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
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
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VOL. XXVI, PARTS 1-2, MAY 1962

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THE ADYAR LIBRARY BULLETIN

Vol. XXVI, parts 1-2

1962

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P. R. SRINIVASAN

INSCRIPTIONAL EVIDENCE ON EARLY HINDU TEMPLES

A.D. 300 TO 600 *

DURING the period A.D. 300 to 600, throughout India, there was a great cultural renaissance. People were engaged in cultural activities of a highly refined order. Buddhism was gradually losing its hold on the people and Hinduism began to dominate their life. Efforts were made to incorporate into Hinduism the salient features of popular cults and creeds. The Hindu Purāṇa-s began to be popularized widely, wherein emphasis was laid on the supremacy of either Viṣṇu or Śiva according to the context. So, the two sects of Hinduism, the Vaiṣṇavite and the Śaivite, began to take a definite shape during this period, which in the subsequent periods got standardized. Brahmā was not altogether relegated to a subordinate position at this time. As a consequence, temples to the two supreme deities, Viṣṇu and Śiva, as also to a few other deities of the Hindu pantheon, associated with one or the other of these two gods, were erected all over India during this period. Sometimes temples to all the three principal gods of Hinduism, namely Brahmā, Viṣṇu

* This is a continuation of the author's paper on the same subject, dealing with the period up to A.D. 300, which was printed in the Silver Jubilee volume of *The Adyar Library Bulletin*, 1961.

and Śiva, were built together. Here we shall examine some of the inscriptions of this period which have a definite bearing upon this matter.

NORTH INDIA: During most of the period, the Gupta dynasty was supreme in North India. So, it is from the numerous inscriptions of this dynasty that information relating to this subject has to be culled.

An early record of Samudragupta's (circa A.D. 330-76) time from Ēraṇ, which is unfortunately badly damaged, mentions 'the erection, at the city of Airikīṇa, i.e. Ēraṇ, of something or other of which the stone was either a portion or the separate record. The lacunae here leave us without any clue as to what was erected, and in connection with what form of religion. But, judging from its shape and appearance, the stone is part of a temple. And General Cunningham has suggested that, if it was attached to any of the existing ruins, it belonged most probably to the temple with a colossal figure of Viṣṇu, immediately on the north of the temple of the Boar.'¹ From the context it is easy to say that the inscription when intact might have referred to the construction of this Viṣṇu temple. This shows that even from the beginning of this period the older tradition of the worship of Saṃkarṣaṇa, Vāsudeva, etc., had given way to that of the worship of

¹ J. F. Fleet, *Inscriptions of the Early Gupta Kings and Their Successors* (*Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum*, vol. III), Calcutta 1888, pp. 19-20. For the figure of Viṣṇu see Cunningham's Report, *Archaeological Survey of India*, vol. X, pl. XXVI B.

Viṣṇu himself or his important *avatāra*-s. The plan of the temple where the above-mentioned Viṣṇu image might have been installed, given on plate XXV B in vol. X of Cunningham's Report, shows a long *garbhagṛha* having a portico with two pillars in front. On each of the three sides of the wall of the sanctum is a small projection obviously indicating the niche in it, intended for a sculptured panel, as in the case of the Daśāvatāra temple of Deogarh.

In the Udayagiri hill, near Bhilsā in the former Gwalior State, there are some rock-cut caves, two of which contain inscriptions¹ of the time of Candragupta II, datable to A.D. 401. One of the caves is a Vaiṣṇava one and the inscription mentions the dedication of it by a Mahārāja [Sodha]la,² son of Viṣṇudāsa of the Sanakānika tribe or family, a feudatory of Candragupta II. The other inscription is Śaiva in character and its object is to record the excavation of the cave where it occurs as a temple of the god Śiva under the name of Śambhu. This was done under the order of one Virasena, a minister of Candragupta II.

The Tuṣām rock inscription dated to the beginning of the fifth century A.D. is interesting as it records 'the making, by an *Ācārya* named Somatrāta, of two reservoirs and a house, for the use of the god Viṣṇu under the name of Bhagavat or the Divine one'.³

¹ J. F. Fleet, op. cit., pp. 25, 35.

² D. C. Sircar, *Select Inscriptions*, University of Calcutta, 1942, vol. I, p. 271, n. 7.

³ J. F. Fleet, op. cit., p. 270.

The inscription on a stone pillar at Bilsaṇḍ (or Bilsaḍ) in Etāh District of Uttar Pradesh belonging to the time of Kumāragupta I (*circa* A.D. 414-55), dated A.D. 415-6 is interesting because 'it belongs to the Śaiva form of worship; and the object of it is to record the accomplishment by a certain Dhruvaśarman, at a temple of the god Kārttikeya under the name of Svāmi Mahāsenā, of certain works'.¹ That there was a shrine of Skanda or Kārttikeya and the divine mothers at Bihār, Patnā District, during the time of Skandagupta (*circa* A.D. 455-67) is known from a stone pillar inscription found in the place.² Unfortunately, however, owing to the great damage the inscription has suffered, the real nature of the context where the deity is mentioned is impossible to know. The Kosam stone image inscription³ datable to A.D. 458-9 of Mahārāja Bhimavarman, a feudatory of Skandagupta, is interesting because it occurs on the pedestal of a sculptured standing group of Śiva and Pārvatī, probably recording the gift or installation of the image and if so the antiquity of the worship of the Umā-sahita form of Śiva is known from this.

Two other inscriptions belonging to the reign of the same king, Skandagupta, one from Bhitari, near Sayyidpur, Ghāzipur District, Uttar Pradesh, and the other from Junāgadh in the former Junāgadh State in Kāthiāwār, furnish valuable information about

¹ J. F. Fleet, op. cit., p. 43.

² *ibid.*, p. 47.

³ *ibid.*, p. 266.

Viṣṇu temples. The former, from the eastern part of North India, records 'the installation of an image of the god Viṣṇu, under the name of Śārṅgin or "the wielder of the bow of horn named Śārṅga"';¹ while the latter, from the western part of North India, dated in Gupta years 136 and 138 (455, 456 and 457-58²) mentions the fact that 'Cakrapālita caused to be built a temple of the god Viṣṇu under the name of Cakrabhṛt or the "bearer of the discus"'.³ It is not possible to know about the shape, etc., of these temples where the above-mentioned images of Viṣṇu were installed. But the inscriptions mentioning these aspects of Viṣṇu are significant, because we know from them that the practice of building temples to these aspects of Viṣṇu dates from at least this period. There are two temples at Kumbhakoṇam in Madras State, one dedicated to Viṣṇu as Śārṅgapāṇi and the other dedicated to Cakrapāṇi (i.e. Cakrabhṛt), both used for worship now and both of some antiquity. The existence of these temples at Kumbhakoṇam reminds one of the remarkable continuity of the Bhāgavata traditions in India.⁴

At Mandasor (ancient Daśapura) in the former Gwalior State in Central India, a temple to the

¹ J. F. Fleet, op. cit., p. 53.

² D. C. Sircar, op. cit., p. 299.

³ J. F. Fleet, op. cit., p. 58.

⁴ The cave temple referred to in the fourth century A.D. inscription in the Susuniyā hill, near Bāṅkurā, Bāṅkurā District, Bengal, was the *kṛtī* of Candravarman and was probably dedicated to Viṣṇu as Cakrasvāmin (*vide* D. C. Sircar, op. cit., p. 342, n. 2).

Sun-God was built by the silk-weavers of the city in A.D. 436 when Bandhuvarman was governing the city during the period of Kumāragupta I.¹ The temple is described as unequalled (*atulaṃ bhavanam*) and as possessing broad and lofty spires (*vistīrṇa-tuṅga-sikharam*).

The copper-plate inscription from Indor, near Dabhāi, Bulandshahar District, Uttar Pradesh, belonging to the time of Skandagupta, dated A.D. 466 is interesting as it records 'a perpetual endowment, by a Brāhmaṇa named Devaviṣṇu, for the purpose of maintaining a lamp in a temple of the Sun at Indrapura or Indrāpura, i.e. the modern Indor'.² That is, this inscription shows that in the middle of the fifth century A.D. there was a temple to Savitr or Sūrya. Besides, we also know from this inscription the fact that from such an early period there was the practice of donating a perpetual lamp (*nandāvilakku* in Tamil) to a temple and that here the donor was a Brāhmaṇa named Devaviṣṇu who gave the gift for the increase of his own fame (*Devaviṣṇur . . . Indrapur-ādhiṣṭhāna-mādāsyāta-lagnam-eva pratiṣṭhāpitaka-bhagavate savitre dip-opayojyam-ātma-yaśo-bhivṛddhaye mūlyam prayacchati* II).

The interesting information of the installation of an image of the god Viṣṇu as Anantasvāmin and a grant of land at a village belonging to the same god under the name of Citrakūṭasvāmin is known from the Gadhwā stone inscription³ dated A.D. 467-8 of the

¹ J. F. Fleet, op. cit., p. 80.

² *ibid.*, p. 70.

³ *ibid.*, p. 268.

time of Skandagupta. It must be stated here that the association of the reclining form of Viṣṇu as suggested by the term Anantasvāmin with Citrakūṭa is significant because we have it today at Cidambaram, where of the two shrines to Śiva and Viṣṇu, the latter with the Viṣṇu reclining on Ananta, is called Citrakūṭa. This name has been known from the seventh and eighth centuries A.D. as it is mentioned in the hymns of the Śaiva saints of the seventh century and in the hymns of Tirumaṅgai Ālvār, the famous Vaiṣṇava saint.

The inscription from Gaṅgdhār in the former Jhālāwār State in Central India, belonging to the time of Viśvavarman, a contemporary of Kumāragupta I, dated A.D. 423, tells us about the building of a temple of Viṣṇu as well as a temple to the divine Mothers by a minister of Viśvavarman called Mayūrākṣa.¹ The description of these temples contained in this inscription is worth quoting: ' . . . caused to be built by his sons, the favourites of great good fortune, this shrine of the divine (god) Viṣṇu, which blocks up the path of sin—seeing the aspect of which, resembling the lofty peak of (the mountain) Kailāsa, the Vidyādhara-s, accompanied by their mistresses, come and gaze into it with happy faces . . . '

'Also, for the sake of religious merit, the counsellor of the king caused to be built this very terrible abode . . . (and) filled full of female ghouls, of the divine Mothers. . . .'²

¹ J. F. Fleet, op. cit., p. 74.

² *ibid.*, p. 78.

The inscription dated A.D. 484 from Ēraṇ in the Sāgar District in Central India belonging to the time of Budhagupta, mentions the erection of the column which is called a *dhvajastambha* of the god Viṣṇu, under the name of Janārdana.¹ It is very interesting to note that temples to this aspect of Viṣṇu were erected then and that as in the earlier periods, temples had *dhvajastambha*-s.

The copper-plate inscription from Dāmodarpur in the Dinājpur District of Bengal belonging to the time of Budhagupta (*circa* A.D. 476 to 494-5)² records the gift of land for the building of a temple (*devakula*) to each of the two deities, namely, Śiva as Kokāmukhasvāmin and Viṣṇu as Śvetavarāhasvāmin. Each of them possessed a *kōṣṭhikā* (probably a surrounding wall) also. This inscription is of interest because it refers to a special form of Śiva and also to the special Śvetavarāha form of Viṣṇu. Probably this is the first and the last instance where a temple to this form of Śiva is mentioned. The Śvetavarāha form of Viṣṇu obviously denotes the presiding deity of the present *kalpa* which is called Śvetavarāhakalpa, and the building of a temple to this form of Viṣṇu at such an early period is noteworthy. It may be mentioned here that the practice of building temples to the Varāha form of Viṣṇu was in vogue in the Deccan and South India also, for some centuries after the fifth century A.D. But in these cases,

¹ J. F. Fleet, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

² D. C. Sircar, *op. cit.*, pp. 328-9.

the deity does not seem to have been called by the significant name of Śvetavarāha.

The Viṣṇu temple of Deogarh called the Daśāvatāra temple dated about A.D. 500 is an excellent specimen of the architecture of the Gupta period, where stone is employed for construction and scenes from the Purāṇa-s and epics carved on stone slabs are introduced as decorative elements.¹

The other Dāmodarpur copper-plate inscription dated A.D. 543 which can be attributed to the time of Upagupta² refers to a gift to this temple for 'making repairs of whatever is broken or torn as well as for such other items as *balī*, *caru* and *satra*'.³ This clearly shows that the temple continued to be in use after its construction, in spite of the fact that it was in a forest.⁴

A temple dedicated to Viṣṇu as Govindasvāmin is referred to in the copper-plate inscription dated A.D. 448 from Baigrām, Bogra District of Bengal. Presumably the image in the temple represented this aspect of Viṣṇu, which is one of the twenty-four chief forms of the god. Images in almost all these forms were made for worship in the subsequent periods especially in the eastern part of North India.

The copper-plate inscription dated A.D. 496 from Khoh in the former Nāgaudh State in Central India

¹ M. S. Vats, *The Gupta Temple at Deogarh*, *Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India*, No. 70.

² D. C. Sircar, *op. cit.*, p. 337, n. 4.

³ *ibid.*, p. 338, n. 6.

⁴ *ibid.*, p. 338, line 8 of text.

records 'a grant by the Mahārāja Jayanātha, to some Brāhman, of the village of Dhavaṣaṇḍikā, for the purposes of a temple of the god Viṣṇu, under the name of Bhagavat or the Divine one, established by them there'.¹ In the same place there seems to have existed a temple to Bhagavatī Piṣṭapurikā-devī for the maintenance of which one half of the village of Dhavaṣaṇḍikā was granted by the Mahārāja Śarvanātha,² who is known to have been ruling in A.D. 513 from another copper-plate inscription.³ It is interesting to note that a temple to Viṣṇu called simply Bhagavat and a temple to goddess Bhagavatī Piṣṭapurikā-devī, existed in the village. The occurrence of the names Bhagavat and Bhagavatī is noteworthy and they obviously denote Viṣṇu and Durgā. In the present case Durgā was called Piṣṭapurikā-devī. In fact in South India, especially in Kerala, Bhagavatī invariably means Durgā.⁴ Another copper-plate inscription dated A.D. 529 from the above-mentioned village of Khoh, informs us about a temple of the goddess Piṣṭapurī (probably short for Piṣṭapurikā-devī) at a village called Opāṇi and about the grant made to it by the Mahārāja

¹ J. F. Fleet, op. cit., p. 121.

² *ibid.*, p. 130.

³ D. C. Sircar, op. cit., p. 370.

⁴ J. F. Fleet (op. cit., p. 113 and n. 2) on the other hand thought that the goddess represented 'a local form of Lakṣmī, the wife of Viṣṇu,' which is not correct. D. C. Sircar, however, was nearer the correct identification when he said that the goddess was possibly identical with Annapūrṇā (op. cit., p. 375, n. 9) who is another form of Pārvatī.

Samkṣobha of the Parivrājaka family.¹ Another copper-plate inscription from Khoh,² dated A.D. 533-4, belonging to the time of Śarvanātha, mentioned above, records the transfer of two villages for the purposes of a temple to the same goddess at the town of Mānapura, which was caused to be built by him there. These records show that from about the end of the fifth century A.D. temples to Durgā under some local names were built in North India, side by side with temples to Viṣṇu.

That during the time of the Mahārāja Śarvanātha of the Uccakalpa family there were temples to Viṣṇu called merely Bhagavat and Āditya (the Sun) at a village called Āśramaka is known from the copper-plate inscription dated A.D. 513 from Khoh in the former Nāgaudh State in Central India (Fleet, op. cit., p. 126). At Ēraṇ in the Sāgar District of the former Central Provinces is an inscription engraved 'on the chest of a colossal red-sandstone statue of a Boar, about eleven feet high, representing the god Viṣṇu in his incarnation as such, that stands, facing east, in the portico of a ruined temple at the south end of the well-known group of temples about half a mile to the west of the village'.³ It refers to the reign of Toramāṇa (*circa* A.D. 500-15) and its object is 'to record the building of the temple, in which the Boar stands, by Dhanyaviṣṇu, the younger brother of the deceased

¹ J. F. Fleet, op. cit., p. 113.

² *ibid.*, p. 135.

³ *ibid.*, p. 158.

Mahārāja Mātṛviṣṇu'.¹ The interest of this inscription lies in the fact that the *mūrti* in which it occurs is called simply Varāhamūrti, not qualified by such words as *śveta* and the image is theriomorphic rather than theri-anthropic as in several other instances. Moreover, the temple is called *Nārāyaṇa-śilāprāsāda* meaning 'the stone temple of Nārāyaṇa', not of Varāha. So, it is clear from this that even though the *mūrti* or the image installed in a temple may represent any one of the aspects of Nārāyaṇa or Viṣṇu, the temple was popularly called the Nārāyaṇa or Viṣṇu temple in those times, as it is today.

To a slightly later period belongs the stone inscription from Gwalior, dated in the fifteenth regnal year of Mihirakula (circa A.D. 515-35),² son of Toramāṇa, recording the building of an excellent stone temple of the sun (*śailamayam Bhānoḥ prāsāda-vara-mukhyam*) 'by a person named Mātṛceta, on the mountain called Gopa, i.e. the hill on which the fortress of Gwalior stands'.

Three inscriptions of king Anantavarman of the early Maukhari family assignable to 'the first half of the sixth century A.D. or perhaps a little earlier',³ one of them engraved in a cave in the Barābar hill and the rest in another cave in the Nāgārjunī hill in Gayā District of Bihār,⁴ furnish particulars regarding the

¹ J. F. Fleet, op. cit., p. 159.

² ibid., pp. 161-2.

³ *The Classical Age* (vol. III of *The History and Culture of the Indian People*, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay), p. 67.

⁴ J. F. Fleet, op. cit., Nos. 48-50.

installation of images of certain deities in the caves. The Barābar hill cave inscription mentions the fact that the king arranged for the installation of an image of Viṣṇu, in his incarnation of Kṛṣṇa.¹ This is very interesting in that it tells us that temples to Kṛṣṇa, not of the form of the deity belonging to the Vṛṣṇi group, were also known from earlier periods. The two inscriptions in the cave in the Nāgārjunī hill are Śaiva in character. One of them records the installation in the cave by the king, of an image of Śiva as Bhūtapaṭi and Pārvatī as Devī.² This image may also be a representation of the Uṃā-sahita form of Śiva similar to the one from Kosam mentioned above. The other inscription is valuable in that its object is to record the installation in the cave, by Anantavarman, of an image of the goddess Pārvatī as Kātyāyanī,³ a *raudra* aspect of her, also called Bhavānī. The image is said to have been placed in the cave (excavated) in the hill spoken of as (a part of) the Vindhya range. This, coupled with the fact that the inscription commences with an invocation to the goddess Mahiṣāsūramardinī, is highly suggestive of the fact that the Kātyāyanī

¹ J. F. Fleet, op. cit., p. 222.

² ibid., p. 224. Fleet suggests that the image was probably a representation of the Ardhanārīśvara form of Śiva which does not seem to be correct, as the expression in the text *vimāṇa bhūta-paṭer-guhāśritam-idaṃ devyāś-ca pāyāj-jagat* may be taken to refer to two images rather than an image of Śiva in his hermaphrodite form.

³ T. A. Gopinatha Rao, *Elements of Hindu Iconography*, vol. I, pt. II, pp. 347 ff., pls. CIII, CIV, CV.

aspect is identical with that called the Vindhyāvāsini or Mahiṣāsūramardini, and that the cult of Vindhyāvāsini began to be popular even from a still earlier period. It is also interesting to note that as in one or two instances mentioned above, here also the goddess is associated with the god Viṣṇu as Kṛṣṇa.

A temple to Kapāleśvara is mentioned in the copper-plate inscription from Nirmaṇḍ in the Kāngra District of the Panjab, dated about A.D. 612-3. The record says that on this date in the already existing Kapāleśvara temple was installed an image of Śiva as Tripurāntaka under the name of Mihireśvara, by Mihiralakṣmī, the mother of a Mahāsāmanta and Mahārāja Samudrasena.¹ It may be mentioned here in passing that there is a temple dedicated to Śiva as Kapālīśvara at Mylapore in Madras which, although its present structures are not very old, seems to have been in existence there at least from the seventh century A.D. as it is referred to in the hymns in Tamil called the *Tevāram* by the Śaiva Nāyanmār-s like Tirujñāna-sambandar, a contemporary of Pallava Narasiṃha-varman I (circa A.D. 630-68).

DECCAN: It is well known that in the western part of the Deccan, Buddhism was very prominent for centuries before and after the birth of Christ as testified to by the numerous rock-cut *caitya*-halls and *viḥāra*-s seen at such places as Bhājā, Nāsik, Bedsā, Koṇḍane, Kārle, Junnār, Kanheri, Ajantā and Ellora. Though

¹ J. F. Fleet, op. cit., pp. 287-8.

Brahmanism was also in vogue in this part, temples to Hindu deities do not seem to have been built till about the fourth century A.D.

One of the earliest Hindu temples in the Deccan seems to be the Bhairaveśvara temple at Chandravalli in the Chitaldrug district of the Mysore State. This is presumed from the mention made of the digging of a tank by the king in the inscription¹ engraved on a boulder at the entrance to the temple, belonging to the time of Kadamba Mayūraśarman who is assigned to about the middle of the fourth century A.D.² If this is accepted, then this temple would be one of the earliest Śiva temples of this part. As has been said above, in the Deccan and South India, Śaivism has been popular from time immemorial and the existence of this temple during the fourth century A.D. would only go to strengthen this belief. The inscription from Malavalli³ attributed to the same Kadamba king Mayūraśarman records a grant of land for the enjoyment of the god Maḷapaḷi-deva, probably the god Śiva called after the name of the place. That a temple to this god has been in existence at the place from an earlier period is known from the inscription, in continuation of which the above-mentioned record of Mayūraśarman is written, belonging to a king of Vaijayantī (Banavāsī) called Mānavyagotra Hāritūputra Viṇhukaḍḍa Cuṭukulānanda

¹ Annual Report of Mysore Archaeological Survey for 1929, p. 50.

² D. C. Sircar, *The Successors of the Śātavāhanas*, p. 233.

³ *Epigraphia Carnatica*, vol. VII, Sk. 264.

Sātakarṇi¹ of about the beginning of the fourth century A.D. To the time of Mayūrasarman's grandson Śāntivarman (*circa* A.D. 455-7) belongs the famous Tālagunda stone pillar inscription² which records 'the construction of a tank in the premises of a *siddhālaya* (temple) of Lord Bhava, (i.e. Śiva) by Kākusthavarman.'³ Interestingly the inscription also mentions the fact that the temple was formerly worshipped by Sātakarṇi (possibly a king of the Cuṭu family) and others. The Praṇaveśvara temple at Tālagunda, on the right jamb of the doorway of which is an inscription in box-headed characters⁴ mentioning a princess called Lakṣmī of the Kadamba family, might have been another ancient Śiva temple of the place. The existence of a temple of Mahādeva during the time of Kadamba Ravivarman (about the end of the fifth century A.D.) is known from his Sirsī grant.⁵

A copper-plate inscription from Bennūr⁶ belonging to the time of Kadamba Kṛṣṇavarman II states that the king was standing in front of the god Mahādeva in the great temple of the village called Inṅuṇa, while making a grant of land, etc. This inscription is dated about the sixth century A.D. From the above-mentioned

¹ D. C. Sircar, op. cit., pp. 249-50.

² *Epigraphia Indica*, vol. VIII, pp. 31 ff.

³ D. C. Sircar, op. cit., p. 257.

⁴ Annual Report of Mysore Archaeological Survey for 1911, pp. 33, 35.

⁵ *Epigraphia Indica*, vol. XVI, p. 264.

⁶ *Epigraphia Carnatica*, vol. V, p. 594.

records it is seen that during this early period, in the western Deccan, Śaivism was predominant.

The record engraved in cave No. III at Bādāmi (ancient Vātāpi), the capital of the Bādāmi Cālukya-s, containing the date of Śaka 500 (i.e. A.D. 578) and belonging to the twelfth year of Kirtivarman I¹ is very interesting. It records the excavation by Maṅgaliśa, the brother of Kirtivarman, of the cave temple dedicated to Mahāviṣṇu, of extraordinary workmanship and possessing a ground floor, upper floor, etc. (*layano(naṃ) mahāviṣṇugrhamatidaivamamānasyakam-
atyadbhutakarmaviracitaṃ bhūmibhāgopabhāgopariṇyānt-
ātiśayadarśanīyatamaṃ kṛtvā*) and installation in it of an image of the extraordinarily brilliant god Viṣṇu (*bhagavataḥ pralayoditārkkamaṇḍalākārakrakṣapitāmarāri-
pakṣasya viṣṇoḥ pratimāpratiṣṭhāpanābhīyudaya*). Besides this image, on the walls of the cave are carved a number of bas-reliefs representing various aspects of Viṣṇu such as Vaikuṇṭhanātha, Trivikrama and Narasimha,² which shows that the conception of this cave was similar to that of the Daśavatāra temple of Deogarh.

Thus in the Deccan too, temples to the two deities, namely Śiva and Viṣṇu, came to be built during this period, a fact which clearly shows the influence that the Purāṇa-s exerted on the people.

¹ *Indian Antiquary*, vols. III, VI, X and IX.

² R. D. Banerji, *Bas-reliefs of Bādāmi*, Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India, No. 25.

