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EDITOR : S. P. SEN

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EDITORIAL

Indian Council of Historical Studies :

We understand that the Ministry of Education, Government of India, is considering a proposal to set up a large all-India body, on the lines of the CSIR and the ICSSR, to encourage historical studies. The proposal is most welcome if the intention be to set up a fund-granting agency to help the numerous institutions, some of an all-India character and some regional, which are engaged in promoting historical studies in the country and also to co-ordinate the activities of the various organisations. So far history has been a neglected subject, not receiving the patronage of any large governmental agency. Surprisingly, when the ICSSR was established a few years ago, history was scrupulously left out of its purview, for reasons best known to those who sponsored the body. We had, in an earlier issue, pointed out the irrationality of the exclusion of history from the scope of Social Science. We understand, however, that very recently the ICSSR has relented and agreed to include history in its field of interest. But in view of the fact that there is not a single historian in the governing body of the ICSSR it is too early yet to say how far the recent change of policy of the ICSSR will prove helpful to the development of historical studies.

If funds are available, historians will certainly welcome the proposal to set up a separate Council of Historical Studies. There will, no doubt, be some who would question the wisdom and social justice of the Government spending so much money on higher education, through the U.G.C., the CSIR, the ICSSR, the ICCR and the rest, while money is not available for free and compulsory primary education even after twentyfive years of independence. It is just in keeping with the policy of the administration to be more sensitive to the interests of the middle class than to those of the poor, despite what our politicians and administrators say to the contrary.

While welcoming the proposal of a separate Council of Historical Studies we have to suggest that it must not be on the usual lines of similar governmental agencies. We had commented in an earlier issue on the line of thinking in Government circles, that whatever is worth doing must be done by Government-sponsored and Government-controlled agencies and that non-official academic institutions do not have much claim on public funds. That is why most of the all-India Government agencies do not function as fund-granting agencies in the real sense

but as super-institutions duplicating the work of official institutions or to duplicate their work, done by the numerous non-official institutions in the country, — holding seminars and conferences, bringing out publications, undertaking research projects etc. The result is an unfair competition between the giant Government-sponsored bodies in New Delhi and the smaller non-official institutions scattered all over the country and doing very much the same type of work, and that in many cases in a better way and at a lesser cost to the nation.

It is high time that an impartial evaluation committee be set up to assess the relative contributions of the Government-managed super-bodies and the smaller non-official institutions in the field of cultural activities and higher research. Such an investigation will reveal most clearly the poor performance of the Government-managed super-bodies (and that at an incredibly higher cost to the nation) than that of the non-official organisations working quietly in different parts of the country, with extremely limited funds and relying mostly on the initiative, enterprise and sacrifice of scholars who love their subjects and want to contribute to their advancement in their own humble way. It cannot be denied that it is this spirit of non-official initiative and enterprise which has been largely responsible for the progress in higher studies and research in this country. Even in the post-independence period when the Government has entered the field in a big way, this private initiative and enterprise is still the greatest national asset.

If it is seriously contemplated to set up a Council of Historical Studies, we have a few suggestions to offer. It should be in the nature of a fund-distributing agency and should not undertake any direct academic activity except in those fields where no other institution is working. It must be clearly laid down that the objective of this body is not to enter into a competition with the non-

official institutions or to duplicate their work, but rather to help them with necessary funds (and advice and guidance when needed) and to enable them to do their work better in their respective areas. Besides this fundamental objective, the Council of Historical Studies may also assess the work of the different institutions, compile periodical reports on an all-India level on the progress made, co-ordinate the activities of the various bodies and offer suggestions and technical help where necessary. The whole idea is that the actual work is to be left to those institutions all over the country which are now doing it and also to similar institutions that may come into existence in future, and the Council of Historical Studies is to be there just to give them financial assistance and needed advice and guidance.

If the Council of Historical Studies is set up on these lines, it will avoid having a top-heavy administrative structure so common among similar institutions in New Delhi, and which eats away a substantial part of the funds allotted by the State. In the composition of the governing body the official bloc should be kept as small as possible and greater representation should be given to the non-official institutions in the country. Among these non-official institutions, those which are of an all-India character, with sustained activities throughout the year, must be given permanent representation. The other institutions, of a regional character, should also have representation on State-basis. Besides these institutions, some eminent historians should also be associated with the governing body of the Council. We do not know whether these suggestions will appeal to those who are now considering the proposal, but we feel it our duty to offer them in the interest of historical studies in the country.

Discussion Meetings :

Since the publication of our last issue two Discussion Meetings were held, one in Janu-

ary and another in February. At the first meeting, Dr. Surojit Sinha, Joint Director, Anthropological Survey of India, spoke on *Tribes and Indian Culture*. It was a very illuminating talk on tribal people scattered in different parts of the country, the gradual penetration of Indian cultural influences among them and the process of their assimilation to an advanced cultural pattern. Dr. Sinha illustrated this process with analogies and comparisons with the development of tribal peoples in other parts of the world. At the second meeting, Dr. J. N. Sarkar, Professor of History, Jadavpur University, spoke on *Guerrilla Warfare in Medieval India*. He gave an exposition of the modern principles and techniques of guerrilla warfare and then described how far they could be discerned in the guerrilla activities in medieval India. He illustrated it with numerous examples of guerrilla warfare in medieval India.

Publication :

Our latest publication, *The Sino-Indian Border Question : A Historical Review*, came out in December 1971. It is a collection of papers read at the Fifth Annual Conference of the Institute held at Patiala in December 1967. The Volume consists of two papers on frontier problems in general, one long paper on the history of the Himalayan States, three papers on the Western, Central and Eastern Sectors of the Sino-Indian border, and finally, one paper on the role of Tibet in Sino-Indian relations. It is to be hoped that these seven papers put together will provide a fairly comprehensive historical background to the Sino-Indian border dispute.

The sudden hotting up of relations between the two Asian giants, India and China, about the middle of the present century has naturally attracted the attention of historians, journalists and publicists. As a result many books have been written on the subject during the last one decade by Indians as well as foreigners. But practically all of them take a

very narrow view and concentrate on events from 1950 to 1962, with brief historical backgrounds going back to the last decade of the 19th century. Starting with such a limited perspective, they naturally came to conclusions which are not borne out by nearly two thousand years of history. It is because of this overconcentration on the recent past that some foreign writers like Alastair Lamb or Neville Maxwell have been led to give a ridiculously distorted view of history.

The purpose of the present volume is to correct the perspective of viewing the border problem, by delving deep into the past history of the entire Himalayan region from the NEFA to Ladakh. It will rectify many of the mis-conceptions based on inadequate historical knowledge and undue concentration on the events of the last seventy or eighty years, and will bring out in clearer perspective India's relations with the region and the hollowness of Chinese claims which some of the Western writers blindly accept as substantially valid. In the present volume an attempt is made to lay before the readers the full history of the Himalayan belt from the days of remote antiquity to the middle of the present century in order to enable them to understand the border problem as it evolved from time to time. Those who attach importance to history as the essential background to present day issues will, it is hoped, find this volume to be extremely useful, indeed the first of its kind, in understanding the Sino-Indian border question as it developed from 1950 to 1962.

Dictionary of National Biography :

As reported already in our earlier issue, Volume I of the Dictionary of National Biography, covering about 350 biographical sketches, from 'A' to 'D', had been sent to press in January. The printing work has been entrusted to one of the best presses in India, Sree Saraswati Press, Calcutta; and every care is being taken to ensure quality produc-

tion as regards paper, printing, binding and general get-up. We hope to bring it up to the best international standard for publications of this kind. Volume I is expected to be out by the end of May. The other three Volumes will also be out in August and November 1972 and February 1973. Each Volume will be of 600 pages (approximately), the size of the page being 24 × 18 cm (Double-Crown), with two columns per page.

The full set of the DNB (4 Volumes) has been priced at Rs. 400/- in India; and U.S. \$ 80, or its equivalent in any other currency, in foreign countries. Postage will be charged extra. It has been decided also to receive a limited number of pre-publication orders at reduced prices — Rs. 250/- in India; and U.S. \$ 60, or its equivalent in any other currency, in foreign countries. Postage will be charged extra. We shall not accept more than

200 pre-publication orders. Those who want to avail themselves of the pre-publication price are to send their orders by 15th May 1972, with a remittance of the full amount. The amount is to be sent either by M.O. or a cheque or a draft on a Calcutta Bank. For outstation cheques the usual Bank collection charge is to be added. Since the number of pre-publication orders to be accepted is very small, those who want to place orders should better do so as early as possible.

We are really happy that the monumental project we had undertaken nearly nine years ago has been completed at last and all the four Volumes will be out within a year from now. It will be a fitting homage, on the occasion of the completion of 25 years of independence, to those illustrious men and women who created modern India.

THE SIMLA DEPUTATION, 1906

T. R. SAREEN

(National Archives of India, New Delhi)

During the British rule in India, the Hindu politicians always held the view that the British adopted the policy of "divide and rule" in India, whereby the Hindu and Muslim communities were pushed further apart. This criticism of the Hindus became more vocal when in October 1906, Lord Minto, by recognising that in any system of representation the Mohammedan community should be represented as a community, was able to create that sharp line by which it became easier for the British rulers to divide the Muslims from the Hindus in the subsequent politico-constitutional development in the country.¹ On the other hand, the Muslims had always maintained that it was the Hindu cry of nationalism which threatened their very existence as a community and it was in order to safeguard their interest that they approached Lord Minto. However, the Simla Deputation Papers, which are now available at Aligarh University, support the Hindu view.

On his arrival in India in 1905, Minto had found the political atmosphere most disturbing. There was not only a boycott against British goods but violence against British officials was quite rampant. The Indian National Congress was considered to be carrying on a disloyal movement and Morley had informed Minto that a new spirit is growing and spreading over India. "You cannot go on governing in the same spirit. You have got to deal with the Congress party and Congress principles whatever you may think of them. Be sure that before long the

Mohammedans will throw in their lot with the Congressmen against you".²

Minto faced with this situation began to search for a counterpoise to the Congress. The opportunity arose when Morley indicated in his budget speech in July, 1906, a desire to reform the Legislative Councils. Minto by encouraging the Muslims in their claims for representation started the process of "setting communities against communities,"³ which was accomplished through the Simla Deputation.

In the Simla Deputation, three persons played a very prominent part. They were W. A. J. Archbold, the Principal of the Anglo-Oriental College, Aligarh; Dunlop Smith, the Private-Secretary to the Viceroy, who encouraged and assisted Archbold and Minto. Mohsin-ul-Mulk, the Honorary Secretary of the Anglo-Oriental College, who figures prominently in the Simla Deputation, actually played the role which was assigned to him by Archbold. This can now be determined on the basis of the Simla Deputation Papers.⁴

During the summer of 1906, Archbold and Dunlop Smith who were both in Simla had discussed the political awakening of the Muslims and the former had even asked Dunlop Smith if "H.E. would receive a deputation from Mussalmans to push their claims for representation on the Councils of the Government of India and the Local Governments."⁵ The proposal received a ready response from

Minto and Dunlop Smith. Whether Archbold had discussed the above question of Muslim Deputation after having consulted the Muslims or on his own accord as an unofficial representative of that community, it is not possible to say, but immediately after these talks, he received a letter from Mohsin-ul-Mulk conveying to him the effect of Morley's budget speech on the Mohammedans and asking "if it would be advisable to submit a memorial from the Mohammedans to the Viceroy and to request His Excellency's permission for a deputation to wait on His Excellency to submit the views of the Mohammedans on the matter".⁹

After having received the above letter which was duly placed before the Viceroy, Archbold moved with his scheme of the deputation and informed Dunlop Smith that he had written to Mohsin-ul-Mulk telling him to do nothing until he had heard from this side. On August 10, Archbold wrote to Mohsin-ul-Mulk regarding the manner in which he was to proceed with the arrangement of the deputation and it is this letter which throws so much light on the Simla Deputation, Archbold wrote :

"I explained the position to Colonel Dunlop Smith. I assured him that I was certain that any address that the suggested deputation might present would contain nothing that was in any way disloyal and that I was also certain that the Mohammedans had no wish whatsoever to do anything that would cause difficulty to the Government. Colonel Dunlop Smith now writes to me to say that H.E. the Viceroy has decided to receive the deputation of Mohammedans, if it is offered and he asks me to say that a formal application must be sent in. He adds that a copy of the address which is to be presented must be sent to him, in the usual way, sometime before the date of reception of the Deputation — at least ten days if possible." He further explained, "Now the following ques-

tions arise out at once:—(1) The sending of the formal application. I think that it would suffice if this were signed by a few representative Mohammedans from various parts of India, the application stating that those who signed, though they had not been elected, felt sure that they were representing the wishes of their community in making the request. The formal application should be enclosed for signature and return, and the whole sent at once". Regarding the persons who were to compose the deputation, Archbold wrote :

"The great thing is to make the Deputation as representative as possible. Now we have:—

- (a) Eastern Bengal and Assam
- (b) Bengal
- (c) The United Provinces
- (d) The Punjab
- (e) The Frontier Provinces
- (f) The Central Provinces
- (g) Bombay
- (h) Madras
- (i) The Native States".

Then Archbold mentioned the points which were to be incorporated in the address — "This is a matter which can be best discussed in a Committee, but as time is short, some outline or draft must be prepared at once; additions can be made later. It would contain doubtless:—A general profession of loyalty and a statement that the history of the Mohammedan in the past justifies confidence in their conduct in future. An expression of gratitude that important steps in the direction of self-government are contemplated, steps which are but a continuation of the settled policy under which so many offices under the Government have gradually been thrown open to Indians. A statement of fear lest by the adoption of any general system of election, the interest of Mohammedans who are numerically in many districts in a minority should suffer. The impression of hope that by the adoption of some system of nomination

or of the representation of interests as determined by religious beliefs, the proper weight should be given to the opinion of Mohammedans."

Archbold was frank enough to point out to Mohsin-ul-Mulk in the last paragraph of the letter that — "All this is, however, for you to tell me rather than for me to tell you. You know where the shoe pinches. In this whole transaction, I wish to keep myself in the background. The movement must be yours. But you know how thoroughly I have the interest of the Mohammedans at heart and I shall be delighted in every way in my power to help. But please remember, my dear Nawab Sahib, that if an effective and powerful movement is to be created in so short a time, we must take very prompt action."⁸ This letter along with the subsequent correspondence which passed between Archbold, Dunlop Smith and Mohsin-ul-Mulk leaves no doubt that it was Archbold who was the originator of the idea of Muslim deputation and Mohsin-ul-Mulk simply acted according to the instructions sent by the former from time to time. However, writers like Syed Razi Wasti who could not trace the above letter still hold the view that "Archbold was acting on behalf of and under instruction from Mohsin-ul-Mulk."⁹

Immediately after receiving the above letter, Mohsin-ul-Mulk telegraphed Archbold "to send draft formal application at once."¹⁰

In order to safeguard his own position Archbold sent the draft of the application which he had prepared on 14th August to Mohsin-ul-Mulk with the request 'to alter anything if necessary'.¹¹ In the application the Mohammedans assured the Viceroy that even in the past "in spite of some temptation", they had kept studiously aloof from all forms of political agitation and were very anxious not to depart from that tradition.

On 20th August Archbold informed Dunlop Smith that he had drawn up the 'Formal Request' for the Mohammedans and they were at this time busy getting it signed, and wrote further that "We are all very anxious that the Mohammedans should not put themselves in the wrong, it is just what their enemies would like. As you know, they are rather backward in the arts of political agitation and the danger is they go wrong through ignorance. I am very glad that they have restrained themselves."¹²

As instructed by Archbold, Mohsin-ul-Mulk proceeded with the task of getting the draft application signed by the representative Mohammedans from all over India.

By the first week of September, the Draft was signed by one thousand, one hundred and eighty three persons¹³ and was submitted to the Viceroy on 6th September, 1906. No change was made in the original which had been sent by Archbold.

After receiving the official acceptance, the Muslim representatives under the guidance of Mohsin-ul-Mulk prepared the draft of the address, and it was finalized by them at a meeting at Lucknow on 16th September. The draft memorial had been prepared exactly according to the instructions sent by Archbold in his letter of 10th August, 1906. After its approval by the Muslim representatives at Lucknow the copy of the address was sent to Archbold at Simla. Archbold suggested certain changes in the draft memorial with a view to "avoid all possibility of criticism; not so much on the part of the officials as on the part of the Congress people."¹⁴

The changes were duly accepted by the Muslim representatives and it was again sent back to Archbold with authority to make any "alteration in memorial not affecting its principle", if the Government wished.¹⁵

It appears from Dunlop Smith's diary that the contents of the Address were known to him even as early as the first week of September as he writes on 9th September, 1906: "The deputation will be received just before we leave on the autumn tour. It will be a most representative address as they have consulted Patna, Hyderabad, Bombay, Dacca and the Punjab. All today I have been at some notes for H.E.'s reply".¹⁶

The Viceroy received the deputation on 1 October 1906 and in his reply assured the Mohammedans that "in any system of representation, whether it affects a Municipality, a District Board, or a Legislative Council in which it is proposed to introduce an increase on electoral organisation, the Mohammedan community should be represented

as a community. I am entirely in accord with you".

Thus there can be no doubt that the Muslim Deputation which met the Viceroy Lord Minto on 1 October 1906 was engineered by Archbold and encouraged by Dunlop Smith, while Lord Minto by his "clear and sympathetic recognition of the rights of the Muhammadans of India as a distinct community" put them in a privileged position. In this way the Government of India succeeded in winning over the Muslims to their side and thereby created a strong counterpoise to the Congress aims. The Simla Deputation marks the triumph of the policy of "Divide and Rule" followed by the British Government in India.

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4. Simla Deputation Papers, available with the Archives Section of the Aligarh University Library, Aligarh (hereinafter referred to as S.D.P.)
5. This conversation took place between the two about two weeks before Fullar, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, resigned. (Fullar resigned on 15 July and his resignation was accepted on 3 August, 1906).
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9. Syed Razi Wasti: *Lord Minto and the Indian Nationalist Movement, 1905-1910* (London 1964) p. 63-64.
10. S.D.P. Telegram from Mohsin-ul-Mulk to Archbold, 13 August 1906.
11. S.D.P. Archbold to Mohsin-ul-Mulk, 14 August 1906.
12. Archbold to Dunlop Smith, 20 August 1906. Martin Gilbert, *Servants of India*, (London, 1966), p. 52.
13. See the Printed copy of the Draft application with the statement of signatories according to their rank and occupation and the original — Simla Deputation Papers.
14. S.D.P. Archbold to Mohsin-ul-Mulk, 19 September 1906.
15. S.D.P. Telegram from Abdul-Fazl-Rehman to Mohsin-ul-Mulk, 20 September 1906.
16. Martin Gilbert, *op. cit.*, p. 54. Wasti, however, tries to establish that up to 19 September, 1906. Minto had no knowledge about the contents of the address. See Syed Razi Wasti, *op. cit.*, p. 69-70.

