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
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P. R. Dubhashi

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THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

A. K. S. Report on 'Formal and
Superstructure of Public Administration'

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Superstructure of Public Administration'

Prof. K. S. Vaid

THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

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THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The Indian Institute of Public Administration was established in March 1954 under the presidentship of Late Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India. The Institute has been recognized as the National Section for India of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences. Regional Branches of the Institute have been established in Andhra Pradesh; Gujarat; Kerala; Madhya Pradesh; Madras; Maharashtra; Mysore; Orissa; Pondicherry; Punjab; Haryana & Chandigarh; Rajasthan; and U.P.; and Local Branches at Ajmer, Baroda, Jammu-Srinagar, Nagpur, Patna, Poona, Shillong, Udaipur and Vallabh Vidyanagar.

The Institute's ordinary membership is open to all persons above 25 who are actively interested in or concerned with the study or practice of public administration, the annual subscription being Rs. 25. Associate membership, without the right to participate in the management of the Institute's affairs and with a membership fee of Rs. 12 per annum, is open to *bona fide* post-graduate students and persons below 25 but otherwise eligible. Corporate Members are admitted on such conditions as may be specified in each case.

The services offered by the Institute to its members include free supply of the Institute's journal and selected research publications, a reference and lending library, information and advice on administrative problems, and participation in the Institute's activities.

Andhra Regional Branch, I. I. P. A.,
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THE INDIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

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ADDRESS BY SHRI Y. B. CHAVAN, PRESIDENT OF THE INSTITUTE*

I AM very happy to be with you in this Annual Meeting of the General Body of the Indian Institute of Public Administration. As the President of this Institute for the last two years, I have noted the multifarious directions in which the activities of this Institute continue to grow. Fifteen years back, this organization was set up to provide a forum for exchange of ideas on various problems of public administration and to initiate meaningful discussions and purposive research. We find that these aspirations have been fulfilled to a large extent, if not completely. The IIPA has received recognition as a premier institution engaged in the pursuits of public administration not only at the national, but also at the international level. Our representatives have been intimately associated with the working of the Administrative Reforms Commission and with several international bodies. While this should be a matter of satisfaction to us, we cannot possibly rest on our oars. We have to continue to nurture these growth processes with sustained endeavour, so that in times to come, this institution becomes a more forceful nucleus of research and study in the field of public administration.

While an institute of this type necessarily employs many methodologies, it is beyond doubt that its primacy will be retained or relinquished on the basis of its research output. Our country is passing through a dynamic period in which the values, norms, beliefs and ideals of society are undergoing rapid transformation. Public administration

*Delivered on the 25th October, 1969 at the Annual General Meeting of the General Body of the Institute.

cannot remain immune from these powerful impulses and its concepts and techniques must develop the requisite mobility and thrust. New thinking and innovations are evident in practically all branches of administration. Such a situation demands that a body like this Institute maintains a high pitch of research activity and keeps itself abreast of the contemporary situation assuming the role of a change agent. I have noted with satisfaction that the Institute gave considerable research support to the Punjab Administrative Reforms Commission and thereafter, to the Administrative Reforms Commission which has been set up at the national level. The A.R.C. has been generally appreciative of the work which we have done for them. Similarly, the completion of the research project on the study of the "Evolution of the Constitution of India" and the publication of the five volumes which were released by the President of India, have been a landmark. Yet, there are many more directions in which the Institute should seize the research initiative.

II

All of you are aware that recently we took a major step on the path of democratic socialism through the nationalization of 14 scheduled banks. This step has been hailed throughout the country and the popular response and fervour among the masses is a living testimony of the hopes which it has aroused. Considerable follow-up work in organizing a new structure in banking and in working out the precise details of their operations has yet to be done. I hope this Institute will take note of these developments and engage in research and analysis in this important sector.

Current year is the Gandhi Centenary Year. All over the world, celebrations have been held to recollect the teachings and precepts of this frail little man who, by his sheer moral force, unleashed tremendous forces of change and reconstruction. It is true that considerable attention has been given in the past to certain aspects of Gandhian philosophy like its economic strategy, theory of social cohesion, approach to international accord and techniques of peaceful and non-violent struggle. His theory of 'conversion of heart' has also been the object of lively debate. One could not, perhaps, speak with the same assurance so far as Gandhian thought on political organization and public administration is concerned. Not much has been done to rummage through his collected works and explore what structure of public administration he visualized and what image the public functionaries were expected to project in his political order. This is another direction of research in which the Institute could, in the

current Gandhi Centenary Year, make a significant contribution and break fresh ground.

III

A full-fledged centre on Municipal Administration has come up in the Institute for training and research on the problems of urban local government. With growing urbanization all round, this undoubtedly is an important field of study. However, there is an equally important field in which substantial administrative innovations have taken place and continuous experimentation is afoot. This relates to the concept of democratic decentralization in rural local government, which is popularly known as Panchayati Raj. As we scan the country, we find that different patterns of Panchayati Raj have emerged in various States. While this variety of approach is welcome in a vast country like ours with healthy regional diversities, there is room for academic effort to explore the reasons for these variations and to ascertain the broad areas of agreement. Continuous research in the working of Panchayati Raj is essential and I hope that in times to come, we may have an equally well-developed centre on Rural Local Government. Over 70 per cent of our people live in villages and the real test of new techniques in the field of public administration will be the extent to which these large masses can be energized towards constructive endeavour. Sustained thinking is necessary in this direction.

Another area which deserves more attention is that of public sector undertakings. In years to come, the public sector is bound to expand in our country. We will have to make continuous efforts to improve the efficiency of these undertakings and they will have to be proved as financially sound investments. They will also have to contribute to the plan effort of the country in a big way. This will imply critical appraisal of their management and production policies and programmes. There is considerable scope for taking up case studies in this important field. Research in this area can be of value not only for the new units in the public sector but also for those in private sector.

IV

After research, the most important activity in which an institution of this type can engage is training. I have noted that gradually the emphasis in this Institute has shifted from teaching to training. This is a development in the right direction; while the various universities

in the country can effectively take up the teaching of public administration, a specialized activity like training has to be undertaken at a place where considerable professional expertise is available. There was a time when it was believed that initial post-entry training was sufficient and all further learning had to take place on the job itself. With the multiplication of the administrative functions and the attendant specialization, it is being increasingly realized that mid-career training in certain specialized fields is essential even for senior administrators. I am glad that the Institute is doing a pioneering work in organizing short-term Executive Development Programmes in collaboration with the Training Division of the Ministry of Home affairs. These courses on diverse subjects like Budgeting and Financial Control, Techniques of Plan Formulation, Economic Decision-Making, Social Welfare Administration, Performance Budgeting and Development Administration, I am sure, will go a long way to meet the urgent requirements of mid-career training. One important aspect in training is the education of trainers. Unless the personnel entrusted with training inculcate right attitudes and possess the requisite expertise, training can often become not only a wasteful enterprise but even a harmful one. In a parliamentary democracy, it is important that the public functionaries manifest right attitudes towards the citizens and the training institutions and their staff have a major role to play in this orientation. It is, therefore, welcome that early next year, the Institute is proposing to organize a course on the training of trainers.

Linked with training techniques is the problem of producing sufficient training material. I have noted that the IIPA Case Studies Programme, which had a modest beginning, has now matured and more than 60 Case Studies have been prepared on various subjects. The need to develop an indigenous case study programme is great because foreign case studies, though valuable academically, are not completely applicable to our conditions. This is another activity in the Institute which should continue to grow.

While training programmes are valuable for administrators up to a certain level, there are many people at the senior levels in government, universities, public enterprises and private industry, who because of their onerous pre-occupations, cannot remain away from their jobs for a long time. Seminars and conferences are the only method to cater to this type of clientele. I am glad that recently the Institute organized two important conferences of this type. The Conference on Training held in February, which I had the pleasure to inaugurate, brought together on one forum the various training experts in the country—from the Ministries, State Governments, training institutions and other professional bodies. As it was the first conference of this type, its proceedings,

which the Institute has published, will be useful for all practitioners of training. The other Conference on Personnel Administration held in August/September last and inaugurated by Shri Asoka Mehta was another important gathering of experts who had assembled to discuss the implications of the A.R.C. Report on Personnel Administration. I am quite sure that the proceedings of this Conference, which are yet to be published, will provide food for thought to all those who are grappling with this important and delicate subject.

I may also emphasize the importance of publications in the activities of a body like this Institute. While seminars, conferences and even research projects are of direct use to the actual participants, it is only the publication of the findings that reach a much bigger circle. I am glad that over a period of time, the Institute's Quarterly Journal has acquired a distinguished reputation and its special numbers have been particularly useful. I hope that notwithstanding the financial considerations, we shall be able to accelerate our publication effort and continuously feed the universities, the government and other similar institutions with fresh material.

V

An Institute of Public Administration should be, as Paul Appleby said, a model of internal administration. We have not been oblivious of this problem and the Evaluation Committee under late Shri Barve and the Implementation Committee under Dr. Lokanathan did useful work in suggesting improvements in the internal working of this Institute. I am glad that the Executive Council has recently constituted a Working Group to make recommendations on how the administration of the Institute can be streamlined. We expect that this Group will give a comprehensive report covering all aspects of the internal administration of this Institute.

We obviously cannot sit back on our laurels, but have to continuously strive for greater efficiency, competence and effectiveness. It is the fortune of our generation to be working in a period of swift transition where stagnant and stationary values are being discarded in favour of dynamic and resurgent ideals. We are passing through a revolution of rising expectations and every social unit has to work at optimum efficiency. There is no scope for slackening of effort. As in other spheres of human activity, so in public administration, we have to keep our concepts and techniques up-to-date and we can ill-afford to become out-dated or outmoded. In a highly competitive world of today, to remain stationary would almost amount to slipping backwards.

As I said earlier the IIPA has fulfilled our expectations to a large extent. It has continued to grow in the right direction. A large part of the credit goes to the able leadership and the band of enthusiastic researchers that the Institute has been fortunate to get. I am sure that the achievements so far would only serve to whet their appetite for more work and research. I wish them success.

Friends, before I conclude I may join my friend and colleague Shri Asoka Mehta in associating myself with the tribute that he paid for the excellent work that Dr. Khosla did during his tenure. I am sorry that he is leaving the Institute. I think we all wish him all success and good luck, in whatever undertaking he goes to next.

A.R.C.'s REPORT ON PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION —FAULTY SUPERSTRUCTURE ON FALSE PREMISES

P. R. Dubhashi

THE A.R.C.'s Report on Personnel Administration aims at laying down a pattern of personnel management which would be conducive to the most effective use of human resources in the civil service so that administration becomes an effective means of achieving socio-economic regeneration of the country. In striving to achieve this task, the Commission has taken note of the new dimensions of development administration as compared with the regulatory administration, the new areas of administration which have emerged as a consequence of new policies and programmes for social welfare and economic growth, and the importance of science and technology. In making administration a fit instrument for accomplishing these tasks, the A.R.C., like the Fulton Committee Report, has also laid emphasis on professionalism and the need for matching each job with the man possessing the requisite skill and expertise. Like the Fulton Committee Report, it has also found fault with "unalloyed generalism" which is out of place in an era of science and technology and has underlined the need for greater use of technical and specialized functional services. It has, therefore, adopted a functional approach to personnel management.

The A.R.C. Report, however, does not deal with personnel management in the public administration system in this country as a whole but only with the staffing of the central secretariat organization and that too not in detail with reference to various departments of the central secretariat nor at all levels. Its recommendations apply to the personnel at the level of Deputy Secretaries and Joint Secretaries and makes only cursory references to the other levels. Also, it is satisfied with illustrative indications rather than comprehensive recommendations.

These limitations are of considerable significance in assessing the adequacy of the recommendations of the Commission. It has not been able to deal with the personnel administration system as a whole because the personnel administration at the state and the district level was left

out to be dealt with by the Commission's Study Teams concerned with state and district administration while for specific branches or departments of administration, like agricultural administration, economic administration or public sector enterprises, the A.R.C. set up separate Study Teams. As a consequence, the subject of personnel administration has been fragmented and the overall approach which one would have liked or expected in the report on personnel administration, is missing. An appraisal of the Report and the recommendations it contains must take into account this very basic limitation in the Commission's approach. By making its recommendations regarding personnel management in the Central Secretariat, divorced from any consideration of personnel management at the level of state secretariats, headquarters departments or districts, the Commission has lost sight of the need for taking an integrated view of personnel administration in a federal country like India.

The 'Functional Approach'

In dealing with the limited area of personnel administration, the Commission has tried to adopt what it has called a functional approach to personnel management. Unfortunately, it has failed to define clearly the term 'functional area' of administration or the term 'function' itself and yet it has based its entire recommendations regarding personnel management on a distinction between the functional and non-functional areas of administration. The basis of the entire Report is contained in the following statement: "Where the post requires a particular academic qualification, or in which a particular specialized experience is essential, it would be in the public interest to draw from the respective technical or specialized functional services for manning even the highest positions. Where, however, these are not the necessary requirements, and the needed specialization can be acquired by training and experience, it would be in the public interest to cast the net wide and choose the best material from generalist as well as specialist sources." (vide para 20, Chapter II, p. 10.) It may be possible to identify clearly "the posts requiring particular academic qualification" which could be filled in by "technical services". Obviously, these include posts like those of Engineers and Doctors. The Report has given illustrations of the posts of District Mechanical Engineers, Chief Mechanical Engineers and the Member (Mech.) of the Board in the Railways which fall in the category of technical services (vide para 11, Chapter III, p.17.) The functional services other than technical services have, however, not at all been clearly defined. In the first sentence of the statement cited above a specialized functional service is supposed to be for filling up posts requiring *specialized experience* but in the

very next sentence indicating the non-functional posts supposed to be thrown open to the generalists or the specialist civil servants, it has been said that needed specialization can be acquired through *training and experience*. It is difficult to see any distinction between these two types of positions. Indeed, no post in government could be treated as either non-functional post or post not requiring specialized experience. To say so is to admit of dysfunctional or *sine cure* position in government which indeed can better be abolished and for which no personnel management of any sort will at all be required. The attempt of the Report in trying to make a distinction without a real difference will be all the clearer when we turn to some of the examples given by the A.R.C. Report to illustrate its categories. Thus, it has combined the posts of Income Tax Officers, Engineers and Collectors as examples of functional posts (vide para 11, Chapter III, p. 17). But it has classified the post of District Development Officer or the Chief Executive Officer of Zila Parishad as non-specialized and belonging to non-functional service (vide para 13, Chapter III, p. 18). On the other hand, the post of the Municipal Commissioner is included in the functional area supposed to be carved out specially for the I.A.S. (vide para 9, Chapter III, p. 16). There is apparently no rational basis for treating the post of a Municipal Commissioner as falling within the purview of a non-functional service like I.A.S. but excluding the post of a District Development Officer from the area specially carved out by the Commission for the I.A.S. In fact, if at all there are any two posts which are close to each other, those are of the Collector and the District Development Officer. Both these posts are typically to be manned by the "area administrators".

The confused basis of the whole approach of the Commission is further indicated by the areas of the posts of Deputy Secretaries which are supposed not to require any particular functional service. These include economic administration, industrial administration, agricultural and rural development administration, social and educational administration, personnel administration, financial administration, defence and internal security and planning. By no stretch of imagination could any of these be treated as non-functional areas or the posts which do not require to be manned by any particular functional service. In fact, these are the major functional areas of administration. Posts in these areas do require both special experience and, in some cases, special academic qualification. There are specialized courses given in Business Management Schools in Personnel Administration and Financial Administration. There are specialized branches of Economics, including industrial and agricultural economics, which are relevant to the economic, industrial and agricultural administration.

There are courses in social work and education which are relevant to social and educational administration. By what stretch of imagination can then these posts be treated as open to persons of all services irrespective of their functional background or experience?

A Fallacious Distinction

Thus, the entire facade of the recommendations of the A.R.C. is based upon a totally fallacious distinction between the so-called functional areas and non-functional areas or functional services and non-functional services. The real distinction is between the technical and scientific service and the administrative service. This distinction is made all along in Indian administration as in the administration of other countries. The technical and scientific services cannot be manned by people except those having technical and scientific qualifications. On the other hand, whatever be the aspects of administration for which the services are organized, if the candidates are recruited on the basis of general qualification, the recruitment is followed by specialized training and experience. Even for administrative service, academic qualification in the relevant subject has been recommended by the Fulton Committee and relevant studies for 3 years in *Ecole Nationale d'Administration* is already a built-in feature of the French Civil Service. Indeed, administration of government, like management of business, is itself a specialized profession and all countries do need, at all stages of their development, a corps of professional administrators to discharge administrative tasks, as business requires professional managers to deal with business management.

The nature of this professional administration can also be specifically identified. Characteristically, the task of public administration consists in helping the formulation of policies and sub-policies in the light of goals and objectives indicated by the political executive, translation of these policies and sub-policies in terms of operational programmes, devising organizations for running these programmes, laying down methods and procedures of these organizations and actually handling these organizations in order to execute the programmes effectively. These are the tasks of administration and these are common to implementation of every type of programme—whether it is organizing of supplies for agriculture, establishing and running basic industrial projects, planning and programming infra-structure facilities or running institutions like hospitals and schools. Agricultural administration is different from agriculture and an agricultural scientist may not necessarily possess the skills of an agricultural administrator. It may be interesting to recollect here that the Committee on Co-operative

Administration headed by an eminent co-operator like the late Shri Vaikunthlal Mehta preferred an I.A.S. officer to a promoted departmental officer to hold the post of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies because it is the former who has the breadth of understanding and outlook which is necessary for the incumbent of the post of a Head of a Department. There the mere narrow functional experience of a departmental officer was considered to be inadequate.

Public Administration—A Speciality

A public administrator like the business manager is responsible for all the tasks of management like planning, organizing, staffing, directing, co-ordinating, controlling, reviewing, evaluating and innovating programmes of different kinds. The public administrator has, even more than a business manager, to have knowledge of the legal framework and the framework of government and the skill to work with the political executive and the constitutional machinery of government. Thus, the public administrator has to be a manager and something more. It is not enough for him to use men, money and material resources to the optimum extent or to take objective decisions. He has to combine them with team work of different kinds of persons, including political executives and scientists. It is hardly fair to dismiss these administrative tasks and the service responsible for the discharge of these tasks as mere 'generalist'. Administrators have to be specialists, in fact, in their own way. This specialism is of critical significance, specially in under-developed countries. In fact, even those like Shri Butani* who have tried to pooch pooch the generalist and to uphold the recommendations of the A.R.C., have identified "integrated co-ordination" as a hall-mark of an administrator.

The exercise of knowledge, skills and techniques required for the "integrated co-ordination" or more generally, for the administrative tasks described above, does require a special corps of professional administrators.

In terms of the tasks outlined above, this corps has to consist of persons of high intelligence, recruited on merit and given fairly diverse experience, at one end of administration in terms of policy formulation, and at the other end, in terms of programme implementation. The administrator also has to have experience of dealing with men and institutions in different sectors of administration. Indeed, skills of public administration like those of business management are built

*K. N. Butani, "Personnel Administration—A Muffled Cry for Change by the Administrative Reforms Commission", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XV, No. 1 (January-March), 1969.

through a certain mobility of experience. In short, experience in depth in the whole spectrum from policy formulation to programme execution and experience in width in different areas of administration go to make a mature professional administrator. Just as management skills are transferable from one field of business to another so are the skills of public administration transferable from one department of public administration to another.

The scope for public administration would, of course, vary according to the ends of the State and the stage of development. During the British days, the scope of public administration was limited to land revenue collection, law and order and certain amount of infra-structure development. Consistent with this, the scope of public administration and the task for which the administrator was trained and in which he had experience, were also limited to the functions of revenue collection and law and order. Today, the scope of public administration is much broader, thanks to the successive plans, and the scope of public administration covers the entire gamut of economic development and social change. The professional administrators have, therefore, to be recruited and trained to perform the administrative tasks in a much vaster area of public administration.

To overlook this and to confine the scope of administrative services to the old functions of law and order and revenue collection is to ignore entirely administrative functions in the context of planned development, to conceive of them in purely static terms and to forget the dynamics of administration, and indeed, to overlook completely the lines on which the administrative service has developed in India after Independence.

Manning of Technical Posts

That does not mean that all posts in government, created in the wake of economic development and social change, will be occupied by the officers of the administrative services. Technical posts requiring technical qualifications, including the posts through which the technical programmes are implemented as well as posts meant for giving technical advice will all have to be manned by technicians and scientists. Like administrators, the technicians and scientists will also be functioning at different levels.

In the context of the widening and deepening of scope of public administration, it would be scarcely appropriate to treat the professional administrator, today, as an "unalloyed generalist", though that might have been a permissible use of the term when the scope of

administration was confined to revenue administration. But it must be pointed out that even the "unalloyed generalist" was assumed to have certain specific qualifications. First, he was recruited on the basis of merit as demonstrated by performance in examination in universities and in competitive selection examination in all subjects including the classical subjects. This was indicative of the mental ability and versatile intelligence capable of quickly grasping the essentials of different subjects and situations. Secondly, the generalist was also supposed to have the ability to sift and weigh the pros and cons of a problem or take a balanced view of different opinions and points of views of different specialists and to arrive at a decision in a practical situation which would be in the best interest of all concerned. These qualities of intelligence, quick mind, sense of judgment and balance, are important in the professional administrator even of today when the administration has become diversified and complicated and is linked up with the progress of science and technology. What is required is to re-inforce these qualities with many other additional qualifications. This would include specialized training in the scientific management which has developed into a speciality including the knowledge of management accounting and statistical techniques. The administrator also needs special training in the techniques and processes of planning. Moreover, the very diversification of administration would require that the administrator, after the general experience in area administration at the field level, should develop specialization in different areas in administration. This is the general basis of the recommendations of the Fulton Committee Report. But the A.R.C., while inspired by the principle of specialization enunciated by the Fulton Committee, has run counter to its application to the administrative service and has applied it in a manner which would lead to the euthanasia of the professional administrator himself! This would be disastrous to the development of public administration as an instrument of State policy.

Importance of Diversified Field Experience

It is in this context, that one would have to assess the role of the officers of the I.A.S. The recruits to that service, like those to the Indian Civil Service are recruited on merit. If this leads to a monopoly of merit, none should grudge it because it is in the interest of the country. In this context, to talk of a privilege and to treat these privileges as on par with those of the feudal landlords is a rank abuse of the term privilege. It is possible to attract the cream of the Indian youth to the I.A.S. only if it is a service of professional administrators providing a challenging career in various areas of public administration and at all levels from programme implementation to policy making. On

the other hand, to downgrade the I.A.S. to collection of revenue and maintenance of law and order is to throw away all possibilities of developing a corps of professional administrators in our country. Indeed, having failed to correctly understand the nature and scope of public administration in India today and the place of I.A.S. therein, the A.R.C. Report makes an uncalled for and somewhat quixotic effort to carve out a special functional area for the I.A.S. To reduce the I.A.S. to a service attending to the functions of land revenue collection, is to emasculate it. Such glorified *Tahsildar service* will not attract promising candidates.

Having regard to the diversification of administration, the officers in the I.A.S. will require, as recommended for the British Civil Service by the Fulton Committee Report, a more intensified programme of training as an integral part of a scientific career development programme. It is the latter which needs the greatest emphasis. After a general district experience, the officer of the I.A.S. will have his career in a specialized area of administration like agricultural, industrial, social or economic administration and special functions of administration like finance or personnel.

The secretariat is essentially an organization to advise the political executive on policy formulation. As indicated earlier, administration by definition covers the entire gamut from policy formulation to programme implementation. The tasks of policy formulation can never be divorced from those of programme implementation or else the policy will tend to be unrealistic; practical difficulties will not be taken into account in policy formulation. Those who are utterly innocent of the conditions in the field can only produce utopian schemes with no chance of success. This is particularly important in India where there is such a big gap between the conceptual sophistication of the intellectuals and the conditions and realities of the masses of people in rural India. A policy is not worth anything except in terms of its practical implementation. It is, therefore, of crucial importance that those responsible for advising on policies in the secretariat are persons with wide variety of administrative experience as District Divisional and State officers and officers in the State secretariats. The success of our planned programmes depends on a single line of understanding and communication from Delhi right up to the village. It is this which makes the field experience of I.A.S. officers of unique significance to the task of policy formulation.

This does not mean that the scientists and technicians will have no place in policy formulation. On all technical and scientific matters,

their advice would be the last word but on all administrative and organizational matters it is the professional administrator who can give the right advice.

The Central Services, like the Income Tax, Audit and Accounts or the Postal services, have not been treated as on par with the I.A.S. because they are purely Central Services and not all-India Services. The policy formulation in the Union Government is profoundly dependent on the relationship between the State and the Union and the officers of the Central Services without any experience of working in the State administration can hardly bring to bear on their tasks intimate understanding of State administration and of policy formulation in State Governments. Indeed, the Central Secretariat is that of *Union Government* and not of Central Government. Where, in the Union Government, policy formulation is purely in respect of Central administration, officers of the Audit and Accounts, Income Tax or Postal services may have their own role to play. But the mainstream of administration at the district level, the State level and the Central (Union) level, has inevitably to be the area of the professional administrator. It is to provide such a professional administration that the I.A.S. is constituted. Barring some peripheral areas, the posts in the Central Secretariat falling in the mainstream of administration, will have to be filled by the officers of the I.A.S. tested in the crucible of experience at the district, headquarters of a department and the State Secretariat.

Conclusions Without Investigation

It is because of the wrong premises and assumptions from which the A.R.C. has started that the structure and staffing of the positions in the Central Secretariat as envisaged by the A.R.C., has gone hay wire. Indeed, it is astonishing that it has recommended certain general classification for the non-functional posts without a detailed examination of the posts and the tasks in the several departments of the Central Secretariat. In other words, having indicated the general lines the Commission left the task of classification of posts in the Central Government to be done by another agency. Thus, their conclusions have preceded investigation! Had the Commission attempted a detailed and scientific job-classification, it would have seen how utterly inadequate and inappropriate its classification of non-functional posts really was.

The A.R.C. Report makes too much of examinations of all sorts including those for a selective entry to the posts of Deputy Secretaries which have been termed as middle management positions. Those who

are prepared to soft-pedal the performance of young recruits at the initial examination are, on the other hand, enthusiastic about the importance of the mid-term examinations, and treat all opposition to them as an attempt of the I.A.S. to claim a privilege or a special protection! The importance of the initial examination was emphasized long back by Macauley Report as also by the Northcote-Trevelyan Report. Young men, who intellectually excel their peers at the early stage in their career, would continue to do so in later life. There is no reason to question this expectation, by and large. On the other hand, modern personnel management practices do recognize scientific system of personnel appraisal as an integral part of career development. It is this, rather than periodic examinations, that should be the basis for the promotion and development of the career of an officer of the civil service. Unfortunately, to the subject of career development very little attention has been paid by the A.R.C. We have done little to plan the careers of our civil servants and yet the success of our planning is significantly tied up with the planning of the careers of the officers of the civil service. It is this rather than mid-career examinations which ought to receive the urgent attention of the reformers of personnel administration.

It is the faulty basis of the A.R.C.'s recommendations regarding the structure of and recruitment to the posts of Deputy Secretaries and Joint Secretaries in the Central Secretariat that has led the Commission to recommend the induction of officers with non-administrative experience at the middle management level in the Central Secretariat and consequently to provide for training of such persons in the rudiments of administration and management. Techniques and methods of management which ought to be imparted to an administrator at the beginning of his career and in whose application he ought to gather experience in the first few years of his service are sought to be imparted to him later in the career at the time of his induction in middle management level. It is, indeed, anomalous and in a way wasteful to provide foundation training at the middle management level.

The Question of a Rational Pay Structure

Just as the A.R.C. has adopted the Fulton principle of specialization but has distorted it in its application, so also it has picked up the principle of unified grading structure and applied it incorrectly. The Commission has attacked the existing multiplicity of scales for different groups of posts as an irrational system and has recommended the unified grading structure as a rational system. It has advocated "equal pay for equal work" as the rational basis for a unified grading structure.

But enunciating this principle in the abstract makes no meaning unless the work content of different posts is analysed. The A.R.C. nowhere makes such an attempt. It does not recognize that by the application of its own principle, multiplicity of work will logically result in multiplicity of grades. Nor does the Commission recognize the fact that the true rational basis of any pay structure or compensation system is to provide incentive to *persons* who are entrusted with jobs. Jobs cannot be considered in isolation from the men who would perform them. It is irrational to fix pay for jobs just because they are so described on paper. The pay is rather to be adjusted to the qualities and talents of the man who can do a job. There are hundred different ways of doing a job—good, bad and indifferent—and it is irrational not to take this into account. The principle of "equal pay for equal work" thus ultimately means or ought to mean "equal pay for equal talent and competence". It is only when this is recognized, that the grading structure does not remain, as it does in the A.R.C.'s Report, a static concept but gets dynamically linked up with the whole system of personnel administration including recruitment and career development calculated to select the best men and to draw out the best in them throughout their career. Of course, an objective measurement either of work or of men is by no means easy and the limitations in this regard have to be taken into account in devising the system of compensation.

A Pandora's Box of Personnel Reforms

The non-scientific distinction between functional and non-functional posts at the level of Under Secretary and Deputy Secretary has led the Commission to recommend a clumsy and complicated system of pools—of recruitment to, retention in and retirement from the pool. These recommendations will open up a veritable Pandora's box of evils. There will be constant jockeying for positions between functional pools and non-functional pools, the pool posts within a functional service and the non-pool posts in that functional service and hostility between different pools and between the service officers who are within the pool and who are left out. It is true that civil service is for government work and not *vice versa*. But civil service seething with discontent because of the pools in which it is divided would hardly provide a satisfactory instrument for the discharge of work which is entrusted to administration.

Indeed, while the A.R.C. Report started with a proper identification of the objective of the system of personnel administration, *viz.*, to make the civil service equal to the task of modern administration

and while the principle of specialization within administration is sound, irrationalities and even some eccentricities have led to the distorted application of this principle, throughout the Report. Employing only one member of the family and not both husband and wife, moral and didactic preaching in the training of administrators, special examinations for first-class graduates and the oracular pronouncements in fixed numerical terms (whose sanctity or rationality is not clear), like 9 grades for middle management, 25 grades for posts at all levels, 26 years of age as an upper limit for entry to competitive examination, 8 areas of specialisations, 35 years of age for late recruitment with 6 years of completed service—all these are some of the points of unintended curiosity in the report!

A.R.C. ON PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION — A STUDY IN BIAS

Nilmadhab Mohanty

THE Report on Personnel Administration submitted by the Administrative Reforms Commission (A.R.C.) to the Government of India makes a number of recommendations for reorganizing the civil service in the country. Particularly, it contains what the Report calls 'an out-line for reform' for manning the higher policy and management posts in the Central Secretariat and the attached offices.