SOUTH INDIA: Though the successors of the Ikṣvāku-s, namely the Bṛhatphalāyana-s and the kings of the Ānanda-gotra, who were powerful in the Kṛṣṇā region during the fourth century A.D., were professed Hindus, no temples of Hindu deities belonging to their times have been known so far. But it is of interest to note that the kings of the Ānanda-gotra were Śaiva-s as is known from the following passage in the Gorantla inscription:¹ *bhagavato vakeśvarādhi-vāsinaś-tribhuvana-kartuḥ Śambhoś-caraṇa-kamala-rajah-pavitrikṛte*. The expression *Vakeśvarādhivāsinaś* may be taken to imply that the god Śiva, referred to here, was residing at the temple of Vakeśvara,² although the exact location of the temple is not known.

Then the kings of the Śālaṅkāyana family became masters of this area between the first quarter of the fourth century A.D. and the end of the fifth century A.D. They were no doubt Śaiva-s although they called themselves favoured by the feet of Lord Citrarathasvāmin.³ But, except for the mention of a temple of Viṣṇu in one of the records of the family, no actual temples to Hindu deities belonging to their time have come down to us. The Viṣṇu temple is referred to in the Peddavegi copper-plate inscription of the time of Nandivarman II (circa A.D. 420-45). In this inscription the king is said to have granted some lands in order to make a *devahala* for the god Viṣṇugṛhasvāmin. 'This

¹ *Indian Antiquary*, vol. IX, p. 102 f.

² *ibid.*, p. 103.

³ D. C. Sircar, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

Viṣṇugṛhasvāmin (literally, lord of the temple of Viṣṇu) was evidently a form (*vigraha*) of lord Viṣṇu. Dedication of lands in honour of Viṣṇugṛhasvāmin and the epithet *parama-bhāgavata* together leave hardly any doubt that the Śālaṅkāyana king Nandivarman II was a Vaiṣṇava'.¹

Curiously there is no epigraphic record pertaining to this period belonging to the kings of the Viṣṇukunḍin dynasty, who were powerful in this area from about the fifth century A.D., and dealing with temples to Hindu deities. But the much damaged record² from Chezārla in the Guntur District seems on palaeographic grounds to belong to this dynasty³ and it contains the passage *kapōtīśvarādhyakṣa dvādaśa-deva-karmibhyaḥ* meaning 'for the twelve supervisors of the (service inside the temple of) Kapotīśvara'.⁴ This shows that not only was there the temple but also a regular establishment to look after the proper conduct of service in it.

Contemporaneous with the above-mentioned dynasties, there was the dynasty of the Pallava-s which held sway over the region south of the Kṛṣṇā, with its headquarters at Kāñcīpuram. Although not many records of the kings of the dynasty of this period bearing

¹ D. C. Sircar, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

² *Annual Report on Epigraphy*, No. 155-A of 1899 and *South Indian Inscriptions*, vol. VI, No. 595.

³ C. Minakshi in her book *Administration and Social Life under the Pallavas* (p. 173) has stated that this inscription belongs to Pallava Mahendravarman I, which does not seem to be correct as the characters of the inscription are definitely of an earlier period.

⁴ *ibid.*

on the subject have been known, the few inscriptions that deal with the temples, etc., are quite significant in revealing the nature of the religious life of the people over whom these Pallava-s ruled.

One of the earliest inscriptions of this dynasty to refer to a temple is the British Museum copper-plate inscription.¹ It records the gift of some lands during the reign of Sirivijaya-khandavarman (i.e. Skandavarman) by Cārudevī, the queen of Pallava Yuvamahārāja Buddhavarman, for the increase of her highness' life and power, to the god Nārāyaṇa of the Kuḷi-mahā-taraka temple (*devakula*) at Dālūra. This king Skandavarman is assigned to about the middle of the fourth century A.D. and the fact that a temple to Nārāyaṇa was in existence is noteworthy as it is in keeping with the Bhāgavata tradition that was then spreading all over India. The Uruvapalli copper-plate inscription² belonging to the time of Dharma-yuvamahārāja Viṣṇugopavarman (*circa* middle of the fourth century A.D.) records the grant of some land as *devabhoga* for the enjoyment of the god Viṣṇu of the Viṣṇu-hāradvakula which was built by the Senāpati Viṣṇu-varman at a place called Kaṇḍukūra.

Then we come to the time of Pallava Mahendrarvarman I (accession about A.D. 600) to whose period belong a number of inscriptions bearing on the subject under study. It is well known that from the time of his father Siṃhaviṣṇu, the power of the Pallava-s

¹ *Epigraphia Indica*, vol. VIII, p. 143 f.

² *ibid.*, pp. 160-1.

extended southward into Tamilnāḍ, with the consequent withdrawal of it from the northern region. So, the cultural and religious activities of these Pallava kings especially from the time of Mahendravarman I onwards, had Tamilnāḍ, more precisely the region comprising the Toṇḍai and Colamaṇḍalam-s, as their centre. Almost all the records of Mahendravarman are found engraved on the shrines to Hindu deities. So, in contrast to the earlier period, there is a profusion of inscriptions testifying to the tremendous efforts made by the king for the promotion of Hinduism. The very first inscription of this great monarch's time found on the rock-cut shrine at Maṇḍagappaṭṭu¹ in the Chingleput District of the Madras State, is interesting in more respects than one. It reads as follows:

Etadaniṣṭakamadrumamalohamasudham Vicitracittena [I]
nirmāpitannrpeṇa Brahmēśvaraviṣṇulakṣitāyanam [II*]*

(This brickless, timberless, metalless and mortarless temple, which is a mansion for (the gods) Brahmā, Īśvara and Viṣṇu, was caused to be created by the king Vicitra-citta.)

The importance of this inscription is due to the following:

From the inscriptions noticed prior to this, it is not known what material was employed in the construction of the temples mentioned by them, except in the case of the Bādāmi Vaiṣṇava rock-cut cave

¹ *Epigraphia Indica*, vol. XVII, pp. 14-7.

inscription, whereas in most of the inscriptions belonging to North India, the temples are stated to have been built with stone. From the specific mention made in this inscription about the avoidance of brick, etc., in the creation of this shrine, it is clear that there were temples built of such materials, and that this was probably the first of the temples made of stone. This shows clearly that it was Mahendravarman who broke away from the early Tamilian tradition which seems to have avoided making use of stone for religious structures. Then, the dedication of the shrine to all the three gods of the Hindu trinity, rather than to Śiva or Viṣṇu, is interesting as this seems to be the first instance of its kind. Here the spirit of eclecticism¹ of the king is apparent although the placing of Īśvara in the middle of the phrase, and possibly the dedication also of the middle one of the three shrines to this god, may be taken to suggest the predilection of the king for Śaivism, because, of the ten or more cave temples attributed to him, a majority are dedicated to Śiva.² Then if the word *Lakṣita* is taken as one of his titles then the phrase

¹ Interestingly the initial verse in the Berūr grant (*Epigraphia Carnatica*, vol. VI, p. 91) of Viṣṇuvarman of the second branch of the Early Kadamba family is in adoration of the three gods, Hara, Nārāyaṇa and Brahmā:

Hara-nārāyaṇa-brahma-tritayāya namas-sadā [| *]

Śūla-cakr-ākṣasūtr-ōdgha-bhava-bhāsita-pāṇine [|| *]

(D. C. Sircar, op. cit., p. 290) which shows the prevalence of this idea in a wider area.

² K. R. Srinivasan, 'The Pallava Architecture of South India,' in *Ancient India*, No. 14, p. 119.

Lakṣitāyatana would mean the name of the shrine as has been made out by Mr. K. R. Srinivasan in his article on 'The Pallava Architecture of South India' in *Ancient India*, No. 14, p. 116. If this is accepted then this temple is also the first in South India to bear the name of the donor, a practice which was continued in the subsequent period also (for example, the Rājasimheśvara, popularly called Kailāsanātha, temple of Kāñci of the time of Pallava Narasiṃhavarman II alias Rājasimha and the Rājarājeśvara, popularly called the Big Temple of Tanjore built by the great Coḷa Rājarāja I). The practice does not seem to have been in vogue in the Deccan or in the Kṛṣṇā valley, although one or two such instances where the god is named after the donor have been known from North India as for instance the naming of the god Śiva of the Kapāleśvara temple at Nirmaṇḍ as Mihireśvara after the name of Mihiralakṣmī, the mother of the Mahārāja Samudrasena (above p. 14).¹ The other inscriptions of Pallava Mahendravarman I's time mostly occur in the other cave temples which he caused to be excavated. They are the Pañcapāṇḍava of Pallāvaram, the Śiva cave of Māmaṇḍūr, the Vasanteśvara of Vallam, the Mahendraviṣṇugṛham of Mahendravāḍi, the upper cave temple called the Lalitāñkura-Pallaveśvara-gṛha of Tiruchirappalli, the Śatrumalleśvarālaya of Dājavānūr and the Avani-bhājana-Pallaveśvara-gṛha of Śiyamaṇ-galam. Of these, a majority are single-celled ones

¹ J. F. Fleet, *Gupta Inscriptions*, p. 288.

and are Śaiva in character suggesting the gradual growth of the influence of Śaivism in Tamilnāḍ. Since no example of a structural temple of this king's time has been known, it is difficult to know about the nature of the superstructure of such a temple of that period, because in the religious literature of the period called the *Tevāram* of the Śaiva saints like Appar and Sambandar and the *Divyaprabandham* of the Vaiṣṇava saints like Peyālvār, Bhūtattālvār and Poygaiālvār there are descriptions of a number of temples with superstructures as existing in various places of Tamilnāḍ. Moreover, elements like the *dhvajastambha*, which were met with in the first period are conspicuous by their absence not only in the cave temples of Pallava Mahendravarman I and of Cāḷukya Maṅgaśa, but also in the epigraphs belonging to other royal dynasties of South India and the Deccan noticed above. The reason for the absence of these is not easy to explain especially when some of the epigraphs like the one from Chezārla refer to comparatively elaborate temple establishment even then.

The above examination shows that during the period from A.D. 300 to about A.D. 600 the building of temples was almost restricted to the two Hindu deities, Śiva and Nārāyaṇa. This clearly shows the unmistakable influence of the Purāṇa-s where one or the other of the two deities is extolled as the Supreme Being. The absence of mention in the epigraphs examined above of temples to other deities, particularly deities like Kārttikeya, popular during the earlier

period, is noteworthy. Unlike in North India, in the South, as well as in the Deccan, there is no epigraphic evidence for the existence of a temple of Durgā. Though stone began to be employed in temples from an earlier period in the Deccan, in South India its use seems to have come into vogue from the time of Pallava Mahendravarman I. Other information of significance that we get from the South Indian and Deccanese epigraphs bearing on temples, noticed above, is that except in the case of the Bādāmi Vaiṣṇava cave inscription, where there is an explicit statement of the fact of the installation of an idol of Viṣṇu (*Viṣṇoḥ pratimā-pratiṣṭhāṇa*), the reference is merely to the god of the temple. The absence of mention of idols in these epigraphs may be taken to indicate the fact that the form of the god was represented by other ways than by an idol. This is supported by the absence of an original idol of the god in the cave temples belonging to the time of Mahendravarman I mentioned above.

Thus the brief examination of some of the ancient records gives us valuable information for a study of the development of this aspect of the religious life of the people of those times and a clearer picture of it is sure to emerge from a more intensive study of the subject matter.

K. KUNJUNNI RAJA

PRĀRTHAYANTI—A GHOST WORD DISCUSSED BY THE GRAMMARIANS

TOWARDS the close of the *ṇijanta* section of the *Siddhānta-kaumudī*, Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita discusses¹ the Parasmaipada usage of the term *prārthayanti* in the line '*prārthayanti śayanotthitaṃ priyāḥ*'. Since the root *arth-* belongs to the *āgarviya* subdivision of the *curādi* class, it ought to be in the *Ātmanepada* alone; hence the need to explain the usage. In the *Praudhamanoramā* Bhaṭṭoji discusses² the various explanations given by earlier writers about the Parasmaipada usage here.

Where does this quotation come from? The *Bāla-manoramā* commentary on the *Kaumudī* says³ that it is a quotation from Māgha; the *Tattvabodhinī* also says the same thing.⁴ But, as Professor Ray has pointed out,⁵

¹ निवृत्तप्रेषणाद्गतोः हेतुमणौ शुद्धेन तुल्योऽर्थः । तेन 'प्रार्थयन्ति शयनोत्थितं प्रियाः' इत्यादि सिद्धम् ।

² यत्तु चक्षिणो हित्करणं अनुदात्तेत्वप्रयुक्तस्यात्मनेपदस्यानित्यतां शपयतीत्युक्त्वा, तेन प्रार्थयन्तीति सिद्धमिति माघवादिभिर्क्तं तदतिस्वीयः, तस्यागर्वादात्मनेपदविधानात् . . . यदप्याहुः प्रार्थनं प्रार्थः तत्कुर्वन्ति प्रार्थयन्तीति तदपि न ।

³ ननु 'प्रार्थयन्ति शयनोत्थितं प्रियाः' इति माघकाव्ये प्रार्थयन्तीति न चौरादिकस्वार्थिकं णिजन्तम्, तस्यागर्वायतया आत्मनेपदप्रसङ्गात् । नापि हेतुमण्यन्तम्, स्वामीष्टं याचते इत्यर्थे तदसम्भवात् । न हि प्रयोजकव्यापाराभावे तत्प्रवृत्तिरस्तीत्यत आह निवृत्तेति ।

⁴ प्रार्थयन्तीति माघकाव्यादिप्रयोगोऽसाधुरित्याशङ्क्य तत्समर्थनायाह . . . प्रार्थनां कुर्वन्तीति विवक्षितार्थे प्रयोगः सिद्ध इति माघः । केचित्तु परस्मैपदसिद्ध्यर्थे प्रार्थनं प्रार्थः तं कुर्वन्ति प्रार्थयन्तीति व्याचक्षते । तदसत् ।

⁵ Sanskrit commentary, Calcutta edition: माघकाव्यस्य श्लोकांशोऽयमिति बहवः, परं तु तत्र तन्नोपलभ्यते इति मूलं मृग्यम् ।

this line does not occur in Māgha's *Śiśupālavadha*. Mādhava has discussed this usage¹ by quoting the line; but he too does not give the source of his quotation.

Really this is a misquotation from the *Raghuvamśa* of Kālidāsa (XIX. 29).² There the reading found in all the editions is '*prārthayanta śayanotthitaṃ priyāḥ*'.³ And from the context it is clear that the verb should be in the past tense, and that *prārthayanti* cannot be another possible reading of the line.⁴ *Prārthayanta* is a regular usage in the *Ātmanepada*.

This is an example of a ghost word being discussed by the grammarians.⁵

¹ Mādhava discusses this in two places. Under root *caṣṣin-* he says: अनुदात्तेत्वप्रयुक्तमात्मनेपदमनित्यमिति शपनार्थोऽयं ङकारः । तेन 'तालैः शिखरद्वलनसुमगैः' 'तृष्णे जुम्सि', 'प्रार्थयन्ति शयनोत्थितं प्रियाः' इत्यादयः प्रयोगाः उपलभ्यन्ते । ननु . . . प्रार्थनं प्रार्थः तत्करोतीति णौ प्रार्थयन्तीति । तत् किमनेन शपनेन । सत्यं शब्दाः सिद्ध्यन्ति । अर्थास्तु सहृदयहृदयगमो न भवति । And under the root *arth-* he says: 'प्रार्थयन्ति शयनोत्थितं प्रियाः' इत्यादि कृदन्तात् तत्करोतीति णिचि नेयम् ।

² कण्ठसक्तमृदुबाहुबन्धनं न्यस्तपादतलमप्रपादयोः ।

प्रार्थयन्त शयनोत्थितं प्रियास्तं निशात्ययविसर्गचुम्बनम् ॥

³ *śayane sthitam* is found as another reading.

⁴ The entire narration in the context is in the past tense.

⁵ It is not contended that *prārth-* has not been used in the Parasmaipada anywhere in literature. The *Sabdakalpadruma* notes: 'प्रार्थयत्यल्पमूल्यानि' इत्यादौ प्रार्थनं प्रार्थः, पश्चात् प्रार्थं करोति इति औपरस्मैपदं इति दुर्गदासः ।' The *Sanskrit Wörterbuch* gives examples like the following:

(a) उत्सृष्टमाम्निं भूमौ प्रार्थयन्ति यथा क्षगाः ।

प्रार्थयन्ति जनाः सर्वे पतिहीनं तथा क्षियम् ॥

(b) पार्थे प्रार्थय ।

(c) गावस्तृणमिवारण्ये प्रार्थयन्ति नभं नवम् ।

(d) अर्थी त्वां प्रार्थयाम्यद्य कुरुष्व वचनं मम ।

cf. Westergaard, *Radices linguae Sanscritae* under root *arth*.

¶. VARADACHARI

A NOTE ON THE MAṄGALAVĀDA OF THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA SCHOOL *

THE word *maṅgala* means 'auspicious' and refers to an act which is auspicious in its nature. Indian writers on secular and scientific subjects have followed the practice of performing *maṅgala*, which takes the form of a prayer to the favourite deity, and incorporating it in the beginning of their works. It was presumed by commentators of works which do not begin with *maṅgala* that their authors performed it but did not include it in their works. Of the various schools of thought, those of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika have shown the greatest interest in discussing the need for incorporating *maṅgala* in the beginning of a work.

While dealing with this subject, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers have sought to show that the purpose of beginning a work with *maṅgala* is to respect the tradition of the *śiṣṭa-s*,¹ to inculcate in the pupils of the author the need to follow this practice in their turn, and to ensure that the work is completed without any obstacles.

* Paper submitted to the All-India Oriental Conference, Bhubaneswar, 1959.

¹ According to Gaṅgeśa, a *śiṣṭa* is one who accepts the validity of the Veda: स्वीकृतवेदप्रमाणभावः शिष्टः । (*Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Sarasvati Bhavana Texts No. 78, p. 180). Śaśadhara defines the word as 'one who is free from human defects': क्षीणदोषपुरुषत्वमेव शिष्टत्वम् (*Nyāya-siddhāntadīpa*, Pandit Series, 1924, p. 18).

Human efforts being ineffective in avoiding impediments, the agency of God is sought to overcome them. This is done by offering a prayer to God and incorporating it in the work.

Regarding the way in which the performance of *maṅgala* helps the author, there is difference of opinion between the ancient and the modern schools of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. According to the ancient school, *maṅgala* brings about the successful end of the work by destroying all obstacles in the way.¹ The modern school, which is said to have started with Gaṅgeśopādhyāya (c. A.D. 1300), holds that *maṅgala* leads only to the destruction of obstacles and that successful completion of the work is due to the author's intuition, application and other factors.²

आरब्धकर्मसमाप्तौ मङ्गलं नाङ्गं न वा प्रधानमहेतुत्वात् । किन्तु प्रायश्चित्तवत्प्रधानं विमलचक्षुः फलम् । (*Tattvacintāmaṇi*, p. 161.)

The argument advanced by Gaṅgeśa against the ancient view is ably expounded by writers of the later period: *maṅgala* rests in the soul of its performer, as it is a kind of cognition.³ Destruction of obstacles too

¹ Vide: मङ्गलचरणेन च विमलचक्षुः एव फलमिति वदतां चिन्तामणिकृतां मतमाह । नव्यास्तिति । *Dinakarī* on *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, Nirnayasagar ed., p. 16.

² According to Jayadeva, non-production of obstacles is the result of *maṅgala*: विमलचक्षुः न फलं अपि तु विज्ञानुत्पादः । विज्ञो मा भूदिति उद्दिश्य प्रवृत्तेः न तु विज्ञो निवर्ततामिति । *Āloka* on *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, p. 158.

³ cf. क्षानविशेष एव नमस्कारत्वम् । *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa*, p. 26.

subsists in the soul. Completion of the work, however, rests in the ether, as it is of the nature of the destruction of the last letter. There is therefore a common substratum (*sāmānādhikarāṇya*) between *maṅgala* and the destruction of obstacles. Such is not the case between *maṅgala* and the completion of the work or between the destruction of obstacles and the completion of the work.¹

It is worth noting that Gaṅgeśa's view regarding *maṅgala* is also advocated by Śaśadhara in his *Nyāya-siddhāntadīpa*:

तत्र मङ्गलस्य तद्विशेषस्य वा नमस्कारस्य प्रतिबन्धकदुरिताद्युत्सारण-
द्वारा अमीष्टसमाप्तिं प्रति कथमुपायत्वं ग्राह्यम् । (pp. 7-8) किं च मङ्गल-
स्यामीष्टसमाप्तिं प्रति कारणत्वे कथं तद्व्यतिरेकेण प्रमत्तनास्तिकाद्यनुष्ठित-
समाप्तिः । (pp. 11-12) एवं विज्ञोत्सारणासाधारणकारणत्वे सति साध्यत्वमेव
मङ्गलत्वम् । (pp. 32-4) निर्विघ्नसमाप्तिमुद्दिश्य बहुशः प्रवर्तमानाः । (p. 5)

Śaśadhara's definition of *śiṣṭa* is rejected by Vardhamāna,² son of Gaṅgeśa. Therefore, Śaśadhara could have been a contemporary of Gaṅgeśa or his immediate predecessor. He too might have been responsible for the Navya-Nyāya view of *maṅgala*.

¹ cf. Mathurānātha on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, pp. 90-1; Dina-
karabhaṭṭa on *Siddhāntamuktāvali*, Nirnayasagar ed., p. 20; Mahā-
deva Puṇatāmākara in the *Nyāyakaustubha*, Sarasvati Bhavana
Text No. 33, p. 24; Nilakaṇṭhadīkṣita in his *Bṛhattarkaprakāśikā*
on Jānakīnātha's *Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī*, p. 2.

² *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa*, Bibliotheca Indica No. 200, p. 9.

Śrīdhara, the author of the *Nyāyakandali*, also held the view of the modern school of Nyāya, although he lived about three centuries before Gaṅgeśa:

फलं च नमस्कारस्य विज्ञोपशमः । . . . नमस्कारादेव विज्ञोपशमः ।
. . . कर्मरग्मे सङ्घिनियमेन तस्योपादानात् । (Vizianagram Sanskrit
Series, No. 4, p. 1.)

Śrīdhara adds further that *maṅgala* gives rise to merit which enables the writer to overcome obstacles:

स हि धर्मोत्पादकस्तिरयत्यन्तरायबीजम् । (p. 2)

On the other hand, Vyomaśiva and Udayana, who belonged approximately to the period prior to that of Śaśadhara, maintained the ancient view:

मानसनमस्कारोपचितो वाचिकनमस्कारः समाप्तेः कारणमिष्यते मान-
सस्तु केवलोऽपि । (Vyomavati, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series
No. 61, p. 16.)

कृतमङ्गलेन चारब्धं कर्म निर्विघ्नं परिसमाप्यते प्रचीयते च ।
(Kiraṇāvali, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, p. 3.)

इह कर्मरग्मे प्रारब्धस्यान्तरायविरहेण परिसमाप्तिं कामयमाना अमीष्ट-
देवतानमस्कारपूर्वकं प्रेक्षावन्तः प्रवर्तन्ते । (Nyāyavārttikatātparyapari-
śuddhi, Bibliotheca Indica No. 205, p. 24.)

It is curious to note that Padmanābha, the author of the *Setu* on the *Padārthadharmasamgraha*, says that Udayana held the view of the modern school of Nyāya,

and that the clever author of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* gave publicity to it, presenting it as his own:

विघ्नघ्नस्य फलत्वमाचार्यसंमतमिति तु विरलैरेव ज्ञातुं शक्यते ।
अत एवातिव्युत्तरेण चिन्तामणिकृता स्वकीयत्वेन स्वीकृतोऽयं पन्थाः ।
(Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series No. 61, p. 9.)

व्यभिचारग्रस्ततया अस्य पक्षस्य विघ्नघ्नसं फलं कल्पयन्ति नव्याः ।
कल्पश्चायमाचार्यचरणानामपि संमतः । (loc. cit.)

Padmanābha holds the view of the modern Naiyāyika-s and seeks the authority of the Nyāyācārya for it, but Udayana does not appear to have held the 'modern' view.

In spite of the influence of Gaṅgeśa's theory on succeeding generations, some writers in the field of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika belonging to the later period held the ancient view. Prominent among them are: Śaṅkara-miśra, author of the *Āmatattovivekakalpalatā*, the *Upaskāra* on the *sūtra*-s of Kaṇāda, etc.; Mallinātha, author of the *Niṣkaṇṭaka* on Varadarāja's *Tārkikaraksā*; Mathurānātha, commentator on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, *Āmatattoviveka*, etc.; Anṇambhaṭṭa, author of the *Tarkasaṃgraha*, etc.; Dinakarabhaṭṭa, commentator on the *Siddhāntamuktāvali*; Nilakaṇṭhabhaṭṭa, author of the *Tarkasaṃgrahadīpikāprakāśa*; Rāmarudra, author of the *Tarkasaṃgrahadīpikāvākyā*; Govardhanasudhi, author of the *Nyāyabodhini* on the *Tarkasaṃgraha*; and Meruśāstrin, author of the *Vākyavṛtti* on the *Tarkasaṃgraha*.

