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(b) the Land Commissioner may at any stage after giving the parties a reasonable opportunity of being heard, transfer any application or other proceeding under this Act pending before any authorized officer in any district for disposal to any other authorized officer in any other district.

(2) Where any application or proceeding has been transferred under sub-section (1), the authorized officer to whom such transfer is made may, subject to any special directions given in the order of transfer, either hold the inquiry *de novo* or proceed from the stage at which the said application or other proceeding stood when it was transferred.

100. Returns and reports.—The authorized officer, the Land Commissioner, the Land Board or the Sugar Factory Board shall furnish to the Government such returns, statistics, accounts and other information as the Government may from time to time require.

101. Authorized officer empowered to obtain information from Court, etc.—The authorized officer may obtain from any Court, Land Board, Sugar Factory Board, Land Tribunal or other authority any information relating to any proceeding pending before the authorized officer, and such Court, Land Board, Sugar Factory Board, Land Tribunal or authority, as the case may be, shall, if such information be available with it, furnish him with such information within a reasonable period.

102. Authorized officer empowered to obtain information from persons.—(1) For the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Act, the authorized officer may, by notice, require any person to furnish any information relating to the extent of land held by such person, the number of members of the family, if any, of such person, and such other particulars as may be prescribed. The person aforesaid shall furnish the information to the authorized officer within such time as may be specified in the notice or within such further time not exceeding thirty days as the authorized officer may, in his discretion, allow.

(2) (a) Where any person on whom notice under sub-

BRITAIN AND EUROPE 1962

POLITICAL QUARTERLY

When Britain Joins

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The Consequences for Economic Structure	John Pinder
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JAN.-MARCH 1963

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WHEN BRITAIN JOINS

IN choosing Britain and the Common Market as the subject for a special number of *The Political Quarterly* at this particular moment, the Editors are fully conscious that a vast amount has already been written about the subject. Why then write more? Why add to the mass of words that has been poured out over several years, by pamphleteers and propagandists as well as by serious analysts?

The justification is that, between June and October 1962, the argument for and against Britain's entry into the European Economic Community moved to a different plane. The decision to enter having been taken in principle some months earlier by the Conservative Government, it became of less importance that there was a body of Conservative opinion which opposed entry and a body of Labour opinion which supported it. In the later stages, the argument has been forced into line with the party pattern; Llandudno silenced the Tory opponents of entry, though Brighton may not have had quite such decisive consequences for the Labour pro-Common Market group. But it is now increasingly hard to separate discussion of the Common Market issue from the ordinary business of party politics. The Editors and the eight contributors to this number are trying to do exactly that—not to present a case for or against the Europeanisation of Britain, but to analyse afresh some of the main consequences of the decision that has to all intents and purposes been taken. The eight contributors were not chosen because they agreed or did not agree with the decision—in fact some of them do agree and some do not—but simply because of their knowledge of the subjects they were invited to write about. None was asked to express a point of view; all were specifically requested to avoid, as far as possible in the framework of their contributions, any temptation to make a case one way or the other.

It is absolutely right that a decision of such tremendous importance should be preceded by long discussion, and it is not surprising that there should be a fair amount of emotion stirred up. But allowing for the sub-rational element that is bound to creep into any argument in which the emotions are involved, the attempt should be made to distinguish between those motives and reasonings which are permissible and those which are not. It is permissible for the supporters of Britain's entry to try to show that there are likely to be substantial economic advantages for Britain; it is not permissible for them to dismiss out of hand the undoubted disadvantages that certain other

countries may suffer. The opponents of entry are quite within their rights if they emphasise these disadvantages, but not if (as unfortunately some of them do) they use these in order to rationalise a purely emotional dislike of change in itself or a narrow insularity which mistrusts and condemns foreigners simply because they are foreign. It is even less creditable to either side in the controversy if, once the party stands have been taken up, the argument is then conducted simply in terms of election strategy. Votes can always be won by appeal to prejudice, but unless the party that wins them is unusually skilful or unusually cynical it may find itself bound hand and foot when it comes to governing.

The Labour Party was perfectly entitled, if it wished, to come down against joining the Common Market on economic and political grounds. It could point, quite rightly, to the fact that Britain in Europe would have less freedom in planning than Britain outside, that joining Europe means joining governments in France and Germany which are far out of sympathy with Labour ideas, that in the structural economic changes which must follow entry there will be the risk of unemployment in certain areas, that food prices will be higher, that some Commonwealth countries will suffer and that what remains of the Commonwealth relationship will be modified and possibly strained to breaking point. It does not follow that these arguments have to be accepted, but merely that they are defensible within the body of known facts and reasonable conjectures. But the timing and the method of the Brighton decision throw doubt on the legitimacy of the reasoning behind it. Nor does it carry conviction when Labour leaders claim that it was not a decision against entry but simply to insist that certain conditions must be fulfilled; to demand impossible conditions is tantamount to rejecting the principle. Behind the decision there appears to have been a reading (possibly a misreading) of the public opinion polls, pressure from those incredibly conservative bodies the constituency Labour Parties, the no less deeply ingrained conservatism of certain trade unions, and the calculation that rejection of the Common Market would reap its electoral harvest in those areas where, at the last election, Conservative members were returned for mainly working class constituencies and where the appeal to working class insularity is likely to be most effective. Being against Britain's entry will not win an Orpington for Labour. But it might win Doncaster, Halifax, a seat or two in Liverpool, or Holborn and St. Pancras South. By its decision the Labour Party has severely limited its future freedom of action, has run foul of the Socialist International, and finds itself a fifth member in the old unholy alliance of its own left

wing, the Beaverbrook Press, the Communist Party and Lord Sandwich.

The Inevitability of Entry

It is a peculiarly stupid position. Some of the Labour Party critics are certainly sincere, and perfectly right, when they argue that the conditions of entry must be made as favourable as possible—not only to Britain, but also to the Commonwealth and the underdeveloped world generally, and also in terms of the most flexible possible attitude to the relationship of Europe to the Communist countries. But what few of them appear to have grasped is that, short of totally unacceptable conditions, Britain has no alternative but to go in, now or later. Virtually no alternative, that is; the only other possibility is for Britain to decline into an insignificant country cut off from all those associations on which its past greatness has depended, and it is hard to believe that most of the critics want that. Neither do the European governments which are bargaining so hard in Brussels, and it is most improbable that they will push Britain to the point where it will be forced to reject the European idea finally and permanently.

The first factor which makes Britain's entry inevitable, or nearly so, is that the other main association, that with the Commonwealth, has been broken already. In economic terms it means little to Britain; the Ottawa preferences have never been very important for the metropolitan country, membership of the Commonwealth has not stopped certain countries such as Australia from restricting imports from Britain, the sterling area and the Commonwealth are not synonymous, and (on the debit side) Britain's financial commitment has been steadily reduced with the ending of colonial control over so many countries. Politically it means less; though the Commonwealth Prime Ministers may assemble from time to time in weighty session, there is no real cohesion about a group of nations which includes India and Pakistan, or Ghana, as well as the fully aligned countries from Britain itself to the Federation of Malaya. Only a sentiment remains, and sentiment would count for very little in a crisis.

The second factor is that the "special relationship" with the United States has also been broken; or at least weakened to the point where it no longer counts for much. There may be an untappable telephone from Whitehall to the White House, but Britain is no longer in any closer position than some of the other allies of the United States. If proof of this is needed, the Cuba episode provided it, when the United States alone took the all-important decisions, and when it was left to a spokesman to remark "We're not consulting our allies, we're

WHEN BRITAIN JOINS

telling them." Before the President made his speech announcing the blockade, Mr. Macmillan was told no more, and given no more opportunity of expressing an opinion, than General de Gaulle. Though Cuba underlined it, the change did not take place then, but much earlier, perhaps about the time when President Kennedy took office, perhaps over a longer period. America's relationship with the whole of NATO has also changed, partly because of new techniques and concepts of strategy, but the effect is to drive Britain and the other NATO countries closer together, not apart.

This leaves little choice for Britain. Isolation is impossible for a country so geared by its own traditions to the following of open policies, and few people in Britain would be prepared to accept either the economic retrenchment or the political neutralism which living alone would entail. Europe, and Europe alone, offers the prospect of association on the scale necessary to meet Britain's present day needs, and while this fact may be unpalatable to those who hanker after past glories, it has to be accepted. Nor does it involve so great a break with tradition as some would have us believe; acceptance of full membership in Europe is not the reversal of a thousand years of history, but a reminder that for much of that time Britain was deeply involved in Europe, and fought four hundred years of wars to assert its claim to be the arbiter of continental affairs.

The most the opponents of entry can do is to fight a rearguard action in a battle they are bound to lose. What ought now to be discussed is not whether Britain should or should not join, but what can be done to make the European Community a better and more open form of association.

The British Contribution

It is pointless now to argue that if Britain had joined the European Community at the start, its voice in the shaping of the organisation would have been better heard and there would be less cause for fear now. So there would, but it is too late. What is surprising, and disturbing, in the argument against entry on political grounds is the implicit defeatism of its proponents, the evident belief that Britain, whether under a Conservative or a Labour Government, can do little to influence the policies or the form of Europe. Yet this is surely what Britain is peculiarly fitted to do, precisely because of its long tradition of looking outwards, and the challenge is there to be accepted. It is not to Britain's interest, not to the interest of the world as a whole, that the European Community should become a tight, protective, restrictive group, a mere political and economic expression of the

WHEN BRITAIN JOINS

military policies of NATO in Europe, isolated from and regardless of the great developments going on in Africa, Asia and the Americas. In the Brussels negotiations, much of the British case has rested on the need to maintain these external links, and rightly so. If this can be done while the economic pattern of the Community is in process of creation, how much more necessary will it be as the political structure begins to take shape? For if Britain left it too late to exert full influence on the economic pattern, it is not too late to help in determining the political form.

There is one sense in which the best of the Labour critics are right; if the Europe of the Common Market becomes a narrow, closed community of the selfishly rich, it ought to be condemned. But to suggest that it must necessarily become so is to underrate the power of Britain to influence the course of events. Firmly grasped, the present opportunity could be the most exciting challenge of the times to the vigour and the ingenuity of the British people. If it is lost, only a slow decline in prosperity, influence and prestige remains.

THE CONSEQUENCES FOR EXTERNAL POLICY

KENNETH YOUNGER

THE Community of Six must be expected to make a major impact upon the pattern of world power, even if its present membership is not enlarged.

It already has a population of over 160 million, not as large as the Soviet Union or the United States, but more than three times that of the United Kingdom. Its peoples are among the most educated and technically skilled in the world and its material resources, though far from making the area industrially self-sufficient, are varied and impressive. Only the relative lack of space in Europe-west-of-the-Iron Curtain suggests that there may be some physical limitation to the European attempt to equal the military as well as the political and economic stature of the existing super-powers.

In the immediate future the main limitation consists rather of the difficulty of securing unity in the political direction of this potential giant. A European federal government still seems fairly far away, there are differences between the leading governments about the kind of political unification to be attempted, and there are special interests in the different countries, which still offer strong resistance to any attempt by the European Commission to make them toe a Community line.

Nevertheless progress already achieved, if not in integration at least in harmonising economic and social activities among the Six nations, is generally held to show that the underlying trend towards integration is strong. The agreement reached on agriculture among the Six at New Year 1962 is seen as a sign that the economic programme envisaged in the Treaty of Rome is likely to be realised, more or less in accordance with the time-table. Such a development would of itself greatly increase Europe's weight in the world, even if the extension of this success into the political field were to prove a harder and longer task.

Already one of the hoped-for consequences of European unity, the ending of Franco-German hostility, is in process of being achieved.

* The author, who is now Director-General of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, was Minister of State, Foreign Office, from 1950 to 1951.

THE CONSEQUENCES FOR EXTERNAL POLICY

Although it may be claimed that Soviet pressure upon Western Europe from across the Elbe has been the most potent influence in bringing the two countries together, it would be wrong to discount either the moral effect of the European idea, or the achievement of the Coal and Steel Community in merging the material interests of the Franco-German borderland areas, which have loomed so large in the conflicts of past decades.

The West and the East

The effect of the formation of the Community upon the eventual reunification of Eastern and Western Europe and upon relations with the Soviet Union is more disputable. Reunification can in any case now be conceived only as the outcome of some accommodation between the Soviet Union and the West as a whole, and this does not depend solely upon the policies of Western European governments. Until the time for this comes, the maintenance of the division of Germany and Europe is clearly an objective of Soviet policy, and on the face of it the integration of the Federal Republic into a purely Western grouping like the Community appears to contribute to this end.

This view is, of course, in direct conflict with Dr. Adenauer's presentation of his European policy to his own people. Yet the more intricate the interlocking of the interests of the Six within the Community, on the basis of the existing frontiers and industrial strength of the Federal Republic, the harder it becomes to contemplate the incorporation of East Germany into the carefully balanced Western Community, or, for that matter, the acceptance of the countries of Eastern Europe as equal parts of a European whole.

This is probably one reason why the Soviet Union, despite its avowed hostility to the Community, has so often seemed to pull its punches. An arrangement which gives Western Europe a vested interest in the division of Germany cannot seem wholly bad to Soviet eyes.

This aspect of the Community also accords well with the traditional objectives of France, for whom partnership with a limited Federal Republic offers a prospect of leadership within Europe, which would fade if all Germany were again reunited. For France, indeed, German reunification would probably still require as its condition the availability of Soviet cooperation to prevent renewed German hegemony. This is one of the concealed divergences of ultimate purpose which underlie the present Franco-German entente.

Political Alignment

It may not be fanciful to suppose that considerations of this kind lie behind both President de Gaulle's insistence on a union of sovereign states rather than a European federation, and his reference to the Urals as Europe's eastern frontier. On the one hand he may wish Western Europe's advance towards unity to take a relatively flexible form, which would not exclude the later addition of the countries of Eastern Europe. On the other he may see eventual Soviet participation not only as the complete fulfilment of the European spirit, but also as the only permanent guarantee that the reunification of the German people can one day be achieved without a revival of the old dangers which have haunted France for generations.

Such speculations are, of course, for a distant future. A more commonly expressed fear is that the Community will become above all an anti-communist bloc, affected by German claims to recover lost territories and tempted by French resentment of the United States to become an independent nuclear power. That these elements are among the many strands in European thinking is undeniable, and both involve dangers for Western unity.

If the Community were to develop primarily as an anti-communist bloc, there could be no place in it for the uncommitted or neutral nations of Europe. It is true that they probably could not in any event be full members of the Community if it is to advance towards political union, for they could not concert their foreign policy with members of a Western military alliance. But there is talk in Europe of even refusing them reasonable terms for association, on the ground that the Community has no interest in making life easy for any country which is unwilling to stand up and be counted in the East-West conflict. United States policy has from time to time been said to favour this view.

The dangers of such an attitude are obvious. The main uncommitted countries of Europe, from Finland to Yugoslavia, occupy exposed positions on or near the Iron Curtain. If in addition to political exclusion from the Community, their considerable trade with the Six is subjected to discrimination on these political grounds, some of them are bound to turn eastwards for alternatives, and an unnecessary division will be opened up within the Western part of a continent already split by Soviet power. When one considers how little military advantage the West would gain from adding the European neutrals to NATO, even if they were willing, it is hard to find a creditable explanation for this attitude within the Six, which may yet become the Community's official policy.

To many of the Community's critics this seems just one more warning sign of the essentially inward-looking tendencies of the Community's leaders, wedded to a dangerously rigid attitude towards the communist problem. On this view, the blank refusal of Bonn and Paris to attempt negotiation with the Soviet Union, which has kept them at almost continuous variance with Washington and London over the last two years, exemplifies the sort of danger to be apprehended from a powerful Europe, inspired by a combination of Catholic anti-communist ideology and German irredentism.

As with so many other aspects of future Community policy, one can say no more than that such a development is one possibility, but that, if constructive policies are pursued by the West as a whole, there is no reason why it should not be avoided.

Europe and the United States

The rise of the Community is bound also to affect the European-American balance within the West, more especially as it comes at the end of the long post-war supremacy of the dollar.

On the face of it, the Western alliance should welcome wholeheartedly the strengthening of any of its parts, more especially the part which is in geographical contact with the potential opponent. This has been the governing thought of the Americans in lending increasing support to European integration. The United States government has accepted the prospect of some fresh trade discrimination against American business as a price worth paying in return for gaining a strong European ally, which could take a larger share of defence burdens and contribute more fully to the development of industrially backward areas of the world.

These are powerful arguments and seem likely to prevail. Indeed the near certainty that the United States will in any event show increasing respect to the Community, on account of its size and resources, is something which other allies of the United States have to accept as being virtually a fact.

Nevertheless there are signs that the United States may not yet have appreciated some other consequences of the emergence of an integrated European power. For example, they profess to welcome the prospect of dealing with a great European partner on terms of equality—the concept of the “dumb-bell”, the axis with an equal weight at each end—but they appear to think this compatible with continued American hegemony in nuclear weapons. The climate of European opinion is already making this seem unreal.

The Third Force Argument

It is true that, among the Six, only France has nuclear weapons, and even these are too primitive to have serious military value for years to come. To regard this argument as conclusive is, however, to make the mistake of imagining that the French deterrent is aimed militarily at Moscow, when in fact it is a political weapon aimed at London and Washington. A nuclear armament which cannot scare one's enemies may yet be sufficient to scare one's friends and to be an aid to self-assertion within the alliance.

It would probably be wrong to credit any influential body of European opinion with the intention of forming a European Third Force, in the sense of maintaining a measure of uncommittedness between East and West. But there is in Europe a belief in specifically European interests, as distinct from American, and a certain lack of faith in continued American solidarity with Europe.

The truth is that Europe, having emerged from depths which Britain never experienced, now has ambitions which Britain does not share. While this may at the moment seem to apply mainly to Gaullist France, the reassertion of Europe as such is an essential part of the mystique of European unity and is partly responsible for the so-called "inward-looking" tendency, which has sometimes been evident during the Community's formative years. It is surely an illusion for Americans to suppose that they can have all the advantages of alliance with an equal, while still retaining the privileges which go with superior power.

Looking Inward

The prospect of an inward-looking Europe is even more relevant to the problems which the industrialised West faces in its relations with Asia, Africa and Latin America. In recent years this has come to be recognised as one of the major problems of the age and one whose solution may ultimately be decisive in the Cold War.

But in Europe other tendencies have taken priority. Inter-European trade has been the largest element in the new prosperity of the Six. West Germans have, understandably, given first attention to their own divided country and to reconciliation with their immediate neighbours. France, Belgium and the Netherlands have virtually shed their overseas dependencies in circumstances giving rise to varying degrees of resentment and of economic loss. In the United Nations, France under de Gaulle has moved from scepticism to contemptuous hostility, while the Federal Republic, through no fault of her own, is excluded from membership.

That these factors have, in the 1950s, made Europeans Europe-centred in their thinking is hardly surprising. Now, however, their new sense of power, their trading needs, and the pressures from the United States and elsewhere are all combining to turn their eyes outwards again to the far corners of the earth. Not that Europeans have been wholly inward-looking even in the past. France, in entering the Community, has been careful to safeguard her economic ties with her former dependencies, while German and Italian business has long been active in the markets of the less-developed world.

The Community is undoubtedly a "rich man's club", but six countries can scarcely be criticised for combining merely because none of them is poor. No one would condemn on this ground a union which comprises California, Texas and New York. The test lies in the attitude of the club to non-members, and this, like so much else, is still to be determined.

This rapid survey of some of the characteristics of the existing Community of Six may be sufficient to show that, in most fields, future Community policy is an open question. What is already sufficiently certain to form a basis for policy decisions is that the work of integration will go forward rather than back and that a new power, strong enough to affect the balance of forces in the world, is likely to be a fact of international life before the end of the decade. It is therefore unreal to imagine that the familiar pattern of post-war relations can go on unchanged.

The Problem Facing Britain

In past centuries, the rise of a great power embracing most of Western Europe would have found Britain trying to break it up or, failing that, to create a counter-balancing coalition. Despite lingering European suspicions, Britain has never contemplated trying to handle the present situation that way.¹ She has never seen the European Community as a hostile power, though she has recognised that it might cause her difficulties. In any case, in terms of the new world balance of power her old interest in preventing Western Europe from being strong has vanished.

Britain's modern problem arises not from her historic relationship with Europe, which everyone recognises as outdated, but from the entirely new framework of British world policy which emerged after 1945. This can perhaps best be described by reference to Sir Winston

¹ The only contrary evidence was a very curious Washington press story of what Mr. Macmillan was alleged to have said to Mr. Dillon in March 1960. The accuracy of the story was denied by the British Embassy.

Churchill's much-quoted concept of the three overlapping circles of British policy: Britain and the Commonwealth, Britain and the United States, and Britain and Europe.

This characteristically impressionistic formulation describes well enough the attempt of post-war British governments to keep at least three balls in the air simultaneously and to avoid committing themselves to any one of the three "circles" in such a way as to exclude Britain from either of the other two. This policy was viable so long as none of the three "circles" required Britain to accept institutional ties or to discriminate against one "circle" in favour of another.

Until recently these conditions were fulfilled. The Commonwealth is notoriously free from institutional as opposed to customary ties; and Commonwealth preference, though discriminatory, and consequently unpopular in the United States and Europe, was tolerated largely because its real importance was in any case rapidly dwindling. The relationship with the United States, frequently described as "special", depended first upon the habits deriving from the wartime alliance and next upon Britain being, for a number of years, the only ally of the United States capable of performing, albeit on a decreasing scale, the functions of a world power. The relationship with Europe, principally through NATO and OEEC, was perfectly compatible with the other two.

Of the three "circles" the most important to the British world position has been the United States, and so long as anything of this "special" relationship could be maintained, Britain preferred to cultivate it on her own. This was something which could not be shared if Britain integrated with Europe. It would simply vanish. In the last few years it has shown signs of vanishing anyway, partly because there is too little left of Britain's special world role to sustain it, and partly because the European Community is beginning to be seen in Washington as a more powerful, though not yet a more reliable, ally than Britain. The United States has not hesitated to indicate that she would like to see British reliability wedded to European strength, and this seems now, for the first time, to be a condition of continued British influence upon United States policies.

As for the Commonwealth "circle", its main role has been to oil the wheels of diplomacy, across the boundaries of races and continents. It has not produced common policies within the Commonwealth. It has not been an instrument for generating power; indeed it has not aimed to be.

It does not seem, therefore, that Britain, remaining outside Europe, can find in the Commonwealth a new framework of power to replace

the "special" United States partnership or to be a substitute for a European grouping.

Finally, the form taken by the Community of Six has forced Britain either to join with it or to see herself no longer as a full member of a European "circle", but simply as the largest of the countries outside the European community, the "Outer Seven". While the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) has merits as a bargaining partnership and as a kind of "fall-back" alternative if agreement with the Six proves impossible, no one imagines that the prospect of a British-led EFTA facing the Community represents an ideal long-term formula for European relationships. It is not a solution likely to commend itself any more strongly to Britain's EFTA partners.

So it is hard to resist the conclusion that, whatever Britain does, the policy of the "three circles" is now impossible to maintain in any effective form. If nothing is done to replace it, the consequence need not be disastrous, either economically or politically. What seems inescapable, however, is that British influence, whether in Washington or in Europe, would be reduced, while compensating gains through the development of the Commonwealth relationship are hard to envisage. It is in these circumstances that the British public is now being invited by its government to take the plunge into the European Community.

The Effects of Britain's Entry

We have seen that the Community of Six might, but will not necessarily, develop tendencies which accord neither with British wishes for Western policy nor with Britain's own interests. By standing aloof Britain could, no doubt, dissociate herself from these tendencies but she could hardly hope to halt them. It is true that she could avoid the need for economic discrimination against the Commonwealth; but the influence she could exert from outside upon the economic, or still more the political, policies of the Six themselves would be narrowly limited. It remains to consider how far this might be otherwise if Britain was inside.

The first point to make is that it would be misleading to talk as though Britain would find herself in more or less continuous opposition, though backed perhaps by other new entrants, to a solid bloc formed by the original Six members. Britain's views on most contentious issues are shared by powerful elements inside the existing Community, the division of opinion being sometimes national but often within the different countries. Many Europeans who sympathise with the

British world outlook make no secret of wanting Britain to come in in order to strengthen their hands.

British adherence to the Community would probably have no more than a marginal effect upon the division of Eastern from Western Europe, for it is the adherence of one part of divided Germany to a Western community that is liable to produce the hardening of the division to which reference has already been made. No doubt Britain, by adding to the Community's resources, would to that extent enhance European aspirations to great power status. But this would not be likely to increase the main danger which this might bring, that is to say the danger of the new Europe becoming primarily an anti-communist bloc, with unduly military overtones.

Britain's policy towards the Communist bloc has been marked by a patience and flexibility which has brought European, and especially German, suspicions upon her from time to time and so has reduced her influence in Europe. Once she was formally committed to Europe, some of the suspicions might be allayed and the weight of her advice increased.

Similarly, Britain's influence within the Community would presumably be thrown on the side of an open and accommodating attitude towards the other non-communist countries of Europe and also to such a country as Poland, which might wish to keep its windows open to the West. Any modifications thus secured in the policies of the enlarged Community would be much more valuable to countries outside it than any concessions which Britain herself might be able to offer on her own.

The American desire to see Britain enter Europe has already been noted. This was put more sharply than ever before in a staff study prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, published in October 1962, where it was categorically stated that "American policy admits no alternative to eventual British membership in the European Economic Community, and Atlantic partnership in that context". This is clearly an essential part of President Kennedy's new trading policy. No doubt it is also thought that any tendency on Europe's part to break the solidarity of the Western alliance in favour of a Third Force, or to build up a European nuclear deterrent wholly independent of the United States would be greatly reduced if Britain were part of Europe.

While the future of the British and French national deterrents is at present in doubt, and American policy towards the French nuclear effort is also becoming less rigid, it is clear that genuine cooperation between France and her allies on this topic can be secured only on condition of full equality between her and Britain being recognised.

This could theoretically be done whether Britain entered the Community or not, for the link between the Community and defence is as yet unavowed. Nevertheless, it would probably be hard to remove the Gaullist obsession about "Anglo-Saxon" domination of the Western alliance unless Britain could be seen to have put behind her the idea of remaining a specially privileged partner of the United States and to have cast her lot with Europe as an equal among her European neighbours.

The counterpart of the American wish to see Britain enter the Community is, of course, the fear among some Europeans that Britain wants to join them only in order to promote Anglo-Saxon as opposed to European interests inside the Community. The fact that Britain in recent years has usually been closer in her policies to the United States than to Adenauer's Germany or de Gaulle's France lends colour to this suspicion.

It is of little use Britain trying to disguise the fact that she will bring to Europe an outlook conditioned by her long connections with the widely-scattered "English-speaking world". She has to satisfy Europe that this will not make her a bad European, but she might as well admit that it will be her aim to ensure that no unnecessary barriers are allowed to rise between the North American and European parts of the Western alliance or, in a wider context, between Europe and the other continents around the world.

The Commonwealth

The aspect of the Community's relations with these other continents which is of most immediate interest to Britain, is its attitude to the countries of the Commonwealth. This is itself a varied problem, which is more fully discussed elsewhere, together with the wider questions affecting the underdeveloped world in general. What has to be considered here is whether Britain's entry into the Community would, by its effect upon the Commonwealth, appreciably modify the pattern of political power in the world.

The answer to the question cannot in the longer run depend upon the fate of Commonwealth preference, which, as we have already noted, has been dwindling in importance for many years. Similarly the transitional safeguards which Mr. Heath is seeking for Commonwealth interests, important as they are, are not the decisive factor for the Commonwealth's political future. What is crucial is the simple fact of Britain accepting a closer form of integration of her affairs with Europe than has ever been realised within the Commonwealth, with

a clear expectation that further political coordination will eventually follow.

If Britain joins the Community, the informal political ties and habits of consultation with the Commonwealth will not be immediately disrupted, but they must begin to suffer erosion as the new institutionalised system of consultation with Europe takes shape and the substitution of Community policies for British national policies proceeds.

The key question here is whether the Commonwealth can in any event be expected to be an effective influence in world affairs in future, in view of the lack of common Commonwealth policies and the evident inability of Britain to provide by herself the minimum economic and military basis for Commonwealth unity. There are few countries outside the Commonwealth, whether in America, Europe or elsewhere, which continue to attach much importance to the Commonwealth concept when considering their relations with particular Commonwealth countries. It appears, moreover, to be the British government's own view that, in economic terms at least, Britain may be able to play a larger part in promoting Commonwealth development and in providing a market for Commonwealth goods if she reinforces her own strength by joining with Europe, and exerts an influence from within upon the overseas trading policies of Europe as a whole.

Political Integration

In all these finely balanced arguments, it is easy to overlook the primitive state of political integration within the Community and to attribute to it a singleness of purpose which it does not yet exhibit. Intra-European consultation has no doubt made solid progress, even if a Gaullist France is likely always to be something of a rogue elephant in any international organisation. But formal organs of political integration scarcely exist as yet and are unlikely to take a strongly supra-national form in the immediate future.

The only sensible assumption for Britain to make is that political union will slowly follow upon economic union. Indeed, unless this concept is accepted for the long run, membership of the Community cannot offer Britain the new framework for the exercise of influence upon world affairs which she is seeking.

The Community's speed of advance towards common international policies is not likely to be determined by constitution-making, but rather by the degree to which the main member nations are in fact able to develop a common outlook. The idea that a major country, whether Britain or any other, could in practice be overruled by some mechanical majority on issues affecting vital national interests is a lawyer's vision

rather than a political reality. Whatever institutions are set up, the growth of their real power is likely for some years to be a highly pragmatic process.

It would be foolish to pretend that a British commitment to take part in this process can be anything but an adventure into a largely uncharted sea, where the hazards are considerable, and the consequences of failure grave. This, however, is something quite different from saying that Britain will suffer a disastrous loss of national freedom of action in international politics. Britain's real freedom in this field is fairly narrow now, in fact if not in form. Membership of the Community is only one of several paths open to Britain, all of which are likely to involve increased inter-dependence. The question for Britain is not how best to retain independence but how to secure the greatest benefits from giving it up.

Conclusion

If Britain joins the Community, she must do so in a positive spirit, intending to be active in promoting European unity, while at the same time trying to strengthen inside Europe the world-wide outlook which she brings with her, owing to her past history and present interests. If Britain can make this resolve, there seems no reason why she should despair of her ability to play an influential part in the policies of a European Community, whose institutions are still so largely unformed and whose future course is so largely undetermined.

In the background of Britain's decision lies the fact, unpalatable to many, that she faces change in any event. The three overlapping "circles" now look more like three stools which, so far from overlapping, allow plenty of room for Britain to fall between them all. If that happened, a new pattern of world power would emerge, woven largely by others. Within this pattern Britain might still be comfortable, but that would be all.

THE CONSEQUENCES FOR INTERNAL POLITICS

SHIRLEY WILLIAMS

ALTHOUGH the discussion over the form a future political union of the member states of the European Economic Community would take has been put into cold storage while the negotiations with Britain are concluded, the issue is bound to come to the fore as soon as Britain has signed—or refused to sign—the Rome Treaty. If Britain enters, the Belgian-Dutch objection ceases to be relevant. Britain will herself have a part in the negotiation of a political union, and will not be accepting a document prepared by others. If Britain does not go in, the effects on the Community are likely to be serious; an immediate gesture to underline the Community's unity would be required, and such a gesture would almost certainly take a political form. In the backwash of such a failure, and in a mood of possible mutual recrimination, there might be little resistance to the Gaullist formula of a political secretariat, and of a political association based upon frequent consultations between Heads of State.

The main political parties of the Six are, to a greater or lesser degree, Community-minded. They are reluctant to dilute the existing Communities, or to weaken the powers of the Commission. They want to see a political union established, but not in a way that would return to Governments complete control over the process of economic unification. Within that political union, the parties, almost without exception, seek a stronger role for the European Parliament. The desire for democratic control at the supra-national level is keenly felt, and it grows with the transfer of an increasing number of issues from the national to the Community level at the second stage of the transitional period.

The paradox is, of course, that it is also the political parties who are most anxious to see Britain enter the Community, despite her known reluctance for political integration. They believe that British Parliamentary experience will lead to a natural, pragmatic development of the European Parliament's powers; that Britain will become, for traditional reasons, a supporter of a louder democratic voice in the

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THE CONSEQUENCES FOR INTERNAL POLITICS

Community's affairs; and that the recent threat of a Franco-German diarchy in political matters will be finally put to rest by Britain's entry on the European scene.

If the parties want political union, a stronger Parliament, and British entry, why have none of these things yet come about? The explanation is to be found in the anti-political attitude of the French Government, and to some extent of the German Government. De Gaulle has never made any secret of his contempt for "the political class" in France. Since the MRP Ministers left the Pompidou Government, de Gaulle has had nothing to do with the traditional French parties. His selection of Pompidou, no politician, to be Prime Minister; his disregard of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic in presenting a constitutional amendment direct to the people, and not to the Assembly; his dissolution of the Assembly after its vote of protest: all these are the actions of a ruler who has learned to dispense with politicians. In West Germany, constitutional practices are strained rather than broken. But there, too, the growing divergence between the Chancellor and senior members of his party, not least on British entry into the EEC, but also on the remote control of government from Caddenabbia, and the extraordinary way in which Dr. Adenauer and Herr Strauss run a coalition, as revealed by the *Der Spiegel* affair, demonstrate, too, a divorce between political parties and Government, or more precisely, the leading Government figure.

The three main political groupings in the European Parliament, Christian Democrat, Social Democrat and Liberal, have all gone on record in favour of political union and a stronger Parliamentary power. At the meeting of the Liberal International in September 1962 at The Hague, the European parties represented there demanded "a democratic development of European institutions". Among the Christian Democrat parties, both the Italian and the German parties have called for political integration, though the German party pointed out tartly that "quarrels over concepts" were irrelevant. The three Dutch parties, broadly described as Christian Democrat, are federalist in their European objectives, and the French MRP, as noted above, has pressed its Europeanism to the point of resignation. The Socialist group goes further, calling for "the creation of an executive European organ having the powers proper to a federal government, and responsible to a Parliament elected by direct universal suffrage" (Statement of 11 January 1962).

The majority of the members of the European Parliament support such proposals as the fusion of the three Executives of the EEC, Euratom and the Coal and Steel Community, which would help to

resolve one of the most obstinate problems that cuts across the responsibilities of all of them, the formulation of a common energy policy; direct election of the members, and an increase in the effective responsibility of the Commission to the European Parliament. But support is not confined to the European Parliament, which is more "European" than the national Parliaments. The Governments and Parliaments of the Low Countries are in favour of this kind of development. The Italian Government, in June 1962, rejected any suggestion of a limited political union based upon the agreement of the Governments of the Big Three, France, Germany and Italy. Equally significant was the statement in the same month of nearly 300 French deputies, excluding only the Gaullist UNR and the Communists, which called for direct elections and majority voting in the Council of Ministers.

Gaullist Intransigence

The strength of "European" sentiment among the Six has been masked by the intransigence of General de Gaulle, and by his determination to impose his own pattern on the proposed political union—and through that, on the existing Communities themselves. The other five can only resist French pressure; they have no means of forcing through their own concepts instead. The French draft treaty on a union of states, presented to the Fouchet Committee in November 1961, was totally unacceptable to the other members of the Community; their own alternative draft, based on a report by the European Parliament's Political Committee, was equally unacceptable to the French. Despite their greater strength, the Five suffer from two weaknesses. One is Chancellor Adenauer's rapidly dwindling political future. Anxious to complete the construction of a durable Franco-German friendship, the Chancellor would like to negotiate a political union as quickly as possible. At the last meeting of the Foreign Ministers in April, when discussions finally broke down, the Germans showed themselves willing to make substantial concessions to the French as the price of a speedy negotiation. And speed, of course, involved leaving the British out, not awaiting the end of the long-drawn-out discussions on British entry. It was this which led to the refusal of the Dutch and Belgian representatives to take part in any further negotiations on political union until Britain was a party to them.

The other weakness of the Five comes from the obvious need for some kind of political association. As the Commission moves further into fields of obvious political import—commercial policy, monetary policy, planning against recession and so on—the anomaly of a scheduled system of economic integration and a total lack of political

system becomes more glaring. But while de Gaulle remains in power, the Six can advance only on French terms, or at best on terms that the French Government will not veto. This puts such European-minded Governments as those of Holland and Belgium in an extremely difficult position, for they can be arraigned as the Governments that refuse to compromise, and hence to permit essential progress in the political field. Nor are they unaware of the dangers of *attentisme* in draining inspiration and boldness from the Community experiment.

The results of the recent French referendum sparked a faint glimmer of hope in the Europeans, since the President was supported by only 46 per cent of the votes of those entitled to cast a vote, and 62 per cent of those who actually voted. But the sweeping successes of the UNR in the first ballot of the French elections in November showed that de Gaulle could still count on his greatest asset—French disillusion with the pathetic record of Parliamentary government in that country.

The President now has a compliant Assembly, the majority of which will accept his attitude to the development of the Communities. He can continue to govern by direct appeal to the people where necessary, reducing the Assembly to a political irrelevance. His successor will not have the same charisma; but if the President can dominate France for another two or three years, the French political system may be so far changed that his successor will not have to come to terms with the centre parties anyway. The UNR success, and the drawing together of the left-wing parties, from SFID to Communist, are the most unfortunate possible outcome for those who want to see the EEC progress—and progress democratically. The pro-European forces in France are now divided among themselves. If before they were weak, today they are impotent; and the issue of Gaullism versus a Popular Front (if matters go so far) will overwhelm the issue of *Europe des Etats* versus supra-national Europe. It is not too much to say that the French elections have been the greatest setback so far to democratic political evolution in the Community.

On the other hand, the French President is unlikely to find so willing a German ally as Konrad Adenauer in the man who succeeds to the Chancellorship. The two obvious candidates would appear to be Erhard and Schroeder. Strauss, the favourite in the race a year or so ago, after his dubious part in the *Spiegel* affair, followed by his resignation, is not a likely possibility. Neither of these men share Dr. Adenauer's extraordinary devotion to the Carolingian ideal. Erhard has again and again indicated his preference for an open Community, which would include Britain as an essential element, and which would retain close links with the United States in NATO. Schroeder, in a

recent speech, stressed the need for the United States to be a partner of the Community, and not a rival—a point underlined by the declaration of the conference of the CDU/CSU on June 27 last, which insisted on the development of the Community and British entry taking place within the framework of NATO. The younger German leaders may well press for all they can get in terms of a stronger voice in the Alliance, and greater independence of action within it; but in the last analysis, they are unlikely to trade the precious American commitment to Europe for dreams, rather than realities, of European independence. To this extent at least, they are likely to prove unwilling to follow a Gaullist lead.

The Importance of Britain

For a variety of reasons, public opinion in the Community countries, with the probable exception of France, favours British entry. The "Europeans" see British accession greatly strengthening Parliamentary influence. They recognise the present British objections to federation, and the preference for limited political commitments. But they believe, with some reason, that British MPs, once appointed to the European Parliament, will insist on more and more control over the Commission, and on the proper respect from the Council of Ministers, instinctively, because of their confidence in the Parliamentary process at home. Those on the Continent who care as much for Parliamentary democracy as they do for the European ideal also welcome the possibility of an effective Opposition developing in Parliament. They recognise that an Opposition which accepts the rules of Western democracy (unlike the Communists or the Far Right), and is vigorous in prosecuting its point of view (unlike opposition parties in at least one of the most important member-states), could make of the European Parliament a force to be reckoned with.

What Signor Saragat recently described as "a great democratic civilisation" is also envied for its political stability. The Six believe they have much to teach Britain in the economic and social fields. They are, on the whole, willing to learn in the political field. The Belgians and the Dutch hope that Britain's entry will prevent any tendency of a Franco-German coalition to dominate the scene. German industrialists and trade unionists alike welcome the access of strength that common policies with their sister organisations in Britain will bring to them. The Italians, more moderate in their policies towards the Soviet bloc than the other two major Community powers, feel that Britain's entry may temper the winds of the cold war.

But the British, if they do go in, will not be able to avoid the often

embarrassing political choices now before the Community. The entry of Britain will, of course, alter the nature of those choices to some extent. The presence of British MPs in the European Parliament will of itself lead to more of its demands being satisfied, even without a formal increase in its powers. Already the Parliament is in close touch with the Commission over many of its proposals, before they are formally presented to the Council of Ministers. Ministers themselves appear before it, although the Treaty does not oblige them to do so. A report by the Foreign Ministers of the Six is to be made to Parliament, another new departure. This organic evolution will be speeded up by British entry, even without direct elections; and as Parliamentary powers increase, direct elections of at least a proportion of the European MPs will become almost inevitable.

The marked trend for policy questions of all kinds to be discussed and settled at the supra-national level makes an evolution of Parliamentary power imperative. In its recent programme, the European Commission has advanced far-reaching plans for common commercial policies, integrated monetary policies, and supra-national planning. These are all issues on which political opinions differ profoundly. If national Parliaments attempt to retain their control, they are likely to find that they have been effectively superseded by industrial and financial organisation on a Community scale. Indeed, it is already clear that on many issues of economic policy, particularly monetary ones, national Parliaments may propose, but cannot dispose. The real power no longer rests with them.

One important example of this is the Commission's proposal for a Council of central bank governors which would hold consultations in advance of major decisions in the monetary and financial fields. The expert's view of the correct decision and the popular view of the correct decision rarely diverge more than in this field. Central bankers are usually devoted to the object of a sound currency. The general public, particularly in France and Britain, is more anxious to retain full employment, even at the cost of inflation. But if there is no means of expressing the full weight of public opinion in the Community on such questions, the experts will have their way. As common policies are put forward in one crucial field after another, it becomes more and more important to test them by the criticism of Parliamentarians, and ultimately by the expression of public judgment through elections.

The Commission's action programme makes it more difficult to draw a sharp distinction between the economic and political fields. But the Commission's programme is not yet accepted, and Britain might enter the Community in time to share in the Council of Ministers'

decisions on it. There would then be another possibility. The British Minister might endeavour to limit the Commission's new initiatives to the minimum necessary to satisfy the requirements of the Rome Treaty. A system of consultation on foreign policy, defence and cultural matters might then be instituted, with decisions depending on a unanimous vote. This would be in line with much of the French draft treaty on political union, and would involve little sacrifice of sovereignty. But it would also mean losing an opportunity to gain democratic control over major economic fields, except by the indirect process of pressure on Ministers via national Parliaments—effective and essential in the short-term, but less and less so as the Council moves on to majority decisions in a growing number of fields.

Effects on Party Alignments

What of the effect on party alignments of British entry into the EEC? This is a fascinating field for speculation, but much of what can be said is pure guesswork. At present, there are three groups in the European Parliament—a loose and heterogeneous Liberal group of over forty, including German Free Democrats, Italian Liberals, French Independents and a handful of UNR members, a Christian Democrat group, which is strongest in numbers—over sixty—but suffers from divisions within its ranks; and a Socialist group of only thirty-three, which makes up in solidarity what it lacks in size.

The Socialist group is the most vocal, and early in November agreed to a broad policy document which lays down its aims for the Community. This document is no blazing manifesto, but it is both sensible and possible; it is "revisionist" in tone. Public ownership is fitted into the picture as one way of restraining "dominant economic positions" attained by monopolies or oligopolies. Common planning, a commitment to full employment, and a larger share for wage-earners of the national incomes of the Six, are all demanded, as one might expect. But where the document is unique is in its emphasis on Community solutions to all the problems Socialists diagnose. The *Community* must be made a social as well as an economic Community. The *Community* must plan—not merely the nation states within it. The *Community* must tackle monopolies, engage in regional planning, find ways of increasing worker participation in the decisions taken by industrial management. The Socialists propose a far-reaching federal structure which alone would make their policies feasible.

The Socialist parties have a liaison bureau, with headquarters in Luxembourg, run by one of the most able Socialists on the Continent, Fernand Georges. The President of the Socialist Parliamentary group,

Willi Birkelbach, is a highly respected federalist from the SPD. It is widely agreed by those who have studied the institutions of the Community that the Socialists are the most homogeneous group in the European Parliament, and that their influence is becoming a political fact outside the Community itself. Since the agreement of association between Greece and the Common Market, for instance, individual Greek Socialists have been in touch with the liaison bureau, and there is now a serious attempt on hand to reorganise the disbanded Greek Socialist party. To take a very different example, the Socialists have kept contact with the interests connected with public enterprises, who have held consultations among themselves to ensure that they do not go unheard in the administration of the Treaty on such matters as State aids, transport policy etc.

But the Socialists suffer from their ineffectuality in the national Parliaments of at least some of the Six countries. It has been suggested that they have moved vigorously on the supra-national level in order to shake off their problems and failures at the national level. Divisions among Socialists are a commonplace of politics in Paris and Rome; but not at Strasbourg. There are also the fissions among the trades unions, Christian, Socialist, Communist—in Italy, France and Belgium—which set workers one against the other in the attainment of their ends.

If Britain joins the Community, the Socialist group will have mixed feelings about its new Labour allies. Clearly on a host of social and economic matters, the Labour Party will find it easy to work for the same objectives as the Continental Socialists. The TUC will immensely strengthen trade union pressures, and will ease the slightly embarrassing situation in the non-Communist trades union movement, which is overwhelmingly dominated at present by the DGB of the Federal Republic. But equally obviously, there are going to be some angry confrontations between the European Socialist group with its well-established harmony of purpose towards European integration, and a British Labour Party which is suspicious, reluctant to abandon potential control over foreign policy, economic planning and monetary policy, and in any case has little respect for the achievements of Continental Socialism outside Scandinavia. One important psychological fact about the Labour Party, which few Continental Socialists understand, is its sheer pride in the post-war Labour Government's Commonwealth achievement. In a sense, the new Commonwealth is "Labour's own"—granted independence, kept in the Commonwealth, consulted with and admired. Like human beings, political parties do not forget their good deeds. And this feeling of achievement has made Labour especially sensitive to the

needs and hopes of the Asians and Africans. Another factor is the attractiveness of non-alignment. The rise of the new countries, many of them proclaiming loyalty to Socialist ideals, contrasts with the advocacy of capitalism in the leading Western countries, and (for some on the left) a certain disillusionment with the USSR since the Twentieth Congress. The closer our ties with Europe, the weaker our ties with the new Commonwealth, many Labour supporters believe. Add to this profound concern about the attitude of the Community to the outside world, a widespread hostility to Germany, finding its roots in the left-wing crusades of the Thirties against fascism, add resentment of the United States which is believed to be the prime mover in the whole matter: then you have a good recipe for anti-Europeanism, even when Europe is seen through the eyes of other Socialists.

Yet, if we do go in, it seems highly probable that within a few years, British Socialists too would be working for the strengthening of Parliament. As the crucial decisions passed to the supra-national level, it would become intolerable for Socialists to accept the absence of organised popular pressure. For they would be the losers; large private industrial enterprises are already supra-nationally organised, as are financial and commercial bodies. They need not so much confront national controls as avoid them. Several of the most perceptive opponents of British membership of the Community have fully seen this argument, and admit that they may well become out and out Europeans if the alternative is a sterile conservatism *within* the Community.

The British Liberal Party would not be likely to have more than one or two representatives in a European Parliament either on the basis of the present 36 members for the large countries, or the possible 108 in a directly elected Parliament. They would presumably join the present Liberal group, the most diverse and strange of the inter-party alliances. The Liberal group contains not only the parties mentioned earlier in this article, but a collection of independents associated with them, at least partly in the hope of exercising some influence on elections for Committee offices and the like. On foreign policy issues—the association of the neutral members of EFTA, relations with the outside world, the attitude to defence questions—the group broadly shares a moderate, open-ended Community point of view. On economic and social matters, British Liberals are likely to find themselves in fierce conflict with a doctrine of economic liberalism of a *laissez-faire* type which they do not share. Continental Liberalism is the child of secularism, and in some countries stands well to the Right of the

mainstream of Christian Democracy. Yet so diverse is it that men like Maurice Faure belong to the Liberal group, who would be described as undoctinal radicals in a different context. It will not be easy for these parties to work out a collective platform.

The Conservatives

The most intriguing party problem of all is that faced by the British Conservative Party. They have no Continental parallel outside Scandinavia. Unless the next election in Britain goes very hard with them, they are likely to be strong enough to form a group on their own in the European Parliament, since group facilities are offered to any body of seventeen members or more that wishes to form a group. A purely national group would be unpopular and suspect among other Parliamentarians, though if Denmark and Norway joined the EEC, a Conservative group could include their members. Such a group might reach a gentleman's agreement with the strong Christian Democrat group, under which each would support the others' candidates for office. An arrangement of this kind would guarantee both groups considerable influence, since Christian Democrat numbers are likely to remain large.

But the Conservatives might choose a more intimate relationship with the Christian Democrats. Already the parties work closely together in international youth movements, and Conservative Party representatives have observer status at meetings of the *Nouvelles Equipes Internationales*, the CD international organisation. However, a close relationship presents substantial difficulties. NEI and its youth groups contain members from *émigré* Governments of Eastern Europe, people with axes to grind on all cold war issues. On top of that, the language of Christian Democrats, including the more radical of them, is heavily weighted with references to Catholic social doctrine. On social and economic questions, Christian Democrats often advance paternalistic policies which involve large-scale State intervention. As one British delegate to a recent NEI meeting put it, practically every other quotation by his Christian Democrat colleagues came from "*Mater et Magistra*", Pope John XXIII's recent encyclical.

Of course the Christian Democrats are a shrewd collection of politicians too: no-one would wish to pretend that they are solely missionaries for a Christian social order. But these are often the terms in which they speak. They may see their advantage in an alliance with Socialists, even Socialists of the far left, as in Italy. In the attempt to create a Community that is social as well as economic, Christian

Democrats often support Socialist initiatives. In Holland and in Belgium, Catholic parties have had considerable experience of working in harness with Socialist parties since the war. As the battle over the schools fades, such collaboration becomes easier. So they dislike the very word "conservative", which starts off all the wrong kinds of associations on the Continent. The Scandinavian and British Conservatives on their side are not much attracted to the idea of Christian Democrat parties, which raise all the old ghosts laid to rest in the educational settlement of 1944.

One final complication must be mentioned—the future place of the Communist parties. At present, no Communist sits in the European Parliament, and Communists have made no effort to be appointed there. But the changed attitude to the Community shown at the meeting of economists in Moscow in 1962 may alter all that. The Communists have now recognised that the EEC is a fact, a body to be negotiated with, and if possible influenced. The Liberals and Socialists, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, recognise that Communist candidates would have to be free to stand for direct elections. The anomaly is, of course, that unless a Community election law were to be promulgated, Communists could not stand in one member country, Germany, where the party is banned.

The future course of the EEC depends in part on the successors to Adenauer and de Gaulle, but also on the alignment of parties. The Communists, once represented, might work with the Socialists on domestic Community affairs though not on foreign policy. The very survival of the Community in the long run is likely to weaken the Communists as against the Socialists, or at least to wean them away from their loyalty to the USSR. Signs of this are already clear in the fairly independent line taken in recent months by the Italian Communist Party. The Christian Democrats, the other unpredictable element in the political structure, stretch across a wide spectrum of views, from those of Fanfani and Katze to those of Adenauer and Scelba. Nobody who generalises about the nature of the political forces in the Community can have looked into the infinite complications of trying to define Continental politics—Communist and neo-Fascist apart—into easy terms of Left and Right. These terms are in any case of little use except as emotive cries; as a guide to politics within the Community, they are not even that.

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JOHN PINDER

MUCH of the debate about the economic consequences of British entry has concerned the technical economic factors rather than the political ones. The effect of the large market on economic growth and structure is the most important of the former, and half of this article deals with this much-pontificated-upon and little-studied subject. Important though it is, however, it must not be forgotten that the effect of the large market will depend on the broad economic and financial policies that are followed in it, and which are examined in another article in this issue by A. C. L. Day. On the whole, the record of the Six in this field of policy has been better than that of Britain, and there is not much cause to fear that the potential benefits of the large market will be frustrated by bad policies.

In the other aspects of economic structure considered below, the policy factor predominates over the technical. Whether the issue is monopolies and cartels, the treatment of Europe's development areas or the nature of the Community's external trade relations, one's judgment on the prospects depends on one's expectations as to the Community's future policies. The same is even more true about welfare arrangements and the distribution of income, where the direction of social and fiscal policies in the Community is all-important.

Apart from the effect of British entry on economic growth, in which it is argued below that Britain is likely to be the gainer, the two main issues are whether the Community will be outward-looking and whether it will be socially progressive. It has not been possible in the space available to consider the latter of these as well as the former, but my conclusion in each case is that the entry of Britain will strengthen the outward looking and progressive forces enough to make it reasonably certain that acceptable policies will be followed. It must be emphasised, however, that these are, of necessity, political not economic judgments; which is why, with the controversy over British membership, there is more justification than usual in the high correlation between economic conclusions and political attitudes.

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The Effect on Production

Propagandists for the Common Market often give figures to show its economic weight. The enlarged Community, they say, will have more people, produce more steel, import and export more and soon produce more cars than either America or Russia. Therefore it is good. Therefore we should belong to it. The critics deride this argument as economic nonsense.

If one is concerned with power rather than welfare, it is very far from nonsense. Military power depends now more than ever before on economic resources, and the European Community could, if it centralised its defence effort, rival the two giants. It probably should not do so and probably will not, but size counts for much in the economic sphere of international relations as well. The weight of the European Community has forced the American Government to embark upon tariff policies that would otherwise have been unthinkable; it has made world-wide agreements for several commodities a probability where previously they proved impossible to get off the ground; and its combined efforts in the field of aid could surpass the American contribution. Size is certainly a powerful factor in making foreign economic policies effective.

It is less obvious that size makes for prosperity as well as power. This cannot be assumed without examining the economics of the large market. Unfortunately the large market seems to have been a blind spot for economists, most of whom have contented themselves with saying (sometimes) that it is important or (more usually) that it is not, without collecting evidence to support their views. This is particularly regrettable when Britain's most momentous decision of this century, the application to join the European Community, has been taken, to judge from Mr. Macmillan's pamphlet, on the economic grounds that we need this vast market in which to sell the products of sophisticated modern industries.

From this point of view British entry cannot be very important to the Six. We will increase the size of their market by about a third, which is useful but not likely to add markedly to any advantages that they will anyway derive from the size of the existing Community. Most significantly, British entry may speed recovery from what looks like being a pause in their economic activity in 1963, by stimulating an investment boomlet in 1964/5. This would be particularly useful at a time when the Community's instruments for dealing jointly with recessions are still embryonic. But in the longer run the mere fact of adding a third to the size of the market will not cause any decisive changes of economic structure in the Six.

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For Britain, on the contrary, if large scale matters at all, membership of the Community is likely to matter a lot; for the size of the home market will be increased not by one third, but by three to fourfold. The most-quoted attempt by an economist in Britain to assess the consequences of this has been an article by Professor Harry Johnson in the *The Manchester School* of September 1958. He analysed the effects on Britain of European free trade under the headings of (a) competition and the spirit of enterprise, (b) economies of scale in production, (c) better terms of trade with the outside world and (d) economies of specialisation and the division of labour. The latter he estimated as equal to one per cent. of GNP over the period 1955 to 1970. Terms of trade with the outside world he ignored, on the proper grounds that in a free trade area the effects would be small; in the Community, with its common tariffs and commercial policy, this is no longer true and this aspect will be considered with external trade, below. As for the economies of scale and the effect on competition and the spirit of enterprise, he said that these were hard to measure and proceeded to discount them entirely.

The subject is more thoroughly examined in *The Theory of Economic Integration* by Bela Balassa. Among many other sources he quotes an OEEC study comparing the volume of output and output per worker in 44 American and British manufacturing industries, which found a fairly high correlation between relative market size and relative productivity. Balassa concluded, after examining a wide range of evidence, that "the size of the market is an important variable in determining the level of productivity".

An estimate of the growth in productivity accompanying growth in the volume of output has been made by Verdoorn, who found that in a number of countries in the past, productivity had grown by a percentage equal to the square root of the percentage by which the volume of output had grown. Colin Clark obtains a similar result, replacing the square root by the cube root and attributing the growth of productivity to increased specialisation, not to economies of scale. On this basis, Britain would find scope for a doubling of productivity according to Verdoorn or increasing it by 60 per cent according to Clark, if the size of the home market was quadrupled. This would bring industry close to American levels of productivity, but it does not seem wise to place too much reliance on these figures, especially when it is remembered that the European market will not be a homogeneous "home market" for a long time to come.

In connection with specialisation, one thinks normally of items such as Italian tomatoes and Yorkshire worsteds. For one reason or another

these goods are best produced in those places; but greater production there will not necessarily increase the scale of enterprises. In many industries in the modern economy, however, greater specialisation and larger scale are one and the same thing. Specialisation is not possible unless there is a large market for the special product in question.

Economies of Scale

In considering whether the British market is big enough to contain the optimum size of firm, one must be more precise than most economists have been as to what one means. It is not satisfactory that the market should be big enough to consume the production of only one or two optimum sized firms; it is desirable to have half a dozen or more optimum firms, and three or four at the very least. This is not so much for the spur that competition gives to efficiency; the Germans and Japanese have shown that a highly cartelised industry can be extremely efficient. It is because a monopoly or an oligopoly can, and sooner or later will, abuse its position of power by exploiting the consumer or failing to give him what he needs. This is true whether the monopoly is publicly or privately owned; and it is a great pity that the Yugoslavs seem to be alone among socialists in realising that public ownership is not synonymous with monopoly, and that several publicly owned enterprises can be set up in an industry to compete with each other.

Professor Johnson, in his *Manchester School* article, referred to economies of scale in respect of production only; and it is, indeed, Henry Ford that usually springs to mind in relation to economies of scale. Yet large production is in the modern economy probably more important in paying for the heavy costs of research and development and of an effective distribution and servicing network, than in reducing the costs of production themselves.

The Size of Units

Not that mass production is unimportant. The textbook case of electric light bulbs is no doubt exceptional. But the British market already looks too small to contain enough optimum production units of the major consumer durables. For example, it has recently been stated by a manufacturer that 300,000 is the minimum production of washing machines required for survival in the Common Market; consumption of these machines has fluctuated around 900,000 in the UK in recent years, making room for only three manufacturers of optimum size. About a third of a million is often given as the optimum production unit, in European conditions, for things such as cars, refrigerators

and television sets, which gives room for two or three such units in the UK in the case of a typical product of this sort. It was estimated in *Britain and Europe*¹ that Western Europe as a whole would by 1970 have room for only 5 to 8 optimum units in the domestic appliance industries and in other industries such as household meters, fractional horse-power motors and the smaller industrial motors—none too many if monopoly or oligopoly is to be avoided. In the USA because it is more capital-intensive, the optimum production is said to be half a million of the domestic appliances and 600,000 cars; and the same should be true for Europe in ten or fifteen years, when current American levels of incomes and technology have been reached.

Thus there can be little doubt that the British market is too small to sustain a healthily competitive and low-cost consumer durables industry in the coming years. Less conspicuous are a number of industries producing items such as insulating paper or plate glass, for which the British market is too small to hold more than one optimum production unit. It is not possible to say how important collectively these industries are, because nobody has done the necessary research. But with increasing specialisation, particularly in the supply of industrial materials and equipment, I believe that they are far from negligible.

Automation will continue to increase the number of products whose output will have to be on a large scale if it is to be low cost. For the industries that represent the new wave of the industrial revolution, however, economies in the costs of research and development are more important than economies in the costs of production.

The aircraft industry is a familiar example. The cost of developing new aircraft is so great that manufacturers could not have existed without defence contracts or other government support. Even the Caravelle, of which 180 have been sold and which is therefore extremely successful, is still said to be 20 short of breaking even. It is clear that Britain alone will not be able to finance the development of a supersonic airliner; it seems that this will be done jointly with the French, but industrial and official links within the Common Market will strengthen to the point where, if Britain is outside, any such collaboration might become more logical between France and Germany instead.

The development of atomic reactors is a newer industry to which similar considerations apply. So also is the "space" industry, where the production of satellites will be the essential basis of global

¹Economist Intelligence Unit (1958)

communications in the future. In chemicals, for many years, the cost of developing new products has been a major factor favouring the giant companies, while in the field of computers it is hard for Britain's ICT to keep abreast of America's IBM, which has ten times as much to spend on research and development. There are, in addition, a number of smaller, less glamorous sectors, in which the cost of development inhibits production unless a market wider than the UK home market is certain to be accessible.

Industries such as aircraft, atomic reactors, space equipment, computers and sectors of chemicals are not only important in themselves. They sow the seeds of technological progress in other sectors of the economy, both by their demand for new types of equipment, materials and parts and because they train and influence people in new techniques and ways of thinking.

If production economies of scale are important for the consumer durable industries that grew up between the wars, and economies in research and development for the industries of the more recent technological revolution, financial and commercial economies are found to apply in many other sectors as well. Of these, the financial advantages appear to be marginal. If a small firm is efficient and profitable, then it should be possible for it to raise the money it needs. In so far as it cannot, the City is not doing its job. The commercial economies, on the other hand, seem to be much more important.

An effective distribution network is an expensive thing, especially where competent technicians are required in each area in order to service a complex product. This network is economic only if a large volume of sales passes through it. For example, seventy per cent. of the UK market for television tubes is held by one firm, and it is believed that a large part of its success is due to the sales and servicing organisation that this turnover enables it to maintain.

If a large production is needed in some sectors to pay for the commercial overheads on the home market, this is still more necessary for a sales organisation abroad. The establishment of an effective distribution network in the Common Market, for example, is an expensive business, and the larger firms will be better placed to do it. This is what prompted Joseph Newsome & Sons, a Bradford woollen firm, to take the initiative recently in forming a consortium of British woollen manufacturers to establish a joint sales organisation on the Continent. But while co-operative efforts by medium or small firms are to be applauded, they do not always work well and the advantage undoubtedly remains with the big ones.

Competition and Dominant Firms

Thus the economies of scale apply not only in the field of mass production but also in research and development and in the establishment and maintenance of a distribution and servicing network. Partly because of this, and partly no doubt for other reasons, a growing number of industries are dominated by one or two big firms. There are the obvious examples in chemicals, rubber manufactures and edible fats. In synthetic fibres one giant now owns a third of the other. Many of the plastic raw materials are now produced by only one firm, usually either ICI or Distillers. The motor industry is being whittled down to dangerously few producers and the process is certainly not complete. Many parts for cars, e.g. electrical parts, are already produced by only one or two firms. Bicycles, boot polish, razor blades, matches and plate glass are sectors dominated by one firm, and there must be scores, perhaps hundreds of similar cases. The importance of the trend towards sectors dominated by one or two firms can only be a matter for judgment, in the absence of serious quantitative research, but in my judgment it has already gone too far.

If this is so, there are three alternatives: accept a monopolistic situation (possibly making the monopoly a public one); break up the dominant producers; or enter a larger market such as the European Community. The first alternative is undesirable. The second could be right if one believes that the technical reasons—whether production, research or commercial—for large scale are unimportant and will remain unimportant. In my view, however, the evidence suggests that the technical reasons are important and that economic progress would be seriously hampered if the present trend towards larger firms was reversed. If this is so, entry into the larger market is the only way in which Britain can ensure that industry is progressive without being monopolistic.

It may be argued that the concept of market size should include export markets as well as the home market: thus if the motor industry depended on the home market alone, its production would be no more than half the existing level. But in order to make the investments that are needed by many of the modern "sophisticated" industries, one needs to be fairly sure of a basic minimum market, which is seldom the case where tariffs and perhaps quotas intervene. The Swedes and the Swiss certainly maintain high productivity on the basis of a small home market; but they do this by specialising in a narrow range of industries. Britain, to do the same, would have to be ruthless in pruning away those existing industries for which a large

market is increasingly required, and in denying itself the establishment of the new industries for which it has been suggested that bigness is essential.

Competition

Professor Johnson's fourth point concerned competition and the spirit of enterprise. This effect is, as he rightly maintained, impossible to measure and hard to assess. Lovers of the hair shirt have stressed the penalties which will be paid by the inefficient. More important in the long run, however, would be the encouragement to the go-ahead manufacturer who would prosper as never before, and who would therefore come to exert more influence on the economy. In the shorter term, there can be little doubt that a decision to join the Community would cause an investment boom. It is, indeed, hard to see what else will cause such a boom, which is necessary if investment is to be lifted up to the level required for Neddy's growth rate of 4 per cent.

It has been argued above that, with the growing trend towards monopolies or oligopolies in the national market, the British economy will be less prey to dominant producers if it is a part of the European Community. Competition could, however, be blunted or even annulled by the formation of European cartels, and much will depend on the effectiveness of Europe's anti-trust laws. The two articles in the Rome Treaty say little more than that monopolies and cartels are bad except when they are good. The regulations published this year are, on the face of it, tough, but they will mean nothing unless they are administered toughly. The European Commission seem ready to take their job seriously, but they have to contend with a Europe (including Britain) whose attitude towards cartels is permissive, to put it mildly.

Thus, while the evidence is less comprehensive and satisfactory than one would wish, it seems reasonable to suppose that entry into the European Community will contribute to Britain's economic growth and at the same time clip the wings of most of our monopolies and market-dominators. Unfortunately the information available allows no quantification of these ideas, but the evidence suggests that three factors are the most important: greater specialisation; economies of scale, applying particularly to the cost of research and development and of commercial organisation as well as to production itself; and the accelerating trend towards market domination in many sectors of the UK economy.

The Common Market does not, of course, provide an automatic

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elixir of dynamism. It is merely the framework within which dynamic forces can find greater scope. If the dynamic forces are inadequate, either because the quality of industry is too poor or economic policies are ineffective, then growth will not take place. The question of economic and financial policies within the Community is dealt with in the article by A. C. L. Day. As for the quality of British industry, a recent official French report on the effect of British entry on French industry confirms that our competitors on the Continent have a much healthier respect for British industry than have many of its nearest and dearest at home.

The Structure of Industry

The table shows that the structure of industry is not dissimilar in Britain and the Six. Britain, having less agriculture, has a smaller food-processing industry and compensates this by doing more metal processing.

Share of major manufacturing sectors in total manufacturing output

	<i>The Six</i> %	<i>United Kingdom</i> %
Food, beverages and tobacco	16.2	10.7
Textiles	7.6	7.1
Basic metals	8.0	8.4
Metal processing.	33.0	42.1
Chemicals	12.7	10.3
Other	22.5	21.4
TOTAL	100.0	100.0

Source: Statistical Office of the European Communities.

There is no reason to suppose that British entry will cause much change in the shares of these broad sectors either on the Continent or in Britain. The effect of specialisation will be seen in much narrower sectors of industry. Thus Italy will expand its sales of cheap woollens, nylons, shoes and scooters; Germany of cameras and scientific instruments; Britain of quality worsteds, lorries and, of course, whisky; France of fashion goods and, of course, wine. These are a few of the most obvious examples, and in most cases the industries gaining from specialisation will be still more narrowly defined, down to the point where it is not so much an industry as a firm making, for example, a special type of printing machinery or a particular quality of cloth.

Outside manufacturing the scope of specialisation seems more marked. The City of London needs no assistance in proclaiming the

excellence of its financial facilities and its prospects of becoming the financial centre of an enlarged Community. The Dutch with their flair for commerce and their tremendous port developments seem likely to attract a growing proportion of trade into their hands. Horticulture will thrive in Holland and Italy, and agriculture in France.

Agriculture and textiles are two sectors whose size will depend much, throughout the Community, on policies adopted in respect of external trade, which are considered below.

If my arguments about large scale have been correct, there will be throughout the enlarged Community a faster growth of the consumer durable industries and, more particularly, of the new industries represented by Telstar, Harwell and the supersonic airliner. And the trend towards more large firms, already pronounced throughout Europe and especially in Britain, will be intensified.

Although it is some comfort that these big fish will be swimming in a larger pond where they will have to compete with other big fish, this trend remains disquieting. So does another tendency which is already only too marked, and which the free play of economic forces within the Common Market would render still more so: the concentration of industry in the heart of the Community and the depopulation of the periphery. London, the South-East and the Midlands look like extending the Paris-Milan-Hamburg-Rotterdam quadrilateral as the pole of industrial attraction, while Scotland and Northern Ireland join Southern Italy and South-west France as the Cinderellas of industrial Europe. There are, of course, national policies such as the *Cassa per il Mezzogiorno* and the British licensing system which try to deal with the problem; and the Community has superimposed on these the Investment Bank and the Social Fund, together with the European Commission's latest interesting ideas for creating complete industrial complexes as centres of attraction in regions such as Italy's South. But the effectiveness of such policies depends on the effort and resources put into them, which in turn depends on the political concepts of the Community and of its member countries. As with so many aspects of the Community—cartel policies, outward-lookingness, social questions—much hangs on one's assessment of the political direction in which Europe is likely to move in the years to come.

Trade across (or under) the Channel

During the fifties, world trade as a whole increased by 10 per cent a year. Between 1958, before the first internal tariff cuts of the Common Market, and 1961, intra-Community trade rose by approximately 25

per cent a year. This growth cannot be attributed to the tariff cuts themselves, which over most of the period were too small to change many prices by more than two or three per cent. It was due to the great interest and energy shown in intra-Six trade by manufacturers and exporters.

British industry has also been interested and energetic, with the result that our exports to the Six were 18 per cent higher in the first three-quarters of this year than of last year, despite tariff discrimination which by the middle of this year, following internal cuts by the Six down to 50 per cent of the original levels, was really beginning to bite. On British entry, Britain and the Six will cut tariffs mutually by probably 60 or 70 per cent. This will add spectacular price changes to the interest-and-energy factor which has in the past been responsible for the growth of trade. A typical British or Common Market tariff on a consumer good is, for example, 20 per cent, so that its imported price would change by 12 or 14 per cent overnight; tariffs on industrial goods are often half that level, so that the price changes would be half as much. Granted that some of these reductions have already been made by manufacturers in anticipation of the tariff cuts, this is still enough to cause many overnight changes in decisions on the "best buy".

It is therefore reasonable to suppose that trade in both directions across the Channel will increase faster than the recent rate of growth of trade between the Six. And even if, in the second half of the decade, the rate of growth of cross-Channel (or perhaps by then, if the Tunnel is built, below-Channel) trade declines towards a percentage somewhere between the recent Community average of 25 per cent and the world average of 10 per cent, it is not unrealistic to forecast that the level may be, in 1970, four times as great as it is today.

If an increase of this order occurs, and our exports overseas grow in the future at 5 per cent a year, which is considerably faster than in the past, then the enlarged Common Market will by 1970 account for about half our total exports, more or less, depending on which countries become full members or associates. At this point it becomes pertinent to ask the question "what is an export?" Should the countries of a tariff-free area which is becoming an economic union regard each other as export markets at all? This depends on the point of view. Some of the bigger firms will by then no doubt have recast their sales organisation so that the Community, not Britain, is the basic unit for home sales. But unless or until there is a common currency, and national policies for dealing with balance of payments problems have

been replaced in full by Community policies, officials and the public will have to continue to think of sales to the Continent as exports.

Some people, having little confidence in the competitiveness of British industry, have forecast a serious deficit on the trade that is stimulated between Britain and the Six in the first few years after we join. An article in *The Times* gave a moderate figure, which looked like an official estimate, of £30 million to £40 million, which the author believed would be compensated by a corresponding inflow of capital. In fact, with inflation at present doing more damage on the Continent than here, and with the evidence of the fast growth of British sales to the Six this year despite the tariff discrimination, there are reasons to question whether the tariff cuts will stimulate imports more than exports. One must also remember what has already been pointed out above: that the British will be moving from a market of 50 million to one of some 230 million people, whereas the Six will just be adding about a third to the size of their market. The effect on British industry is therefore likely to be fairly explosive in comparison with the effect on the Continent, and I would not be at all surprised to see a substantial surplus on the new trade that is generated between Britain and the Continent in the first year or two. It is not in our trade in Europe, but in connexion with our imports of foodstuffs from overseas, that the balance-of-payments problems are likely to arise.

External Trade: Inward or Outward Looking?

These balance-of-payments problems arise from the expected increase in the price of food, and it has been suggested that this may eventually add some £300 million to our import bill: about 6 per cent of the present total value of imports. Commentators do not always distinguish between a rise in food prices due to the Community's import levies and one due to higher world prices; yet the distinction is important because the treatment of these levies—who is to get how much of the money—is still being discussed by the Six, and the Germans clearly have as much interest as the British in securing as large a share as possible for the importing country, correspondingly reducing the payments burden. In so far as the addition is due to higher world prices, *The Economist* suggested recently that they will rise whether we join or not. But it must be expected that they will rise more if we join, if only because it is rather difficult for the British Government to call for cheap food and at the same time to claim that it is defending the interests of the Commonwealth's food exporters.

Food will, then, be a problem for our balance of payments if we do not join, and a somewhat bigger one if we do. There will, moreover

be some losses to UK exporters in the Commonwealth countries that grant us preferences, as they bargain these away in negotiations with other countries; and there will be some compensation for the UK in the opening of the American market foreshadowed by the US Trade Expansion Act. But all in all the real problem of external trade involved in British membership of the Community is not the UK balance of payments: it is whether the Community will be inward or outward-looking; whether or not it will encourage imports from overseas and particularly from the developing countries.

It is sometimes argued that, because Europe lacks natural resources, it must perforce be outward-looking if it is to export enough to pay for its imports of raw materials; that liberal import policies will be essential in order to encourage similar policies in export markets and thus make it possible for Europe to earn the necessary foreign exchange. Europe's need for raw materials is certainly a factor that contributes to outward-lookingness, but to suppose that it is a sufficient condition of outward-lookingness is a complacent fallacy. With the growth of productivity on farms, autarkic agricultural policies can sharply reduce the need for imports of foodstuffs. And, while industry's need of materials will certainly increase year by year, some commodities suffer pressure from synthetic substitutes and others from surplus production with the result that commodity prices are generally weak and that Europe's imports from developing countries have in recent years shown a very disappointing trend in relation to the growth of European industry. This is not to say that Europe has no good economic reason to follow liberal trading policies, but that it has no compelling one. The compelling reason is political. Looking outwards would result from conscious acts of policy, not from economic necessity.

For sophisticated industrial goods there can be little doubt that the Trade Expansion Act and the evident intention of the American Administration to make use of it will cause the trend of trading policies to be at least a liberal one. But much more important, from the Commonwealth point of view, is the trend in policies for agricultural trade and, as regards developing countries in general, for tropical products and the simpler manufactures.

In agriculture, nobody can stop the growth of productivity in Europe and nobody should want to do so. What is both desirable and possible is that the difference between European prices and world prices should be reduced rather than increased. There is no doubt that the European Commission wants to have lower prices in the Community, but cutting the prices paid to farmers is a political problem whose outcome depends on the balance of political forces.

Resistance to change comes from the peasants and farmers in the countries with higher prices, particularly Germany. Peasants and farmers are, of course, electorally important, even in the UK where they comprise only 4 per cent of the economically active population. The percentages in the Six are much higher: 12 per cent in Germany; 27 per cent in France at the last census in 1954, probably nearer to 20 per cent by now; 30 per cent in Italy; some 10 per cent in Benelux taken as a unit. There is in addition that sector of conservative opinion which wants a lot of peasants because they are good Catholics and infantrymen.