The A.R.C. rightly points out that the work of modern government has become more technical and complex due to the scientific and technological progress and increase in the positive activities of the State. There is, therefore, need for discarding the concept of 'unalloyed generalism' and making room for professionalism in the civil service. The suggestion that there should be proper job analysis of the civil service posts and that all higher policy and management posts in the Central Secretariat and attached offices should be filled up by professionally competent persons, is a rational one.

The A.R.C. seeks to promote professionalism in the higher civil service by dividing the work of government into what it calls the 'functional areas' and the 'non-functional areas' and by suggesting various procedures for staffing the higher policy and management posts in these areas. There should be a 'functional service' for each 'function' of Government and officers belonging to the various functional services will develop professionalism by occupying all posts (including the middle and senior management posts) in their respective functional areas. The posts outside the functional areas (called 'non-functional posts') have been divided into eight 'areas of the specialism'. The middle (Deputy Secretary and equivalent levels) and senior (Joint Secretary and above) policy and management posts in these areas of specialism are to be manned by officers from the various 'functional services' as well as from the non-functional services.

The use of words like 'function', 'functional service' and 'functional approach' lends a pseudo-scientific touch to the Commission's recommendations. But an examination of the proposals would show that

these recommendations suffer from a number of inadequacies, contradictions, lack of objective and detailed study which make the Report anything but scientific.

Lack of Definitions

To begin with, the Report does not contain any clear definition of the terms, 'function', 'functional service' and 'non-functional posts'. The farthest it goes when it says that:

"Wherever numbers involved in a particular function are viable, we would recommend that such posts should be grouped into the regularly constituted services.

"However, in forming such services—all-India or Central—the functional aspect should be fully borne in mind. There should be reservation of posts for a particular service only insofar as the qualifications, training and experience of its members make them specifically qualified to man the posts; but in respect of other posts, the eligibility should be shared in common with the members of other Services who may be expected equally well to fill these posts after some training and/or work experience, if necessary."¹

There is no detailed study of the civil service work (at least of some representative blocks or areas) either by the Commission or its Study Teams to show that the tasks of the Central Government, particularly in the Secretariat, can be categorised into such 'functional' and 'non-functional' compartments. In fact, when the process of job analysis is entered into it may appear that most of the jobs in the Secretariat have the so-called 'functional' and 'non-functional' components and their allotment to different services or areas will be arbitrary.

There is also confusion regarding the eight 'non-functional areas of specialism' and 'functional areas' as the basis of this distinction has not been indicated. For instance, it is not understood as to how agricultural administration could be grouped under the 'non-functional area of specialism'. Besides, in the context of a specialised and complex administration every higher policy and management post in the Government will require professionalism and deep familiarity with the subject-matter of work. Therefore, the distinction between the 'functional areas' requiring 'specially' qualified persons and the 'non-functional areas' requiring persons with 'some training and/or work

¹ Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on Personnel Administration*, New Delhi, April, 1969.

experience, if necessary, appears arbitrary and unnecessary. In fact, the Study Team on 'Personnel Planning, Staffing of Public Sector Undertakings and Personnel Management' headed by Shri R. K. Patil had recommended that the work in the civil service should be categorized into eight areas of specialization and civil servants, irrespective of their service-origin, should specialize in these areas of professionalism. Similar conclusions were reached by the Deshmukh Study Team on 'Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work' and the Setalvad Study Team on 'Centre-State Relationships' although they differed on the details of these areas. In the U.K. also, the Fulton Committee has talked of the broad 'areas of Government' where administrators have to specialize in order to attain professionalism in their work.

Further confusion has been created by defining the term 'functional service' to include not only those 'services' which are charged with a technical function for which a pre-entry vocational education is required (*i.e.*, the various Engineering Services) but also those which specialize after entry in a particular area of administration (such as, Accounts, Income Tax) and for which no pre-entry vocational education other than a certain level of educational qualification is prescribed. The distinction between these two groups of personnel is a real one as they perform qualitatively different functions and avoidable confusion has been created by grouping them together.

Flexibility

The non-technical services like Accounts, Income Tax, Postal Service, etc., are unifunctional in nature. Like the 'departmental classes' of the U.K. (which also include Customs and Excise, Inland Revenue, etc.) they have been constituted to meet the requirement of specific skills and aptitudes for the kind of work their respective departments do. Thus, by definition, these non-technical, unifunctional services will lack the flexibility of operation and breadth of vision which is needed in the higher policy and management posts in the civil service, particularly in the Secretariat. A general (as against generalist) Civil Service, on the other hand, can remain flexible as its members often have experience of a variety of posts and there is a high degree of interchangeability which enables it to meet the demands of different administrations. The performance and achievements of the Civil Service in India after Independence and partition of the country is a pointer to this fact. In the U.K. also, the trend is against the formation of such departmental classes as "the flexibility of Civil Service, and its abilities to move quickly to meet the changing demands

of different administrations, would be seriously at risk if a pattern of Departmental Classes emerged on any more widespread scale than exists at present.”² The Fulton Committee which, like the A.R.C., pleaded for professionalism amongst administrators also envisaged a general civil service whose members would specialize in different areas of administration. “At the same time”, the Committee went on to say, “since modern administration requires men to have breadth as well as depth, and since civil servants operate in a political environment, it seems to us important that such specialization should not be narrowly conceived.”³

One of the A.R.C.’s Study Teams (the Patil Study Team) had also examined this question and came to the following conclusions:

“We also do not favour the other extreme suggestion of meeting the requirements of higher positions in the Secretariat by officers belonging to the corresponding departments only without any arrangements for building up a specific group of higher civil servants for the following reasons:

- (i) There is no one—one correspondence between executive departments and Secretariat Departments. There may be more than one department under the same ministry or an appreciable part of the area of activity of a secretariat department may not be concerned with any specific department; the secretariat department may be dealing with wider public policy which may concern the private sector or the citizen directly. In the Central Government, some secretariat departments may depend on State Governments for the execution of their policies; for these units which do not have an executive counterpart, personnel for higher levels will have to be specially built up;
- (ii) This scheme may have the effect of making the Central Government and State Governments separate water-tight administrative units without any organic link.”⁴

In the main report, the A.R.C. has not given any reason as to why it differed from these conclusions. The Commission has gone in for a set of uni-functional services with the avowed object of

² *The Civil Service, Evidence submitted to the Fulton Committee (1966-68)*, Vol. 5(1), London, H.M.S.O., 1968.

³ *The Civil Service, Report of the (Fulton) Committee (1966-68)*, London, H.M.S.O., 1968.

⁴ Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report of the Study Team on Personnel Planning, Staffing of Public Sector Undertakings and Personnel Management*, New Delhi, August 1967, Para 3.149, p. 88.

promoting professionalism amongst the civil servants although the needs of modern administration will be served better by the existence of a general civil service whose members are encouraged to specialize in different areas of government work by proper training and career development.

Inner Contradiction

Besides, in some ways the proposals of the A.R.C., if accepted, would encourage ‘generalism’ rather than curb it. Part of the ‘generalism’ of which the civil service in India is accused of, has been due to the fact that officers from various unfunctional central services are utilized in posts in the Central Secretariat and attached offices where their specializations are not relevant. This has been highlighted by the Patil Study Team of the A.R.C. when it said:

“... the requirements of professionalism and expertise have not been provided for; the induction of officers of specialist services has been more by virtue of their belonging to a Class I service and having a sort of claim to Secretariat positions rather than as a result of a purposive policy of determining their suitability of specific positions on the basis of their specialist experience in parent departments. Thus, a worse type of ‘generalism’ is developing where the only requirements to occupy a senior position are belonging to any Class I service and having put in a specific number of years; previous experience is being rendered completely irrelevant for secretariat postings....An officer with a background of Income-tax may be placed in the manpower branch and an audit service officer in agriculture.”⁵

This was also supported by the Deshmukh Study Team when it said:

“... those who come from specialized cadres (*i.e.*, the Central services other than C.S.S.) become generalists when utilized in posts where their specializations are not relevant.”⁶

The A.R.C.’s suggestion for providing officers from various ‘functional services’ for manning the posts in the non-functional areas of specialism will merely formalize and accentuate the process and continue the present reliance on generalism which the Report seeks to

⁵ *Report of the Study Team on Personnel Planning, Staffing of Public Sector Undertakings and Personnel Management*, op. cit., para 3.127 (iii), p. 81.

⁶ Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report of the Study Team on Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work*, New Delhi, February, 1968.

criticise. The Report suggests that these officers from the 'functional services' will be eligible for middle management posts in the Central Secretariat after eight years of service in their parent department. Considering the fact that they will have to undergo initial training after recruitment during this period, the time available for developing the necessary specialization is not adequate. Their secondment to the non-functional areas would mean that the functional expertise will not be developed fully in these offices. The examination which is proposed to be conducted for recruitment to middle management posts in 'non-functional areas' of specialism will be of a general nature and will mean repetition of a portion of the examination taken at the time of initial recruitment and can hardly test their professional competence. Although it is provided that at the time of final selection and allotment to different areas of specialism, the previous background of the officers would be taken into consideration, there is no certainty that the written examination will throw up officers from various 'functional services' having the background required for the areas of specialism where vacancies have occurred. Again, if after completing his tenure in the non-functional areas of specialism, an officer comes back to his parent cadre, he goes back to the 'functional area' with which he has no touch for a number of years and where his recently acquired specialization may not be of use. This will be generalism par excellence.

Thus, there is an inner contradiction in a system where a set of unfunctional non-technical services meant for doing the special work of their respective departments will provide the personnel for the higher policy and management posts in the Secretariat. The A.R.C. seems to have fallen victim to this contradiction due to the fact that it never undertook any scientific study of the various kinds of functions being discharged by the existing unfunctional, non-technical services (like Accounts, Income-tax, Postal, etc.) and members of a general civil service, like the Indian Administrative Service, in their respective cadre posts in order to establish their respective co-relations (or lack of it) with the work being done in the policy and management posts in the Secretariat. Although an exhaustive study was not possible (and is recommended to be done by the proposed Department of Personnel), a few representative samples could have been examined before the conclusions were formulated. Without doing any such objective study, the A.R.C. has merely proposed the continuance and creation of a set of unfunctional non-technical services and thereafter, has sought to endow these services with the characteristics and functions of a general civil service with the result that we may have the worst of both the worlds.

This is not to say that members of these unfunctional services will

not be eligible for top policy and management posts in the Government. Those among them who later on show aptitude and ability to take up higher management work should have an opportunity to man these posts and the personnel system must provide for this.

Specialists

The technical services (like Scientists, Engineers, Doctors, Economists, Statisticians, etc.), on the other hand, come under a different category. These are 'specialists' and they play a distinct role in the formulation of government policies and their implementation. The primary concern of these groups is the practice of their specialism and their role at the decision-making level is to speak with specialist experience and depth of knowledge of the scientific and technical merits of particular policies or course of action. Today, as Shri Shanker has pointed out in his dissenting note to the Report on Personnel Administration, the view point of the specialist is accorded due recognition in the decision-making at the highest levels. The administrator, on the other hand, cannot have the same depth of expertise as the specialist. His role consists in bringing together the disparate issues involved in taking major decisions of policy, advise (along with the specialist) on what the decisions should be, and subsequently to ensure that the decisions are implemented. He works in a political environment and has to prepare a great deal of explanatory information for the Minister, the Legislature, and the public. He prepares legislation and helps Ministers in its passage in the legislature. These are functions for which there are always deadlines and the civil servant has to attend to these on priority basis. Work of this kind should not be handled by specialists. This is not to say that specialists are unable to have full appreciation of the wider issues and discharge the other functions of the administrator. What is meant is that if a specialist becomes immersed in the day-to-day problems of administration, he ceases to be a specialist and will, in turn, need other specialists for giving expert advice which is needed in policy-making. The Fulton Report on Civil Service reforms in the U.K. emphasized this point and said:

"Our aim is not to replace specialists by administrators, or *vice versa*. They should be complementary to one another. It is, rather, that the administrator trained and experienced in his subject matter should enjoy a more fruitful relationship with the specialist and that the service should harness the best contributions from each."

¹ *The Civil Service, Report of the (Fulton) Committee, op. cit.*

Complementary Relationship

The A.R.C.'s Report unfortunately does not discuss this complementary nature of relationship between the specialist and the administrator in the higher policy-making levels. Instead, the technical and non-technical services have been projected as competitors for the middle and senior management posts in the Central Secretariat and attached offices. The A.R.C. has found all ills in Government due to the fact that members of the technical services have not occupied the higher policy advisory posts in the Secretariat. One is not sure if the A.R.C. had examined and compared the performance of the Ministries and organizations staffed mostly with the technical services (like the Ministry of Education, the Planning Commission, C.S.I.R., etc.) with that of the other Ministries where non-technical services predominate, it would have come to the conclusions it did.

This is not to say that all is well with the working relationship between the specialists in technical services and administrators in the country. Mostly, difficulties have arisen due to the lack of understanding of functions of one group by the other and due to an irrational scale of preference which places the Secretariat posts on a higher level than the field posts. Perhaps a detailed job analysis as suggested by the A.R.C. will set these posts in their proper perspective and will be able to minimize discrepancy in status and emoluments amongst the services. Their working relationships can be improved: (i) by widening the opportunity for persons with technical qualifications to join the general civil service (I.A.S.) at the time of recruitment, (ii) by allowing members of the technical services showing aptitude and abilities late in their career for administrative work to transfer themselves to the higher policy-management group, and (iii) by arranging for the administrators and technical officers to work in integrated hierarchies (on the basis of the right man for the right job) while retaining their separate grades.

Elite Service Concept

The most astonishing part of the A.R.C.'s Report, however, is the way it has treated the Indian Administrative Service. The I.A.S., like its predecessor the I.C.S., has a special role in the higher civil service scene and, whether one likes it or not, any analysis of the personnel administration of India must examine the concepts and considerations underlying the service. The Report does not contain any such detailed examination. It merely states that in the context of a specialized administration a 'general purpose' service like the Indian

Administrative Service having no such so-called 'functional' area of its own has no validity and acts as a hindrance to the development of specialized cadres. These conclusions have been arrived at without any detailed discussion about the considerations underlying the creation of the service and have been stated in a manner as if these are the last words on the subject. Not that the Commission did not have before it an analysis of the nature of the Indian Administrative Service. The A.R.C. Study Team headed by Shri R. K. Patil contained an exhaustive analysis of the considerations that have led to the creation of an elite service like the I.A.S. and had come to the conclusion that these considerations be applied with greater force in the present-day India. The Setalvad Study Team on Centre-State Relationships contained what it called a case study of the I.A.S. and discussed the considerations underlying the creation of the service objectively and in great length. Both these Reports while emphasising the need for professionalism in modern administration had come to the conclusion that by suitable policies of recruitment, training and deployment the service could and should be made to adapt itself to meet the changed requirements of a growing techno-economic society. Even the Deshmukh Study Team on 'Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work' had conceded that "the I.A.S. must remain the principal feeder source providing as it does the right kind of experience for senior management".⁸ The A.R.C. has differed with all these without reasons, at least without indicating any. It is intriguing as to why it chose not to meet the arguments of its own Study Teams.

At this stage it is perhaps worthwhile to examine some of the considerations which have led to the creation of the service. The basic concept underlying the I.A.S. is talent and the service is meant to recruit personnel of high calibre to man the higher policy and management posts in the states and the Centre, thereby ensuring uniformity of standard at these two levels. In a developing society like ours the Government which has a positive role to play, must have its due share of the best available talent in the country. The existence of a service with clearly defined prospects of interesting and demanding work at a fairly early age and further increase in responsibility, for those who prove themselves, acts as a real incentive for attracting graduates of high calibre to the government service. This elitist concept is the very substance of the Indian Administrative Service, and any arrangement that disturbs this concept also demolishes the service. The A.R.C.'s recommendation for carving out a narrow 'functional' area has this effect and the Indian Administrative Service that remains thereafter

⁸ Report of the Study Team on Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work, op. cit.

is not the Service which was created by Sardar Patel and lauded by Paul Appleby but something else. The more honest course for the Commission would have been to suggest the abolition of the I.A.S.

Criticism of the Concept

The criticism of the concept of 'elite service' has mainly proceeded on the following lines:

- (i) It is a colonial concept and leads to inequality amongst various cadres and hegemony of one service;
- (ii) Every function of Government has become important and talent should be equally distributed among all the services; and
- (iii) The 'elite service' concept lays undue emphasis on the results of an examination taken at the time of recruitment and prevents qualified and able members of the other services from reaching the top position in the administration.

The first criticism has mostly come from other service-groups who are resentful of the role of the Indian Administrative Service. It is argued that an elite service (I.C.S.) mostly consisting of foreign rulers had validity in the pre-independent India but in the democratic set-up established after Independence all services should be treated alike and have the similar conditions of service. This argument stems from a mistaken understanding of the nature of an elite service. The importance of the group constituting the higher civil service lies in the fact that it sets the tone for the entire administration. It is, therefore, essential that personnel of high quality are attracted to this group. The elite service is a mechanism to recruit personnel of high calibre to man higher civil service posts. Thus, the condition of its existence is quality, not colonialism. The need for personnel of high calibre manning the top administrative and policy advisory posts has all along been recognized by the Indian society from ancient times and the I.C.S. merely reinforced this tradition. The I.A.S. was created by the leaders of Independent India and could not be called the handiwork of the colonial rulers. Besides, as the Patil Study Team has pointed out, the need for constituting a higher civil service has been recognized in most of the advanced countries in the world. The higher civil service in France, for example, is extremely elitist and by no stretch of imagination France can be called a colonial society.

Once the need for a talent-based elite service is accepted, democratic principles would mean equality of opportunity for all to compete for joining the service on the basis of proven merit. Thereafter the

arguments of democracy and egalitarianism should not be allowed to dilute the concept by bringing the elite service to a position of equality in terms of responsibilities and conditions of service with other services most of whose members had failed to make the grade. For this will act as a disincentive for persons of high calibre to join the civil service. It is for these reasons that the Setalvad Study Team had advised that the Government should "discourage resentful attitudes in other services, both State and Central. There is room in administration for all the different kinds of services and each should bend its entire energy in the performance of its allotted task rather than fritter away so much of it in bickering and recrimination".⁹ This is not an argument in favour of the hegemony of one service or inferiority of the other, it is only a plea for giving greater responsibilities on the basis of proven merit and superiority of mind. It is unfortunate that the A.R.C. has failed to put this distinction in its proper perspective, thereby contributing to inter-service rivalries.

The second criticism to which the A.R.C. has lent support is based upon the erroneous assumption that personnel of high calibre are available in sufficient numbers for all the services to have their due share. Talent in any country is scarce and the Government has to compete with trade and industry—both in public and private sectors—for getting its share of high quality personnel. No Government can match the private sector in the matter of providing attractive emoluments and other conditions of service. This is more so in India where, over the years, the attractiveness of the higher civil service for the best available talent in the country has progressively decreased. The case study of the Indian Administrative Service undertaken by the Setalvad Study Team has shown that "although the number of first class graduates produced has increased, both absolutely and proportionately, the number of first class graduates appearing (in the competitive examination) has declined, both absolutely and proportionately (the decline in latter case being from 29 per cent to 8 per cent)".¹⁰ Another study shows that while in 1959 every one out of 7.8 first class graduates appeared in the combined competitive examination for the Indian Administrative Service, etc., in 1967 the comparative figure was 1:21.5 although the number of first class graduates coming out of the Universities and the number of vacancies had increased considerably. "It is not merely the fact of decline", says the Setalvad Study Team "that causes concern but its extent, illustrated more dramatically by a comparison of the figures for 1959 when for every vacancy in the

⁹ Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report of the Study Team on Centre-State Relationships*, New Delhi, September, 1967.

¹⁰ *Report of the Study Team on Centre-State Relationships*, op. cit.

Indian Administrative Service proper 11 first class graduates applied (as against an average of 14 in the period 1950-55) and for 1964, when this number came down to 3".¹¹ The Chairman of the U.P.S.C. in his oral evidence before the Second Pay Commission had also stated:

"Our opinion on the experience of the combined results of the written examination and personality test is that about 80 to 90 top persons every year are suitable for I.A.S. and I.P.S. and about 200 or so would be suitable for Central Service. I would say that of them, about 40 to 50 candidates are really of good quality and stand out."

In this context, therefore, any arrangement that would seek to distribute talent amongst the services is bound to fail as in every such service the personnel of high calibre will be sadly outnumbered by mediocrity who would set the pace of administration. This will hardly be the proper condition for the best available talent in the country to join the higher civil services. Besides, it must be remembered that the mechanism of an elite service (with prospects of interesting and demanding work at a fairly young age and of further increases in responsibility for the deserving (entry into which signifies a recognition of merit at the all-India level, plays no mean part in attracting the best available talent in the country. To some extent, it offsets the effect of higher emoluments offered by the private sector. The acceptance of the A.R.C.'s recommendation of diluting the character of the I.A.S. would not result in proper distribution of talent but its diversion from the government service. At this stage, the civil service can not afford to further reduce its attraction to the most able university graduates. Instead, the quality of the I.A.S. should be rigidly controlled by netting talent from as many sources as available and by restricting entry to the most able. In this context, the suggestions of the Setalvad Study Team for restricting the appointment of the I.A.S. personnel only to the top posts with distinct managerial and coordinating functions requiring the best quality and limiting annual recruitment to fifty persons, deserve consideration.

The third criticism has three main aspects. Firstly, it is contended that a substantial part of the country's talent gets diverted to technical institutions at the secondary level and is not available for recruitment to the higher civil service. This argument is easily conceded. The procedures for recruitment and the examination system should be reoriented to net talent from all possible sources including those with technical qualifications. As recommended by the Setalvad Study Team,

¹¹ *Report of the Study Team on Centre-State Relationship, op. cit.*

the scope of choice of optional subjects for the I.A.S. examination should be enlarged to include technical subjects (e.g., engineering, medical sciences, accountancy, etc.).

Secondly, it is argued that the method of the competitive examination consisting of written test and interview is defective. This is not a criticism of the concept but that of the technique of the examination. This can be met by refining the system by the adoption of modern techniques of tests so that only the best available talent gets recruited into the service. It is, however, interesting to note that although the A.R.C. has not attached much importance to the competitive entry examination, it seeks to select officers for manning middle-management posts through yet another written examination (combined with interview) for Class I officers who have put in 8 to 12 years of service. This examination to be taken a few years after recruitment appears wholly redundant and can hardly serve the purpose of testing the professional competence of the candidates.

Thirdly, it is argued that undue emphasis is given on the results of an initial examination for recruitment. Not all of those selected for the elite service may prove suitable for the top posts in future and there may be some in other service-groups, particularly in the technical services, who may develop abilities and qualifications to man the higher policy and management posts in the government. There is some force in this argument but this should not be allowed to belittle the significance of the competitive examination in our socio-political context. Historically, the competitive entry examinations have been introduced as an answer to nepotism and political jobbery. The tradition of making appointments solely on merit assessed through a competitive examination conducted by an independent agency like the Public Service Commission, has taken deep roots in this country and this should not be disturbed. On the other hand, attempts in the past for forming 'administrative' and 'economic' pools through mid-career selection of officials have run into difficulties as these have come to be associated at least in public mind with privilege and patronage. In a country where forces of regionalism, casteism, and nepotism continue to raise their ugly heads, any whittling down of the significance of the competitive entry examinations can have serious consequences.

There is yet another reason as to why the competitive entry examination is important. The examination is open to candidates in the age group of 20-24 and it is at that level that the distribution of the best available talent between the private sector and the government

service takes place. In India, the civil service is a career service and there is not much mobility between the private sector and the government service due to the absence of a homogenous market for talent in various sectors. Therefore, the best available talent which goes into the private sector at the entry-level (20-24) is permanently lost to the civil service. It is, therefore, necessary to have a system of competitive examination which, at the level of initial recruitment, can net in talent from all available sources and which, by the opportunities and prestige it gives to the successful, is able to attract the graduates of the highest calibre.

This is not to say that all those selected for the I.A.S. through the initial examination would prove suitable for the top posts although the presumption is that with proper training and experience most of them would because of their quality. These personnel should provide 'the principal feeder source' for manning the senior management posts in the Central Secretariat and equivalent positions elsewhere. An element of selection and assessment should be introduced in mid-career (15-17 years) to ensure that only the deserving rise to fill the top posts (Joint Secretary and above) in the Central Secretariat. Similarly, some officers joining the technical services and unifunctional non-technical services late in their career may show abilities and talent for manning the top administrative posts and may wish to change over to the higher management group. The personnel system should give them widest opportunity to make this transfer.

'Generalism' and 'Professionalism'

Another concept which has long been associated with the I.A.S. in the philosophy of 'generalism'. According to this concept, the ideal administrator is seen as an intelligent layman moving frequently between various jobs, can take practical view of any problem in the light of his experience and knowledge of the government machinery. This philosophy has severe limitations as, in the modern context, deep familiarity with the subject-matter of one's work is equally important. This familiarity can come only through proper training and sustained experience. The A.R.C., however, seems to think that the principle of generalism is basic to the I.A.S. and, therefore, has sought to bring about a fundamental change in the nature of the service. A deeper examination would show that this is not so. 'Generalism' in the I.A.S. is the product of a particular manner in which the training and deployment of its members have been organized so long. Unlike the concept of talent, it is not the essence of the I.A.S. and can be changed to suit the requirements of the growing techno-economic society.

"Policies of recruitment, training and deployment may, therefore, have to be fashioned", said the Setalvad Study Team "to work out a gradual and continuous evolution of the character of the service so that it is able to adapt itself to changed requirements and yet remain itself, the stress on its different attributes changing according to the ethos of the era".¹² The Patil and Deshmukh Study Teams of the A.R.C. have also thought on similar lines and have recommended that the members of the I.A.S. should be allowed to develop professionalism in different broad areas of government work through suitable policies of training and career development.

It may be added here that professionalism expected of an administrator is different from the knowledge in depth which the specialist brings to bear on his work. Familiarity with the subject-matter of his work will enable the administrator to seek for specialist advice in the right quarters, understand the advice and process it for decision-making. It will improve his capacity to evaluate the government policies and programmes and initiate new lines of action.

Although subject-matter professionalism is important, the value of the specialized knowledge in public administration, which the members of the I.A.S. have, should not be minimized. They spend their careers at various levels of administration—district, state and Centre—and acquire a high degree of expertise in administrative processes and working of a complex machine of Government in a way not found in other service-groups. It is in this sense that they are 'professional' administrators—a role which the A.R.C. has failed to recognize. This professionalism in administration needs to be enriched by further 'professionalism' in subject-matter so that the I.A.S. can truly play its role as the 'principal feeder source' for the top policy posts in the higher civil service.

Another consideration which has led to the creation of the Indian Administrative Service is the need to have inter-change of experience between the Centre and the States. This is achieved through a system of deputation from the States to the Centre. The uniqueness of the 'district experience' has been emphasized by the champions of the I.A.S. and its utility for higher policy and management posts has been questioned by its critics. The relevance of the district experience of the I.A.S. officer cannot be considered in isolation; it has to be taken in conjunction with other experience-pattern in the States in order to find out the suitability of the members of the service to man the senior

¹² Report of the Study Team on Centre-State Relationship, op. cit.

management posts in the Central Government. The district experience (which includes experience in sub-divisions) brings the members of the service face to face with the rural masses, with "the human side all the time in a dynamic and moving society"; it gives them a unique opportunity of knowing the problems in the field where the effects of the policies of the government are felt. It involves them in the formulation and execution of local development schemes and helps in developing qualities of judgement, objectivity, and coordination, which are so essential in the higher policy and management posts in the States and the Centre. At the State level the experience-pattern covers many spheres of administration, like finance, planning, agriculture, industrial development, development of transport and communications, etc. Besides, they also operate in top policy-making advisory and executive positions and work in support of Ministers in a political environment. It is the totality of this experience which makes the I.A.S. officer uniquely suitable for the higher managerial posts in the Central Government.

There may not be much originality in the view-points expressed in the foregoing paragraphs as most of them are based on the arguments put forward by the A.R.C.'s own Study Teams referred to above. These Study Teams consisted of many prominent personalities and were professionally competent to pass judgement on the personnel system. By and large, they have based their conclusions on detailed study and analysis. The A.R.C.'s main Report has dispensed with these 'luxuries'. The result is that most of the recommendations are in the nature of dogmatic assertions, more like the private opinions of its members than the result of any objective study. And two of its members—Shri Shankar and Shri T. N. Singh—who have had wide experience of the working of the Central Government, have submitted their notes of dissent in respect of some of the basic recommendations, particularly those relating to the reorganization of the personnel system. It is, therefore, doubtful if the A.R.C.'s Report on Personnel Administration can provide any objective basis for the reform of the higher civil service. The Government may have to turn to the Reports of some of the Study Teams for necessary analysis and recommendations for further action.

An Alternative Proposal

There is need for change, and change there should be. The existing personnel system needs to be reformed to meet the requirements of a complex techno-economic society. On the basis of the principles and concepts discussed in the foregoing part of this article,

an alternative proposal for reform of the higher civil service is discussed below.

(1) There is need for a flexible, general (as against generalist) civil service to man the higher policy and management posts in the Central as well the State Governments, particularly in the Secretariat. The members of this service should be of high calibre and they should have experience in breadth and depth to meet the requirements of modern administration. The Indian Administrative Service has traditionally met this need and it should be reoriented so that its members can play an effective role in a complex administration.

There are a number of senior posts under the Central and State Governments which because of their technical, technological and/or scientific nature of work, require technical experts from various disciplines. These posts are manned by experts grouped into various Class I technical services (Central and All-India). They perform a very useful role in administration.

There are a number of Executive Departments (as distinguished from Secretariat Departments or Ministries), mostly in the Central Government, which require senior personnel having specialized skills for the kind of work their respective Departments do. Members of a number of unifunctional, non-technical Class I services man the senior posts in these executive Departments.

The personnel structure that exists in the country today needs to be reoriented to meet the requirements of modern administration.

(2) Recruitment to the Indian Administrative Service, the technical services as well as the unifunctional, non-technical services, should primarily be on the basis of open competitive examination. There should not be any common examination for recruitment to these categories of services as the purpose of recruitment in each case differs from that of the other. The present practice of having some sort of a common examination (in a few subjects) for recruitment to the Indian Administrative Service and non-technical services should be abolished and, instead, there should be different sets of examination for each of these categories.

