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Has Indian Idealism Failed Us ?

by

G. R. MALKANI

This question has been prompted by Dr. P. T. Raju's latest book "Indian Idealism and Modern Challenges", published by Punjab University Publication Bureau. The title of the book is rather intriguing. It seems to suggest that Indian Idealism might not be adequate for the modern man, unless it adjusts itself to modern conditions and modern currents of thought. That is in fact what Dr. Raju says in substance. His aim in this book is to bring Vedanta into line with western systems of Idealism. He says, ".... And as we have to face new problems posed by western philosophy, we have to go beyond what Sankara and Ramanuja and even their own followers have said.... But if idealism is to develop its thesis in the context of modern challenges, it can neither be what western idealists think it to be nor stay where Sankara and Ramanuja left it....." p. 81.

The whole attempt to give a new orientation to Indian Idealism, it appears to us, is foredoomed to failure. Philosophic truth, according to the Indian tradition, is timeless or eternal. You may accept it or you may not accept it. But you cannot so interpret it as to conform to changing fashions in philosophical thinking. Philosophy either answers your fundamental questions or it does not. It has nothing to fear from progress in scientific thinking and the philosophies that are based on such thinking. There is therefore no question of "Indian Idealism making its own contribution to a fresh defence of the spiritual view of the world." Those who do not accept a spiritual view of the world will certainly not be convinced by all the arguments that can be advanced by Indian Idea-

lism. Dr. Raju has certainly not made Indian Idealism more acceptable to the modern man. He would have done better if he had put Indian Idealism in its pure, pristine and easily intelligible form instead of re-interpreting it in terms of western philosophy and thus making it less comprehensible even to an Indian reader.

It is said that there is a crisis of thought in the modern world. Ethics and religion are the worst sufferers. Naturalism has almost a free field. "It is at this juncture that idealism can again serve humanity, not by presenting its old theses in their old forms, but by transforming them so as to include the truths of science and so as to make science possible. And Indian idealism has much to contribute to the idealistic thought of the world. But again, it can serve humanity by adjusting its thesis to the growing demands of science and material life. If it does not adjust its thesis to them, it cannot serve even the Indian man." p. 7. The question however to ask is, whether Indian Idealism does need any such adjustment. Those who think that it does are themselves victims of the false claims of science and naturalism. It is not science that is a challenge to the philosophy of the spirit. It is just the other way. It is the philosophy of the spirit that is a challenge to the over-weening claims of science. If any adjustment has got to be made, it is in the domain of science turned philosophy and passing its judgment upon the reality of the spirit and the connected spheres of ethics and religion. True philosophy or philosophy of the spirit need not be sensitive, much less submissive, to the challenges of science. Its true role is to act as a corrective to science and its vagaries.


Science is all right. Its utility is quite evident. There is therefore no question of either ignoring or neglecting it. It has got to be accepted for what it is. But Dr. Raju goes much farther. He wants us to accept a philosophy of life which will give a privileged place to scientific values. He therefore wants that Indian Idealism should take matter seriously and also give more value to the doctrine of activism. He says, "Epistemological realism is common to all schools except two schools of Buddhism and one sub-school of the Advaita. What Indian idealism has to do is not the pointing out of the reality of matter, but of the necessity of taking interest in matter and of the necessity of activism both in ethics and religion;.... Denying the reality of objective matter is as harmful as discouraging interest in the material world and in ethical activity...." p. 13.

It is conveniently forgotten here that interest in spiritual values often comes into conflict with interest in the material world.

We have then a choice; and we should not shrink from making the right choice and sacrificing the lower in favour of the higher. A person who has a keen sense of awareness of ultimate spiritual values cannot possibly bring himself to take an *equal interest* in the so-called well-being of his body. He is essentially a soul, not a body. The body, it is true, cannot be ignored. It has a vital part to play in the realization of spiritual values. But it is, after all, an instrument only,—a means to an end, not the end itself. We may yet have to realize that the relation of the body to the spirit is an adventitious one. Matter in general must therefore be subordinated to the spirit at all levels. As to ethical activity, it is basic to spiritual evolution. But its importance varies with the level of that evolution. There may be a level where ethical activity, understood as some kind of social or religious *duty*, has itself to be *de-graded* in order to fulfil the highest aspiration of the spirit. Everything then depends on the sort of philosophy of the spirit to which we subscribe. If it is the sort which goes by the name of Advaita Vedanta, matter cannot be real; and ethics has got to take a secondary place, modern tendencies and currents of thought notwithstanding. An Advaitist does not need to be advised in regard to the challenges of modern thought to his way of life and to his philosophical thinking. He can ignore those challenges as imaginary and unreal. They are challenges only to the uncertain and wavering mind under powerful alien influences.

After this general indication of what Dr. Raju intends to prove in the book, we are not surprised when he proceeds to point out certain supposed defects in Indian Idealism. Idealism for our purpose may be understood as a spiritualistic view of life and reality; and Indian Idealism may be restricted to the Advaitic philosophy of Sankara and the Viṣiṣṭadvaitic school of Ramanuja. Dr. Raju then points out four main defects. We shall consider them one by one.

(1) According to Dr. Raju, some forms of classical Indian Idealism confuse what is to be attained (*sādhya*) with what is already attained (*siddha*). This has evidently reference to the Advaitic thesis that the goal of Freedom, namely, the identity of *jīva* and Brahman, is eternally accomplished. All that we have to do is to remove our ignorance of the same. Here something is certainly accomplished through our efforts, namely the *removal of ignorance*. What is *not accomplished* by any efforts is the *unity* of *jīva* and Brahman. There appears nothing wrong about such a thesis. It does not say that we need do nothing, that there is no difference between actuality and value, and that the goal of human



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life itself is eternally accomplished. The identity in question remains to be realized in our experience. We cannot therefore agree with Dr. Raju's suggestion that "man is asked to live and act as if he is already that original being" p. 86. He says, "One interpretation of Sankara is that the world is not there and that it has never been born. If the pragmatic world is not there, what is the need of ethical activity?" pp 86-87. This is pure and simple confusion. On any interpretation of Advaita Vedanta, the world does possess *vyavahārik-satta* (called here the pragmatic world) for the average seeker of truth. It is only those who rise to the level of the Absolute Truth that can assert the non-existence of the world in all the three times. For them the world was never born or created. But then they are already beyond the pale of our common human values and common human struggles. They have no goal to achieve. When we say that the world was never born, we are simply giving expression to this higher stand-point, *which we have yet to realize in our lives*. For us the world is a fact, and our struggles are a part of the hard reality of our empirical existence. It is a wholly imaginary objection against Indian Idealism and certainly betrays a lack of understanding.

(2) The second defect is also related to Advaita Vedanta. Dr. Raju says, "The Supreme Spirit is infinite, creative, dynamic; and from a creative entity nothing can be logically deduced. Its mysteriousness lies primarily in its creativity. But some of the Advaitins made attempts to derive the world from the Brahman." p. 87. Now it is a doctrine *wholly opposed* to Advaita Vedanta that the Supreme Spirit is creative and dynamic. It is *apara-Brahman*, also called *Īvara*, that may be said to be so. Nothing can be deduced from the Supreme Spirit or *para-Brahman*; and no Advaitin, knowing his A, B, C, would attempt such an absurd thing. The whole idea of deduction is Dr. Raju's own, derived from western Idealists. So far as Advaita Vedanta is concerned, there is only creation of *the illusory*; and the illusory cannot be deduced from anything. The very notion of deduction is directly opposed to what has been called *ajātivāda*, the standpoint of the highest truth, in the first objection.

(3) The third objection is also directed against Advaita Vedanta. Dr. Raju accepts the possibility that the world "is really the same as the Brahman" and that it "is only appearing differently." But if one accepts this possibility, where is the objection to calling the world-appearance false? But Dr. Raju objects. He says, "But has human reason a logical right to give this kind of

answer? For the human reason, the world is not yet the Brahman in actual experience, but only an idea. In the example of the rope being seen as a snake, unless we see the rope we have no right to call the snake an illusion...." p. 88. The real point is not whether we directly know the world to be the same as Brahman. If we did, we should have *no problem* about the reality of the world. The problem arises, because there are certain *reasons* against the reality of the world. We may not accept those reasons. In that case, we solve the metaphysical problem in our own way. We do not accept Advaita Vedanta at all. We have a different system of metaphysics. But once we accept the possibility, as Dr. Raju does, that the world is the same as Brahman and only appears differently, the inevitable conclusion follows that the world is only an illusory appearance. Human reason is *necessitated* to it. The very definition of the illusory is: where something is not, there the something appears to be (*atasmīn-tad-buddhi*). So here too, if the reality is Brahman, and that reality contains the absence of the world, the appearance of the latter is certainly illusory.

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Dr. Raju, it appears to us, mixes up issues. He says, "Only because when one experience is had, the other cannot be had, we are not justified in saying that one of the two is false." p. 91. He means to say that the experience of Brahman does not by itself contain the falsity of the world. When we know the world, we know the world only; and when we know Brahman, we know Brahman only. How is the falsity of the world at all proved? This is like saying that when, as in a cinema show, I see one scene and then I see another following it, there is no conflict between the two, such that the truth of the one entails the falsity of the other, and vice-versa. But is our knowledge of Brahman like that? This knowledge is not obtained without a process of reasoning and discrimination, and without a reference to our knowledge of the world. It is only obtained through the *negation* of all that is falsely identified with Brahman and that is not Brahman. This includes our intellect (*buddhi*), the mind in general, the physical body and the *whole outside world related to us through the body*. It is because of this false identification (*adhyāsa*) that knowledge of Brahman becomes possible. But if that is so, we can only rise to that knowledge through the negation of the world, even as we may be said to rise to the knowledge of the rope through the negation of the illusory snake. In other words, the illusoriness of the world is part and parcel of the basic process for the knowledge of Brahman. It would therefore be completely wrong to suppose

that the knowledge of Brahman contains no implication about the reality or otherwise of the world. We are therefore surprised at the following statement of Dr. Raju which is wholly misleading: "When everything is seen as the Brahman, the world is not seen at all....But then, there is nothing to be denied, not even a trace of the memory of the world, which, if it remains, will prevent realization of the Brahman. But when the world is being experienced by us, the Brahman is not experienced....." p. 89. A truer statement of the situation would be—either Brahman alone is and the world is not, or the world alone is and Brahman is not. In other words, reality of the one is incompatible with the reality of the other, and vice-versa. We fail to see any truth in Raju's statement: "Our reason has no logical right to pronounce the judgement of falsity on the world. If it does, then reason condemns itself as false, since it belongs to the order of that very world...." p. 91. He does not seem to realize that what is part of the illusory world can yet point to a truth beyond itself which is not illusory, namely Brahman. Reason can negate itself, and in a sense become the Truth.

After all his arguments against Advaita Vedanta, Dr. Raju's conclusion would appear to be wholly paradoxical and even contradictory. He says, "Sankara's central position can be said to be logically true; but it cannot give a connected picture of the world, man, and the Supreme Spirit—but such must be the philosophy which idealism has to present man as a way of life—unless it treats all levels as real and existent." p. 94. This amounts to saying that what may be true in logic may not be true for life. But what sort of logic is that which is incompatible with the real needs and requirements of life? We must be bold enough to condemn it as bad logic, unworthy of our attention. But few in India have the temerity to accuse Sankara of employing bad logic. Even his enemies extol him for his inexorable logic and find fault only with his ultimate standpoint. Why should not Dr. Raju do the same more simply?

(4) A fourth defect of Indian Idealism also has reference to a certain interpretation of Sankara's philosophy. This is subjectivism in epistemology. Dr. Raju says, "It does not need elaborate proof to show that subjectivism in epistemology is not only false in itself, but also leads to a false philosophy of our consciousness and of our life. Independent existence of the object apart from our mind is a condition of epistemology....Subjectivism is, therefore, false as epistemology and as a basis for ethics." pp. 94-95. We admit

that subjectivism is repugnant to commonsense and to all those philosophers who take their stand on common-sense. Even Sankara has criticised the subjectivism of vijñānavāda Buddhists. It can be plausibly argued that we do not know mere ideas in our mind. We do distinguish these ideas and external objects which we are said to perceive. But this is not the only form of subjectivism. There is another and much subtler. This is based upon the truth-value of all our perceptions. Advaita Vedanta argues that our perception, in the best of circumstances, is dubious, and that it has no more weight of internal evidence in its favour than all known and recognised forms of erroneous perception. If this contention can be sustained, we get subjectivism of a slightly different order,—but it is subjectivism nevertheless. The object perceived is not exactly an idea in our mind,—but its seeming out-sidedness and independence is never-the-less illusory or *anirvacanīya*. The object is not a mere or simple idea of our mind; it is an idea that is superimposed upon, or confused with, the reality that exists in itself and that is essentially of the nature of Brahman. All Advaitins must subscribe to this analysis. Is this not subjective Idealism once again? In fact, if we do not accept this Advaitic analysis, perception as a method of knowledge must be true and dependable, and absolutely so, at least in some cases. How is then Idealism of any form or variety to establish its thesis of the primacy of the spirit? Is not the physical world, as perceived and as existing in its own right, a challenge to that primacy? If the world is real and our knowledge of it true, the whole problem of truth is ended there; and we have no need to go beyond the world to a spiritual ground of it called Brahman. It is the problem of error that poses the theoretical problem of a higher kind of reality which can be known truly and as it is in itself. Metaphysics just arises from our epistemology. If we are realists here, we have no need to go beyond the physical reality in order to explain it through a higher spiritual reality.

Dr. Raju accepts epistemological realism. But he cuts at the very roots of that realism by his explanation of the creation of that world. He says, "The creativity of spirit is not transformation of itself into something else, but self-polarization, in which spirit, while remaining itself in tact in one pole, objectifies itself in the other pole. An analogical process in our experience is that of imagination....If the Absolute Spirit has created the world in some similar way, it has not transformed itself into the world, but has projected it as its own object." p. 31. If the world is the

product of the imagination of the Supreme Spirit or if the Supreme Spirit has projected it through its own power of maya, can it be a real world? No product of imagination ever is. There is never any creation of the real. There is creation only of the illusory. Brahman alone is uncreated and therefore real. Subjectivism, in one form or another, is inalienable from any consistent and thorough-going Idealism.

To conclude, we are not convinced by Dr. Raju's laborious and often confused arguments. Indian Idealism, and particularly Sankara's Advaitism, may have no attraction for the western philosophers and those Indians who take their cue from them. But the least we Indians can do is to leave Indian Idealism alone, and not parade its supposed defects without entering fully into its spirit. I have a lurking doubt whether Indian Idealism as propounded here has any contribution to make to the Idealistic tradition of the world as a whole. There is such a thing in Indian philosophy as taking it whole and in entirety or leaving it in entirety. A great insight or a *daršana* cannot be taken in part and left in part. It is an integral whole which cannot be broken up or sub-divided. Dr. Raju wants to put forth the claims of Indian Idealism to recognition. But after all his labour, one wonders whether there is anything worth-while in it which one could accept. He would have perhaps done better to give us *his own* Idealistic system, which incorporated and showed forth the best in all Idealistic traditions, both eastern and western. Nothing of the sort emerges in his book.