It is of interest to note that the modern view of *maṅgala* was well known to writers prior to Gaṅgeśa, who belonged to schools of thought other than Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Among such writers, the following deserve mention: Indu, commentator on the *Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya* of Vāgbhaṭa; Padmapāda, author of the *Pañcapādikā* on Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*; Bhaṭṭa Umbeka (c. A.D. 700), author of the *Tātparyāṭikā* on Kumārila's *Śloka-vārttika*; Vidyānanda (c. A.D. 750), a Jain who wrote the *Āpta-parikṣā* with his own commentary;¹ Haribhadrasūri, a Jain, author of the *Anekāntajayapatākā* with his own gloss; Vimuktātman (before A.D. 1000), author of the *Iṣṭasiddhi* with *Vivaraṇa*; Bhaṭṭotpala, who wrote in A.D. 966² the commentaries on Varāhamihira's *Bṛhatsaṃhitā* and *Bṛhajjātaka*; Anantavīrya (11th century A.D.), a Jain, who wrote the *Laghu-vṛtti* on the *Parikṣāmukhasūtra* of Māṇikyanandin; Sarvānanda, who completed in A.D. 1159³ his commentary on Amarasimha's *Nāmaliṅgānuśāsana*; and Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra (c. A.D. 1200), the Jain authors of the *Nātyadarpaṇa* with commentaries. Among these writers, Vidyānanda uses the word *avighnasiddhi* while referring to the result of *maṅgala*,

¹ The word *maṅgala* is derived by Vidyānanda thus: मङ्गं सुखं समुत्पद्यत इति तद्गुणस्तोत्रं मङ्गलं मङ्गलतीति व्युत्पत्तेः । मङ्गं गालयतीति मङ्गलमिति वा । *Āpta-parikṣā*, Sanātana Jaina Granthamālā No. 1, p. 3.

² वस्वव्याप्तमिते शाके कृत्यं विवृतिर्मया । Bhaṭṭotpala's concluding lines on *Bṛhajjātaka*.

³ *Amarakośa* with *Ṭikāsarvasva*, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, p. 91.

Sarvānanda, Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra use the words *pratyūhaśamanāya* and *pratyūhavyūhopaśamanāya* respectively, while the remaining writers use the word *vighnopaśama* or *vighnavināyakopaśānti*. From this it appears that Gaṅgeśa could have been influenced by Śrīdhara and some of the writers mentioned above, but the extent of the influence cannot be determined for want of evidence.

A striking feature in the treatment of this topic by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers is the mention of *nāstika* writers as having performed no *maṅgala* in their works which however were completed. This is said to be due to the total absence of obstacles acquired by these authors in their previous births:

अत एव मङ्गलं विनापि जन्मान्तरानुवर्तमानविज्ञात्यन्ताभावात् प्रमत्त-
नास्तिकानुष्ठितसमाप्तिः । (*Tattvacintāmaṇi*, p. 166.)

ननु मङ्गलं न विघ्नध्वंसं प्रति न वा समाप्तिं प्रति कारणं, विनापि
मङ्गलं नास्तिकादीनां ग्रन्थे निर्विघ्नपरिसमाप्तिदर्शनादिति चेत् । (*Siddhānta-
muktāvali*, Nirnayasagar ed., p. 7.)

This reference to the *nāstika-s* appears to be incorrect as many *nāstika* writers have begun their works with *maṅgala*.¹ Some of these writers uphold this practice.² On the other hand, during the later period,

¹ Mention has to be made here of Diñnāga, Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara, Śāntarakṣita and Durvekamiśra among the Buddhists and Haribhadra, Hemacandra, Akalaṅka, Prabhācandra and Vidyānanda among the Jains.

² Among them are Akalaṅka, Anantavīrya, Durvekamiśra, Hemacandra, Prabhācandra and Mallavādin.

there were writers on the *āstika* side who did not begin their works with *maṅgala*, as was the case with Vallabhācārya, Nimbārka, Maṇikanṭha, author of the *Nyāyaratna*, and Durgācārya, who commented on the *Nirukta*. Some writers said to belong to the *nāstika* fold even recommend the performance of *maṅgala* for becoming free of *nāstikatva*, for instance, Āśādhara, author of the *Anagāradharmāmṛta*.

E. A. SOLOMON

THE PROBLEM OF OMNISCIENCE (SARVAJÑATVA)

IN the early Indian philosophical thought we find a tacit assumption of an omniscient entity, though not a rational account of the concept of *sarvajñatva* (omniscience). In the Veda-s, gods like Agni and Varuṇa are believed to be all-seeing, all-knowing. The concept of omniscience associated with divinity in the early stages grew into the concept of the Supreme Deity. In the Upaniṣadic period, attention was directed chiefly to the relation of the individual to the universe, of the individual soul to the Supreme Deity or the Ultimate Reality. Thus, as a result of philosophical speculations, when the idea dawned upon the mind of thinkers that the human soul was a part and parcel of the ultimate divinity, it was assumed that the individual soul was potentially omniscient.¹

¹ There seem to have been two distinct trends of thought in India. One came to a clear vision of the individual self through the ideal, and via media, one might say, of God, and also depended on His Grace for the attainment of excellence of all kinds. The other relied on the powers of the soul itself and did not concern itself very much with anything higher than it or controlling it. We find the latter trend reflected in the Sāṃkhya, the Buddhist and the Jaina systems of thought, though the grace of the *guru* (teacher) was not excluded even in their modes of self-realization.

It is difficult to say how the concept of omniscience originated. Man has an innate craving for true knowledge (*buddheḥ tatpakṣapātataḥ*). But with his physical and other limitations he cannot know or explain everything. The universe seems very vast to him; the past and the future have an inexpressible fascination for him. Conscious of his own weakness and smallness and yet realizing that progress can be made by persistent efforts and practice in any direction, man might have conceived of the soul as having innate powers of all kinds, and also of a God who knows everything and controls everything. This general concept of omniscience was accepted in all the systems of thought, and this ideal has been a dynamic force guiding man in all his progress on the path to his goal.

See *Rgveda*, hymns to Agni, Indra, Varuṇa and other gods who are regarded as all-knowing, all-seeing, etc. See also *Puruṣa-sūkta* (X. 90). Cf. also:

(i) अग्निर्गायत्रं त्रिवृद् . . . सर्वज्ञोऽनघोऽप्रमेयोऽनाद्यन्तः श्रीमानञ्जो
जीमाननिर्दिष्टः सर्वसृष्टिः सर्वस्यात्मा सर्वभुक् सर्वस्थेशानः सर्वस्यान्तरान्तरः । *Maitrāyaṇi Up.*, VII. 1. Also *Svet. Up.*, III. 16, 19; *Mundaka Up.*, I. 1. 9; *प्रश्नानं ब्रह्म*; *Ait. Up.*, VI.

(ii) न पश्यो मृत्युं पश्यति न रोगं नोत दुःखताम् ।

सर्वं ह पश्यः पश्यति सर्वमाप्नोति सर्वशः ॥ इति ॥

Ch. Up., VII. 26. 2

(iii) अयमात्मा ब्रह्म सर्वानुभूः । *Bṛh. Up.*, II. 5. 19; also *Bṛh. Up.*, III. 7. 1; V. 6. 1; *Praśna Up.*, IV. 5, 10, 11; *Ārṣeyopaniṣad*, 9.

For the Buddhist concept see *Majjhima Nikāya*: *Cūḷa-mālunkhya-puttasutta*, *Kaṃpakatthalasutta*, *Devadahasutta*, *Cūḷa-sakuludāyisutta*, *Cūḷa-dukkhakkhandha-sutta*; *Milindapañha*, IV. 1. 19-27. For the Jain concept, see *Bhagavatisūtra*, VIII. 2. 106; *Ācārāṅgasūtra*, I. 3. 4. 122, and the passages where *kevala-jñāna* is discussed.

The main opponents of the belief in omniscience were the Materialists (Cārvāka-s), the Agnostics, (Ajñānavādin-s) and the Pūrva-Mimāṃsaka-s, the last being opposed to the idea of a person being *sarvajña*. All the other schools of thought supported the doctrine of omniscience. The Cārvāka-s were not prepared to admit anything that is not perceived by the sense-organs. Hence there was, in their system of thought, no acceptance of an independent sentient principle nor of God, nor of the omniscience of these. The Agnostics or Sceptics believed that knowledge has its own limitations, that it is impossible to know everything, or to know what we know, correctly.

The Pūrva-Mimāṃsā thought was a class by itself, in holding that word (*śabda*) is eternal and the Veda-s are *apauruṣeya* (not composed by a personal agency). To uphold this doctrine it was natural that in the epoch of ratiocination, in an atmosphere ringing with debates and speculations, it had to repudiate the concept of a *sarvajña*, who could have been the author of the Veda, or who could, setting aside the Veda, be an expounder of the ultimate good. Even before Kumārila, we find discussions concerning the problem of omniscience, for example in the Buddhist Piṭaka-s, the Jaina Āgama-s, to some extent even in the Upaniṣad-s, and also in the early Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Yoga, and Buddhist and Jaina works to which we shall have occasion to refer later on. But it can be said that Kumārila was the first to challenge the concept boldly, with the result that all later thinkers had to give serious thought to this problem.

We find repeated inquiry in the Upaniṣad-s as to what that is, by knowing which everything is known (see *Ch. Up.*, VI. 1; *Muṇḍaka Up.*, 1. 1. 3; *Bṛh. Up.*, II. 4. 5). The answer is given in the *Bṛh. Up.*, II. 4. 5, that by seeing, hearing, thinking and knowing the *Ātman* (Ultimate Reality) everything is known (*ātmano vā are darśanena śravaṇena matyā vijñānenedaṃ sarvaṃ veditam*). Or as Āryadeva tells us in his *Catuhśataka*, VIII. 16: *bhāva-syaikasya yo draṣṭā draṣṭā sarvasya sa smṛtaḥ | ekasya śūnyatā yaiva saiva sarvasya śūnyatā ||* He who realizes the nature of one thing is known to realize the nature of all, for *śūnyatā* (essencelessness, Void) is universally found, it is the very nature of all entities. We find it said in the *Ācārāṅgasūtra*, I. 3. 4, that he who knows one knows all, and he who knows all knows one (*je egaṃ jānai se sarvaṃ jānai | je sarvaṃ jānai se egaṃ jānai ||*). Such passages seem to indicate that by knowing the nature of the one essential entity, one can know all its ramifications, or by knowing essencelessness (i.e. everything is momentary, pain-giving, soulless, etc.) one can know that everything is such, or that by knowing one *doṣa* (defect, affliction) which is binding, one can know the nature of all *doṣa-s* that are binding and so on. These passages seem to hint at the attainment of the knowledge of the basic truth regarding all things, though these thinkers might be led to claim, for the *sarvajña*, knowledge of all the minutest details. We find such descriptions in the case of the Superior One and consequently such omniscience can be accepted in the case of the soul also. We are also told that he who knows that

sūtra (thread) and him as the inner controller, he is the knower of Brahman, knower of the worlds, knower of gods, knower of the Veda, knower of the self, knower of all (*sarvaśāśvī*) (*Bṛh. Up.*, III. 7. 1).

In the Jain Āgama-s, Lord Mahāvira, as also all emancipated souls, are said to be omniscient (*sarvajña*, *kevalajñānin*). The Buddhist current of thought as seen in the Piṭaka-s seems to attach greater importance to the knowledge of *dharma* (good), than to the knowledge of all and epithets most used for the Buddha are *dharmaśāśvī*, *dharmadeśaka* (teacher of *dharma*). Even when the Buddha is said to be *sarvajña*, it is mostly in the sense of knower of *dharma*, or knower of the Path (*mārga*). (See *Majjhima Nikāya*, *Cūḷa-mālunkya-puttasutta*). We find this approach to the problem reflected in Dharmakīrti (See *Pramāṇavārttika*, I. 32-5). In any case continued knowledge of all things of all times simultaneously is very clearly denied even in the case of the Buddha (See *Majjhima Nikāya*, *Kaṇṇakatthasutta*; also *Milindapañha*, IV. 1. 19-27).

But no one had, it seems, till Kumārila attacked the concept, examined the question whether knowledge of one thing yielding the knowledge of all things, or knowledge of the ultimate entity leading to the knowledge of the manifold things of the phenomenal world, meant knowing all these things in all their details or knowing just the very essence of these and ignoring the rest which do not constitute their true nature or their very core. When Kumārila repudiated the concept of omniscience with arguments that are powerful and

appealing to the intelligent mind, the idea of *sarvajña* was analysed in all its subtlety and philosophers gave their own interpretations. The arguments of Dharmakīrti and those of Śāntarakṣita and his disciple Kamalaśīla¹ are the mainstay of this article inasmuch as hardly anyone has added anything further to them, though the concept of *sarvajña* is found defended in a number of later works. They all have in view Kumārila as the rival thinker with his *prima facie* view (*pūrvapakṣa*), and have cited the very words of Kumārila.²

Kumārila's stand is that the knowledge of *dharma* (merit, good) and *adharma* (demerit, sin) can be attained only from the Veda-s and there is no other source of

¹ I am highly indebted to Dr. Ganganatha Jha's translation and interpretation of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* (the portion dealing with omniscience, Baroda, 1939) and his choice of terminology, though I may have differed from him occasionally. I am also indebted to Pandit Sukhlaljee's article on 'Omniscience' in *Darśana aur Cintana* (Hindi).

² See *Āptamīmāṃsā*, *Āptaparīkṣā*, Jainasiddhānta Prakāśinī Saṁsthā, Calcutta, pp. 53 ff.; *Aṣṭasāhasrī*, Nirṇaya Sagar Press, pp. 45 ff.; *Tattvārthaslokavārttika*, Nirṇaya Sagar Press, pp. 13 ff.; *Śāstravārttāsamuccaya*, Āgamodaya Samiti, pp. 79 ff.; *Prameya-kamalamārtanḍa*, Nirṇaya Sagar Press, pp. 68 ff.; *Sanmatīpikā*, Gujarāt Purātattva Mandira, pp. 43 ff.; *Siddhāviniścaya*, *Sarvajña-siddhi*, Jñānapīṭha Mūrtidevī Jaina Granthamālā; *Syādvādaratnākara*, Ārhatamata Prabhākara Kāryālaya, Poona, pp. 363 ff.; *Prameyaratnamālā*, Vidyā Vilāsa Press, Poona, pp. 52 ff.; *Bṛhat-sarvajñasiddhi*, Laghiyastrayādisaṃgraha, Māṇikyacandramālā, Bombay, pp. 130 ff.

It can be seen from this list of works, which does not claim to be exhaustive, that it was the Jainas who were most concerned with the question of omniscience.

valid knowledge so far as these are concerned. Kumārila declares that no man can be *dharmajña* (knower of dharma) except through the Veda; he does not admit that a person can have immediate apprehension of supersensuous things. If a person is said to become *sarvajña* (knower of all) with the help of the six means of valid knowledge, Kumārila does not challenge that. What is not accepted by him is the claim that a man can be *sarvajña* with the help of only one *pramāṇa* (source of valid knowledge), namely, *pratyakṣa* (Direct Perception); for in that case one should be capable of perceiving taste, smell, etc., with the organ of sight.¹

In our worldly dealings, by the word *sarva* we refer to things associated with one another in a particular context, e.g. the articles used in cooking, or the notion of being and non-being as comprehending the whole universe, or the categories recognized by a particular system of thought, or the things that can be cognized by the six means of valid knowledge. There should be no objection to a person being *sarvajña* in the sense of a knower of these. But if the existence of a person

¹ नानेन वचनेनेह सर्वस्वनिराक्रिया ।

वचनादत इत्येवमपवादो हि संश्रितः ॥

यदि षड्भिः प्रमाणैः स्यात् सर्वज्ञः केन वार्यते ॥

एकेन तु प्रमाणेन सर्वज्ञो येन कल्प्यते ।

नूनं स चक्षुषा सर्वान् रसादीन् प्रतिपद्यते ॥

Slokavārttika (ŚV), II. 110-12. See also *Tattvasaṃgraha* (TS) :

धर्मस्त्वनिवेषश्चेत् केवलोऽत्रोपयुज्यते ।

सर्वमन्यद् विज्ञानानः पुरुषः केन वार्यते ॥ (3128 and 3135)

capable of directly perceiving at one time all things in their details is intended, that is false and futile. Even in a single body there are so many atoms and so many hairs, etc., that one cannot know them. Then where is the possibility of knowing everything in the universe? (See TS, 3129-39).

In examining the concept of *sarvajña* further, Kumārila says that the potency of the sense-organs is restricted to certain objects. It is our experience that, with the eyes, one cannot see taste or smell or sound. It was so in the past exactly as it is in the present. Even where some excellence is found in respect of a power, it is subject to the limitation of its kind. For example, a person may have very good eyesight capable of perceiving very small things or distant objects, or he may be able to smell odours from a very great distance, but this does not mean that he is capable of scenting odours with his eyes, or that he can see things with the nose or ears.¹

The *Tattvasaṃgraha* and other works have expounded this theory. Great excellence is often found in a man in respect of the exposition of a particular branch of science, but this does not prove that he is an

¹ See ŚV, II. 113-4:

यज्जातीयैः प्रमाणैस्तु यज्जातीयार्थदर्शनम् ।

मवेदिदानीं लोकस्य तथा कालान्तरेऽप्यभूत् ॥

यन्नाप्यतिशयो दृष्टः स स्वार्यानतिलक्षणात् ।

दूरस्त्वस्मादिदृष्टौ स्यान्न रूपे श्रोत्रवृत्तिता ॥

See also TS, 3159-63

expert in all the sciences. A grammarian may have a thorough knowledge of the categories of grammar, of the correctness or otherwise of words, but he cannot be regarded as capable of determining the position of planets, the dates of eclipses, etc, and vice versa. A man well versed in the knowledge of the Veda, History and such subjects is unable to visualize such matters as Creation, Deity and *apūrva* (Unseen Potency). Then, again, our experience tells us that there is a limit to the excellence one can attain. The man who can jump into the sky to the height of fifteen feet, can never jump to the height of eight miles, however much he may practise jumping. Thus even when the superiority of knowledge advances very far, it can comprehend only a little more than others but can never grasp things beyond the ken of the senses; that is to say, direct apprehension of supersensuous things is an impossibility. Sitting in one's own cottage one cannot perceive things in another's hut or things beyond the hills and the ocean (TS, 3164-71).

Further, if a man is omniscient he must know the past and the future also, which is not credible, for sense-perception has never been found to extend to things other than those of the present. Inference and other such means of cognition cannot help in respect of past and future things for these cannot operate without the *liṅga* (mark of inference) and such other factors.¹

¹ मविष्यति न दृष्टं च प्रत्यक्षस्य मनागपि ।

सामर्थ्यं नानुमानादेर्लिङ्गादिरहिते कश्चित् । ŚV, II. 115; TS, 3174.

Some people refuse to recognize any difference between the omniscience of the Buddha and others on the one hand and the *apauruṣeyatva* of the Veda on the other as an authoritative source of knowledge.¹ But the existence of the *sarvajña* (omniscient person) is not vouched for by any of the five positive means of valid knowledge: Perception, Inference, Word, Analogy (*upamāna*) and Presumption (*arthāpatti*). Therefore the *sarvajña* should come into the category of Negation or Non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*) and be a non-entity. The *sarvajña* is not seen by us at the present time; nor is there any *liṅga* which could enable us to infer the existence of a *sarvajña*, because Inference always has perception in its background. There is no scriptural assertion affirming the existence of an eternal omniscient person. Whatever statements we find in the Upaniṣad-s regarding the omniscient, all-seer, etc., are all laudatory (*arthavāda*). If the Buddha and Mahāvira were accepted as *sarvajña* simply because they said so, then one should accept the words of every person as true without doubting his veracity (ŚV, II. 119-33; TS, 3186-90). Even the contemporaries of the so-called *sarvajña* could not know him as *sarvajña*, because they could not possibly know that only a particular number of things existed in the world and that they were all known by the Buddha or Mahāvira or the omniscient recognized by them. Only a *sarvajña*

¹ सर्वज्ञत्वनान्यैस्तु वेदे चापौरुषेयता ।

तुल्यता कल्पिता येन तेनेदं संप्रचार्यताम् ॥ ŚV, II. 116; TS, 3185.

can judge the omniscience of another *sarvajña*. A number of *sarvajña*-s might thus have to be postulated each to stand witness to the omniscience of the previous one and so on; and if any one of these is not a *sarvajña*, his assertion will be as unreliable as the statements of common people. (ŚV, II. 134-6; see also TS, 3191-3). Thus, as the *Tatvasaṃgraha* argues for the *pūrvapakṣin*, if anyone is said to be *sarvajña*, it is by virtue of his knowledge of the self, and not because he has knowledge of all the things in the universe.¹

If any person similar to the *sarvajña* were seen, the existence of the Omniscient Person could be recognized on the strength of Analogy. But we do not find any such *sarvajña*, and therefore on the basis of Analogy it is only possible to say that there never was any *sarvajña* in the past. If Presumption (*arthāpatti*) be made to the effect that the Buddha or Mahāvira could not give instruction regarding *dharma* (merit), etc., if he did not have knowledge of these and therefore we have to admit *sarvajñatva*, it is not true. The instruction on *dharma*, etc., can be otherwise explained on the basis of dreams, delusion, wrong teaching or the Veda itself (TS, 3215-29).

Even if we take it for granted that there is a *sarvajña*, still there could be no words issuing from him, for when

¹ TS, 3205-6:

यद्वात्मन्येष तज्ज्ञानं ध्यानाभ्यासप्रवर्तितम् ।
तस्यैवाप्रतिपातेन ज्ञानाप्रतिषेधोच्यते ॥
ज्ञानं वैराग्यमैश्वर्यमिति योऽपि दद्याद्व्ययः ।
शंकरः श्रूयते सोऽपि ज्ञानवानात्मवित्तया ॥

he is free from attachment and such other defects, he would be rapt in meditation, his perception would be devoid of all imagination, conceptions (*vikalpa*, *adhyavasāya*, judgment) and he would never be able to impart any teaching. If he is said to impart his teaching after rising from his meditation, those words of his would be like the words of an ordinary person, for he would no longer be omniscient (ŚV, II.137; TS, 3238-40). The Buddhists argue that when the Buddha is in meditation, teaching issues even from the wall, by virtue of the presence of him who is like a *cintāmaṇi* (desire-yielding jewel). But such assertions are only worthy of credulous people. No rational man can have faith in such utterances coming from walls, etc. There would be doubt as to who propounded such teaching. Was it propounded by the Buddha or by some evil beings, not seen, to deceive others or by evil spirits (*piśāca*)? ¹ Thus knowledge of supersensuous things like *dharma*, *adharma*, etc., can be attained only through the Eternal Non-personal Veda.

These are the arguments put forth by Kumārila against *sarvajñatva*. Further arguments are attributed

¹ सान्निध्यमात्रतस्तस्य पुंसन्वितामणेरिव ।
निःसरन्ति यथाकामं कुड्यादिभ्योऽपि देशनाः ॥
एवमाद्युच्यमानं तु ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य शोभते ।
कुड्यादिनिस्तुतत्वाच्च नाश्वासो देशनाद्यु नः ॥
किं तु बुद्धप्रणीताः स्युः किमु कैश्चिद् दुरात्मभिः ।
अदृश्यैर्विप्रलम्भमर्थं विद्याचादिभिरीरिताः ॥ ŚV, II. 138-140

See also TS, 3241-6. Compare the belief of the Digambara Jaina-s that *Huṃkāra* emerges from the head of the Kevalin.

to Sāmaṭa and Yajñāta: Does the omniscient person apprehend all things by a single cognition or by several cognitions? Does he apprehend them all at once or in succession, noticing only the more important things? Or, is he said to be *sarvajña* because he possesses the capacity to know all things, just as Fire, which though not actually devouring all things, either simultaneously or in succession, is yet called all-devourer? A single cognition has never been found to apprehend such contradictory qualities as pure and impure; and divergent cognitions have not been found to appear together. Who, too, is there who could apprehend even in hundreds of years each of the endless number of things past, present and future? Even if a person has the knowledge of the generality or universality of things without apprehending their specific individualities (*svalakṣaṇa*), of what avail is a *sarvajña* who knows things only in their general form? This uniform cognition could be either true or false. If it were true, the whole world would have to be looked upon as one without a second; and there would not be such diversities as the pupil, the *sarvajña*, *dharma*, *adharma* and the teachings of such a person, as the distinctive features of these would not be cognized. If the uniform cognition be regarded as false, then the omniscient person cannot be depended upon, and his words would then be like those of a man with a deranged mind. If the omniscient person is held to be one who apprehends all things and their causes by a single extraordinary cognition brought about by *samādhi*, there could be,

for establishing his existence, no means of cognition—Perception, Inference or Word—that is not supplied by the person himself. Hence the conclusion would be that no omniscient person of any kind is conceivable. Consequently, no human assertion can be the means of providing knowledge of *dharma* (TS, 3247-61).

Another argument of the Mimāṃsaka is that those who accept a *sarvajña* as the propounder of their own beliefs, regard the founder of their own system as a *sarvajña*, and do not recognize the founders of other schools as being omniscient. If the Buddha is looked upon as *sarvajña*, why should not Kapila and others also be looked upon as such? And if they are all omniscient, then how is it that there is difference of opinion among them?¹ The very fact that their words are contradictory shows that not one of them is omniscient (TS, 3148, 3150-6). Kumārila has come to the conclusion that men are, as a rule, liars. As one cannot have faith in them with regard to things of the present, so also one cannot have any faith in their statements pertaining to things of the past.² Hence the

¹ बुद्धो यदि सर्वज्ञः कपिलो नेति क्व प्रमा ।

अथोमावसि सर्वज्ञौ मतमेदस्तयोः कथम् ॥ TS, 3149

This stanza and a few others are not found in the *ŚV*, but are invariably included in many works in the portion giving the view of Kumārila. Hence it can be inferred that such stanzas were somehow dropped by scribes from the *ŚV*, or lost or that there was some other work of Kumārila in which these stanzas existed.