The groups whose interest is to secure lower farm prices include the industries in each country, the consumers, the farmers in the lower-cost countries, particularly France and Holland, and the British Government with its interest in combining a square deal for the old Dominions with the cheapest possible food. Despite this formidable array, the weight of peasant voters will be hard to overcome in the early years. There is, however, the flight from the land that is reducing the percentages given above by some half to one per cent. a year, according to the country. Thus the balance of forces will be tilting in the direction of lower prices in Europe and hence of a reduced discrepancy between European and world prices.

This discrepancy can, of course, also be reduced by raising world prices and this will almost certainly happen. Thus, although nothing can stop the growth of production on European farms from presenting a threat to Europe's imports of foodstuffs, it is virtually certain that the problem for overseas producers will be eased by higher world prices, and there is a reasonable prospect that the trend of policy within Europe will be in a liberal direction, anyway after the first few years.

The main issue for tropical products is how far the countries associated with the Community will benefit at the expense of other tropical countries. The tariff preferences were agreed by the other five because France insisted. When tariffs become subject to majority not unanimous votes, it may be supposed that these preferences will wither away. There will be American pressure for nil tariffs on tropical products; Britain, with most of the Commonwealth not associated, has an interest in reducing them; and the other members of the Community will be equally glad to see the last of this discrimination, provided that the retreat is dignified enough to avoid economic disruption with possible political consequences in the associated countries.

Policy towards the simpler manufactures, however, which represent

the only means whereby countries such as India and Pakistan are likely to add substantially to their export earnings, is the acid test of outward-lookingness. As in the case of foodstuffs, the consumer and, in this case, the more progressive sectors of industry have an interest in cheap imports. But the special interests will fight hard against an open policy, and their pressure will not be overcome unless the European institutions—essentially the European Commission and a qualified majority of the member-governments—are imbued with a liberal attitude. To judge from their records, the governments of Germany and the Benelux countries and the European Commission will favour liberal import policies while France will not. Britain, with its Commonwealth responsibilities and its extraordinarily liberal policies towards imports of cheap manufactures from the Commonwealth, will be a powerful factor on the side of low tariffs and generous quotas. But a consistently open policy will not be followed unless the majority has consistently liberal convictions based on a long-term view of Europe's place in the world. So this, and indeed the whole issue of looking outwards, depends, like many other apparently economic factors, on a political assessment. My own judgment is that, with Britain added to the outward-looking forces, the prospects for a satisfactory external economic policy are reasonably good; but it must be stressed that this judgment has to be made on political, not economic grounds.

THE CONSEQUENCES FOR ECONOMIC PLANNING

A. C. L. DAY

It is inevitable that membership of the European Economic Community will deprive the individual members, to an increasing extent over time, of their freedom to plan their economies in some of the ways which they might otherwise choose. This, indeed, is an unavoidable counterpart to the fact that the Community is itself an institution which is designed to plan and organise certain major features of the economic situation. It is unacceptable that two different bodies—the national state and the Community as a whole—should attempt to plan in contradictory ways, and membership of the Community must, in this sense, involve a substantial abandonment of national sovereignty. At the same time, membership of the Community in no sense implies that the members are committed to a *laissez-faire* free enterprise economy; the whole conception of the Community is one of a mixed economy of the type which was firmly established in Britain in the early post-war years and which is to be found (with varying proportions of planning and *laissez-faire* in the mixture) in all the economically advanced western countries.

There are two main difficulties involved in trying to answer the questions to what extent membership of the Community would inhibit a British Government's freedom to plan the economy. One difficulty is that it is by no means easy to define what is meant by "planning"; it is one of those words which are used, frequently with a considerable emotional content, but also with little in the way of accurate definition of what is meant. The second difficulty is that the Community is a rapidly evolving institution; it is not difficult to identify the limitations on freedom to plan which are inherent in the Rome Treaty and subsequent Regulations which have been published, but it is impossible to be dogmatic about the further limitations which will appear as the Community evolves. There is an important body of opinion in Europe, which is strongly represented at the Commission in Brussels, which believes that the Community should and must develop into a federal United States of Europe, in which the power of the members would be reduced to something similar to that of states in the United

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THE CONSEQUENCES FOR ECONOMIC PLANNING

States of America. Whether events do develop in that way or not depends on how political forces work out, and in particular on the will of the national governments making up the Community, which in turn will be largely influenced by the desires of the electorates.

For the present purpose, it is convenient to consider four different ways in which a governmental authority (whether it be a central or local government or an institution such as the European Commission) can plan. It is possible to plan by confrontation, by co-ordination, by prohibition or by active initiation.

Planning by Confrontation

Planning by confrontation occurs when a number of separate bodies (such as all the major firms in an industry, all the governments in a group of countries, or the government and the major industrial firms in a single country) get together to discuss their expectations about the future and the plans that they, individually, are making for the future. Such confrontation has been of some importance in international economic policy in Europe since the war, in the procedures of OEEC and, more recently, OECD. Representatives of national governments and the international secretariat meet together from time to time to discuss what they expect to happen to their national economies and (in broad terms) what they intend to do to correct undesirable developments. In this procedure, if events or policies in one country are likely to have adverse effects on another, then attempts are made by persuasion to do something about it.

To a large extent, the much-praised French domestic planning of the post-war years has relied on a more closely articulated version of such a confrontation procedure. Representatives of major industries and the Government meet (largely by personal contacts in an old-boy network) to inform one another about their expectation and plans for a period of years ahead. In this way, it is possible for the plans of individual industries to be consistent with one another, and with whatever broad developments the Government expects for the economy as a whole, so avoiding waste caused by building unnecessary capacity in one industry and also avoiding bottlenecks through the existence of inadequate capacity in another.

Although it remains unclear how Britain's National Economic Development Council will work out in practice, it is clearly going to be concerned largely with such planning by confrontation. There can be little doubt that such planning is valuable. It allows individual plans (as for plant expansion) to be based on fuller information and therefore to be more rational. It also makes it more possible to

identify particular difficulties (e.g. shortage of skilled labour) and so prepares the ground for doing something about them. At the same time, there are real dangers in long-term planning of this kind, because no one can make confident and satisfactory long-term economic predictions on many critical matters—as can be seen, for example, from the stupendous failures of British forecasts of demand and supply of various fuels which have been made since the war. But in spite of the danger that confrontation procedure may lead to everyone acting on the wrong predictions, such planning, used with circumspection, has its value. It will play a big part in the work of the Community, and in the Commission's Report to the Council of Ministers at the end of October 1962, a firm recommendation was made that there should be such a confrontation of the expectations of the Community's members for a five-year period ahead. At worst, such an exercise will be no more than a waste of a good number of committee hours (as may happen if the "predictions" are simply glib extrapolations of past trends). At best, it will provide better information on which to identify particular problems and on which to base a more consistent set of particular plans by individual governments, industries and firms.

Planning by Co-ordination

The second type of planning listed above—planning by co-ordination—goes beyond planning by confrontation in that the planning body takes a more active role. It acts in such a way as to alter the economic environment in which other decision-making bodies themselves operate. Perhaps the most familiar form is that of changing taxes, either to influence the general level of activity (the now well-established Keynesian techniques) or to influence activity in particular sectors of the economy (such as the reduction in purchase tax on cars, designed to stimulate that particular industry). The other main method of planning by co-ordination is the use of monetary measures, such as changes in interest rates and in the availability of bank credit.

There can be no doubt that planning by co-ordination of this type will continue to play a major role when the Community is fully operative, both in controlling the whole economy (to achieve some politically satisfactory compromise between excessive unemployment and excessive inflation, and to achieve a satisfactory balance of payments situation), and also in influencing particular sectors of the economy. But the major question of how these planning functions will be split between the Community's organs and the national governments, is one on which there is still a good deal of ground for uncertainty.

Planning by Prohibition

Before proceeding to a consideration of the major issue of how this planning by co-ordination is likely to operate, it will, however, be convenient to consider the two other broad categories of planning which were listed above. The third of them is planning by prohibition—the sort of planning which was common throughout Europe in the early post-war years and which is a considerable part of the armoury of controls of even the most *laissez-faire* governments. There is one important kind of planning by prohibition which will become quite impossible once the transition period is over and which, even during the transition period, can only be used to a very limited extent and in quite exceptional circumstances. This is the imposition of import restrictions. If a single country in the Community were to impose such restrictions, it would be acting in a manner directly contrary to the whole purpose of the Rome Treaty. This weapon—one of the most powerful in the armouries of controls used by countries in the early post-war years—will be completely unavailable to any member of the Community. Moreover, the power to impose restrictions over capital movements is to be severely limited, although under the First Directive it is still open to members to impose restrictions over short-term capital movements, which are the movements likely to be the most violent and disturbing in an economic or political crisis. These limits to the power to impose planning by prohibition of external transactions undoubtedly impose substantial restraints on national freedom of action, and to that extent they mean that the problems of achieving planning by co-ordination (notably the use of fiscal and monetary policy) are so much the greater.

At the same time, it must be emphasised that there is a great deal of domestic planning by prohibition which can continue unaffected by membership of the Community. For example, town and country planning legislation, building controls and licensing, and prohibition of certain kinds of investment are examples of forms of planning by prohibition which are perfectly permissible under the Treaty.

Planning by Active Initiation

The fourth kind of planning listed above is planning by active initiation on the part of a governmental or other authority. Such planning occurs when the government itself goes out and does something—planning the location of industry by subsidising industry in certain regions or planning the transport system by spending money on new roads or by subsidising a nationalised railway system. Here, again, the Rome Treaty does impose substantial limits on the freedom of

action of governments; Article 92 provides that except where otherwise provided for, state aid "which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it adversely affects trade between Member States, be deemed to be incompatible with the Common Market." The Article then goes on to define those categories of aid which shall be allowed, in spite of this general provision; the important category which is always permitted is "aid having a social character, granted to individual consumers", provided there is no discrimination by origin of the products concerned. The government can give babies black-currant juice, as long as it does not discriminate between English and Italian juice.

More important, there are certain kinds of state aid which may be permissible. They include aid to promote the economic development of regions "where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious under-employment" and aid "intended to facilitate the development of certain activities or certain economic regions, provided that such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to such an extent as would be contrary to the common interest." In other words, economic planning to help Scotland or Northern Ireland by subsidies has every chance of approval in the Common Market. But in general, subsidies to particular industries or particular lines of activity may have to be justified, by proving that they do not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the general interest. Moreover, it is possible that the word "aid" referred to in Article 92 may be interpreted more widely than direct money subsidies and include aid through remission of taxation.

It seems, therefore, that the Treaty will impose some restriction on the power of individual states to plan by active intervention. On the other hand, there is no prohibition whatsoever of intervention by nationalisation, although it is worth bearing in mind that the Rome Treaty rules may well prohibit some of the commercial practices of British nationalised industries, such as differential pricing of coal in home and overseas markets and non-publication of specially negotiated railway rates.

Monetary and Fiscal Policies

The major question which remains to be discussed is the way in which monetary and fiscal policies can be used by members of the Community in order to plan their economies to achieve full employment, price stability, balance-of-payments stability and a satisfactory rate of economic growth. A reading of the relevant articles of the Treaty

would suggest that, in these respects, there will be remarkably little practical restraint on the freedom of action of the members. On the other hand, most of the officials at Brussels and most of the more ardent Continental supporters of the Community (along, let it be said, with some of the more ardent British opponents) consider that the Community must inevitably move towards a common monetary policy and a common currency, and towards a common fiscal policy. This opinion has had its clearest reflection yet in the Report to the Council by the Commission at October 1962. Neither of these two extreme positions should be taken at its face value: the Community is an evolving institution and it is impossible to consider that its final form will be limited to the structure agreed in the Rome Treaty; but at the same time the Commission is a body with a strong interest in obtaining additional powers for itself, and much the best way of achieving a huge increase in its powers is to persuade the members (and prospective members) of the Community that economic policy cannot operate satisfactorily without a great deal of centralisation of fiscal and monetary policy.

The fundamental logical problem that arises here has been described on many occasions¹ and need not detain us for long here. It can be exemplified by describing two extreme approaches to the co-ordination of economic policies of different countries within a common market—i.e. within a group of countries with a common external commercial policy, no trading barriers and with relatively free internal movement of labour and capital.

At the one extreme, there is the solution of complete fiscal and monetary integration, as found in the relations of England and Scotland within the United Kingdom. At the other extreme, there is the solution which gives the biggest possible degree of autonomy to the individual countries, which is consistent with the existence of a "common market" as defined above. This solution is that of allowing fiscal and monetary autonomy, including the power to fix taxes at whatever levels seem appropriate, to have an independent policy on interest rates and (the fundamental point) the power to vary the exchange rate between one's own currency and that of the other members of the common market.

If effective freedom to run one's own monetary and fiscal policy is to be maintained, then the freedom to alter exchange rates is the only way available to be certain of maintaining the common market. For example, if a country decides (perhaps for reasons of income distribution

¹ A good recent discussion is in J. J. Polak: *International Co-ordination of Economic Policy*, International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, July 1962.

to maintain low interest rates relatively to those of its colleagues in the common market, the effect is likely to be a net outflow of capital, which weakens its balance of payments. Again, if it decides to follow a fiscal policy leading to particularly low levels of unemployment relatively to its colleagues, it is likely to cause faster inflation than in its colleagues, and its goods are likely to be less competitive—and so again it finds itself with a weaker balance of payments. Again, if it is a country with a shortage of innovating entrepreneurs, a conservative labour force, a remoteness from the main market areas, or a rather unfavourable geographical endowment of raw materials, then its goods are likely to become relatively less competitive with its colleagues in a common market, which is likely to lead in turn to relatively heavy unemployment and to balance-of-payments difficulties—and if it tries to deal with the unemployment by expansionary domestic fiscal or monetary policies, it in turn finds itself with all the more serious balance of payments problems. The upshot is that it is always possible that policies or circumstances may lead a country with an independent fiscal and monetary policy into payments difficulties. For a time, it can deal with these difficulties by drawing on reserves—but they are exhaustible and cannot be used indefinitely. Sooner or later, it must abandon its independence, or make its goods more competitive by altering the exchange rate, since it would be quite inconsistent with the ground-rules of a common market to impose its own private import restrictions. At the one extreme, full fiscal and monetary independence within a common market implies full freedom to alter the exchange rate.

At the other extreme, an immutably fixed exchange rate (as presumably can be taken to exist between England and Scotland) implies that, within a common market, a country cannot maintain any substantial degree of independence in its fiscal and monetary policies. There can, indeed, be a little; for example individual states in the United States have different local income taxes, and on rare occasions, different regions in the Federal Reserve System have followed slightly different interest rate policies. But in comparison with the degree of national autonomy to which we have become accustomed in modern nation states, it can safely be said that a common market with immutably fixed exchange rates would deprive member states of much the greater part of their fiscal and monetary autonomy.

In such a common market (of the type envisaged in the Commission's Report of October 1962), a country with an unfavourable geographical situation or conservative labour or businessmen would find itself in the position of Scotland today, with relatively high unemployment and probably relatively slow growth, and unable to do anything

significant about the situation by the unaided efforts of its government. Such a country would either have to accept its position, or persuade its colleagues in the common market to give it special aid of one sort or another (just as Scotland tries to persuade England to do today, although by rather different political processes). Undoubtedly, in the European Economic Community, such aid would be forthcoming; but except for the very limited extent to which it is available as of right from the Social Fund, the country concerned would be at the mercy of its colleagues.

Possible methods within the Community

The logical implications of a common market system with no conceivable possibility of exchange rate changes would be that, since individual countries would not be free to determine their own national monetary and fiscal policies (except when by chance the policies they chose did not lead to excessive payments difficulties, as indeed might be the case for quite long periods of time together), then one of three things would be possible. One would be that there would be no economic planning designed to maintain full employment and to avoid inflation; to a considerable extent the "common market" of the pre-1914 world of the gold standard, free trade and free migration was of this character. This possibility can safely be disregarded. A second possibility would be that national fiscal and monetary policies would be the outcome of bargaining between the various members of the Community; for example a member in payments difficulties might receive help (such as special loans) from the other members on condition that it did specific things, such as increasing taxes or reducing government spending. This sort of international planning has a long history, particularly in the field of co-operation between central banks, and is clearly growing in importance today, throughout the western economic system and not merely within the European Community. The third possibility would be centrally-determined planning. Such an outcome appears to be the ultimate aim of the Commission's proposals for attaining a single unified currency and for close harmonisation of fiscal measures. It is, however, perfectly conceivable that a common currency would be compatible with the second possibility just outlined (that of inter-state bargaining); for example the original intention of the United States Federal Reserve System was to create much more autonomy for the twelve member banks in regional centres than in fact has occurred. It can be argued that the high degree of centralisation of policy which has in fact developed in the American monetary system has been the result of the dominance of the New York financial

markets and the high degree of centralisation of the political structure, so that it has not been possible in practice for individual member banks to follow substantially independent interest-rate policies, whereas in Europe there might be a common currency, together with significantly different policies in different centres.

There is, therefore, a wide range of conceivable and practicable ways of operating planning by fiscal and monetary methods in the Community (or in any other common market). Which of them is likely to develop in Europe remains highly uncertain: the only thing that seems reasonably clear is that neither of the extreme possibilities (of frequently altered exchange rates and a high degree of national autonomy on the one hand, and a United States type of centralisation of monetary and fiscal policy on the other) seems at present to be the likely outcome. Frequent exchange rate changes are likely to be regarded as inconsistent with the fundamental philosophy of a common market, because they change the terms on which competition takes place between enterprises in different countries. A high degree of centralisation seems equally unlikely, at least for a good many years to come, because it would either demand a much higher degree of centralisation of political institutions than the individual member-states seem likely to concede, or alternatively because it would give a degree of power to a central bureaucracy which would be unacceptable to countries with democratic parliamentary institutions. Many of the most ardent European enthusiasts talk as if a political structure something like that of the United States is the inevitable outcome of the process of European integration. Undoubtedly it is a possible outcome, but the frequent assertions that it is the only satisfactory outcome appear often to conceal a poverty of imagination and a failure to realise that other outcomes are possible which would push European integration much further than the Rome Treaty itself envisages and, at the same time, take account of the fact that national interest and the sense of national identity in Europe remain so strong that no country is likely easily to accept becoming a California or a Maine.

How might such an outcome develop between the two extremes of national autonomy and frequent exchange rate changes and a United States type of centralisation? Prediction is obviously impossible, but intelligent guesses can be made.

In the first place, it can be expected that exchange rate changes will be rare events, and that great efforts will be made to avoid them—but that circumstances are quite likely to arise when an exchange rate change is regarded by the members of the Community as a lesser evil than any other way open to a country in payments difficulties. For

example, if one country has inflated its prices right out of line with its colleagues, as could easily happen in a couple of years of careless exuberance, or if one country has much heavier unemployment than its colleagues, then exchange rate changes might well seem the best way out. Secondly, it is reasonable to expect that the effective powers of the Commission and of the Monetary Committee on fiscal and monetary questions will become *greater than the* (very limited) formal powers in the Rome Treaty. One does not have to accept all the brave claims being made for additional powers, but one must accept that the Commission is in a strong enough position to obtain substantially greater powers in these fields than it now has. Thirdly, national decisions on fiscal and monetary matters will to a greatly increased extent be the outcome of bargains and negotiations between the various member governments. Planning by confrontation between national governments will become increasingly important and so will come more and more to determine the ways in which they themselves plan their domestic economies.

It is not hard to indicate in broad terms, the kind of way in which these developments might come to pass. For example, we can take the case of a country which, for some reason, finds itself in balance of payments difficulties by having an intolerably high level of unemployment. Its colleagues in the Community might help it by giving it temporary loans, perhaps through some European Monetary Fund, or perhaps by being willing to hold larger amounts of its currency than they would normally wish to do. And they might, in return for any substantial amount of aid, make the bargain that the country in difficulties shall carry out appropriate policies—such as tax changes designed to speed up economic growth or following a monetary policy which does not embarrass other countries in the Community.

With luck, it might well turn out that the difficulties would correct themselves in time—seemingly “permanent” economic problems have a habit of suddenly evaporating. But one cannot rely on luck or self-correction. What then happens if the country’s difficulties persist? Several things seem likely. One is that, as the total amount of aid given to the country mounts, the other partners in the Community will put in increasingly strong demands for corrective measures. The role of the Commission in formulating these demands is likely to be powerful, and the pressure for appropriate policies is likely to grow as it becomes more and more apparent that the difficulties are chronic. At the same time, the country in difficulties will find it increasingly hard to resist the demands of its colleagues and of the Commission, because it finds itself increasingly in debt to them, so that they could

force it into hopelessly awkward difficulties if they demanded repayment of their claims.

This means that a country in really persistent difficulties would find it extremely hard to carry out policies which ran counter to the wishes of its colleagues—e.g. by bringing about a devaluation which they regarded as unjustified. At the same time, the difficulties might in time be so persistent and the accumulated credits so large, that devaluation was the right remedy—just as today, in the common market of the United Kingdom, Great Britain would not find it hard to accept the devaluation of Northern Ireland's pound in order to help solve Ulster's unemployment, if only we had the mechanisms by which such a devaluation could be brought about. In the developed form of the European Community, as envisaged here, devaluation would be a final remedy, which would be determined internationally and which no country could introduce arbitrarily, because it would be so much in debt to its colleagues by the time devaluation came to be seriously considered, that it could not act unilaterally without risking sharp retaliation from its colleagues, who would be able to demand prompt repayment of its debt.

This sort of integration of policies would lie somewhere between the extreme possibilities indicated earlier; it would not be as centralised as some people would like and, at the same time, it would considerably reduce national autonomy in fiscal and monetary policy and imply a much greater degree of co-ordination of national policies than we have yet known.

THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE UNDER-DEVELOPED WORLD

SIR SYDNEY CAINE

DISCUSSION of the possible British entry into the Common Market seems at times to have turned almost wholly on its possible effects on relations with Commonwealth countries and—to a much smaller extent—on policies towards the under-developed world at large. At first sight this may seem strange, considering how much the internal trade and business of the United Kingdom itself would be affected; it looks odd to have so much detailed calculation about the possible effects on Canadian wheat or New Zealand butter and so little about the effects on the United Kingdom chemical or electrical goods industries. But I think it is not so entirely odd because these careful economic calculations cover a deep concern about the fundamental basis of ideas underlying the whole European idea.

The issues which worry people in this field may be expressed in three questions. What will be the economic effects of the British entry into the Common Market on the trade and economics of Commonwealth countries? What effect will it have on the Commonwealth as a political organisation? And how will it affect underdeveloped countries outside the Commonwealth? These issues are interlocked and they lead on to the deeper questions; what is the real nature of the Commonwealth, what are the basic ideas which hold it together, and how are they related to the basic ideas which pull us towards Europe? Will the new Europe be outward or inward-looking? And how do our own ideas, and more important our practice, about helping the poorer peoples of the world compare with the ideas and the practice of the Common Market countries?

Common Market and Commonwealth

In considering both economic and political effects on the Common-

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wealth, and especially the choice for Britain herself, it is important to remember the very different characters of the Commonwealth and the European Economic Community. The latter aims explicitly and in detail at economic integration—complete removal of tariffs between its members, common policies in relation to, for example, agricultural support, harmonisation of laws in economic and social spheres, and so on—and less explicitly but increasingly clearly at a closer and closer political and strategic co-operation. The Commonwealth, on the other hand, is a much looser association and professes no intention to become a tighter one; its members have comparatively few agreements for common action in detail; no systematic movement towards harmonisation of law or practice forms part of declared Commonwealth aims; and the trade arrangements which are the most detailed of the agreements between members are non-uniform in their scope and envisage nothing remotely like the total removal of trade barriers between them. For the political future, it is only the most optimistic who can look to the Commonwealth attaining any greater community of political purpose than it possesses today. In the area of personal movement, the objective of the EEC is the removal of all restrictions; in the Commonwealth, the trend is the opposite way, the United Kingdom having now joined all her partners in abolishing the right of unrestricted entry of Commonwealth citizens. In brief, the EEC looks towards an integrated European society, the Commonwealth towards a continued looser association of a group of diverse (and probably diversifying) societies.

The economic effects must be considered separately for the United Kingdom itself, and for different groups of Commonwealth countries. For the United Kingdom, entry into the Common Market means, *inter alia*, exchanging the system under which she both grants and receives tariff preferences to and from Commonwealth countries, for one in which she grants and receives rights of duty free importation from and into the EEC countries. It would be a formidable task to try and work out the losses and gains in detail for every item of trade, in fact a quite impossible one, bearing in mind the ineluctable uncertainties of the future. In assessing possible effects on United Kingdom exports, one falls back on the overall feature that, whereas the Common Market offers duty free facilities, the Imperial Preference system offers only a duty preference and provides no safeguard against the ever-widening range of duties and other devices designed to protect local production at the expense of United Kingdom as well as other external competitors. With that in mind it is difficult to challenge the apparent conclusion of the Government, that the United Kingdom economy will not lose

merely by changing from Commonwealth preference to European customs union.

More awkward problems are posed by the probable effects on other members of the Commonwealth. Before examining some of them in detail, it is well to emphasise that the significance of the Imperial Preference system varies very greatly from one member country to another. Many primary products of the Commonwealth, e.g. rubber, wool and metals, are unaffected because they are on the free-entry list in the United Kingdom as raw materials, and will stay on the European free list; and others, like cocoa, although nominally enjoying a duty preference in the United Kingdom, get no consequential price advantage because their production largely exceeds United Kingdom demand, and competition keeps the price down to world market levels. At the other end there are substantial territories in Africa where tariff preferences are ruled out by international obligations; others, where the preference system has never been very fully developed; and yet others, like Hong Kong and Singapore, where the scope for any tariff preference is limited by the narrow range of the local customs tariff. Accordingly, we can find many different groups; countries like the West Indies, which secure significant, sometimes vital, advantage from United Kingdom preferences and offer effective advantages to United Kingdom exporters in return; countries like Hong Kong which gain real advantage for some of their own exports but have little to offer in return; countries like Malaya and Singapore and most of West Africa, which both gain and offer only marginal advantages; others again, like Central and East Africa which gain significant advantages for some of their exports but can offer no *quid pro quo* at all; and finally the more complicated situations of the larger or more highly developed countries, particularly Canada, Australia, New Zealand and India, which gain varying amounts of benefit from preferences, but whose reciprocal grants of preference to United Kingdom exporters have had much of their value eroded by local protectionism.

Different Commonwealth countries have, therefore, very different interests in the loss of United Kingdom preference which would eventually result from British entry into the Common Market. There is another factor which affects them variously. Not merely may they lose an advantage in the United Kingdom market; they may be placed at a disadvantage in respect of customs tariffs and in some cases in respect of quota arrangements too, compared with alternative suppliers from within the European Economic Community. This adds to the concern of the temperate zone agricultural producers in Canada, Australia and New Zealand and of actual or potential exporters of

manufactured goods, e.g. Canada, India and Hong Kong. Another aspect affects some African territories which might otherwise be indifferent to the loss of United Kingdom preference, i.e. the danger that other African territories which rank as "associated" will enjoy an advantage in United Kingdom as well as Continental markets which they themselves may have lost.

On the other side of the account has to be reckoned the expected effect of the Common Market arrangements in increasing the basic prosperity of its members and therefore their total demand for imports. This could be very important for producers of raw materials and tropical foodstuffs (including drinks), and perhaps in the slightly more distant future for producers of the simpler manufactures. There is also a kind of reverse facet of this consideration. If the United Kingdom stays out of the European Economic Community, will it be able to maintain sufficient prosperity to offer a growing, or even a stationary, market for the Commonwealth producers who now depend on it?

Differences in the Commonwealth

Ignoring many complications, the Commonwealth countries can be put into certain broad groups, related to the probable effect on them of United Kingdom entry into the Market. First, there is a large group, comprising the West Indies and the African countries, who can preserve most of the advantages they now enjoy, whether large or small, by accepting "association"; if they choose not to, for political reasons, they can hardly be said to have been unfairly treated in the economic field. Sugar is the special problem for the West Indies, but it is already so subject to special arrangements through the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement (by which the United Kingdom undertakes to purchase most of their exportable surpluses at special prices) and the International Sugar Agreement (which limits exports from nearly every producing country in the world), that further special arrangements, if required, ought to present no difficulty of principle.

Secondly, there is a smaller group, typified by Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo territories, which appear to have only marginal effects to fear even if they are not offered "association".

Thirdly, there is a group, small in number but important, who will need to face substantial adjustments but need not be substantially worse off if the Community pursues a sufficiently liberal overall policy; I have in mind Canada, Australia and India.

Lastly comes a still smaller group which stands to lose advantages in the British market with much less prospect of compensatory replacement. This includes Hong Kong and New Zealand, with the difference

between them being, that the loss looks much more serious for New Zealand. Let us take a little more detailed look at the position of the five countries mentioned as falling into these last two groups.

For Canada, the United Kingdom has in recent years provided about 15 per cent of her export markets and the Common Market countries about 8 per cent. Agricultural and vegetable products, wood and paper and non-ferrous metals have formed by far the greater part of the exports to both, and no clear trends are discernible, except an apparent sharp increase in Canadian non-ferrous exports to the Six. For one important commodity, wheat, much must depend on the ultimate form of any international arrangement, but it is hard to feel convinced that Canada could not retain most of her export markets in Europe, or that any losses or adjustments would affect her vitally.

For Australia, both the United Kingdom and the Six provide proportionately larger markets, exports to the United Kingdom between 1956/57 and 1960/61 ranging from 28 per cent to 24 per cent, and exports to the Six ranging from 20 per cent to 14 per cent (in both cases with a declining trend). Wool constitutes more than half the total exports to the United Kingdom and an even larger proportion to the Six, but it is notable that non-wool exports to the latter have been growing fast. As wool itself, being promised free entry, should not be adversely affected, and it is clear that Australia has been getting less dependent on European markets as a whole, it is again reasonable to doubt the likelihood of any very serious consequences.

India, over the same period, has found a market for about 25 per cent of her exports in the United Kingdom (about half being tea) and for 7 per cent to 8 per cent in the Six. Exports to both have been rising a little but not sharply, but it is noticeable that sales of Indian manufactures (constituting well under 10 per cent of the total) have been rising faster in the Six than in the United Kingdom. It is in respect of manufactures that India is most vulnerable to the loss of preference, but this suggests that it is by no means impossible for her to sell in European markets. Also, as her main exports are still food and raw materials, her prospects need not necessarily cause serious alarm.

The Difficult Cases

There remain Hong Kong and New Zealand. The former, formerly transacting a purely *entrepôt* trade, has in the last generation developed a large export of local manufactures. Preferential markets in the United Kingdom, Malaya and elsewhere unquestionably helped greatly, and great concern has been felt by British manufacturers about Hong

Kong competition in, e.g., rubber goods and cotton textiles. The United Kingdom and other preferential markets remain important, but it is noteworthy that Hong Kong's domestic exports to the Six have been rising fast (from H.K. \$98,000,000 in 1957 to H.K. \$158,000,000 in 1960). Hence it is reasonable to hope that, although some sales will unquestionably be lost, Hong Kong will retain much of her newly established trade and, given the vigour and ingenuity of her entrepreneurs, may even increase it.

New Zealand is perhaps the hardest case of all. The United Kingdom provides half or more of her total export market and 90 per cent of the market for butter. Undoubtedly the latter is very vulnerable to European competition and could not, at least, command the same prices after the loss of preference. On the other hand butter, although a major export of New Zealand, constitutes less than 20 per cent of the total and is well behind wool, while her other main export, mutton and lamb, should be less affected by European competition. Moreover, if one may be realistic, one cannot attach overriding importance to the preservation of a special position for a country enjoying a standard of living well up in the international league table.

Very much must depend in all cases on the policy which eventually emerges in the Common Market with regard to imports. With a liberal policy, which it ought to be the constant endeavour of the United Kingdom to promote, most of the Commonwealth countries should find the adjustment, in purely economic terms, not too hard. The toughest nuts are likely to be among the temperate foodstuffs. Here the immediately favoured solution lies in some form of international regulatory agreements. If these agreements, at present only sketched in very shadowy terms, can effectively check agricultural protectionism among all the advanced industrial nations, much will be achieved not only in relation to the Common Market but in a wider context.

Suppose we accept the view that, with special provision for a limited number of cases, the long-term economic interests of Commonwealth countries are unlikely to be damaged and may indeed be benefited by Britain's entry, there remains the fact that the peculiar economic ties between Britain and the rest of the Commonwealth will be weakened. How serious is that, and what are the political implications? First, let us remember that the present economic ties are not only those of buying and selling under the preferential umbrella. A lot of trade will go on, as it did before 1932, because Britain is a natural market for, say, India's tea or Australasia's wool, and because Commonwealth peoples are used to British machines and British fabricated goods. The

ties arising from past investment will remain, the banking and monetary arrangements which form the real basis for the sterling area need not be affected and the resort to London for new finance will no doubt continue. In some ways, even more indestructible are the ties resulting from purely personal relationships in the business and allied worlds. Thus a large element of special economic relationship will survive.

The Commonwealth Relationship

Nonetheless some special factor in the Commonwealth relationship will have gone. Before considering how essential that special factor is to the politics of the Commonwealth, we had better turn back to look at the character of the Commonwealth relationship. As already noted, it is far removed from the integration envisaged by the Six. Indeed, it could be argued that the Commonwealth is not really a political entity at all. It has no organ of common political decision, no executive and no judicial machinery for settling differences or enforcing the (almost non-existent) rules of membership. Most of its members are terrified of the idea of a common external policy and refuse to join the defensive military alliances to which the United Kingdom and some other members belong. In actual practice, judging from voting at the United Nations, the views of Commonwealth members on specific international issues show little uniformity; the United Kingdom normally finds the other European countries taking the same line as herself oftener than she does a number of the Commonwealth countries.

The Commonwealth, indeed, is much more like a family than any ordinary political organism. It is like a family sharing many common memories and common ideas, a number but not all of whose members belong to the same clubs, whose head, out of sentiment and habit, buys most of his domestic supplies from shops owned by brothers or cousins, but whose members freely exercise their right to go off on their own whenever they feel like it. This family is now faced with the prospect of its head going into a new business partnership and strengthening other friendships hitherto of lesser importance. Does it follow that the family must break up?

I believe that the fundamental basis of the Commonwealth is not a set of political rules, nor a complex series of trade bargains, but a common inheritance of thought and ideals. Here we come, I think, to the crux of the issue. It is more and more clear that the surge of instinctive feeling in favour of entry is not based on economic calculation (any clever economist can prove that, on appropriate assumptions, we shall lose by entering, and no conscientious economist will commit

himself to saying that in all circumstances we must gain). The feeling is, I think, simply that we belong at bottom to Europe and if there is going to be a really united Europe we must be in it. The strategic or military argument, influential as it is in some quarters, is only another expression of this deeper feeling of unity. It is that deeper feeling which also underlies the very general welcome to the tentative moves towards *rapprochement* by the Christian churches. We share with Western Europe at least, a vast inheritance of ideas, political, legal, moral and cultural, going back to the mediaeval church and the Christian Fathers, to Rome and to Greece.

That is part, too, of the common inheritance which, I suggest, is the true basis of the Commonwealth, but that common inheritance is not identical with what we share with Europe, since it is infused with particular British habits of thought, significantly in politics and law, and recently has begun, in the eyes of some, to contain large elements of distinctive approach to the relationship of advanced and under-developed countries—of white and coloured. The real issue of the survival of the Commonwealth in such political sense as it now has is this: of the relative importance of the common European elements or the specially British elements in our ways of thought, which is the idea that really matters? The idea, for instance, of personal liberty, the basic moral idea of the value of the individual human being, which we share with so many in Europe, or the British form of Parliamentary Government? The basic idea of the rule of law, or the English Common Law as distinct from the Roman Law? If basically the older unity of European ideas has the same importance for the Commonwealth members as I suspect it has for the people of the United Kingdom, there is no reason why the Commonwealth should disintegrate. Certainly so far as forms and procedures of consultation are concerned, there is no reason why the change in the United Kingdom's position should bring it to an end; these forms are flexible enough to stand a great deal of change.

If, however, there is not this basic community of intellectual inheritance, the Commonwealth may well dissolve under the impact of British entry into Europe. But, in that event, could it long survive, even without that particular shock, except as a form as empty as the later Holy Roman Empire? In recent discussion, the attitudes of some of the new Commonwealth members have been very interesting. India and others appear to have been more concerned about the possible implications for military alliances than about economic effects, and to have disliked the prospect of the United Kingdom taking a more European view. Some of the African states were so nervous of

becoming "European" that they appeared to regard the offer of "association" as a vicious trap rather than an offer of help.

I suggest, indeed, that the Common Market issue has not created but only brought to the surface the basic issue of the survival of the Commonwealth, has confronted its members much more clearly than ever before with the question of what the Commonwealth is about, what are the ideas that inspire it. If, in fact, the ideas which appeal most fundamentally to the British people, the ideas we inherit in common with Western Europe, are not those which appeal to the rest of the Commonwealth, or at least not to all of it, the issue would have arisen some time ago. It may be an open issue whether the Commonwealth, as so greatly enlarged recently by the addition of Asian and African members, retains a large enough core of common ideals and traditions to be visible. It may be asking too much of one side or the other to expect either that Mr. Nehru and Dr. Nkrumah will become good Europeans or that the British people will accept the principles of Afro-Asianism, but the present membership of the Commonwealth could hardly fuse into a permanently effective organism unless a move in one direction or the other takes place. The Common Market prospect has only highlighted, not created, this problem.

In fact, I believe that the very looseness of the present Commonwealth connection will enable it to survive. It is hard to kill a jelly-fish, and the Commonwealth may be equally hard to destroy. On the level of ideas, what I would call the European system of ideas, the system which is pulling us towards European integration, has a sufficient, if not a dominating influence among the great majority of Commonwealth members to make it likely that they will not be too unhappy to have an indirect but still intimate contact with a new European political order. And on the level of institutions, the forms of Commonwealth organisation are so fluid that it can hardly be impossible to adapt them to new conditions. So, reverting to the family analogy, the new connections of the head of the family ought not to prevent him continuing to exchange visits and correspondence, even if a little less frequently, with all its members, unless there are some who find it a convenient moment to make a breach which would have occurred anyway sooner or later.

Europe and the Under-developed World

I turn last to the position of the under-developed world. Opponents of British entry seem often to accept it as axiomatic that the creation of EEC has damaged the under-developed countries and that our accession will make the damage worse. The key phrase is "a rich

man's club" a phrase to which it is hard to attach any relevant meaning. The assumption appears to be that if trade is made easier between the European countries it must be made harder between them and the under-developed countries, an echo of the too common assumption that nobody ever becomes richer without somebody else becoming poorer. What are the facts and reasonable expectations?

First, the Six have together long constituted one of the major markets for the raw materials and tropical foodstuffs which are the mainstays of "under-developed" exports. (I emphasise the word "tropical"; the position of temperate zone foodstuffs is different, but the countries principally interested in these products are not commonly classed in the under-developed group.). If the United Kingdom (and no doubt some of the smaller European countries as a consequence) is added, the joint market for most such products will be the biggest in the world; and if the EEC realises the general hopes of increasing prosperity, its importance as a market will grow. What seems to be in the minds of the apprehensive is that the Continental countries will be less interested in importing from the under-developed world than the United Kingdom would be. Figures of recent trade hardly support that apprehension. The Six take over ten times as much coffee as the United Kingdom and over three times as much cocoa (though, as might be expected, less than a tenth of the amount of tea). They took nearly four times the United Kingdom's imports of oilseeds and cotton and over twice as much rubber and sisal and copper. There is certainly no reason to expect that, with growing national incomes, these and similar demands for other "undeveloped" exports will decline.

The second cause of misgiving is the belief that the Continental countries are less interested in technical aid to the under-developed countries than we are. This misgiving arises almost entirely from sheer ignorance of what they have been doing. It comes as a surprise to nearly everybody in Britain to be told that for years France has been devoting a higher percentage of her national income to overseas aid and investment than either Britain or the USA; and that Germany last year closely rivalled, and may now be surpassing the United Kingdom in her total of aid and investment. The universities of France, Germany, and the rest of the Six are just as accustomed to receiving students from Asia and Africa as are those of Britain. It was in the Netherlands, not in Britain, that there was started the first institute devoted to the training of men destined to be concerned with development planning overseas, with generous provision of scholarships. I have been surprised and ashamed in visiting Latin American countries, to find how much larger the programmes of educational assistance

financed by France and Germany are than those financed by Her Majesty's Government. Even within the Commonwealth area, in which so much of United Kingdom aid is concentrated, we are finding ourselves outdone—the Six between them are contributing twice as much as the United Kingdom to the financing of India's development plan. All the evidence suggests that there is just as much practical concern on the other side of the Channel as on our side about the vast problems of the development of the poorer countries of the world.

There is, however, a third point on which there is more solid ground for apprehension. In its present form the EEC, while providing a substantial market for tropical produce, constitutes a preferential market for a particular group of tropical countries—the former French and Belgian colonial possessions. As already shown, this preferential position is of concern to a group of Commonwealth countries and British Colonies, and it is proposed to meet that concern by granting the "British" group the same rights of association as the "French" and the "Belgian". The effect will be, however, to remove still more of the total European market from the field of completely free competition and to raise fears that it may come to be supplied almost wholly from the enlarged preferential group. A further effect of the same kind would be brought about if the problems of the temperate zone Commonwealth food producers are solved by agreements giving them a position inferior (in relation to the European market) to that of internal producers but superior to that of any other outside producers.

Arrangements of this kind must in principle work to the prejudice of primary producers outside the favoured circle. The "outsiders" would include, apparently, India and Pakistan and, of course, the whole large group of Latin American countries. Some of the fears expressed about the consequences are almost certainly exaggerated, but any long-standing arrangement of this kind must involve some diminution in the effective contribution of Europe, through trade, to the under-developed countries as a whole. It is a field in which the solution of Commonwealth problems may be only at the expense of countries just as much in need of help, even if less closely tied to us politically.

The better answer would lie in a more liberal import policy all round. The prospect of a rather tightly knit block of Europe and Africa, with European agriculture heavily protected or subsidised and African primary produce given significant preferences over most of the rest of the under-developed world, is not inviting. A Community which was moving clearly towards a policy of freedom of importation from all the world, in which the removal of tariffs between its members could be regarded as only a first step towards a world-wide lowering

of barriers to trade, would have vastly greater attractions. If one supports British entry, it is in the faith that Europe is today, as in the past, outward looking, that it believes still in its own powers to give a lead to the world and to help other countries, through aid *and* trade, on the path of development, prosperity and peace.

I return, therefore, to my point of commencement. The real issues here are not narrow calculations of economic profit or loss to particular interests. They are issues of broad ideas, of whether we are right in thinking that we share the really basic ideas which guide our politics with the peoples of the other Western European countries and that those ideas are basically compatible with an "outward-looking" policy. If we are right, the political future of the Commonwealth depends on whether those same basic ideas are also shared by our Commonwealth partners. And, finally, the huge under-developed section of the world, inside or outside the Commonwealth, will benefit to the extent that the European group as a whole retains, as I personally believe it does, a world rather than a sectional or regional outlook.

THE CONSEQUENCES FOR FARMING AND FOOD

PETER SELF

THE consequences of Britain's joining the European Economic Community are likely to be still greater for British agriculture than they will be for British industry. In addition, there will be considerable changes in food prices, the pattern of food supplies, and agricultural subsidies. There will also be a number of awkward new issues for public policy, at both the European and British levels, the nature of which is only just beginning to appear.

In some ways this article is an exercise in crystal-gazing. The EEC has now worked out the rudiments of an agricultural and food policy after much toil and sweat. It is well known that the Six are extremely reluctant, some members more than others, to change in any way the agreements which they have already reached. This circumstance has already severely circumscribed British aims in the Brussels negotiations. However, it is also important to remember that many issues have still to be settled by the Six themselves, particularly the question of how rapidly and how completely a unified agricultural market can be reached.

Again, the detailed agreements that have already been reached on European agricultural policies refer mainly to a transitional period. Decisions upon important long-term matters such as the financing of agricultural support, the level of the external tariff, and the allocation of European markets, have still to be reached. All that can be known about these things is the statement of general intentions contained in the Treaty of Rome itself and in the more recent agricultural agreements. This article will pay most attention to the long-term developments and problems which the integration of European agriculture is likely to produce. This approach seems more interesting since it is the eventual results of integration with Europe which will be most significant and important, however complex and immediately pressing the transitional arrangements may prove to be; and it is these longer-term effects which the people of this country should bear in mind when considering the desirability of joining the EEC.

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The Contrast in Systems

The present British system of agricultural support is unique in the world. In theory it provides highly comprehensive and specific economic guarantees for British farmers whilst maintaining the advantages of relatively cheap food. In practice it does not work quite so satisfactorily as this for either farmers or food consumers. Its main difficulty is generally agreed to be the high, mounting, and unpredictable weight of the agricultural subsidies. By contrast the EEC's agricultural system offers more modified, although still substantial, support to farmers, provided partly at the expense of food consumers through levies on imported food. In addition, it treats Western Europe, at least potentially, as a single agricultural market and important consequences flow from this fact.

The present British system of agricultural support does not depend upon a protective wall of tariffs and import duties, except in the important case of horticultural products. Many products enter duty-free or at very low rates of duty, particularly from Commonwealth countries. However, British agriculture is subsidised to the levels which are necessary for it to compete successfully with imported products, and the effect of subsidies has been to increase home food production considerably. Today British farming supplies about half the total value of the nation's food supplies and about two-thirds of the total value of these supplies if tropical products which could not be grown here are excluded. These are substantially higher proportions than before the last war, and they bear witness to the efficacy of guaranteed prices in encouraging more production.

The instrument of agricultural support is the annual price review when officials of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food confer with representatives of the National Farmers' Unions. These reviews are exceedingly complex affairs, and are closely governed both by statutory provisions and by well established conventions. After the review the Government establish guaranteed prices for the principal agricultural products. In cases where imports are particularly important, principally for cereals and fat-stock, these prices are administered through deficiency payments which reimburse to farmers the difference between actual average market prices and the prices they have been guaranteed. This leaves the market free and does not of course guarantee a particular price to an individual farmer, but it does ensure a given income for a given output to farmers generally.

In addition to price guarantees, the Government provides a variety of direct grants and subsidies to farmers for such purposes as fertilisers,

field drainage, farm improvements, calf rearing, and the ploughing of old grassland. Most of these direct grants really represent an alternative to higher price guarantees, and are preferred (sometimes rather dubiously) on the ground of their greater contribution to technical efficiency. The whole of this system of support is governed by a "global" guarantee to British agriculture, which takes account of movements in farming costs and profitability and also of national economic considerations. Under the 1957 Agriculture Act, the Government is able to reduce the values of both its global guarantee and its specific guarantees by prescribed amounts each year, after allowing for cost increases; but whether these cuts are actually applied in whole or part is decided after listening to the farmers' case. Thus, British farmers know fairly closely the general level of support which they can expect, although the support is on a collective rather than an individual basis; and their representatives play a very full part in working out the details of the annual transaction.

The annual cost of agricultural support cannot be closely foreseen since it turns on the level of import prices. This is a source of some annoyance to the Treasury. The Government has been trying for some years to reduce the total cost of its support, but in fact this cost has risen to a total of about £350 million in 1961/62. This increase has been mainly due to the rapidly rising productivity of farmers in all advanced countries, which has outstripped the appetites of food consumers in the richer countries and has consequently led to the accumulation of food surpluses and to relatively low world prices. British farmers have kept up with these prices, increasing their own output at a faster rate than demand for their products (at the prices which they expect) warrants. They have been shielded from this world problem by the support system, which has enabled them roughly to maintain their post-war level of prosperity, but not, however, to increase their real incomes as most other sections of the community have been doing. This situation sometimes dismays farmers, but the facts of the situation are against them. Undoubtedly, if Britain does not join the EEC, the present system will have to be amended, but it is most unlikely that it would be amended in the same direction as will be necessary if Britain joins.

Union with Europe would change this situation radically. At present, there is relatively little competition or connection between British and European agricultural systems, except for a well-established trade with Denmark and Holland and the import of certain fruits and vegetables from Southern Europe. A high proportion of British food imports comes from non-European sources, particularly the Commonwealth,

while the British support system largely insulates farmers from their cross-channel competitors. Under the new system, however, British agricultural conditions will be largely regulated by European decisions and British farmers will find themselves increasingly in competition with Continental farmers. This competition will be very limited in the early stages, but in the course of time the prosperity of British and European farmers will become increasingly interlinked.

Can the British Farmer Compete?

In terms of technical efficiency, British agriculture is well equipped to compete with European farming. Production per head is much higher than in continental countries with the exceptions of Holland and Denmark. The average British farm is much larger and also more mechanised and better equipped. Britain has a "small farmer problem", but it is of quite different dimensions from the problem of surplus peasants which occurs in France, Germany and Italy. In the United Kingdom there are only about 300,000 full-time farmers and only about 100,000 farmers who are in difficulty for reasons of the small size and inadequate resources of their holdings. In each principal European country those in this position are numbered in millions, particularly in southern France, southern Italy and parts of Germany.

Against this advantage, however, must be set the much higher incomes and standards of living which British farmers have come to expect. The average net income of British farmers (e.g. remuneration for their labour and return on their working capital) is now about £1,200 per annum. Admittedly, the range around this figure is enormous, but it would be fair to say that the top third of farmers are as well off as moderately successful business-men or professional men, while the bottom third earn an income that is not very different from that of farm labourers; and farm labourers in Britain have earnings about 25 per cent to 30 per cent lower than average industrial workers, but the difference is much less when account is taken of their lower expenditure on transport and housing.

Britain has, what most European communities do not have, a civilised well-serviced countryside, whose dwellers enjoy a standard of living comparable to that of city dwellers. This countryside is nourished by large subsidies. Agriculture is relieved of rates and rural local authorities get large equalisation grants from the Exchequer. Rural water supplies, rural electrification, rural transport and so on are subsidised in various ways. On the Continent, civilisation is much more urban and, despite considerable recent improvements, it is generally taken for granted that those on the land should have very

much lower standards than urban dwellers. Of course, the amenities of the English countryside owe much to the presence of rich "ex-urbanites" but the benefits to farming remain. The question is whether British agriculture is efficient enough to maintain its present relative prosperity within the European system.

It is out of the question for the EEC to support agriculture on the British scale, or by British methods, in view of the vast numbers of workers in agriculture who would need to be supported. The EEC arrangements employ a looser system of "target" or "guide" prices, to be maintained largely through the use of import controls including variable levies which are intended to raise the price of imports to somewhere near the target price, thus protecting home farmers. In addition, export subsidies will be paid under certain conditions to assist the disposal of surplus produce. So far it is only in the important cases of cereals (wheat, barley, maize and rye) and butter that a direct system of guaranteed prices to be implemented by European purchasing agencies has been planned.

When the system is fully working Western Europe will be a single agricultural area, and import levies and export subsidies, etc., will apply only to trade with the outside world, including the Commonwealth. But unification is not immediately practicable, since enormous structural changes in European agriculture will be necessary; e.g., German wheat prices are much higher than French wheat prices, so that a common target price for wheat can only be reached by stages. During this interim period, import quotas and export subsidies will apply to intro-European as well as extra-European trade, with the proviso (on which the French are particularly keen) that a kind of European preference system (the *montant forfaitaire*) shall replace other preferences such as that accorded to the Commonwealth. Thus, in this interim period the various national agricultures will be substantially shielded, but in the longer run (a maximum, it is hoped, of seven and a half years) full integration must be faced.

This programme will require substantial changes in the structure of British agriculture. Some special problems will have to be resolved. For example the European system of supporting dairy farmers by subsidised purchases of butter will not suit Britain, where the main (and very important) market is in liquid milk. In the long run, British consumers may even get some of their liquid milk from France and Holland unless special protection is allowed. Again, the European countries do not eat much mutton or lamb, and have no arrangements for supporting these products. While British farmers can probably compete quite well in the production of beef and grain, they

are more poorly placed for the production of pig-meat, eggs, milk and (most of all) fruit and vegetables. This suggests the possibility of considerable changes in British farming. East Anglia and the lush fattening areas should do well, but many parts of the country and many small farmers and horticulturists will face severe difficulties, unless—as is always quite possible—the “interim” protective arrangements get indefinitely prolonged, both for Britain and other countries.

Dilemmas of Food Policy

A critical question for Britain is the method of financing agricultural support since this will affect food consumers and the economy generally as well as farmers. The EEC has always intended to finance its agricultural schemes largely from the proceeds of import levies. This looks very unfavourable for Britain, which imports at present a larger volume of food than the whole EEC.¹ This country will be in the ironical position of paying higher food prices in order (among other things) to subsidise the export of French farm surpluses. To a lesser extent, Germany will also suffer under this system, and because of internal differences the Six themselves have not yet agreed on the final method of agricultural financing. They have agreed to set up an agricultural fund as part of the EEC's budget, and as an interim arrangement this fund will largely be financed by tax contributions from the various countries, with only 10 per cent in the second year and 20 per cent in the third year coming from levy proceeds. Possibly Britain may be able to secure that the bulk of this fund continues to be financed from taxation rather than from levies. In any event, nothing can disguise the fact that food prices will increase substantially, partly through the use of import levies, and partly because this country will no longer be able to import food from the cheapest and most efficient sources, of which certain Commonwealth countries are notable examples.

It is often said or hoped that Britain will exercise a strong liberal influence on European food policy. We might do this through trying to keep the European target prices for farm produce relatively low, so that agricultural production does not rise too rapidly in Europe, and scope is left for Commonwealth and other imports paying relatively low levies. But there are some hard political facts telling against this assumption. In the first place, British farmers themselves will want the highest prices they can get, and they will only be able to achieve this goal by teaming up with European farm organisations to demand

¹ Net imports of foodstuffs in 1960 were £1,300 million for the U.K. and £800 million for the EEC.

better prices, thus indirectly squeezing out Commonwealth imports. If Britain enters Europe, the interests of home and Commonwealth farmers become directly antithetical, and both sets of interests cannot be accommodated. This will be a very hard fact for British politicians, and even for the National Farmers' Union which has greater ties and sympathies with the Commonwealth than with Europe. It will in any event be difficult to check the rise in European agricultural production which is already outstripping the growth of consumer demand. Finally, under the new system Britain has really very little economic incentive to maintain large Commonwealth imports, since their price will be raised to the local level through import levies and much of the proceeds will in any case go into a European fund.

Perhaps Britain will press for a rather more liberal food policy than some European countries. But the hard fact is that European integration will leave very little scope for the traditional Commonwealth trading links, with all their accompanying benefits. The great fuss which the Government has made (not very successfully) about transitional arrangements for Commonwealth food is irrelevant to the long term prospects, which have received hardly any attention at all. The burden of higher food prices may perhaps be softened by rising prosperity, and agricultural subsidies will be reduced, but the balance of advantage on food policy is against entry. In addition to the fact that agriculture will be supported more by consumers and less by taxpayers, there is the other fact that a world trading system in food will be replaced by a European system. Some of the advantages of international specialisation will be lost, and lost at the expense of Commonwealth countries bound to Britain by sentiment as well as trade.

On the other side it may be said that the advantages of world and Commonwealth trade have already been circumscribed by the large protective subsidies paid to British farmers. Now British farming may gain in efficiency through direct competition with European farming, while in time an improved new system of European farming should grow up with its own patterns of specialisation. These points are quite valid in a general way, but everything depends upon the wisdom of EEC policy and the capacity of British farming to adjust to wholly new conditions.

The Politics of Entry

The Government has promised that the vital interests of British agriculture will be assured if Britain enters Europe. However, the National Farmers' Union is completely dissatisfied with the

provisional arrangements. Its objections are that the new support systems will be much vaguer and looser, that many commodities will be without specific price guarantees, that livestock producers will suffer from levies on imported cereals, that horticulturists will be unprotected, and that no support has been promised for liquid milk. The Union has been particularly displeased by Mr. Heath's failure at Brussels to get permission for states to apply residual guarantees, e.g., separate support systems if the EEC system proves inadequate. The Union has not (at the time of writing) flatly opposed British entry into Europe but it has produced a counter-plan for world agricultural schemes as an alternative to European integration. The political point of these proposals, which are not themselves very novel, is to offer an alternative to a prospect which the Union dislikes.

The British Government has persuaded the Six to adopt the principle of an annual European price review, which will mirror the British review in surveying the economic conditions of European agriculture. The Minister of Agriculture has regarded this as something of a triumph for the British system, but from the farmers' viewpoint it is a somewhat hollow one, as it is not linked with the British system of price guarantees. This review may, however, give additional opportunities to the National Farmers' Union to seek out partners among the European farm organizations, and to encourage them, as the Union has already begun to do, to increase their demands.

The Union's problem is how far to press its opposition to entry into Europe, assuming (which is almost certain) that agriculture cannot continue to be given the protection it now enjoys. The Union might be perfectly justified in saying that, by the test of its own promises, the Government has let agriculture down, but how successfully can it wage opposition? The Union's post-war strategy has rested on neutrality between the parties, and its occasional opposition to price review decisions has always been based on the contention that the Agriculture Acts have been unfairly administered. On these occasions it has successfully put pressure on Governments by harassing their back-bench supporters and enlisting the support of a compliant Parliamentary opposition. Entry into Europe is a much larger and less reversible type of issue involving much more than agriculture. If, for example, the Conservatives choose, or have, to fight an election on the European issue, strong opposition to entry by the Union would virtually amount to taking political sides.

Moreover, the Union's opposition might not in fact prove very successful. Most farmers, like other voters, probably tend to vote on past experience and allegiances rather than on prospective dangers

which they do not properly understand. The Union has issued excellent reports about the technical problems of European integration, but it has done little actively to stimulate farmers' anxieties, or to build up consolidated opposition. While very many small farmers certainly are anxious, the Union has only rarely attempted actually to influence farmers' votes, and its ability to do so is very uncertain. The Union's electoral power has always been latent, and completely subsidiary to its position of great prestige as the widely recognised and frequently consulted voice of agriculture. Better for the Union that this power should stay untested. Its chief hope of effective opposition would seem to lie in the formation of some kind of general anti-Market front, independent of party.

The Future of British Farming

The European countries are pledged, under the Treaty of Rome, to a progressive modernisation of their agricultures. Basically, this entails the transformation of the traditional peasant proprietor into a modern capitalist farmer, operating a substantial business over a larger acreage. Substantial progress in this direction has, in fact, already occurred naturally as a result of rapid economic growth, but the amount of surplus labour on the land (judging surplus by economic criteria) remains formidable. Part of the EEC's agricultural budget is specifically allocated for the purpose of assisting such structural improvements. Britain, too, has a small farmer scheme which provides special assistance for farms that are at present not properly economic, but which could be made so. (Thus the weakest farmers are deliberately excluded). It seems certain that a scheme of this kind will find a legitimate place within the new European framework. Britain's small farmers' scheme may very well be extended, perhaps in replacement of the direct grants to farmers which are likely to be disallowed as vitiating the EEC conditions of fair agricultural competition.

As already noted, Britain has moved very much farther along the path of agricultural rationalisation. The number of full-time farmers is falling only very slowly, but in the last twelve years a third of the hired labour force has left the land. Nonetheless, production has steadily increased, and men are being replaced by more machines and by intensified chemical aids. Even in Britain, however, this process can go a great deal further, and European competition may further stimulate the process if farming prosperity is to be preserved or possibly increased in some areas.

Often, British agriculture is viewed as a weak element in European integration, but this may not altogether prove the case. It is quite

possible that the better British farmers will build up a substantial export trade to Europe, and it may even be vital that they should do so since Britain's industrial performance may be worse than anticipated. One possibility is a much more intensive system of beef production, based on improved grassland management and possibly upon the feeding of grain in such areas as East Anglia. Considerable scope exists both for intensification and specialisation, and a higher output of food could be gained from a smaller agricultural acreage, thus releasing land for other purposes. Of course, if demand for this extra food cannot be built up, increasing areas of agricultural land will become neglected or under-used.

If European agricultural integration is really pushed through, it seems certain to widen differences in farmers' prosperity. The less favoured agricultural areas may face severe decline and an accelerated exodus of farm workers. It is not always realised that large parts of rural England, including even some parishes only twenty miles from Piccadilly, are losing population, and the decline is more pronounced in Wales and Scotland. This fact is concealed by the undoubted attractions of other rural areas for urban commuters and retired people. The only way to maintain a viable community life in the more rural areas would seem to be the introduction of new industries at the most suitable local centres. The EEC is actively supporting the development of backward and impoverished regions such as southern Italy and the French *Midi*. The British equivalent is the aid to development districts under the Distribution of Industry Acts, but except in the Highlands, these schemes have not so far been used to help rural areas. They could be so used, however, and a plan for some industrial development in suitable rural centres seems highly desirable.

Clearly entry into Europe will provide a severe test of the power and prestige of British rural interests. Because so many Conservative M.P.s live in Granges, Halls or Manors, and often dabble in farming, and because country life and land ownership still carries much social value, it is often assumed that the Government will not let agriculture seriously decline. Unfortunately, much of the interest of these influential rural dwellers may be sentimental rather than practical. The hard facts which have helped British agriculture since the war were the need for more food production; the influential position of the National Farmers' Union; the interests of machinery and fertiliser manufacturers in having a prosperous agricultural market, and the readiness of the Labour leadership to back the farmers' cause. The first of these factors has gone, the second is weaker and the fourth is unpredictable.

There is another approach possible on this subject. Although food consumption is likely to increase only slowly in Western Europe, the unsatisfied needs of the inhabitants of poor tropical countries remain enormous. A really humanitarian European society, determined to refute the accusation of being a rich man's club, might develop a large programme of free surplus disposal to hungry nations, and plan its agricultural policy to this end. In that event a fully productive British agriculture would be needed, as well as a higher volume of overseas food imports which would help (e.g. by supplying cheaper cereals and feeding stuffs) to keep Western Europe as productive as possible. Such possibilities should not be ignored because they seem to have little connection with current politics. After all, the European venture should be a time for the formation of new ideals.

Initially, entry into Europe must be considered a regressive step as far as food policy in this country is concerned. Food will be dearer and imports will be obtained from less efficient sources. Commonwealth interests will be severely injured. There will be a reduction in the cost of agricultural subsidies, but some reduction could in any event be gained, without going into Europe, through adopting a more rational agricultural policy. The prospects for British agriculture are very uncertain, but they generally portend a greater stress on favourable locations and farming systems. The effects on British agriculture will be much less if transitional arrangements are allowed to endure, but this would lose such positive advantages as going into Europe does offer. If union with Europe is accepted, the only wise agricultural policy is one that is both liberal and aggressive, hard as these conditions will be to obtain. This policy must aim at preventing too protected a European agriculture, while seeking to give British farmers positive opportunities for expansion within a unified European market.

THE CONSEQUENCES FOR LABOUR AND SOCIAL POLICY

R. COLIN BEEVER

IF Britain joins the European Economic Community there are likely to be four main effects at home directly involving trade unions and the working conditions of ordinary people.

1. The social policy of the Community will extend the field of *publicly regulated* industrial conditions and benefits.
2. The social policy will affect the climate and trends of collective bargaining in industry.
3. More flexible employment and training policies will come about.
4. The trade union movement will need to adapt itself to a new trade union structure in the Six and to the cession of some sovereignty over policy to the international level.

These probable effects and their causes must be examined separately.

Determining Industrial Conditions and Benefits

The guiding principle of the EEC Treaty is that distortions to competition within the Community be eliminated in order not only that individual enterprises start on equal terms, but that some member countries are not able to gain advantages over others by virtue of widely differing fiscal systems, industrial financing or devices which may help to offset the abolition of protective trading measures. Thus all the factors of production must be enabled to move freely and cartels, monopolies and other trade-restricting devices must be curbed.

The chapter on Social Policy in the EEC Treaty exists mainly as an extension of this objective of eliminating distortions. It is true that pressure from continental trade unions was also partly responsible for its existence, as the Governments of the Six, which had enjoyed the unions' enthusiastic support for integration, were to some extent receptive of their views. The decisive pressure, however, came from the employers and the Government in France when the Rome Treaty was drafted.

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They put the view strongly that a distortion of the market would occur, to the detriment of French industry, if tariff and other trade barriers were removed while French employers were bearing a disproportionately heavy burden of social costs.

French industry had operated a forty-hour normal working week, and given equal pay for equal work for men and women for many years. French employers also paid heavy amounts for social security for their employees, including contributions for family allowances. If other member countries with less generous conditions and social security were not made to bear similar burdens, it was argued, French industry would be at a severe competitive disadvantage.

Whilst the other potential partners were not fully convinced that France's total burden of labour costs was greatly out of line with their own, they nevertheless acceded to French pressure and agreed to write in the principle of "upward social harmonisation". The theory is that some labour cost equivalence might be struck as between the various member countries. There is no intention to make the social and fringe benefits in each country exactly the same or to equalise completely the system of financing them. Clearly, traditional preferences and practices will continue to operate.

There will, however, be pressure for each member country to aim at the standards set by the best in any particular sphere. Thus the forty-hour week and high family allowances of France, the generous retirement pensions of W. Germany, the extensive holidays of Italy, the National Health Service of Britain (if she joins), and so on, will be the targets at which other member countries will be persuaded to aim, without in any way trying to prevent those pace-setting countries from making their best still better.

Generally speaking, there is no time limit set for the achievement of harmonisation, except on equal pay. This must be brought about by the end of 1964 at latest and differences in remuneration exceeding 10 per cent have to be reduced below that by 30 June 1963. At the present time they must not exceed 15 per cent.

Equal pay for work of equal value between men and women will be the first encroachment of regulation on traditional collective bargaining ground in Britain, if she enters EEC. The British unions have tried for many years, with little success, to achieve equal pay by collective agreement with employers. But it operates in very few industries outside the non-industrial public service. The unions may well be impressed that what they did not achieve by bargaining strength is brought about by the simpler expedient of regulation. There is a likelihood that they will follow the lead the TUC has already given

and adopt the view that the intransigence of British employers in the normal process of collective bargaining makes it desirable that regulated improvement should operate in some cases.

The TUC at one time held the view that upward social harmonisation would not work well for Britain because the provisions could lead to encroachment on issues traditionally settled by collective bargaining and that inferior social conditions on the Continent might hold Britain back. They now take the view that the importance of social improvement overrides the first consideration about collective bargaining, and they specifically recognise that Continental social conditions are not inferior, now, to British standards, but are frequently better. Only in the National Health Service, in fact, does Britain now have a lead.

In accepting that some industrial conditions will be internationally regulated rather than agreed with the employers, in future, the unions will recognise that they are only exchanging some national for some international influence, because they will have representation on Community bodies. Already a changeover to the international determination of conditions is taking place in the harmonisation of vocational training policies and the international regulation of social security conditions for migrant workers. Such things as the harmonisation of pensions and sickness payments may follow on. This could mean the establishment of industrially-based schemes by national or international regulation here, and possibly some harmonisation with other EEC countries in the method of financing them. Table I gives details of differences in financing social security.

Table I: Social Security Financing, 1961

	% of National Income spent on Social Security	Social Security Costs as % of Labour Costs (based on earnings in manufacturing)		
		Worker	Employer	Total
Belgium . . .	17.8	9.2	21.1	30.3
France . . .	17.1	6.4	30.3	36.7
W. Germany . .	18.3	12.6	14.7	27.3
Italy . . .	16.8	5.1	39.8	44.9
Luxembourg . .	18.4	8.9	17.3	26.2
Netherlands . .	13.3	11.6	11.9	23.5
United Kingdom .	10.5	4.9	4.2	9.1

Collective Bargaining

It is unlikely that the EEC Commission will attempt to harmonise the majority of social security and industrial fringe benefits directly. Most of the programme of upward social harmonisation was

intentionally left in general terms in the EEC Treaty until the full and complex implications had been studied and analysed thoroughly. Other than equal pay the only two fringe benefits directly regulated by the Treaty and its attached Protocols are paid holidays and overtime rates.

The Article on paid holidays says simply "Member States shall endeavour to maintain the existing equivalence of paid holiday schemes". This is a declaration of intention with the onus of compliance put on Member States. It is widely believed that the somewhat obscure wording conceals an intention to harmonise holidays upwards, but what it does in the first instance is prevent any Member State harmonising downwards. The likely trend will be for the trade unions to attempt to secure more paid holidays in those countries which now fare least well. Italy, with her two or up to three weeks' annual paid holidays plus seventeen paid public holidays is the target for others. In Britain, at present, most manual workers receive two weeks' annual paid holiday plus six paid public holidays.

Overtime rates are dealt with not in the Treaty itself, but in a special protocol dealing with matters of concern to France. It amounts to a recognition that overtime rates in France were at that time (1957) a heavier burden than in other member countries, mainly because she had a normal forty-hour week while the others worked forty-eight or forty-five hours. This was said to put up France's labour costs to an extent which would make her uncompetitive when tariffs came down. She was therefore authorised to take safeguarding measures if the average overtime rates in other countries did not correspond to hers by the end of the first stage of the transitional period, but only if average increases in wage levels in those countries had not exceeded those of France in the meantime.

In fact, devaluation of the franc meant that France no longer felt the need to invoke the protocol when the time came, so the provision has been put in limbo. What it really amounted to was an obligation on the part of other Member States to increase their wages to a greater extent than France in the period up to 1 January 1962, in order to offset France's supposed higher labour cost. The alternative would have been for other Member States to adopt the French system of overtime payments, and this would have brought in the forty-hour week. It was never likely that this would be allowed to occur by regulation—it will have to come as a result of collective bargaining, as it already is doing in W. Germany.

This gives added encouragement for the trade unions of other

Member States to achieve the forty-hour week by collective bargaining under the general umbrella of Community approval for upward social harmonisation, just as with the case of paid holidays. The new climate that the harmonisation principle is creating for the collective bargainers could be more important to Britain than the possibilities of improvement by regulation. Public approval of improvements should strengthen their hand considerably because of the possibility that if the employers refuse to concede them, the ultimate power of regulation upwards may well be used by Government or by the Commission. In the last instance, employers are likely to accept the view that improvements to which they are party are preferable to regulated improvements, and therefore to reach agreement with the unions.

The corollary of this appears to be that the new concentration on fringe benefits might mean less emphasis on wage claims and a stiffening resistance by British employers to granting them. Their labour costs would be rising and British wages are comparatively high already (See Table II). Whether this is a valid forecast of the position will depend on the extent to which productivity rises. If joining the EEC stimulates investment in new and more efficient machinery and encourages other aids to higher productivity, then there would be no justification for a check to wages, especially if they are rising rapidly in other member countries as has been happening in recent years. It is frequently the countries with high labour costs which are the most competitive because high labour costs stimulate industrial efficiency. It is significant that W. Germany, which has had the highest labour costs in the EEC for some time (Table II) is probably also the most competitive and is certainly the country whose wages have been rising fastest in the last two years.

Table II: Wages and Labour Costs, 1960*

	<i>Average hourly wages in manufacturing industry</i>	<i>Average hourly labour cost in manufacturing industry</i>
Belgium	4s	5s 3d
France	3s 6d	5s 3d
W. Germany . . .	4s 6d	6s 3d
Italy	2s 9d	4s 6d
Netherlands . . .	3s 6d	4s 6d
United Kingdom . .	5s	5s 9d

*Latest figures available. Since 1960, wages and social security costs have been rising faster in every EEC country than in Britain. It is now likely that average *wages* in Germany exceed those in UK and that average *labour costs* in Belgium and France are about equal to those in UK.

In view of the fact that there are likely to be rises in food prices in Britain, and heavier social charges on the employee as well as the employer, the pressure for wage increases is not likely to subside. If industry does well and profits flourish, the pressure will be even greater.

Thus, while a static analysis indicates a period of more slowly rising wages, a dynamic analysis which assumes no serious setback to current trends indicates that wages are not likely to rise at a lesser rate than in recent years, and may rise faster. If productivity, prices and profits all rise, as seems likely, this will give the unions a very strong bargaining position.

Employment and Training Policies

There are two basic principles underlying the EEC's operations which affect employment and training policies. One of these has already been mentioned—that all distortions to competition be eliminated. The other is that the benefits of the Common Market must be shared along the broadest possible front so that those who are in socially or geographically underprivileged positions advance with the rest. If possible, the gap between them and the more privileged communities will be narrowed.

Translated into practical policies via the Rome Treaty, this has meant that, as far as competition is concerned, all factors of production, including labour, must be freed so that distortions are avoided. Hence the free movement of labour provision contained in Articles 48 and 49. This is a policy for overcoming short-term anomalies such as co-existent labour scarcities and surpluses in different countries. It is of interest that the continental trade unions have almost unanimously welcomed this because it will eventually allow all workers to seek the best they can obtain in the Community without restriction.

As far as the principle of a general development of standards is concerned, the EEC is pursuing a policy of regional development both by use of the European Investment Bank and by encouraging member Governments to operate their own schemes. This is the longer-term policy which it is hoped will ultimately take work to the people and ensure balanced development, thus checking the flow of permanent migrants.

In order that both short and long-term policies could be effective, it was necessary to cushion workers against social disruption which might arise through keener competition and the removal of trade restrictions. If labour surpluses and labour shortages were to be matched up, it was also necessary that the people who were unemployed should have

whatever training was necessary to enable them to accept the jobs available.

Disruption is being avoided, firstly, by the introduction of free labour movement gradually, with domestic priority operating for vacancies for the first three weeks. There are prohibitions against employers offering inferior wages or conditions to workers from other Community countries and regulations to ensure that nobody loses social security benefits or qualifying time by working in different Community countries.

Just as important as any of these is the establishment of the Social Fund. It is a device to encourage Governments to set up their own schemes to arrange training and/or resettlement for unemployed workers and to pay wages to those temporarily unemployed. The Fund can then compensate Governments for 50 per cent of their expenditure on these approved projects. As the Social Fund is financed by member Governments in predetermined proportions laid down in the Treaty, there is every incentive for them to set up such schemes and apply for reimbursement to recover some of their enforced outlay.

There are three types of expenditure for which the Fund can compensate Governments:

- (a) On grants for occupational retraining for unemployed workers.
- (b) On resettlement grants covering travelling, removal, out-of-pocket and family expenses incurred by workers moving home in order to find suitable employment, either across or within national boundaries.
- (c) On grants to cover the maintenance of 90 per cent of previous gross wages of workers temporarily unemployed or underpaid because of the (approved) conversion of their undertaking to new forms of production.

The main effects of the combination of free mobility provisions, regional development and the existence of the Social Fund will be to enforce a greater flexibility on employment and training policies in Britain. The emphasis will swing away from attempts to obtain guaranteed security in particular jobs or industries. Flexibility in labour distribution will be the new theme, with changeover effects being indirectly cushioned for the workers concerned by the Social Fund. "Labour hoarding" by employers is likely to become less prevalent because of its high cost, but severance payments for workers are likely to be increasingly demanded by the unions as the first line

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of defence for workers' security. These trends should allow industry to adapt itself more quickly to changing markets.

Unemployment in Britain is normally a regional and not a national problem, as it is in each EEC country where it occurs. Italy, for instance, has heavy unemployment in the South and labour scarcities in the North, just as Britain usually has unemployment in Scotland and Merseyside, but labour shortages in the Midlands and South-east. Community schemes are likely to encourage greater extension of labour mobility within national boundaries than across them. It is unlikely that emigration either to or from Britain will increase at a fast rate if we join EEC.