Rejection of Metaphysics by Logical Positivism

by

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Within the Empiricist tradition in European philosophy the tendency to reject metaphysics began with Hume. He felt that deductive inferences as to the existence of unobserved objects and relations from a few so-called self-evident intuitive truths were not valid. And in this feeling he was merely following the foot-steps of Locke and Berkeley who started analytical as well as empirical traditions in modern philosophy. It was the aim of Locke to inquire into the nature, limits, extent and origins of human knowledge; his method was mainly analytical in that he tried to reduce the several complex ideas that are possessed by the human mind into what he called sensations and reflections. All valid knowledge for him consisted of propositions about the intuitive knowledge of the self, the inferential knowledge of God or the Probable knowledge of the external world. His purpose in this analysis was to base human knowledge on firm foundations. And we must remember that the same was attempted by Descartes and Spinoza, or in fact, if we wish to go as far back as Greek philosophy, by Socrates and Plato. The Greek philosophers were trying to rescue philosophy from the onslaughts of the Sophists and the sceptics who denied the possibility of knowledge. The defence usually took the shape of establishing the validity of knowledge by pointing out the rational nature of our knowledge. The Greek philosophers, for instance, showed that though the purely particular was incommunicable, because of the participation of the particulars in the universals it was possible for them to be communicated in terms of their likenesses and differences. But the main defect in philosophers like Plato lay in overdoing certain things. Without being satisfied with pointing out the rational element in knowledge, he hypostatized the rational element and made it the only reality, besides committing himself to the view that all knowledge is reminiscence. He entirely ignored and underestimated the role of experiential element in knowledge and even degraded it. By hypostatizing the rational forms he could build up an ontology with values attached. Much of his

dialectic was futile, since it showed the barrenness of empty reason; and successive abstraction led one not to the good but nowhere. The shortsightedness of Plato is well demonstrated by the fact that he believed that the Dialectic (with which he did not actually proceed till the end) was all that was needed to arrive at the Good.

Many of Plato's mistakes were repeated by his modern successors. In Descartes, the same eagerness to base philosophical knowledge on sure foundations was mixed with his too hasty procedure of jumping at conclusions without sufficient warrant.

The movement of analysis commencing with Locke ended in Hume's scepticism, this time with the denial of the possibility of *metaphysical* knowledge as is professed by the Rationalists Descartes, Spinoza and Leibnitz. Hume did not doubt the capability of sense-data being reported and the possibility of manipulating symbols like quantity and number. But, according to him, if any book contained anything but statements about sense-data and symbols like quantity and number, it deserved to be committed to flames! The procedure of committing metaphysical books to flames, as remarked by a recent philosopher, has been refined later by Logical Positivists.

Kant, too, denied metaphysical knowledge to the extent that it tried to postulate, illegally, existences not warranted by experience. But he could not reject the validity of synthetic *a priori* propositions. The denial of the existence of synthetic *a priori* propositions was left to the Logical Atomists and Positivists.

The Positivist Comte also rejected metaphysics as falling outside the purview of valid knowledge. Metaphysical thinking, according to his law of three states, was only an intermediary between the Theological and the Physical. According to Comte, the business of philosophy lay in defining and classifying the various specialised sciences and arriving at a synoptic picture of the world presented by the totality of scientific knowledge at any particular period. Metaphysical speculation was not valid, because it fell outside the limits of knowledge obtainable by empirical methods which alone ensure valid knowledge.

Prior to the announcement of the programme of Logical Positivism by the Vienna Group there were several influences working on the members of the group. The main influences are three in number: (1) The Positivist influence coming from Comte

and scientists like Mach and Pearson. (2) The influence of the innovations in the philosophy of mathematics or what was called mathematical logic. (3) The influence from the side of Behaviourism in psychology. The second influence deserves lengthy consideration.

The forerunners of the Vienna Group in Britain were Russell and Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein came under the influence of, and in turn influenced, the thought of Russell, who with Moore started the analytic trend in Philosophy in the twentieth century in reaction to the Idealists. Russell believed that the main business of philosophy was analysis, and he even likened philosophy with logic and mathematics. He was also under the influence of Hume and Comte when he said that metaphysics had no special method of its own nor a special means of knowledge, and that it should borrow the conclusions of science and construct a world picture out of them, if it were possible. He saw that many of the disputes in philosophy arose because the language used by the philosophers was not logically precise. So the business of philosophy would have to be to attempt to translate the puzzling sentences in philosophy into those of an ideal language, when either the puzzling nature of the propositions would disappear or the sentences would become untranslatable. Russell supposed that the structure of such an ideal language was presented in his and Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica*. The structure of this ideal language was believed to correspond with that of the actual world. This was, of course, a metaphysical assumption which was later sought to be avoided by the Logical Positivists like Carnap. All propositions in the ideal language are extensional or truth-functional in the sense that the truth of all the complex or molecular propositions depends on the truth of the atomic propositions from which they are derived by the use of logical connectives like 'and', 'or', 'if', 'then', etc. Corresponding to the atomic propositions, they supposed, there are atomic facts in the world in which constituents (logical particulars) and components (qualities and relations) are integrated into a complex whole. Logical proper names (like 'this' in 'This is red') in the atomic propositions are names for the logical particulars, and predicates and relations refer to the components of atomic facts. There is a one-to-one relation between the parts of the atomic propositions and those of the atomic facts. The truth and the falsehood of the atomic propositions depend upon their correspondence with the atomic facts; that is why they are called *intentional* in the *Principia Mathematica*. There is a

second category of propositions in the ideal language—tautologies and self-contradictions. The first type of propositions are always true, irrespective of the truth or falsehood of their constituent propositions; the second are always false.

The ideal language structure presented in the *Principia Mathematica* supplies the form of a logically precise language, the content being supplied from experience, according to its proponents. That is, the variables in the atomic propositions have to be substituted by constants.

Here it must be observed that there is a confusion between truth and validity in Logical Atomists which is borrowed later by the Logical Positivists. As a result of this confusion, there is a discrepancy between their statement that *a priori* propositions are always true, and that they are merely tautologies. We cannot see how they would reconcile the above two statements. In our view it is wrong to speak of the truth of *a priori* propositions, when once the Atomists committed themselves to the correspondence theory of truth. For every true proposition (at least the atomic propositions), there must be a corresponding fact. But *a priori* propositions, according to the Atomists, are mere tautologies; they tell us nothing about the world. Then how can we say that they are true? They may perhaps be valid if they follow from certain premises according to some self-evident logical principles, or if they themselves are the premises because of our acceptance of them to be self-evident. To speak of material and formal truth or material and logical truth is to confuse issues. This observation will have an important bearing on our later discussions, since according to the Logical Positivists also all the statements in a scientific language fall under either of the two categories, and no statement has meaning if it does not fall under either of them. The two categories are (1) analytic or *a priori*, and (2) *synthetic* or *a posteriori*.

The reason for the above confusion is not far to seek. Philosophers have been from the beginning fascinated by the indubitability of mathematical propositions. But they did not see that mathematical propositions are, as such, neither true nor false, but are only either valid or invalid. Here we can see also the confusion between self-contradiction and evident falsehood. Self-contradiction is lack of consistency. But how this can be called falsehood within the framework of the Atomists' definition of truth is a matter of surprise for us.

Besides the above there are many other difficulties within the school of logical Atomism pointed out by critics. I shall mention a few relevant ones.

Firstly, the method of reduction of all propositions to a few atomic propositions, if followed consistently, led one to what Carnap later on called 'methodological solipsism'. For when it was said that the atomic propositions reported atomic facts, there arose the difficulty of giving an example of atomic facts, and the location, within one's own sense-experience, of the logical particular. The difficulty is due to the fact that 'logical particular' and 'atomic fact' are concepts purely relative, and we cannot at any time say that this is the logical particular; and even if one were to locate such a particular, it could not be reported. Were it properly reported, then it would involve a description which Russell excluded from the atomic propositions. Using words such as 'this' would not solve the difficulty, since even these may entail descriptions, as Wisdom suggested. According to him, the sentence 'This is red' may imply, when a person reports it to another, the description 'I mean the thing to which I am pointing'. To avoid this difficulty Carnap made use of the 'physicalist language' and Behaviouristic doctrines.

Secondly, an obvious difficulty was encountered by the atomists in analysing general propositions like "All men are mortal". On the one hand, such propositions may be thought of as mere conjunctions of their instances, or, on the other, one may say that they are certainly more than the mere conjunctions of instances, because they are about open classes, the members of which can never be completely enumerated; in which case general propositions cannot be reduced to atomic propositions. Then we must adopt either of the two ways, viz., either to say that general propositions are not propositions at all because they cannot be reduced to atomic propositions, or to admit that there are molecular facts corresponding to the general propositions. Wittgenstein adopted the alternative of considering general propositions as mere conjunctions of atomic propositions, whereas Russell, though reluctantly, accepted the existence of molecular facts. Ramsey, though he first concurred with the view of Wittgenstein, later came to the conclusion that general propositions are no real propositions at all.

Thirdly, the metaphysical presupposition of the Atomists that the structure of the real world resembled that of a logically

perfect language, is an unwarranted piece of metaphysics from which the Logical Positivists tried to get away as far as possible. Besides, there is a mystical tendency in Wittgenstein, viz., that the similarity of structure between the ideal language and the world, which he expressed by saying that the atomic propositions pictured atomic facts, could only be shown but not stated. Positivists were not ready to accept such conclusions.

Fourthly, the philosophy of Logical Atomism assumes that the world is an intelligible assemblage of discrete facts.

And lastly, there is the difficulty concerning the theory of logical constructions. Russell, for instance, believed that concepts of classes, things, and other selves were logical constructions out of the particular sense-data. A logical construction is neither a logical proper name which designates a sense-datum, nor the description of the nameable. The doctrine, for instance, that "tables are logical constructions" is a metaphysical doctrine, and not a verbal doctrine as is claimed by the Atomists, since the translation of such a sentence into a sentence about sense-data would still be excluding at least a part of the intended meaning of the sentence. It is also a metaphysical doctrine to suppose that the collection of sense-data is the thing. That the doctrine of Substance of Aristotle is not avoided even in the case of Wittgenstein can be seen from the discussion of Urmson in his *Philosophical Analysis* (p. 57). There is another point to be noted here. Tables etc. are not logical constructions at all in the ordinary sense of the term. The sense-data out of which it is supposed that things are constructed are themselves abstractions from the psychologically simpler elements of knowledge. The Atomists are still committing the same old mistake of Locke who considered that experience was a collection of sensations and reflections. To avoid such theories in general Carnap postulated his 'Physicalist Language' which accepts the *conventional* physical language comprising basically the protocol sentences or sentences reporting sense-data.

These observations on logical Atomism are important for our discussion, because logical Positivists rejected metaphysics mainly through the help of what they borrowed from logical Atomism. Logical Positivism adopted the Atomists' conception about the nature of philosophy. It accepted that philosophy is mainly a linguistic activity, that its method was analysis, that all language is truth functional in nature, and that all statements in a scientific

language, i.e., all statements having meaning, are either direct protocol statements, or truth-functions of them. They also borrowed the Logical Atomists' doctrine that a hierarchy of language-systems or sentential calculi can be constructed. Several of the Positivists were later engaged in constructing other calculi than the calculus of the *Principia Mathematica*. Again, they adopted the view of the Atomists that all that the philosopher must do is to frame the rules of definition (within the same language) and rules of transformation (from other languages) and apply them in specific cases. The Positivists shared with the Atomists their empiricist tradition besides their method of analysis eschewing its metaphysical implications. It is for these reasons we have had to discuss at considerable length the philosophy of Logical Atomism.

Now we come directly to the Wittgensteinian thesis of the rejection of metaphysics. Wittgenstein shared, as we have seen above, with the Atomists their metaphysics in addition to their conception of philosophy as the logical analysis of language. Alongside this there are many passages in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* which reject metaphysics as nonsense. The *Tractatus* was first published in Europe in German and later in English with an introduction by Russell. The later English positivists like Ayer were not directly influenced by Wittgenstein, but rather by the writings of Carnap, and by direct participation in the group discussions of the Vienna Circle, comprising of eminent men from different walks of academic life. Carnap, Neurath, Reichenbach, Shlick, Waismann, and Bergmann were among the members of this group. There were other Positivists also, of Polish origin. Many of the continental Positivists later migrated to the U.S.A., and a few to England. It was mainly through the writings of Ayer and Miss Stebbing that many of the doctrines of Positivists were later known in England. It was Wittgenstein's influence that led the Vienna group to the declaration of the rejection of metaphysics.

According to Wittgenstein the main proposition in Philosophy is that philosophy (not metaphysics) is nonsense. Here are some of his key statements which summarise his position with regard to the topic concerned:

- 4.003. "Most propositions and questions that have been written about philosophical matters, are not false, but nonsensical. We cannot therefore answer questions of this kind at all, but only state their senselessness. Most

questions and propositions of the philosophers result from the fact that we do not understand the logic of our language....And so it is not to be wondered at that the deepest problems are really no problems."

- 4.0031. "All philosophy is 'critique of language'."
- 4.11. "The totality of true propositions is the total natural science."
- 4.111. "Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. (The word 'Philosophy' must mean something which stands above or below, but not beside the natural sciences)."
- 4.112. "The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a doctrine but an activity. A philosophical work consists entirely of elucidations. The result of philosophy is not a number of philosophical propositions, but to make propositions clear. Philosophy should delimit sharply the thoughts which otherwise are, as it were, opaque and blurred."
- 6.42. "Hence also there can be no ethical propositions. Propositions cannot express anything higher."
- 6.421. "It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed. Ethics is transcendental."

The main difference between the earlier rejections of metaphysics and the present one can now be seen: The earlier empiricists did not reject metaphysics as meaningless or non-sensical. They only rejected it as invalid. But, as Urmson suggests (*loc. cit.* p. 103), the thesis that metaphysical statements are non-sensical is implicitly contained in their arguments, but they have not worked it out as an inevitable conclusion of their premises. The earlier empiricists, for instance, could have said that what did not directly or indirectly report particular sensations or reflections was not meaningful. From the above premise it would have followed that since metaphysical statements did not do anything of that sort they were meaningless or nonsensical. But the earlier empiricists were not interested in such a thesis. They were satisfied with stating that metaphysical speculation is empirically invalid.

Wittgenstein's thesis has some peculiarities in it. (1) Wittgenstein refuses to understand metaphysical statements, though they have been intelligible to many philosophers and laymen from times immemorial. (2) He does not seem to consider that *a priori* propositions are in any sense meaningful, hence his conclusion that the major proposition in philosophy is that philosophy is non-sense. He does not distinguish philosophy from metaphysics which

the later Positivists did. (3) He insists that the propositions of natural sciences alone are meaningful. By these propositions he means perhaps such propositions like "This is red." If so, it follows as an inevitable consequence that all philosophical propositions, including his own elucidatory propositions, are nonsensical. Indeed, Wittgenstein was not hesitant to accept such a conclusion. He only maintained that his own philosophical propositions were important nonsense. In his own words: "...He who understands me finally recognises them as senseless, when he has used them to climb out beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder, after he had climbed up on it). He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof must one be silent." But how is one to discriminate between important nonsense and unimportant nonsense?

The main defect in Wittgenstein's thesis is that it does not discriminate between what is ordinarily understood by nonsense and philosophical nonsense. Wittgenstein speaks in his *Tractatus* as though nonsense is the same thing as unintelligibility, which is the ordinary sense of the term; but the philosophic statements are really not unintelligible. The purpose of this sort of rejection is probably to deny the validity of metaphysical speculation and to vindicate logical analysis as the method of philosophy. But this is not clearly brought out by his thesis.