(3) Quality is the essence of the I.A.S. and under no circumstances there should be any deviation from this principle. Recruitment to the I.A.S. at the entry level should be open to graduates of all qualifications (including technical qualifications) so that there is the widest opportunity for the best available talent in the country to compete for the service. The graduates should be put to toughest possible tests to ensure that only the best are selected for manning the higher policy and

management posts in the Government. The optional subjects in the I.A.S. examination should include all technical subjects so that graduates with technical qualifications do not suffer from any handicap *vis-a-vis* graduates with qualifications in arts and pure sciences. Entry of graduates with different background and qualifications will give diversity to the service. Direct recruitment to the I.A.S. should be limited to 50 persons every year so that there is no deterioration in the quality of its members. In case of subsequent entries (lateral entry) into the I.A.S., there should not be any departure from the principle of merit. The Setalvad Study Team in its "Report on Centre-State Relationship" has suggested a number of measures for maintaining quality as envisaged in the original scheme of the I.A.S. These should be accepted and implemented immediately.

(4) The I.A.S. personnel should be employed in higher administrative, managerial and coordinative posts in the State and Central Governments. The State Cadres should consist of senior administrative posts like those of Chief Secretary, Development Commissioner, other Commissioners (including Commissioners of Divisions), Members of Board of Revenue, Collectors, Secretaries to Government, Deputy Secretaries of important Departments, and certain Heads of Departments. The I.A.S. should be recognized as the 'primary feeder source' for middle and senior policy and management posts (Deputy Secretary and above) in the Central Secretariat. It is, however, necessary that for manning the posts of Joint Secretary and above in the Central Secretariat, an element of selection is introduced for selecting only those officers who have shown ability and talent for administrative and managerial work at the top-most levels. The method of selection should be such as to ensure that only the deserving go to the top. Similar procedure for selection should also be introduced for manning the posts in the super-time scale of the I.A.S. in the States. This may necessitate revision of rules governing retirement and pension so that those among the officers who are dissatisfied with the result of the selection can leave the service without much pecuniary loss and can seek employment elsewhere.

The deputation-quota of various I.A.S. Cadres should be increased so that the Central Government is able to utilize the services of more I.A.S. officers than at present. The tenure system should be continued so that there is interchange of experience between the States and the Centre although at the senior levels (Additional Secretaries and Secretaries to Government of India) there may be some modification of the principle on grounds of specialization.

(5) By adopting suitable policy of training and career development, the Indian Administrative Service should be developed into a

corps of competent, professional administrators. The members of this service acquire a high degree of expertise in administrative processes and the functioning of the complex machinery of the Government by working in various levels of the State and Central Governments. This expertise is essential for manning the higher policy and management posts in civil service. Their professionalism in the subject-matter of various areas of government work should also be developed by purposive training and career development. The Report of the A.R.C. as well as those of the Study Teams give an outline of various areas of Government work. These should be carefully examined and broad areas of administration should be identified. The members of the I.A.S. should be encouraged to specialize in these areas of work.

Until now the most important method of training has always been thought to be on the job and although this will always continue to be very important, there should be more of formal training at various stages in an officer's career. The training should aim at the development of the officer's skill in administrative and managerial techniques as well as in the knowledge of the subject with which he is concerned.

Career planning in the form of carefully thought-out postings is essential for the development of required professionalism in the members of the I.A.S. Postings should take due account of a person's background, training and aptitude as well as the need for widening of experience. Through planned movement between the posts in an area of administration or related fields (covering many Departments/Ministries) officers should be encouraged to specialize. An officer should be kept in an area of administration or related areas for the first 15 years of his career in order to enable him to acquire the required professionalism. During this period he should also be posted to the Sub-division (in junior scale) and the District (in senior scale) to have experience of administration at the 'grass-roots' level and develop qualities of judgement, objectivity and coordination. This is also necessary in the interest of widening of experience of the officer. Too short a period in one job prevents an officer from being effective in a particular field of government work. Longer tenure should be allowed for officers both at the State level and the Central level. As a rule, Secretaries to Government in the States and officers in the posts of Joint Secretary and above in the Centre should be kept in jobs for not less than 5 years. Similar terms should be worked out for other posts. The need for specialization should be kept in mind while deploying officers in the States as well as in the Central Government.

Thus, by intensive training and career planning, a group of

professional administrators will be available for the highest posts in the civil service.

(6) The Class I technical services (Central and All-India) consist of specialists like Engineers, Doctors, Scientists, Economists, etc. Their role is complementary to that of the administrators and they bring in the element of expert knowledge in decision-making. They also administer the technical departments in the country. Most of these officers would like to make their careers in their own fields and would reach the highest posts in the scientific and technical spheres. Some of them, however, may show aptitude and abilities, perhaps late in their career, for administrative and managerial work and they should have the widest opportunity to man the senior policy and management posts in the Government. These personnel should, however, be selected on the basis of their ability and talent for administrative work rather than by virtue of their being specialists. Their previous background should determine their suitability for specific senior management posts.

(7) The unifunctional, non-technical Class I Services, like Audit and Accounts, Income Tax, Customs and Excise, Postal, etc., have been constituted to meet the requirement of specific skills and aptitude for the kind of work their respective executive departments do. They will develop these skills in great depth and will normally reach the highest posts in their respective spheres. Some of them, however, may exhibit ability and skills for policy and management work in the Secretariat and they should have an opportunity for manning the higher policy and management posts in the government. Their suitability for specific secretariat posts should, however, be decided on the basis of their specialized experience and not for the reason of their being members of Class I Services as is being done at present.

Thus, in the personnel system that is envisaged, the I.A.S. should continue to be the 'principal feeder source' for the higher policy, management and administrative posts, both in the States and the Central Government. The quality of the personnel joining the I.A.S., their experience-pattern, the professionalism to be developed through coherent training and career planning and the qualities of judgement, objectivity and man-management acquired by working at different levels, would make them uniquely suitable for manning the top posts in government. The officers of the technical services as well as the unifunctional services will normally man top-most posts in their respective spheres. Some of them may perhaps late in their career show abilities and talent for administrative work. They should have widest

opportunity to man the senior policy and management posts in the Central Government and there should be flexibility in making appointments to these posts. The working relationships between the technical and non-technical services should also be improved by deploying the officers in integrated hierarchies on the basis of the best man for the job.

(8) A Central Personnel Agency should be created as suggested by the Administrative Reforms Commission and this Agency should undertake job analysis at various levels of public employment and examine the work being done by the members of various services. The remuneration-pattern for various posts can be established after such detailed job analysis. This will also help place the Secretariat posts as well as the posts in the executive departments in their proper perspective and correct the irrational scale of preference which brings in the concepts of superiority and inferiority in what is essentially a cooperative venture.

(9) In administration, members of various services have different roles to play and it is important to ensure that unnecessary service-rivalries are not allowed to vitiate the atmosphere in the civil service. The Central and the State Governments have a duty to see that there is no bickering among the services.

The proposals outlined above take into consideration the constitutional and administrative set-up, as well as the socio-political conditions existing in the country and seek to improve upon what has been built over the years so that the personnel system can meet the requirements of modern times.

PATERNALISM IN NEFA ADMINISTRATION

G. C. Singhvi

WHILE going through the scholarly article on "Paternalism in Indian Administration"¹ by Dr. Haridwar Rai, one feels that history apart, paternalism in administration characterized by the control of all departments of the administration in a district by one officer, the Deputy Commissioner (D.C.), and the maintenance of direct personal contact between him and his subordinates, on the one hand, and the tribal and other villagers, on the other, has a place of pride in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) even today. The guardianship orientation has been 'watered, nurtured and allowed to flower' in NEFA. It will, therefore, be worthwhile here to have a look at what is the constitutional status, geographical location and administrative set-up of NEFA. For, with that back-drop we shall better be able to appreciate the perspectives of the paternalist ideology to which happily NEFA stands committed.

The Back-drop

NEFA is constitutionally a part of Assam. It is bounded by Bhutan on the west, the Tibetan region and Sinkiang province of China in the north and north-east and by Burma in the east and south-east. Its international border is nearly 800 miles. NEFA covers an area of 31,438 square miles (81,426 square kilometres), and hardly any of it is flat. It is 'so mountainous, so cut about, chopped up and divided by countless streams, that on a month's tour you may well climb a total height exceeding that of Everest'. The annual rainfall averages to 180 centimetres.

NEFA consists of five districts, the names of which represent the names of the main rivers flowing through each of them. The names of districts and district headquarters are: Kameng (Hqrs. at Bomdila), Lohit (Hqrs. at Tezu), Subansiri (Hqrs. at Ziro), Siang (Hqrs. at Along), and Tirap (Hqrs. at Khonsa). It is inhabited by a number of tribes, and sub-tribes, totalling 82 and covering a population

¹ Dr. Haridwar Rai, "Paternalism in Indian Administration: The Non-Regulation System of Field Administration under the British", *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XV, No. 2 (April-June), 1969.

of 2,99,944 out of a total of 3,36,558, according to 1961 census. Almost all the tribes have their own dialects.

NEFA is administered by the Union Government (Ministry of Home Affairs) with the Governor of Assam acting as Agent to the President of India under provisions of the Sixth Schedule (Table Part B) of the Constitution of India. The Governor is assisted by an Adviser. The Agency Secretariat has full fledged Planning and Development, General Administration, Home, Supply and Transport, Finance and Judicial wings and the offices of the heads of departments like Education, Medical and Health, Agriculture and Community Development, Engineering, Forests, Cooperatives, Industry, Publicity, Panchayats, Rehabilitation and Settlement. It is located at Shillong.

Each of the five districts of NEFA is under the charge of a Deputy Commissioner. There are five Sub-divisions which are in independent charge of an Additional Deputy Commissioner each. These are Tawang, Sepla, Daporijo, Pasighat and Anini. All these Deputy Commissioners (which term includes Additional Deputy Commissioners as well) are senior Indian Administrative Service/Indian Frontier Administrative Service officers. The other 10 Sub-divisions are in the charge of Assistant Commissioners (A.Cs.) or Extra Assistant Commissioners (E.A.Cs.) who belong to the NEFA Administrative Service while the 79 Circles are under the charge of Circle Officers (C.Os.).

The Administrative Officers act as "local heads for all subjects affecting their jurisdictions, such as development work, maintenance of law and order, revenue work, community development schemes, socio-cultural affairs of the people and the exercise of authority over the various installations and schemes of the various technical departments, such as Schools, Hospitals, Roads, Agriculture and so on".²

'Focal Person'

This underscores the point that, in the districts, the powers of direct superintendence and control over all governmental activities are centred in one authority, i.e., the Deputy Commissioner—the 'focal person'. This position of primacy accorded to the single overall head of the district (and his subordinate administrative officers) "has come to be known as Single Chain Administration", (an action-motivated and achievement-centred variant of paternalist administration). Under this pattern the heads of all technical offices in the districts like the Inspector of Schools,

² Shri P. N. Luthra, "Tribal Customs in NEFA Administration", *Statesman: Independence Day Supplement*, August 14, 1969.

the Agricultural Officers, the Co-operatives Officer, the Industries Officer, the Medical Officer and so on, work directly under (and as an integral part of the office of) the Deputy Commissioner. Technically speaking, they are not heads of offices (drawing and disbursing officers). Even the ministerial staff posted in their offices is not under their disciplinary control. Thus, administratively and operationally the district departmental heads are under the overall control of the Deputy Commissioner.

Administration of Justice

The edifice of the administration of justice in NEFA stands on powerful pillars of a couple of proven principles. One is that 'the tribal communities need simple codes and laws' in the formulation of which 'the local customs and usages' need be given due importance. The other one is that the customary laws and indigenous institutions of the tribal people should be maintained intact while deciding judicial cases at the village or community level. Both these criteria are eminently fulfilled by the law governing the administration of justice in NEFA—the Assam Frontier (Administration of Justice) Regulation I of 1945. Its bare 59 sections admirably encompass the whole law relating to the police, civil and criminal proceedings and evidence. The salient features of this system are:

- (1) Civil and criminal justice is administered by the D.Cs., A.Cs. and village authorities, 'all of whom are recognized as competent administrators of the law'. They are, however, to be guided by the principles and spirit (and not the letter) of the Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure and the Indian Evidence Act.
- (2) The D.Cs. and A.Cs. are appointed by the Governor. Members of village authorities are appointed by the D.Cs.
- (3) Village authorities discharge ordinary duties of police, like keeping a watch and reporting on crimes and criminals, and apprehending suspects and criminals.
- (4) Civil Police Stations, which luckily are conspicuous by their very absence in NEFA at the moment, are under the control of the D.Cs. Criminal cases are to be registered at the police stations, investigated and put up in the Courts by the investigating police officers only under the orders of the D.Cs. The supervisory police officers have only routine administration of police staff to be looked into by them.
- (5) Civil and criminal jurisdictions have been defined. A. D. C.

may try suits of any value and may pass any sentence warranted by law. An A.C. may try suits not exceeding Rs. 1,000 in value and has powers of a First Class Magistrate. Village authorities can try certain types of suits in which both parties are indigenous to the Agency. On the criminal side, these authorities may try cases of thefts, mischiefs, simple hurts, etc., provided the accused persons are resident within their jurisdiction, and may award sentences of fine not exceeding Rs. 50 for any offence.

- (6) Village authorities decide civil and criminal cases in open *Darbar* in the presence of at least three independent witnesses and both parties. Proceedings need not be recorded in writing. Similarly, statements recorded by D.Cs./A.Cs. need not be got signed by the parties concerned.
- (7) D.Cs. and A.Cs. make endeavours to persuade parties to the civil suits to submit to arbitration.
- (8) Appellate authorities have been prescribed. In certain circumstances appeals go to the Assam High Court. The High Court may entertain an appeal by special leave also. High Court and D.Cs. have powers of revision.
- (9) Sentences of death, transportation and imprisonment for seven years or more are subject to confirmation by the High Court.
- (10) The President and the Governor are vested with certain powers of suspension, remission and commutation of sentences.
- (11) No pleaders can appear in any case before the village authorities. Pleadings may, however, be allowed to appear in the Courts of D.Cs./A.Cs. with the permission of D.Cs.

These courts, with their simplified procedures possess definite advantages for the poor classes of litigants. Their working is based on the paternalist principles that cases should be tried in the simplest, cheapest and the most expeditious manner. Thus, paternalism permeates administration of justice in NEFA.

The Panchayati Raj

Paternalism has found manifestation also in the Panchayati Raj which is being introduced in NEFA under the auspices of the North East Frontier Agency Panchayati Raj Regulation of 1967. This Regulation envisions a four-tier system of Panchayati Raj—the Gram

Panchayat at the base (village level), the Anchal Samiti at the block level, Zila Parishad at the district level and the Agency Council at the apex (the NEFA Administration level). The Gram Panchayat shall be the village authority as defined by the Assam Frontier (Administration of Justice) Regulation of 1945. Its members shall be appointed by the D.C. "The idea of 'electing' people is not yet familiar"³ to the people of NEFA. Nevertheless, the other three tiers shall consist of elected bodies—the base, of course, being the Gram Panchayat. The S.D.O. (Additional D.C., A.C. or E.A.C.) shall be the President of the Anchal Samiti; the D.C. of the Zila Parishad; and the Governor of the Agency Council. The emerging pattern of paternalist Panchayati Raj would very well fit in, the well established and well set Single Chain Administration.

Single Chain Administration Weakened ?

In short, it is evident that what has come to be known as Single Chain Administration is conceptually a variant of paternalist administration and that there would be a perceptible change for the better if it is transformed structurally *also* into a Single Chain. At the moment, admittedly, there is a little lack of fusion in the links of the chain because of the induction, at the Agency level, of the heads of technical departments who function under the subordination of the NEFA Administration but who, understandably though, have no superordination, over the D.Cs. to whom the district heads of technical departments are subordinate. The entire gamut of relationships assumes a new complexion because the heads of technical departments at the Agency level are also vested with some sort of control over district officers of their departments. The ensuing duality of control over the district heads of technical departments weakens and loosens the departmental chain of command to the detriment of role-playing in the developmental drama, comprising programming and execution of developmental activities. Moreover, this induction undeniably amounts to introduction of multiplicity of authorities which tends to perplex the simple minded tribals. "We should not over-administer these areas or overwhelm them with a multiplicity of schemes."⁴ Tailoring technical appointments to suit the administrative needs is, therefore, inescapable. In order to conform to the norms of the ethos of the paternalist administration, the posts of highly paid heads of departments should willy-nilly be replaced by moderately paid technical advisers to the Administration in Medical, Education, Agriculture, Industries, Engineering, Forest, and similar other Departments.

³ Verrier Elwin, *Democracy in NEFA*, Shillong, North East Frontier Agency, 1965.

⁴ Jawaharlal Nehru, Foreword to the second edition of *A Philosophy for NEFA* by Verrier Elwin, Shillong, North East Frontier Agency, 1958.

An Integrated Set-up

The resultant hierarchical structure imparting a new meaning, a new rationality, in terms of functional considerations of public administration would be somewhat like this. At the apex there would be the Adviser to the Governor, and below him would be Secretaries-cum-Heads of Departments for specific activities or group of activities. Technical Advisers would be attached to them as part of the Secretariat (as Deputy Secretaries or the like) but they would not have any control over the district technical officers. Below the Secretary-cum-Head of a Department would be the D.C. who could, for each department be an *ex officio* joint head of that department in his own district. Under him, would be the district heads of technical departments. This 'level-jumping' would be more rational, logical and paternal, and would help in stimulating participative role-playing. In the interest of economy, efficiency, propriety and decorum, the technical advisers to the Administration and the district heads of technical departments should be placed in a pay scale not higher than the senior scale of pay of the I.A.S. and the scale of pay admissible to the A.Cs. or E.A.Cs. belonging to the NEFA Administrative Service, respectively.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it may be added that, as Raikes points out, "the paternalist Single Chain Administration of NEFA which euphemistically speaking is 'a half-way house between despotic personal rule and the Government by impersonal rule of law' and which is characterized by 'the union of all powers, executive, magisterial and judicial in the hands of the Deputy Commissioner'—the 'paternalist of the benevolent type', the 'kindly autocrat', and in a word 'a kind of terrestrial providence'. This pattern of administration is so simple, so powerful, so entirely adapted to the genius of the people that it must, like truth, prevail and sooner or later extend over the entire peninsula. However much philosophers may sneer, a 'paternal despotism' is not only the happiest but the only regime for India."



DELEGATION OF FINANCIAL POWERS

M. J. K. Thavaraj & K. L. Handa

WITH the progressive involvement of the Government in developmental activities and the increasing specialization of its functions, the nature of decisions taken has undergone a basic change and, at the same time, the points at which their implementation rests have become numerous. Such an unprecedented expansion in the scope and content of governmental activities within the framework of a highly centralized administrative structure has often led to inordinate delays and inefficiency in the implementation of the developmental programmes. Consequently, several attempts have been made since Independence to bring about a close correspondence between authority and responsibility at the various levels of administration. Of the whole gamut of delegations, those pertaining to financial powers are of crucial importance as their nature and extent would have intimate bearing on most of the administrative actions.

The need for delegation of financial powers was recognized years ago in the reports of Sir James Grigg (1934-39) and Sir Richard Tottenham (November 1945). The problem assumed added significance after Independence. It attracted increasing attention in the different administrative reforms enquiries commissioned by the Government, e.g., reports of N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar (1949), A.D. Gorwala (1951), Paul H. Appleby (1953), etc. The Estimates Committee in its Ninth Report (1953-54) stressed the need for delegation of financial powers to meet the requirements of the changed circumstances. As a result of the growing awareness of the problem both within and outside the government, greater financial powers were delegated in 1953 in respect of creation of posts and contingent expenditure. These powers were further enhanced in 1954 and again in 1955. A real break-through, however, came in 1958 when the Government of India sought to delegate enhanced financial powers based on the recommendations of Shri A. K. Chanda.¹ Another scheme of

¹ Shri A. K. Chanda, the then Comptroller & Auditor General of India, undertook the task of preparing a comprehensive plan for delegation of financial powers and for a reorganization of the system of financial control and included his plan as an appendix to the Audit Report of 1955. He recommended that to avoid delays in the issue of

delegation was worked out in 1961 which, on an experimental basis, devolved enhanced financial responsibilities on the Ministries of Commerce and Industry, Community Development, Panchayati Raj and Cooperation, Information and Broadcasting, and the Department of Food. This scheme envisaged exercise of control by the Ministry of Finance mainly through pre-budget scrutiny and through random checks and work studies. The scheme was extended to other ministries and departments of the Government of India from June 1, 1962.

Soon after the introduction the scope of this scheme had to be restricted under the impact of the Chinese aggression. The Government order of 30th September, 1964, required all proposals for new construction or for release of funds to be sanctioned in consultation with the Ministry of Finance. Another Government order, of 19th August, 1965, placed a ban on the creation of fresh posts not required for Plan schemes or security purposes. The position was, however, reviewed towards the end of 1965. Consequently, the bans imposed earlier were lifted on March 15, 1966 and the Scheme of Delegation brought into operation as it obtained in June 1962.

Of late, the Administrative Reforms Commission² has been seized of the question of delegation of financial powers. Its Study Teams on Financial Administration and on Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work³ have devoted considerable attention to this problem. The Administrative Reforms Commission has submitted to the Government of India a special report entitled "Delegation of Financial and Administrative Powers"⁴ incorporating its views on the subject.

The Delegation Scheme of June 1962 was reviewed in 1967 by the administrative ministries at the request of the Finance Secretary, and

expenditure sanctions, the particulars of the proposal referred by the administrative ministry to the Ministry of Finance at the pre-budget review stage should be furnished in greater detail to enable the Finance Ministry to carry out a better and more systematic pre-budget scrutiny and that the administrative ministries might be empowered to issue expenditure sanctions of schemes included in the budget and the cost of which did not exceed Rs. 50 lakhs.

² Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report of the Study Team on Financial Administration*, New Delhi, May 1967 pp. 49-67.

³ Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report of the Study Team on Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work*, Part II (Vol. I), February 1968, Ch. VII.

⁴ Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on Delegation of Financial and Administrative Powers*, New Delhi, June 1969. This report contains the views and recommendations of the Administrative Reforms Commission on the suggestions made in their reports by the Study Team on Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work (February 1968) and by the Working Group constituted by the Commission to report on Financial Rules (December 1968).

in the light of this review a modified scheme was evolved by the Ministry of Finance, delegating larger financial powers to the administrative ministries. The new scheme, which was introduced from October 1968, is also based on the arrangements that the Ministry of Finance will exercise its control mainly by a proper scrutiny of the schemes, proposals, etc., before inclusion in the budget and through an adequate system of reporting and test checks.

EXPENDITURE SANCTIONS

The statutory provisions under the Constitution assign to the Ministry of Finance a special position in regard to the management of financial affairs of Government. Such a pre-eminence of Finance is meant to ensure orderly allocations of limited resources between the competing demands. Traditionally, the Ministry of Finance exercised its control over public expenditure by scrutinising the various proposals of the spending departments before inclusion in the budget estimates and by according expenditure sanctions before the expenditure could be actually incurred.

The main objective of the various delegation schemes has been to improve the procedures for pre-budget scrutiny and delegate powers of post-budget expenditure sanctions to the administrative departments within broad limits. Under the Delegation Scheme of August 1958, the administrative ministries were authorized, subject to certain conditions, to issue expenditure sanctions on any scheme the total expenditure of which did not exceed Rs. 50 lakhs. These powers were enhanced under the Delegation Scheme of June 1962, which provided that any amounts, without specified limits, could be sanctioned by the administrative ministries if the projects for which such amounts were sanctioned, had been earlier scrutinized and accepted by the Ministry of Finance. The present position in this regard, therefore, is that administrative ministries have full powers to sanction expenditure on schemes or projects, provided funds are available and the scheme or the project, as a whole, has been scrutinized and accepted by the Ministry of Finance.

On the face of it, these powers of expenditure sanction vested in the administrative ministries are large enough to provide them with the necessary operational facility. But the actual position seems to be somewhat different. It has been observed that in a good many cases it is not found feasible to complete the examination and scrutiny of schemes at the pre-budget stage. The Ministry of Finance maintains that the administrative ministries do not send their schemes in time

with all the necessary details. Lump sum provisions in the budget have, therefore, been found necessary. Consequently, the powers of expenditure sanction delegated to the spending Departments cannot be exercised. On the other hand, the administrative ministries complain that the Ministry of Finance keeps asking too many and sometimes unnecessary details rather than examining the proposals in the broader perspective.

Pre-budget scrutiny of expenditure proposals by the Ministry of Finance is a well-accepted principle and is necessary to be treated with all seriousness to serve best the interest of effective financial control. Such a scrutiny is also an important pre-requisite for a meaningful operation of any scheme of delegation of financial powers. It should, therefore, be the prime concern of both the administrative ministries and the Ministry of Finance to make efforts to see that such a scrutiny is completed before the expenditure proposals are incorporated in the budget. Whereas the administrative ministries would need gearing up of their organizations to be able to submit their expenditure proposals in time and complete in all significant aspects to enable the Ministry of Finance to carry out the necessary pre-budget scrutiny, the Ministry of Finance would also need to restrict such a scrutiny to the important details of the proposals asking for such relevant information in regard thereto as the administrative ministries could be reasonably expected to procure and supply within the stipulated period.

It is well-recognized that the administrative authority responsible for executing a major scheme has to take a number of steps before such a scheme is worked out to the last detail. Under conditions of uncertainty such estimates are subject to some variations. In fact, providing for such contingencies is an important aspect of delegation plans. This being so, excessive concern for details by the Ministry of Finance would disqualify even the most carefully worked out schemes at the stage of pre-budget scrutiny thereby negating the very spirit of delegations. The latest Delegation Scheme of October 1968 states that "the preparation of budget proposals in sufficient detail and their proper pre-budget scrutiny by the Finance Ministry is an essential feature of the scheme". It is, however, left vague as to what precisely is meant by "sufficient details" supporting an expenditure proposal for a "proper pre-budget scrutiny" by the Ministry of Finance. The realization of the intentions and purposes of the Delegation Scheme would, therefore, very much depend on the attitudes of the two sides and the good faith in which the Delegation Scheme is operated.

If the administrative ministries work out the schemes and projects

in all significant details having important financial bearing and the Ministry of Finance carries out pre-budget scrutiny in a constructive, purposeful and imaginative manner, asking for only essential details in broad terms, there is no reason why the Delegation Scheme, insofar as the powers of expenditure sanction are concerned, should not work well. It would help matters if a sort of check list is drawn up by the Ministry of Finance in consultation with the administrative ministries of the broad details which it would consider essential for its examination of the proposals before they are incorporated in the budget. These broad details may relate only to the essential features of the scheme giving reasonably accurate estimates of cost to enable the Finance Ministry to determine its feasibility and suitability for sanction. The remaining details may be left to be worked out by the administrative ministries from time to time with the help of their internal finance.

Under the Delegation Scheme of October 1968, the powers of expenditure sanction will not be available to the administrative ministries in cases of Plan or non-Plan schemes for which lump sum provisions are made in the budget until full details and justification of the schemes have been furnished to the Ministry of Finance and accepted by them. The A.R.C. Study Team on Financial Administration has made the following observations on this problem:

"It is a well accepted principle of budgeting that no provision should be made for a scheme unless adequate details, together with a breakdown of cost, have been furnished to the Treasury and accepted by it. In other words, lump sum provisions, *i.e.*, provisions of which the details have not been worked out and, therefore, are not available, should not ordinarily be included in the budget".⁵

Though the principle of not resorting to lump sum provisions in the budget estimates is unexceptionable, such a recourse may be unavoidable in certain unanticipated situations. There may arise an emergency situation necessitating urgent measures and a lump sum provision of funds therefor. It may also become necessary to provide for preliminary expenses on survey, etc., in connection with a projected scheme; an itemwise and detailed breakdown of expenses may be difficult to work out in such cases. There is also another type of situation. Due to certain policies of the government or due to some sudden decisions at the higher levels about absorbing foreign aid or providing funds for some Plan schemes, a lump sum provision is

⁵ Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report of the Study Team on Financial Administration*, New Delhi, May 1967, para 9.1, p. 38.

"imposed on" the administrative ministry and it is asked to go through the various formalities with the Ministry of Finance for getting the same included in the budget estimates.⁶ Obviously, the administrative ministry would have little knowledge about the schemes to be covered by such a lump sum provision, much less their details. Of course, these are exceptional situations which could, when they arise, stand in the way of the exercise of delegated powers by the spending departments.

If, on the other hand, a lump sum provision results from the inability of the administrative ministries to adhere to the time schedule for budget making inasmuch as they are not ready with the necessary details of the scheme, such lapses in detailed planning on the part of the departments would render Schemes of Delegations meaningless and inoperative. All possible measures need to be taken to curb such a tendency of the administrative ministries. They should be pressed to work out their budget proposals, supported by all the necessary details, by the scheduled dates stipulated in the budget calendar so as to obtain the clearance of the Ministry of Finance well before the final date fixed for the purpose. In those cases, however, where funds are required to meet preliminary expenses on survey, etc., of a scheme and it is not possible to work out all the details, a small amount may be provided in the budget for the purpose. It needs hardly any emphasis that the Scheme of Delegation would work the best if lump sum provisions are avoided in the budget; and in most cases this would require advance planning of their operations on the part of the administrative ministries as part of their exercise of the formulation of budget proposals.

POWERS OF RE-APPROPRIATION

Under the Delegation Scheme of August 1958, the administrative ministries were delegated powers to re-appropriate funds in all matters except in the following cases which required concurrence of the Ministry of Finance: (a) reappropriation to augment the provision under the primary units relating to 'Pay of Officers' and 'Pay of Establishment' either for a scheme or for other types of expenditure; (b) reappropriation between the primary units under which provision is made for a scheme, involving an increase in the provision under any one such unit by more than 5 per cent or by more than Rs. 1 lakh, whichever is less; or (c) reappropriation from the provision made for a scheme to meet expenditure on any other purpose. The Delegation Scheme of June 1962 empowered the administrative ministries to reappropriate funds

⁶ Some such cases came to light during the course of another study by the authors.

between primary units under which provision was made for groups of allied schemes, subject to the grouping of such allied schemes being specified with the previous consent of the Ministry of Finance. Grouping of provisions for Plan items with other items was not permissible, and reappropriation of funds from Plan items in order to meet non-Plan expenditure required the concurrence of the Finance Ministry.

Under the latest Delegation Scheme of October 1968, the administrative ministries have been given full powers of reappropriation within a grant, provided there is no diversion of funds intended for Plan schemes to non-Plan activities and there is no augmentation of the total provision made for administrative expenses (*i.e.*, pay, allowances, and other charges) under a particular grant.

The adequacy or otherwise of the existing powers of reappropriation delegated to the administrative ministries can be gauged better if we consider the whole problem in the light of the actual operation of these powers as between the administrative ministries and the Ministry of Finance.

