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
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THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

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Ordinary Language and Linguistic Licence

by

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Patna University

It goes without saying that any enquiry deserves to be called an enquiry only if its findings are statable in language. Some mystics and metaphysicians hold that there are some ultimate truths too deep and profound to be expressed in language. To say that a certain thing cannot be expressed in language may mean that there is a personal, lexical, or logical difficulty in expressing it. It may mean, for example, that the person who wants to express it does not have the necessary familiarity with or mastery over the language in which he wants to express it, though the vocabulary of the language is rich enough to describe such things. Suppose I do not know the use of the word 'Yellow', and am perceiving the yellow colour. Then I cannot say what colour I am perceiving, though English language does possess a word which can be used to describe what I am perceiving. Here when I say that I cannot express what I am seeing, 'cannot' indicates a personal defect, a defect or lack in *my* linguistic training, and not one in the language. This defect can be removed simply by improving *my* vocabulary. It may also happen that the language in which I want to express what I am perceiving does not contain any word for the yellow colour. In that case, I cannot express what I am perceiving not because of a personal but lexical defect. If I do not know what word is to be used to describe the colour perceived, I do not know because the lexicon of my language does not contain any such word. This lexical defect can be removed by adding to the existing lexicon


a new word or by giving a new use to an already existing one. In the latter case, necessary precautions will have to be taken to ward off the possibility of the new use being confused with any one of the existing uses of the word. The language of many Hottentot tribes contained only three numbers, one, two, and three, and any number larger than three was called by them 'many'. That is, if a Hottentot had four daggers, when asked, he could not have said the exact number of the daggers he possessed; he could have only said he had many daggers. To improve his powers of calculation what was needed was to improve the arithmetic of his language. But when mystical philosophers say that they *cannot* express in language the truths they have discovered by using their supra-sensuous and supra-rational powers, they do not most often mean that *their* vocabulary or the vocabulary of their *language* is poor. The 'cannot' in their case seems to mean a logical impossibility. What they say seems to mean that it is logically impossible to express the mystical truths in language. If this is what they mean, then we cannot talk about those truths, we cannot even say that they are truths. We must remain silent because there is no use trying to talk about them when we cannot. I am not saying that such incommunicable, inexpressible, mystical truths are devoid of any sense; rather, I would like to say that when we cannot talk about them, we cannot talk about them either sensibly or nonsensibly. What we would do about them, if we could do anything at all, would not be a talk, and therefore it would be inaccurate to call it meaningful or meaningless. The mystic's dissatisfaction with language can never be removed because no amount of linguistic improvement, according to him, will ever make language capable of describing adequately the content of mystic experience. Therefore, the only alternative left is to keep quiet. 'Whereof one cannot speak', says Wittgenstein, 'thereof one must be silent.'

It remains, however, a fact that languages grow and change and develop. Modern English is definitely richer than old English. The former is more serviceable because it can fulfil the needs of its users much more satisfactorily than the latter could. Every language is sometimes found to be imperfect; it is found to be not capable of expressing what a certain user of it intends to express by means of it. However rich the lexicon of a language may be, there do occur occasions when poets, philosophers, scientists, etc., who use the language, do not find in it appropriate words to express what they feel and think. The result is that they use their linguistic licence to develop the language in such a way that it may become a satisfactory means of communication. But there

never arrives the stage of perfection. Due to changes in his environment, man happens to have newer and newer experiences which the available linguistic garbs do not always adequately fit, and, therefore, new garments have to be tailored. In this way languages are always growing and developing, and one which refuses to do so fails to fulfil the changing needs of its users. Therefore, in course of time it ceases to be used and becomes what is called a dead language. A dead language is simply a language which is no longer in use.

We are dissatisfied with our language when we find that the existing linguistic tools do not help us in saying what we want to say. There are various ways in which we may proceed to remove our dissatisfaction, and it will be removed only when we make available to us a word or phrase by the use of which we think we can say satisfactorily, or at least in a much better way than by the use of any existing one, what we have to say. We want that the language we employ should express only that which we want it to express, and that if we employ it to say *x* it should not suggest that we are saying *y*. Our linguistic tools do not always fulfil this requirement, and that is why they need to be sharpened, chiselled, re-modelled, and sometimes even new ones have to be manufactured.

Philosophers very often complain that ordinary language is a very imperfect medium for the expression of philosophical ideas. This complaint has been made even by those who differ very greatly among themselves in their philosophical views. We have seen that mystics are dissatisfied with it. But there are also some non-mystic philosophers who condemn it as undependable on various grounds. At one time Russell declared that ordinary language was misleading in the sense that it did not give us a correct picture of the structure of reality. He admitted that the structure of reality was the same as that of language, but held that ordinary language was so imperfect that we could not have a correct idea of how facts were really patterned by looking at the various patterns of word-combination prevalent in it. Therefore, he attempted to construct an ideal language whose structure, he maintained, would be an accurate picture of the structure of reality. This ideal language, he thought, is free from the defects of ordinary language. Whitehead also complained against the poverty of ordinary language. He not only collaborated with Russell in attempting to present the ideal language in its skeletal form in their joint work *Principia Mathematica*, but also used in his own works a lot of



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technical terms, thinking that he would be able to say by using them the things he could not say by means of the words of ordinary language. If one reads Aurobindo's *The Life Divine*, one cannot help coming across a large number of technical terms many of which are his own coinage.

Some philosophers who coin technical terms, or use ordinary terms in technical senses, think that their linguistic freedom is not controlled or regulated by ordinary language; they think that by the use of technical terms they transcend the limitations of ordinary language altogether and can say by means of them all that they want to say in an unpolluted manner. What I wish to contend is that however different from ordinary language a technical language we construct, if the latter is to be meaningful, it cannot transcend ordinary language completely. That is, we do have the licence to change ordinary language to suit the technical purposes of philosophy, science, or any other discipline, but ordinary language exercises a very effective control over our technical language. If we free ourselves *completely* from its control, the language we shall construct will not make any sense.