The whole or a part of the thesis was received cordially by the Vienna Circle of the Logical Positivists who officially formed a group in 1922, and was vigorously worked upon. This group professed that their thesis was a development of the earlier thesis of the rejection of metaphysics by Positivists into a logical rejection of metaphysics.

According to this group, metaphysics has to be rejected because metaphysical statements are meaningless or nonsensical. The general statement of the thesis is the same as that of Wittgenstein. But for this group, as well as for other Positivists like A. J. Ayer, statements are meaningful only if they can be verified in experience. The meaning of a statement is its method of verification. If a statement cannot be verified, i.e., if there is no method of verifying a statement, then the statement has no meaning at all. Since there is no method of verification for metaphysical statements they have no significance. And that is why metaphysical disputes can never be settled for or against either side of the dispute. So, metaphysics as a whole should be thrown overboard.

The Positivist group accepted the language thesis of the Logical Atomists, viz., that all language is extensional or truth-functional in nature. For the Positivists also all propositions in a language must either be empirical or tautologous. They believed that it was not the business of philosophy to inquire into the relationship of language to the world. They also believed that a hierarchy of languages could be constructed, and a few of them did construct such ideal languages. The verification principle also can be shown to have been derived from the metaphysics of Atomism. "If the only genuine facts are atomic facts then every significant statement must be analysable into pictures of atomic facts. Hence to understand a sentence is to know what atomic facts must obtain for it to be true; and to know this is to know how to verify it." (Urmson, *loc. cit.* p. 109). Whether the principle was really so derived we cannot say, since the Positivists tried as much as possible to avoid the metaphysical pitfalls implied in the philosophy of Logical Atomism.

Later Positivistic thought turned much around the discussions about the meaning of 'meaning' and 'verification'. For it is difficult to verify all the propositions beyond doubt, and on the verification of the propositions depends their meaning. Positivists were divided into two groups on the issue of verification—the group which maintained a strong verificationist principle and that which maintained a weak verificationist principle. The strong verificationist principle follows from, and is in conformity with, the Wittgensteinian premises. According to Wittgenstein, because the only real facts are atomic facts, and the only true propositions are those picturing the atomic facts, any general proposition must be capable of being reduced to atomic propositions, and then only one can say they have any meaning. In the same manner, the strong verificationists held that if propositions could not be conclusively verified, they would have no meaning. This is the position taken up by Shlick. But according to the weak verificationists like Ayer and Carnap, a statement is significant even if there is a possibility of verifying it partially, if at least some evidence for or against the statement could be found.

But it seemed clear that general propositions could never be conclusively verified. The weaker form of the verificationist principle also ran into difficulties because it seemed that Propositions were meaningless to the extent that they were not verified! To overcome both the difficulties, Karl Popper in his *Die Logik Der Forschung* suggested that 'verifiability' should be replaced by

'falsifiability'. A proposition is meaningful if it can be conclusively falsified. That means, even if there is one instance in which the proposition is falsifiable, then it is significant. But this alternative has its own difficulties, since existential propositions can never be conclusively falsified, though general propositions can be conclusively falsified if there is a single instance running counter to them.

According to Carnap, metaphysical disputes have arisen because we have been accustomed to speak in the 'material mode of speech'. What we should do instead is to speak in the 'formal mode of speech'. When we speak in the 'material mode of speech' we speak as though we are speaking about things, whereas really we are speaking about words. An example would serve as an explanation:

Material mode: "A rose is a thing".

Formal mode: "'Rose' is a thing-word".

Syntactical errors, according to the earlier Carnap, alone were responsible for metaphysical disputes; an example of which has been given above. This over-syntactical approach was later abandoned by Carnap when he developed a new science called 'semantics', the main function of which was to investigate the relationship between words and things, whereas the business of "logical syntax" was to frame rules of definition and rules for translation (see above for explanation). Carnap believed that metaphysical disputes would disappear when translated into the formal mode of speech. But that at least some metaphysical disputes would not so vanish when translated is shown by Bergmann in his *Metaphysics of Logical Positivism*.

Questioned about the linguistic status of their own thesis that metaphysical statements are nonsensical, the Positivists replied that it was tautological, since it was their contention that the philosophical activity consisted in discussing the nature of a language (scientific or otherwise) in a set of equivalences and in reducing scientific language to a set of protocol statements.

There is also the problem of the meaning of 'meaning'. If the Positivists say that the term is employed in consonance with ordinary usage in the sense of intelligibility, there would be many statements which are intelligible, but yet which do not conform to the Positivist's criterion of meaning. So some philosophers like Wisdom (*Metaphysics and Verification*) and Stevenson (*Persuasive Definitions*) interpreted the Positivist definition of meaning

as a 'verbal recommendation', or a 'persuasive definition', in which case the metaphysicians need not be prepared to accept such a recommendation or persuasion. Some Positivists held that metaphysical statements have meaning, not cognitive but emotive. The metaphysician's statements spring from some unconscious motives, desires and needs, and their language shows a disease; and it was the business of some Positivists to undertake a therapy.

The main criticisms against Logical Positivists' rejection of metaphysics can be stated as follows at some risk of repetition:

(1) In Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* which was the Bible of the Positivists, the Atomistic metaphysics contained in it cannot be reconciled with its rejection of all metaphysics whatever.

(2) Instead of trying to explain the nature of the phenomenon of metaphysical propositions, or examining them in detail, the Logical Positivists rejected them *in toto*. In doing so they were only closing their eyes to the major part of philosophy. Their rejection actually served no purpose, but of raising unnecessary disputes.

(3) In the method of analysis itself, which the Logical Positivists borrowed from the Logical Atomists, there were some inherent difficulties as, for instance, that of the infinite regress involved in its search for logical particulars. (Logical Positivists like Carnap stopped short of a thorough-going analysis by making use of a physicalist language. One might wonder why he should stop there.)

(4) There are many difficulties even in the principle of verification, which was proposed as the criterion for meaning, as, for instance, in the case of general propositions. The difficulties cannot be solved without taking up a metaphysical stand at some stage or other.

(5) There is the objection, as Bradley said, that those who were rejecting metaphysics were themselves brother-metaphysicians.

(6) The method of analysis presupposes that the results of analysis are more real than or preferable to the analysed propositions. But why should we prefer only those propositions which are obtained as a result of our analysis to those that are analysed, if the results are only a set of equivalences?

(7) The Positivists' use of 'meaning' is not in conformity with ordinary usage. It involves a 'decision' to use it in a par-

ticular sense, by which decision the metaphysicians may not be bound.

(8) The Positivists share with the Atomists the view that all language consists of only two types of statements, *a posteriori* or empirical and *a priori* or tautological. But how can the criterion of verification be applied to the second category of propositions? Besides, the Positivists speak as though the latter category of propositions are also true, though only formally. This confusion between truth and validity was borrowed by the Positivists from the Atomists. If the *a priori* propositions are merely verbal, why should the Positivists include them in a perfect language?

(9) However much the Positivists may try they cannot equate Meaning with Verifiability.

Several attempts were made, after the advent of the Logical Positivists, to put forward a tenable theory on the nature of metaphysical statements. We cannot mention them here for want of space. (See: Emmett: *The Nature of Metaphysical thinking*; Lazerowitz: *The Structure of Metaphysics*; Collingwood: *Metaphysics*; A. C. Ewing: *Metaphysics in Contemporary British Philosophy*).

The metaphysical theories of the various philosophers should not be considered as falling under a single category. Instead, there are several types of metaphysical thinking: (1) There is first of all the speculative metaphysics in which we find several sub-categories: The speculative metaphysician may (a) try to interpret the world by a hypothesis using categories of thought and extending their use analogically; (b) justify and interpret mystical experience with theories about reality—again using categories of thought analogically; and (c) justify theological beliefs by showing them as conclusions of a deductive system. (2) Secondly, the metaphysician may try to inquire into what is implied in experience, i.e. inquiring into the absolute presuppositions either of the scientist (as Collingwood said in his *Metaphysics*) or of the common man; or (3) he may merely undertake a logical analysis of either common-sense statements about the world or other metaphysicians' statements about Reality, and try to find out whether their conclusions follow from their premises in accordance with strict logic, and whether the metaphysicians are shifting the meanings of the words they use from time to time (as is claimed by Lazerowitz in his *Structure of Metaphysics*); or lastly, (4) he may undertake comparison and criticism of the different con-

temporary metaphysical theories. Whether this list exhausts the metaphysician's activity may well be doubted, but it will at least be conceded that these are some of the primary modes of metaphysical activity. We may obtain one or more of these modes in a single philosopher. But they are logically distinguishable from one another.

That logic is the main instrument of the metaphysician cannot be denied too. The speculative metaphysicians were trying to apprehend Reality (it may be what is or what *ought to be*) in terms of their own thought forms applicable only to what is contained in experience; in this they have no warrant. The extension of application of the categories of thought beyond all possible experience may well be questioned; it is certainly a belief of the speculative metaphysician. He starts usually with some statements about experience which are presumably self-evident—these he takes as his premises. Whether they are themselves true or not can never be ascertained, because they are about experience or the world as a whole, not about a part of experience. They can be verified only if they are about what is contained in experience. So verification is out of question. But taking for granted his initial premises and definitions, we can test whether his conclusions logically follow from his premises, i.e. whether his conclusions are valid, not whether they are true or false (for that can never be done even in the case of his premises), and whether he is using his words consistently without any shift in their meaning. We can only question the validity of his conclusions granting his premises; or much discussion can be raised on his premises also, as for instance, whether he has any right to assume the premises. Granting all this, the speculative metaphysician's activity seems to be quite similar to that of the mathematician who builds up logical systems on arbitrary preliminary definitions and axioms, the conclusions from which cannot possibly be applied in experience, nor verified. In such cases we are only questioning the validity and not the truth of his conclusions.

The author does not find any objection to considering speculative propositions as *a priori*. In the case of analytical or critical propositions also, even if we do not commit ourselves to the view that propositions of logical analysis are mere verbal equivalences, we may say that they are *a priori* too.

Then we may question whether metaphysical propositions have any cognitive meaning, besides emotive meaning. They certainly

have, since they present us with all the implications of holding a particular view about the world as a whole. If the implications do not amount to cognitive significance, the logical positivists' discussions also, which really bring out the logical implications involved in an empiricist theory of knowledge and in the belief that verifiable knowledge is the only real knowledge, may not be accorded any value at all.

The desire to speculate about the nature of the world, the desire to understand it, and the search for absolute truth may well spring, as some recent philosophers have claimed, from the desire for security, the fear of change, the feeling of the burden of time, the fear of loneliness and such other unconscious or conscious emotional elements. But any amount of psycho-therapy will not eradicate them unless they are tackled fundamentally. When once we have recognised them the burden lies on us to understand their source and the process of their coming into being.

The mystics also, like the Positivists, indicate a way of dissolving the metaphysical problems, instead of solving them. These problems, according to them, have arisen on account of the inherent constitution of our minds. They can be dissolved not by banishing or rejecting metaphysical problems as sheer nonsense, but by silencing the mind which creates these problems. To discuss whether such silencing is possible, or what is the method of such silencing is beyond the scope of this Paper; but any-how the silencing cannot be effected unless the constitution of our mind, with its fears, emotions and desires, is understood. The emotive meaning of metaphysical speculations has tremendous value, if only we understand how the problems arise, but not if they are explained away.

The Nature of Aesthetic and Moral Values

by

S. S. BARLINGAY

1. Value is commonly regarded as an economic concept. In Economics value is contrasted with wealth. Every object which has a property called utility is called 'wealth'. 'A glass of water' is wealth in Economics. The idea of wealth implies the relation between man and things, whereas 'value' implies a relation between things—a relation that takes actual form in the shape of exchange. It is a relative notion like weight and size, and economists think that if there were only one object in the world it would not be possible to say whether it would have any value. According to Ricardo, the idea of wealth is necessarily bound up with that of abundance, on the other hand the idea of value is connected with that of scarcity. The word 'value' thus implies a relation, a comparison, a preference. It can be seen without much difficulty that the use of the word 'value', made by the economists, is in the sense of means. In economics 'value' is value because it 'leads to' "something else", which is valuable in itself. That is, this second entity possesses a certain property which *does not* have any relation with 'anything else,' but has some relation 'with itself'. This second sense of value, I regard, as primary; and Philosophers use the word in this sense when they talk of '*intrinsic value*'.

2. It was this concept of value which was, for the first time, made use of by Prof. Moore in his Ethics. Before his days subjects like Ethics and Aesthetics were confined to the study, either of (good) conduct, or of (beautiful) things. Prof. Moore, on the other hand, laid stress on the notion of value. He wrote :

"Ethics is undoubtedly concerned with the question, what good conduct is; but being concerned with this, it obviously does not start at the beginning, unless it is prepared to tell what is *good* as well as *conduct*. For, good conduct is a complex notion—all conduct is not good. . . . On the other hand other things besides conduct may be good" (P.E. p. 2). What is the nature of this 'good'? Prof. Moore maintained that when we say an experience is good we are simply saying that it is endowed with a certain non-natural property, which cannot be reduced to any natural or psy-

chological property, such as being desired or approved. This property is simple and cannot be further analysed. "Good, on this view, is in no way a short-hand term for some more explicit account. The things, which are good, are just good, possess a property which can be recognised by immediate intuition and here the matter must rest" (P.L.C. by I. Richards, Chapter on value). If you take any ethical judgment such as 'X is good,' it is the predicate 'good' which represents this property, and for Prof. Moore, this property is identical with 'value'. Moore himself writes: "Every one does, in fact, understand the question, 'Is this good'? When he thinks of it, his state of mind is different from what it would be, were he asked, 'Is this pleasant or desired, or approved?'" It has a distinct meaning for him, even though he may not recognise in what way it is distinct. Whenever he thinks of 'intrinsic value' or 'intrinsic worth', or says that a thing 'ought to exist', he has before his mind a unique object—the unique property of things—which I mean by the term 'good,' (P.E. pp. 16-17) (F. N. That Prof. Moore is aware that words like 'good' and 'intrinsic value' are synonymous is clear also from pages 21 and 173 of P.E.). By extension of meaning the term value can be extended to 'beautiful', and words like 'good' and 'beautiful' can be regarded as value words.

3. The distinction which Prof. Moore has drawn between 'good' and 'the good', is very important. But still, it appears to me, that there was some confusion in his mind about the nature and status of the property 'good'. Like most other philosophers in those days, including early Russell, early Frege and Meinong, Prof. Moore seems to have, at the back of his mind a notion that a word, to be meaningful, must stand for something that *exists in some way*—may be in some non-natural way. The plausibility of Prof. Moore's view, thus, depended upon, as Richards pointed out, "primarily on the metaphysical assumption that there are properties in the sense of subsistent entities, which attach to existent particulars, but which might without absurdity be supposed to attach to nothing. These metaphysical entities, variously named as Ideas, Notions, Concepts or Universals, may be divided into two kinds, sensuous and supersensuous. The sensuous are those which may be apprehended by the senses, such as 'red', 'cold', 'round', 'swift' and 'painful', and the supersensuous, those apprehended not in the sensuous perception but otherwise. Logical relations, 'necessity' or 'impossibility', and such ideas as 'willing', 'end', 'cause' and 'being three in number', have in this way been supposed to be

directly apprehensible by mind. Amongst these supersensuous ideas, 'good' is to be found." (pp. 39-40, P.L.C.). Prof. Moore himself is unambiguously clear on the point. In *Principia Ethica* (pp. 110-111) he writes, "Metaphysicians.....have been always much occupied not only with other classes of natural objects which consist in mental facts but also with the class of objects or properties of objects which certainly do not exist in time, are not, therefore, parts of nature and which, in fact, do not exist, (i.e., in space and time); (the brackets are mine). To this class, as I have said, belongs what we mean by the adjective 'good'..... Two and two are four, but that does not mean that either two or four exist. Yet it certainly *means something*"..... "Two is somehow although it does not exist".