A study of this aspect made by us for the Administrative Reforms Commission in March 1967, revealed that the administrative ministries, in actual practice, enjoyed enough freedom in the matter of reappropriation of funds, even in those cases where reappropriation of funds could, under the rules, be done only with the prior sanction of the Ministry of Finance. The only thing the administrative ministries need ensure is that savings are available under certain sub-heads of the Grant.⁷ In the cases where the administrative ministries are in a position to locate savings under certain sub-heads of a grant, there seems to be an implicit feeling in them that the Ministry of Finance would put its seal of approval on a reappropriation proposal to divert funds from such a saving to meet an excess expenditure under some other sub-head of the same grant, and the whole process is looked upon by them as one of procedural interest only. The necessary concurrence of the Ministry of Finance is never doubted in such cases. It may also

⁷ It may be stated here that the reasons for excess in expenditure, generally, are: (i) enhancement in the rates of emoluments of the employees during the course of the financial year, which could not be foreseen at the time of framing the budget estimates; (ii) abnormal rise in market prices; (iii) meeting expenditure on items not anticipated, including expenditure for equipment and machinery ordered in the previous year; (iv) extension of schemes and activities and consequent incurring of expenditure not provided for in the initial budget estimates, etc. Savings become possible for various reasons, namely, (a) non-filling or late filling of vacant posts and non-creation of additional new posts; (b) non-execution of stipulated task; (c) less receipt of equipment; (d) postponement of construction of works; (e) postponement of purchases of stores; (f) late or non-arrival of experts from abroad; (g) termination of schemes earlier than provided for in the budget, etc.

be stated that the timing of transmission of most of the reappropriation proposals by the administrative ministries to the Ministry of Finance for approval is such as would not allow a reasonable opportunity to the Ministry of Finance to examine such proposals with any degree of thoroughness. The majority of such cases are submitted to the Ministry of Finance in the later half of March when in most cases the excess expenditure has already been incurred or committed by the operating agency, and the Ministry of Finance has to deal with a case which is a '*fait accompli*', leaving it with no choice except to acquiesce in what has already been done.

Also, the Ministry of Finance is required to dispose of all the reappropriation cases before 31st March of that particular financial year as no reappropriation order issued after that date is accepted as valid by audit authorities. Therefore, during the few days which the Ministry of Finance gets to dispose of a good lot of reappropriation cases, its examination of such proposals cannot but be carried out in a hurried and casual manner and finalized at lower official levels. We may state here that out of all the 142 reappropriation orders pertaining to the various grants of an administrative department, sanctioned during 1965-66 and examined by us, 82 were issued on or after 15th March, 1966. Similarly, in the case of another administrative department all the three reappropriation orders pertaining to a grant were issued after the 15th March, 1966. The same was true of another department where all the 8 reappropriation orders pertaining to a grant were issued after 15th March, 1966. The study also revealed that the Ministry of Finance hardly had sufficient time to examine with any degree of thoroughness reappropriation cases submitted by the administrative ministries; and since the deadline of 31st March is to be adhered to, the ministry of Finance puts its seal of approval hurriedly on such cases. It would, therefore, seem that the control exercised by the Ministry of Finance in the cases of reappropriation of funds is more nominal than real.

The report of the above study, which was completed by us in March 1967, proposed that the administrative ministries should be vested with full powers to reappropriate funds within a grant, subject to certain conditions. It is gratifying that the Ministry of Finance have, vide their Orders of October 1968, delegated to the administrative ministries full powers of reappropriation within a grant. But, as mentioned earlier, these powers are subject to the condition that there is no diversion of funds intended for Plan schemes to non-Plan activities and there is no augmentation of the total provision made for administrative expenses (*i.e.*, pay, allowances, and other charges) under a particular grant.

In view of the actual operation of reappropriation powers, as outlined earlier, it is not understood how it would serve the interests of financial control if the administrative ministries are prohibited from reappropriating funds from Plan schemes to non-plan activities even if such a reappropriation is from one development scheme to another developmental purpose. It is rather a superfluous exercise of getting a proposal for reappropriation of funds from Plan to non-plan schemes approved by the Ministry of Finance, as for all practical purposes, the Ministry of Finance endorses the decisions already made by the administrative Ministries. Moreover, it is difficult to appreciate as to why a distinction should be made between Plan and non-Plan items in the matter of reappropriation of funds and not between development and non-development items of expenditure. Once some funds have been invested in a particular year in building an asset under the Plan, the expenditure on the operation and maintenance of this asset in the ensuing years is not treated as Plan expenditure though its relevance for development cannot be questioned. It is, therefore, suggested that the administrative ministries may be delegated powers to reappropriate funds from Plan schemes to non-Plan activities so long as the latter are developmental in character.

A better procedure for financial control would be that when an administrative ministry resorts to reappropriation from one item of expenditure to another and the amount involved exceeds a specified limit, it must seek the prior concurrence of the Ministry of Finance. If the specified limit is fixed at a reasonably high level, the number of reappropriation cases coming to the Ministry of Finance would be reduced, enabling it to examine such cases with a fair degree of thoroughness. It should, however, be ensured that such proposals reach the Ministry of Finance well before the close of the financial year so as to allow it sufficient time to carry out a proper examination of the reappropriation proposals.

For cases where full powers of reappropriation vest in the administrative ministries, it may be considered that the decision-taking should be at senior levels, say, Deputy Secretary and above depending upon the amount involved in the reappropriation proposal. Such a system would ensure a more responsible exercise of reappropriation powers by the administrative ministries than what obtains at present when these decisions are taken at junior official levels. It may also be considered that the Demands for Grants are recast to comprise of allied and related items of expenditure only so that the intentions of Parliament in voting a Demand are not defeated afterwards by reappropriation of funds between entirely unrelated items of expenditure.

Again, as we have seen earlier, the Delegation Scheme of October 1968 makes the exercise of powers of reappropriation by the administrative ministries subject to the condition that there is no augmentation of the total provision made for administrative expenses (*i.e.*, pay, allowances, and other charges) under a particular grant. We do not find much of a logic in putting such a restriction on the exercise of powers of reappropriation. We are of the view that the delegation of various other financial powers to the administrative ministries would be rendered considerably ineffective if the administrative ministries are denied powers to create posts even though such a course results in augmenting the total provision made for administrative expenses.

Incidentally, we may refer here to the suggestion made by the Study Team on Financial Administration⁸ that there should be a greater overall control on the power of the administrative ministries to create posts. It has recommended that the proposals of the administrative ministries for additional staff or creation of posts should be considered by an independent and a well-trained Staff Inspection Unit and the administrative ministries should be precluded from augmenting the provisions under the 'Pay of Officers' and 'Pay of Establishment' by recourse to reappropriation. It has further stated that in the event of a sudden increase in work or work of an emergent nature devolving on a ministry they should continue to have powers to create posts of purely temporary nature for periods not exceeding three months if funds could be found by valid reappropriation within their budget provision. The Administrative Reforms Commission has expressed its agreement with the above suggestion of the Study Team on Financial Administration.⁹

We, however, find it difficult to agree with the views on the subject of either the Study Team on Financial Administration or the Administrative Reforms Commission. How do we provide an administrative ministry with the necessary operational freedom in the discharge of its functions by vesting it with powers to reappropriate funds within a grant from one primary unit under which a saving has occurred to finance another project requiring additional expenditure if the need for this excess expenditure turns out to be no more than appointing a few additional personnel for successfully executing the project? We would, therefore, urge that the restriction contained in the Delegation Scheme of October 1968 that there should be no augmentation, as a consequence

⁸ Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report of the Study Team on Financial Administration*, New Delhi, May 1967, pp. 53-55.

⁹ Cf. Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on Finance Accounts and Audit*, New Delhi, January 1968, pp. 30-31.

of reappropriation of funds, of the total provision made for administrative expenses under a particular grant, is out of tune with the rest of the provisions of the scheme and is also not in consonance with the spirit in which other financial powers delegated are supposed to be exercised.¹⁰ When financial powers are delegated to the administrative authorities to facilitate their functioning and to make for efficiency and speed in the implementation of the programmes, it is also necessary that these authorities are vested with adequate powers of creating posts needed in the execution of their tasks. Therefore, to enable the administrative ministries to make a meaningful use of the financial powers delegated to them they should be vested with full powers to create temporary posts, for even longer durations, by reappropriation of funds within a grant. Such powers should, however, be for the creation of temporary posts only, and in the event of these posts being made permanent the prior sanction of the Ministry of Finance should be essential. It is but reasonable that when an administrative authority proposes to bind the public exchequer with a long-term commitment by creating a permanent post, the Ministry of Finance should have final say in the matter and its prior approval should be necessary. Even where the powers are delegated for the creation of temporary posts only, it is imperative to ensure that such powers are exercised by the administrative authorities diligently and with due care of the established norms and standards. It may be added here that this is an area where much restraint and discipline has to be exercised in the use of financial powers so as to avoid adverse criticism from various quarters in the event of any increase in expenditure on staff. It needs hardly any emphasis that work standards should exist in the various organizations and that new posts should be created after a thorough study of the work load data.

Though the vesting of powers in the administrative ministries

¹⁰ We may quote here the views of another Study Team of the A. R. C. "At present, administrative ministries can create posts upto those of Joint Secretary's rank under their own powers subject to certain specified restrictions. We do not go along with the view of a sister study team that these powers should be curtailed on the ground that "there is considerable over-staffing in Government Departments" and that intra-ministry work study units have not built up the expertise required. We consider that delegations in regard to creation of posts cannot be looked at separately from the totality of financial delegations. The fundamental objective of delegating financial powers to administrative ministries is to make them as fully responsible and effective operationally as possible. It would be a contradictory and retrograde measure to make extensive delegations in their favour in other fields and to pull back in this matter of posts. If there is a fear that these powers may be misutilised, the answer should lie in the direction of building up arrangements for good financial management within ministries and a system of test checks from the Ministry of Finance rather than in the direction of recentralisation." Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report of the Study Team on "Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work"*, Part II (Vol. I), New Delhi, February 1968, pp. 47-148.

for the creation of temporary posts when needed is not disputed, it is suggested that the exercise of such powers should be subject to a thorough examination later by an independent Staff Inspection Unit staffed by trained personnel well-versed in the techniques of work study, work measurement, etc. Such a course would ensure that the administrative authorities exercise their powers of creation of posts according to the accepted principles and with due regard to the canons of efficiency and economy.

ADEQUACY OF EXISTING DELEGATIONS

It would seem that the Ministry of Finance has been receptive to the demands for greater delegations to the administrative ministries and has been issuing orders from time to time to give effect to its various schemes for delegation of enhanced financial powers. It is, however, difficult to give a straight answer as to whether the powers delegated so far are adequate enough to meet the present needs of the administrative ministries. The nature and extent of the financial powers delegated by the ministry of Finance to the administrative ministries would not alone provide an answer to this. The pattern of redelegations from the administrative ministries to the Heads of Departments and from them to the lower echelons and field agencies is also an important factor to be considered in judging the adequacy of existing delegations. Also, the needs for delegations would vary in the case of different organizations depending on their respective programme requirements and on whether they are to exercise such powers in normal times or in times of crisis and strain.

The Delegation Scheme of June 1962 exhorted the administrative Ministries to re-delegate, in their turn, administrative and financial powers to Heads of Departments and to other subordinate authorities, with due regard to their respective levels of responsibilities. It is well recognized that for a system of delegations to be effective, the powers delegated should seep down the line and be commensurate with the responsibilities to be discharged at the various official levels. The delegated powers should vary according to the nature and quantum of work to be performed by the delegates. Though there are a few organizations, such as the Central Public Works Department, Scientific Laboratories, etc., in which cases special financial delegations have been made, by and large, in our delegation pattern, a sort of uniformity exists inasmuch as the same type of powers are delegated to all the administrative ministries, to all the Heads of Department and to the Heads of Office.

It is not understood how the needs for financial powers of all the

administrative ministries and Departments would be the same? How would similar powers delegated to all types of Heads of Departments would meet their respective needs. Also, the different types of Heads of Office would require different delegations for successfully discharging their functions. The Ministry of Finance should, therefore, evolve more than one delegation pattern to meet the requirements of the various categories of administrative ministries and Departments, of various types of Heads of Departments and Heads of Office, in accordance with their functional variegation. Not only that, the Finance Ministry should undertake a periodical review of such delegation patterns and effect modifications to suit the changed circumstances.¹¹

The Heads of Department are, at present, not authorized to redelegate any of their powers to their subordinates. They can, however, do so with the prior consent of the administrative ministry. It has been observed that the administrative ministries are generally willing to accord approval to proposals for redelegation submitted by the Heads of Department. But the procedure of going through the formality of obtaining the concurrence of the administrative ministry is cumbersome and time consuming. It is, therefore, suggested that the powers delegated to the Heads of Department may be classified into two categories, firstly, those of a minor nature for which full powers may be vested in the Head of Department for redelegation to his subordinates according to his discretion; and secondly, powers of an important nature which can be redelegated by the Head of Department only after seeking the prior consent of the administrative ministry. Such a course would provide greater operational freedom to the Head of Department in making adjustments and readjustments in the redelegation of powers to his subordinates according to the needs of different programmes and changing circumstances.

Matching of adequate powers with the responsibilities at different official levels is not enough. It is of utmost importance that the delegates exercise the powers so delegated in the discharge of their responsibilities and for the realization of the goals and objectives of their organizations. No scheme of Delegation, howsoever well framed, would work satisfactorily unless there is a 'will' on the part of delegates to exercise the powers and on the part of the delegator to encourage the use of the delegated powers in the spirit in which they are intended. Again, the willingness of the delegatee to use his powers would very much depend on the prevailing environment and climate in which he has to function.

¹¹ The A. R. C. Study Team on Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work has echoed a similar line of argument in their Chapter "Delegations", (Chapter VII, Part II, Vol. I).

There are a number of inhibiting factors to the exercise of delegated powers, which we have observed during the course of our other studies. Sometimes the powers delegated are hedged by various conditions which the delegatee has to satisfy before exercising such powers. For instance, the Heads of Departments are empowered, under the rules, to write off a loss up to Rs. 1,000 provided: (i) it is not due to any serious negligence on the part of any government servant, (ii) it does not disclose a defect in rules or procedures the amendment of which requires the orders of higher authority or Finance Ministry, etc. In such cases where the powers delegated can be exercised only after satisfying a number of conditions, the tendency on the part of the delegates is to push cases to the higher authorities for obtaining their concurrence. The delegates do not feel sure of having satisfied the various conditions attached.

Fear of audit objections drives them to play it safe. Such fears manifest themselves in the form of frequent references to higher authorities in doubtful cases which often undermines the very spirit and purpose of delegations. The psychology of 'fear of audit' and 'public criticism' is responsible for sapping the initiative of the officers. Decisions of the administrators are often probed long after the event and when the context in which such decisions were taken has completely changed. Often they get demoralized when their individual acts of discretion are questioned. Sometimes audit objections are raised on petty and small matters and the concerned officer has to explain the lapse years after event when he might have been transferred to another organization and become completely out of touch with his previous work. To avoid landing into such like situations, the officers shy away from the exercise of discretion and prefer not to use the powers delegated to them. They try to involve as many authorities and agencies as possible in the decision-making process. Thus, the fear of being judged unfairly later for any lapse, major or minor, or for any error of judgement, acts as a big restraining influence on the officers in the matter of using their powers and taking decisions.

There may also be interference or pressure from above which make it difficult for a delegatee to exercise his powers. Verbal instructions from the higher bosses and directives given in high-level meetings may hold back the officers from exercising their delegated powers. At times, enhanced powers are delegated to the officers without their being properly equipped for the exercise of such powers. It is, therefore, obvious that adequate preparations ought to be made before launching a delegation plan and the delegates should be provided with all the encouragement and support necessary for the exercise of such powers.

Another important factor responsible for discouraging the officers from using their powers is the multiplicity of rules and regulations which are changed so often that the officers generally do not feel confident of knowing all the relevant rules while exercising their powers. In their eagerness to avoid mistakes they are prompted to consult higher authorities and seek their concurrence.

It is suggested that if the scheme of delegations is to be meaningfully operated, the exercise of powers by the delegates should be insisted upon. The Ministry of Finance should send back a case without expressing its views if the matter fell within the delegated powers of an administrative ministry. The same way the administrative ministries and Heads of Departments should insist upon the decisions being taken at levels vested with adequate powers. When references are made to them despite specific delegations, senior officers should return such cases to the subordinate officials without expressing their views thereby compelling the subordinates to take decisions falling within their ambit of authority and responsibility. Efforts towards 'neck preservation' at lower levels should be discouraged in practice. However, in the event of a genuine mistake committed in good faith, the subordinate official should be given proper and adequate protection. The exercise of powers by the delegatee, who has used his best judgement with due care, should be shown all sympathy and consideration by the higher authorities. There is an urgent need to remove from the minds of the officers the fear that they are likely to be judged unfairly if individual acts of judgement and discretion come to be questioned later. "A system of delegation will work effectively only if it is based on a trust of those working 'on-the-spot'. Trust begets trust. A system which is based on a nagging distrust of those exercising powers will be destructive of initiative, the exercise of which is essential on a large scale in this era of development."¹²

It may facilitate exercise of delegated powers if up-to-date manuals are prepared containing the various financial rules and regulations which an officer would need to know in his day-to-day functioning. Functions should be clearly demarcated for each officer and he be supplied with an up-to-date booklet of powers enjoyed by him as well as by other officers he has to deal with.

PERFORMANCE BUDGETING

The Government of India have accepted the recommendations of

¹² Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on "Delegation of Financial and Administrative Powers"*, New Delhi, June 1969, p. (i) para 4.

the Administrative Reforms Commission in regard to the introduction of Performance Budgeting in the Departments and organizations which are in charge of developmental programmes. The Government have followed it up with the preparation of alternate presentations of the budgets of some selected Ministries and Departments on a performance basis.¹³ This, however, is an initial step towards the installation of performance budgeting as a tool of management of developmental programmes. Such a budget would specify physical targets, to be accomplished according to a time-schedule. Besides, it would indicate the volume of work to be taken up by the functionaries at various levels, who are responsible and accountable for their performance in achieving the targets.

In this scheme of budgeting, patterns of delegation would assume added significance as means of accomplishing the physical goals of the organizations. In this context, apart from a proper matching of authority and responsibility at various operational levels of performance, adequate attention should also be paid to create the right type of climate and other environments necessary to motivate the delegates to exercise their powers for the effective performance of the tasks assigned to them.

Performance Budgeting also envisages suitable review of performance at various levels of operation. Such a review and control is largely based on meaningful reporting systems geared to managerial decisions. In this context, it may be worthwhile examining the role of the audit as an agency for evaluating the performance of various agencies. The Administrative Reforms Commission in their Report on "Finance, Accounts and Audit" have emphasized that the Comptroller and Auditor General should undertake propriety-cum-efficiency audit to cover all developmental activities of Government. As has been observed earlier, if the decisions of the administrators taken in their best judgement are probed much after the event and out of context of the circumstances then existing, it is bound to lead to irritations and heart

¹³ Performance Budgets were prepared for the year 1968-69 in respect of four Ministries and some organizations under them. For the year 1969-70, the Government prepared performance budgets for the following Ministries/Departments:

- (1) Ministry of Irrigation and Power;
- (2) Department of Food;
- (3) Department of Communications; (a) Posts & Telegraphs Department, (b) Overseas Communications Service, (c) The Monitoring Organization, (d) Wireless Planning & Coordination Wing;
- (4) Ministry of Health, Family Planning, Works, Housing & Urban Development: (a) Department of Health, (b) Department of Family Planning, (c) Central Public Works Department, (d) Chief Controller of Printing & Stationery;
- (5) Ministry of Shipping & Transport; and
- (6) Ministry of Tourism & Civil Aviation: (a) Department of Civil Aviation, and (b) India Meteorological Department.

burning among the officers and would leave a demoralising effect on them. Efficiency audit by an outside authority would give a handle to the audit agency to question individual acts of discretion and the soundness of an officer's judgement. Such a development is bound to vitiate the climate for the exercise of delegated powers by the functionaries. The officers under such a situation would prefer to play safe and avoid taking decisions and responsibility. In our view, efficiency audit by an external agency would be a serious inhibiting factor to the exercise of powers by the delegates resulting in delays, inefficiency and uneconomic execution of the projects.

We could also look at the problem from another angle. The present audit authority as it is constituted, conducts audit, by and large, with the assistance of auditors who belong to lower clerical cadres. It is true that other subordinate officers namely, Accountants (non-gazetted) and Assistant Accounts Officers (Class II Gazetted), supervise the work of the audit teams which are further placed under the charge of a Deputy Accountant General. But the fact remains that the bulk of such work is done by the functionaries at the lowest rung, namely, Auditors. The question, therefore arises as to whether such a body of officials would be competent to conduct efficiency audit of other organizations? Will it not seriously vitiate the climate for the exercise of delegated powers by the officers when they know that their judgements and actions would be commented upon later by these junior officers from the Comptroller and Auditor General's organization? A comment on the efficiency of another officer would evoke respect only when the Auditor is of an equivalent or higher rank than the officer whose work he comments upon. Also, such an auditor should have built up a reputation about his knowledge of the specialized area in which he conducts efficiency audit.

In view of the present shortage of trained manpower of the specific type, a further question arises as to whether it would be possible for the Comptroller and Auditor General to raise a large contingent of senior officers, divided into teams of specialists, for conducting efficiency audit in the various specialized fields to cover all developmental activities of the Government? If attempted, will the cost of such a measure be not prohibitive? We are, therefore, of the view that the work of efficiency audit should not be assigned to an outside authority like the Comptroller and Auditor General's organization.

This is, however, not denying the importance of the regularity-cum propriety audit which this organization is already conducting and which should continue to remain its responsibility. But, the task

of efficiency audit should be an internal function carried out by an agency under the charge of the chief executive of the organization who is ultimately responsible and accountable for the achievement of results in terms of the objectives and targets laid out for his organization. The chief executive would be in a better position to gear such an agency to the needs of his organization, keeping in view the various considerations and maintaining the necessary climate for the proper exercise of delegated powers and shouldering of responsibility. Higher authorities like the administrative ministry and the Cabinet would also be there to sit in judgement on the overall efficiency of an organization.

DELEGATIONS AND FINANCIAL ADVISER

With the enhancement of powers of the administrative ministries over larger areas of responsibilities, the availability of expert advice to them on diverse and sometimes complex financial matters is of utmost importance. The need for developing cost consciousness within the spending Departments and agencies has been emphasized in all the delegation schemes. The institution of Financial Advisers in various forms have been suggested from time to time for this purpose. Accordingly, the Delegation Scheme of October 1968 emphasises that competent financial advice should be available internally to the administrative ministries. It gives the administrative ministries full powers to appoint Internal Financial Advisers of their choice and provides that the Internal Financial Adviser should be consulted in all cases before the exercise of delegated powers although it is open to the administrative Secretary to overrule his advice by an order in writing. According to the scheme, the administrative ministries should indicate in the sanctions issued by them in the exercise of their delegated powers that they have been issued after consultation with the internal Financial Adviser. The Scheme of October 1968 also permits the grouping of Ministries/Departments to be served, in certain circumstances, by a common Internal Financial Adviser.

In view of the complex and extended responsibilities which have devolved on the administrative Ministries and its officers in the wake of plans of economic development, the expertise of a financial adviser in matters pertaining to Finance should prove of great help in solving many a problem arising in the day-to-day working of the Ministry. It is, however, not understood as to why the Scheme of Delegations (October 1968) should treat an Internal Financial Adviser as differently from any other Joint Secretary in the administrative Ministry. The role of the Financial Adviser is to advise and assist the administrative Secretary in financial matters as is done by the other Joint Secretaries

in other matters. It should be left to the administrative Secretary, who is ultimately to assume full responsibility for a decision taken, to utilise the services of and take work from the Financial Adviser in whatever way he considers best. How much use is made of the presence of a Financial Adviser in the Ministry should be left to be decided ultimately by the personal equation which comes to be established between the administrative Secretary and the Financial Adviser and the amount of confidence which the former develops in the latter. The administrative Secretary need not be under any compulsion to consult the Financial Adviser in all cases of the exercise of delegated powers. If he has strong reasons to do otherwise, he may have freedom to by-pass the Financial Adviser and take the decision all by himself. It is enough that he assumes full responsibility for his actions and is accountable for the results. We may add here that the nature of expertise of the Financial Adviser being such, the administrative Secretary would be very much inclined to consult him in all matters having financial bearing. However, we are not in favour of providing any restrictions in the Delegation Scheme whereby an administrative Secretary is bound to consult the Financial Adviser while exercising the delegated powers and he has to record in writing his reasons for over-ruling the Financial Adviser in any particular case.

We are of the opinion that too rigid walls should not be erected around the Financial Adviser and the function of financial advice. The endeavour should be to train each of the officers as his own financial adviser so as to become adequately equipped to dispose of a good many cases of financial implications where he feels confident about his knowledge of rules and is prepared to take full responsibility. It is only to deal with difficult and complicated financial matters that a cadre of Finance Officers headed by the Financial Adviser carved out of the existing administrative hierarchy should exist to render expert advice when called upon. Such a cadre should remain an integral part of the administrative hierarchy in the organization and be completely under the head of the administrative Department. Some common functions like managing the budget and accounts work of the organization may also be put under the charge of these officers. However, the main responsibility for effective financial control should be that of the executive officers functioning at various levels. Such a course would considerably reduce the work load of the staff of the organization of the Financial Adviser and leave them with enough time to attend to those important and complex financial matters which the executive officers cannot dispose of by themselves. The administrative Secretary should have the discretion to assign this work of financial advice to any of his senior subordinates (a Joint Secretary) in whose competence

he has confidence. This senior officer rendering financial advice would form an integral part of the administrative ministry, functioning completely under the administrative Secretary and assisting him in the same way as any other Joint Secretary in the same Ministry.

If the position of a Financial Adviser is made similar to that of any other Joint Secretary in the administrative Ministry, it may not be possible to appoint one Financial Adviser to work for a group of Ministries/Departments as is envisaged in the Delegation Scheme of October 1968. However, if the work-load in an administrative Ministry pertaining to financial advice does not justify having a whole-time functionary for the job, the administrative Secretary should have powers to assign to the Financial Adviser any additional duties relating to other work of the Ministry. There need not be any fears entertained about this suggested arrangement so far as the role of the Financial Adviser is concerned and as regards the quality of financial advice to be tendered by him. The administrative Secretary, the Financial Adviser, the Joint Secretaries and other officers in the hierarchy are all limbs of the same government machinery and are supposed to consider matters in a purely objective and unbiased manner with due regard to the policies and decisions of government and to give honest and impartial advice to the authorities above them. There is no reason why a particular limb, namely, the Financial adviser should not function objectively and discharge his duties effectively as is expected of any other officer in the organization. The fact of the Financial Adviser being placed completely under the control of the administrative Secretary should not deter him from giving his independent and honest advice on financial matters as it is not supposed to happen in the case of any other conscientious Joint Secretary working under the same administrative Secretary. Also, it should not give rise to any misconceptions about the position and role of the administrative Secretary as he must remain fully responsible for the efficient and economical administration of the programmes entrusted to him and be accountable for the results.

PROFESSIONALISM IN CIVIL SERVICE

B. K. Dey

PROFESSIONALISM has of late become a fashionable term, almost a byword, in the parlance of public personnel administration. In the raging debate of the day, the slogan among the public services seems now to be 'professionalise or perish'. This has been heightened by the Prime Minister's recent pronouncement about 'committed bureaucracy'. The initial fog having now been dispelled, it has become abundantly clear that what the Prime Minister is advocating¹ represents almost the highest that the public services should seek to achieve, and interpreted correctly, it should really lead to one very distinct and distinguished acquisition for the civil services, that is, professionalism which alone can inject satisfying element into the services and bring about better policy formulation, more effective programme implementation, and all round community contentment.

Nature of Professionalism

The term 'professionalism' implies the existence, in good measure, of certain essential attributes connected with a profession. A profession has been defined in the Oxford English Dictionary, as "a vocation in which a professed knowledge of some department of learning or science is used in its application to the affairs of others or in the practice of an art founded upon". It is not merely a collection of individuals who eke out a living for themselves by the same kind of work; it essentially refers to a body of men who carry on their work in accordance with the rules (or recognized conventions) designed (or followed) to enforce certain standards for the superior performance of their duties and responsibilities, for greater service to the public, and for a more effective protection of the rights and interest of their membership group. A 'professional' would be distinguished from an ordinary 'laity'² by a more positive correlation between the acquisition of certain learning, and its applied excellence in the performance of his assigned functions within the frame of some accepted code of conduct geared to promote

ultimate public good. It fact, in spite of his specific pre-entry knowledge-base pertaining to concepts, techniques or other skills germane to his functional field, a professional has continuously to explore, even in his post-employment career, the (new) unknowns of his earlier knowledge and re-equip himself constantly for better and perfected performance.³

It is possible to list certain traits which are basic to, and characteristic of, a professional group of public officials. They are:

- (i) an organized body of knowledge and its various disciplines which is available to its members;
- (ii) establishment of norms of competence for not merely initial entrance but also subsequent elevation in the service and consistent effort to secure general acceptance of these standards;
- (iii) the need for development of such basic skills through training opportunities for the existing and prospective members of the profession;
- (iv) a well-developed sense of dignity and worth as also the professional prestige attaching to the appropriate segment of public service;
- (v) a code of ethical conduct, violation of which by any member will serve to debar him from the profession; and
- (vi) an effective organization for the promotion of these objectives.

It would indeed be impossible to compile a complete catalogue of criteria⁴ whose existence or absence would categorically decide any group's inclusion into, or exclusion from, the province of professionalism. These illustrative yet important traitist 'differentia' help, nevertheless, in identifying with relative facility the professional groupings and

³ Fulton defines 'professionalism' as including two main attributes, "one is being skilled in one's job—skill which comes from training and sustained experience. The other is having the fundamental knowledge of and deep familiarity with a subject that enables a man to move with ease among its concepts. Both spring from and reinforce a constant striving for higher standards". *The Civil Service, Report of the Committee 1966-68*, Vol I, London H. M.'s Stationery Office.

Please see B. K. Dey, "Fulton Report—Some Comments", *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol XIV, No. 4 (Oct.-Dec.) 1968 for an operational critique of Fulton's concept of professionalism.

⁴ York Willbern, "Professionalisation in the public services. Too Little or Too Much?" in Claude E. Hawley and Ruth G. Weintraub (Eds.) *Administrative Questions and Political Answers*, Princeton (N.J.) D Van Nostrand Co. Inc., 1966.

¹ *The National Herald*, New Delhi, dated 6.9.1970.

² "All professions are conspiracies against the laity", George Bernard Shaw, quoted in "The Fulton Report: The Role of the Professional", by W. G. Harris, *Public Administration*, (London), Spring 1969, Vol. 47.

in distinguishing them from the purely 'technical'.⁵ Over the years, there had been rocketing membership of different professional groups and services. Old professions are branching off into new ones and are becoming differentiated. Completely new professional areas have also been carved out—partly through splintering off from established ones and partly as a result of syntheses of older skill-groups. Those, which were earlier classed as "skilled trade", are now getting promotion (through later sophistications in theory and application) into "professional grade". Experience of the past, analysis of the present, and forecast of the future seem to suggest that the embryo of professionalism making perhaps its first small sprouting in the courtyard of 'guild' of the earlier centuries, has now grown into a 'great banyan', firmly rooted in the field of public personnel administration.