Table III: Unemployment and Union Strength

	% unemployed (mid 1962)	Trade unionists as a % of non-agricultural working population
Belgium	1.7	48.0
France	0.9	20.0
W. Germany	0.4	34.0
Italy	5.7	49.0
Netherlands	0.6	33.0
United Kingdom	1.8	42.0

A subsidiary but important aspect will be a new approach to training problems. In Britain, five-year apprenticeships are traditional and there are a few provisions for anybody to train for a skilled job after the age of twenty-one. Under occupational retraining schemes connected with the Social Fund, however, it will almost certainly be necessary to train people for skilled jobs after this age. In the Treaty's Chapter on Social Policy, Article 118 urges close collaboration between Member States on social policy including, *inter alia*, employment, and occupational and continuation training. Article 128 makes provisions for the implementation of a common policy of occupational training. The upshot of these for Britain is likely to be a move closer to the Continental position, where apprenticeships are shorter and frequently take in several skills rather than our one. The change is unlikely to upset industry or the unions very much, as the latter have been considering, fairly favourably, the possibility of changes in these directions in recent years.

British and Community Trade Unionism

The trade unions in the six EEC countries, apart from continuing their usual operations at local and national levels, also play a part at Community level. They do this in two main ways—first through

co-ordination of their own activities at international level, especially through liaison bureaux in Brussels which present the Community with a united viewpoint, and secondly through their representation on Community institutions.

Only the West German trade union movement, however, is broadly united in a single national centre as are the unions in Britain, in the TUC. France and Italy each have three major national centres, the largest in each case being communist, the second largest Catholic and the smallest social democrat. The Netherlands has, in order of size, a social democrat, a Catholic and a Protestant centre, and Belgium and Luxembourg each have a social democrat centre and a smaller Catholic centre.

The communist centres are affiliated to the World Federation of Trade Unions and maintain no liaison bureau in Brussels and have no representation on Community institutions. (The French centre follows the international WFTU line and is solidly against the Common Market; but the Italian centre, which includes some Nenni socialists, supports the economic aspects of the Common Market whilst disliking certain political implications). The social democrat unions, like the TUC, are affiliated to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions; they have the majority of trade union strength in the Six, they maintain a liaison bureau in Brussels and have representation on Community institutions. Catholic and Protestant centres are affiliated to the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions, with the exception of Italy's Catholic centre which affiliates to the ICFTU. They have their own liaison bureau in Brussels and representation on Community institutions. The ICFTU-affiliated and Christian-affiliated unions work unofficially but fairly closely together at this Community level, and their views and approach on EEC problems are fairly similar. They all strongly back the EEC, in principle, and are keen advocates of fuller and faster integration.

If Britain joined, the TUC would take its part in the work of the liaison bureau of the ICFTU unions and would have seats allocated on the trade union Executive Committee which has close supervision over it and in the Assembly which has ultimate control. All these institutions are set up and operated entirely by the joint unions themselves. The TUC, or its affiliated unions, would also have representation on the various joint trade union committees working in specific industrial fields.

In addition, British trade unionists would be nominated to official Community institutions. The most important of these is the Economic and Social Committee on which trade unionists have one-third of the

seats. Another third are occupied by employers and the final third by representatives of other sectional interests. The Committee's job is to advise the EEC Commission and the Council of Ministers on certain policies and administrative questions, as required, and as laid down in the Treaty. Trade unionists are also seated on the Committee which administers the Social Fund and on various consultative committees dealing mainly with specific social questions.

Although the trade unions will still find that the national level will be the most important one on which to concentrate their powers and influence, there will certainly be some fields in which hard work at the international level will pay off, particularly as regards the formulation of regulations and directives under the Treaty for implementing various economic and social provisions and concerning the introduction of the upward harmonisation programme. The opportunities for influencing the Council of Ministers, and more particularly the Commission and the European Parliament are sometimes substantial.

Eventually, international collective bargaining should come about, with the organisation of joint unions in Brussels negotiating with international organisations of employers on a Community-wide basis. When it does, it is likely to concern fringe benefits rather than wages, but it is not likely to be for a number of years, yet. In the meantime the British unions would have to get used to working in the closest consultation with the unions in Community countries and reserving action in some cases until agreement had been reached after confrontation of policies, particularly on questions affecting general Community policy.

Finally, entry into the European Coal and Steel Community and Euratom at the same time as the Common Market would have marginally different effects on the workers in the industries concerned and the social provisions applicable to them. The differences are mainly technical, however. There are certain special provisions, also, under the EEC Treaty concerning the agricultural and transport sectors which it is not possible to detail in an article of this length.

Labour legislation, the law as to trade unions and collective bargaining and the provisions concerning industrial accidents, diseases and hygiene are mentioned in Article 118 of the Treaty as meriting the close collaboration of Member States, in case there should be problems over national differences. Progress to date on this collaboration is not sufficiently decisive to draw any hard conclusions about the implications for Britain, although it is fair to say that the unions here will need to establish close surveillance to ensure that the framework within which they operate and their members are employed is not impaired.

THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES

D. G. VALENTINE

THE United Kingdom has applied for membership of all three of the European Communities. Its application in each case has been submitted to the Council of Ministers of the Community concerned and on paper it is easiest for this country to join the Coal and Steel Community because by Article 98 of that Treaty the Council of Ministers is unanimously to decide the terms of such membership and on a specified day that membership becomes effective. In the case of the Common Market and Euratom Communities, however, the conditions of admission of the United Kingdom are to be the subject of agreement between the present Member States of those Communities and this country, and it is then provided that "such agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements". This means that any agreement with this country which is reached in Brussels will have to be ratified by the Governments of the seven countries concerned.

The Adaptation of English Law

The application to join the European Communities was made by this country without any prior reference to Parliament because the negotiating and signing of Treaties falls within the royal prerogative. However, the signing and even the subsequent ratification of the Treaties will have effect solely in international law and will have no effect upon English internal law or legislation. It will therefore be necessary, as the Prime Minister has already pointed out, to introduce legislation into Parliament making the provisions of the three Community Treaties part of English law, and at the present moment a mammoth Bill is in process of being drafted to achieve just this. However, there are several legal complications in incorporating these Treaties which should be considered.

First, and perhaps the most important, is the fact that, at the moment, there is no official English text of the three Treaties and it has already been decided that the versions recently produced by the Stationery Office are to be further revised. Secondly, when fairly

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recently the Warsaw Convention on air transport was incorporated into English law by the Carriage by Air Act of 1960, the relevant Convention was annexed to that Act in a schedule in both English and French, and by that Act the French version was declared to be authoritative in the event of any divergence between the two texts. In the case of the Community Treaties, however, such a method of proceeding will be impossible because within the Community there are four versions of the Treaties, in French, German, Dutch and Italian, and each version is declared to be authoritative and each varies from the others—even, in some cases, to the extent of whole phrases being in one version and not in others. Thirdly, (and this back-benchers may very much object to), in practice the Bill presented to Parliament to achieve this incorporation will have to be passed *en bloc*, if it is passed at all, because any amendment would, of necessity, mean that this country had failed to incorporate some part of its Treaty obligations and would thus have made probable a subsequent breach of one of the Treaties.

Fourthly, many of the provisions of the Treaties are entirely specific, such as, for example, the already famous Article 85 of the Common Market Treaty, which sets out that certain specified practices are prohibited as being incompatible with the Common Market. Other provisions, however, are expressions of intention, such as, for example, that "the Assembly shall draw up proposals for elections by direct universal suffrage". Although it might seem that these latter Articles could be omitted from the British incorporating statute, this would in practice be dangerous because the Communities Court has frequently ruled that each Treaty is to be read as a whole, and the omission of any particular provision from the incorporating statute might therefore affect the meaning subsequently to be given by a British court to the provisions which were retained.

A fifth difficulty, and one which has never presented itself to the British Parliament before, is that under the three Treaties executive bodies, either the High Authority in Luxembourg or the two Commissions in Brussels, will have power to pass what are variously called "decisions" or "regulations", and it is provided that these "shall be binding in every respect and directly applicable in each member State". On the Continent, this provision produces no difficulty because the three Community Treaties and the regulations made under them are immediately part of the municipal law of the six Member States, which is in direct contradiction to the position in this country. Over here, therefore, in order to avoid the necessity, every time they are passed, of incorporating regulations and decisions into British

statutes so that they are enforceable in this country, Parliament will have to cede to the Commissions and to the High Authority some of its present right to legislate. This ceding may be regarded either as the giving up of some part of sovereignty, or more accurately, as Parliament delegating to other bodies a certain right to legislate on specific topics.

However, these decisions and regulations will have to be given by Parliament the legal ability to overrule any legislative enactments or rules of the Common Law in this country with which they are in conflict. But it is a fundamental doctrine in English law that the provisions of a statute are by implication repealed by the provisions of any subsequent statute which is in conflict with them. It will thus be legally possible, after ceding this legislative competence to the High Authority and the Commissions for Parliament to repeal, even inadvertently, any of these regulations or decisions merely by passing a statute which is at variance with them. Because so to repeal regulations and decisions would be to commit a breach of the Treaty, it is suggested that it will probably be necessary for an Interpretation Act to be passed, directing the courts of this country not to hold that a regulation or decision has been repealed except by the clearest possible wording to that effect.

Sixthly, apart from the difficulty of incorporating the Treaties and the machinery set up by the Treaties, all the decisions and regulations of which have already been passed by the High Authority and the Commissions must be incorporated into English law. It will be remembered that it was by regulations that the Common Market Commission laid down virtually the whole of that Community's policy on agriculture, with its target prices, its intervention prices and its Community subsidy. Further, the High Authority has laid down detailed rules for the publication of price lists by steel enterprises, and other regulations of the Community deal, for example, in such detailed matters as the grading of cauliflowers and with what colouring matter may be added to food stuffs, including chewing-gum. At the present time, the *Journal Officiel* of the Community is being closely read by the Government departments, and the Lord Chancellor's department will then be given a list of all the matters which are to be added to the omnibus Bill eventually to be presented to Parliament.

Supranational Control over British Companies

In considering the legal effect of joining the Communities, it is most important to realise the extent of the control over British industry which will be exercised by the High Authority in respect of matters

relating to coal and steel, and by the Commission in Brussels in respect of virtually all other trading concerns.

As has been mentioned, the High Authority has specified the form in which all price lists of steel companies are to be published before they are adopted, and the High Authority has, and will again, fine any firm for not complying with these provisions. Further, if the High Authority finds that any private or public company (and this expression includes the nationalised corporations) is in an economically dominant position which protects it from effective competition, it can address to such a company recommendations requiring it not to use its position for purposes contrary to the Treaty, and, if it continues to do so, the High Authority, apart from fining the company, can in effect take over the running and management of it by fixing the prices and conditions of sale to be applied, and by drawing up programmes of manufacture and/of delivery which must be fulfilled. Further, in the case of the High Authority, that Authority is empowered to levy a tax of up to 1 per cent on the turnover of coal and steel companies, in order to provide the Authority with its necessary funds; at the present time this tax is running at 0.35 per cent of such turnover.

The Commission of the Common Market has control over all companies and individuals who are engaged in trade, a term which includes agriculture and fisheries. Further, under the Treaty, all agreements between companies and all concerted practices which are liable to affect trade between Member States or are prohibited, are null and void, and companies which operate such agreements or practices are liable to be fined. The details of this provision were left to the Commission to work out, and by means of a regulation, the Commission has required that all such agreements and concerted practices must be registered with the Commission by the 1 November 1962, or, in some cases, of 1 February 1963. The Commission also has power over one or more undertakings which possess a dominant position within the Common Market, and which use that position for what is called "improper exploitation", which is defined *inter alia* as the imposition of unfair purchase or selling prices, other unfair trading conditions, or unequal conditions to parties undertaking equivalent engagements in commercial transactions. These provisions, and the regulations made under them, will bind all British companies as soon as Britain becomes a member of the Community, but, in addition, they already do bind British companies even before Britain's entry, if, for example, these companies have a subsidiary in one of the Member States, or possess an agent who is in some way restricted in his power of selling, either because he is acting under a sole agency

agreement or because he has some territorial limitation upon the area in which he can sell. Such agreements, then, have to be registered and in default of registration they may be declared null and void.

The Court of Justice of the Communities

At the summit of the constitutional hierarchy set up by the Community Treaties stands the Court of Justice in Luxembourg. This Court is composed of seven Judges, elected by the member States. The present President of the Court is Judge A. M. Donner, who previously was a Professor of Constitutional Law at Amsterdam University. The Court hears actions brought by the Commission against States which have violated the Treaty, and already two actions have been brought successfully against the Italian Government because that Government was applying the wrong quotas or customs duty to pork and to radio valves. The Court may also hear cases brought against States by the High Authority, and that Authority has already successfully brought an action against the German Government because German railways were subsidising the freight charges to certain German steel companies.

A second power of the Court is to hear cases which challenge the legality of regulations and decisions passed by the Commission or the High Authority. Under this head of its jurisdiction, the Court has been concerned with the High Authority's closing of unprofitable coal mines in Belgium, with the breaking up, or rather the attempts to break up, the Ruhr coal monopoly, and with many cases concerning the system of subsidising certain scrap metal prices throughout Europe. In such actions the plaintiffs may be the State concerned, the enterprise or association of enterprises affected, or, where applicable, the individual himself, if, for example, an unincorporated body, such as the trade unions, becomes affected.

The grounds of appeal against a particular regulation or decision are the classic ones in French administrative law, namely that the Commission or the High Authority possesses no legal competence to pass the regulation or decision in question, or that in passing such regulation or decision there had been a violation of a substantial procedural requirement. This has been interpreted by the Court to mean, for example, a failure to consult with the Council of Ministers or with the Parliamentary Assembly, and so forth. It has also been held by the Court that if a regulation or a decision is passed which is not adequately supported by reasons, so that it can subsequently be controlled by the Court, that is a violation of a substantial procedural requirement. A further ground of appeal is a violation of the Treaty

or of any rule of law, the rule of law here referred to being a general rule of law and not necessarily a rule set out in the Treaty, and the final ground of appeal being that there has been an abuse or misuse of power. The French term for this is a *détournement de pouvoir*, and this is usually defined as existing when a body, although empowered to do a particular act, does that very act but does it for an improper reason. It has sometimes been thought that this concept does not exist in English law. However, the illegality of an administrative body using its discretionary powers for objects which are not authorised has long been recognised by the English Courts. Indeed, the concept of *détournement de pouvoir* arose very recently in its pure form in the Soblen case, when in effect the Home Secretary, although he clearly possessed power to deport an alien, was alleged to have been attempting, in the exercise of this power, to deport Soblen for an improper purpose, namely that of effecting his extradition to the United States. Although the Court of Appeal in this country did not in any way refer to *détournement de pouvoir*, it is suggested that the concept, although phrased in different terms, exists, and is not as alien to this country as some people may suggest.

It may also be noted that, with the introduction into this country under the Treaty of these four grounds of appeal, the old myth will come to die that English liberty has been based largely upon the fact that in this country we, unlike the French, do not possess a *droit administratif*. Indeed the myth has often been exploded and perhaps most recently in the Crichton Down case, when it was clearly realised that the French, under their *droit administratif*, would have provided a legal remedy which this country was unable to do.

The Communities' Court of Justice and English Courts

Under the Coal and Steel Community Treaty it is provided that "the Court shall have sole jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings upon the validity of resolutions of the High Authority, where such validity is challenged in an action brought before a national Court". This provision will mean that English Courts will, by statute, have to be required to apply for such rulings, and further, English Courts will have to be bound by them when they are obtained.

Under the Common Market and Euratom Treaties, any English Court may apply to the Communities' Court if, in a dispute before it, a question arises concerning the interpretation of one of those Treaties, and it is further provided that the final Court of Appeal, which in this country is in general the House of Lords, must apply to the

Communities' Court if it is concerned with any case which brings into issue the interpretation of the Treaty.

This will mean, for example, that if a contract between two companies in this country is in any way brought into issue, the High Court or a County Court may be faced with the argument that the terms of that contract are void under Article 85 of the Common Market Treaties as being "liable to affect trade between the member States". The High Court *may*, but need not, appeal to Luxembourg for a ruling on this point. If (which is most unlikely) the case ever reaches the final court of appeal which in this country is the House of Lords, that final Court must obtain a ruling on this preliminary point from the Communities' Court and will be bound by that ruling. The cost of this reference will, it appears, be borne by the party which finally loses the main action.

Future Legal Developments

Under Article 100 of the Common Market Treaty, provision is made for the "approximation" of legislative and administrative provisions of Member States, where these directly affect the establishment or operation of the Common Market. The object of this provision is fairly clear. If competition is to be upon a Community basis and is to be fair, then as far as possible all unequal legislative restrictions must be removed. Thus, if the procedures for obtaining a patent are far stricter in one country than in another, persons in the stricter country are at a disadvantage commercially. Again, if creditors' rights against a liquidated company are more favourable in one State than in another, there may well be some reluctance to trade with companies in the less advantageous State. Thus, internal laws on patents and the formation and liquidation of companies, are intended to be brought into line, as are also those on advertising, restraint of trade, social insurance provisions for employees, and the movement of capital, to name only a few. Many professional bodies, such as the British Medical Association and the Law Society, will have to reconsider the qualifications necessary for practising, and in all probability, all the Member States will have to agree upon lists of qualifications which will be recognised for practising within the Community. These bodies must also ensure that they do not impose discriminations upon other Member States. The British Government will also have to look carefully at Article 69 of the Coal and Steel Community Treaty by which "Member States undertake to remove any restriction, based on nationality, on the employment in the coal and steel industries of workers who are nationals of one of the Member States, and have

recognised qualifications for positions in such industries". An acute difficulty will arise, if, for example, a miners' union were to exclude from membership subjects of other Member States, for this might constitute a breach of Article 69 for which the British Government would be liable, but which, without directly interfering in trade union affairs, it would be unable to prevent. Indeed, it may very well be difficult to determine whether a particular requirement for union membership in a closed shop industry is a discrimination or not, and the Courts one day may have to consider whether, for example, a requirement of understanding the English language, a requirement to be determined by the unions themselves, does in a specific case constitute such a discrimination for which the British Government is liable.

The matters referred to above, however, are matters mainly for the future; the immediate legal problems for this country are very largely constitutional, and joining the Community necessitates that the British legal profession shall absorb Continental concepts and Continental legal procedures, where a far greater emphasis is placed upon written pleadings, and far less upon cross-examination. The legal profession must also become acquainted, for their study of the regulations and decisions, with the Continental method of drafting legislation, which is far more general in its terminology than are English statutes. Continental legislation leaves much to be filled in later by interpretation, and not by reference to the enactment itself, but by reference to the enactment's intention, which is to be deduced not only from *travaux préparatoires*, but also from a study, more familiar to an American than an English lawyer, of its social and economic consequences. If the British profession can adapt itself, as one believes it assuredly can, then it is suggested that from this marriage with the Continent only good and renewed vitality of legal thinking can result.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE EDEN MEMOIRS. FACING THE DICTATORS. By THE RIGHT HON. THE EARL OF AVON, K.G., P.C., M.C. [Cassell. 659 pp. 42s.]

THE author of these memoirs must be among the most tragic of figures in recent British history. He aimed at and achieved the highest place in British politics. His meteoric rise, from Parliamentary Private Secretary to Foreign Secretary in ten years, ended in a major break with the dominant group in his party, and resignation in 1938. His second term in office ended with the catastrophic defeat of his party in 1945. His third term, in which after twenty years he at last achieved his ultimate goal, ended in near disaster for his country and overwhelming personal catastrophe for himself. He has already given the world his account of his last years in office. Here is the account of his first term.

Both books must be seen, and it is clear that the author intended them to be seen, as an attempt to reverse the verdict of history. He has raided the archives of state on a scale small, it is true, by comparison with the major rape of state secrets practised by his predecessors, Churchill and Lloyd George, both of whom could excuse their action by their role as victorious leaders in war, but massive and extraordinary by comparison with the reticence practised by most other peace-time Premiers and Foreign Secretaries. His research assistants have had a free run at the papers of the Foreign Office. This volume is packed with extracts from Foreign Office documents whose publication in the normal run of things would lie years in the future, and there are a far from inconsiderable number of quotations from Cabinet papers and memoranda. An historian cannot but welcome this in the general interests of historical research. But the degree to which Lord Avon has been enabled to evade the provisions and purpose of the Fifty-Year Rule must cast discredit on its operations; and one cannot but sympathise with the unfortunate Civil Servants whose brief is to supervise those operations, at the false position in which they are placed by this.

Comparison has been made with the Churchill War Memoirs. It is clear too, that this comparison is intended. Lord Avon's limping prose is charged with Churchillian echoes; even the device of breaking the narrative into chunks with a line of five asterisks is borrowed wholesale from the Churchillian model. The Eden memoirs are also as one-sided in their own way as were Churchill's; they are memoirs of a very full kind masquerading as history. The principal difference between the two is that between their authors. Churchill saw his subject against the background of the majestic sweeping tides of history, a continuously unfolding epic in which both his country and he himself could play a major role, providing only they would remain true to their native virtue. Eden's memoirs reveal a smaller, more limited vision, incapable either of the agony of soul or the magnanimity of his model. They reveal a streak of paltry vindictiveness towards his predecessors, Sir Samuel Hoare and Sir John Simon, which is still more noticeable in the tone employed to deal with such lesser figures as Sir Horace

Wilson, Sir Joseph Ball and Sir Warren Fisher, Civil Servants who opposed his policy towards Italy.

However, it must be said that the broad theme of the volume is handed capably and intelligently. The scheme of the chapters is not an easy one to follow. But it is worth persisting with. Lord Avon lacked Churchill's sense of historical doom. He never doubted the inherent strength in the British position. Moreover he understood the tactics of what is now called "negotiation from strength", and could on occasion employ them admirably. Indeed his pressure on Italy in 1937 was so effective, and his sureness of touch in dealing with the constant danger that the Spanish Civil War would spread into a Mediterranean conflagration of the kind on which so many of Hitler's schemes of aggression were predicated is so admirable, that it is clear that only a personal vendetta with Mussolini prevented his achieving the settlement of Anglo-Italian problems which his gifted juniors secured after his resignation. Where Avon differed from his colleagues was precisely in the degree to which Britain could use the threat of force against the aggressors; and his difference rose, it is clear, from a failure to understand the paralysing sense of British weakness in the face of the three aggressor states which Churchill shared with those whose disagreement with Avon forced his resignation. It is perfectly possible that towards both Italy and Japan the policy which Avon wished to follow, one of "brinkmanship" in contemporary parlance, could have succeeded; though over every question of this kind the catastrophic miscalculation of Suez must hang like a brooding question-mark.

Indeed the whole of this volume cannot but be read in the light of its author's later career. It is clear, from the numerous asides, that the author intended it to be. Eden achieved his final stature because of the reputation he earned during the years 1935-1938 within the National Government as the principal opponent of "appeasement", and from his resignation in February 1938. Churchill above all romanticised him. One of the finest passages in his War Memoirs describes the night of despair which he spent on learning of Eden's resignation. His resignation is taken to have made him the obvious heir to Churchill's leadership in the Conservative party, once that party had turned its back on Chamberlain's leadership. But it is not easy to see how he could have achieved this without Churchill. He was singularly ineffective in opposition. It was Leo Amery, not he, who tore down Chamberlain's government. It was Churchill and Duff Cooper whose opposition to Munich won such international acclaim as to put them at the top of Hitler's gallery of personal enemies. One is left to wonder how far he could have gone without Churchill's subsequent backing, and how right Churchill was in his assessment of Eden.

Was Eden in fact the foe of "appeasement" he would have history believe him to be? On Italy, the record is clearest—though it is worth pointing out that the policy of "appeasing" Italy was not the failure it is sometimes alleged to be. Italy was the lesser of the two enemies; yet her depredations in the Mediterranean, disgraceful as they were, were easily contained in 1939-1940. Only the fall of France brought Mussolini into the war on Hitler's side; and nothing could have prevented that. On Japan, the record is less clear. Eden does not mention at all the efforts made in 1936-1937, before the outbreak of the renewed Sino-Japanese conflict

in July, to reach a *modus vivendi* with Japan, although he took part in some of the crucial conversations. Instead, he dwells with force on his proposals in November and December 1937 for a joint Anglo-American naval demonstration in force in Chinese waters. According to his account, he was prepared to send the major part of the British battle-fleet to take part in this. He does not indicate if the Admiralty were consulted on this. There is good reason to believe that the First Sea Lord, Lord Chatfield, was bitterly opposed. The State Department were profoundly sceptical, seeing in such a proposal an attempt to use American naval strength for Britain's ends. They could not believe that Britain would denude her Home and Mediterranean fleets on such a scale. When Admiral Leahy, Chatfield's opposite number in America, who was strongly in favour of such a scheme, sought out the British Ambassador and the British Naval Attaché, for help with which to overcome that scepticism, he found them entirely without information as to how Eden's scheme was to be realised. The French, on whose help in the Mediterranean Eden was relying to counter-balance Italy, directly advised the Americans against hoping for major British participation in resisting Japan in the Far East.

The biggest question-mark, however, hangs over his attitude to Germany. Eden is extremely candid about the role he played at the time of the Rhineland crisis—it is not an easy one to defend, and he does not either defend or apologise for it. He dwells on the episode of the dossier of documents on the Hitlerite danger, which he prepared for the Cabinet, and which fell into Italian hands, presumably stolen from the safe of the British Embassy in Rome, which their agents raided almost nightly. But he passes over the prolonged and repetitious negotiations for a new western security pact which were to last well into 1937, and which at the time he prosecuted with vigour, though what genuine basis for hope of their success anyone could have had is difficult to see. He mentions the Commonwealth Conference of 1937, but omits the clear and unequivocal vote in favour of further appeasement of Germany there produced. He omits entirely the curious episode of the invitation to Baron von Neurath to visit London which immediately followed that conference, and which Neurath cancelled on a pretext connected with the Spanish Civil War. He is scathing about Halifax's venture into personal diplomacy in his mission to Germany in November, 1937, and admits his mistake in agreeing to it. But his last note on his conversations with the French Ministers that same month, at which the subject of Czechoslovakia came up, does not suggest that, had he stayed in the Government, he would have staunchly opposed the line followed by his successor toward that country in the summer months of 1938.

Most interest will, however, probably focus on his policy towards America, especially over the so-called Roosevelt message of January 1938, and on his resignation. On the latter, his account confirms very closely what was already known from the long extracts from Neville Chamberlain's diary printed by his biographers. Occasion is taken for a good many such remarks at the expense of Simon, Hoare and Sir Kingsley Wood, another of the villains of his story. He resigned from a mixture of personal detestation and distrust of Italy, a genuine difference of judgment as to the prospects of agreement with Italy (which astuter and less passionate minds than his own were enabled to evade in the subsequent Anglo-Italian agreement, which

withheld British action until all the Italian side of the bargain was fulfilled), and resentment of Chamberlain's intervention and continuing refusal to take his advice. He was right to resign—but he would have been equally right to resign much earlier.

His resignation is inextricably entangled, however, with the message sent by Roosevelt in January 1938, which Chamberlain rejected while Eden was absent on holiday. In Eden's and Churchill's view, this message, which proposed an international conference to agree on the "essential principles to be observed in the conduct of international relations", should have been taken up with the utmost enthusiasm by the British government, as a means of involving America again in world politics. In Chamberlain's view, it was a typical piece of transatlantic unrealism which would afford both Germany and Italy a chance of evading the steady British pressure to bring each to a separate conference table. Eden cites Sumner Welles's memoirs in support of his view, ignoring the evidence produced by the American semi-official historians Langer and Gleason, which casts a good deal of doubt on Welles's story. (As the originator of the idea advanced by Roosevelt, Welles is not altogether a balanced witness). There are always bound to be two views of this episode, but the balance of the evidence is against Eden's and Churchill's estimates, and in favour of those who condemned the idea as unrealistic and inopportune.

In this Eden was misled by the British Ambassador in America, Sir Ronald Lindsay, one of the many disastrous diplomatic appointments of that disastrous decade, a bitter, indiscreet and disappointed man, whose American wife came from the hard-core Republican opposition to the New Deal. He reported that rejection of this scheme would undo all British efforts to achieve closer Anglo-American co-operation, efforts which had only that month resulted in informal Anglo-American staff talks on action in the event of war in the Far East. In this he was profoundly wrong, as events were to show. And one is left wondering at Eden's judgment of men, never his best side. Not that he appointed Lindsay, who had been in Washington since 1930. But he passed over Sir Percy Loraine for Berlin, in favour of Neville Henderson. He tolerated Perth at Rome. He put Vansittart in a post which was meaningless, as he of all people should have known. The only Chief Diplomatic Adviser a British government can tolerate is His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. His only successful appointment was to promote Sir Alexander Cadogan as Vansittart's successor, a stroke which brought to the fore the ablest, most brilliant, most successful and least known of all who filled that post in this century.

The picture that emerges from these pages is not that of a great Foreign Secretary to compare with Grey, Curzon, Austen Chamberlain or Bevin. Eden's judgment was not always very sound. He wrote copious, well-balanced minutes, and he was not averse to the use or threat of force. But despite his pressure for acceleration of the armament process, one does not sense in him any real appreciation of British weakness, that sense of living in an agonising and humiliating anticipation of defeat of which so balanced a man as Lord Ismay has spoken as haunting him day and night throughout these years. He was fertile and inventive in device, negotiating move, block and balance, as witness his success over the long and agonising process

of limiting the Spanish Civil War. He was, in fact, essentially a diplomatist—and one is left to regret for his own sake that he did not enter the diplomatic service rather than politics, as he first contemplated. He did not do Britain bad service in the 1930s; but his rise stood in the way of others, whose judgment was better than his own. And he might have been spared the ultimate breakdown and humiliation of Suez. No worse disaster has befallen a British premier in the field of foreign affairs since Pitt turned his face to the wall.

D. C. WATT.

WORLD ORDER AND NEW STATES. By PETER CALVOCORESSI. With a Foreword by Donald Tyerman. [Chatto and Windus, for the Institute for Strategic Studies. ix and 113 pp. 12s. 6d.]

THE contraction of European empires in Asia and Africa has given rise to the familiar phenomenon in international politics of a power vacuum. This vacuum may be regarded as "the cockpit of the great powers", the scene of a struggle between the Western powers and the Soviet Union for allegiance in the cold war. But it may also be seen as an area in which the great powers have common interests, which they should unite to uphold. It is this latter aspect of the relations of the great powers to the new states that Mr. Calvocoressi has chosen to explore. Disorders within or between the states of the uncommitted world may, if they are allowed to spread, occasion that general war which the great powers are ready to risk and threaten but in the last resort anxious to avoid. There is therefore, he believes, a problem of "keeping the peace" in this area, to which it is a general interest that solutions be found.

Solutions, Mr. Calvocoressi thinks, may be found at three levels. The disorders may be contained by the governments of the new states themselves, if they have sufficient resources. Or the great powers may intervene in order to contain them. Or intervention may be entrusted to the United Nations, or to regional associations such as the Organisation of American States or the Arab League, if there is a danger that the direct involvement of a great power will increase the risk of general war.

Mr. Calvocoressi writes with distinction, and makes recommendations as to how, at each of these three levels, the business of containing disorder can best be set about. We may single out for special mention his discussion of United Nations intervention, which is the most cogent analysis of this subject the present reviewer has seen. He rejects the idea of a permanent United Nations force as undesirable and impracticable at present: the circumstances in which military interventions by the organisation are likely to take place are so diverse and unpredictable that they must in each case be undertaken by national contingents recruited on an *ad hoc* basis. He holds, however, that the U.N. should have a small, permanent military staff, some military material and a team of communications specialists whose function it would be to present the actions of the U.N. to world opinion in the best possible light.

Two aspects of this book invite dissent. The first is that in focussing his attention upon those interests which the great powers appear to have

in common in the uncommitted world, Mr. Calvocoressi is inclined to blur the distinction between these and the other interests that cause them to treat it as a cockpit. Is there a common problem of "keeping the peace" within and among new states, which can be variously assailed by local governments, intervening great powers or the United Nations? Or is it not rather the position that each party wishes to maintain or establish a peace, but would prefer disorder to the acceptance of the adversary's peace? It is not always clear whether Mr. Calvocoressi is concerned with the West's peace, or with a peace, if such there may be, which reflects the will of the great powers in concert.

Thus Mr. Calvocoressi upholds the late Mr. Hammarskjöld's bid to have the United Nations Secretary-General and its Congo Force act independently of the common will of the great powers, and chides Mr. Khrushchev, whose Troika proposals were intended to frustrate this development, with being a "champion of a nineteenth century order of things" (pp. 82-3). It may be argued that the Western powers, from the point of view of their own political objectives in the cold war, have a strong interest in presenting themselves as the champions of progress in the field of international organisation, in the face of Soviet obstruction. But whether the expansion of the role of international institutions, under Western patronage and without Soviet consent, constitutes a contribution to world order, is another matter.

The other aspect of this book which deserves mention is its tone. Mr. Calvocoressi writes with an apparent conviction that the truth of his general view of international politics must really be quite obvious to any good man and true, and with a certain scolding disdain for the possibility of reasonably holding anything very different. Would that this were so.

HEDLEY BULL.

THE SOVIET UNION AT THE UNITED NATIONS. By ALEXANDER DALLIN. [Methuen. x and 246 pp. 30s.]

WESTERN Governments tend to regard the United Nations as a means for recruiting world support, while silently ignoring or publicly deploring the more inconvenient General Assembly resolutions. Meanwhile, the public behind them generally assumes that the organisation is, after all, the only real insurance against chaos and that some day, somehow, it will prove itself an "embryo" world government. For the Soviet Union, on the other hand, as Professor Dallin, of the Russian Institute at Columbia University, explains in this able book, the matter is more complicated. Believing that the United Nations, like any other political fact, must either serve or obstruct the ultimate victory of Right, she violently oscillates between praises and curses; Mr. Khrushchev calls for the personal attendance of the world's leaders at the Assembly as an oecumenical council, only to indulge in vulgar abuse when he attends himself.

The factors in these oscillations are identified by Professor Dallin as, first, the irreducible Soviet premise of conflict between two systems which may occasionally take on the form of peace but which never loses the character of struggle, with Communism as the final victor. This means that neither during Russia's brief membership of the League of Nations during

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the thirties nor during the United Nations regime could Soviet leaders regard international organs as half-way houses to permanent peace. It also meant that, after the admission of a host of ex-colonial states into the Organisation as from 1957, the Soviet Union was obliged to abandon Stalin's scarcely-veiled contempt for the Organisation, but could never conceive the new members as filling any other role than that of junior partners with the Communist bloc in the struggle with the West. It was when, during the Congo operation, the new states showed no inclination to act their part in the Soviet play and the General Assembly under Hammarskjöld began to follow courses neither of the giant Powers could wholly control, that Mr. Khrushchev embarked upon his "troika" plan for reorganising, or emasculating, the Secretariat. Professor Dallin has some interesting things to say about how the "troika" proposal represented an attempt to prove to the "dogmatists" in the Communist camp that Khrushchev's campaign to win over the new states at the United Nations would not result in the total loss of the Organisation as a means of winning the world struggle against the West.

The other major factor in Russia's United Nations policy, as Professor Dallin shows, has been her permanent minority position in the Organisation. This the grant of separate membership to Byelorussia and the Ukraine in 1945 served only to underline, and the shift in the Organisation's centre of gravity towards the Assembly these last ten years has accentuated it. More votes cannot be won by securing the admission of Communist states at present outside the Organisation since Communist China, East Germany and North Vietnam, if admitted, are most unlikely to fall into line in the *cortège habituel* of the existing Soviet bloc. Yet, as Russia's temporary absence from the Security Council at the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950 showed, to quit the Organisation is only to hand it over on a plate to the West. At United Nations meetings therefore, as was pointed out by one of Khrushchev's defenders at the Twenty-second Soviet Party Congress in October 1961, there is nothing but "hard work, work that demands constant concentration and resourcefulness and the ability to use all the forces of argument". The reward for this, more often than not, is defeat at the hands of General Assembly majorities determined to keep the Organisation as free as possible from Great Power dictation.

The question suggested by this book is what kind of United Nations developments will permit the Soviet Union to resolve these painful dilemmas in a manner consistent with the maintenance of at least a minimum of good relations with the West. Professor Dallin thinks that the Soviet Union cannot be expected to co-operate in efforts to convert the United Nations into a framework for a genuine world community. But neither is it likely that she will leave the Organisation, or desirable that she should. The fact is that the Organisation must continue to live in the margins of power politics, hopeful that the Powers will use it where possible to hammer out some terms of co-existence. For, as Professor Dallin writes, "in the short run"—and who can afford the luxury of thinking further?—"restraint from recourse to extremes, retreat from the logical to the political, from incompatibility to co-existence, from the inexorable to the possible, refraining from the *ultima ratio*, remain the essence of power politics".

If this book is any guide then, the West will put aside its dreams of

converting the United Nations into a world government, will think twice about organising majority votes to spite the Soviet Union and will continue patiently to argue that, short of piecemeal compromises achieved within the United Nations and elsewhere, there is no future even for the discussion of which of the two systems will survive.

F. S. NORTHEGE.

THE LAST REFUGE. By PETER TOWNSEND. [Routledge and Kegan Paul. 567 pp. 60s.]

THIS is a very good book, and a very sad one. As a model of how social research should be conceived and executed, it could hardly be surpassed. The subject with which it is concerned is of great social importance. Its findings are based on extensive and systematic first-hand investigation, and are presented in a form that is as readable as it is full of human interest; and its penetrating criticism leads up to a series of careful and constructive proposals for reform. Indeed almost the only criticism to be made of it is that, inevitably, it is very expensive; and that criticism, it is greatly to be hoped, will be met by the publication of a cheaper and perhaps abbreviated edition.

But sad indeed is the story which Mr. Townsend has to tell. He and his colleagues visited and interviewed inmates in 173 homes for the aged, covering institutions of all types, large and small, privately financed or Local Authority-owned. Naturally they found very marked differences between one part of the country and another, but the bad alas! seem generally to have outweighed the good. Most distressing of all is the persistent survival of the old workhouse building—still its old self even if its name has been changed from "Workhouse" to "Part III accommodation", and even if work is no longer done there. The large old halls, the unpromising hard backed chairs, the almost complete absence of personal possessions—all these depressing features still survive; and to make matters worse, miserably little progress has been made in replacing these monstrosities with smaller, civilised modern homes. Fifteen years have gone by since Aneurin Bevan proclaimed categorically that "the workhouse is to go", and the Ministry of Health took up the cry with the promise that its place would be taken by "small comfortable Homes", in which the old "master and inmate" relationship would be replaced by "one more nearly approaching that of an hotel manager and his guests". Yet in the following twelve years the number of beds in former workhouses has been reduced only from something between 39,000 and 40,000 to 35,000, a figure which as late as 1960 still represented 51 per cent. of total Local Authority provision.

This is the ugliest part of the picture, and it occupies still far too much of the canvas. At the same time both the physical and the mental climate are changing slowly. Administration is gradually becoming less rigid and the newer homes more commonly measure up to the standards of civilised living. Mr. Townsend, however, wants to go beyond measures designed to improve the quality of communal homes, and to question the whole assumption that the provision of more and better institutions should be the only, or even the principal item, in future policy. Bundling old people into institutions is too often simply a convenient device for forgetting their

existence. Many, perhaps even most, of those who are not seriously incapacitated might greatly prefer to live in their own homes, if suitable, sheltered housing were available. In support of this view Mr. Townsend calls attention to the changing attitude towards other forms of long-stay institutions such as mental hospitals, approved schools or children's homes, and to the contemporary emphasis upon "community care"; but he adds that, although we are gradually abandoning the nineteenth century belief in "custodial care", we have as yet found no adequate philosophy to put in its place.

As the fashionable doctrine of the day, community care can perhaps be overdone. But on the total failure of the irresponsible society to evolve any acceptable philosophy in regard to its unfortunates and its misfits Mr. Townsend is undoubtedly right. "Out of sight out of mind" is still the prevailing rule. Nevertheless it must not be overlooked that the proportion of old people whose social and family contacts have become minimal is by no means negligible, and that even with the most admirably designed housing, household chores can become intolerably burdensome; nor can regular visits from home helps and social workers remove the fear of being struck with sudden illness during the long hours when nobody else is within sight or call. Until really attractive and home-like institutions are available for all who wish to make use of them, we shall not be in a position to judge the genuine preferences of the aged for communal or independent living.

BARBARA WOOTTON.

THE YUGOSLAV LAW ON GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE: INSTITUTE OF COMPARATIVE LAW, BELGRADE, 1961. [Stevens. 157 pp. 21s. 6d.]

THIS book consists of a thirty-page introduction by Professor Lado Vavpetic of the University of Ljubljana followed by a translation of the Law regulating General Administrative Procedure which was published on 19 December 1956, and came into force on 19 April 1957. The code here set out and, on the whole, well translated, will be of considerable value to all those interested in the administrative procedure of other countries.

The political philosophy of the Yugoslav Government, the ends which the constitution seeks to achieve, and the economic and social attitudes which have resulted from both that philosophy and those ends are well known in this country. The particular interest of this code to lawyers and to political scientists is the way in which the Yugoslav experiment seeks to solve the universal problems of law, politics and the administrative process.

J. A. G. GRIFFITH.

JEREMY BENTHAM, 1748-1792. By MARY P. MACK. [Heinemann. 482 pp. 42s.]

JEREMY BENTHAM's reputation has suffered from a notoriously bad literary amanuensis and executor, as well as biographer, in Bowring. James Mill's services as a publiciser of some of his doctrine, albeit necessary and valuable as a means of propagating it, has set it for many in the narrower framework of his more limited mind. It has been seriously handicapped by other facts

too. The very immensity of his work, the product of some sixty years of incessant activity, resulting not only in many printed volumes in several languages but in a huge collection of manuscripts, many of them difficult to decipher, has been enough to deter or overwhelm. It has also meant that publication has been fragmentary. There are large omissions, owing to which his doctrine as a whole has been seriously diminished and his real contribution very inadequately assessed. Though these writings have provided a rich source of inspiration, and many sections have even found their way into the Statute Book of this and other countries, the non-publication and consequent ignorance of much of them has resulted in serious misinterpretation. Nor is it surprising that a further outcome of these handicaps has been an accumulation of misinformed criticism. Bentham's habit of so often failing to complete a work enthusiastically undertaken, his tendency to fly from the good to a better, and his frequent taking up of an old theme and working it out more fully after the lapse of twenty or thirty years—none of this has helped.

Mrs. Mack brings to her study of this great inventor in the field of politics and administration, as well as of the law, a very thorough examination of the enormous material, a good knowledge of the historical background, social, economic and legal, enthusiasm for her subject, and a vivid pen. Her work is likely to have a considerable influence upon subsequent interpretation. It throws new light. It will do a good deal to rehabilitate Bentham's reputation, and will lead to its recovery from some at least of the misguided criticism which has lessened it.

Perhaps the chief originality of this extremely valuable work lies in the emphasis on the democratic character of Bentham's theory and the conclusive evidence it adduces for the radicalism of his reforming mind as a product of his own thinking, and as certainly attributable to him as a young man no less than to him as the man who was nearing sixty when he first met James Mill. This is a correction of the often-held view that it was Mill who converted him from more middle-class or aristocratic political leanings. His writings in this spirit had indeed been continuing for something like a quarter of a century before he met Mill. They have not seen the light of day, partly no doubt owing to Bentham's own weakness in failing to organise publication himself, but, more important, because of the fact that from 1790 onwards such writings certainly would fall within the field of what the Government proclaimed to be "criminal and seditious writing" in 1792, would have constituted breaches of similar prohibitive legislation in succeeding years and might well have brought the force of law down upon him. "The climactic change in his thought," Mrs. Mack claims, "was his conversion to democracy in 1790". Certainly he was always an ardent admirer of the American revolution, and constitution, as well as of the French revolution. He had no fear of "the people". Although he thought security a prime aim of the State, his basic philosophic assumption was one of equality of claim, and he advocated gradual expropriation of the wealthy as "favouring equality without prejudice done to security". His analysis of power laid great stress upon the importance of privilege, economic, social and legal, as lying at its centre; although he himself seems to have forgotten it when he returned to the same subject in 1820, he spoke of "sinister influence" already in an analysis made in 1790.

His remedy for the abuse of power lay throughout in representative institutions and parliamentary government. Although he regarded revolution as necessary in France because of the rigidity of the Bourbon Monarchy's institutions, he thought that liberty was both better secured in England and more capable of constitutional and peaceful enhancement, owing to the greater social and legal elasticity of the English tradition.

Mrs. Mack's literary biography of the first forty four years of Bentham's life covers the early influences, the development of his writing upon the law, and his applications of the principle of utility in psychology and ethics, as well as his "voyages and discoveries", and his association with Lord Shelburne and the world of politics. She lays great emphasis upon the fact that he was a pragmatic thinker and *practical* philosopher. It was always a principle with him that nothing should be pulled down unless a better substitute could be presented at the same time.

As to his principle of utility "I had it from Epicurus, from Carneades, from Horace, from Helvetius, from Beccaria . . . If it be denied me, I confess I shall be altogether at a loss to prove it . . . nor shall I easily be brought to think it necessary." He was emphatic that "the science of legislation is a practical science". Far from his producing an *a priori* "first principle" for general application, as critics have said, he defined science as not universal laws but as "memory and judgment applied in a systematic way". Genius was a synonym for invention. The purpose of scientific study of all kinds was to draw from increased knowledge, new advantages for the benefit of mankind. His own application of this view of the nature of scientific activity led him from his earlier tendency to criticise or attack individual officials, to the examination and condemnation of institutions, and to develop the principle of individual responsibility and normative individualism as the foundation of his theory of democracy; this stage he had certainly reached by 1790.

Bentham has often been attacked, both by followers and by critics, for inadequacies in his psychology, and Mrs. Mack springs here quite effectively to his defence. His excellencies in psychology, as she well points out, are often "buried among his legal analyses" as in his *Rationale of Evidence* or are lost in unpublished work, more particularly those uncompleted works which are full of instructive writing on the penal code and on sex.

Finally, that misinterpretation of Bentham which has led so many to associate him with, and indeed to regard him as being the father of, *laissez faire* is once more refuted, and well refuted, by Mrs. Mack. She writes: "He has often been named one of the fathers of *laissez faire*, yet he fought a never-ending war against it. His critics do not make the valuable distinction between internal or political and external or economic *laissez faire*. Bentham was not the radical state interventionist in economics that he was in other areas of social life because he felt that manufacturers knew more about finance and industry than members of Parliament. And so they did. The government in Bentham's England had almost no fact-finding machinery and most of the members of Parliament were ignorant dilettantes in economics." Bentham's legislative experimentalism is the very antithesis of *laissez faire*. The law he saw as an instrument of infinite possibility, as holding society together, as having as its object "to afford steady and permanent security to the interests of mankind." His criticisms of the actual operation of law and institutions were pragmatic, drawn from the

observation of them in practice, and not least the operations of the Courts of Justice which he watched in person as a student at the feet of Lord Mansfield in the Court of King's Bench. Both reform of the judicial system and the conversion of the Parliamentary system into a truly representative one were to be the means for bringing about that welfare state in which the happiness of the community would be maximised—to use one of the many terms with which he enriched the language of social science. Faced with a primitive criminal code having the characteristics of brutality and vindictiveness, his attention to reform at this level was a natural and necessary preliminary, but only a preliminary, to improvements of a much wider and more far-reaching character. Such improvements also found both their source and their justification in his writings during the period which Mrs. Mack's book covers, not less than in the succeeding forty years of his life.

H. R. G. GREAVES.

THE NEW RADICALISM. By BRYAN MAGEE. [Secker and Warburg. 238 pp. 25s.]

IN Mr. Magee's view: "Although the Labour Party is mainly a radical party it contains a number of incompatible elements: it contains conservative elements, class-war elements, authoritarian elements, Marxist elements, and just plain cranks—to name only five." His own attitude towards these groups is one of unyielding hostility. In fact, he declares: "I am a Socialist. But my really deep loyalty in politics is to the beliefs set out in this book, and my loyalty to the Labour Party is subordinate to this. If the Labour Party were to be irredeemably captured by any one of the five elements listed in the previous paragraph I should leave it."

His attitude to those whom he terms "opposition-minded Socialists" is no less scathing. Among them he "can discern nine common motivations: (1) envy and resentment of people more fortunate than themselves, (2) hatred of authority, (3) revenge, (4) anxiety, (5) guilt, (6) what has been called "aestheticism", (7) immaturity, (8) priggishness, and (9) the need for a religion-substitute."

Communists and Conservatives come off even worse. Both are "essentially nineteenth century ways of looking at things (they both happened to get a shot in the arm in the nineteen-thirties)". The indictment of Communist practice is well documented and, a welcome change, the critique of Marxist theory is made by one who has read Marx, even though there is some confusion on the relation between surplus value and capital accumulation. The Conservatives are condemned, above all, for preserving the present class structure (the category of class is retained, unlike those categories mentioned above), to which are attributed the major ills of our country in a chapter entitled: "The Backwardness of Britain". Presumably on the grounds that "by the use of Keynesian techniques capitalist economies seem able to maintain full employment indefinitely" no provision is made for another "shot in the arm" in the future.

In effect, this book is an attempt by a libertarian empiricist to offer solutions to our present problems. Although Mr. Magee strongly supports the United Nations, large scale assistance to the under-developed countries, and reform of the British legal system on such matters as capital punishment

and homosexuality, his attitude is strictly one of treating each problem on its own merits, and allowing for some flexibility in so doing. This is demonstrated best by the fact that on the one hand he demands that: "Every parent should have a choice of different kinds of school for his children," whilst on the other he demands the end of the tripartite system in the state education service and the incorporation of the independent schools in that service. To every man his own Achilles heel; for this indeed contradicts his own dictum that, far from the end justifying the means, "the way things are done in a society matters more than what is done".

Why, then, can the publishers fairly claim that this is an important book? Certainly it is not the type of book that will be widely read at trade union branch and local Labour Party level. Neither does it contribute anything new to political theory. Its importance is that it is an able stockpiling of ammunition for those engaged in the internal struggles in the Labour Movement. Although the author would protest, this reviewer, at least, believes it is a natural heir to the polemics conducted in the past by the Right against the Left. Those who wish to see the Constitution of the Labour Party re-written, a new image created, and a wider and more popular appeal developed to broader sections of the electorate, will quite rightly give it an enthusiastic welcome. Those who believe that there are such things as unalterable and fundamental Socialist principles, will react as violently against it as they have been violently attacked.

Supposing that the Labour Party adopted Mr. Magee's position and that the Conservatives, contrary to his opinion, sincerely attempted to carry out their professed progressive opinions, where then would there be the little gap between them into which Mr. Grimond's cohorts could endeavour to insert themselves?

K. W. WATKINS.

THE STATE AND THE FARMER. By PETER SELF AND H. STORING. [*Allen and Unwin*. 251 pp. 30s.]

MUCH of this book, like its title, suggests that the farmer is nowadays the principal person considered in the formation of the State's agricultural policies. Certainly, the National Farmers' Union has for some years been speaking with the loudest voice in this field. And it is true that the Labour Government adhered closely to the views put forward by the N.F.U.

It is clear enough that the Agricultural Workers' Union has not yet had much influence with any government. But the Country Landowners' Association, keeping deliberately as quiet as possible to minimise antagonism, scored a notable victory over the tenant farmers in 1958 when the "open market" principle was established as the basis on which arbitrators should fix new rents. Even Sir Stafford Cripps made a special concession to the large landowners in 1948. And agricultural land still gets preferential treatment for death duties.

Many state policies, like derating, are to the advantage of both landowners and farmers, and it is only sound tactics for the landlords to leave the propaganda in the hands of the farmers who command wider sympathy. The main achievement of the N.F.U. in recent years was the statutory

entrenchment of subsidies and this is even more valuable to landowners than to farmers.

The abolition of the powers to remove inefficient landlords and farmers was not wanted by anybody important in the countryside at all. It was an expression of townee sentiment, stirred by judges and journalists, and finding a ready response in all quarters of the House of Commons.

The N.F.U. are still allowed their Marketing Boards partly because these are ineffective for the pressure and propaganda purposes for which the N.F.U. wanted them.

There is a large and important overlapping membership which links these two powerful pressure groups. The owner-occupying farmers now comprise three quarters of the membership of the Country Landowners' Association which, however, continues to be led mainly by larger landlords. But the N.F.U. is led mainly by the larger owner-occupying farmers, who also preponderate in the County Agricultural Committees in charge of much of the Ministry's administrative apparatus. So the leaders of the farmers are the same people as make up the respectful rank and file of the landowners' organisation.

The book is packed with interesting information from a wide range of sources, arranged in an orderly, concise, yet readable manner. There is some refreshing light on our constitutional ways, both in the detailed accounts of the process of policy-formation on particular topics, and in the last chapter a sensible distillation from the literature on pressure group politics generally.

This book should be useful to debaters on each side of most agricultural controversies. It does not go very far on the Common Market question because it is a record of facts, and, therefore, of the past, even though mostly a fairly recent past, rather than the future.

But the perennial argument about nationalisation has already been a dynamic factor in the history of agricultural politics. In the back of everyone's mind, it powerfully stimulated Government, farmers and landlords, for their different reasons, to work closely together and avoid controversy during the early post-war years. The landowners trod very warily indeed, while making great and successful efforts to expand their Association and improve its efficiency. It was in 1949 that they adopted their present name to distinguish themselves clearly from the urban landowners whose danger was more real. Meanwhile, fear of nationalisation was employed with great effect to recruit owner-occupying farmers into the landowners' trade union.

A comparison with Labour Party policies for urban land indicates that, even if at some distant future date Labour actually came to the point of enacting a measure of public ownership of agricultural land, the owner-occupied farms would be excluded, and as many tenant farmers as so desired would have an opportunity to buy their farms before the remaining tenanted land was placed under the administration of the County Councils or perhaps the County Agricultural Committees who so largely administer it already.

In these circumstances, it is a pity for Labour to continue losing almost all the farmers' and most other rural votes through a misunderstanding. This might begin to be cleared up if the Party adopted, among its proposals for

the nearer future, a policy for helping tenant farmers to buy the freeholds of their farms (on the lines of the proposals for leasehold enfranchisement). The proportion of farms in owner-occupation has already increased from 11 per cent in 1913 to about 40 per cent. And the Country Landowners' Association itself has declared in favour of a broader diffusion of ownership through tenants' purchases of their holdings.

T. C. BOYD.

JOHN ANDERSON, VISCOUNT WAVERLEY. By JOHN W. WHEELER-BENNETT. [Macmillan. 430 pp. 45s.]

THE story of Viscount Waverley's life is a success story. His father kept a stationer's shop in Edinburgh; his mother was the daughter of an engineer, who was of German extraction. John Anderson was given a good education at George Watson's College. He was brilliantly successful from the start. He took every academic honour at school and at Edinburgh University. He then took the Civil Service Examination and came out top of the list with the second-highest total of marks ever obtained. No one has ever had a more distinguished career in the British Civil Service. Beginning in the Colonial Office, he was outstandingly successful there and in the Ministry of Health, the Board of Inland Revenue, and the Home Office. In 1920 he went to Dublin Castle as Under-Secretary for Ireland and until 1922 practically was responsible for the government of Ireland at the most difficult and dangerous time. In 1932 he was transformed from a great Civil Servant into a great pro-consul, for he became Governor of Bengal, again at a most difficult and dangerous time. Returning to England he soared still higher into a new sphere. Elected to Parliament in 1938, he became Lord Privy Seal the same year, Home Secretary in 1939, Lord President of the Council in 1940 and Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1943. Medals "to stick in his coat" were showered upon him and he ended with the Order of Merit. He was twice married to two charming women and was as happy in his domestic as he was successful in his public life.

There is no doubt that John Anderson was a first class Civil Servant, a very good Governor of Bengal, an unusually good Home Secretary and Chancellor of the Exchequer. Very few men have held so many different offices so successfully. There is no mystery about the reasons for his inordinate success. He was not in any way a "brilliant" man; he had no touch of genius; he had little imagination and an exiguous, rather primitive sense of humour. His understanding of the working of the mind and heart of human beings (including himself) was limited. He was terribly pompous and heavy on the hand, and slightly, and rather endearingly in real life, ridiculous. But he was tremendously able; his ability was so tremendous that it almost became in certain spheres of action genius. In practical affairs he had a first class mind, a stupendous memory, iron nerves, great courage both physical and mental, the rare characteristic of liking responsibility. He was one of those many people who call themselves and think themselves Liberals, but are in fact fundamentally conservative, if not reactionary, and are therefore in Britain universally trusted as respectable and respected. Finally, he was personally, under his carapace of pomposity, a very nice, simple minded man.

The biography of a man with a character and career such as Anderson's ought to be of great interest and value, both psychologically and historically. Sir John Wheeler-Bennett has only partially succeeded in doing justice to his subject. He enables the reader to get some idea of Anderson's character, of his achievements, and of how he achieved them; his book is, up to a point, amusing and interesting. But it has a good many lamentable and irritating defects which have caused him to miss a great opportunity of writing a first-class biography. First, Sir John suffers from a naïvety, a curious mixture of snobbery and pomposity, in face of royalty and all the upper tiers of the Establishment. Thus when Anderson went to Buckingham Palace to receive a medal to stick in his coat, Sir John writes: "This event was recorded by the King with characteristic brevity: Sir John Anderson (now Governor of Bengal) came to luncheon and I gave him the [G.C.I.E. In effect, however, this laconic entry does less than justice to His Majesty's deep interest in the problems which Anderson was about to confront."

Secondly, he has most of the faults of style of official biographers. He is incorrigibly verbose; there are 430 pages in the book and it would probably have been greatly improved if it had had only 320. The passage about His Majesty, quoted above, is an example of useless verbosity. But there is also a perpetual, purely verbal verbosity, due partly to pomposity and partly to the unconscious belief that it is impressive to use not only long words, but five words where one would suffice. Thus, to open the book at random, you will find Chapter V beginning "The India into whose service John Anderson was now called stood at the climacteric of her constitutional development". And after a paragraph of twelve lines, the sense of which could easily have been conveyed in six, the second paragraph begins with the inevitable cliché: "Indian nationalism had drunk deeply of the heady wine of 'self-determination' . . .". Committees, we learn without surprise, do not "allow the grass to grow under their feet", and when Sir John has to make a not very original statement, he will preface it with: "It is not untrue to say that . . .". It is not untrue to say that the words "it is not untrue to say that" are always meaningless and unnecessary.

LEONARD WOOLF.

STALIN AND THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY, 1941-47. By ALFRED J. RIEBER. [Columbia University Press, 363 pp. bibliography, index. 60s.]

Mr. Rieber's book is quite evidently a Ph.D. thesis. It is a good thesis. Unfortunately, however, it is not a good book, partly because of its many irritating minor lapses, and partly because it fails to answer the questions the author sets out to answer. Mr. Rieber has seven errors in his list of abbreviations, and is constantly deceived by "false friends" in the French vocabulary, giving literal translations of words like *important*, *eventuel*, *métallurgie*, *syndicat*, *éditeur*, *grandeur* and so on. There are inaccurate or misspelt names, like Benoît Frachon, Debrû-Bridel, and J. Capocci, while the *département* of Loir-et-Cher turns up more than once as Loire-et-Cher. Errors of this kind make one hope that the author has been more careful in his handling of fact and hypothesis than in his use of words.

Mr. Rieber's aim is "to compare the activities and policy statements of (one of the) local Communist parties with those of the Soviet Union", in

order to discover "whether Soviet war aims were limited to attaining territorial security for the USSR in Eastern Europe", whether the Soviet leaders "equated post-war security with frontier rectifications and friendly relations with 'capitalist countries', or with the destruction of all capitalist states, the establishment of dictatorships of the proletariat everywhere—the triumph of world revolution". He has chosen France as his sample in this matter, because of the size and strength of the French Communist Party, the importance of France herself and the "deep interest of the Soviet leaders in strengthening its resistance to Hitler and in influencing its post-war development". The period covered—from the Russian entry into the war to the Soviet-bloc rejection of the Marshall Plan is intelligently chosen.

The author divides this six-year period into five parts, and within each one considers successively Soviet policy and French Communist policy. The chapters on French Communist policy contain nothing new, but they would in themselves have made an excellent work, about two-thirds the length of this one, on French Communist policy in the period. The account of the much discussed Communist activity in South-West France and in Paris in June '44 is the fairest I know. Mr. Rieber believes, quite rightly in my view, that there was no general attempt to seize power for the Communist Party, and quotes the Central Committee of the party, in a statement issued eight years later, in support of the view that this was because the exclusive Communist (and Soviet) aim at this period was to defeat Hitler, prevent de Gaulle from going Fascist and avoid what they saw (or claimed later to have seen) as the risk of an alliance with Hitler and Japan against the USSR.

The chapters on Soviet policy have some interesting quotations, not previously known to this writer, but they add nothing at all to our knowledge of Soviet policy. Still less, and more surprisingly, do they fulfil the major purpose of Mr. Rieber's study. We are taken through the story and reminded again of the many occasions on which Soviet declarations and French Communist policy were in complete harmony, as well as of the few on which the French were slow to come into line (e.g. immediately after the German invasion of Russia), or showed a difference of emphasis (as over the satellite Peace Conference in Moscow in May, '46), or were in open disagreement (over the Ruhr in 1945-6 and at different times over the future of Syria, Indo-China and Algeria). But although on each of these we get some *ad hoc*—and probably quite true—explanation of the divergence, we get no assistance from them in completing the general picture of Soviet-French Communist Party relations. A spattering of quotations from the Soviet press, eulogising French Communist Party activities in well worn clichés, gets us nowhere. Quotations from Soviet doctrinal discussions are more to the point, but there are too few of them to be helpful.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Mr. Rieber fails to answer the main questions in the minds of students of this subject. What we want to know is whether, on the many occasions on which the French Communist Party slavishly followed the Moscow line, it did so of its own volition, or on the basis of very general directives, or in response to precise instructions. Where there were differences, we want to know whether Moscow allowed Paris a free hand, or whether Paris insisted on taking its own line. Mr. Rieber accepts that "both followed the same line of thought and action;

they supported each other consistently and pushed aside their differences as minor and unimportant." He accepts from M. Pierre Hervé (probably a good source, since his expulsion from the party) the view that "the general line laid down by the Soviet press was a satisfactory guide to action", and that this explains the frequent perplexities of French Communists. This is a new point and may well be true: most—perhaps all—of the facts could be made to fit M. Hervé's view. But as serious evidence it remains inadequate.

Still more surprising is Mr. Rieber's conclusion. "From 1942 to 1947", he writes, "the French Communists and the Soviet Union planned and worked actively toward the ultimate establishment of a 'people's democracy' in France". None of Mr. Rieber's evidence supports this view, unless by "ultimate" he means "as soon as such a consummation was at the same time possible and convenient to the Soviet Government"—which is only another way of saying that Russian Communism is Russian Communism.

No doubt world revolution was always Stalin's ultimate goal, as it is presumably still that of Khrushchev. One may also presume that, where possible, local and shorter term problems were adjusted to fit them to the main objective. But the general evidence suggests that, in the short period discussed here, Stalin's purpose was to ensure the security of the Soviet Union, and the evidence given by Mr. Rieber suggests that French Communist policy was—usually willingly—subordinated to that Soviet purpose, the occasional differences being due either to French ignorance, or to Russian acceptance of the need for local tactical adjustments, or—more probably, in view of German Communist experiences in the pre-war and Yugoslav in the post-war periods—to simple Soviet indifference to the needs and wishes of Communist Parties outside the USSR, and the consequent occasional differences of adaptation.

The requirements of Soviet security varied, in Stalin's view, according to the geographical situation of the country concerned. Those already occupied on VE day were either annexed or turned into satellites. Of the remaining contiguous countries, East Germany was subjected more slowly, Iran and Greece were saved by the resistance of non-Communist forces, and Finland and Turkey by the probability of US intervention. But there is not, and never was, any evidence that France was destined for similar status, and Mr. Rieber himself suggests the reasons. With Western Germany, the allied forces, and ultimately the atom bomb between her and the Red Army, she could not be conquered. But a revolution was almost equally risky, even if it succeeded, for her people had already shown their capacity for resistance to alien rule, and they could get assistance from Britain and the US, while Russia had no direct access to her coasts or land frontiers.

In the circumstances, the French Communist Party was of use to Stalin only so long as it stopped short of attempted revolution. Its value was a nuisance value—sometimes very high—and for this purpose it was consistently used, first against Hitler and then against the West; with a brief period between the two (liberation to early 1947), when the advantage of having Communists in the French Government may well have seemed overwhelming both to Moscow and to the French Communists themselves. Apart from that, French Communists and their dozens of front organisations

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could and nearly always did support the Moscow propaganda line, which was in itself useful.

There is no sign that the French Communist Party ever rebelled against this role, and very little sign that it ever argued much with Moscow even on tactics. (Mr. Rieber's period ends nearly ten years before the emergence of what Signor Togliatti, the Italian Communist leader, called "polycentrism"). It was expendable and it knew it and believed it right that it should be so, for the triumph of Communism was dependent on the safety of the Socialist motherland. Besides, Stalin knew best, and could make life very uncomfortable, even outside Russia, for Communists who presumed to think otherwise. This, surely, is the true account, and there is no single instance in Mr. Rieber's narrative of anything that does not accord with it.

W. PICKLES.

THE LONDON GOVERNMENT BILL

THE London Government Bill which is now before Parliament provides an instructive example of the extent to which the existing system of local government has become a vested interest. The present structure of London government was set up in the 19th century and it takes no account of the subsequent growth of the metropolis, the advent of modern transport, and the needs of the public services. It is therefore quite obsolete and unable to deal with the major problems confronting the 8½ million people who live in Greater London.

The Government decided to modernise the structure (outside the sacred precincts of the City!) as part of a general reform of local government areas and authorities envisaged by the Local Government Act, 1958. The Greater London problem was referred to a Royal Commission (the Herbert Commission) while the rest of England was entrusted to the Local Government Commission. The Herbert Commission produced a unanimous report which is one of the great state documents of our time. It sprang from the conviction that local government is good in itself if it is well adapted to the environment and the conditions in which it operates. The Commission felt, however, that the present structure is not only failing to achieve many essential aims but is not conducive to the health of representative government. The choice before local government in Greater London was either abdication in favour of central government or reform. The Commission came down strongly on the side of reform.

The Basis of Reform

The reform proposed by the Commission was essentially a projection of the system now existing in the County of London to the whole of Greater London. Thus in place of the medley collection of more than 100 counties, county boroughs, non-county boroughs, metropolitan boroughs and urban districts which now make up the patchwork quilt of local government in London, they recommended a directly elected Greater London Council and 52 London Boroughs of 100-150,000 population range. The Greater London Council would be responsible for matters of concern to the whole metropolis, while the London Boroughs would be much stronger than the existing second-

tier councils and would have a greatly extended range of functions, including the health and welfare services.

The Government accepted the principles of the report but have departed from the proposals in certain respects. They consider that the London Boroughs should be larger than those the Commission recommended, and the Bill provides for 32 Boroughs with populations of between 170,000 and 340,000: an average of 250,000. Second, while the Boroughs outside the present County of London will become local education authorities, it was thought necessary to preserve the existing education service inside the county for at least a transitional period. So the Greater London Council, acting by means of a special committee drawing members from inner London, will administer the Inner London Education Area until 1970, when the Minister of Education will review the educational arrangements in this area to see whether the inner London Boroughs should participate, and if so to what extent. A third divergence was the exclusion of several peripheral areas, chiefly in Surrey, which has reduced the Greater London of the Bill by a third of a million population and more than 80,000 acres. There was no rational justification for this exclusion: it was done to propitiate the county councils concerned.

The London Bill has some serious defects which could and should be rectified—we mention these below—but it is nevertheless a measure of genuine reform which may in due course produce great improvements in the planning and municipal government of the metropolis. For the first time the problems of Greater London will be considered by a body having authority over the whole area.

The Defenders of the Status Quo

Yet the measure and the proposals in the White Paper and the Herbert Report which preceded it, have been attacked from all sides as though they were the demented proposals of a madman. Lord Morrison set the tone for much of what followed by saying that the proposal for a Greater London Council is neither local government nor London government, thereby going back on much more far-reaching proposals for a regional council to cover all the Home Counties and including Southend, Margate, Ramsgate and Brighton which he had made in giving evidence to an earlier Royal Commission. Subsequently Lord Morrison denounced the measure as a Tory plot to get Labour out of power in London; and this line of argument was adopted by many Labour members of the L.C.C. and Labour M.P.s. The County Councils which will be abolished (like Middlesex) or severed (like

Kent, Essex and Surrey) have opposed the Bill on the ground that it will disrupt an excellent system of local government without any compensating advantages. Individual local authorities which will be merged with others have persuaded their M.P.s to oppose the Bill—Sir Cyril Black, M.P., a former Mayor of Wimbledon, has not allowed his allegiance to the Conservative Party to stand in the way of his opposition to the Bill. Some boroughs have sent their Mayors and other spokesmen to Westminster to petition against the Bill. The London teachers, the architects, the doctors, the magistrates of juvenile courts, social welfare workers and other professional groups have all deplored and denounced the measure as an unmitigated evil. L.C.C. Councillors and Aldermen have almost wept in public at the spectacle of their life's work being brought down in ruins by an irresponsible act of vandalism.

These groups consist either of public spirited persons who in many cases have been devoting themselves for years to unpaid work on council or committees, or honest and competent officers with professional qualifications. The curious thing is that public service of this kind can make otherwise reasonable men and women so blind to the fundamental defects of the organisation which they serve—defects which no personal effort can overcome—and so emotionally involved in the perpetuation of obsolete institutions, that they are unable to see any merit or hope in changes of any kind. They have become adherents to the divine right of things as they are.

The London Labour Party's Attitude

The attitude of the London Labour Party is intelligible though short-sighted. The party has been in power at London County Hall for 29 years; and the retention of power has become an end in itself, irrespective of any wider consideration. The party leaders apparently lack faith in their ability to gain a majority of seats on the Greater London Council, though there is no reason why with courage and imagination they should not do so. The Labour Party's defensive attitude to the whole question of Greater London was shown by the evidence of the L.C.C. to the Herbert Commission. The Council's representatives denied that there were any problems at all in the metropolis requiring interference by a royal commission or the central government! The Conservatives (who are called Municipal Reformers) on the L.C.C. presented a radical view to the Commission and have consistently supported the changes embodied in the Bill.

In Parliament the Labour Party has opposed the London Government

Bill on the ground that the proposed changes will have a disturbing effect on the existing services. This is a normal conservative reaction to any change in any sphere of life; and it is not an appropriate attitude for a party which is preparing for a general election and desires to project an image of itself as the party of progress, of dynamism, of anti-establishment, of responding to contemporary needs, of being the opponents of vested interests, of being guided all the time by a concern for the people's welfare.

It is unlikely that the ordinary citizen of Greater London is deeply attached to the local government structure which now exists, but this is not a point on which any considerable amount of positive evidence exists. We can assume, however, that few votes are likely to be lost—and fewer still to be won—by the action of the Government in laying hands on the ramshackle structure of the metropolis.

Defects of the Bill

To turn to the Bill itself. Its main defects lie either in the inadequate powers given to the Greater London Council or the excessive supervisory powers conferred on central departments. These are particularly noticeable in the spheres of planning, development, housing, traffic and highways—all of them fields in which the case for a metropolitan-wide representative and executive body is strongest.

Let us first consider the provisions relating to highways, traffic management and public transport. The Bill places a duty on the Greater London Council to ensure the expeditious, convenient and safe movement of motor traffic and pedestrians, and the provision of suitable and adequate parking facilities. But numerous powers required to carry out these purposes are conferred both on the Council *and* on the Minister of Transport, e.g., trying out experimental traffic schemes, regulating traffic signs, ordering bollards or other obstructions to be placed or removed, and the designation of parking places. Again the Minister may direct the Council to make an order for a specified purpose concerning traffic control and he can equally prohibit them from making or bring into force an order relating to specified matters. Nor may the Greater London Council exercise powers in relation to the provision of parking places except with the consent of the Borough concerned or the Ministry of Transport. The dual control envisaged by provisions of this kind will result in a dispersal of responsibility and will prevent the Greater London Council from achieving the objects of the Bill to the fullest possible extent.

The classification of roads is highly unsatisfactory. Trunk roads,

which come directly under the Ministry, do not at present exist in the County of London but they will do so when the Bill becomes law. A new class of "metropolitan" roads is created and these will be the responsibility of the Greater London Council. Here again there is duplication of function and a failure to concentrate power and responsibility in the Greater London Council, where it should lie.

The provision of highways and traffic regulations are closely related to public transport services. The latter come under London Transport. There is no provision for consultation between this body and the Greater London Council.

The Minister of Transport's excessive powers were rightly challenged by the Opposition in the Committee Stage of the Bill on the floor of the House; but the Minister refused to amend the Bill beyond a meaningless change in the form of words which will make no difference in practice.

The Minister of Transport's insistence on acquiring duplicate and over-riding powers is particularly obnoxious because his is one of the weakest Departments of the Central Government. The Ministry is responsible for railways, roads and ports; and it has a very poor record of achievement since the war in respect of all of them. It is difficult to see why the Ministry of Transport should make a better job of the highway and traffic problem in the metropolis than the Greater London Council.

The statement often made from the Treasury benches is that the Minister has no intention of using the over-riding powers or powers in default for which he asks; he merely wants to have them in reserve in case of need. The essential point is, however, that the existence of such powers can and does have a profound effect on the relations between the Central Government and local authorities. The latter cease to be partners in common tasks and become subordinates. In a country as civilised and cosy as Britain, where threats are never made and power is seldom openly used, it is unnecessary for the Central Government to assert its authority by blatant means. Everyone round the table knows where the last word lies and the local authorities quietly sink into a position of subordination.

In planning there is also duplication, though of a different kind. The Greater London Council is the planning body for the whole metropolis and the Borough Councils are local planning authorities in respect of their own areas. Although the Royal Commission urged that the Boroughs should exercise planning control functions, neither they nor anyone else contemplated they would become full planning

THE LONDON GOVERNMENT BILL

authorities in their own right. Even in respect of the crucially important central area, for which the Greater London Council should be the planning authority for all purposes, nothing is done in the Bill beyond allowing the Minister of Housing and Local Government to confer such powers by regulation. The Bill as at present drafted will introduce unnecessary complexity and procrastination into the planning of the metropolis.

Housing and Development

In the realm of development the Bill is an improvement on the Herbert Report; but here, as elsewhere, the power of the Greater London Council to initiate or participate in development depends on the agreement of the Borough(s) concerned or the permission of the Minister. It is absurd that this great new metropolitan authority should have no such power in its own right.

*A similar arrangement is laid down in regard to housing within Greater London. At present in the County of London the L.C.C. and the Metropolitan Borough Councils have concurrent housing powers, and this system has worked exceedingly well. Only in regard to overspill housing outside Greater London is the Greater London authority given exclusive power under the Bill.