3.1 Prof. Moore, here, clearly feels that numbers 'two' and 'four' do not exist in the ordinary sense of the term; yet in a more important sense of the term they do exist. They *are*: the words *point them out*; *denote* them, *'mean'* them. That, for Prof. Moore, denoting and meaning are identical, is clear (from his remark on p. 36 of P.E.). Here, 'meaning' is nothing but '*naming*'. (Earlier he himself has used the word '*naming*'). And again, if these metaphysical objects do not exist in time, they "must at least exist elsewhere" (p. 111, P.E.). It is clear that for Prof. Moore, 'Good' or 'Value' also is a name of a property which '*is*' and '*exists*' in some supersensible sense.

4. Though I am quoting mostly from Prof. Moore, I am simply taking him as representative of Philosophers who think that a word or a description, to be meaningful, must be a name of something that is existing. The problem that arises in this connection, then, is this: Does 'meaning' consist in 'naming' some natural or supernatural entity? It is indeed true that we learn some words in this way. But does it mean that all the words that we learn are learnt in this way? Is every word in a sentence a name word—that the meaning of the word is the object for which the word stands? This is evidently far from true; all words do not behave in one way—in the way of naming an object. In fact, even in the case of words which signify objects, we identify the meaning of the words with the object because we fail to distinguish that 'it belongs to the meanings of the words that they can be used to refer to objects'. Wittgenstein has pointed out that even in the case of a primitive language, where an expression like 'Five Red apples' is used, each word is not learnt in the same way. We cannot ask the meaning of the word *five* in the same way as we ask the

meaning of the word 'apple'. The word 'apple' stands for apple. But what is relevant in the case of 'Five' is how we 'use' the word. As Wittgenstein has observed 'the functions of words are as diverse as the function of tools in a tool box' (P.I., p. 6). Statements are different from orders, and expectations are different from wishings. Further, corresponding to every assertion there need not be something existing. Wittgenstein has very well said: "If you want to understand the use of the word 'meaning' look for what are called 'explanations of meaning'..... "We do not realise that we calculate, operate with words, and in the course of time translate them sometimes in one picture, sometimes in another. It is as if one were to believe that a written order for a cow which some one is to hand over to me always had to be accompanied by an image of a cow, if the order was not to lose its meaning (P.I.—pp. 131-132)." Every use of the word, then, does not indicate the function of 'naming' or "standing for." It is, thus, futile to search for entities for every word in a sentence and create a false metaphysics. Corresponding to value words, then, there need not exist any entity.

5. I think, at this stage, it is necessary to draw a distinction between meaning and existence. Existence, in some broad sense, is a characteristic of a thing. As such, it belongs to the sphere of Ontology. On the other hand, 'meaning' is for us (without making it subjective in any sense of the term). It is not a characteristic of a thing, though it may be *about* it. And all that is *about* a thing need not be a thing or a part of a thing. I believe, it is only a thing, or a part of a thing, or a quality or an action of a thing, which can be said to have 'existence'. The concept of 'meaning' is more extensive than the concept of 'existence'. It is only in a special case of meaning that the "existence" may be denoted, and it is only in such cases that the naming theory of meaning can be significantly applied. My contention is that the value words, 'good' and 'beautiful', are meaningful in a sense, though in themselves they do not point out or name any quality or property of a thing.

6. It is not merely the naming theory of meaning that is responsible for our thinking that words like 'good', 'beautiful' and 'right' are *name-words*. It is also the ambiguous use of the verb 'is', which is equally responsible for such a notion. When we make judgments like 'x is good', or 'x is beautiful', or 'x is right', it is necessary to ask the grammar of the verb 'is'. "Is" sometimes stands for 'existence' and sometimes it is merely a 'copula' between

the subject and the predicate. Wittgenstein has pointed out two different uses of the verb 'is' in (1) 'The rose is red' and (2) 'Twice two is four.' He writes: "The rule which shows that the word 'is' has different meanings in these sentences is the one allowing us to replace the word 'is' in the second sentence by the sign of equality and forbidding this substitution in the first sentence" (P.I. p. 149). There are several uses of the word 'is', and it is sufficient for our purpose to know that 'is' in the sentences made from propositional functions like ".....is good" or ".....is beautiful" does not stand for existence in whatsoever manner.

6.1. Like the grammar of the verb 'is', it is equally necessary to know the grammar of prepositions like 'in' in sentences of the following form: 'Goodness is inherent *in* him' or '*in* this kind of conduct.' "There is beauty *in* the rose." On account of the grammatical structure, we should not be misled to think that the above sentences are like the following: 'There are ten petals *in* the flower' or 'there is a pot *in* the cupboard'.

6.11. I think it will be interesting to compare ethical or aesthetic judgments with some other kinds of judgments. Compare the following sentences where we get different uses of adverbs. Contrast 'It is raining heavily' with 'it is raining *probably*'. When I say that 'it is raining heavily', I mean that it is raining in a special way, but when I say that 'it is probably raining', I certainly do not want to suggest that there is a special mode or manner of raining which I call 'probably raining' (P.I. p. 3—by Kneale). On the contrary, it is equally easy to jump to the opposite extreme that the adverb 'probably' connotes a subjective existence. It is, therefore, worthwhile to compare a proposition like "It is *probably* raining" with another proposition, "It is raining *unfortunately*". It must be noted that 'unfortunately' is an additional comment about his own state of mind in making this assertion, whereas 'probably' is not. Like the use of the adverbs, the use of the adjectives also differs widely. "This is pleasant" is different from "This is yellow", and both of them are different from 'this is good', or 'this is beautiful.' When I say 'something is good or beautiful', I am neither conveying a state of mind as I do when I say it is pleasant or I am happy, nor am I stating that 'goodness or beauty' are parts of 'something which is either good or beautiful'. "This is good" and "This is beautiful" are significant sentences. But as soon as it is asserted that the significant sentences must *denote* 'existence', search for the substratum—which will support the so-called qualities like 'good or beautiful'—starts, with the result that objec-

tive or subjective theories of 'good and beautiful' are introduced. Thus, people begin to think that values are almost the parts of a thing or a state of mind. This ofcourse, is more explicit in the case of 'beautiful' than in the case of 'good'. But even in the case of 'good' some such notion must be at the back of moral philosophers when they use a sentence like the following: "A certain conduct must have an inherent goodness in it". It appears to me that even Prof. Moore almost literally thinks of 'beautiful' as a part of a thing when, in *Principia Ethica*, he elaborately deals with the two worlds, one 'ugly' and the other 'beautiful' and asks: 'well, even so, supposing them quite apart from any possible contemplation by human beings, still is it irrational to hold that it is better that the *beautiful* world should exist than the one which is ugly? Would it not be well, in any case, to do what we could to produce it rather than the other?' (P.E. pp. 83-84). I think what misleads us in correctly adjudicating the status of value words is that in language they assume the form of adjectives.

7. If value words like 'beautiful' and 'good' do not stand for names of certain properties, can we say that values are objective? In a sense they are certainly not; but in another sense we can say that they are objective, because when different people make value judgments, they have or can have in their mind only one use of the value word. Two such value judgments about a single object convey only *one sense* of the value word. Suppose A and B are making an aesthetic judgment about an object 'x'. Suppose A says 'x is beautiful' and B contradicts him and says 'x is not beautiful', provided there is a communication between A and B, there is a possibility that both of them have only one sense of the word 'beautiful' in this context, however much they may be differing between themselves whether x is beautiful or not. Just as it is possible to talk about words qua words as in the sentence " 'Table' consists of five letters", so also it is possible to talk about values or value words in the same context. The word 'table' in the above sentence is not a word in any body's private language, otherwise its communication would be impossible, nor is it an entity. The value words have to be understood in a similar way. The common reference need not denote any property which exists.

8. Two problems may still arise in regard to value words. It may be said that though every word need not be a value word, a value word may as a matter of fact stand for some property. It may be alleged that all that I have been saying is that there are words which do not stand for anything. This may be admitted.

But just as proper names stand for something, so also the value words may stand for something, and this position I have not refuted. As a corollary to this it may be pointed out that some value judgments can be incorrect (or false?). If value does not reside in the object, how can there be a false value judgment?

8. (i) I must confess that I cannot strictly answer the first question. I feel that had beauty or goodness been a name of a certain ontological property, mere cognition would have been enough to know it. In such a case, if a person did not know that a certain conduct was good it would be because his cognitive *apparatus* was defective. But whereas two persons with equal cognitive power can discover the colour, the length, the shape, the symmetry and the like, one person may discover that the thing is beautiful whereas the other person may not so discover. When a person says that X is beautiful, he does not simply know X or the qualities of X. There is something *more*, by whatever name you may call it. What is true of the aesthetic adjective seems to be equally true of 'Good'. This leads me to think that adjectives like 'beautiful' or 'good' are not the names of any property.

8. (ii) What is the explanation of incorrect or false value judgment? I believe it simply means this: Suppose I judge that 'X is beautiful'. Now, so far as this is a value judgment, it is something more than a cognition of X, and may in some broad sense be regarded as '*an interpretation*'. (I have used the word only in the absence of any other suitable word). Nevertheless, it is connected with X, which is a thing having qualities, or a whole having parts. Suppose that there are two pairs of qualities;

(1) $a \dots a_1 \dots a_2 \dots a_3 \dots a_n$

and (2) $b \dots b_1 \dots b_2 \dots b_3 \dots b_n$

Further suppose that when we are correctly judging 'X' as beautiful, it is the " $a \dots a_n$ " group of qualities which are associated with 'X'. Now, when we wrongly judge that 'X' is beautiful, it means that 'X' is associated with some or all of the ' $b \dots b_n$ ' group of qualities, and this should not evoke in us a judgment that 'X is beautiful'. That 'beautiful' is not a name of any quality should not lead us to think that ' $a \dots a_n$ ' are not qualities. A value judgment is always passed on things or actions; it is always passed on a subject which may exist. The maxim suggested by Wittgenstein can be usefully employed here. "In such a difficulty ask yourself", writes Wittgenstein, "how did you learn the meaning of

the word, ('good', for instance)? From what sort of examples?" (P.I. p. 77). We learn the use of the word 'good' only from the subject of value judgments. So, to decide about 'Good' (or beautiful) without reference to the subject will be incorrect.

9. It may be objected at this stage that if there is no ontological entity corresponding to value words, where is the necessity of the enquiry about value words? The objection, however, will not hold water; it is presupposing that 'meaning' is 'naming'. It means that words which do not stand for some property or which are not name-words should not find a place in language. It should not be forgotten that words are like tools in the tool box.

10. 'Good' and 'beautiful' are value words. Neither of them names any (existential) property. But what is the difference between the two? I feel that the difference can be found out by examining the different types of value judgments. Make judgments from the propositional functions like "...is good", "...is right", "...ought to be", and "...is beautiful". Contrast the first three with the last which will be an aesthetic judgment. When I say that a certain conduct is right or a certain thing is good, or a certain thing ought to be, I am referring to a certain kind, a class of these things or conducts. I am concerned with a general rule and so my judgment can go beyond the empirical sphere. It can be expressed in a hypothetical form. The subject of such judgments—the ethical judgments—need not exist, or be present at the moment a judgment is passed and communicated to others. A universal quantification would be possible in respect of such judgments. Supposing that 'F' stands for an action or a thing and 'G' stands for the value word 'good', the logical form of the ethical judgment would be $(x) (Fx \supset Gx)$. An ethical judgment can take the form of a universal proposition and the proposition can hold good whether or not there exists any conduct which is judged good. On the other hand, one can never say that something is beautiful unless the subject of the judgment is presented to us. An aesthetic judgment is an empirical judgment, a particular judgment; it cannot be expressed in a hypothetical form. 'X is beautiful' is undoubtedly a propositional function out of which aesthetic judgments are formed. But I do not think that the judgments as such can be expressed in a hypothetical form. In order to judge something as beautiful there must at least be a particular mental picture before the person who judges it as beautiful. It is much more so when he is conveying an aesthetic judgment to others. An aesthetic judgment, then, requires a particular word picture, or a particular

image or a particular thing, unlike the ethical judgment where a judgment can be passed on something that is abstract. The logical form of aesthetic judgment then is something like this:

$(\exists x) (\exists x. Gx)$ and $\exists x =$ Some definite object.

We are taking for granted that F stands for a thing and G stands for the predicate beautiful. This, I think, is a very important structural difference between the ethical and the aesthetic judgments apart from the fact that the two value words suggest two entirely different kinds of attitude.

11. Let me summarise the results of my enquiry. In this paper I have tried to discuss two questions:

- (1) In what respect a *value* differs from a *thing*? and
- (2) In what logical respect an aesthetic judgment differs from the ethical?

In respect of the first question I tried to show that whereas a thing has an existence (and also perhaps in some sense, a meaning) values have only meaning but no existence. They are only 'useful' notions. Prof. Moore was, therefore, partly right in his approach to the problem in-as-much as he said that 'Good' cannot be identified with any natural property like pleasure, or with any metaphysical concept. But he went wrong in supposing it to be a name of some property nevertheless, thus creating some false metaphysics about it.

11. (i) I have also tried to show that though the value concepts are useful they cannot be considered in isolation from the value judgments. In most cases the value judgments have a grammatically indicative mood. This may give rise to thinking that predicates like 'good and beautiful and right' literally inhere in the subject, just as 'red' in 'The Rose is Red' inheres in the thing 'rose'. It is such misconceptions which are at the back of the naming theory of meaning. Language, however, has more functions than one, and it is the non-indicative function that is suggested when value words are used.

11. (ii) I have also tried to show that an aesthetic judgment cannot be passed unless the subject of the aesthetic judgment is present and is definite. An aesthetic judgment, then, is, in a sense, a particular (singular) judgment. An ethical judgment, on the other hand, can be a universal judgment; it is thus immaterial whether or not the subject of the ethical judgment exists.

A Critical Study of Ayer's Analysis of Ethical Propositions

by

G. N. MATHRANI

I. Expository: Professor A. J. Ayer is a leading British writer on "Logical Positivism". According to him, the fundamental ethical concepts are pseudo concepts and the so-called ethical propositions are not assertions, but merely emotive expressions. Ayer believes that ethical propositions do not communicate any thought; they do not say anything about anything; and that they are a sort of emotional display.

Display of emotions takes different forms: (i) Motor display, that is, display of emotions through overt bodily movements, (ii) display of emotions through observable physiological and organic changes in the body, (iii) vocal display, that is, display through ejaculations or exclamations, inarticulate or articulate. According to Ayer, ethical propositions are a sort of articulate exclamations. "In every ethical judgement the function of the relevant ethical word is purely emotive. It is used to express feeling about certain objects, but not to make any assertion about them."¹ In moral judgements Ayer sees nothing more than a sort of emotional outburst.