Professionalist Take-over

The inevitability of impending professionalist take-over from what is lay and amateurish in administration comes in sharp relief when we focus our attention of the changing pattern of tasks and functions of the present-day administration and make a projective assessment of the nature and style of administration in the seventies or perhaps the eighties. There is, in this diagnosis, the implied assumption that public services of yesterday, their structure, procedure, personnel, etc.—are going to be generally inadequate, and will, in reality, be thrown out of gear, to cope with the administrative imperatives of tomorrow. Indeed, meeting the future challenge squarely enough will be an impossible exercise for 'status quoistic' services with only traditional or conventional skills available with them; it would surely need a new commitment, a pervasive and permeative ethos, and sharper tools and equipment.

⁵ To understand the real import of professional grouping, it may be apposite to quote here from the definitions of 'professional engineers' and of 'technicians', agreed to by the European and United States Engineering Committee and accepted by Britain's Council of Engineering Institutions:

"A Professional Engineer is competent by virtue of his fundamental education and training to apply the scientific method of outlook to the analysis and solution of engineering problems. His work is predominantly intellectual and varied, and not of a routine mental or physical character. It requires exercise of original thought and judgement and the ability to supervise in technical and administrative work of others...."

A Technician Engineer is one who can apply in a responsible manner proven techniques which are commonly understood by those who are experts in a branch of engineering or those techniques specially prescribed by professional engineers."

One should, however, hasten to add that this distinction, though broadly valid, is not really divisive, as each group depends upon the other and the demarcating line can at times be too tenuous to be distinctively recognizable as separate entities.

Administration of Seventies: Olympian Change

What is going to be the character of future administration in a country like ours, say, in seventies? From 'warfare' to 'welfare', from 'agraria' to 'industria', or from what Morstein Marx calls negative 'nightwatchmanship' to positive 'state-manship',—in short, from passive regulation to positive management is not 'just a small step but a giant leap forward', to use the mighty expression of the Appollo 11 astronaut. The compulsive positivism of modern state, particularly the assumption of new roles as a promotor of public good in the social sector, as a dynamic entrepreneur in economic and industrial fields, and as the fountain spring of all round developmental and directive forces, has its counterpart implications for the public services⁶ whose charge it is to marry ideological philosophy with administrative idiom, to transform policies into programmes and to function as a feed-back for suggesting not merely what is rational but also what is feasible.

New administration's challenging tasks in ushering in an egalitarian society⁷ based on socialization of opportunities for all, modernization of traditional institutions, re-ordering and rationalizing the system of societal-relationships, etc., as also in bringing about a self-reliant affluent socialist economy through gigantic state projects, production and distribution system, presuppose a major bureaucratic breakthrough, indeed they need a momentous managerial explosion. The basic shift in the nature and style of functioning consequent on development administration's taking up multi-dimensional activities⁸ of Olympian proportions is a significant pointer to the vastly different varieties of new skills that management has necessarily to acquire. For instance, administering an awakened agricultural community which is not inert, uneducated or temperamentally fatalistic as before, but which demands all benefits from many institutional and technological innovations and new strategies evolved in the agricultural sector (whose generic name has come to be known as 'green revolution'), postulates a band of agricultural administrators who should not merely have a good grasp

⁶ A Hand-book of Public Administration, New York, United Nations, part I, 1961, "To an ever-increasing degree, the effective utilization of national resources depends upon the adoption of the sound economic and social programmes, whose success in turn depends upon an effective public service."

⁷ *Ibid.* "The concept of the service state has been almost universally accepted. Governments have taken upon themselves the responsibility for the direction and utilization of manpower, natural resources, and the fast growing technology of the modern world for the creation of an environment conducive to widespread economic and social well being... less and less are they (the people) resigned to lives of poverty, hunger, illness, ignorance and idleness."

⁸ For details, see B. K. Dey, "Bureaucracy and Development—Some Reflections", *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XV, No. 2 (April-June), 1969.

of science and technology of agriculture but also of other infra-structural processes representing financial, marketing, storing and other relevant inputs of development; what is more, such administrators must be capable of utilizing mass-communication media to their effective advantage.⁹ Similarly, managing steel mills, atomic reactors, ship-yards and other sophisticated industrial projects or piloting intricate programmes, like family planning or population control, health, urban housing, education, etc., demand invariably an educated understanding of, and a deep familiarity with, the concepts, principles and practices germane to the concerned sectors of activity, in short, the knowledge of relevant technology of operation in every such functional sphere often requiring a multi-disciplinary approach;¹⁰ they also call for a new orientation-cum-commitment, a new drill of skills involving initiation and maintenance of a continuous harmonious dialogue with both other specialists and professionals in the field as well as the most important dimension in administration, namely, the people. In other words, all those skills, namely, conceptual, technical and human relations, have to be imbibed by the administrators of tomorrow through a healthy synthesization of knowledge at the "campus" and a deep exposure of 'live' experience at the "capitol". This forms the basic foundation for the professionalism-edifice.

New Frontiers

It can confidently be anticipated that the future administrators in charge of managing such a colossal change following from the assumption by the government of transformatory functions in all spheres of societal life must acquire a basic literacy in the following fields, namely:

- (i) science and technology;
- (ii) social and behavioural sciences;
- (iii) economics in government;
- (iv) management in government and all that goes to make administration management-oriented; modern tools of management and other numeric aids (or quantitative techniques) to decision-making with particular accent on economic analysis.

⁹ Kamla Chowdhry, "Developing Administrators for Tomorrow", *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol XV, No. 2 (April-June), 1969.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* "(The administrator) is the partner of other specialists in the numerous techniques that the modern world has evolved. He must work side by side with experts in social, economic, fiscal and industrial affairs in law and political science, in engineering, agriculture, health, education, science and culture."

- (v) human relations in management;
- (vi) impact of 'people' on the policy and programmes for change, nature of group dynamics, and public relations;
- (vii) research and development.

It is not suggested that future administrators have all to be scientist or technologist *per se*, though the place of the latter in tomorrow's administration will have to be made secure and commensurate with the increasingly important role they are expected to play. The development of science in such fields as transport and communications, electronics, aeronautics, power and indeed weapons of war together with the latest need for experts in the field of social and economic engineering must contribute to the growth of a new tribe of public servants! Quite clearly, in the modern age of technology and science, the experts belonging to these disciplines must find an increasingly important position in society. This is a universal secular trend, much to be welcomed.¹¹ The general administrators on their part must also imbibe what the Prime Minister calls a broad "scientific temper"¹² which must permeate down the line and replace the earlier amateuristic or simplistic approach. This is possible only through goal-oriented, well-structured training courses and more purposive career development programme operated through a dynamic deployment and placement plan which can make good administrator of a specialist as also an administrative 'specialist' out of a generalist administrator.¹³

Another important area on which emphasis needs to be placed in some good measure is social and behavioural sciences. Indeed, if the new administrators have to function as a catalyst of change, they need to know the 'dynamics of resistance' and other factors involved in the process of change—individual, group and community-wise. When reaching decisions, they have to take into account such social factors as community attitudes and values, rural sociology, and industrial relations. As social element enters into a vast number of administrative

¹¹ S. Banerji, "A Unified Civil Service" *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. IX, No. 2 (April-June), 1963.

¹² *The Statesman*, Delhi, Feb. 6, 1970.

¹³ The Fulton Report puts great emphasis on training for both categories, namely, (i) general administrators, not only in the techniques of administration but also in the subject matter of the two broad groups, economic financial and social; and (ii) specialists (e.g., scientists, engineers, etc.), in administration and management in addition to their normal skills in their specialization. The Civil Service College would conduct, *inter alia*, these training programmes.

decisions, it postulates a training in social psychology. The future social administrators, therefore, cannot at all escape taking account of psychological and social trends in the community, social structure, community organization, and group dynamics."¹⁴

The idea here, again, is not to train the administrator as a behavioural scientist but to give him a conceptual framework that would help him to observe, comprehend, analyse, and evaluate a decision situation in its total perspective, without which observations tend to become biased, irrelevant, and unrelated to 'inner soul' of realities. Like a physician using conceptual knowledge of anatomy, physiology, biology, etc., in diagnosing a patient or in evaluating a public health hazard, etc., an administrator applies his knowledge of social behavioural sciences to deal with human problems.¹⁵

Similarly, since administration of seventies cannot but have its eyes fixed on widening economic and industrial horizons, administrators have to engage in economic programming, formulation of policies on firm structure, price support, industrial development, expansion of employment opportunities, market promotion, and other cognate functions which presuppose not merely a nodding acquaintance but a basic understanding of the forces influencing and determining the economy as a whole.¹⁶ Decisions with far-reaching economic implications have to be taken on state investment in infra-structure, and the financial implications of various forms of state aid for health, welfare and environmental services have to be examined. It seems, therefore, that knowledge of economics and mechanics of economic analysis are essential requirements for administrators. The application of quantitative techniques of decision-making to governmental affairs has lately acquired significant importance, particularly in the context of enormous potentialities opened up by the vast data-handling capacities of computer and also in the light of other sophisticated tools of management like network analysis, PERT, CPM, OR, PPBS, Management Accountancy, etc., that help in arriving at better and more effective managerial decisions, through rationalisation of criteria for formulation, selection and evaluation of schemes and projects. These modern 'aids' requiring what Fulton calls a "high level of numeracy" must enable the administrators to perform their overall management functions like planning, organising, staffing, directing, coordinating, and budgeting, (*i.e.*, Gullick's POSDCORB) much more effectively.

¹⁴ T.P.O'Connor, "The Fulton Report", *Administration* (Ireland), Autumn 1968 (Vol. 16, No. 3).

¹⁵ Kamla Chowdhry, *op. cit.*

¹⁶ T.P.O'Connor, *op. cit.*

Management to be fully effective must not merely direct its attention to capital-machine technology but concentrate on an equally important input, namely, human resources, and must believe in and practise human relations approach. Administration after all consists of human beings, operated by persons having feelings, complexes, ambitions of their own and interacting even in their largely impersonalized behaviour while functioning under a formalized administrative framework (often euphemistically called a machine). It is, therefore, very essential that for running the 'show' at a sufficiently high level of efficiency over a long period, not only constantly improving innovations in operative technology would be called for but also new motivations, impelling the administrators to identify themselves completely with the organization goals and to put in their might and mite to productive processes, must also be worked up. Even new experiments may have to be conducted if the vital human element in the administrative 'machine' is not to fail. Which means administration has itself to be human, as well as humane, and not degradingly depersonalized in regard to its relationship with its various client-groups. Indeed, Theory X must now yield place to Theory Y.¹⁷

In fact, in the frame of democracy in bureaucracy, the dignity and human value of every individual in the organization must needs to be recognized. What, then, becomes relevant in the changed context is really creating opportunities, releasing potential, removing obstacles, encouraging growth, providing guidance, in short, generating a climate where the higher needs of the organization-man rather than his mere physiological or 'safety' needs¹⁸ can be fulfilled. The future managers must know, not merely intuitively but also by cultivated knowledge and sustained experience, the new styles and management methodology, that will result in more productive group-goals and which can be ignored only on peril of resentment, disharmony and friction, withheld efforts, and programme failures. It is a truism to say that the age of administrators depending on, and managing by 'flair or force of personality or a good honours degree' is gone; the new era is one in which the administrators must learn to do the hard 'home task', be literate and remain up-to-date, and simultaneously inculcate the skills suited to the needs of emerging situations.

While both the qualitative flavour or inner refinements of individual personality, and quantitative managerial gadgets are necessary for better and efficient performance, their operational sharpness would be

¹⁷ Douglas McGregor, *The Human Side of Enterprise*, New York, McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960.

¹⁸ Maslow, A.H., *Motivation and Personality*, New York, Harper & Bros., 1964.

rendered blunt, if the other equally important area, namely, public relations and popular participation in public programmes, is not adequately cultivated. That management of public affairs is a participative and partnership enterprise and no longer a paternalistic, authoritarian venture, and that people is a dimension in administrative dispensation, significant and meriting much greater attention than it had received in the past, have increasingly to be accepted now by administrators of the new kind. S. Banerji has, in one of his recent articles, drawn pointed attention to the importance of 'public counter' and 'counter clerk' in the new administration. It is difficult to resist the temptation of quoting him here, rather at some length.

"It is, however, a matter of some regret that such attention as Indian Administration has received since Independence has tended to relate, by and large, to the relatively higher, rather than the so called 'lower levels' of administration. And yet it is at these 'lower' levels that a million points of contact are established everyday between the administration and the common citizen. . . . If administrative reforms are to catch the imagination of the people of this country, our thinking and action will have to descend to the crucial level of the counter clerk in the millions of public offices at the ground level. . . . Not only the development in this country but the very contentment of a free people, going through the experience of great awakening to their rights and needs, will depend in a large measure upon the responsiveness and behaviour of administration at the lowest levels. The selection and training of the man at the counter determines the 'face' that administration puts up to the people. The choice of good looking and friendly females for public counters is really an 'administrative device' commonly in vogue in the advanced Western world. At least, the avoidance of the 'dyspeptic' or the 'disappearing' type at our public counters will go a long way to improve the image of our administration."¹⁹

This concern for and service to the people must be the prime-movers of administrative behaviour, not only on the operative frontier but also right through the line to the top. Just as the cutting edge cannot be allowed to get blunt, so also must the sensibility of "the higher and taller" be kept sharpened. For long the administrators have only felt, and worked under, the weight of the top, but in the years ahead, the administration must have to reckon with the pressure from below, the gush of on-rushing people.

¹⁹ S. Banerji, "Random Reflections", *Management in Government*, Journal of Department of Administrative Reforms, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi, Vol. I No. 1, April-June, 1969.

Rather than living in a closed and secluded chamber of their own, the administrators of tomorrow must have to come out in the open and face an exciting society of people pulsating with passion, asserting their rights, demanding their dues, and, perhaps, settling the old scores. How can an administrator afford to live in complete isolation from this mainstream and yet be effective? It will only be emphasising the obvious to say that all administrators worth their salt must develop minimum literacy, nay expertise in depth, regarding the complex reflexes of people's attitudes, motives, motivations, psychology, etc., group dynamics, the parameter of the whole society on the move. Indeed, if professionalism in public services has any meaning, it cannot mean anything less than devoted commitment to the cause of 'public interest', not in its woolly, amorphous and unidentifiable sense but in the shape of serving the real interest or cause of the public, i.e., people.

Indeed, the new administrators must function in future, keeping their eyes, trained as they should be, wide open not only to the changing objectives of their organizations, but also to the total societal value. This underpins importance of research, exploring the new turns and unknown watersheds of their functional context and achieving integration of their roles with the overall goals of administration. Research into the diverse facets of administrative universe is not only necessary, but also essential to gain an understanding of the milieu interacting so vitally on the administrator. Study of ecology of administration should, thus, form an absorbing and continuous, preoccupation of new tribe of administrators! Who can, then, deny the pride of place being given to research and development as an area where administrators must take an abiding interest? Administrative intelligence as an aid to purposeful research must needs to be organized in an efficient manner and put to effective use so that 'smog' is cleared up, visibility of goals gets brightened, and means and measures adopted are geared to reach the set ends! Indeed, the new lines of development must also be discovered to be in step with the march of time. When in advanced countries 1 per cent of the GNP is set apart for R & D projects, it is not too much to expect that our administrators at least aim at and attain a minimum research-orientation and follow the path of strict objectivity, i.e., subjecting any question, problem or issue to the incisive scrutiny on the basis of collection, collation and interpretation of all relevant data and adopting an inter-disciplinary approach.

These are some of the significant new dimensions of administration in the years ahead,—resultant of state activism, functional gigantism,

and new developmental strategy, which all call for much intellectualization of administration, technological sophistication and long-range thinking and perspective planning. Can any administrator, in such a changed environment, throw in his proper weight, if he remains a prisoner of precedents, a total conformist allergic to the wind of change that blows over the administrative world? A scientific (or professional) administrator would be sterile and ineffective if he is a 'preserver rather than an innovator'. Most tasks encountered in the contemporary world call for organizations wherein creative thinking and innovation are essential ingredients of survival as well as growth.²⁰ If even the advanced West suffers from a management gap,²¹ which has resulted in a prosperity gap, the developing economies bent upon seeking new frontiers of socio-economic development must before long have to bridge this gulf and catch up fast to avoid stagnation in backwater pool.

The crux of the question then is how we can impart to our administration the much needed management-orientation and make the public services embrace the religion of professionalism, and how soon. Leonard D. White sounded prophetic, when, writing in 1926, he stated that one of the main lines of development which might be expected in the future was "the emergence of the specialist and the expert, the origin of significant economic and professional organization of public employees."²² The whole stretch of public services must be made expert and trained, and inured to professionalism founded on the finest principles of specialised competence, 'elitism', 'separatism', self-esteem, social status, and strong 'group consciousness'.²³ This calls for jettisoning, at the very outset, the nostalgia for inflated virtues of generalism—the tradition of glorifying the cult of the "amateur", "all-rounder" or "gifted layman",²⁴ who is mistakenly accepted, on account of a chance success in a highly academic examination at the age-range of 21-24, as a "miracle man" competent to hold, up to his 58 years of age and, certainly, without any sustained spell of specialized training, any post in any area from, say, steel, family planning, oil exploration, foreign trade, shipping, heavy engineering to agriculture or even, hospital administration, etc. That this monopolistic control of senior

²⁰ Vikram A. Sarabhai, "Science and National Goals," *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XV, No. 3 (July-Sept.), 1969.

²¹ Atma Ram, "Scientists and Management", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XV, No. 3 (July-Sept.), 1969.

²² L. D. White, *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration*, London, MacMillan, 1926.

²³ A. M. Carr Saunders and P. A. Wilson, 'Professions', *Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences*.

²⁴ Lord Fulton (Chairman), *The Civil Service, Report of the (Fulton) Committee, 1966-68*, Vol. I, London, H.M.'s Stationery Office.

management by generalists is the bane of our public personnel administration has been emphasized, in no uncertain terms, by the Study Team of the Administrative Reforms Commission of India chaired by C. D. Deshmukh. The said Report suggests:

"The monopoly of generalism should be broken. Specialization should be gradually developed among generalists, and specialists and technical personnel freely inducted into secretariat wings . . . We would favour experimenting in the direction of an integrated hierarchy for all these within a wing rather than system of parallel hierarchies for generalists and specialists."²⁵

The heavy, almost total, reliance on the generalists deprives, and more will it do in future, the administration of the depth which might come from a large mixture of persons possessing 'basic' or specialized qualifications. The myth that specialists are all incapable of displaying the skills and broad administrative vision necessary for senior management stands already exploded. Indeed, it is difficult to prove that the intensive preoccupation of an expert with a particular field of activity comes in the way of sound administrative judgment. "No self respecting technician can accept the assumption which underlies much official procedure that the acquisition of long training of his specialist skill has deprived him of such common sense and business judgment as he previously possessed."²⁶ When, on the contrary, one remembers that "civil service is now in the business of managing a highly complex techno-industrial society and this is quite a different job requiring different and more technical skills and an entirely and more positive approach", one cannot but be led to the conclusion that what is required in this changed context is "a more forceful concept of public service and a civil servant who is more professional, adaptive and creative."²⁷

How do we envision that public service which is at once generalised, yet should be specialised and professionally adaptive?

²⁵ Administrative Reforms Commission (India), *Report of the Study Team on Machinery of the Government of India and its Procedures of Work*, Part II, (Vol. I), Feb., 1968. Most experts regard this relationship as an "unhappy shot gun marriage in which bureaucrats have an arbitrary controlling position", K. Price, 'Government and Science'.

²⁶ Arthur Newsholme, *The Last Thirty Years in Public Health* quoted in S. Banerji *op. cit.* In fact, the best students of the academic world in India today are, by and large, taking up technological and other professional careers and to hold that they keep their 'brains' mortgaged when they pass out of institutions of their professional learning for taking up administrative jobs or lose it later in life is obviously next to absurd. To work on this basis would be making the society distinctly poorer.

²⁷ Evidence of the Labour Party in U.K. before the Fulton Committee on the Civil Services.

The Generalist—His Speciality

When one talks of professionalism, one tends to assume that generalism is its opposite pole and that the so-called generalist is really a dilettante amateur with little that is required of him by way of special ability or knowledge or anything like a professional experience of his line. Both these assumptions are to some extent erroneous. The general impression that the generalist can lay no claim to any special ability which is relatable to his specific spheres of duties or his experience is similarly not fully correct. The generalist, in his sphere²⁸ can also do his bit professionally. As pointed out by S. Banerji:

"In truth, there are special skills of a generalist administrator which commonly escape reckoning because, as Eric Ashby says, 'these skills, despite the striving of academic departments which teach administration, have not been reduced to order and codified in text books'. Whether in a law and order or other situation of emergency, or in the matter of man-management and public relations and whether this be with non-officials or teams of experts and departmental officers among whom he is required to bring about coordination—all such situations, typical of the tasks confronting a generalist administrator call for, on his part, the qualities of prompt and sound decision-making tact, imagination, initiative, organization and leadership, and other personal qualities which have to be systematically cultivated That these reflect a set of 'general' qualities does not take away from the fact that they represent skills of a special kind which administrative experience alone can provide. Indeed, his proficiency in the dynamics of human relations and his gift of objective appraisal of situations would seem to correspond to the special knowledge and skill of the technician."²⁹

To assume, therefore, that the generalist can be such an 'ignoramus' of his specific though diverse responsibilities or that any un-initiated one can discharge generalists' many public assignments with ease or that neither familiarity with the functions nor experience of the job is required in his case will be an over simplification of his

²⁸ Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on Personnel Administration*, April, 1969. It mentions three broad classifications of governmental work: general administration, specialized administration and technical and/or scientific administration.

²⁹ S. Banerjee, "A Unified Civil Service", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. IX, No. 2 (April-June), 1963. It is interesting to note that the qualities that were considered necessary for the Administrative class of U.K. in the pre-Fulton era were "outlook, power and quickness in comprehension, the gift of dealing with people, readiness to take initiative and to assume responsibility" quoted in Herman Finer, *Theory and Practice of Modern Government*, London, Methuen and Co., 1965 (Reprint).

duties. As Wilmerding would say, an administrator "is a specialist but not in the limited field of a profession or a science. His speciality is method, rather than subject matter. He is a coordinator of knowledge rather than a researcher into the minor recesses of one of its branches"³⁰

Indeed, at the senior policy management levels of administration, whether of general or technical variety, what is required is not "specific information" or subject-matter specialization, but a mind, which can assimilate the quintessence of all relevant knowledge bearing on a subject; a way of thought, a mental or moral discipline. Enlightened commonsense, analytical faculty, an alert and agile mind, foresight and farsight, capacity for man-management and coordination, etc., are the critical ingredients in a top man as he approaches inter-departmental horizon, and whatever sharpens these qualities, such as training in depth, education *in extenso*, fruitful experience, etc., should also make for inculcation of professionalism. Viewed in this light, administration becomes a profession by itself, method of administering a speciality, and even a generalist administrator a professional!

Need for Specialization

What this line of logic misses, however, is that administrative content has now changed so much and become so complex that commonsense alone, howsoever uncommon and enlightened it may be, will be incapable of comprehending all the mystiques of an obscure field; even an alert mind cannot retain the quality of agility for long, when it has to contend with subjects which are completely unknown; similarly, analytical faculty cannot operate in vacuum if the knowledge or training to apply techniques of analysis is not existent. In other words, the doctrine of 'sound mind' is valid only up to a point and has largely lost much of its soundness and pristine purity in the context of new frontiers of administration, the unprecedented magnitude of tasks in hitherto unexplored fields, and the changed style of operation. Particularly unsound seems to be the concept of 'rolling stone' which gathers no moss in the shape of some substitutive specialization or a cluster of specializations. In his concluding address, on February 25, 1969, at the Conference on Training, L. P. Singh, Union Home Secretary, said:

"With the growing professionalism all round, I feel a stage has arrived when civil servants will have to be trained for particular groups of specializations. The administrative functions have

³⁰ Lucius Wilmerding, *Government by Merit*, quoted in S. Banerji, *op. cit.*

become so difficult and complicated that a generalist while possessing common sense and understanding of public affairs and management, must have a greater or lesser degree of specialization in some field or other. I do not believe that everybody is capable of framing a good budget, much less a performance budget, or of managing personnel, or planning the lay-out and equipment of an office, or dealing competently with political, social or economic problems of the country, or managing public enterprises."³¹

What, in this background, is needed is to develop a business-like, professionalized attitude and orientation in all sectors of civil service (whether generalist, specialist or technical), to sharpen the edge and brighten the shine, wherever they are wanting. This can be obtained either (a) by imparting specialization to the generalists and non-technical services, or (b) by giving administrative training to the promising members of specialist or techno-professional services. While the need for giving specialized training to the generalist is widely recognized, the importance of training the specialist in the ways of administration and management is hardly realized. The second type of training is as essential as the first because there are administrative implications of technical development which are more in terms of a series of inter-relations that go far beyond the limits of that development and the related discipline.

The specialist or technical services are, by definition, concerned with a specialized technical function for which a pre-entry vocational education is required. In most cases, their post-entry duties and responsibilities provide them the applied training, which supplement their earlier academic-cum-professional education. These services constitute the professional element in the public services right from the start. Though at the higher levels of even such specialist hierarchy, functions become more and more generalized (and less and less technical) and acquire larger administrative dimensions, what, by and large, these specialist cadres lack is the management training—meaningful, methodical, and goal-oriented. That this partial inadequacy, despite their otherwise professional character, should be met, early and effectively, in the larger interest of enabling such an important segment of public services to make fruitful contribution is pretty obvious. Management training for the specialist has, therefore, been put as one of the priority items of future executive development programmes. Indeed, the first item in the training charter of the Civil Service College of U. K., as

³¹ L. P. Singh, "Training of Civil Servants—The Wider Perspective", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XV, No. 1 (Jan.-March), 1969.

recommended by the Fulton Committee, is "courses for the specialists (e.g., scientists, engineers, and architects) who need training in administration and management both early in their careers and later".

Implications of Professionalism in Generalistic Frame

To develop professionalism within the generalist framework, it is first necessary, among other things, to generate specialization, apart from imparting a sense of purpose and direction to it. And this cannot be brought about except through a well-delineated and dynamic programme of in-depth training and purposeful career planning. This has got at least four aspects: one, sectoral (or segmental) analysis leading to a breakdown of administrative activity into certain 'corps' or 'specialisms' like personnel, financial, economic, agriculture, industrial administration, etc.,³² for acquisition of appropriate expertise. There could be two types of specializations: 'staff' and 'area' or substantive. Two, a systematic scheme of prospecting talent in various services, testing their aptitudes and selecting them for specific sectors where they could be retained on long tenure for area-specialization. Three, intensive training in the concepts, techniques and substantial body of knowledge germane to each such specialism; administrators nominated to a particular sector³³ must be allowed to spend sufficiently long period there, without being shuttlecocked between unrelated fields. These areas should be so structured and organized that administrators would, in normal circumstances, make their career in one such area, but should jump to other, preferably cognate, areas on approach to senior policy management level, where wide-ranging experience may be a distinct advantage. It is, here, in the specially carved out specialized career-sectors, that an imaginative placement policy can play a crucial role, i.e., the postings should be planned in such a way that administrators accumulate a gradually widening range of experience of *related subjects* in a single organization or in a group of related organizations so that

³² The A.R.C., in its Report on Personnel Administration, lists the following 8 specialisms, in the non-functional area, namely, (1) Economic, (2) Industrial, (3) Agricultural and Rural Development, (4) Social and Educational, (5) Personnel, (6) Financial, (7) Defence and Internal Security, and (8) Planning. In the functional area, unfunctional services, like Postal, Income Tax, Audit and Accounts, etc., have been assumed to be, and treated, *ab initio* specialised and, therefore, professionalised! Patently, unfunctionality alone cannot bestow all the virtues of professionalism on a service!

³³ In the general administrative sector, the Fulton Report mentions two broad areas for acquisition of professionalism by administrators, namely, (i) social, and (ii) economic and financial, with scope for further specialization. "Each of these two main categories of work", the Report states, "has its own substantial and broadly based body of knowledge. We believe that a civil servant needs to draw on this to supplement his skills as an administrator, if he is to develop the professionalism now needed." (Ch. 2).

This seems to correspond to Deshmukh's area of 'substantive specializations' broadly identified as industries, social services and agriculture.

they see things more *widely* than a narrow specialist and more *deeply* than a mere generalist. Four, specialized training in the principles and practices of modern administrative sciences; in management gadgetry; in tools and techniques of quantitative analysis, etc.—in short, in the entire sophistry which constitutes the core of modern 'decision-making technology,'³⁴ (This management training should be imparted to the specialist or technical services also.) Behind all this lies the basic postulate of a pride in belonging to a specially chosen, exalted group which is capable of achieving excellence and incapable of violating an accepted, well-understood code of behavioural ethics. There is, in this, the further assumption that a specialist, be he a technical or an administrative specialist, is, and remains, committed to his specialism and that the application of his expertise is with reference to highest standard of public, in contradistinguished to private, individual or group, interest. A kind of rare scruples of say 'I can do no wrong'—variety has to be generated in the group members. This conformity to the integrity norm and achievement-orientation are the real hallmark of professionalism. How do we operationalize this concept in the context of prevalent generalist cult and its primacy over the specialist professions, generally at all levels but particularly in the senior policy management level, forms the crux of the question. Higher policy posts by their very nature cannot be technical posts but would have generalistic overtones, where more than depth in one narrow speciality, breadth of experience through an exposure to a wide variety of assignments, preferably in cognate fields, is required and expected. Even there, the superstructural ornamentation of experience can certainly be better built on the solid foundation of substantive specialisation rather than on the shifting sands of 'greaseless' rotation! One important way this specialization of skills and expertise can be acquired, and then blended with universalization of experience, is through formation of functional 'corps' corresponding to the demarcation of sectors of administration, such as personnel administration, financial administration, economic administration, development administration, etc.

The Concept of 'Corps'—Its Mechanics

A group of civil servants who have specialized in a particular area of administration will form a functional corps. Such men should be on related jobs for a long enough period, for a significant interpenetration of their personalities with the area of administration in which they are involved. This achieves two purposes: deep familiarity with subject-matter and continuity of experience. The concept of the 'corps'

³⁴ I am grateful to Shri G. R. Nair, Director, Department of Administrative Reforms, for this and some other apt phrases.

should not be taken to mean that it is a closed field of administrative function in which alone an individual should seek his career's ultimate progress. While it would certainly envisage a fairly long and creative spell of specialized work in a particular sector for an individual, it should not generate rigidities that would stand in the way of diversifying their administrative experience. The tenure in a 'corps' should, in short, be long enough to make the 'expertise' an officer has gained in a specific field a permanent part of his mental equipment.