There are various ways in which we introduce a change in ordinary language, but the need for it arises only when the existing words in their existing uses are not found to be fit for expressing what we have to express. Sometimes it may happen that there is a word or phrase by means of which I can say what I have to say, but the difficulty is that the available expression is equivocal, i.e. is used to say what I have to say on this particular occasion as well as to say some other things. Therefore, there is the danger that it may mislead people to construe that I mean to say x when in fact I mean to say y. To improve the situation I may do either of the following things: I may deliberately restrict the use of the word to express y and state it clearly that I am using it to mean y and not x. Or, I may coin a new word and use it for the required purpose. When the available expression is vague, its vagueness is removed by stipulation or arbitrary definition. When the Walking Club of America wanted to have walking races it had to define what it meant by walking in order to distinguish walking from running, because it found that the word 'walking' was vague. It defined 'walking' as 'moving along on foot in such a way that the knee of the forward leg is locked when that leg touches the ground and the forward heel is placed on the ground before the rear toe leaves the ground'. A word is vague when the criteria of its application are not definite, when

there are situations in which we are not sure whether we can or cannot use it. We know that certain cases of leg-movements are cases of walking and also that certain others are not, but there are also some cases about which we do not know whether to call them cases of walking or running. This is so because the criteria for the application of the word 'walking' have not yet been definitely stated. It has not yet been decided by the users of English language how much distance there should be between two steps to make the movement of legs a case of walking and not of running slowly. That is why the American Club had to define the term.

Thus, one way of utilizing the terms of ordinary language for the technical purposes of various intellectual disciplines is to free them from ambiguity and vagueness as far as practicable. But in doing all this we do not transcend ordinary usage, we only make it more precise and exact. We simply narrow down the range of the application of the term in question. When Bergson defined time to mean 'duration' and did not approve of its being used to mean 'succession', he narrowed down the current usage of 'time' by restricting its use to designate only 'duration'. In ordinary language 'time' conveys the sense of duration as well as of succession in different contexts. The word 'substance' is both ambiguous and vague, but Descartes wanted to make it univocal and precise when he made a technical use of it by defining it to mean 'that which exists in itself and is conceived by itself'. To use the definition consistently in his works it was necessary that he should dissociate it from its other existing uses. Perhaps because he could not succeed in completely dissociating it from them that he called mind and matter relative substances.

It quite often happens that a philosopher takes a word from ordinary language, makes it a technical term of his system, and, because he has a highly exaggerated idea of his linguistic licence, uses it in a sense which is entirely different from the sense or senses it has in common usage, but thinks that by so using it he proves or states a thesis which in fact cannot be proved or stated meaningfully if the word is not used in its ordinary signification. The word 'illusory' in ordinary language is used to distinguish that which is unreal from that which is real, that which is the object of erroneous perception from that which is the object of veridical perception. We say that when a rope is perceived to be a snake, the snake is illusory because we also have occasions to perceive real snakes. The philosopher uses the word 'illusory' (or 'illusion') to express a certain metaphysical view of his about the

nature of the world when he says 'Everything is illusory'. Now in 'Everything is illusory', 'illusory' has lost its ordinary sense. It does not make sense to say that everything is illusory; because we can say of some things that they are illusory, only because we can say of some others that they are not. But he does not realize that by saying 'Everything is illusory', he has made 'illusory' a vacuous term; he still believes to have asserted that everything is illusory in the same sense in which an illusory snake is illusory. But the logic of our language does not allow us to say that everything is illusory. We may use the word 'illusory' in a non-ordinary sense, for example, we may use it to mean 'transient', 'impermanent', etc., and then certainly 'Everything is illusory' would be meaningful. But in that case it would not mean that everything in the world is like the snake we perceive in the snake-rope illusion. This shows that we cannot play fast and loose with ordinary language. If we want to preserve and emphasize a certain sense a word has in ordinary usage, we cannot free it completely from the control of the rules of use which govern its behaviour in ordinary language.

Sometimes we find that none of the existing words of the language we are employing is fit to express what we want to say. On such occasions we either use an old word (or a combination of old words) in an entirely novel way, in a way in which it has not been used so far, or we coin a new word. Russell wanted a term to express a particular kind of relationship between antecedents and consequents of *if-then* propositions, and finding ordinary language as well as the existing terminology of logic not fit to express it, he used a new term 'material implication'. Both 'material' and 'implication' were old words, words already in use, but the combination 'material implication' was Russell's invention and the sense he gave to it was entirely his own. Therefore, the phrase 'material implication', though it had a familiar verbal form when it was introduced by him, was in effect a new term. Sometimes entirely new words have to be coined. For example, the Dutch chemist J. B. Van Helmont coined the word 'gas', the German physicist Karl von Reichenbach coined the word 'paraffin', and the logician William Whewell introduced such terms as 'physicist' and 'scientist'. Hegel, Whitehead, Aurobindo, and many other philosophers have coined a lot of technical terms. Perhaps it was Whitehead who for the first time used 'ingression' in the sense which it has in his writings, and perhaps nobody before Aurobindo had used 'overmind'.

Some philosophers think that by coining new technical expressions they are freed from the control of ordinary language. But they are certainly mistaken when they think so. A newly introduced term, whether it is a fresh coinage or an old term completely divested of its existing usages, does not have in the beginning any meaning; rather, it has to be given a meaning. Words are meaningful only when they are in use; to know what they mean we must know how to use them. Technical terms, being new terms, are without any use or employment, and therefore, definite indications must be given as to how they are being used. That is why it is necessary to define one's technical terms. One can use a word already in use without giving any definition of it,—and this is what we most often do—but one cannot make meaningful discourse if one does not, explicitly or implicitly, define one's technical terms. It is my suspicion that much of *The Life Divine* is unintelligible, not because what Aurobindo says is extraordinarily profound, but because he introduces technical terms or uses old words in technical senses without informing the reader even by means of contextual suggestions what kind of employment he is giving them. Further, the definition of technical expressions must be given in terms of expressions which are in ordinary use, which form a part of ordinary language; because, if the definition itself contains an expression which we do not know how to use, the entire definition will become obscure. Russell's use of 'material implication' is intelligible to us because his definition of it employs terms the use of which we already know. According to him 'p materially implied q' is equivalent to 'Either p is false or q is true', when p and q are propositions. The terms of the definitions are terms of ordinary language which we know how to employ. Therefore, by coining technical terms we do not free ourselves from the control of ordinary language. If the Governor of the Reserve Bank introduces a new coin, he must tell the public what it is equivalent to in the existing system of currency, otherwise nobody will honour it, and even if an extremely faithful citizen honours it, he will not get anything for it. Mystics usually say that mystic truths are described in terms of analogical or metaphorical expressions, that the language used to talk about them is a code language. But they forget that a code language functions as a language only because it is translatable into ordinary language for those who know the rules of conversion. To those who do not know the rules, it is devoid of any sense. Therefore, the mystics' code language must derive its meaningfulness from its being transformable into ordinary language. It may be that

the rules of transformation are known only to them, but that does not make their language completely independent of ordinary language.