THE MARATHAS AND THE PINDARIS : A STUDY IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP *

DR. TARASANKAR BANERJEE

(Visva-Bharati University, Santiniketan)

The paper outlines the relationship between the Marathas and the Pindaris — a relationship that did not follow the pattern of a conventional contact between two powers. In the political and diplomatic plane contact and adjustment are possible only between two settled, territorial powers. The relationship between settled governments may be based either on treaties or on convention and even custom as a result of a longstanding contact, political or otherwise. There may also be an idea of a give-and-take between the contracting parties and even a promise of mutual help when occasion demands. These conventional norms of political and diplomatic contact cannot, however, be super-imposed on the relationship between the Marathas and the Pindaris. We will be utterly disappointed and confused if we try to apply the modern ideas of relationship between two states or powers in the case of contact under study. The pattern of contact in this case has a peculiar historical perspective the like of which cannot be seen elsewhere. At the outset we have to keep in mind that the 18th century was an era of predatory politics when relationship was not always guided by usual norms. On the one hand the Marathas were a settled territorial power with an organised civil administration and economy of their own. Their ambition was political but the means to fulfil it led them to take recourse to adjustment even with an organised band of freebooters. The Pindaris, on the other

hand, were not a settled, territorial power, and had no avowed political objective. They were in fact a band of lawless marauders of all races, castes and religions, but bound by one common tie, i.e., loot and plunder.¹ It must be said to their credit that they had introduced a new element of complication in the political life of India in the 18th and in the first quarter of the 19th century.

The relationship between the Marathas and the Pindaris may be divided in three distinct phases: (1) The first phase continued from their coming into existence in the late 17th century to the battle of Panipat. During this phase we find an employer-employee relationship between the two, and the Pindaris were completely subservient to their Maratha masters. (2) The period between 1761 and 1800 witnessed a gradual ascendancy of the Pindari power and a formal recognition of their strength by the Maratha leaders. It was also an era of mutual exploitation of the strength of each other. (3) The third phase from 1801 to 1818 was a period of confusion in their relationship. There took place, during this time, an acute intra-Pindari trouble which was but a symptom of tension among Maratha leaders themselves. This phase also witnessed a mounting pressure of the English under the impact of which the Pindari-Maratha contact cracked.

It is a matter of great controversy when exactly the Pindaris came into existence and

* Paper read in the Maratha History Seminar in Bombay, November 1971.

established contacts with the Marathas. Surendra Nath Sen, the great historian of the Marathas, could not point any exact date. It is true that there was an age-old tradition of employing robbers during wars or raids on enemy territories. All the Muslim kingdoms in the Deccan had armed retainers like the Pindaris. But it would be erroneous to state that all these kingdoms employed Pindaris, because the very name did not come into existence at that time.² Manucci observed that the Mughal rulers also employed plundering hordes who were known as Bedaras. He said "Prince Shah Alam, when he was within the territories of Shivaji, near Goa, had in his army seven thousand such."³ Contrary to a view that the Pindaris arose from the Bedaras, it must be noted that they were not identical though there was a close resemblance between the two. In his translation of Manucci, Irvine made this point clear. S. N. Sen, however, tried to strike a balance when he wrote, "It may not therefore be altogether unreasonable, though the objections of so great an authority as Irvine cannot be lightly rejected, to suppose that the Pindaris of the Peshwa army had their prototypes in the Bedaris who followed the Mughal forces"⁴. This observation of Sen does not clear the point of controversy as to when the Pindaris came into contact with the Marathas. According to Tod, the Pindaris first came into contact with the Marathas during the time of Shivaji's father.⁵ Tod states that one Nusroo was in the services of the father of Shivaji and he was the founder of the Pindari system. The descendants of this Nusroo became the leaders of the Pindaris under the Marathas.⁶ Sardesai is also not clear on the point. He writes: "At one time they (Pindaris) were a convenient ingredient of the system of warfare developed by the Marathas. In that system ever since the days of Shivaji and Santaji Ghorpade, there had always been a class of unpaid auxiliaries attached to each chief's fighting quota, whose duty it was to step in the moment

the battle ended and finish the enemy by seizing his property and camp equipage and destroying his power of recovery".⁷ It is true that these "unpaid auxiliaries" mentioned by Sardesai very much resembled the later Pindaris. If we read Sardesai very carefully we cannot conclude with justice, as has been done by M. P. Roy in his thesis,⁸ that Shivaji and Ghorpade first established relationship with the Pindaris. Even Grant Duff maintains the distinction between the "Unpaid auxiliaries" and Pindaris. S. N. Sen is clear on this point when he wrote, "from the account available in the Maratha Chronicles it does not appear that Shivaji ever employed these marauders like his Mughal adversaries did". Thus Biswanath Ghosh did not approximate to the truth when he observed that "these 'unpaid auxiliaries' were no others but the fore-fathers of the Pindaris of the nineteenth century".⁹ It may be safely said that the coming into existence of the Pindaris may roughly be traced to the time when the Mughal imperialism came into clash with the nascent Maratha nationalism. They may be said to have been born in the anarchy and confusion of the late 17th century.

There is a general agreement that the relationship between the Pindaris and the Marathas was first established in the last decade of the 17th century. If we accept Ferishta, the Pindaris fought against Zulfikar Khan and other generals of Aurangzeb; and a definite mention of the Pindaris may be traced to the year 1689 at the time of the siege of Bijapur. During the rule of the Peshwas the relationship was cemented and the Pindaris became a part of the Maratha military system. Their services were profitably utilised by all the Peshwas till 1761. In the opinion of Sydenham there was little to distinguish between the predatory habits of the Maratha army and the activities of the Pindaris.¹⁰ As the Marathas gradually became a settled territorial power, their military system also became organised and regular

and the role of the Pindaris became well defined. The Pashwa's cavalry had four classes—(1) the Khasi-paga, (2) the Silehdars, (3) the Ekandas and (4) the Pindaris. This was the net outcome of the transformation of the Maratha military system. There is some element of truth in the observations of Sydenham: "The Maratha troops of those days (pre-Peshwa period) were what the Pindaris are now, plundering hordes, not maintaining allegiance to any one sovereign, though sometimes subservient to those whose protection it might be their immediate interest to court. In the progress of the dominion of the Marathas and their subjection to fixed systems of Government their armies would naturally be modelled on a more regular form, though their predatory habits which had so essentially contributed to the formation and advancement of their power..... would not be entirely relinquished, and the rest of their forces probably consisted of professed Pindaris who were maintained at a small expense and were very useful auxiliaries in harassing an enemy, attacking his convoy, carrying off his cattle, sacking his villages, collecting grain and other provisions, and in short performing all the predatory duties of a Maratha army. Their own interests must have been the only tie by which a military class of such licentious habits could have been attached to their employers, and it may be reasonably concluded that they would avail themselves of every favourable opportunity, which the weakness of their Government might afford them, to act independently and to appropriate to themselves the fruits of their spoils returning to obedience when compelled by force or by internal disunion to submit to control." The latter part of Sydenham's observations holds good during the period following the battle of Panipat, 1761.

The relationship in this period was marked by mutual gain. The Pindaris did not get a regular pay like soldiers, but they had always

a fixed share in the booty.¹¹ Moreover, they often got assignment of land and revenue for their subsistence. Useless as fighters, the Pindaris were employed by the Maratha masters for provisions and monetary gain. Sardesai has rightly observed that they had become "a convenient ingredient of the system of warfare developed by the Marathas".¹² They were actually authorised plunderers and became a source of income to the Maratha generals. To the state they surrendered 25% of the booty, and to their generals they had to pay a *Palpatti* or tent-tax at the rate of 3 rupees per tent. Actually, the practice of employing the Pindaris became so lucrative a business during the time of first Madhav Rao that a check had to be imposed, and the number of Pindaris attached to each general was strictly limited.¹³ In the Peshwa's Diaries, Vol. IX we have also a reference how Trimbak Rao Dhamdhare was authorised to retain in his camp 50 Pindari families who paid *palpatti* at the fixed rate.

It is no wonder that the Pindaris also would be increasingly enthused to serve the Marathas and earn a fortune which was beyond the capacity for a 19th century soldier. They sought every opportunity to fall upon their enemy like a veritable avalanche. Thus when Nazzar Ali Khan was appointed by Aurangzeb towards the end of his rule to occupy Khandesh, he was harassed on his way by bands of free-booters who are identified as Pindaris.¹⁴ When the great Maratha push to the north began during the period of Baji Rao, they found a new opening for them.¹⁵ The Pindaris gave their Maratha masters invaluable services in the swoop over Malwa and Rajput states. They overran Malwa in 1722 and were further encouraged by the Peshwa in 1725 in which year deeds were granted by Baji Rao authorising Holkar, Sindhia and Pawar of Dhar to levy *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* in Malwa. Half of the money thus collected could be utilised by them for maintaining their troops.¹⁶ The

Kapad Dwara records of Jaipur are full of reports about the confusion and terror created by the armies of Holkar and the Pindaris. In 1730 Malwa was again ravaged by them. The Farman of the Mughal Emperor issued on 19th January, 1725 urging Maharaja Sawai Jai Singh to suppress them did not bring about any tangible change.¹⁷ *Musfarriq Ahalkaran* series of Jaipur records show that imperial *Abkams* were issued urging all local rulers to rally under the banner of Maharaja Sawai Jai Singh in the suppression of the 'Dakshini-Mufsid'. Curiously enough, some local Fauzdars and Zemindars made no attempt to arrest the *mufsid*s in their territories and even opposed the armies against them.¹⁸ They even gave shelter to these invaders and as a result repeated orders were issued to them, without much effect, for helping the Maharaja's *naib* in suppressing them.¹⁹ All these attempts to check the Pindaris failed in the long run and *Khatoot Ahalkaran* series of Jaipur records narrate how they helped the Marathas in reaping a rich booty. Once rooted in Malwa it was easy for the Pindaris to carry on devastating raids all over Rajputana on behalf of their masters. In the mid-eighteenth century the Pindari-Maratha collaboration was remarkable. At that time the name of Dost Muhammad was frequently referred to, and one such reference may be found in a letter to Dattaji Sindhia in 1753.²⁰ The first phase in the relationship between the Marathas and the Pindaris saw its climax in 1761, when the freebooters accompanied Sadashiv Rao Bhao to the battlefield of Panipat. Till that time, the Pindaris were only an effective and vigorous part of the Maratha army, but, as S. N. Sen has pointed out, "they were by no means the peculiar product of the Maratha method of warfare."²¹ It is sometimes remarked that "the great Maratha chiefs had learned to live as princes rather than as predatory leaders; but their original habits of lawlessness were being followed by a new set of freebooters, known as the Pindaris".²² This view is some-

what akin to that of Sydenham which cannot be accepted without a grain of salt. The Marathas cannot be properly said to be the precursors of the Pindaris. Moreover, Maratha insurgency of Shivaji's time cannot be, without injustice, equated with lawlessness. But the fact remains that the Pindari-Maratha relationship was dictated by a sense of expediency. As they stood in the mid-eighteenth century, they represented in one sense "the debris of the Mughal empire".²³ They actually acted as a sort of "roving cavalry that accompanied the Peshwa's armies in the expedition rendering them such service as the Cossacks performed for the armies of Russia".²⁴ However, it should be borne in mind that in their initial stage of growth the strength of the Pindaris was regulated by their Maratha masters.²⁵ As an appendage to the Maratha army they were completely under the thumb of their generals. But this fact does not justify the observations of Sardesai that "the profuse British accounts suffer from a natural bias created by the last years of their activities perpetuating the impression that the Pindaris were the enemies of society and such loathsome pests as deserved to be exterminated".²⁶ They were undoubtedly loathsome even before 1761. The only difference was that the terror and devastation created by them were organised and directed according to the plans of their masters.

The period following the holocaust of 1761 witnessed a radical change in the pattern of relationship between the two. The third battle of Panipat proved to be a turning-point in the career of the Pindaris themselves. With the weakening of the Maratha power after Panipat, the Pindaris found an opportunity to pursue an independent course of action. Gradually they could flout any authority if they liked and soon assumed the shape of a rapacious banditti. As a modern researcher has rightly observed, "the rise of the Pindaris to power was inversely pro-

portionate to the decline of the Maratha power".²⁷ A direct outcome of the shock of Panipat was the decline of the central authority of the Peshwa. It was followed by the gradual rise of the Maratha leaders like Sindhia and Holkar who were practically independent of the central authority at Poona. The new power-alignment among the Marathas also brought a vital change in their attitude towards their Pindari collaborators. Sardesai has rightly remarked: "So long as the Maratha State worked as an organized unit, controlled by a competent chief, these predatory bands, unmatched in their long and swift marches and having their assigned duties, followed their regular avocation and were considered quite helpful and not obnoxious".²⁸

In the wake of the new power-alignment among the Marathas, there came another change in the relationship with the Pindaris in the shape of their regrouping according to allegiance they owed. Though the Pindaris used to serve, prior to 1761, almost all the leading Maratha generals, by the nineties of the 18th century they were regrouped under two broad heads — Sindhia and Holkar. This regrouping was not a sudden development, neither was it a natural phenomenon. Perhaps, it was a part of the settled policy of the Peshwa to push the Pindaris more and more under Sindhia and Holkar. Baji Rao first employed the Pindaris in his northern campaigns, and they remained in central and northern India even after the Peshwa diverted his ambition from the north to the south. Grant Duff observed, "it probably was an object of the great man's policy to draw them out of the Maratha country. It is certain that he left his Pindarees in Malwa with his officers Sindhia and Holkar, that they always attended their armies when they invaded the

Mughal provinces. . . ."²⁹ It is not, however, clearly known what prompted the Peshwa to push the Pindaris from the Deccan. It may be conjectured that the Peshwa was busy in acquiring new strength and setting the house in order. He perhaps did not think it desirable that the Pindaris in large numbers should remain in the Deccan as they could be easily utilised by Sindhia and Holkar in the struggle for supremacy. But it would be wrong to suppose that the Pindaris were never again employed by the Peshwa. During the First Anglo-Maratha War their services were utilised. The Minister of Peshwa, Parashuram Bhao sent 4000 Pindaris to reinforce the Maratha columns fighting at Talegaon.³⁰ In the battle of Kharda in 1795 also they took his side and let loose an attack on the provisions of the Nizam's armies.³¹ On the whole, however, the Pindaris were commonly considered to be divided into two broad groups, one owing allegiance to Sindhia and the other to Holkar. Jenkins has rightly observed that these divisions were merely nominal.³²

The first recognition of the strength of the Pindaris may be found when the Peshwa granted a jagir on the Nerbudda at Kanonga to Gazi-ud-din Khan as a reward for his assistance in the Peshwa's campaigns in Hindustan in 1735.³³ This jagir was inherited by his descendants. In the second half of the 18th century grant of land became very common and both Sindhia and Holkar wanted to attract the Pindari leaders to their respective ranks.^{33A} In 1794 a large body of Pindaris under Hiru and Buran had been settled by Sindhia by assignments of land near the banks of the Nerbudda. Thereafter, both Sindhia and Holkar gave liberal assignments of land to the prominent Pindari leaders with a view to extending nominal authority over them and enlisting their support in their political designs. It would be wrong to conclude that

the assignments of land were reflective of any deep attachment between the two. There was nothing sacred in the relationship, it was neither sacrosanct on both sides. It was actually a barter deal. On the one hand the Pindaris needed a formal protection against chastisement by other powers and some place to rest their heads. On the other, the Marathas calculated certain benefits from their relationship with the Pindaris. *Firstly*, the Pindari hordes could still bring wealth to the Maratha leaders, especially from the Rajput States. *Secondly*, they could still be utilised as an addition to the strength of the Maratha leaders in the hour of need without the charge of any regular pay or establishment. *Thirdly*, such assignments could be an effective safeguard against depredations in their own lands. It is an irony that towards the end of the 18th century, the Pindaris did not even spare the Maratha States. It is said that Hiru and Buran to whom grants of land had been made by Mahadji, were later put to death for their aggressions on the territories of Sindhia.³⁴ *Fourthly*, in the inter-State rivalries the Pindaris could be utilised as a pawn in the political chessboard. But it was not then realised that the ruination of one chief in collaboration with the marauders virtually encouraged them to play the same game against the other party when occasion arose. *Lastly*, they could be used as a weapon to harass the English who were becoming menacing from the point of view of the Marathas. But it would be wrong to suppose that the sole motive of the Marathas in employing them was to utilise their services against the English only as thought by contemporary English authorities.

The exact strength of the Sindhiashahi and Holkarshahi Pindaris cannot be stated. Different accounts are available regarding their respective numbers. Moreover, the number of Pindaris attached to both was not constant. It varied from time to time as a result of wars and internal tension. Jenkins gave the follow-

ing figures of Sindhiashahi and Holkarshahi Pindaris in 1811³⁵:

SINDHIASHAHI				
Leaders	Horse	Infantry	Guns	
Chitu	7925	1000	4	
Dost Muhammad	2430	400	8	
Karim Khan	3500	5150	15	
Kader Bux	4750	—	—	
Total	18605	6550	27	

HOLKARSHAHI				
Leaders	Horse	Infantry	Guns	
Tukku	2000	800	5	
Imam Bux	2000	1000	2	
Sahib Khan & Bahadur Khan	1060	—	—	
Kadir Baksh	2150	800	4	
Nathu Buchika	750	—	—	
Bappu	150	—	—	
Total	8110	2600	11	

Grand Total :—26715 horse, 9150 infantry and 38 guns.