² सर्वदा चापि पुण्याः प्रायेणानृतवादिनः ।

यथाद्यत्वे न विसम्भस्तथातीतार्थकीर्तने ॥ *ŚV*, II. 144; TS, 3286 :

Veda is the only sure means of knowledge with respect to supersensuous things like *dharma*, *adharma*, etc.¹

Now, we shall see what other schools of thought have to say regarding omniscience. The Buddhists, as previously mentioned, were not interested so much in *sarvajñatva* as in *dharmaññatva* (knowledge of the right path). Dharmakīrti has the arguments of Kumārila in view when he says that when a seeker after ultimate knowledge goes in search of a person whose teaching can be regarded as authoritative, he does not do so just for fun, or because he is used to doing so, but because he wants to attain *Nirvāṇa*, and if he were to follow the words of any ordinary person he would be deceived. Therefore when we wish to examine the omniscience of anyone we should examine his knowledge of the means necessary for the removal of the misery of repeated births and deaths. It is of no avail whether he has or has not knowledge of the number of insects in the world (a dig at the Jaina-s). Only that knowledge of the teacher is useful which pertains to the norm of thought and behaviour to be pursued by the seeker after truth. He alone is to be regarded as *pramāṇa* (authoritative) who is a knower of the Four Noble Truths (*āryasatya-s*). It is immaterial whether he can see things at a great distance or not; what matters is whether he knows what we want from him. If he who can see things at a distance be regarded as *pramāṇa*, then we should, leaving others,

¹ चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थो धर्मः । *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra*, I. 1. 2

worship the eagle who has this capacity to a very great degree.¹

Karunā or infinite mercy leads one to seek such knowledge for imparting it to others so as to bring them out of the slump of ignorance and passions to the light of emancipation. Dharmakīrti refuses to accept that he who is omniscient cannot speak, for there is no established rule that the omniscient person does not speak; on the contrary, knowledge is an indispensable requirement for speaking or imparting instruction.²

The *citta* (mind, consciousness) is, according to the Buddhists, luminous by nature, the impurities being adventitious.³ Hence the capacities of the soul for

¹ ज्ञानवान् मृम्यते कश्चित् तदुक्तप्रतिपत्तये ।

अज्ञोपदेशकरणे विप्रलम्भमनशङ्किभिः ॥

तस्मादनुष्ठेयगतं ज्ञानमस्य विचार्यताम् ।

कीटसंख्यापरिज्ञानं तस्य नः क्रोपयुज्यते ॥

हेयोपादेयतत्त्वस्य साम्युपायस्य वेदकः ।

यः प्रमाणमसाविष्टो न तु सर्वस्य वेदकः ॥

दूरं पश्यतु वा मा वा तत्त्वमिष्टं तु पश्यतु ।

प्रमाणं दूरदर्शी चेदेहि ग्रामानुपासहे ॥ *Pramāṇavārttika*, II. 32-5

² उक्त्यादेर्दोषसंशयः ॥ 144 ॥

नेत्येके व्यतिरेकोऽस्य संदिग्धो व्यभिचार्यतः ॥ 145

तायः स्वदृष्टमागोक्तिः, वैकल्याद् वक्ति नानृतम् ॥ 147

दयालुत्वात् परार्थं च सर्वारम्भामियोगतः ।

तस्मात् प्रमाणं तायो वा चतुःस्त्यप्रकाशनम् ॥ 148 ॥ *Pramāṇavārttika*, II

³ प्रमास्वरमिदं चित्तं प्रकृत्यागन्तवो मल्लः ॥ *ibid.*, 210

infinite knowledge and mercy cannot be denied. This was acceptable to Dharmakīrti also though he does not say so specifically in connection with omniscience in the sense of knowing everything in the world. Dharmakīrti as a logician is not interested in whether a person can know things at a distance or not, or know the past or the future. What, according to him, is worthy of examination is that he whom we regard as authoritative, should have knowledge of the ultimate truth which is essential for the attainment of *Nirvāṇa*, that is to say he must have the realization of the Four Noble Truths. Still, it cannot be said that Dharmakīrti would have denied omniscience in the sense of knowledge of all things past, present and future in the case of the Buddha. The theory of *prabhāsvara-citta*, luminous consciousness, would not have allowed him to do so.

Śāntarakṣita and following him Kamalaśīla refute all the above arguments of the Mīmāṃsaka-s at great length and give arguments of their own in favour of an omniscient person (TS, 3262 ff.). The Buddhists believe that the Veda can be traced to a person and this proves that there is a person who perceives all things directly, not through the Eternal Word, which is an impossibility (3262-7). Further what has been stated as to the impossibility of anyone knowing all hairs, etc., even of a single body . . . is without any basis, due entirely to ignorance, because it is quite possible that there may be someone for whom all things become manifested by the clear, unflinching

light of knowledge and no proof can be adduced against such a possibility.¹

Mere non-apprehension cannot prove the non-existence of the omniscient Person; apprehension is neither the cause (*kāraṇa*) nor the pervader-concomitant (*vyāpaka*) of the existence of things. Things may not be perceived and yet they may be existent, for example, the distant Himālaya-s. If through some means of cognition the Mīmāṃsaka has recognized his apprehension as invariably concomitant with all things, then his own omniscience is established without any effort and he cannot be hostile to his own omniscience (3270-4). Only an omniscient person can apprehend the omniscient person. The *sarvajña* not being apprehensible (*upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāpta*), his non-existence cannot be established by any of the rules laid down to establish the non-existence of apprehensible things (3275-81). The Buddhist very rudely says that if the *sarvajña* is denied on the ground of mere non-apprehension then the Mīmāṃsaka might as well deny the marriage of his own mother and such other facts (3282-6). Even if it can be proved that there is no apprehension whatsoever of a *sarvajña*, there could be only doubt regarding his existence, but one cannot deny his existence. There are some saintly

¹ किंचाकारणमेवेदमुक्तमक्षयमाश्रितम् ।

केचरोमणि यावन्ति कस्तानि शतुर्महति ॥

यस्माच्चिर्मलनिष्कम्पज्ञानदीपेन कञ्चन ।

द्योतिताखिलवस्तुः स्यादित्यत्रोक्तं न बाधकम् ॥ TS, 3268-9

persons who are believed to have knowledge of the *sarvajña*. It is also conceivable that the *sarvajña* being *ātmanjyoti* (a light unto himself, self-luminous) perceives himself by himself. Thus, there can be no certainty regarding the non-apprehension of the *sarvajña* by all men (3287-91).

From these arguments it can be seen that to the Buddhist, mere non-apprehension of an entity cannot be proof of its non-existence.

The Mimāṃsaka-s argue that if the *sarvajña* has direct perception of all things, then he would have direct experience of impure and unclean things also and no one would approve of such a *sarvajña*!¹ The Buddhist reply is that if he experiences these things by the sense-organs then he could be regarded as blameworthy. But things are cognized by him without actual contact of the sense-organs through the *citta* (mind, consciousness) whose perceptiveness has been brought about by the impression of past experiences (3318-9).² Kamalaśīla adds here that there is no one who is really blameworthy because the code of

¹ साक्षात्प्रत्यक्षदर्शित्वाद्यस्याशुचिरसादयः ।

स्वसंवेद्याः प्रसज्यन्ते को नु तं कल्पयिष्यति ॥ TS, 3145

² Cf. *Sanmatitarkaṭikā*, p. 62, ll. 32-7: 'यदि परस्पररागद्विषेदनात् रागादिमान् भवति ; अन्यथा भोग्रियद्विषस्यापि स्वप्रकृतेन मद्यपानादिसंवेदनाद् मद्यपानदोषः स्यात् । अथाप्यरसनेन्द्रियजं तज्ज्ञानमिति नाबं दोषस्तर्हि नेन्द्रियजमिति कथमशुचिरसात्वाद-दोषस्तत्रासंभवे ? न च रागादिसंवेदनाद् 'रागी' इति लोके व्यवहारः ; किन्त्वज्ञानाकाम-नाद्यमित्यपस्वसंवेदितस्याशिष्टव्यवहारकारिणः स्वात्मस्वभावस्योत्पत्तेः, न चासौ तत्रोक्ति-कथं स रागादिमान् ?

ethics varies from race to race and from time to time. In any case, the Buddha is not blameworthy because his perception of things is purely mental. His *citta* also is not likely to suffer from despair (*daurmanasya*), etc., because these arise from illusion, whereas the Buddha's mind is free from it and cognizes all things correctly as evanescent. Again all these objections might be valid if the external world existed, but according to the Vijñānavāda, as there is no *rūpaskandha* (physical matter, colour-phase), there can be nothing impure and unclean and no impression due to it, as everything rises from Ideas only. It has been said, 'The unclean taste and other things manifest themselves only through Ignorance; hence they are imperceptible (for the Wise One), just like the second Moon.' Kamalaśīla says that the Veda being omnipresent is in contact with all unclean places and it also resounds in the Brāhmaṇa's mouth. Can he then be said to be free from blame? " (*Pañjikā*, 3319)

In a dogmatic vein it is argued that even though there are a number of teachers such as Kapila, Mahāvīra and others, the Buddha is the only *sarvajña*, for the doctrine of No-soul (*nairātmyavāda*) realized by him is the only ultimate truth. Other schools are lost in the doctrine of the Soul and so cannot give a convincing explanation of *mokṣa* or Non-Ego. Even though the definition of the *sarvajña* is stated in the general form that that person is *sarvajña* who knows the whole world in its true nature of being without soul, etc., yet it follows by implication that the particular person who

fulfils the conditions of this definition is *sarvajña*, and only the Buddha does so as he knows the Four Noble Truths perfectly (3320-37).¹

Omniscience follows from the removal of the obstruction of afflictions (*klesāvaraṇa*) and obstruction of cognizable things (*jñeyāvaraṇa*). The afflictions, love, hatred, etc., obstruct the perception of the real nature of things and are called the cover of afflictions (*klesāvaraṇa*). The cover of cognizable things (*jñeyāvaraṇa*) consists in the incapacity to discern all things to be secured (*upādeya*) and to be rejected (*heya*) and also the inability to describe them. Of these two, the *klesāvaraṇa* is removed by direct perception of the fact of there being no-soul (*nairātmya*), and the *jñeyāvaraṇa* is removed by faithful, intense and long-continued meditation upon the said soullessness (3338 and *Pañjikā* on it). Omniscience can be thus attained and this has been possible in the case of the Buddha alone (3339-53).

¹ Every school regards its own teacher as the only *sarvajña*. Haribhadra however says in his *Yogadr̥ṣṭisamuccaya* (101-7) that there can be but one *sarvajña*, whatever his name; that is to say, every *sarvajña* knew the same ultimate truth, though he might have presented it variously in accordance with the attitude and needs of his pupils. (सर्वज्ञो नाम यः कश्चित् पारमार्थिक एव हि । स एक एव सर्वत्र व्यक्तिमेवेति तत्त्वतः ॥ 103; also 131-47.) He says that *tarka* (reason, ratiocination) which can be manipulated as one chooses, cannot help us in regard to the highest truth which is unattainable except by Yogic knowledge (141 and न चानुमानविषय एषोऽर्थस्तत्त्वतो मत्तः । न चातो निश्चयः सम्यगन्यथाप्याह चीमतः ॥ 142 ; cf. तर्कप्रतिष्ठानात् *Brahmasūtra*.)

Other arguments advanced by the Mīmāṃsaka-s are also refuted. The Mīmāṃsaka-s argue that 'speakership' (*vaktṛtva*) is incompatible with omniscience, for the former involves conception which is not a piece of valid knowledge. The answer is that when the *sarvajña* speaks the conceptual state does exist; yet this does not mean that his words are such as have been uttered by one who is not omniscient, because non-omniscience has been set aside by omniscience (3359-65). Some Buddhists believe that even when the Buddha is free from conceptualization, his teachings go on under the force of the initial momentum—in the manner of the revolutions of the wheel (3368-9).

By omniscience what is meant is a mental cognition; so the objection raised by the Mīmāṃsaka to a person being able to perceive all things like taste, odour, etc., by the eyes (3158) is absurd (3381-9). Again, one has no idea of the power of the sense-organs in all times—past, present and future. He who has, would himself be a *sarvajña* and all this discussion would be superfluous. All cognitions, when pure, would, as a rule, apprehend all things though in a certain case there may be some peculiarity in the result of the cognition on account of particular causes. For example, if a fruit tree is found to yield a small fruit in the desert it does not necessarily follow that in other places also it will yield fruits of the same small size. Similarly it is asserted that serpents hear through the eye. In fact the capacities of action

belonging to beings are wonderful and anything might be possible for them.¹

We know of persons who have the art of thought-reading which brings about the knowledge of what is passing in another's mind and with its help people come to know and describe things, past, present and future that have not been perceived, inferred or heard of during the present life. Similarly, people are distinctly and truly found to be possessed of the capacities of curious incantation, etc. All this may not be seen, yet there is no proof for denying it.² Hence it cannot be said that the *sarvajña* does not exist (3390-401).

Further, just as the capacity of the ear and other sense-organs in relation to their objects is enhanced by special exercise, meditation, etc., so also is the case of the mind. Vultures, for example, are able to see things lying at a great distance and people are enabled to perceive such things as hidden treasures, by the use of magic ointments, etc. Similarly, through special exercise one should be enabled to see celestial and other beings as also things subtle, hidden and so forth. Through particular practices of Yoga, etc., the mind of the mystics and their cognitions come to be of a superior order. There can be nothing incompatible in this (3404-7).³

¹ शृण्वन्ति चक्षुषा सर्पा इत्येषां श्रुतिस्ततः ।

समाचार्या विचित्रा हि सत्त्वानां कर्मशक्तयः ॥ TS, 3392

² मा वा भूद् इष्टमित्यादि तथाप्यत्र न बाधकम् ।

किंचित्प्रमाणमस्तीति तदभासो न सिद्धयति ॥ TS, 3401

³ योगाभ्यासविशेषाच्च योगिनां मानसं तथा ।

ज्ञानं प्रकृतकर्म स्यादित्यत्रास्ति न बाधकम् ॥ TS, 3407

Wisdom (*prajñā*), mercy (*kṛpā*), and so forth are qualities of the mind and there is every possibility of their rising to the highest stage.¹ Thus is that wisdom attained which consists in the knowledge of all things and it remains incomplete while even a single thing remains unknown (3410-3).² When there is complete deterioration of afflictions and defects which are adventitious and obstruct the perception of truth, true knowledge appears unobstructed and proceeds to comprehend the whole circle of knowable things (3416-20). Thus we have here the clarification that omniscience in its ideal stage means knowledge of all things.

Wisdom, mercy, etc., by their very nature, are of the same essence as the perception of Truth and as such they constitute the nature of consciousness. Once the path (*mārga*) is identified with the stream, there is no suppression of them by impurities which are adventitious. As the flow of qualities goes on appearing in the stream of consciousness, it grows more and more luminous (3434-40).³

The cognition of the ultimate truth (*nairātmya* or *jñāna*) is vouched for by Perception because it is clearly

¹ This is a stock argument of many *darśana*-s, that where gradation is found, there is bound to be the highest limit. See *Yogasūtra*, I. 25; *Aṣṭasādhari*, 4, etc.

² अर्थावबोधरूपा हि प्रज्ञा लक्षणतः स्थिता ।

एकस्याप्यपरिज्ञाने सासमाप्तैव वर्तते ॥ TS, 3413 ॥

³ यावद् यावद् गुणोच्चोऽस्याभाभिमुख्येन वर्तते ।

प्रमास्वरत्ना तावत् सुतरामेव वर्तते ॥

प्रमास्वरमिदं विचित्रं तत्त्वदर्शनसात्मकम् ।

प्रकृत्यैव स्थितं यस्मान्मन्त्रस्वागन्तवो मन्त्राः ॥ TS, 3434-5 ॥

manifest and is in agreement with the real nature of things. The single clear appearance of all things in a single cognition is quite possible.

This teaching is so consistent and fulfils its purpose so excellently that it cannot be asserted that it comes from a person with a deranged mind (3458-61). Thus when there is superior knowledge and it proceeds on the basis of proper means, it can comprehend all that is, even that which is beyond the senses. You cannot judge the capacity of others from your own weakness. In this way your stupidity being ascertained you would regard even the learned man as stupid from your own example (3462-66).

The knowledge of things of all times—past, present and future—should not be conceived of as something impossible. All things directly and indirectly bear to each other the relation of cause and effect. The present thing is always the effect of the past thing and the cause of the future. What the Yogin-s do is to apprehend all things by direct Perception, and thereby determine the Past and Future entities also on the basis of the stream of entities, past and future, which are related as cause and effect respectively—by means of conceptions (*vikalpa*) which are really objectless, but yet are in conformity and follow in the wake of the said Perception (3473; see also 1853-5).¹ This shows that at

¹ This means that in the view of some of the Vijnānavādin-s, even the *yogi-pratyakṣa* alloyed with *vikalpa* is a kind of clear inference, but is termed *pratyakṣa* for convenience inasmuch as it is clear, valid and in conformity with other knowledge. The case of

least some of the Vijnānavādin-s regard Yogic perception as a perception by conceptions inasmuch as it does not betray, it works, it is in conformity and is clear, even though *vikalpa* or conceptualization is involved in it. The Sautrāntika-s, on the other hand, believe that the

the Buddha is different, for he is beyond the realm of ordinary men's thought and words. Cf. कथं प्रत्यक्षेण अर्थस्य रूपं न गृह्यते । न ग्रहणे वा कथं प्रमाणमिति चेत्, अनवस्थानात् । योगिमिः ग्राह्यग्राहकविकल्पानपेक्षः परचित्तज्ञानमपि व्यवहारविशेषादादेव रूपाद्यालोचनमिव प्रमाणम् । योगबल्यत् तेषां ज्ञानं परचित्ताकारविशेषानुकारि स्फुटप्रतिभासमानं भवति । कर्मदेवाद्यधिष्ठानवशात् : सत्यस्वप्नदर्शनवत् । तेषामपि परचित्तगोचरप्रत्ययोत्पादः । तैरपि स्वचित्तप्रतिभासाकार-तुल्यत्वादेव च ज्ञत्वा परचित्तज्ञानमिति अवधारणादेव व्यवहियते । तत्प्रत्यक्षस्य तदाकारानुकारस्य स्फुटप्रतिभासनात्, अविश्ववादकप्रमाणा मिति इष्यते ।

अचिन्त्यो हि भगवतः सर्वार्थावगमः, सर्वथा ज्ञानवचनविषयातिक्रान्तत्वात् । (*Santānāntarasiddhi* of Dharmakīrti, obtained from Muni Śrī Jambūvijayajī).

Compare the Jaina concept of *manah-paryāyajñāna* (knowledge of the mind and thoughts of others). We find two different views regarding it. According to one tradition, *manah-paryāya* is to know directly the things reflected upon by another's mind; whereas the other tradition is of the view that *manah-paryāya* is visualization of the modes (*paryāya*) of another's mind which is engrossed in thought and therefrom later infers what the things reflected upon could be. This second tradition started on account of the objection that could be raised that the things thought of could be both corporeal and non-corporeal and the *manah-paryāya* could not know these latter directly. See *Āvaśyakamiriyukti*, Gāthā 76, *Tattvārthasūtra* and *bhāṣya* (I. 29) for the first view, and *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya*, 814, *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, Singhi Jaina Series, p. 15 for the second view. The view of Dharmakīrti given here corresponds to the second kind of *manahparyāya* wherein the modes of another's mind are known directly, but the things thought of by it, indirectly.

See also *Yoga-sūtra* and *bhāṣya*, III. 19; *Majjhima-nikāya*, 16. 2.

Lord Buddha has direct perception of all things of all times. So Śāntarakṣita alternately says that through the powers of Yoga, the mental perception of Yogin-s can clearly perceive the past and the future also, independently of Inference and Verbal Testimony. True, there is no specific individuality (*svalakṣaṇa*) in what is past or future, yet as apprehending its own manifestation the Yogin's mental perception does envisage a *svalakṣaṇa* and as envisaging a clear and distinct manifestation it is held to be Perception.¹

Having established that omniscience is possible, Śāntarakṣita comes to details regarding it. There is nothing incongruous in mutually incompatible or mutually exclusive things (*parasparaparihāri*), like pure-impure, and non-coexistent (*sahānavasthāyi*) being cognized, like a serpent and a peacock, by the same cognition. By figuring in the same cognition things do not become either unified or co-existent.² If pleasure and pain are not cognized simultaneously that should be understood to be due only to the requisite cause being absent. Even the various colours, blue, yellow, white, etc., which are mutually incompatible in reality on account of the difference of place, origin, etc., are actually seen at one and the same time (3622-6). It is quite possible for the *sarvajña* to comprehend within a

¹ स्वात्मावभाससंविदेस्तत्सबलक्षणगोचरम् ।

स्पष्टावभाससंवेदात्तच्च प्रत्यक्षमिष्यते ॥ TS, 3475

² न चैकविज्ञानभासनादेशामैक्यमेकदेशत्वं वा प्रसज्यते ॥

single moment of cognition the entirety of all that is to be known; hence no succession need be necessarily admitted (3627).

Kamalaśīla, at this stage, gives a detailed exposition. Some Vijñānavādin-s themselves have raised the objection that if the entire round of cognizable things is embraced within a single cognitive moment, then that would imply a limit to the number and extent of things and this would go against the accepted view that the number and extent of things are endless. Kamalaśīla's reply is that if this argument is put forth on the basis of the view that cognitions are formless, then there is no force in it. Whenever a thing on becoming cognized thereby acquires existence, all that is comprehended by the cognition of the *sarvajña* is that it is existent and is, therefore, said to be embraced by it. This does not mean that it covers the place occupied by the thing as a cloth covers a number of jars. The fact that certain things are apprehended by a single cognition does not deprive the things of their nature or character, so that by reason of their being cognized by a single cognition they could be said to renounce their endless character. Blue, yellow, etc., appearing in a single cognition do not cease to be many, nor do they merge into one another; they are apprehended by that cognition exactly as they are. The world which has existence is similarly apprehended by the cognition of the *sarvajña* exactly as it exists. There is no end to the extent of the worldly region in any direction, hence it is apprehended as limitless, not as limited.

If the objection is meant to be urged against the view that cognitions have forms, then also there is no such incongruity as has been pointed out. As the limitless things manifesting themselves in endless forms come into existence, so also rises the consciousness of the *sarvajña*, which appears as envisaging the forms of all these limitless things and there is no incongruity in this as there is nothing incompatible in a single cognition envisaging the forms of several things. When things enter into the cognition in certain forms, in those same forms they become recognized by the representative consciousness (*parāmarśacetā*) that follows it, and things do not enter into the consciousness of the *sarvajña* as appearing in a limited number of different forms, but everything that happens to be existent enters into it. The capacity of the *sarvajña* is such that in becoming the substratum of the cognition of all things, it is not trammelled in any way, especially as mental cognition envisages all things. Thus the consciousness of the *sarvajña* can apprehend the forms of limitless things.

There are some people who hold the view that the whole consciousness of the Yogin is devoid of objective basis and resembles the true dream; hence, being in conformity with the real state of things, it is valid or reliable. In answering these people, there is much less scope for the objection regarding things becoming limited.¹

¹ ये तु पुनः सर्वमेव योगिविशानमालम्बनं सत्त्वप्रदर्शनवद् वस्तुसंवादितया प्रमाणमिति प्रतिपन्नास्तान् प्रत्यन्तवत्त्वचोद्यं दूरीकृतावकाशमेवेत्यलं बहुना ॥ *Pañjika*, 3627

Some people believe that there are persons who become omniscient at will. Whatever such a person wishes to know he comes to know without fail—such is his power, as he is free from all evil. He knows things either simultaneously or in succession just as he wishes and having secured knowledge of all things, he becomes the Lord (*prabhu*). There is no incongruity even in the view that the Lord's cognition of things is successive. He knows all that is knowable, namely the Four Truths, by means of his sixteen cognitions in succession and on that account he is omniscient. The cognition of the Lord comes in quick succession; not even a single moment has to be awaited, let alone a hundred years! (3628-31) ¹

The *pūrvapakṣin* had argued that even if the *sarvajña* could apprehend all things, he could not apprehend the specific individualities of all things (see 3251). The answer to this is that the person who apprehends all things in their own undiversified form knows the very form of all things. When the scriptures say that the cognition of Yogin-s, free from all impurities, pertains to universals only, not to specific individualities, it has to be pointed out that it is the specific individuality

¹ यद्वा बोद्धव्यमिच्छितेभ्यः सत्यस्वभावकम् ।

क्रमेण वेत्ति विज्ञेयं सर्वं सर्वविदित्यतः ॥ *TS*, 3630

बोद्धव्यमिच्छितैरिति । क्षान्तिज्ञानैः । अष्टौ क्षान्तयो दुःखधर्मज्ञानाद्यादयः, अष्टौ च ज्ञानानि दुःखधर्मज्ञानादीनीति 'बोद्धव्यमिच्छितेभ्यः सत्याभिसमय' इति वचनात् । *Pañjika*.
Note the stress on the Four Truths.

