided under the following categories: (i) Principal contemporary chronicles like those of Minhaj, Amir Khusrau, Isami, Barani, Afif and Yahya; (ii) Minor contemporary chronicles like those of Hasan Nizami and Fakhr-i-Mudabbir; (iii) Works on Institutions like those of Fakhr-i-Mudabbir (*Adab ul Harb wash Shujaat*), Amir Khusrau (*Ijaz-i-Khusrawi*), Malik Ain

ul mulk (*Insha i Mahru*), Barani (*Fatawa Jahandari*), Haji Abdul Hamid Muharri Ghaznavi (*Dastur ul Albab fi ilm il Hisab*) (iv) Works on Religion and Mysticism like Malfuzat or discourses of saints, the *Fuwa'id ul Fuwad* of Amir Hasan Sijzi, the *Khair ul Majalis* of Hamid Qalandar, the *Siyar ul Auliya* of Sayyid Mubarak Ali Kirmani (Amir Khurd); (v) Travels and Statistical Accounts like Ibn Batutah, Shihabuddin al Umari (*Masalik ul absar*...); (vi) Important secondary sources like Badayuni and Firishta.

The value of the book has been heightened by the use of these chronicles, the two works of Fakhr-i-Mudabbir and of *Ijaz-i-Khusrau* not usually laid under contribution by the authors of the period.

Chapter 2 depicts the Ilbari nobility as King-makers. Here the author has explained the accidental character of the rise of the nobility, the contributions as well as the disservices of Iltutmish (pp. 25-27), the emergence of the nobility as a powerful group under Ruknuddin Firuz (p. 30), and the bad result of Balban's ruthlessness towards the nobles.

Chapter 3 traces the evolution of the nobility under the Khaljis. The author has found Alaaddin to be 'a child of the circumstance of the age' (p. 62). In critically analysing his policy of curbing the old nobility and creating a new one in what was a 'politic state' (p. 70), the author opines that Alaaddin "left behind a rich legacy of unhealthy political traditions and personal vices..." (p. 68). He has also criticised S. C. Misra's view (p. 71) regarding the analogy between the reigns of Qutbuddin Mubarak Shah and Muizzuddin Kaiqubad.

In Chapter 4 dealing with the nobility under the Tughluqs, the author has found Muhammad Tughluq to be himself responsible for the hostility of the nobles (p. 77); for the nobles accustomed to regard the King as *primus inter*

pares, were not willing to accept a position inferior to the crown (p. 78). Under Firuz there was a change in the relations between the sovereign and the nobles. The strong and the weak points of this have been clearly discussed by the author with reference to the creation of hereditary and heterogeneous nobility and the institution of slavery (pp. 87-92).

Chapter 5 discusses the character of the Turkish nobility. The author agrees with Moreland in holding that this was not wholly feudal and shows that it was 'more bureaucratic than feudal' (p. 103).

In describing the organisation of the nobility (Chapter 6), the author has criticised K. M. Ashraf's view (p. 104) that there were two major groups, the *Ulema* and the *Umrah* and that the Turkish nobility was a hired bureaucracy (p. 105). He is inclined to agree with M. Habib that it was "a sort of joint-family organisation in its early stages" (p. 106). Next he analyses the different elements of the nobility, the Ilbaris, the Khaljis, the Taziks, the Hindus, the Abyssinians, the Mongols, the Afghans and immigrant foreigners (pp. 106-110). He has emphasized 'the racial organisation' under the Khaljis but racialism was discarded under the Tughluqs (pp. 113-116). The elements of heredity have also been examined. The author concludes that the nobility was 'organised and re-organised' repeatedly. Lastly there was also a wealthy merchant class (p. 118).

In Chapter 7 (Nobility, Ulema and the Crown), the author has shown that though the Ulema occupied a significant place in the administrative set-up (p. 119), many Sultans like Alaaddin and Muhammad bin Tughluq had to keep them under control, because the interpretations of the Holy Law given by the Ulema were not in the interests of rule (p. 119). The author has approvingly quoted M. Habib that "the Shariat provided no means for its own development" (p. 119). But a contrary view is held in Arnold's *Legacy of Islam*. At

any rate the point requires a much fuller discussion.

The service conditions, privileges and administrative training of the nobles have been discussed in Chapter 8, dynasty-wise under each of the following sub-sections: (a) recruitment and promotions, (b) postings and transfers, (c) pay and emoluments, (d) privileges, (e) dismissal and other disciplinary proceedings, and (f) administrative training. The author rightly sounds a note of caution 'in separating theory from practice' (p. 180). This is a unique feature of the book.