Makers of jargon very often think that by coining and using technical terms they employ a language completely free from the defects of ordinary language. This also is not possible. If our technical language is not definable in terms of our ordinary language, it will be too good to be used to communicate anything. Its constituent expressions will be uninterpreted symbols. The logical calculi are such artificial languages, languages consisting of purely formal, uninterpreted, symbols, and we know that their constituent expressions are devoid of any meaning. We can do calculations with them within the logical systems, but cannot use them to communicate anything unless we are supplied with instructions for interpreting them in terms of ordinary language. On the other hand, if the constituent expressions of a technical language are translatable or definable in terms of those of ordinary language, the latter will infect the former with imperfections. Therefore, it is no use condemning ordinary language when we cannot do without it. To have a rich technical language it is necessary to have a rich ordinary language because, if the former is given an interpretation in terms of the latter, the latter, if it remains poor, will certainly diminish the elegance and grandeur of the former.

The development of ordinary language does not follow a straight path. It is a social and historical process, and not the work of any one individual. A particular person may contribute to it more than others, but unless his suggestions are put to use by the linguistic community, they are of no great significance. Many of the laws which govern and the factors which influence the course of development are amorphous or not characterizable in definite terms. Ordinarily language grows and develops in a manner very much similar to that in which a living being does. It grows and develops only by assimilating into its body what we give to it. We cannot make it rich simply by coining new words, just as we cannot make a lean and thin child fat by adding to his body any amount of flesh from outside. The rational way to make him fat is to give him good food, but only he can digest the food given to him, and if he does, then alone he will become fat.

Coherence as Aesthetic Criterion

by

S. L. BHYRAPPA,

Vallabhbhai Vidyapeeth

The object of this paper is to enquire whether coherence, which is a test of truth can also be a criterion of beauty; that is, whether by applying this test, we can judge the merits or otherwise of a work of art like a piece of musical composition, a painting, a novel, a poem, sculpture etc. This attempt presupposes that both the logical and the aesthetic criteria are one and the same; or that they are two different forms of one basic principle. If for the idealist, coherence can be the criterion of beauty, for the realist imitation or copying should be the aesthetic standard, while for the pragmatist the beauty of a work of art should be determined by its utility-value in "enriching human life", whatever he may mean by this phrase.

I propose to divide the paper into three sections, and discuss very briefly (1) whether the criticisms levelled against the realist's and the pragmatist's criteria of truth can be raised against their criteria of beauty; (2) whether the basic concepts of art exhibit the essential nature of coherence; and (3) if they do, is it a sufficient proof for identifying the two.

I

The main arguments levelled against correspondence as the test of truth are: (a) that it begs the very question it asks. For to verify whether the idea in our mind corresponds to the outer reality, we should be able to know the reality independently of the idea. When we cannot peep into the world apart from the one given window, to say that the sight from that window is the real description of the outer world is nothing but a case of *petitio principii*. (b) Further, this theory reduces human mind to a state of *tabula rasa*; for if correct copying is truth, truth depends upon the object that makes the idea, and not in the least on human mind. (c) Thirdly, as Joachim points out, if correspondence can be a perfect correspondence, it cannot be merely a one-to-one-relation of the elements of the original impressed in the copy; but in the copy all the component elements should be organized in the same relation as the components are organised in the original; in which case both the original and the copy are two

different forms of the expression of one basic principle, whatever the differences be between the two. (d) Lastly, some cases of truth, like mathematical truth, have nothing to correspond to them.

The aesthetic counterpart of the theory of correspondence is the view that beauty is imitation; and against this theory also similar criticisms may be levelled. In the first place, to say that art or beauty is imitation of some real thing involves *petitio principii*. For the function of art is to create beauty; and this theory implies that beauty is already there in nature, life etc., and the function of art is only to create a shadow of it in some material. Just as when we know a thing (which is implied by the theory of correspondence) it is unnecessary to see whether our ideas correspond to it, in the same way when beauty is already there in nature, life etc., it is useless to imitate it. Besides, in this case, art is not a creation, and the creative mind is reduced to the level of merely an imitating mechanism. In point of fact, both truth and beauty are something created by the mind when the mind does its activity at certain levels and according to the principles of those respective levels. Thirdly, the argument of Joachim can be raised against this theory also: if, say, a beautiful scenery is imitated, and if it should be a perfect imitation, the artist should see that the inner principle that holds together the various parts of the actual scenery should be expressed in his imitation also. Then alone the imitation will be a perfect one. But then, it is not merely an imitation of the original, but a case of revealing the inner principle of the scenery in a different medium like paint. Finally, just as all truths like higher mathematical truths do not have objects corresponding to them, some forms of art like music and architecture have no objective counterpart.

If the correspondence theory of truth makes the fallacious assumption that reality is outside the mind, the imitation theory of beauty commits the same fallacy, namely that beauty is outside the mind. Thus both the theories create a dualism.¹

The main arguments used in refuting the pragmatic theory of truth are as follows: (a) In its over-enthusiasm for emphasising the

1. Beauty as imitation is a completely refuted theory. However it is very interesting to read the criticisms of Osborne: *Aesthetic and Criticism*, Chs. IV & V; Anand K. Coomaraswamy: "The Transformation of Nature in Art", Ch. V; R. H. Wilenski: "The Modern Movement in Art", Ch. on "Degeneration of Technique"; Prof. Dolman Jr.: "The Art of Play Production", Ch. XVIII; Clive Bell: "Landmarks in Nineteenth Century Painting", P. 134ff; Wimsatt Jr. and Brooks: "Literary Criticism: A Short History", P. 456ff.

functional aspect of truth, it reduces the whole concept of truth to mere function. In this way, truth for the pragmatist ceases to be a fixed eternal fact, and it is not even an end to be loved and valued for itself; it is a changing thing depending upon whether it successfully serves a definite purpose. Truth is not an end but only a means. When the purpose is over that truth ceases to be. (b) Further, he commits the fallacy of what is known as illicit conversion when he holds that all that works is true. In fact, he should say that all truth works. (c) The pragmatist refuses to assign any independent value to truth on the ground that human intellect was evolved originally to serve some practical purpose. According to him, the sole business of the intellect is to serve the same purpose for which it was created. As Montague puts it, his argument is like saying that since our fingers were evolved for eating food, they should not be used in holding a pen or playing on a harmonium.