These corps need have no service appellation but should merely be known by functional characteristics of the class of posts for which they would mainly cater, for instance, "personnel officers' corps", "finance officers' corps", etc. for these corps should be made from all service selection sources (whether general, professional or technical) on grounds of merit alone. There should be equal treatment for entrants to the corps irrespective of the service to which they once belonged.

It should be possible to draw to these corps, particularly in the field of development administration, persons of specialized knowledge and experience from the academic and business worlds, to bring in new talent and diverse experience, and to measure the standards of regular service officers against the best available outside. This may mean a break from the conventional closed cadre system that has been operating in our civil service. But where men from the university or from industry should be able to make significant contributions, there should be no objection to make their entry possible. While conditions in this country in terms of technological development are different from those of advanced countries, like the U.S.A., where such "cross-fertilization" has been successfully tried, it can certainly be no argument to prevent experimenting with such induction. A cautious beginning in this direction can be made by bringing in persons of outstanding merit from universities and even private business on contract basis for a specified period.

Optimum development of officers selected for appointment to the corps cannot be achieved or maintained without close attention to the merits and deficiencies of individual officers and careful planning of postings and transfers in their earlier and middle years in such a way as to give the right kind of exposure to the right officer at the right time. It would also be necessary to provide for his transfer to other departments within the sector of administration and for retraining, where needed, to draw the best of him.

This 'corps' concept operates, in the main, at the middle management level where different types of specializations³⁵ have to be designed for meeting the diverse challenges of work. Indeed, it is this level that mainly acts as the shock absorber and does almost all the back-stage work for sound policy making and efficient implementation of such policies and plans (the Deshmukh Report rightly, therefore, terms officers of this level as the "back room boys") and, pressure thus, is most pronounced here for development of professionalization.

The corps scheme does not bar (the intention in fact is that it should encourage) a young promising officer who has acquitted himself well in a particular corps being allotted to another corps to give him experience in diverse fields and prepare him for top management posts. Indeed, when an officer gets funneled into the senior management level, he is already a tempered steel. With his specialized backdrop, in one or more areas and a rare flair for administrative management, he is expected to function as a fully professionalized civil servant. Assumptions apart, suitable programmes for further and continuing education of the senior management should also be drawn up. Indeed, when knowledge is known to double itself every ten years, the senior management can remain complacent about updating their knowledge only on pain of vital efficiency and effectivity. The professionalism-buck must not, therefore, stop at the door-step of senior management. Indeed, the fresh air of professionalization must force entry into their chambers also. Self education, reflective training programmes, study tours and orientation trips, seminars, conferences and workshops, sabbatical leave, attachment to universities and other institutes of higher learning, etc., could be some of the effective mechanics for the busy top to make good the 'equipment gap'. The plurality in the senior management,³⁶ should by itself make for a healthy cross-fertilization of experience.

³⁵ The Study Team (Deshmukh) of A.R.C. on Machinery of Government and its Procedures of Work mentions three broad types of specializations for headquarters works, namely: (1) Substantive specialization, (2) Staff Specialization, and (3) Specialization in headquarters work. For details, see Ch. VI, Sec. III of the Report. How should these specializations be acquired, has also been dealt with in the outline of different kinds of training as stipulated by the Study Team vide paras 6.36(3), 6.36(4) & 6.36(5).

³⁶ Ibid., "Senior management positions should be open to all sources and should not be the preserve of any cadre or set of cadres" (Deshmukh Report). There is a striking identity in this respect between Deshmukh and Fulton, as the latter also writes: "No posts should be the preserve of any group except insofar as the individuals comprising the group may be uniquely qualified for them, e.g., doctors for medical posts (Chap. 6, para 214 of the Fulton Report).

Also see L.P. Singh, *ibp. cit.*, "For top most administrative jobs at levels where administration becomes something akin to statesmanship, the net has to be cast wide to get from the specialized groups men with conspicuous managerial ability and wide understanding of problems."

India's Experiments with Professionals

Before the curtain is drawn, it would be less than fair not to mention that though the commanding heights of Indian administration are still by and large the generalists' preserve, wind of change has started blowing over the administrative landscape and some unmistakable signs of professional-cum-specialist 'dent' are also evident. The Department of Atomic Energy has all along been headed by a nuclear scientist; Ministry of Law by a member of the legal profession or service; and the Railway Board by members of the Railway Services. The Department of Economic Affairs of the Finance Ministry is now headed by an Economist. The constitution of so many professional services like Indian Economic Service, Indian Statistical Service, Indian Service of Engineers, Indian Medical and Health Services, etc., speaks volume regarding the trend. Again, in organizations, like Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, and regional laboratories under its charge, it is the scientists who preponderate, though 'general bureaucracy' also tries often to dominate the scene in an area generally foreign to it. Staff agencies like D.G.T.D. and other bureaus and boards provide much needed professional advice to ministries at a sufficiently high level, though not from within the policy-making hierarchy but only from a distance. Perhaps, this integration is not far off, and already some attempts at such integration have been made notably in the Home Ministry. It must be conceded, however, that professionalism as has been injected into the veins of Indian administration has so far been of sporadic character and does not seem as yet to have been introduced as part of a design or conscious plan or a long-term policy. While it is not suggested that there should immediately be a total blood transfusion, after emptying all the old bottles, the need for adequate doses of professionalism is inescapable and, hence, requires to be straightaway recognized and acted upon. One cannot certainly fight modern space-era weapons with stone-age implements. To be in step with the times, one must heed the zooms of 'jumbo' jets on the horizon and not remain content with the rattles of bullock carts.

CONCLUSION

The new directions, which the administration of the 1970's is certain to take, should throw positive guidelines for the entire civil service, not excluding the top, to catch up and that too quickly enough, if the civil services are not to be overtaken by future events. The administration can no more rely or stand on the thin crust of amateurism. The questions posed by the futurology of administration and its multi-dimensional ramifications have to be answered, and professionalization of civil service seems to be the only answer.

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MANAGEMENT OF RESEARCH

A STUDY OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CENTRES IN INDIA*

K. N. Vaid

THE study and research of industrial relations is of relatively recent origin and has acquired a greater significance in countries which are undergoing rapid economic development within a democratic political framework. Freedom of association for promoting one's economic and social objectives, right to strike and expression, free press and the existence of several political parties ranging from extreme left to far right tend to give rise to an articulated public opinion, heavy and often politicalized organization of labour and employers and several other competing forces within the industrial setting. In order to secure industrial peace necessary for uninterrupted production, the governments take legislative and other measures to ensure viable industrial relations. All this makes the study and research of industrial relations meaningful, interesting and complicated: all the same more important. The subject has become an area of research and teaching to varying degrees at many places in India, and I believe in a few other Asian countries also. The central concern of this paper is to examine the working of industrial relations' centres and institutes and, in particular, to focus attention on some of the major problem areas in their orientation, finances and management. The discussion is based on the Indian experience though the comments and opinions may also prove useful to those engaged in similar work in other developing countries.

BACKGROUND

Origin

The growth of the industrial relations' teaching and research in India has been conditioned, amongst others, by its historical origin, the system of education in the country and the dynamic demands of a developing economy. The study of industrial relations in India owes

* The author is grateful to Mr. Arun Joshi, Director of the Shri Ram Centre and Mr. Fred C. Munson of the Michigan Business School who, by continuous interaction, contributed to give shape to his ideas.

its origin to the social concern for labour.¹ In mid-twenties, Mahatma Gandhi organized industrial workers into the 'labour' front of the freedom movement. He laid emphasis on fair deal to labour and on their welfare needs. Large scale migration to industrial areas during the years between two world wars further augmented the need for labour welfare. In mid-thirties, dozens of voluntary bodies could be found engaged in labour welfare work in cities like Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Kanpur. In 1936, the Tata Trust in Bombay set up a social work school to train labour welfare workers with a view to help improve the quality of welfare services to labour. This marked the beginning of the teaching of 'labour' subjects at academic level in India. Most of the other schools of social work which came into existence during the subsequent years taught courses not only on labour welfare but also on personnel management and industrial relations. Thus, it was the schools of social work who first gave courses on labour welfare, personnel management, industrial relations, labour economics, etc. The courses were geared primarily to the needs of welfare personnel. This gave a labour welfare orientation to industrial relations teaching. The tradition stayed and grew strong due to the government's stress on welfare.

Teaching

Industrial relations as a subject is not taught at any of the Indian universities. Courses on social sciences are offered by 51 (out of a total of 70) universities. Industrial relations subjects usually comprise of one 'optional' paper in most of the traditional social science teaching programmes. The following table shows the status of the teaching of industrial relations subjects:

STATUS OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SUBJECTS AT THE INDIAN UNIVERSITIES²

Subject	Number of Universities Where Subject is		
	Optional	Compulsory	Not taught
Labour Economics	32	6	13
Industrial Sociology	12	2	37
Industrial Psychology	19	3	29
Labour Legislation	9	2	40
Personnel Management	25	8	18

¹ For a detailed discussion on the subject, see K. N. Vaid, "Labour Welfare in India", *Encyclopaedia of Social Work in India*, New Delhi, Publications Division (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting), Government of India, 1968.

² For a detailed reference on the subject, see K. N. Vaid, "Industrial Relations Teaching in the Indian Universities", I. R. S. Series No. 1, New Delhi, Shri Ram Center Press, 1965.

It will be observed from the table above that whereas Labour Economics and Personnel Management are being taught in many of the Indian universities, Industrial Sociology has not received recognition from its parent discipline. This also explains, at least partly, the insignificant contribution of sociologists to industrial relations. It is interesting to note that the teaching of labour legislation has not been developed despite the fact that the Indian industrial relations system permits lawyers and judges unlimited scope for making contribution to it. Further, neither universities nor any institute offer courses on industrial relations' research methodology. Courses on social research, wherever given, do not draw concepts and tools from different disciplines and remain useful for research within the framework of a particular discipline. The course work in statistics is elementary in all social science subjects (except Psychology) and imparts little skills in quantitative methods.

Thus, we find that no university has either a department of industrial relations or an integrated course in industrial relations. For the same reason, the universities do not engage themselves in any extension work in labour education, management development or industrial relations. Only three institutes in the country have post-graduate (Master's degree) programmes in 'labour'. The Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Bombay, runs a Master's degree programme in Personnel Management and Industrial Relations. The Bombay Labour Institute prepares students for the M.A. degree in Labour Welfare of the Bombay University. The post-graduate course of the Xavier Labour Relations Institute, Jamshedpur, has been recognized by the Government of India as equivalent to M.A. in Industrial Relations.

Data and Information

Data gathering is done mostly by the governmental agencies. The Labour Bureau, Simla, the Census of Manufacturing Industries (CMI) and the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), the Census Commission, and the Directorates of Economics and Statistics* as well as Labour Departments of the State Governments are the principal agencies that gather and release, on a continuing basis, most of the data available in labour and industrial relations. *Ad hoc* surveys are published from time to time by different governmental agencies or departments, and other private organizations. Again, most of the labour and industrial

* Almost all publications brought out by the Central Government and its ministries can be ordered from the Manager of Publications, Government of India, Civil Lines, Delhi-6 and those of the State Governments can be enquired with the Manager, Government Printing & Stationery Departments at different State capitals.

relations literature has been published by the government. It is only recently that the publishing trade has begun to take interest in this subject and several publications have been brought out during the last five years. Three Indian journals brought out from India are devoted to the field of industrial relations.³ A few other journals give adequate coverage to the subject as and when necessary.⁴

ORIENTATION

What should be the orientation of an industrial relations centre in a developing country like India? Should it be concerned with teaching or research or with both: in the latter case what should be the mix? What should be the level and nature of teaching programmes? What should be the focus of research? These are some of the more important questions which should be considered in order to understand the orientation, role status and structure of industrial relations centres.

Centre Defined

Let me state what I mean by a 'Centre' so as to distinguish it, let us say, from a university department. A Centre is a specialized agency concerned with the application of scientific thought to concrete situations and phenomena with a view to multiplying the effect of effort. It is a place where ideas, tools, techniques and methodologies are developed, tested, modified and communicated with a view to improving practice and knowledge, and to increase human welfare in the ultimate sense. In order to encourage the spirit of experimentation and innovation in a Centre, the bureaucratic processes are developed as facilitating services rather than control mechanism. The goal of the Centre is to bring its expertise to put the existing knowledge into a usable form so as to enhance the development and happiness of the community in a more immediate and direct manner.

Role in Teaching

The industrial relations centres will have less ability to serve their above-stated objectives, if they were to undertake teaching at undergraduate or graduate levels. In addition, there will be two other

³ They are namely: *Indian Labour Journal*, published by the Labour Bureau, Simla; *Indian Journal of Labour Economics*, care Department of Economics, Lucknow University, Lucknow (U.P.); and, *Indian Journal of Industrial Relations*, published by the Shri Ram Centre for Industrial Relations, 5 Pusa Road, New Delhi-5.

⁴ For all periodicals in the field of labour, please refer to "*Indian Journal of Industrial Relations*", Vol. 1, No. 4, April 1966.

major disadvantages. First, teaching will require Centres to invest a major part of their scarce resources in educational programmes. It might be more appropriate to stimulate universities to divert their funds to teach industrial relations courses. Second, in order to attract students, the Centres will need to gear their teaching for the award of specific degrees or diplomas. By seeking that such degrees are sought to be conferred by some universities (which is inevitable), the Centres will invite external control and bureaucracy which is not always healthy. On the other hand, if the Centres award their own diplomas, they will be found competing with universities—a situation which is unfavourable to Centres as well as not to be liking of universities.

However, by suggesting that the Centres should not teach courses for degrees or diplomas, I do not imply that they should not take interest in promoting teaching of industrial relations in universities; for such a position will be detrimental to the professional and institutional interests of the Centres themselves. The Centres will have to play their part in stimulating universities to teach industrial relations courses. A greater interchange or interaction amongst universities' and centres' personnel will be a step in the right direction. Centres can also encourage their staff to accept teaching assignments at universities and to participate in curricula development as well as in students' evaluation. Being specialized agencies having professional competency, library resources and other research support services, the Centres can serve as seats of advanced research where universities could send their Ph.D. students and, where other scholars interested in the subject could work.

Another area where Centres could be useful is the extension work. Universities generally work in ivory towers and have, so far, not developed competence to serve the needs of practitioners in industry and business. Industrial relations centres can fill this gap by organizing training programmes for different levels of personnel in enterprises and trade unions. By undertaking such programmes, the Centres will serve the needs of practitioners, ensure a much faster communication of research results to the consumer groups and expose their own staff to industrial problems more meaningfully. The extension work could also become a source of revenue over a period of time. Experience has shown that such courses must be of short duration, sharply focussed on one or two concrete problem areas, and utilize teaching material drawn from indigenous sources. The managers or union leaders will have to continue to utilize respective university departments for formal academic teaching in Economics, Political Science, etc.

Focus of Research

The focus of research carried out at industrial relations centres has been a subject of debate for some years now. A distinction has been made between pure research (theory building with no obvious immediate application), basic research (arriving at generalizations which are widely applicable to several problems) and applied research (designed to solve a limited, specific and immediate problem). It has been stated by several educationalists including those in the Centres that whereas pure research is primarily of interest to universities, the basic and applied research should be the principal focus of industrial relations centres. The whole discussion is rather hypothetical. First, it is obvious that a developing country must give priority to such researches which make direct contributions to improved practice, either by solving concrete problems or by establishing conclusions capable of wider application to a variety of situations in real life. Second, till it can afford the luxury of sufficient resources, a country like India will do well to profit from the discoveries made and truths uncovered by the affluent nations. In the context of current resources, India's investment on pure research will be as unwise as spending money on space research in preference to building fertilizer plants. Pure research, howsoever glamorous and academically satisfying, is a luxury, we cannot just afford. Thirdly, it would be appreciated that empirical research needs theory or a set of concepts to provide the framework for analysis. Empirical research may yield descriptive data and provide the basis for short-term policy determination; but it cannot progress significantly without the guidance of verified knowledge. Similarly, case studies, not replicated and not tied in with other related studies, are likely to be of much limited use. Additive studies, on a theme, built on each other, piece by piece, have a special value for both improved practice and improved knowledge. In order that industrial relations research may play a more influential role in the development of the country, a series of long-term empirical and additive studies based on carefully formulated theoretical propositions will have to be undertaken.

The Independent Role

Another important role that industrial relations Centres are generally called upon to play in many developing countries is to depute their experts to participate in policy making by sitting on various committees and commissions as 'independent' persons. This kind of participation could prove satisfying as well as suicidal to Centres. The committee work gives a sense of participation in policy making to individuals and makes them a part of the political power structure in the country.

It brings power, prestige, travel, money and sometimes provides a spring-board to jump to higher offices. Thus far, it may not be bad. However, individuals may develop vested interests in committee work which might lead them to compromise their 'independent' status in order to seek continued patronage of the administrator. The 'independent' status may become either a validational function or mediation in conflicting interests with a view to securing or enforcing consensus. Industrial relations centres will need courage to reject participation in committees, if the 'independent' function cannot be discharged with integrity and objectivity. This also implies that the Centres will do well to steer clear from either taking political positions or getting involved in current public issues or aligning themselves with any single interest or social group. Any departure from an 'independent' position is likely to impair the Centres' objectivity, reliability and scientific attitude.

The orientation of the Centres as suggested above also implies that they should better stay outside the hierarchy of the universities and function as autonomous bodies. They should undertake teaching to supplement the work of universities or to extend it to non-student groups. The research activities of these Centres should be focussed on basic and applied research. In their functioning, the Centres should apply the high standards of academic work to contribute to improved practice. Whereas the individual scholars could look to universities as their reference group, the institution should look to industry and the enterprise to determine the nature and scope of its work. Further, the Centres should zealously guard their 'independent' status and stay clear of political positions and alignments which might impair their objectivity and tamper with scientific attitude.

FINANCES

Government

In India as in many other developing countries, the government is the principal financier and sustainer of research in various fields of social sciences, natural sciences, and technology. The Ministry of Education, Government of India, and the University Grants Commission disburse funds, administer grants, and standardize procedures and norms for the purpose. Several other ministries and government departments as well as the Planning Commission also sponsor research studies with a view to either generating data necessary for policy formulation or evaluating a particular programme. Apart from the fact that the government funds are necessary for the existence of

research institutes, and that many may extinguish without it, these funds have promoted minimum standards of pay and professional qualifications of research personnel. However, often the minimum also tends to become the optimum resulting in the deployment of low salaried and low skilled personnel in research. Further, the public funds, more often than not, bring in a plethora of rules and regulations, forms, returns, etc. As more funds flow in, the senior scholars who act as project leaders get tied up with administrative routine, with the result that the bulk of research work falls on the shoulders of junior scholars—with anticipated results. Further, the grants are made in support of specific projects and the project-charged staff live in perpetual job insecurity and the institutes are also unable to stabilize their research facilities. Again, whereas the government has shown keen interest in determining goals, time schedules and terms of reference of projects at the time of sponsoring them, it has generally been not vigilant in ensuring that such decisions are implemented. Scores of studies, involving huge amounts, have not seen the printers' ink and are unlikely to do so. On the whole, it might be said that whereas a research centre has to accept government grants, it must continuously seek funds from other sources with a view to preserving its organizational health and vitality. On the other hand, the government may do well to pool together all research funds available with its different sub-agencies and administer it in a coordinated manner. A Social Science Research Council on the lines of Britain was set up in December 1968.

Foundations

Another source of funds are the foundations—both Indian and foreign. The Indian foundations are few as well as small. They are mostly created by different industrial houses and administer small funds. The Tata Trust, the Birla Foundation and the Shri Ram Foundation are some of the better known foundations who support a network of agencies. In any case, this is a very recent development and its impact could only be evaluated after a very few years.

Several foreign foundations have taken active interest in promoting research and training, particularly in the area of management, industrial relations and development in general. The resources have been made available for different activities to include sponsoring specific research projects, piloting new programmes which could go on their own steam after initial start, building resources and structure for institutes to help them improve efficiency, etc. The success of most of these investments remains uncertain. Occasionally, the foundations came with some pre-conceived ideas, found local people who were willing to work them

out, and made investments. At times, the programmes administrators, relying on their hunches, made grants to people and institutes whose principal activity was 'grant-baiting'. A new class of people has come up. They specialize in cultivating foundation personnel and make a high living on their funds. However, whenever a foundation was able to understand the felt needs of local agencies, came with an open mind and involved competent local persons in policy planning, laid emphasis on institution-building programmes in preference to *ad hoc* project grants, and supported programmes which could become self-supporting in due course of time, the results were satisfying both to the foundation and the local agencies. The foundations can and are playing important roles in the development processes of several Centres. Industrial relations centres can profit from these foundations provided that the inflow of resources comes in support of institution-building programmes determined by the local people.

Industry

Industry is another source of funds. It has a big potential for supporting research and teaching activities in the country. Unfortunately this resource remains, by and large, untapped. This is partly due to the excessive government patronage to research and teaching, and partly due to the research results and the scholars not having particularly made themselves useful to industry. If scholars could learn to establish rapport with industrial managers and made efforts to undertake research and training whose results could be utilized by industry, funds will start flowing in. The limited experience at the Shri Ram Centre in this regard has proved encouraging.

Thus, it can be said that although the government is likely to stay as the principal financier of teaching and research in most developing countries, the academic bodies should try to reduce this exclusive dependency by exploring alternative sources of funds. The funds made available by foreign foundations should be invested in institution-developing programmes or experimental projects which are likely to catch up and become self-supporting in due course of time. The research Centres need to pay special attention to the needs of industry, bring research to serve the latter, and take back funds as per requirements.

MANAGEMENT

A Philosophy

In order to grasp the problems of research management, one

needs to appreciate several peculiarities of a research organization. An assumption appears to be widespread that the retired or likely to retire senior civil servants make good directors of research institutes; or that someone who is a competent scholar will also be an effective manager. This assumption has led many research organizations to become just a replica of the civil service: large bureaucratic establishments producing notes and memoranda, keeping themselves busy in making rules as to why certain things can or cannot be done; and consuming most of the time of the seniors and other talented persons in the process. One is even tempted to say that a good deal of non-productive research, brain drain, lack of impact of research on practice and a feeling of stagnation amongst scholars can be attributed to this malady. An academic organization is very unlike a government or a business office or a production unit.

Research is the process of innovation in the world of ideas. It requires an attitude that gives unquestioned obedience to the discipline of scientific method, a frame of mind that continuously evaluates the on going results of a research project, and an alertness of mind that stems from the desire to learn rather than to prove. The scholar deals with a problem which he believes to have importance, lend itself to significance of results and correctness of methods, and can logically be argued with other scholars anywhere. All scholars may not achieve this excellence of standard, but most of them like to strive for it. In order to achieve excellence of quality and efficiency, the key controls must be internalized. The attempt to use external controls is unlikely to yield results. It might be efficient to order a clerk to put up a file, or a mechanist to rub a surface smooth, but it will not work if a scholar is ordered to produce a creative insight. Whereas a bureaucrat acknowledges that his work is useful to the organization in some ways; the scholar, more often than not, thinks that the organization is somehow useful to his work. The bureaucrat must understand his inability to control results; and the scholar must accept restraints on expenditure, time, and curiosity about irrelevant matters that might accompany research conducted within an organization.

Identification of Goals

Another major problem in the management of research is the lack of clarity of goals of individual researchers as well as of research organizations. Most scholars in universities maintain that their primary professional interest is the creation of knowledge, building theory and to do 'academic' work only. They are cynical about research that is applied, problem solving or geared to the needs of policy formulation. Such an attitude has no relation with either the abilities of

these scholars or the resources that they have. More often than not, it reflects either ignorance or a hang-over of the colonial past. There are many scholars who are brilliant as well as producers. But there are many more—and they constitute the bulk—whose writings are at best a rehash of the work of some other authors and whose research activities are confined to data gathering mostly. Scholars need to make an assessment of their real research potential. After all they can do only such work as is permitted by their abilities and resources. And the results of their research should be significant to the country and its development. Similarly, a research organization needs to know its purpose. Although both the processes will go on simultaneously within it all the time, yet an organization needs to establish whether its primary purpose is to discover new knowledge or to work with existing knowledge to improve practice and make the knowledge more usable. The two purposes lead to different kinds of organizational structures. A knowledge producing organization requires departmentalization by the field of knowledge, such as Psychology, Sociology, and Economics. A knowledge-applying organization will need a structure which could serve the requirements of fields, such as labour market and manning problems, salary and wage administration, incentives and work loads, union-management relations, etc., and other staff services, such as survey, sampling, interviewing, and data processing.

A focus on knowledge requires an environment that encourages specialization within an intellectually unified field (a discipline), while a focus on application requires specialization by the nature of problems. Scholars in pure research organizations will have fellow scholars and universities as their reference group; those in applied and basic research organizations will have to extend their reference group to include the users of research in addition to the scholars. A purist will normally work on a problem all by himself and stay within a small group of colleagues. The applied scholar will need regular contacts with wider groups relevant to his work. Further, an applied research organization requires considerable organizational flexibility so as to make it possible for scholars to shift to a wide range of subjects.

Scholar Administrator

One of the most damaging practices in an academic centre is to assign the management function to scholars as a matter of routine. Very often, one gets the impression that scholars hanker after administrative, managerial and supervisory positions in their respective organizations: again, a hang-over of colonial traditions. Also, there

seems to be an assumption that since a good scholar is better than poor ones, he should also be over them. Ability to do research or teach is taken as synonymous with the ability to manage people. Alas, most scholars do not know that they are (or could be) bad administrators. Very often they complain that they are over-controlled, but are measurably worse when it is they who control. Their concern for detail and thoroughness makes them treat their subordinate scholars as tools rather than as colleagues. Often their very abilities as scholars prove to be the disabilities as administrators. The ability to sustain an intensive and narrow focus on a single dimension of a problem is vital to the work of a scholar. But an administrator must switch his attention from one problem to another, and be adequately effective in all. A scholar must look for details and empirically supported inferences: the administrator avoids details and works with best guesses constantly. Thus, it is vital not to confuse the scholastic ability with administrative skills. If a scholar aspires or is required to become an administrator or head of an academic institute, he must understand that he will have to give up many attitudes that made him excel as a scholar and pick up new ones in order to do reasonably well in the new job.

Research Team

Interdisciplinary problem: The academic background of the research staff of a Centre, and the nature of its mix continues to be one of the unresolved managerial problems. It is our experience that barring survey work and data collection from primary sources, it is uneconomical and unworkable to set up research teams comprising of persons drawn from different academic disciplines. The problems of semantics, choice of variables, and alternative strategies of data analysis assume huge proportions in an interdisciplinary research team. Time schedules and funds become irrelevant and project seldom gets completed. By saying this, I do not imply that work should be stopped on developing interdisciplinary concepts or that various disciplines may not have a common social science core. I only suggest that this work could be undertaken by those Centres who are in a position to divert a good part of their resources to it.

If a team is necessary for a particular project which has a budget and a time schedule, it might be more useful to draw scholars from the same discipline and encourage them to borrow concepts, tools and methods of other disciplines, if necessary. The research climate in an applied research centre—as most industrial relations centres are—will facilitate this process. Problems need solutions, and they do not

particularly respect the academic discipline of a scholar. If a scholar's discipline does not have usable tools, he must look for the same in other disciplines. Not all scholars have the ability or the perceptions to borrow from other disciplines. One has to be good in one's own discipline and field. Only a good economist can utilize concepts or tools of psychology in his own work and *vice versa*. The industrial relations centres, particularly in developing countries, will do well not to give unduly more importance to interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary competency in their scholars. They should recruit academically sound people, who know their theory properly, expose them to problems in the field, allow them time to make mistakes and learn, and they will shape well unless, of course, a mistake has been made at the recruiting stage. As a long-term policy, the Centres could recruit outstanding young scholars and put them through a period of training in the concepts and methodologies of other disciplines.

Reporting relationships: The nature of reporting relationship within a team is vital to its ability to succeed. (Here, we are not referring to survey work.) The first need is to reduce the length of hierarchy. Nothing can be more confusing than to set up a project team having a number of senior and junior investigators reporting to a hierarchy of supervisors, research officers and assistant and deputy directors; and everyone has an overlord—the project director. The investigators collect and sort out data, supervisors prepare drafts which are corrected by officers, which are verified by assistant directors, further refined by the deputy director and finally signed, authored and released by the director. The existence of this style of operations may surprise many; nevertheless it is not a typical of what actually happens. This style of operation is a sure way of setting up a failure mechanism of producing undigested reports, and of demoralising young scholars.

The second need is to avoid setting up teams comprising of more than one senior scholars. If one is made the chief of the project, others are more likely to offer less co-operation. If all are given equal responsibilities they might exercise pulls in different directions and efficiency will suffer. My suggestion to the research organizations will be that in the interest of quality of results and efficiency of operations, the research teams should comprise of scholars drawn from the same academic discipline. The structure of the team should be centrifugal: one chief and everyone else reporting to him directly. Whereas the professional status of different team members could be reflected through salary and authorship policies, no one should be over anyone else, except, of course, the project leader.

The Director

The principal executive of a research centre has a very crucial role to play in setting standards and pace of work therein. He is the principal director, motivator, coordinator, enabler, validator and manager of men and activities in the organization. His is a very delicate role. He must keep seniors and team leaders motivated to meet the required standards and at the same time protect their subordinates from pressures that will demotivate them. He must stress high standards of output along with the need to conserve resources. He must encourage experimentation and innovation but discourage irrelevant curiosity and idleness. He has to create climate for research, help people to change their perception of organization's purpose and apply pressures that increase the efficiency of others. On balance, it might be useful for him to go on the assumption that senior scholars know their job: if they don't they need replacement rather than supervision. It will free him and permit time to give attention to human-resource building, organizational development, standard setting and an ongoing evaluation of work, men, structure and procedures, as well as needs of the centre and country.