This was just a rough estimate and even the Maratha leaders could not give the actual number of their Pindari followers. Neither was it possible to give a true return as the Pindaris often changed sides. For example, when Karim Khan had a tussle with Sindhia, he left his ranks and joined hands with Holkar's lieutenant Amir Khan, the Pathan leader; but Karim's son Namdar Khan remained with Sindhia along with his followers. The extension of the British dominions was also responsible for the fluctuation in the number of the Pindaris. As a result of Wellesley's Subsidiary Alliance with native powers, numerous native cavalries who could no longer be usefully employed, joined the ranks of the

Pindari leaders. "Their numbers grew as one Indian State after another passed under British protection and dispensed with its troops."³⁶

It is evident that towards the end of the 18th century, the Pindaris went out of the control even of Sindhia and Holkar. Sometimes they deserted their masters and at other times returned to their obedience as occasion demanded.³⁷ The lack of Maratha control was clearly demonstrated in the Pindari activities in Rajasthan. The First Anglo-Maratha War and the internal conflict following the death of Peshwa Madhavrao II in 1795 created a favourable opportunity for the Pindaris to flout the authority of their masters. They availed themselves of the opportunity which the weaknesses of Sindhia and Holkar's governments afforded them. It is debatable whether the Marathas were short-sighted in their policy towards the Pindaris. There cannot be any fair comparison between the character of pre-Panipat, and post-Panipat periods. The context of Maratha politics changed so rapidly that perhaps the Maratha leaders themselves could not foresee the outcome. But the fact remains that "if initially the Pindaris had been jackals to the Maratha tigers, feeding at their kill, later when the tigers turned upon one another, the jackals were to crack even Maratha bones."³⁸ Grant Duff has, however, given an explanation to this. In his words, "when the Marathas ceased to spread themselves, the Pindharees, who had attended their armies, were obliged to plunder the territories of their former protectors for subsistence..."³⁹

The relationship between the Pindaris and the Marathas during 1801-1818 became an exceedingly complex phenomenon when there was a wide gulf between appearance and reality. Several factors complicated the contact between the two during the period. *Firstly*, there was the complete loss of cohesion among the Marathas. The Peshwa, Sin-

dhia, Bhonsla and Holkar, all acted at cross purposes. Their mutual jealousy and rivalry degenerated into a fight for mutual annihilation since the death of Nana Fadnavis. The desultory warfare between Sindhia and Holkar started in 1801 in which the Pindaris took sides as they liked, much to their own advantage. The period of unrest thus created came to be known to the inhabitants of Central India as *Gardi-ka-Wakt* which reduced the country to the last state of misery and distress.⁴⁰ *Secondly*, the rise of Amir Khan as a powerful element in Central Indian politics was significant. Amir Khan, the Pathan chief, was a close associate of Jaswant Rao Holkar and handled the Pindaris with utmost dexterity. Amir Khan has often been characterised as a Pindari. Many scholars, old and new, are rather confused on this point. Though an examination of the character of Amir Khan is out of place here, the present writer asserts that he was never a Pindari himself. He directed the Pindaris on many occasions, no doubt, but he was not a part of the Pindari system. There are numerous evidences to prove this contention. The English did not take him to be a Pindari in the real sense of the term. In his Minute of 16th April, 1816, Edmonstone, a prominent member of the Council, drew a distinction between the "Organised troops" of the Pathan leader and the Pindaris. Lord Hastings did not also identify Amir Khan with the Pindaris. Whatever that may be, Amir Khan was a close collaborator of the Pindaris. He often acted as a go-between in a triangle of Pindaris-Marathas-Rajputs. He commanded such a respect that both the Marathas and the Rajputs resorted to him regarding trouble with the Pindari leaders. *Thirdly*, the gradual rise of the English power since the Treaty of Salbai, 1782, introduced a new element in Indian diplomacy. The English grip was tightened since the treaty of Bassein, 31st December, 1802. For the time being the Peshwa was removed from the scene of conflict, but the Pindari-Holkar-Sindhia-English

quadrangular diplomacy became much complicated. These developments were taking place at a time when British Imperialism was on the offensive vis-a-vis Indian native powers. They were shrewd enough to take advantage of the mutual jealousy and distrust between Holkar and Sindhia. They also tried to sharpen the conflict between the Pindaris and the Marathas and that between the leaders themselves as evident from the following two letters (translated) which may be found in the private collections of the prince concerned :

- (1) From — Amir Khan
To — Maharaja Man Singh of Jodhpur
Dated — Falgun, Sudi 10,
V.S. 1864 (1808?)

Your Highness will be surprised to learn that it was due to the instigation which the Pindaris received from the officers of the Company Bahadur that they betrayed their Maratha masters and plundered the territories of the Rajput rulers. At times the British even gave financial assistance to the Pindaris for getting princely territories ravaged. Prior to their contact with the British, they were neither freebooters nor dishonest.

- (2) From — Nazar Mohan Ram
To — Maharaja Surat Singh of Bikaner
Dated — Kartik, Sudi 6,
V.S. — 1875 (?)

Your Highness should always be on your guard against the intrigues of the British. They fomented strife amidst the various Pindari Sardars and those who agreed to betray the cause of the Pindari Union were given jagirs and hard cash amounting to several thousands. Those who did not agree to betray the cause of their unity were hunted like wild beasts and hanged. A band of 30,000 Pindaris

was put to death by the British in the most merciless manner.

Needless to say, there are many obvious inaccuracies in the above extracts, but the point of English instigation finds expression in two different letters written to different Princes. The association of Amir Khan with the Pindaris naturally excites our suspicion about the correctness of his statement. There is no sufficient historical evidence to prove beyond doubt that the English instigated the Pindaris. At the same time the point cannot be summarily dismissed as a myth. It is not unlikely that the English would try to take advantage of the rift in the enemy camp. It might not be the official policy of the English to instigate the Pindaris against the Marathas. But it would have been possible that the English officers at the Residencies did it as a matter of political expediency. Moreover, there is such a hint in a Secret General letter from the Court of Directors, dated 5th September, 1816. The Directors wrote : "22. If instead of declaring a general war against all predatory associations you avail yourselves of the advantage to be derived from the discordant elements of which they are composed and of the dissensions which prevail among their leaders, it appears to us not unreasonable to expect that any project for uniting all the freebooters against you under the banners of the Maratha chiefs may be defeated, but that you may from time to time obtain a partial cooperation from one or other of those chiefs according to the degree in which the peculiar interests of each may be affected by any incursions of the Pindaris, and that you may even derive from some of the Pindari leaders themselves occasional aid against such of their associates as they appear to regard as rivals". In view of the above instructions the English can, at best, be given a 'benefit of doubt'.

Constant in-fighting was going on among the Pindaris owing allegiance to different

Maratha leaders. But at times they incurred the displeasure of their Maratha master and had to face a double fire. A glaring example of how the Pindaris were not sincerely attached to any single leader is that of Karim Khan. Karim at first served Sindhia along with Chitu. During the Holkar-Sindhia war in 1801, Karim and Chitu took the field on the side of Sindhia and inflicted a defeat on the brigades of Jaswant Rao at Indore and compelled them to retire to Samurghat.⁴¹ But after some time, he joined Holkar with whom he remained for some years. Thereafter he entered the services of Hayat Mohammad Khan, Nawab of Bhopal. Karim again came back to Sindhia who gave him in 1803 the 'Panj Mahals' in jagir and conferred upon him the title of Nawab with a view to conciliating him. But the insolent attitude of Karim together with his devastation of some of Sindhia's territories earned the displeasure of the Maratha leader. Karim also became engaged in an open war with Chitu in 1806.⁴² Chitu was defeated and he fled to Sindhia's camp. Karim negotiated with Holkar for assistance and was perhaps tempted to reap a benefit from Holkar's continued rivalry with Sindhia. Sindhia invited Karim on the plea of a settlement and imprisoned him as soon as he came. Karim was interned at the Gwalior fort till 1811. After his release he openly defied the authority of Sindhia and asserted that "he was a robber and that all countries were his".⁴³ He was again interned by Amir Khan, though he was earlier released by Zalim Singh by paying a ransom of 6 lakhs of rupees. Perhaps Amir Khan did this on the remonstrances and threats of Sindhia.⁴⁴

As the diplomatic pressure by the English mounted, both the Maratha leaders and the Pindaris tried to patch up. That game was still more difficult because of the skilful manoeuvring of the English. It is interesting to note that the Pindaris opened negotiations with the English, the Peshwa and Sindhia almost at the same time. Chitu and

Namdar Khan requested the English for shelter and showed their eagerness to enter the services of the Company.⁴⁵ But the Company's government refused to accede to their request.⁴⁶ Almost the same request was made to the Peshwa along with a veiled threat. Chitu wrote to Hindu Rao in 1816 : "I am ignorant whether all this (advance of the English) is known to the presence, but let the Sarkar consider well, when we shall be no more how will the Nagpur man and the Peshwa Bahadur escape? We are not without remedy, let His Highness's commands be made known to us that we may obey them. Hitherto we have never disobeyed orders or acted treacherously towards the Sarkar. We now request that some arrangements or negotiations may be entered into with the English and that they may be communicated to your servants, it will then be seen that our conduct will be likewise. One thing gives me uneasiness, the Pindaris are a lawless tribe and will lay every country waste; they regard your Highness as their refuge and protector, and for that reason I earnestly represent that if there is any delay in an answer to this, your servants will be ruined, and the greater despatch is used in sending us your commands, the more it will be to our advantage".⁴⁷ The Peshwa suspected intrigues by Sindhia and came into touch with the English through the Resident at Poona. The English pressurised him not to give any shelter to the Pindaris.

Under the shadow of a danger of an English attack, Sindhia tried his best to improve his relationship with the Pindaris. While he was giving all assurances of cooperation to the English through the Resident at Gwalior, he was trying secretly to conciliate the Pindaris. He succeeded in this game at the end. Jean Baptiste, who had been sent earlier to chastise the Pindaris, terminated his operations against them by conclusion of written engagements. Under these stipulations the Pindaris agreed to abstain from plunder, to keep a body of horse with the Maharaja's


army, and to receive grants of territory.⁴⁸ Karim's son Namdar Khan and Chitu were conciliated and they agreed to help Sindhia. They assured to obey him in everything and wanted his instructions how to act in the present critical situation.⁴⁹ But Karim was not reconcilable. Even at the beginning of 1817 when a war against them was in the offing, they were quarrelling among themselves and Karim was ready to take a revenge against Chitu. The secret honey-mooning of Sindhia received a bad jolt when the English tried to commit him on one side or the other and gave him a good piece of their mind in plain terms. Lord Hastings had not the slightest doubt about the duplicity of Sindhia.⁵⁰ In October, 1817, Sindhia was categorically told that he must not give shelter to the Pindaris. Not only that, he was required to employ his troops against the Pindaris in such a manner as desired by the English.⁵¹ The diplomatic offensive launched by the English was thorough and the Pindaris were practically left in the lurch by their former protectors. Sindhia made a futile last ditch attempt to

conceal Wasil Mohammad, one of the prominent Pindari leaders. John Adam, Secretary to the Governor-General, rightly remarked in his letter to Captain Stewart, Acting Resident with Sindhia, on 1st June, 1818; "The public manifestation involved in the surrender of Wasil Mohammad marks the complete abandonment by Sindhia of the cause of the Pindaris....."⁵²

The relationship between the Marathas and the Pindaris was actually a sordid tale of mutual exploitation of each other's services for narrow ends. The contact started with a definitive purpose but it was lost in cross purposes after the Maratha debacle in 1761. The freebooters were thereafter utilised for a political end; but the nefarious game ended in confusion resulting in unprecedented misery and torture for the common man. In essence the contact between the two reflected the trend of the predatory system of politics in the Indian subcontinent during the 17th and 18th centuries.

APPENDIX A

Genealogy of a Branch of the Pindaris



APPENDIX B

General Statement of the Jagheers held by the Pindaries at the end of 1811.
[Progs: Foreign (Secret) No. 2 of 21st June, 1814]
Sindia Shahee

1. Cheetoo, and the Runjunes, have Districts to the amount of four Lacks, and Sixty Two Thousand as detailed below :

From Sindia	
	Rs.
Sutwas and a few other villages	7,000
Arone	1,00,000
Madhoneah	1,00,000
Total from Sindia	2,07,000
From the Nabob of Bhopal	
Seepaner	10,000
From Holkar	
Fytha	10,000
Turanah	10,000
From the Bhooslah	
Singapore Barrah & ca. & ca.	2,25,000
Total of the Jagheers held by Cheetoo	4,62,000

- 2nd Dost Mohamed has Districts to the annual value of one Lack and Ninety five thousand Rupees as detailed below :

From Sindia	
Bagroda	15,000
Dhunanood	80,000
Total from Sindia	95,000
From the Bhooslah	
Jytree	40,000

Chhatoor Codapoor Byngunge & ca. Talooka Bairee	60,000
Total from the Bhooslah	1,00,000
Total of the Jageers held by Dost Mohamed	1,95,000

- 3rd Kurreem Khan has Country to the Annual value of thirteen Lacks of Rupees as detailed below :

From the Nabob of Bhopal	
	Rs.
Kurreenghur	60,000
Wuljamool	12,000
Khokia	60,000
Kurrungaon	12,000
Total from the Nabob of Bhopal	1,44,000
From Sindia	
Kyrah	50,000
Sytl Barree	1,25,000
Baurassa	75,000
Other places not specified	4,06,000
Total from Sindia	6,56,000
From Holkar	
Shahjehanpore, Shujawalpore, Sarungpore	5,00,000
Total of the Lands held by Kurreem	13,00,000

Abstract	
Cheetoo and the Runjurs hold Lands, to the amount of Rupees	4,62,000
Dost Mahommed	1,95,000
Kurreem Khan	13,00,000
Grand Total of the Revenues of the Sindia Shahee	19,57,000

Holkar Shahee
Holkar's Pindaries hold Country from Holkar alone, but this account does not men-

tion the value. The names of the Chiefs and the Lands they hold are as follows; Tukko Jemadar holds Kunnade—Imam Buksh holds Kurrungaon and Neemawur—Sahib Khaun and Buhadoor Khan hold Goonds and

Ehlehra—another Sahib Khaun holds the Pergunnah of Ambah in Khandish granted this year—and Nuthoo Buckerka holds Ehhola Khathpore.

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A STUDY OF THE PROBLEMS OF INDIANS IN EAST AFRICA

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(PART II)

Historically, the most important contribution of Asians to the East African economies has been the extension of the monetary economy into the subsistence areas—a prerequisite for any economic development. A whole array of early explorers, administrators and missionaries testify to the indispensability of Asian traders and artisans in the opening up and development of the interior. Their function was essentially the introduction of attractive imported consumer goods to large sections of the rural population throughout East Africa, thereby stimulating their desire for money incomes. Until recent times Asian traders also acted as the main outlets for produce of indigenous rural economies. Asian dominance in the distributive sector of the economy laid them open to charges of exploitation which will be discussed later. Here it is important to emphasise that the Asians continue to perform the old but vital function of introducing and extending the money economy in such areas.

Since the Asian 'dukawalla' or shopkeeper is still a characteristic feature of township and small urban centres throughout the East Africa, it is necessary to say something about him. To a typical 'dukawalla' living in a remote township, life offers few excitements. It is hard work with little compensation. The working day is long, usually starting at 7 a.m. and continuing late into the evening. The shopkeeper, who generally lives in a small brick house adjoining the shop, will

typically be helped in his chores by his relatives; but he may barely manage to save enough for his children's education or for his daughter's dowry. Life in the township offers few amenities; there is very little by way of organised recreation and entertainment. The tedium of enforced leisure may partly and occasionally be relieved by social calls on the few Indian families in the neighbourhood. But in general there is little colour or variety in the daily routine.

However, contrary to some popular myths held abroad, not all Asians in East Africa are dukawallas living in remote parts of the country. Today their main economic contribution is the supply of high—and middle—level manpower and capital. This combination of capital and technical know-how in one section of the population is a great potential asset to the economy. Unfortunately, we do not have adequate data to assess quantitatively this crucial contribution to the total stock of capital and skilled manpower. According to Guy Hunter's estimates, in mid-1961 there were 67,500 skilled persons in East Africa, divided into two categories: the first consisted of just over 18,000 professional men of graduate or equivalent level, senior administrators, and senior managers in commerce and industry, and the second covered about 49,500 in the next layer of skilled manpower, including technicians and sub-professional grades (for example, the second echelon in agricultural extension

work), executive grades in the civil service, middle management in industry and commerce, and teachers with secondary education but without a university-degree. Hunter's estimates show that Asians provided a little less than 40 per cent of the people in category I and about 50 per cent of those in category II, in the whole of East Africa.

We have no information on the occupational distribution by race of high—and middle—level manpower in East Africa. But a few sample surveys and general observations suggest that in category I the Asian contribution is especially large in medicine, law, engineering, pharmacy, accountancy, and business management generally. In category II, Asians provide most of the skilled, manual personnel such as mechanics, electricians, tailors, carpenters, salesmen and supervisors. A large proportion of persons in category I consists of European expatriates, whose numbers may be expected to decline rather sharply in future. Thus the limited flow of African trained manpower will be needed not only to provide for the needs of the expanding economy but also make good the expected loss of European expatriate manpower. It is, therefore, clear that a simultaneous withdrawal of Asian skilled manpower from the country could deal a crippling blow to the economy and act as a serious constraint on the development potential of East Africa.

Asians have made an equally important contribution in the form of savings and capital for the expansion of the economy. It is true that when the Asians originally immigrated to East Africa they brought relatively little capital with them; but it is also true that the savings made by them could have been used to increase their consumption rather than accumulate capital. A high proportion of this capital was originally generated in commerce, but it has since been invested in most sectors of the economy, especially in the manufacturing and construction industries. Again, it is

not possible to quantify the share of Asians in the national stock of capital, but a rough idea of their contribution to economic growth may be obtained by mentioning the main economic activities in which they have been pioneer entrepreneurs. In Uganda, cotton ginning and coffee curing were long a complete Asian monopoly, though in the last decade or so African co-operatives have greatly increased their share. At the moment all the sugar produced in Uganda is grown in the plantations of two Asians, who are also the leading industrialists in East Africa; the growing steel complex in Jinja owed its inception to one of them. Likewise, the timber and saw mill industries were originally developed in Uganda on the initiative of Asian businessmen. In Tanganyika many of the larger sisal and other plantations are owned by Asians; while in Kenya, they have contributed greatly to industrial expansion in the post-war period. It is in fact difficult to think of any significant sector in the East African economies where Asian capital, entrepreneurial ability and skills have not made an appreciable contribution.

For long Asians had a virtual monopoly of wholesale and retail trade and the marketing of minor cash crops especially in Uganda and Tanganyika. Their dominance in the distributive sector of the economy exposed them to widespread criticism for alleged dishonest practices and to charges of exploitation. It is difficult to define the latter term precisely; in most cases it is undoubtedly used as a term of abuse without referring to any specific practices. To the extent that it is not used simply as a term of abuse, it may be expected to refer to a variety of sharp practices from which Asian businessmen, like the businessmen of other races, cannot claim entire freedom. These may include the problems of short weight, misleading information, overcharging or a number of other ways by which customers feel themselves cheated. But in a majority of cases criticism is levelled

against the wide-spread practice of bargaining in Asian shops.

Any system of bargaining must inevitably lead to the charging of different prices to different customers, and thereby to complaints of exploitation and racial discrimination. It is perhaps also true that many Asian traders have shown themselves more interested in quick profits rather than in steady, long-term gains, and have not hesitated to exploit temporary scarcities to make windfall gains. All these malpractices have served only to promote ill-will and distrust between the customer and the trader. It will be noticed that none of these practices are peculiar to Asian traders in East Africa; and indeed they are the stock-in-trade of businessmen all over the world, especially in under-developed countries. But in East Africa because of the dominance of Asians in wholesale and retail trade, criticism of such practices is often couched in racial terms.