Abd

The aesthetic counterpart of this view is that beauty of a work of art should be judged by the definite function it is meant to serve. The functionalist aestheticians deny any independent value to beauty. Just as truth ceases to be eternal in its value, beauty also loses its claim to permanence; for when conditions change, the new conditions call for new functions and the old works of art created for different conditions become useless. In other words, they cease to be beautiful. Perhaps the primitive man learnt to draw figures for some religious purposes. Now the functionalist wants us to treat art just as the primitive man took it to be, however our purposes might have changed in nature or even become refined. We ourselves do not argue that beauty or a work of art has no other function, but we only maintain that function in itself cannot be the criterion of aesthetic judgement. Here also we commit the same fallacy of illicit conversion, if we infer from the proposition "all works of beauty have some function" the proposition "all works that have some function are beautiful".

There are still other theories of truth, like mysticism, authoritarianism etc., with their possible corresponding theories of beauty. But since the scope of this paper does not allow us to deal with any of those theories, we shall take up the theory of coherence.

II

Without entering into the details of the nature of coherence as a criterion of truth (nay, as truth itself), it is sufficient for

our purpose if we just note that coherence is a *systematic* whole; a whole in which every part "entails" every other part. It is a unity, which is not a product of the juxta-position of parts, but a unity which expresses itself through the parts. The parts are real and true, because they imply the whole, and apart from the whole they have no significance. It is an *organisation*, which is "the process of its self-fulfilment, and the *concrete* manifestation of its individuality."² Coherence is not bare consistency of formal logic, nor is it merely the absence of contradiction. "The coherence—if we call it a form—is a form which through and through interpenetrates its materials; and they—if we call them materials—are materials, which retain no inner privacy for themselves in independence of the form."³ Systematic coherence also exhibits the nature of more and more of inclusiveness, the nature of resolving strife, transmuting discord into concord and assimilating disjointed elements into a harmonious whole.

All the marks of the principle of coherence can be seen in any genuine work of art. The unities demanded of a play, the harmony required of a piece of music and a work of painting, balance and proportion maintained in sculpture and architecture, the concepts of rhythm, form etc., and all other basic concepts of the various branches of art can be included and explained in terms of coherence. Speaking about the relation between the whole and the part, Aristotle says that the part is that without which the whole cannot remain the same; that is, the parts are necessitated by the demand of the inner principle of the whole. The work of art is a unity. "The work of art has an imaginary point of reference (analogous to a centre of gravity) and around this point the lines, surfaces and masses are distributed in such a way that they rest in perfect equilibrium. The structural aim of all these modes is harmony and harmony is the satisfaction of our sense of beauty."⁴

We may briefly analyse the meaning of some of the basic concepts of art criticism, like rhythm, harmony, symmetry, unity and balance. The first two concepts are used mostly in music. Rhythm is a quality "when any kind of pattern or design is perceptible in movement."⁵ It is "a balanced harmony maintained

2. Joachim: *Nature of Truth*, P. 76.

3. *Ibid.*, P. 77.

4. H. Read: "Meaning of Art", P. 15.

5. Emid Hamer: *Metres of English Poetry*, P. 2.

by a system of subtle recurrences";⁶ that is, by means of certain regular time-intervals certain impressions take place; and the result is a certain harmony. Though basically rhythm is a concept which has as its base, movement of time, its aim is to produce *harmony* or unity of impressions; or to make our impressions coherent.

Harmony is "the representation of all opposed elements in a work of art in such a way as to become a pleasing unity", and "since quite generally the task of art is to bring the distinct parts into a unified whole, or to demonstrate them as components of one unified law and thus to excite aesthetic satisfaction, harmony is the main requirement of every art."⁷ Basically the concept of harmony is derived from the art of music, where all the beats, volumes, intensity, pitch and other subtle play of sound are produced in order to contribute to an ideal structure, which forms an active unity; conversely, disharmony means some elements at some place opposing the ideal structure, just as in logic incoherence means at least contrariety. Though basically a concept of music, harmony is also applied to other branches of art such as painting. Thus critics of painting speak of "harmonious play of colours and volumes" or "lack of harmony in creating the volumes", meaning thereby nothing less than "using colours etc., in such a way that there must be an active or significant unity in the painting, or without any inner rift from the point of view of aesthetic perception".

Though the word symmetry is used often in architecture, it is also used in other arts having some similarity with architecture like painting and sculpture, and even in music. Thus we speak of symmetry in the progression and building up of musical pitch. Symmetry may be roughly described as the building up of elements in such a way that their sense of volume, balance, weight etc., will form one unified whole, so that the spectator does not feel any sort of mental discomfort in reconciling the expectations of his imagination. As Santayana says, symmetry is what metaphysicians call the principle of individuation;⁸ it is that which makes the building (of sound, colour or stone etc.) one unitary individual whole.

6. Sri Aurobindo: *Future Poetry*, P. 26.

7. *Ency. of Arts*. Article on "Harmony".

8. Santayana: *The Sense of Beauty*, P. 71.

The word unity is used mostly in literature. The concepts of the unity of space, of time and of action are basically nothing but the way of expressing the principle that the piece of literature is one whole; in which the plot, sub-plot, characters etc., should be conceived and expressed in such a way that nothing in it should seem incongruous with the main action.

Balance is a concept which means two or more forces spread in opposite directions held together by a central point, thus maintaining equilibrium and unity.

In all these concepts we find one common characteristic: the nature of a systematic whole. The nature of the whole is not confined only to plastic arts. In fact, just as in philosophy the concepts of space and time are mutually dependent, in art also both imply each other.⁹ Thus we speak of the "stretch of the musical composition", "rhythm in the flowing lines of pencil" etc.