Manpower Problem

Academic institutes, particularly the research centres, are experiencing a great difficulty in getting competent scholars. On one hand the availability of Ph.D.s in social science subjects has increased substantially over the years. And on the other hand, several research and teaching positions continue to remain vacant as suitable scholars are not available. The problem is genuine and a complex one. As a result of the increasing industrialization as well as the traditional prestige association with senior civil service jobs, the cream and the best amongst the students go in for further education and training in technology, natural sciences, and civil services. Students generally opt for social sciences as second or third choice. (The women students might be an exception.) Again, many students decide to go in for Ph.D. as they find nothing useful coming their way after M.A. The problem of finding a job is postponed for some years in the hope that things might be different later on. Thus, most research institutes find that their labour market is dominated by highly qualified, poorly trained, less gifted and poorly motivated job seekers. It is easier to fill low skilled and poorly paid jobs with Ph.D.s than to attract a young, talented M.A. with a spark in him on high salary. A research centre has three alternatives open to it. First, it can set up a low level salary structure, and employ the best among the available who want to join

in. The centre will do this at its own peril. Second, it can hire researchers of demonstrated competence at high prices. The supply is likely to be unsatisfactory. There are only too few people of this calibre around: and they are too involved in work at their current places. There, the centres can look for students (not degrees) with a high probability of becoming competent researchers and face the costs of time and money to train them. The third alternative is certainly in national interest, and is also in the long-run interest of the organization itself. However, accepting this alternative will mean that the development of scholarship becomes an explicit goal of the organization having bearings on its structure, budgetary decisions, standards of evaluating efficiency and output, and supervisory loads.

Financial Management

The styles of financial management of an industrial relations centre should be geared to suit the dynamic nature of the institution. Attention may be drawn to several pitfalls in this regard. First, there is a problem of balancing grants and sponsorship income. Whereas, a major grant from a single source can sap the vitality of an organization, its absence may be perceived by staff as lack of stability and make them feel insecure. An emphasis on seeking sponsors for research may bring scholars in more intimate touch with problems in the field and involve sponsors in the success of a study; and over emphasis on sponsorship may lead the Centre from research to the business of research besides the loss of many scholars who get picked up by industry in the process of their work. Second, the problem of balancing overhead costs with research costs is a continuing one. A Centre has to maintain a certain minimum number of support personnel, such as for establishment, administration, library and similar other services. These are the fixed costs. The abilities of these personnel are flexible in catering to the needs of research staff. A centre employing too few researchers may experience heavy overhead costs, making each project expensive. It may, therefore, find that in order to function economically, it must operate on a fairly large scale, conducting several research studies at the same time. In order to keep overhead costs at about 15 per cent of the total costs, it might be necessary to run 12 to 15 projects at any point of time involving a core staff of 25 to 30 full time researchers. Third, the Centre's income must increase continuously without which even the existing level of research activity cannot be maintained. The continuously rising cost of living—a feature characteristic of most developing countries—increases operational expenses from year to year. Annual increments of employees inflate the wage bill. Unless the income also increases, a centre

may find itself shrinking despite all efforts to the contrary. Finally, a centre may do well to establish a Central Research Fund. There may be occasions when the institution is interested to work on a problem for which no one is willing to pay. Besides, the cash flow situation is seldom to the liking of the institution. The commitments are fixed and must be honoured regularly and at stated frequencies. But those who have to pay do so at their own convenience. Generally, there is a time lag in the flow of funds. Also, it is not always possible to predict the availability of sponsored research. Somehow, its flow is lopsided. There are periods when there is too much to do and at times the entire group may be busy on institution-financed research. The Central Research Fund is a handy device to absorb the vagaries of sponsored research.

To conclude; industrial relations centres in a developing country should be very much a part and parcel of the developing efforts of the community. They have the onerous duty to discover continuously ways and means of making knowledge useful and usable in increasing goods and services, promoting harmony between various social groups and improving human welfare. For this, I believe, the institutionalization of research is necessary for its efficiency, sustenance, and growth. Those entrusted with the task of institution building need to be innovators in their approach to the process of managing research. There are no short-cuts and no ready solutions. A great sense of pragmatism must prevail all around.



COMMENTS

(In this feature we give comments received from the readers on the articles published in the previous two issues of the Journal. The comments should be critical and thought-provoking, and confined to the major points made by the author(s), inadequacies in reasoning or data, or any new solution to the problem which suggests itself to the reader. They should not normally exceed 1,500 words.—Ed.)

SATISFACTION OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE CAREER*

This article by P. R. Dubhashi is thought-provoking. But one may well ask: Why this solicitude for the satisfaction of an administrative career? It is a fact that all kinds of work cannot give satisfaction to all. A businessman, a doctor, or a lawyer may well be dissatisfied with his assignment if he is unduly concerned with the stigma attached to the profession.

Work, it is said, is not merely a physical necessity but a psychological one as well. And for our aggregate living, socially useful work is equally necessary. To a social thinker, therefore, it is redundant to compare two jobs and place one after the other. For example, it is very difficult to determine as to whose job is more important in the series—teacher's, engineer's, administrator's, journalist's. Nor is this all. One may not excel in all the assignments equally. All works—the work of a valet, a butler, a cook, a mali, a dhobi, a maid and an ayah not excluding—require specialization. Excellence in one's social posting gives satisfaction. It is, therefore, unimportant to classify social beings as first rate, second rate, etc., and put one in a vantage position over the other. One should not forget, a scientist may prove to be a worthless administrator. 'Place of administration' in national life is already determined—administrative knowledge and function are essential for the society. It is for the authority to determine the attributes of an administrator and prescribe rules for the same. Surely, the virtue of an able administrator is not a first class university degree as Macaulay is long dead and with the advancement of scientific knowledge and changed situations, fixation of new criteria for a good administrator is overdue. Glamour is equally meaningless as it gives birth to a false sense of vanity and to snobbery, which stands in the way of fostering team spirit.

In a truly democratic society, power, status, or wealth of an individual should not count much. Social living is a joint endeavour and all of us

* The original article of this title by Shri P. R. Dubhashi was published in the Journal in Vol. XV, No. 1 (Jan.-March), 1969.

should jointly contribute to the course of developments according to our station and duties.

—DEBI PRASAD MUKHOPADHYAY

Author's Rejoinder

It is natural for a person in the administrative career to have a solicitude for the satisfaction that it offers. It is also important for the country, since a dissatisfied administrative service can hardly be an effective instrument of plans for economic development and social change. That, of course, does not mean that a similar solicitude for the satisfaction for persons in other careers is not equally significant. It is and does need appropriate expression.

One can take an idealistic position regarding the importance of power, status, or wealth but these cannot simply be wished away! One can also affirm that excellence in every assignment in any career is a reward in itself. At the same time, philosophical satisfaction of this sort cannot prove enduring unless accompanied by appropriate recognition, material compensation or incentives of other sorts. Motivation, even at the highest level, cannot be divorced from such mundane matters. Idealism should not degenerate into hypocrisy!

New criteria for a good administrator today is a subject which has received attention in India and elsewhere. The Fulton Committee Report, for example, has pointed out that the administrator of today cannot just be an "intelligent layman" but must specialize in specific fields of administration, like economic and social administration. He must also have special training in management and develop skills in numeric aids. At the same time, the importance of first-class university degree does not disappear, just because Macaulay is long dead. Ideas do survive their progenitors if they are potent. A first-rate academic performance, assuming, of course, that the examinations themselves are quite rigorous, is one of the objective indicators of an intelligent and versatile mind and, therefore, a dependable basis for recruitment to an administrative career. But this is not to deny the need for reinforcement of the latent faculties through a continuing process of training and development of talent.

—P. R. DUBHASHI

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

After going through the last Special Number of IJPA—containing articles nearly all of which deal with what Government and the country should do for science and scientist—one gets a feeling that our scientists and technologists are behaving like trade-unionists in presenting an ever-increasing charter of demands to Government and the country. The country, it appears, must pay through her nose to maintain these men or else they will drain out of India and give their services to that country which offers them the best wages. The emotion of patriotism seems to be only for the army and the civil services; for our scientists, considerations of self seem to rule uppermost.

A constant refrain in a number of articles is that scientists should participate in policy formulation and decision making. In our democratic system, Parliament is the supreme policy-formulating and decision-making body. It is not clear how scientists can participate in this without becoming members of Parliament. If our scientists have a wrong notion that the civil services lay down policies and take decisions they should be disabused of this notion. The role of the civil services happens to be to implement policies and decisions laid down by Parliament and the political executive but our scientists seem to resent being called in whenever they are required for the purpose of implementation of these policies. What alternative do they suggest?

It is not clear why, if scientists are clamouring for a role in policy

formulation and decision making, they have not yet succeeded in evolving a machinery for formulation and overseeing of implementation of National Science Policy. Surely if "constitutionally timid ignoramuses" have stood in their way in achieving this, they could have worked out a blueprint for the purpose and put it up before the political executive for its approval. Their failure to achieve this basic minimum for success of science policy in India, indicates the bankruptcy of Indian science. The poor performance of the C.S.I.R. in promoting science for industry has been explained away in one article by the answer that scientists and science administrators were busy in expansion of laboratory facilities. I am inclined to agree with Dr. R. K. Vepa that a lot of second rate stuff is parading as Indian science.

In this context, I would like to make a few comments on the concepts of neutrality and anonymity of civil services. The concept of neutrality has of late come in for considerable criticism from responsible public men in the country. I feel that neutrality is a hideous word almost conveying the same meaning as the word sterility. The sooner we drop this notion, the better will it be for the virility of the services. As against neutrality, the concept of commitment has been suggested. The civil services have everything to gain by declaring that they are committed to achieve the goals laid down in the Constitution. As regards the concept of anonymity about the role of a civil servant as a District Officer

or as a Head of a Government department one may mention that the general public knows him as such and seeks his intervention in times of necessity. This is a role which calls for impartiality but not anonymity.

I, however, wish to suggest that a certain degree of freedom of speech should be given to the members of the civil services. By this I am not advocating that civil servants should use their freedom of speech to take part in political controversies. Neither am I suggesting that they should divulge State secrets in exercising their freedom of speech. In our times, one's survival seems to be directly related to the volume of noise one makes. In such ecological circumstances anonymity and lack of freedom of speech are operating manifestly to the detriment of the services. At the bar of public opinion in India and before the Administrative Reforms Commission the case of a generalist civil service has clearly gone by default. So religiously are we (the civil servants) hugging our

anonymity that we are afraid even to whisper a word in defence. Surely the Indian public has a right to know the outstanding work done by Indian civil servants.

With the freedom of speech which I have in mind, I would suggest that the members of the services should take active part in educating public opinion regarding the role of a generalist civil servant. The controversy of 'generalist' *versus* 'specialist' is a futile one and will do more harm than good to the country. In the ever expanding functions, which the State is assuming, there is surely room for both the generalists and the specialists. The camel is a specialist of the desert but is awkward in the swamp. The hippopotamus, who is a specialist in the mud-lands, is helpless in the desert. It is only man, the generalist who is master of both the desert and the swamp.

—J. C. PANT

Deputy Commissioner
Rae Bareilly (U.P.)

INSTITUTE NEWS

Shri Y. B. Chavan was unanimously re-elected President of the Institute, for the year 1969-70 at the Fifteenth Annual General Body Meeting of the Institute which was held on October 25, 1969. *Shri Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee*, Chief Minister of West Bengal, is the new Vice-President of the Institute for a period of two years. The following are the coopted members (for one year) of the Institute's Executive Council: *Shri B. Sivaraman*, ICS, *Shri Chandra Shekhar*, M.P., *Shri N. P. Sen*, *Shri Asoka Mehta*, M.P., and *Shri B. Venkatappiah*.

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During the two quarters (July-December) the Institute organized 12 courses for middle/senior level officials of the Central, State and Municipal Governments, Public Sector Undertakings, etc., on: Modern Aids to Management; Municipal Administration; Materials Planning; Development Administration (two courses); Appreciation Course on Techniques of Administrative Improvement (conducted in association with Department of Administrative Reforms, Union Ministry of Home Affairs); Budgeting and Financial Control; Performance Budgeting (two courses); Project Formulation; Administrative Behaviour; and Budgeting & Financial Management (this first out-station course was organized at Port Blair for training 27 senior officers of the Andaman and Nicobar Administration).

The Institute in cooperation with the National Academy of Administration (Mussoorie) also organized

another Conference on Personnel Administration, at New Delhi from August 31—September 2. Sixty-five participants, who were M.Ps., Journalists, senior government officers from various services, business executives and academicians, discussed matters relating to effective implementation of ARC's recommendations on: (i) Staffing Policies, (ii) Unified Grading Structure, and (iii) Training and Development of Personnel.

In addition, two seminars were also held on "Cabinet System in Municipal Government" and "Unauthorized Construction"—in the latter Delhi Municipal Corporation collaborated.

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In the Institute's Faculty, the following new appointments were made: (i) *Dr. M. J. K. Thavaraj*, Professor of Financial Administration (Budgeting & Financial Management); (ii) *Shri B. S. Narula*, Professor of Public Administration (Administrative Theory and Behaviour); and (iii) *Dr. S. K. Goyal*, Reader and Head of the newly-created Industrial Administration Unit.

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In pursuance of the invitation of the Director of IIPA, for promoting "A Debate on the ARC proposals on Personnel" to create a favourable climate for implementing accepted recommendations of ARC Report on Personnel Administration, the IIPA regional/local branches organized the following: (i) *Seminar on Public Services in a Developing*

Democracy (Chandigarh, October 3-5); (ii) *Discussion on ARC Report on Personnel Administration* (Poona, October 9); and (iii) *Seminar on ARC Report on Personnel Administration* (Madras, October 11-12).

In addition, 12 lectures were also arranged under the auspices of regional/local branches of the Institute which include lectures on: (i) "Problems and Priorities of Development" by *Mrs. Vera Dean*, Professor of International Development, Graduate School of Public Administration, New York University; (ii) "The Contract Between Policy and Performance—Some Reflections" by *Dr. William H. Wriggins*, Professor in Government, Columbia University (U.S.A.); and (iii) "Criteria for Government Intervention in Industry" by *Mr. Maurice Zinkin*, Head of the Department of Economics & Statistics, Unilever Ltd., London. These three lectures were organized by Maharashtra Regional Branch at Bombay.

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IIPA's Centre for Training & Research in Municipal Administration brought out, in November, the inaugural issue of its quarterly journal *Nagarloka*. The new quarterly

will cover municipal affairs exclusively.

The following new publications were brought out by the Institute: (i) *Relations Between Politicians and Administrators* by Prof. Shanti Kothari & Dr. Ramashray Roy (Rs. 20.00); (ii) *Citizen Administration and Lokpal* by Dr. V. Jagannadham & H. R. Makhija (Rs. 17.50); (iii) *Conference on Training* (contains proceedings of the Conference on the subject, held at IIPA, as well as papers contributed by the Training Division, Ministry of Home Affairs, and by some of the participants) (Rs. 25.00); (iv) *Five Year Municipal Development Plans* (proceedings of a seminar organized by IIPA's Municipal Centre) (Rs. 5.00); (v) *Citizens' Grievances and Administration* by Dr. A. P. Barnabas (Rs. 10.00); and (vi) *Administration of the Urban Fringe* (proceedings of the Seminar on the subject organized by IIPA last year) (Rs. 3.00).

Besides, Madras Regional Branch brought out the *Proceedings of the Seminar on Redressal of Public Grievances* which it conducted earlier. The copies of the proceedings were released by *Shri Ujjal Singh*, Governor of Tamil Nadu.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The Administrative Reforms Commission, besides the Report on Personnel Administration, submitted four more reports to the Government during the period April-December, 1969. These were on: (i) "Centre-State Relationships", (ii) "Delegation of Financial and Administrative Powers", (iii) Small Scale Sector, and (iv) State Administration. Digests of (i) and (ii) appear at pages 729 and 733 respectively.

A Policy Planning and Coordination Division has been set up in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting to sift and analyse information and plan long-term strategy. It will also ensure inter-media coordination in the publicity effort of Government and undertake training and evaluation in the field.

The P & T Department has streamlined its organization for promptly redressing complaints of its clients. Officers to deal with complaints exclusively have been provided at headquarter, divisional and circle levels. The complaints cell in the P & T Directorate is headed by a full-time Director.

A separate department, called "Social Welfare Department", has been created by the Government of Tamil Nadu, to co-ordinate the various social welfare activities and to give an impetus to social welfare work. For similar reasons, the state government has also set up three separate Secretariat Departments for: (i) Industries, (ii) Labour, and (iii) Co-operation.

The National Commission on Labour has, in its Report, recommended setting up of permanent Industrial Relations Commissions both at the Centre and in the States and also Standing Labour Courts in the States.

It has urged immediate setting up of a Pay Commission to determine the wages and other conditions of service of government employees, and has suggested the following basis for promotions: (i) seniority at the lower rung; (ii) seniority-cum-merit at the middle rung, and (iii) merit alone at the higher managerial and technical administrative positions.

For effective participation of employees in the process of collective bargaining, it has recommended several measures for making trade unions well organized, strong and stable—such as compulsory registration of unions; raising membership fee as well as the minimum number of members required for forming a union; reducing number of outsider members, etc.

It exhorted greater respect to the principle of equal pay for equal work and, while recommending progressive increase in real wages, incentives and "fall-back-wages", it emphasised increase in productivity. It recommended a number of measures for making Wage Boards as an effective machinery for wage fixation.

It also suggested increase in absorption of women in skilled categories of work and that they should

nowhere be considered subordinate or secondary to men.

Following the recommendations of the National Commission on Labour, the Government of India has decided to appoint a new (third) Pay Commission to review the pay structure and other conditions of service of Central Government employees. Without having a sectoral approach in respect of departments or categories of Government employees, the new Pay Commission is expected to go into questions that may be referred to it in respect of Central Government employees as a whole.

The Government of Tamil Nadu has also appointed a Pay Commission (second) to consider revision of the pay scales and allowances of employees of the State Government, Local Bodies and teachers in aided institutions. The three-member Commission will be headed by *Shri F. Sivanandam*, now Chairman of the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission.

The Government of Uttar Pradesh has set up a 7-member high power Committee on U.P. Civil Service (Executive Branch) (Chairman: *Shri J. D. Shukla*) to examine and report on matters relating to its existing strength, chances of promotion of its officers, and the necessity for posting them in different capacities in other government departments.

The Government of Assam has constituted a Police Commission (Chairman: *Shri Shanti Prasad*) to enquire into the organizational personnel and functional aspects of police administration in Assam. It will also cover relationship between Superintendent of Police and District Magistrate.

For improving the quality of training of I.A.S. probationers and making

it more problem-oriented, a "sandwich pattern of training" has been introduced by Union Ministry of Home Affairs at the National Academy of Administration, Mussoorie, from July. The first spell (of 8 months) of training, at the Academy is for intensive training in subjects like Law, Economics, Political Theory, Constitution, Indian History and Culture; and after one year's on-the-job training in their States of allotment, the second spell (of 4 months) at the Academy is to be concentrated largely on the problems and techniques of administration and more practical aspects of Economics. Being problem-oriented, the latter would be based largely on their experience and observations in the field of district administration.

The Government of Gujarat has given gazetted status to all posts of Superintendents in the Subordinate Secretariat Service and other similar posts redesignating these as "Section Officer Class III" (with effect from May 17, 1969). The state Government has also curbed transferring powers of the concerned authorities to avoid unnecessary inconvenience and other domestic hardships to Class III and IV Government servants.

In pursuance of the recommendations of Gajendragadkar Commission regarding streamlining of appointments to the gazetted posts, the Government of Jammu & Kashmir has set up, for specific services, Departmental Promotion Committee to consider promotions to all gazetted posts/services. The recommendations of the Committee will be forwarded to the Public Service Commission for approval. The State Government has also decentralized recruitment to non-gazetted cadres. Three types of new cadres—one each for District, Division, and State—will be department based and comprise the

posts borne on the establishment of the three levels. The gazetted posts of these will remain under the purview of Public Service Commission, and maintained as State Cadres.

In order to improve the management of public sector undertakings, no officer of a Ministry will be appointed as chairman of a public sector undertaking or included in their boards of management, according to the decision of the Government of India. Further, each public enterprise will have a full-time chairman-cum-managing director or at least a full-time managing director.

In *Madhya Pradesh*, a directive issued by the Government enjoins upon its officers that they should not accept invitation for inaugurating any public function including those for opening of buildings, roads, bridges, public institutions, etc. Such functions should, in the view of the Government, be performed by non-officials. In *Haryana*, excepting the first official visit, no district officer is to wait on a Minister on tour in a district unless specially desired by the Minister. However, when Chief Minister visits district headquarters, the Deputy Commissioner and the Superintendent of Police would invariably meet him.

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A study team has been set up by the Government of *Punjab* to look into various problems concerning the development of the Panchayati Raj as well as the problems of animal husbandry and dairy farming.

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The Ministry of Irrigation and Power has set up a Committee of Central and State Ministers to suggest measures for accelerating the provision of the drinking water,

irrigation and electricity in the Himalayan region. *Dr. Y. S. Parmar*, Chief Minister of Himachal Pradesh, will be the Chairman of this Committee. For a similar purpose Government of *Tamil Nadu* has also set up a Water Supply and Drainage Board.

The Old Age Pension Scheme, has now been revived by the *Haryana* Government keeping in view the hardships of the destitute old persons—unsupported—men of 65 and above and women of 60 and above. The rate of pension has also been enhanced from Rs. 15 p.m. to Rs. 25 p.m.

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As recommended by Gajendragadkar Commission, the Government of *Jammu & Kashmir* has set up a State Development Board to formulate long term proposals for the five-year and annual development plans of the State. Headed by the Chief Minister, it will also make recommendations regarding mobilization of resources for financing the development needs of the State.

An eight-member committee, with Finance Secretary as the Convener, has been constituted by the Government of *Madhya Pradesh* to ensure speedy implementation of Programme and Performance Budgeting in Governmental expenditure. As a first step, the works expenditure in the *Madhya Pradesh* State Budget of 1970-71 will be shown in accordance with this system.

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For promoting the development of a modern mechanised small scale sector, the administrative Reforms Commission has, in its Report on Small Scale Sector, proposed the constitution of a statutory high-power apex body to be called "the Small Scale Industries Commission"

to replace the present Small Scale Industries Board.

The Commission has also suggested creation of an apex investment and finance institution by a state with a paid up capital of Rs. 25 crores, besides making other important recommendations pertaining to: providing of technical advice and guidance in common basic trades and in industries with lower technologies; proper planning and developing of an industrial estate; training of its entrepreneurs and personnel; establishment of new management consultancy units; equitable distribution of scarce raw materials between the large scale and the small scale sectors, based on the priority of the end-products, etc.

The Industrial Licensing Policy Committee of the Government of India, which enquired into working of the licensing system during 1956-66, recommended continuance of the licensing system in a much more rationalized and purposeful manner, and made several recommendations in this regard and also for improving organization of financial institutions. To prevent further concentration of economic power, the Committee recommended development of the 'Joint Sector', and participation of Government in the management of such crucial areas where funds are being provided in substantial proportions by public financial institutions and, sometimes directly by government. It confirmed that industrial houses, with assets exceeding Rs. 35 crores, had received a disproportionately large share of industrial licences, and undue preference in financial assistance from the specialized financial institutions during 1956-66.

By virtue of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1969, which

ratified the earlier Bank Nationalization Ordinance, 14 top Indian Commercial banks with deposits exceeding Rs. 50 crores were nationalized. The Act, provides for workers' participation in the management of these banks. Further, the Government of India has also set up a study group to examine various aspects of the idea of setting up a foreign Trade Bank of India to take over and run all the foreign branches of the public sector banks.

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The Law Commission, in its report on the Code of Criminal Procedure, has drafted a completely new Code consisting of about 480 sections as against the present 565 sections. Some of the more important recommendations of the Commission relate to separation of the Executive from the Judiciary in the administration of criminal justice; organizing all judicial magistrates—as class I and II (abolishing class III)—under a Chief Judicial Magistrate for each district under the control of High Court; and upgrading the status and widening range of functions of the Public Prosecutor of the district. It does not favour putting Executive Magistrates in two or three different classes according to their powers. The Commission is for continuance of the institution of Presidency Magistrates.

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With a view to fostering a co-ordinated democratic youth movement, the Government of *Mysore* constituted a Youth Welfare Board with the State Minister for Finance Planning & Youth Welfare, as the Chairman. A similar Youth Commission was also created in *Uttar Pradesh* with Chief Minister as its Chairman.

In order to gear educational administration to development needs, the Government of *Bihar* has constituted a 7-man Committee to examine the entire set-up of the State's Education Department. Similarly, the *Uttar Pradesh* Government reorganized its University Education Advisory Board to make it more plan oriented and has appointed a separate experts Committee to examine

pattern of medical education. Another Committee appointed by the Government of *Assam* will, in addition to going into the problems of Secondary Education, examine the pay and service conditions of teachers in aided schools. Besides these, a permanent Urdu Board (Chairman: Chief Minister) has also been set in U.P. for development of Urdu language.

DIGEST OF REPORTS

INDIA, REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS COMMISSION ON CENTRE-STATE RELATIONSHIPS, New Delhi, Government of India, 1969, pp. 54, Rs. 1.10

The Administrative Reforms Commission submitted its Report on Centre-State Relationships to the Government of India on June 19. The Commission was assisted in the work by a Study Team on the subject (Chairman: *Shri M. C. Setalvad*) which went into the different aspects of the subject. The important findings and recommendations of the Commission are as follows:

THE UNITY OF INDIA

(1) The basic constitutional fabric of the country is quite sound and must remain intact. The Constitution is flexible enough to ensure its successful working irrespective of whichever party may be in power and that it is not in the amendment of the Constitution that the solution of the problems of Centre-State relationships is to be sought but in the working of the provisions of the Constitution by all concerned in the spirit in which the founding fathers intended them to be worked.

ALLOCATION OF FUNCTIONS AND RESOURCES BETWEEN THE CENTRE AND THE STATE

(2) As recommended in the ARC Report on "Machinery of the Government of India and Its Procedures of Work", the role of the Centre in areas covered in the State List should be largely that of pioneer, guide, disseminator of information, and overall planner and evaluator. The func-

tions of the Central Ministries and Departments with regard to subjects falling within the State List should be confined to the matters listed in paragraph 85 of that Report.

(3) [The Commission have already dealt, in their Report on the Machinery of the Government of India and Its Procedures of Work and the Report on Machinery for Planning, with matters relating to Central assistance, etc. Therefore, the Commission in this report were concerned with the following two connected problems: (a) the steps to be taken to deal with the problem of mounting debts of the States to the Centre, and (b) the need for pre-determination of the principles on the basis of which grants should be given for Plan schemes.]

(i) Loan for Plan schemes should be given only when they are of a productive type. Whether a scheme is productive or not, should be decided by the Planning Commission in consultation with the Finance Ministry and other Central Ministries concerned.

(ii) The repayment of productive loans should be made over a period of time, the States endeavouring to maximize the return on the investments and building up sinking funds for amortization of loans. The timely payment of a proper rate of interest should be insisted upon.

(iii) Assistance for non-productive capital schemes should be in the form of capital grants.

(iv) The problem of dealing with outstanding Central loans to the States for Plan schemes, as also the question of setting up of sinking fund for the amortization of debt, should be referred to a committee of experts.

(4) When the Constitution was framed recourse to its Article 282 for the purpose of making grants for the Five Year Plan schemes could not have been contemplated. Hence, the Finance Commission may be asked to make recommendations on the principles which should govern the distribution of Plan grants to the States. The appointment of the Finance Commission may be so timed that when making its recommendations it will have before it an outline of the five Year Plan as prepared by the Planning Commission.

The application of the principles governing the distribution of Plan grants from year to year will be left to the Planning Commission.

In order to secure effective co-ordination of the Finance Commission's recommendation and the Plan, a Member of the Planning Commission may be appointed to the Finance Commission.

The Finance Commission should include two persons, one having experience of financial administration at the Centre and the other having such experience in a State.

The Unit of the Plan Finance Division of the Ministry of Finance at the Centre may be strengthened. It should form the nucleus of the Finance Commission's secretariat from time to time.

(5) The Finance Commission should take into consideration the

problem of granting increased emoluments to the State Government employees on account of increase in the cost of living, while making allocations of resources to the States.

(6) The State Governments should adequately tax the direct beneficiaries of the heavy investments in big projects like the Irrigation and Power projects.

ROLE OF THE GOVERNOR

(7) A person to be appointed as a Governor should be one who has had a long experience in public life and administration and can be trusted to rise above party prejudices and predilections. He should not be eligible for further appointment as a Governor after the completion of his term. Judges, on retirement, should not be appointed as Governors. However, a Judge who enters public life on retirement and becomes a legislator or holds an elective office may not be considered ineligible for appointment as Governor.

(8) The convention of consulting the Chief Minister before appointing a Governor is a healthy one and may continue.

(9) Guidelines on the manner in which discretionary powers should be exercised by the Governors should be formulated by the Inter-State Council and on acceptance by the Union issued in the name of the President. They should be placed before both Houses of Parliament.

(10) The Governor, besides sending the fortnightly reports to the President, should make *ad hoc* reports as and when the need arises. He must act according to his own judgement and discretion in making such reports to the President and also in regard to the reservation of Bills for the consideration of the President.

(11) When the Governor has reason to believe that the Ministry has ceased to command a majority in the Assembly, he should come to a final conclusion on this question by summoning the Assembly and ascertaining its verdict on the support enjoyed by the Ministry. When a question arises as to whether the Council of Ministers enjoys the confidence of the majority in the Assembly, and the Chief Minister does not advise the Governor to summon the Assembly, the Governor may, if he thinks fit, *suo motu* summon the Assembly for the purpose of obtaining its verdict on the question.

(12) Where functionaries like the Speaker act arbitrarily and prevent the functioning of legislatures, effective remedies must be devised by the legislatures themselves by way of formulating rules of business which would enable the legislature to transact the business for which it was called into session.

(13) When a Ministry is defeated in the Assembly on a major policy issue and if the outgoing Chief Minister advises the Governor to dissolve the Assembly with a view to obtaining the verdict of the electorate, the Governor should accept the advice. In other cases, he may exercise his discretion.

(14) The Governor should not only receive information as provided for in Article 167, but should also actively look for it with a view to discharging his Constitutional responsibilities effectively.

INTER-STATE COUNCIL AND INTER-STATE WATER DISPUTES

(15) Centre-State and inter-State differences should not be discussed in public as it does often rouse or even inflame public opinion. Such differences should be settled

by mutual discussions. To the extent possible, these discussions should be held in camera. Only the decisions may be issued in the form of Statements.

(16) An Inter-State Council should be constituted under Article 263 of the Constitution. It may consist of: (i) the Prime Minister (Chairman); (ii) the Finance Minister; (iii) the Home Minister; (iv) the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha (when one is not available, a representative should be elected by the Opposition parties by single transferable vote), and (v) five representatives, one each from the five Zonal Councils. Any of the Union Cabinet Ministers or Chief Ministers who may be concerned with a particular subject, may be invited for discussion when the relevant subject is under consideration.

The proceedings of this Council must be secret.

(17) (i) The functions of the Inter-State Council should be as indicated in Article 263 of the Constitution, i.e., (a) inquiring into or advising upon disputes which may have arisen between States; (b) investigating and discussing subjects in which some or all of the States, or the Union and one or more of the States have a common interest; or (c) making recommendations upon any such subject and in particular, recommendations for the better co-ordination of policy and action with respect to that subject.