At another level, Asians are sometimes accused of holding back the progress and participation of Africans in the economy of the country. It is undeniably true that the presence of a large, economically sophisticated community has had the effect of retarding African participation in the commercial sectors of the economy. But to argue from this that the absence of the Asian community would have resulted in generally high level of incomes for Africans is to commit an error in elementary economics. In the preceding section, it was shown that the Asians have made a vital contribution to economic development. It is difficult to believe that East Africa would have developed to anything like its present level without the full and active economic participation of Asians.

The above criticism can be reinterpreted to imply that Asian business firms have not consciously aided Africanisation. There is undoubtedly much truth in this charge.

Asians have for the most part been solely concerned with their own salvation; in the past they have spared relatively little energy for the economic advancement of Africans. The skills and training which Africans have acquired from Asian business firms have been the by-product of their employment with the latter rather than the result of a conscious attempt to promote the economic position of Africans. Having said this, it is difficult to see how it could have been otherwise. Most of the Asian firms are small, essentially family concerns. In many cases the employment of Africans in 'responsible' positions would have meant a loss of jobs for some members of the family—something very few Asians are prepared to accept. However, their old attitudes and habits are gradually breaking down in the face of pressure from African leaders. Some Asians have started business in partnership with Africans. Many of the larger commercial and industrial firms have initiated policies of Africanisation. Towards the end of 1964, the (Asian) Dar-es-salaam Merchants Chamber announced a comprehensive scheme to accelerate the participation of Africans in the commercial and industrial sectors of the economy through loans, partnerships, and training in commercial techniques. Despite these recent moves, one cannot help feeling that the Asian response to the need to increase the share of Africans in wholesale and retail trade has not been sufficiently swift or thorough-going.

In recent years the Asian community has been widely criticised for exporting capital. The imminence of independence in East African countries, accompanied as it was by widespread fears of a breakdown of law and order in Kenya and Uganda led to a crisis of confidence among the immigrant communities, resulting in a fall in domestic investment and a large outflow of capital abroad. With the attainment of independence and the return of confidence, there has been a slight reversal of the above trends, but there are

still many individual Asians and Europeans who continue to transfer abroad part of their current income. The response of the immigrant communities to conditions of uncertainty and fear of exchange control has been similar to that of the affluent classes all over the world.

There is little doubt that independence has progressively meant large shifts of incomes and assets from non-Africans to Africans. This has already been foreshadowed in the policy declarations of the ruling parties in the three countries. The recently published development plans of Kenya and Tanganyika attempted to translate these policies into concrete projects. Before we consider them in detail, it is necessary to point out that the achievement of high rates of economic growth in East Africa could greatly ease the economic problems of the Asian community, while a stagnant economy could have serious effects on their economic prospects. Their actions and attitudes could be a vital determinant of the rate of growth. Asian businessmen and industrialists are responsible for a significant proportion of total investment; if they do not pursue expansionist policies, the efforts of the East African governments to accelerate the rate of economic growth will be largely frustrated, thereby seriously augmenting the economic problems of the Asian community.

A very high proportion of the Asian labour force in East Africa, amounting to between 60 to 70 per cent, derive their livelihood from commerce or from employment in the public sector. Here the economic prospects for Asians appear rather gloomy. An accelerated programme of Africanisation in the civil services has already gone some way in redressing the past racial imbalances. It is likely to be pursued rigorously for some years to come. But Africanisation by definition leaves little scope for either the recruitment or the promotion of Asians. Different cate-

gories of Asian employees are affected differently; the most numerous category consisting of clerks, typists and other holding junior posts have been hit the hardest by programmes of Africanisation. Those in the teaching profession, particularly in the secondary schools have relatively little difficulty in continuing in their jobs over the next few years. With regard to other graduates and persons with professional qualifications such as accountants, doctors, lawyers, architects, engineers, dentists and so on, the prospects for employment in the public services depend entirely on the official attitude of the new governing class.

There is little doubt that for many years to come there is likely to be an acute shortage of skilled and educated manpower in both the public and the private sectors. But this does not mean that the Asians will automatically be assured of jobs. The new i.e. free East African governments have until now shown little enthusiasm for employing Asians, even where Africans with the requisite qualifications are not forthcoming. This has undoubtedly resulted in an outflow of educated Asian manpower to countries like Canada, the U.K., India and Pakistan. An intensification of this trend could be a severe setback to solve the manpower crisis.

For many years to come there will be ample economic opportunities for professional persons; this is especially true of professions for which Africans have hitherto shown little inclination, such as engineering, accountancy, architecture or pharmacy. But persons with such qualifications will always command an international market, and the lack of openings in East Africa need not spell economic disaster for them. In any case, they have always constituted a tiny minority of the total Asian working population.

In the private sector, many of the leading expatriate firms are pursuing a policy of

Africanisation at all levels, and are therefore reluctant to take on new Asian employees. It is unlikely that the Asian predominance in wholesale and retail trade will last for long. One of the aims of the development plans drawn up in the three East African countries is to increase rapidly and substantially the share of Africans in commerce.

This is perhaps stated most clearly in Tanganyika's Five Year Plan, which specifies that the co-operative movement should expand to secure 10 per cent of the total turnover of wholesale trade by 1970; the target for retail trade is 10 per cent by 1970, and in the long run some 30 to 40 per cent of the total volume. The Tanzania government has worked out a comprehensive scheme to implement these targets; and it also plans to place the marketing of all crops in the hands of co-operative societies or of African farmers. This would deprive Asian dukawallas of a valuable source of income. Similarly the Kenya Development Plan puts forward various proposals to enhance the share of Africans in commerce and industry; the most important of these is the decision to establish a chain of People's Shops managed by the National Trading Company, which has been formed under the aegis of Kenya Industrial Development Corporation. In Uganda too, plans are afoot to help African traders through loans, subsidised rents, training programmes and so on.

All these measures, if successful, would imply an absolute reduction in the turnover of wholesale and retail trade handled by Asian businessmen. Thus the commercial sector is unlikely to absorb the increase in Asian labour force.

The pressure of African competition is already beginning to make itself felt among small retail stores, especially in villages and other small centres, and has resulted in a drift of Asian traders to the town and cities.

In Tanganyika the big increase in the number of African shops took place in the last 10 or 15 years. In 1961 there were, 36,157 African retailers licensed. Very few of these African shops are in towns or trading centres; almost all are situated in the interior. In 1961 there were 10,090 non-African retail businesses, and 3,921 wholesalers, of whom the great majority were Asians, with a small number of Europeans; though the Asian traders are less numerous than the Africans, they handle, even at the retail level, much the greater part of the business.

The indications are that this pressure will be further intensified and in a few years' time the erstwhile ubiquitous dukawalla may cease to be a part of the landscape in small urban centres. It is only the large import; wholesale and retail business owned by Asians which will continue to have a future in East Africa.

This leaves us with the industrial and agricultural sectors as possible openings for the increasing Asian labour force. Undoubtedly, a rapid growth of the manufacturing and construction industries could ease their unemployment problem. But here again, the resultant demand for unskilled and semi-skilled jobs would be largely satisfied by the existing African labour supply, while only a few Asians may expect to be employed in managerial and executive posts. Is there any considerable scope in agriculture? Although Asians were prevented by legislation from acquiring and cultivating land in the past, the reasons for discrimination no longer apply. Agriculture might therefore be thought of as a possible solution of the 'Asian problem'; however, for a variety of reasons, this seems most unlikely, even if such policies were adopted. The question of land arouses the deepest emotions among Africans and any suggestion of alienating land for Asian settlement would run into bitter opposition. Quite apart from that, Kenya has no substantial unutilised land capable of cultivation.

Even if the other two governments (those of Uganda and Tanzania) were to encourage Asian settlement, it is doubtful whether many capable and enterprising Asians would take kindly to agricultural life. Nor is it reasonable to assume that the governments would be prepared to inject large sums of capital and technical know-how to make these schemes viable. It does not, therefore, seem to us that agriculture is likely to employ any substantial number of Asians.

The above analysis does not hold out hopes of a bright economic future for Asians in East Africa; to that extent it confirms the current widespread pessimism among the Asian community. Economic difficulties will perhaps manifest themselves in growing unemployment, pressures on average earnings, increasing economic competition from Africans, and generally a gradual erosion of the many privileges which Asians have enjoyed in the past. But all this will have the effect

of closing the economic gap between Asians and Africans and thus may contribute to racial harmony in East Africa. Furthermore, for some years to come there may be a substantial net emigration of Asians from East Africa to India, Pakistan and the U.K. The emigrants will consist for the most part of retired civil servants and businessmen, of the unemployed and of those with little prospects for employment, and finally of those with high educational qualifications in search of better economic opportunities, just as their fathers were a generation ago.

Some of the Asian economic problems will therefore be exported in this way. For those who choose to stay on, their most enduring guarantee must lie in their complete acceptance as East Africans. To this process of acceptance, they can make a powerful contribution by a genuine commitment to the ideals and aspirations of an independent East Africa.

INDIA TRADE UNDER THE DANISH FLAG : 1772-1808

A Review Article*

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This is a study of India Trade under the Danish Flag over a period usually regarded as the golden age of Denmark's trade with India and China. The story begins in 1772 with the termination of "the India monopoly" of the Danish Asiatic Company enjoyed by it since its formation in 1732, and ends in 1808 with the British occupation of the Danish settlements in India almost immediately after the commencement of the 1807-1814 war between Britain and Denmark. The entire period is broken up into five sub-periods, and in each of these the activities of the Asiatic Company and Danish private traders are separately analysed.

The broad determinants of the mode of financing, scale, and axis of India trade under the Danish flag over this period which the study brings out in clear relief were :—

- (i) the gradual emergence of a British India through a phase of Indian history marked by frequent wars, political instability and disintegration;
- (ii) the growth of India-based private British commercial interests

('Anglo-Indian'), and the struggle between the private British and Anglo-Indian commercial interests on the one hand, and the English East India Company on the other, over the 'opening of the India Trade';

- (iii) the tussle for power between the European nations, culminating in protracted wars; and towards the close of the period,
- (iv) the replacement, on the European market, of Indian textiles by European textiles.

The two main Danish settlements in India were at Tranquebar, 150 miles south of Madras on the Coromandel coast, and Serampore, near Calcutta. Besides, the Company had set up factories at Calicut and Colachel on the Malabar coast, and at Balasore, Patna and Porto Novo. Danish trading activity on the Malabar coast was only 'sporadic', and the stations at Patna and Balasore remained commercially insignificant except for a brief phase.

The author classifies the goods imported into India by the Asiatic Company into six main groups; metals, marine stores, munitions, wines and spirits, silver and miscellaneous, the last forming only a small part of

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the total value. "Very little was of Danish origin". In the first group, for instance, copper came mainly from Sweden, iron from Norway and Sweden, lead from England; again, in the second group, anchors, timber, pitch and tar came from Norway and the Baltic countries, canvas, rope and cordage from Sweden and Russia.

The composition of the cargo varied. The decline in the relative importance of the European cargo (exclusive of silver) in financing the purchase of Indian goods is, however, noticeable. This was, no doubt, caused partly by the rapid decline in the import of munitions after 1780. In India, the chief market for munitions was in the Southern region, and as the Asiatic Company began to concentrate its activities more and more in Bengal, the decline set in, and imports of munitions were discontinued after 1790.

Like other European Companies, the Asiatic Company had found the proceeds of imports of European produce and manufacture inadequate to cover the purchases of goods in India, and relied on import of silver and loans raised in India to cover the difference. The absence of an attractive official channel for the remittance of the fortunes acquired by the employees of the English East India Company had placed at the disposal of private traders and trading Companies from other European countries a great amount of liquid funds for making purchases in India. The Asiatic Company sometimes found borrowing from this "Anglo-Indian remittance market" a profitable way of financing its exports from India, but was never dependent on it. Thus while there was even a ten year period (1776-1785) in which the Company had stopped importing silver, relying exclusively on the remittance market to cover the difference between exports and imports, it had no difficulty in resuming the import of silver adequate to finance about 3/4ths of its

total purchases in India in the period from 1788 to 1807.

Among the items exported from India, textiles predominated, accounting for about 80% of the total value of the cargo in the period covered by the book. Other items like saltpetre, sugar, pepper, redwood, bamboos etc. found place mainly as packing material or ballast, though some of these were also attractive because of their commercial value.

The Indian branch of the Asiatic Company's trade was "always its problem child." The "modest profits in trade were swallowed up" by the expenses of administration in the settlements as long as this was the responsibility of the Company. The finances of the Company were considerably improved with the cession of the settlements to the Danish Crown after 1777, but other handicaps remained. The Danish settlements produced only a very insignificant part of their exports from India. The trade was dependent on production outside the Danish settlements. The textiles purchased on the Coromandel coast were classified by the Company into South and North goods, according to the location of the supplies. Textiles procured from 'the district round Tranquebar and those South and West of it' came under the first category, while those procured from the areas 'around Madras and further north' came under the second. Up to 1782, most of the textile piecegoods were South goods bought from Indian merchants, a small part being supplied by the English (in or outside the service of the East India Company) on the northern part of the coast. But with "the interruption in production and transport" caused by wars in Southern India, the Indian merchants were no longer able to supply the piecegoods, and the Asiatic Company gradually came to rely exclusively on the English suppliers in the northern part of the coast. "The Indian merchants appeared for the last time in the contracts for cloth in 1785-1786, and until the Asiatic Company abandoned its activities on the Coroman-

del coast, the servants of the English Company were the sole suppliers of north coast cloths". The continuity of trade on this basis was dependent on the effectiveness of the measures taken by the English Company to curb the private trading activities of its employees. With the tightening up of the English Company's internal administration, the Asiatic Company began to feel the pinch, and its ships had to be filled up with other types of cargo for want of piecegoods.

The Asiatic Company's activities began to be increasingly concentrated in Bengal, which in the early part of the period came second to Coromandel in importance. The movement had begun even before the switch from Tranquebar to Madras on the Coromandel coast. The concentration was, however, completed between 1793 and 1801, when 94% of the imported cargo was unloaded at Serampore, and 92% of the Indian cargo originated in Bengal.


In Bengal, the Asiatic company was not completely dependent on the English suppliers as it had become in Coromandel. The European element in the supply side was probably indispensable when remittance capital provided the finance as the Indian merchants could not accept bills drawn on Europe. But the Asiatic Company had stopped the import of silver altogether only for a period of ten years, and even though the climax of financing through remittance capital was reached after the resumption of import of silver, the bullion imports provided some room for manoeuvre. In the period of the Revolutionary War about 75% of the goods were being purchased from Indian suppliers. It is not quite clear whether all the Indian merchants mentioned were really independent traders or mere agents or *benam-dars* of Anglo-Indian principals, though the fact that Indian suppliers were willing to accept interest-free instalment payment in

India rather than bills on Europe suggests Indian enterprise.

The decline of the Asiatic Company in Bengal started with the increasing difficulty of selling the imported goods. Though the European cargo was auctioned at Serampore, they were re-exported, the main destination being Calcutta. The change in the policy of the English Company in regard to private British trade made it "unnecessary to maintain European enclaves" in British India for importing European goods. The factors of the Asiatic Company could feel "how a net of customs charges and malice" was tightening around the auctions at Serampore. The final blow was the decline in the European market for Indian textiles. In this sense it was the trade that undermined the finances of the Asiatic Company. The Company now "paid dearly for its concentration" on a single product. It had to seek new products from other sources and its India trade became insignificant.

Financially, the India trade had always been a source of trouble to the Asiatic Company. "Only during wars in Europe and in India would the Company's India trade pay and even war conditions did not ensure profitability in the long run". The Asiatic Company had been able to expand its scale of operations in India due to the conflict between the English Company and private British and Anglo-Indian commercial interests. The resolution of this conflict and the growth of British India were, in the final analysis, the decisive factors in the eclipse of the Asiatic Company from India, for these ruled out the possibility of reorganizing its India trade on a new viable basis.

The story of private trade is quite different. The trade of the Asiatic Company profited by the availability of remittance capital but could do without this mode of financing whenever necessary. Remittance capital was,



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however, the foundation on which private India trade under the Danish flag rested. The author has made a distinction between direct and return trade expeditions, the former starting from Indian shores, the latter originating in and returning to Copenhagen. The direct expeditions almost always represented Anglo-Indian capital and enterprise, with a thin cover of Danish nationality in the form of the Danish flag, Danish officers of the ships (who had sometimes acquired Danish citizenship just to satisfy the requirements) and necessary shipping documents. The Danish service was useful not only because the expedition could thus steer clear of any infringement of the East India Company's rights, but also because Denmark maintained a position of neutrality during European wars which made ships under the Danish flag a safe vehicle for trade and remittance.

The capital and enterprise of the return expeditions was more varied in its composition, but close association with British and Anglo-Indian interests was essential. The ships of the return expeditions were fitted out by traders or trading firms in Copenhagen, but there was frequently a substantial element of non-Danish collaboration. The Danish role in the return expeditions was often nothing more than that of an agent for the British and Anglo-Indian interests in the background.

The return expeditions sometimes functioned primarily as agencies for carrying freight offered by Anglo-Indian interests, the cargo being consigned to Copenhagen firms or to the owners of the ships in Copenhagen. The return expeditions also obtained capital in the remittance market against bills drawn on Europe. The suppliers of capital in this market preferred to lend against bottomry bonds on the security of ship and cargo. Where Danish participation was real (i.e., not merely a cover of Danish nationality to hide the British or Anglo-Indian ori-

gin of the undertaking), the help of European and Anglo-Indian interests had to be sought to buy Indian goods.

The total value of "Anglo-Indian capital and goods transported to Europe aboard ships under the Danish flag" in the entire period has been estimated at 55 million Current Rupees. There were other channels for Anglo-Indian remittance and trade. But the Danish channel was, "except for a brief break in 1801-1802, in constant use throughout the first fifty years after 1757", while other channels "ceased to function from time to time". The channel was, doubtless, useful to the Anglo-Indian, but what was the gain reaped by Danish nationals? The direct gains took the form of freight receipts, various commissions, trading profits, and the fees paid to the State (in which the Asiatic Company had also a share) by all private expeditions under the Danish flag. The secondary gains comprised the generation of income in activities sustained by the use of this channel. The greatest beneficiaries was a small group of Copenhagen traders who could persuade the Danish Government to adopt whatever measures it considered necessary to maintain this lucrative business. In the summer of 1782 the Danish Government came to the rescue of the Copenhagen firms by extending loans on a liberal scale, thus restoring their credit in the European capitals which had become reluctant to accept Danish bills. The Copenhagen firms succeeded in persuading their Government to pass an ordinance in 1787 establishing priority of bottomry bonds among the creditors' claims (which brought the Danish law in line with that in other European countries) to counteract the damage caused to the entire Danish credit in India by the failure of an important Copenhagen figure to discharge his debt.