When we say that truth is coherence, we do not mean that anything that is coherent is truth; coherence in the sense of self-consistency may be found in a dream or a false witness in a law court. Truth which is coherent is a systematic coherence in the sense that it should cohere not only with its inner structure but with other units of knowledge also. It is this that distinguishes a genuine systematic coherence from mere self-consistency. In the same way, mere unity cannot make a work of art, it must be significant unity, or say, "Significant Form" that makes a work of art.¹⁰ Significance in this sense means the arrangement of lines, incidents, tones etc., in such a form that all these materials lose their particularity in creating a new whole which becomes unique. Every work of art is profoundly individual. There is no fixed physical form to which each work of art should conform. Form or wholeness is a quality (if we may use the word) that permeates all the materials when they are brought together in a particular way. The same materials may be brought together in a number of forms, the only condition being that they should be significant. In the same way, coherence in logic does not mean any set pattern, but it means a certain systematic development of thought. Each work of art is individual, but all works of art are governed by the same inner significance. This significance may appear distinct

9. See, Etienne Souriau: "Time in the Plastic Arts" in the *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticisms*, Vol. VII, No. 4.

10. Clive Bell defines Beauty as "Significant Form" in his "Art".

depending upon the media in which it is expressed like paint, sound, words, marble etc.; but it is because of this, that we group different forms of art like music, literature, painting etc., together and call them by the common word "art".

III

Now, we may raise a most relevant question: Are we not going beyond our scope when we use coherence, the principle of logic, as the principle of aesthetics? The principle of thought should be different from that of imagination. To confuse the two is to mistake fancy for rational thinking.

This question, though a relevant one, is based on the supposition that the faculty of imagination and that of cognition are so separate that the one has no relation with the other. It also makes another supposition, namely, that the cognitive activity is completely absent in aesthetic experience. But both these assumptions ignore the fact that both the faculties belong to the same subject. It is true that understanding is governed by certain *apriori* laws of its own. In the same way, imagination is also governed by its own laws. If the understanding aims at realising its need in thinking, namely the fulfilment of the ideal pattern of thought which is coherence; imagination also aims at the realisation of its need which is the development of its play without any inner strife or rift. No doubt the coherence that imagination seeks is not bound by the considerations which limit and bind the understanding. The imagination is freer than understanding, and as such it can create any number of coherent wholes which understanding cannot do. But however they differ from each other, both exhibit the same nature in their function and development.

In a general way, we may say that the life-purpose itself aims at a certain harmony or coherence. Thought cannot bring coherence in all the facts of experience, and where it fails to fulfil this need of life, imagination does it. Things which are opposite in every-day life, sentiments and emotions that are mutually antagonistic to one another, and qualities which are deemed to be irreconcilable are integrated together into a happy coherence in a work of art. "Through art we may secure an imaginative realisation of tendencies to think and act and feel, which, because incompatible with each other or with the conditions of our existence cannot find free play in real life".¹¹ "In order for the health

11. Dewitt, H. Parker: "Principles of Aesthetics", P. 28. Italics mine.

of the mind to be restored, the contradictory fact must somehow be *reconciled* with the mind's presupposition, and the rationality of existence reaffirmed."¹² Now, what is the presupposition of mind? It is reconciliation, harmony and absence of rift. And whatever cannot be achieved by thought is taken up by the imagination for fulfilment. In the scheme of Kant, imagination is a higher stage than the understanding.

We may state the positive thesis of our paper thus: the aesthetic criterion of harmony etc. can be explained in terms of the logical criterion of coherence; or, both of these criteria are the two distinct expressions of one basic principle, and the difference between the two is due to the two spheres or levels in which they function.

The New Subjectivism in Ethics

by

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Brand Blanshard, in an article under the above title,¹ raises certain objections to the emotive theory of ethics propounded by the logical positivists. His contention is that the emotive theory is not the outcome of "a fresh and searching examination of moral experience and its expression", but a necessary corollary of the theory of knowledge accepted by the logical positivists. The logical positivists contend that literally significant prepositions can be classified into two categories, namely, (1) Apriori or necessary, that is, analytic proposition which "unpacks in its predicate part or all of its subject"; and (2) empirical proposition which "refers to sense-experience". Now, granted this classification of propositions, Blanshard maintains, the emotive theory necessarily follows. The judgements of value cannot be said to be analytic, as the value of a term is no part of the term. Such judgements cannot be said to be empirical either, in-as-much as value of a term is not an empirical quality like colour or sound which can be seen or heard or experienced in some such way. There being no other category of knowledge recognised by the logical positivists, they are inevitably led to assert that ethical statements, like any other statement of value, are literally meaningless. As Prof. Ayer puts it: "They are pure expressions of feeling and as such do not come under the category of truth and falsehood. They are unverifiable for the same reason as a cry of pain or a word of command is unverifiable—because they do not express genuine propositions."² Thus, Blanshard thinks that the logical positivists explain moral judgements by explaining them away.

With this general comment, Blanshard next proceeds to point out what he considers certain obvious absurdities that this subjectivism entails and thinks that these are sufficient proofs of the

1. Published in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 1949, reproduced in *A Modern Introduction to Philosophy*, edited by Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap, Pp. 434-441.

2. A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, Pp. 108-09.

12. *Ibid.*, P. 31, *Italics mine.*

unplausibility of the theory. I propose to show in this paper that the points which Blanshard brings forward are not sound and do not justify the conclusion which he establishes.

Blanshard's first point against the emotive theory is: "The theory claims to show by analysis that when we say 'That is good', we do not mean to assert a character of the subject of which we are thinking."³ He cites an example to make his position clear. "We come upon a rabbit that has been caught in one of the brutal traps in common use. There are signs that it had struggled for days to escape and that in a frenzy of hunger, pain and fear, it has all but eaten off its own leg. The attempt failed; the animal is now dead. As we think of the long and excruciating pain it must have suffered, we are very likely to say: 'It was a bad thing that the little animal should suffer so.'" The author then argues, that the statement does not merely express our present emotion which is caused by our reaction to the scene, but asserts "something of the pain itself, namely, that it was bad—bad when and as it occurred". It is not a fact, he proceeds to point out, that nothing evil occurred before we came on the scene, as the positivist view would have us believe; because, if the statement only expresses our emotion then the emotion cannot be said to be present before we felt it by seeing the dead rabbit in the trap. Against the positivists he maintains that the pain was itself bad—"bad when and as it occurred and before anyone took an attitude toward it."