However, the Inter-State Council need not deal with matters within the purview of the National Development Council and such matters as the Prime Minister may decide to refer to the full-fledged Chief Ministers' Conference. Matters which can more appropriately be discussed in *ad hoc* conferences of Ministers, e.g., Food Ministers' Conference,

Education Ministers' Conference, may also not come up before the Council.

(ii) The Inter-State Council may be set up, to begin with, for a period of two years. A decision may be taken on its continuance in the light of experience gained.

(18) A time limit of three years may be prescribed for settlement by mediation of any Inter-State water dispute reckoning from the date the dispute first arises and on the expiry of the time limit the dispute shall be referred to compulsory arbitration by a tribunal.

LAW AND ORDER

(19) (i) The use of the naval, military or air force or any other armed forces of the Union in aid of civil power of a State may be made either at the instance of the State Government or *suo motu* by the Centre. The question whether such aid is needed must obviously be a matter of judgement by the Centre. This is also consistent with Article 355 of the Constitution. The intervention of the Centre in aid of the civil power on its initiative cannot be restricted to a threatened emergency under Article 352.

(ii) The Centre may exercise its discretion to locate the needed forces in the States and to deploy them for maintaining public order for purposes of the Centre, such as protection of central property, central staff, and works in which the Centre has an interest.

(20) The issue of direction by the Centre to a State should be the last step. They, therefore, recommended that before issue of directions to a State under Article 256 the Centre should explore the possibilities of

settling points of conflict by all other available means.

SOME IMPORTANT INSTITUTIONS HAVING A BEARING ON CENTRE- STATE RELATIONSHIPS

(21) It is not necessary to restrict the role of State Governments in the matter of selection of High Court Judges. The present procedure and method of appointment of High Court Judges has worked satisfactorily on the whole and should continue with the modification that the role of the Ministry of Home Affairs may be taken over by the Ministry of Law.

(The Commission does not favour the Study Team's proposal that one-third of the Judges may be selected from 'outside' the State. In this connection, they observed that keeping in view the pressures now being built up in the States that the courts should adopt regional languages and that Hindi should be the language of the Supreme Court, it may not be possible to enforce the recommendation of Study Team when different High Courts use different languages.)

DECENTRALIZATION OF POWERS IN CERTAIN AREAS

(22) A constant source of irritation in the relations between the Centre and the States is the need for the States to obtain 'clearance' from the Centre for action required to be taken from time to time on projects which are financed by the Centre or are carried out by them as agents of the Centre. Powers should, therefore, be delegated to the maximum extent to the States with regard to their work on projects in which the Centre is directly interested or which are carried out by them as agents of the Central Government.

INDIA, REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS COMMISSION ON DELEGATION OF FINANCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS, New Delhi, Government of India, 1969, pp. 26, Rs. 1.20

The important findings and recommendations made by the Administrative Reforms Commission in the report are as follows:

(1) (i) Speedy decision-making is the essence of efficient administration in a big and complex organization like that of the Government where a large number of decisions are to be taken from time to time. Therefore, to avoid bottlenecks, delegations of powers on a large scale is inescapable. In making delegations the approach should, therefore, be that powers to be delegated should be the "maximum possible" in the circumstances rather than the "minimum necessary". (ii) Such delegations should be reviewed at periodical intervals in the light of the requirements of the changed circumstances in which powers are exercised. The Department of Administrative Reforms should assist the nodal and other Ministries concerned in making such a review and formulating proposals for changes necessary in the delegations, for the consideration and decision by Government. (iii) Further, whenever any modifications or changes have to be made in the delegations, these should be done through amendments to the rules themselves and not through executive instructions.

Exercise of Delegated Powers

(2) To ensure that the tendency to push up decision-making to higher level is checked properly, (i) the higher authorities should exercise restraint and discrimination in calling for information on matters which are the subject matter of exercise of powers delegated to subordinate authorities. (ii) Senior managers should organize their work in such a way that they do not handle tasks which

should be left to those who are working under them. (iii) Senior managers should make it a part of their duty consciously to encourage and train those functioning at lower levels to develop initiative and habits of decision-making on their own.

(3) (i) The delegating authority should be responsible for ensuring that powers are properly exercised by its subordinate agencies. For this purpose, it should organize on-the-spot inspections and scrutiny of periodical returns containing details regarding decisions taken by delegatee authorities.

(ii) In judging the manner in which delegated powers are exercised, a broad view should be taken. Petty mistakes or minor errors of judgement should not be made much of and one who has shown initiative and boldness in taking decisions should be encouraged notwithstanding minor errors.

DELEGATIONS IN RELATION TO FINANCIAL POWERS INCLUDING BUDGET

(4) While the responsibility of the Finance Ministry for budget-making and for pre-budget scrutiny should remain unimpaired, ways and means should be devised by mutual cooperation between the administrative ministries and the Finance Ministry to avoid as far as possible duplication of work in the matter of budget scrutiny.

(5) In order to ensure that the delegation of financial powers does not become ineffective due to the widespread existence of two inter-related practices of including the lumpsum provisions in the budget estimates or accepting estimates subject to the post-budget scrutiny, the Finance Ministry should initiate

a joint programme for the improvement of budget procedure in collaboration with the administrative ministries and the Comptroller and Auditor General, with a view to spacing out the budget proposals during the year and avoiding rushing them at the very end of it.

(6) Subject to necessary safeguards, the ministries should delegate adequate financial powers to the Line and Specialist Organizations. The delegations should generally be related to the nature of work handled in such organizations. This should be achieved mainly by suitable adjustments in the delegation of powers of the existing categories of authorities. An increase in the number of patterns themselves should be considered only if unavoidably necessary. Care should, however, be taken to ensure that there is no needless proliferation of patterns.

(7) In view of the importance of adequate arrangements for the good financial management as an accompaniment of, or a pre-requisite to, the delegation of powers, the feasibility of having an internal Finance Officer in selected Line and Specialist Organizations should be examined and such an officer should be appointed wherever the nature or the volume of work clearly warrants such an appointment.

DELEGATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS

(8) There should be a personnel cell in important viable line and specialist organizations to deal with the work relating to personnel administration and ensure careful exercise of powers in the delegated fields.

(9) While it would not be expedient to vest discretion in the heads of organizations to re-delegate all their powers, the administrative ministries should consider it a part of their duty to foster and develop decision-making, initiative and action at the lower levels. Heads of Organizations should be empowered to re-delegate, with the approval of the ministries, some of their administrative powers to the officers within the organizations. The re-delegations should be subject to periodic review and, where found necessary, suitable amendments should be made in the light of the experience gained.

RULES AND REGULATIONS HAVING A BEARING ON DELEGATIONS

There is lack of proper arrangements for keeping up-to-date the manuals and regulations regarding financial matters and service conditions. No single authority is charged with the duty of compiling, and keeping up-to-date, the existing rules and regulations, arranging for their periodical reprint, and for the issue, from time to time, of correction slips for the use of officials administering these rules.

A central agency should specifically be entrusted with the multifarious duties relating to these rules. All rules and regulations having a financial bearing may be entrusted to a cell in the Finance Ministry. Rules relating to personnel administration as such, may be entrusted to a cell in the new Department of Personnel already recommended by the Commission in their Report on the Machinery of Government of India and Its Procedures of Work.

BOOK REVIEWS

DEMOCRACY IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE; By EMMETTE S. REDFORD, New York, Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 211.

One who is familiar with the writings of Professor Redford will open the book with anticipation and close it with a feeling of satisfaction for being served a rich dish of intellectual diet. Professor Redford turns his attention in the book under review to discussing the relationship between democracy and the administrative structure that inevitably comes into being to implement the concerns of democracy. To be more precise, the theoretical focus around which analysis in the book is organized pertains to the question as how "to reconcile the practice of effective democracy with the positive and energetic public administration required by the modern state".

The modern state is characterized by the increasing complexity of governmental functions as well as the size of these functions. Moreover, due to the operation of certain factors the government has not only to continue certain services provided to the public but also to create and undertake new functions necessary for security and welfare of the public.

This has necessarily meant the emergence of complex organizations—both public and private—whose decisions affect the pattern of distribution of benefits. In the context of the inevitability of the administrative system and the various ways in which it affects the lives of citizens, Professor Redford explores the existence (or non-existence) and

the possibilities for achievement of democracy through the operations of the administrative state and the influences upon it.

This exploration takes Professor Redford to investigate the basic tenets of democratic morality which he identifies as individual realization, equality of men in their claims for attention, and participation either directly or through control of leaders—as the instrument of implementation of substantive values. However, obstructions to the realization of these tenets in real life are manifold and their sources multiple. Nor can the democratic—for that matter, any—political system ever remove these obstructions completely. For instance, law cannot take care of the individual's internal conditions nor can it create and regulate conditions that vitiate perfect equality and equal participation.

Professor Redford then goes on to examine the natural, regular, and persistent factors in the operation of public administrative institutions and their implications for realization of the democratic ideal. Examining in detail the institutional aspects of administrative structures, the role of individuals, and the interactive processes between administrative structures and individual roles, he demonstrates that policies are made by interactions of men occupying strategic positions in specialized institutions. The diversity of institutional structures, official roles, personal

stakes and professional orientations counteract the tendency towards concentration of power and decision-making. The dispersal of power as well as the participation, either direct or indirect, in decision-making processes by power brokers, opinion makers, non-leaders and others makes for a search for consensus and reconciliation of claims.

Turning his attention to sketching the American national administrative system, Professor Redford locates the strategic centres of influence, describes the effects of their interactions and demonstrates their implications for democratic morality. His analysis brings out some important features of the structure and function of administrative system. He observes, for example, that administrative relations are multi-dimensional and involve coordination and channeling of influence through several points both political and administrative. Professor Redford also delineates the ways in which macro—as well as micro—political systems impinge on the administrative structure and influence administrative decision-making processes. The macro-system, that is, the legislative and the executive branches, frames rules which guide the functioning of the administrative system and through frequent reviews of administrative performance functions as a control mechanism.

The interrelationship between the administrative structure, the micro-system and the macro-system is very complex and multi-dimensional. The contact points between these different structures serve as communication linkages as well as channels of influence. Another crucial feature pertains to the plurality of the sources of pressures on the administrative structures and the utilization of various kinds of influence structures for the fulfilment of demands

channeled into the administrative system. The conflicting nature of claims and demands on the administrative system transforms it into a system that functions essentially through processing these conflicting claims, reconciling them and forging a consensus that can provide a viable basis of effective decision-making. Moreover, in a functioning democracy administrative structure is characterized by its porousness, that is, influences and pressures can be brought to bear on it from above, sides, and below. All these factors make for administrative responsiveness and responsibility. It should, however, be emphasized that whether or not the administrative system manifests the attributes of responsiveness and responsibility depends also on the degree to which the macro-political system is itself representative and effective in its operations.

In addition to the fact that the administrative system impinges upon the lives of its clientele, it has also considerable influence over the lives of its employees. Professor Redford rightly includes this aspect in his discussion. While organizations provide work, they can also be harsh. Various approaches, such as, authoritarianism, guildism, and human relations, prescribe the ways in which workers' interests can be protected. However, as Professor Redford demonstrates, they have their own shortcomings which prevent each of them from being completely effective. Professor Redford, therefore, suggests a fourth approach—liberal constitutionalism—which contemplates legal definition of the rights of and limitations on the parties in the employment relationship.

There is no doubt that Professor Redford brings to bear on the problem his vast scholarship and sharp analytical skill. However, a few

deficiencies in an otherwise closely reasoned analysis must be noted. In the first place, it is unfortunate that Professor Redford restricts his analysis to American experience. This has prevented him from discussing the salience of cultural context for administrative system.

This omission is unfortunate because cultural differences have an important bearing on the functioning of administrative systems in different climes. In the second place, the analysis presented in the book seems to be overly influenced by group theory of politics. It is not valid to argue that political or administrative decisions are the resultant of the conflict between various organized interest groups. Nor, all countries have as yet developed a structure of pressure groups as in

America. Further, even if we recognize the crucial role played by the conflict between pressure groups in political decision-making, what happens to those interests which are unorganized or cannot find a protector and promoter? And, lastly, if a representative and effective macro-political system is a necessary condition for making administrative system responsive and responsible, what happens when a country, particularly a developing country, does not have a well-stabilized democratic political system? Clearly, the American experience does not become fully relevant for such countries. In short, then, the lack of a comparative perspective robs much of the usefulness of the book under review.

—RAMASHRAY ROY

STATESMEN IN DISGUISE: THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CLASS OF THE BRITISH HOME CIVIL SERVICE, 1853-1966; By Geoffrey Kingdon Fry, London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1969, pp. 479.

The book under review is an enlarged version of the author's doctoral dissertation submitted to the University of London in 1967. At a time when many students of Public Administration in England were very much concerned with the deteriorating performance of the British Civil Service, particularly of its Administrative Class (which according to many had remained stagnated in its functions since its inception in 1853), and were advocating drastic "modernization" of its role and structure to suit the changed conditions, Dr. Fry's study could not have been more topical and significant. The fact that the book came out after the much awaited Fulton Committee verdict on the reorganization of the British Civil Service had been discussed and debated in the press, in the Parliament, and in the academic and professional

circles, has provided an additional opportunity to the author to re-evaluate his conclusions against the backdrop of Fulton Committee's proposals. The author has thus attempted to survey the development of the role of the Administrative Class personnel in the British Civil Service up to 1966, and to look forward to its possible development in the light of the Fulton Report.

Dr. Fry builds up his thesis against the historical perspective of the development of the Administrative Class since 1853 (such a perspective he thinks is lacking in the Fulton Report, p. 365). He concludes that the Administrative Class's ideal administrator—a direct descendent of the "intellectual class" envisaged in the Northcote Trevlyan Report of 1853—basically remains the same "intelligent layman", who sees his

special role as "the awareness of Ministerial responsibility". This theme which he admirably develops in his first chapter amply justifies the title of the book "Statesmen in Disguise". This conventional role, the author concludes, "is now outmoded" and the Administrative Class "would need to learn more in the future in the direction of technocracy". "The all rounder tradition of the Administrative Class, its tendencies of low valuation to management, specialized knowledge and investigation as preliminary to action," constitutes according to him, attitudes more appropriate to the service of a Regulatory State than that charged with administering the welfare State and of managing its economy. The remedy, according to him, lies in a radical recasting of the Civil Service with the initial step in the process of abolition of the separate Administrative Class, and the merger of the Executive and the Administrative Classes on the basis of a more specialized career structure—the leading grades of the merged class, together with the equivalent grades of the specialist groups forming an integrated Higher Civil Service. In his subsequent chapters, he further examines the impact of the Positive State on the direct entry recruitment and post-entry training arrangements of the Administrative Class, and the relationships of that class with the managerial Executive Class, and the leading specialists groups. These chapters have a special value for the readers who wish to acquaint themselves with the large amount of source material that exists on the methods of recruitment and training of the British Civil Service. The author thus comes to the conclusion that a more unified Higher Civil Service would provide the type of administrators needed by the modern state. With an open hierarchy, the service should be able to exchange staff with the local authorities, the

public corporations, private industrial and commercial undertakings, and the Universities on a larger scale than at present. The study ends with a post-script relating to the author's review and reassessment of the Fulton Report and its recommendations on the reorganization of the British Civil Service.

To a distant observer, the conclusions may not seem to be too formidable or significant in relation to the vast and exhaustive material that the author had the opportunity to examine for establishing his case. To certain extent similar steps as suggested by the author had already been taken in the British Diplomatic Service (re-organized on the pattern of uniformed grade structure after the Plowden Report of 1964). The extension of these moves into the Home Civil Service was more or less anticipated in the Fulton Committee Report as a logical sequence of such development. The author's originality, however, lies in the fact that he has attempted to evaluate the existing structure of the civil service in terms of the changing and growing needs of the society and the requirements of a Positive State. He advocates the amalgamation of the Administrative and Executive on a rational basis—viz., as a symbol of class distinction with the civil service. In other words where the Plowden Report (on the British Foreign Service) failed was in its veiled attempt to maintain class distinction within a unified Diplomatic Service, while Dr. Fry rightly pleads for total and real breakdown of such barriers.

The concluding chapter of the book (pp. 251-360) seems to have been greatly supplemented with the new material that had come to light immediately after the author had completed his doctoral dissertation. Such material was produced to be

received as evidence for the guidance of the Fulton Committee deliberations. One of the initial themes discussed in the conclusion is the very complex problem of the proper relationship between the Ministers, civil servants and the experts, having its bearing on the concept of neutrality and anonymity of the civil servants—a problem which he rightly thinks has not received adequate attention in the Fulton Report. However, instead of arriving at some far-reaching conclusion, as one hoped he does not go any farther than an implicit support for the Labour Party's proposal of creating "posts of confidence" for the help of Ministers, which in itself is quite controversial. Another theme discussed at length in the concluding chapter is the "Training of the Civil Servants". Here again he merely examines in detail the proposals of the Report of the Working Party of Her Majesty's Treasury on Management Training (1967), and in doing so missed an opportunity for presenting a scheme for the Training of the re-organized service as would suit the demands of the contemporary welfare state. Yet another theme on the system of Personnel Management and Recruitment for the Unified Civil Service is likewise sketchily discussed in the concluding chapter.

The post-script of the book contains Dr. Fry's assessment of the Fulton Report and its various recommendations on the Civil Service. While conceding that reasonable

people might differ on the problems of the British Civil Service, his analysis appears to be not adequately objective at many places. To mention one example, Fulton's proposal for a separate Civil Service Department, regarded by the author as "ill-considered" is indeed the vindication of the growing realization that personnel management is a distinct and direct responsibility of the Chief Executive in any organization, which could no longer be muddled through the financial transactions, nor be left to be bogged down under a traditional, negative and static outlook.

Nevertheless, the book is an accomplishment of a stupendous task on the part of the author inasmuch as he presents an impressive survey of the British Civil Service. His use of the primary and secondary sources is judicious and effective, which he has further supplemented with the oral and written evidences of the persons in and outside the civil service. Despite the frequent long quotations of texts from numerous reports and books, inevitable in a work of this kind, the author's painstaking efforts and judgement compel admiration, for he does establish the main points of his thesis convincingly. To a research scholar on the British Civil Service, the appendices containing some important statistical data and the Bibliography at the end of the book should prove to be highly useful—indeed unavoidable!

—R. B. JAIN

PANCHAYATI RAJ AND BUREAUCRACY: A STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIP PATTERNS; By V. R. GAIKWAD, Hyderabad National Institute of Community Development, 1969, pp. 77, Rs. 10.00.

Next only perhaps to the *Das Kapital* and the Shakespearean plays, panchayati raj in India has been the pet theme for researchers and com-

mentators. On the recommendations of the Balwantrai Mehta study team, panchayati raj was inaugurated with much fanfare as a system of

Local self-government that would usher in both democracy and development in rural India. In course of operations, the new system naturally developed stresses and strains which belied the hopes of many an optimist. Although in terms of sheer quantity, researches into panchayati raj are bewilderingly numerous; but to the discriminating eye, very few of them would pass for real 'research'. It is heartening to note that the work under review can certainly claim a place among the selected few.

This research work concentrates on a specific aspect of panchayati raj, viz., the relationship between the non-officials and the officials, which has earned a notoriety for giving rise to stresses in the administrative system. Based on a micro-study of the interaction pattern between the two arms of panchayati raj in a zilla parishad in Maharashtra, it has tried to find out the actual areas of conflict and cooperation between the two sets of actors. Instead of relying merely on structural-institutional factors and forces, the author has successfully delved into the behavioural realm which serves as the matrix of ideas and attitudes and explicit relations in the form of conflict, competition and cooperation. A remarkable feature of this study is the elaboration of the areas of differentiation between the non-officials and the officials, such as educational achievements, social background, and economic and occupational background. Very often, the tensions between these two wings are glibly attributed to formal-legal situations. For instance, recurring conflicts between the deliberative and the executive wings in the municipal corporations have frequently been stated to be due to the statutory separation of powers between the two. But, as this research work has revealed, "Many of the conflicting

situations observed and studied show that their basis was essentially of socio-psychological nature. The question of power prerogatives seems to have its origin in and is the reflection of such an atmosphere where the clashes especially at the higher echelons of district administration are the outcome of conflicting self-images of the individuals involved." Insofar as this study has been able to successfully explore the socio-psychological hinterland of local public administration, it has added a new dimension to the arid, formalistic research in public administration.

By way of criticism, it may be said that despite the meticulous gathering of comparable data on the socio-economic background of both the non-officials and the officials, the correlations between the variables and the conflict situations have not been clearly established. Also, it would have been better to check the temptation to make a sweeping statement at page 67 on "the general condition prevailing in the administrative set-up in the country".

Methodologically, this research piece deserves attention because of the efficient use of the method of participant observation supplemented by informal, unstructured interview technique. It has well demonstrated how methodology can be more than a jargon and really useful in scientifically organizing a research work. One would expect that such micro-studies would be conducted more extensively both in urban and rural local governments to facilitate the formulation of general propositions about the operations of local government.

—MOHIT BHATTACHARYA

NAGALAND NIGHTMARE; By P. D. STRACEY, Bombay, Allied Publishers, 1968, pp. 319, Rs. 25.

'Nagaland Nightmare' is essentially an administrators analysis of the political developments in Nagaland during the last 10 years. Stracey did not have an intimate knowledge of the undercurrents of Naga political moves till he was posted at Kohima in 1963 but he had adequate knowledge of the Naga character or personality because of his having to deal with the Naga Hill Districts as Chief Conservator of Forests of Assam of which Naga Hills District was a part. With this background Stracey is adequately qualified to write on Nagaland—next probably only to a Chief Secretary or a D.C. if he was to write such a book.

Why has Stracey called the book "Nagaland Nightmare"? Experiences vary and while some are lucky to experience affairs which encourage optimism others are unfortunate and compelled to look at things with pessimism. While Stracey's pessimism as regards the political solution of the Nagaland problem might be shared by several, his pessimism with regard to administration will not be shared by many now. Of course allowance has to be made for the continued peace for three more years since Stracey retired. During these 3 years the State Government which to quote Stracey is considered by undergrounds and Peace Mission only a 'Caretaker Government' has gained greater confidence in itself and has begun to assert, as a rightful Government of Nagas (a belief reinforced by last General Elections in which a party supported by undergrounds is also stated to have contested). Secondly, with the establishment of such Government the rank and file of administrators have also learnt to work the machine more in accordance with the rule of Law and not dictates of

their tribal loyalties or not always anticipating what its reaction will be on the under-ground element, except where any action is to endanger their personal security. It will be an exaggeration to say that the administrative behaviour, attitudes and knowledge of the rank and file of administrators in Nagaland has now attained a stage of maturity similar to other States, and they can be as apolitical as their counterparts elsewhere, but it is quite safe to say that there is a trend towards that stage. Moreover, it is not only the change in the outlook and performance of the administrative machine that is material but also a change in the outlook of those who hitherto were either apathetic or ignorant of the role of the administrators. The Members of the Legislative Assembly, for instance, now expect the officers and their men to operate the administrative machine in the same fashion as in other States and this is an encouraging sign.

Stracey has very ably portrayed the Naga character—an understanding of which is essential for both political solution and administrative improvements. He praises Nagas for "The free and independent outlook and their men to men attitude on most questions", "reputation for truthfulness and honesty" and "the Naga oneness". "Once they have no more use for a person and have secured a tactical advantageous position, or sense danger, they never hesitate to act even though it smacks of callousness. In these respects they are to be both admired and feared". "Sentiments played little part in their make up." "Naga was a good chap with a free and independent outlook, scornful of control and impatient of criticism; a generally fine physical specimen capable of

great endurance and exertion and an industrious worker in his field; truthful and honest when compared to average standards and with a man to man attitude; quick to respond to sympathetic personal handling and leadership; a person with an ingrained sense of humour which could be relied upon to rise to a funny or comic situation". "Naga is not wanting in political sagacity and sound commonsense." "A unique combination of characteristics; an acute sense of oneness stemming from a highly democratic system, an innate stubbornness amounting to obstinacy, a high degree of intelligence which is concealed under an unimpressive surface, a shrewd cunning which hides behind a cheerful grin and a political maturity for which the average person does not give the sufficient credit."

On the other hand Stracey also refers to "general Naga stubbornness in matters involving broader interests of their people". He is critical of them because "Naga is basically a reticent individual, rather suspicious of strangers and inclined to be on the defensive", "he is very sensitive to correction and wants to be taken seriously at all times, he has a streak of great stubbornness in him particularly when he has set his heart on something which makes him a difficult person to handle; that while his output of work can be high he is not very reliable and that he has his own ideas of what should be done and how it should be done." "There is a certain similarity between Naga (personality) and form: under an attractive, external openness an inscrutable depth, a group solidarity a stubborn persistence, a pulsating repetitiveness."

In relation to the administrative environment and behaviour of Government servants Stracey observes, "There was a certain strong personal interference in the control over the

working of every department". "Within the seeming 'one big family' atmosphere there was an inner Naga oriented policy which we had to follow willy nilly." "Conditions in Nagaland were not yet ready for direct administration." "There was an omen of unreality if not worse about the (officials)." "Obsessed by the otherwise admirable feeling that their first duty was to the people under their charge and vested with almost limitless authority, they tended on the one hand to make the rules as they went along; on the other hand unable to free themselves, in some cases of career considerations and in the case of local men, tribal ties, they tended to go with the tide unless they were of unusual mettle."

These traits are not, however, unchangeable and as Stracey has himself pointed out through the utterances of some persons, some change in their personality was already noticeable. It should not be forgotten that some of the characteristics of Nagas are acquired characteristics created as a result of tensions during the Second World War and the subsequent underground activities. With political stability there is bound to be relaxation. In respect of the attitudes of Government servants and the administrative environment Stracey seems to have particularly felt frustrated but such frustrations may not remain for long as administration comes closer to Nagas, and more and more Nagas themselves get involved in administration either as political chiefs or as officers. Stracey has himself in a different context pointed out "In recent years many tribal people have been taken in (IFAS) by direct recruitment and by promotion and if the quality has suffered to some extent that is made up by a greater sense of affinity with the tribal people under them". No doubt as again pointed out by Stracey "the danger is that a frontier

administration is likely to become excessively committed in respect his charge and to develop a closed mind". But there are situations which have been faced in other States also and the corrective of adequate mixture of outside persons in the various ladders of services can with profit be applied in Nagaland also.

Stracey has also presented brilliantly the administrative set-up prevailing before the advent of independence and its effect. To quote Stracey "The British left the tribal people very much to themselves and ruled them with light hand. It did not pay them to organize an elaborate administrative machinery for the hills were largely unproductive and were even then a financial liability... the word of the hill administrator was law to the simple tribesman, who in turn was 'a good fellow' to his master." "They did not post Indians to the Hill districts and encouraged the Sahib type of administrator to remain as long as possible in one station". This isolation to quote Stracey again "had a subtle effect on the psychology and general outlook of both rulers and ruled. This was visible to any discerning person. In the case of Nagas it can be said to have spoilt an already strong willed people for Indian citizenship." The advent of freedom has no doubt brought tremendous changes in the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. European and Anglo Indian officers for whom Nagas had a special liking on account of past good associations have been replaced by 'black Indians' who in the past were known to Nagas or were so presented only as tricky plainmen. This has naturally created more suspicion in their minds. But the countervailing factor is that after Independence and with the ushering in of a programme of development highly professional people have also come from plains whose services

have also been recognized by the local people. It is as impossible now to run administration in Nagaland in the fashion in which a few D.Cs. ruled in Naga Hills in the former days—as it is impossible for the Nagas to revert back to their old way of living. The Nagas also have now better understanding of the people in the plains—they themselves having been educated in the plains. A new relationship of the ruler and the ruled is therefore being produced which given the political stability will assume a pattern more or less similar to other States. Stracey is therefore wrong when he jumps to the conclusion: "Thirty years before, the Naga was like that snake full of spirit and aggressive but severely held in the firm British grip; now in the crisis of the struggle for independence from weak India the same people still impressive but elusive and with a determination to escape like this snake". The following observation of S.E. Peel "(Nagas) need an intelligent chief over them—one not changed for every little frivolous pretext, but one who will elect to live among them and work for them" however still commends itself as a corrective to the present thinking on administration in Nagaland.

Stracey has very correctly exposed some of the myths prevailing in the rest of the country about the possible solutions to Nagaland's political problem—such as 'give the army a free hand and they would solve the matter in no time' or "to enforce security in the villages, isolate loyal villages from the hostiles", "the villages should be regrouped". Anyone who has spent a reasonable amount of time in Nagaland would realize the futility of these schemes. Both of these measures can be implemented but with disastrous results. At the same time Stracey has also conclusively and convincingly exposed the recalcitrance of the die hard among

the underground to come to any reasonable settlement within the Indian Union. His narration of the political dialogues held with the underground by various agencies clearly establishes that each time a concession was made to the underground, they came up with another demand and when they were beaten out in political negotiation, they just avoided reaching a settlement on some pretext or the other. Fortunately, a moderate group has emerged among the undergrounds who are rallying round the view point that Government of India has gone farthest that it could go and that the solution of the problem lies only in remaining within India—details of extent of autonomy dependent on the ethical and social character of the people being left to be worked out by negotiations.

It seems that after writing the book it has occurred to the author that he must give his own solution of the Nagaland problem. This is why in the last chapter he suggests that some sort of Third Force should be created which will persuade the dissident Nagas to remain with India. This Third Force according to him will be some sort of a massive peace corps type of voluntary effort working with missionary zeal to transform Nagaland without changing it. "The activities of such a movement must come from among the Nagas themselves and must be outside the dispute, while the workers must be Indians who are prepared to leave their political shoes outside." There is no denying that a better under-

standing and a much greater social contact between the Nagas and the masses in the rest of the country are called for. But after presenting so brilliantly the recalcitrant attitude of the die hards of the undergrounds, it is not known on what basis Stracey has built his hope that such a third force will pay dividends. Completely ignoring the lawful Government of Nagaland in finding the political solution also seems to overlook the political developments in Nagaland notwithstanding that undergrounds have still a large following. But these are his conclusions and one has freedom to hold his own views!

As for the style of the book and the contribution it makes on the growing literature about Nagaland, I am all appreciation for it. The book makes an absorbing reading because of its style. Such a serious matter as the political tangle of Nagaland is presented as a historical fiction because of the style. Through a collection of anecdotes he unfolds the political drama played in Nagaland during the last 10 years. Stracey must have kept detailed notes of the events as they were taking place because practically every argument, counter argument press reaction in India and above all reactions in Nagaland have been detailed which only a minute observer could do. I do not know whether anyone has maintained a diary of events in the history of Nagaland tangle but one can easily construct one by reading Stracey's book.

—H. G. PARANJPE

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