(*svalakṣaṇatva*) itself as different from heterogeneous and non-momentary things which is spoken of here as universal (*sāmānya*) on the ground of its leading to calmness and dispassion. The cognition that apprehends this, which is brought about by the force of meditation and appears only in great Yogin-s, envisages the specific individuality itself. The import is that the universal (*sāmānya*) referred to in the scriptures does not mean Generality or Universality which the Buddhists regard as illusory, but it means the specific features of similarity which put certain things on the level of homogeneity and distinguish them from heterogeneous things. It is clear that this is equivalent to the perception of specific individuality. The consciousness of the mystic is free from conceptual content and is not erroneous; and if it apprehended the said universal it would be something beset with conceptual content and error. Therefore there does exist a *sarvajña* who knows all things along with their causes through a single extraordinary cognition brought about by *samādhi* (communion) (3632-41). Śāntarakṣita proceeds to say that the Buddha alone is this *sarvajña*; he has propounded the teaching which is pure and wherein things are said to be essenceless; there is nothing that can sublate this teaching; it destroys the entire host of enemies in the shape of evils and is the cause of various kinds of prosperity as also of the attainment of *nirvāṇa*. Such a person acquires special powers not common among men, by which he is distinguished from all other men, and he alone is *sarvajña*. This is entirely

vouched for by means of right cognition. Thus the assertion of a person (*pauruṣeyavacaḥ*) can certainly be the means of providing knowledge of *dharma*, contradicting the Mīmāṃsaka belief that the *apauruṣeya* Veda alone is capable of it (3642-5).

The arguments of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla have been given at length, because the *Tattvasaṃgraha*'s treatment of the concept of *sarvajña* is the best that we find in the whole range of Indian philosophical literature. We find the same arguments repeated in other works and so a detailed exposition at this stage will permit us to relate the views of other systems in brief. It can be seen that Śāntarakṣita and his disciple clearly admit the existence of a *sarvajña*, the Buddha, and also of Yogic perception which can perceive supersensuous things. But they are of the view that the *sarvajña* does not necessarily know all things in their specific individualities all at once. The knowledge might be successive, while at the same time the capacity for knowing all things without exception exists. Again, to move abreast with the times they did admit omniscience as meaning knowledge of all things in their specific individuality, but their emphasis was, in line with their own tradition, on the knowledge of the Four Noble Truths. We may recall here two episodes in the Pali canon. The Buddha is reported to have said that there was no *śramaṇa* or *brāhmaṇa* who was *sarvajña*, who knew and visualized everything. The Buddha explained that what he meant was that there was no such person who knew and visualized

everything all at once.¹ We find that the Pali Piṭaka-s frequently rail at Mahāvira who is believed in the Jaina tradition to know and see all things fully every moment of his existence.²

The second episode is found in the *Milindapañha* (IV. 1. 19-27).³ Milinda asked whether the Buddha was omniscient. Nāgasena replied that he was, but the insight of knowledge was not always and continually present with him consciously. The omniscience of the Buddha was dependent on reflection (*āvajjana-paṭibaddham*). But if he did reflect he knew whatever he wanted to know. Now the question is, if his all-embracing knowledge was reached through investigation, could the Buddha be called omniscient (*sabbāññū*)? The answer to this is that there are seven classes of minds, each succeeding one purer than the preceding one. The omniscient Buddha's mind is of the purest type and is clear and active to a degree that is beyond our ken. And yet it is on reflection that he knows whatever he wishes to know. This can be explained as follows. It is as when a man passes something he already has in one hand to the other, or utters a sound when his mouth is open, or swallows some food that is already in his mouth. More rapid than that and more easy in its action is the all-embracing knowledge of the

¹ नन्वि सो समणो वा ब्राह्मणो वा यो सकिदेव सर्वं अस्सति सर्वं दक्खीति, नेतं ठानं विज्जतीति । See *Kaṇṇakathālasutta*.

² See *Devadahasutta*, 101; *Cūḷa-sakuludāyisuttanta*, 79; *Cūḷa-dukkha-khandhasuttanta*, 14, and so on.

³ See *The Questions of King Milinda*, SBE, vol. XXXV, pp. 154 ff.

Buddha, more rapid than that his reflection. Though it is by reflection that the Buddha knows whatever he wants to know, yet even when he is not reflecting, even then he is not anything other than omniscient. Suppose there is a very rich man with his coffers and granaries full. A guest comes unexpectedly after the inmates of the house have finished their meal and they have to get rice out of the jar and prepare a meal for him. Should that wealthy man merely by reason of the deficiency in eatable stuff at that unusual time be rightly called poor or needy? Certainly not. Just so is the case of the all-embracing knowledge of the Buddha when reflection alone is wanting; but which on reflection grasps whatever he wants.

The Buddhist view of omniscience is that the *sarvajña*, the Buddha, has the capacity to know all things both simultaneously and successively, depending on whether he directs his attention or reflection to them, as the need arises. This corresponds to the Jaina concept of *upayoga* (attention, active consciousness), though in a *sarvajña*, the latter is continual. The Buddhists admit the element of conceptualization (*vikalpa*) in Yogic perception, but regard it as valid inasmuch as it works and is not incompatible with the real state of things. Their stress on the knowledge of the Four Noble Truths is noteworthy.

The Jaina-s were the staunchest supporters of the doctrine of omniscience. They had no difficulty in explaining or justifying omniscience because in their view the soul itself is the direct seer and knower.

According to them, true *pratyakṣa* (direct knowledge) is of the soul. Perception with the help of the sense-organs is only secondarily or empirically so (*sāmānyava-hārika-pratyakṣa*). When by true knowledge, faith and conduct, all passions and evils are dispelled and the soul attains its inherently pure state, free from the obscuration (*āvarāṇa*) of *karma* (psychic and physical), the soul's perception is at its best and the soul becomes omniscient; that is to say, it achieves *kevalajñāna* (omniscience) which can cognize everything in the universe in all its aspects and details.¹

Perception does not mean perception by the senses of things that are near. What is meant by *pratyakṣa* is a clear grasp of things. It may be of things present, or even of those of the past or future.²

According to the Jaina-s, in contrast to the view of the Buddhists, there is continual *upayoga* (attention) in the omniscient soul, so it continually has knowledge of all things in all their aspects—*dravya* (basic substance), *bhāva* (modes of all times), *kṣetra* (space) and

¹ *Bhagavatisūtra*, VIII. 2. 106: केवलज्ञानस्तु न मते! केवलस्य विसृष्टे! गोयमा! से समासओ चतुर्विधे पञ्चते, तं ज्ञा—दृक्त्वओ, सत्त्वओ, कालओ, मावओ। दृक्त्वओ न केवलज्ञानी सत्त्वदृक्त्वाद् जाणइ पासइ। एवं जाव मावओ। also *Sanmatitarka*, p. 62. II. 10-4: तथा हि—‘अनुते’ सर्वपदार्थान् ज्ञानात्मना व्याप्नोतीति व्युत्पत्तिश्चन्द्रसमाभयणाद् अक्षः आत्मा, तन्माभितम्, उत्पाद्यत्वेन तं प्रति गतमिति प्रत्यक्षमिति व्युत्पत्तेः। अम्युपगमभावेन चाभ्यासवशाद् प्राप्तप्रकर्षेण ज्ञानेन सर्वं इति प्रतिपादितम्। न त्वस्याकम्यमम्युपगमः किन्तु ज्ञानाद्याचारकषातिकर्म-चतुष्टयवशोऽज्ञानाशेषवशेयव्याप्यमिन्द्रियव्यवहारात्कारिजनवतः सर्वज्ञत्वमम्युपगम्यते।

² See *Nyāyakumudacandra*, pp. 96-7; also Jayanta's *Nyāyamajjarī*, Kashi Sanskrit Series, pp. 97-8.

kāla (time). The Jaina-s believe that it is not possible to know fully even a single thing without knowing thoroughly all the other things in the world. A thing has to be known from the point of view of its own modes (*svaparyāya*) and from that of alien modes (*paraparyāya*), so as to be able to know its essence as also to distinguish it from others. Therefore he who knows one can be said to have knowledge of all things, and he who knows all knows one thing. Thus the omniscient must have thorough knowledge of all things at the same time.¹

We find no note of even the slightest dissent in any of the Jaina works as regards omniscience. Only a few *gāthā-s* in the *Niyamasāra* of Kundakundācārya are a bit puzzling. It is said that if someone argues that the Omniscient Lord sees the nature of the self only, but not the universe (*loka*) and the non-universe (*aloka*), how could he be blamed? (165); it is further said that if someone argues that the Omniscient Lord knows the universe and the non-universe only, but not the soul, how could he be blamed? (168). This has led some to believe that even the Jaina-s, especially the most rational ones, believed that the omniscient soul is not expected to know every little thing in the

¹ *Ācārāṅgasūtra*, I. 3. 4; also एको मावः सर्वया येन दृष्टः सर्वे मावाः सर्वथ तेन दृष्टाः। सर्वे मावाः सर्वया येन दृष्टा एको मावः सर्वया तेन दृष्टः॥ Quoted in *Syādvāddamajjarī*. See also *Pravacanasāra*, I. 48-9: जो न विजाणदि जुगवं अत्वे तिकाळिओ तिहुवणत्वे। जातुं तस्स न सकं सपञ्चयं दृक्त्वमेगं वा॥ दृक्त्वं अर्थात्मकयमेगमर्णतानि दृक्त्वआदीणि। न विजाणदि अदि जुगवं किंच सो सम्वाणि जाणदि॥

world; what was regarded as essential was the knowledge of the soul, or self. This was the *mīcaya-naya* (real point of view) of the Jaina-s which alone is ultimately true as against the *vyavahāra-naya* (practical point of view) which is ultimately false.¹

But if we carefully examine the context in which these *gāthā-s* occur in the *Niyamasāra* we find that the point in question is that *darśana* (indeterminate intuition) and *jñāna* (determinate knowledge) exist simultaneously in the *kevalajñānin* (omniscient soul). Now some may try to distinguish between the two by saying that *jñāna* illuminates other objects, while *darśana* illuminates the soul only and the soul illuminates itself and other objects. This may be valid from the empirical point of view and if someone says that the *kevalajñānin* has *darśana* of the soul only, or that he has *jñāna* of things other than the soul, we cannot find fault with him from the empirical point of view. But from the ultimate point of view, no such abstraction or even distinction is possible. The soul, *jñāna* and *darśana* are all one. Thus even the *gāthā-s* mentioned above cannot be said to be in conflict with the Jaina notion of omniscience.

There is a very interesting discussion in Jaina works regarding the simultaneity or otherwise or identity of the *upayoga* of *kevaladarśana* (indeterminate intuition) and of *kevalajñāna* (determinate knowledge, omniscience). The Digambara-s regarded the two

¹ वषाणेभूदत्यो भूदत्यो देखिओ दु सुखजने । भूदत्यमस्तिओ सङ्ग समविट्ठी इवदि जीवो ॥ *Samayasāra*, 13.

upayoga-s as simultaneous.¹ Amongst the Śvetāmbara-s, Jinabhadra has in his *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* (Gā. 3090 ff.) and *Viśeṣaṇavati* (Gā. 184 ff.) made a strong case in favour of the successive *upayoga* of *kevaladarśana* and *kevalajñāna*. We find that the Āgama-s are of the view that the *upayoga-s* are successive; there is no *darśana* when there is *jñāna*, and no *jñāna* when there is *darśana*, for the *kevalin*. (See *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya-tīkā*, 3112). But then such a *kevalin* with successive *upayoga* could not be called a *sarvajña*. Therefore the idea of simultaneous *upayoga* came into force, and an attempt was made to support it by interpreting the Āgama-s accordingly. The notion of the identity of the *upayoga* of *kevalajñāna* and *kevaladarśana* could not but follow in the wake of the idea of their simultaneity. Mallavādin was regarded as the pioneer of the belief in their simultaneity and Siddhasena Divākara of the belief in their identity.² It can be seen that the idea behind the identity of the *upayoga* of *kevaladarśana* and *kevalajñāna* was that such abstractions are made only from the empirical point of view, but from the real point of view, they are but one whole. This is what Kundakunda also seems to have meant in the above-mentioned *gāthā-s*.³

¹ See *Tattvārthabhāṣya*, I. 31, *Sarvārthasiddhi*, I. 9, *Āptamīmāṃsā*, Kā. 101; *Aṣṭaśati*, p. 281, etc.

² For a detailed discussion, see *Jñānabindu* (pp. 38 ff.) of Yaśovijayaḥ.

³ अप्यसकसं पेच्छदि लोयालोयं न केवली मयसं ।

जह कोह मयह एव तस्य य किं वृत्तं होह ॥ 65 ॥

We have the problem of Yogic perception (*yogi-pratyakṣa*) which is closely allied with the omniscience treated in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya-Yoga and other works. Praśastapāda says that unlike us Yogin-s can perceive even subtle things like their own soul, the souls of others, ether, space, time, the atom, air, the mind, attributes, actions and universals, and differentia related by inherence to them and the relation of inherence itself. Yogin-s can be of two kinds: *yukta* and *viyukta*. When the Yogin is in *samādhi* and the mind is incessantly connected with the soul, he can know everything. This is his *yukta* state. But when the Yogin is not in *samādhi*, his perception is like ours brought about by the contact of object, sense-organs, mind, and soul as the case requires; only he can perceive even subtle, hidden and distant things.¹ Viśvanātha also says that *yogaja-pratyakṣa* is twofold. In the *yukta* there is continual knowledge of all things; while in the *yuñjana* (i.e. in the process of concentration), *cintā* (corresponding to the Jaina *upayoga*) also is necessary.²

लोयालोयं जाणइ अप्याणं जैव केवली मगं ।

जइ कोइ मगइ एवं तस्स य किल दूत्तणं होदि ॥ 168 ॥

Niyamasāra; see *ibid.*, 159-70

¹ अस्मद्विशिष्टानां तु योगिनां युक्तानां योगजवर्मानुग्रहीतेन मनसा स्वात्मान्तराकाशदिक्कालपरमाणुवायुमनःसु तत्समवेतगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषेषु सम्भावे चावितर्क स्वस्मदर्शनमुत्पद्यते । विद्युक्तानां पुनश्चतुष्टयसंनिर्वाद् योगजवर्मानुग्रहसामर्थ्यात् सूक्ष्मव्यवहितविप्रकृष्टेषु प्रत्यक्षमुत्पद्यते । *Bhāṣya*, p. 97. See *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, IX. 1. 11-15.

² योगजो द्विविधः प्रोक्तो युक्तयुज्जानमेवतः ॥ 65 ॥

युक्तस्य सर्वदा मानं चिन्तासहकृतोऽपरः ॥ 66 ॥ *Kārikāvali*.

The Sāṃkhya-Yoga has a new point to offer which is worth noting. According to them, the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) is *vibhu* (infinite in dimension) and all things are potentially present at all times. Hence, even in *yogaja-pratyakṣa*, contact with the object can be established and the ordinary definition of *pratyakṣa* is valid here also. The omniscience of the Yogin in the highest stage is called *ṛtambharā prajñā* (Truth-bearing wisdom).¹

It may be noted that in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view, knowledge is an attribute produced in the soul by its contact with the mind, which itself is in contact with the sense-organs or its own object. Thus in the state of liberation, when the soul is no longer in contact

युक्तस्य तावद्योगजवर्मसहादेन मनसा आकाशपरमाण्वादिसिद्धयदार्थगोचरं ज्ञानं सर्वदैवमविद्युमर्हति । द्वितीयस्य चिन्ताविशेषोऽपि सहकारीति ॥ *Siddhāntamuktāvali*; see also *Nyāyasāra*.

Jayanta has treated the problem of omniscience and Yogic perception at length in his *Nyāyamatiśari* (pp. 95 ff.). He also quotes Kumārila as his *pārvoapakṣin*, and he is very much influenced by the Buddhist rejoinders to Kumārila and by the Buddhist and Jaina view of perception as clear, distinct knowledge. If a man passing through a jungle, on account of his mind being overpowered by fear, sees an imaginary robber behind a bush, he is prepared to concede to this knowledge the status of perception inasmuch as it is clear presentation. Thus by constant reflection one can have a clear presentation of imperceptible things also.

¹ See *Yogasūtra*, I. 24-7, 48-9 and commentaries. But the *vibhūti*-s including omniscience are not regarded as directly indispensable for the attainment of *mokṣa*. (See *Yogasūtra*, III. 54-5 and *vārttika*).

with the mind, sense-organs and body, it has no knowledge, and then the question of omniscience does not arise at all. Similarly in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga, the soul is only the witness and it is the *buddhi* (intellect) that is the knower. Therefore in the state of *kaivalya* (emancipation) the soul—pure sentiency—will have no particular differentiated knowledge, which is a phenomenon of *prakṛti*, and consequently cannot be *sarvajña*. This is held to be true of the emancipated soul in the philosophy of Śaṅkara also, with this additional point that in that state, there is nothing other than it which could be known. The other Vedāntin-s regard the soul as a knower and so accept it as omniscient even in the emancipated state.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Yoga introduced God into their systems, perhaps at a later stage. Both regard God as bodiless. Yet they regard God as a knower, as omniscient and so on. God is eternally omniscient, powerful. That is his very nature. Hence the Yoga calls God *puruṣaviśeṣa* (a special kind of soul) and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, *paramātmā* (Highest Self).¹ All the schools of thought that recognize a personal God regard him as omniscient.

It can thus be seen that almost all the systems of Indian thought recognize the soul as capable of omniscience, that is knowledge of all things past, present and future, in all their specific details. According to the

¹ See *Yogasūtra*, I. 24-7 and commentaries of Vyāsa, Vācaspati and Vijñānabhikṣu; also *Nyāyamahatī*, pp. 184-5.

Buddhists, this knowledge may be all at the same time, or successive, as the consciousness of the Yogin wants it to be. The Nyāya believed that in the state of *samādhi*, there is continual knowledge of all things at the same time, while when the Yogin has risen from it, attention and help derived from sense-organs also play a part in his perception. Yoga regards omniscience as one of the *vibhūti-s* (excellences). The Jaina-s believe in continual *upayoga*, and therefore in the knowledge at one time of all things of all times in all their fullness in the case of a *kevalin*, whether the body exists or not. In the case of a *kevalin*, omniscience is bound to be present. The other systems of thought do not regard omniscience as indispensable for emancipation, though it may be found in particular cases or because the soul regains its natural state of purity. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Śaṅkara's school do not regard the liberated soul, free from the body, etc., as *sarvajña*. The Buddhists, Jaina-s and the theistic Vedāntin-s regard the liberated soul as *sarvajña*.

II. TEXTS AND STUDIES

LAGHUPASARGAVṚTTI

EDITED BY V. KRISHNAMACHARYA

THE *Laghūpasargavṛtti*, which is now being published for the first time, is a small and simple monograph dealing with the Upasarga-s or Prepositions in Sanskrit. These Upasarga-s are twenty in number and each of them has several meanings. The work explains in verse and prose the meaning of the Upasarga-s with suitable illustrations.

Regarding the significance of Upasarga-s there are two views. The grammarians hold the view that Upasarga-s have no meaning in themselves, but they simply reveal the hidden meaning of the roots to which they are prefixed. On the other hand, the Naiyāyika-s hold the view that like other words, the Upasarga-s too have their own meaning and by virtue of their expressive power the original meaning of the roots is changed. The author of the work belongs to the former school.

The name of the author is not known. As the work is found in the midst of some Jaina works in the codex, he may be inferred to have belonged to the Jaina faith. The work is written on the model of Kāśīrasvāmin's *Nipātāyayopasargavṛtti*, published in the Sri Venkateswara Oriental Series, Tirupati, and is different from the Upasarga portion of that edition.

This edition is based on a unique MS. (No. TR 443) in the Adyar Library. Another MS. of this work is in the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, described under No. 4606 of vol. 6 of their Descriptive Catalogue. Other MSS. entitled *Upasargavṛtti*, *Laghūpasargavṛtti* and *Laghūpasargadīpikā*, evidently identical with the present text, are in the Oriental Institute, Baroda, the Kerala University, Trivandrum, and the Punjab University collection.

लघूपसर्गवृत्तिः

प्रपरापसमन्ववनिर्दुरभि-

व्यधिसूदतिनिप्रतिपर्यपयः ।

उप आङ्गिति विंशतिरेष सखे

उपसर्गगणः कथितः कविभिः ॥ १ ॥

अयमुपसर्गगणः प्राचीनैः कविभिरुक्तो विंशतिसंख्याकः ॥ १ ॥

नियोगे वियोगे भृशार्थे च तृप्तौ

तथा शुद्धिश्चक्यप्रपूजासु शान्तौ ।

वदन्त्यादिकर्मण्युदीर्णे प्र सन्त-

स्तथा संभवैश्वर्यदृष्टामिलाषे ॥ २ ॥

प्र इत्ययमुपसर्गः पञ्चदशस्वरेषु प्रवर्तते । नियोगे; प्रयुक्तः । वियोगे; प्रोक्तः । भृशार्थे; प्रवदन्ति दायादाः । तृप्तौ; प्रमुक्तमङ्गम् । शुद्धौ; प्रसम्पुदकम् । शान्तौ; प्रसक्ते विद्यावाम् । अत्रे; प्रवाले वृक्षः ।

पूजावाम्; प्रवाले; वृक्षः । शान्तौ; प्रसक्ते विद्यावाम् । अत्रे; प्रवाले वृक्षः । भवातः । उदीर्णे; प्रसक्ते राज्ञः । संभवे; प्रसक्ते गता मन्वति । ऐश्वर्ये; प्रसक्ते वृक्षः । अत्रे; प्रसक्ते वृक्षः । अत्रे; प्रसक्ते वृक्षः ॥ २ ॥

परा वये गतौ धर्षेऽनामिमुखमहृष्टार्थयोः ।

अप्राधान्ये विमोक्षे स्याद्विक्रमनामिलोम्ययोः ॥ ३ ॥

परा इत्ययमुपसर्गः नवस्वरेषु प्रवर्तते । वये; पराहतः । गतौ; फल्यते । धर्षे; परावृष्टः । अनामिमुखे; परावृष्टः । मृष्टार्थे; पराजितः । अप्राधान्ये; पराधीनः । विमोक्षे; परागतः । विक्रमे; पराक्रान्तः । मातिलोम्ये; पराङ्मुखः ॥ ३ ॥

वियोगे वर्जने चोर्वे हर्षे निर्देष्टव्यारणे ।

विपर्ययविकृत्योऽप्यप इत्ययमुपसर्गः ॥ ४ ॥

अप इत्ययमुपसर्गः अष्टस्वरेषु वर्तते । वियोगे; अपयान्ति । वर्जने; अप साकेतात् वृष्टो देवः । चोर्वे; अपवर्ति । हर्षे; अपहसति । निर्देशे; अपदिशति । वारणे; अपवर्ति पापात् । विपर्यये; अपशब्दः । विकृतौ; अपवृत्तम् ॥ ४ ॥

सिद्धौ समक्षे प्रभवैक्ययोग-

समन्ततोभाषविधूपनेषु ।

श्लेषाभिमुख्ये च विधौगसत्ये

वदन्ति सं स्वीकरणे च कोपे ॥ ५ ॥

सम् । अयमुपसर्गः अष्टस्वरेषु प्रवर्तते । सिद्धौ; संसिद्धिः । समक्षे; संकक्ष वर्तते । प्रभवे; संभवः । प्रभवः कर्तुः । ऐश्वर्ये; संभवति मुख्याः ।

योगे; संगतः । समस्ततोभावे; संकीर्णः । विदूषणे; संस्मृते कन्ध ।
स्तेष्वे; संघटे कार्यम् । आभिमुख्ये; संमुखम् । वियोगे; संविमक्तः ।
सत्ये; संस्तः । स्वीकरणे; संगृह्णाति । कोपे; संकुदः ॥ ५ ॥

पश्चाद्भावे सप्तमे आभिमुख्ये
सामीप्याधिष्ठानसादृश्यहीने ।
स्वाध्यायेऽपि प्रोक्त एवानुबन्धे
पूर्वाचार्यैरन्वयं चाविसर्गे ॥ ६ ॥

अनु । अयमुपसर्गो दशस्वरेषु प्रवर्तते । पश्चाद्भावे; अनुबन्धः ।
सप्तमे; । आभिमुख्ये; अनु मातरं धावति । सामीप्ये;
अनुसायं गमनम् । अधिष्ठाने; अनुक्षेपं पाटलिपुत्रम् । सादृश्ये; अनुकृतिः ।
हीने; अन्वर्जुनं योद्धारः । स्वाध्याये; अनुवाकमधीते । अनुबन्धे; अनु-
शयः । अविसर्गे; अनुकान्तो गच्छति ॥ ६ ॥

व्याप्तिशुद्धिवियोगेषु विज्ञाने चावलम्बने ।
बुधैः परिमवे प्रोक्तमीषदर्थेऽप्यव स्फुटम् ॥ ७ ॥

अव । अयमुपसर्गः सप्तस्वरेषु प्रवर्तते । व्याप्तौ; अवकीर्णः । शुद्धौ;
अवदातं सुखम् । वियोगे; अवसुक्ता कान्ता । विज्ञाने; अवगतोऽर्थः ।
अवलम्बने; दण्डमवहम्बास्ते । परिमवे; अवहसति । ईषदर्थे; अव-
लम्बनम् ॥ ७ ॥

पापात्मबभूवार्थेषु वियोगावेद्ययोश्च निर् ।
कामातिक्रमयोः प्रोक्तः पण्डितैरवधारणे ॥ ८ ॥