The Danish Government was well aware that the extent of Danish participation was frequently nominal, and "that merchant

houses in Copenhagen were often no more than agents of the foreign investors". But it was "a principle in Denmark's trading system to encourage and extend the East Indian trade by every means, and thus encourage not only the traders of the country, but also to draw foreign capital into the Danish East India trade, as much as might be possible". The East India trade was valued because "without risking much of the country's resources in this trade, (it) makes Copenhagen one of the most considerable markets for East Indian goods, where most of the buying and selling is on foreign account, of which the certain profits fall to the State and Danish subjects, besides the several receipts that always naturally flow from such transit trade". The transit trade was maintained by the Government requirement that ships under the Danish flag, irrespective of their real nationality, should discharge and sell their cargo at Copenhagen. But this traditional policy of the Government was altered in response to the demand of the Copenhagen traders during the Revolutionary War as the entire private Danish Asiatic trade was threatened by imports through Hamburg.

The continuation of private trade under the Danish flag, however, depended on the conflict between the East India Company and the private British and Anglo-Indian commercial interests rather than on the concessions which could be granted by the Danish Government. With the opening of private shipping between India and Britain, and the amendment of British customs legislation in the closing years of the eighteenth century, "the entire basis for clandestine British and Anglo-Indian trade was removed", and the foundation laid for realising "Dundas' great plan of leading India's exports to Europe into the Thames". Though clandestine British and Anglo-Indian trade had again come to the fore later for a short while due to a stiffer British policy towards private shipping, the

end was in sight. While the Asiatic Company's trade had undermined its finances, it was the drying up of finance that was primarily responsible for the "galloping decline" of private India trade under the Danish flag.

This bare summary fails to do justice to a very painstaking detective effort which seeks to penetrate the camouflage of the Danish flag for each expedition. The "unmaskings", as is obvious from the nature of the case, have often to rely on 'circumstantial evidence', but they are convincing. The author has offered a huge mass of evidence in support of his main theses that "important aspects of the Asiatic Company's Indian trade can be interpreted only in the light of special Anglo-Indian market conditions" and that "fluctuations in private India trade must be mainly explained as consequences of developments within" the "internal conflict of interest between the East India Company and the private financial activity of that Company's servants and the growing English and Anglo-Indian free trade interests" on which, "in all essentials", it was based. To one, who, like the reviewer, would receive his initiation into the mysteries of eighteenth century trade through this book, the wealth of detail — in the accounts of fortunes made and lost by Copenhagen traders and employees of the Asiatic Company, of the feverish, speculative activity during the climax of remittance-financing, of 'the booms and bursts' in the Copenhagen market, the frantic bids to preserve access to the remittance market in order to maintain private India trade — would indeed be fascinating. The reviewer, however, feels that the wealth of information could have been utilized to throw some more light, or at least, risk some conjectures, on two related problems — the division of risks and spoils between the British and Anglo-Indians on the one hand, and the Danes on the other, and the relative profitability of the alternative channels of remittance and illicit trade from India. The structure of the remittance

market can best be described as being marked by competition among the few on both sides, without any evidence of collusive behaviour. The sensitivity of the supply side to any change in the underlying conditions is striking. There was probably an equilibrating process at work, but the system was subject to so many shocks that it is difficult to say how far the actual rates of profitability moved in step. One also forms the impression that the suppliers had, on the whole, much greater staying power which they used to full advantage. The dependence of private Danish trade on Anglo-Indian suppliers was also a lever effectively employed to squeeze the margin of Danish participants.

In an appendix, the author has presented certain estimates of gross and net profit of the Asiatic Company's 'return cargo' based on the results of auctions in Copenhagen. The estimates, as the author himself concedes, must be taken with some reserve. He has in mind the hardly justifiable method of calculating the transport and allied costs at a flat rate of 25% of the purchase price, irrespective of the value of the cargo. The separate calculation of the profitability of the return cargo is a dubious procedure. The basic limitation is, however, absence of information about the accounting methods of the Asiatic Company which precludes any definite statement about profit rates.

SOME ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC LIFE IN PRE-MUTINY OUDH

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Agriculture :

The country was predominantly agricultural. The soil was fertile, and water available in almost all quarters for irrigation from the rivers and rivulets that coursed through the country from the Himalayas towards the Ganges. The peasantry understood tillage well and was capable of hard work. In fact, there was hardly an acre of land unfit for good cultivation. But the state of agriculture was not as it should have been under these conditions.¹ The principal crops raised in Oudh were rice, wheat, gram, pulses, oil-seeds, maize, millets, barley, poppy, sugar-cane and cotton but the yield per acre of each had greatly diminished,² the decline having commenced from Nawab Asaf-ud-Doula's reign (1775-1797). Under Shuja-ud-Doula Oudh was a surplus province in regard to agricultural production wearing an aspect of affluence beyond what prevailed in Bengal.^{2a} During the famine of 1770 Oudh supplied huge quantities of grain to the Company's Government in Bengal enabling it to carry on.³ The fall in the volume of agricultural production, a subsequent event in the annals of rural Oudh, is accounted for not only by "the ill-contrived and worse administered revenue system" of the country under Shuja-ud-Doula's successors but also by the diminution of its annual supply of rainfall — the result of ruthless destruction of the north-western forests without any thought to artificial planting.⁴

A striking feature of the agrarian life in

Oudh was that caste-prejudice determined cultivation of crops. What is implied is that certain crops could be raised by certain castes only. The Caste Hindu agriculturists did not cultivate poppy which engaged solely such low castes as Koeris, Kachis or Murais. The result was localisation of poppy-cultivation in the neighbourhood of Fyzabad where such castes were in a majority. Generally speaking, vast areas of land were under poppy-cultivation on the left bank of the Gomati but on the right bank only a bigha or two were sown with poppy in each village. The produce was partly consumed on the spot but chiefly sent to Lucknow, Fyzabad and Benares by retailers on bullocks in April and May, and on boats in June and July, though there was always the risk of its being plundered.⁵ For similar reasons potato-cultivation was not common in Oudh. It was grown only in the vicinity of Kanpur, Lucknow and Fyzabad by a few Kanjars for their own consumption and also for sale in the nearest British Cantonments. In the interior of Oudh potato and turnip were either unknown or, where known, their use was prohibited by the caste-prejudice of the people, particularly of the Brahmins and the Bachgoti Rajput zamindars.⁶

Sugar-cane was grown in small patches here and there between the river Sai and the Ganges but sugar was not manufactured in the south-western part of the country. Some amount of sugar was made at Rampur near Madanpur and at some other places near Fyzabad in the eastern districts of Oudh.⁷ Cotton fields were a familiar sight every-

where in Oudh and the crop was abundantly grown on the highlands along the Sai, Oudh cotton was worked up chiefly at Tanda, only a fraction of it being sent to the manufactories of Mau. Cleaned cotton sold at Rs. 10/- or Rs. 12/- per maund at Salon, and at Rs. 11/-, Rs. 12/- or Rs. 13/- per maund at Banswara. It appears that the bulk of raw cotton grown in Oudh in the early years of the 19th century was short of its requirements and this was why "huge quantity of cotton was brought on men's heads from the westward through the Cantonment of Sultanpur" three quarters of which came from Bundelkhand and the Doab.⁸ The Deccan cotton seems not to have formed an article of import to Oudh. The cotton sent from Jalaun, Hydernagar, Amravati, Nagpur and some other places in the Deccan to the Company's dominions only passed through Oudh paying a duty of 5 per cent to the Nawab "on the fixed valuation of six rupees per maund of ninety-six sicca weight to the seer".⁹

The agricultural implements were crude and simple. They and the prices at which they were available in the thirties of the 19th century are given below :

Implements	Prices
A plough	2 annas
An iron plough-share	8 "
A narrow hoe	8 "
A broad hoe	Re. 1/-
A plank for smoothening the ground	2 annas
A yoke for the plough	2 "
A leathern bag for drawing water	Rs. 1/8/-
A rope 25 or 30 cubits in length for drawing water from well	12 annas
A basket made of split bamboos for raising water from tanks	2 pices

Unlike in some other parts of India in those

days the peasantry in Oudh was not prejudiced against introduction and use of new agricultural implements but what prevented the use of such implements was their high prices.¹⁰ As for manuring the fields the agriculturists of Oudh had no knowledge of deep ploughing and scientific compost. The usual practice was to manure the fields in the month of June with horse or cow-dung and with the refuse of village households. But fields intended for wheat, barley and rice were manured in the same manner in November also. Familiar with the advantages accruing from the rotation of crops the tillers of the soil practised two rotations—one for high lands and another for low lands. High lands were cultivated with barley or wheat from the middle of October to the end of March and were allowed to remain fallow till the end of June when they were sown with Kodo and Arhar. These were harvested in March, fields lying fallow from then to the middle of October, to be re-sown with barley or wheat. For low lands the rotation practised was as follows :

- rice from the middle of June to the end of September;
- gram or linseed from the end of September to the end of March;
- fallow from then to the middle of June, and rice again.¹¹

As regards rice-cultivation both the methods — transplantation and broadcasting — were in use.

The Siul, Dhak (Palas) and other forests on which the villagers depended so much for grazing their horned cattle had been felled in order to meet the demand for fuel. The supply of fodder had diminished and the country's livestock had degenerated physically and numerically. In the south-western districts of Oudh the population increased

nearly ten times roughly between the years 1780 and 1830 but persons who once owned one hundred oxen and fifty buffaloes had about the year 1837 only four or five. The almost universal practice of seizing and carrying off cattle when their owners became defaulters of revenue was also responsible for this. The result was a sharp fall in the production of Ghee, the price of which rose up from 20 seers a rupee to 1½ seers.¹² Moreover, oxen and buffaloes in Oudh were "the only animals employed in agricultural labour". Their numerical deficiency caused hardship to the agricultural families and it was not unusual to see at the time of irrigation men and women working at the well-rope instead of cattle. It was only along the river Sai and near Fyzabad that there was some supply of fodder and the state of livestock there was better than in other districts. Possibly the bullocks reared in this part of the country were exported, among other places to Jaunpur where they sold at from Rs. 10/- to Rs. 20/- a pair. Buyers of bullocks came to Oudh from Bundelkhand also. The Oudhians reared more female buffaloes than male ones for the sake of milk. During the period from December to June when grass was scarce in parched fields they were fed with cotton-seeds softened in cold water — a nutritious and milk-giving article of fodder.¹³ Sheep and goats were bred in large numbers to cater to the needs of the surrounding provinces.¹⁴

Industrial Production:

The industries were on small scales and the principal manufactures were salt, soda, glass, glass-bracelets,¹⁵ cotton-cloths, blankets, dyes, paper, opium, saltpetre, gunpowder and arms. Salt, soda and saltpetre were abundant in the country's soil.

Salt was manufactured either by evaporating the water taken from saline wells numerous on the bank of the river Sai or by "lixiviation of earth containing both salt and

saltpetre, and subsequent separation of these two ingredients". Ateha, Behta and Pratapgarh were the chief salt manufacturing centres, where the Nuias paid an annual sum of Rs. 50/- to the zamindars for saline wells dug by them. Salt of inferior quality (i.e., salt containing moisture) was purchased only for the sheep at the rate of 3 maunds a rupee while that of superior variety was sold on the spot at 2 maunds a rupee. Salt of very fine quality when brought to Sultanpur fetched a value of one rupee a maund, whence it was carried off by merchants to Naiya Gunj Chinhat (8 miles east of Lucknow), the principal salt market of those days.¹⁶

Coarser variety of cotton cloth used by the poor was woven in almost every village but those of very fine texture were manufactured at Tanda and Jayis. At Jayis were manufactured very fine pieces of cloth for turbans costing Rs. 18/- a piece which were marketed chiefly to Lucknow. Rae Bareilly, once noted for its *Adhota* (the same as Adhati in Bengal) was in decay and had lost much of its pristine pre-eminence in this respect. Blankets of grey and black colour and of coarse texture were made by the shepherds in all parts of the country and were worn "by all castes even by Brahmins when at their meals".¹⁷ Generally a blanket measuring 8'-4" in length and about 6' in breadth was available at 10 or 12 annas.¹⁸

Dyeing was a thriving art and was practised at all large towns but the best dyers between Kanauj and Gorakhpur dwelt at Shahzadpur noted for brilliance and durability of its dyes. Huge quantities of cotton cloth came from far off places to Shahzadpur for dyeing.¹⁹

Paper was manufactured at Bahraich and Lucknow but the product was much inferior to that imported from Kalpi.^{20a} Glass brace-

lets and bottles were made in the western part of the country where soda was in plenty.¹⁹ Soda was collected "by scraping off the white efflorescence known by its alkaline taste" formed on the surface of the soil and "by subsequent lixiviation, decantation and evaporation".²⁰ Soap was manufactured from a special kind of soil called Reha in Oudh (Saji Mati in Bengal) "by the addition of lime, fat and linseed oil...."²¹

Indigo of inferior quality was manufactured on a small scale near the British frontier and was commercially called "Oudh Indigo". Absence of Indigo Planters in the country's interior was a striking feature. At Sathini, five miles north-west of Daundia-khera, an Indigo factory had been erected by an European planter but fifteen years of toil could not make it a flourishing concern and it was abandoned.²²

Opium manufactured in Oudh was a potential source of public revenue but the product was of an inferior quality having been "thin, dark-coloured, fermented and not unfrequently adulterated".²³ This was because methods of poppy-cultivation and opium-manufacture were in the hands of the unenlightened common gardeners of Oudh. As opium-eaters were as common in Lucknow as in China,²⁴ a considerable part of Oudh opium must have been locally consumed but what remained was procured by the agencies established along the Oudh frontier by the Government of India.²⁵

Saltpetre had an extensive market in Oudh throughout the period under review, and the trade was so lucrative that in the days of Shuja-ud-Doula American traders clandestinely dealt in it having trespassed into his territories.²⁶ It was required in huge quantities by the Government for coercing the refractory zamindars and by the zamindars to defy the Government. The principal manu-

facturing centres of the same were at Banswara, Salon, Pratapgarh and Banaudha where it was farmed by Ijaradars who having stationed their agents there procured it at a fixed price. The article thus obtained at all seasons of the year was sent to Lucknow where it was used for making gunpowder. Agai (a place near Pratapgarh) was also a seat of saltpetre-manufacture but it was not farmed there, and was sold by the Nuniyas direct to the local zamindars in the form of Sora at Rs. 2/- or Rs. 3/- a maund. Having refined this article the zamindars employed "it in the local manufacture of gunpowder solely, none being sent to Lucknow".²⁷

As a result of long continued misrule and anarchy in Oudh arms of all descriptions were much in demand for protection of life and property. Manufacture of matchlocks, blunderbusses, swords, spears, bows and arrows gave employment to many and the chief seats of manufacture were Alipur, Dobhiyar, Pithla, Marsan, Rae-Bareli and Lucknow. Manufacture of firearms, cannon, muskets, bayonets, and shells by the Government seems to have been stopped in Oudh about 1849 A.D. which then formed items of export from the British territories.^{27a} But this was not the case in Oudh under Shuja-ud-Doula. His Ordnance factory at Fyzabad produced very fine pieces of cannon and field-carriages particularly after the battle of Buxar when at least for some time he had directed his resources towards increasing his military strength.²⁸ It may be mentioned here that the Engineer of the Ordnance factory at Fyzabad was a Frenchman with two Bengali gun-manufacturers who had "the direction in casting his guns" and who were considered more efficient than the local artificers.²⁹ Another industry which has not been evidenced but which in all probability existed is the manufacture of ice for the local people and the Europeans in Oudh to whom, as Hodges pointed out, the dust and heat in the dry season were intolerable.³⁰

Coinage and Currency:

The country's inland trade was subject to various impediments such as want of uniformity in weights and measures, diversity of coins and their debasement, absence of good roads and bridges, and insecure state of the riverways.

Copper coin called Madhushahi Pice weighing 270 grains was the unit of weight throughout Oudh. There were two weights — Pakka and Kachcha. The Pakka seer weighed 64 standard Madhushahi Pices while the Kachcha varied in weight from 19 to 40 pices in different parts of the country and was useless "except as a means of cheating foreigners such as Europeans and the Musalman Sipahis of the King".³¹ Between Salon and Manikpur the only weight in use in the thirties of the 19th century had its seer equivalent to 56 Madhushahi Pices. Another concomitant evil was that the dealers used one weight when purchasing from the producers and another while selling to the consumers.³²

As for silver coins, a great variety of them were current in Oudh in the late 18th century. They were Lucknow, Fyzabad, Malihabad, Dariabad, Kora, Farrukhabad, Etawa, Bareli, Bungalow, Recavi, Hawely and Waziri Siccas sharply differing from one another in their intrinsic value.³³ This was because coinage of money was not the exclusive business of the Government. There were several mints in the country which were farmed by the Government at exorbitant rates. Re-farming of mints was also the practice. In the days of Asaf-ud-Doula Lucknow mint was in farm to Bhawani Singh at Rs. 22000/- who had re-farmed it to another person at Rs. 8000/- who again had sub-let it to a person for a further emolument of Rs. 8000/-. The farmer of the mint at Kora had re-farmed it at the most exorbitant rate causing much debasement of the coins.³⁴ The multiplicity of coins varying in their silver contents had given rise to a class of professionals called shroffs or money

changers who earned large sums "by their knowledge of the exchange which in India is in a state of constant fluctuation to the great injury of the poor and the industrious" (Hodges, p. 103). But the rate of exchange was fixed not so much by the intrinsic value of each variety of coins but by its being the currency of any particular place; as for example, Farrukhabad Rupee when in Lucknow was considered nearly 2 per cent worse than the Lucknow Sicca but the same when in Farrukhabad was adjudged 2 per cent better than the Lucknow currency. At Etawa it fell to its old standard and the local coinage "rose in value over the Oudh Sicca".³⁵ Some change is noticeable in this respect in the early 19th century when we find only four varieties of silver coins in circulation in Oudh, namely, the Lucknow Sicca, the Company's Sicca, the Farrukhabad Sicca and the Shershahi Rupee. In point of silver contents the Lucknow Sicca was slightly superior to the Company's Sicca but " $\frac{1}{2}$ pice worse than the Farrukhabad rupee....". The Shershahi rupee (coined at Fyzabad) was considered one pice inferior to the Company's rupee. All coins when lighter than their standard weight and all rupees of previous reigns even when of full weight bore discount. Thus, King Ghazi-ud-Din Haider's (1814-1827) Sicca passed at a discount of 7 Damries and that coined in Saadat Ali Khan's regime (1798-1814) at a discount of 6 Dams^{35a} in the thirties of the 19th century.³⁶

Transport:

In a country like Oudh intersected by rivers, torrents and ravines there were neither metalled roads nor an adequate number of bridges. The only one in existence linking Lucknow and Kanpur was a military road "so awfully bad" that travellers moving in carriages were "most uncomfortably shaken" and covered with dust.³⁷ Across the river Sai there was not a single bridge. There were only two bridges in Oudh in the early 19th century — one at Mohaun on the Lucknow-

Kanpur Road and another south of Tanda. A third bridge was under reconstruction across the river Tons at Shah Gunj by the local zamindar for his personal convenience.³⁸ The paucity of means of communication was a result of the Government's apathy towards promotion of trade and works of public utility which had been left solely to private enterprise.³⁹

The Ganges, the Gogra, the Sai and the Gomati were all navigable "throughout their respective courses within the Oudh territory"⁴⁰, but owing to turbulence of the zamindars and unauthorized taxes levied by them on merchant boats plying the rivers (in direct violation of the treaty of 1788), the last three had been abandoned as means of transport. Even on the Ganges few boatmen frequented the Oudh bank for fear of being plundered. Hackeries were therefore the dependable means of transport specially in Banswara and Sultanpur districts. But where they were not available as in Salon and at places inland from Medini Gunj, commercial traffic was not carried farther than 8 miles and everything was conveyed on bullocks and buffaloes. Articles imported from Benares were not sent direct to Lucknow but through "the safer though circuitous route of Allahabad and Kanpur".⁴¹ The obstacles thus put to the country's internal trade had led to the decay of almost all useful arts and crafts "except the indispensable occupations of the agriculturist and weaver" and the plough outnumbered the loom in proportion of a hundred to one.⁴²

Banking:

Although there was not an efficient system of Police and crimes were often committed with impunity, there seems to have been not much outflow of capital from the country.⁴³ It is true that Rae Bareilly had about A.D. 1837 only three or four bankers with a capital not exceeding Rs. 20,000/-; others having migrated to such safer places

as Lucknow, Kanpur, Farrukhabad and Benares; but in other districts the number of bankers was not small. In the district of Banswara there were nearly two hundred bankers possessed of large capitals, and in Fyzabad district each village had a banker. At Medini Gunj in the southern part of Oudh dwelt some of the wealthiest and most enterprising banker-cum-merchants who had their agents at Calcutta, Mirzapur and other commercial towns. The Oudh bankers were also dealers in cotton, cloth, and grain. They financed trade as well as employed their capital in advancing loans to the needy zamindars.⁴⁴ The noticeable thing about Banking in Oudh was participation by the Brahmins who had been able to relax their caste rules regarding choice of professions to some extent. There were money-lenders, merchants and cultivators⁴⁵ among the Brahmins in Oudh, but the Rajputs were precluded "by the rules of their caste from touching scales and weights".⁴⁶

Trade and Commerce

Apart from the daily sale and purchase of commodities in every town and large village, and movement of the itinerant merchants from place to place with bullocks laden with grain, salt and jaggery, fairs connected or unconnected with religious festivals drew a large number of traders both indigenous and foreign from Nepal, Gorakhpur, Azamgarh, Jaunpur and Bundelkhand. The merchants from outside Oudh came in bodies of 250 or 300 well-armed men and did not enter the territory until they crossed the Ganges at Surajpur.⁴⁶

The articles imported into Oudh were matchlocks from Lahore, swords from Gujarat, Jodhpur and Sirohi, shields from Sylhet, horn-bows from the Doab, reeds from Calcutta, iron, lead, copper and brass from Sagaur, Nepal and Kumaun. Steeds much superior to the local breed came from the Punjab, Kabul and Bukhara, and ponies from

the sub-Himalayan region. Elephants were brought from Nepal, Tripura and Chittagong and Hariana bullocks from the Punjab. A few luxuries such as shawls from Kashmir and the Punjab, silks, satins and broad cloth from Mau, Benares and Britain, corals and pearls from Calcutta and Bundelkhand, guns and watches from England, and rock-salt from the Punjab (preferred by the Brahmins

to the common salt for fear of losing their caste) constituted important items of import.⁴⁷ Some other articles like betelnut, nutmegs, tobacco, tea, medicines, cutlery, clocks and large looking glasses were in demand. Whether these too were imported is not known, though evidence of an attempt to smuggle them from Bengal in 1768 is available.⁴⁸

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16. Butter, pp. 72-74.
17. Ibid, p. 80.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
- 19a. Ibid, p. 81.
- 19b. Ibid.
20. Ibid, pp. 74-75.
21. Sleeman, Vol. I, pp. 191-92. According to Dr. Butter, soap was not manufactured in the southern districts of Oudh where animal fat was scarce.
22. Butter, p. 82.
23. Ibid, pp. 59-60.
24. A Personal Narrative of the Siege of Lucknow by Rees quoted in *Eighteen Fiftyseven* by S. M. Sen, p. 178.
25. Butter, p. 59.
26. Bengal Select Committee Proceedings, 1768, p. 39.
27. Butter, pp. 76-77.
- 27a. Ibid, pp. 78-70. Also vide Sleeman, Vol. II, p. 9.
28. Bengal Select Committee Procdgs, 1768, p. 363.
29. Ibid, pp. 365-67.
30. Hodges, pp. 100-01.
32. Butter, pp. 82-83.
32. Foreign Secret Procdgs., the 1st February, 1776, pp. 327-29. We have a statistical account of this practice in the zamindari of Benares and Ghazipur in 1775-76. It may be mentioned here that the same commercial usage called Dhalta is continuing in the Birbhum district of West Bengal even today.
33. Foreign Secret Consultation, No. 1., 26th August, 1776.
34. Ibid.
35. Foreign Secret Consultation, No. 1, 29th July, 1776.
- 35a. One Damri was equal to three Dams. Twenty Damris made an Anna. Sixteen Annas were equal to one rupee. Vide, Butter, p. 83.
36. Butter, p. 84.
37. Up the Country by Emily Eden, Vol. I, p. 89.
38. Butter, p. 85.
39. Notes on the Caste, Tribe and Races inhabiting the Province of Avadh by P. Carnegy, pp. 73-75.
40. Essays on the Indian Army and Oude by Sir Henry Lawrence, p. 285.
41. Butter, p. 87.
42. Ibid, p. 85.
43. Payment of prodigious sums as subsidies to the Company's Government was no doubt a drain on the country's resources but it stopped with the cession of a part of Oudh to the Company in November, 1801. Thereafter money began to pour into Oudh through diverse channels which have been enumerated by Sleeman. A very important source of financial gain to the country was the existence of a number of places of pilgrimage which were visited by the Hindu pilgrims from outside whose expenditures on food and other necessary items "during their transit and residence" fructified in the pockets of the local people. Vide, A Journey Through the Kingdom of Oude in 1849-50 by Col. Sleeman, Vol. II, pp. 8-9.
44. Butter, p. 86.
- 44a. They did not cultivate the land with their own hands but employed the Ahirs and the Kurmis for tillage.
45. Ibid, pp. 86-87.
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47. Ibid, p. 95. Also Vide, Sleeman, Vol. II, pp. 8-9.
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THE REGISTRAR IN THE EARLY BRITISH JUDICIARY OF BENGAL

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"Necessity compelled us to form some establishment of justice; we chose the best we could. . . ." — wrote Warren Hastings to Josias Dupre on 6 January 1773.¹ The establishment of British political authority in Bengal was inextricably associated with the question of law and order. So the British had to work for a judicial system on the British pattern so as to suit their administrative needs. The process, thus started, saw the emergence of new elements and personnel like the Registrar in the judiciary of this country.

The first Judicial Scheme of the Company on 15 August 1772 introduced the system of transmission of abstract registers by the judges of different Courts in Bengal. The system was maintained in practice, but nothing was done to appoint any special officer for the purpose.

The need of such an officer, however, found clear expression in an Act of Parliament passed in 1781. This Act was entitled "an Act for establishing certain Regulations for the better management of the affairs of the East India Company as relates to the administration of justice in Bengal". The 11th clause of the Act laid down that the names of all Indians who, as employees of the East Company, were under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, were to be entered in books alphabetically disposed, distinguishing each district or districts in which they were employed.

An officer was obviously needed to take charge of the registers of persons mentioned in the above Act. This had been felt earlier by Impey, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who proposed several regulations which received the assent of the Governor-General and Council on 3 November 1780.² These regulations were subsequently incorporated with additions and amendments into a revised code adopted by the Governor-General and Council on 5 July 1781. In accordance with this code, a Registrar was appointed to each of the Provincial Courts. It was the Registrar's duty to summon all persons noted by the Act of Parliament and take down their names, residence and employment. He was to preserve two books for the purpose. This act of registration was thus to check the delinquencies of the Company's servants and of others who obstructed the flow of justice. The Registrar was also assigned an active role in the judicial procedure. In case of appeal from the Provincial Courts the judges of these Courts were to send copies of all proceedings, rules etc., duly attested by the Registrar or clerk of the Court, to the *Sadar Dewani Adalat*. When a Decree had been passed in a cause in the Provincial *Dewani Adalat*, copies of papers concerning the cause were to be sent to the *Sadar Dewani Adalat* only after an endorsement of the same by the Registrar. Any rule of practice, framed by the *Sadar Dewani Adalat*, also was to be transmitted to the Supreme Council witnessed by the Judge and

signed by the Registrar of the Court concerned. In the absence of the Judge of the *Sadar Dewani Adalat*, the Registrar was empowered to make reasonable adjustments. The Registrar was to be appointed by the Judge of the *Sadar Dewani Adalat* only with the assent of the Governor-General and Council. The Registrar of the *Sadar Dewani Adalat* was empowered also to swear and examine the witnesses, take their depositions in writing and procure the same, to be signed by the respective witnesses and attest the same by his signature. The first Registrar to the *Sadar Dewani Adalat* was William Johnson. He was appointed to the post in the Supreme Court with a salary of Sicca Rs. 1000/- per month.

The office of the Registrar was thus introduced in the judiciary of Bengal. The Governor-General's Minute on 2 March 1784 further clarified his duties.³ The 3rd clause laid down that the Registrar was to prepare a book containing copies of letters, applications etc. in the *Sadar Dewani Adalat*. The 4th clause enumerated that he was to report to the *Sadar Dewani Adalat* monthly the receipt of abstract registers of the proceedings in mofussil Courts. According to the 5th clause, he was to report to the *Sadar Dewani Adalat* all causes of appeal. The 8th clause laid down that the Registrar was to report to the *Sadar Dewani Adalat* all the proceedings of mofussil *Dewani* Courts together with an abstract of the same against the Zemindars, Talukdars, Chowdries or landholders for contempt. The 9th clause directed the Registrar to record all additional regulations, orders or rules framed or approved by the *Sadar Dewani Adalat* and to transmit the same in cases concerning the mofussil Courts. According to the 13th clause, he was also to receive the deposits. The 14th clause laid down that he was to maintain an account of all sums of money, received from mofussil *Dewani* Courts or *Sadar Dewani Adalat*, on account of deposits and place the same every

six months before the Governor-General-in-Council. According to the 15th clause, he was to make the report, directed to be made previously by the Judge of the *Sadar Dewani Adalat*.

The Judicial Scheme of 27 June, 1787 contained elaborate provisions on the institution of Registrar. The Registrar, like other Indian Officers in the Courts, was to take the following oath in open Court before the Judge; "I will truly and faithfully perform the office of Registrar of this Court, according to the best of my knowledge and ability and I will not receive, directly or indirectly, any present or Nuzzer, either in money or in effects of any kind, from any party in my cause or from any person whatsoever on account of any suit to be instituted. . . ." The Registrar was to assist the Judge in every mofussil *Dewani* Court by translating into Persian all the papers which the Judge required. The Judge was authorised to empower the Registrar to hear and receive evidence in any cause and to pass sentence in causes where the value contested did not exceed the sum of Rs. 200/- or if the suit was for land, when the Government rent thereof would not exceed Rs. 200/- per annum when *malguzary* or *lakheraj* where the annual produce did not exceed Rs. 20/- or if a *Ajma* paying a quit rent to Government, where such revenue would not exceed Rs. 10/- per annum. All such acts were to be performed in open court on extra days and such decrees were to be signed by the Registrar and countersigned by the Judge as a mark of his approbation. The Registrar in mofussil Courts were to receive copies of rules and orders, framed by the *Sadar Dewani Adalat*, mark such copies with the day of the month and file the same to be recorded. A separate book was to be maintained by the Registrar for this purpose.

The Registrar was thus allotted a definite role in the judicial procedure. In all cases where the defendant would refuse or neglect

to rejoin at the time appointed for that purpose, the Registrar of the Court would enter a rejoinder for him, and the cause would be proceeded with as if the defendant himself had rejoined. The Judges of the mofussil Courts were made liable to suspension for disobedience to the Registrar of the *Sadar Dewani Adalat*. The Registrar of the *Sadar Dewani Adalat* might also examine witnesses by order of the Court, who might proceed in the manner prescribed for the mofussil Courts.⁵

While the Registrars were thus appointed in the *Dewani* Courts, arrangements were also made for their appointment in the *Faujdari* Courts. On 3 December 1790 an officer with the designation of "Registrar to the Nizamat Adalat" was appointed to conduct executive business of the Adalat. On the submission of a case by the Court of Circuit, he was to consult with the Qazi and Mufti and place the case before the *Nizamat Adalat*. Each of the four Courts of Circuit also was to appoint a Registrar to conduct executive business of the *Adalat*.⁶ For the smooth course of prosecution in cases of murder, it was decided on 8 April 1791 that in case of the death or absence of the prosecutor, the Registrar to the Court of Circuit was to carry on the prosecution on behalf of the Government.⁷

The Registrars thus were allotted a definite role in the judiciary of Bengal and the Government had to consider their rate of remuneration. As early as 26 March 1782 the Supreme Council asked J. Duncan, Preparer of Reports, to prepare a general and uniform establishment of fees for the mofussil *Dewani Adalats*. The Judge of Bhagalpore, however, opposed any fee to the Registrar. The districts of Chittra, Bhagalpore, Rungpore and Islamabad were too poor and too thinly populated to bear the cost of high remuneration to the Registrars. Accordingly the Preparer

of Reports framed the following table of fees for the office of Registrar in District courts:⁸

The Registrar : For registering every petition or answer at the commencement of every suit and for the enrolment of every decree to be paid by the party in whose favour the same was made, where the

cause of action exceeded Rs. 20/- and not Rs. 50/- = 8 as.

In causes not exceeding Rs. 100/- = 10 as.

In causes exceeding Rs. 100/- and not exceeding Rs. 3000/- = an addition of 2 as. on each hundred.

In every cause exceeding Rs. 3000/-

= Rs. 5/-.

For every order, summons or process whatsoever to parties or witnesses where the cause of action exceeded Rs. 50/- and did not exceed Rs. 100/- = 2 as.

In causes not exceeding Rs. 500/- = 3 as.

In causes exceeding Rs. 500/- and not exceeding Rs. 3000/- = an addition of 1 anna on every five hundred rupees.

In every cause exceeding Rs. 3000/- = 10 as.

For making copies of every petition or answer of every exhibit and every deposition and of every deposition and of every paper rule, matter or proceeding, for entering and filing every security where required at the commencement of any suit or for appearance —

For registering every *Vakilautnamah* and for every search in the office where the cause of action exceeded Rs. 100/- and not Rs. 500/- = 2 as.

For registering...etc. in causes not exceeding Rs. 1000/- = 3 as.

For registering...etc. in causes exceeding Rs. 1000/- and not exceeding Rs. 3000/- = an addition of one anna on every Rs. 1000/-; and in every cause exceeding Rs. 3000/- = 8 as.

For registering every 'Durkquest' or petition of appeal = 2 as.

For serving or executing every order, summons or process whatsoever in causes appealed to levied from the party in whose favour the decree was made = 4 as.

Four annas out of every rupee received by the Registrar, by virtue of the foregoing fees, were to be paid to and divided among the Indian officers in proportion fixed at the discretion of the Judge of the Court.

The above table of fees was approved by the Supreme Council. The Courts at Rangpur, Islamabad and Chittra, however, were excluded from the table and no fees were allotted to the Registrar or Indian officers of these courts. For, the Supreme Council was of opinion that the Registrars of those courts, being at the same time assistants to the judges in their separate capacities of Collectors of the Revenue, their allowances must be made equal, if not superior, to those of any of the Registrars including the fees which they were to collect.⁹

Further additions were made to the above table of fees in causes of higher value.¹⁰ These additions also included fees to the Registrar.

The Registrar :

1. For registering every petition of Appeal or answer where the cause of action did not exceed Sicca Rs. 5000 = Rs. 5/-.
2. When it exceeded Sic. Rs. 5000/- = Rs. 10/-.
3. For registering any other petition = Rs. 2/-.
4. For every summons or process etc. to parties or witnesses in causes not exceeding Sic. Rs. 5000/- = Rs. 3/-.
5. The above exceeding Sic. Rs. 5000/- = Rs. 5/-.
6. For the enrolment of every decree to be

paid by the party in whose favour the same was made in cause of action not exceeding Sic. Rs. 5000 = Rs. 5/-.

7. Where the above exceeded Sic. Rs. 5000/- = Rs. 10/-.
8. For making copies of every petition, exhibit etc. where the cause of action did not exceed Sic. Rs. 5000/- = Re. 1/-.
9. Where the above exceeded Sic. Rs. 5000/- = Rs. 2/-.
10. For filing every security or for registering every *Vakilautnamah* etc. = Re. 1/-.
11. A fee of 10 per cent upon the Deposit fee was to be received on all original suits or appeals.

Assistants to the Registrar :

1. For calling every cause where the sum did not exceed Sic. Rs. 5000/- = Re. 1/-.
2. Where the above exceeded Sic. Rs. 5000/- = Rs. 2/-.
3. For every copy of pleading matter etc. six annas out of every rupee received by the Registrar.