The Winds of Change Blow Not in the City

Elsewhere in this issue we publish an article on the exclusion of the City Corporation from the reform of London Government. We fully endorse the criticism of the Bill in this respect which has come from several quarters. One day the City Corporation will be forced to share its pageantry, its traditions and its wealth; but this will not happen so long as the Prime Minister of the day attends the Lord Mayor's Banquet. Perhaps Mr. Wilson, if he should become Prime Minister, will set a new example in this respect.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW

D. C. WATT

THE recent publication of Lord Avon's memoirs, with their copious quotations from Foreign Office dispatches and memoranda prepared for the Cabinet, has raised again the question of public access to the records of Britain's recent past. "Former ministers and retired service officers", as Dr. Charles Wilson of Jesus College, Cambridge, pointed out in a letter published in *The Times* of 19 November 1962, "are free to publish and interpret documents and policy statements not previously revealed. Journalists and other writers are apparently accorded similar privileges, when it is convenient to the department concerned that this should be done . . . Professional historians are governed by quite different rules. They have accepted a principle reached by a committee of historians and civil servants that research should be restricted to official documents not less than fifty years old." Dr. Wilson's letter was strongly supported by his colleague of Trinity College, Cambridge, Dr. Kitson Clark, who pointed out that *The Times* had itself based its leading article of 19 November "squarely . . . on the *ex parte* statements of one of the main actors in certain highly controversial transactions", (i.e. Lord Avon himself).

The Fifty-Year Rule Challenge

The dissatisfactions voiced by these and other historians were taken up the same month by Mr. Michael Foot and Dame Irene Ward and again by Mr. Shinwell in questions put in Parliament to the Prime Minister. They earned only a repetition of the traditional official doctrine on access to official papers. Access to official papers within fifty years of the date of their creation would lead Ministers to "begin to write minutes not so much to deal with the occasions and problems they had to deal with but with a view to the record." Publication of Cabinet papers "would tend to destroy the collective responsibility of the Cabinet and have the great disadvantage of making public the advice given by officials to ministers." Finally, "there is no great

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demand" for a revision of the Fifty-year Rule. These were the Prime Minister's words as reported in *The Times*.

The fact that it was the publication of Lord Avon's memoirs which gave rise to this latest outburst of dissatisfaction with the restrictions on public knowledge of past governmental policy is unfortunate. The letters to the press and questions in Parliament quoted above have tended inevitably to give the impression of a small body of disgruntled academics, complaining with infantile petulance that Lord Avon was being unfairly accorded privileges denied to them. But the matter cannot be allowed to rest there or to be discussed in these terms. In a turnover article in *The Times* of 19 June 1962, Mr. H. G. Nicholas of the University of Oxford was allowed to present some of the wider issues involved. The Fifty-year Rule, he pointed out, always allowed the foreign historian to have "first say". In the matter of British Foreign Office papers it was originally laid down "in the heyday of triumphantly successful isolationism, when British relied on no allies, when her foreign policy could be determined and its secrets guarded by almost exclusive reference to her own interests and motivations." Yet today Britain is a member of an alliance system whose major figure is a country "with a passionate belief in the virtues of publicity". The consequence was, he pointed out, that despite all the precautions taken under the Fifty-year Rule and the other machinery designed to restrict public knowledge and inhibit public discussion in Britain of the actual processes of governmental decision-making in particular instances, there was always a full American account of international events in which Britain had taken part, which inevitably shed a flood of light on British policy, if it did not often distort it. On many of the major issues in British foreign policy, the foreign historian can establish a version of events which it may take generations to eradicate from the public mind. He could well have added that the same applied to the processes of "decolonisation". The versions of how Ghana and Nigeria were accorded their independence now current in those countries bear little or no relation to the actual facts. Yet no attempt is made whatever on this side to counter them by commissioning an official history.

The Role of the Historian in Society

The truth is that these complaints, these dissatisfactions, are not purely and solely those of professional historians. Even if they were, to dismiss them as the edginesses of mere academics is to ignore the role of the historian in society as a whole. The historian is among other

things the custodian of the national memory. It is his responsibility to see that memory is kept as free as possible from the distortions of distance in time from the events remembered, of imperfect or biased recollection, or of prejudice or ignorance. The recent past, by a curious paradox, is far more subject to these distortions, since it is much more often appealed to in current controversy. But the historian is not only the custodian of the memories of the nation, but the instructor of the new citizens only emerging into adulthood. He has to equip them so far as is possible with the memories of their fathers. Today's new citizens, after all, were only entering school as Japan was defeated and the first atom bomb dropped.

No amount of official restrictions can prevent histories of the recent past being written. They can only secure that they are badly and inaccurately written. If respect for evidence inhibits professional historians or laymen with an equal respect for the objective truth from undertaking this work, it will be done by those who have an interest in establishing alternative versions of events, favourable to their own reputation or to their own economic or political purposes. The less accurate information available, the more scope will be given to rumour, gossip, invention and biased deduction. The spate of accounts of the Suez operations, or the recent revelations of the Vassal tribunal as to the considerations which lead journalists to represent intelligent hypothesis as established fact, show how easy it is for a particular version to obtain wide popular currency and illustrate the processes by which it achieves this.

Throttling the Flow of Information

But the restrictions imposed on historians by the Fifty-year Rule are only one facet of the gradual throttling of the flow of information to the public on the background of British foreign policy which has taken place over the last five decades. In their review of the diplomatic blue books of the nineteenth century, Professors Temperley and Penson pointed to the paradox that as Parliament grew more representative of the people, so it came to be accorded less and less information about the foreign affairs of the nation whose interests it guarded. This process has continued and is continuing. In the inter-war years only a very few diplomatic blue books were published, the last being Eden's account of the efforts to achieve a European settlement torpedoed by the German reoccupation of the Rhineland. Since 1939, apart from the almost obligatory account of Britain's entry in to the Second World war, no diplomatic blue book whatever has been published.

Crises have come and crises gone, Berlin, Palestine, Korea, Indo-China, the defeat of E.D.C., Suez, Cyprus, the Congo, Cuba, the end of the Common Market negotiations. The amount of information vouchsafed to the British public as to the formulation of British policy on each of these issues, and its conduct during the ensuing crises, is infinitesimal, by contrast with the detailed publication of diplomatic dispatches which would have been more or less *de rigueur* a century ago.

Increasing Interest in Foreign Affairs

Yet there is nothing to suggest that the public's demand for information on current and recent foreign affairs has in any way diminished over the same period. The educated public of today, the public which, to use a theatrical metaphor, occupies the stalls rather than the gallery, is as active and as vocal as ever. No doubt those who enjoy it can easily depict the mass of the British public as sunk in the intellectual morasses of the affluent society, sustained only by the sex and sports pages of the popular press and the inanities of commercial television. But the success of the news-magazine programmes such as *Panorama* or *Tonight* on B.B.C.'s television does not accord with this picture, nor does the growth in the class of professional commentator, or "news analyst" as the Americans would call him, to whom these and other popular media turn to explain or expound some new turn in public affairs. This class itself cannot but be an avid consumer of information on British foreign policy, on its actual formulation and the considerations which underlie that process.

If there can be doubt as to the public demand for information on current and recent public affairs, there can be no doubt as to the growth in the historians' demands for information on the recent and less recent past. Courses on recent international history, on international relations or on international politics are now taught in the majority of British universities as integral parts of courses leading to degrees in arts or the social sciences. The universities' demand for specialists in these fields has grown four-fold in the past fifteen years, and is becoming increasingly difficult to supply. A growing market for specialist studies, articles, monographs, and text books exists in these subjects, one, it may be said, largely unexploited as yet by any but a handful of the most enterprising publishers. One wonders in the light of these facts how the Prime Minister can maintain that there is no demand for a revision of the Fifty-year Rule;¹ save only that the

¹ There is even a great deal of work in this field done in the University of Oxford, of which he is the Chancellor!

historians' demands, such as that voiced at the recent history group of the Anglo-American historical conference held in July 1962 at the Institute of Historical Research in London, pass unreported in the press.

Moreover, all these demands are really part and parcel of the same demand from the same market. "Academic" or "professional" historians do not write on the recent past only for their students, nor are their books only read by and noticed by the closed coterie of Academe. Public discussion of current and recent foreign affairs draws in Britain on a wide range of sources of information and the institutions through which such discussions takes place are part of an integrated society where academic ghettos and intellectual *apartheid* are the exception rather than the rule. The recent public debates on Britain's application for entry into the Common Market well illustrate the range of these institutions. The serious daily press, the weeklies, monthlies and quarterlies have carried a range of articles and correspondence. Evening dinner-discussions in clubland and in the City have heard in turn the leading academic protagonists and antagonists on the issue, questioned them in detail, and debated the questions, openly after the speeches were over, privately thereafter in the traditional off-duty meeting-places affected by their members. The quasi-academic institutes such as Chatham House, the Royal Commonwealth Society or the Royal United Services Institute have run lectures and debates on the implications and desirability of each kind of association. Pamphlets, hard-cover books and paper-backs have flooded the book-stalls and bookshops. And from these the opinions and analyses, at whatever level of academic abstraction they were made, have been funnelled back to the public through the book review columns of the serious press. There has been a constant circulation of ideas, and a constant feed-back, aided by institutions such as P.E.P., the research machines of the political parties and the party "ginger-groups", such as the Bow Group or the Fabian Society, to name only two. The trade union journals have taken the matter up, aided by the B.B.C. and I.T.V. television news programmes and the radio. The market for information, for ideas and proposals has been at its most greedy, its most demanding. How has it been fed?

Official Obscurantism

An examination of the press of the last eighteen months shows that it has been fed largely from outside the official machinery for supplying information on official policy to the public. Statements as to the reasoning which led the Cabinet to reverse its original stand of position

to the E.E.C. in the summer of 1961 have been sparing in number and very general in character. No indication whatever has been given either as to the representations made to Britain by other governments or the estimates made and assurances received by Britain's representatives as to the chances of Britain's application to join being crowned with success. Not that the machinery has been inactive, far from it. But it has been as unwilling as ever to supply the direct detailed evidence on which its statements are based; and as inclined as ever to prefer the unofficial statement which can be disavowed to the diplomatic dispatch or public statement which can be challenged.

The main elements in this machinery are eight in number. Firstly, there is the ministerial statement to Parliament. With a few exceptions, such as Lord Lansdowne's account of his Congo mission in the days preceeding Mr. Hammarskjöld's death, these have become decreasingly candid on matters of detail. Next come the papers laid before Parliament, the Blue Books and the White Papers. The first of these has disappeared from public usage. The second continues to proliferate. But their main role is to republish, under official sanction, the texts of treaties, internationally-agreed statements, agreements and the like already made public. Thirdly, there is the Ministerial statement outside Parliament, the reporting of which depends both on the journalists in attendance and the editorial staff of the newspapers employing them. They are rarely collected or republished as originally given. Fourthly, there are the publications of the Central Office of Information, handbook surveys written for low fees by freelance writers or by their own staff, usually without benefit of any sight of Foreign Office papers or print.

These are at least all public, in the sense that the public can get direct access or at least access at one remove to the source of the information. Three of the remaining four sources are not. The first is the press conference and briefing of journalists by the Foreign Office at home or by whoever is the appropriate authority on a British delegation, embassy or legation abroad. These conferences are rarely public. Indeed it is notorious that, at the Foreign Office, there is an extra and more intimate briefing session than that provided for the bulk of the press, reserved for the representatives of *The Times* and the B.B.C. The second is the deliberate "leak", direct or indirect, to a selected journalist, a mechanism much practised in defence matters. A recent study of J. L. Garvin has shown how his famous campaign on naval construction against the Liberal government of 1906-1914 was fed entirely by the First Sea Lord, "Jackie" Fisher. The third source, akin to the first, is the activity of the ministerial Public Relations

Officer, an activity on which the most curious comment made was the resignation of Mr. William Clarke, who occupied the post of Public Relations Officer to Sir Anthony Eden, at the time of the Suez crisis.

The last source of public information on recent matters is the official history, of which there are three kinds: those sponsored by the Cabinet Office, and written by academic historians seconded from their academic posts; those sponsored by the Ministry of Information or similar institutions and written by well-known writers or journalists; and those sponsored by individual branches of the armed services, written by members of their historical sections, mainly if not entirely from the standpoint of the service concerned.²

The single factor which unites all these forms of information is that control of what is said remains in the hands of the authorities; and that the blanket claim that they are guided by "the public interest" in deciding what may or may not be revealed cannot absolve them from the suspicion that they see information itself as a weapon, less to control the matter of debate, be it said, than to inhibit its manner.³ Yet the latter cannot be achieved without the former.

They have been aided in this by the permissive nature of the legislation affecting the flow to the public of official information on current and recent public affairs. This legislation is embodied principally in the Official Secrets Acts of 1911 and 1920, and in the Public Records Acts of 1958. The Act of 1911 was principally designed to prohibit military espionage, and concerns itself in detail with sketches, plans, models, articles, notes, documents or information relating to prohibited places, which are "calculated to be, or might be, or are intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy". But it does allow by implication for the communication in confidence of such information to a private individual by some one in government service, since it includes a clause (Article 2, paragraph 2) penalizing such an individual if he should pass such information on to a third person, and it allows for such communication if the person concerned is "acting under lawful authority".

The Act of 1920 was designed to close loopholes in the 1911 Act. Its most relevant clause is that which deals with the retention of any official document by an individual "when he has no right to retain it or when it is contrary to his duty to retain it", but continues to relate this solely to "purposes prejudicial to the safety and interests

² There are also the publications of Foreign Office papers in *Documents on Foreign Policy*, 1919-1939 dealt with below.

³ This applies least of all to the Cabinet Office histories: but even here, though ideas and occasionally personalities in political positions have been violently criticised, personalities in civil service positions have not.

of the State". Since a simple statement that action in communicating information to a member of the public is "prejudicial to the safety of the state" can be made by a servant of the State without challenge in an English Court of Law, this statement is of interest principally in that it retains in the hands of officialdom the control over publication, reserving considerable punitive powers to them to enforce this. Publication as such is not prohibited—providing only that officialdom be the judge of whether to publish or not.

The Lord Chancellor's Powers

Turning from this to the Public Records Act of 1958, the same permissive note may be found. The Act defined the nature of public records, and provided for their care, weeding and transfer to the Public Record Office. It set up an Advisory Council, on which a number of distinguished historians serve under the Chairmanship of the Master of the Rolls, to advise on the care and publication of records. And it placed the whole under the parliamentary and departmental responsibility of the Lord Chancellor. As to access, it laid down that the public records "shall not be available for public inspection until they have been in existence for fifty years *or such other period, either longer or shorter*, as the Lord Chancellor may . . . for the time being prescribe". The Act was intended principally to standardise the treatment of departmental records, and to end a state of affairs where individual departments were still clinging, presumably "in the public interest", to records dating back to the middle of the eighteenth century. But it is still largely permissive as affects the decisions of individual departments as what to release to and what to restrict from public access—and few can come up to the standards of the Foreign Office. Its other major historical effect was to open the papers of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and, in principle, once the fifty-year period is passed, the Cabinet Office papers, to prevent the disclosure of whose secrets strenuous efforts were then in progress, even including the withdrawal from the public domain of papers previously open to public inspection. It retained, however, the permissive element, as the quotation made above illustrates. Information, records, can be declassified earlier than 50 years, or remain classified well beyond them. The general effect however is, to quote Mr. H. G. Nicholas again, "to confine free enquiry . . . to the dangerous topicalities of the Haldane mission of 1912".

Secrecy Defended

The principal defence of the practice enshrined in the Public Records

Act of not opening papers until fifty years from the date of their creation is, in the words of the Committee on Departmental Records set up in 1953 under Sir James Grigg, that the quality of "unself-consciousness . . . so important a feature of archives from an historian's point of view . . . would be likely to be impaired if an official knew that what he wrote would be available for public inspection during his life time."⁴ To put this argument more correctly would be to say that if officials felt that their words would be placed in the public domain during their life-time they would no longer advise ministers honestly, but would be guided always by the feeling that some one was watching over their shoulder or listening to their conversation. Every minute would be written less for ministerial guidance than for the approval of posterity. The "public interest" would suffer as the efficiency of the Civil and Foreign Services became impaired.

Hitherto this consideration has been allowed to override all others. The protection of the freedom of debate within the machinery of the Cabinet and the administration is clearly of considerable importance in the British system. But so too is the possibility of free and informed debate among the British public. On things not British this debate is more "informed" than it was. But the flow of information on British foreign policy has diminished to a mere trickle. Much of this has been the result of the latent distrust which those in authority in Britain display towards the public generally. But much, too, is the product of the war and cold-war atmosphere of the last decades. The contrast with the informed discussion of foreign policy in the United States, and the considerable reservoir of lay talent on which each new incoming Administration seems, as a result, to be able to call, is very striking.

The Disadvantages of Concealment

The effects of the current practice in Britain are much more deleterious than is normally recognised. The characteristics of public discussion of internal affairs in Britain in the 1950s are a rigidity of outlook and concept, a slowness to adjust to changes in Britain's world position and freedom of action. The concepts most prevalent are all borrowed from the debates of the inter-war years or drawn on their alleged "lessons". Illusion and misinformation abound. The lack of a coherent intellectual debate on British defence policy, before the foundation of the Institute of Strategic Studies, is particularly striking.

⁴ Cmd. 9163 (1954), paragraph 153.

An historian concentrating on the study of the recent past is confronted continuously with popular misreadings of that history, and with discussions of current affairs based on such misreadings. The development of new ideas is painfully limited and slow, the appreciation of foreign news reports limited and obstructed by the rigidity of public misconception.

But the effects on Britain's position in the world are still worse. The ignorance of Britain's true position and manner of approach to her problems often encountered abroad, even among learned and professional students of Britain, is very striking. Much more striking however, is the way in which prejudiced and one-sided versions of events in which Britain was involved, based on non-British sources, become current;⁵ and once such currency is achieved, subsequent publication of the British version can never entirely catch up with them. The versions of the Anglo-Arab agreements of 1915 published from Arab sources before 1939⁶ played a major part in convincing Arab nationalists in that period, that Britain's attitude to their aspirations was duplicitous and insincere. The effects have dogged Anglo-Arab relations ever since. The consequence of the versions of their achievement of independence now current in Ghana and Nigeria may effect adversely the relations between those countries and Britain for a generation or more. Even outside these specific instances, the general effects of the present practice are most deleterious. If Britain's real strengths and weaknesses and the motives behind her policy are not appreciated, her achievements will never be properly appreciated abroad, her motives will be persistently misunderstood and the choices of action available to her will be misinterpreted. One cannot of course prevent those with basic Anglophobe prejudices from exercising them in public comment on Britain's actions. But the present situation deprives our friends abroad of material with which to counter such prejudices, and drives the genuinely neutral and objective observer willy-nilly to accept, even if only provisionally, the versions put about by more interested parties.

⁵ In the 1920s, a selection of the German diplomatic archives were published, as part of a calculated move to call into question the clauses of Versailles attributing responsibility for the outbreak of war in 1914 to Germany. They were answered by a similar publication of British and French diplomatic papers. Yet recently a senior American historian remarked that nothing which had appeared since the German publication had altered the view of that period he had then formed—a remarkable indication of the rewards to Germany of being first in the field. The role the revisionist interpretation of the origins of the 1914-18 war played in the recrudescence of American isolationism in the 1930s is well known.

⁶ The British texts were published by the British government in 1939 after the Palestine Round Table Conference in a vain effort to counter those effects.

The "Public Interest" Myth

The issues, as has been argued, have been greatly obscured by the interjection of two basically irrelevant considerations: the protection of the anonymity of civil servants, and the internal disagreements within the historical profession as to the possibility of achieving objectivity in the study of the recent past. The one has been erected as an absolute barrier to any change in the present system. The other is essentially irrelevant to this debate, since it affects only the status in the eyes of the historical profession of the work actually done. It does not prevent either the work being done or such work making on public opinion an impression, which may be tendentious, one-sided and contrary to the national interest. To quote Dr. Wilson again: "The historical profession fully realizes the inconvenience to a department of uncontrolled or irresponsible invasion of the time and attention of busy administrators. But the arguments of the "public interest" that are put forward to obstruct the serious search for the truth are simply dishonest and unworthy . . . The problem is being dealt with at present on a basis of administrative convenience, not of the public interest in any real sense."

The problem then is to find ways and means to protect what is felt so desirable to protect, the "unselfconsciousness" of civil servants, and the unfettered workings of the Cabinet.⁷ The need is to reverse a process which has been getting steadily worse, not better, as the flow of information to the public is increasingly more and more curtailed in the ironical name of the "public interest". The authorities have so far set their faces resolutely against any impartial enquiry into the present system. Moreover they have always separated the demands for a relaxation of the restrictions on studies of the recent past from demands for more information on the formulation of British policy on the issues of the moment; though one and the same blanket answer—the "public interest"—covers both.

One can, however, divide the period of lay ignorance within the fifty years established by the Public Records Act into five periods. Firstly there is the period between 1913 and 1919 which at the present rate of progress may not be entirely open to research until 1969, even provided departments do not plead the "public interest"

⁷ One may suspect that these arguments are bogeys. No Civil Servant can be 100 per cent conscious of the eye of posterity, nor does the present system necessarily prevent the historically-minded among them from weighing such considerations, when penning their most important memoranda. The practice of publishing diplomatic dispatches in the nineteenth century only affected the spontaneity of the advice offered by British representatives abroad in that it made them more conscious of their prose style—not in itself a bad thing.

to enable them to continue to reserve large sections of the war-time records from research. Second is the period from 1919-1939, covered in part by the official publication of *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, a majestic enterprise unrolling itself at an unbelievably slow and snail-pace. Thirdly, there is the period of the war-time years, which, thanks to the devoted labour of the academic historians gathered together under the Cabinet Office, is as well covered as we can expect it to be at this period. Fourthly, there are the seventeen years since 1945, for which we must turn to the inspired guesswork of the press, a small assortment of memoirs, one or two drastically censored biographies, and a wealth of non-British material. And finally, there is the immediate present.

As to the first period, it is suggested that advantage be taken of the recommendation of the Grigg Committee that the operation of the Fifty-year rule be re-examined five years after its implementation; and that the Foreign Office archives be opened *in toto* up until 30 June 1919, the date at which the publication of *Documents on British Foreign Policy* begins. As to the second period, it is urged that the small staffs engaged on the publication of that series be sufficiently expanded, and their work given priority by the Stationery Office, so that the date of completion for the whole series can be set for at least the end of the next decade. It is suggested also that a good deal of sectional declassification of material could well be possible, particularly in the defence field. The art and nature of warfare have changed so radically since 1945 that, for example, the evidence presented to the Birkenhead Committee of 1925 on Britain's cruiser needs, or that of 1936 on the future of the capital ship could hardly be held to be dangerous to the public interest today.

The third period is reasonably well covered by the official histories; it is probably too early to hope for any more thorough-going publication here. Though it is greatly to be regretted that the original move to answer the publication of the American records of the great war-time conferences, Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam was abandoned.

The Historical Section of the Cabinet

When one approaches the fourth period, it is the comparative success of the official histories in resolving the dilemmas of public knowledge and the "public interest" that leaps most to the lay mind. The work of the Cabinet Office historical section on the history of the Second World War is, as these things go, within sight of completion. As this is achieved, presumably the office will be disbanded, the techniques

and expertise so laboriously built up abandoned and destroyed. This would be deplorable in essence and dangerous in practice. A decision should be taken now to expand the fine scale of these histories and push them forward to cover, for example, British financial policy up to Korea, Britain's participation in the Marshall Plan, the workings and effects of the commodity agreements policy of the Labour Government, the British contribution to the Korean war, British occupation policy in Germany, the work of the British Atomic Energy Authority,⁸ Britain's role in the formulation and early years of the United Nations. There is no lack of topics, and it should not prove impossible to recruit a team of writers on a par with those who served the Cabinet Office so effectively on the war series.

Present Day Needs

But the most crucial and critical of all is the present. Here there are two separate sets of issues, the alteration of certain administrative arrangements so that what is already being said achieves a wider circulation, and a major change in policy so that more is said and more made known.

On the administrative side, perhaps the greatest reform would be the publication of some British equivalent of the *Department of State Bulletin*, so that Ministerial statements and speeches made outside Parliament or indeed outside Britain achieve a wider circulation. To the objection of cost, it may be replied that this could be met by abandoning the wasteful, costly and incredibly out-dated republication of parliamentary papers and international treaties in the series *Britain and Foreign State Papers*, one which fills no role in the modern world that is not more than adequately filled by the parliamentary series on the one hand or the *United Nations Treaty Series* on the other.

On the policy side four proposals suggest themselves at once: first, that Ministerial statements to the Commons should begin to concern themselves not only with the *why* but the *how* of international negotiations; second, that the admirable practice of *private* Ministerial meetings with representatives of the informed public introduced in the defence field by semi-private institutions such as the Institute for Strategic Studies be widened to the general field of foreign policy (the success of that last-named institute in altering the whole range of the public debate on defence policy in Britain in the short period since its foundation has been truly remarkable); third, that press briefings and press conferences be themselves made more a matter of public record, as is the

⁸ It is reported, in America, that such an enterprise is "in its early stages".

practice in the United States; fourth, that a return be made to the practice of publishing diplomatic blue books. Any request for the publication of papers is invariably met in Parliament by the reply that it is not the practice of Her Majesty's Government to reveal the substance of confidential communications with foreign governments. This, as has been argued above, is far from backed by traditional British practice. It is a modern innovation, and should be discarded when the public interest truly demands it, that is, in the defence of British interests after the breakdown of an international conference, or in the explanation of a policy which has culminated in an international agreement which is being misunderstood and misrepresented at home.

The Uninformed "Informed Public"

In this analysis more attention has been paid to the public than to members of Parliament, though they too have become equally excluded from the detailed information on policy formulation necessary to intelligent and informed discussion. Much has been made of the need for standing parliamentary committees on foreign affairs on the French and American model, and viewed from a purely parliamentary standpoint there is much to be said for this. But the basic problem covers a wider area than back-bench M.P.s of either party. It is rather to secure that the participants in public debate on issues of foreign affairs, that curious inner circle of journalists, academics, men of affairs, civil servants and public commentators which make up the so-called "informed public" should be properly informed by fact rather than by innuendo, gossip, word-of-mouth and unattributable private statement.

In this connection, there is one further proposal that might perhaps be made—a widening of the number of academic historians permitted to do research in the closed period. In his letter quoted above, Dr. Wilson suggested that such persons and projects should be "vetted" by a committee on which the historical profession should be represented "to examine bona fide applications for research". The suggestion runs foul of the all-or-nothing egalitarianism enshrined in the Public Records Act—but any practising contemporary historian can think of a number of instances in which this egalitarianism has been ignored. Indeed in a letter to *The Times* of 22 November 1962, Mr. Blake of Christ Church, Oxford, complained that it has more usually ignored in favour of American than of British academics. As the system in fact exists it should not prove difficult to regularise it.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, PUBLIC INTEREST, RIGHT TO KNOW

There could thus be built up a cadre of professional research historians with expert knowledge on matters of recent governmental policy of a kind now lacking either in the academic world or in the financially starved research departments of the Foreign Office or the Ministry of Defence.

This proposal could also be objected to by the egalitarians among the profession and the professional anarchists and anti-Establishmentarians of the academic world in general. It is true that privileged entry of this kind presents its own dilemmas and problems—not least to those to whom it is accorded. But much depends on the mechanism used and the spirit displayed by both officials and academics. The carping gladiatorial methods of historical controversy now prevalent in sections of the profession, and the shields of anonymity accorded them by certain journals, make it clear that such a proposal would not be all plain sailing. Yet the experience of the Cabinet Office histories, and the editorial boards of the twin series in which the Foreign Office acted as employer, that of *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, and *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945* show that there is no reason to fear for academic standards of probity. When the editors of the latter series published documents on the alleged contacts between the Duke of Windsor and the Germans in 1940, they were denounced in the House of Commons by the then Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill, as grubbing academics, dabbling in Nazi hearsay; but the documents were published, and the editors stayed in office.

The relationship in such cases is a two-way one; and it is difficult for an official body that has, so to speak, pledged itself to respect the professional integrity of the historians it employs, to push them into a resignation which would discredit, at least by implication, all that officialdom hoped to gain from the publication.

The Demand for Change

The most urgent need is for a reappraisal of the advantages and disadvantages of the present system, and an abandonment by those in authority of their apparent conviction that the present system represents the sole conceivable way of protecting the workings of the Civil Service and of the Cabinet System of government. It does not. Moreover at home, it tends to perpetuate a view of Britain's position in the world which is the biggest obstacle to the government's own efforts to practise realism in the conduct of foreign affairs; while abroad it gives rise to interpretations of British policy which offer almost equally difficult obstacles to the chances of a successful outcome to any measure

of policy the British government may adopt. There *is* a demand for the revision of the existing system, despite what the Prime Minister is told by his advisers, or chooses to believe in their despite. It is not the product of the petty spite of a few disgruntled anti-Establishmentarian academics but reflects the anxieties of a good many responsible members of the historical profession. And their plea for an alteration is put forward with a proper responsible feeling for the considerations underlying current constitutional practice and a desire to preserve what it is designed to defend, while removing the most deleterious and avoidable of its consequences for the true interests of the public and the nation.

THE PRESS AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA

JAMES B. CHRISTOPH

FACED with the increasingly severe challenge of television and other mass media, the newspaper press in democratic countries is going through a time of troubles. It is being forced under pressure to rethink and reshape its fundamental role. Not the least of its uncertainties is over its special relationship to politics.

In the past the press has served as a prime vehicle for the transmission of news and opinions about the actions of government, as an important carrier of attitudes about political authority and as a continuous link between the "world outside and the pictures in our heads." It cannot be assumed, however, that the press will inevitably continue to act in this manner. The public role that newspapers is able to play depends, after all, not only on the state of the industry and the desires of their owners and staff; it is also affected by the character of the political system in which their activities are imbedded. In recent decades this interaction between press and politics has been changing in such a way as to create new problems for democracy, not the least of which is the growing difficulty of the citizen to find the real shape of the news.

In the following pages I propose to examine several aspects of this reciprocal relationship as it affects the newspaper press in Britain and the United States. I hope to be able to show that while newspapers in both countries have had to adjust their political roles in the light of certain common trends, they also have moved in different directions because their respective social and political institutions continue to accent different values. Thus any reappraisals must begin with different sets of "givens". My concern here is less with dramatic instances of the press's involvement in politics (such as during elections or sudden international crises) and more with the day-to-day aspects of reporting and interpreting the actions of government. I stress this because while recent studies have shown that the press is not as influential in changing opinion in the short run as its boosters and

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detractors would have us believe, it can still be assumed that its long-term impact on popular images of the political process remains important.

Common Trends in the Press

In comparing institutions it is often tempting to pass over structural and functional similarities in the quest for revealing differences—to favour, in other words, a model of national uniqueness. This would create a distorted picture of the British and American presses, for they have many common traits, even though the effects of shared conditions may be different. The American visitor to Britain, when he picks up a daily newspaper, is not faced with an exotic and baffling artifact. Nor does the press in general stand in a radically different relationship to governmental authority. In both countries the press is free in the sense that it does not depend upon official favour for its very existence or its finances, in both the press is able to print comment critical of ruling groups, and in both the dominant pattern is separation from (or only very loose alignment with) major political parties.

Equally important, individual newspapers in each country have been finding it increasingly difficult to maintain a distinctive political personality because of two twentieth-century trends: the stark consequences of the economics of their industry and the impact on news-gathering of the growing scope and complexity of government activity.

A hundred years ago in Britain a circulation of 10,000 would guarantee a newspaper's success, and even as late as 1914 a circulation of half a million provided a decent cushion for a national daily. Developments in the last fifty years have changed all this. Newspapers have become big business, and the demands of commercial viability have impinged more and more on the character of all types of papers, large and small, "quality" and "popular". The economic syndrome is a familiar one: skyrocketing costs of newsprint and labour, combined with the absence of outside subsidies and the decision to keep the price of papers low, have made the press increasingly dependent on advertising for financial success. For the bulk of papers, advertising revenue hinges upon circulation, and only papers with phenomenally high sales can command sufficient advertising to cover their "first copy" costs. The break-even figure for a British national daily today is about two million copies. The *News Chronicle* expired in 1960 with a circulation of a million and a quarter, and the *Daily Herald*, with 1,400,000, continues only because it has been underwritten until at least 1967 by the Mirror Group. Thus competition has declined markedly and

standardization has become more of a necessity. British and American readers have accustomed themselves to growing casualties, declining choice, greater control by chains, and monopolies, and more single newspaper towns.

The Trend to Monopoly

In 1961 the three leading British undertakings (the Daily Mirror group, Associated Newspapers and Beaverbrook newspapers) controlled 67 per cent of the total daily circulation.¹ In the United States, where concentration has not gone quite so far, thirty per cent of all papers (with more than forty per cent of the total circulation), are in the hands of chains.² The increase in local monopoly has reached the point in Britain where, according to the latest Royal Commission, there is now no town in England or Wales with more than one entirely locally published morning paper, and only seven towns outside London with more than one evening paper.³ By 1954, only six per cent of American cities with newspapers enjoyed the choice between competing dailies.⁴

The lessons of these trends are painfully clear. In the uncertain world of modern journalism, a clear advantage lies with those papers that can hold and add to large circulations. To do so, they must appeal to larger and larger audiences and eschew features and views which might alienate groups of potential readers. All too often this is achieved by watering down the paper's clear-cut character, especially by avoiding political items that deviate from prevailing norms and raise too many hackles. A further temptation is to increase the amount of space devoted to trivial affairs and to treat politics mainly in terms of "human interest," freakish happenings and colourful personalities; to conceive of newspapers, in other words, more as daily magazines than as reports. Thus adjustments in a paper's policies that originate on the business side take their toll in the reduction of political impact.

The News Agencies

The need to report at least something of the ever widening activities of government has also changed the character of the press. No paper today, however public-spirited or wealthy, has the staff or the expertise to cover adequately the many centres of political decision. In order

¹ Compared to 45 per cent in 1948. *Royal Commission on the Press 1961-62*, Cmnd. 1811, par. 18.

² F. L. Mott, *American Journalism*, 3rd ed. (New York: 1962), 861.

³ *Royal Commission, 1961-62*, par. 27.

⁴ Raymond B. Nixon, "Trends in Daily Newspaper Ownership Since 1945," *Journalism Quarterly*, XXXI (Winter 1954), 7.

to fill the gap, newspapers have had to turn increasingly to two kinds of packaging services: news agencies and public information officers.

Such massive and efficient news-gatherers as Reuters, the Press Association, the Associated Press and United Press International undoubtedly give the readers of subscriber papers a quick picture of happenings in places that could not conceivably be reported directly by any single paper. Co-operative ventures in news coverage have widened the horizon of press coverage immeasurably, but it is doubtful if they have done much to deepen the quality of news analysis. In most cases heavy reliance on this source for the news has sapped the distinctive political character that papers could project when they were able to cover a narrower scene with their own staff. By their nature, the wire services must cater to hundreds—in America thousands—of papers, large and small, sophisticated and provincial. Their managers know full well that the product is apt to be juggled, truncated or butchered before it reaches the reader. As a result, agency news reports are aimed at a shapeless common audience and are likely to be fragmentary and antiseptic, heavy on “official facts” and light on background, criticism or selective judgment. The widespread use of political news derived from these sources may support the claim that the press is reporting more about government than ever before, but at the same time the reader finds himself increasingly bereft of the kind of cues about the context and significance of news that once he was given by men who both gathered and printed the news as they saw it.

The Government Information Service

The press's commitment to convey news of the vast activities of government, combined with the desire of public officials to explain and gain support for their programmes, has spurred the growth of public relations in politics. While publicity has been a fixture of American politics for over fifty years, in Britain the extensive use of press and information Officers did not develop until the Second World War. Today each country is amply supplied with officials whose task is to see that the press is given information on the plans and policies of government, sometimes in the form of publishable handouts, often through background briefings “not for attribution.” A Washington reporter has estimated that he and his colleagues are serviced by over 3,000 government information officers—more than twice the size of the press corps in the capital.⁵ The tables of the National Press Club groan under a mountain of daily handouts. Although British journalists are not as elaborately dealt with, the situation is rapidly

⁵ Douglass Cater, *The Fourth Branch of Government* (Boston: 1960), 5.

moving in the same direction. The Central Office of Information churns out a flood of documents; each Whitehall department has its press section (co-ordinated by the Treasury); the Prime Minister briefs the press through his aides; and there is a minister of Cabinet rank charged solely with stimulating the flow of information to the mass media.⁶ Thus the working journalist is seldom at a loss for material; his problem is rather to decide how valid and useful it is for his newspaper.

The effect of the growth of governmental public relations cannot easily be ascertained. Two consequences stand out, however. The first is the increased access to political information that this degree of standardization has made possible. Whereas in the past reporters were left pretty much to their own devices, and prestigious or politically favoured papers were often able to scoop their rivals, today the great bulk of political news has become common property, conveyed to groups of reporters at news conferences, in behind-the-scenes briefings or in handouts for future release. This has helped to close the gap between the metropolitan and the provincial press, between enterprising and indolent journalists, and between papers in and out of political favour. The gap has not disappeared entirely, of course: the *New York Times* man may be given more top-level interviews than the *Podunk Gazette's* representative, *The Times* greater access to the inner circle of the Foreign Office than the *Tolpuddle Advertiser*. But a greater standardization of political news has emerged from this less competitive situation. This has contributed to a second trend: the declining ability of journalists to get behind the handout, to pursue the real meaning of the official explanation. The increasing availability of public information officers has encouraged government officials to channel all contact with the press through these regulated peep-holes; as a result, alternative sources (which permit cross-checking of stories) have tended to dry up, as reporters are told by old departmental contacts that they must get their news from the press officer instead. Some journalists are persistent or skilled enough to still do their own digging, but many become discouraged over the pervasiveness of “channels” or find the handout an easy crutch in a busy, confusing day. One cannot blame them for wanting guidance or official assurances that they have their stories correct. (Their editors also will breathe easier in the knowledge that they are avoiding the treacherous waters of libel suits and contempt citations.) The fact remains that the very scope of government

⁶ The governing party is seldom satisfied that the achievements of its leaders are communicated effectively to the electorate. An example is the debate on government information at the 1962 Conservative Party annual conference.

operations has made this type of public relations necessary; but widespread reliance on this source, like the wire services, has robbed the press of a bit more of its individuality in judging political affairs.

Different Approaches to the News

A realistic assessment of the political role played by the press in these two societies must take into account not only the common trends just mentioned, but also significant differences in the character and institutions of politics. A systematic statement of these would require more space than is presently available. I will therefore concentrate on two conditions which I believe influence strongly the manner in which political news is communicated: the degree of geographical integration and differential access to the news.

Visitors to Britain are quickly struck by the wide gap, in seriousness and circulation, that exists between the few quality and the numerous popular papers. This latter-day extension of the "two nations" frequently has been explained in terms of the class and educational differences that divided the country during the late nineteenth century, when the modern press took shape. To this condition must be added another, which helps to explain why Britain, unlike the United States, is full of newspapers which can afford to appeal to more specialised readerships. I refer to the more truly national character of British society, a product of geographical compactness and a history of political centralization. Because a genuine national communications system exists, a considerable division of labour within the press is possible. For example, the BBC has come to enjoy a high reputation for careful, factual reporting of the "hard news" of domestic and international events; indeed, it serves many Britons as their chief source for this type of news. Its ubiquity permits local newspapers to concentrate more on purely local concerns, or on giving national news a local slant. Furthermore, because of the BBC's coverage the national quality papers feel less compelled to report as much "hard news" as is the case in other countries. They can, instead, devote a great deal of space to editorial interpretation, specialized reporting and background pieces. And the mass popular press can throw its forces into the pursuit of entertainment and diversion.

Thus while each type of paper may strike the outside as strangely lacking in balance, the total communications system offers enough variety to permit the average Briton (if he wishes) to get a fair balance between hard news, interpretation and the lighter side. Admittedly, the balance is not perfect, and a sizeable gap between the information

and cultural level of the two kinds of national papers persists. But this division of labour, made possible by the national character of the society, at least offers scope for the presentation of varied political views.

The Lack of National Dailies in US

By contrast, in the still largely provincial United States, with few if any national papers,⁷ and only partially national electronics media, the press is required to be more multi-purpose, blending together an often confusing mixture of national news, local news, "think pieces" and entertainment for largely undifferentiated audiences. What "balance" there is comes from the felt need to print something for everybody in a paper's circulation area, and from a distaste for comment that might offend major groups of subscribers. With a handful of exceptions, the American newspaper press is remarkably uniform in appearance and character: bland, self-satisfied, fragmented by advertising and uncertain over the political role it should play. This may help to explain the amazing appeal of *Time* magazine, which, infuriating as it may be to many enlightened Americans, nevertheless manages to convey a distinctive political personality.

Paradoxically, at a time when the centre of popular attention has shifted to national and overseas areas, most papers are able to speak with authority only on state and local issues. Furthermore, because American papers are so numerous and so widely dispersed, they are highly dependent on wire services, syndicated political features and the daily outpourings of columnists writing for hundreds of subscribers, material that detracts further from any single paper's ability to convey a clear political orientation. The problem is not only geographical; it is also a reflection of the constitutional decentralization of the American system, which creates so many centres of political decision that the press is hard put to cover them all in depth or with assurance. Like the voter, the press is expected to keep its eyes on all rings at once. How its practitioners must envy those from whom London provides all the political news that's fit to print, and whose political orientation can be fixed largely in terms of national controversies.

Political Secrecy and Reticence in Britain

While a torrent of words about the activities of government is released daily in both countries, journalists generally find it more difficult to get basic political news in Britain than in the United States; and even

⁷ Except the low circulation, special audience *Wall Street Journal* and *Christian Science Monitor*, and the *New York Times*, now published in New York and Los Angeles.

when they are given access to it, they are often more constrained from publishing what they have learned. Official doors swing open less readily, and reporters must cultivate the habits of speculation and detective work from secondary sources. For example, the British political journalist, unlike his American counterpart, must wait fifty years for Cabinet papers to become available, and the ministerial oath to observe the Official Secrets Act often prevents politicians from "telling all" even years after the event. Until six years ago the notorious 14 Day Rule forbade the mention on radio or television of any legislation during the fortnight preceding its discussion in Parliament. These distinctions can be overdone, of course, for there is hardly a news blackout in London or constant light in Washington. But the testimony of dozens of journalists who have covered the two capitals bears out the impression that marked differences in access do exist and influence the scope of political journalism in different ways.

What accounts for these differences? For an answer one must look to several aspects of the two cultures, in particular traditional attitudes towards authority, social status, legal norms, and constitutional and political institutions. It is necessary first of all to recognize the consequences of the differing views of government authority held in Britain and the United States, which might be described as hierarchical and populist, respectively. Despite its basically democratic content, British political society is suffused with aristocratic habits of mind, so that the conduct of government is still regarded with a degree of awe by the populace, who are less inclined than Americans to demand full exposure of the activities of ruling groups. This continuing deference to establish authority means, as Edward Shils has pointed out, that "The citizenry and all but the most aggressively alienated members of the elite do not regard it as within their prerogative to unmask the secrets of the Government, except under very stringent and urgent conditions."⁸ American society, on the other hand, has developed on a foundation of distrust of aristocratic pretensions and suspicion of government, attitudes that foster the belief that machinery must exist to throw the light of publicity into every nook and cranny of political decision. Its newspapers traditionally have been expected to be exposers and crusaders, poking into the conduct of government at all levels and regularly pointing the finger of accusation. To the extent that attitudes such as these are shared by politicians, journalists and the public in each country, they effect the ease by which the press is able to obtain full information about the operation of politics.

⁸ E. F. Shils, *The Torment of Secrecy* (London: 1956), 49.

The Status of the Journalist

The social status of the men who gather news is also important to the question of access. In neither country does the journalist enjoy top prestige, but on this score the American does better; he is able to deal with policy makers on a more equal level. He partakes of the higher regard in which the press has always been held in his country; for while in Britain a free press developed fitfully and only after the major political institutions had matured, in the United States it grew up with the country. Indeed, it was an active power in making the nation. Newspapers were important organs in the struggle for independence; they were the forum in which the debate over the ratification of the Constitution took place; they propagandized the settling of the West and were regarded as indispensable status symbols for every new town; and they were instruments for holding together, politically and commercially, a vast, scattered society. As a result, the reporter as well as the editor and publisher came to enjoy an established place in the community. He did not, as the late Colonel McCormick once remarked of British journalists, behave as if his proper point of admission was the servants' entrance. And because of the absence of strong class lines, American reporters do not feel themselves at a social distance from the officials with whom they come into contact. Like those whose activities they report, the majority of American journalists today are middle-class university graduates, trained to regard themselves as members of a profession. (In 1958, there were 112 departments or schools of journalism in the United States; in Britain there were none.)

The Education of Journalists

In Britain, by contrast, journalists (unlike most MPs and higher civil servants) are still recruited largely from secondary schoolboys.⁹ In a political system where many decisions are made on an "old boy" basis, often in clubs to which no working journalist has the status or income to aspire, it is less easy for reporters to achieve easy relations with key policy makers. This social gap is apt to widen when the Conservatives are in power;¹⁰ it is also reflected in the varying statuses that attach to quality and popular newspapers in Britain. Needless to say, access to information is not wholly dependent on the social relationships of pressmen and politicians. There is also the question

⁹ With the possible exception of leader writers. A member of the most prestigious group of reporters, the Parliamentary Press Gallery, estimated for me that no more than one-fifth of his colleagues were university graduates.

¹⁰ The MP-journalists are almost all on the Labour benches.

of how much the officials feel they *need* the press, as will be shown later. But the press is bound to be treated differently in a society where there is a lingering impression of journalists as consuls of the people and one where they are still often viewed as the hirelings of Grub Street. (A rich lode of politicians' comments on the press can be found in the House of Commons debates on the espionage trial of the unfortunate Vassall.¹¹)

The Law of Libel and its Effect

A further constraint on the gathering of political news is the law of the country governing national security and the defamation of reputations. Most journalists develop a working sense of what is legally permitted and do not bother with news that will never get into print. Both countries have laws hedging the press in some way—official secrets acts, libel laws, laws penalizing contempt of court and contempt of legislative bodies. British laws of this type are more severe and more likely to be enforced. For example, despite recent liberalization of the law of libel,¹² the fear of lawsuits arising from newspaper comment on the actions of government officials (as well as private persons) is seldom out of the mind of reporters. The propensity of British juries to convict and of judges to mete out stiff sentences and whopping fines are well known. American libel laws vary considerably from state to state, but on the whole "fair comment" is interpreted broadly and, for better or worse, juries are loath to convict, especially in cases involving politicians, who are expected to be more than normally thick-skinned. Perhaps the most striking differences occur over press comment on criminal proceedings. The American newspaper habit of printing full reports on the apprehension of alleged lawbreakers and of commenting freely prior to the actual trial has given rise to the accusation that justice is inhibited by a virtual "trial by newspaper" (though the practice has been defended as encouraging more witnesses to come forward). By contrast, English law not only forbids the publication of any but the barest facts about a crime until court action begins; it even exposes to contempt proceedings a newspaper that advocates the prosecution of persons who, unknown to it, may already be under arrest.¹³ The temptation to steer clear of comment on the administration of justice is therefore great, for, as *The Times* has

¹¹ 571 *Houses of Commons Debates* 385-523 (14 November, 1962).

¹² Through the Defamation Act of 1952, an outgrowth of the report of the Porter Committee, Cmd. 7536 of 1948.

¹³ See the cases cited in *Contempt of Court: A Report by JUSTICE* (London: 1959) and the strictures of Cecil H. King in *The Press and the People: 9th Annual Report of the General Council of the Press* (London: 1962), 11-15.

pointed out, "Though those who lay crime bare may be thought to act in the public interest, they are themselves potential criminals."¹⁴ British law is assiduous in protecting the reputation of the citizen and in restraining the press from undertaking certain kinds of probes; American law, on the other hand, while it guarantees many civil liberties also allows greater latitude for press excursions in what Britons would regard as the domain of privacy.

The Value of the Press to Politicians

Political information is likely to flow more freely in systems that are loosely organized and made up of many competing parts. The constitutional and political structure of Britain is—at least as compared to the American—tightly knit and cohesive, with few independent seats of power and easily accessible dissentients. With its fusion of functions, its doctrine of collective responsibility and its disciplined civil service, it offers the press only a controlled number of points of entry. The tradition that all major decisions should be announced first to Parliament, for instance, has prevented the full flowering of informal instruments such as the well-publicized press conference, the trial balloon and the calculated leak, so useful to the press in other capitals. Press campaigns against government policies do occur in Britain, but they are likely to be sporadic and short-lived, partly because it is assumed that the parliamentary opposition is capable of filling the watchdog role without much outside stimulus. The strength of party loyalties (especially in Conservative ranks) also works against the steady flow of inside dope, though the net is drawn less tightly here than in executive decisions; politicians, particularly those on the losing side of party skirmishes, often leak news to the press in order to keep the issue alive in the wide public. Finally, it must not be forgotten that Westminster is still the principal arena for political battles and the advancement of careers. Every ambitious politician likes publicity, but the British politician needs to be less keen than the American to stay in the good graces of the press of his constituency and—if he has grander ambitions—of the nation. His chief concern is to cultivate his party colleagues, most of whom are immediately at hand and do not have to be addressed through the mass media.

One cannot conclude that the press in Britain is so far removed from the heart of politics as to be inconsequential. Clearly both Government and Opposition leaders care how their activities are reported and interpreted. Behind-the-scenes briefing of the sixty-odd

¹⁴ "New Muzzle for a Free Press," June 17, 1958.

lobby correspondents is a regular and elaborate procedure. Not surprisingly, either, the press occasionally is used to fly kites to test public reactions to proposals under consideration, and reporters can rely upon a network of contacts for news or accounts of secret proceedings.¹⁵ But this kind of access does not give much power to the press. Now that politicians can go to the public directly on television, they feel less need of journalists than in the days when Northcliffe, Rothermere and Beaverbrook were names to be reckoned with. The sense of mutual dependence between press and government has not been developed very far in contemporary Britain. Without it, the press can be a useful adjunct to the process of government, but it cannot be a genuine Fourth Estate.

The American press enjoys a more supra-constitutional role. This is especially true of the Washington correspondents, but it is also characteristic of the press in state and local affairs.¹⁶ Since the very beginning, when Americans opted for a constitution that limited and fragmented political power, the press has served as one of the informal populist checks on government. The American system, with its numerous competing elements, offers plentiful opportunities for non-elected, non-responsible persons to participate actively in official decisions. The continuous tension and occasional warfare between the President and Congress, between House and Senate, between various committees and commissions and bureaucratic agencies (e.g., the armed services or the Army Engineers and the Department of the Interior's Reclamation Bureau) create the need for systems of communication which the formal political structure cannot satisfy. The unpredictability of party loyalties, too, gives power to those in a position to trade in inside political dope. Coalition-building is a necessity for both Presidential and Congressional leaders, and to do it successfully they must have all the intelligence information they can get. In such a milieu, the opportunities for the fruitful mingling of journalists and officials are many.

The Calculated Leak

In the bargaining ethic so characteristic of British and American politics, access to political news is likely to go to those with something to offer the keepers of such treasure. Governments need publicity

¹⁵ It is fairly common, for example, for ministers to take special note of the queries put during lobby press conferences as being typical of the public reaction their policies might receive.

¹⁶ Full descriptions of the life of the Washington journalist are found in Leo Rosten, *The Washington Correspondents* (New York: 1937) and Douglass Cater, *op. cit.*

for their policies in order to promote efficient administration and improve their electoral position.¹⁷ The press is thus in little danger of being frozen out of its political role. But because of the constitutional and political factors cited above, the American press is in a better position to bargain. It can offer politicians a platform to advance their own careers or get at their rivals. (Witness the phenomenal grip Senator McCarthy had on even unsympathetic journalists because of his awareness of their needs.) Occasionally the press can hoist nonentities to national fame. Through calculated leaks an administration can test new programmes before they are formally unveiled, gain attention for hitherto neglected programmes,¹⁸ put pressure on foreign powers, and even release damaging "confidential" information about its own members to prepare the way for their demotion or departure. (It has been suggested that the Kennedy Administration has employed this latter tactic in the cases of Chester Bowles and Adlai Stevenson.) It may be an overstatement, but one gets the feeling that if the cardinal sin for the Westminster journalist is the publication of information given him in confidence by government officials, the equivalent sin in Washington is the failure of a reporter to give prominence to news leaked to him by an official whose plans call for its "indiscreet" publication.¹⁹

Trading Access to News for Influence

The American journalist, then, seldom is troubled by the problem of access to essential political news. Even in the area of defence, as the press reaction to the Pentagon's news blackout at the height of the Cuban crisis showed, the flow of inside information has been extensive. (At the very time that Joseph Alsop complained about "total news control" by the McNamara regime, his brother Stewart published a detailed story on American defence planning based on interviews with forty senior Pentagon officials.) Compared to his British brothers, he is in a better position to get behind official statements and to print the results of his probing.

For this power the total system—of press and politics—pays a price, however. The very closeness of American journalists and politicians,

¹⁷ For some administrative uses of publicity, see Francis E. Rourke, *Secrecy and Publicity* (Baltimore: 1961), 124-48.

¹⁸ "The leak or exclusive story is rarely an example of a reporter's persistence and skill. More often it is simply an evidence of the harassed necessity of some official to put a situation before the public with a spurious sense of drama in order to gain attention for it." William S. White, "Trying to Find the Shape—if any—of the News in Washington," *Harper's* (August, 1958), 79.

¹⁹ For a recent example, see Karl E. Meyer, "Ordeal by Leak," *New Statesman*, 14 December, 1962.

often bordering on collusion, makes it difficult for the press to achieve the perspective that distance can give. Newspapers are sorely tempted to do the bidding of officials, however unwittingly, in return for generous access to news. Thus the independent watchdog role of the "Fourth Branch of Government" can no longer automatically be assumed. More than the British journalist, who can take some comfort—as well as frustration—from his outsider position, the American reporter, like his newspaper, must wrestle with the ethics of power. He must be strong indeed not to use his power irresponsibly, to expose for the sake of exposing, and thus reduce further the general esteem for the political process.

If the British press suffers from a surfeit of barriers to the news, the low regard in which it is held, and a lack of aggressiveness in dealing with politics below the level of high policy, the chief defects of American political reporting are another sort: an absorption with trivial exposés, an overly homogeneous presentation of fundamental policies, and, in William S. White's phrase, "too damned much togetherness" in the world of politics and newsgathering. Though it sets limits to what the press can do, the government system does not rigidly dictate the political role of the press. It is hard to believe that the British press could not benefit from a healthy dose of Pulitzer-style journalism, just as the American press could from a bit more monasticism.

THE REFORM OF THE FIRM

LEONARD TIVEY

THE public ownership debate in the Labour Party seems to have exhausted itself for the moment. It has resulted in the compromise doctrines of *Signposts for the Sixties*: and prudent socialist politicians will no doubt let well alone.

At any rate it may now be possible to discuss industrial ownership and control without participating in the battle. For many years nothing on this subject could be published without being uncereemoniously (and often inaccurately) labelled pro- or anti-nationalisation. Now perhaps the control of industry can be examined a little more soberly without striking attitudes.

A beginning can be made by asking again the basic question: why are the capitalists the bosses? By asking, therefore, why are industrial units organised this way round? Why does capital hire labour, and not vice versa? Professor Phelps Brown has suggested that the basic reason was that wage earners did not show any capacity to manage or develop any business except co-operative retailing.¹ There is surely also an inherent difficulty for the relatively poor in undertaking risk-bearing, even collectively. But the need for managerial efficiency was at any rate the basic motive for the invention of the public corporation.

The dominant position of owners of capital (including land) has always seemed immoral, and not only because of the social inequality it breeds. It is all very well for "capital" as a factor of production to receive a share of the product: but this goes to its owners—to those with a merely legal (and hence artificial) claim to it. The shares of labour, enterprise and management go to those inherently concerned. They are inevitably personal, not the result of a man-made arrangement.

Opposition to Private Ownership

It is important to recognise the primacy of opposition to private ownership of industry over the apparent converse, advocacy of public ownership. The wrongs of private ownership are real, are seen and felt.

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¹E. H. Phelps Brown, *The Growth of British Industrial Relations* (Macmillan, 1959), page 210.

They should be reformed; and consequently some form of public ownership is recommended. Other systems—workers' or consumers' co-operation—are often taken to be different forms of public ownership. The development of these forms in variety is one approach to the problem, from which valuable results may flow. But it is possible that recent developments in capitalism, with some features of nationalisation, indicate another way of thinking about the problem, which might in the future lead to new methods of reform.

This is to substitute the concept of breakdown of ownership for that of transference of ownership. Ownership was once a fairly clear and coherent set of rights, a simple and straightforward situation. But this has been rendered so complicated that it is sometimes difficult to recognise the method of control as ownership at all.

The traditional rights of ownership are several. First, it involves the control of use: the right to deploy, to develop—that is, the managerial and the entrepreneurial function in industry. Secondly, it gives control of access—it can exclude others. Thus it implies the role of employer for the owner who wants others to co-operate in the use of his property. Thirdly, the right of disposal gives the right to transfer and the right to determine the transferee—hence the right to give away, to sell, to exchange and to bequeath (and inherit) property. Fourthly, ownership gives the right to the fruit of the property in use: whatever share of the product goes to property (i.e. capital) goes to the owner. There are also social consequences arising from different systems of ownership. Private ownership means that the owners of capital have extra income—a cumulative inequality, for this extra income enables them to make further investments, to make capital gains, and to give children a better environment and more expensive education, as well as bequeathing wealth. These economic advantages involve the consolidation of a social class and a political élite.

Recent Developments

The twentieth century has modified the crude simplicity of the ownership system. The adoption of limited liability put an intermediary between man and property—the Company. But since a man or small group could effectively control the Company, this did not disturb the situation very much. Three changes really have made a difference, however: first, the limitation of owners' freedom by legislation (such as town planning laws) and by national collective agreements about wages and other matters; and then by the multiplication of shareholders so that there were too many to act as a body; and now by the growth of secondary ownership—industrial firms being controlled by

insurance companies, banks, investment trusts and pension funds rather than directly by individual shareholders.

The private ownership system is therefore not what it was. The system has also been altered by the nationalisation of certain industries; and it is crucial to notice that this did not mean merely a transfer of ownership. Legally, assets were transferred from companies to a new entity, a public corporation. But this does not have anybody in the position of shareholders with their functions, their needs or their attitudes; and it is misleading to regard the community as stockholder, as do many authorities. The community gets no dividend payments and no one can transfer his holding. In fact, it is not enough to say that the industries have new owners, or even a new type of owner—the whole structure of power, administration and accountability has been changed.

Now, the development of modern capitalism and the practice of nationalisation shows that it is possible not only to transfer ownership but also to transform it—perhaps to do away with it altogether in some of its aspects. It should therefore be possible to take the concept to pieces, to make a new assessment of the situation and to devise policies for various facets. For this assessment we have to make up our minds about what is desirable and what undesirable in current developments in industrial control; and to devise means of encouraging the former and restraining the latter. In order to do this we need some further understanding of the nature of the organisations we wish to reform. But the fundamental principle should be to recognise the breakdown of traditional ownership, and therefore to extend some features of the situation while moderating others.

The early advocates of the public corporation saw the need for effective direction of non-capitalist organisations. They were right to reject syndicalism, radical decentralisation, producer co-operatives and government departments as inadequate in this respect. To provide flexible management, independent power and authority for the controllers of enterprise are essential.

Industrial public corporations are, however, extremely large and often cumbersome bodies. They are not failures; the wide international acceptance of the principles they embody is evidence enough of that. For very large organisations with a monopoly element they are surely the most adequate instrument, and in these cases changes should be sought in terms of improving the working and control of this type of industrial unit. Nevertheless, other forms are now required, if any advance is to be made in the relationship of industry to society—

forms suited to organisations on the scale of the "large firm" (rather than the "industry" which is nationalised), suited to multi-product trading, to distribution and other services, and to flexible and competitive operation free from intimate Government control. In short, we need reform of the existing type of unit, of the firm.

Political Nature of the Firm

But we need a more searching analysis of the firm in order to discover what might be done; and it is important to realise that this should be a political analysis. We should look at the governing board of a public corporation or a large private firm in political terms—that is, as a focus of power and influence, subject to some controls and pressures, and able to exert others. It has often been said that the crucial question is not who owns industry, but who controls it. But as in any political organisation, what matters is not so much *who* controls, but what obligations these controllers have to meet—what situation they are in, what pressures there are moulding their decisions. In capitalist firms their primary obligation, legally and socially, is to the owners of the equity. In public corporations it has come to lie with, in practice, the requirements of the Government of the day. Some of the main questions to be decided, therefore, are what situation the controllers should be in, how their decisions should be moulded; and how to put them in this situation.

This political nature of the industrial enterprise, in respect of its internal structure, has been inadequately recognised; and this has affected the way private enterprise concerns are criticised, and the way public corporations are organised. But it is crucial to observe the distinctive political character of the firm. It is neither a nation-state, where citizenship is virtually compulsory, nor an entirely voluntary association. Leaving a firm is both a penalty and a right. Like armies and political parties, firms are essentially combat organisations, in constant rivalry with one another. The loyalty of employees is a dubious virtue, for general economic welfare may be served by desertion. Among the multiplicity of interests which it exists to serve there are a number internal to the firm—but the firm does not exist, like a club or a nation-state, primarily for the sake of its members.

In fact, the direction of major enterprises is a political or governmental activity because it involves the adjustment and reconciliation of a variety of aims. Furthermore, there is room for dispute about the relative values of these aims. It is therefore a mistake to look on control as "management" or "administration", in the sense of

activities directed towards a single or simple set of goals. Fundamental improvements in the control of industrial bodies will not be achieved unless the needs to balance interests and to make judgments about objectives are recognised as the tasks of their leaders.

On the occasions when the political nature of industrial control has been noticed, the political analysis has generally been inadequate. Thus a weakness of simple notions of workers' control has been this inadequate appreciation of the specific nature of the firm and its particular political characteristics; and so they merely carry over conventional ideas about the democratic organisation of countries or voluntary associations. The firm is not like these bodies, and its government poses special problems. Democracy is generally taken to be a system where the "governed" can ultimately control the governors, and it is defended on the grounds that those affected know best "where the shoe pinches". But employees are not the only ones affected by the decisions of a firm, and hence are not its only appropriate constituents. Firms are contingent institutions, not sufficient unto themselves.

The firm has been described by Dr. Norman Ross² as "a plural society", and he emphasizes that it cannot be understood as a unitary organisation with a simple hierarchy of authority. Different people, different groups within a firm, expect different things from it; and they have varying degrees of commitment to it. A satisfactory system of government within a firm should recognise, then, that there are several different groups with different interests connected with it, and the system should provide a means of reconciling these interests which is acceptable to the various groups.

As indicated earlier, it is also a mistake to regard a firm as having a single overriding objective. Capitalist firms have usually regarded maximum profit as such an objective, and some economists have encouraged them in this view. But the place of a firm in society is not so simple: its achievements cannot be assessed by accountancy alone, nor by measurement of productivity. By the location of its plant and by the techniques it uses it imposes a pattern of life on all its employees whatever their status, and by the skills it fosters it helps to shape the education—and thereby the culture—of the communities in which it operates. Businesses should not be allowed to abdicate responsibility for any consequences of their actions. It is sometimes argued that the purpose of a firm is efficient production, and that is the end of the matter. But a great deal depends on what "efficient" is taken to mean, and how it is assessed. The main purpose of a school is

² N. S. Ross, essay on British industrial relations, in E. M. Hugh-Jones (ed.), *Human Relations and Modern Management* (North-Holland Publishing Company, 1958).

education, yet we do not judge it by examination results alone; and though the main purpose of a newspaper is to be read, we expect more of it than a large readership. The customers of a firm, and ultimately final consumers, expect from it high-quality low-cost goods. But its workers expect secure, highly-paid employment; the capital-owners hope for large returns; neighbours look for co-operation in civic projects; and currently the community needs a special effort to raise exports. It is the duty of firms to work towards an amalgam of these, and other, objectives; and their achievement cannot be reckoned by any simple criterion.

The Providers of Capital

What are needed, then, are systems of control more complex, and more responsive to varying pressures, than "ownership". The controllers of industrial enterprises should be put in positions where "management" (better called government) means more than the skilled deployment of productive forces.

What developments in large public companies would be conducive to these ends? Company directors often like to describe themselves as trustees for the community. They should be taken seriously. They should be made responsible—that is, accountable—to those whose lives they affect. Their authority should not be lessened, but it should be legitimised: it should be made clear that it derives not from the owners of the capital but from all the interests it affects. This is most important where enterprises are capitalist-owned, because at present these are oriented towards serving one interest before all others—serving other interests is merely a means whereby, ultimately, distributed profits can be maximised. But, surprisingly enough, the same defect also arises in publicly-owned enterprises. We are sometimes told that the community is the stockholder, or that Parliament (or its committee) functions as a shareholders' meeting. These are misleading concepts. The community, and its Governmental agents, should be concerned with the general interests of all people affected, with no special regard for the capital invested. In Britain, the Treasury finds itself in the position of a banker who has lent money to a Corporation: and it is entitled to the lenders' proper rights over capital provided. Nevertheless, if the Government and Parliament concentrate their attention on this aspect of the Corporations, they echo the central capitalist blasphemy—the granting of full power to one interest out of many, the providers of capital.

From the point of view of establishing industrial trusteeship, it is

a notable advance for control to be in the hands of professional managers. But the régime is still a form of capitalism—the capitalists may be inactive but their interests still must come first. James Burnham suggested in *The Managerial Revolution* that the managers of industry would come to resent capitalist control and would institute instead some form of state ownership. In fact, managers passionately prefer private ownership because there is no active interference from the shareholders: their wants (dividends, growth) are provided for impersonally, and in practice the power of the managers is free from interference—whereas for public corporations an elaborate scheme of accountability is imposed. Coupled with the natural sympathies of social class, this means that a capitalist atmosphere persists. Yet from this situation a line of improvement is clear: managers are the appropriate "professionals" to control industry, as journalists are the right people to run newspapers and musicians the proper controllers of orchestras. It is the conditions under which their power is exercised that need to be adjusted.

Industry of course will always need to draw some of its capital from private saving. Moreover, lenders are entitled to some say in how their money is used. Nevertheless, their present dominance needs to be ended, and two contemporary developments could be used with radical effect.

In the first place, shareholders can be deprived of controlling rights—in particular of the right to choose the governing boards. The "A" share (now under much criticism in financial circles) is a device to this end. In current usage it merely deprives a section of the capital-providers of voting power. Similar devices could weaken the power of all shareholders, and the right to elect directors dissociated from shareholding. Most boards are already in practice recruited by internal promotion, but a change in theory would accentuate the shift in social orientation of the firm. The legitimacy of the board's claim to direct the firm, that is to say, would not longer be derived from the shareholders, but would be functional—it would be valid if the board could show that it was attempting to satisfy all the interests dependent on the firm.

Secondly, the growth of secondary ownership could be encouraged and reformed; and thus the influence of capital lenders channelled through banks, insurance companies, investment trusts and the like. These should be agencies which put their public responsibilities first, and there should be a great measure of publicity and openness about the way they make their decisions. But they should remain autonomous institutions, and a market in capital thus preserved. The most

acceptable structure to aim at, in current circumstances, is one where personal savers invest in a variety of financial agencies, which in turn provide the capital of industry, largely through non-voting securities. Through this secondary ownership, capital lenders would exert influence on industrial enterprises. Their satisfaction would no longer be the *raison d'être* of the economic system: but the various lending agencies would be able to bargain with borrowing firms about the supply and resupply of funds, and thus not be powerless. Industry would moreover have a source of capital apart from the internal savings of the firm and the Government. In short, the investor should be conceived as a lender of capital, and not as the purchaser of a share in control.

Would institutional investors be stronger and more vigilant than personal shareholders? Certainly they would be more professional, more expert, and yet it would frustrate the purpose of reform if they were able to force firms to distribute earnings that would be better ploughed back. For this reason, some measure of public control, perhaps even in the public corporation style, might be necessary. Investing agencies should not only be the servants of the savers and lenders: they have duties to industrial borrowers too, and they should accept moderate dividend policies. The interposition of this institutional stage between the dividend-hungry individual and the firm would, in fact, make farsighted capital policies easier to maintain.

Workers and Managers

If the power of the capitalist over firms has become remote but pervasive, then that of the employers has been immediate but narrowly restricted. No reform of industrial organisation that fails to give employees greater influence over the policies of the firms in which they work is worth considering; but no reform giving real promise of this has yet been made compatible with dynamic enterprise.

The Liberal Party has proposed, in a report on *Industrial Affairs* of June 1962, a scheme for the indirect election of Boards of Directors. These would be chosen by an Annual Representative Meeting consisting half of shareholders' representatives and half of employees' representatives. The authors are sanguine that this would not create deadlock; but they do not notice that it is obviously a bargaining situation, to be settled by negotiation. Nor do they consider the probability that elections to the A.R.M. will be "organised" by groups, that representatives will be committed supporters of slates of directors, and that prospective directors and their backers at the A.R.M. will

have to make policy promises. Individual merit would no doubt count for something, but it would scarcely be as decisive as the scheme supposes. The whole proposal is subjected to trenchant criticism in a Note of Dissent by Miss Nancy Seear, and there is little doubt that it will have to be drastically revised. It is an interesting example of the persistent naïveté about the electoral process noticeable in the Liberal Party.

It is likely, in fact, that any actual electoral arrangements within the firm would fail. There are no grounds, however, for regarding the brisk decision-making necessary at the top of big firms as being incompatible with strong pressures from within. Loyal or not, many employees are heavily committed to service in special situations in particular organisations. All are engaged in highly interdependent and co-operative work, and a large number are in positions needing responsibility and initiative. It is absurd that the government of any such groups should be effected by simple line-of-command management structures, and by the reactionary notion of management prerogative. These primitive principles have no basis in justice or democracy, and in advanced societies in the second half of the twentieth century their efficiency can scarcely be credited either. Industrial relations and industrial organisation will not be improved by merging the workers' interests in the firm into a streamlined continuum; the need is to see that their interests are satisfactorily adjusted and balanced with the other objectives of the firm.

The first political essential is therefore to welcome group activity in the firm, and to legitimise discussion and pressure on all aspects of the firm's activities. This should lie between any groups within the firm, and should not be presumed to be always a labour-management affair. To this end, representative councils in some form might provide helpful machinery, especially if they provided links between various factories and offices and the headquarters of the firm. But some real sanction, however limited in scope, would be worth more than any machinery. For the employed to realise that the firm could not take *some* action without their active consent would be the start of a transformed situation. Clearly, wholesale transfer of control, by merger or otherwise, is the prime instance of a situation where the will of the majority should prevail over the leadership of the managers.

If all shares became non-voting ones, of course, then take-over bids from outside would be impossible. But so complete a change is likely to take time, and while any voting shares are on the market, some institutional battles between investment agencies are feasible. In any case, the negotiated merger would continue to flourish. In

addition, as a replacement for the financial bidding and counter-bidding now usual, there could be provision for a firm aiming at a merger (if it fulfilled prescribed conditions of resources and status) to demand a poll of the established employees of another firm, over the heads of its directors. In order to assure their position, therefore, a managing board would have to cultivate the confidence of their employees. This would be a beginning, at any rate, to democracy in industry; and unlike the election of boards, it would be a situation in which a dynamic team of managers would have a chance to prove itself.

Accountability

The proposals so far look like managerialism with a vengeance, and unrestrained managerial power may seem no great improvement on unrestrained capitalist power. In fact, there is pressing need already to make the managers accountable. In *Power without Property*, Adolf Berle suggests that "public consensus" limits their power. So it may; but it does not probe very deeply, and on some matters it is possible that the managers do a good deal themselves to shape the public consensus.

There is little doubt that more definite sanctions are needed. In its pamphlet on *Industrial Affairs*, the Liberal Party proposed that the responsibility of companies to a variety of interests should be legally established, and that men from the Board of Trade should attend company meetings to voice the public interest. But these would be effective only if some means of investigation and public discussion were made available—something that would do for large firms what the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries does for public corporations. There needs to be adequate outside knowledge of a firm's problems before the interest of public or final consumers can be worked out. Ultimately, any necessary action against firms, based on informed public discussion, should be taken by Ministers responsible to the House of Commons, either by initiating legislation or by administrative action.

It is sometimes suggested that competition has a contribution to make to public accountability. The reformed firms here suggested would be of course in competition with one another, and this is one of the advantages of dealing with industrial control in terms of the firm rather than the industry. Yet it would be an illusion to suppose that competition fierce and uninhibited can prevail if notions of wide responsibility, public accountability and plural values are held relevant to a firm's performance. Competition is an economic concept,

virtuous by economic standards of judgment, and yielding economic benefits. If we concede that these standards and these benefits are not overriding goals, then we must be prepared to temper the competitive process.

The Breakdown of Ownership

A system like this, if established, would bear little resemblance to an "ownership" system. Legally there would be, of course, an owner capable of suing and being sued and so on—but this would be the firm itself, the company as a legal personality. The capitalists would not be owners, but merely lenders; the Government would only have reserve powers based on its political sovereignty; the workers would have increased influence but no control; and though the managers' direct authority would be strong and unimpaired, their efforts would necessarily be bent to meeting a variety of obligations. The employees as a body would have the ultimate say in one ownership right, disposal of the property. The managers would be the main inheritors of another, the right to deploy and to act as entrepreneur. They would be also in an immediate sense the employers—but remuneration, engagement, dismissal and even promotion should be increasingly governed by rules (by laws, codes of practice, and national agreements) drawn up outside the firm. Some share of revenue would still be attributed to capital, and this would still reach the lenders: but the size of this share would be determined increasingly by a bargaining process (between the managers and the lending agencies) not dissimilar to the one now determining the rewards of labour.

The social consequences of capitalism, including the inequality of wealth it fosters, would not be resolved by the developments here advocated, and fiscal measures would still be necessary. But some good might be done by weakening the position of the capital providers. They would no longer be organisationally enmeshed with the controllers of industry. Their interests would be one set of interests among others. In practice, of course, managers would prosper and would be also investors; but they would at least be checked from consolidating their power in any single industrial unit.

The reform of the firm, involving the breakdown of ownership, is designed to follow certain contemporary developments. But it is necessary to modify or even divert these changes if they are to fulfill social purposes—that is, if they are to build a more democratic and egalitarian system in industry and commerce; and this can only be carried through by legislative, and hence political, action.

THE SOBLEN CASE

CEDRIC THORNBERRY

FOR the last ten years or so there has been, in the House of Commons each November, a small reunion of a handful of Labour M.Ps. It has been an infinitely nostalgic gathering, indulging pleasantly in cosy reminiscence of yesteryear. Mr. Sidney Silverman has sung a plaintive little song, and Mr. Paget and Mr. Michael Foot have sometimes entertained the company with a cross-talk act. Mr. Hale has delivered an eloquent monologue, full of light and shadow. For an hour or so the company has been good, the conversation warm and witty. Occasionally, a Tory back-bencher is discovered, asleep, in their midst, and when this happens the gentlemen are found in high glee, as the somnolent one is aroused, and departs, disgruntled. But then the Government sends down an Under-Secretary, with the revellers' hats and coats, to banish these wild spirits, and to move the House on to more serious matters; of deciding whether or not to allow Scottish schoolchildren under thirteen to leave their lessons and help with the potato harvest, and whether pigs have wings.