Ayer does not wish to characterize ethical propositions even as emotive statements, that is, statements about somebody's emotions.² According to him, 'X is good' does not mean 'I like X or most people like X.' He repeatedly points out that through ethical propositions we do not describe our emotions, we merely release our emotions. Ayer says that we should distinguish between the expression of feeling and the assertion of feeling, and that through ethical propositions we express feelings and do not assert the existence of any feelings.

II. Critical: (i) If Ayer's analysis were correct, it would follow that whosoever pronounces an ethical judgement must ex-

1. Ayer's 'Language, Truth and Logic', p. 160.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 162-163.

perience a certain emotion, and that apart from that emotive experience there will be nothing left of his ethical judgement.

It may be pointed out that generally every felt emotion impels the individual concerned to act in a certain direction and manner; whereas sometimes we pass moral judgements without feeling any impulsion within us to act in accordance with those judgements. On such occasions ethical judgements are pronounced without any ethical emotion being felt. This may happen when the 'Judge' has no intention to influence the reactions of those to whom his ethical remarks are addressed. In such instances moral evaluations can be as cool and unemotional as mathematical calculation.

Even if we grant that emotion-less ethical judgement is not possible, it must be added that emotion invariably is reaction to some cognition. It may be argued from Ayer's point of view that ethical judgement is always an emotional reaction to cognitive experience of what can be empirically observed in the action or mode of action judged. In that case, whenever two or more persons' empirical observations of the action judged are the same, they must display the same emotional reaction by pronouncing the same ethical judgement. Whereas it happens sometimes that the empirical facts taken note of by different observers are the same and yet their ethical reactions are different.

Ayer explains such instances in terms of "moral conditioning." To put it in his own words, "But if our opponent happens to have undergone a different process of moral 'conditioning' from ourselves, so that, even when he acknowledges all the facts, he still disagrees with us about the moral value of the actions under discussion, then we abandon the attempt to convince him by argument."³ By 'moral conditioning' he seems to imply conditioning of emotional reactions to actions by the method of sympathetic induction in which emotions are sought to be transferred by correlating the display of emotions with the uttering of certain ethical remarks.

In this moral conditioning how are ethical remarks selected by those who control and conduct the process of moral conditioning? Is the selection of ethical remarks arbitrary or has it some basis? If the selection of ethical remarks is arbitrary like giving a proper name to an object, there should be no objection to indiscriminate and inconsistency in their application. Just as two or more proper

3. *Ibid.*, p. 166.

names (contrary in verbal meaning) can be given to the same person; similarly there should be no objection to using (verbally) contrary ethical remarks about the same action on different occasions or even on the same occasion. Obviously Ayer seems to emphasise (by implication) consistency in the application of ethical remarks; because otherwise moral conditioning will not be effective and enduring. From traditional and common stand-point, moral conditioning presupposes moral insight (capacity for trans-empirical moral discernment) on the part of elders and teachers who control moral conditioning. But Ayer would not accept this presupposition, and yet he values consistency in the use of ethical language.

If the selection of ethical remarks, in the process of moral conditioning, has some basis, ethical remarks must mean something and the meaning must refer to the action judged. As a significant sentence, any ethical remark may be intended to be taken as a verbal description (in some special sense) of some empirically observable characteristics of the action or actions about which the given ethical remark is made. This would imply that ethical propositions used in moral conditioning are analysable into empirically observable experiences. Whereas, according to Ayer, ethical propositions are unanalysable, and it is on that ground that he rejects the naturalistic theories in Ethics.

If ethical remarks used in moral conditioning do mean something, and if their logical content does not refer to the empirically observable characteristics of actions, then it would be reasonable to infer that the logical content of ethical remarks used in moral conditioning perhaps refers to trans-empirical moral discernments.

To put it briefly, ethical remarks used in moral conditioning either do not possess any logical content or they do possess some logical content. If they do not possess any logical content, they cannot be useful for effective and enduring moral conditioning. If, on the other hand, they do possess some logical content, their logical content must either refer to empirical characteristics or non-empirical characteristics of actions. Ayer does admit (though by implication only) the possibility of effective and enduring moral conditioning, and yet denies logical content to ethical remarks used as a medium for moral conditioning. This to all appearances seems to be logically an untenable stand-point.

This inconsistency in Ayer's approach arises because he admits the practical value and utility of ethical language and denies the

logical basis and meaning of ethical language. To be consistent, he should say that we should abandon ethical language altogether, that ethical language has no practical value and no logical meaning.

Perhaps according to Ayer, in moral conditioning, ethical remarks are required to be used consistently, though they do not possess any meaning or logical content in terms of empirical or trans-empirical characteristics. If ethical remarks used in moral conditioning were meaningless sentences, mere consistency in their use could not make them an effective device for moral conditioning. As a matter of fact, use of ethical remarks becomes effective in inducing the required moral emotions and behaviour, only when the child responds to the remarks intelligently and understands their meaning. Till then ethical remarks produce as little effect on children as on animals. Full significance of ethical remarks can be grasped and judged only with the development of moral insight.

II. (ii) The emotions displayed or expressed through ethical propositions are, according to Ayer, the feelings of moral approval or disapproval.⁴ It has to be admitted that a feeling of approval is a sort of a feeling of pleasure. But all feelings of pleasure are not feelings of approval, and also all feelings of approval are not feelings of moral approval.

If all feelings of pleasure are not feelings of approval, there must be something else, in a feeling of approval, besides a feeling of pleasure. The additional element, in a feeling of approval, usually is thought to be some assent. But there cannot be an assent without a discernment. In a feeling of moral approval assent to the action is based on a moral discernment. According to this analysis, a feeling of approval is a composite whole in which a cognition, a conation and a feeling are inextricably mixed up. Unlike feelings and emotions, cognitions and conations cannot be expressed or displayed; to put them in words is to communicate them and make assertions about them.

On the basis of the above analysis, it would not be wrong to conclude that ethical propositions, which Ayer alleges to be merely expressions of moral emotions, are partly at least communicative of assents or dissents and moral discernments.

It could be argued from Ayer's stand-point that feelings of moral approval and disapproval are unanalysable and are purely

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 158-159.

and exclusively feeling states, felt in direct response to the empirical observation of a certain class of actions. This sort of argument may enable Ayer and others of his way of thinking to maintain inner consistency in their stand-point; but logically the argument is not very strong. The fact that Ayer is able to give a significant name to the feeling expressed through ethical propositions (calling it feeling of moral approval or disapproval) logically implies that even for Ayer it is not unanalysable. Only he does not wish to analyse it, for the analysis will go against his theory.

II. (iii) Ayer's own argument against the theory of trans-empirical moral discernments: Ayer rejects this view mainly on the ground that the intuition of different persons very often does not operate uniformly. The same action in a given situation may be discerned by one to be right and by another to be wrong. The same goal or end may be discerned by one to be good and by another to be bad or evil. Ayer further complains that no method is suggested for deciding between such conflicting intuitions.⁵

Ayer seems to have exaggerated the difficulty regarding the conflict of intuitions. The power of moral discernment is a quality of the dispassionate Reason; and the dispassionate Reason operating in all the mature minds discerns uniformly. Moral disputes arise only when one or both the parties are dominated by passions and prejudices, and are not acting from the plane of dispassionate Reason. It is possible to settle a moral dispute to the satisfaction of the parties concerned, if they could rise for a while to the level of emancipated Reason (Reason which is not conditioned by passions and preconceptions) and discuss the issue from that level of the mind.

Ayer however would not be satisfied with this answer to his difficulty about the conflict of intuitions, because his real argument against the theory of moral discernment is based on his theory of meaning. According to his theory of meaning, a synthetic proposition can be said to be logically significant and meaningful only if it is empirically verifiable. His theory clearly implies that synthetic propositions which are empirically unverifiable must be taken to be meaningless, containing no thought content. I have discussed the inadequacy of this theory in some of my previous writings; and I still believe that empirical verifiability cannot be the test of meaning for all classes of synthetic propositions.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 156-157.

Whatever types of empirical verifiability Ayer and others may postulate in order to make their criterion universal in application, their criterion must imply that a synthetic proposition cannot be said to be logically significant if its truth cannot be proved by the method of empirical observation. This implication of their criterion narrows down the field of its application; and also it makes the meaning of a proposition dependent on its truth value. According to their criterion, a proposition cannot be said to possess meaning if it does not possess any truth value; also a proposition cannot be significant if its truth value cannot be established by the method of empirical observation.

Meaning and truth are two distinct properties of a proposition; and meaning is a more fundamental and basic property of a proposition than its truth value. A proposition may possess meaning (logical content) and yet it may not possess the property of truth value. Fictitious propositions possess meaning, but they do not possess the property of truth value. According to Ayer's criterion, in whatever way his criterion may be stated and elaborated, fictitious propositions must be classed as meaningless. A criterion which condemns fictitious propositions as meaningless cannot be a sound criterion of universal meaning.

Similarly it is unreasonable to insist that empirical observation can be the only method for establishing the truth value of a proposition. It would be much more unreasonable to say that a proposition cannot be said to possess any meaning or logical content if its truth value cannot be established by the method of empirical observation. This is exactly what Ayer says about ethical propositions.

II. (iv) Concluding remarks: Ayer's view that in every case an ethical proposition is purely an emotive expression and not an intellectual communication does not seem to be true for the reasons given in the earlier sections. However there seems to be some truth in his contention, in-as-much as in many instances an ethical proposition partly is an emotive expression; and in some cases it may even be purely an emotive expression.

For many persons emotion appears to be a frequent constituent of their moral experience, which is indicated and expressed through the ethical propositions made by them. In all such instances the emotive element seems to be merely a feeling of pleasure or displeasure felt towards the action judged, caused by a moral discernment. The function of the ethical judgement pronounced by them is both to communicate the moral discernment and to express the

feeling caused by it. The emotive element becomes more prominent when the "Judge" wants to influence the moral reactions of the person or persons to whom his remarks are addressed. Emotion, in their cases, is only a constituent and not the core of moral experience; and even as a constituent it is the effect of moral discernment and not an independent constituent.

There is however a large number of persons, in every society, who are not very much mentally developed and consequently are not deeply reflective. Moral conditioning undergone by them may have been more or less a mechanical and not an intelligent process. Such persons' ethical propositions perhaps are merely emotive expressions. But then the moral emotions which they learn to display, through their moral conditioning, are merely the feeling reactions of pleasure and displeasure; and their ethical judgements also merely express their feelings of pleasure or displeasure. They learn to feel and express pleasure at certain actions and displeasure at certain other actions. Afterwards they use ethical propositions, taught to them, only to express their pleasure or displeasure.

Such persons' moral reactions can be easily re-conditioned because their habitual moral reactions are not rooted in moral reflection and discernment. For instance, many of the born vegetarians get easily converted to non-vegetarianism even though they may have been subjected to a long process of moral conditioning in favour of vegetarianism.

Moral experience of the mentally developed persons invariably contains moral discernment as a prominent constituent. Ethical judgements pronounced by them are not mere emotive expressions. It should be added in the end that even for the mentally developed persons moral experience partly is a social product, as they too require moral conditioning; but in their case the purpose of moral conditioning, which is to awaken their power of moral discernment, is realised in a fuller measure. Consequently their moral reactions are based on their moral discernments and not merely on moral conditioning.

A Critical Study of Neo-Hegelianism in Ethics

by

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I

On Doctrines of Self-Realisation and Hedonism.

Hegel's system is dominated by the one idea of 'unfolding', the unfolding, that is to say, of the Absolute Spirit. As far as Ethics is concerned, his main emphasis was on self-realisation of the human spirit through successive stages in the evolution of social institutions. His system is in many respects a stage farther than Kant's in that he takes into account the supreme importance of society and social institutions, without which there could hardly be anything moral or immoral. There can be no mere form without content, and Hegel provided this content in the shape of an objective moral order, which bridges the gulf between the individual will and the Universal Will. As regards the moral ideal of complete Harmony and Union of the individual and the Universal, Hegel admits that it is never fully attained. Morality is an 'adventure', as Taylor describes it; in this adventure the individual is the chief participant, whose goal, which is the infinite, is never fully realised.

Hegel's philosophy has been accepted more or less 'in toto' or at least in broad outlines by many post-Hegelian philosophers of the 19th century both in England and America. Though they have differences between themselves, both in the matter of the terminology they use and in their thinking, we can, by reason of the many similarities they have to Hegel's system as a whole, easily characterise them as Neo-Hegelians. Their thought almost falls into a regular pattern. In what follows I propose to consider five of the most prominent Neo-Hegelians*, viz: F. H. Bradley, T. H. Green, H. J. Paton, A. E. Taylor and Josiah Royce. A strong undercurrent of Hegelianism could easily be detected by a careful

*1. F. H. Bradley: *Ethical Studies*.

2. T. H. Green: *Prolegomena to Ethics*.

3. H. J. Paton: *The Good Will*.

4. A. E. Taylor: *The Faith of a Moralist*.

5. J. Royce: *The Philosophy of Loyalty*.

analysis of the ethical systems of these philosophers. It is my endeavour to bring to light some of the similarities, and touch also on differences where possible, between these various systems, which obviously owe their inspiration to their parent Hegelianism.

Formalism vs. Teleology in Ethics:

The fundamental question in Ethics seems to be, in Bradley's words, 'why should I be moral'? To take morality for granted is not to annihilate this question. Assuming that there can be morality only in relation to a self, we can still ask, what is it that is desired for its own sake? Two answers are generally given. According to some thinkers, in all morality, there is a good that is to be achieved and there is a goal to be reached, be the goal pleasure, or happiness, or the highest good or self-realisation. Among classical thinkers Aristotle might be considered a Teleologist in this sense, because he believed that 'every art and every enquiry and similarly every action and pursuit aims at some good.' According to the other group of thinkers, morality is an end in itself. Moral value consists in the quality of the will, disposition or motive, and not in any ends or results that may be achieved thereby. Kant was the most consistent exponent of this 'Formalist' view. His fundamental tenet was 'Nothing can be called good, save good will'. According to Kant, ends have no value in Ethics; it is the will that matters. He calls the moral command the categorical imperative. The common criticism against Kant's categorical imperative is that it is just pure form devoid of any content.

Now we can proceed to consider our Neo-Hegelian thinkers within the framework of the Formalist and the Teleological Ethics, and enquire whether they would fit into one of those moulds. Bradley, in his 'Ethical Studies', rejects Kant's strict formalism. If morality is the activity of the formal self, the standard must be formal too. So, Kant's practical maxim, the categorical imperative, reduces itself to realising non-contradiction. But doing duty according to pure form has no meaning. For Bradley the end of morality is self-realisation, just as for Aristotle it was Happiness or the highest good. The Ethics of Bradley thus can be classified under Teleology as opposed to formalism. What we aim at in morality is the self,—and the self as a whole, which is the content of our wills (E.S. 71). There can be no form of the will apart from the content.

Green's departure from Kant also stems from his emphasis on the content of the moral ideal as distinct from the form. The idea

which the good will seeks to realise is identical in form with the idea of the end as realised in the eternal mind. The former is the medium through which the latter idea determines the moral development of man. The good, of course, as for Kant, is the good will which again is the will for the unconditional good. The idea of the end or unconditional good, however, is that of self-realisation, and this self is social. That is, its good includes that of others who are conceived as ends-in-themselves. Green also is a Teleologist like Bradley, but with the difference that the goal is set up in terms of the will itself, not only one's own, but also of others.