Now, Blanshard obviously makes a confusion between the occurrence of pain and its moral designation as bad or evil. The occurrence of hunger, pain and fear, in short, of suffering, in the animal can be easily established. There may be no disagreement in belief as to the occurrence of a certain set of events independent of any percipient. But no amount of production of relevant facts can resolve the disagreement in attitude; and moral judgement is concerned with our attitudes, and not with our beliefs which fall within the domain of science. Is it a fact that badness of pain and suffering is an objective fact independent of our attitude toward it? Let us hear what a great champion of metaphysics, farthest away from logical positivism and its theory of knowledge, says about

3. The same objection is made by A. C. Wing in Ch. I of his "The Definition of Good", parts of which are reproduced in *A Modern Introduction to Philosophy*, Pp. 400-10, entitled "The Objectivity of Moral Judgement". He says: "...when I judge that Hitler was bad or acted wrongly, I am not really talking about Hitler at all but about my own psychology".

good and evil. "Whenever, then, anything in nature seems to us ridiculous, absurd, or evil," Spinoza says, "it is because we have but a partial knowledge of things, and are in the main ignorant of the order and coherence of nature as a whole....What our reason pronounces as bad is not bad as regards the order and laws of universal nature but only as regards the laws of our own nature taken separately."⁴ George Santayana, expounding the view of Spinoza, states that the greatness of God "is not moral, its dignity is not human, and to call it 'good' would be not a 'higher truth' but a silly impertinence."⁵

In Hindu religion, we may further point out, the forces of destruction are not conceived as evil, as ordinarily people do. The Hindu worships not only the beneficent Durga, but also "the terrible Kali in her blood-stained dance of destruction."⁶ In other words, according to the Hindu, both good and evil receive the same moral status, each being attributed to a goddess worthy of devout worship.

We, thus, find that goodness and badness of events are not objective facts as the events themselves are, but only register our attitudes toward objective facts—attitudes not even so much based on facts, as on constitutional differences of the individuals. It is not the whole truth that same beliefs generate same attitudes or that our attitudes are only the outcome of certain definite commitments of the society in which we happen to have been born and brought up. As the anthropologists tell us, no society, in spite of uniform set of beliefs, is free from deviants. Margaret Mead says: "If human nature were completely homogeneous raw material, lacking specific drives and characterised by no important constitutional differences between individuals, then individuals who display personality traits so antithetical to the social pressure should not reappear in societies of such differing emphases."⁷ This fact is also emphasised by C. L. Stevenson, the foremost propounder of the emotive theory in America. It is, he says, highly improbable that scientific knowledge about facts would resolve our attitudes toward them. "Apart from a heuristic assumption to the contrary,

4. *A Political Treatise*, Ch. II, Sec. 8.

5. Introduction in *Everyman's Library Edition of Spinoza's Ethics*.

6. Sri Aurobindo, *Essays on the Gita*, First Series, P. 57.

7. *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies*, Mentor edition, P. 193.

it is possible that the growth of scientific knowledge may leave many disputes about values permanently unsolved."⁸

The facts of pain and suffering in the rabbit, we hold, do not justify the conclusion that these are objectively evil, as and when they occurred, independently of our attitude toward them, or that the character of evil belongs to pain and suffering and does not refer to our feeling. On the contrary, even in the face of this example, it is quite reasonable to hold the logical positivists' view that the statement: "It is a bad thing that the little animal should suffer so," only expresses our present emotion, and that pain and suffering as evil would not exist, if we had not come on the scene. The occurrence of pain and suffering of-course is not dependent on our perception; but then, the logical positivists never say that it is.

Blanshard's first argument is that the removal of the present feeling does not remove the evil character of suffering; and thus, by application of the method of difference, he believes, it is proved that present feeling is not the cause of the badness of suffering. But we have seen that the removal of the present feeling does remove, not the suffering, but its badness; and we hold that the emotive theory has not been refuted by this argument. The second argument of Blanshard consists in applying the same method in a reverse way. If, for example, it is found that we were mistaken in believing that the rabbit had been caught in the trap and suffered, would not our statement "It was a bad thing that the little animal should suffer so" become false? Whether the animal actually suffered or not, the statement would express the same feeling; and if the function of ethical judgement be only to express feeling, as the logical positivists insist, then the same statement made under two entirely different circumstances would not make any difference. But Blanshard maintains that this obviously makes a difference. In the one case the statement is true and in the other false, and the difference is evident from the fact that in the latter case we heave a sigh of relief. "On the theory before us," he says, "such relief would be groundless, for in that suffering itself there was nothing bad at all, and hence, in its non-occurrence there would be nothing to be relieved about. The positivist theory would here distort our meaning beyond recognition."

Now, why does the knowledge of the non-occurrence of suffering relieve us? Obviously because we disapprove of suffering, as a

8. The article entitled "The Nature of Ethical Disagreement", reproduced in *A Modern Introduction to Philosophy*, P. 432.

result of which, its occurrence produces a disagreeable feeling in us. Cannot we imagine a sage with "an equal eye" who remains unperturbed in the presence of suffering? If we do not first have a particular attitude toward suffering, its occurrence would not cause a disagreeable feeling in us, nor the subsequent knowledge of its non-occurrence would relieve us. But this does not prove that in one case the ethical statement is false and in the other case true. The positivists, surely, believe that one may be mistaken about the facts of the case and that by supplying relevant facts which have been missed by the opponent, he can be won over in a moral dispute. But this does not entail that one ethical statement is true and the other false. Both are based on the same moral principle, and the statements, as ethical, have the same status—the difference being, not of value, but only of fact. The proper appraisal of objective facts only helps to re-direct our attitudes, but does nothing to change them. There cannot be any argument regarding the validity of the moral principles themselves. "We merely praise or condemn them in the light of our own feelings."⁹

The third argument of Blanshard is the outcome of a wrong interpretation given to the word "feeling" as used by the positivists in maintaining that ethical statements express feeling. He takes the word "feeling" to mean an outburst of emotion in the presence of an event and wonders how can a moral statement be said to be repeated at a time much after the occurrence of the event which called it forth, since the "feeling" that it caused before must fade away, and may even totally vanish after the lapse of a certain period. "It is as empty as the word 'Hurrah' would be when there was no enthusiasm behind it." But the logical positivists never maintain that an ethical statement should be backed by emotion excitement. All that they mean is that it expresses one's attitude, feeling of approval or disapproval, toward facts and does not elaborate or modify the description of facts. This, surely, does not mean that one must be in a state of emotional tension in order to pronounce an ethical statement. At a later date when the incident is recalled and the statement repeated, it only reveals the fact that one is favourably or unfavourably disposed, as the case may be, towards incidents or actions of that kind.¹⁰ That an ethical statement can be repeated long after the occurrence of the event that

9. A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, P. 112.

10. A. J. Ayer, *Philosophical Essays*, P. 237.

called it forth only implies that one's attitude towards incidents or actions of a particular type may remain the same for a considerable period of time, if not throughout life.