For the occasion is the committee stage of the Expiring Laws Continuance Bill prolonging, for another year, a variety of diverse matters which, but for it, would have become defunct. One of the provisions of the Bill relates to the Aliens Restriction Act, 1914, and to the Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act, 1919. These are the enabling Acts authorising the Orders in Council in which the main body of law regulating the entry, control and departure of aliens is contained. Chief amongst these is the Aliens Order, 1953. During this annual circus on the floor of the House the administration of our aliens law by the Home Secretary during the previous year is discussed, and the Home Secretary or his nominee reports to the House. Each year his draconian powers are deplored, and each year the absence of permanent legislation lamented. The House is regularly assured that the onus of administration placed exclusively on the shoulders of the executive is anxiously and humanely borne. Under the stewardship of Mr. David Renton, until last year Minister of State at the Home Office, the party remained nevertheless jolly, enjoying, it seemed,

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Mr. Renton's annual display of reassuring and ill-informed benevolence as much as did that Minister himself.

But by the autumn of 1962 all these things had changed. In the first place, there had in the preceding parliamentary session occurred the emotional experience of the passage of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill. The accompanying histrionics, as well as the detailed debating of its provisions, had stimulated public speculation on the broad subject of immigration and deportation. Secondly, a radical and widely-respected Home Secretary (Mr. Butler) had been replaced by Mr. Henry Brooke who, unhappily, enjoys no such reputation. Thirdly, during the parliamentary recess the last miserable months of Dr. Soblen had been lived out in a blaze of publicity which had served to throw into full sinister relief the provisions of our aliens laws. The popular imagination had been stirred by what was seen to be the relentless hounding of a pathetic, dying figure; and when the Expiring Laws Continuance Bill came up again on November 28 the occasion had lost much of its former whimsical domesticity.

Robert Soblen was Lithuanian in origin, and had emigrated to the United States just before the last war; there, he had become naturalised in 1947. In 1961 he was accused and convicted of conspiring to deliver secret information to Russia. The instances had occurred in 1944-5. Ultimately, after a series of appeals during whose pendency he was, because of the state of his health, released on bail, the Supreme Court rejected his case. On this same day, 25 June 1952, on which also his sentence of life imprisonment was to begin, Soblen, using the passport of a dead brother, fled from the United States to Israel. There he was held by the immigration authorities before being placed on a specially-chartered aircraft in company of a U.S. marshal and taken to Athens. At Athens, he was transferred to an El Al airliner bound for New York via London.

In the meantime, the British immigration authorities had been forewarned of the impending arrival of Soblen en route for New York. Under the Aliens Order the Home Secretary is empowered to grant or refuse leave to land as he wills, and need give no reason for his action. A notice was made out under the Order refusing Soblen leave to land. On this being served on an alien he may be held in custody until the Home Secretary sees fit to send him away. But between Athens and London, Soblen managed to inflict severe injuries upon himself and on the arrival of the plane at London he was rushed to hospital. When, after two days, he was out of immediate danger, the notice made out while he was on his way here was served on him in person.

The Meaning of "Leave to Land"

Proceedings were instituted in the High Court, challenging the legality of the order made against him. The point taken by his counsel was that he had received implied leave to land under the Order and that he could not subsequently be refused leave. If the Home Secretary wished to persist in his course, he must institute deportation proceedings against him under a different provision of the Order which, it was believed, would give Soblen rather more opportunity of avoiding return to the States. But the point was barely arguable and though the decision of the Divisional Court was taken to the Court of Appeal none of the six judges who heard it could find any merit in it. The understanding of the courts was that the existence of "leave to land", without which an alien may not, in general, legally enter the country, must be inferred from the circumstances of each individual case. Here, they said, no leave had been granted; the action had been taken solely to save his life. The notice had been served as soon as practicable. The way was now, apparently, clear for the Home Secretary to effect his purpose of sending Soblen on to New York.

Political Asylum Refused

At this point, however, two new factors appeared. In the first place, Soblen applied for political asylum. In the second, the Israeli government, whose action had at the time encountered little adverse domestic comment, found itself increasingly under pressure. The manner of Soblen's removal, rather than the fact of it, was the main ground for criticism. The opposition forced a vote of confidence in the Knesset, and though surviving it, Mr. Ben Gurion was visibly shaken. Israel decided on caution. But Mr. Brooke was in no such way inhibited. He told an apparently apathetic House of Commons that he had declined to grant Soblen asylum: though Mr. Silverman protested, the House was unimpressed—Mr. Silverman had often been heard to protest. Furthermore, it was the eve of the summer recess. Of the Home Secretary's refusal to grant asylum, more will be said later.

Directions were now given for Soblen's removal. The removal of an alien refused leave to land depends, under the Aliens Order, upon the co-operation of the carrier. Despite a broadside from Washington, directed at Britain and herself, Israel was reluctant. El Al flights were cancelled, and it was finally announced that if Soblen were placed on an Israeli aircraft he would be brought back to Israel. Her interpretation of her international obligation happily coincided with her proposed course of action: though, Israel said, she accepted that it had become

a customary rule of international law that a carrier should bring away aliens rejected by immigration authorities, no rule of international law imposed a duty on that carrier to take the reject to the destination named by the rejecting State. The exposition cannot be faulted.

The Deportation Order for Soblen

Apparently exasperated by Israel's action, Mr. Brooke now gave orders for Soblen's deportation to the United States; under the Order an alien may be deported by means of any ship or aircraft chosen by the Home Secretary. A deportation order may be made against any alien either where he has been convicted of an offence punishable with imprisonment and the court has made a recommendation to that effect (though the recommendation need not be acted upon); or where the Home Secretary sees fit—that is, without any previous proceedings at all or without any grounds being assigned for the action—other than that he "deems it conducive to the public good". Contrary to what seems to be generally imagined, the fifty or so aliens deported under this "umbrella" provision every year (another fifty are deported after recommendation by a court) are apparently very rarely subversives or secret agents; many of them are aliens who have been convicted but with regard to whom the court has decided to make no recommendation.

Counsel for Soblen now challenged the validity of the deportation order. They did so on four grounds. Whistling bravely, they contended that the Aliens Order was wholly *ultra vires*, as the enabling Acts were to apply only in time of war or emergency and were therefore dead or dormant. Had this enterprising argument been accepted the country would have found itself without any means of controlling the entry of aliens. But the point was patently bad—the terms "war or emergency" contained in the 1914 Act having been expressly omitted in the continuing provisions of that of 1919. The second point was that the "exclusion order" made against Soblen had not been lifted; consequently he was not, as it were, legally "here" at all for the purposes of the Order save for the exclusion provisions—and a deportation order could be made only in respect of a person who had at one time been granted "leave to land". This ingenious argument was superficially attractive, but again, it ignored the plain terms of the Order, which permit the Home Secretary to do this very thing.

A Denial of Natural Justice

The third contention required more consideration by the courts and

its rejection by them emphasises the obnoxiousness of our present aliens law. It is a principle of natural justice, often reiterated by the English courts, that before a man's person or property is interfered with by someone in authority, he should have the right to state his case. It is expressed in the maxim *audi alteram partem*. Soblen argued that the Home Secretary's power of removing an alien when he deems it conducive to the public good must be construed in the light of this principle, and that the order had been made without such a hearing. The courts, while accepting that ordinarily a man should be heard in his own defence, and that any statutory modification of the rule should be clear, held that such a modification must, by necessary implication, be read into the Order. For, in 1920, on the similar provision of an earlier Order, the Court of Appeal had decided that no such right was given. Parliament had, since that decision, had a number of opportunities on which to dissent from and alter the law laid down in it—but had taken no action. Therefore, the court said, they had no option but to declare that the point had no substance.

Illegal Extradition Alleged

Soblen's main argument was that the deportation order was a sham concealing a starkly illegal act of extradition. Deportation or expulsion are terms implying a unilateral act by which a country removes from its territory a person who has, for one reason or another, become undesirable. The essence of the phenomenon is being *rid* of the deportee. Extradition, on the other hand, involves the surrender by one country to another of a person who has been convicted of, or is wanted for, an offence committed in the latter—and it implies a bilateral arrangement.

This country was one of the last in Europe to accept the necessity for a general law of extradition—the mid-nineteenth century spirit of rabid liberal individualism which had, for example, brought down Palmerston over his innocuous Conspiracy to Murder Bill, being highly suspicious of any arrangement for the surrender of fugitives. It would, perhaps, be rather exaggerated to say that the mere fact of a man's being a fugitive from foreign justice *ipso facto* entitled him to sympathy and a hero's welcome in those times, but in Palmerston's day, at least, the tendency existed. And when eventually in 1870 provision was made in the Extradition Act to enable the executive to conclude and carry out extradition treaties, the passage of the Bill was resisted step by step. The Act governs our extradition practice today, and the suspicion of foreign justice which marked its birth is

still patent on its face. Extradition is restricted to a limited number of offences, and will not be ordered if the offence for which the fugitive's surrender is requested is of a political character or if it is believed that he will suffer political persecution if handed over. The requesting government must make out a *prima facie* case, according to English standards, of his guilt. Nor will he be surrendered if the act for which his extradition is requested is not criminal in this country. Counsel for Soblen argued that the United States and British governments were jointly conspiring to avoid the safeguards of the Extradition Act, well knowing that the man's surrender could not be obtained under it. To this end, the Home Secretary, on representations from the United States, was making use of his comprehensive discretion in making a deportation order and directing that Soblen be sent to America. This, said his counsel, was illegal, in that it amounted to an abuse of power.

It is certainly true that extradition could not have been successfully effected. Apart from the suspicion that the evidence on which he had been convicted was highly unsatisfactory by English standards there is the further point that his offence is unknown to the Extradition Acts. This would have been sufficient to scotch the thought of taking this kind of proceeding—but further, his offence was a political one.

Why was Soblen Returned to U.S.?

The United States had indeed made representations to the British Government—this much was admitted—but the terms of the representations were not given, the Crown claiming—as it is entitled to do with respect to this class of document—privilege from disclosure. Counsel for Soblen nevertheless argued that from the facts which were known an arrangement to extradite could be inferred. He instanced the Home Secretary's refusal to permit his client to return to Israel, or to go to Czechoslovakia (which had offered him a visa). The facts could not, he asserted, be consistent with the single intention of ridding the country of an unwanted alien—they implied, instead, an attempt to surrender a fugitive criminal to the State of conviction.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal on this persuasive argument is rather interesting. The court was unanimous in the opinion that the true nature of the order could not be discovered in its effect. Its identification must, rather, depend upon the purpose with which it was made. The mere fact, therefore, that Soblen's deportation to the United States would result in his being delivered into the hands

of his enemies did not invest the order with the character of extradition. The Master of the Rolls, Lord Denning, accepted the proposition that if the underlying purpose was extradition, then the court would intervene and restrain the Home Secretary from what would otherwise be an illegal act. But, he said, it was Soblen's duty to demonstrate the impropriety of purpose—in the sense that he must make out a *prima facie* case. (For it is presumed that an act is legitimate until the contrary be shown—*omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta*.) The Master of the Rolls pointed out that this would in any case be an immense task—because to demonstrate impropriety, the alien must show that the deportation order was made against him not because the Home Secretary deemed it conducive to the public good but because he sought to extradite. That the *consequence* of deportation was in fact the surrender of a fugitive alien was not conclusive—it was a neutral piece of evidence of no value to Soblen unless supported by other evidence tending to demonstrate impropriety of purpose. This, said Lord Denning, did not exist—the determination to send him back to the United States instead of to Czechoslovakia did not assist the alien. The Home Secretary was merely restoring the position which had existed prior to Soblen's self-mutilation. In short, Soblen had failed to make out a *prima facie* case; in that the evidence he adduced was as consistent with a desire to deport because he thought it conducive to the public good as with a desire to extradite.

But Lord Justice Donovan was apparently not prepared to accept this distinction between what was a proper and what an improper use of the power. He could see no reason why an order made with extradition in mind should not be a perfectly legitimate exercise of the discretion of the Home Secretary as to what was "conducive to the public good". The third judge, Lord Justice Pearson, found it unnecessary to decide the point—for in his view Soblen had not made out a *prima facie* case that the Home Secretary's purpose was extradition.

Has the Home Secretary an Absolute Discretion?

There seems to be no good reason why because of the terms of the Aliens Order or otherwise Lord Denning should have chosen the yardstick of propriety that he did. His choice is readily comprehensible—but it is of dubious validity. It seems improper thus to limit the plain meaning of the words of the Order conferring a virtually unlimited discretion upon the Home Secretary to deport any alien and, by choosing the means of his removal, in fact to control his destination. However much it might shock those who established our law of

extradition that its safeguards should thus be capable of evasion, the logic of Lord Justice Donovan's exposition of the Aliens Order seems irresistible. And there is no reason to suppose that the situation disclosed in the Soblen case is in any way novel. During the first World War, for example, the similar provisions of an earlier Order were made use of to execute what was in fact an extradition arrangement with France for the mutual surrender of nationals of the two countries avoiding national service. The procedure of extradition is expensive, and may be hazardous (because of the various restraints on its grant) if the fugitive's surrender is wanted badly enough. The State Department's archives have recently been shown to contain a number of requests addressed to the United States by Britain (amongst other countries) suggesting the return of fugitives by means of American immigration and aliens procedures. It is difficult not to infer from this that the requests have been made on the understanding that reciprocal arrangements will be made available in this country. To state this is not necessarily to imply a criticism. The Extradition Act should be no sacred cow. It may be that the nineteenth century extradition procedure is cumbersome and ill-suited to modern needs. The chauvinism prevailing at the time of its enactment may be out of tune with the harmonies sought through the Atlantic Alliance. If this be the case it would be well to say so.

No Legal Loopholes

It is to be remembered that the conduct of the Soblen case was, in terms of the present law, perfectly proper. Though one may quibble at some of the language used by the Court of Appeal, their decision is not one which the lawyer, confining himself to the law, can criticise on any more substantial ground. It may even be that the court overreached itself in seeking to be fair to Soblen. This, no doubt, was the motive which led the Master of the Rolls, in the writer's opinion, into error in exaggerating the powers of the court and of the rights of the alien faced by a deportation order made against him because it is "conducive to the public good". The discretion given the Home Secretary is in practice unbounded. He may, with an alien, in substance do as he pleases. He may admit, reject, and deport, and is answerable only to Parliament.

But this is not the result of the Soblen case. It is the consequence of the natural and logical meaning of the statutory provisions. The Soblen case has merely brought a somewhat tardy general realisation of their enormity.

The Right of Asylum

But what of the right of asylum for the persecuted, for which Soblen at one time applied, and for which Britain was once famous? Its existence in mid-Victorian times cannot be doubted—from 1826 until 1905 no means existed to prevent the entry of the disaffected and the non-conformist—nor, except under the Extradition Act, could they be sent away. Many European revolutionaries were welcomed, and it was not until they in their turn established other liberal constitutional States, and created a new kind of dissident, comprising communists and anarchists, that we again began to look to our ports. The gospel of the new deviationist threatened the security of this country as well as that of others, and an attempt was made to exclude him from the category of political offender—he was an “enemy of all civilised nations”. Our first modern Aliens Act—that of 1905—nevertheless stipulated for the right of asylum in certain cases.

The right was in its origin a true right, or competence, enjoyed by an individual under the law. In this country it referred to the practice of sanctuary in spiritual places which could be achieved by any malefactor. But in current international law, into which the doctrine has been assumed, it runs in favour not of the individual, but of the State to which he applies. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for instance, refers to it in these terms (Art. 14):—“Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution”. The late Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, British judge at the International Court, described this definition as “flippant”, and others, with an eye to the practice of States, tend to regard the “right of asylum” as something of a grim joke.

Is there a Liberal British Tradition?

Parliament is often told that the Home Secretary, in administering our aliens law, is religious in his observance of our tradition in this matter. On the other hand, we do not today keep open house, and every alien who claims to be admitted to asylum must satisfy our test of a political refugee. This test is that contained in the Geneva Convention on Refugees of 1951 and it is interpreted restrictively. The Home Secretary thus described it—“political asylum is granted only where there are grounds for believing that the life or liberty of the applicant would be in serious danger if he returned to his country, or that he would be subject to persecution of such a nature as to render life insupportable.” There is, of course, no way in which the Home Secretary’s decision may be challenged, except in Parliament. In the

past ten years a number of angry debates have been sparked off by decisions which have been considered inhumane. In these the charge has often been made that political asylum has today become nothing other than a weapon of the cold war. This has been as often denied, but it is difficult not to conclude that there is much substance in the allegation. Cases like those of Dr. Cort in 1954, and Soblen in 1962, have done a great deal to tarnish the image of an entirely objective Home Office adjudication.

Mr. Brooke, in refusing Soblen asylum, said that he was not a political refugee—he had been convicted of an offence by the courts of a country possessing democratic institutions. On the other hand there is no doubt that the offence for which he was convicted was of a kind which in the common practice of States and the opinion of international jurists was “political”. A curious situation therefore arose in which, though Soblen was a political offender who could not be extradited, he was not a political refugee “entitled” to asylum. But had he been convicted of espionage on behalf of the West by a Russian court, and escaped to Britain, it is inconceivable that he would not at once have been given asylum.

The Home Secretary’s Defence

It remains to be recorded that on the morning of the day on which Soblen was to be deported to the United States he killed himself by taking an overdose of drugs. Mr. Brooke was expected to defend his action when Parliament re-assembled. Instead, he chose to rely on passages carefully culled from the judgments in the Court of Appeal. In the writer’s opinion, the Home Secretary’s speech is unrivalled for sheer humbug in the years of alien administration since the last war. As Mr. Paget temperately remarked, such reliance would have been more convincing had he not chosen to suppress evidence vital to Soblen’s case.

This is not to deny that Mr. Brooke had been placed in a position of extreme delicacy and difficulty during the episode. One of the matters brought out by the case was that except under the Aliens Order there is no power by which we may surrender convicted or accused spies to our allies. Though these are political offenders, in that their crimes have been directed against the fabric or security of the prosecuting States, it must be a matter of very serious consideration whether arrangements should not be entered into, and powers circumscribed by proper safeguards, assumed to meet this situation. The writer finds some of the British reaction to the case rather

unattractive and irresponsible in its xenophobic suspicion of foreign justice, supported by an unreflecting idealisation of a past practice which was by no means so objective or impartial in its attitude to political offenders as is usually made out. It is a commonplace that the concept of political offence is highly subjective, in that any act deemed criminal under a system of law is in the ultimate analysis an offence against the body politic. The attitude adopted by any society to a supposed political offender will inevitably be coloured by its own basic interests and philosophies, political and economic.

The Law Needs Reform

But this said, there remains substantial ground for disquiet. The powers given to the Home Secretary under the Acts of 1914 and 1919 were intended as a temporary expedient, to meet a time of crisis. The form in which they were assumed is the form common to emergency legislation, in its comprehensiveness and its by-passing of the customary processes of the law. This form is now quite anachronistic in its secrecy and in the absolute discretion which it confers. It militates against all the traditions of natural justice implicit in the common law guarantees of individual liberty. It would no doubt astound many in this country as it would surprise lawyers in the United States that envious glances should be directed across the Atlantic at the administration of the McCarran-Walter Act. In few democratic countries today, however, can powers comparable to those of the Home Secretary be vested in any one administrative officer of state.

No Tribunals of Appeal

It was not, however, always so—by the Aliens Act of 1905 boards were created to which aliens refused permission to land could appeal. The ill-drafted terms of the Act, together with the erratic and unregulated behaviour of the appellate boards, have combined to give the Act a very bad name; it was something nasty which the Home Office once saw in the woodshed. Since 1914 no such appeals tribunal has existed—though in the thirties, and again since 1956, certain classes of alien ordered to be deported have had a right of petition to bodies whose function has been entirely advisory.

Parliamentary Control Inadequate

The Home Secretary has often said that alien administration can be controlled by Parliament much more readily if the exercise of power

remains his exclusive responsibility. But it may be thought that this is a lame and transparent rationalisation. The Home Office has become entrenched in the unregulated enjoyment of its powers over a period of fifty years and will not surrender them lightly, or without a struggle. When last year during the passage of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill the precedent of the 1905 appellate tribunals was cited, the Government asserted that the activities of those boards had prevented the Home Office from executing the will of Parliament expressed in the terms of the Act. The contention is scarcely maintainable—if fault there was, it lay in the limited scope of the legislation. For the Act did not attempt any quantitative but rather a limited qualitative control, which was restricted to a limited number of alien immigrants—those travelling steerage on vessels bearing a large number of immigrants. The “will of Parliament” as expressed in the Act was not at all what the Government last year said it was. It is, indeed, difficult to defend the erratic behaviour of the boards, but their effect on the admission of aliens was minimal. And it is a very long way in the history of administrative tribunals from 1905 to 1963.

The Government has in the past two years, in response to the perseverance of Mr. Paget and his friends, declared that legislation on alien control was in contemplation—but that it must await the result of the negotiations at Brussels. Nothing now stands in the way of a radical reform. It has indeed been called for over the last twenty-five years by every independent investigator of this part of our law. But there are no votes to be gained through a liberalisation of alien regulations and the benevolent despotism of the Home Office must first be overcome. Our problems are not the same as those of other countries and cannot satisfactorily be resolved by rash transposition of other laws and techniques of control; nor can or should all element of discretion be eradicated. But aliens should be treated not (as Mr. Gordon-Walker once happily observed) as “microbes invading the body politic”; rather, as human beings having had the misfortune to be born out of the United Kingdom.

In this context, Harold Laski once found unanswerable the warning of J. S. Mill—“Whatever are the reasons for conferring power, those also are the grounds for erecting safeguards against their abuse.” Dr. Soblen may yet prove not to have endured in vain.

WHAT SHOULD THE LORDS BE DOING?

BERNARD CRICK

ONCE more the mountain has laboured and has brought forth a mouse. The Parliament Act of 1948 brought Life Peers and Peeresses into the Constitution to strengthen the repute and efficiency of the House of Lords. And now the Joint Committee on House of Lords Reform¹ has proposed that hereditary Peers may renounce their titles and status for life, thus removing an injustice for some reluctant elder sons and, in some cases, for their loyal and unhappy constituents. Perhaps the Government may even accept its recommendations—they are, as we will see, modest enough. Certainly the Government will go no further. So another piece of patch-work is added to the already crazy quilt of modern government in feudal dress. A British Parliament can bring itself to tear apart and rebuild the whole administration of our largest urban area (albeit with a typical reprieve for the pageantry and futility of the City itself), but it still allows the mouse of reform only the smallest nibble at the ermine. The way in which the whole question of the House of Lords has been handled is now either beyond a joke or beneath contempt.

No lasting solution to the resulting set of anomalies, contradictions, privileges and inefficiencies will be achieved until both political parties are willing to look, not just at the question of powers and composition of the Chamber, either separately—which has been foolish enough—or even together, which has been deliberately avoided, but at the basic question of the function and utility of the Second Chamber in the context of the work of Parliament as a whole, indeed of the whole framework of British government and administration.

The Wedgwood Benn Affair

It is hard to keep a sense of proportion about the Wedgwood Benn affair. A personal wrong may soon be righted and perhaps it is a kind of victory for democracy that Peers may soon be able to divest themselves of nobility and run for the Commons. Even in our mundane

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¹ H.L. 23, H.C. 38 (Session 1962-63.)

WHAT SHOULD THE LORDS BE DOING ?

politics there is a bit of the romantic in us all which is joyful that a personal campaign such as Benn's can get so near success at all, amid the frozen prejudices and the well-disciplined party fears that have surrounded this whole problem. But the campaign was fought and won on a very narrow front. It was important not for its cause or effect so much as for the conditions it revealed.

Let us recall the main facts of the case. The First Viscount Stansgate was created in unusual circumstances. On 21 December 1941 a statement was issued from No. 10 Downing Street: "The King, on the advice of H.M. Government, has been graciously pleased to confer peerages upon four members of the Labour Party. These creations are not made as political honours or rewards, but as a special measure of state policy. They are designed to strengthen the Labour Party in the Upper House . . . at a time when a coalition Government of three parties is charged with the direction of affairs." He would certainly have been a Life Peer had the recent Act been then in force (or had an attack of the gout not afflicted Sir James Parke—later Lord Wensleydale—on the first day of Session 1856, preventing him from taking his seat and thus giving their Lordships time for second thoughts about accepting him as a Baron for life). Since this was a "special measure of state policy" there was an element of ungenerosity throughout in successive governments invoking heraldic precedent, rather than using the sovereign power of the Crown in Parliament to find some relief for the Member for Bristol, South-East, before the crisis came. A Private Bill and a Public Bill promoted by Benn were both rejected. Then, on 17 November 1960, the first Viscount died. The House of Commons referred to the Committee of Privileges Anthony Wedgwood Benn's claim that he was not disqualified.²

The Committee reported against Benn: that his "instrument of renunciation" had no legal effect; that his status disabled him, not the Writ of Summons to the Lords for which he had not applied;³ and that the issue of such a Writ, while plainly forcing someone to leave the Commons, yet constituted no breach of the Commons privileges.⁴ And they rather gratuitously added, after voting on straight party lines, that they neither recommended the introduction of a special Bill to help Benn, nor were they called upon to express any view about the desirability of general legislation. The Committee, while accepting the view that the House of Commons is the sole judge of the qualification

² 631 H.C. *Debates*, 171-174.

³ The current *Roll of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal*, (1) H.L., 1962-63, shows 68 peers who have never bothered to collect their Writs of Summons without which they cannot sit.

⁴ *Report from the Committee on Privileges*, 142 H.C., 1960-61.

of its members, yet hid behind the law. (And the story went around that one Conservative Member of the Committee persistently committed the politically Freudian slip of saying "Hogg" for "Benn".)

When the Report was debated and accepted, the House refused permission, voting again on strict party lines and against several clear precedents, for Benn to address them from the bar of the House on his own behalf. But on this division twelve truly honourable Conservative Members voted against the Government. Certainly, as one of the editors of *Public Law* wrote: "such a refusal must . . . have injured the reputation of the House for generosity, courtesy and fair play".⁵

Public opinion now entered into it, and Conservative M.P.s were left in no doubt from press, radio and television that Parliament had acted foolishly in the eyes of the public. It is hard to think of a case in which Parliament was so much at odds with an aroused and informed public opinion. The new Writ was at last issued for a by-election and Benn determined to stand. The Returning Officers have statutory power to refuse a nomination paper only if the formal particulars of the candidates and other persons subscribing the paper are not as required by law. Many odd holes in the Constitution began to appear. On 4 May 1961 Bristol returned Benn by 23,275 votes to 10,231, double his majority at the General Election, despite much publicity by his opponent that his election would be invalid. And so the Election Court found when his opponent, Mr. Malcolm St. Clair, petitioned it. Meanwhile the House, on 8 May 1961, yet again refused admission to Benn, though with growing ill-temper and doubt as it realised how clearly it was challenging the rights of the constituency; here was, indeed, the clearest clash between Parliament and a constituency since the days of Wilkes and the Middlesex elections in the 1760s, and between the hereditary and the democratic elements in the Constitution since 1911. But the Commons sheltered behind the Court.

There is no reasonable doubt of the legal soundness of the first part of the Court's judgment: that Benn was not elected because under a disability. He had argued that the disability of a Peer only arose from the incompatibility of duties imposed by the Writ of Summons. In practice the Crown only issues a Writ when applied for, and he had neither applied for nor received one. There were precedents on his side—the whole status of Peerage was much more uncertain and flexible until the mid-seventeenth century than today. But it is hard

⁵ Gordon Borrie, "The Wedgwood Benn Case", *Public Law*, Winter 1961, pp. 349-361; see also Peter Bromhead, "Mr. Wedgwood Benn, the Peerage and the Constitution", *Parliamentary Affairs*, Autumn 1961, pp. 493-506—both excellent accounts of the whole case.

not to follow Victorian judges who held that these precedents and practices had fallen into desuetude (there is now, as with modern ceremonial, a kind of bureaucratic freezing and codification of customs and pageants once far more fluid). The modern law was quite clear. But what were the sources of the law? Nothing was to be found in statute. The sources were, of course, the decisions of the courts; the opinions of writers of authority; and the reports of the Committees of both Houses. This reveals what was shabby in the whole affair. Clearly the Election Court would give most weight to modern decisions of Parliament itself. But the Committee on Privileges had itself refused to contemplate change or innovation. What was, in the eyes of the Court, the only unchallengeable source of new law in these matters, itself took political shelter behind a refusal to consider anything except the precedents and the opinions of writers of authority.⁶ This was to the discredit of Parliament.

But the Court went further. It declared that votes for Benn did not count and that, therefore, Mr. St. Clair was the Member for Bristol, South-East—an injustice and a political absurdity. The Court relied on *Beresford-Hope v. Lady Sandhurst*⁷ which had found that when the fact of incapacity was well known, votes for that candidate were thrown away. But was it as "clear and notorious" that a Peer was disqualified in 1961, when seemingly allowed to stand at all, as was a woman in 1889—particularly when it was well known that a case was pending? The public might well suspect, wrongly, that if electoral law were not in a thorough muddle, an action would take place at the time of nomination, not after a campaign and the declaration of the Poll. The Court could easily have avoided the absurdity and injustice of declaring Mr. St. Clair elected. On this matter of opinion it could have declared the election invalid and ordered a new Writ to be issued. It was the first time—and one hopes the last—in which a candidate with a minority has been seated by order of a Court (the House of Commons acted directly in the case of Wilkes).

The Latest Nibble at the Ermine

Two days after Wedgwood Benn (Viscount Stansgate) had been nominated for the British by-election, Mr. Butler announced in the House of Commons that the Government intended to set up a Joint Select Committee (that is, of both Houses) to consider: (i) the composition of the House of Lords; (ii) whether Peers should have the

⁶ The tautologous character of the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy has never been made more clear: Parliament is even supreme to ignore its own supremacy—but surely not its political duty?

⁷ (1889) 23 Queens Bench Division 79.

right to sit in either House, to vote at elections or to surrender their peerages; and (iii) remuneration.

The terms of reference were subsequently narrowed to the second point alone. The Labour Party simply refused to join a committee on such terms. Perhaps the wonder is that they joined it at all, but for the fact that they had already fully committed themselves on the Benn case, albeit Mr. Gaitskell himself had from the beginning shown far less enthusiasm than most of his followers, both on points of law and policy. For the Labour Party had and has no policy whatever on the House of Lords. The impetus for reform in recent years has been, with the single exception of the Benn case, Conservative. Since the breakdown of the 1947 Conference of Party Leaders and Mr. Attlee's refusal to enter into fresh talks in 1953, Labour had pursued a resolutely conservative policy of letting sleeping top-dogs lie. They feared that any reform or rationalisation of the Upper House would strengthen its prestige even if the powers were left as now, or even reduced. And this was probably sound sociological sense; but it is political cowardice and, in the long run, politically untenable. It will be remembered that the Labour Party opposed the Life Peerages Act of 1958, though immediately co-operated in its working. Clearly it was absurd, theoretically and politically, for Mr. Butler to expect Labour to discuss the question of composition without discussing the question of powers. It is normally thought that the nature of a job is relevant to the selection of personnel. But the real objection was to discussing the problem at all. One supposes that the Government refrained from calling Labour's bluff by including "powers" in the terms of reference only because they actually did want some result and not another stalemate. They were under, as usual, far more backbench pressure from their own supporters to provide some remedy for reluctant Peers—after all, they have more of them—than was apparent in the Parliamentary debates on the Benn affair.

If the subsequent Report of the Joint Committee on House of Lords was a mouse, yet it was a very pretty one—well suited to pseudo-Gothic surroundings. The Select Committee on Public Accounts should reprimand Her Majesty's Stationery Office for not advertising it in the hopes of wide commercial sales among all the many literate eccentrics and men of humour still in the realm. The printed evidence showed the Lord Lyon King of Arms taking the committee relentlessly through the history of "hereditary tribal representation" in the second of the Scottish "Thrie Estaits"; Lyon showed that the Scottish Peerage had had the undoubted right of resignation *in favorem* and even powers of Nomination and Tailzie.

Our own Garter Principal King of Arms struck closer to the eventual recommendations of the Committee; Garter did, however, find need to solemnly reject "the genetic argument", but to weigh judiciously the "social argument" as being "too deeply embedded in human nature to be changed easily". And much more of the same—including several disingenuous proposals, notably from Lord Salisbury, that Peers should be allowed to stand for the Commons without renouncing their titles.

The Report of the Joint Select Committee

The Report recommended that:—

(i) Peerages may be surrendered. Existing Peers will be given six months to make up their mind from the date when the new law comes into effect; newly succeeding Peers one year, except if they are already in the Commons, then one month. The resignation will be for life, complete and irrevocable in every respect of title, dignity, precedence and privileges, but will be resumed by the heir on the death of the "holder" of the dormant title (the Labour minority on the committee had voted for the extinction—technically, "the drowning"—of such peerages).

(ii) The Peerage of Scotland (that is those created before the Act of Union of 1706) should all be admitted to the House of Lords. At present they elect sixteen Representative Peers; the additional number will be only fifteen. So here is an actual increase in hereditary numbers!

(iii) The Peerage of Ireland (that is those created before the Act of Union of 1800) have had no Representative Peers since 1919; so they should now be able to stand for any constituency in the United Kingdom and to vote if they fulfil normal residence requirements (previously they were excluded from election in Northern Ireland). This removes an anomaly without increasing (by about seventy) numbers in the Lords; but it emphasises the remaining absurdity that some people *with* titles may stand for election and sit in the Commons. This seems, for obvious reasons, inequitable.

(iv) Peeresses in their own right (at present some seventeen ladies) of England, the United Kingdom and of Scotland should be allowed to sit in the Lords, or to surrender their titles on the same terms as all other Peers.

Well, justice may be done—to Peers. And once again it is done without infringing the right of hereditary Peers to sit in the Lords. And no-one questioned the continuing undemocratic habit of Irish

Peers and of holders of courtesy titles (many eldest sons of the senior Peerage) being able to use their titles in Parliamentary elections. This is a pretty small point; but it is a pretty small-minded report. Mr. Wedgwood Benn may have succeeded in his personal case; but both parties saw to it that no thin end of the wedge would be made towards an agreed and genuine reform of the Lords. Yet his fight could have very great political significance. His remarkable majority in the Bristol by-election should convince any future Labour Government that public opinion is not so wedded to the Lords as the Lords make out. If public opinion remains in this mood, may prior agreement between the parties prove politically necessary at all? Would there be much risk in a unilateral Labour House of Lords Reform Bill?

Agreement as to Reform

It is not too difficult to see a clear way to reform in the sense of improving the utility of the Second Chamber. It may perhaps well be, as Lord Chorley has asked in a tone of amused despair, "quite unrealistic to think that any such agreement can be reached".⁸ Let us grant that the Preamble to the Parliament Act of 1911 was a quite unrealistic red-herring;⁹ no-one now wants a "popular . . . basis" for the Chamber; the Commons is and should remain the only elected, national body in the Constitution. But agreement about the function of a second chamber is, in principle, great.

Let us go back to Lord Bryce's report of 1918 on the "Conference on the Reform of the Second Chamber" of 1917—which is still the classic study of the function of the Lords. He distinguished four functions:

- (i) "The examination and revision of Bills brought from the Commons."
- (ii) "The initiation of Bills of a comparatively non-controversial character."
- (iii) "The interposition of so much delay (and no more) in the passing of a Bill into law as may enable the opinion of the nation to be adequately expressed upon it."
- (iv) "Full and free discussion of the large and important questions . . . at moments when the House of Commons . . . cannot find sufficient time for them."¹⁰

⁸ See his thoughtful, "The House of Lords Controversy", *Public Law*, Autumn 1958, pp. 216-235.

⁹ "Whereas it is intended to substitute for the House of Lords as at present constituted a second chamber constituted on a popular instead of a hereditary basis, but such a substitution cannot immediately be brought into operation . . ."

¹⁰ H.C. 9038 of 1918.

It is commonly agreed that the value of work in the first two categories is now actually greater than in Bryce's time, in terms of the time saved to the Commons, indeed for clauses of Bills and statutory instruments that often would not have been examined at all but for the Lords.¹¹ (There is simply *no* case whatever for abolishing a Second Chamber). The third function has been modified drastically by the Parliament Act of 1949. And the fourth function of general debate seems to do no one any harm and may sometimes do some good. The essential thing is that Bryce's first two categories point to the use of the Lords as an efficient working body.

The "Agreed Statement on Conclusion of Conference of Party Leaders"¹² in 1948 stated that: "The Second Chamber should be complementary to and not a rival to the Lower House and, with this end in view, the reform of the House of Lords should be based on a modification of its existing constitution as opposed to the construction of a Second Chamber of a completely new type based on some system of election." The full concept imminent in the word "complementary" is yet to be explored.

The Parliament Act, 1958

Then came the Parliament Act of 1958. It must be remembered that this was a Conservative measure, introduced without inter-party agreement and without any Mandate (the Conservatives, like ancient Chartists, invoked "the Mandate" in 1948). It was clearly intended to restore the efficiency of the House of Lords without diluting the hereditary vintage. The repute of the House of Lords depends upon its efficiency, and upon its repute depends the social esteem that the public give to the Peerage.

Conservatives are well aware of the truth of Tocqueville's great maxim that aristocracies without function wither into contempt.¹³ And the Act might have killed the two birds with one stone. But the use made of it has been both half-hearted and contradictory.

Forty-five Life Peers have been created (including seven Peeresses), of whom forty-three are still alive. It was said by the Government in the debates on the Bill that they would all be people who would be willing to play a regular part in the work of the House. In most of the cases this has been true, but not in all. There has been a tendency for the list to degenerate into, if not window-dressing, then a

¹¹ See P. A. Bromhead, *The House of Lords and Contemporary Politics*, (Routledge 1958) Part III, "The Lords at Work"; and Chorley, Crick and Chapman, *Reform of the Lords* (Fabian Society, 1954), pp. 11-21.

¹² H.C. 7380 of 1948.

¹³ See my "The Life Peerages Act", *Parliamentary Affairs*, Autumn 1958, pp. 455-465.

supplementary form of patronage; and appointments have been made of people already so impossibly distinguished and busy that they have had little time for their duties. They seem to play no more or less a role in the recent life of the House than the other Peers of First Creation who provide most of the hard core of sixty-seventy regular attenders who do the honourable donkey work.¹⁴

About the same time the Standing Orders of the House were amended so that a Peer *may* apply for leave of absence for either a session or a Parliament, and will be deemed to have applied if he doesn't turn up at all. Then he "is expected not to attend the sittings" and "he is expected to give notice . . . at least one month" before he might subsequently attend. At the moment sixty-two Peers have leave of absence for the Session and one hundred and fifty-six for the Parliament. But this is a purely informal and legally quite unenforceable tidying up—"is expected" forsooth! The Crown's Writ of Attendance is absolute. There is no legal power to stop any absentee turning up if the spirit moves him.

Clearly the Life Peers Act could be an effective instrument to create a Chamber of men and women experienced in the administration of matters likely to come before the House for scrutiny and revision. And the stress should be on relevant experience rather than on "public distinction" in the conventional way of the New Year and Birthday Honours Lists. It can be said that no-one has been made a Life Peer who could not, with propriety, have been made an ordinary hereditary Peer, were they willing. Yet a few good Town Clerks would do far better service than most of the already over-busy people of public distinction who have been appointed. If an element in a reformed House should continue to be retired M.Ps. and failed Ministers, yet at least an equal element of it could be, if properly paid, almost a career service, certainly something to fill an important stage in the career of a lawyer, civil servant, public official, some businessmen and some people in education: not all appointments need be for life, nor need "nomination" preclude application.

A House of Scrutiny

The true function of the Upper House is to save time for the Commons;

¹⁴ See Bromhead, *House of Lords* p. 31 ff.; and Chorley, Crick and Chapman, *Reform of the Lords*, pp. 9-10. Some newer figures: the average daily attendance of all Peers in the Session 1961-62 was 143; the total number attending at least once was 578 (of whom 56 did attend only once); and only 123 attended more than half the sittings.

Of the 32 Life Peers who sat for the whole Session, 1961-62, frequency of attendance was:

115	—	100	—	80	—	60	—	40	—	20	—	0
4		3		7		7		3		8		

 Peers (two once only)

to give more time than can the Commons for the scrutiny and suggested revision of complex public Bills and of statutory instruments; and to discuss and debate not so much great issues of public policy but matters of administration and of the working of social policies for which the Commons seemingly has little time, or even, with the declining use of Select Committees, inclination.¹⁵ If this administrative, bureaucratic, scrutinising conception of an Upper House as a Chamber of Review (or House of Correction?) could be grasped, and the composition made appropriate, then one could envisage many useful *additional* functions being undertaken by such a thoroughly de-politicised "Lords". Committees could undertake work of investigation as well as scrutiny, to allay the continued public worry, and to fill the real gap in Ministerial accountability, about the workings not merely of systems of public tribunals and enquiries, *vide* the Franks Report, but also the greater un-tribunaled areas of ordinary administration, *vide* the Whyatt Report. It would be a proper place for the Standing Council on Tribunals envisaged by the Franks Report, and even, with Law Lords active, a final Court of Administrative Appeals. Many forms of public enquiry, even many topics handled by inter-departmental committees, at the moment completely outside the scope or control of Parliament, could be undertaken or reviewed by such a Second Chamber. In this context the composition and work of the *Conseil D'Etat* of the French Fourth Republic deserves far more sympathetic study from British parliamentarians. And to press to the uttermost bounds of political imagination, could not the Commons, if the Second Chamber is both de-politicised and de-Lorded, pass on to it some of the detail of financial scrutiny of which it is more important that it should be done adequately, than who does it.

But the main point is that the functions of a reformed and efficient Second Chamber should be studied in relation to the work of the Commons. It is for the Commons to use the Upper House as a policy-making body uses committees of consultants, advisers and scrutineers. The solution to the House of Lords problem will not be found until the next Select Committee on Procedure of the House of Commons has, in its terms of reference, the function of the House of Lords.

As for composition, the Labour Party must nerve itself, as Mr. Benn has just suggested,¹⁶ to cut the Gordian knot and divorce membership of the Peerage of the Realm from membership of the Upper House of

¹⁵ See my *Reform of the Commons* (Fabian Society 1959), pp. 18-20; and "A House of Scrutiny?", *Observer*, 1 April 1962.

¹⁶ Anthony Wedgwood Benn, "The Labour Party and Lords Reform", *Guardian*, 28 January 1963.

Parliament. Half-way houses, such as Lord Salisbury has been fertile in planning, all have the same object: to preserve the social and political esteem of the Order of Peers. This consideration is simply irrelevant to the work of Parliament—though it is relevant to the social mechanics of Conservative electoral prospects. And if this is so, as most politicians would agree it is (even though different conclusions can be drawn from the observation), the Labour Party should attack the inequity of the Order of Peers having any special role in Parliament at all. Since they may now lay down their rank and run for the Commons, let them do so. They could be appointed to serve in a nominated Upper House the same as anyone else; and they are likely to furnish more than their share of people with the right kind of experience of service on public bodies and in local government.

The Labour Party has been wise not to be affronted by the hereditary principle as such in relation to the work of the Lords. But the Life Peers Act recognised that the Peers could no longer perform this work. And the Peers is, after all, part of an undemocratic system of social influence exploited by the Conservative Party. Social esteem may be, as the worthy Garter argued, "part of human nature"; but there is no justice in continuing to give it constitutional sanction.

The House of Commons could well, as Benn argues,¹⁷ be given power to override the decisions of the Lords by simple affirmative resolution. But his suggestion to leave the Peers of First Creation, together with the Life Peers, the Bishops and the Law Lords would still leave a Chamber of about two hundred and fifty members. If Mr. Benn would consider what the functions should be, rather than putting composition first (in his admirable animus against the hereditary principle), he might think that something far smaller was appropriate—perhaps no more than a hundred if most were genuinely full-time, not Lords but Councillors of Parliament.

So the House of Lords should be radically reformed for two reasons, which perhaps up until now have only been implicit in this argument, but reasons which should make the Labour Party think the question part of the matter of Britain and not just a silly, quite useful anomaly which can be ignored on sufferance. First, that the House of Commons is overburdened with work and thus drowned in detail. Second, that the prestige of the Peers helps to perpetuate the undemocratic character of British life.

¹⁷ *Guardian*, *op. cit.*

ITALY IN TRANSITION

NINETTA JUCKER

THE big change began in 1959 to 1960. In that year Italian industrial output rose spectacularly by 17 per cent. There were peaks reaching up to 25 and even 40 per cent. in certain industries like the synthetic fibres and petrochemicals. The upsurge was regarded at first almost with mistrust. Businessmen were disturbed by such a rapid change in the traditional structure of their world. They urged the politicians not to use the word "miracle". Some thought this was a freak record which would be levelled down in a year or two, but the pace was kept up with only a slight diminution for four years in succession. This is the fifth year of the miracle and industrial output is still rising at 11 per cent. Not only economists but the public have accepted the facts of growth and at least some of their implications. Rostow's theories are probably more familiar to Italians than to Britons for they are constantly told that their country has passed the period of take-off and is well into that of spontaneous growth.

Rapid Economic Growth

Now the experts are trying to put the big change into an historic context. They place Italy of the mid sixties about half way through a period of transition lasting some twenty years. The transition began soon after Italy recovered its pre-war level of output in 1950. It should end in the mid seventies with the achievement of full employment. In the course of this rapid and revolutionary cycle the structure of the country's economy will have changed completely. In 1950 Italy still had the ethos and institutions of a predominantly agricultural country. In 1961 agriculture produced only 22.8 per cent of the national product and employed 28.8 per cent of the labour force. By 1973 the experts calculate that 89 per cent of the national product will come from non-agricultural sources and that only four out of twenty-two million workers will be employed in farming. At the end of this cycle the outflow of labour from farming to industry will have ceased and the country's still large pool of under-employed rural manpower will have been drained. Recognition that the economy is already predominantly industrial is reflected in certain administrative reforms such as the switch over from the agricultural to the solar year.

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Agriculture is the weak part of the economy and takes the brunt of the strain of the transition years. The pathological weakness of Italian farming could have political repercussions which might upset the calculations of the economists. But, failing any violent upheaval, it is assumed that by the mid seventies Italy will have a fully developed modern industrial economy with an output very close to that of France in spite of the handicap of possessing a weak instead of a prosperous agriculture to support industry.

A Move to the South

One important and unexpected characteristic of the transition phase is the gradual shift of the country's economic axis from the North towards the South. The industrial triangle, Milan-Turin-Genoa, still stands out by many lengths as the most highly capitalised and prosperous part of the country. But it is not the only centre of initiative and perhaps not even the most important centre. Rome, not Milan, is the economic as well as the political capital of the new Italy. This is due in great measure to the presence in Rome of the central offices of such bodies as the *Cassa per il Mezzogiorno*, of the IRI and ENI groups of state owned industries and of the Ministry of State holdings which controls them. As government control over the economy tends to increase in future there is every reason to expect that Rome will impose its ideas and directives with increasing decision. This will certainly be the case if the left centre coalition is returned to power, as it expects to be with the Socialists in a stronger position than they have at present after the general election next April. The parties have pledged themselves to give the country a full-fledged economic development plan which will almost certainly be articulated in a long and a short period. The short period of five years will correspond to the duration of the next Parliament. The long period of ten years should carry the country to the end of the transition period.

But such quasi-political motives account only in part for the southward shift of the country's economic centre. Industry is beginning to move South of its own accord and capital is moving there in response to the incentives which, ten years after their inception, are beginning to take effect. The gap between North and South is still immense. Very probably it will never be completely closed. But the South has acquired its own dynamic. It has woken up and is beginning to exert a power of attraction upon industrialists in the North. These feel a growing interest in and desire to be near the new markets of the Mediterranean area. The attraction of these markets is closely connected

with the advent of new sources of oil and natural gas in North Africa. The emancipation of the African countries and the discovery of their petroleum resources have a direct bearing on the Italian miracle, particularly in its second phase which concerns the awakening of the South. The miracle itself is based upon a change in the country's fuel structure, since oil and gas have replaced coal as the main source of power. This "revolution" was the life work of the late Enrico Mattei who set himself the task of proving to the Italians that they were not doomed to everlasting poverty simply because they had no natural sources of cheap power. At the beginning of this century Italian industry had its first flowering under the impulse given to it by the development of the hydro-electric power. In the fifties the development of gas in the Po Valley played a similar role. But the really decisive factor was the extraordinary drive and determination shown by Enrico Mattei in his campaign to procure cheap imports of crude oil. This led him to cultivate the friendship of the new African countries on the seaboard and beyond. He was the first to perceive that the development of these countries put Italy in a central position at the junction of the new oil routes from North Africa and the Near East towards northern Europe. Mattei's policies created a mystique which has survived him. The attraction of African markets for Italian industry has been transformed into the idea of a spiritual mission for Italians to act as the agents for the reconciliation between Europe and Africa. Italy's "presence" in Africa is courted by the new countries and it would be a mistake to underrate the importance of the Mediterranean mystique as a factor inducing hard-headed Milanese businessmen to build their plant in the South. Italy has in fact succeeded in establishing a new type of relationship with certain African countries, particularly the countries of the Maghreb, Egypt, the Sudan, Ghana, Nigeria and Tanganyika (all countries in which ENI is either building or has built refineries). Italian prestige in Africa is witnessed by the contracts for the Kariha and the Volta dams. Mattei was not alone in creating this mystique. He was seconded by such men as Giorgio la Pira, Giovanni Gronchi, Fanfani and others who believed that Italy had a chance to develop a new sort of relationship with the former colonial peoples.

The emancipation of the Italian economy from dependence on coal made it possible for many industries to operate economically almost anywhere on the seaboard. In particular it favoured the development of chemical and petrochemical industries on all except the inhospitable Calabrian coast. These industries lifted parts of Southern Italy from their depression. Syracuse, Brindisi and Gela are the outstanding

examples. They created external economies which made it possible for the engineering and manufacturing industries to follow where they had broken the soil. Finally, as it becomes difficult to procure trained manpower in the North, industrialists are finding it expedient to build new plant in the South where labour can still be found. It still has to be trained, but the alternative is to draft untrained workers North and provide housing in areas where land values are extremely high.

The main characteristics of the transition period can be summarised as shift of emphasis from agriculture to industry and from North to South with the growing importance of Rome as the intellectual centre of the country's development. Labour still tends to migrate to the North and it is not infrequent to meet foreign workers in towns like Milan or Turin who have come to look for work attracted by the Italian miracle. At the same time skilled Italian workers are coming home from France and Germany, often recruited by the big Italian firms in search of trained manpower.

The Labour Market

The changing condition of the labour market is by far the most important social phenomenon of the sixties. Italian workers are still emigrating to the nearer European countries, chiefly Switzerland, Germany, France and Belgium. But overseas emigration to America or Australia is becoming a thing of the past. The greater number of Italians who are still forced to leave their homes in search of work, make for the big towns of northern Italy. They move up at the rate of about ten thousand a month travelling on the special "immigrant" trains which leave two or three times a week from Sicily, taking the long route via Reggio Calabria and Taranto, for the North. The influx of untrained southern workers and their families creates many a headache for the city councillors of Milan, Turin and Genoa but by and large the immigrants tend to become assimilated very quickly and, unlike their comrades across the frontier, they are rarely tempted to take the train home. This is the first real welding of the population since the unification of Italy.

Most Italian industrialists reckon that their advantage over foreign competitors on the labour front may last another six years at the outside. By the end of that time, they believe, Italian wages will have caught up with the European level. This has almost happened already in industries that call for really difficult skills. The Chairman of the Industrialist's Confederation, Doctor Furio Cicogna, admitted once that the Italian miracle was due, above all, to the fact that, during the

fifties, productivity increased more rapidly than wages. Mattei put the same thought more brutally when he said the miracle was built "on the backs of poor folk". By and large Italian *entrepreneurs* can be classed in two groups: those who realise that cheap labour is a poor foundation for competitive enterprise and must be replaced as quickly as possible by reducing other costs and meeting labour claims with as much enlightenment as they can muster; and those who would like to put the clock back. Most of the country's really big industries are run by men who belong to the first group. But they are an elite. The mass of *entrepreneurs* who form the majority of the membership of the Confederation of Industries looks backward. Both views are reflected in the "independent" newspapers which, in Italy, belong to and plug the views of the various industrial groups. *La Stampa*, which represents Fiat, stands mainly for enlightenment. *Il Corriere della Sera*, *Il Resto del Carlino* and other smaller but influential provincial papers plug the conservative view. *Il Giorno*, directly owned by ENI, speaks for State industry and government planning.

New Style Trade Unions

The trade unions feel that they are fighting on two fronts, against enlightened neo-capitalism and against capitalism *tout court*. They find the struggle arduous for they are weak, divided and without experience of labour conditions in a fully developed industrial economy. The only real advantage the unions possess is their often brilliant intellectual leadership, a characteristic—the leaders themselves believe—of a depressed economy. Trade union leaders at the cultural level of university professors seem rather to be a feature of Italy's transition period, for the first generation of union leaders have belonged to the old traditional pattern of workers who had got their training at night school. The intellectual background of Italian union leaders tends to keep them apart from their opposite numbers in other countries—on either side of the Curtain—which could be one reason why trade unionism in Italy is developing on lines of its own, as much at variance with, say, the British unions as with the Soviet. The subject is certainly a theme for research.

But if the trade unions are weak, by British or American standards, the workers in Italy are beginning to feel their strength. It is they, not the unions, who set the pace. The young men are not afraid to lose their jobs for, in most cases, they know they can find a new one. Hence their willingness to strike even though the unions possess no strike funds and strikes therefore spell real hardship for their families. Strikes are a concomitant of prosperity and Italy is no exception to

the rule. Labour troubles in every sector of the economy accompany the miracle. But there are a few specifically Italian features of this unrest. In areas where labour is beginning to be scarce industrial wages are causing farm wages to rise, thus putting an additional strain on the farmers. In the former depressed areas where new industries are going up, the builders working for the contractors, when recruited locally, tend to go on strike for the right to be taught the skills that will be needed in the plant they are building. Where protracted strikes cause hardship the Roman Catholic Church tends to make appeals on behalf of the families. During the electrical engineering workers' long strike last winter collections were held in the churches in Milan and the Archbishop of Turin made an appeal on television. This attitude—the appeal to feelings of sympathy and brotherhood—is significant. It means that the Encyclic *Mater et Magistra*—which, in truth, contains no revolutionary innovations to Roman Catholic social doctrine on the relations between management and labour—is the key to the Church's policy at the moment. The Encyclic was promulgated just as the Italian miracle was getting under way and it is continually referred to by the hierarchy.

In the past ten years the trade unions have been weak partly as a result of the ideological rivalry which split the once united movement into three major federations, marxist, catholic and social democrat. So long as the offer of manpower exceeded the demand this division enabled employers to play off one federation against another and even to encourage the growth of "tame" unions in the ambit of a single enterprise. Fiat perfected this technique in the years that followed the big setback suffered by the marxist federation (CGIL) in 1955. But the miracle is making it increasingly difficult to follow this tactic which was based on the assumption that workers employed by a big enterprise believed themselves to be better off than those employed by smaller concerns. This condition no longer obtains and last July, for the first time in many years, Fiat workers called a series of strikes. The breakdown of the myth that Fiat was untouchable had a traumatic effect on employers all over the country. Since then there have been numerous signs that the changed condition of the labour market is gradually including the trade union federations to forget their ideological disputes and act in harmony. It may not be long before they achieve some sort of association if not actual fusion.

Political Party Developments

A new and specifically Italian factor in the labour situation is the impatience shown by young immigrants from southern Italy towards

the rather heavy paternalistic discipline which characterises big industry in this country. Young men from the South, who have won their first moral fight by breaking with an old environment, are not impressed by the traditions and legends of the industrial North. They were not brought up in awe of such names as Fiat or Montecatini. In fact they are grappling with a new world in which one name means as much as another. Often they are no more respectful of the unions than they are of the big firms, but they have learned what it means to possess human rights and the power to make them respected. For a while they stand clear of the political parties but naturally many drift towards the Communists who are better equipped than the others to understand and attract them.

The change of political alignment known as the "opening to the left" which occurred just over a year ago, was a direct consequence of the miracle. Between 1948 and 1961 Italy was governed by a series of coalitions all hinging on the centre. The government, always predominantly Christian Democrat, relied sometimes on the votes of the liberals and monarchists (when the fascists would try to climb on to the band wagon), sometimes of the liberals and social democrats. The trouble with the fascists in June 1960 and the conflicting attitude of liberals and social democrats towards the problems created by the miracle, made it impossible to continue either compromise. The breach between the liberals and Christian democrats came when the Catholic party realised that, if it was to keep its hold upon the electorate it would have to embrace the cause of social justice, not in the ambiguous terms that de Gasperi and his successors had given to the idea of "sociality". The word is a euphemism invented by the Christian Democrats to imply social reform without tears (for the upper dog). Now all this nonsense has been put aside. The Party has accepted the thesis that prosperity in a country with such an unbalanced economy as Italy's, calls for serious planning. As early as 1959 the Christian democrats accepted the notion that the country's increased wealth would not automatically spread itself throughout the community. It took another two years to accept—in deed as well as word—the political implication of this thesis.

The Influence of the Pope

The belief that Catholics and Socialists have a long stretch of road to travel together would never have been translated into a political fact had it not been for the subtle and intelligent guidance of Pope John XXIII. Looking back over the four and a half years of his pontificate

it is possible to see how his influence upon Italian politics has been immeasurably more important than that of his predecessor. There is good reason to believe that the *Mater et Magistra* was timed on purpose to prepare the way for the opening to the left in Italy. The "opening" itself now appears as part of a grand design. It was, in fact, a necessary element in the preparation of the political climate in Rome most propitious for the Ecumenical Council. Undoubtedly one of the steps towards the fulfilment of Pope John's design for the Church is a break in the relationship between the hierarchy and the more reactionary part of the governing class in all catholic countries. This breach was doubly important in Italy where the political climate is a matter of paramount importance to the Papacy.

The Italian hierarchy is not unanimous in sympathising with the left centre alignment but the powerful (though naturally unconfessed) support of the Pope should suffice to keep the Catholic party loyal to the experiment at least for the duration of the next Parliament, and possibly for much longer. The truth is there is no democratic alternative to a coalition of catholics, socialists and social democrats (with a handful of radicals—called the Republican Party—to act as the main link between the Christian democrats and the socialists). Pope John's precarious state of health certainly casts a shadow on the prospects of the left centre but experts on Vatican affairs believe that the Ecumenical Council has brought to light such a ferment within the Roman Catholic Church that no future pontiff would feel inclined to put the clock back by restoring a despotic centralised régime within the Church which favoured the relationship between the hierarchy and the reactionary classes in Europe and America.

Hostility to Gaullism

If the left centre were to falter in Italy there would almost certainly be some sort of fascist revival which in turn could only lead to a communist push. That is why de Gaulle and his régime appear such a menace to Italians. Gaullism revives the authoritarian instincts of the catholic and the fascist right. In Britain Gaullism is often described as bonapartism to distinguish it from the brutal régimes of the nazi and fascist dictators. But the distinction appears invidious to continentals. In Italy, in particular, the whole tragedy of the Gaullist adventure lies in the fact that it tends to revive dormant fascist or nationalist proclivities just when these seemed about to be eliminated forever. (It was known, for instance, in Rome that the Church was examining a project to revise its organisation and propaganda

in Spain in view of the possible advent of a more democratic régime there. Instead Gaullism is making the Spanish and Portuguese dictatorships look less fragile.) The noblest reason Italians have for detesting de Gaulle is their fear that he is jeopardising democracy in nascent "Europe". This is what prompts the supporters of the left centre alignment, who are the heirs of non-communist anti-fascism, to ardently wish Britain to join the Community. It also makes them look to the Kennedy Administration for support.

But there is also a baser reason for Italian suspicion of de Gaulle. His post-Algerian policy tends to set up a rivalry between France and Italy for influence in North Africa and the Mediterranean. De Gaulle's approaches to Spain and Portugal, his desire to replace the lost Moroccan bases by others in Spanish or Portuguese territory (even though these might be on the Atlantic side), his obvious desire to forge new cultural and commercial links between France and the French speaking African countries, are initiatives which interfere with the Italian "mission" to represent Europe to the African world. The image Italians are seeking to project upon the under-developed countries as the clean-handed messengers of western civilisation tends to be obscured by the ungainly shadow of the French dictator. This rivalry apart, Italians feel instinctively that de Gaulle can only carry through his design by courting those Mediterranean countries—Spain, Portugal, Greece perhaps, where democracy is either non-existent or insecure.

The Outlook

The political and economic prospects for the new Italy of the second period of transition appear to be intimately linked to the course of events outside the country. Much will depend on how firm the British government stands by its intention "not to turn its back on Europe". Italians at present are inclined to be optimistic about this. Possibly they underestimate the difficulty of establishing a common policy of firm action between Britain and the Five in relation to de Gaulle.

One thing is certain. Italy's New Deal cannot safely be halted at this stage. It is an experiment which must be carried through to the end. In its first year it has encountered enormous difficulties. None the less it has achieved a good deal—the school reform is probably a more important monument than the nationalisation of electricity—and has promised more. The country is going through a period of tremendous strain and upheaval. Its morale is high. But disappointment would be dangerous. There is no democratic alternative to the New Deal.

WHY SHOULD THE CITY ESCAPE?

BELLE HARRIS

"HERE we are looking on what is an old project to improve local government in London, and we find the most backward-looking, retrograde, ossified resistance at every turn." These words were used by Sir Keith Joseph in the committee stage of the London Government Bill. Such comments are equally apt to describe his party's own attitude to the preservation of the City of London as a single local government unit.

The City was dismissed in a few pages of the Report by the Royal Commission on Greater London. It was accepted that it is an anomaly which should theoretically be amalgamated to Westminster. However, their final recommendation was that the *status quo* and, therefore, the artificial separation of the historic, ceremonial, financial centre of London from the rest of the metropolis should be maintained. This is comparable to a reform of Edinburgh—excluding Princes Street!

Elsewhere the Commission used as their criteria throughout the need for administrative efficiency plus maximum local responsibility but refused to take advantage of the opportunity to remove "a backward looking body steeped in tradition and largely indifferent to the needs of the modern metropolis" (Professor W. A. Robson's pamphlet 'The Greater London Boroughs'). Their reluctance to bring the City of London up to date was not due to ignorance, nor because they felt it to be a model local authority that needs no changes, but rather to a fear that controversy might wreck the whole of the Bill. They hinted at this when they referred to the "insuperable political difficulties" which would be encountered if they recommended changes. So once again the City, established since 1346, will be allowed to escape the logic of reform. The reward for its wealth and influence may prove once again to be at the expense of obtaining an efficient London government.

The defence of the Corporation was submitted in written evidence

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WHY SHOULD THE CITY ESCAPE?

to the Royal Commission. The theme underlying their case was that it was impossible to reform the City—it must either be abolished, or not a single hair on the sacred head touched. Thus, they said "In the national interest Parliament has made provisions for the preservation of ancient buildings [it is] at least as important that ancient institutions [Corporation of London] should be preserved." But they were also careful to emphasise that this "ancient institution" needed to exercise the duties of a local authority if it were to survive. The Corporation was "an historical asset to be safeguarded . . . The pageantry and ceremonial . . . require the support of the municipality of which they are the crown." Even the Bow Group had suggested that this pageantry should relate to the whole Greater London area, but, said the City "Divorced from their historical associations . . . such ceremonies would become meaningless and the prestige of the City would rapidly decline." Finally, they made reference to the hoary contention that the reason for the City having for so long escaped the axe of change, was due to the Council being "regularly elected on a democratic basis."

If the Royal Commission had put forward some relevant questions they might have arrived at the opposite conclusion. What has clearly protected the City is its wealth, political influence and undemocratic constitution. The famous Common Council is, in fact, little more than a business man's club with administrative, paternal and ceremonial functions.

Government of the City

The constitution of the Corporation is largely unwritten. The regulations pertaining to the election of the Lord Mayor, Common Councillors, and extent of boundaries, etc., are mainly governed by local and domestic legislation, i.e., by City of London (Various Powers) Acts, and Acts of Common Council. For the purpose of elections the 'square mile' is divided into twenty-five wards, and there are at present 163 Common Councillors to represent an electorate of 13,745 made up of residents and occupiers of business premises (other than Joint Stock Companies) of an annual gross value of at least £10. In the second reading of the Bill Sir Keith Joseph maintained that it was a matter of principle that sixty councillors only should comprise the councils of the new London boroughs. This gave an opportunity to Sir Leslie Plummer to ask the pertinent question "As a matter of principle, what is to happen to the two hundred members of the City of London Corporation?" There was no answer!

The qualifications necessary to stand for the Common Council are that a person must become a freeman of the City, either by patrimony, servitude, or redemption, at a cost of from two to three guineas. He must solemnly declare that he will be obedient to the Lord Mayor and will maintain the franchises and customs thereof, and will keep the City harmless, etc. Last year, approximately 1,100 persons became freemen providing a remunerative source of income for the City of London Freeman School. In addition, the candidate must be registered in the ward for which he is standing and occupy as owner or tenant in that ward rateable land or premises of not less than £10 per annum.

These qualifications differ in three ways from the normal requirements of other boroughs: the necessity of being a freeman; the necessity of having a ward qualification; and the fact that the City is the only area where residence by itself is not a sufficient qualification. In practice, this debars most women electors from standing due to their not being householders. At one end of the scale five Common Councillors represent fifty electors in the Bread Street ward, while at the other end twelve Councillors represent three thousand electors in the largest ward.

Besides the Common Council, there are two other branches of civic government in the City; the Common Hall (made up of the liverymen of the craft guilds) and the Court of Aldermen. These two bodies have mainly ceremonial and financial functions.

There are twenty-five Aldermen, who are elected for life and need not possess any voting qualification in the ward they represent. On election they automatically become *ex officio* Justices of the Peace. It is from the Aldermen that the future Lord Mayor must be chosen by the private oligarchies of the liverymen and when chosen he also becomes the Chief Magistrate in the area. The only qualification for this office seems to be private wealth.

Elections in the great majority of wards are rare. Normally the sitting members are unopposed and are formally reinstated annually at Ward Motes held on St. Thomas's Day, 21st December, when the required number of "most sufficient and discreet men" are sworn in by the fully robed alderman and beadle who are in charge. However, if there are more candidates than vacancies the election takes place on the following week day, hence the ludicrous situation last year of having to vote on Christmas Eve. No wonder the City men are angry at the recent novelty of the two declared Labour candidates standing in Portsoken. Sufficiently angry to agree to consider approving the resolution from Portsoken to prevent elections being

held on Christmas Eve, thereby changing one sacred tradition which has survived 500 years!

The result of the fancy franchise has been to keep party politics outside the Guildhall. If normal electoral law and practice had prevailed, there would in all probability have been for many years Labour and Liberal candidates and, therefore, Conservative candidates in all the wards. As it is, the City can hang on to its cry of being an independent, non-political all-male body because the electoral anomalies ensure that the composition of the Court of Common Council mainly consists of bankers, lawyers, traders and financiers, which not merely makes for a Conservative body, but suffers from the same defects as any political body which is not scrutinised by an opposition—in this case opposition of working people who live in the City.

City's Cash

The Royal Commission might also have looked into the cost of the ceremony and pageantry. They then might have unearthed the peculiar nature of the City's control over its financial resources. The City is unique in possessing substantial private assets not subject to and statutory control; there is no district auditor, only private chartered accountants, such as any commercial company employs. The Corporation has complete freedom to spend this money as it wishes. Part of the income from these funds, the "City Cash" is used to maintain the mayoralty expenses, which totalled £112,000 in the year 1961-2. It is the Establishment who are the main beneficiaries of the City's lavish hospitality, hence it is hardly surprising that they condone its existence. It would, for instance, be most churlish for Mr. Macmillan to bring about the disbandment of the City system which recently granted him its highest order, an Honorary Freedom.

The most valuable assets are the properties and investments owned by the Corporation. At current values it is thought that, thanks largely to rising property values, they run into many tens of millions of pounds. The control of the City's cash lies in the office of the Chamberlain, who is elected by the liverymen, not by the Common Council.

It is difficult to see why the Commission did not recommend the transfer of these funds to the new Greater London Council. At present it creates a loss to the general community. For example, the expenditure on the separate City of London police force is over £1m and a large part of this sum is reimbursed by taxpayers in the Greater London area. Also the benefits from the rate equalisation scheme

would be higher if the City increased its present rate of 17s. 7d. in the £1 to a level comparable to that of all other areas in London. The wealth of the "square mile" could well provide either a subsidy to the less well-off boroughs, or assets to be used for the welfare of the whole of London and not merely six hundred and seventy acres of it. Further, was it really not possible to hand over the "necessary" ceremonial functions to the Greater London Council whereby the Lord Mayor of London, when entertaining foreign and national dignitaries, would be doing so by virtue of representing 8,000,000 people and not merely 4,700.

The City as Local Authority

As it is, the present wealth of both the public and private funds is little used for the social amenities of the neglected people who live there. It might be thought that the residents of the City would constitute a favoured group benefiting from having the good fortune to find themselves residing in the richest borough. However, the Corporation flats in the City are well below the average standard of other borough and L.C.C. flats. There are no lifts to fourth floors in flats modernised since the war, although the majority of tenants are over sixty years old; and there are still flats with shared kitchen and toilet facilities (although it is hoped, of course, that modernisation will come soon). Similarly the local children are not provided with playing facilities so necessary in a congested area, and soon the only school in the area (rather run-down) will be moved some distance away. With the exception of the imaginative Barbican scheme (for the high income group only), the Corporation's policy has been to encourage the maximum number to move from the City whilst maintaining minimum standards for those who insist on staying—an ageing population of unwanted working people who happen to live there.

If the London Government Bill is passed in its present form, the City, with a residential population of 4,700 and a commuter population of approximately 400,000, will have the same powers as each of the thirty-two new London Boroughs. It will, for example, have control over child services, health and welfare as well as its present functions of housing, etc., but in addition to these it will still possess its many special powers acquired by ancient privileges or special legislation. It will continue to claim the right of holding markets within a seven mile radius of the City—the wholesale markets of Spitalfields, Smithfield, Islington abattoir, etc. It will control four of the bridges over the Thames; it will retain the ownership and administration of many

open spaces outside its boundaries, including Epping Forest and Burnham Beeches; and it will continue to be the sanitary authority for the Port of London. These functions are a direct contradiction of one of the principles adopted by the Royal Commission that local government services should be controlled by a body that is local in character.

There is perhaps one defence the Royal Commission could have used for omitting the Guildhall from its reforms, if it had felt that it had discharged its duties of rebuilding the commercial centre in a worthy manner—if it works it is good! Yet it is hard to disagree with the late Mr. Gaitskell's view on the newly built City of London when he said: "It seems to me a national monument to mediocrity, the greatest missed opportunity of the century . . . where the power of the profits is allowed to dominate the power of the community and the forces of the market build a concrete wasteland . . ." The City is a good symbol of the last twelve years of Conservative rule. Curiously there is one man who cannot plead ignorance as an excuse for leaving the City untouched by the current reforms. Sir Keith Joseph, the Minister responsible for the Government's London Bill was successively a Common Councilman and then an Alderman of the City before he became an M.P.

There are two possible alternatives for a Labour Government. First the City could be amalgamated with an adjoining Borough, preferably Westminster, and either the enlarged borough could take over the ceremonial functions and assets, or, better still, they could be transferred to the Greater London Council. Second, a Greater London Borough could be formed to include the whole of the central area (this was the proposal of Professor Robson) with all planning control powers to be exercised by the Greater London Council.

Both these alternatives would strike a more favourable balance between the valid financial interests of the ratepayer and the social needs of the wider metropolitan community. The Corporation's maxim is "If it is not necessary to change—it is necessary not to change". There is, however, sufficient evidence to show that there is an overwhelming *need* for change.

LATIN AMERICA AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

DUDLEY SEERS

LATIN America is in many ways a fossilised society from the eighteenth century, or even earlier.¹ There are great inequalities of income, reflecting on the one hand a very uneven distribution of land, and on the other weak or non-existent systems of direct taxation. Taking the region as a whole (though there are exceptions, such as Costa Rica and Uruguay), the majority of the population still lives illiterate, poorly housed and fed, and without any real say in the political life of their country. Apart from Mexico, few major social upheavals occurred during a century and a half, when Europe was in political turmoil.

This structure has however been audibly creaking for at least three decades. Since the purpose of this article is not to contribute to economic history, but to look at future prospects, I can only indicate very briefly the forces which have been breaking it up:—

(i) *The increase in population.* The growth of population gathered pace after the war. Death rates fell sharply, with improved medical services (especially the eradication of malaria in tropical areas), and there was no corresponding fall in the birth rate, which even rose in some cases.²

(ii) *Growing political activity.* The public was not merely growing in numbers, but also in political awareness. This had many causes, notably the spread of American films, magazines, etc. It showed itself in the acceleration of movements to the cities, as people sought a better life. The expansions of Caracas, Mexico City and Sao Paulo have been dramatic. This in turn caused a rise in further political interest. Eventually the newcomers to the cities became dependent on regular employment to buy food and they were drawn into political parties and trade unions. Together with (i), the increased mobilisation of the poor made economic growth imperative.

(iii) *The failure of commodity markets.* But the external stimulus

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¹ I am grateful to Professor Hirschman of Columbia and Professor Grundwald of Yale for useful comments. The responsibility for the points made here is, however, mine alone.

² "A Preliminary Study of the Demographic Situation in Latin America" (ECLA).

to growth was fading, and it was becoming increasingly difficult to earn the foreign exchange with which to buy the rising supplies of imports, especially capital equipment, needed by expanding economies. Yet as the pace of economic growth slowed down in the industrial countries, especially the United States, so the volume of Latin American exports also grew less rapidly and the terms of trade turned against the region. The tightening foreign exchange position forced countries to develop substitutes for the imports they had previously imported. Yet this itself was made more difficult by the very shortage of foreign exchange, because founding industries requires big initial purchases of equipment. Industrialisation moreover now meant, for the bigger countries such as Brazil, the creation of heavy industries, a much more difficult task than establishing factories to process food and textiles.³

The economic symptoms of these problems were recurrent foreign exchange crises, inflation and stagnation. Practically every country suffered from at least one of these disorders, and Argentina and Chile have suffered from all three simultaneously.

Initial symptoms of political stress were the popular support for the regimes of Peron and Vargas. More serious was the Bolivian revolution of 1952, followed by the aborted Guatemalan revolution, and above all by the successful revolution in Cuba. Other countries were also restive. The overthrow of the Perez Jimenez dictatorship in Venezuela turned out to be more than just a political coup; in 1958, the Popular Front candidate (Allende) almost won the Presidential election in Chile, and rural unrest grew to serious proportions in many countries, notably Brazil and Columbia.