Paton too is a Teleologist; and for him Morality has an end, and the end is the coherent Will. This coherent will is not a contentless abstract principle in complete isolation from the actual willing self. All the rationality that there is in our judgments of goodness and badness is derived solely from this principle, as it is consciously or unconsciously applied (345). There can be no abstract good, but only such as could come out in actual willing, and this is concrete goodness. The good will then is not the Kantian Abstract Universal, but a concrete Universal. Every good act is an embodiment of the whole which lives in its parts (361-362).

Taylor seems to approach Morals from the point of view of a Theologist. God beckons to man from a distance with an overpowering force, and we cannot but respond to his overtures. Taylor is convinced of Divine initiative in all moral advance which is a perpetual 'becoming', a becoming open to the influence and pressure of the Eternal Being. Morality thus becomes for Taylor in effect a means to the perfecting of the individual spirit. The ideal that inspires us and sustains us is not only a final but an efficient cause.

Among the list of the Neo-Hegelian writers we are considering, only Royce seems to be a faithful follower of Kant in his pure formalism, though he was not equally consistent. From times immemorial idealists have been moved by one desire almost with the intensity of a passion, to seek unity and system in the Universe; and when they failed to find it, they forced an artificial figment of their own imagination on it. So all along we have been having very attractive and logically consistent idealistic systems, but with just one defect, namely the lack of all content. Ideally they were all right, but when it came to application, to the drawing of consequences, they either completely evaporated or broke to pieces. That is why no idealist ventures to face reality but is content to

revel in formalism. Whatever be the success of Idealism in other fields, in the field of morals Idealism seems to be a thorough failure. 'Duty for duty's sake' says the categorical imperative. Does it say what is my duty in particular circumstances? No! Then it is just form, and nothing else!

There is no abstract duty or abstract right, or abstract loyalty. Duty is always a particular duty, right is always a right act, and loyalty is always a loyalty to something. Prof. Royce gives us in his 'Philosophy of Loyalty' his own formulation of the 'Categorical Imperative,' namely 'Be loyal to Loyalty', and he claims that it is a guide to conduct. He defines Loyalty as the 'willing and practical and thorough-going devotion of a person to a cause'. I am sure any dictionary would have given the same definition. But he goes a step further and tells us how this loyalty works. Loyalty in some mysterious way tells us what causes to choose and how. 'So choose your cause that there will be more rather than less loyalty in the world.' But now can we know whether there is more or less loyalty in this world? It depends on the choice of the causes; good causes enhance the sum-total of loyalty in the world, and bad causes decrease it. In other words, loyalty depends on a good cause. What is a good cause, then? It is loyalty that tells us what a good cause is. 'A cause is good in so far as it is essentially a loyalty to loyalty, that is, an aid and a furtherance of loyalty in my fellows'. This certainly is going round and round. Royce, no doubt, succeeded in his 'deliberate centralisation of all the duties and of all virtues along the one conception of rational loyalty', but only at the cost of mere emptiness. To be just to Royce, however, we must say that in so far as he was not consistent in his formalism, he was in equal proportion realistic in his theory of loyalty. He recognised differences in causes, conflicts in the choice of causes, and he even believed in training for loyalty. Though he recognised some of the practical problems which we have to encounter when we are in doubt in the choice of causes, somehow he felt that his magic talisman of the 'Categorical Imperative,' i.e., loyalty to loyalty, would help surmount all our difficulties.

Self-Realisation :

The doctrine of self-realisation in Western Philosophy is as old as Plato, and in the East perhaps much older. In Plato, Aristotle and some other philosophers, the self that is sought to be realised is mainly the individual self, and that, through the triumph of the rational soul. It was reserved, however, for Hegel to give a

new interpretation to the self-Realisation theory by his emphasis on the social self. It was he who first gave an explicit formulation in modern times to the theory that man's real self truly is a social self, and that self-realisation is just the realisation of the social self. Bradley, Green, Paton, Taylor and Royce follow Hegel in this respect, though they differ among themselves in the detailed working of the theory.

Bradley asks himself the question: Why should I be moral?, and answers that "morality implies a good to be realised. I must do the act, must realise the end. Ends and means cannot be separated. The act for me is my act, and there is no end beyond the act. For morality the end implies the act, and the act implies self-realisation". From the above we can draw some conclusions regarding Bradley's position.

(1) Morality implies a good to be realised and in some sense it is my good, since I do the act. Bradley thus seeks a relation between morality and my self, and finds in it its justification.

(ii) Ends and means cannot be separated. Is self-realisation, then, a means or an end? Or are they identical? Let us put together some of Bradley's statements and see whether we can make anything out of them.

(a) I must do the act. (b) End implies the act. (c) There is no end beyond the act. (d) Act implies self-realisation. (e) Ends and means cannot be separated. From these five statements, it appears as though ends and means are either the same or are at least indistinguishable, and that self-realisation is at the same time the process, the standard, the objective and the consummation. The question then would be, do we realise our self through a process of self-realisation?

(iii) 'What is desired must in all cases be self'; in other words, self-realisation is an object of desire. It would be interesting to compare this with the Hedonist's contention that 'pleasure' is the object of desire and see whether Bradley's self-realisation would have any advantage. As to the identity of means and ends, it can perhaps be argued that progressive self-realisation is always in a state of 'Becoming' and so means and ends in such a state are relative.

For Bradley, then, the object of desire is the self itself, and the act of morality implies self-realisation. In Green, the act presupposes motive; but the motive is not a mere desire which solicits

a man, but a desire as identified by the man with himself. The source of acts of will for Green, therefore, is this identification of the self with a desired object in which self-satisfaction is sought, and the moral quality of the act depends on the nature of this object. The object is the idea of the good, which is realised in the progress of humanity towards a perfect society. Since society is comprised always of persons, progress is personal. Thus the end for Green also is self-realisation, though self-realisation is identical with the idea of the end as realised in the external mind. According to Green, the former becomes the medium through which the latter idea determines the moral development of man. Thus in Green, more than in Bradley, we find activity of the Eternal, and its manifestation in the human will. Green emphasises also the autonomy of the wills. The true good, which is the highest good, is always the common good. This seems to be the distinguishing characteristic of Green's ethics. It is not however just an overall devotion to society that he was advocating. In realising oneself, one should not only not hinder, but actually help, others realising themselves. In promoting one's good, one seeks the good of others. Virtue in short is the common good.

In Royce we find the same identification which Green speaks of, but in a different garb. While in Green the identification is of the 'self with the desired object in which self-satisfaction is sought,' in Royce the identification is of the will with a 'unified cause'. It is loyalty that 'fixes our attention upon this cause, and bids us look without ourselves to see what this unified cause is, and shows us some one plan of action'. It actually says to us, 'In this cause is your life, your will, your opportunity, your fulfilment'. In other words, this identification of the self and the cause, and the consequent self-fulfilment, can be translated into the Neo-Hegelian jargon as 'self-realisation'. What is it that does the trick? Loyalty! What is Loyalty? That's a trick again! If you ask Royce 'what is Loyalty', he will reply, 'ask the cause!' If you ask: 'what is the cause, then?', he would retort: 'find that out from Loyalty'.

Paton in his 'Good Will' introduces new terminology, which is novel and interesting. We shall consider two terms which he most frequently used, namely, 'policy' and 'coherence'. In fact his work was, as the title itself indicates, a study in the Coherence theory of goodness.

Now with regard to the first term 'policy'. A policy is a more developed volition which has the double characteristic of 'momen-

tary spontaneity and consistency through time' (163). He further says, when our acts are genuine policies then we say we are truly ourselves. (166). Here again there is the same identification of the self with its object. An action 'is coherent or is a policy, so far as its parts are willed as parts of a whole. It has three characteristics of spontaneity, perseverance and efficiency' (172).

Morality for Paton consists in a will, which transcends itself in the double sense of giving itself up to its object, and endeavouring to establish a coherence going beyond the moment. This double movement of self-denial and self-realisation he calls self-mediation and self-transcendence. In other words, self-realisation consists in the establishing of a coherent will. The maxim for Paton, in short, is, 'Realise the coherent will or policy'.

Now we have to enquire whether the introduction of these new terms 'policy' and 'coherence' in any way helps us out of our difficulties which we encounter in the practical sphere of morality. Unfortunately, the answer seems to be 'no'. Paton's 'coherent policy' makes as much or as little sense as Royce's 'Loyalty' or Bradley's 'duty'. 'Coherence' principle is as empty as the principle of Uniformity of Nature in science. Neither explains anything new, but they are made use of only to tie together behaviours and willed actions in one case, and things and motions in the other, into convenient bundles. They serve that purpose all-right so far as they give some system to our thinking. Paton in a way confesses this when he says: 'while it is true the abstract principle of coherence will tell us nothing of what we ought to do, it is precisely by it we can distinguish goodness and badness in our actual life' (370).

Morality for Taylor points beyond itself. The moral life is a tension between the temporal and the eternal, and the moral process is an advance to the eternal. The human personality is lifted up, as it were, towards the eternal, and in that process, it is 'transfigured' and 'transformed'. All genuine morality presupposes, according to Taylor, the supernatural, the Eternal Being, as an overpowering force, which draws the human will to itself and must be an efficient as well as a final cause. Moral process is a 'Becoming', open to the influence and pressure of the Eternal Being. In Taylor, thus, we find explicit what was present implicitly in the other Neo-Hegelians like Bradley, Paton and Green, namely, the character, the initiative, and the driving force of the Eternal. Self-Realisation in Taylor's system must then be equivalent to realisation by the temporal human personality of the Eternal.

Taylor is confident, unlike Bradley, that the moral process must be definitely a progress and an advance towards the Eternal, and that this process need not be endless. One could reach the destination, and still 'progress' in that state of fruition. In other words, when 'vertical' progress attains fruition perhaps 'horizontal' progress begins.

Pleasure and Hedonism: Bradley brings forward several objections to Hedonism, according to which pleasure is the supreme end.

(i) Common moral opinion is decidedly against its being a sufficient account of morals; (ii) there are things we should choose even if no pleasure came from them; (iii) increase of progress and increase of pleasure do not always go together; (iv) to say that in desiring the right the self proposes to itself a pleasure is to fly in the face of facts; (v) even if what is desired is pleasure, the moral consciousness does not think it acts for pleasure; (vi) hedonism has taken the universal in the sense of all the particulars (sum of particular pleasures); and since the particulars are arising and perishing, the universal can have no higher reality; (vii) if I am to seek my pleasure, it must be left to me to judge my pleasure, and so all moral legislation disappears.

Taking these criticisms one by one:

(i) As regards common moral opinion, it can very well be doubted. Pleasure, of course, should not be taken to mean mere sensuous pleasure. Pleasure in the higher sense should mean disinterested and enlightened pleasure, and I do not see why pleasure understood in this sense could not be the end. In this sense it would mean Happiness or bliss itself. On the other hand, we could well ask, in what way Bradley's self-realisation is a better candidate as an end? We do not believe that common moral opinion is in any way more favourable to self-realisation. It doesn't even know what it is! Self-realisation is in no sense a more practicable and intelligible end than pleasure. (ii) There are no doubt things we should choose even if no pleasure, understood in the ordinary sense, came from them. In the ordinary sense it means only the opposite of pain. The very fact that pain is welcomed by some is evidence that pain itself is borne for the ultimate pleasure which it is expected to bring, and which, to the agent, is of the 'disinterested' and 'enlightened' kind. (iii) Increase of progress and increase of pleasure do not always go together.


Here again, progress is as vague a term as pleasure. When Bradley says that advance could be at the cost of pleasure, we should reply: advance, if it were real advance, could never be at the cost of pleasure. Whenever there is advance, there is always pleasure, in the sense of disinterested pleasure, happiness or bliss. (iv) Simply because we say that pleasure is the end, it does not necessarily mean that whenever we do any act, we should say to ourselves 'I do this act for the sake of the pleasure I derive from it'. That is, the end, though a conscious end, need not always be present to consciousness.

(v) Bradley is perfectly right when he says that even if what is desired is pleasure, the moral consciousness does not think it acts to get pleasure. But in such cases does it cease to be Hedonism, or do we have to give it a new name 'qualified Hedonism'? (vi) Bradley says that pleasure and pain are simply modes of self-feeling, and that they are subjective. We should reply,—if self-feeling is an abstraction, is not the self itself an abstraction from what Bradley knows to be a wider or infinite self? What would be the fate of self-realisation itself? In short, the whole criticism of Bradley levelled against pleasure can equally legitimately be directed against the self itself. We do not see why the self itself may not be regarded as a sum of momentary states and not a unity, if pleasure felt by the self is viewed that way. (vii) If I am to seek my own pleasure, Bradley is right in saying that all moral legislation ceases. No less is it true of self-realisation. But enlightened Hedonism can seek others' pleasure as well. My own pleasure may involve somebody else's pleasure.

It must, however, be clearly borne in mind that Bradley did not deny the existence of pleasure as such, but only its status as end. Pleasure is always there, but it is not the motive. Here we must draw attention to a queer use by Bradley of the term 'motive'. Motive for Bradley does not mean the psychical stimulus to action, the feeling of desire. It means the object of desire itself, or the desired object simply. We do not know whether psychology sanctions such a usage. He says that the end is consciously and explicitly subjective, and that nothing objective is desired for itself. But if nothing objective is desired for itself, then why any effort at all, why activity? Even if it is the self that is desired, it must be in some sense an object apart from the desiring self.

It would be safe perhaps to conclude from Bradley's account that though we do not always act for the sake of pleasure, it is

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generally the case that pleasure is one of the main components as well as perhaps the resultant of such activity. It would also be fair to concede that there could be other ends than pleasure, and Hedonism in the pure form is unreal and so unacceptable. Paton seems to arrive at some similar conclusion. He confesses that there is a great deal of obscurity in the nature of pleasure. He rightly believes that it is hard to separate the feeling of pleasure from the things which arouse that feeling. He describes it as 'ludicrously intellectualistic' account of action to suppose that we always distinguish between the activity and the pleasure, and pursue the activity for the sake of pleasure; but Hedonism in practice is based on just this distinction, and so it cannot be justified. On the point that pleasure is or ought to be a guide to our action, Paton observes that pleasure as immediate feeling cannot be the only guide of life and motive to our actions. He makes also another important point, namely, that Hedonism has not always distinguished between the theory that men always pursue pleasure, and the theory that it is reasonable always to pursue pleasure; the first theory, he says, is one of fact, and as a statement of fact appears to be false. The second theory seems to rest on some kind of intuition; if so, Paton observes, there are other moral intuitions which have at least as much right to be heard. Here again I do not see why we cannot accept the hedonist doctrine of pleasure with certain qualifications and reservations. Men pursue always pleasure in the sense that they *tend* to pursue always such activities which, they believe, would bring them pleasure,—pleasure in a wide and spiritual sense. And also, it is not necessary that they should always have the end as pleasure consciously before their mind—they merely *tend* to pursue that end.