निर् । अयमुपसर्गः दशस्वरेषु प्रवर्तते । पापे; निर्मर्त्यः ।
अत्यवे; निर्मलं सरः । भूवार्थे; निर्णीतम् । वियोगे; निःसत्यम् ।
आवेद्ये; निर्दिष्टः । कामे; निर्दिष्टः (?) । अतिक्रामे; निष्क्रान्तः ।
अवधारणे; निमित्तम् ॥ ८ ॥

वैवर्ण्यकृत्सनालामासंपत्तिषु दुरुच्यते ।
ईषदर्थे कृते प्रोक्तः पूर्वाचार्यैः कवीन्दैः ॥ ९ ॥

दुर । अयमुपसर्गः षट्सु अक्षरेषु प्रवर्तते । वैवर्ण्ये; दुर्बले;
कृत्सने; दुष्पुत्रः । अलामे; दुष्पाम् । असंपत्तौ; दुर्गतः । ईषदर्थे;
दुर्गृहीतः । कृते; दुःखः ॥ ९ ॥

पूजोक्तीच्छादने नृत्ये सादृश्याभायोरभिः ।
सारूप्याभिमुख्यभाषौ स्यादृष्टार्थप्रयोगयोः ॥ १० ॥

अभि । अयमुपसर्गः द्वादशस्वरेषु प्रवर्तते । पूजायाश्च; अभिवाद-
यति । उक्तौ; अभिप्रदयः । इच्छायाश्च; अभिलषति । अदने; अभ्यवहरति ।
नृत्ये; अभिनयः । सादृश्ये; अभिजातः । आभाये; अभ्यस्यति । आदृश्ये;
अभिरूपः । आभिमुख्ये; अभिमुखः स्विः । व्याप्तौ; अभिसन्धः ।
भूवार्थे; अभिस्तः । प्रयोगे; अभिप्रमाति ॥ १० ॥

नानार्थे भयकृत्सने च कलहे दूरार्थपेक्षुन्ययो-
रैश्वर्यातिशयमर्थनभूवार्थोत्कर्षयोरेषु च ।
अभाषान्यविषयोऽपि दुरुच्यते ।
कस्मिन्मन्त्रेऽपि अयमुपसर्गः प्रोक्तः विरचितुं ॥ ११ ॥

वि । अयमुपसर्गः पदस्वर्गेषु वर्तते । नानार्थे; विचित्र
पाणिनेः सूत्राणां गतिः । भवे; विष्णुः । कुत्सने; निरूपः । कस्ये;
विमर्शं वनम् । दूरार्थे; विस्तृतमन्त्रानम् । वैश्वानरे; निरुति । ऐश्वर्ये;
विमुक्तदणः । अतिशये; विकीर्णः । प्रदर्शने; विवेकनीया कन्वा ।
मृष्टार्थे; विस्तृता नभः । उत्कर्षे; विस्मितो जनः । शौर्ये; विक्रान्तः ।
अमाधान्ये; निष्ठः । विद्योने; विमुक्तः । मोहे; विमनस्कः । चतुल-
स्थाने; विप्रान्तः । ईश्वर्ये; निरुतिः । अनामिमुख्ये; विमुक्तः ॥ ११ ॥

आधिक्यस्मरणैश्वर्यवशीकृतिषु वर्तते ।

अधिष्ठानेऽप्यधिः शोक्तस्तथा चाध्ययनेऽपि सः ॥ १२ ॥

अधि । अयमुपसर्गः पदस्वर्गेषु वर्तते । आधिक्ये; अकिराजः ।
स्मरणे; मन्त्रमधिसरति । ऐश्वर्ये; अधिपतिः । वशीकृतौ; अधिकरोति
रणी रम् । अधिष्ठाने; अधिगुणः । अध्ययने; अधीते व्याकरणम् ॥ १२ ॥

पूजायां च सृष्टौ च मृष्टकुष्कार्ययोरपि ।

उपसर्गविशेषज्ञैः सुः शोक्तोऽनुमतावपि ॥ १३ ॥

सु । अयमुपसर्गः पदस्वर्गेषु वर्तते । पूजायाम्; सुखम् । सृष्टौ;
सुखम् । मृष्टार्थे; सुखा आपः । कुष्कार्ये; सुदुष्करम् । अनुमतौ;
सुहृत् ॥ १३ ॥

मायव्यकायमोसोर्ध्वकर्ममाकाशवचकषु ।

विद्योवामावन्त्ये स्वादुदस्वाद्यमवामयोः ॥ १४ ॥

उत् । अयमुपसर्गः पदस्वर्गेषु वर्तते । मायव्ये; उद्वेगः तवी ।
काये; उत्पन्नं द्रव्यम् । मोहे; अज्ञः । कायैश्वर्ये; आत्मादुपिहति ।
माकाशे; उचरति । शक्तौ; उद्गाहः । विद्योने; उत्पन्नं गच्छति ।
अमाये; उत्पन्नः । वन्त्ये; उद्गाहः कन्वा । अस्वास्थ्ये; उत्पन्नः ।
मवाने; उत्पन्नः ॥ १४ ॥

मृष्टार्थेऽतिशयेऽपि स्याद् वृद्धपतिक्रान्तयोरपि ।

अत्यतिक्रमणे शोक्त उपसर्गविचक्षणैः ॥ १५ ॥

अति । अयमुपसर्गः पदस्वर्गेषु वर्तते । मृष्टार्थे; अतिसा आपः ।
अतिशये; अतिमानुषस्य ज्ञानम् । वृद्धौ; अतिमेवं गणनम् । अतिक्रान्ते;
अतिनु जन्म । अतिक्रमणे; अतिहस्यति ॥ १५ ॥

निवेष्टे शुक्लार्थमने दारक्ये-

अधोमामविद्यासक्तोऽप्यधिः

समीपे सृष्टौ कर्मव्यवस्थिते

कुर्वन्मामाये विरामे निरिषु ॥ १६ ॥

नि । अयमुपसर्गः पदस्वर्गेषु वर्तते । निवेष्टे; निवेष्टो ।
मृष्टार्थे; निरुतिः । आधारे; निष्ठा । दारक्ये; निमित्तो देवदणः ।
अधोमाये; निपतिः । विद्यासक्ते; निवेष्टनं गृह्यम् । कर्मव्ये; निपुणः ।
मोहे; निष्ठः । समीपे; समिद्धः । कर्मव्ये; निवेष्टनं गृह्यम् । निरिषु;
व्यक्तम् । सृष्टे; निरुतिः । विरामे; निवेष्टनं गृह्यम् । निरिषु;
निरामे; निरुतिः ॥ १६ ॥

सादृश्यादानरुग्धिसातद्योने व्याप्तिवारणे ।

निवृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बामिमुख्ये स्याद् व्यत्यये प्रति ॥ १७ ॥

प्रति । अयमुपसर्गः एकदशस्वर्षेषु प्रयुज्यते । सादृश्ये; प्रति देवदत्तस्य । आदाने; प्रतिगृह्णाति । रुजि; प्रतिश्यायः । हिंसायाम्; प्रतिहतः । तद्योगे; प्रतिपन्नमेतेन । व्याप्तौ; प्रतिकीर्णः पांसुभिः । वारणे; प्रतिनिवृत्तः । निवृत्तौ; प्रतिक्रान्तः । प्रतिबिम्बे; । आभिमुख्ये; प्रतिसूर्यं गच्छति । व्यत्यये; तैलेन घृतं प्रतिददाति ॥ १७ ॥

परि दोषोक्तिविभूषण

उपरमपूजासमन्ततोभावे ।

व्याप्त्यालिङ्गनवर्जने-

निवसनशुभ्याधिवीप्सासु ॥ १८ ॥

परि । अयमुपसर्गः द्वादशस्वर्षेषु दृश्यते । दोषोक्तौ; परिहसति देवदत्तः । विभूषणे; परिष्करोति कन्याम् । उपरमे; परिपूर्णः कुम्भः । पूजायाम्; परिचरति गुरुम् । समन्ततोभावे; परिभ्रमति । व्याप्तौ; परिगतो वह्निना ग्रामः । आलिङ्गने; परिष्वजति कन्याम् । वर्जने; परि त्रिगतेभ्यो वृष्टो देवः । निवसने; परिधानम् । शुचि; परिदेवनम् । व्याप्तौ; परिगताः स्फोटकाः । वीप्सायाम्; वृक्षं वृक्षं परिसिञ्चति ॥ १८ ॥

संभावननिवृत्त्याक्षीरपेक्षासु समुच्चये ।

प्रभ्रभूषणगर्हाभ्रंशेऽपिः प्रोक्तो मनीषिभिः ॥ १९ ॥

अपि । अयमुपसर्गः नवस्वर्षेषु वर्तते । संभावने; अपि सिञ्चेत् मूलसहस्रम् । निवृत्तौ; अपि मानसं ज्ञात् । आक्षिपि; अपि कर्षस्तं

वीज्यात् । अपेक्षायाम्; अपि विद्वान् । समुच्चये; अपि सिञ्चेः । प्रभ्रे; अपि गच्छति । भूषणे; अपि नद्यति द्वारम् । गर्हायाम्; अपि स्तुवात् वृषलीपतिम् । भ्रंशे; अपि भ्रंश्येत् वचने ॥ १९ ॥

दाक्षिण्यवीप्सावृत्तिदानपूजा-

तद्योगसामर्थ्यसमीप उक्तः ।

व्याप्तावुपाचार्यकृतौ च दोषा-

ख्याने तथारम्भविनिश्चये च ॥ २० ॥

उप । अयमुपसर्गः त्रयोदशसु प्रयोगेषु प्रयुज्यते । दाक्षिण्ये; उपचारः । वीप्सायाम्; देवं देवमुपयाचते । वृत्तौ; उपरतो देवदत्तः । दाने; उपहरत्यर्थं देवदत्ताय । पूजायाम्; उपासितो वह्निः । तद्योगे; उपपन्नं ध्यानमाह । सामर्थ्ये; उपकरोति देवदत्तः । समीपे; उपकुम्भम् । व्याप्तौ; उपकीर्णः पांसुभिः । आचार्यकृतौ; उपदिशति शिष्येभ्यः । दोषाख्याने; उपघातः । आरम्भे; उपक्रमते भोक्तुम् । विनिश्चये; उपपन्नमेतत् ॥ २० ॥

स्पर्धेच्छाप्तिषु बन्धने च निलये वाक्ये समीपग्रहेऽ-

प्यन्तर्भावनिवृत्तिविस्मयभयादानोर्ध्वकर्माक्षिपि ।

कृच्छ्रे साध्यनिमन्त्रणाभिविधिषु श्लेषाभिमुख्येऽपि चाङ्

निर्देहावधिविक्रियासु शकने स्थानादिकर्मण्यपि ॥ २१ ॥

आङ् । अयमुपसर्गः सप्तविंशत्यर्थेषु वर्तते । स्पर्धायाम्; मल्ले मल्लमाद्वयते । इच्छायाम्; आकाङ्क्षति । आप्तौ; आसादितमनेन । बन्धने; आमुञ्चति कवचम् । निलये; आवसथः । वाक्ये; आश्रययति । समीपे; आसन्नः । ग्रहे; आलम्बते । अन्तर्भावे; आपीतमुदकं सिक्ताभिः । निवृत्तौ;

आवृत्तः । आरमति । विस्मये ; आनन्दितः । भये ; आकम्पितः । आदाने ;
 आवृत्ते धनम् । ऊर्ध्वकर्मणि ; आरोहति हस्तिनं हस्तिपकः । आशिषि ;
 आशास्ते । कृच्छ्रे ; आपदं गतः । साध्ये ; आचरति कपटेन । निमन्त्रणे ;
 आमन्त्रितः । अभिविधौ ; आकुमारं यशो रामभद्रस्य । श्लेषे ; आलिङ्गति ।
 आभिमुख्ये ; आगच्छति देवदत्तः । निर्देशे ; आदिशति । अवधौ ; आका-
 न्यकुब्जं वृष्टो देवः । विक्रियायाम् ; । शक्ने ; आक्रमते गगनं
 चन्द्रमाः । स्थाने ; आस्पदम् । आदिकर्मणि ; आरभते विद्यामध्येतुम् ॥२१॥

इति लघुरूपसर्गवृत्तिः समाप्ता

III. NOTES AND REVIEWS

OBITUARY NOTICES

DR. FRIEDRICH OTTO SCHRADER

We record our deep appreciation of the splendid work of the great German Orientalist, Dr. Friedrich Otto Schrader, who passed away on 3rd November 1961. He was Director of the Adyar Library from 1905-16, and was mainly responsible for establishing the scholarly traditions of this research centre. Born in 1876 at Hamburg, Dr. Schrader was educated in different leading universities of Germany, such as Kiel, Göttingen and Strassburg. In 1902 he took his Doctorate, the subject of his thesis being 'The State of Indian Philosophy at the Time of Mahāvīra and the Buddha'. He came to India with high credentials from Deussen, Oldenberg and Leumann, at the invitation of Col. H. S. Olcott, the President of the Theosophical Society, and took charge of the Adyar Library as its Director on 28 November 1905. During the first World War he was interned as a German subject towards the end of 1914, and stayed in a camp in Ahmednagar till 1920, when he was repatriated to Germany with other prisoners. During the term of internment he could do little except continue a part of the literary work he was doing for the Library; and his official connection with the Library ceased in July 1916. Still he continued to be a well-wisher of this institute and was in touch with its activities till his death. Back in Germany he accepted in 1921 the Sanskrit chair at the Kiel University which he held till 1950. After retirement he continued to live in Kiel until his death on 3 November 1961.

Dr. Schrader's services to the Library have been unique and we shall keep them in grateful memory. It was he who set the academic activities of the Library on firm foundations. By his diligent search for manuscripts and the several tours he himself

made in the early years of his service, as well as the tours of the pandits organized by him, he was able to enrich the collection of Sanskrit manuscripts, especially in the sections relating to the Upaniṣad-s and the Āgama-s of the Pāñcarātra school. It was under his direction that a preliminary list of Sanskrit and Prakrit MSS. of the Library and the Descriptive Catalogue of the Upaniṣad Manuscripts were published; also the critical editions of the *Sāmānya Upaniṣad-s* and the *Ahīrbudhnya Saṃhitā*. His *Introduction to the Pāñcarātra*, completed during his captivity, still remains a classic introduction to the subject. Dr. Schrader's scholarship and interest covered a very vast field. A list of his publications, kindly sent to us by his daughter, Sita Ljungerud, is given below:

- Ueber den Stand der indischen Philosophie zur Zeit Mahāvīras und Buddhas*. Leipzig, 1902
Kennt die Lehre Buddhas den Begriff der christlichen Liebe? Berlin, 1903
Māyā-Lehre und Kantianismus. Berlin, 1904
Die Fragen des Königs Menandros. Berlin, 1905
Wille und Liebe in der Lehre Buddhas. Berlin, 1905
 'On the Problem of Nirvāṇa' (*Journal of the Pali Text Society*, 1905)
Bibliography of Sāṅkhya-Yoga-Samuccaya Works. Adyar, 1906
A Descriptive Catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Adyar Library, Vol. I: *Upaniṣads*. Madras, 1908
The Lingua Franca of Future India (lecture del. at the Ranade Library, Madras on 28 March 1909). Madras, 1909
 'On Ahimsā and Vegetarianism, mainly in Buddhism' (*Ceylon National Review*, Colombo, 1910)
On the Relation of Herakleitos the Dark to Some Contemporaries and Predecessors. Adyar, 1910
 'Zum Ursprung der Lehre vom Saṃsāra' (*ZDMG*, 64, 1910)
 'Ueber Bhagavadgītā II, 46' (*ibid.*)
 'Zur Bedeutung der Ausdrücke Mahāyāna und Hīnayāna' (*ibid.*)
The Minor Upaniṣads, Vol. I: *Samnyāsa Upaniṣads*, critically edited. Adyar, 1912
The Problem of Free-will in Indian Philosophy. Bangalore, 1914

- Buddhism*. Adyar, 1914
The Religion of Goethe. Adyar, 1914
 'Das Śaṣṭitantra' (*ZDMG*, 68)
The Ahīrbudhnya Saṃhitā of the Pāñcarātra Āgama, Vols. I-II, critically edited. Adyar, 1916
Introduction to the Pāñcarātra and the Ahīrbudhnya Saṃhitā. Adyar, 1916
 'Transcription and Explanation of the Siamese Alphabet' (*Asia Major*, 1, 1924)
 'Dravidisch und Uralisch' (*ZII*, 3, 1924)
 'Lingāyatas and Metempsychosis' (*WZKM*, 31, 1924)
 'Brahman und Dharma' (*Festschrift H. Jacobi*, 1925)
 'Siamese mute h' (*Asia Major*, 3, 1926)
 'Neues über die Bhagavadgītā' (*Festschrift R. v. Garbe*, 1927)
 'Ein syntaktisches Problem der indischen Sprachfamilien' (*ZII*, 6, 1928)
 'Problems of the Siamese Alphabet' (*Journal of the Siam Society*, 21, 1928)
 'Sanskrit *anala* "Feuer"' (*Zeitschr. f. vgl. Sprachforschung*, 56, 1928)
 'Hinduismus: I. Religionsgeschichtlich' (*Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Handwörterbuch für Theologie und Religionswissenschaft. Zweite, völlig neu bearbeitete Auflage. Band II. Tübingen, 1928)
 'Indien: I. Ethnologisch und politisch. 1. Vorderindien' (*ibid.*, Band III)
 'Indien: II. Religionsgeschichte' (*ibid.*, Band III)
 'The Sacrificial Wheel taught in the Bhagavadgītā' (*IHQ*, 5, 1929)
 'Concerning Bhagavadgītā III. 15' (*ibid.*)
 'Der Hinduismus'. Tübingen, 1930. (Religionsgeschichtliches Lesebuch, in Verbindung mit Fachgelehrten herausgegeben von A. Bertholet. Zweite erweiterte Auflage. Heft 14)
The Kashmir Recension of the Bhagavadgītā. Stuttgart, 1930
 'Esa muñjam parihare' (*JRAS*, 1930)

- 'Nachlese zu Āśvaghōṣa's Buddhacarita' (*Journal of the Taisho University*, 1930)
- 'A Curious Case of Idiomatic Sanskrit' (*BSOS*, 6, 1931)
- 'The Bhagavadgītā in Ancient Kashmir' (*The Aryan Path*, Bombay, 1931)
- 'Goethe and the East' (*ibid.*, 1932)
- 'On Some Tibetan Names of the Buddha' (*IHQ*, 1933)
- 'A Critical Study of Īśopaniṣad' (*Indian Antiquary*, 1933)
- 'Rezensionen der Bhagavadgītā' (*Festschrift Winternitz*, 1933)
- 'Indische Beziehungen eines nordischen Fundes' (*ZDMG*, 1934)
- 'Ancient Gītā Commentaries' (*IHQ*, 1934)
- 'Vedānta and Sāṃkhya in Primitive Buddhism' (*Indian Culture*, 1935)
- 'On the Form of the Bhagavadgītā contained in the Kashmirian Mahābhārata' (*JRAS*, 1935)
- 'Apropos the Brahmapurāṇa' (*Indian Culture*, 1936)
- 'On the "Uralian" Element in the Drāviḍa and the Muṇḍā Languages' (*BSOS*, London, 1936)
- 'The name Kalki(n)' (*ALB*, 1, 1937)
- 'Contemporary Indian Philosophy' (*Philosophy*, 12, 1937)
- 'An Implication of the Bhagavadgītā Riddle' (*New Indian Antiquary*, 1938)
- 'Sanskrit hevāka' (*Bulletin of the Sir Rama Varma Research Institute*, Trichur, 1938)
- 'Two Unexplained Names in the Milindapañha' (*JRAS*, 1939)
- 'Beziehung zwischen Veda und Edda' (*Zeitschrift für Deutsches Altertum und Deutsche Literatur*, 1940)
- '"Selige Sehnsucht". Ein Bekenntnis zur Seelenwanderung' (*Euphorion*, 46, 1952)
- 'Sāṃkhya, Original and Classical' (*ALB*, 1955)
- 'On the Meaning of the Terms Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna' (Source unknown)
- 'Zenna and Dhyāna' (Source unknown)

P. K. GODE

The sudden demise of Dr. Parashuram Krishna Gode on 28 May 1961 removes from the scholarly world an enthusiastic and mature research worker and a prolific writer of illuminating papers on many out-of-the-way topics connected with the literary and cultural history of India. Born on 11 July 1891 and educated under scholars like Prof. Gune, he joined the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute as its Curator and continued to be there till his retirement. Besides the various volumes of Descriptive Catalogues of the manuscripts in the Bhandarkar Institute, and the editions of standard Indological journals like *The New Indian Antiquary* and *Festschriften* to eminent Indologists (edited jointly with Dr. S. M. Katre), Dr. Gode has to his credit nearly 600 original research papers published in the various journals and commemoration volumes. Arrangements were made to publish them in several volumes; of the seven volumes contemplated five have already been published. He received the honorary degree of D. Litt. from Paris, and two years ago a volume of Indological studies was presented to him by scholars. Dr. Gode was closely associated with the academic activities of the Adyar Library and was a regular contributor to *The Adyar Library Bulletin*.

MARY PATTERSON

We regret to announce the sudden passing away in South Africa of Mrs. Mary Patterson who came to Adyar from the United States and worked as Librarian for a few years.

MANUSCRIPT NOTES

ṢAḌBHĀṢĀVIVARAṆA OF BĀLASARASVATĪ

THE *Prākṛta-prakāśa* of Vararuci and the *Prākṛta-sūtra-s* of Vālmīki are the two famous Sūtra works written on the grammar of the Prākṛta dialects, as is the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini in the case of Sanskrit. Following the *Prākṛta-sūtra-s* of Vālmīki, Lakṣmīdhara and Bālasarasvatī wrote the *Ṣaḍbhāṣācandrikā* and the *Ṣaḍbhāṣāvivarana* respectively, explaining the *sūtra-s* after rearranging them into various chapters, namely, *Samjñāprakaraṇa*, *Sandhiprakaraṇa*, etc., so that they might be easily and clearly applied to the formation of words, just as Rāmacandra and Bhaṭṭoji have done in the *Prakriyākaumudī* and *Siddhāntakaumudī*. Of these two works, the former (*Ṣaḍbhāṣācandrikā*) has already come to light and scholars have utilized it for their study. But the latter (*Ṣaḍbhāṣāvivarana*) still remains unnoticed.

There is a rare MS. copy of the *Ṣaḍbhāṣāvivarana* of Bālasarasvatī, preserved in the Adyar Library amongst its valuable collection of MSS. It is a paper MS. written in the Devanāgarī script containing 146 pages. It bears the shelf No. TR 451. The work is not mentioned in the *Catalogus Catalogorum* of Aufrecht. It is divided into the following chapters:

I. Prākṛta

- (a) Samjñāprakaraṇa
- (b) Sandhiprakaraṇa
- (c) Śabdādhikāra
- (d) Taddhitaprakriyā
- (e) Tīñantaprakriyā

II. Śauraseni

III. Māgadhi

IV. Paisāci

V. Cūlikā Paisāci

VI. Apabhraṃśa

VII. Bhāṣāvinīyoga

Beginning:

चतुर्मुखमुखाभोजसुखक्रीडितरागिणी ।
 वाणी यमभिसेते स्म तस्मै वाल्मीक्ये नमः ॥
 कविसंज्ञा पुरा यस्मादजनिष्ट जगत्त्रये ।
 काव्यानि यदुपज्ञानि तस्मै वाल्मीक्ये नमः ॥
 वाल्मीकिं सूत्रकारं च वृत्तिकारं त्रिविक्रमम् ।
 वन्दामहे महाचार्यान् हेमचन्द्रादिकानपि ॥
 तातपादं गुरुं देवं तान्महाकविनायकान् ।
 कृष्णदेवान्नमस्यामि ब्रह्मविद्यागुरुन् सताम् ॥
 यलकूचिकृष्णदेवप्रथमसुतो भैरवस्य यः पौत्रः ।
 बालसरस्वत्यार्यः षड्भाषाविवरणं समातनुते ॥
 प्रागर्वागुपरिप्रभूतकविराड्बृन्दानुहार्यस्ववा-
 ग्जाले बालसरस्वतीकविमहोपाध्यायमट्टारकः ।
 संगृह्य प्रथमागमानसुगमांस्त्रैविक्रमादीनिदं
 बालानुग्रहकाम्यया रचयति प्रख्याप्यतां सज्जनैः ॥

सिद्धिल्लोकश्च ॥ प्राकृतभाषासिद्धिः लोकव्यवहारात् ज्ञेया स्यात् ।

End:

ननु—प्राकृतभाषा अनुपादेया, अपभ्रंशत्वात्, गावीगोण्यादिशब्दवत् ।
 उपादाने स्लेच्छनप्रसङ्गः । शिष्टानिबद्धविरलदेशभाषात्वमपभ्रंशत्वम् । हम्पतिरक्ष-
 त्यादीनां विरलदेशभाषात्वेऽपि शिष्टनिबद्धत्वात् नापभ्रंशत्वम् । नाट्यविषयज्ञाणा-
 किणादीनां शिष्टानिबद्धत्वेऽपि नापभ्रंशत्वम् । प्राकृतं त्वपभ्रंशः । अतो न

ग्राह्यमिति चेन्न; भगवता वाल्मीकिना निबद्धलक्षणं सर्वदेशप्रसिद्धव्यामिश्रकोप-
कारि प्राकृतं नापभ्रंशः; संस्कृततुल्यमेव । अन्यथा नाटकेऽप्यपभ्रंशस्यानुपादे-
यत्वप्रसङ्गः ।

Colophon:

इति श्रीसकलसुकविमहोपाध्यायभट्टारकबालसरस्वतीकृते
षड्भाषाविवरणे सर्व संपूर्णम्

Bālasarasvatī was the son of Kṛṣṇadeva and grandson of Bhairava. He was a great Telugu poet. He wrote a Telugu commentary on the *Āndhra Śabdacintāmaṇi* (a Sanskrit work on the grammar of the Telugu language) of Nannayabhaṭṭa. The commentary is called *Bālasarasvatīyam*, described under No 1248 of the Descriptive Catalogue of Telugu MSS. in the Madras Government Oriental MSS. Library. In this work he mentions himself as the author of the following works also: 1. *Kaumudīnāṭakamu*, 2. *Ṣaḍbhāṣāvivarāṇa*, 3. *Bāhaṭamu*, 4. *Candrāpariṇayamu*, 5. *Vāmanapurāṇamu*, 6. *Bhramara-gīṭiprabandhamu* and 7. *Yādavarāghavapāṇḍavīyam*. The author's original name was Venkatakṛṣṇa Kavi and his titles were Bālasarasvatī and Vāganuśāsana. The colophon of the work reads: *iti sakalakavitāsvatantrabhaṭṭāraka-bālasarasvatikavimahopādhyāya*, etc. He was a resident of the village Eḍappalli donated by Rāmarāya, son of Tirumalarāya (A.D. 1550).