At the turn of the decade, the three main disruptive forces grew in strength. Population growth accelerated to over 3 per cent a year in many countries, including Brazil; political activity was given a fillip by developments in Cuba; and the prices of most of the region's commodities continued to decline. Moreover, some cumulative forces appeared. Foreign private capital began to flow more slowly into the region, and a good deal of Latin American capital left in search of safer areas. There was a noticeable tendency for moderate governments (like that of Betancourt in Venezuela) to come under increasing pressure as Leftist and Rightist forces gained strength, at the expense of the Centre.

The Change in U.S. Policy

Until 1959, Latin America had seemed safely within the sphere of

³ See "Inflation and Growth in Latin America" (ECLA) for evidence on these points, and also an explanation of how they contributed to inflation.

American influence. It provided a chain of military alliances covering the Southern flank; its votes in the United Nations were usually available on critical issues; its materials and foodstuffs could be purchased by the exports of American manufactures; it was a secure field for American investors. This state of affairs had lasted for so long that it seemed part of the natural order; it was institutionalised in the Organisation of American States.

As was only to be expected in such circumstances, little attention was paid to the area. The State Department faced much more pressing problems in Europe and Asia, so only a small fraction of post-war foreign aid went to Latin America, and in this period no special financial institutions were set up for the region. The official view was that if countries only followed the advice of the International Monetary Fund, by balancing budgets and restricting the expansion of credit, foreign capital would be encouraged to flow in, local savings would increase, and economies would grow.

Stabilisation policies based on I.M.F. precepts were attempted by many governments, but since they were derived from analyses which ignored the historical roots of the problem, they often aggravated the situation. Thus in Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Uruguay, foreign payments continued to be severely unbalanced, and the initial consequence was not merely an acceleration of price rises, but also a decline in activity. (To be fair, the stabilisation policy in Peru was more successful, since it helped achieve a sharp rise in exports.)⁴ Then price increases slowed down a good deal, but in each case it appeared to be politically impossible to achieve the complete programme of monetary restraint. Moreover, whenever activity was revived, inflation reappeared. Meanwhile, although growth continued in Brazil, inflation and the exchange crisis grew worse there, and development slowed down in Mexico. In fact it was growing more obvious month by month that the socio-economic crisis went much deeper than financial irresponsibility.

The big reversal in U.S. policy started in 1959 (not, as is popularly believed, with the change of Administration). An Inter-American Bank was set up, and by the Act of Bogota (1960) a special fund for social investment was established. At the same meeting, there was heavy emphasis not merely on the need to build schools, hospitals, etc. but also on the urgency of social reforms, especially the redistribution of land holdings and improvement in the collection of taxes.

⁴ Even this was partly the result of plans laid before the programme was adopted (See "Monetarists, Structuralists, and Import Substituting Industrialisation: A Critical Appraisal" by David Felix—a paper read at the Rio Conference on Inflation and Growth in Latin America, January 1963).

The Alliance for Progress, officially established at Punta del Este in 1961, merely carried matters a stage further. Really large foreign capital (a total of \$20 billions over a decade) was declared necessary to help promote rapid economic growth. A target rate of growth of 2½ per cent a year in *per capita* income was set. Countries of the region were, for their part, required to produce long-term economic plans—a complete reversal of the previous attitude, and a shock to many civil servants (both in Latin America and the United States!) Against the wishes of the larger countries, a group of experts was established (now popularly known as "The Nine Wise Men") to review these plans and report on their economic and social adequacy. The relevant United States agency (A.I.D.) indicated it would be guided by the views of this group in allocating funds.

The need for social reform was more heavily emphasised. In fact the Charter of Punta del Este looks very much like the programme of any nineteenth century revolutionary group in Europe. (The Communist Manifesto, for example, also proposed land reform, graduated direct taxes, industrialisation, measures to raise productivity and living standards in rural areas, and universal education.) Governments committed themselves to it, but with some qualms and reservations.

American official thinking since 1959 can be summed up as follows. Economic and social progress must be accelerated in Latin America, since the present systems will clearly not survive the mounting political pressures. But one cannot rely on the existing upper class to achieve this, if they are left to do as they please. In order to make sure that financial assistance is not wasted, it should be made conditional on sound economic plans being drawn up, with adequate mobilisation of local financial resources, and concurrent modernisation of the social structure. In brief an overdue social transformation is to be engineered, if need be, from the outside.

Fundamental Factors Affecting Latin America in the Decade Ahead

Let us put ourselves in the shoes of the State Department and ask ourselves how the situation looks. On the positive side there are a number of reasons for confidence.

The first is that the United States will inevitably be the chief customer of Latin America for many years. The Soviet bloc can "look after" Cuba, in the sense of buying nearly all its exports, selling it capital equipment on long-term credit and providing considerable technical assistance. But it could not do this for a larger fraction of

Latin America. The Cuban revolution was rather fortunately timed from the viewpoint of the Soviet Union; it happened when internal Soviet policy was becoming rather kinder to the consumer. Big purchases of sugar fitted into this trend. To absorb most of the coffee of Brazil would be much more difficult, and for some other products there would be no market in the Soviet bloc; this group of countries is a marginal exporter of tin and cereals, and a big exporter of petroleum. Again it is one thing to make loans in hundreds of millions of dollars to Cuba; thousands of billions would be needed for Latin America as a whole. The Kremlin has a political stake, and therefore economic obligations, in other parts of the "underdeveloped world", and it has always shown a particularly keen interest in countries which are nearby. Certainly it will not swing all its available resources to Latin America. The United States, on the other hand, does have considerable funds available and the intention to use them.

Other reasons are suggested by looking at the basic causes of the Cuban Revolution, or perhaps rather of the Cuban Revolution taking the form it did. The structural characteristics of Cuba included (i) a high proportion of the island's economy (including sugar) in the hands of foreign companies; (ii) a great contrast between quite highly developed cities and a very primitive countryside, especially Oriente; (iii) within each area, great income inequality; (iv) chronic stagnation (average income had changed little in purchasing power between 1925 and 1958); (v) high and growing unemployment, which was regularly over 20 per cent (except during the months of the sugar harvest) apart from disguised unemployment; (vi) a notoriously corrupt and incompetent bureaucracy;⁵ (vii) close contact with the United States through tourism, etc., so that Cubans were in the position of beggars looking in on a feast; (viii) a revolutionary tradition, born in the nineteenth-century struggles against Spain, and nurtured by United States military intervention and by a series of dictatorships; (ix) virtually no participation of the bulk of the public in political decisions.

There is no other country in Latin America where all these nine causes of revolution can be found. The table on page 210 indicates whether each of them does or does not exist in various countries. Naturally it is rather arbitrary to decide in any particular case whether the answer is 'Yes' or 'No', and the table should not be considered anything more than a very rough general impression.⁶

⁵ Graphic details can be found in an International Bank Report on Cuba (1950) which also gives information on other points mentioned here.

⁶ The list of causes is of course not exhaustive. For example, rapid but distorted growth can also cause popular discontent.

Only in Bolivia and Mexico are there revolutionary traditions comparable to Cuba, and in both cases these have been incorporated in the machinery of government. Only in Mexico and Venezuela is the United States known sufficiently well to have a great influence on local aspirations (though the information services of the United States, together with U.S. films, are doing a great deal to spread its revolutionary impact!). It is true that the countries in which foreign capital dominates the export sector are more numerous—Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela and much of Central America. Most countries have corrupt and undemocratic administrations, and exhibit considerable inequality, especially as between town and country. Several have experienced little change in *per capita* income in the last decade; all suffer from more or less severe and chronic unemployment. But pre-revolutionary Cuba was unique in showing such a large number of disruptive factors in a single country.

There are other reasons for believing that the revolutionary movements will not have the political driving force that some people in Washington fear. One is that Latin Americans, revolutionary or otherwise, are less doctrinaire and more pragmatic than their political counterparts in Europe. The split between China and the Soviet Union, by raising the question of which leader to follow, makes local Communists more inclined to follow the path dictated by national interest. A somewhat greater realism is now shown by the Right (as evidenced by the October meeting of the Alliance for Progress in Mexico City), whereas the Left are somewhat chastened by Cuba's recent experiences. The Catholic Church is still a stabilising influence. The experience of the past century and a half suggests that the masses of Latin America require very great provocation before they are moved to revolutionary action. In many countries of the region those with reasons for revolt (especially the Indian majorities of countries like Peru and Ecuador) are remote from the centres of political power, both geographically and culturally.

There are therefore certain brakes on the process of social change. But if we look down the columns of the table, every country in the region has a number of reasons for revolution which would not be found, for example, in a stable area like Western Europe. If we allow for the dangerous tendencies mentioned early in the paper (in population, political awareness and commodity trade) acting within this framework, we at once see the likelihood of revolutionary movements gaining strength.

In Latin America itself, a perennial topic of conversation is: where will be "the next Cuba"? While it would be dangerous to predict

revolution in any particular country, because of all the special circumstances that determine the shape and timing of social upheavals, it is a reasonable guess that *some* quite radical governments will come to power within the next decade. There is hardly any country where one could say at all confidently that a revolution is impossible. Perhaps the most likely cases are stagnant economies, those with a foreign-dominated export sector and those where social inequalities are great. Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela satisfy two of these conditions; Chile and several countries in Central America all three. There could be a chain reaction: a revolution in any one country would accelerate revolutionary influences elsewhere.

Questions that face U.S. Policy-makers

How will the Alliance machinery operate in this climate? Some fairly big questions arise.⁷ First, can foreigners really decide what is a desirable programme of economic development? This requires a most careful analysis of the social structure and a thorough knowledge of the balance of political forces. Even in one's own country, it is very difficult to estimate what degree of change is feasible. Any politician, however well-intentioned, has to take account of the support he needs, imposing delays in some areas; deciding on the adequacy of a programme in a foreign country hardly seems possible, especially if it is charged with political tension. Even if one knew what changes are necessary, can one really impose them from outside? Is it proper to do so? And does one not risk a tremendous hostility from those who believe the recommended pace is too slow or too fast?

To take an example which is not remote, the government of Chile may come forward with a land reform which seems inadequate, and refuses to modify it. What is A.I.D. to do? It can refuse financial assistance, but this would almost certainly mean laying the basis for a Popular Front government at the Presidential Election of 1964, if not sooner. Would Congress tolerate this? On the other hand if the United States helps a basically conservative government, it alienates the Popular Front, which may well provide the next administration.

This example points up some of the basic difficulties of the new policy. It relies on existing governments to draw up, or at least to accept, plans of social change, although they may be in power precisely to prevent such change. Presidents are usually elected on a quite limited franchise; even if they adopt popular programmes when

⁷ There are also some unclear technical points such as: How was the figure of \$20 billions arrived at? And is it supposed to be "gross" or "net" of capital outflows?

candidates, there is little to stop them changing it completely after the election (as Frondizi did, for example, in Argentina). On the other hand, those political groups really determined to carry out the changes required are, in some cases (though not all), either Castrophile or at least rather unpalatable to the State Department. Propaganda and pressure in favour of far-reaching reform is bound to strengthen these groups, and may well bring them to power. One cannot have social change without mobilising certain social forces, and there is no way of being sure that they will remain "safely" harnessed. If there is a clear link between pressure from Washington and Leftward shifts in the attitude of governments, what will the reaction of Congress be?

There are also other apparent inconsistencies. The Alliance programme requires land reform, but what will happen in Washington if, for example, American-owned plantations lose land? Secondly, planning involves making estimates of the likely trend in exports. How will Congress react if a planning office decides that this trend is inadequate and puts pressure on U.S. mineral companies, say, to export more than they want to? Or expropriates them? To demand that governments plan to satisfy their countries' needs is to open Pandora's box.

A number of officials in Washington see these difficulties (or run into them when they try to make policies "operational"), and draw pessimistic conclusions. Enough has been said to show that there is plenty of material for a gloomy outlook. It is clearly impossible for the previous position to be re-established—Latin America as a safe "sphere of influence" isolated from the currents in the world at large.

There is some parallel here with the basic problem facing the British and French in the twentieth century, namely how to retreat gracefully, as the pressures of change grew overwhelming. America faces special difficulties, apart from the faster pace of political change today. It can hardly intervene openly in Latin American politics, as a colonial power can; it has to work through governments which are often not at all amenable to pressure. The course of such a retreat is not pleasant, and the United States public by no means realises either the politically volcanic nature of the region nor the extent to which it is committed to promoting social change. The overtones of official Latin American statements, and of their votes in international bodies, will often be anti-American or even pro-Communist, and this will cause widespread offence in the United States.

Nevertheless, such diversity in the same Hemisphere is not a state of affairs that the United States need find intolerable, or even very uncomfortable. Other countries have had to live with uncongenial

neighbours for centuries! And reasons have been indicated for believing that revolutionary governments would not be, in the first place, implacably hostile.

Yet, will Washington be able to keep open lines of communication with governments which are apparently uncongenial, so as to avoid making them irreconcilable enemies? And can it help over-committing itself to military cliques which are prepared to follow its lead on major issues of foreign policy (but on nothing else)? The temptation to dabble in the affairs of the region are strong—for example by subsidising journals, promoting frontier incidents or bribing senior military officers. But to do this successfully requires a degree of perception and skill which, if past developments are any guide, are unlikely to be manifested. So relations with any new revolutionary government may well start on the wrong foot.

More profound will be the difficulties after the revolution. What has the United States learned from its Cuban policy? How would it react next time to the expropriation of U.S. firms? Would it have the courage to abandon the lesser interest (American property overseas) in favour of the really important aim of avoiding encirclement? (The remaining U.S. investments in Latin America have a book value of about \$10 billions; it would hardly be worthwhile to put forward a \$20 billion programme if the *primary* object were to save this stake!) Or will the State Department try to maintain the *whole* of the present set-up? Will it ever fall again into the trap of trying to overthrow a Government by direct or indirect military intervention? The recent revival of the Monroe doctrine suggests that the sovereignty of countries in the Western Hemisphere does not include the right to get too close (though how close this is remains undefined) in their relations with the Soviet block.

A pessimist might grant that important safeguards exist, but argue that United States policy is nevertheless under domestic constraints which disastrously limit its freedom of action. A case can certainly be made for saying that Congressional opinion is so firmly set that policy can never be flexible or pragmatic. There are strong pressure groups in favour of preserving the status quo (especially the position of American companies overseas). The attitude of the Press to any Latin American government seems to depend on the single question of how "democratic" it is. Yet to make this question at all precise is increasingly difficult, and the decisive test often appears to be whether a government helps Washington in the Cold War or not. Who, one could ask, is trying to show the public that the Latin American situation is a pre-revolutionary one, and prepare them for what lies

ahead? The Administration seems, from its Cuban policy, to be bound to what (paraphrasing Trotsky) one could call a policy of "permanent counter-revolution".

Yet after all both public and official opinion are modified by events. Not many people would have anticipated, even as late as 1958, that Congress would ever support a programme like the Alliance for Progress. The only trouble is that, as in every other country, the process of learning sometimes lags dangerously behind events.

ROUGH INDICATION OF THE PRESENCE (OR ABSENCE) OF VARIOUS CAUSES OF REVOLUTION
IN LATIN AMERICA

DUDLEY SEERS

	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Ecuador	Mexico	Paraguay	Peru	Uruguay	Venezuela	Central America (a)
(i) Dominance of foreign capital in export sector	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes/No
(ii) Great rural-urban contrast ...	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
(iii) Great income inequality	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
(iv) Chronic stagnation ...	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes/No
(v) Severe underemployment	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
(vi) Severe administrative weakness (c) ...	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
(vii) Strong envy of U.S. living standards ...	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No
(viii) Revolutionary tradition (d) ...	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
(ix) Political machinery very undemocratic (e) ...	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes

(a) The classification is of course particularly rough here. Moreover the answers indicated do not cover the case of Costa Rica, which has very different characteristics than those of the rest of Central America. (In many ways Costa Rica has features in common with Uruguay). However, Panama, Haiti and the Dominican Republic are in most respects similar to Central America.

(b) There are also cases, such as Brazil and Mexico, where foreign influence is strong enough in other sectors to be politically important (e.g., in manufacturing).

(c) This is a particularly difficult matter to decide. Even in the few cases shown as not being severely inefficient, there are grave weaknesses in some areas (e.g., Argentine railways). One decisive question is whether corruption pervades the administrative structure.

(d) Cases of social revolutions within the past century. What may be just as important are cases of unsuccessful rural violence e.g., in Brazil, Peru and (particularly) Colombia.

(e) Another very difficult question. One clue is whether over 50 per cent of the public voted in recent Presidential elections (assuming these were genuine contests). On that basis, only Argentina, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela would count. Yet both Argentina and Venezuela have experienced mainly military dictatorships since the war, and even in Venezuela one could not say that there was now full freedom of the press or of organisation. In Mexico the result of the election is always a foregone conclusion, but the government party is in some ways susceptible to popular pressures; similarly, in Chile, although the participation in elections is low, there is some feeling of popular consultation.

BOOK REVIEWS

PROCESS OF INDEPENDENCE. By FATMA MANSUR. [Routledge and Kegan Paul. 177 pp. 25s.]

THE NEHRUS: MOTILAL AND JAWAHARLAL. By B. R. NANDA. [Allen and Unwin. 343 pp. 30s.]

REPORTING INDIA. By TAYA ZINKIN. [Chatto and Windus. 219 pp. 30s.]

VILLAGE GOVERNMENT IN INDIA. By RALPH H. RETZLAFF. [Asia Publishing House. 125 pp. 25s.]

THE COLLECTED WORKS OF MAHATMA GANDHI. VOLUME SIX. [The Publications Division, Government of India. 502 pp. 35s.]

Dr. Mansur's is, among these books, the only general study. It is a very ambitious work. The author takes the process of independence in its largest sense: not the transfer of power but the development of nationalism up to independence and the trends of politics subsequently. She studies the process in India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Ghana with some references to a few other countries. She is concerned to examine the experience with a view to the discovery of common patterns, generalisations about the nature of this kind of political development. Her main theoretical guides seem to be Pareto and Mosca, and it is on the formation and the roles of élites that she chiefly concentrates.

The scale and nature of Dr. Mansur's study is not new, but it has usually been tackled by team-work among groups of American area-specialists. Perhaps that is still the only normally safe way. Dr. Mansur has been moderately selective in her themes: the education of the nationalist élites, their acquisition of power, the making of constitutions for the new states and the formation of political parties. Even so, she has had to review an enormous mass of difficult material and does not claim to have done so otherwise than sketchily. Expert in no one of her particular areas, she has not been able to avoid accounts which are somewhat wooden, stilted and occasionally inadequate. Her Turkish background may assist in certain insights but is no substitute for immersion in the details of at least one of the new developing political systems.

What the author has to offer as findings nevertheless constitute interesting hypotheses. She holds that the Westernising nationalist élite was generally not from a new social class but the younger generation of an old ruling group. This seems only patchily true, but it is one of several aspects about the history of nationalist movements which await examination. The book goes on to show how the conquest of power only places the leaders face to face with the real problems of development, political as well as economic. There is too little space available for a coherent presentation of post-independence events in these new states and the interesting suggestions thrown out at the end do not really emerge from the hurried surveys. They are nevertheless useful, though many of them have featured in the writings of American scholars to which surprisingly little reference is made. In general, Dr. Mansur expects that some of the distinctive features of the non-Western political process at the present time—the dominating

charismatic leadership, the presence in the body politic of substantial disaffected elements especially of a traditional kind, the prevalence of violence—will disappear as economic growth and experience of politics replace old social cleavages by new ones which modernised political systems are better able to resolve. She is right to urge that it is less valuable to measure how far short of some Western model these new states fall than to examine carefully their present political processes and then to see where they point. But she must in a further book fulfil the promise to do this, for it is not done here.

The question, how are nationalist leaders made? is in a sense taken up in Mr. Nanda's book which gives us a beautiful close-up of one of Dr. Mansur's themes. Mr. Nanda has done it again: his finely judged and excellently written biography of Gandhi is now partnered by this most valuable one of *The Nehrus*. This second piece of work must have been, if anything, the more difficult of the two. Gandhi was complex enough but here we have the shaping of Indian nationalism woven into the texture of a deep and lively father-and-son relationship. It was high time Motilal Nehru had biographical justice done to him. Despite the title, this is a book about him and it ends with his death in 1931. (Was its title not announced at one stage as "Motilal Nehru"?)

Jawaharlal of course very properly comes in; was there ever a father to whom the son meant so much? Once beloved Jawaharlal is of age, Motilal's life almost ceases to be his own. At least it seems that each major change of direction in his life follows his son's pointing finger. But Mr. Nanda warns us not to be over-simple and shows us how circumstances working on Motilal might have sufficed without Jawaharlal. Take even the fantastic conversion of the rich, Savile Row tailored, Westernised Motilal, lawyer and constitutionalist reformer, into the gaol-going, homespun wearing, civil disobedience follower of Gandhi. It is true that the son first fell in love with Gandhi and acquired another father. But Motilal was not the only recruit of his kind that Gandhi secured in the major disillusionment with British rule that took place around 1920-21. Moreover, Motilal appraised Gandhi independently after working with him on a job of Motilal's own style: the sifting of evidence in the study of the ghastly Amritsar episode. That said, however, the balance of truth may lie in Gandhi's own judgement of Motilal: asked if love of India was not Motilal's greatest quality, Gandhi replied, "No, his love for India was derived from his love for Jawaharlal". Mr. Nanda tells us that when Jawaharlal was first imprisoned, his father "secretly tried sleeping on the floor to get an idea of what his son would have to go through in gaol".

But what an impressive and imposing man in his own right was Motilal! The impact of Western education on India made many noble human products but none nobler than him. The profession of the law has helped to shape the discipline and integrity of many of its servants but few more perfectly than Motilal. One wonders whether his several English friends among the bureaucracy and judiciary of India were able to avoid blaming themselves when they found such a man becoming estranged from their system of rule. Here was a Victorian liberal aristocrat asking only that the things he had been taught to care for should be allowed to develop in India. To his "progressive" son these values and attitudes seemed after 1919 inadequate. Yet he could not throw them away—the rule of law and the respect for

individual rights—any more than he could jettison his inheritance of temperament—pride as well as integrity, fastidiousness as well as capacity for work, flaming temper as well as fearless courage. India has needed all these in her leader.

From the moment of Gandhi's entry on the scene, even the Nehrus seems a little dwarfed. (It is amazing how Gandhi was brought into even domestic questions. Kamala, Jawaharlal's wife, is to go to Geneva for medical treatment: what does Gandhi think?) But whereas Motilal, then at sixty, has had a full career, Jawaharlal is thirty and still looking for his place in the world. Gandhi himself was then already fifty-two. Although he was new to Indian politics, he was experienced and mature. Both Nehrus at once saw a side to him that others were to miss: a man "as hard as a diamond... inflexible and terribly earnest... a fierce fire... steel in him... rock-like (and with) inner reserves of power". These qualities—together with the limitless capacity for work, the mastery of detail and the precision of thought—are already clear in his letters and memoranda of 1906-7, now published as Volume VI of the *Collected Works*. This collection will be near a hundred volumes before completion, but it is a necessity for any library seriously concerned with world politics. The present volume of course deals with the campaign on behalf of Indians in South Africa and lays bare all the work of organisation and persuasion—including the deputations to London—in which Gandhi took the lead. It also includes some interesting articles for his *Indian Opinion* paper in which we see the idea of *satyagraha* unfolding.

For Gandhi, independence meant more than a transfer of power from British hands. It meant a condition of self-rule and self-control for the Indian people. This entailed on the one hand a transformation of character from servility to dignity and discipline, on the other hand the establishment of political institutions that would reflect and encourage such self-rule. Among these were to be arrangements for village self-government. Efforts in this direction have been made since 1947 and Professor Retzlaff's study is a great help in assessing the outcome. *Village Government in India* is in fact a study of one village, but the factors to which the author draws attention are not peculiar and his conclusions have a general relevance. The subject is the relation between political institutions and social structure (incidentally, not one of Gandhi's strong subjects). Comments on this subject have too often tended to be of one of two kinds, both extreme and absurd. Some have naively hailed democratic decentralisation or *panchayat raj* as a political device which has already transformed the social basis of rural life. Others profess to discover in the experience of the recent years nothing but the successful exploitation of new institutions by old ruling classes of village society. The truth is much more interesting: the interaction is genuine and complex. New institutions and new political techniques entail a challenge to the rural establishment; they survive only if they adjust; to conserve, they change—and things are not then the same as before. Professor Retzlaff's account is economical and vivid. To the radical, change may seem negligible, but it is going about as fast as possible short of self-defeating violence. The book also brings out very well the new relations between village politics and the politics of political parties.

From the microscope to the panoramic drive: Taya Zinkin has all India—

has an impressive logical coherence when certain assumptions are accepted, but which like other more famous bodies of doctrine have their limitations and even dangers.

B. C. ROBERTS.

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY. By F. S. NORTHEDGE. [*Allen and Unwin*. 341 pp. 38s.]

AGAINST THE COLD WAR. By CHANAKYA SEN. [*Asia Publishing House*. 288 pp. 25s.]

Dr. Northedge's study of British foreign policy from the end of the second World War to Britain's application to join the Common Market is one of the Minerva Series of Student Handbooks. It does not claim to be anything more; its object is to give a straightforward account of events against the background of world politics and economics, with the minimum of comment by the author. Nonetheless the book is a plea—a plea for a liberal interpretation in all senses, recognising that it is far more difficult for a government to take decisions (often with inadequate knowledge to go on) than for people outside to criticise it afterwards. "The proper understanding of foreign policy demands compassion" writes the author in the preface, and he sticks firmly to his own rule. About the strongest expressions he uses are "somewhat unwise" (for the use of Japanese troops to suppress Indonesian nationalists in 1945) and "an ill-considered enterprise" (for Suez).

The main theme is that the sixteen years covered form a whole, a period in which Britain had to transform itself from a world power to one looking inward to the smaller community of Europe, while still maintaining something at least of a special relationship with the United States; Dr. Northedge had finished writing before the Nassau conference or General de Gaulle's brusque rejection of the British approach. Sheer economic necessity was the mother of many inventions in foreign policy and a barrier to many things that might have been done. Britain's part in the cold war has not been that of an initiator (Churchill's Fulton speech gets only a brief mention) but of a follower of American policy, itself in large measure the response to Russian intransigence. The idea of a third force had to be recognised early as unacceptable, as much to a Labour government as to a Conservative one, and on this and other major issues the change of government in 1951 made relatively little difference. The cold war was, in fact inevitable, and Dr. Northedge's interpretation of why it came about is conventional—perhaps being a little less than fair to the Russians at times, and certainly underrating the genuine element of fear of Germany and of the west in general which accounted for much of their unreasonableness in the earlier years. But Britain's place in the cold war once established, the rest had to follow, down to the decision to turn away from the Commonwealth and into Europe (a decision which one suspects Dr. Northedge regards as a rather sad one); and in the one passage where he allows himself sustained criticism, it would seem to be because successive pieces of British policy in the Middle East up to and including Suez showed too tardy an appreciation of the changed role of the country by Bevin and Eden.

By contrast, Mr. Sen's book is a polemic, but with a great deal of history in it. From an Asian point of view the cold war has not always been a disaster. "The phenomenal progress of Asia and Africa to nationhood" he writes at one point "has become possible in a large measure because of this ruthless big power struggle", and elsewhere he remarks on the greater ease with which underdeveloped countries can get economic help from two mutually fearful blocs. "But while American methods have been generally crude and blunt—and, therefore, less successful—Soviet methods have been clever and subtle"—a judgement with which a good many recipients of both would disagree profoundly. However, the cold war has now served its purpose and ought to be ended, since neither the main contestants nor the non-aligned could possibly escape catastrophe if it continued too long, let alone become a hot war. The uncommitted countries have a great part to play in bringing the big powers together.

The main interest of Mr. Sen's work is, however, not its pleading, but the way in which it interprets great power politics from an Indian point of view—perhaps a little conceitedly identifying Asian and African viewpoints with his own. The judgement quoted above is not the only one which will surprise the western (or possibly the Russian) reader, but there are quite a few of Dr. Sen's comments on western behaviour which deserve to be taken seriously. It is, after all, to everyone's interest that there should not be a wall of incomprehension between the old continents and the new, and nothing Mr. Sen says need surprise us more than, perhaps, the reactions to India's attack in Goa in the countries which had perpetrated Cyprus, Suez and the Bay of Pigs surprised him. But he would carry greater conviction if the book were better constructed, less polemic, more attentive to minor fact, and provided with fuller indication of the sources of even quite long quotations.

On the subject of quotations, even so good a scholar as Dr. Northedge can go astray. With no other reference than to a Chatham House article, from which it is not clear whether he is quoting directly, he records that, on 3 July 1945, when British and American forces entered Berlin "they were met by the people of Berlin with the words 'Why did you not come sooner? The Russians kept telling us to take no notice of you since you are here only as guests.'" Were they indeed?

T. E. M. McKITTERICK.

ARABIC THOUGHT IN THE LIBERAL AGE 1798-1939. By ALBERT HOURANI [*Oxford University Press for Royal Institute of International Affairs*. x and 402 pp., index. 42s.]

THE scope of this lucid and comprehensive treatise is indicated by the terminal dates which appear in its title. Mr. Hourani provides a conspectus of writings in Arabic on social and political questions in the period running from Bonaparte's invasion of Egypt to the eve of the Second World War. The writers of this period whom Mr. Hourani deals with are a miscellany:

practical political and administrative reformers like Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi for whom abstract speculation was justified only by its utility; political agitators like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Mustafa Kamil; *littérateurs* who made it their business to report on the newly-discovered world of Europe, and to introduce the new Western science and philosophy to their countries, like Tahtawi, Shumayyil and Farah Antun; and learned theologians, like Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida, who were primarily concerned to adapt Islam to the new intellectual climate, and to defend it against the onslaughts of Europeans and Christians, and against the indifferentism and unbelief of a new generation of Muslims tainted with the influence of the West. The terminal dates of the title, therefore, not only set the chronological limits of the author's study, but also indicate his main unifying theme, which is that of the reception of European thought in the Arabic-speaking world.

The book, then, is a history of ideas and very readable as such. But does not its very readability, the smooth development of a main theme and its subsidiary corollaries, give perhaps an exaggerated idea of the orderliness and the *esprit de suite* of the writers here discussed? It is a risk which the historian of ideas and his readers must bear in mind, that summaries and orderly expositions, in contrast to the quotation of substantial passages, may actually flatter some writers; particularly when the writers, as is the case with most of them here, are not of the first class, are in fact pamphleteers or publicists, pleading a cause or popularising an idea, rather than original thinkers and stylists.

As appears from his title, Mr. Hourani views this period in Arab political thought as liberal. By this he means that the dominant themes of the age were the primacy of the individual, the limitation of the power of government and the acceptance of "the values of modern civilisation". These ideas do constitute the dominant themes of a few writers, notably the Egyptian Lutfi al-Sayyid, but is it not the case that he and his like have been the least popular and the least influential in the Arab world? If we consider the others, who were infinitely more influential, it is doubtful whether Afghani, or Mustafa Kamil or Rashid Rida or Zaghul or the theorists of Arab nationalism cared much for individual liberty; the dominant theme in their political writing is rather admiration and quest for power and efficiency. Abduh, it is true, is a major exception, but he is an ambiguous figure, and his influence, such as it is, equivocal.

Nor is this particularly surprising; for the age in which these writers lived was, in this region, the opposite of liberal. It was an age of upheaval and revolution which saw a tremendous increase in autocracy, despotism and, in its latter end, of demagoguery. It is the age of Muhammad Ali, the military tyrant, and his equally tyrannical successors; of Sultan Mahmud the Second, an enlightened despot, and of Abdul Hamid, whose despotism was perhaps equally enlightened; of Armenian massacres, and Young Turk conspiracies; of the downfall of the Ottoman Empire, and its replacement by even shakier and more doubtful regimes, a prey to corruption and intrigue, and, in the years before 1939, infatuated with Nazism. This middle eastern "permanent revolution" must be kept in the reader's mind, as it must have been continuously in these writers' minds, however seldom they ventured to mention or discuss it. In this respect they are the heirs of medieval

Islam where the gap between the world of ideas and the world of events is vertiginously wide. Mr. Hourani's book, it is safe to say, will long remain indispensable to the student of the subject.

ELIE KEDOURIE.

THE MAN ON HORSEBACK. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN POLITICS. By S. E. FINER. (*Pall Mall Press*. 268 pp. 27s. 6d.)

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES. Edited by JOHN J. JOHNSON. (*Princeton University Press*. 423 pp. 68s.)

ARMED FORCES IN NEW STATES. By W. GUTTERIDGE. (*Oxford University Press for Institute of Race Relations*. 68 pp. 6s.)

BOTH the first and the second of these books rest on a common insistence that military coups and military intervention in politics generally, far from constituting extraordinary infringements of a law of nature which ordains that civilian rule be supreme and unquestioned, are on the contrary exceedingly frequent, even normal, occurrences in many parts of the world; and that the phenomenon therefore needs to be more thoroughly studied and better understood.

Professor Finer's book is much the more ambitious of the two, since it seeks to account for every possible aspect of the military's involvement in politics, anywhere, and for all the possible reasons which make some countries and not others prone to Bonapartism. As a brisk introductory survey, the book may do well enough, but it unfortunately suffers from some severe limitations. These limitations mainly stem, it appears to me, from the author's approach to his subject. Professor Finer's key category of analysis is the "level of political culture" in any given society, by which he means its "attachment to civil institutions". This leads him to weave a number of variations on the theme that "where civilian associations and parties are strong and numerous, where the procedures for the transfer of power are orderly, and where the location of supreme authority is not seriously challenged", there "the political ambit of the military will be circumscribed"; and when the military have "neither disposition nor opportunity to intervene", there "no intervention will occur". Just so. But these and similar propositions scattered throughout the book seem hardly more than elaborate probes into the obvious—not necessarily harmful but not very illuminating either. The trouble with Professor Finer's account is that his focus is so predominantly political and institutional, with far too little and too superficial attention accorded to the pulls and tensions of social and economic forces. It is this apparent unwillingness to probe beneath the institutional surface which makes it possible for Professor Finer to advance for instance the rather peculiar view that "the Argentine armed forces are now the devoted supporter of the parliamentary regime" because they bitterly oppose Peronism.

The kind of sociological awareness which Professor Finer's book lacks is amply displayed by the authors of the essays brought together under the editorship of Professor Johnson and published under the auspices of the

RAND Corporation. This is an extremely useful symposium on a subject whose importance in the world today scarcely needs emphasis. Three of the essays deal with Latin America and three with South East Asia, one with the Middle East, one with Israel, one with Sub-Saharan Africa, and two more essays, by Professor Shils and Professor Pye, consist of general reflections on the role of the military in under-industrialised and transitional societies. Though it would be absurd to underestimate the influence and power of the military in settled countries, it is of course in those societies that military intervention is most frequent and thoroughgoing. Most of the countries concerned, the essayists note, have been and are subject to a multitude of problems and stresses of fearful intensity, which the established classes have nowhere been able to subdue. Their failure has enormously enhanced the chances of the military to play a role, and often indeed to take over the principal roles: in Latin America, quite unmartial "civilians-in-uniform" have become the needed partners of the ruling oligarchies, so that breaking the power of the army is a basic condition of genuine reform; while in the Middle East, on the other hand, it is army officers who in the recent past have often been responsible for the overthrow of the old regimes. There, as Professor Manfred Halpern notes in an illuminating essay, the army has become "the principal political actor and instrument of a new middle class", whose aspirations are still very far from fulfilled. What remains unresolved is how far and how deep army juntas are likely to carry the process of reform which they set in motion.

Civilian-military relations do not, or do not yet, present a serious problem to most of the new African states, since they are still in the process of creating their own armed forces, without which no new state feels that it has properly arrived. The factors which affect the character of these emergent military establishments in African societies are usefully set out and discussed in Professor Johnson's symposium. Despite its title, Mr. Gutteridge's essay is more narrow in scope: it is mainly concerned with the present state of the armed forces in the former British colonies in Africa. As such, it provides an informative review of the relevant data, but its discussion of the social and political role of the armed forces in the new states is too brief and sketchy to be very useful.

R. MILIBAND.

FROM UTOPIA TO NIGHTMARE. By CHAD WALSH. (Bles. 191 pp. 15s.)

Brave New World and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* have every right to be considered classics of anti-utopian literature. Their influence has been truly incredible: much of the nomenclature, and many of the concepts, contained in them have passed into journalistic and even popular language. Any study of anti-utopian writing must take them into account. In fact, a discussion of the genre might logically commence with them. For Professor Walsh these works are key pieces in his critique. Yet the author of *From Utopia to Nightmare* fails to appreciate the full significance of *Brave New World* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*; the failure of apprehension is so fundamental that it fatally flaws his study.

Professor Walsh appears to ignore or discount much of the literary tradition of anti-utopia. Thus he isolates these novels of Huxley and Orwell and endows them with a synthetic uniqueness. Both *Brave New World* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, with all their dissimilarities, have their origins in two other works: Eugen Richter's *Pictures of a Socialistic Future* and Evgenii Zamyatin's *We*. Richter, a German liberal, wrote his novel as a response to the social-democratic theories of August Bebel. He attempts to envisage the socialist leader's programme in action. But in spite of its denunciatory tone, *Pictures of a Socialistic Future* is a comparatively sober work—it entirely lacks the hysteria and even malice present in later anti-utopian novels, such as Constantine FitzGibbon's *When the Kissing had to Stop*.

On the other hand, the pressures upon Zamyatin are different. He is not interpreting an unrealised programme—he is castigating an actuality, which in this case is the incipient Thermidorean climate of Stalinism.

Huxley and Orwell were writing their novels in the immediate backlash of accomplished totalitarianism. The former protests at a conceivable total perversion of science (his book was first published in 1932) and the latter at the pursuit of pure power—power which has divested itself of all ideological rationalisations. In a sense, of course, the two novels are complementary to one another, and what makes them so important is their full-scale, unrelenting anatomising of a whole and complete society.

No one, I expect, would disagree with Professor Walsh when he comments that latter-day anti-utopian or dystopian novels (as he prefers to call them) reflect the crucial and traumatic changes that totalitarianism and mass ideology have wrought on human life and consciousness, but in approaching his analysis as a Christian theologian he has missed certain meaningful features which a less obviously prejudiced writer would seize upon. This may explain why he has failed to research into other anti-utopian works, which, although more limited in scope and range, possess certain singular insights. There are, for example, the Veblenesque economic anti-utopias of Frederik Pohl, in which the concepts of conspicuous consumption and planned obsolescence are taken to the edge of horrific satire. Ray Bradbury's *Fahrenheit 451*, a novel attacking togetherness and the tyranny of mass media, in which the function of firemen is to burn books—"Monday burn Millay, Wednesday Whitman, Friday Faulkner . . ."—receives no mention from Professor Walsh. Neither is there a reference to Sarban's story of a feudal Nazi-dominated future, *The Sound of his Horn*. These examples are not chosen capriciously; their themes, extrapolating extant or once-extant trends in society, complete and bulk in the corpus of the anti-utopian vision.

Professor Walsh contends that the anti-utopian writer "operates as social scientist and philosopher", and that in addition, many of these writers are "prophets of our times". Here, I believe, are two particularly suspect and over-romanticised statements; there is, moreover, little reason for supposing that anti-utopian writers have a function within these terms. What is both certain and important is that anti-utopian writing embodies an individual, and in many cases, shared response to far-reaching convulsions in society, and precisely for that reason is eligible for analysis by the sociologist and the philosopher.

The definitive study of the anti-utopia idea still remains to be written;

From Utopia to Nightmare, unfortunately, is only a very small step in that direction.

MICHAEL MADDISON.

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND BRITISH POLITICS. By JAMES B. CHRISTOPH.
[George Allen & Unwin. 202 pp., index. 25s.]

IN this book Professor Christoph, an American student of politics, presents us with a history of the struggle in Great Britain to abolish the death penalty for murder which culminated, for the time being, in the Homicide Act, 1957. The writing of contemporary history is always difficult, and is exceptionally so when the subject-matter is one which arouses strong emotions. Although the author does not conceal his sympathy with the abolitionists, he gives a really objective and, I think, accurate account of the events which he narrates. The historical survey gains enormously through Professor Christoph's sensitiveness to the social and political aspects of the problem which he studies, and the commentary on these matters transcends in value the purely historical side of his work. Indeed he throws a flood of light on some aspects of British politics which are peripheral to its strict party aspects, and this should not only be of interest and value to students of the subject, but may even make some points clearer to those who are actually engaged in the practice of this difficult art.

The subject of capital punishment lends itself with particular aptness to the sort of study which Professor Christoph here undertakes. It can be easily isolated from the general run of political problems, since, technically at any rate, it has always been treated as non-party. But it arouses feelings as strong as if it were, so that it provides those colourful clashes of personality which are grist to the mill of the historian. At the same time the elucidation of the actual march of events is not so difficult as to absorb him at the expense of the over all picture which he has to paint, for, as the author himself says, the sort of underground financial and economic interests which are so often at work in modern democratic states have played little, if any, part in the movement which he describes: for it has been inspired by moral considerations and dominated by emotional feeling.

The book opens with a short section on capital punishment in English history. This subject has been overwritten of recent years, but was no doubt necessary as an introduction to the present work. In any case, it is very short and a model of its kind. I cannot, however, agree with the statement that the "wholesale increase in capital offences" in eighteenth century England was due to "the social and economic chaos which accompanied the early stages of the Industrial Revolution". It had already commenced a generation earlier: indeed, Professor Christoph himself instances the notorious Waltham Black Act which created a number of new capital offences, and was passed as early as 1722. However, he is no doubt correct in attributing this extraordinary outbreak of repressive violence, which was unique in Europe, to the combination of rapidly growing wealth and a police system, particularly in the large towns, which was almost non-existent.

Accurately enough Professor Christoph finds the origins of the modern abolitionist movement in the wave of reaction against the slaughter of the first world war. During this period the Howard League for Penal Reform was founded (1921), and the first of the dynamic leaders against capital punishment, the late Roy Calvert, commenced his campaign. Calvert was a considerable figure in the movement for penological reform, and the importance which he attached to the abolition of the death sentence for murder undoubtedly played its part in bringing that objective on the front of the stage. His early death was a tragedy mitigated somewhat by the singleness of purpose and enthusiasm displayed by his widow in pushing on with his work, a reference to which would have been appropriate in this book.

Calvert and those working with him had set the stage for an all out attack on the death sentence, to be delivered in Parliament at the time of the Criminal Justice bill of 1939, the passage of which through Parliament was prevented by the outbreak of the war. It was inevitable that this would be renewed with considerable hope of success when the Labour Party came into power in 1945.

As I have said, capital punishment is technically a non-party matter, but in fact, as one might expect, the Labour Party is overwhelmingly abolitionist and the Conservative Party pretty solidly retentionist. Unfortunately in 1948 when the revived Criminal Justice Bill was going through Parliament, some of the most influential Cabinet ministers were anxious not to get involved, at a time when much important social legislation was going through the mill, with a highly controversial and time consuming measure, and the Home Office, representing the police and the prison system, threw its weight into the same scale, so much so that the Home Secretary Chuter Ede, who was not only an abolitionist by temperament but had in the past actively allied himself with the movement, underwent a temporary reconversion. This was a matter of great significance, for if he had stuck to his guns and respite all death sentences during the four years 1948-51, as the clear majority in the Commons against them entitled him to do, the Belgian experience of abolition by desuetude would almost certainly have been repeated, and capital punishment would have come to an end because it would have become clear that it is not in fact a deterrent to murder. Professor Christoph hardly underlines this point sufficiently.

There is no need to recapitulate the events which led to the entire elimination of all reference to punishment for murder from the Criminal Justice Act 1948. The Conservative triumph in the Lords was complete—too complete, because in 1957 they were forced to eat many of the words spoken with such exuberance in 1948. Professor Christoph picks his way carefully and objectively through this confused history, which he narrates with admirable clarity. He properly plays down the importance of Mr. R. T. Paget's unfortunate *gaffe* about Alexander Patterson, the most influential of all recent Prison Commissioners, having been converted to abolitionism before his death. Actually there is evidence that this was so, though Paget was certainly not justified in his categorical assertion: Professor Christoph having taken up this issue might well have pursued it further.

In the events of 1948 most of the leading roles both in and out of Parliament had been played by pre-war figures. While this continued to be largely true in Parliament during the intervening years leading up to 1957,

the agitation outside was conducted by a new organisation, the National Campaign for the Abolition of Capital Punishment, which was formed by people new to the movement like Victor Gollancz, Arthur Koestler and Canon Collins. Professor Christoph argues that the National Campaign is a "pressure group" and discusses its activities in comparison with the work of other pressure groups which have been active in the politics of democratic states of recent years.

The effect of its propaganda upon public opinion is not easy to assess, though, as Professor Christoph shows from a close analysis of the Gallup and other polls, there was undoubtedly a movement of opinion in the direction of abolition. However, the report of the Royal Commission, set up after 1948 to study alternatives but which pretty clearly indicated that abolition was desirable, obviously influenced thoughtful people a great deal, especially after its chairman, Sir Ernest Gowers, had publicly announced his conversion. The general public was no doubt more worried by the series of murder cases associated with the names of Evans and Christie, Ruth Ellis, and Bentley and Craig, in all of which executions were carried out despite strong opposition from large sections of the community.

The result of this movement of opinion was, after the 1955 General Election, to strengthen appreciably the handful of Conservative abolitionists in Parliament. Sidney Silverman MP, who had during the 1945-50 Parliament become the acknowledged leader of the abolitionist group in the House of Commons, adroitly seized his opportunity, and for a time it looked as if the Government would be forced to give way. However, partly by disciplinary methods and partly by introducing that very compromise of degrees of murder which they had so scornfully rejected in 1948, the Conservatives succeeded in foiling the attack. The result was the Act of 1957 which, ludicrously unsatisfactory as it is on the main issue, did introduce several valuable reforms and had the effect of bringing down the number of annual executions to a figure countable on the fingers of one hand. In spite of his failure Mr. Silverman undoubtedly deserves the encomia bestowed by Professor Christoph for the skill and moderation of his leadership.

In his final chapter Professor Christoph appropriately discusses the political process in the United Kingdom in the light of the historical events which he has set out and analysed. This essay is penetrating and highly pertinent, well worthy of study by political scientists and practical politicians. Among the points which he makes the following are, I think, particularly deserving of attention.

First, that a comparatively frail reform movement can make considerable headway even against a hostile Government if it is well led, and can command the sincere and keen allegiance of quite a small section of the community. This one has succeeded to the point that abolition has become certain, and certain in the not too distant future.

Secondly, that it is difficult for a government, however much it may pay lip service to the idea of leadership, to move far ahead of public opinion which remained throughout this period predominantly hostile to abolition. Few of the Labour Cabinet were personally opposed to the movement, and it is difficult to believe that Mr. Butler, the Conservative Home Secretary at the relevant time, was not in sympathy with the abolitionist section of his party. Yet the political needs of the situation were too strong for all of them.

Thirdly, this type of movement has a better chance of success if some moral issue is involved, rather than one the main implications of which are economic or straight political: unless of course it has found its place in a party political platform.

Fourthly, adventitious circumstances are more likely to play an important part in a campaign such as this, than in normal party politics. Thus a few revolting murders in 1948, highlighted in the papers, encouraged and assisted the Lords in their successful obstruction of the Commons, while in the 50s the position was reversed, and the cases above referred to undoubtedly assisted the abolitionists.

CHORLEY.

NEGOTIATION FROM STRENGTH. By CORAL BELL. [*Chatto & Windus*. 224 pp. 21s.]

STUDIES OF WAR. By P. M. S. BLACKETT. [*Oliver & Boyd*. x and 246 pp. 21s.]

POWER POLITICS IN THE NUCLEAR AGE. By SIR STEPHEN KING-HALL. [*Gollancz*. 224 pp. 25s.]

ON THE PREVENTION OF WAR. By JOHN STRACHEY. [*Macmillan*. 344 pp. 40s. (in paper covers, 15s.)]

ALTHOUGH the four books reviewed here differ widely in style, content and presentation, their basic theme is the same, and it is simple: nuclear war is not inevitable, but it is probable in the future unless means can be found to maintain the balance of power between US and Soviet Union, and then to devise techniques for disuading other states from acquiring nuclear weapons. Only Mr. Strachey carries this theme to the conclusion of either a concordat amongst nuclear powers never to use nuclear weapons amongst themselves, or a world authority whose power would reside in the sole ownership of them.

Mr. Strachey's book is in fact rather a puzzle. Some of the harsher things already said about it can be discounted, notably that an increase in nationally owned nuclear weapons is actually recommended as a further insurance against the depredations of non-nuclear states, i.e. smaller powers, warring amongst themselves, but attempting to get the support of more powerful states. It must be admitted, however, that the charge is rebutted by this reviewer because of the book's ideal solution of a world authority, rather than the arguments and proposals advanced in the body of the text.

The trouble is that Mr. Strachey contradicts himself from time to time, and one is never absolutely sure which course he is advocating. His book is anyway far too long and discursive, more suited in manner to a seminar than the close analysis of present facts and future possibilities, which any study of foreign policy, strategy and disarmament must provide today. And, like so many American writers, accorded by Mr. Strachey the imprecise status of "defence experts", and quoted with approval, he is obsessed by nuclear weapons to the point of virtually ignoring the power which comes or can be provided by properly trained and equipped conventional forces—a fact which the recent Cuba crisis surely emphasised.

For example, Mr. Strachey says: "The fact remains that if we wish to retain any capacity to settle our own destiny without being obliged, if threatened, to obey the will of another nation or alliance, we must, in the nuclear age, retain some form of deterrence." But later we read: "America and Russia are super powers. The gap between their strength and the next most powerful nation-state (which in 1962 is still Britain, since she alone of the rest has some effective nuclear capability) is wider than the gap between the strengths of all other important nation-states relatively to each other."

The "we" in the first quotation is not made explicit, but by inference it refers to Britain, or equally to any other power with aspirations to play a part on the world stage. Yet Mr. Strachey is concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons as a probable rather than an improbable cause of war. The second quotation is simply not borne out by the facts of the present balance of power, or Britain's part in shaping contemporary history. All that Britain's nuclear weapons do is to destabilise the balance, by encouraging other states to acquire similarly inadequate armouries of weapons which could only be used on the assumption that the "super powers" would eventually join in the fray.

Nevertheless it remains true that Mr. Strachey has written a book which cannot easily be ignored. His analyses of abortive disarmament and test ban negotiations, with his accompanying plea for pragmatic, if limited measures of arms control as more likely to succeed than utopian schemes of "general and comprehensive disarmament", will be widely supported. He might perhaps have made an even stronger case if he had discussed the degree to which limited unilateral disarmament has a contribution to make.

Miss Bell eschews all such speculations. Her book is essentially a straightforward, very penetrating account of post 1945 US/Soviet confrontations, most of them over Europe and governed always by assessments of either side's total military strength. Although in no sense a "defence expert", Miss Bell shows herself imaginatively more aware than many professional strategists of the dangerous imbalance which exists between the West's nuclear superiority and Russia's conventional strength.

Throughout, the author is analysing diplomacy in order to illustrate Mr. George Kennan's dictum that "the search for an ideal military posture is the enemy of negotiation". At no time does she lean on this dictum to disparage genuine efforts that have been made to reach agreements. Always astringent, she is never sour. Power of observation and style are well reflected by the following: "Strength-building was to be the reality of policy for the moment and negotiation a fairly distant aspiration... Negotiation from strength operated at the aspiration level, and provided a sort of happy ending for the containment theory... Dulles was a congenital cutter of gordian knots, a process that in diplomacy may lead to a good many loose ends."

Books like Mr. Strachey's, full of abstract theory, properly stimulate intellectual curiosity; those like Miss Bell's perform the equally valuable and currently more useful task of getting the historical record straight. She reminds us that the present US strategy of deploying nuclear weapons against military targets and not cities was considered as early as 1954, when Mr. Dean Acheson also said: "Strategic atomic bombing is not our first but our last resort." This quotation, and its accompanying passages on the

development of US strategy from absurd notions of massive retaliation to its present flexible range of options, reveals that the much maligned American military establishment has probably been quicker to appreciate the relationships between strength and negotiation than its diplomatic counterpart in the State department.

Sir Stephen King-Hall's and Professor Blackett's works are those of a skilled polemicist and a uniquely experienced scientist/strategist/sailor—and as Blackett has been a professional at all three occupations, what he writes is usually rewarding. *Studies of War* is, however, a collection of essays which have appeared elsewhere before, and it is really more suited to the expert's workshop than the layman's study. It is a pity that it has not been possible to include Professor Blackett's latest observations (given at this year's Pugwash Conference in Cambridge) on the mis-called "counter-force" strategy, developed and frequently propagated by Mr. Robert Macnamara, the US Secretary of Defence.

Mr. Macnamara, like Mr. Acheson, argues for the last resort, but controlled use of nuclear weapons, intended to halt combat and induce negotiations, not, as its detractors commonly say, to initiate the process of full scale nuclear war in the hopes of "fighting it through". Professor Blackett is a critic of the Macnamara strategy, but on the more acceptable ground that the number of nuclear weapons it requires will accelerate the arms race. There is a good deal in this criticism, although present indications are that the number of nuclear weapons that Mr. Macnamara will actually deploy in relatively invulnerable sites or at sea is much less than was originally proposed.

Sir Stephen King-Hall is not concerned with such fine points. He takes up and simplifies Mr. Strachey's theme, with particular reference to British defence policy. In the author's view, this should be unequivocally non-nuclear. One of the more endearing of Sir Stephen's characteristics is his patriotism, which, in its present manifestation, sees no contradiction between a great and a nuclearly disarmed Britain. It is not too much to say that if it was not for him, even educated lay opinion would assume all British nuclear disarmers to be devoid of natural patriotism and utterly indifferent to Britain's influence in the world. There is enough truth in this for the courage and vigour of Sir Stephen's approach to be worthy of the widest possible attention.

ANTHONY VERRIER.

BETWEEN ARAB AND ISRAELI. By LT. GENERAL E. L. M. BURNS. [*Harrap*. 336 pp. with maps and illustrations. 25s.]

FROM August 1954 until November 1956 the Canadian General Burns was Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East, and then became Commander of the United Nations Emergency Force. This book is his account of these years, down to the spring of 1957 when the Force took up its position along the Gaza Strip Demarcation Line and the International Frontier in the Sinai. But his book is valuable not only for his account of his stewardship for these years but for

his observations on the policies of the Middle East Governments and the attitudes of their leaders. It draws on the General's own diary and the files of the UNTSO and the UNEF. It becomes at once a major first-hand source for the study of the contemporary Middle East.

The root of the problem, says General Burns, is quite simply the nationalistic conflict of Zionist and Arab. He likens the Middle East problem and "the Palestine problem" within it to "a large ball of string". "Several loose ends protrude but when one begins to draw out any particular little bit of string, one finds it is inextricably tangled up with the other pieces in the ball." (p. 113). If his primary task was to persuade all parties to honour the terms of the General Armistice Agreements of 1949, this could not be done without the settlement of many associated problems; and indeed, as those problems worsened and the attitudes of hostility hardened, it was to prove incapable of being done at all.

General Burns distinguishes four major problems on which the Arab position and the Israeli position are still far apart. One, the Arab refugees. There were by 1956 900,000 of them—today the figure is probably close on a million—living in refugee camps on inadequate rations, supplied largely by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. They must, say the Arabs, be allowed to return to their homes, from which they were driven by acts of flagrant inhumanity. They went of their own accord, says the Israeli Government, or at the orders of the Arab Higher Committee; to allow them to return, a large and bitterly hostile group, would now destroy the State. Second, boundaries. The Arab Governments want a return to the boundaries specified in the partition plan adopted in 1947 by the United Nations General Assembly. The Israeli Government points out that it was the Arabs themselves who rejected this plan and went to war over it. Third, compensation for Arabs who have lost property in Israel. Here there is no great divergence in principle but the Israelis say they would need financial assistance to pay for private property taken over. And, fourth, the status of Jerusalem, now sadly divided into two parts. But behind these four problems and keeping them permanently at fever point are the passions of nationalism, pride and personal ambition.

It is against this ugly backcloth that General Burns tells this story of the various incidents that arose around Israel's contentious frontiers from 1954 to Suez. He tells the story with accuracy and balance. Yet there can be no escaping the conclusion that he sees Israel as the most dangerous element on the scene—in part because of its very intelligence and zeal. He recognizes that Nasser cannot pursue or enforce policies which are unpopular with the Army and that he uses nationalism as a weapon but he saw in him an element of moderation—"there is no bluster, no menace, instead an appearance of reasonableness" (p. 18). Syria is unpredictable and Jordan, after Glubb's departure, was even more so. (It is certainly clear from this account how closely Ali Abu Nuwar modelled the coup of 1956 in Amman on the Cairo model, and himself on Nasser). But none of these men or their states wielded the power or had the intelligence of Ben Gurion and it is clear that in these years the stability of the Middle East turned on the policies pursued with much calculation by Israel. The decision to destroy the *fedayeen* bases in Sinai was an Israeli decision, made in flat defiance of all United Nations pleading; and made before Suez, but in the light of the

expectation that by September 1956 it would have tacit British and French approval. The replacement as Foreign Minister of Sharrett by Mrs. Meir was to strengthen Ben Gurion's position. Ben Gurion, says General Burns, took decisions on defence on his own responsibility. And Dayan's influence with him "was usually exercised in the direction of solution by force" (p. 67). General Burns says little on Suez except as a background development; and nothing on Anglo-French "collusion" with Israel. His volume suggests that any planned collusion was unnecessary; Israel for her part planned, acted and won without any need of it.

General Burns's concluding chapter is particularly valuable—and gloomy—reading. He believes that the case for an international police force is not proven; that without local support it will be largely powerless; and that it is, in any event, in the United Nations that the decision rests. It was only the United States or Britain or France or Russia that in 1956 could have averted war in the Middle East. The United Nations negotiators in Palestine were reduced to producing a protocol, to finding a form of words on which both sides could agree, words which, when found and agreed on, were so vague as to be meaningless. That this gloom reflected Dag Hammarskjöld's reading of events is confirmed by the General's Notes, a very valuable collection, drawn from the Secretary-General's "Summary Study".

But the story does not end in 1957. Indeed the General's reflections on the years since 1957 include a valuable and depressing assessment of Israel's position. He sees it as likely to be economically in perpetual imbalance, yet politically unwilling to curb immigration or population growth. It is bound, he believes, to be expansionist and aggressive. And its pride and passion will, equally surely, be matched by equally intense—but less disciplined and controllable—passions and pride on the Arab side. If the peace of this tortured and much too promised land is to be kept in our lifetime, it will be kept not by relying on the xenophobic politicians of Cairo, Damascus, Amman or Jerusalem but by the balance of terror between the Great Powers in the United Nations.

But to that uncertain and impermanent peace the tiny United Nations force commanded by this patient Canadian soldier did, in 1954-57, make a contribution. He has given us a record of his stewardship that is frank, sad and without illusion. The world will need many such servants, in many such areas, permanently vigilant. They will commit themselves almost as a professional act to frustration and to failure, as did General Burns. But history is likely to make more of his story of failure than of the campaigns of gore and glory other generals of our time have fought and won.

ESMOND WRIGHT.

PLANNING AND SPONTANEITY IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY. (*Planification de la Croissance et Fluctuation Économique en U.R.S.S., Tome 1. 1918-1932*). By EUGENE ZALESKI. [Paris: Sedes. 372 pp.]

TODAY when so many countries, particularly in Asia and Africa, are trying to launch some kind of planned economy, a detailed study of the Soviet

experience in planning acquires particular significance. This task has been undertaken by the *Ecole Pratique des Hautes Études*, a French research institution connected with the *Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique*. The task was entrusted to Dr. Eugene Zaleski, known for his previous works on Danubian economic problems.

It took M. Zaleski nearly ten years to produce a detailed story of Soviet planning from the October Revolution up to 1950. Now this task is completed; the first volume has already been published; the second is to appear shortly.

The first thing which emerges from the opening chapter of this very scholarly work is the enormous intellectual effort which had been invested by the Soviet economists in preparatory studies before the First Five year plan was launched in 1928. The best brains in economic theory and practice which could be found in post-revolutionary Russia had been mobilised for these studies conducted in the "Gosplan" (Central Planning Office), the Supreme Council of the National Economy and in the Commissariats of Agriculture and Finance.

Their approach was gradual and cautious. At first, national plans were prepared only for particular branches of economic life: electrification, transport, metallurgy, agriculture. Then, for three years before launching the First Five Year Plan, the Gosplan prepared yearly "control figures" which were not meant as directives but only as estimates of expected development. This provided an opportunity to educate the first cadre of experienced planners.

The central methodological idea was that of dynamic equilibrium. It was considered that the plan should be so constructed as to avoid any sharp maladjustment between supply and demand, and that certain basic proportions must be preserved between the various parts of the economic organism. This was the idea of balanced growth. Dr. Zaleski gives figures concerning the ten versions of the First Five Year Plan.

When, however, the time for the execution of this plan had come, events took a dramatic turn, not easy to comprehend. The carefully prepared blueprints were scrapped; most of the leading planners were removed from their posts, many of them imprisoned, some disappearing without trace. This happened not because the Plan was unworkable—as a matter of fact there was no opportunity to test it—but because by that time the ruling élite—Stalin being the most powerful personality amongst them—became less interested in the introduction of a planned economy than in the maximisation of certain priority targets: coal, steel, engineering, armaments, great constructional projects. The economists, with their ideas of balance and equilibrium, became an obstacle to the maximisation of productive capacity in the priority sectors. The era of full Stalinist dictatorship opened with the slaughter of the economists.

Thus Dr. Zaleski's account of the carrying out of the First Five Year Plan is, in fact, the story of the powerful though chaotic drive towards the building up of the nation's heavy and armament industries, with the concurrent neglect of non-priority sectors: agriculture and consumer goods. He provides also an analysis of the results of the first four years of that drive. Production, with a few exceptions, was considerably below the accepted targets, but the rate of growth in priority sectors was impressive. There

was a fall in industrial productivity per head instead of the expected increase, but this trend was reversed in the later years. M. Zaleski calculated that in the period of the execution of the First Five Year Plan real wages fell by 17.9 per cent. In the last two years of the First Five Year Plan there was a general slowing down in the rate of economic growth, though in different degrees in the various sectors.

M. Zaleski seems to believe that the Soviet economy has been subject to cyclical fluctuation and he has tried to find certain similarities between the pre- and the post-revolutionary economic recessions in Russia. In the first volume of his great work these efforts seem to be inconclusive: perhaps his second volume will bring more definite results in this respect. But one general conclusion, rather surprising for those who are searching for models of planned economy, emerges very clearly from his investigation. This is that, behind the façade of economic planning, there were spontaneous forces which determined the path of Soviet economic development. In order, however, to penetrate the nature of these forces, the efforts of sociologists and social psychologists must be added to those of economists and statisticians.

At the end of the twenties the Soviet Union passed through a violent clash between the rationalism of economic planners and the irrationalism of Party activists. Monsieur Zaleski speaks about "*le caractère mystique du plan*" under Stalin. These clashes between the rationalism of some Soviet intellectuals and the irrational spontaneity of the tremendous machine of the Soviet state is likely to be a recurrent element in Soviet reality, and for this reason the study of the economic consequences of that clash which upset the proportions of the First Five Year Plan may be also of current significance today.

S. SWIANIEWICZ.

FRENCH-SPEAKING WEST AFRICA. By PHILIP NERES. [O.U.P. for *Institute of Race Relations*. 101 00. 7s. 6d.]

THE Institute of Race Relations has already published a number of admirable small monographs on areas of the world where relations between races are of special interest or, as in the region covered by this book, undergoing rapid change. Mr. Neres has fully maintained the standard set by earlier volumes in the series, and has managed to compress into limited compass, and in highly readable form, a great deal of information about countries which are practically, but regrettably, unknown to most English readers. The former French empire in West Africa has, in a very few years, been liquidated in a manner quite different from the withdrawal of British colonial power, and with reasonable success; of the nine states which used to form the federation of *Afrique Occidentale Française*, seven are still in close relations with France, and one at least of the other two is trying to heal the breach of 1958. When one compares this with the disastrous record of French imperialism in South-East Asia and in Algeria, there is clearly a subject for study.

French rule in the colonial days was not gentle, but its repressiveness was

different from British repressiveness; though, for instance, forced labour did not end till after the last war, the French never maintained a British-style exclusiveness, or discouraged the growth of a class of African *évolués* from which many of the leaders of today originate. Especially since 1945, the aim was to incorporate the colonies into metropolitan France. There were Africans in the French National Assembly as early as 1946, African political parties emerged which, like the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (R.D.A.), were factors in French internal politics, and many prominent Africans acquired French political experience in addition to the French education which some of them had enjoyed. Today, the chief political figures in, say, the Ivory Coast, as well as the senior civil servants, are a great deal more French than their counterparts in Ghana or Sierra Leone are British; yet they are also thoroughly African. From the long dispute between the advocates of assimilation and the advocates of association, this at least is a triumph for the assimilationists.

It was the Mollet government of 1956 which began the final liquidation of colonialism in West and Equatorial Africa, with its enunciation of the *loi cadre* which was attacked by men like Léopold Sedar Senghor (now President of Senegal) on the ground that it made for the balkanisation of the two regions, creating in effect fourteen separate states instead of two federations. When de Gaulle returned to power in 1958 the *loi cadre* was replaced by the concept of a French Union (Guinea's vote against joining was followed by an incredible piece of French spitefulness which is still being paid for); but the concept was ill-founded, and within two years all the African territories had become fully independent, though on such close terms with France that they could without difficulty be given associate status in the Common Market. They were able to play a full part in the groupings and regroupings of African states between the Monrovia and the Casablanca groups, in which personal jealousies between the leaders played no larger a part than one might expect. Their future is inevitably in some form of association with their former British neighbours, though it may take years for this to develop.

Mr. Neres has done an excellent job in guiding the reader through the complex history of French-speaking West Africa. It is no slur on his achievement to hope that this will be the last book of its type. Future studies should preferably drop the distinction between French and British, and treat the region as a single whole. For, as Mr. Neres points out, the frontiers were in any case thoroughly irrational.

T. E. M. MCKITTERICK.

THE DECLINE OF PARLIAMENT

EVEN without the violent shock of the Profumo case, the approach of a general election would have forced Parliament into public attention. The end of the present House of Commons will be the end of an era; Mr. Macmillan is probably the last British Prime Minister to have been born while Queen Victoria was alive or to have served in the first world war, and whatever result the coming General Election may produce the next government will be formed mainly of men of the twentieth century proper. Parliament will be dominated by the generation of the nineteen thirties and forties, with a sizeable majority of members elected for the first time in 1945 or later. It may be no better and no worse than previous Parliaments, but at least it will be different.

It could afford to be better than the one now drawing to its close. The Conservatives increased their majority in 1959 on the basis of a phony boom which, as in 1955, had to be put into reverse once the election was safely over. The Labour Party was weak and divided; had it won the 1959 election, it would not have known what to do with its victory. Neither party was over-supplied with men of ability. Mr. Macmillan was at the peak of his reputation as an adroit political performer, but his team was not an inspiring one. Mr. Gaitskell had not yet reached the position of authority he was to gain before the political and personal tragedy of his premature death; Aneurin Bevan was still alive and his personal breach with his leader was healed, but of the few others of real ability in the Labour Party some at least were playing a private game of power in the most public conditions and could not be relied upon as loyal colleagues. The result was a Parliament of, at best, below average quality. As in 1959, the Editors have invited comments on the parliamentary performance of the two main parties from close observers, this time both from the other side of the House; making every allowance that neither Mr. Thomson nor Mr. Hornby supports the party he is writing about, the account they give is not a cheering one.

It is, unfortunately, not just a matter of the last four years. The signs are that Parliament itself is in decline—losing in popular esteem, losing in the degree of control it should exercise over the government, failing to adapt itself to the complexity of the tasks the quickened tempo of modern life has thrust upon it. For this it has chiefly itself to blame. It is not the sort of institution that ought

introduce a second contradiction, an important criticism of Parliament today is that the party organisations have too much influence. Strengthening them further might, in fact, narrow the field of choice still more, since it would suppress the unorthodox, the rebels who, as Mr. Hornby points out, have played a large part in the revival of the Labour Party's fortunes, and who have their counterparts on the other side of the House.

Party Influence

The next election will be a battle of mass communications to an extent that no previous one has been; added to the now familiar television and radio programmes and to the poster campaigns there will be prolonged periods of Press advertising. The two big parties are likely to gain most from this (unless, conceivably, they overdo it to the point where they irritate the public), and the Liberals will be at a disadvantage because they have less to spend, while the smaller parties will be nowhere at all. The parties alone command the funds needed for this vastly expensive operation, which means that they alone will decide who shall enter Parliament; there will be no place for a Sir Alan Herbert, a Daniel Lipson, or a James Maxton in the new generation of parliamentarians. This is a loss to Parliament.

It also means that the disciplinary control of the parties over their members in Parliament is enormously increased. At one time it would have been possible for a rebellious member to defy the whips, stand at the next election as an independent, and get himself elected on his personal reputation. It is still possible in theory, but it is extremely unlikely that it would happen; even Mr. Michael Foot could not be certain of winning Ebbw Vale except as an official Labour candidate.

This is the real sanction behind the party whips, and it is becoming steadily stronger. Excessive use of the whip is among the chief reasons for the decline of Parliament's prestige, and both the main parties are to blame—more, perhaps, the Labour Party, which was too cautious in relaxing its standing orders even in the period of its huge majority after 1945, and which since then has equated parliamentary unorthodoxy in any form with disloyalty to the leadership during the long-drawn battle for unity. The scope for truly independent expression has been so far reduced that Parliament has been deprived of one of its most important functions, the scrutiny of government policy without fear or favour, and has also largely lost its power of initiative. This is entirely unnecessary.

It would be greatly to the advantage of Parliament to do away with the convention that a defeat in the Commons is necessarily a mortal blow to the government—a convention which, in the last resort, is not fully enforced anyway—and to confine the activities of the whips to occasions when it is the broad policy of the government and not some point of relative detail that is in question. Clearly the government must resign if it loses the support of a sizeable proportion of its own back-benchers on a matter of real confidence. But there are hosts of other issues when criticism is needed and when the government ought to be forced by parliamentary disapproval to change a point of policy without having to resign. For instance, as a striking recent case, many Conservative members were against the government in its decision to deport Chief Enahoro; had the Government been defeated on this it need not have been treated as a defeat on a matter of confidence leading to resignation; but in the end only a handful dared to vote against the whip and a few more to abstain. This is the negation of the prestige Parliament ought to have. If, because of party discipline, it cannot right what a majority of its members believe to be a wrong, what on earth is it there for? And this is by no means the only instance.

A Private World

Against the argument for professionalism is the increasing feeling that Parliament has little contact with what goes on outside; it is a private world of its own. This is partly the result, however, of the stranglehold of the party machines. The tactics of a parliamentary debate are interesting, but as an exercise in a game rather than in politics as the public understands the term, the language is esoteric, the results seldom significant. Members have too little opportunity to discuss, with full freedom, anything that really matters except on the set occasions when the whip system has already determined the outcome. Consequently they find a fascination in trying to trip the government up on minor issues; occasionally they succeed and make a Minister look silly, but the impact on the public is practically nil and the effect on policy hardly any greater. One need only read the *Hansard* reports during the whole history of the Vassall episode to see how true that is. In the early stages members who ought to have known better spent their time blackening the character of Ministers and treating a matter of state security in the style of the popular Press, but when it came to the actual debate on the report, with the Opposition hamstrung by prior confidential

communications to its leader and with the whips on, the performance was poor indeed. The Profumo affair showed the House of Commons in a better light, it is true, though even in that case it took a positive outrage on the House's susceptibilities to bring out the best in it.

So it tends to be with more important matters. There are relatively few subjects discussed on which there is more than a handful of members with expert knowledge, yet often the debate has to be prolonged for a day or two days to allow members to get the proper sense of the importance of the occasion—an importance seldom felt by the public. Speech after speech is made, device after device is tried to catch the government out—and again the conclusion is a foregone one. It could be that things would be improved if more work could be done in committee to which members with knowledge of the subject are appointed (if they exist). It may be that there are other and better solutions. But what is certain is that something must be done about it if the gulf between Parliament and the public is not to grow wider still.

What is the Answer?

What, then, ought to be done to restore the prestige of Parliament? It has a variety of functions and there is, inescapably, some conflict between them. To be independent and at the same time fully in touch with the outside world it ought not to become a closed circle of professionals with no other interests. But it must also provide the individuals for the serious business of government, and it is hard to see how the right men can be attracted unless there is a degree of professionalism such as would follow from better pay and better conditions of work. Its main job is not to initiate legislation—except for the curious convention that certain social subjects such as divorce are normally dealt with by private member's Bills—but to criticise the legislative proposals of the government, and to stand between the administration and the public in the interests of the latter. This second task it performs reasonably well when it is allowed to, though it usually needs a tough and skilful member to get behind the wall of official reticence when the behaviour of a government department is called in question. The first task it now carries out with less and less effectiveness; in the end, it is the whips and not the members as a whole who determine the outcome of debate. (The Parliamentary Labour Party always claim that the meetings which give orders to the whips provide sufficient opportunity for back-bench opinion to express itself, but this is very

doubtful. It may be a sound enough procedure when, say, a determined and concerted effort to bring the government down is to be made, but it is at best a remarkably clumsy way of dealing with many other issues where less is at stake from the parliamentary point of view, but more from the public.)

On the first point, the balance of advantage is probably with a greater degree of professionalism, while recognising its dangers; the salaries of members should be increased to the point where people of the right type can be attracted whatever section of society they come from, and conditions of work should be improved so that members do not have to operate in the present undignified way—for instance, dictating letters to secretaries in obscure corners of the House.

Secondly, the parties should take a long, hard look at their methods of selecting candidates. It is useless to try to swim against the tide of party dominance; the sheer scale of a modern election and the campaign that goes before it is such that only a large and wealthy organisation can foot the bill. The disappearance of the independent member may be regretted, but there is little that can be done about it. The parties alone can ensure that they do not put into Parliament too uniform a bunch of members, and that, once in, the members are not too closely muzzled.

Thirdly, it is essential to review the whipping system and to find means of preventing its abuse. This again is something that only the parties can decide. The three-line whip should be reserved for questions where nothing less than confidence in the whole policy of the government on a major issue is at stake; for the rest, it should be perfectly possible for Parliament to force a change of detailed policy without the need for resignation.

Finally, there is a lot to be said for a number of changes in parliamentary procedure—the shortening of debates, more freedom for individual members, more use of committees. Present procedures, added to bad conditions and excessive discipline, are a positive discouragement to many men and women who would make excellent members and potential Ministers. In the last few years Parliament has lost to outside jobs a number of good members who have simply got bored. It cannot afford to go on doing so.

PARTIES IN PARLIAMENT 1959-1963

I. THE LABOUR PARTY

RICHARD HORNBY

THE pitfalls in the path of a Parliamentary Opposition are many and various. If they plague the government too much, they can be thought irresponsible; if they do so too little, they are said to lack vigour. If they confine themselves to criticism, they are taunted with charges that they have no ideas of their own; if they put forward constructive proposals of their own, they risk seeing them either shot to pieces or pinched by the government and put into effect with no credit given. If the Whipping is strict, they anger their members; if their discipline is lax, they are lampooned as a rabble.