(To be continued)

Knowing What Others Feel

by

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For an ordinary man who lives in his closed world of common-sense, there is no such problem as the problem of knowing what others feel. No one ordinarily doubts that one knows not merely the sensations felt by oneself but also the sensations felt by others. A philosopher, however, is sometimes puzzled over the issue whether or not one can know the sensations felt by others. And the source of the philosopher's puzzle lies in the logic of the word 'know'. For though this word is used in a variety of sentences, yet not all the cases of knowing seem to have a fixed meaning. Knowing that I am in pain is different from knowing that some one else is in pain, knowing that Gandhiji was murdered and knowing how to play chess etc. To say that the meaning of the word 'know' is not changed, what is changed is the way of justification of these sentences, is itself to make an unjustified claim. For the difference in justification does give some ground for thinking that there is a difference as to the meaning, but no ground for thinking that there is an identity as to the meaning. Not only that the word 'know' has a plurality of meanings, in many sentences its use can easily be exchanged for the use of such other words as 'quite sure' and 'think so' etc., without any loss of the original meaning. For example, sometimes it makes a mere terminological difference to a hearer whether one says, 'I know there is a table next door' or 'I am quite sure that there is a table next door'. As language is ordinarily used, 'knowing' in certain contexts stands merely for the psychological state of 'being sure'. The fact that the word 'know' has a plurality of meanings and the fact that sometimes its use can easily be exchanged for the use of certain other words lead the philosopher to make certain queer inferences. These facts lead him to raise the question whether all the instances of knowing are genuine. Is it not possible that sometimes when one claims that one knows one really does not know or does not have a know-frame of mind? But if one really does not know when one claims that one knows, how to describe such a frame of mind? The difficulty is sometimes met by bringing to notice the words which can

be used in exchange for 'know'. The case is not of *knowing* but of *being sure* etc. As a result of questioning the status of 'know', the philosopher comes to make a decision about a particular meaning or use of 'know' as its standard meaning or use. The uses of 'know' which do not come up to this standard are not its genuine uses. When a philosopher makes such statements as 'Material objects cannot be known' and 'only what is directly presented can be known', he is applying his own chosen standard meaning of 'know'. However, to say of a standard meaning of 'know' that it is chosen does not mean that it is purely arbitrary. The reasons of such a choice, as we have already seen, lie in our ordinary language itself. Our every-day language itself gives the philosopher an opportunity to choose his standard.

The philosopher who declares that he can know only his own sensations is obviously choosing such a case of knowing as his standard in which this word means knowing one's own sensations. In knowing one's own sensations one is directly experiencing them, and since we can never directly experience the sensations of others, so the philosopher is led to infer that one can never know the sensations of others. One may not feel happy over this business of standardising the meaning of 'know', for it leads to such questions as: 'Are other persons mere automata?' 'Do other persons have sensations?' Ordinarily these questions are silly and philosophically they involve a contradiction. For the use of 'other persons' implies that they have sensations and are not mere automata. This contradiction, however, can be removed by reformulating the questions. Instead of using the expression 'other persons' one can use some such expression as 'others having similar physical features as myself'. But even if their contradiction is removed, these questions remain unanswerable. If I cannot know or experience the sensations felt by other persons, I cannot say whether or not they are mere automata. If it is impossible for me to get a look inside the minds of others, it is also impossible for me to judge either that they have sensations or that they have not. But however silly and unanswerable these questions may seem to be, the philosopher whose view generates them cannot easily be refuted. He so formulates his position that granting the Truth of his assumptions it is impossible to refute him. For example, if knowing what others feel is dependent on having the sensations of others as one has one's own, then it becomes a logical impossibility to know what others feel. To refute such a view one has to show the possibility of having others' sensations, and I do not think that such a possi-

bility can be shown. Of course the philosophers like Wittgenstein and Ayer have made attempts to show this possibility, but their attempts seem to me fruitless. I shall presently discuss the view of Ayer which expresses to a great extent Wittgenstein's ideas in explicit terms.

The reason why "it is not conceivable that there should be people who were capable of having one another's pains, or feeling one another's emotions", thinks Ayer, "is simply that we attach no meaning to such expressions as 'I am experiencing your headache', 'she is feeling his remorse', 'your state of anger is numerically the same as mine'.¹ As is clear, Ayer traces "the privacy of experience to the acceptance of a verbal convention." And a verbal convention according to him "is arbitrary in the trivial sense that, however we may use words, it is always conceivable that we should have used them otherwise."² What Ayer means to say is, had we accepted a verbal convention in which we attached a meaning to the above mentioned expressions, it would have been conceivable that there should be people who were capable of having one another's experiences. But Ayer's view does not seem to represent correctly the relation subsisting between language and facts, for it is not the acceptance of a verbal convention concerning the privacy of experiences that it is not conceivable that there should be people who were capable of having one another's experiences; the truth is, that we accept the verbal convention concerning the privacy of experiences because it is not conceivable that there should be people who were capable of having one another's experiences. It is surprising to think that the conceivability of facts depends on the acceptance of a verbal convention.

Ayer's further argument to show the possibility of altering the verbal convention concerning the privacy of experiences also is not convincing. Besides other things, one of the striking features of this argument is that it falsifies what Ayer means by his remarks discussed above. Ayer thinks that in the present circumstances "we do not find it convenient to use expressions that would imply that different people could have numerically identical experiences." But he believes that "it is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which we should be inclined to give such expressions a meaning."³ These remarks clearly mean that it is not the conceivability of facts

1. Vide, *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge*, Macmillan, pp. 138-9.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 140.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 140.

which depends on the acceptance of a verbal convention, it is the acceptance of a verbal convention which depends on the conceivability of facts. And no verbal convention is arbitrary in the trivial sense; it has a reasonable ground for its acceptance or rejection. In support of his view Ayer imagines a state of affairs in which it is possible for two persons to feel their pains in numerically the same body. As he says, "suppose that two people, A and B, display signs of being in pain, and then when they are asked where the pain is they both point to B's leg; and suppose, what may be physically but not logically impossible, that when pressure is applied to B's leg A's pain as well as B's appears to be intensified, and that after B's leg has been medically treated, A's pain as well as B's appears to be assuaged. In such a case we should say that while B was feeling a pain in his own body, A was feeling a pain not in his own body but in B's."⁴ If occurrences of this kind were frequent, Ayer thinks we should have a ground to give meaning to such expressions as 'I am experiencing your headache', 'she is feeling his remorse', etc. But should we have any such ground? I do not think that we should have. As is clear from the imaginary example of A's feeling his pain in B's body, Ayer thinks that the verbal convention concerning the privacy of experiences is grounded merely on the contingent empirical fact that different persons feel their sensations in different bodies. But Ayer is clearly mistaken in his judgment. For the philosopher who accepts the verbal convention concerning the privacy of experiences accepts it not merely because different persons feel their sensations in different bodies, but because it is inconceivable for him that different persons should feel numerically the same sensations, whatever temporal, spatial or physical relationships their bodies or sensations might have with each other. The present verbal convention remains acceptable for him not only when A and B feel their sensations in numerically different bodies, but also when they feel their sensations in numerically the same body. As Ayer himself accepts, "we should still, according to our present conventions be obliged to say that if A did feel pain in B's body, the pain which he felt was not numerically the same as that which was felt by B."⁵ Then what is the use of Ayer's imagination? And how is Ayer justified in thinking that the verbal convention regarding the privacy of experiences is grounded merely on the fact that different persons feel their

4. *Ibid.*, p. 141.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 142.

sensations in different bodies? And what has Ayer to show? Has he to show the logical possibility of different persons sharing numerically the same sensation or has he to show the logical possibility of different persons sharing numerically the same body? If the verbal convention regarding the privacy of experiences had been grounded merely on the fact that different persons felt their sensations in numerically different bodies, it would have been impossible to maintain this convention if different persons were shown to have felt their sensations in numerically the same body. But Ayer himself accepts the possibility of this convention even when different persons felt their sensations in numerically the same body. Ayer's proof for showing the possibility of altering our present convention is almost unique. It is as if one may show that a tiger can kill a lamb to prove the falsehood of the view that a lamb cannot kill the tiger. What has Ayer got to show is the logical possibility of different persons sharing numerically the same sensation, and what he shows is the logical possibility of different persons sharing numerically the same body. His conclusion that two persons can share numerically the same sensation from the fact that they can share numerically the same body is as illegitimate as one would have concluded that two persons can share numerically the same sensation from the fact that they can share numerically the same restaurant for their breakfast or can share numerically the same bus for the university. To show that two persons can share numerically the same sensation Ayer brings to our notice a state of affairs in which we may discover that two persons are having numerically different sensations.

Ayer has not merely failed to refute our philosopher, the idiom of his refutation is also objectionable. It is misleading to say 'A is feeling his pain in B's body'. For the use of such a sentence presupposes a clarification as to the meaning of such expressions as 'B's body' and 'A's body'. If B's body means the body in which B's sensations are located (what else could it mean?), and 'A's body' means the body in which A's sensations are located, then the situation imagined by Ayer can be described by saying that 'A and B feel their pains in the same body', but not by saying that 'A is feeling his pain in B's body'. For the body in which A also feels his pain is no more an exclusive property of B than it is an exclusive property of A. It is a common property of both, and hence it is misleading to say 'A is feeling his pain in B's body'. I think if occurrences of the kind in which two persons could feel pain in the same body were frequent, the physical criteria would

completely break down to account for the identity of a human person. In such circumstances, the question of human personality would be dealt exclusively in terms of the psychological criteria.

Though Ayer made a good attempt to defeat our philosopher, his attempt was destined to be a failure. For if 'knowing what others feel' is a self-contradictory expression, no magic is possible which may make this expression meaningful.

If we want to win the game against the philosopher who denies knowledge of what others feel, we should have to break the rules prescribed by the philosopher himself. If we follow the rules of the game prescribed by the philosopher himself, we stand no chance of success against him.

Badness, Madness & Folly

by

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I—A Conflict of Choice and a Conflict of Involuntary Sinfulness.

One of the distinctive difficulties of moral life is not so much a want of knowledge of the distinction between good and evil; the real difficulty is of the will to be good. Duryodhana, the Chief of the Kauravas and the greatest rival of the Pandavas in the Mahabharata, may be regarded as representing the common man regarding the moral conflict that he experiences. "I know what is good, but I am not inclined to do it; I know also what is evil but I am not inclined to abstain from doing it."¹ In the Gita Arjuna poses his difficulty in the following words: "What is it that incites and forces a man into committing a sin even against his will?"² This is a different kind of conflict from the conflict of choice. In the present conflict, there appears to be a knowledge of the good but an absence of the will. It is a case of separating the theoretical conviction from the practical implementation. This is a peculiar difficulty with moral knowledge. In other kinds of knowledge, there is not the same gap between theory and practice.

II—The Theory that Virtue and Vice are Innate

The answer provided by Srikṛṣṇa³ is that the knowledge is covered by ignorance and the man is under a delusion. It is his own passions that devour the agent. The gulf between knowledge and action is created by the prohibitive elements of *rajas* and *tamas*.

Here I propose to raise an interesting question. Does a man sin because he is morally evil in nature, or because he is igno-

1. Jānāmi dharmam na ca me pravṛttiḥ.
Jānāmyadharmam na ca me nivṛttiḥ.
2. Gītā, III-36.
3. Gītā, III-37 & 39.

rant, or because he is insane? What is the distinction between badness, folly and madness? Or contrarily, between goodness, wisdom and sanity?

Different views have been held. For instance, it is believed that there are men who are naturally bad. Satan is a representative example. His motto is "Evil! be thou my good." Such men recognize evil to be evil, but they have no intention to be good. They are the most difficult men to deal with. They are a menace to the well-being and happiness of society. Like Nero they rejoice in human suffering. On the other hand, there are men like Buddha, Christ and Gandhi who are prepared unconditionally to return good for evil. Not only that; they are even prepared to believe in the divine spark of original goodness in men. It is their faith that the continuous pouring of goodness on evil will melt the outer covering, and the inner goodness of men will shine forth. Belief in the intrinsic goodness of every person goes far beyond the Kantian recognition of each person as an end and not merely as a means. We may be prepared to respect the personality of every individual without recognizing or believing in the intrinsic moral worth of the person.

III—The Theory that Virtue is Sanity, Vice Insanity

Another view is that a man's badness is a sort of mental disease. Samuel in his novel "Erewhon" recommends a sympathetic treatment of criminals as they are not morally bad, but only psychologically mad. Therefore they deserve to be sent to lunatic asylums rather than to jails. The jails are meant for those, in his opinion, who suffer from physical disease, which is usually caused by irregularities in the hygienic behaviour. The suggestion is that sickness is avoidable, and a man is responsible for incurring it. Madness is something which a man cannot help. Badness is not a moral defect, but only a psychological one. We don't hold the lunatics responsible for their acts. The so-called criminals do not enjoy normal mental health, and hence the necessity of giving a psycho-therapeutic treatment. They should be given to the sympathetic care of doctors rather than to the exacting jailors. Modern improvements in prisons are owing to this view. Prisons are more of hospitals and technical schools. The change from retributive or preventive theories of punishment to the reformatory theory is the result of a changed outlook towards the criminals. The disabling cruel physical punishments are given

up. Criminals are looked upon as persons, as ends, and they are helped to regain their respectable position in society. In legal theory also such fine distinctions between murder and culpable homicide are a recognition of the psychological state of the criminal. Whether an act was done under provocation or not makes a whole difference to the act. Similarly, other circumstances which might have led the criminal to crime are taken into consideration while giving punishment. The crime is a resultant of certain social-psychological situations over which an individual has no control. The cases of delinquency, for example, are due mostly to disorder in family life. Either the children are orphans, or the parents are cruel, neglectful and quarrelling between themselves. In the circumstances, the children cannot help developing abnormal psychological traits. Poverty is another factor of great importance. In order to satisfy hunger man is goaded on to crime. *Bhubhukṣitaḥ kiṁ na karoti pāpam?* So long as the social order has not been changed, so long as economic security has not been established, it would be wrong to hold criminals fully responsible for their actions. Criminology has thus to consider the psychological and the sociological aspects of the problem. The roots of crime are not so much in the morally evil nature of the individual as in the deeper psychological and social make-up of his personality.

Whatever may be the crime, it could be viewed as a psychological case, and hence an attitude of forgiveness rather than that of revenge is called for. The Christian injunctions 'Judge not', 'Resist not evil', 'Return good to evil' are significant in this that we are not competent to judge, because we cannot put ourselves into the psychological frame of the culprit's mind, and we cannot have the correct perspective of the motives from which the person acts. Neither are we free from bias and prejudice, nor are we ourselves free from sin to take upon ourselves the responsibility of sitting in judgment over others. The situation demands an attitude of immense love which is more than the attitude of forgiveness. To forget and forgive we have to assume that a crime has been committed and judged to be so. While we presume that the culprit deserves punishment as a matter of justice, an attitude of pity is taken towards him. Pity assumes that there is a degradation of personality. The culprit is assigned an inferior moral worth. When we say that 'justice is human, pity divine', what we mean is that it is not given to man to pity other men, it is God's privilege. As men we are equals both in our merit

and demerit, none holds a superior worth or an inferior worth in relation to others. God, as superior to man in every respect, may take pity on man's sin, as He is beyond all sin, and perhaps also because He knows human weakness. Man can at best take an attitude of love towards other men. It is a faith in the brotherhood and equality of men. Therefore for us the gradational valuation is justice, pity and love. Justice is too exacting, pity has a tinge of moral egoism, love alone is altruistic and equalitarian. Christ has shown by example that the attitude of love works wonders. The woman who was condemned for adultery was brought before Christ. He asked the men who thought themselves pure to stone her. No one dared. For how can those who live in glass houses afford to throw stones at others? There was a complete change in the heart of that woman. She no more sinned. Love is a superior substitute for any form of revenge or punishment. We cannot reform *others only*, the reformation has to begin with ourselves. Each one of us needs a transformation in our being to make it replete with love. A mental defect needs a mental healing.