In Chapter 9 (Conclusions), the author shows that the nobility started as a small racial group of Ilbari Turks (p. 181) but racialism became so diluted that it became only a myth (p. 184). He emphasizes that it was not feudal, but poles asunder from its European counterpart. He sums up as follows: "Broadly speaking, the Turks established so far as the central structure of the government was concerned, the same administrative system in India as prevalent in Persia and Egypt. In the provinces, too, the same system was adopted in broad details, but, so far as the local administration in the interior was concerned, the old indigenous system continued throughout the period of this study" (pp. 186-87).

There are five useful Appendices: (A) A note on Chihalgani slaves of Iltutmish; (B and C) Explanatory note on statements; (D) Life and career of Qutlugh Khan; (E) Letter of Maulana Rashid ud din. The statements are very illuminating.

There is scope for difference of opinion on some views of the author: (i) the impact of Turkish rule on the Indian society (preface); (ii) the subjugation of entire Northern India by the Muslims by 1206 (pp. 2, 21), for it is well known that the final reduction of Northern India was the result of Khalji imperialism. It would again have been useful if the Hegira dates (e.g., p. 15) have also been

equated with the Christian.

The bibliography is exhaustive. The quality of printing, paper and binding leaves nothing to be desired. There is, of course, no errata. But the printer's devil has crept in at several places, e.g., 'It' (p. vii), by any and all means (p. 23), Kaiqubab (p. 45), tributary (p. 118), Reverty (p. 202n). Use of even partial diacritical marks would have lightened the task of the reader in pronouncing the names and technical terms. The name of the journal in which Moreland's article 'Feudalism in the Moslem Kingdom of Delhi' (April 1928) appeared has not been noted in p. 93n; only Vol. VIII has been noted.

However, these are only minor blemishes. By collecting and using a vast mass of evidence critically, he has produced this highly useful and interesting analytical study of the subject. The author's performance has been highly creditable. He is free from dogmatism and does not claim finality (p. x) in his findings. His style is very lucid and the book, dealing with a most difficult subject, has been made not only readable but of absorbing interest. The publishers deserve the sincere thanks of the scholarly world for publishing this excellent work in such a nice form.

J. N. SARKAR

A History of South Kanara, By K. V. Ramesh, published by the Department of Extension Service and Publications, Karnatak University, Dharwar-3; pp. i-xxvii-340; Rs. 40.00.

It is, indeed, a happy augury for Indian historical research that in recent years more and more scholars are taking zealously to the study of regional history, which was previously a much neglected field. The researches of these scholars have not only brought to light many obscure dynasties, but also have enriched our knowledge on little-known dynasties. As far as the history of Karnataka is concerned we have been getting at regular intervals

scholarly works on major and minor dynasties; the latest in the series being *A History of South Kanara* by Dr. Ramesh.

Dr. Ramesh is adequately equipped to write on South Kanara as he belongs to this region and has an easy access to epigraphical material on which the work is based, being an officer in the Department of Epigraphy.

The study, divided into ten chapters, encompasses both political and cultural life of the people of South Kanara, the Tuluvas, a coastal region, which now forms a district of the Mysore State. The first six chapters are devoted to political history. Beginning from the earliest man in South Kanara, Dr. Ramesh traces the political life of the people during the iron age and in historic times down to the fall of the Vijayanagara Empire in 1565. The only ruling family that presided over the destinies of the region was the Alupas. The rules of the early Alupas, medieval Alupas, last Alupas and the annexation of their territory by the Vijayanagara empire have been discussed in greater detail. Their relationship with the contemporary imperial dynasties in Karnataka, such as the Chalukyas of Badami, the Rashtrakutas and the Hoysalas and likewise of the Tamil countries like the Pandyas, Pallavas and Cholas are admirably brought out.

A feature of the History of the Tuluvas is that in spite of the changes that were taking place in the neighbouring Karnataka and Tamil country, the Tuluvas maintained themselves as a distinct political entity. The Hoysala occupation of the territory did not affect them greatly, as one of the queens of Ballala III, Chikkayi Tayi, who was ruling over the territory on behalf of Ballala, was herself a Tuluva. But within a decade after the establishment of the Vijayanagara Empire, South Kanara lost its independence and became a part of that empire. From then onwards, the Tuluvas did not interest themselves in their own administration. The shock that the Vijayanagara Empire suffered at the battle of

Rakkasa Tangadi and the occupation of their territory by the Nayakas of Keladi did not enthuse them. As Dr. Ramesh puts it: "They once again lapsed into a feeling of indifference towards the fate of the empire. They appear to have lost once again the interest in participating in the day-to-day political administration of the region. This tendency to ignore political developments at home persisted for long and until the first of November 1956 when South Kanara was allowed to re-enter the fold of its parent State of Karnataka and strive in unity for the glory of Mother India" (p. 313). This seems to be an overstatement. In fact, many Chieftains, like the Chautas, came into prominence during Vijayanagara times. The period also witnessed important developments in local institutions.