The office of the Registrar thus became a part and parcel of the judicial system in Bengal. The Registrar not only continued to send abstract registers to the Supreme Council but occasionally also made suggestions on the administration of justice. Thus on 17 October 1792 J. Fombelle, the Registrar to the *Nizamat Adalat*, requested the Supreme Council to adopt a rule for all cases of Homicide.¹¹ On another occasion he proposed that the monthly transmission of the report of prisoners should be discontinued and the magistrates were to transmit such report to the Registrar to the *Nizamat Adalat* within twenty days after the Judges of the Courts of Circuit had completed the business of each circuit. A form was also framed for the purpose. This regulation was expected to save the time and trouble of the magistrate. This proposed regulation of Mr. Fombelle was accepted and approved by the Supreme Council.¹²

In consideration of the growing importance of the institution of the Registrar, the Code of 1793 laid down provisions on the same. Under Regulation XIII, a Registrar was appointed to every Court. He could try cases up to Rs. 200/- only.¹³ The Registrars were appointed from the junior branch of the European servants. Under Reg. VI of 1793, the salary of the Registrar to the *Sadar Dewani Adalat* was fixed at Rs. 40,000 per year. His assistant was allotted a salary of Rs. 6000/- per year. Reg. XIII laid down in details the powers and responsibilities of the Registrars in the judicial system. The Registrars could try cases on *malguzary* land, the annual produce of which did not exceed 200 Sicca rupees in value. Similarly they were empowered to try and decide suits for *lakheraj* lands the produce of which did not exceed 20 Sicca rupees per annum. While thus authorising the Registrar to try suits, Reg. XIII directed that the decrees passed by him could be effective only when the Judge countersigned the same.¹⁴ This restriction consequently defeated the purpose of

the Regulation. So in 1794 the Supreme Council had to decide that the Registrars to the District and City Courts were to sit thrice a week for the trial of cases referable to them. Their decrees would be final in suits of personal property amounting to Rs. 25/- only. In all other suits too, unless appealed against within a limited time, their decrees would be final.

From the above it appears that the institution of Registrar took several years to make way into the British Indian judicial system in its formative period. The Registrars were at first needed not only to maintain registers of the details of the Indian employees of the Company, but also to help the transmission of abstract registers from different Courts to the Supreme Council. What was more, they saved the time and trouble of the District and City Judges from being occupied with the trial of petty suits and thereby enabled those Judges to determine causes of magnitude with greater expedition.

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3. *Ibid.*, 2 March, 1784.
4. *Ibid.*, 27 June, 1787.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*, Rev-Jud. Dept., 3 Dec., 1790.
7. *Ibid.*, 8 April, 1791.
8. *Ibid.*, Rev. Dept., 10 Sept., 1782.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*, 17 Dec., 1784.
11. *Ibid.*, Rev-Jud. Dept., 29 Oct., 1792.
12. *Ibid.*, 11 Jany., 1793.
13. Reg. XIII, 1793.
14. Jud. Letter to the Court of Directors, 29 Dec. 1794.

INSTITUTE OF HISTORICAL STUDIES

ANNUAL REPORT (1970-71)

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It gives me great pleasure to present to you the Annual Report of the Institute of Historical Studies for the year 1970-71. The pleasure is all the greater because the year 1970-71 completes the first decade of the life of the organisation and may, therefore, be regarded as an important landmark. When we started in 1961, it was with some amount of uncertainty that we looked ahead, not quite sure about the pace of progress we could make. Happily the most critical phase in the life of a new organisation is over, and we can now look forward to the future with confidence and assurance of strength. The first decade presented many hurdles in our way — official indifference, financial difficulties, accommodation problems etc. It redounds to the credit of our members, friends and well-wishers that we crossed all these hurdles with our determination and self-reliance. It is flattering indeed that an organisation started in 1961 could establish its position as one of the leading all-India academic organisations within one decade. To commemorate the completion of the first decade of the Institute's life, we propose to bring out a special illustrated brochure, giving the history and the activities of the organisation. Such a stock-taking at the end of each decade will give us incentive to work with more devotion and sincerity and achieve greater success in the next decade.

Membership

During the year under review the membership of the Institute recorded a slight fall.

Two factors were mainly responsible : first, the disturbed conditions in Calcutta and to a large extent in several other parts of the country; and second, the vagaries of floating members, who join one year to attend the Annual Conference but drop out in the following year. Perhaps, it is necessary to take some effective measures, like imposing an admission and re-admission fee or some other measures, to check the unfortunate trend of fluctuating membership, numbering about 50 or 60 every year. We should, at the same time redouble our efforts to enrol a substantially large number of new members in the coming year, so that the membership may record a steady increase in spite of the dropping out of 50 every year. In this we depend on the active co-operation of our members, and I appeal to each member to undertake the responsibility of enrolling at least one new member in 1971-72. We should aim at a total membership of 1000 in the next two years. In spite of the fluctuation in number, one happy thing is that the composition of our membership fully retains its all-India character. There is no State in India from where we do not have at least a few members.

Meetings

It is a matter of deep regret that not more than two Discussion Meetings could be arranged during the year under review. This was in sad contrast to our previous record, of holding at least six Discussion Meetings a year. Our failure to arrange more Discussion Meetings in 1970-71 was due : first, to the chronic disturbed conditions in the city which

made any advance planning impossible; and second, to lack of accommodation, the Meeting Room being diverted for office-work to meet the increased demand for office space. To remedy this unfortunate situation arising from lack of accommodation, we propose to shift to a new building from the year 1971-72, in a quieter part of Calcutta and with an accommodation which may meet our requirements for at least the next ten years. I can assure the members that after this shifting to new premises, we shall arrange Discussion Meetings as regularly as in the past, or perhaps more frequently.

New Fellows

The following new Fellows of the Institute were elected in 1970-71, under Article V of the Constitution :

1. Dr. P. M. Joshi, Professor of Medieval History, Deccan College and Post Graduate Institute, Poona.
2. Dr. A. R. Kulkarni, Professor and Head of the Department of History, University of Poona.
3. Dr. V. G. Dighe, History of Freedom Movement Unit, National Archives of India, New Delhi.
4. Dr. G. N. Sharma, Professor of History, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur.
5. Dr. B. K. Apte, Head of the Department of History, Nagpur University.
6. Dr. D. K. Ghosh, Professor and Head of the Department of History, University of Burdwan.
7. Dr. N. Subramanian, Professor of Ancient Indian History, Madurai University.

8. Dr. K. Rajayyan, Professor of Modern History, Madurai University.
9. Dr. A. Krishnaswami, Professor and Head of the Department of History, Annamalai University.
10. Dr. V. N. Hari Rao, S. V. University, Tirupati.
11. Dr. V. N. Datta, Head of the Department of History, Kurukshetra University.
12. Dr. Shibnarayan Ray, Head of the Department of Indian Studies, University of Melbourne, Parkville-Victoria, Australia.

Annual Conference

The Eighth Annual Conference of the Institute was held at Jodhpur (Rajasthan), under the auspices of the University of Jodhpur, from 20th to 23rd October. The inaugural session was held on the 20th morning. Mr. V. V. John, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Jodhpur, welcomed the members and delegates as Chairman of the Reception Committee. Mr. Justice Bery of the Rajasthan High Court inaugurated the Conference. The Conference was presided over by the most distinguished historical scholar in Rajasthan, Dr. M. L. Sharma.

From the morning of 20th to the morning of 22nd October the Conference Programme was, presentation and discussion of papers. Two broad themes were adopted for the Papers : (i) Sources of the History of Rajasthan (Ancient, Medieval and Modern Periods) and (ii) History in Modern Indian Literature. On the first theme 10 papers were scheduled to be presented and on the second 17. Some of those who were to have presented papers could not actually attend the Conference, but their papers will be included in the Proceedings Volumes. The 20 papers actually

presented on the two themes were of a high standard and the discussions on them were most lively. The attendance at all the sessions was very good and most of those present evinced an active interest and took part in the discussions. This seriousness of purpose offered a pleasing contrast to what has now become very common at many of the all-India Conferences of this kind. Another striking feature of the attendance was that while the total number was not very large (in fact the Institute's Annual Conference is deliberately kept confined to only those who are serious about the subject), the members attending came from all parts of the country and the gathering was most representative and all-India in character.

On the whole the Eighth Annual Conference was a great success, in keeping with the tradition set at earlier Conferences. Most of the Universities had co-operated with us by sending delegates to the Conference and the Railway authorities had also granted fare concession to participants in the Conference. We take this opportunity to offer our thanks to Mr. V. V. John, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Jodhpur, Mr. Justice Bery of the Rajasthan High Court, Dr. M. L. Sharma, the President, Dr. Dasarath Sharma, the Local Secretary, and all his colleagues in the History Department, specially Dr. R. P. Vyas. We are also thankful to the writers of papers, to the rapporteurs and to all those who had taken part in the discussions.

Programme of Papers

THEME : SOURCES OF THE HISTORY OF RAJASTHAN

Papers by :

(Ancient Period)

- Dr. M. L. Sharma (Rajasthan Institute of Historical Research, Jaipur)
Dr. Dasarath Sharma (University of Jodhpur)

(Medieval Period)

- Dr. G. N. Sharma (University of Rajasthan, Jaipur)
Dr. V. S. Bhargava (Government College, Ajmer)
Dr. M. S. Ahluwalia (Punjabi University, Patiala)

(Modern Period)

- Dr. M. S. Jain (University of Rajasthan, Jaipur)
Dr. Sukumar Bhattacharyya (Jogamaya Devi College, Calcutta)
Dr. V. K. Vashistha (University of Rajasthan, Jaipur)

THEME : HISTORY IN MODERN INDIAN LITERATURE
Papers by :

Bengali Literature :

- Dr. Tarasankar Banerjee (Visva-Bharati University)
Dr. Kalyan Kumar Dasgupta (Calcutta University)

Hindi Literature :

- Dr. H. S. Srivastava (Gorakhpur University)
Dr. R. R. Bhatnagar (University of Saugor)

Punjabi Literature :

- Dr. Ganda Singh (Patiala)

Urdu Literature :

- Mrs. Zubaida Yaseen Ali Khan (Osmania University, Hyderabad)

Assamese Literature :

- Dr. S. N. Sarma (Gauhati University)

Oriya Literature :

- Principal S. N. Choudhury (Kendrapara College)

Marathi Literature :

- Mrs. M. P. Kamekar (University of Bombay)

Mr. N. H. Kulkarnee (National Archives, New Delhi)

Gujarati Literature :

Dr. V. K. Chavda (Baroda University)

Tamil Literature :

Dr. N. Subramanian (Madurai University)

Telegu Literature :

Dr. V. Yashoda Devi (S. V. University, Tirupati)

Kannada Literature :

Dr. K. R. Basavaraja (Karnatak University, Dharwar)

Malayalam Literature :

Mr. M. G. Sankara Narayanan (University of Calicut)

RAPORTEURS

Dr. (Mrs.) Uma Das Gupta (Jadavpur University)

Mr. Chittabrata Palit (Jadavpur University)

Dr. M. S. Ahluwalia (Punjabi University, Patiala)

Dr. V. K. Vashistha (University of Rajasthan, Jaipur)

Journal

The *Quarterly Review of Historical Studies* also maintained its steady record of progress, and all the four numbers of Vol X were brought out during the year under review. With the end of the year 1970-71 the *Quarterly Review* also completed Vol X of its publication. This is no small achievement when we consider the numerous difficulties, both financial and otherwise, which the journal had to face during the first decade of its publication. It is gratifying to note that our journal has established its position as the leading historical journal in India. Every endeavour is made to retain its high academic standard which has earned the appreciation

of history scholars not only in India but also abroad. The circulation figure of the journal maintained its steady yearly increase and if this trend continues we shall have to print more copies from 1971-72 than during the first decade of publication.

To commemorate the completion of the first decade of publication, it is proposed to bring out a special Index Volume, covering the contents of Volumes I to X.

The following numbers of the *Quarterly Review* had long gone out of print (and a few other numbers are also nearing that point): Vol. I (1961-62) nos. 1-4; Vol II (1962-63) no. 1; Vol. IV (1964-65) nos. 3 & Vol. VIII (1968-69) no. 1.

Orders for these numbers could not be met for the last few years, I am happy to report now that M/s. D. K. Agencies (461, Vivekanand Nagar, Delhi-7) have undertaken to reprint these out-of-print issues at their own cost on the basis of normal Royalty to the *Quarterly Review*. I am sure this arrangement will be welcomed by all who want to have complete sets of the *Quarterly Review* from Vol. I No. 1.

To meet the increased costs of paper, printing and postage it was decided to raise the Indian subscription rate from Rs. 15/- to Rs. 20/- from 1971-72. It may be hoped that this slight increase in the subscription rate will cover the annual deficit.

Library

The Institute's library specialises in historical journals and has most of the well-known historical journals of the world. Our collection compares favourably with that of any other library in India. Most of the journals we get in exchange, but some we have to subscribe. For lack of funds it was not possible to make any substantial addition to our collection of books. The additions in 1970-71

were mostly the volumes, not inconsiderable in number, which were sent for review or as gifts. One difficulty of building up a good library is lack of accommodation. But this difficulty will be removed when we shall shift to our new premises in 1971-72, where we shall have sufficient accommodation not only for proper stocking of our steadily growing collections but also for a fairly big reading room for the convenience of our members. We shall then be in a position to apply to the Government of India and the Government of West-Bengal for suitable annual library grants to enable us to develop our library into a big specialised reference library. In keeping with our all-India character we maintain our library services open to members all over the country. We send volumes by registered post to any place in India, provided the member concerned pays for the postal charges.

Research Service Bureau

The Research Service Bureau, whose main task is to help scholars, both Indian and foreign, with the services of research assistants for the collection of material in India, maintained its activity during the year under review, although on a very small scale. To make the Research Service Bureau more active and useful, additional funds are needed and unless the Government or the U.G.C. comes to our assistance, the Bureau cannot be activated in the way we would like.

Publications

It is a matter of regret that our publication programme did not progress according to plan. *The Sino-Indian Border Question* which was sent to the press during the year under review is not yet out. The delay is due mainly to difficulties in the press, which again are due to the chronic disturbed conditions in the city. Anyway, the work is nearly over and the volume will be out early in 1971-72. Two more volumes were also made ready for the press by the end of the year 1970-71: *Histo-*

rians and Historiography in Modern India and Historical Writings on the Indian Nationalist Movement. One difficulty about implementing our publication programme is lack of funds. When one volume comes out we have to wait for at least one year to realise the cost from the sale proceeds, and the next volume, although ready, cannot be sent to the press before the cost of the earlier volume is realised. It is necessary to have a revolving fund of at least Rs. 10,000/- to enable us to proceed with our publication programme with more regularity and promptitude.

In spite of the high academic quality of our publications, it is a matter of regret that our sales so far were not as good as we could have expected. I take this opportunity to appeal to our members to help our publication scheme by purchasing a copy of each publication (at 20% discount) and also by ordering for copies on behalf of their respective institutions.

Dictionary of National Biography Project

The Dictionary of National Biography Project made very good progress during the year under review. Biographical material on nearly 100 names added to the list in 1970 had been collected. Nearly all the biographical entries, on a little over 1300 names, had been received by the end of the year under review. Only a few entries were yet to come but we hope to receive these remaining entries also shortly. The volumes will be sent to the press in 1971-72. Vol. I will cover names from 'A' to 'D'; Vol. II from 'E' to 'L'; Vol. III from 'M' to 'R'; and Vol. IV from 'S' to 'Z'. Each volume will be of approximately 600-650 pages.

Biographical entries will be given in strict alphabetical order on an all-India basis. The alphabetical order under which the entries will be given will follow the surnames. But in some cases entries will go under names more popularly known. For the convenience

of readers there will be cross references to different versions of the names wherever necessary. At the end of each entry the name of the Contributor would be given as also, in a different type, the name of the Research Fellow who had collected the material. Each entry will also have a select bibliography. For the convenience of readers there will be given a separate alphabetical list of all the names given in each Volume and also an alphabetical list of the names of Contributors whose entries are published in that Volume. On the whole, our endeavour will be to help, in every way we can, those who may consult the DNB volumes.

The printing work has been entrusted to the Saraswati Press, Calcutta, one of the best presses in India, and every care will be taken to ensure the quality of production one would expect for a publication of this kind by the best international standard.

There is a sense of relief and pleasure when one comes to the end of a long journey, specially when there were many hurdles and the going was not that easy. The Project was undertaken eight years ago, in 1963-64. The first year was taken up by planning, setting up the necessary organisational machinery on an all-India basis, appointing and training Research Fellows in different States, drawing up tentative lists of names from different States to be included in the DNB, preparing guide-lines for collection of material and enlisting support and co-operation from Universities, newspapers, political parties, non-political associations and the Central and State Governments.

The next five years were taken up by collecting biographical material on the basis of an elaborate standard format. It was done by 16 Research Fellows in all the States and regions working under the supervision of the local University Professors. The Research Fellows evinced keen interest in their work,

with a sense of dedication of which we are really proud. We are also grateful to the University Professors who gave the necessary advice and guidance to the Research Fellows and also checked their work.

The last two years were taken up by writing actual biographical entries on the basis of the material collected by the Research Fellows. The task was entrusted to nearly 400 Contributors all over the country. In order to ensure uniformity of treatment, elaborate instructions were issued to the Contributors indicating length, style, arrangement of material, bibliography, etc. We are happy to note that the Contributors took their work with all seriousness and in many cases they undertook additional labour to collect supplementary material and to check up the material supplied. Of the 400 Contributors, nearly 300 are professional historians, drawn from all the major Universities in the country. It is most gratifying that we could secure the kind co-operation of all historians who have any professional standing. There is hardly any well-known historian who is not associated with the DNB Project. The remaining 100 Contributors are non-professionals. Most of them are men of eminence in public life, Union and State Cabinet Ministers, Governors, High Court Judges, Ambassadors, leading figures of all the Political Parties in the country, Vice-Chancellors, Journalists, Lawyers, Industrialists, Social reformers, Litterateurs, Scientists, etc. We are happy to note that these Contributors have fully justified their inclusion by bringing a freshness of approach and treatment which will enhance the value of the DNB.

From the detailed account given above it will be clear that the DNB Project has been completed in as short a time as one could expect for a Project of this magnitude. We do not want to appear boastful of our performance. But our love for modesty need not prevent us from feeling a legitimate sense

of gratification and pride that we have been able to complete such a gigantic Project within a much shorter time and at a much lesser cost than any other similar Project undertaken anywhere in India.

Finances

(i) General :

So far as the general finances of the Institute are concerned, the position is getting desperately worse every year with mounting deficits. The following figures will show the total deficit increased from year to year :

1962-63	111.27	1966-67	2,127.63
1963-64	586.98	1967-68	6,247.63
1964-65	1,405.10	1968-69	10,155.10
1965-66	2,584.67	1969-70	13,566.42
		1970-71	22,772.24

The financial position was gravely affected by the termination of Foundation Grants from 1968-69, amounting to Rs. 9,500/- a year. We had appealed in 1970-71 to the Ministry of Education, Government of India, to give us a recurring grant of Rs. 10,000/- to offset this loss. But unfortunately, the Government of India sanctioned a recurring grant of Rs. 5000/- only. We are happy, of course, at this first sanctioning of a recurring grant, which may be taken as a token of recognition by the Government of India of the services rendered by the Institute in the field of historical studies. We are thankful to the Government of India for such recognition. But at the same time the fact remains, as the Audit Report for 1970-71 will show, that even with the Government of India grant of Rs. 5,000/- there was a deficit of Rs. 9,210.82 in 1970-71 in the Institute's General Account.