How then should one judge the performance of the Labour Party in Opposition? Because politics is about power, and how it shall be exercised and by whom, the true test of their performance still lies ahead, when the General Election results come in and the country decides who shall rule. Meanwhile, other yardsticks must be found, and there are plenty to choose from.

One can judge the Opposition by their tactics in the House of Commons and their speeches in the Chamber. One can judge them by the number of constructive ideas they put forward in debate and in amendments to legislation or by their success in frustrating the Government's programme by keeping the House up all night. Or one can take a more general view and simply consider their image as an alternative government, an image portrayed by the broad principles and policies which they have adopted, by the personalities and talents of their Shadow Cabinet, and by the relationship between the leaders and the rank-and-file, the key to the pressures to which any future Labour government would be subjected in office.

Labour and the Electorate

Or should one set aside all these House of Commons judgments, and assess the performance of the Opposition by the impression they have created in the country, as seen in the voting intentions of the electorate and the findings of the Gallup Polls?

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PARTIES IN PARLIAMENT 1959-1963: I. THE LABOUR PARTY

Judged by the Gallup Poll test the Labour Party would seem, at first sight, to have been resoundingly successful in the present Parliament. Consider their position. Defeated at the polls in 1959 for the third successive time; torn to shreds by internal strife to the point at which the enemy within their own ranks seemed infinitely more hateful than the enemy across the floor of the House and the regaining of power seemed for ever unattainable to some of them and irrelevant to others; bereft of the services first of Mr. Bevan and then of Mr. Gaitskell, they have nevertheless survived these disasters and at the time of writing look forward to a majority of anything up to 100 in the next House of Commons, if present trends are maintained.

As a measure of the change in the Labour Party's prospects the Gallup Poll figures are impressive. But as a test of the efficiency of the Parliamentary Opposition they will not do. First, the swing of opinion away from the government is neither necessarily nor probably due to the rival attractions of the Opposition. It is much more likely to be—and certainly was in this case—a deliberate vote "against" the present government than a vote "for" the alternative one. Such a swing of opinion, furthermore, in mid-Parliament is not automatically a guide to the result at the polls. The placings in the middle of the race are of no importance. It is the order at the finishing-post that counts. One need only look back at the Gallup Poll figures themselves to see how quickly events can change. As late as June 1961—nearly two years after the General Election—the Tories still had a three-point lead over Labour. The lines of popularity first crossed in July, and even then it was the Liberals rather than Labour who were drawing support away from the Government.

So it must be in Westminster, in the personalities and the tactics of the Opposition there rather than amongst the electorate, that we must judge the Labour Party's achievements. And, of course, one should warn the reader of an unavoidable bias in the writer. Looking at and listening to the Opposition from the benches opposite, one finds it difficult to preserve a proper neutrality—even for the duration of this article—in forming a judgment on individuals and on policies. Nor is one always aware of the tactical reasoning behind one's opponents' decisions, despite the disarmingly imprudent forthrightness with which so many of the Labour Party seem willing to dissect their Party in public. One has not, alas, been concealed behind a curtain, while the Shadow Cabinet or the Party Committees were meeting. And looking back over the life of a

Parliament presents its own difficulties. Political memories are very short. An exciting debate is quickly lost track of in the jostle of the next week's events. It is the present and future that counts. Of the past only a few impressions remain.

Three Phases

One sees the Opposition during this Parliament in three clear-cut phases. The first lasted until the spring of 1961; the second until the death of Mr. Gaitskell, and the third covers the leadership of Mr. Wilson. During the first phase the Opposition to the government seemed to Tory eyes to be almost non-existent. It was the struggle within its own ranks that absorbed all its energy. Criticism of the government played second fiddle to the election post-mortem at Blackpool. Clause IV mattered more than the contents of the Queen's Speech; and so it went on for more than a year. In June 1960 the Parliamentary Labour Party was finding it necessary to pass a vote of confidence in the leadership, and seventy-one members were either absent or abstaining. The periodical Press seemed to echo and re-echo with the noise of battle between the fundamentalists and revisionists. If Mr. Crosland or Douglas Jay wrote an article in one paper, Mr. Crossman or Michael Foot would reply in another. Throughout 1960 it seemed to the benches opposite that the very survival of the Labour Party was in question. There was hubristic talk of an era of one-party government and discussion of how in these circumstances the power of the executive could best be controlled. The plain fact, obvious for all to behold, was that for the first fifteen months of this Parliament the Opposition was in no state to do its job of opposing the Government at all, and the job was not done. No alternative government existed, for, as Mr. Gaitskell himself said: "the country would not allow itself to be governed by a party who were disunited and quarrelling among themselves". One marvels, in retrospect, to see how little use the Government made of their luck.

Recovery 1961

The change came suddenly, and as a result of decisions of the Government rather than from any resolution of Labour's internal problems. It came because at last the Opposition rediscovered the joys of attacking the government. In February 1961 changes in insurance contributions and charges for the Health Service were announced; in April the Budget gave relief to surtax payers; and in July came the Pay Pause. Here, if ever, was opportunity to

attack, and attack they did. Interest was aroused; old divisions were submerged if not forgotten; and—for the first time in this Parliament—Labour members began to believe again in the possibility of victory. Even so, it was some time before the revived spirit at Westminster communicated itself to the country and convinced the electorate that Labour was coming into the reckoning again as an alternative government. In October 1960 Mr. Crosland had written in *Encounter* that "an unreconstructed Labour Party, committed to all-out nationalisation and austerity, would lose votes heavily to the Liberals at the next election; and the swing against the Tories when it came would find the British Left divided hopelessly in two". Mr. Crosland was right. Throughout the second half of 1961 and most of 1962, when the Government's fortunes remained at a very low ebb, it was the Liberals rather than Labour who seemed likely to reap the electoral gains.

The Influence of the Left

The Parliamentary Labour Party's rediscovery of the will to win was undoubtedly the major achievement of the period 1961-62. To whom does the credit belong? The opportunity occurred because—as has been mentioned above—Government policies provided irresistible opportunities for counter-attack. It occurred also because the more turbulent elements on the Left of the Party took the bit between their teeth and taught their leaders how to fight. Against the background of party dissensions, it was frequently embarrassing when the "usual channels" were ignored and guerrilla warfare carried far into the night by Mr. Michael Foot or the Scottish "irregulars". But if your opponent is vulnerable and some of your troops are showing fight, a party leadership is unwise indeed if it stands back from the fray and takes no credit for any victories that may be won. For the Labour leadership in 1962 to have held its fire would have been to invite bitter attacks from their own side. In yielding to pressure from the Left in the interests of unity, they sometimes seemed to take up positions which subsequently they might come to regret.

To the opportunities provided by Government policies, and the pressure from the Left for all-out attack, a third fact should also be added. How it came about, what back-stage work was involved, the writer is not in a position to know. But during 1962 there seemed little doubt that Mr. Gaitskell's position was greatly strengthened and that the calibre of the Parliamentary Labour Party itself was improving. New members such as Mr. Taverne, Mr.

Rodgers, and Dr. Bray and the return of Mr. MacDermot suggested that a breakaway from Union pocket-borough candidates and the selection of candidates who might give a younger, more up-to-date character to the Party was occurring. Whatever the reason the Labour Party by the end of 1962 was seriously thinking of itself as an alternative government. And by thinking of power, it was slowly beginning to look the part again.

Bevan, Gaitskell, Wilson

By the end of 1962 Mr. Gaitskell was firmly in the saddle, victory at the polls seemed near enough to make outright rebellion undesirable, and the outlook for Labour was good. When the House reassembled in January, Mr. Gaitskell was dead. There is no better illustration of the revived determination of the Labour Party to win than its reaction to this crippling blow. For to Tory eyes Mr. Gaitskell seemed to tower head and shoulders above his colleagues. The necessity of electing a new leader reopened the prospect of a split in the Party. But no split occurred. The boat must not be rocked with an Election only a few months away. Two years earlier the same would not have occurred. That is the measure of the Opposition's achievement since 1961. They are back in the race.

Against this backcloth, how does one see the personalities and policies of the Opposition in Parliament? In the loss of Mr. Bevan and Mr. Gaitskell within the space of three years the Labour Party has been cruelly treated. Both were big figures in Parliament, judged by any standards. There is no orator in the Commons today quite like Mr. Bevan; nobody with quite the same cadence of voice, or quite the same joy in the selection of words, sometimes spilled out in a prodigal torrent and sometimes chosen and spoken more slowly, as if each was a gem selected with loving care. And certainly there is nobody who—when angry—can lean forward across the dispatch box as he did, and spit his accusations full in the face of the Government. He was an artist, and one is happy to have heard him.

Mr. Gaitskell, too, made fine speeches. But with him it was the range and the orderliness of his thinking rather than the oratory which commanded attention. A Gaitskell speech was a parade of his well-stored mind. It stated the situation, it posed all the right questions, and then it proceeded to his criticisms of the government and his own answers. Sometimes one felt that Gaitskell the intellectual, alive with curiosity about political problems and their answers, was too strong for Gaitskell the tactician. Sometimes it

seemed that his intellectual vigour encouraged him to develop lines of argument much further than it was wise to do. Why provide your opponents with so big a target to shoot at? Why advance so many ideas of your own? Much better to rest content with exposing the weaknesses of the Government's case and merely hint at the broad principles, rather than spell out the details, according to which the Opposition would find a solution. Thus to many Tory observers, while Mr. Gaitskell was warmly admired as undoubtedly the best Prime Minister that the Opposition possessed, his lack of tactical skill gave them plenty of grounds for optimism.

No such charge will be made and no such compliments paid to Mr. Harold Wilson. For long we have laughed at his speeches and recognised an accomplished performer. Therein lies both his strength and his weakness; his strength in that he puts his own troops in good heart and gives nothing away to his opponents, and his weakness in that it seems always to be the performance, and never the substance of what he has to say, that is uppermost. If he possesses deep convictions, they are well concealed. If he harbours in his mind policies which he thinks might lose him votes, we expect to hear little about them this side of a General Election. Certainly there will be no tendency to underestimate his abilities, or to ignore the possibility that he may well be a more formidable Leader of the Opposition than his predecessor. Equally, however, if there was any tendency on the Tory benches to think that it was in fact time for a change, the prospect of Mr. Wilson as Prime Minister has been quite enough to dispel it. It will be surprising if the election campaign, when it comes, is not a robust one.

Policies and Pressures

Alongside the star performers one has come to expect a high degree of competence, but no flights of rhetoric, from Mr. Gunter, Mr. Michael Stewart, Mr. Kenneth Robinson, Mr. Douglas Houghton, and others. One has admired the courage, though not always the discretion, of Mr. George Brown, and watched with slightly irritated amusement while Mr. Callaghan tried on the robes of statesmanship and decided how best to make them fit over his natural propensity to be noisy and petulant. One remembers a fine speech from Mr. Roy Jenkins in a Common Market debate, a hilarious one about surtax relief—heard in total silence by his own side—by Mr. Woodrow Wyatt, and regrets that one has heard Mr. Crossman so seldom, for there are few who speak better. One has felt time and again that the interests of Scotland could be represented better and

less boringly; one has marvelled that the lean frame of Mr. Michael Foot could contain so much scorn. With these exceptions, individual performances are hard to recall and the prevailing impression has been of a still rather elderly party bringing forward competent younger men, of which it still needs many more to staff a government adequately, and perpetually harassed by the sniping of the Far Left behind them. Despite all the compromises and despite the new-found will to win, the Labour Party's weakness as an Opposition and as an alternative government has still seemed to be in the policies which it, or at least a substantial number of its members, insists on pursuing. However much the Front Bench want to come to terms with the 1960s in economic policy or to preserve our alliances in foreign policy, one has been aware of the weight of criticism from behind, from fundamental socialists and representatives of declining industries, from unilateralists, anti-Germans, and anti-Americans, and one has felt that the continuing outspoken presence within the party of many of these elements must always saddle the leaders with a weakness, which they would dearly like to be without. One is forced to the conclusion, therefore, that throughout most of this Parliament the Opposition leaders have failed to persuade their followers to act sufficiently as a cohesive force, seeming to stand for the same kind of principles and to want to build the same sort of society. Because of their inability to prevent the extremists from taking up so much time and exerting so much pressure, they have blurred the image, which they have sought to create, of a party that is once again in tune with contemporary needs.

This article is not the place to analyse in detail the strength and weakness of Labour policy in different fields, nor does one know the extent to which policies were decided by the Executive in response to particular pressures within the party. To the outside observer, however, it seems that the price of placating the Left has frequently been to twist Labour policies into shapes which will make them unsightly documents to those who are looking to the Labour Party to produce a more up-to-date form of radicalism than they have done in recent years.

How Much Socialism?

Let us take some examples. The leaders were fully aware after the last election that nationalisation was electorally harmful. Yet Clause IV remained unchanged and the Party stays pledged to take into public control the commanding heights of the economy, with

all the uncertainties which such a phrase involves. If nationalisation is less of an issue at present than it was in 1960, it is not because the Opposition has clarified its thinking, but because two men appointed by the Government—Lord Robens and Dr. Beeching—have brought the touch of modernity into the operation of two nationalised industries and made them more efficient and hence less repugnant to voters.

Defence

In defence policy, Mr. George Brown reminded the Scarborough Conference in 1960 that "Britain had to be defended in the conditions that existed today, not in the conditions we wished existed today". Yet, in every major defence debate there appears to be a hard core of fifty or so members, who suggest that wishful thinking and neutrality can be a substitute for a defence policy, and, despite the undercurrents of anti-Americanism that are all too often apparent, the official defence policy of the Opposition now places total reliance on America for the ultimate defence of Europe. Yet, having abdicated all responsibility for nuclear decisions, Mr. Harold Wilson still felt able to say at the height of the Cuba crisis: "It is not the question why the United States failed to consult Britain. It is why we apparently count for so little that she did not feel any obligation to consult us". One feels entitled to ask whether unilateral abdication of responsibility is really the best way to secure fuller consultation, and whether this policy was really the wanted child of the Shadow Cabinet or the progeny of a shotgun marriage between the Left and Right in the Party.

The Common Market

And most of all—and here one expresses a personal view—one regrets the insularity that drove the Labour Party so far into opposition towards Britain's entry into the Common Market. Here, again, it seemed that the forces of inherited dogma and tradition had triumphed over newer ideals. One cannot complain too much if an Opposition chooses to sit on the fence, although one might wish that, on a great issue such as this, decisions other than purely tactical ones might prevail. One does wish that the Opposition, while preserving its freedom to attack the Government, could yet have shown some excitement and some awareness of the scale of change in Europe, with all which that might entail. But it was not to be, and one finds it hard to believe that in ten years' time the Labour Party will be proud of its record in this respect.

Compromise

And so one could go on from one field to another, but not without launching into arguments, which there is no space to develop. One comes back to the beginning, to the bitter strife of 1960 when in effect no Opposition existed. One commends them for the rediscovery of their zest for battle and for the regaining of power. For without the hope of putting one's principles into practice, what point is there in politics at all? And in doing so, one remembers—as the events of 1961 pointed out—that the role of an Opposition is to wait for the government to make mistakes and then to pounce like a tiger. One suspects that in patching up the peace in their ranks they have adopted policies which may yet cost them dear. And, if this should occur, one would have little sympathy for a party, whose rebellious spirits had such little regard for the limits beyond which party discipline could not be stretched without breaking and whose leaders allowed themselves to be pushed around quite so much. The final verdict on the Opposition must rest, however, with the electorate, not with the writer.

PARTIES IN PARLIAMENT 1959–1963 II. THE CONSERVATIVES

GEORGE THOMSON

How has the Conservative Party in the House of Commons looked to a socialist during the four years of the present Parliament?

They resumed government in October 1959, in the most favourable of circumstances, with a majority increased from 60 to 100. It is significantly hard now to remember how they looked as they jauntily resumed their seats on the government benches in that dark winter of 1959, for the Parliamentary Labour Party was introspectively preoccupied with contemplating its third defeat in a row. And things grew worse instead of better. In the autumn of 1960, when the unilateralists won at the Scarborough conference, the death of the Labour Party and a generation of Tory government were being prophesied by some commentators.

How remarkable, therefore, that only three years later there are almost as frequent forecasts that the Conservatives are bound to lose the forthcoming election! No one contemplating the immense fluctuations in the fortunes of all three political parties between Suez in 1956 and today could agree with the claim so often made that the politics of affluence are dull and without drama. In the case of the Labour Party the change in its fortunes is all the more striking when one considers the unforeseeable losses of leadership it has suffered since 1959.

A first glance at the rival front benches produces the sombre impression that the years of opposition have taken a greater personal toll than the years of office. Both Hugh Gaitskell and Aneurin Bevan, the men who led the Labour Party into the 1959 General Election, are tragically dead. But on the Conservative side the old familiar faces are, in the main, still there. Selwyn Lloyd has been the main political casualty, for the other victims of the great Cabinet purge of July 1962 were of the second rank—some ex-future Prime Ministers amongst them, but no serious claimants to Downing Street apart from the sacrificial Chancellor.

The Conservative Grip

Mr. Macmillan's tired eyelids droop more than ever, and all the public image skills of Colman, Prentis, and Varley have been able

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to do little with that moustache. Mr. Butler looks more wearily oblique than before. Mr. Macleod limps along as if he still suffered from that stab in the back by Lord Salisbury. And Mr. Sandys, while remaining handsomely stoic, gives the grim impression that there is plenty for a member of the Cabinet to be stoic about.

But these senior members of the Conservative Administration have survived twelve years of Tory Cabinets, by itself a considerable tribute to their possession of those qualities of skill and stamina and luck that make the successful politician. Nor is that their only achievement. These ageing long-distance runners have reinforced their ranks by the recruitment of young men, like Sir Edward Boyle and Sir Keith Joseph, Mr. Reginald Maudling and Mr. Edward Heath, to the Cabinet. It is the youngest Cabinet in average age for a century.

Yet despite this combination of experience and youthful brilliance it is a Cabinet that has lost its touch. I give two illustrations from many that are symptomatic of the malaise that afflicts the government. When Mr. Marples presented the Beeching Report—the biggest thing of its kind, we were given to understand, since the Beveridge Report—the operation was intended to show the Conservatives courageously looking forward to the seventies, while the socialists, tied to the railway unions, timorously look back to the forties. But Mr. Marples muffed it monumentally and suffered a Press universally worse than I can remember a Minister receiving.

He is not alone. The Prime Minister, the Home Secretary, the Leader of the House, and the Attorney-General all came down to the House to deal with the case of the Nigerian Chief Enahoro. Already a relatively minor case had been allowed through bungling to become a matter of confidence in the Government. Within a few minutes Mr. George Brown, by the adroit use of material which had been in the hands of the Government for months, forced the Prime Minister to adjourn a debate he had sworn a few minutes before was impossible to adjourn.

Incidents like these—each in itself quickly forgotten—have had a cumulative effect on Conservative morale. Mr. Macmillan's sweeping Cabinet changes would have been forgiven if they had been followed by greater popularity at the by-elections. But with rising unemployment during the winter of 1962-63 the reverse was the case. Behind the stiff upper-lip unity which the Conservatives show in adversity there was much grumbling about the Prime Minister. There was resentment amongst the friends of the sacked Ministers, and perhaps more resentment amongst those who had

been passed over for promotion. One senses through the invisible curtain that hangs across the Floor of the House between the two sides a certain resigned defeatism. Too many back-bench Tories are now saying nobly in private that it is bad for democracy if the pendulum sticks too long at one end.

Mr. Macmillan has now announced his intention to lead his party into the next election. Partly this is due to the Conservatives' inability to agree on a successor. But partly, also, it is a reflection of the reluctance of any of the aspirants to push their claims when confidence in victory is so low. There is no enthusiasm to be a British Adlai Stevenson. The question mark is whether Mr. Reginald Maudling's Budget can restore enough expansion to the economy and enough *élan* to Conservative morale to improve their chances at the polls—before the next balance of payments crisis. Never was there such a delicate and agonising task of electoral timing! But Mr. Macmillan has a strong enough nerve for it.

What are the distinctive and significant features of Conservative policy in this Parliament? I would distinguish four developments.

Failures in Performance

First, in world affairs there was the failure to sustain the manufacture of modern methods of nuclear delivery and the decision to buy continued nuclear "independence". Secondly, in the Commonwealth, there was the reversal of the Lennox-Boyd African policies and the decision announced in the Prime Minister's Wind of Change Speech at Cape Town not to defend the privileged position of white settler minorities in Africa. Thirdly, in Europe there was the attempt to join the Six and the humiliation of President de Gaulle's veto. Fourthly, at home, there was the increased recognition of the failure of the stop-go economic policies with the consequent stagnation of production, and there was the conversion to the theory, if not the practice, of planned economic expansion.

1. Defence and Foreign Policy

First, world affairs and defence. The Macmillan Government was born out of the Suez disaster and it never seems to have recovered its full international self-confidence after that nightmare. Its defence policies are full of schizophrenic contradictions. It never wants to collide with America again as it did at Suez; but it wants to buy from America the means to allow it to pursue a contradictory policy. It believes it is a good thing for Britain to prevent an American-Soviet nuclear monopoly, but a bad thing for France.

Having wasted much money over Blue Streak, and much time over Skybolt, the Conservative Party is now preparing to exploit as an election asset the argument that only they stand for an independent nuclear Britain. If their defence policy cannot defend Britain, it can at least be deployed to defend the Conservative Party.

During almost the whole of this Parliament, from July 1960, the Foreign Secretaryship has been in the House of Lords. The original appointment of the Earl of Home was strongly attacked as undemocratic by the Opposition, but the criticisms have been much modified by experience. Lord Home was the Unknown Foreign Secretary when he took up his appointment and it was widely suspected that Mr. Macmillan, whose love of personal summitry was well known, simply wanted a complaisant office boy. But no one would now deny that Lord Home has been a strong Foreign Secretary in his own right. A widely held socialist view of him would be that he has been cool and clear-headed in his dealings with the communists and emotional and unimaginative in his attitude towards the uncommitted countries and to the UN as their main sphere of operations.

Lord Home's criticisms of the new coloured nations at the UN have been oddly in conflict with the major shift in the government's African policies. This marked one of the biggest changes between the pre-1959 and post-1959 Macmillan administrations and it received the Prime Minister's own imprimatur with his courageous Cape Town speech. It was a characteristic Conservative policy change, a calculated surrender of traditional attitudes to political realism. For the Tories, political principle—even the deep-rooted principle of backing white imperial settlement—takes second place to the retention of political power. In Kenya and in Central Africa (as in Cyprus) the present Lord Boyd had ridden the storms of the Devlin Report and the Hola Camp abuses rather than retreat from the policy of protecting European positions. The new government decided that it could not afford the military cost of holding back African nationalism by force, nor the political cost before world opinion of retaining the Colonialist role. So the Conservatives steeled themselves to South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth, and for the breaking of the promise which they themselves had made to the Europeans in Central Africa in the 1953 Parliament. They deeply alienated Lord Salisbury in the process and damaged Mr. Iain Macleod's prospect of the succession, but in the long run it was remarkable how radical a change of Tory attitudes

was carried through without large-scale disaffection amongst the rank and file.

2. *The Common Market*

This was equally true over the negotiations to enter the Common Market which put a considerable strain on Commonwealth relations. But since it was the white-ruled Empire that had commanded instinctive Tory loyalties and that was being abandoned, the Tory back-benchers were understandably reluctant to desert Macmillan in order to defend Diefenbaker, far less Nkrumah or Nehru. Although the Common Market question divided both the main parties, it was one of the more fascinating reversals of history how it turned the imperialist Conservatives into the pro-Europe party and the anti-Colonialist socialists into the pro-Commonwealth Party.

Many Conservatives had enjoyed a blinding vision of Europe as a new super-Power which would enable British politicians at least to share in exercising an influence in the world comparable to the vanished days of empire. In this view, the turbulent, poverty-stricken chip-on-the-shoulder community of the new Commonwealth nations would be exchanged for the tidy, prosperous white-collar community of the new European technocracy with exciting scope for the smooth young executives who are replacing the colonels and the gentlemen farmers as the average Tory back-bencher.

3. *Home Policy*

This is the new Toryism which the Conservative leaders have shrewdly been trying to develop since the 1959 General Election, the Toryism of Brussels and Beeching, of the efficient, streamlined seventies. But it reckoned without President de Gaulle in Europe and perhaps Mr. Marples at home.

Make Britain modern—it is an attractive slogan to all the parties. With the Conservatives it appeals to their bright young men, and there is the tempting discovery that speedy social change presents severe trade union problems and therefore tends to push Labour into a posture of being stuck in the *status quo*. But the evidence since 1959 is that it has even more formidable difficulties for the Conservatives. In the first place, there has been the practical experience of the electorate. While Mr. Macmillan has talked about getting Britain moving, the country has in fact stagnated. The Conservatives entered the Common Market negotiations from a position of weakness in the middle of a balance of payments crisis.

They have shown only haphazard signs of realising that modernising means a great deal of comprehensive planning. Their first fumbblings towards an incomes policy took the form of an appeal for a pay pause that was resented as unjust in the immediate aftermath of surtax concessions. The immediate victims were nurses who enjoyed strong public support, or teachers and university staffs upon whom the future supply of Britain's modernisers depend. Electorally the Conservatives alienated white-collar groups where they could otherwise have looked for a good deal of support. The White Collar Revolt came to a head with the Orpington by-election in March 1962. What used to be regarded in Sir Waldron Smithers' day as a classic Tory seat, which you took visiting American journalists to inspect, swung wildly Liberal. Since then the Liberal paradox has continued—while they have tried to steal Labour's radical policies, what they have in practice done is to steal disgruntled Tory votes.

Yet the Conservatives since 1959 have creditable performances in particular white-collar fields. They can, for example, legitimately claim that they have transferred national resources from arms to education. The share of the Gross National Product going to education has increased from around 3 per cent. to 4.9 per cent. this year. But there has been a failure to plan for the expansion of Sixth Forms and Universities, to march in step, with lamentable results for the present unlucky generation of young people. Similarly, it has become plain that you cannot drastically replan the railways in isolation from the whole transport system.

4. *Economic Policy*

Some potentially useful instruments of state planning have been created in the National Economic Development Council and the National Incomes Commission, and Mr. Reginald Maudling has produced a planning budget, both in terms of seeking expansion without inflation and in trying to distribute new industrial development in areas of high unemployment. But planning in a democracy requires the creation of the right climate of opinion. People must feel that the restraint they are being asked to exercise is being spread throughout the community. The electorate must feel the government is sincere in its intentions and intends to persist in its efforts.

After twelve years of stop-and-go policies, the Conservatives find great difficulty in convincing the public that Mr. Maudling's conversion to planned expansion is a permanent one and not just an

electoral one. Mr. Harold Wilson's most devastating indictment of Conservative economic policies was his simple recital of the tax reliefs given away in successive budgets. It went from £5m. in 1954 to £155m. in 1955 immediately before the General Election. Then in the autumn £113m. was clawed back. For the next few years never more than £11m. was handed out. Then in the election year of 1959 no less than £320m. was distributed. During the next three years £200m. of this was drawn back. And now in 1963, with an election looming ahead £250m. is given away.

Keynesian economics greatly reinforce the already considerable power of a government to choose its own election date. The Conservatives have used it in the past to create a favourable economic climate for the polls. Can they do it again? Already there are anxious calculations about timing the General Election before the Maudling expansion Budget produces a balance of payments crisis. Will the Conservatives succeed in doing so? They have left themselves without much freedom of manoeuvre. And will the British public for the third time accept a boom election at its face value?

MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY

GEOFFREY MARSHALL

In rejecting proposals for setting up new machinery to investigate complaints against the administration the Government have stated that the methods suggested would be incompatible with the British constitutional doctrine of ministerial responsibility. Judgment of the relevance of this objection may be assisted by a review of some of the ways in which similar arguments about ministerial responsibility have been used in the past.

The General Nature of the Doctrine

The uncontroversial implications of ministerial responsibility may be stated simply. Ministers, as the Crown's servants, carry on the executive government of the country. They accept legal responsibility for the use made of the royal prerogative and for the advice which they give to the Crown. They are politically accountable to the House of Commons both collectively and individually. They must by convention resign if defeated in the Commons on an important policy issue. A Minister as head of a department should resign if he is found to be at fault in the running of it or if important errors are made by civil servants under his control which are of such a kind that they imply inadequate supervision by the Minister. (It has sometimes been suggested that resignation should follow as a form of vicarious penance for any administrative misdeed, but no one now appears to believe this.¹)

For the present purpose it is unnecessary to trace the history of the process by which the Crown's Ministers became collectively responsible for their policies. Today the significance of this may be seen in what ministerial responsibility is contrasted with, namely, a system of government in which legislature and executive are constitutionally co-ordinate and (as in the United States) the administration is not formally answerable to the legislature. Answerability in a literal sense is one of the primary characteristics

of the British system in that Ministers may be asked questions about matters which fall within the field of their department's work. A number of propositions about the civil service therefore must also be included in a statement of the ministerial responsibility principle. Civil servants speak through the mouth of the Minister or of a ministerial spokesman and have no other constitutional channel of communication with the public, the Press, or Members of Parliament. All of this is elementary and undisputed.

What the Principle is Not

It is important, however, to notice one way in which the doctrine of ministerial responsibility is uninformative. It merely tells us that Ministers must be accountable and answer to Parliament and ultimately the electorate for matters which are entrusted to them or to their departments. It does not tell us what matters ought to be entrusted to them or in what degree solely entrusted to them. As a principle of the Constitution, ministerial responsibility certainly does not imply that Ministers must be responsible for all public issues. Erskine May specifies many matters for which Ministers are not held answerable by way of questioning in either House of Parliament.²

Nor can it be deduced from the principle that Ministers alone should make the final decision in all matters affecting the work of their departments. Otherwise an administrative tribunal would be a standing interference with ministerial responsibility. In many fields of which pensions, national insurance, and industrial injuries are typical, decisions made in the name of a Minister may be disputed by the citizen and reversed after an independent decision over which the Minister has no control and which he cannot override. Of course this is because Parliament, in passing the relevant statutes, has laid down general rules and decided that decisions affecting the rights of individual citizens shall be made in this way; but Parliament has equally obviously provided in other fields that decision-making shall be shared in a variety of ways between Ministers and other bodies. A public inquiry, a consumer council, an advisory committee or the select committees on Statutory Instruments, Nationalised Industries, and Estimates all result in the making of inquiries and the publishing of conclusions about matters

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¹ The most frequently cited post-war dicta about responsibility in relation to civil servants are those of Sir David Maxwell Fyfe and Mr. Herbert Morrison (as they then were) speaking in the Crichton Down Debate of 1954, 530 H.C. Deb. 5 s., cols. 1286-1287 and 1278-1280. See also Lord Morrison's *Government and Parliament* (1954), pp. 320-324, Sir Ivor Jennings, *Cabinet Government* (3rd ed.), pp. 120-133, and S. E. Finer, "The Individual Responsibility of Ministers" (*Public Administration* 1956, p. 377).

² Obvious examples being questions decided in courts of law, decisions in day-to-day matters taken by the boards of nationalised industries, and matters under the control of local authorities. In the 16th ed. of *Parliamentary Practice* (ed. Fellowes and Cocks) (1957), twenty-nine inadmissible types of question are listed.

There is a passage in the same writer's *Constitutional History* which aptly points the fact that executive authority belongs to Ministers and the Crown. "Parliament has no direct control over any single department of the state. It may order the production of papers for its information, it may investigate the conduct of public officers, and may pronounce its opinion upon the manner in which every function of the government has been or ought to be discharged. But it cannot convey its orders or directions to the meanest executive officer in relation to the performance of his duty."⁹ May's distinction here is an essential inference from the principle of ministerial responsibility. The borderline between inquiry and execution is one which the Commons was sometimes thought to have overstepped in periods when Parliament's authority over the Crown's servants was greater than that which has become familiar in the last century.¹⁰

One notable piece of parliamentary enterprise occurred in 1695 when the Commons resolved that a Council of Trade be set up which should have powers to require information from merchants and traders and to send directions for the protection of trade to the Lord High Admiral "which directions are to be controulable by His Majesty under his Sign Manual". They were to receive proposals for the better employing and setting on work of the poor of the Kingdom and in addition it was resolved that "the said Commissioners be likewise impowered to receive complaints in relation to trade, of the misbehaviour of Commanders and Officers and to represent the same to His Majesty . . . and send their directions to the Admiralty for proceeding against offenders according to law".¹¹ Though this body supplies an interesting precedent as a piece of machinery for the redress of grievances its somewhat bizarre mixture of functions could certainly be described in today's idiom as a derogation from ministerial responsibility.

A much later inquiry which Ministers at least regarded in that light was the committee which was proposed in the Commons in 1855 to investigate the conduct of the Crimean war. Roebuck's motion was: "That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the condition of our army before Sebastopol and into the conduct of those Departments of the Government whose duty it has

⁹ *Constitutional History of England* (1863), Vol. I, p. 466.

¹⁰ See, for examples, Hallam's comments on various committees set up towards the end of the seventeenth century to inquire into matters of civil and military administration. The "interference of Parliament with all the course of government . . . if not absolutely new, was more uncontested and more effectual than before the revolution". Henry Hallam, *Constitutional History of England* (1832 ed), Vol. 3, p. 194.

¹¹ 11 *Commons Journals*, 423 (January 31, 1695).

been to minister to the wants of the army". Though the Committee eventually sat it was resisted by Ministers and Aberdeen's Cabinet fell after a defeat in the House on the issue. Mr. Gladstone had no doubts about the impropriety of the Committee.¹² He thought it "a proceeding which has no foundation either in the constitution or in the practice of preceding Parliaments". It was, he thought, a transfer of the functions of the executive to a select committee. Here Gladstone can be seen adopting a rather modern attitude, albeit unsuccessfully. He and his colleagues were simply attempting to treat as a matter of confidence a proposal for inquiry unwelcome to the ministry. But their arguments of principle hardly stand examination. There was nothing unprecedented about the inquiry. Nor did it transfer the executive government in any single matter to a select committee as its opponents suggested. The inquiry revealed much which might otherwise have remained hidden. It provides an apt illustration of the way in which the House of Commons was able at that time to extract information from the government.¹³ Ministerial responsibility in the sense of answerability to the House of Commons operated both collectively and on individual Ministers.

The facts of life in the shape of solid party voting in the House which have transformed this picture are well known. Whilst a government retains its support collective ministerial responsibility becomes in practice answerability to the electorate at a time in the future largely within the Prime Minister's control. Responsibility for individual acts of administration is often impossible to enforce, and it has been possible to argue that in the absence of any other than parliamentary methods of investigating and publicising administrative failings, the extent to which this function is carried out in the British system is unduly hampered and attenuated.

The disadvantages of public opinion and general elections as checks upon ministerial power were aptly enough described in

¹² 136 *Parl. Deb.* 3 s., col. 1205, and John Morley, *Life of Gladstone*, Vol. I, p. 388 *et seq.* Cf. the speech of Mr. Sidney Herbert: "You cannot mean to inquire into the mode of conducting the business of a department, or to enter into a pedantic disquisition as to the duties of this or that office; for depend upon it you must look not so much to the form of the office as to the energy and will of the man who holds it". 136 *Parl. Deb.* 3 s., col. 998. The Commons, of course, wanted to look at both.

¹³ The position of the Cabinet in relation to the demands of private members at this period is described in John P. Mackintosh's recent study, *The British Cabinet* (1962), pp. 71-105. It is remarked that the effect of yielding to demands for information or papers was not necessarily always to weaken the government's position. In consequence, "the House, the Press, and the public had very full accounts of the Levant crisis of 1839-41, the origins of the Crimean war, the arguments over Italy, Schleswig-Holstein, and all the other major questions laid before them almost at once" (*ibid.* p. 93). The twentieth-century House of Commons has been less fortunate.

Sidney Low's *Governance of England*, first published in 1904. "For the control of Parliament" (he wrote) "which was supposed to be regular steady and constant is exchanged the control of the electorate which is powerful but intermittent. It is brought into operation at uncertain intervals and is exercised only with reference to one or two great issues of policy, often determined by Ministers themselves, instead of being applied from day to day to the conduct of public affairs."¹⁴ The facts in any situation in which independent inquiry would be likely to damage the electoral image of Ministers in office may well remain concealed from the British public for many years whether the government in question stays or falls. They may not be fully revealed if Ministers resign rather than face inquiry, as Mr. Ramsay Macdonald's government did in 1924 after the withdrawal of the Campbell prosecution. Equally plainly they may remain hidden if a government does not resign but keeps its majority, refuses an inquiry and asserts that it must take responsibility and be judged (without the evidence) by history and the electorate—as did the government of Sir Anthony Eden after the military operations of 1956.

It is noteworthy that the independent inquiries sometimes conceded by Ministers and set up, whether under the provisions of the 1921 Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act or otherwise, have never been regarded as in any way incompatible with ministerial responsibility. The issues under inquiry, of course, have often not been related to departmental conduct (as, for example, where police behaviour has been in question) but a number have involved the conduct of Ministers or persons under their control. Examples were the Budget leak Tribunal of 1936, the Lynskey Tribunal of 1948, the Crichton Down inquiry of 1954, and the Vassall inquiry of 1963.

Refusal of Information

A second type of situation in which arguments about ministerial responsibility are often advanced is that in which claims of privilege are made in relation to documents or information in the possession of departments, or Ministers take advantage in the House of their right to remain silent in response to questioning on the ground that they judge that course to be required by the public interest or the proper working of the machinery of government. Two claims are

¹⁴ At p. 81. In contrasting public and private responsibility Low remarked that: "If a butler, after being told that he is responsible for the plate chest, carelessly allows the spoons to be stolen, he may be discharged without a character and may never again get a good place" (*ibid.* p. 144). An analogous predicament for Ministers has not been noticeable in recent times.

involved here. First, that publicity for certain material is undesirable; secondly, that only Ministers or their subordinates should judge the limits of desirability and the occasions for secrecy. In the courts Crown privilege was previously claimed for documents which it is now admitted may be produced without deleterious consequences for the efficient conduct of governmental business. As a matter of practice,¹⁵ privilege is no longer claimed in cases where a Minister considers that documents of importance to litigants (such as medical or accident reports) may be disclosed without danger either to security or the giving of frank and confidential advice to Ministers. Public and judicial criticism clearly brought about in this area a relaxation of ministerial attitudes, just as similar and even more prolonged public criticism brought Ministers in 1947¹⁶ to agree that formal departmental immunity from actions in tort need no longer be maintained.

The notions of ministerial responsibility and public interest are frequently linked together by Ministers when standing on their parliamentary rights of non-disclosure. The nineteenth-century affair of the Mazzini correspondence provides an example of the form which ministerial answers have often taken on similar occasions. On June 14, 1844, Mr. T. Duncombe presented a petition complaining that the letters of Joseph Mazzini, W. T. Linton, and two others residing at No. 47 Devonshire Street, Queen Square, had been opened and begged to ask Sir James Graham (the Home Secretary) whether he was aware of the opening of the letters and whether what had been done was by the authority of any of the principal Secretaries of State. Graham replied that the letters of one person had been opened under the authority of the Secretary of State. The report continues:

"Having said this much that as he had the power so he had exercised it, he was bound to add that this authority was vested in the *responsible* Officers of the Crown and entrusted to them for the public safety and that while Parliament placed its confidence in the individual exercising this power it was not for the public good to pry or inquire into the particular causes which called for the exercise thereof. He could not consent to enter into any further explanations and would only express his hope that the House would confide in the motives which had influenced him. . . . It was not consistent with his duty to give any more explicit answer. He had given an explanation and he must respectfully but firmly decline saying anything further on the matter."¹⁷

¹⁵ See statements by the Lord Chancellor in 1956 (197 H.L. Deb. 741-747) and 1962 (237 H.L. Deb. 1191-1193).

¹⁶ With the passing of the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947 (10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 44). It will be recalled that this matter first came under active official consideration in 1921.

¹⁷ 75 Parl. Deb. 3 s., col. 893 (*italics added*).

A somewhat similar form of answer was given by Sir Anthony Eden in May 1956 when asked to make a statement about the death of Commander Crabb, an ex-naval "frogman". In his answer the Prime Minister stated that "it would not be in the public interest to disclose the circumstances in which Commander Crabb is presumed to have met his death".¹⁸ He added that whilst it was the practice for Ministers to accept responsibility, what had happened had happened without the authority or knowledge of Her Majesty's Ministers and certain disciplinary action was being taken. He would add nothing further to this statement. This episode illustrates one permissible (if etymologically odd) form of ministerial responsibility.¹⁹

Many such situations relate to what could unambiguously be called "security information". Not all, however, do so. That there are other grounds on which Ministers may decide to stand upon (or in some cases one might be tempted to say "sit upon") their responsibilities could be illustrated by the attitude adopted until 1959 towards requests for information about the Casement Diaries. Before that time a number of requests had been made either to see the diaries or to obtain a statement about their existence. Mr. J. R. Clynes, as Home Secretary in 1930, stated that "on inquiry I find that it was decided long ago not to make any official statement as to the existence or non-existence of these diaries. I have carefully considered whether it is still necessary to maintain that rule and there seem to me to be very good reasons why in the public interest it is desirable not to break the official silence".²⁰ Subsequent Home Secretaries maintained this view of the public interest until Mr. R. A. Butler's announcement in 1959 that the diaries had been in the Home Office since 1925 and were to be placed in the Public Record Office.

Resistance to New Machinery or Procedures

It is a revealing exercise to select some of the procedures or institutions which are now admitted to be a useful part of our machinery

¹⁸ 552 H.C. Deb. 5 s., col. 1220.

¹⁹ Defending the Prime Minister's attitude in a subsequent debate, Sir Patrick Spens said: "Once the *responsible* Minister of the Crown, accepting *full responsibility* upon himself, has said it is impossible to give the public information because public security is involved it behoves no other *responsible* citizen . . . to attempt to carry the matter further in this way. It is the *responsibility* of Ministers and always has been to give such a considered answer when the occasion arises". 552 H.C. Deb. 5 s., col. 1767 (italics added).

²⁰ See *The Trial of Sir Roger Casement*, ed. (1960) H. Montgomery Hyde, and R. MacColl, *Sir Roger Casement* (1956), pp. 278-283.

of government and to set out the arguments which were being urged against them by official spokesmen before their adoption. Exposure to this process is almost sufficient to bring about a conviction that there exists in Whitehall an all-purpose speech (with the requisite blank spaces) which is used for expressing doubt about the viability of new parliamentary or administrative procedures. The key phrases in it are "incompatible with ministerial responsibility" and "inappropriate to our constitutional arrangements". Some reference may also be expected to the rights of the House of Commons, the adequacy of existing procedures and the importance of avoiding "muddles", "blurs", and "confusions" between executive and legislative functions or between the British form of government and other forms of government—especially those of France and the United States of America.

An episode which illustrates the process is the setting up of the procedure by which statutory instruments made by government departments are scrutinised. During the war of 1939-45 the desirability of some control of this kind was urged upon the government by a number of back-benchers. A committee of the House had been recommended for this purpose by the Committee on Ministers' Powers which reported in 1932, but the suggestion had never been adopted. Thus Mr. Herbert Morrison was able to say on January 19, 1943, that no government since that time had thought that it would be a good thing to appoint a committee. He added that it might weaken the position of the ordinary member.²¹ On May 26 Mr. Morrison stated that "either the House or the Government should be clearly responsible. We had better not mix ourselves up in responsibility between the two".²² Mr. Maxton suggested that analogous committees for scrutiny already existed in the field of Public Accounts, Estimates, and National Expenditure. Mr. Morrison replied that none of those three committees was in "any sense executive". He was speaking, he said, "of executive only in the legislative sense, not in the ordinary sense". Neither the ordinary nor the "legislative" sense of "executive" was clear to members of the House. They did their best to make the point that they did not want an executive committee in any sense but only an advisory committee. Sir Herbert Williams was "quite tired of arguing with the government. They put up a boggy and proceed to knock it down again".²³

²¹ 386 H.C. Deb. 5 s., col. 160.

²² 389 H.C. Deb. 5 s., col. 1655.

²³ *Ibid.* col. 1684.

The Home Secretary was prepared to admit that no one was asking for an executive committee, but if the proposal were to work, "this is where we get to". The government could not share the responsibility with a committee of Parliament. For:

"The success of the British Constitution to a great extent lies in the fact that the House of Commons and the Executive can work together and at the same time the Executive on the one hand and Parliament on the other have definite responsibilities. If we got them mixed up in day to day matters I am sure we would get into a muddle."²⁴

In July 1944 the Home Office found that it had set up a National Fire Service three years earlier without laying the necessary regulations before the House and the scrutiny committee was set up within the year. It is admitted to be a successful and useful piece of machinery which has affected departmental activities for the better.

In 1946 a Select Committee reported on the procedure of the House of Commons. Amongst the proposals considered and rejected were a number made by the Clerk of the House, Sir Gilbert Campion. *Inter alia*, Sir Gilbert suggested that the terms of the scrutiny committee might be extended to the consideration of the merits (in a defined and restricted sense) of regulations. Mr. Morrison, in the course of explaining the government's objections to this proposal, conceded that the official arguments against the setting up of a committee in 1944 had been just as absolute as they now were to any extension of it. He suggested, however, that it was not the merits of the case which had dictated the earlier attitude but the strain and pressure of war-time administration. "I was the villain then", he said. "I was speaking for the government, of course. . . . This was a case where the persistence of the House and the changing circumstances caused the government to give way, and I think we were right to give way."²⁵

In 1959 Mr. R. A. Butler found himself expressing similar sentiments to those of his predecessor before another Select Committee on Procedure. A memorandum placed before the Committee had suggested the setting up of a specialist committee of the House on colonial affairs. It was made clear that no executive powers should be conferred on the committee. It should simply receive information, keep in touch with the department, and advise the House of any matter by way of resolution. The Select Committee

split on party lines and the scheme was rejected in the following words:

"The main argument against the proposal and one which convinces us lies in the nature of the committee, which in our view would constitute a radical constitutional innovation. . . . There is little doubt that the activities of such a committee would ultimately be aimed at controlling rather than criticising the policy and actions of the department concerned. . . . (The House) has always been careful not to arrogate to itself any of the executive power. The establishment of a colonial committee would not only invade this principle but would also lead to the establishment of other similar committees."²⁶

In oral evidence Mr. Butler elaborated the government's view. Such a committee, he thought:

"would be a muddle in our constitution . . . it would be difficult from the point of view of administration because it might well be such a specialist committee would confound the French and American systems and imagine it had a direct say in the administration of colonial affairs. Therefore I think any government of the day would regard this as a muddle which is not one that fits in with normal parliamentary procedure . . . a sitting specialist committee . . . would get in the way of administration and blur ministerial responsibility."²⁷

The affinity in structure between Mr. Butler's view and that put forward in 1944 is unmistakable. Perhaps it would not be going too far to call it "the Morrisonian argument".

The deliberations of the Franks Committee provide a similar recent occasion on which a conflict was thought to occur between administrative innovation and ministerial responsibility. The issue was that of publication of the reports made to Ministers after statutory public inquiries. The official witnesses discussed the question before the Committee at some length and were opposed to it. The Treasury Solicitor's view was that the inspectors making the reports were civil servants and their advice should be confidential. It was an essential part of ministerial responsibility that a Minister should not have his officials' advice quoted against him. To carry this process too far would "really break down the machinery of ministerial responsibility to Parliament".²⁸ The Franks Committee did not, however, concur in this conclusion, preferring the argument for publication set out in 1932 by their predecessors on the Donoughmore Committee.²⁹ This time the Government agreed. Reports

²⁴ At cols. 1657-1661.

²⁵ *Third Report from the Select Committee on Procedure*, H.C. 189-1 (1946), Minutes of Evidence, p. 149.

²⁶ *Report from the Select Committee on Procedure*, H.C. 92-1 (1959), p. xxv.

²⁷ *Ibid.* Minutes of Evidence, pp. 188-189.

²⁸ *Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries*, Cmnd. 218 (1957), pp. 266, 273.

²⁹ *Committee on Ministers' Power Report*, Cmd. 4060 (1932) at pp. 100-107.

are now published. The machinery of ministerial responsibility survives.

The language of the official statement on the Whyatt Report proposals for a Parliamentary Commissioner is familiar in its outline. (The proposal was also made that more tribunals might be considered to provide appeals against departmental and other decisions in fields where none now exist.³⁰)

"The government consider that there are serious objections in principle to both proposals and that it would not be possible to reconcile them with the principle of ministerial responsibility to Parliament. They believe that any substantial extension of the system of reference to tribunals would lead to inflexibility and delay in administration and that the appointment of a Parliamentary Commissioner would seriously interfere with the prompt and efficient dispatch of public business. In the government's view there is already adequate provision under our constitutional and parliamentary practice for the redress of any genuine complaint of maladministration."

Since the proposals under discussion envisage nothing more than publicity, inquiry, and report to Parliament their compatibility with ministerial responsibility as hitherto understood seems plain beyond dispute. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that "ministerial responsibility", as it occurs in statements of the foregoing kind, is little more than a form of official incantation and one which often embodies an apparent determination to exaggerate or misrepresent the proposals against which it is directed. Its use here corresponds closely to a tactic recommended in F. M. Cornford's maxims for Liberal-Conservative obstructionists.³¹ "When other methods of obstruction fail," we read, "You should have recourse to Wasting Time. . . . The simplest method is Boring. Talk slowly and indistinctly, at a little distance from the point." The injunction has clearly been obeyed.

³⁰ One such field is the refusal of admission under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1962. Resisting an amendment to provide for an appeals tribunal the Lord Chancellor argued that the proposal would "come between Ministers and their responsibilities to Parliament and would prove frustrating in its exercise". (See 238 H.L. Deb. 5 s., col. 420 *et seq.*)

³¹ *Microcosmographica Academica* (1953 ed.), p. 19.

DEFENCE AND POLITICS AFTER NASSAU

ANTHONY VERRIER

THE object of this article is to consider whether the December 1962 Nassau agreement, whereby Britain became finally dependent on the United States for new nuclear weapons, means a fundamental change in the future course of British defence policy, and thus in the political climate in which defence, foreign policy, and strategy are discussed.

Will, therefore, the next General Election provide the voter, the average man and woman, and not merely those educated in the facts of nuclear policies, with a chance to decide whether Britain should execute its home and overseas strategic commitments primarily with nuclear weapons, or alternatively, by non-nuclear or "conventional" forces?

There is, of course, another choice open to the voter. Should Britain so drastically reduce her commitments, in order to develop the home economy, that the question of how we defend ourselves and our friends largely becomes academic? The first two views reflect official Conservative and Labour Party policy, the third conveniently caters for a large minority of the British people who wish to nourish rather than contain their native insularity. I will consider later the argument that Britain can best contribute to international peace by becoming neutral. This, in essence, seems to be the guiding principle of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, where peace and security are frequently, if illogically, equated.

Post-Nassau Comment

Because most of the serious public analysis of British defence policy is wide ranging in scope and radical in tone, Nassau and its logical sequel, President de Gaulle's exclusion of Britain from the Common Market, have already been interpreted as forcing an immediate change in the strategies that, depending on the weapons and forces provided, support the prevailing aims of Britain in the world. Commentators, however, forget that governments, particularly British ones and specifically Mr. Macmillan's, have a large capacity

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for ignoring what to disinterested minds is a clear shift in the balance of power. But when we consider that Britain's retention or abandonment of nuclear weapons, capable of independent use and theoretically against any opponent, is always liable to become a major political issue, Mr. Macmillan's policy in the last five months of pretending that no such shift has taken place is understandable if unfortunate.

The wish has nevertheless been father to the thought in arguments ably deployed in *The Times*, the *Observer*, the *Guardian*, and the *Economist*. For example, the informed and perceptive defence correspondent of *The Times* wrote two articles in January called "Defence after Skybolt". He repudiated the notion that the "supreme national emergency" clause in the Nassau agreement indicated President Kennedy's wish to preserve an independent British deterrent, or to allow American nuclear weapons in British submarines to be used without Presidential consent. The counter-argument was advanced, and supported by much circumstantial evidence, that this clause was merely a civil American gesture to its senior ally and good friend, and was not to be regarded as a concession to nuclear independence, or represented any weakening of Kennedy's belief in the necessity for "indivisible" Western nuclear strategies. Kennedy, after all, has recently said that he is "haunted" by the fear that national nuclear systems may increase in number.

Parliamentary Debate

Others wrote in similar vein, whilst the cost of preserving the physical apparatus of a British nuclear system, by embarking on a programme of missile-armed submarines, was variously estimated and criticised. Indeed the factor of cost, coupled with that of whether or not various devices controlling communications, navigation, and guidance (all to be provided from the United States), would effectively limit the freedom of a British submarine force, received more attention in the popular Press and in Parliament than any other aspect of the Nassau agreement. In these arenas little attention was paid to the broader and deeper question of Britain's future world role now that she was patently unable to make the weapons which to many are a symbol of "first class status".

Cost and control therefore figured largely in the January and March Nassau and Defence Statement Commons debates, because they seemed obvious methods of criticising a government which had bought a pig in a poke. Since neither the Prime Minister nor his colleagues were prepared to give more than a rough estimate

of a submarine nuclear system's cost, critics were forced to guess or rely on private sources of information. The most frequent figure quoted was £50 million for each submarine and £350,000 for each missile. Since four boats are initially planned, each one to be equipped with sixteen missiles, approximately £220 million is presumably being earmarked, spread over five years, by which time the present nuclear system of V-Bombers will be wholly obsolete.

This sum would only be between 2 and 3 per cent. of the annual defence bill, and since current spending on nuclear weapons and their defence accounts for "only" 13 per cent. of the total, this additional increase could, in theory, be easily absorbed. It was thus with these comparatively modest sums that Government spokesmen made, and continued to make, great and not ineffectual play. But within the limitations of debates which interest only a handful of members and where speeches tend to become tedious by repetition, they were less successful in convincing either their supporters or opponents that Britain would control the weapons she had bought, or even supposing this, could deter an opponent by threatening to use them, much less actually do so.

Despite Mr. Macmillan's assurance that the Nassau agreement had no strings, the doubts remained and were strengthened by what some members saw as the unfortunate American habit of breaking promises to supply weapons. Members constantly referred to the cancellation of the Skybolt missile by Mr. Robert McNamara, the United States Defence Secretary, which in effect meant that when the United States services lost a particular weapon so did the equivalent British service for which it was intended. If the Polaris Sales Agreement, signed in April, had been available for the debates, the Government would have been more convincing, because although this agreement has secret and unpublished clauses, it is ostensibly a sales contract which is designed to ensure that Britain gets the nuclear weapons she wants.

Further, although both the Nassau and the Sales agreements refer to the supply of missiles to British submarines as being part of a wider Anglo-American attempt to create a NATO nuclear force, impliedly without national control, the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, said after the latter was published, that even if such a force was not created, Polaris missiles would still be supplied to Britain. Considering the American aspiration to create this multilateral force (reaffirmed at the May NATO conference in Ottawa), of which one composed of national elements is seen merely as a forerunner, Mr. Rusk's statement may fairly be considered a

diplomatic fiction. It may be compared with the one he uttered last year, which was that Mr. McNamara's criticism of national nuclear forces did not apply to Britain. As I show below, the United States has been rebuffed over the multilateral forces; this will not increase Kennedy's enthusiasm to supply Britain with new weapons.

The Government enjoyed still less success in the debates when it attempted to justify the retention and, with American help, the development of a British "independent" nuclear system, on the grounds that if this were not allowed a foreign Power could "black-mail" us. This word aroused ridicule when first used by the Prime Minister and contempt when employed by his colleagues. I should add, lest the reader think this a subjective observation, that I was present throughout both debates and that the atmosphere on these occasions reflected the average M.P.'s incredulity that any British government could seriously contemplate using nuclear weapons without the consent and support of the country which provided them, doing so, moreover, in operations against a state which lacked them.

No Minister was prepared to give a concrete, if hypothetical, example of how, when or why this would be done, although it is not difficult to imagine the limited war situations in which Britain might find herself alone, facing a powerful opponent or one with powerful neighbours, and lacking the non-nuclear forces to deter conflict or contain it long enough for help to arrive or a settlement to be reached. The places are Kuwait and Hongkong. For the defence of both, one may add, British-made nuclear weapons are already available and have been assigned targets, in order to compensate for the decline in the non-nuclear strength of the British armed forces.

Nevertheless, despite all these criticisms of government policy, such is the transitory and unsatisfactory nature of parliamentary debate and the emotional response to strategic arguments couched essentially in party terms, that the Government had comfortable majorities in both debates, and has had no difficulty since in repressing the murmurs of critics within the Conservative parliamentary party. The very incisiveness of the Opposition's attacks, both during the debates and at subsequent Question Times, has rallied the Government's supporters.

The Picture Abroad

More surprising than this recovery of the Government from the atmosphere of hostility and doubt which followed the Nassau

agreement, is its subsequent success in Western Europe in at least temporarily thwarting United States plans for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons by the creation of a multilateral force, owing its allegiance to NATO collectively. The British Government has succeeded in persuading its allies that a multi-national force, whose elements would be simply assigned to NATO commands, is preferable, and can be created more quickly, than one whose composition would be complex and development prolonged. At the Ottawa conference the British point of view prevailed over the American. Mr. Macmillan, Lord Home, and Mr. Thorneycroft have not only defeated Kennedy's attempts to interest European NATO in a multilateral force, but they have, in diplomatic terms, recovered much of the ground lost after January 14.

When, in March and April, Mr. Livingston Merchant, Kennedy's special envoy concerned with the multilateral force, was touring NATO capitals, the Prime Minister and his colleagues were talking privately to Dr. Adenauer and de Gaulle, about the glories of nuclear independence, the power that attaches to states owning nuclear weapons, and the domestic and international humiliations which befall statesmen who abandon them.

This British opposition to American intentions was not checked by hurried journeys made to London and Paris in April by Mr. Rusk and Mr. McNamara. They had hoped that their presence at the NATO Council would encourage open support for the multilateral force, and would in particular impress the Federal German government with the necessity for supporting this American strategic imperative. The two Americans were also aware that when in March Lord Home had argued the case for a multi-national force before the NATO Council, he had received a diplomatic setback, which was emphasised by the French Foreign Minister's absence from the meeting. Similarly, when Mr. Thorneycroft had tried to argue the same case at a WEU Defence Committee meeting in London, he found that his audience was opposed to any nuclear force which appeared to have the seeds of a European deterrent within it, and was one, therefore, which might, by being independent of the United States, effectively add to the number of national nuclear systems.

Nevertheless, Mr. Rusk and Mr. McNamara found that the British point of view prevailed at the April meeting of the NATO Council. On April 12 I wrote in the *New Statesman*: "Home, with considerable diplomatic skill, worthy of a better cause, has played on the mutual suspicions which the United States and the

Franco-German axis now harbour". The *Economist* on May 4 said: "Concerned for its public image and no doubt for its electoral chances, the British Government has hopped back on to its old perch to sing the praises of the national deterrent in terms to warm the cockles of a Gaullist heart. To play along with NATO at the same time, a fancy-dress 'inter-allied' force has been dolled up though it commits the nuclear Powers but little and fools the others even less".

What We Have Now

Before considering in greater detail the Government's determination to pretend that Nassau, like Suez, never happened; the likely results of such a tactic in diplomatic and strategic terms; and the impact of an effective Labour opposition on its political prospects, it is necessary to summarise the real, as compared with the fictitious, strength of British military forces which are available to support current foreign policy and strategy, particularly outside the NATO area.

With the ending of conscription, Britain's conglomeration of international and Commonwealth commitments is defended by a variety of ageing nuclear weapons and by regular military forces, whose manpower is in competition with industry for skilled men, and whose overall efficiency depends on the ability of depôts and units to process an uneven flow of recruits. This is a harsh summary of the position, but not I think an unfair one, when we consider the nuclear strategies for limited war situations which have already been mentioned, and the widely varying manpower levels revealed by the published recruiting figures.

Throughout 1962 long-service enlistments for the army, the least popular service, averaged 2,000 monthly; today this has dropped to approximately 1,500 and the re-enlistment rate has also gone down. As a result, the ceiling of 180,000 all ranks is unlikely to be reached this year, and considering that pay and allowances already account for over half the total defence budget, this may finally be abandoned for a more "economic" figure. I am not here concerned with establishing the right manpower level to meet our present commitments, or what the level should be if commitments were reduced.

The point is simply that an uneven recruitment rate precludes a consistently effective overall and unit strength, increases uncertainty about capacity to deter or contain conflict, may indeed provoke it, and certainly throws an unfair burden on the armed forces as such. This is particularly true of BAOR, where it is a matter of expert, if confidential, knowledge that it would take at

least fourteen days before reserves and reinforcements from the United Kingdom could become operational.

Bearing in mind that Britain is still nominally responsible for keeping the peace in East and Central Africa, South Arabia, Malaysia, Hongkong, and the Caribbean, quite apart from its NATO, CENTO, and SEATO commitments, plus the overriding importance (in the Government's view) of Kuwait and the Persian Gulf, excessive dependence on nuclear weapons, coupled with manpower that is now exceedingly widely deployed, must arouse widespread fears that British strategic dispositions are a bluff. But bluffs may be called; this happened at Suez. Despite the progressive dilution of BAOR in order to maintain garrisons and develop mobile forces, this could happen again, involving us in what Mr. Nigel Birch, a loyal and influential Tory but no believer in fraud, has called "national humiliation".

That the above is a partisan summary of the present situation is true only in so far as it implies opposition to substituting nuclear weapons for men, and doubts the credibility of a strategy which employs the technique of a stage army. Patently our forces cannot execute all present commitments; probably those commitments should be reduced. Certainly, strategic priorities as between nuclear and non-nuclear forces should be established, and undeniably this is not being done today.

The Government's Tactics

Now the relevance of all these factors to the aftermath of Nassau in terms of defence and politics is that, although Mr. Macmillan and his Cabinet understand the realities of power better than Mr. Wilson and his colleagues, they have nevertheless failed to arrest a rapid decline in Britain's real military strength. This situation is totally incompatible with an electoral picture of a strong, free, and influential Britain. Such considerations are never far from the Prime Minister's mind, nor is this surprising. It should also be remembered that despite near total confusion about the value, if any, of nuclear weapons for Britain, the Conservative belief is that the British people expects its governments to defend them.

It may be very well to assert the necessity for Britain to have her own nuclear weapons: deriding the Labour Party for disowning them, and accusing Mr. Wilson, *pace* his visit to the United States, with wanting to reduce Britain to the status of a "second class" Power, may be politically effective now and a trump card at the General Election. But Mr. Macmillan knows perfectly well that

a genuine debate on nuclear weapons, and what they are supposed to contribute to our peace and security, might just conceivably arouse the voter to question and reject all the assumptions on which the whole present defence edifice so dangerously rests.

What then, so far as Mr. Macmillan is concerned, is defence and politics after Nassau? First, to pretend that the agreement only marks a stage in the continued development of "independent" nuclear weapons; secondly, to attack the Labour Party's policy of substituting men for missiles so hard and consistently that it will be utterly discredited, and Mr. Wilson will be unable to forget or refute taunts that he is unpatriotic and has no care for the safety of the British people. However absurd such charges may be, the point remains that Mr. Macmillan can count probably on an *initially* favourable reaction to them, and the very hollowness of his own policy may force him into harsher and more challenging strictures. Equally, of course, Macmillan's attacks may boomerang, but as I show in my concluding paragraphs, this is not a pious hope on which it would be safe for the Labour Party to base its own policy.

Thirdly, as Macmillan sees each day more clearly the *realities* of power and strategy, he will proclaim the need for an "independent" nuclear policy just because European nations are acquiring a taste for it also. As the *Economist* wrote a fortnight before its sensible article quoted above, a nuclearly disarmed Britain might find herself "a minnow in the pike pond". But this is exactly the picture of a Labour government's defence policy Mr. Macmillan will wish to conjure up for the electorate, and if his instinctive allies de Gaulle and Adenauer can help him to do this, so much the better. The irony will not escape Macmillan that he will be at one and the same time exhorting the British people to forget its humiliation over Britain's exclusion from the Common Market.

Therefore, the Labour Party's interpretation of Nassau as marking a fundamental change in the whole nature and purpose of British defence policy will only be politically successful if Macmillan is challenged on his own ground, and independent nuclear systems attacked as useless and yet dangerous. But all that Mr. Wilson has said so far, in the January Commons debate, in a subsequent speech in Cardiff and in the United States can be summarised thus: a Labour government would "stand by NATO"; cease the manufacture of nuclear weapons; oppose giving "nuclear status" to the Federal German Republic; "increase Britain's military strength" in conventional forces; support United States initiatives for a European accommodation with the Soviet Union; give a greater measure

of recognition to the East German régime; seek measures to preserve Western access to a neutralised Berlin. This is an intriguing bag of generalities, but it is not an exposition of foreign or defence policy.

Moreover, although all is presently quiet inside the Labour Party, Mr. Wilson is fully aware of the fact that its left wing expects him to carry out a much more radical policy than that outlined above. Further, despite schism in the CND, intensified recently by direct communist attempts to identify it with treachery, exemplified by the Spies for Peace pamphlet, the fact nevertheless remains that the movement's appeal cannot be disregarded, although in rational intellectual terms it doubtless should be. CND's appeal is not based on a specific argument about power, policy or strategy. It stems from a feeling of helplessness that Britain is a catspaw in the international struggle and should make some gesture, albeit one of renouncing international responsibilities, let alone claims to national greatness, which could spotlight what are thought to be the dangers and absurdities of the nuclear deterrent premises on which the United States and Soviet Union conduct their affairs.

There are enlightened and experienced strategic analysts, like the physicist Professor Patrick Blackett (one of Mr. Wilson's private advisers on policy) who accept some CND arguments but have parted company entirely on the refusal of the body of the movement to realise that there is a middle way between a disarmed and neutral Britain and one which assumes a degree of influence, shoulders some of the burdens and responsibilities of international affairs, and is determined to provide those non-nuclear forces which can accurately reflect this role.

Such a policy would enable Britain to support the United States strategy of defending Western Europe with a non-nuclear sword and a (last resort) nuclear shield. This strategy is a complete reversal of the previous reliance on massive nuclear retaliation if a fragile non-nuclear shield is pierced. In many quarters it is believed to be a more effective way of reaching an accommodation with the Soviet Union over Europe's political future, achieving some degree of disengagement, and compared with exaggerated hopes for comprehensive disarmament, a pragmatic but effective system of arms limitation. However, the American strategy is vitiated by the non-nuclear weaknesses of NATO, and increasingly by the growing reluctance of its members to accept effective American control of such nuclear weapons as do form the shield.

As I have indicated already, there is no British capacity today to contribute forces in support of this United States strategy, and if

Mr. Wilson seriously contemplates altering this situation, and making an electoral issue of it into the bargain, he must be prepared, if he also wishes to maintain essential overseas commitments, to nail his colours to the mast about conscription.

There is no sign as yet that Mr. Wilson is prepared to do this. Unlike Mr. Gaitskell and Mr. Bevan, Mr. Wilson is essentially a cautious and noncommittal man. But he might take comfort from the supposition that there seems to be, so far as one can judge, a growing mood in Britain that its nuclear weapons are an expensive wash-out. If Mr. Wilson can change this mood into a mature realisation that there is no cheap substitute for nuclear weapons if Britain is to continue to have an international status, he may after all give the right impetus towards creating a strategy which will utilise Britain's resources most effectively, and match her real interests in the second half of the twentieth century.

THE EMERGENT COUNTRIES

W. H. MORRIS-JONES

If we in the West were less preoccupied with the cold war, we should no doubt be more aware than we are of the other world development of the mid-twentieth century, the emergence of new nation-states. As it is, we often think of this mainly as it affects the cold war. We see the awakening part of the world as uncommitted and its soul as a prize to be captured. Even if this view were the whole truth, it would point to the need for careful study of these new countries. In fact, it is a fraction of the truth.

For one thing, this soul is not one single simple thing, but various; sometimes it is raw, malleable, passively awaiting a masterful imprint; more often it is already fashioned by near and even distant history. For another, the chances are that the new nations will leave us in peace even less than the cold war. The cold war can continue to be lived with, and this is indeed the best there is to be got—that and a gradual relaxation of tension. But the developing nations are a developing problem. In these lands men's lives are being quickly shaped and often roughly. These processes will not leave our own lives untouched. It is not so much a crude "Suez" threat to our position as a challenge to our understanding of a changing world. Musical chairs on a moving staircase is difficult enough without introducing blind man's buff. Moreover, the cold war itself is a victim of this deeper movement in the world, not simply its master. Russia has been an emerging country and China is now most insistently so. Seen thus, their communisms seem to do no more than create a sub-division within the great category of new states.

Economic and Political Development

Economists have made us familiar with the theme of economic development and parts of their jargon have become popular. "Take-off" is talked of on platforms and "self-sustained growth" appears in pamphlets. The notion of political development is less readily grasped. The uniformities of economic relations make possible models of the process of growth; the ends are given by the

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discernible movement. The variations in political relations seem plausibly to baffle the most orderly minds and the ends are as many as the movements. Yet today, more than often before, we seem to have before us a host of comparable specimens and perhaps certain classifications and patterns of tendency begin to emerge.

In the search (at the boldest) for laws of political development, the first trap to avoid is the idea that these will be indicated by some simple relation with economic development. The tentative steps towards such error are to be found in certain beliefs very widely held in the developing areas themselves. There is, for example, the curious conviction that political stability rests chiefly on the attainment of some high rate of economic growth. That no such simple rule holds is strongly suggested both by history and by reflection on the power of other variables which could turn the hypothesis upside down. Another firmly held belief—also strange in itself though understandable as a deposit left behind by years of popular agitation—is that which asserts that a necessary and nearly sufficient condition for economic growth is a high level of mass enthusiasm for government plans. It does not require excessive faith in the beneficence of private interest (or, for that matter, in the versatility of economic weapons) to begin to doubt this; it does not indeed require great imagination to visualise circumstances where the rousing of such enthusiasm might wreck the best of government plans. No, if there are laws of political development they will be at once more subtle and more autonomous. In relation to economic development, political development is neither a mere by-product nor a simple pre-condition. It is a distinct and separate need to be sought in its own way, with its own pre-conditions and by-products.

The Nature of New States

With what standards and measurements are we to approach the new states? How are we to obtain insight into their characters? For a useful way of understanding political development, we can take up a theme put forward by one of the first students of the subject. Aristotle suggests the idea that the different ways in which states are constituted can be regarded as differences of degree along a continuous range: the most constituted state is that which has developed a constitutional government, the least constituted state is at a point on the range where it is not merely not constitutional but also hardly to be described even as a constituted entity. The problem of new states is to get constituted. Some of them develop

well enough to become constitutional; they establish, that is, a political system so genuine as to be regular and regulated, so far from arbitrary as to be obedient to laws. The Congo is still near one end of the range, India still near the other.

Constituting anything is a matter of relating parts to the whole. In trying to constitute new states parts of two kinds in particular have been of importance: the "units" and the "layers", the territorial and the social diversities respectively. No new state has tackled these two problems wholly from scratch; each new state begins with a legacy. (New states are neither as new as they would sometimes like to be, nor as old as at other times they choose to pretend.) The legacy usually contains two elements: the pattern of colonial rule and the character of the movement against such rule.

The problem of units is almost everywhere present and difficult. All new states are sufficiently under the impact of Western ideas to wish to be *nation-states*, but this does not always show the way clearly: which is the nation? Geography has sometimes helped by putting sea around the right size of island—as in Cuba and probably Jamaica. But this is not always decisive, as Ceylon's troubles show. More often geography has been of no help, though seldom indeed has it had its face slapped so firmly as by the creation of Pakistan. Sometimes the uncertainty relates to relations with units outside the inherited boundaries; the Ghana-Guinea moves may not impress, East Africa may not come together, Egypt's links with Syria were too one-sided—but the attempts indicate some genuine ambiguities. In the process of state-birth, there are moments of real indeterminateness; it could be twins or it could be one. More often, this uncertainty refers to boundaries within the inherited unit. Katanga is here only an extreme case which received high publicity. Indonesia came near to breaking-point after independence, the West Indies federation came unstuck before. The Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland has all manner of special features—but so has almost every case. The troublesome instances are not always the most dramatic and unit tensions are present in the best-run states. Pakistan went from four main provinces to two units of East and West. Already before independence, India grappled with the potential chaos of several hundred units and reduced them to twenty-six main units by the time of her Constitution. But within a few years thoroughgoing reorganisation was called for and the latest step was taken only last year. Even where boundaries are not the problem, powers may be: the degree of Nigerian federalism cannot be regarded as very settled.

Reconciling Diversities

Uncertainty about the units arises out of many factors but principally cultural. Experience of common government may make a nation, but it may not if heterogeneity is excessive. What is excessive cannot be strictly determined; the bulk of cases are somewhat marginal some of the time. Economic pressures and the quality of political leadership can push the doubtfuls over in either direction. The amount of skill required to check the secessionist movement of Tamils in Madras is not great. The Tamils in Ceylon make a less tractable problem. It is not easy to keep East Bengal happy in Pakistan. Often the difficulty is not simply differences of culture but rather the unequal development (measured in terms of modernisation) of the different cultural groups. This makes many nationalist movements less universal than they would like to be. The Muslim League of British India demanded Pakistan because the Hindus were different and were a majority but also because the Muslims were even disproportionately weak in industry, political experience, education, the professions. This kind of unevenness is a factor in Kenya as between Kikuyu and the rest, also in Uganda.

These difficulties of territorial integration are thus a major element in the problem of getting new states constituted. They influence political forms in obvious ways, such as the degree of federalism. They work in less obvious ways, too: often it has been a problem of units which has made some persons in new states lean towards autocratic and military rule as a source of toughness designed to counter disunity; in Pakistan, Burma, Ghana, and the Congo this has been a factor present at times.

The second large element in political development arises out of the existence of great social diversities, the layers or social sub-cultures within even a well-defined nation. Most new states have this problem to face at the same time as all the others. In this they are less lucky than new states of the past; European nations were mostly able to tackle this one separately and over a long period. There are no doubt always élites in politics and new states are no exceptions. But their élites come to power in a world where the popularisation of politics is inescapable; yet they find that the gulf between them and their masses is one of immense proportions. Sometimes the leaders seem to belong to one civilisation, followers to another. This is something far beyond the manageable sub-cultures of most established states. The cause is to be found in the limited extent of westernisation. Leaders may be at home in Paris

and London while the ordinary folk are confined to the culture of tribe and caste. Yet unless the gulf is bridged the new state in effect fails to get firmly constituted. The nature of modern politics abhors a gap of this kind.

Forming Parties

Here, too, much depends on what goes on before independence, on the shape of the nationalist movement. Machiavelli observed that those whose route to power is too easy have the hardest job to maintain their régimes. Some nationalist movements are more élitist than others; their way to the seats of power is not too tiresome. But they pay for it afterwards unless they can display exceptional skill. Ceylon is the classic case here: so late and sedate was her movement for independence (freedom from colonial rule came in the wake of Indian success, a present "made in India", a gift secured without struggle) that the men to whom power was transferred were unable to hold it for more than very few years; they had no links with their masses, could not forge them soon enough and were swept away in a moment. Some leaders of independence movements in former French territories have shown great survival skill when placed in not dissimilar situations. Other nationalist leaders have managed to stay close to their peoples' cultural centre of gravity. Gandhi did this, raising that centre in the process; Kenyatta did too, but very differently, lowering the centre as he did so.