Chapters VII, VIII and IX are devoted to the study of Administration, Social and Economic Conditions and Religions. In the last chapter the threads of discussion are woven together.

The work is not well balanced. There is too much emphasis on political history inasmuch as three-fourths of the book is devoted to it and a quarter only to cultural history. The reason being want of space, though enough material is available (p. xxvi). Elsewhere (pages 240, 244 and 273) the author complains of lack of information. Whatever the aspects of culture that are included are discussed under different periods such as early Alupas, medieval Alupas and so on. This could have been integrated and the stages in the evolution brought out to make the account more lucid. The organisation and the role of the guilds could have been more appropriately included in the chapter on Economic Conditions than under Administration. His statement: "Having been closely acquainted with the nature and contents of the early records from South Kanara, the present writer feels that future discoveries are not likely to affect drastic changes in the chronological and genealogical tabulations arrived at in this work" (xxvi),

seems to be too tall a claim.

Those apart, Dr. Ramesh unreservedly deserves our congratulation for his painstaking and sustained research. The impression that he leaves on the mind of the reader is that he is an archaeologist first and secondarily a historian.

The printing is excellent though in many words letters are missing. The four maps, seven illustrations, bibliography and index add much value to the work.

H. V. SREENIVASA MURTHY

The World is My Family, By Smt. Manorama R. Modak, published by Thacker & Co. Ltd., Bombay, 1970, pp. 266+X; Price Rs. 28.00.

This is the story of an Indian Christian Missionary, written by his American wife, who has adopted India as her permanent home. The author has attempted to give a scientific touch to her work by tracing the origin and ancestry of the family of her husband and relating the circumstances under which his grandfather became a Christian convert. The earlier part of the book relates the hard struggle her husband and his family had to wage against the tyranny and the persecution of the American Marathi Mission at Ahmednagar, the family home. This persecution followed him even during his first visit to America, the tragic part in the whole affair being the role played therein by a man of the stature of Dr. R. A. Hume. Modak's only fault was his desire to Indianise the Indian Church. The persecution of the Modak family, in which jealousy of the Christian fellow-Indians had a big hand, reached such heights that life became impossible in India, and Ramkrishna Modak who had now married Miss Marguerite Grove, an American citizen, decided to leave for America.

Here begins the second part of the story which is full of hectic activity. Events pass

with dramatic rapidity : Presentation of more than 4,000 performances representing real Indian life and culture which they named "Portrayal of India's Life," given in schools, churches and clubs in the nooks and corners of America, which helped immensely to remove the prejudices, the result of British propaganda, and created respect for the dignified Indian way of living among the Americans, who became friends of India; meeting with Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai, Agent-General of India, whose mission was to present India to the American Government from the British point of view and who was forced to whisper to Mrs. Modak : "You are a very clever woman," for her introduction of him to the guests ; refusal to become British Agents ; presentation in the *New York Times* of a plan for India's freedom which was appreciated alike by Indians and foreigners and forwarded to London and New Delhi by Lord Halifax, the then British Ambassador to the United States and an ex-Viceroy of India ; confrontation with Bertrand Russell at a debate on India on a broadcasting station in New York at which the latter was forced to repeatedly stammer before the microphone : "I didn't know that ! I didn't know that !" and finally, "If I had known all these matters I would not be here on the side of the British. I hope


India becomes free soon !" ; publication of the book "Land and People of India" which went into three editions ; organisation of One World Association which sponsored the First World Congress of Dominated Nations ; success at San Francisco in getting the word "Independence" inserted in the preamble statement of the United Nations for all dependent people ; return to India to align the Christians of Maharashtra with the Congress Party in the 1952 elections ; meetings with Jawaharlal Nehru, Abul Kalam Azad, Chester Bowles, B. R. Ambedkar and President Rajendra Prasad.

Blessed by a gift, the couple returned to their home in India in December 1967, but Ramkrishnapant did not survive long.

This is the story of a selfless, unassuming, a most saintly human being who was in total harmony with himself and the troubled world, and for whom "the world was his family."

The simplicity of the style and the sincerity and vividness with which the author describes the events at once appeal to the reader.

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