The last three arguments of Blanshard do grave injustice to the logical positivists in-as-much as the opponents are not met on their own ground. Certain charges are brought forward which cannot properly be said to apply to the view they champion nor to anything which follows from their view. These charges seem to be more emotional than rational and are based on a deliberate distortion of the emotive theory. "... to take delight in what is evil or wrong is plainly unfitting. Now on the subjectivist view, the answer is ruled out. For before some one takes up an attitude toward death, suffering or their infliction, they have no moral quality at all. There is therefore nothing about them to which an attitude of approval or condemnation could be fitting." Now, it cannot be seriously denied that what are fit objects of delight and approval or sorrow and condemnation does not depend on the objects themselves, but on the moral principles accepted by an individual or society. In a society having ideals contrary to ours, objects, which in our society are considered fit for invoking delight, will be considered fit for invoking condemnation. Dr. Ruth Benedict, an anthropologist of repute, remarks: "We might suppose that in the matter of taking life all peoples would agree in condemnation. On the contrary, in a matter of homicide, it may be held that one is blameless if diplomatic relations have been severed between neighbouring countries, or that one kills by custom his first two children, or that a husband has right of life and death over his wife, or that it is the duty of the child to kill his parents before they are old!"¹¹ Unless we have certain commitments, there cannot be any fitness or unfitness of moral response, and these commitments cannot be rationally justified as they only embody a system of values. As Prof. Ayer says: "We feel that our own system of values is superior... But we cannot bring forward any argument to show that our system is superior... It is because argument fails us when we come to deal with pure questions of value, as distinct from questions of fact, that we finally resort to mere abuse."¹²

From this it does not follow that the logical positivists do not have moral standards or do not consider events and actions as right

11. *Patterns of Culture*, Mentor Edition, P. 41.

12. *Language, Truth and Logic*, P. 111.

or wrong, good or bad. All that it means is that their moral standards are not based on their moral theory or that their moral theory does not entail any moral standard—that a moral philosopher is not a champion of virtue and should not be looked to for guidance. The logical positivists admit that their moral theory is "on the level of analysis; it is an attempt to show what people are doing when they make moral judgements; it is not a set of suggestions as to what moral judgements they are to make."¹³ The scope of Ethics, as moral philosophy, is restricted to the definition of ethical terms. "There cannot be such a thing as ethical science, if by ethical science one means the elaboration of a 'true' system of morals. For we have seen that, as ethical judgements are mere expressions of feeling, there can be no way of determining the validity of any ethical system... All that one may legitimately enquire in this connection is, what are the moral habits of a given person or group of people and what causes them to have precisely these habits and feelings? And this enquiry falls wholly within the scope of the existing social sciences."¹⁴ Thus, it does not follow, as Blanshard thinks it does, that logical positivism justifies any moral principle or can make the wrong right just with a cry, "Hurrah for murder". Nor does it have any sinister bearing on international problems. The logical positivists do not say that nothing is good or bad; because that itself being a moral judgement will contradict their view that the scope of moral philosophy is restricted to the analysis of moral judgements. Like other men, they also believe that some actions are good and some bad, but they deny that the moral philosophers determine their value by rational methods. They hold that the conception of right or wrong follows from our moral commitments which do not admit of rational justification.

13. A. J. Ayer, *Philosophical Essays*, Pp. 245-46.

14. A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, P. 112.

The Akhandārthaka, the Apriori and the Advaita Metaphysics

by

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The form of propositions, that are accepted by a particular philosopher as basic, determines the nature of reality in the context of his philosophical system; for these propositions, according to him, do reflect the nature of reality in an unmistakable fashion, and all other forms of propositions are merely unwarranted degenerations or distortions of the basic ones. Thus for Leibniz, the propositions of S—P form, each of which has a unique and unalterable subject which is different in different propositions, are the basic ones, and the metaphysics of monads is a simple consequence of that.¹ Similarly, for Bradley, reality is one, and the many are only adjectival, in accordance with his conception of propositions as being of the S—P form, and as having the one Absolute Reality as the ultimate subject in all of them.² Again for Russell, the relational propositions are basic, and they reflect the true nature of the world. In India too the Vedantins accept the Akhandārthaka propositions as the basic ones, out of the two types of propositions, *Samsargāvaghāhi* and *Akhandārthaka*. We will now see what these *Akhandārthaka* propositions are, having distinguished them on the one hand from the *Samsargāvaghāhi* and on the other from the *apriori* propositions; and we will also see what metaphysics follows from them.

The *Samsargāvaghāhi* propositions correspond roughly to the western empirical or informative propositions that contain both the S—P propositions, in so far as these are translatable into relational ones, and relational propositions too. The truth of these propositions is fallible in principle. Thus the Indian philosophers came to lay great stress on the *akhandārthaka* propositions. These are, according to them, infallible in principle.

1. *An Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz*—Russell.

2. *Principles of Logic*—Bradley.

Mathematical methodology had the greatest allurements for Descartes. The vedāntins however did not even recognise the western *apriori* as a type of proposition at all. Their *akhaṇḍārthaka* is not the western *apriori*.