But even with the best nationalist movement, the problem usually remains gigantic. The instrument most suited for its solution is the political party with its human agent, the politician; here is the great gap-closer. The temptation, of course, is to use short cuts, notably the charismatic leader. This can help greatly—as Nehru has helped—but when relied upon in substitution for party—as with Sukarno and to some extent Nkrumah—it causes more instabilities; it impedes the constituting process of the new state. Military rule, too, is a running away from the problem, a retreat which, though sometimes necessary, will not prevent the problem from returning and will be likely to weaken capacity to meet it. Most new states do in fact begin with at least the embryo of a political party in the shape of the independence movement. Becoming a political party entails great changes of attitude and methods of work but Congress in India shows that under favourable circumstances it can be done. It is much more difficult to get genuine

opposition parties. The movement-party is often so large and all-embracing that opposition is left expressing only total opposition to the régime or the aspirations of unassimilated units. But one thing is the dominant-party which permits other parties freely to exist and which has a lively and free debate within its own ranks, a debate responsive even to the small voices outside it; a very different thing is the one-party which takes steps to prevent the rise of rivals and which employs its disciplined ranks to penetrate and control any potential independent opinions.

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There are no inevitabilities in political development. Circumstances are pushing the emerging countries in almost as many political directions as the established countries. It still remains true that the most firmly constituted are those which have achieved a degree of constitutionalism, where personalities work within procedures, where the rulers have rules.

What is common to all these states is that, for better and worse, they are not left to work out their problems alone. They find themselves in a world of *blocs*, unable easily to set up an effective *bloc* of their own. Sometimes they can exploit others' need for their friendship, but they too need friends. They seek them where prejudices permit and interests dictate. Their external policies like their internal structures are not normally very set. Emerging takes time even if everyone is in a hurry.

THE POLITICS OF THE IRRATIONAL IN CENTRAL AFRICA

TERENCE RANGER

SINCE the creation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953 African politicians in the three territories have consistently behaved in a way which most British politicians have held to be irrational and unpredictable. This is because contemporary British politicians of the Right and Left measure rationality primarily in economic terms. Rational behaviour to a Conservative is behaviour which leads to national prosperity; rational behaviour to a socialist is behaviour which proceeds out of an objective and enlightened sense of class interest. It is this economic basis of European political thought that is rejected at a philosophical level by African leaders and thinkers like Senghor, who recently told an Oxford audience that Africans rejected both capitalism and socialism because neither could transcend their "material bounds" and because neither cared for the "satisfaction of the spiritual needs which transcend our material needs". And at the more practical level of day-to-day politics Africans in Central Africa have similarly refused to conform to the economic measurement of the rational.

As a result white politicians both inside and outside Central Africa have made the gravest of their errors. Federation itself was such an error. As Sir Roy Welensky recently reminded us, the opposition of the African majority in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia was well known to Britain in 1953. But it was then believed that this opposition was irrational, and that it could be overcome by the economic progress which it was confidently expected that Federation would bring. This, as we now know, was a complete error. Nyasas really meant it when they said that they preferred freedom under a ragged blanket to prosperity under Federal rule, though they were also able to point out that even under Federation too many blankets were still ragged. African leaders were playing not the politics of prosperity but the politics of dignity, and as a result they were constantly misunderstood and under-estimated.

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Non-Material Standards

A similar error underlay Sir Edgar Whitehead's policies in Southern Rhodesia, which have on the whole received that sort of sympathetic understanding in this country which is naturally accorded to a man making the same mistakes as oneself. Sir Edgar Whitehead, who is himself the incarnation of the rational economic man, believed that African nationalism in Southern Rhodesia was exclusively about unemployment, and low wages and shortage of land on the part of the masses, and lack of economic opportunity on the part of the articulate. He therefore set out with confidence to undercut African nationalism by economic improvements. Once again it is certainly true that his policies failed partly because he was unable to achieve any economic reforms of significance. But they failed primarily because they were essentially misdirected. Mr. Nkomo is as "irrational" a leader as Dr. Banda; he, too, cares for dignity more than prosperity. Thus, after being told by the Duke of Devonshire that Southern Rhodesia had to be treated as a special case because of its industrial economy, Mr. Nkomo announced his Party's support for a policy which would "destroy industry". Thus his supporters boycotted the opportunity of obtaining seats in Parliament and places on the Constitutional Council. Thus an African worker interviewed on a recent B.B.C. programme said that although he was earning a wage which did not support his family he would not mind this if he were being employed by an African. His prime motivation was the dignity of his people rather than the achievement of economic advancement.

This sort of attitude is as puzzling to veteran Marxist observers as it is to Sir Edgar Whitehead and Mr. Butler, and they are just as ready to write it off as "racialism". The most orthodox Marxist I know in Southern Rhodesia sadly remarks that Southern Rhodesian African leaders are "rather unprogressive". And in this sense they certainly are. They are not, and do not aspire to be, leaders of a black proletariat. They are not out to create a socialist society—though they talk in terms of an African socialist one, which is a very different thing. They are out to "liberate" a nation, to restore its sense of dignity, its hold on the past, its place in a culture, its opportunities for the future.

Of course, to say that this is the essential issue in Central Africa is not to say that economics are not important. It remains true that a good deal of the driving power of African nationalism comes from poverty and land hunger, and above all from the disparity

between African and European standards of living. It remains true also that much of the failure of Federation is to be measured in terms of its failure to realise its own ideals as defined by its leaders. Federation has *not* brought prosperity to Nyasaland; and though it has brought prosperity to Southern Rhodesia it has scarcely brought it to Southern Rhodesian Africans. If this were not true many things about politics in Central Africa would be different. But essentially the issue would be the same as it now is, with the difference that the African demand for liberty and dignity would seem more "irrational" even than it does now.

The Appeal of Irrationality

While to most British politicians this African "irrationality" appears disconcerting and alarming, to many of those who have espoused the African cause it seems exhilarating and attractive. Indeed, in many cases it is precisely this refutation of the economic interpretation, coupled with that other phenomenon of African politics, the impact of the outstanding individual, which makes men espouse the African cause.

There is, of course, a real difficulty here. White supporters of African nationalism in Central Africa remember only too well that the doctrines of national dignity, the role of the great individual, the inadequacy of the materialist interpretation, the necessity of National Socialism, have led in Europe to terrible outbursts of behaviour so genuinely irrational as to border on the insane. The parallel that sometimes worries them is not the parallel with communism so often and so fatuously drawn by Sir Roy Welensky, but the parallel with Fascism.

There is, indeed, a parallel with Fascism to be found in Southern Africa. But these observers would agree, as I have from personal experience found, that African nationalist movements themselves do not provide such a parallel. It is only to those, after all, who conceive of rationality exclusively in economic terms that a rejection of the economic seems like a headlong rush to the insane. African nationalist movements have their own criteria of the sane and of the insane. Once again Senghor expresses what one has felt to be true within the nationalist movements of Central Africa. "Our revised Negritude", he writes, "is humanistic. . . . The neo-Humanism of the twentieth century stands at the point where the paths of all nations, races, and continents cross, where the four winds of the spirit blow". One might express it by saying that for the African nationalist the measure of the sane is the humane.

Thus the African nationalist in Central Africa is by no means necessarily committed to the rake's progress of European nationalism. Far from it. He is, for instance, a nationalist in the context of a continental wide feeling; every significant African leader in Central Africa is a convinced Pan-Africanist and whatever that may mean in concrete practical terms it means a very great deal in intellectual terms. As Pan-Africanists—and especially as Pan-Africanists faced with a situation in which the positive goods of Africa have been so persistently denied by the ruling minority—they are asserting the role to be played in Senghor's "Civilisation of the Universal" by the African virtues. But every one of the important African leaders is also a formally committed non-racialist; the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union and the United National Independence Party are open to members of any race. Moreover, if in practice African "irrationality" does not mean racialism, neither does it mean an insane contempt for the material. Far from it—the first task of the new African governments in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, as it will be the first task of the future African government in Southern Rhodesia, is that of improving the economic welfare of the mass of the people. In this context the European supporter of African nationalism feels that it may be safe to re-establish the once important concepts of "liberty" and "dignity".

But both he and African nationalists are confronted with an "irrationality" which *does* threaten to move towards the insanity of the Fascists. This has been obvious for a long time in South Africa, where the "irrationality" of Afrikaner nationalism, tending irresistably to Fascist insanity, has for years discredited African nationalist movements as such, and has produced, until the recent rise of the Pan-Africanist movement, an opposition of an essentially socialist character. And now in Southern Rhodesia the same process is beginning.

White "Rationalism"

If for the last ten years the sorely tried British politician has been faced with the "irrationality" of Africans, he has usually been able to rely upon the good sense in economic terms of Rhodesian whites. Whatever else one might say of them they seemed supremely aware of enlightened self interest; Federation was created for them and exploited by them in largely economic terms. But now Britain is faced with the "irrationality" of whites as well as of blacks.

The implications of Mr. Winston Field's victory in the last Southern Rhodesian election are clear. Whites, too, have put other matters before economics. For economics the United Federal Party was the Party to back. They were led by Sir Edgar Whitehead; they were in close alliance with the interests which provided the economic mainstay of Southern Rhodesia; they were pre-eminently the party of rationality, advocating the abolition of discrimination where it was proving inefficient or expensive. The rejection of the U.F.P. meant that Southern Rhodesian whites were saying that they preferred to keep inefficiency or expense; or that they preferred to risk slump and economic decline in order to preserve the essentials of their "way of life". Rather than be affected by African government in Northern Rhodesia they preferred to run the risk of losing the northern markets for Southern Rhodesia's secondary industry. Rather than accept a degree of social integration they appear to be prepared to pay some part of the cost of a programme of "community development" which appears to be the Rhodesian equivalent of apartheid. Indeed, if things go as seems probable whites in Southern Rhodesia will have to pay a higher price for preserving their "way of life" than the loss of markets or the costs of "community development". They will have to pay the price of isolation, expulsion from the Commonwealth, very heavy defence expenditure, uncertainty, and strain. At the moment they appear to be prepared to pay that price; to behave in a thoroughly "irrational" way.

We must at this point pause to examine one point. Although this choice appears to have been made it is possible to wonder whether there can in fact be this kind of separation of the material and non-material aspects of the life of the white Rhodesian. It is possible to argue convincingly that the white Rhodesian "way of life", in so far as it is different from any other way of life and so worth defending, is purely and simply material. The white Rhodesian "way of life", it can be held, consists in gracious living and gracious family motoring; and if economic recession undermines these there will be nothing left to defend. This may well be true; in many ways one hopes that it is. But suppose that it is not true; suppose that the white Rhodesian has a sense of an ethos, a non-material dignity attaching to his way of life, has something of the "fire in the belly" of Afrikaner nationalism. How then are we to regard his movement to "irrationality"? It will certainly be a nuisance to British politicians—indeed, it is already being a

nuisance to them. But should we feel for it the same attraction that can be felt for African nationalist "irrationality"?

African Humanism

There are senses, certainly, in which it *is* possible to feel a certain attraction—to feel, as many Africans feel, that the Afrikaner attitude is essentially preferable to that of the English South African. But by the test we have already applied it is hardly possible to support this variant of the "irrational" in Central Africa. The standard of the sane in this new white "irrationality" is *not* the humane. Once again I quote from Senghor's address to Oxford University. "If European civilisation were to be imposed, unmodified, on all peoples and continents, it could only be by force. . . . It would not be *humanistic*, for it would cut itself off from the complementary values of the greater part of humanity. . . . It would be a universal civilisation; it would not be the civilisation of the universal."

These two objections formulated by Senghor are at the root of contemporary politics in Southern Rhodesia. "It could only be by force"—and by force it is. The "irrationality" of the whites in Central Africa leads—is leading already—to the police state, where the rule of law is defended by its suspension. It leads to detentions without trial and imprisonments by the score.

Moreover, it does not *lead* to the severance of whites from "the complementary values of the greater part of humanity", for that has always existed; but it preserves this and entrenches it. My own experience compels me to contrast the receptiveness of African nationalism on the one side, its profound Europeanisation, with the closed system of thought on the other side, with its refusal to be affected or influenced by Africa. This refusal sprang from an early assumption of superiority which can no longer exist in its primal innocence but which has to be—and is—justified by theories of racial superiority, or of frank minority self-interest. Finally, the "irrationality" of the whites is not characterised by hope, as is that of Africans, but by fear.

It would not be true to say that white Rhodesia is Fascist yet but it would be true to say that it is moving rapidly towards that sort of insanity. Thus it is important to bring out the fallacy of an argument which is now being advanced in Britain. That argument runs like this. All sides in Central Africa are equally irrational; none deserves support; the "irrational" whites are merely doing what the "irrational" blacks would do if they could.

The issue has ceased to seem to many people one of social justice or economic advancement, or one of moral right, but one of competing "irrational" demands for power. This argument is not soundly based. And this is not because one side is a majority and the other a minority, which would be a poor enough reason for supporting the first. It is partly because, as I have tried to show, the "irrationality" of the one side is constructive and firmly grounded upon a humane view of self-interest and even of the interest of others, while the "irrationality" of the other side is restrictive and misconceived even in terms of self-interest. One has and observes a standard of the sane; the other does not. In simple terms this means sympathy and support for Z.A.P.U., and sympathy of a different sort but withdrawal of support for Mr. Winston Field. Britain may have something to learn from the "irrationality" of Southern Africa, but she should be careful from which instructors she imbibes it.

HISTORICAL INEVITABILITY AND THE SINO-SOVIET DEBATE

P. ROYLE

WESTERN newspapers always succeed in making ideological disputes between factions in the communist world seem unutterably ridiculous; and the language in which different interpretations of Marxist dogma find expression is ludicrous in the extreme (although many of its terms are not intrinsically worse than terms such as "modernism", "conformism", and "isolationism", frequently used in the Western world). Yet what we are witnessing at the moment in the conflict between China and the Soviet Union and her satellites is a debate which not only has enormous practical implications for the future of the world (that is generally taken for granted), but is also not devoid of philosophical interest.

Ostensibly, the central issue in this debate is the Leninist doctrine of the inevitability of war; with the Chinese on one side hurling at the Soviet Union (or, until recently, Yugoslavia) accusations of "revisionism", and the Russians on the other replying with charges (until recently directed at Albania) of "dogmatism". At a deeper level, however, the dispute turns on the basic Marxist doctrine of historical inevitability. To put it simply, Mr. Khrushchev has discovered at the heart of orthodox Marxism-Leninism a contradiction, the sort of contradiction, let it be whispered, that communists love to point out in the doctrines and workings of capitalism. It is this: if, as Lenin maintained, war is inevitable, it is certain that Marx's Utopia, also reckoned to be inevitable, will never see the light of day; for, as is constantly being impressed upon us, in a nuclear war there can be no victors, only universal devastation. But does this mean, then, that it is inevitable that there should be *no* war? This would seem to be the inescapable inference from the premise of the inevitability of world communism. The Russians say "no"; the Chinese say that war is unavoidable, but that it is also certain, if it is true, as the Russians maintain, that there would be no victors (which they are inclined to doubt), that it will not be a full-scale nuclear war (this perhaps explains the frequent Chinese references to capitalists as "paper tigers", to which Mr. Khrushchev retorts that they may be paper tigers, but they are paper tigers with nuclear teeth).

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HISTORICAL INEVITABILITY AND THE SINO-SOVIET DEBATE

Now, let us try to see some of the ramifications of this dispute. According to Lenin, the contradictions in the capitalist system and the inherent competitiveness and irrationality of the capitalist temper were such that wars were unavoidable. But these wars would have to be fought by the workers, for whom nothing would be easier than to turn their bayonets against their masters and bring the whole capitalist edifice crashing down in ruins. But this is no longer the case: for, as Jean-Paul Sartre has pointed out, nuclear science has made it possible for capitalists to wage war without arming the workers at all; and to imagine, as the Chinese seem to, that, in the event of war, nuclear weapons would not be used is, in Soviet eyes, the most incredible naïveté.

Now, unless one believes in the unfailing wisdom of party politicians, or finds it, with Teilhard de Chardin (and, apparently, Pope John XXIII), unthinkable that God should allow man to blow himself to smithereens, unless, that is, one is addicted to some sort of irrational faith, it is impossible not to sympathise with the Soviet point of view. We should recognise, however, that whereas this point of view costs us nothing to achieve, it represents for the Russians a painful review of one of their own most deeply held beliefs: for if it is possible for a nuclear war to wipe out the whole of mankind, what becomes of the inevitability of world communism?

Marx versus Hegel

But, if they consciously jettison the doctrine of historical inevitability, will it still be possible for the Russians to consider themselves Marxists? I believe not only that this question must be answered in the affirmative, but further that in their present mood and with their new outlook they are nearer the humanism which is inseparable from any coherent Marxism than they have ever been in the past: for, in fact, what they are in the process of jettisoning is not the Marxist doctrine of historical inevitability but the doctrine with which, unconsciously, they have hitherto replaced it, the Hegelian doctrine of *absolute* historical inevitability. The charges the Russians should be levelling at the Chinese are not the relatively mild ones of "dogmatism", "abstractionism", or "isolationism" (a cruel one, this), but the more heinous ones of "idealism" and "obscurantism": the Chinese, despite their expressions of contempt for "bourgeois idealism", are fundamentally still, what the Russians have been up to now, communist Hegelians.

Let me amplify this statement. What Marx did when he set Hegel on his feet was to substitute for the doctrine of the inevitability of the realisation of the rational (which, for Hegel, meant the Prussian State) that of the inevitability of the rationalisation of the real (which, for him, meant communism). Now, both these doctrines are rationalist; but whereas Hegel's is idealist and conservative (though the conservatism is incidental), Marx's is humanist and revolutionary. Hegel's philosophy is a philosophy of passivity (we just sit and wait for the Idea to achieve consciousness of itself); Marx's is a philosophy of action (the world must be fashioned by men in conformity to reason, the real must be rationalised).

This is, of course, in a sense, an over-simplification. For it is quite possible—and the radical Hegelians of the nineteenth century and the Chinese of today are witnesses to the possibility—to reconcile, as does Christianity in its own way, a philosophy of action with a near-deterministic theology.¹ Basically, however, the distinction holds: for the actions of a revolutionary Hegelian can never quite be taken seriously, as in the last analysis he is simply a tool of an incontrovertible Providence; whereas if Marxism is to make sense at all (and the philosophising of Marxists often does not), there can be no such thing as Providence, but only man working out his social and political destiny in conformity with his conditions of production: if there is historical inevitability, it is, ultimately, because it is man himself who makes history, and man can only be in the last resort what he is: an economic, labour-organising and a rational, knowledge-seeking animal.

Two Forms of Inevitability

Both philosophies, then, posit historical inevitability; but whereas for Hegel, for whom Reason was God, this inevitability was unconditional, there is to the Marxist doctrine an implicit limitation: communism is inevitable to the same extent as life itself, in response

¹ What this should mean, in effect, for communist Hegelians (and what it has hitherto seemed to mean also for many authentic Marxists) is that those trained to understand the workings of the historical process should simply wait until the inevitable revolution breaks out and then, by assuming control of it, bring it to a full consciousness of its own latent aims. The process of education may, of course, be started *before* the revolution; but the actual revolution should be allowed to occur *spontaneously*. (In this connection we may recall the dispute between Stalin and the Chinese communists under Mao. Stalin was opposed to the staging of the revolution in China, arguing that the time for it had not yet come. Whether his view or Mao's was correct in terms of Marxist dogma does not concern us here; and, in any case, any action whatsoever, for Marxists as for Christians, can ultimately be justified in terms of their own dogma. It could be argued, however, that here the hard-headed Chinese were closer to the spirit of Marxism than was Stalin.)

to the irresistible demands of which, on the part of the dispossessed, the dictatorship of the proletariat will be ushered in. Now, for Marx, to say this is virtually tantamount to saying that communism, to which the dictatorship of the proletariat is the necessary prelude, is *absolutely* inevitable: for in his day there was no prospect at all of the developments which have put into capitalist hands the means of destroying mankind. But if the question had arisen, Marx, unlike Hegel, would have been forced to reply that, in a situation like ours, there being no God, whether the world lasted or not depended entirely on man himself, and that anti-progressive forces now having it in their power to behave as more than delaying factors, it would be impossible to forecast with certainty one thing or the other. The *quamdiu mundus durat* of the Christian Fathers would have become *si mundus durat*. Communism is inevitable if the world lasts.

Marxist historical inevitability is, therefore, not an excuse for quietism: it is, and has in practice generally (though not always) been understood to be, a clarion-call to action. At the present juncture in the world's history the coherent Marxist attitude should be more akin, despite its language, to Auden's "We must love one another or die" than to the complacency of Teilhard de Chardin. Despite the suicidal lunacy of nuclear war, we are still free to wage it; whether reason prevails or not depends on us. We are bound to act rationally or perish. We must attain perfection in the evolutionary sense that we must adapt ourselves speedily to the new environment we have created or cease to exist. If this means the overthrow of old values and the creation of a new personality, more socially conscious and universally minded (as it does), this exigency, painful though it may be to many people, must be faced.

The practical demands of government in our nuclear age have, then, forced Mr. Khrushchev to discover the unstated *conditio sine qua non* of the Marxist doctrine of historical inevitability, and to strip Marxism of its quasi-mystical trappings. He now realises clearly that there is a radical alternative to perfection (communism), and that this is the evolutionary alternative of extinction. Communists, following Marx, have always recognised that obstructionist capitalists have it in their power to delay the advent of communism; personal and accidental factors have never been banished from the communist view of history: on the contrary, they have always been acknowledged and looked askance at (the opposition to the "cult of personality" is, of course, an instance of this). Now, however, they are being obliged to recognise that there are those who also have it

within their power (and the "Better dead than Red" brigade are mad enough to avail themselves of that power) to destroy the world and thereby prevent communism absolutely. They are being forced to acknowledge, in other words, that the achievement of communism depends on them and us, that they are free to a much greater extent than they had ever thought, that personal factors are not merely accidental but crucial to the success of their endeavours, which depends, as they are coming to see, not only on the "impersonal" workings of economic laws but also on such personal qualities as fortitude, imperturbability, and common sense. When Mr. Khrushchev pronounced the outcome of the Cuban affair a victory for reason and humanity, he meant what he said; but it should also be pointed out, at the risk of being pilloried for a new "cult of personality", that the reason and humanity were in the last analysis exercised by Mr. Khrushchev. This fact, the fact of personal responsibility, synergism, so to speak, can only, despite the appalling dangers it implies, be welcomed by those for whom doctrines of absolute inevitability make a farce of human dignity (and there must be many Marxists who feel like this). It is also entirely consistent with the Marxist belief in the moral superiority of socialist man: for the impersonal workings of history, if such there were, would not be enough by themselves to make men morally better; ultimately men can only *make themselves* better.

The Avoidance of Destruction

History, therefore, allows greater scope for individual and collective freedom than Marxists were accustomed to acknowledge. But belief in the doctrine of historical inevitability, albeit modified—or rather, as I have argued, more correctly understood—remains. Provided the world can be prevented from blowing itself up, communism is inevitable. It is, therefore, clearly in the interests of communists to see that the world is *not* blown up, as it is their system which will triumph if it is not. It is, of course, in the interests of humanity as a whole, but some capitalists are so blinded by stupidity and greed that they fail to see it, and, in their private fear (not wholly unjustified) and antagonism to progress, declare themselves ready to send us all to Kingdom-come. It is with the communists, therefore, the apostles of reason, that the responsibility must lie for the prevention of a nuclear holocaust. Carried to its logical conclusion, this doctrine means that slavery, *i.e.*, capitalist domination, is preferable to death—for, after all, it can only be

temporary. And here we seem to hear Chinese charges of "capitulationism" ringing in our ears.

Victory for Capitalism?

Of course, this view cannot be publicised: it would be a direct invitation to the capitalists to overthrow every existing communist régime; and this is the last thing communists are prepared to accept. One of the reasons for the air of emotional unreality which surrounds the Sino-Soviet dispute is surely that it hinges fundamentally on an intuition which cannot—for psychological as well as strategic reasons—be acknowledged.

For here we face another dilemma. Is not "rather slavery than death" precisely the definition given by communists, following Hegel, of the slave mentality? (It is, of course, also the definition through which the Romans sought to justify slavery.) And however correct this attitude may be, in present circumstances, can it serve otherwise than to allow the perpetuation of capitalist domination? In other words, is not the irrational temper of the capitalist world its strongest (and, according to Hegelian psychology, the overlord's traditional) weapon? Of course, we are living in an entirely different world from that of the nineteenth century, and anyone who accuses Mr. Khrushchev of cowardice in his handling of the Cuban affair should have his head examined. But the dilemma, both theoretical and practical, remains.

How, then, is world communism to come about? One can believe it will come about through war only if one shares the irrational faith of the Chinese in the providential pusillanimity of the capitalist tigers. There is, however, another way, and Mr. Khrushchev has recently indicated it: "We will bury capitalism, but the burial will be achieved by the workers of each country; they will bury their own capitalists". Is this credible? I think not. For the only conceivable way in which communism can expand is by winning control of the countries on the immediate borders of the communist *bloc*; everywhere else, as the Cuban episode demonstrated, the Russians being at a disadvantage in terms of conventional forces, American nuclear blackmail comes into play. The United States has only, therefore, to ensure that the countries of NATO, CENTO, and SEATO, in addition to India, do not go communist (not an exceptionally difficult matter in most cases)² to prevent any

² Even if Laos and South Vietnam went communist, the position would not be radically altered. Nor would it if Finland and Austria went communist, which is hardly likely.

further effective communist advance; and to imagine that the workers of Western Europe will in the foreseeable future rise up and bury their capitalist overlords is nothing short of fatuous.³

Communism and World Government

How, then, is communism to come about? There is one way and one way only. It is nuclear weapons which have created Marxists' difficulties: they must therefore be neutralised. Now it is just possible they could be banned; but even if they were, the technological means of their production could never be abolished; and knowledge is lost only when the need for it ceases to be felt. They must, therefore, sooner or later, be put in the hands of a central world authority; which means, in effect, world government. Now, communists cannot expect capitalism to agree to world government by them: that would be to ask the leopard to change its spots (or should I say: the tiger to change its stripes?). It would also be contrary to Marxist dogma. But is there any valid reason why they should not accept a non-communist government themselves? World government is clearly demanded by reason, and should on these grounds alone commend itself to Marxists; and (they are quite right) reason must prevail. The fact that such a government would not be communist in political orientation should not matter to them at all: for is it not an article of faith that eventually communism must triumph? Not only that, but the road to victory would be clear: only one successful revolution to be staged, with the danger of nuclear war averted for all time; and much of the world fast approaching that stage of industrialisation at which Marx declares revolution to be inevitable! Furthermore, acceptance of a non-communist government brought into being by honourable negotiation would not be at all the same as acceptance of defeat at the hands of a capitalist Power in a nuclear show-down. "Rather slavery than death" would, in other words, be stripped of its humiliating implications; and think of the propaganda value of such a course!

The prospect I am holding out no doubt sounds Utopian. But in the present state of the world, if world government is Utopian, it is Utopia that is called for. It is along these lines, in any case, that Western governments ought to be thinking. If we are still here

³ Democratic socialisation is, of course, always possible, and is to a large extent taking place. It is doubtful, however, if this is what Mr. Khrushchev means. If it is, then naturally there is no problem, and we may well agree with Mr. Khrushchev in the inevitability of Utopia.

in fifty years' time, we shall indeed be superior creatures; but it will be *we ourselves* who are responsible for this, as it is we ourselves who make history. And, Heaven be praised, there will ultimately be nothing whatsoever to prevent us from relapsing into superstition, brutality, and servility.

PROBABLES AND POSSIBLES, 1963

R. W. J. WILCOX

IN July 1959, *The Political Quarterly* published an analysis of Conservative and Labour Members of Parliament and candidates who had narrowly missed victory at the 1955 election. The present article repeats these analyses for the 1959 election, but extends them to cover candidates who lost by majorities up to 5,000. It also includes (as did the previous article) a breakdown of candidates adopted by the two parties for seats which they do not at present hold, and which were lost by majorities of less than 5,000 in 1959. A new table, not given in 1959, shows the average age of candidates successful in by-elections since 1959.

The figure 5,000 was chosen in preference to 2,000 since, on present showing, no Conservative-held seat with a smaller majority can be regarded as anything but marginal. The tables should, therefore, be sufficient to give some indication of the ages, occupations, and educational background of most people who are likely to be elected to the next Parliament.

It will be noticed that for neither party was the average age of successful candidates in 1959 very different from that in 1955; in this category and in the category of narrowly defeated candidates, the Conservatives were fractionally younger and the Labour men fractionally older. The average ages of candidates selected for seats already held by members who are retiring and for seats lost by small majorities is lower in both cases, the difference being greater in the case of the Conservative Party than that of the Labour Party.

The analysis by age groups shows that well over half the Conservative candidates are under 40 (52 out of 91) while Labour candidates under 40 number only 31 out of 83. The most interesting change is in the table showing the education of candidates; the proportion of Conservative candidates with higher education has actually declined, while the proportion of Labour candidates with higher education has risen from under half to nearly two-thirds. In respect of occupation, there is also a rather startling change. Grouping together barristers and solicitors, journalists and writers, and company directors and business as the professions which are commonly supposed most suitable for Members of Parliament, it

* The author is a statistician with The Economist Intelligence Unit.

will be found that the proportion of these among Conservative candidates has fallen from 62 per cent. to 51 per cent., while the corresponding proportion among Labour candidates has risen from 23 per cent. to 35 per cent. These comparisons are, of course, partly affected by the fact that the dividing line is fixed at a majority of 5,000 instead of 2,000, but a closer analysis of Table 7 shows that this makes little practical difference.

Statistical Analysis

At the 1959 General Election the average age of Conservative candidates returned was 48, and of Labour candidates returned 55. As in 1955, there were some interesting variations between regions and types of constituency. This was no doubt partly due to the fact that where the gains were made by the Conservatives the average age of the successful candidates was lower—in fact, the average age of Conservative candidates winning seats not previously held was 41.

TABLE 1. AVERAGE AGES OF SUCCESSFUL CANDIDATES, 1959
(1955 figures in brackets)

	Conservative	Labour
London Boroughs	50 (56)	54 (52)
English Boroughs	48 (49)	53 (53)
English Counties	48 (48)	56 (56)
Wales	42 (42)	54 (55)
Scotland	50 (55)	54 (55)
Northern Ireland	41 (48)	None (None)
Total	48 (49)	55 (54)

The average age of Conservative candidates defeated by majorities of under 5,000 was 41, and of Labour candidates 46.

TABLE 2. AVERAGE AGES OF CANDIDATES DEFEATED BY 5,000 OR LESS, 1959

	Conservative	Labour
Former Members	55	54
New Candidates	40	43
Total	41	46

The average age of candidates returned in by-elections since 1959 is given in the following table:

TABLE 3. AVERAGE AGE OF CANDIDATES SUCCESSFUL IN BY-ELECTIONS SINCE 1959

	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Labour</i>
Average Age	40	42

The following analysis of candidates selected for the next General Election is confined to those chosen to replace members who are not standing again, and for seats where the candidate will face a hostile majority of 5,000 or less. In cases where there has been a by-election since 1955, the majority at the by-election is used. While it is possible that some candidates will overturn larger majorities, the limit of 5,000 has been chosen to bring into the analysis only those candidates whose chances of being elected can be rated fairly highly.

The coverage is incomplete, since there are some candidates who have not yet supplied full data about themselves. The material on which the analysis is based has been provided by the head offices of the two parties, and the thanks of *The Political Quarterly* are due to Mr. Paul Bryan, M.P., Vice-Chairman of the Conservative Party in charge of matters relating to parliamentary candidates, and to Miss Mollie Bell, the Information Officer of the Labour Party.

TABLE 4. AVERAGE AGE OF CANDIDATES SELECTED (MAY 1963)
(1959 figures in brackets)

	<i>Conservative</i> (91 candidates)	<i>Labour</i> (83 candidates)
Seats already held	39 (41)	47 (46)
Majority against, under 1,000	42 (41)	38 (44)
Majority against, 1,000-2,000	36 (45)	44 (43)
Majority against, 2,001-3,000	39 (—)	43 (—)
Majority against, 3,001-4,000	38 (—)	43 (—)
Majority against, 4,001-5,000	36 (—)	39 (—)
Average of above	39 (42 *)	42 (44 *)

* First three lines only.

TABLE 5. CANDIDATES SELECTED BY AGE-GROUPS
(1959 figures in brackets)

	<i>Conservative</i>						
	Seats Held	Under 1,000	1,001- 2,000	2,001- 3,000	3,001- 4,000	4,001- 5,000	Total
Under 30	1 (2)	1 (1)	3 (2)	2	4	1	12
30-34	4 (7)	4 (2)	2 (3)	3	4	2	19
35-39	4 (6)	2 (2)	6 (3)	3	5	1	21
40-44	3 (10)	0 (4)	1 (1)	7	4	2	17
45-49	0 (7)	4 (3)	0 (5)	3	3	1	11
50-54	3 (1)	1 (2)	0 (4)	1	1	0	6
55-59	0 (3)	3 (0)	0 (2)	0	1	0	4
60 and over	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (1)	0	0	0	1
Totals	15 (36)	15 (14)	13 (21)	19	22	7	91

	<i>Labour</i>						
	Seats Held	Under 1,000	1,001- 2,000	2,001- 3,000	3,001- 4,000	4,001- 5,000	Total
Under 30	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1	0	3	4
30-34	1 (1)	6 (5)	0 (2)	3	2	2	14
35-39	1 (2)	2 (3)	4 (4)	2	3	1	13
40-44	4 (3)	1 (2)	4 (4)	3	2	5	19
45-49	1 (3)	2 (3)	1 (7)	3	2	2	11
50-54	3 (3)	1 (2)	4 (1)	4	2	2	16
55-59	4 (2)	0 (4)	0 (0)	0	1	0	5
60 and over	0 (0)	0 (1)	0 (1)	1	0	0	1
Totals	14 (14)	12 (20)	13 (19)	17	12	15	83

The two tables which follow analyse the same candidates (*i.e.*, 91 Conservative and 83 Labour) by education and occupation. In the table of occupations it has been necessary to eliminate some of the descriptions to avoid double counting; thus a candidate with more than one occupation will be classified only once according to which appears to be his or her main occupation.

TABLE 6. THE EDUCATION OF CANDIDATES

School *	Seats Held	Conservative					Total
		Under 1,000	1,001-2,000	2,001-3,000	3,001-4,000	4,001-5,000	
Elementary only	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Grammar only	1	2	3	6	6	1	19
Public only	3	2	0	3	2	0	10
Higher education	11	11	10	9	15	6	62
of which:							
Oxford Univ.	10	5	1	0	0	1	17
Cambridge Univ.	1	1	5	4	5	1	17
London Univ.	0	0	1	0	2	0	3
Other Univ.	0	4	1	4	3	1	13
Other higher education	0	1	2	1	5	3	12
Not given	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Schools attended by those having higher education as well							
Grammar	1	5	2	5	10	2	25
Public	10	5	8	4	5	4	36
Other	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Not given	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
School *	Seats Held	Labour					Total
		Under 1,000	1,001-2,000	2,001-3,000	3,001-4,000	4,001-5,000	
Elementary only	6	3	2	3	0	3	17
Grammar only	2	0	1	2	3	4	12
Public only	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Higher education	6	9	8	11	8	8	50
of which:							
Oxford Univ.	0	2	2	1	1	1	7
Cambridge Univ.	0	0	0	5	2	2	9
London Univ.	1	3	0	0	0	3	7
Other Univ.	1	3	3	4	2	2	15
Other higher education	4	1	3	1	3	-	12
Not given	0	0	2	1	0	0	3
Schools attended by those having higher education as well							
Grammar	2	5	2	3	3	4	19
Public	1	2	1	5	3	0	12
Other	3	0	5	1	1	1	11
Not given	0	2	0	2	1	3	8

* Bearing in mind that most candidates finished school before the passing of the 1944 Education Act, pre-1944 definitions have been used.

TABLE 7. THE OCCUPATIONS OF CANDIDATES

	Seats Held	Conservative					Total
		Under 1,000	1,001-2,000	2,001-3,000	3,001-4,000	4,001-5,000	
Barristers and Solicitors	1	1	2	4	3	0	11
Journalists and Writers	1	1	2	0	1	0	5
Doctors	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Teachers (incl. University)	0	2	1	0	3	0	6
Other Professions	4	5	3	5	5	3	25
Company Directors and Business	5	4	5	7	5	4	30
Clerical	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Trade Union and Trade Assn. Officials	0	0	0	1	1	0	2
Party Officials	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
Manual Workers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Local Gvt. Officials	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Farmers	2	1	0	1	2	0	6
Retired Officers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Housewives	0	1	0	1	1	0	3
Not given	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Total	15	15	13	19	22	7	91
	Seats Held	Labour					Total
		Under 1,000	1,001-2,000	2,001-3,000	3,001-4,000	4,001-5,000	
Barristers and Solicitors	0	9	1	4	3	3	11
Journalists and Writers	1	0	1	0	1	0	3
Doctors	0	0	2	1	0	0	3
Teachers (incl. University)	1	5	2	4	1	5	18
Other Professions	3	2	2	2	0	1	10
Company Directors and Business	3	3	2	2	3	2	15
Clerical	0	1	0	1	0	0	2
Trade Union and Trade Assn. Officials	3	0	1	2	1	1	8
Party Officials	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Manual Workers	2	0	1	1	3	2	9
Local Gvt. Officials	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
Farmers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Retired Officers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Housewives	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Not given	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	14	12	13	17	12	15	83

BOOK REVIEWS

THE SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF WAGE POLICY. Second Edition. By BARBARA WOOTTON. [*Unwin University Books*. 200 pp. 15s.]

SALARIES IN THE PUBLIC SERVICES IN ENGLAND AND WALES. By HILDA R. KAHN, with a preface by BARBARA WOOTTON. [*Allen & Unwin*. 428 pp. 60s.]

A DECADE or so ago advocacy of a national wages policy was confined to a handful of economists (who had scarcely done more than sketch the probable need for some direct restraint upon income movements under full employment), and of Fabian pamphleteers anxious to provoke in labour recognition that planning everything else would involve some planning of itself. Until quite recently the preponderance of expert opinion was probably that such a policy was either impracticable, or unnecessary, if not both. Now we have had some: the attempt to defeat inflation by cutting down demand has shown itself, not merely of dubious efficacy, but to involve also such disappointment to now-established expectations of high employment and rising consumption as to amount almost to political suicide for any government that persists in it. And almost overnight, expert and official attitudes have changed: the need for an "incomes policy" is enshrined in a conservative government's White Paper: and even the TUC's General Council seems now prepared at least to endorse general statements to the same effect.

The change is so sharp that earlier advocates of reason's purposive application to the distributive process must suspect a catch. And the catch, of course, is that both the content and the mechanism of incomes policy remain undefined—beyond some officially pronounced percentages of uncertain status, and a National Incomes Commission whose functions are more those of a coroner's court than an executive board. And these issues are potentially even more a matter of conflict and controversy than the need for a policy itself. We live, in fact, between two overlapping debates: if "incomes policy" is accepted in principle, its implications for the pursuit of sectional and private interests in this area are far from being so. While many of its current advocates fail to realise that by itself acceptance of the need for an incomes policy will solve no problems, it will merely *permit* the problems to be solved—but by alternative methods and according to alternative distributive philosophies.

Barbara Wootton, in relation to both these debates, is fully entitled to say "I told you so" (and does it, in her new preface). The 1955 edition of her book probably did more than any other private effort to stimulate discussion of the wage-policy problem, and to bring home our present wage-and-salary structure's many absurdities. She was, of course, unfair to the economists; her criticism of their theory of wages showed little recognition of the extent

to which economists themselves would assert its limitations—indeed, her own discussion (for instance, of the positive association between cash earnings and non-monetary job advantages) displayed some curious misunderstandings of that theory itself. But her trenchant and witty criticism of our wage-fixing processes and their distributive effects remains quite as valid as when she first made it. Above all, her proposals were based on the proposition that if an incomes policy was necessary to make full employment viable, it could also not be neutral in distributive terms.

Lady Wootton, however, was singularly vague as to the mechanism of wages policy: of this her all too brief discussion displayed the intellectual's fallacy—that it is only necessary to explain what is wrong to induce people to stop doing it. And on mechanisms, Miss Kahn's study is much more to the point. Where Dr. Kahn served her apprenticeship to the subject would be amply demonstrated by her style and approach, even had not Lady Wootton (so to speak) signed her completed indentures by writing the preface to her book. Even her raw material is that of her apprentice labours: and the impressive body of information on salaries in seventeen major public services and nationalised industries which she here presents was so formidable that she has been unable to revise it substantially, so that as a work of reference it is already over a decade out of date, and can serve only as a valuable starting-point for one seeking mainly current comparative data.

However, there is nothing obsolescent about Miss Kahn's analysis of the divergent principles and practices on which public salary-scales are based; and her discussion of the problems they raise is highly relevant to contemporary events. Anomaly and irrationality, in fact, would seem to be almost as characteristic of the structure of pay-differentials in public employments as of that in the economy at large. In several respects, indeed, Dr. Kahn carries Lady Wootton's critique further: her chapter on the difference between wages and salaries goes far to show, not merely how much of this (perhaps the most widely significant caste-distinction in contemporary society) is social in origin, but the extent to which it rests on no other consistent demarcation. While her exposition of the effect of accident in salary-differentials suggests that their present dispersal is explicable in large part by neither economic nor non-economic reasons, but by no reason at all.

Dr. Kahn's proposed rationalisation of the structure of public salaries might well be a major contribution to resolving what has recently emerged as a central dilemma in wage-policy's implementation in a mixed economy. The government cannot expect to have a national incomes policy taken seriously if it doesn't apply it to public employees. But if it does so, and—as is all too likely to happen—the government's example as paymaster is not widely followed by all private employers, the result is a cumulative injustice to public servants. However, where salaries are concerned a tendency for private concerns to model their pay scales on public ones is already beginning to make nonsense of the old principle that public pay should be fixed by comparison with outside employment. A common structure of salaries for public services—or a structure based on consistent and uniformly applied principles—would be a very powerful influence on private employers indeed.

H. A. TURNER.

THE SECRETARIAT OF THE UNITED NATIONS. By SYDNEY D. BAILEY. [Stevens. vi and 113 pp. 25s.]

DIPLOMATS IN INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION: STEPCHILDREN OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE. By MICHAEL H. CARDOZO. [Cornell University Press. 166 pp. 28s.]

AFTER the regulation of international affairs ceased to be the personal prerogative of sovereigns assisted by a small band of secretaries, it became the business of an increasingly numerous profession of diplomats, distinguished by a special skill and cultivating at times a special tongue. They still hold the field, but no longer alone; for the international arena is now peopled by something that begins to look like a horde, in which the traditional diplomat is being submerged. These new operators are of two kinds.

There are, first, the so-called international civil servants, who are required to slough off their national loyalties and serve an organisation which includes, but transcends, the state of which they are citizens, and which has a corporate being and purposes of its own, to which it demands a paramount devotion. Although styled civil servants, these men and women often find themselves playing a diplomatic rather than an administrative role, with the result that conflicts of loyalty may easily arise. The most eminent of them is the Secretary-General of the United Nations, certainly a political figure; but the UN is not the only forum and training ground for this type of activity.

Secondly, there is a wide variety of men and women who remain servants of nation states, but go abroad on business that has not hitherto been part of the diplomat's round. Besides specialists housed, sometimes a trifle apologetically, within the conventional state-to-state diplomatic mission, we find emissaries who are accredited not to a state but to an international organisation, and also special groups engaged on a task in a given foreign country, but more or less independent of the regular diplomatic mission staffed by their compatriots. Ambassadors accredited to the UN or other international bodies provide examples of diplomacy at work in a new context; groups operating alongside the diplomatic service, and staffed mostly from outside it, have included Lend-Lease and Point Four missions.

Mr. Bailey's book on the UN Secretariat explains a lot of things. Mr. Bailey knows his subject as a result of many years' study and, in particular, a stint as Director of the Quaker Programme at the UN. His book provides a number of basic facts, including useful statistical information about, for example, the number of UN staff employed in the various departments in New York and in missions in the field. Some of these figures will surprise many readers. Further, he explains the principal problems that have arisen in recent years, such as the geographical limitations on the recruiting of staff, the organisation and reorganisation of the senior posts, and the various kinds of "troika" that have been proposed.

The paradox of the UN lies in the fact that it is vaguely regarded as in some way "superior" to each of its members, and yet it has no independent power of its own. This political anomaly is at the root of the doubts and tensions that tend to gather round the functions of the Secretary-General. He himself is to be impartial but his organisation lacks true independence. In these circumstances a purposive Secretary-General—one, that is, who seeks to translate the express purposes of the organisation into fact—is bound either

to find frustration in the restraints imposed on independent action, or, if he transcends them, to be accused of an unconstitutional partiality. This is what happened to Dag Hammarskjöld and if, as seems likely, U Thant's conception and use of his office turn out to be more like Dag Hammarskjöld's than was originally expected, it will happen again. Mr. Bailey's examination of this situation—clear, perceptive, and sensible—is therefore of considerable political importance as well as historical interest.

Professor Cardozo also aims to explain, but as his sub-title immediately suggests, he has an axe to grind as well. As Washington's Lend-Lease representative in Turkey during the latter part of the war, he has himself served as a pseudo-diplomat (if that term may be used without offence), and he has been in and out of the State Department since then in a way that is more familiar in the United States than it is here. In his book he describes the origins and performances of some of the new institutions that have invaded the diplomatic scene (OEEC, NATO, the European Communities created by the Six), a development that is producing a new kind of diplomacy in place of the old diplomacy which took cognisance only of states. He has seen some of the possibilities and some of the rubs; the outstanding example of the latter was the effective displacement of Ambassador Winant as the White House's representative in London during the war by Mr. Averell Harriman in his capacity as head of the Lend-Lease mission. Professor Cardozo is right to draw attention to the increasing importance of the "stepchildren" of the foreign service, and to the difficulties which they sometimes experience through being accorded a lower status than the senior progeny.

PETER CALVOCORESSI.

REACTION AND REFORM: ENGLAND IN THE EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY (1793–1868). By JOHN W. DERRY. [Blandford Press. 232 pp. 18s.]

DR. DERRY's volume—the fourth in the "Blandford History Series" of compact textbooks about modern English history—is ably constructed, clearly presented, and attractively written. It covers, in time-span, roughly the same era as Professor Asa Briggs's *Age of Improvement*: that is, the years of rapid social and economic change which lay between the outbreak of the wars with France in 1793 and the first Gladstone Ministry in 1868. As is the admirable fashion with texts of this kind, it weaves together the strands of political, economic, social, military, and intellectual history. It can be judged, therefore, by two simple tests, since it makes no pretence to originality of interpretation. Is the impression it conveys of early nineteenth-century England coherent, clear, and consistent? And is it, in fact, true?

By the first test Dr. Derry's book passes muster well. Based on sound knowledge of the period and an intelligent grasp of its main features, it shows the interplay of politics with basic economic changes and their social repercussions. The reforms of the thirties and the agitations of the forties are adequately described. The issues of foreign policy are explained. The accounts are free from bias or lack of balance. They are direct, sensible, and uncontroversial. Many students will get from them just what they want.

But in applying the second test, one must ask: "Is competence enough?" What is included is true enough; what is omitted may leave the final picture

lifeless or even distorted. By this test the book is considerably less successful. Somehow the reader does not feel that profound confidence in progress—can it be that so little is said about Macaulay, nothing about Herbert Spencer? Or is it that we discover too little about the new Press, the civil service, education, the physical and mechanical sciences? Again, although considerable space is devoted to foreign policy, surprisingly little is said about the Empire. The Durham Report is mentioned: so is the Indian Mutiny. But there is no firm assessment of the importance, for the Victorians, of the rapidly expanding overseas Empire, nor of the role of the Indian connection in both the growth of the English economy and the maintenance of British naval and military power. England of the mid-century cannot be explained apart from its immense overseas connections, and to recall them occasionally, almost in asides, is no way to elicit their continuous relevance.

This important criticism apart, the book is better than many of its kind. It is adorned with attractive illustrations and good maps. It is intelligently devised. It is some of the wider ramifications and the deeper complexities that are missing, and with them the sense of Victorian originality and vitality.

DAVID THOMSON.

THE MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY. By JOSEPH FRANKEL. [Oxford University Press. xvi and 231 pp. 35s.]

IN the United States the theoretical study of foreign policy has become a thriving industry. Where Disraeli is said to have accosted aged Parliamentarians whose names escaped him with the question "how's the gout?", American professors of international relations now reputedly ask of their young colleagues "how's the conceptual framework?". Joseph Frankel, who is head of the Politics Department at the University of Aberdeen, explains this striving for a general theory of decision-making in foreign policy by the fact that "American society favours decisions and condemns procrastination". Another factor no doubt is the American academic's desire to show his social usefulness by working out theoretical systems as a contribution to "education for survival".

Dr. Frankel's aim in this book is the same as that of transatlantic theoreticians, such as Boulding, Kaplan, Neumann, and Morgenstern, in that he is seeking a general abstract framework within which the foreign policies of all states, great and small, old and new, communist and non-communist, can be accommodated, and which (he claims) helps us to classify the various forces shaping the external behaviour of states. But his book is an agreeable departure from American method. It is in the first place non-technical; one has no need to be a mathematician to follow it, and the style is clear and free from the ponderous Teutonisms familiar in studies of this kind. The book is also admirably humble; Frankel is alive to the role of chance, of what Sir Harold Nicolson once called "the accidental and fortuitous in human affairs", and of such factors as the frailty of will and imagination which cannot be forced into mathematical equations. The book is also based upon a broad familiarity with international practice, Dr. Frankel's filing-system

being so efficient that no generalisation is offered without at least a triplet of historical examples. Some of these could be criticised—this is especially true of the references to British practice in the 1930s, where, for instance, the fashionable error is repeated that Neville Chamberlain and Eden were divided on the principle of "appeasement" (which in any case meant something different then from what was later assumed) rather than on the circumstances of its application.

The centrepiece of Dr. Frankel's analysis is the independent sovereign state, the scene of a continuous flow of decisions by which values dominant in the state are related to the international environment as conceived by the decision-makers. The various groups into which the latter fall are explained, including such subsidiary elements as the military, the intelligence services, and, today, the nuclear and social scientists. Before the decision-makers is the world environment in its physical and social aspects, the latter including aspirations for world-wide solidarity under the heading of "One World" philosophies. Behind them is the domestic scene, in which the key components are public opinion, political parties, pressure groups, "power clusters", which in their several ways secure the ear of decision-makers. The link between decision-taking and the two environments is defined as information, in the study of which regard must be paid to the "rules of interpretation" in terms of which Ministers and their advisers collect, sift, and assess the factual basis of their decisions. Then come the state's values and the way in which these are transformed into concrete policy objectives and principles of behaviour. The concluding chapters of the book deal with the actual process of decision, which is divided into a "pre-decisional" stage, which raises such problems as the incompatibility of alternatives, and a "post-decisional" stage in which decisions have to be explained and justified to the various publics in whose name they are made.

Inevitably, perhaps, truisms insinuate themselves into such a treatment: success in politics is defined as "securing as large a portion of the vision of the good life at as low a cost as possible"; history is said to show "how severe can be the penalties for blind perseverance with unattainable objectives". Moreover, the range of possibilities in state behaviour is frequently set so wide that the general framework seems to fragment into heterogeneous observations. But the main question posed by this book, simply because it is one of the best of its kind, is whether the generalised approach to foreign policy really can compare in value with the detailed and documented study of the foreign policies of a group of selected countries. This is not to say that the traditional diplomatic historian's method is necessarily the best one; in its preoccupation with the flow of diplomatic documents traditional history tends to ignore the wide-ranging forces which affect foreign policy in the twentieth century. But the hard labour of studying the making of policy in a specific context, with all the detail which makes foreign policy the complex business it is, impresses one, after reading such a work as Frankel's, as having no substitute. This book has the value of providing us with a very wide range of vital considerations to bear in mind when taking up foreign policy as a living thing. But it is at that stage that the understanding of what the making of foreign policy really is must begin.

F. S. NORTHEGE.

CUBA AND THE RULE OF LAW. *Report of the International Commission of Jurists.* Introduction by SIR LESLIE MUNRO. [*International Commission of Jurists.* xiv and 267 pp. 15s.]

THE VOICE OF LATIN AMERICA. By WILLIAM BENTON with a foreword by ADLAI STEVENSON. [*Weidenfeld and Nicolson.* xix and 204 pp. Index. 21s.]

LATIN AMERICA—DIPLOMACY AND REALITY. By ADOLF A. BERLE. [*Harper & Row for the Council on Foreign Relations.* xii and 144 pp. \$2.95.]

In January 1959, the International Congress of Jurists meeting in New Delhi sent Fidel Castro a telegram of congratulations and best wishes. The Congress was particularly heartened by the appointment of the internationally known Cuban lawyer, Dr. José Miro Cardona, to the office of Prime Minister. Miro Cardona lasted just six weeks. The International Commission of Jurists, which had long concerned itself with gross breaches of law by the government of Fulgencio Batista, was once more obliged to turn its attention to Cuba. *Cuba and the Rule of Law* is the result of the Commission's study of two kinds of evidence: that provided by the *Gaceta Oficial* of the Cuban Government and that provided by 124 victims of Castro's methods.

Although *Cuba and the Rule of Law* is primarily a study of revolutionary "law" in Cuba and its application, the report is an important contribution to political analysis. The Commission has rejected the argument that mass poverty and economic stagnation both caused and justified the revolution. Measurable indicators of social conditions such as birth rates, death rates, literacy, income *per capita*, food consumption, electricity in the home, baths per home, etc., reveal that when Castro took power, Cuba was the third richest Latin American community and that its material wealth was growing, ownership and control of capital were becoming increasingly Cuban, and that diversity of industrial activity was expanding.

The Commission has likewise been unimpressed by the argument that the weakness of the middle class explains the instability of Cuban political life. Cuba, in fact, has (or had) a numerous middle class and the wage-workers were largely assimilated with it by reason of their high incomes, urban experience, and the absence of distinctions of race and colour. The only true class of *descamisados* in Cuba were the small minority of *montunos*, the landless, unorganised rural casual labourers of the Sierra Maestra, whom Castro has chosen to depict as the typical "peasant" of pre-revolutionary Cuba. A comparatively high level of illiteracy seems to be the principal distinction between Cuba and the more advanced industrial communities.

Having dismissed the economic and social sub-structure as compelling factors in the rise of Fidel Castro and the present behaviour of his government, the Commission turns to an analysis of Cuban politics. This at once throws a powerful light upon their prime concern: the extent to which the rule of law prevails in contemporary Cuba. In March 1952, Fulgencio Batista organised a military *coup d'état* against the Government which had been elected in accordance with the terms of the Constitution of 1940. Batista had himself promulgated this Constitution as the elected President of the Republic. Upon seizing power, Batista altered the Constitution of 1940 so

that the President nominated the Cabinet, and the Cabinet in turn nominated the President. On July 26, 1953, Fidel Castro led an armed assault on the Moncada Barracks. At his trial he made a brilliant satirical attack upon Batista's alteration of the Constitution of 1940, and pledged himself to restore that constitution in every particular.

The evidence is very strong that from the day of his release from prison under the Amnesty Law of 1956, Castro's objective was personal power, not the restoration of the liberal democratic constitution. The Constitution of 1940 was only a talking-point for the purpose of uniting the anti-Batista forces. When in December 1957, for example, a delegate from the July 26th Movement subscribed to the programme of the Council of Cuban Liberation based upon the restoration of the Constitution of 1940, Castro repudiated him on the grounds that the "Council was fighting an imaginary revolution from comfortable quarters in the U.S. while the leaders of the July 26th Movement are fighting in Cuba a real revolution".

As soon as Batista fled Castro commenced, not the re-establishment of the Constitution of 1940, but its destruction. On January 5, 1959, the new President, Manuel Urrutia Lleo, proclaimed two amendments—innocent enough in themselves—prefaced by these ominous words:

"The Revolutionary Government, fulfilling its obligations to the people of Cuba, interpreting the people's will and feelings and faced by the urgent necessity to use the constituent power in order to provide force for legislation enabling the acts required of the Revolution to be performed, using the full powers placed in the Revolution, agrees to approve, sanction, and proclaim the following constitutional reform."

Eight days later, the irremovability of the judiciary, which Batista had respected and from which Castro had benefited, was suspended for thirty days. At the same time, the retroactivity of the criminal law was extended, the death penalty and the penalty of confiscation of property were introduced and provision made for new criminal legislation to cover past acts. On January 30, Articles 27, 29, 196, and 197 of the Constitution were suspended for ninety days. These articles guaranteed the right of habeas corpus, quick public trial, and competent freely chosen professional defence. A week later, Castro simply abandoned the Constitution of 1940 and promulgated a new Fundamental Law. At the centre of this Fundamental Law is the principle that the President appoints the Council of Ministers and the Council of Ministers the President. A second principle of "dictatorship" has been established, *i.e.*, that the Council of Ministers is executive and legislature rolled into one with auxiliary powers to control the judiciary, the armed forces, the civil service, the trade unions, the economy generally, the universities, the schools, and, in fact, every aspect of life. The Fundamental Law is an instance of centralised decision-making gone mad.

The detailed examination of the consequences of this constitutional structure in the lives of the Cuban people makes grisly reading. One young man received fifteen years' for laughing not at Castro but at some children setting off fireworks. The fate of educated people employed in government service, in the universities, and in the professions has been appalling. There seems to be no correlation between death, ill-treatment, or long prison sentences and political outlook, or class, or sex or even alleged offences. In the matter of

terror, Castro appears to be quite impartial. Castro having thoroughly disorganised Cuban society, it will be interesting to see whether Soviet advisers and technicians and trading arrangements will be able to convert Cuba into anything better than a wasting political asset.

Senator Benton's book is an account of a trip he and Adlai Stevenson made through the Latin American states. It is a naïve and charming book which reveals as much about American politicians as it tells of Latin America. But it is also an important book because it is a serious but popular attempt to enlighten the American public and to encourage them to stop judging policy by catch-words like "free enterprise" or believing that a government that does not levy an income tax must be a good government. Senator Benton is particularly acute on education. With few exceptions, the Universities of Latin America are a disgrace, and until they become centres of serious teaching and research, the Latin American states will continue trying to lift themselves, if not by their bootstraps, at least by their slogans.

The least said about Mr. Berle's book the better. He thinks the United States can do without Latin America, but Latin America cannot do without the United States. Surely Castro has demonstrated otherwise. What does Mr. Berle want? A few more Cabas perhaps. In addition to being silly, the book is badly written.

H. S. FERNS.

AFRICAN ONE-PARTY STATES. Edited by GWENDOLEN M. CARTER. [*Cornell University Press*. xii and 401 pp. 58s.]

AFRICA IN WORLD POLITICS. By VERNON MCKAY. [*Harper & Row*. xii and 468 pp. 52s.]

THE first of these books contains essays on six African states which have in common recent independence and single-party government. Four are Franco-phone—Tunisia, Senegal, Guinea, and the Ivory Coast; four are neighbours, the three last-named and Liberia; the sixth, Tanganyika, is the only Commonwealth member, and had not formally announced its adherence to the one-party system at the time when the book was written. The treatment of the different countries follows the same rather curious form: the history of the territory is taken up to the moment of independence, then a section is inserted on geography and natural resources, and then the narrative is resumed. Each writer has his own idea about the amount of past history that is relevant—or is it only that there is more recorded history north of the Sahara than south of it? One does wonder whether the "long and distinguished" list of Christian martyrs in Tunisia has much bearing on Bourguiba's political philosophy.

The writers are concerned with the general policy of the six states, and give considerable attention to the various conceptions of wider union that have been current since they attained independence. Ernest Milcent makes some pregnant remarks about the impossibility of maintaining a federation with no supreme government, which are pertinent to other questions than the break-up of Mali.

In pursuing the theme suggested by the title of the book, the various authors consider how far, or whether, the different single parties are in fact

totalitarian; what scope there is for discussion within the party and whether civil liberties can be protected even where organised opposition is not allowed. They give, where these are available, the recorded views of the different party leaders on the reasons why single-party government is the most appropriate in their present circumstances; as far as Tanganyika is concerned, Julius Nyerere unfortunately has only now produced his most substantial contribution to this discussion.

It is depressing to see how many clichés have become axioms in the few years since Ghana headed the independence procession. Free discussion until the decision is made, then no criticism; this, which one has read of as a Soviet principle, is repeatedly said to be a part of "African tradition"; nobody stops to reflect that the typical decisions made in pre-colonial Africa were not concerned with matters of general principle but with *ad hoc* questions of appointment to office or disputed claims, and that in fact sections which did not get their way quite often retorted by asserting their autonomy.

Then there is the cliché about "tribalism", which appears to mean any way of recognising the authority of a chief. All these writers seem to think that this, and this alone, accounts for local particularism among populations of illiterate peasants divided by language from their neighbours. They might find it illuminating to read why it proved impossible in the nineteenth century to form a confederation of the four white-dominated political units in South Africa.

Dr. Gwen Carter in her introduction suggests that further advance in this subject must wait for more refined techniques. Surely we could get some way by asking some different questions, particularly what are the circumstances in which governments are obliged to tolerate opposition, and what the circumstances in which citizens seek to organise it. Mr. J. P. Mackintosh has already given some reasons why African citizens, even without being coerced, prefer to support the party that is obviously going to be the government.

Vernon McKay's book, discussing the emergence of Africa as an autonomous factor in world politics, breaks new ground. Its four sections deal with the relations of African states with the UN, among themselves and with Europe, with India and the Soviet Union; and the African policy of the United States. Dare one murmur that there is something a little "colonialist" in the treatment of this last topic? In the rest of the book we learn what line the African states have taken in different aspects of their external relations; in this part there is not very much about what Africans think of America. But perhaps this is appropriate in the culminating section of a guide to aspirants for the United States foreign service, and for the ex-colonialists it is most instructive to learn about the evolution of American policy. Professor McKay describes in detail the State Department organisation for dealing with Africa. This includes not only the Bureau for African Affairs, which was only created in 1958, largely thanks to the tireless efforts of Congressman Frances Bolton, but the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Bureau of International Organisation Affairs, which briefs American delegations to the United Nations, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Agency for International Development, and the United States Information Agency.

Professor McKay shows how important the United Nations has been as a sounding-board for African claims and aspirations, and analyses the different

groupings that have been formed in relation to different issues. His section on Soviet influence in Africa is refreshingly well balanced. It is interesting to note how early some leading African figures repudiated their adherence to communism—though equally interesting, in reading Sekou Touré's speeches in *African One-Party States*, to see how much of its vocabulary he retains.

In examining the obstacles to Pan-African union Professor McKay surely makes the legacy of colonialism bulk unduly large. "Artificial barriers" is another of the depressing clichés; it is used here as if it implied that African units larger than the present ex-colonial states had been broken up by the European Powers. Certainly the fact that a number of different European languages are spoken is an obstacle to Pan-African communication, but how much communication would there be without any European languages? Would there be no economic rivalries—if it comes to that, could there have been economic policies deserving the name—without the colonial era? When Professor McKay allows, almost on his last page, that colonialism was "the galvanising force which awakened Africans to their opportunities", it is reasonable to ask who created the opportunities.

LUCY MAIR.

SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AFRICAN SOCIETY. By P. H. GULLIVER. [*Routledge & Kegan Paul*. xiv and 306 pp. 35s.]

THIS book is the first to describe from direct observation the operation of an African society where political functions are distributed through the adult male population on the basis of age. The 63,000 Arusha, living at a density of 1,000 to the square mile, are unified by the fact that the formal entry of batches of men into social adulthood with its military duties, and their later formal passage from warriorhood to elderhood, are marked by ceremonies in which the whole tribe participate. The significant unit in everyday life is the "parish", a local group with a population of under 5,000. Each parish has its own assembly in which the junior division of the elders play the dominant part. Decisions are taken by this body as a whole, no individual having even the authority of a chairman (until colonial rulers designated such a person), but there are always some "notables" whose personality gives them special influence.

Another source of influence comes from special status in the agnatic lineages into which the Arusha are divided. Each lineage has a "counsellor" formally chosen and installed, not the senior member, but one who is mature and still physically active, of the same "junior elder" status as the members of the parish assemblies. There are about a hundred of these. Their function is to mediate in disputes within the lineage and to witness and remember important transactions of its members. But they may also be called in as neutrals to help in the settlement of disputes in other lineages than their own.

To this egalitarian system, in which no office carrying a right to command exists, a system of local administration was added under colonial rule. The Germans divided the Arusha into two chiefdoms, and these were maintained under the British administration until 1948, when they were combined under one chief chosen by a newly created tribal council. Under him were twenty-eight headmen selected by the parish assemblies. As has been observed so

often, the chief, who was fairly closely supervised by the District Commissioner, sought to implement government policy and was popularly thought of as the tool of the central government, while the headmen, to whom their standing in the community mattered more, avoided responsibility as far as they could.

Dr. Gulliver shows how an individual with a claim may choose the way of dealing with it that seems likely to be the most advantageous—appeal to the headman, to the parish assembly, to a lineage "moot", or to a government-appointed magistrate. These last are educated Arusha, who are not required to have any technical qualification beyond literacy. They do not, as their creators would, see their courts as a superior institution destined to replace the traditional modes of settlement, and they often refer disputants to these, or hear them privately out of court, where the procedure of bargaining and compromise can be followed.

The working of this political system, with its mixture of old and new, is described in admirable detail. One's only regret is that such a densely packed book is not more fully indexed.

LUCY MAIR.

THE RISE OF DEMOCRACY IN PRE-REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA. Political and Social Institutions Under the Last Three Czars. By JACOB WALKIN. [*Thames and Hudson*. viii and 320 pp. 42s.]

IT is only in very recent years that the history of the Russian revolutions and of the rise of the Soviet state has become emancipated from the aura of mythology with which its first historians surrounded it. Under the influence of the image projected by Soviet historians, Lenin's revolution has been portrayed as a violent but quite inevitable reaction against the police state for which destruction was the only cure. Alternatively, it has been seen through the eyes of Marxist theory as the pure product of a novel view of society, desirable or regrettable according to one's point of view, but at all events little subject to the ordinary rules of political experience and calling for analysis of an entirely new order. It was not to be expected, once the first emotional impact was spent, that this somewhat primitive view should survive unchallenged. And, to be sure, of late there has been a healthier trend towards an attempt to see the revolutions of 1917 as a stage in a long period of historical development, not necessarily either final or unique, and closely related to the particular society in which they occurred. But much of the study of society and institutions in post-reform Russia, from 1861 until 1917—the period covered by this book—is only available to those who can read Russian. There are, it is true, some excellent general histories of modern Russia available to the English reader, and there is the late Professor Leontowitsch's masterly history of liberalism in Russia available to those who know German, but most regrettably not yet available in an English translation (Mr. Walkin is apparently unfamiliar with this work—which is the one serious gap in his sources). Those, therefore, who wish to pursue a serious study of the Soviet régime, without a knowledge of Russian, are heavily indebted to Mr. Walkin. He has filled a real gap in the literature, and he has done it with a balance, scholarship, and lucidity which make his book a pleasure to read.

His broad theme is the study of society and institutions in pre-revolutionary Russia after Alexander II had initiated his great era of reforms with the emancipation of the serfs in 1861. Mr. Walkin provides a wealth of well-documented detail for the specialist student of Russian government. But he also raises a number of vital and important questions for those whose interest lies more broadly in the general field of the nature of autocratic and totalitarian government. I will select only three of these broader issues by way of illustration. First, it is frequently asserted that what has happened since 1917 in Russia is that one autocratic government almost inevitably replaced another autocratic government in a country which for centuries had known nothing else. Although there is an element of obvious truth in this, it is far from the whole truth. For a great gulf separates the constitutional régime of post-1906 Russia from the Soviet régime. Constitutional Russia was, of course, subject to a large measure of administrative interference, but it was also far removed from the "pseudo-constitutionalism" which Max Weber denounced. The limited free institutions of pre-revolutionary Russia were real, however much hampered and restricted—the local government bodies, the voluntary associations, the co-operatives, even the Duma in many respects. Their very existence within an autocracy spelt the eventual doom of that autocracy. The bolsheviks never made that mistake. They really did create, and have succeeded so far in maintaining, a system in which *all* institutions are controlled, manipulated, and fake. Hence the great strength of the régime.

Secondly, why did democratic development ultimately fail in Russia? Mr. Walkin's analysis offers many explanations, but one is of paramount importance: the failure of "state" and "society" to coalesce. To the very end the liberal elements in society remained hostile to and alienated from the state, with which they could never bring themselves for long to co-operate. No doubt the problem whether this was more the fault of the liberals or of the emperor and his ministers will be debated by historians for generations. Lastly, why did the old régime collapse, suddenly, almost by its own inertia, with little more directed activity by the revolutionaries than some skilful manipulation of the army and of the crowds? Here, perhaps, is the key question, of great relevance to our times. I think the answer in simplified form is that the last emperor was neither one thing nor the other—neither an Alexander II nor a Stalin. He was at heart opposed to the limitations on his traditional autocracy which he had been reluctantly compelled to concede. He was therefore unwilling to allow the adaptation of an outmoded and inefficient government to the conditions of a society in which industrialisation and modernisation were making considerable strides. Yet, for the alternative to adaptation—ruthless, terroristic, totalitarian suppression of all criticism and opposition—he had neither the stomach nor, be it said in fairness, the amorality of a Stalin. It looks very much as if one or other of these alternatives—adaptation or Stalinism—is in similar circumstances unavoidable. Something of the nature of this choice of alternatives seems to lie before Mr. Khrushchev today.

LEONARD SCHAPIRO.

ISLAM AND THE WEST. By P. K. HITT. [*Anvil* No. 63. 192 pp. 12s.]

WORLD COMMUNISM. By S. HOOK. [*Anvil* No. 62. 192 pp. 12s.]

THE IDEA OF RACIALISM. By L. L. SNYDER. [*Anvil* No. 66. 192 pp. 12s.]

IDEAS IN CONFLICT. THE POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD. By E. M. BURNS. [*Methuen*. xiv and 587 pp. Index. 30s.]

THREE of these books are Anvil Paperbacks, an admirable series of short histories or studies of the social sciences. They devote half their space to important documents or illustrations of points made in the text, and preface them by a long but clear historical commentary. They are welcome not only for their brevity and clarity but because they make available extracts from source-materials that are often imaginatively chosen and by no means conventional. Designed for the American market, they have hit on a splendid formula: they reverse the trend in the United States to textbooks of awesome size and weight; they make available a range of extracts for quick reading; they are cheap; and they are the work of editor-writers who are not afraid in their long introductory essays to look at their subjects with freshness, and to offer an overall view. In the hands of intelligent students they will be useful; benzedrine and an Anvil paperback will soon become the University diet from Easter onwards.

All three of these titles are valuable. An historian finds himself most at home with Professor Hitti, doyen of American historians of the Near East. His selection of extracts is exciting, from the Surahs of the Koran to a ninth-century Syrian Chronicle, from fables to poetry, from the first scientific description of smallpox (written by Al-Razi in the tenth century) to the accounts of a barbarous West as it appears in eleventh- and twelfth-century Arabic writing. Professor Hitti's essay is imaginatively done: Islam is described partly as religion, partly as state, partly as culture; and the contact of Islam and Christianity is presented in terms of "The East Goes West"—the advance of Islam in the seventh to tenth centuries—and of "The West Goes East", from the crusades to the mandates. This is an admirable, lucid, and straightforward study.


Sidney Hook's study of communism is more difficult, more adventurous, and less successful. He knits the extracts very tightly into the text, and tells his story well by quotations from appropriate parts of the testament. The material on American communism is presented with particular vigour. But his vividness is too often achieved by a sacrifice of objectivity; his introductions too often become scornful, even hostile. To end with an emphasis on espionage is to play to an American gallery. He gives less than two pages to Khrushchev in a book of 255 pages and he uses them only to show that between 1937 and 1961 Khrushchev changed his views of Stalin. He introduces this section by a laconic entry—"The following quotations present in brief but striking form the essence of a political biography. Further comment is unnecessary." There is much more to Khrushchev than this in a study entitled *World Communism*. Of course Khrushchev changed his views on Stalin. But in twenty-four years, one recalls, so did Professor Hook.

BOOK REVIEWS

Louis Snyder's study of *Racialism* is gloomy reading. It is hard to believe that the ideas discussed here have been so widely held in this supposedly enlightened century. It is no bad discipline to be reminded of the extent to which early anthropologists pinned their faith to the notion of a cephalic index and held it to be a guide to something-or-other. Professor Snyder is, of course, enlightened; but it is perhaps a danger in this series that by selecting the right or the wrong extract an editor can establish a trend and docket a name into a category a shade too smoothly. It seems hardly fair to A. J. Balfour, for instance, to see him as proudly Anglo-Saxon when he was so much more, and patently unfair to Theodore Roosevelt to present him as a critic of Houston Stewart Chamberlain when he was in fact much more an admirer and disciple. One lays the book down with a despairing thought: why did quite so many Anglo-Saxons and especially so many Germans think this way? The question remains unanswered, despite the range and excellence of the quotations.

Whatever these caveats, the Anvil handbooks are useful. Professor Burns of Rutgers in his *Ideas in Conflict* has compiled a handbook of twentieth-century political thought to outdo all handbooks, described by its publishers as "a book of vital interest." He reduces the writings of the last sixty years to four groups: liberal and democratic theories; collectivism; conservatism; and world conflict and world order. The categories are broad enough to serve, but not every victim is made for easy branding. One meets Laski, properly, as a pluralist, in company with Gierke, Maitland, and J. N. Figgis; a little later he appears, equally properly, in the section "Collectivism". The formula is all a little too easy, too contrived. Does a political theorist think quite so logically, following his school? To summarise each thinker's main thoughts in two pages, however concisely it may be done, is to do small service to political ideas: Laski, one notes, does better than Shaw; Sartre does almost as well; Oakeshott does best of all—he is not here: presumably incapable of being reduced to the ruthlessness of two pages—or to clarity at all? All the rest seem to be here, tightly rationed: Santayana and Toynbee, Hitler and Haushofer, Eliot and *élitism*, Keynes and Kierkegaard. We proceed from Mahan and T. Roosevelt to Nasser and Nkrumah in sixteen pages. Professor Burns concludes at page 543—not perhaps unnaturally—with a section entitled "The Challenge to Political Theory": the challenge of thinkers who are critical of political thought. Among them is a Professor Oppenheimer of Stanford whose interest "is not primarily in developing new theories but in devising criteria for testing the validity of theories already formulated. He considers it extremely important that political theories should not be assumed to have equal value . . .". Only those capable of meeting rigorous mathematical tests should, it seems, be taken seriously. The last name listed is Norbert Wiener. No doubt some enterprising graduate is already engaged on Laski by computer or the cybernetics of Fascism. In such safe mathematical objectivity we come to harbour. But on the voyage we have met a host of Nealets and each of them has been without his Prince of Denmark. Objective yes. Vital, no.

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