V. KRISHNAMACHARYA

NOTES

ADYAR LIBRARY JUBILEE

The seventy-fifth Anniversary of the Adyar Library was celebrated at Adyar on 29th December 1961. The occasion also marked the Silver Jubilee or twenty-fifth Anniversary of *Brahma-vidyā*, the Adyar Library Bulletin. The function began with the Prayers of all Religions, following the custom introduced by the Founder, Col. H. S. Olcott, at the inauguration of the Library on 28th December 1886. The President of the Theosophical Society, Sri N. Sri Ram, then welcomed Dr. C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar who presided over the celebration. It was appropriate that in the President of the celebration we had a great friend and co-worker of Dr. Annie Besant, the late President of the Theosophical Society, and one who is an elder statesman of India, renowned for his leadership in political, administrative, educational and other fields, as also for his deep love of Sanskrit and Indian philosophy and culture. A special Jubilee number of *Brahma-vidyā*, containing contributions from scholars in different parts of the world, was released by him during the function.

In his opening remarks, Sri N. Sri Ram said:

Dr. Srinivasa Murti, who was for a number of years Director of the Adyar Library, used to speak of the Library as a Temple of Sarasvatī, the goddess of learning and inspiration, the embodiment of a pure stream of influence branching out into different arts, crafts and modes of knowledge. The Adyar Library is a temple, not merely because it is housed in a beautiful building (we hope before long to have a building that is handsome and dignified, to house the Library), but I feel that the work of the Library in its inner aspect is really the creation of a temple, or innumerable temples in the hearts and minds of those who come to that source.

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This Library has been in existence for all this period and has been engaged in digging out numerous treasures of ancient knowledge which are preserved very carefully, and some of these treasures have been shared with the public and with the world in general. The Library is not merely a collection of ancient treasures which repose on its shelves, but is a research centre constantly engaged in digging out something new, something with which to bring new enlightenment to the world.

The Second Object of the Theosophical Society is "To encourage the study of Comparative Religion, Philosophy and Science", all ways in which the one Truth breaks into numerous colours. And the whole function of the Library is to display these colours and draw the attention of people to them. It is work which is more needed than ever in a world which is rushing towards the ends of the earth and in which man tends to forget the riches that he can find within himself.

The Library, having reached the stage of seventy-five years, having come, so to say, to an apex of its labours during this period, has, I feel, to start from a fresh foundation and raise a super-structure which will stand dignified, facing all the corners of space, combining the dignity of the old with the newness of the modern, the young world.

Prof. Jal B. Dorab, Joint Director of the Adyar Library, read messages of greetings from various parts of the world, including the following message from the then President of India, Dr. Rajendra Prasad:

'On the occasion of the 75th Jubilee Celebrations of the Adyar Library, Madras, I send its organizers and workers my best wishes. Founded in 1886 by the first President of the Theosophical Society, Col. H. S. Olcott, this library has been a centre of research in Eastern civilization, philosophy and religion. The Adyar Library and allied educational institutions are reminiscent of the great spiritual awakening and renaissance witnessed in our country during the last century. Let me hope the spirit of

catholicity and religious tolerance which marked the birth of these institutions will continue to grow in the congenial atmosphere of free and secular India. I wish the Jubilee Celebrations of the Adyar Library success.'

Among others who sent greetings and good wishes were Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, then Vice-President and now President of India; Sri Sri Prakasa, then Governor of Maharashtra; Dr. Humayun Kabir, Minister for Scientific Research and Cultural Affairs, Government of India; Sri B. P. Sinha, Chief Justice of India; Their Holinesses, the Sri Sankaracharyas of Kamakoti and Sringeri Maths; Sri M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar, Speaker of the Loka Sabha; Dr. A. L. Mudaliar, Vice-Chancellor of the Madras University; Mr. A. Isenberg, the Ford Foundation representative in India; Mr. Karl Kup, Curator, Spencer Collection, New York Public Library; the Librarian, National Library of Australia; Dr. C. Kunhan Raja, former Director and Curator of the Adyar Library; Prof. J. Filliozat; Prof. Giuseppe Tucci; and Prof. V. I. Kalyanov who sent messages on behalf of the Leningrad Oriental Society in Hindi and Sanskrit. Greetings were also received from Sections of the Theosophical Society all over the world, and from a number of scholars, libraries, research institutes and universities.

Srimati Radha Burnier, Joint Director, gave a resumé of the work of the Library. She said:

The Adyar Library was founded by Col. Olcott in 1886, so that it would be a centre where the Second Object of the Theosophical Society, namely the Comparative Study of Philosophy, Religion and Science, could be pursued; and also to bring Eastern knowledge to the West. The Library was founded with the small personal library of the Founders of the Theosophical Society. Although it was small it was an extremely valuable library and to that Col. Olcott added a number of precious books from all over the world. He travelled widely and brought books from Ceylon, Japan, China and many other countries. So, quickly, the

Library grew into a very valuable centre of learning. Later on, Col. Olcott also appointed as Director Dr. F. Otto Schrader, a scholar from Germany. Dr. Schrader was greatly responsible for increasing the collection of palm-leaf and other manuscripts in the Library. He travelled widely all over India and also started the publications of the Library including his *Introduction to the Pāñcarātra and the Ahirbudhnya Saṃhitā* and his Descriptive Catalogue of Upaniṣad Manuscripts. That work of publication has been continued during all these years. We have recently published in the Adyar Library Series the 88th volume which is a Navya-Nyāya manual entitled *Maṇikāṇa*. I am glad to say that the Government of India has now given the Library a grant to continue the work of publishing the Descriptive Catalogues of Manuscripts which are so essential for scholars. A grant has also been given for publishing various other rare works which will include, for instance, Nanda Paṇḍita's commentary on the *Viṣṇu-smṛti* which is being edited by Pandit V. Krishnamacharya. I think, without exaggeration, I can say that because of the efforts of all the scholars in the past who included Dr. Kunhan Raja, Dr. Srinivasa Murti, Mr. Johann van Manen, Pt. K. Mahadeva Sastri, Pt. S. Subrahmanya Sastri, and others, the Library has grown to be a unique one in the whole of India. It has collections from all over the world. It includes books in Tibetan, Chinese, Sinhalese, Latin, Greek, Dutch, French, etc. We do not accumulate all kinds of books as this is a specialized Library. Many of our books are rare and of great value. To house this growing collection suitably, we are now planning a new building where the holdings will be carefully kept and the work developed. Even now a number of foreign scholars come to study in the Library but we hope that in the future, the Library will also become a kind of residential centre where they can come and stay for temporary periods and carry on this work.

Dr. V. Raghavan, Professor of Sanskrit, University of Madras, and Adviser to the Adyar Library, spoke as follows:

On behalf of scholars working in the Indological field, in this country and outside, and also on behalf of those who are working in the City of Madras, I associate myself with this Jubilee function. I have been connected with the work of the Adyar Library Bulletin from its very inception, having been a contributor to its pages from the inaugural number. And as a scholar working in the field of Sanskrit and allied studies in the Madras University, I have had occasion frequently to use the material preserved in this library. I can say, after having visited all the libraries in India and also several in foreign countries, that the Adyar Library possesses not only a very rich collection of valuable manuscripts but they are very well preserved and the service given by the Library to scholars is highly commendable. The Adyar Library has always been very helpful not only to scholars working here who have means of easy access to its treasures but also to those outside. It is with these considerations at heart that the scholars and institutions whose messages were read sent their greetings.

The Library has been supported by the Theosophical Society and its members for a long time by means of their donations; but recently the Government of India, through its Ministry of Scientific Research and Cultural Affairs, have recognized that the Adyar Library has been doing very good work and have come forward with grants to support its cataloguing work, as also the publication of rare works. As Srimati Radha Burnier has already mentioned the Adyar Library has published 88 volumes of texts and studies and some of them are of basic value. For example, in the field of Āgama literature, before Dr. Schrader published his edition of the *Ahirbudhnya Saṃhitā* and his *Introduction to the Pāñcarātra*, there was no material available of a comprehensive nature to give an idea of the contents of the Āgama literature. The second set of publications worth mentioning in the Adyar Library Series is the volumes devoted to unpublished Upaniṣad-s. The largest single collection of Upaniṣad-s are preserved in this Library and they have been published, and also translated into English, with the commentaries of Upaniṣad

Brahmendra, who was a saint living in Kanchipuram. The library contains a complete collection of all the MSS. of Upaniṣad Brahmendra. In addition to his commentaries on the 108 Upaniṣad-s, which gave him the name of Upaniṣad Brahmendra, who was otherwise known as Ramacandrendra, the Library has also published several of his other commentaries, for example, on the *Bhagavadgītā*, his concordance to the *Brahmasūtra-s*, and his works relating to his own approach to the Advaita philosophy. A third set of important works that the Adyar Library has published is the contribution of Prof. P. N. Srinivasachariar, elucidating the philosophy of the Viśiṣṭādvaita and the Bhedābheda schools of Vedānta. Another noteworthy set of publications relate to the field of Indian music. This includes an edition of the *Samgītaratnākara* of Śārṅgadeva, which is the most important text on medieval music, with an unpublished commentary of Siṃhabhūpāla, the Andhra king. The printed books of the Adyar Library are very valuable for research scholars, not only because of the very many valuable monographs and tomes which are stored here but because of the very large number of periodicals which are available for consultation. In fact, for research scholars the periodicals are the most important, because the flowing current of research is to be seen in the pages of these periodicals and those scholars who do not keep themselves in touch with the current research periodicals fall back. In this context, I should express the feeling that I have always had, that the citizens of Madras, and those interested in learning here do not come as often and in such numbers as would be proper to consult these periodicals and other valuable publications in this Library.

One of the chief characteristics which have always impressed Indological scholars in India and abroad about the Adyar Library is the care devoted to its publications and the very neat and flawless way in which they are printed. We should on this occasion congratulate the Vasanta Press where these publications have always been printed and those who are responsible for the editorial work of the Library. The meticulous care with which proofs

are examined and the very neat appearance of all these volumes is something which other institutions and publishers in India should emulate.

Dr. G. Hooykas, Professor in the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, remarked:

I wish to add my congratulations to those which have already been offered. Here in Madras in this library I see with admiration the marvellous work done on MSS. Thousands of them have been collected and I know by personal experience the trouble it often gives to procure a manuscript one specially wants. I have witnessed how they are carefully kept and aired and cleaned and I doubt whether anywhere in the world a better system could exist. What impresses me most of all is the fact that a permanent staff is in charge of copying the manuscripts. Above all, these manuscripts are published and made available to all those interested. There was a time when the West considered itself as dynamic, active and good, calling the East static, passive and not so good. Those criteria are not only antiquated and dubious, but in fact untrue. I can only say that I admire sincerely the work done here in Madras.

Mr. Renzo Pagin, Public Affairs Officer and Head of the United States Information Service, Madras, then spoke as follows:

I am very much honoured today at being asked to join you this morning in paying tribute to this great Library and Research Centre on the occasion of its 75th anniversary. Admittedly seventy-five years of steady growth and ever-improving usefulness are a record not many man-made institutions can claim. From its small beginnings the Adyar Library and Research Centre has grown to be one of the truly great international centres of scholarship and culture. Eminent men from many countries who have associated themselves with this institution, its collection of rare and precious MSS., especially from Asian countries, are known all over the world. Its list of publications testifies to the

high standards of scholarship those who work here have set for themselves while the roster of contributors to its bulletin *Brahmavidyā* reads like an International Who's Who of intellectuals. In offering my congratulations to all those who served in the growth and development of this unique temple of scholarship I have no doubt in my mind that the years to come will see it progress to the stature of an international Oriental University.

It is a particular pleasure to me to associate myself with this celebration today for several reasons: I learned of the Theosophical movement and of the Adyar Library in my early days—college days—both in Italy and in the United States. I live in this neighbourhood now and I pass by this gracious institution several times a week, and as a good neighbour I rejoice at this anniversary. I have the privilege of knowing several distinguished members of the Theosophical Society and I share their pleasure on this happy occasion. Above all, I feel a particular satisfaction that the Founder of this great library back in the dim reaches of 1886 was an American, Col. Henry Steel Olcott. Those connected or acquainted with the Theosophical movement know more about Col. Olcott than I do, I am sure, and I cannot hope to add to their knowledge, but the rest of us to whom he is merely a name can well ponder over his extraordinarily rich and full life which is one of the most interesting that we can hope to come across in the drama of international cultural relations.

Col. Olcott was born in 1832 in a Puritan family which had lived in America since colonial days. He started his adult life as an agricultural expert and founded one of the new Republic's earliest model agricultural schools, later achieving considerable renown as a writer on agricultural subjects. He was in fact for some time the Associate Agricultural Editor of *The New York Tribune*. When the Civil War broke out in 1861, Olcott volunteered for the Northern Army and under Gen. Burnside participated in the North Carolina campaign. Stricken with fever he was retired from active frontline service and was assigned duties as a special investigator and received the rank of Colonel.

As investigator he gained a great reputation by uncovering a good deal of corruption. After the war, he studied, was admitted to the Bar, and practised for some years in New York City. This spirit of inquiry led him to study a variety of subjects including spiritual phenomena and his interest in the field eventually brought him into contact with Mme. Blavatsky. The rest of the story, including their forming the Theosophical Society, and eventually setting up their Headquarters in Madras is too well known to need repetition here. A long way indeed from the North Carolina battlefields of the American Civil War to the quiet groves near Madras and quite a change in occupation from a legal consultant in customs and revenue cases in the United States to that of Chief Organizer of the Theosophical Society the world over. To such fortunate accidents do we owe the creation of immeasurably important institutions, such as the Adyar Library.

If Col. Olcott displayed an understanding that reached beyond the borders of national prejudices in attempting to bring together the lasting values of Eastern thought with the thought patterns of the West, he displayed equal foresight in creating this Library, with the aim of 'the revival of Oriental literature, the rehabilitation of the true pandit in public esteem, the promotion of a higher moral sense and spiritual aspiration among Asian youth, and a stronger mutual regard between the learned of the East and the West'.

It is of some interest to note that in founding a library Colonel Olcott was following a rather well-established tradition among Americans. The nucleus of Col. Olcott's library was his own collection of books and MSS. which he had acquired while travelling in many countries. Similarly the nucleus of several famous museums, art galleries and libraries in the United States, came from the private collections of enthusiastic hobbyists. Especially in the second half of the nineteenth century many Americans became especially interested in collecting books and forming libraries. Henry Huntington who brought together the fine library of Elizabethan rarities in San Marino, California,

said: 'The ownership of a fine library is the surest and swiftest way to immortality.' There are many distinguished collections in the United States which were formed by individuals and later donated to the public, for instance, the Pierpont Morgan Library in New York which specialized in the book arts, the Newberry Library, the John Crerar Library in Chicago which specialize in the Humanities and the Pure Sciences, respectively, and the Folger Library in Washington which has the world's greatest collection of books relating to Shakespeare.

Col. Olcott may well be proud of the Adyar Library as it is today. Indeed we may all feel pride, mingled with gratitude to the founder, at the expansion of the library's activities and the excellent research work it has been instrumental in bringing forth. But a library is a growing organism, not a static collection of books. The Adyar Library as it grows has many new needs and requirements. As, on this happy occasion, we felicitate the Library on its magnificent record of service to the world of pure learning and scholarship, let us also consider how best we can help the Library to help all of us further in the years to come.

Dr. C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar, in the course of his address said:

I have been given the precious opportunity to take part in this morning's proceedings. I welcome that opportunity for many reasons, one of those reasons and not the least important was that, although I did not personally come across Col. Olcott, I knew many of his successors in the Presidency for the Theosophical Society who have taken a dominant part in founding, augmenting, and improving this Library. I need hardly refer to the work done by persons like Dr. Besant, like Dr. Arundale, and like that great Buddhist scholar, C. Jinarajadasa. But I wish on this occasion to mention three names: the first, Dr. Otto Schrader, whom I knew and whose silent unostentatious but profoundly stimulating work was of inestimable value in making this Library the collection that it is; Dr. van Manen who was even more unobtrusive perhaps than Dr. Schrader but who did equally good work; and

also Dr. Srinivasa Murti, who is not in good health now. He was a rare phenomenon and I wish to take this occasion to pay a tribute to him, which I am sure he deserves and which I know you will appreciate.

A library, what does it mean? The British Museum, the Vatican Library, the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris, these are not only collections of books, they are places where great men are curators or librarians, men to whom scholars resort for illumination, guidance, and for proper endeavours to help them in the field of research and scholarship. Great libraries now are also engaged in the very useful work of making things easy for the readers; microfilms are available and there are libraries where under special circumstances easy reading for the people—popular as well as scientific, reading—and research work is helped by the authorities of the library. That has been the type of work that the Adyar Library also has been doing in the past.

Now it was a Latin poet who said: *Homo sum; humani nihil a me alienum puto*. 'I am a man. Nothing that appertains to man is foreign to me.' And that is the science in developing the library. A Library collects everything that interests humanity and keeps it available for people who are anxious to obtain knowledge and wisdom.

Now I have been asked to release the *Brahmavidyā*. I do so with the greatest pleasure. I have taken the occasion to dip through some of its articles and was struck by the amount of varied learning, scholarship, and erudition enshrined in this special number of the *Brahmavidyā*, the Adyar Library Bulletin, which I have great pleasure to release this morning.

The Theosophical Society has done great work. It has aroused the consciousness of the people of India which needed arousing at one time into the possibilities and the greatness of the ancient heritage. Mr. Renzo Pagin in a very interesting survey has pointed out what Col. Olcott was in his early days, and how he ranged from agricultural economics to military science and later to spiritual elucidation. All the Presidents of the

Theosophical Society alike were characterized by the very wide extent of their knowledge and the range of their interests and that quality, that attribute, has communicated itself to this Library. My friend, Mr. Sri Ram, is a very quiet, seemingly quiet, gentleman but he is a mine of knowledge and of carefully collated wisdom. He is a person who without obtrusively putting forward his points of view, in a quiet undemonstrative way, has helped to arouse interest in things that are Indian and in things that are spiritual.

Friends, I have very great pleasure in acknowledging, on behalf of the public of India, with gratitude the services done by the Adyar Library in the collections which they have made, in the care bestowed on the collation and arrangement of that collection, in the hospitality offered by it to scholars all over the world and the manner in which it has stimulated, encouraged, and fostered the study of ancient texts in the light of modern knowledge.

No library can be static. Knowledge grows from step to step. I have been present in American libraries where they have made television and pictures of new acquisitions. We cannot, on account of our financial and other conditions, notwithstanding the ambitiousness of our many five-year plans, afford to encourage libraries to that extent. I am fully aware of the manner in which the American public libraries have tended to serve as instruments of popular education as well as specialist education. Carnegie was one of those men, one of the precursors of those who regarded that every village, every township should have a library in order to contribute to the progress of popular knowledge and the elucidation of problems through the light of proper research and study. The library movement is yet in its infancy in India but great work has been done in that direction. In that work the Adyar Library can also play a part, no doubt. Much of the contents of this Library are *recondite*. Many of them are such that they would interest only the scholar or the spiritually-minded person, but even these things, precious treasures, should be popularized, so that people might know the value of the heritage of the past, which

past is a guide to our future and a light on our path. With these words I have great pleasure in congratulating the Adyar Library on the attainment of its 75th year, which is also the occasion for another smaller Jubilee, the Silver Jubilee of the *Brahmavidyā* Bulletin. God speed the Adyar Library!

Sri N. Sri Ram closed the proceedings by thanking Dr. C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar and all the speakers and guests who participated in the function. In his closing remarks he said:

When one uses the word 'library' the word creates a certain concept of a collection, a concept which is static, which is essentially something fixed, of which people can take advantage to some extent. But I feel that the Adyar Library should be a stream of inspiration, there should be flowing through it a certain influence. It is undoubtedly a reservoir of knowledge, but this reservoir should be the source for innumerable channels which will irrigate many fields of knowledge and accomplishment. There are great possibilities before the Adyar Library. It can easily extend its work tenfold without much effort, but all this will become possible as we put our minds to the task, plan out what can be done in the near as well as the farther future, and then go forward to meet the needs of the world as it is at present. The Library should be a meeting-place for minds—the mind of the ancient world and the mind of the modern man. Let us hope that the Adyar Library will be able to extend its usefulness greatly and in manifold ways, and that it will become a source by which humanity can be increasingly enlightened, a source from which it can derive comfort, consolation and strength.

THE ALL-INDIA ORIENTAL CONFERENCE

The twenty-first session of the All-India Oriental Conference was held at Srinagar on the 14th, 15th and 16th October 1961 under the auspices of the Government and the University of Jammu and Kashmir. Dr. V. Raghavan was the General President; in his Presidential address he traced the contribution of Kashmir

to Indian culture and gave a review of the progress made in the different fields of Indology. He stressed the need for senior scholars actively participating in the work of the Conference, and for raising the standard of research papers submitted. He discussed also problems of textual criticism, the proper approach to the question of interpretation of ancient Indian history and culture and pleaded for the formulation of sound principles of Indian historiography.

As usual the Conference divided itself into various sections and conducted its academic activities under different sectional presidents. There was also a Paṇḍita Pariṣad which was well attended. There were two special lectures by Dr. K. M. Panikkar on the Role of Indology in Indian Integration and by Dr. Raghuvira on Greater Indian Studies.

DR. V. RAGHAVAN HONOURED

We are happy that Dr. V. Raghavan, Member of the Advisory Board of the Adyar Library and of the Editorial Board of *The Adyar Library Bulletin*, has been honoured with the Republic Day distinction of 'Padmabhūṣaṇa' by the President of India this year.

INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF ORIENTALISTS

Sri A. K. Ghose, Secretary, Organizing Committee, announces that the 26th Session of the Congress will be held at New Delhi from 4th to 10th January, 1964, both days inclusive.

REVIEWS

REVELATION AND REASON IN ADVAITA VEDĀNTA, by K. SATCHIDANANDA MURTY, Head of the Department of Philosophy, Andhra University, Waltair, and Columbia University Press, New York, 1959. Pages xix, 365. Price Rs. 25.00.

Here is a challenging book on the significant theme of revelation and reason in Advaita Vedānta. It is a grandiose work covering a considerable area of Advaitic thought and raising several points which call for vigorous examination. The concept of scriptural authority occupies an important place in all systems of Indian thought; on the other hand, Advaita classics like the *Citsukhī*, the *Khaṇḍana* and the *Advaitasiddhi*, not to speak of the works of Śaṅkara himself, contain a good deal of subtle dialectical discussions. Hence it is but natural that a modern exponent of the subject, 'who is not a Hindu fundamentalist', should attempt an assessment of the relation between reason and revelation in Advaita. And so it is with no small expectation that the reader turns to the present work to find enlightenment on this difficult and even obscure topic. His expectation is considerably enhanced when the author ventures to hope that this book, in which all expositions, he says, are based upon original texts, will be a contribution towards a better understanding of Advaita Vedānta (p. viii).

The work is divided into two books, each consisting of two parts. After giving a summary of the Advaita conception of God and revelation, the Advaita conception of scriptural testimony and interpretation is expounded in Book I, 1; the second part deals with the function of reason in Advaita Vedānta. Most of the arguments and conclusions in Book I are those of Advaita Vedāntin-s. Book II, 1 attempts a study of the remaining five

systems of Hindu philosophy with reference to the two topics, the knowledge of God and the nature of scriptural authority. The Nyāya theology is given special prominence in view of the fact that 'little attention has been paid to it by any modern writer'. In the second part of this book the author attempts an independent criticism of Advaita metaphysics, theology and Vedic revelation.