IV.—*The Theory that Virtue is Knowledge, Vice Ignorance*

The third theory associated with the great name of Socrates is that virtue is knowledge, vice ignorance. Nobody is involuntarily good or voluntarily bad. This theory denies that men are by nature bad or good, it also denies that vicious men are psychological cases of insanity, whether temporary or lasting; it rather finds the root of evil in ignorance or folly, and of goodness is knowledge or wisdom. The bad man does not know that it is bad on his part to act the way he acts. Had he known better, he would have been a better man. Lack of knowledge, not voluntary sinfulness, issues in bad conduct. The need is of education. For if virtue is knowledge, it could be taught. We find so much evil in human society only for want of proper education.

On the face of it the theory does not appear plausible. But it could be so explained as to show the truth in this theory. People ask, does not a man tell a lie knowing full well that it is morally bad to tell lies? Does not a man behave dishonestly or unfaithfully, in spite of his knowing that it is bad to do so? The answer from the Socratic point of view would be that these men really do not *believe* in what they profess. There may be ulterior motives in professing goodness without *genuinely understanding*

what goodness is. To pay a lip service to moral virtues is no indication of knowledge at all. *A man's belief is expressed in his behaviour.* Whatever a man may profess, his actual conduct is the true token of the beliefs that he holds. A man's practice is the criterion of the theory that he holds. We are deceived only because we go by what is on a man's lips; we won't be deceived if we had access to his heart. But there being no direct access to another man's heart, we can judge his beliefs only by his express conduct. So it is no use saying that a man knows that it is good to be truthful and bad to tell a lie, and yet he acts contrary to his knowledge. The fact rather is that a man does not believe in truthfulness, and hence tells lies. He does not believe in keeping his word, and therefore breaks promises. He does not believe in honesty and faithfulness. Therefore, Socrates is right in saying that these people really do not know and hence behave in that bad manner. What is needed here is that they should be made to see what truthfulness and honesty and justice are, and then they would be good. The whole purpose of education is to mould the right kinds of beliefs, and once they are formed the right actions follow as a matter of course. There is no gap, for Socrates, between genuine knowledge and doing. To know the good and not to act up to it was, for him, a psychological impossibility. A man's knowledge is not a superficial, verbal, intellectual acquisition, an external decoration, an ornamental show. Knowledge must take possession of a man's heart, hold his will, stir his soul, regenerate his whole being. Then virtue becomes his habit, his second nature. It flows as spontaneously as sweetness from rose. A flower cannot cast off its fragrance, because fragrance is its essence and not an accident. And so too a wise man cannot afford to be vicious, because that is not his nature.

V.—*Educational Theory of Goodness*

We have expounded so far all the three important theories of moral good and evil. Good and evil are looked upon either as innate moral qualities, or as psychologically normal or abnormal states, or as forms of wisdom and folly. If we ask a man whether he would like to be called morally bad or mad or foolish, it is difficult to guess his answer. There is truth in all these views. Wisdom consists in the practical sense of values. We do not all possess that sense in equal proportion, though knowledge and experience is bound to make an improvement. This may be regarded broadly as an Educational Theory of Good and evil.

VI.—*The Yogic Psycho-therapeutic Theory of Goodness*

What is the distinction between sanity and insanity? Can we call all those persons morally sane who are psychologically recognized as normal? Is mental normality definitively an exhaustive characteristic of goodness? While it is true that abnormal persons are more or less mad in proportion to their degrees of abnormality, and hence it is not possible to expect goodness from them, it does not appear to be true that all mentally normal persons are good. For the distinction of good and bad is made among these normal persons. Goodness can be expected of them, but somehow people do not come up to this expectation. Either then mere mental health is not enough for moral goodness, or unless there is moral goodness there is not genuine mental health. On a closer analysis it is possible to see that men whom we usually recognize as normal have also their fits of abnormality and frenzy. Just as all of us very rarely enjoy perfect physical health, though for all practical purposes we are supposed to be normally healthy, so all of us rarely enjoy genuine mental health. All of us have our idiosyncrasies and eccentricities. Susceptibility to physical disease with slight climatic and other disturbances is the normal trait of persons enjoying normal health, which is not therefore perfect health. Similarly, susceptibility to a loss of mental balance at the slightest provocation is the kind of normal mentality we possess. That is, our conception of mental health allows the play of passions and emotions. But it is very difficult to draw a line of demarcation that would distinguish normal and abnormal lust, anger, greed, pride, delusion and hate to which we all are susceptible. We are said to be enjoying normal mental health with all these susceptibilities, without deciding their boundaries within the limits of goodness. An ideal mental health is more than psychological normality. It must include a sense of values. Mad men are psychologically deficient in the sense of values, and that madness even the psychologically normal men share with them to a certain extent. Therefore, unless men possess a perfect sense of values, they could not be regarded as enjoying real mental health. The yoga psychology is a serious attempt to develop an elaborate discipline for the acquisition of perfect mental health. Beside the physical postures (*āsana*) and control of breath (*prāṇāyāma*) and control of senses (*pratyāhāra*) which help soundness of physical health, the yoga has laid down ten-fold moral discipline in the form of restraints (*Yama*) and observances (*niyama*) as foundational, and a psychological discipline of con-

centration, meditation and absorption as a superstructure thereon.⁴ That is the enjoyment of perfect psychological health. Sound mind has aspects of physical and moral health. This may be regarded as the Yogic Psycho-therapeutic theory of Goodness.

VII.—*Metaphysical Theory of Goodness*

That goodness or badness is an innate nature of man is the Metaphysical Theory. A good man has an intrinsically right sense of values, while the bad man has intrinsically a perverse sense of values. The Gita classifies three kinds of valuational knowledge that results from three kinds of human intellect. The intellect that has a natural sense of discrimination between activity and inactivity, the right and the wrong, the dangerous and the non-dangerous, the binding and the liberating is called of the nature of "*sattva*". The intellect that naturally misjudges the distinction between the good and the bad, the right and the wrong, is under the influence of "*rajas*". And the intellect that has a topsyturvy sense of good and bad, an inverse scale of valuation of everything is of the nature of "*tamas*".⁵ These are the elemental qualities of human nature.

VII.—*Valuational Harmony in all the Theories*

In short, whether a man is called bad or mad or stupid, in one way or the other the reference is to his sense of values. The stupid man is ignorant of values, the mad man has a deficient sense of values, and the bad man has a perverse sense of values. No description is exclusively correct, and yet every one of them has a modicum of truth in it. When we commonly use all these terms indiscriminately we are not far from truth. Some men are at once bad, mad and foolish, as some others are good, sane and wise. Harmony, balance, equilibrium characterize wisdom, sanity and goodness. Disharmony, imbalance, inequilibrium characterize folly, insanity and badness. This equilibrium is of the elemental qualities. The whole purpose of knowledge is to enable a person to gain this initial equilibrium.

4. Non-Violence (*ahimsā*), truth (*satya*), non-stealing (*asteya*), continence (*brahmacarya*), and non-possession (*aparigraha*) are the five restraints. Purity (*śauca*), contentment (*santoṣa*) penance (*tapas*), spiritual learning (*svādhyāya*) and meditation on God (*śvarāpranidhāna*) are the five observances.

5. Gita, XVIII, 30 to 32.

IX.—The Vedantic reconciliation of the Three Theories

The above three theories of good and evil have been beautifully reconciled in the Vedānta. It recognizes that ignorance (*ajñāna*) is responsible for all evil, and that knowledge alone liberates a person from evil. As a matter of fact, this fundamental fact of knowledge as the way to salvation is the common teaching of all the systems of Indian philosophy. Ignorance or folly is a form of insanity, and wisdom alone is sanity. The innateness of goodness and evil is also explained on the Vedantic theory. Man's nature (*prakṛti*) is made of the three *gunas*, and it is the predominance of the *rajas* and the *tamas* that is responsible for his passions. These are responsible for giving rise to sin. Through the preponderance of *sattva* sin is overcome. But the Vedānta insists that so long as the moral agent identifies himself with the *gunas*, or *prakṛti*, there is an innate tendency to evil. It is only when he transcends *prakṛti* and knows his true Self that he realizes his fundamental being, fundamental knowledge and fundamental goodness (*sat-cit-ānanda*). Not *prakṛti*, but Brahman is his real nature.⁶

6. *Svabhāvo'dhyātmanamucyate*, Gītā, VIII-3.

Book Review

Reminiscences of Swami Vivekananda by His Eastern and Western Admirers. First Edition, May 1961; Price Rs. 7.50; Pp. 404; Advaita Ashrama, 5, Dehi Entally Road, Calcutta-14.

India's spiritualism has reached its high watermark in the lives of Sri Ramkrishna and his worthy disciple, Swami Vivekananda. Their lives signify religion and philosophy in practice. In the lives of both, the flame of spiritualism glowed at its white heat. At the same time, it was wedded to the service and welfare of humanity. This twofold ideal of living for one's own salvation no less than for the welfare of the world (*Atmano Mokṣārtham Jagaddhitāyacha*) continues to be lived in the non-sectarian Ramkrishna Mission of Service founded by Swami Vivekananda.

Many standard and authoritative works on the lives of Sri Ramkrishna and Vivekananda are available now. Yet the present work seems to be a welcome addition to them. These reminiscences by Swami Vivekananda's disciples, friends and admirers, and even one detractor, appeared from time to time in periodicals. But now they are presented together in bookform. It must at once be recognized that they have a value of their own revealing as they do, in very intimate terms, the various facets of the Swami's many-sided personality as seen through the eyes of different persons belonging to different countries and possessing different cultures. Here we see the Swami at work, the work of carrying out the chief mission of his life—the propagation of Advaita Vedānta. Verily he was an apostle of Vedantism and its powerful spokesman.

It is interesting to see the practical effects of the teaching of this ancient wisdom on persons with different religious and philosophical persuasions usually not favourably inclined towards Advaitism. The Swami explained to his audience the significance of the *Mahāvākya* 'Thou art That'. 'You are that now', said the Swami: 'it is only an illusion that is to be overcome'. The effect of this on herself is thus stated by Sister Christene: 'Was it possible to hear and feel this and ever be the same again? All one's values were changed. The seed of spirituality was

planted to grow and grow throughout the years until it inevitably reached fruition" (p. 156). "We saw the Promised Land.... and the sorrow and trials of this world have never been quite real since" (p. 172). There is in a sense a vindication of the illusory character of the world which is a fundamental tenet of Advaitism. "This world is a mud puddle", said the Swami; and the statement "was received with shocked protest, doubt, and a tinge of resentment" (p. 211). But on deeper consideration, the point was conceded: "We wallow in the mire of this mud puddle of a world and.... find pleasure in it—we, who are meant for something better, the heirs of immortal glory" (p. 212). As a direct result of the Swami's teaching, "Many a child of the West has found in his message the solace of his life and the solace of his death" (p. 349). India became for some of them "the 'Holy Land' to which one goes, not as a tourist but as a pilgrim". (p. 163).

To his own countrymen Swami Vivekananda gave the message of freedom, strength, fearlessness and self-confidence. He gave a new orientation to the Vedanta philosophy to suit the altered conditions of the land of his birth. He sought to renovate the national and spiritual life of India. Service to the poor, the *Daridra Nārāyaṇa*, constituted according to him service to God.

The last article in these *Reminiscences* by Reeves Calkins may be noted for a different reason. It strikes a discordant note, but it serves the purpose of drawing attention to the opposition the Swami had to meet from the Christian Missionaries whose ire was aroused by his successful propagation of Hinduism in the West. Reeves Calkins is a typical example of such an opposition. The Swami's brilliant success at the Chicago Parliament of Religions is quite wellknown. But the said opposition group was unhappy at this very success, and Calkins makes no secret of it. "My first impression of the Swami", says he, "was not a happy one" (p. 399). But this unhappy impression is offset by the happy impressions of a host of his other compatriots who are all admiration for the Swami. "I was at the Parliament of Religions at Chicago in 1893", says Mrs. Blodgett, "and when that young man got up and said, 'Sisters and Brothers of America', seven thousand people rose to their feet as a tribute to something they knew not what" (p. 247). "He electrified the assemblage with the simplicity and beauty of his message", says Constance Towne. The Newyork Herald frankly announced him as "undoubtedly the greatest figure in the Parliament of Religions."

In conclusion we have no hesitation in agreeing with the publishers that "these reminiscences are attractive, informative, and instructive". The book is especially welcome, coming as it does on the eve of the Swami's birthday centenary celebrations.

Institute of Philosophy,
AMALNER.

S. M. CHINGLE.

Professor K. C. Bhattacharya Lectureship Fund

An Appeal

The late Professor K. C. Bhattacharya, formerly King George V Professor of Philosophy, Calcutta University, left a rich legacy of philosophical thought for posterity. His life was dedicated to the cause of philosophical learning. For about half a century he taught generations of students who still cherish a loving memory of his noble character and inspiring personality. He was an acute metaphysician, a profound scholar, an original thinker and a great teacher. His original contributions to philosophy are known in India and abroad. To perpetuate his memory and disseminate his philosophical thoughts, it is proposed to institute a Lectureship in his name at Calcutta University. A permanent fund of Rs. 25,000/- is needed for this purpose. We appeal to the public, especially to all teachers of philosophy and ex-students of Professor Bhattacharya, to contribute generously to the Fund. All contributions may be sent to the Honorary Treasurer, Dr. S. C. Chatterjee, 59-B, Hindusthan Park, Calcutta-29. Cheques should be made payable to the Honorary Treasurer, K. C. Bhattacharya Lectureship fund.

Humayun Kabir.
D. M. Datta.
N. V. Banerjee.
S. C. Chatterjee.
R. Das.

T. M. P. Mahadevan.
J. N. Chubb.
T. R. V. Murti.
A. K. Majumdar.
J. N. Mohanty.

Books Received

1. *A Yankee in Canada* by Henry D. Thoreau, published by Harvest House Ltd., Montreal, price Paper \$1/65, Cloth \$3/50.
2. *Towards a Science of Man In Society (A positive approach to the Integration of Social Knowledge)* by K. William Kapp, published by Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands.
3. *The Decline of the West* by Oswald Spengler (Abridged edition by Helmut Werner), published by George Allen and Unwin Ltd., price 32/- net.
4. *Imagination: A Psychological Critique*, by Jean—Paul Sartre (Translated, with an Introduction, by Forrest Williams), published by The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, price \$ 3/95.
5. *Fundamental Physical Theory and the Concept of Consciousness*, by Johan H. Greidanus, published by Pergamon Press Ltd., Oxford, price 30/- net.
6. *The Nation of Good in the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, by Eugene E. Ryan, published by Ejnar Munksgaard Ltd., Copenhagen, price D. Kr. 14/-.
7. *Sri Aurobindo's Vedic Glossary*, Compiled by A. B. Purani, published by Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry, price Rs. 15/-.
8. *There is but One Individual (A religion for To-day's World)*, by Wendell Thomas, published by Celo Press, North Carolina, price \$ 1/00.

FORM IV

(See Rule 8)

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
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METAPHYSICS OF ADVAITA VEDANTA

BY

G. R. MALKANI

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