It will be readily appreciated that a total accumulated deficit of Rs. 22,777.24 is a crushing burden for a young and small organisation. To maintain our activities as at present we have to take two steps :

- (1) To raise donations from members, industrialists and the general public to wipe off the accumulated deficit up to 31.3.71;
- (2) To get adequate funds for normal annual expenditure from 1971-72.

So far as the first step is concerned, we applied to the Income-Tax Commissioner for declaration of the Institute as a public charitable institution entitled to the benefit of Sections 11 and 80-G of the Income-Tax Act, 1961, under which all donations made to the Institute would be exempt from payment of income-tax. We hope to get the necessary Declaration Certificate shortly and that will facilitate securing donations from industrialists and the general public. I hope to get the kind and active co-operation of our members in securing such donations.

Regarding the second step, we have to appeal to the Government of India to increase the recurring grant from Rs. 5,000/- to Rs. 10,000/-. We have also to request the Government of West Bengal for a recurring grant of Rs. 5,000/-. In that way the normal annual deficit may be met from 1971-72.

At the last Annual General Meeting in September 1970 it was resolved to increase the membership fee from Rs. 20/- to Rs. 25/- from the year 1971-72. This little additional annual income will be used to offset the impact of increased cost of paper, postage, etc.

(ii) DNB Project :

During the year under review we had revised our DNB Project budget. The total from 1963-64 to 1971-72 amounts to Rs. 7,50,000/-. This includes Rs. 1,75,000/- as cost of publication. But there is every possibility, in the present market trend, of the publication cost going up. Out of the total estimated expenditure, we have so far received Rs. 6,01,184 (Asia Foundation—

Rs. 2,43,184; Government of India — Rs. 1,99,000/-; State Governments — Rs. 1,59,000/-). There is thus a deficit of Rs. 1,49,000/-. We are hoping to get at least a part of this amount by additional grants from the Government of India and State Governments and donations from industrialists and businessmen. But we are afraid, if these additional grants and donations do not come within two or three months, the publication of the DNB may be held up. The position is not desperate but at the same time it is one which causes anxiety.

Conclusion

Before concluding the Annual Report, on behalf of the Institute of Historical Studies, I offer our thanks to the Government of

India and the Governments of Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Mysore, Kerala, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Panjab, Haryana, Orissa, West Bengal, Tamilnadu, Himachal Pradesh and Jammu & Kashmir, for their kind financial assistance; and also to the Contributors who had offered us their helpful co-operation in the Dictionary of National Biography Project. I am also thankful to the press for giving publicity to our work. I also take this opportunity to thank the members of the Executive Committee and Editorial Advisory Committee and all the members and well-wishers of the Institute for their kind and active interest.

August 10, 1971
Calcutta.

S. P. SEN
Director

BOOK REVIEWS

Harper Encyclopedia of the Modern World, Edited by RICHARD B. MORRIS and GRAHAM W. IRWIN; Harper & Row, Publisher, 1970 : Price \$ 17.50; pp. 1271

In the era of ever expanding horizon of knowledge reference histories and aids have acquired a new significance. The '*shrinking world*' has thrown a new challenge to the educational concept and capability of mankind with a great urge for knowing the unknown in the civilized society. Heavy scholarly works have their own merits; but they are not an antithesis to concise, general learning. Hence, the importance of reference aids. '*Harper Encyclopedia*' is one of those few reference works which have a broad perspective of territorial and intellectual boundaries.

Though the starting point of the study of "the Modern World" (1760) is somewhat arbitrary, the volume makes a good attempt to diffuse knowledge of a variety of subjects and not simply general historical information. The '*Encyclopedia*' has been divided into two parts. Part I deals with "Basic Chronology" of political, military and diplomatic history by state, region and area. A "Topical Chronology" of social, economic and constitutional developments in the modern world and the history of science, thought and culture has been handled in Part II. It will be futile to expect details in such a volume, but one may find useful answers to many of his basic queries. It must be admitted that the section dealing with 'economic development and technology in an age of revolution' is unique in its approach and content.

A claim has been made that the present

work is "a world encyclopedia in a special sense". In the opinion of William H. McNeill "this new encyclopedia really takes on the world, and not simply its Western parts." But a careful reader will find that this claim is more apparent than real, especially in Part II dealing with topical chronology. The western bias is very much pronounced in the second part in general and in section entitled "Thought and Culture in an Age of Revolution" in particular. The reviewer holds that justice has not been done to East and South Asia and Africa in this section. What about great modern cultural and literary developments in India and China? Where is the description of eastern philosophy? Who can deny that Vivekananda, the great savant of the East, shook the western world by the renewed Vedantist philosophy? It may be conceded that these lapses are perhaps due to defects in the collection of necessary information. We are here concerned with facts rather than intentions. Notwithstanding the shortcomings which are unavoidable in a big reference work, the volume under review is remarkable for its planning, arrangement and style. It has introduced a new orientation in reference work design.

TARASANKAR BANERJEE

Elite Conflict in a Plural Society Twentieth Century Bengal.

By J. H. BROOMFIELD.
Oxford University Press, Bombay : Price Rs. 50.00; pp. 349.

Political movement in Bengal in the present century offers new ground for critical historical study. There are, however, few works dealing with this aspect of the history of Bengal. The volume under review is an

attempt to study 'institutional politics', particularly 'politics of the legislature' in Bengal, with particular reference to the attitude and approach of what the author calls the "bhadraloks". True, a historical analysis of the approach and attitude of a social group in the political structure of a linguistic region is an interesting theme. But to be fruitful and reliable such a study should be scientific, and not simply based on a confused connotation of a phraseology which is applied loosely in social status-relationship.

The introduction itself is divided in two parts. Part I deals with the position of the 'bhadralok' in the Bengal Society, and Part II handles the mutual response of the 'bhadraloks' and the British administrators. Who were these bhadraloks? Commonly speaking, they were respectable educated gentlemen. "The bhadralok as a group had gained a new sense of cultural identity from their nineteenth-century experience in adapting local traditions to the challenging demands of their rapidly changing society" (p. 11). This loose expression has been applied uniformly in the complex politico-sociological phenomenon of the period making the study confusing and at times erroneous. In the opinion of the author "the advantage in the use of the Bengali word 'bhadralok' is that it emphasises the attribute which was most important to the members of the group themselves: their social honour" (p. 13). The author has applied the term as an expression for a 'status group' after the pattern of Marx Weber. Is it really a scientific application of the term? The author's study reflects a vague generalization of the characteristics of the educated middle class men in Bengal based on peripheral information about them. The matter has been made more confusing by introducing Max Weber's distinction between 'open' and 'closed' group. Catchy titles and phrases do not necessarily enrich a scholarly work.

Though the title refers to the twentieth

century, the author's main concern is with the study of the period between 1912 and 1927 which witnessed crucial developments in Indian politics. The reunification of Bengal in 1912 ushered in a new era of politics in the province. The floor of the legislature became the battle-ground for conflicting political ideologies. The failure of the Moderates became apparent. Politics of violence and communalism created inner rift in Bengal and offered a new opportunity to the imperialist rulers to divide the people and attempt to perpetuate their stranglehold. The role of the British administrators in the whirlwind of politics assumed a great significance. All these have been discussed in seven chapters. The 'Epilogue' outlines the developments down to the partition of 1947. The 'Conclusion' summarises the story of the period together with the author's views. It is difficult to agree with the analysis regarding the emergence of communal politics and conflict between the Hindu and Muslim elite. The author writes: "It is a striking fact that throughout this period of almost half a century the Bengal Muslim politicians unflaggingly asserted their community's right to a separate political existence. The strategies of Muslim politics were not constant, the type of Muslim politician with influence varied, and the political system underwent radical changes. But this determination to maintain a distinct political identity was throughout the basic factor in Muslim thinking" (p. 326).

The scope of the review will not permit a detailed discussion of the causes for the emergence of communalism in politics; but it is necessary to observe that the Congress movement and the Muslim politics are not two parallel trends from the beginning. The main current of the nationalist movement under the leadership of the Congress was not an exclusively Hindu affair. However, it may be said that the political movement of the Muslim community was an offshoot of the main nationalist movement. The separatist move

ment was actually nurtured and protected by the imperialist rulers as that was the last means to maintain their hold. The author seems to be usually soft to the British when he concludes that "by their actions the British gave encouragement to the separatists" (p. 331). Separatism reproduced by the virus of communal politics was not simply incidental to British actions. It was the reflection of a cool, calculated and deep-rooted conspiracy of the British rulers; and the Hindu-Muslim elite at the height of their passion fell an easy prey to the vile imperialist game.

The author has taken pains to collect materials from government and non-government records and other materials. But he has somewhat neglected the speeches and writings of the persons who counted, though a few references of the works of B. C. Pal and some others may be found in the footnotes. It would have been helpful for the readers of such a work, if a select bibliography had been appended at the end.

It must be admitted that the author has attempted to break new ground with his study of the politics of a key British Indian province. The reviewer, however, remains unconvinced about the correctness of his methodology. He has indeed documented his study well and added charts and statistics to prove his point of view. But what has he communicated to the readers? It has been neither a Marxian analysis of the role of the educated middle class, nor a sociological examination of the role of caste, religion and group in the politics of Bengal. At best, it has described the social bases of an angular political action. Moreover, such a study remains incomplete if the developments of a particular region are not examined in the broader perspective of the Indian situation in general. The great merit of the work is that it will surely enthuse other researchers to make fresh enquiries along a new line.

TARASANKAR BANERJEE

Swami Dayanand By B. K. SINGH (N.B.T., India) pp. 136.

Sri Singh has brought out a popular biography of Swami Dayanand in the National Biography Series. The Book has been divided into nine chapters. The first three chapters bring out the early life and career of the Swami in the context of the general social and religious background of the country. Prof. Singh compares Dayanand with Buddha (pp. 13 & 15) but at p. 31 the author considers it safe to assume that 'Swami Dayanand got all that he wanted to know at the feet of the master'. The essential element of a comparison with Buddha (self-enlightenment) is missing. He has also made some sweeping generalisations. He calls West Asia as the epicentre of world politics in medieval times (p. 1); and contends that the Shudras formed the backbone of the Indian social structure (p. 5).

In the fourth chapter he has put Swamiji's task of reform in a proper perspective. In his zeal to make Dayanand argue with the traditional Pandits, he has put the Kumbha fair in 1866 at Hardwar (p. 34); again in 1869 at Prayag (p. 39) and again in April 1879 at Hardwar (p. 64). It is simply incorrect. Could the author not find other arguments for providing audience to Swamiji at these places? He is vague when he says that Dayanand's visit to Calcutta crystallized his views and then lists the various ideas of Dayanand (p. 44). Does he mean to suggest that all these were formed as a result of his visit to Calcutta? It is not correct to say that with the establishment of Arya Samaj at Bombay in 1875, the Arya Samaj movement gathered momentum all over North India (p. 52). It was only after its headquarters had been shifted to Lahore that the movement gained momentum and in fact it never made much headway in the Deccan. He calls Punjab, the citadel of Islam (p. 60); and considers the ten principles of Arya Samaj like the ten com-

mandments of Christianity from which 'the followers of the Samaj later drew their inspiration and strength'. (p. 62).

Chapter five contains a record of the places visited by Swamiji. The impression which is being conveyed is that his meetings were frequently disturbed which is not necessarily correct. Chapter six describes his visit to Rajputana and the seventh chapter describes his death. The eighth chapter brings out the emphasis on rationalism laid by Dayanand. The ninth chapter is particularly good since he has been able to bring out the contribution of Dayanand in instilling in the educated youths of the country a confidence and a craving for their rich heritage and pristine glory and thus saved them from falling an easy prey to the seductions of Western Culture (p. 120). He is right in saying that Dayanand's inspiration for the reform of Hindu Society came mostly from within (p. 121).

The book is readable; but does not create an impression of the work done by Swamiji. The narrative is rather uninspiring. Too many details of the places visited by Swamiji could have been avoided and some mention should have been made of his legacy in the building up of modern India, specially the contributions of the movement he had built up.

M. S. JAIN

The Aligarh Movement By PROFESSOR H. K. SHERWANI.

The brochure is the 2nd of the Sir Syed Memorial Lectures delivered by Professor H. K. Sherwani, an old student of the Muslim University, Aligarh. In the first lecture Professor Sherwani traces the background of the movement and then goes on to show the influence of the Aligarh Movement on Religion, Social Reform, Education and Politics. He concludes his 2nd lecture by saying that the Aligarh Movement ended when the ideal

of a self-governing All-India educational Institution of Sir Sayyid died with the acceptance of Government control over the proposed Muslim University.

Professor Sherwani is right in assuming that the Aligarh Movement was 'an all pervading movement' primarily 'for bettering the conditions of the Muslims' (p. 2). But he fails to show even a casual connection between Tipu's reforms, Ram Mohan's visit to Delhi and Sir Sayyid's movement; he contents himself by saying that Sayyid Ahmad 'must have realised' the failure of Tipu's measures or 'must have continued to meet' Ram Mohan. Professor Sherwani incorrectly argues that the foreign travel to England had a salutary effect on Ram Mohan's reforming psychology, for the simple reason that Ram Mohan's reforming zeal had begun much earlier than his journey to England.

Sayyid Ahmad's basic problem in religious reform was to re-interpret Islam and to prove it to be in accordance with Western scientific ideas. This was not the problem before the Wahabis. Nor did he agree with the Wahabi contention that India was a Dar-ul-Harb. Therefore, Professor Sherwani's contention that the Wahabi's tenets had a close resemblance with some of the basic principles laid down by Sayyid Ahmad (p. 5) may be true only in the sense that all reformers in Islam would have some similarities.

The motives which persuaded Sir Sayyid to undertake a visit to England were multifarious and, if it is to be judged by results, the outcome of the scheme of Muhammadan College of Aligarh was more important than any thing else. A man of Professor Sherwani's calibre should have been more careful to connect the discontinuation of Tehzib in 1876 with the beginning of Tafsir-ul-Quran in 1893 (p. 12).

Sir Sayyid's religious views were not taught

to the students of the Aligarh College who even did not know of the publication of *Tahzib-ul-akhlaq*. He himself was not a member of the committee entrusted with religious education. In the light of these facts Professor Sherwani's assertion can hardly carry conviction that Sayyid Ahmad's views about religious reform were the 'acme of the Aligarh Movement not only for...the extent of its influence but also for the permanence of its principles' (p. 16).

Professor Sherwani has failed to analyse the motives of Sayyid's speeches advocating co-operation of the Hindus with the Muhammadan college which could be found at p. 257 of *Safarnama-i-Punjab*. He is wrong in saying that the supporters of Hindi wanted to replace Urdu by Sanskritised Hindi (p. 23). He himself recognises that this was a move for a change of script only (p. 24). Professor Sherwani, it appears, did not care to go through Sayyid Ahmad's speeches opposing the National Congress; otherwise he would not have said that nothing in his speeches or writings shows that he had any antipathy against the Congress (p. 33). His assertion that politics was no part of the game might deceive those who do not have even a fragmentary knowledge of the Aligarh Movement. His attempt to whitewash Sir Sayyid's activities can hardly carry conviction. Sir Sayyid was undoubtedly a great leader but it is time that we dropped the habit to eulogise every action of Sir Sayyid and judge him in a correct perspective.

M. S. JAIN

Travels of Guru Nanak By DR. SURINDER SINGH KOHLI, Publication Bureau, Panjab University, Chandigarh, 1969. Price Rs. 15/-.

Guru Nanak's travels are better known as 'Udasis'. The author has described the travels of Guru Nanak calling them the first, the

second, the third and the fourth 'Udasis' or journeys. Before coming to the subject, he has given a brief account of Nanak's birth-place and his early life. In the first journey, the Guru visited Punjab, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Bengal, Assam, Orissa and the Madhya Pradesh. The second journey covered a wider range than the first, the Guru having visited Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh, Mysore, Madras, Ceylon, Kerala, Maharashtra and Gujarat. During his third journey the Guru visited Himachal Pradesh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, Tibet, China and Kashmir. The fourth journey was the longest when Nanak adventured, like many of his age, to visit Aden, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Palestine, Egypt, Sudan and Abyssinia, Syria, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran, Russo-Turkistan, Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier Province.

Dr. Kohli has given an account of the political conditions of the places in India and beyond but he has not thrown much light on the social and economic conditions of the people from the Guru's expressions and quotations. He has described these travels in two hundred pages, whereas the earlier writers like Shri Sewa Ram Singh, Shri S. Khazan Singh and Dr. Ganda Singh did better in a concise manner. However, it would have been a real service to the people had Dr. Kohli documented the account with comparative views of some of the Indian as well as foreign historians on this subject.

In the end the author has given six appendices bearing on the Legendary journey, which are very confusing for the students of this period of history. The bibliography given at the end shows that the author has not gone beyond the sources, to explore the subject, which had been tackled by more than a hundred writers. Being a man of literature, Dr. Kohli perhaps could not be expected to do more justice to a historical subject.

BAKSHISH SINGH NIJJAR

The Government and Politics of Tibet
By RAM RAHUL, Foreword by the Dalai Lama, Vikas Publications, Delhi, December, 1969 : Price Rs. 20/-.

Tibet remained secluded for centuries and hence the sources of information regarding the people and institutions in Tibet are limited. The Sino-Tibetan relationship since the middle of the 17th Century, when the Manchus came to power in China, was a kind of 'patronage relationship' between the Dalai Lamas and the Emperors of China. This was a relationship of religious leadership on one side and rather tenuous secular leadership on the other. Till the end of the 19th Century Tibet had her indigenous structure of government (1642-1895), with only two officials called Ambans representing the Emperor of China. In the early twentieth century, the Dalai Lama XIII declared de-facto independence of Tibet but neglected to secure for it international recognition. Tibet was to pay for this negligence 40 years later when she was forced to swallow the bitter-pill of the 17-point Agreement dictated by the People's Republic of China without any international intervention. Since the so-called liberation a new administration had been imposed by the Chinese on

what they call the TAR or Tibet Autonomous Region of China. But to understand and evaluate the later change it is necessary to know the earlier political and administrative system and that is what Dr. Rahul has attempted in the present work.

The author has neatly traced out the development of the dual administration, religious and secular, in what was essentially a theocratic state. It had an impact on the agrarian society and profoundly influenced social and economic institutions. The evolution of the political institutions like the Cabinet (Kasha), the Finance Department (Chanzo), and other executive and judicial bodies, essentially Tibetan and indigenous, has been carefully traced by the author. However, the power struggle between the Dalai Lamas and the Panchen Lamas leading to the formation of parties in Tibet has not been noticed adequately.

As the Bibliography shows, the author has devotedly collected data from all available sources and that has made his study comprehensive and authentic. The appreciation made by H. H. Dalai Lama in his Foreword has also enhanced the worth of the book.

S. K. PATHAK

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