The author states: 'My views on Revelation . . . are in agreement with those of the Nyāya writer Jayanta, while my conception of God differs very little from that of Rāmānuja' (p. ix). This biased attitude seems to have influenced the author's expositions and criticisms of the Advaita views on the various topics discussed in this work. To the lack of objectivity in approach is added the author's inability to understand and appreciate many a subtle, but vital point in the Advaita philosophy. His acquaintance with the writings of western philosophers has not helped him much in elucidating the intriguing relation of reason to revelation in the system of Advaita philosophy. There are many instances where he misinterprets the Advaita view and criticizes it on wrong assumptions. A few points are noted below.

The statement of the three cardinal tenets of Advaita on the first page itself betrays a basic misunderstanding of the fundamentals of Advaita. It is well known that in Advaita the ultimate Reality, Brahman, is *nirguṇa*, beyond all attributes. Therefore the assertion 'The Real is one and is of the nature of consciousness and bliss', can only have a provisional validity. Again the statement, 'due to its *māyā* the Real appears as the world of plurality', is misleading, since Advaita predicates *māyā* not of *nirguṇa* Brahman, but of *saguṇa* Brahman, or *Īśvara*. The author's thinking on the point does not seem to be clear (see also p. 4); yet Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* has no obscurity on this point (II. 1. 14). Thirdly the affirmation, 'there is absolutely no difference between Brahman and the individual soul' (or *jīva*), needs elucidation.

p. 19. The role of *samastapratyavamarśini buddhiḥ* in the cognition of a word as one word, pointed out by Śaṅkara in the *bhāṣya* on *Br. S.*, I. 3. 28, is not indicated.

p. 40. The author says that Śaṅkara 'seems to conceive the eternity of the Veda as *pravāha-nityatā*'. Śaṅkara uses the term *pravāha* to denote the procession of the objects of creation, and not of the Veda.

p. 115. The difference between *Brahmadarśana* and the mystic 'visions' of medieval Europe is not elucidated.

p. 116. The author says that *Brahmajñāna* destroys itself. It is only the *Brahmākāra-vṛtti* that is destroyed, not *Brahmajñāna* by which is meant not 'the knowledge of Brahman', but 'knowledge that is Brahman'. The distinction between *svārūpajñāna* and *vṛttijñāna* should not be ignored in a technical discussion of the nature of *sākṣātkāra*.

p. 137. The author maintains that according to Madhusūdana, 'Śaṅkara nowhere admitted the need of Yoga for Brahman-knowers', and that 'the Vedāntin-s never engage themselves in Yoga, because they hold that the defects of the mind are removed only by deliberation and discussion'. Śaṅkara's point is only that *yogamārga*, independent of Veda, cannot yield the *summum bonum*. The quotation given from Madhusūdana says only that the *Brahmavid* has no use for Yoga. Śaṅkara points out the importance of Yoga in his *bhāṣya* on the *Gītā* (ch. VI). See also Madhusūdana on *Gītā*, VI. 12.

pp. 178-9. How is the impartite Brahman transformed into the world? Discussing this question, the author says that Śaṅkara wants us to follow blindly the Śruti which asserts both that Brahman is partless and that it is partly transformed. He quotes from Śaṅkara, *akṛtsnaprasaktiṃ niravayavatvaṃ ca*, adding the remark: 'That is the final word on the subject'. Far from it. Śaṅkara himself says: नैष दोषः ; अविद्याकल्पितरूपमेदाम्युपगमात् । न ह्यविद्याकल्पितेन रूपमेदेन सावयवं वस्तु संपद्यते । (On *Br. S.*, II. 1-27). In fact the final Advaita view on the point is given by the author himself on p. 182: 'It is evident that the main purpose of the Upaniṣad-s is not to give accurate accounts of creation, but to impart knowledge of Brahman.'

pp. 212-3. The author criticizes modern exponents of Advaita like Vivekananda and Dr. Radhakrishnan for holding the view that

the Veda-s are the records of the spiritual experiences of sages. The author claims to champion the orthodox view 'expressly stated by great authorities like Kumārila and Śaṅkara'. The relevant views of these authorities, however, have not been quoted. Śaṅkara has clearly stated his views on the subject: तस्माद् मनो-वृत्तयुपाधिपरिच्छिन्नं मनोवृत्तिनिष्ठमात्मचैतन्यम् अनादिनिधनं आत्मविशानं मन्त्राः । (bhāṣya on Tai. U., II. 2). Mantra-s constituting the Veda-s are spiritual truths reflected in the modes of the mind, of course, of the sages. In the light of this clear-cut statement of Śaṅkara, it is obvious that the author should have been more discreet in taking up cudgels against the 'modern exponents'.

p. 219. The author says, strangely, that Hinduism is as exclusive as the Semitic faiths and that the statements of modern exponents that 'all religions are true' do not represent the orthodox Hindu tradition. Surely 'एकं सद् विप्रा बहुधा वदन्ति' recognizes the validity of all honest formulations of experienced reality; and in 'ये यथा मां प्रपद्यन्ते . . .' one hears an assurance that all sincere patterns of religious conduct secure divine approval. See also *Raghuvamśa* (X. 26) 'बहुधाभ्यागमैर्भिन्नाः पन्थानः सिद्धिहेतवः' and the *Śivamahimnas-stotra* verse 'रुचीनां वैचित्र्यात् . . .'. The author himself quotes elsewhere (p. 232) Jayanta's view that all scriptures are true.

pp. 248-9. The author affirms that Vedānta does not convince 'us' that there is only one Brahman. 'अहं ब्रह्मास्मि' and 'सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म' embody metaphysical experience. The author's perceptual experience may be different. One wonders why he has not discussed the Advaitic doctrine of *adhikāra*.

He asks: By whom is Brahman cognized always? The Śruti has anticipated him and answered, 'विष्णोस्तत् परमं पदं सदा पश्यन्ति सुरयः'. As a matter of fact all the apparently devastating questions asked on p. 249 have been duly considered and answered by Śaṅkara, e.g., in his bhāṣya on Br. S. I.1.5. The failure to distinguish between *svarūpajñāna* and *vyrtijñāna* has spoiled many pages of Sri Murty's book. He taunts Advaita with having a double standard of truth, ignoring the fact that the Advaita concept of truth as *abādhitatva* is applicable to all the three spheres of truth and reality

recognized by it. To his naive question, 'How do we know Brahman is self-luminous?' Śaṅkara's answer occurs in the opening section of his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* in the passage अपरोक्षत्वाच्च प्रत्यगात्मप्रसिद्धेः.

pp. 250-1. The author's remarks are reminiscent of the missionary writings of the early decades of the present century.

p. 252. He has misunderstood the words of *Iṣṭasiddhi* on the nature of *avidyā* (दुर्घटत्वमविद्याया भूषणं न तु दूषणम्). *Durghaṭatva* does not mean impossibility, but only irrationality or inconsistency.

p. 252. The author labours under a confusion of standpoints. The world is reduced to the status of a barren woman's son for one who has realized *niṣprapañca-brahman*; the reality of the world is denied to those who still strive to realize Brahman.

p. 254. Śaṅkara 'does not base Advaita on his personal experience or on the experience of others'. But surely he bases Advaita on the Upaniṣad-s which, as mentioned above, are statements of the metaphysical experiences of inspired seers. Śaṅkara himself claims to have the Advaita experience. He affirms at the beginning of his bhāṣya on Br. S.: 'श्रुत्यादयोऽनुमवादयश्च यथासंभवमिह प्रमाणम्'. And it is well known that the *upadeśavākya* 'तत् त्वमसि' is meant to elicit the *anubhava* 'अहं ब्रह्मास्मि'.

p. 254. 'Independent personal experience does not confirm . . . Scripture.' Śaṅkara solemnly declares: अनुभवावसानत्वाद् भूतवस्तु-विषयत्वाच्च ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य । (bhāṣya on Br. S., I. 1. 2).

The author says that *anubhava* is not mystic experience in 'the usual sense'. After all mystic experience is not 'usual'. And there is no rule that two mystics should have identical experience, or at any rate, should give identical verbal formulation of such an experience.

p. 257. The author asserts that the Upaniṣad-s do not teach *nirguṇa* Brahman. He should re-read the Upaniṣad-s, especially the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* with an open mind.

There is no need to continue further. Sufficient has been said to demonstrate that this book, which attempts to prove that Advaita as a system of philosophy does not satisfy, is biased by the author's predilections and is not written objectively. And

what the author has succeeded in showing is only that Advaita does not please him!

A. G. KRISHNA WARRIER

DĪPĀRṆAVA with the commentary ŚILPAPRABHĀ by P. O. SOMPURA. Published by B. P. Sompura and Bros., Anand Bhuvan Paldi, near Bus Stand, Ahmedabad, 1960. Pages 76 + 488. Price Rs. 25.00.

While the names of Ellora and Ajanta echo down the corridors of time, it is the middle ages that form the golden age of Hindu religious architecture. *Dīpārṇava* is a Sanskrit text which embodies the principles of this development as crystallized by the thirteenth century. It contains a detailed account of various kinds of temple construction, involving considerations of astrology, aesthetics and engineering. There is also a section on Jain architecture. The images of thirteen Āditya-s, different forms of Gauri and Sarasvatī, the Tīrthaṃkara-s and their attendant divinities are treated in detail. Equally illuminating are the passages on decorative themes with instructions on their proper use.

Sri P. O. Sompura who has edited this Sanskrit text with a Gujarati commentary, is one of the best living architects of Gujarat, combining theoretical knowledge of ancient texts and practical experience in the construction of many temples, and was the chief architect in the reconstruction of the great temple at Somnath. He gives precise and accurate definitions for the technical terms; the illustrations, plans and line-drawings bring additional clarity. His work creates the impression of a craftsman who combines his skill with loving scholarship.

Sri P. O. Sompura's work will be of great value to students of Indian architecture, and deserves to be translated into English and Hindi.

SARASVATĪ NITYANANDA

STUDIES IN INDIAN CULTURAL HISTORY, Volume I, by P. K. GODE. Edited by Vishva Bandhu. Vishveshvaranand Vedic Research Institute, Hoshiarpur, 1961. Pages x, 495. Rs. 30.00.

This is volume IV of the Collected Works of the late Dr. P. K. Gode and volume I of his *Studies in Indian Cultural History*. Its second volume, forming volume V of his Collected Works, was already published by the Prof. Gode Works Publication Committee in 1960. (Reviewed in this Bulletin, vol. XXIV, p. 231 ff.) Including the present publication five volumes of Dr. Gode's Collected Works have come out, and the remaining two volumes of the *Studies in Indian Cultural History* will be published in due course by the same committee. As in the other volumes, here too there is a General Index by Dr. A. D. Pusalker and a Subject Index by Prof. N. A. Gore.

The present volume edited by Sri Vishva Bandhu, contains fifty-one research papers bearing on Indian cultural history, arranged in three groups: studies in the history of the Indian science of cosmetics and perfumery, studies in the history of *tāmbūla*, and studies in the history of Indian plants. Dr. Gode's papers are all of them comprehensive, well-documented and thorough, and are indispensable for students of Indian culture. It is not possible in a review to give a detailed account of all the topics dealt with in this volume.

In the first section there are interesting papers on the Campaka-oil, recipes for hair dyes, and the history of the migration of ambergris, rose-water, etc., and contains detailed analysis of many texts in Sanskrit and Marathi pertaining to Indian cosmetics and perfumery. Dr. Gode points out that there is no early reference in Sanskrit to the rose or rose-water in spite of the contact between India and rose-growing countries like Persia. It may be noted that in South India rose-water is known as *pannīr* or *paninīr*; in Malayalam literature there are references to *paninīr* in the fifteenth century work *Līlātilaka* and the sixteenth century poem *Candrotsava*.

The second section contains eleven papers about *tāmbūla* and chewing; papers on the nut-cracker and the spittoon are included

in this section, but not those on tobacco which is reserved for the third section. The references to *tāmbūla* in the Gupta inscription of A.D. 473 and in the works of Kālidāsa, Vātsyāyana, Suśruta and Varāhamihira suggest that it must have come to India much earlier than the Gupta period, even if Kālidāsa be assigned to the Gupta period. Prof. Kane's statement that '*tāmbūla* was probably introduced some time before or about the beginning of the Christian era in South India and then spread northwards' (p. 129) seems to be nearer the truth. Among references to *tāmbūla* may be added L. V. Ramaswami Aiyar's paper on 'Dravidic Forms for Betel Leaf' (*JOR*, vol. V) and the traditions that Mūka became a poet by taking the *tāmbūla* given by the Goddess at Kāñci. [cf. स्तन्येन कश्चित् कवयांबभूव ताम्बूलरागेण परो जनन्याः ।]

On p. 119n., it is said that according to *Sino-Iranica* by Laufer, 1919, pp. 285-6, the *dālimba* (*dāḍima*), i.e. the pomegranate tree was introduced into India from Iranian regions in the first centuries of the Christian era. Dr. Gode says that the tree is not mentioned in Vedic, Pali or early Sanskrit literature. Recently D. D. Kosambi has also stated (*JOR*, vol. XXIV, p. 57) that the pomegranate tree is of Persian origin 'with logical spreading during the Gupta period, or at any rate after the Sātavāhanas'. But Patañjali refers to the pomegranate in the oft-quoted line '*daśa dāḍimāni śaḍ apūpāḥ . . .*'

The third section is the biggest and contains twenty-eight papers, and deals with the history of various plants like Caṇaka, Jawār, Mahāśāli, Maize, Fig, Mendi, Almond, white Mustard, Tea, Tobacco and Aśvabalā. The history of the white sandal (*candana*) is discussed in detail, but the view of C. E. Fischer that white sandal was introduced into India from outside does not seem to be acceptable. It is true that the *Aini-Akbari* written in the sixteenth century in North India says that the *candana* was successfully planted in India from China; but there are clear references to the white sandal in India much earlier than that and the Malaya mountain in the South is mentioned as the original home of the sandal. The problem needs further study.

On some of the topics discussed by Dr. Gode there is scope for further research; and it is hoped that the publication of his collected works will give young scholars the impetus to continue the work begun by the great savant.

DR. K. KUNJUNNI RAJA

SOME OLD LOST RĀMA PLAYS by DR. V. RAGHAVAN, Annamalai University, Annamalai Nagar, 1961. Pages xiv, 126. Price not given.

This book contains a series of lectures delivered by Dr. Raghavan at the Annamalai University in March 1957 with some additional material added later. The lectures can be read with pleasure and profit not only by scholars but by lay people interested in Sanskrit drama.

The story of Rāma as sung by Vālmiki in the *Rāmāyaṇa* has been the source of inspiration for numerous plays in Sanskrit, the famous *Uttararāmacarita* of Bhavabhūti, the *Anargharāghava* of Murāri, etc. Other Rāma plays are quoted and mentioned in various dramaturgical works, commentaries and anthologies, but unfortunately the full texts of these plays are not available.

Dr. Raghavan, with his extensive and intimate knowledge of Sanskrit literature and drama, has brought together all the references and quotations found in manuscript as well as published sources and has reconstructed the lost Nāṭaka-s as far as possible by tracing the contexts by means of the hints given in the dramaturgical works, tallying the citations with the chronological sequence of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, etc. The most extensive of the Rāma plays thus reconstructed and critically commented upon is the *Rāmābhyudaya* of Yaśovarman, patron of Bhavabhūti and Vākpati. The other plays dealt with are *Kṛtyā Rāvaṇa*, *Chalita Rāma*, *Jānakirāghava*, *Rāghavābhyudaya*, *Rāmānanda*, *Māyāpuṣpaka*, etc. There are many lovely verses in these plays which give an idea of

their quality and merit; Dr. Raghavan has also pointed out the ingenuity of the writers in creating variety in the same, much-loved theme.

Those who read the book under review would also like to read what the author has had to say on Prakaraṇa plays (*The Social Play in Sanskrit*, Indian Institute of World Culture, Bangalore, 1952).

RADHA BURNIER

MĀTRPARIDEVANA and BHAKTARASĀYANA by Panditaraja K. ACHYUTHA PODUVAL. Printed at the Raja Press, Tripunithura, 1961. (1) Pages 7+38. Price Rs. 0.75. (2) Pages 4+40. Price not mentioned.

These are two small pieces of metrical composition in Sanskrit, written in simple language and elegant style by an eminent scholar of the Kerala State.

The *Mātrparidevana* consists of a hundred stanzas composed in the beautiful Āryā metre which is always pleasant to read and sweet to hear. It is noteworthy that the author has chosen here a modern topic unlike the usual themes based on religion, philosophy and Purāṇic myths. The sacred land of Bharata Khaṇḍa is personified as an ideal mother. In stanzas 1 to 19 she is depicted as feeling fortunate in having had in the past many inspired sages and seers among her sons, who not only formulated the codes of law and moral conduct, but also propagated them among the people and themselves abided by them. She also feels happy in recollecting that she had in the past many able and virtuous ruling princes who completely rooted out *adharma* and established *dharma* in the land. She is also proud in having had recently some noble and unselfish personalities among her sons, who fought for her freedom, sacrificing their wealth and position and who brought about independence from foreign rule. In stanzas 20

to 75 she feels distressed to see the wicked sons of the present generation who are quarrelsome and deceitful in public affairs. She is also afraid that their wicked action will end in depriving her of the freedom obtained with difficulty. In stanzas 76 to 100 she advises her sons to be united and to strive honestly for the welfare of the nation and universal brotherhood. The book contains also a good and readable English translation by Dr. E. R. Sreekrishna Sarma and a foreword by Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja. In stanza 78 the word *mati* is used in the sense of *manas* or mind, which is not common.

The *Bhaktarasāyana* contains a hundred and eight stanzas in various metres, Mālinī, Sragdharā, etc., and is written in praise of Lord Śiva, worshipped in the author's native land. The stanzas have their own intrinsic value in revealing the truths regarding the greatness of Śiva as taught in the Upaniṣad-s and Śaiva Purāṇa-s and Tantra-s. The style and flow of the language is without blemish. The brief gloss on the stanzas, also provided by the author, is useful for understanding the real meaning of the text.

In stanza 36 the word *āsva* ought to be *āssva*. In a learned introduction in Sanskrit, the famous scholar, His Highness Pariksit Rama Varma, compliments the author on his erudition in Nyāya Śāstra.

V. KRISHNAMACHARYA

MADHVA'S TEACHINGS IN HIS OWN WORDS by DR. B. N. K. SHARMA. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1961. Pages 180. Rs. 2.25.

Dr. B. N. K. Sharma is a well-known authority on Dvaita philosophy and has already published two substantial books on the subject: *A History of the Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature* (vol. I) and a comprehensive exposition of Madhva's philosophy.

In the present volume, which is No. 79 in Bhavan's Book University Series under the General Editorship of K. M. Munshi and R. R. Diwakar, Dr. Sharma presents the diverse aspects of Madhva's teaching by quoting 155 select passages from his works arranged under different topics, each passage followed by an English translation and explanation. The general Introduction deals with the background of Madhva's Darśana, and the life and works of that teacher. There are two Appendices, one giving a brief outline of the contents of Madhva's works, and the other on the devotional movement of the Haridāsakūṭa in the Deccan. As Professor D. M. Datta says in his Foreword, the book is 'an authentic epitome of Madhva lore', and is sure to be of great use to the students of Indian philosophy.

K. KUNJUNNI RAJA

DHARMARAKṢAṆAM by B. LAKSHMINARAYANA RAO. Trilinga Granthamala, Tirupati. Pages xx, 35. Price not given.

This is an interesting prose drama in Sanskrit consisting of six short scenes. The theme is taken from the late T. P. Kailasam's English playlet 'Purpose', and deals with the killing of the archer Ekalavya by Kṛṣṇa before the beginning of the Mahābhārata war. The author tries to justify the action of Kṛṣṇa, which was to protect Dharma. For some time this incident was a controversial issue among Kannada writers. There is little sense in trying to measure the values and ideals of the ancient past with the yardstick of modern ideas; still the question of the position of the individual in society which the play raises is of perennial interest. The language is lively and clear conveying the emotions intended. In a long Introduction the author explains the basic thought underlying the theme dealt with in the play.

K. PARAMESVARA AITHAL

THE SAMSKRITA RANGA ANNUAL II, 1959-60. Edited by DR. V. RAGHAVAN, 7, Sri Krishnapuram, Madras 14. Annual Subscription Rs. 2.00.

Founded in 1958 with the aim of promoting dramatic activity in Sanskrit, the Samskrita Ranga, Madras, has been rendering signal service on the practical side by participating in the major national dramatic festivals like the All-India Kālidās Samāroh, Ujjain, the Summer Drama Festival, Delhi, the Tagore Centenary Celebrations, and the Annual Conferences of the Madras Music Academy, and producing at these festivals as also under other suitable auspices classical Sanskrit plays, modern farces and Sanskrit versions of dramas in other languages. Last year it also received the award at the Ujjain Kālidāsa festival for its staging of the *Śākuntala*.

The *Samskrita Ranga Annual* reviewed here forms the literary counterpart of the Ranga's activities. Published once a year, it carries, besides accounts of the activities of the Ranga, editions of short plays, studies on classical dramatic works and papers on the technique of production of Sanskrit drama and the traditional stage of ancient India. It also takes stock of Sanskrit dramatic activity elsewhere and, as such, forms the only all-round periodical devoted exclusively to this fascinating subject.

The volume under review contains three short plays by Dr. V. Raghavan besides a Bibliography of English Translations of Sanskrit Dramas compiled by him. In a long paper on 'Kūṭiyāṭṭam', Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja gives a detailed account of the staging of Sanskrit plays in the traditional Kerala theatre. Besides News and Notes on recent Sanskrit dramatic activities in India and abroad, there are Reviews of publications in the field of Sanskrit drama and dramaturgy. This periodical will be useful both to the votaries of the Indian stage and to institutions and scholars interested in Indological studies.

K. V. SARMA

HINDUISM AND ITS RATIONALISM by M. HARIHARAN. Published by Mangalam, 171, Lloyds Road, Madras 14, 1961. Pages viii, 111. Price Rs. 2.00.

Analysing, within a little over hundred pages the more important tenets of the Hindu religion, the book reviewed here forms a handy volume to which a lay reader interested in a rational approach to Hinduism may turn with profit. At the outset the author distinguishes between real Hinduism as gleaned from the Upaniṣad-s and popular Hinduism based on later works like the Purāṇa-s and the Āgama-s. It is the Upaniṣadic Hinduism that he takes up for exposition; the latter he would discount as later accretions, the product of exigencies, social, political, etc. The author summarizes Hinduism in its varied aspects, mainly in the form of pithy statements from authorities, ancient and modern, pieced together and expounded, where necessary, in a rational manner.

Enumerating Truth, Duty, Self-control, Self-dependence, Non-violence and Tolerance as 'Hinduism in a nutshell', the author proceeds to examine the various tenets of the religion under such heads as general observations, rationalistic features, ideals, practical values, etc., followed by the treatment of Hindu conceptions on subjects like God, Soul, the world and Māyā. Sections are also devoted to the author's views about idol worship, the caste system, the cow and the Brahmin, Hindu ethics, *ahimsā*, the three paths of *jñāna*, *bhakti* and *karma*, etc. Brief outlines of the different orthodox and heterodox philosophies of India take up the last chapters of the book. Some select opinions on the vitality, appeal and rationalistic nature of Hindu thought conclude the volume.

The book has its quota of misprints and lack of punctuation marks, which might be remedied in a future edition. If the author would also make it a point to give always the exact references to the sources of his quotations and provide the book with an index, it will make the book more scholarly and facilitate easy reference.

In a work of this kind, making a rational approach to a faith, differences of opinion are bound to occur in details. But the object of the author is to present in his book 'a maximum amount of information... packed in a minimum number of pages, so that one who is interested in Hinduism, in a general way, may know something about every important point connected with Hinduism' (p. vii) and in this he has succeeded. This book is also likely to act as an incentive to the serious reader to pass on to a study of the original sourcebooks and more elaborate treatises.

K. V. SARMA

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Most useful work is being done by compiling and publishing bibliographies both of subjects and of persons. One late publication (1960) is *Robert Nathan: A Bibliography* by Dan H. Laurence, covering books and pamphlets, as well as contributions to books, periodicals, works in translation, and musical contributions. An Index of first lines of poetry and a general Index complete this useful work. Another publication (1961) is *A Bibliography of the Writings of Irving Fisher* compiled by Irving Norton Fisher. This volume of some 543 pages is in the form of a chronological record of the voluminous writings by Prof. Fisher on Economics, Health, Monetary Theory, Peace, etc., in articles and reports to the various governmental administrations concerned with these subjects.

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Commonwealth £ 2
Americas \$ 6
Other Countries Rs. 25.00

THE ADYAR LIBRARY BULLETIN

Statement as required by Rule 8 of the Registration of Newspapers
(Central) Rules 1956.

1. Place of Publication Madras
2. Periodicity of Publication Quarterly
3. Printer's Name K. Ramanathan
3. Nationality Indian
3. Address The Theosophical Society
Adyar, Madras 20
Seetha Neelakantan
4. Publisher's Name Indian
4. Nationality The Theosophical Society
4. Address Adyar, Madras 20
5. Editors' Names N. Sri Ram, V. Raghavan
K. Kunjunni Raja, Radha Burnier
5. Nationality Indian and Swiss
5. Address Adyar, Madras 20
6. Names and addresses of individuals who own the newspaper and partners or shareholders holding more than one per cent of the capital The Adyar Library and
Research Centre
Adyar, Madras 20

I, Seetha Neelakantan, hereby declare that the particulars given above are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

SEETHA NEELAKANTAN
Publisher

30 May 1962

N62-25-1-2

(316)

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