The *akhaṇḍārthaka* propositions of the vedāntins contain chiefly two sub-classes, definitions and identifications. An instance of the former is "*Prakṛṣṭa-prakāśaḥ cāndraḥ*". In this statement the moon is defined with reference to its brightness in the night sky. This is not a tautology, nor an *apriori* statement. This proposition is also different from *Samsargāvaghāhi* propositions, in the sense that it does not state, for us, any relationship of two or more things. Thus the uniqueness of this proposition consists in the fact that it is *apriori* or tautological in form, but informative or referential in sense. The whole statement only draws our attention to a particular fact. The difference in meaning between the subject and the predicate is purged, so that both of them combinedly mean, and point to, the same thing, the moon. Since definitions are explained in this way, the necessity for admitting a special class of propositions, such as *apriori* or tautological, is eliminated.

The other type of *akhaṇḍārthaka* proposition is the identificatory. An instance of this will be 'This is that Devadutta'. Here also 'that Devadutta' and 'this Devadutta' are identified after the purging of their differences in meaning, so that they, together, point to the same thing.

The *Samsargāvaghāhi* propositions are not dependable or complete in meaning. An example: "*Yajate iti ukte katham kena kadā iti praśavyam*" (B.S.S.B. II. 2.14); i.e. if we assert, 'one performs a sacrifice', innumerable questions will arise regarding the details of the description of the 'one' and the 'sacrifice', the subject and the predicate.

The *akhaṇḍārthaka* propositions that are definitions are also, to some extent, not indubitable; for even though definitions are always of *something*, the existence of that thing is not warranted by the definition itself.


The identificatory *akhaṇḍārthaka* propositions are the only ones that unmistakably point to the thing talked of. The thing must have existed in order that such a statement can be meaningfully made.

Again, since all other propositions but these identificatory ones are dubitable, and since these point unmistakably to a thing, they

reveal the true nature of reality; and this reality is one without any differences. The apparent differences, as the difference in meaning between the subject and the predicate of such an identificatory proposition, are ultimately to be negated; or in other words, the one object of reference, the Reality, is to be purged of the differentiations, which have simply the function of pointing to it.

Thus the Advaitic metaphysics can be legitimately deduced from an analysis of the nature of our language. But we have seen that these identificatory propositions are not sacrosanct in any special sense such as the western *apriori* propositions and we have also seen that these *apriori* analytical propositions are not even recognised as a class of propositions. Even if they are accepted as propositions, they have been found by contemporary analysis to be vacuous or uninformative. The identificatory propositions, such as '*Tattvamasi*' of Śaṅkara, are always true; but their truth depends upon the peculiarity of the demonstrative pronouns which are used in them. It is only when there is a thing that we can use a demonstrative to point to it. Demonstratives are linguistic substitutes for physical gesticulations.³ We do not, and we cannot, point to nothing. Thus the very condition under which such propositions can be made, i.e., the existence of the thing talked of, is the condition of their being true. But in order to be indubitably true they lose their propositional value. The whole proposition is merely a demonstrative pronoun. The predicate is already contained in the subject. When the '*tat*' and the '*tvaṁ*' are purged of their differences they become together only one demonstrative '*Tattvam*', and the sense of '*asi*' is already contained in a significant use of '*tattvam*', just as the sense of 'exist' is contained in 'I'. One cannot use the demonstrative 'I' without the existence of the 'I'. Unless I existed, I could not use the word 'I' meaningfully. Thus we will conclude that since these are not propositions at all in the true sense of the term, no metaphysics should be deduced from them, for they do not describe any character of anything. They only point or refer to the thing. But to point to the thing is not to say anything about the thing. Thus from propositions such as these nothing can be known about anything or all things.

3. *Foundation of Empirical Knowledge (causito ergo sum)* — Ayer.



Analysis of Creativity

by

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Spontaneity:

Creativity is an activity which is essentially characterised by spontaneity. Spontaneity is absence of external compulsion. Wherever there is determination from without, there cannot be any creativity in the activity. The source of the activity has to be purely from within the agent. It is wholly an internal or self-springing activity.

There is a certain sort of suddenness, an uncontrolled fluidity, in the spontaneous activity. Preplanning, deliberation, elaborate ratiocination are foreign to creativity. Of course, a certain human activity which is very complex may have these, but they are not the determinants of creativity. The spontaneity of the creative activity is independent of these extra, if not external, factors.

Freedom and Openness

Creativity thus has to be an absolutely free activity. Freedom of the creative act consists in the absence of determination whether mechanical or teleological. There is neither a push from behind nor a pull from before. Bergson has rightly pointed out that teleology is only inverted mechanism. Freedom, therefore, abhors finalism as much as causal necessity. Though, on the whole, the creative act has a futuristic tendency, it is not fore-conditioned by the future as it is not pre-conditioned by the past. Creativity refers eternally to the present wherein alone its significant meaning becomes evident. References either to the past or to the future are out of question, being wholly arbitrary or incidental, and hence meaningless in this connection. It is in this sense that spontaneity could be described as instantaneous activity.

In some creative acts, as those of composing a poem or painting a picture, there could be shown elements of purpose and realization of an end. But these elements are comparatively vague and unimportant. The artist, for example, may experience a constant shifting of the end. The ends come to an end, not because they are

continuously being realized, but more frequently because they are not specifically entertained, as they may be found to be altogether inadequate for the freedom of expression. The fact is that creativity as much applies to the end as to the process of the realization of the end. The artist's or the poet's reshuffling of the efforts is nothing but the waiting upon the creative instant to occur. There may be a period of long dissatisfaction, before the actual happiness of freedom may dawn. And till that moment dawns, there is a constant reformation of the form, a continuous reconstruction of the ideal, a ceaseless revaluation of the values. In this sense, a free activity is an open activity. It is not bound to any set of circumstances or any routine traditions and rules of procedure. It is not confined to this or that mode of thinking, or to a code of values, or to a barricade of principles of methodology. The openness of an activity consists in beginning from the beginning. It is re-thinking, re-feeling, re-willing. The creative agent is free even to refuse to think, feel and will. He is free to accept or to reject or to cut a line unknown before. It is owing to this freedom that unheard voices could be heard and voiced, unseen shapes and colours could be visualised, unthought of ideas could be thought; in short, it is freedom which has the richest possibilities of experiencing things not experienced before.

Originality

In this openness of freedom lies the originality of the creative act. Originality means irreducibility to anything more fundamental, for the simple reason that the original is itself the fundamental. There is nothing more primal, nothing more ultimate, in terms of which the originality could be explained. The creative act is its own law, it constitutes an autonomous value, it forms a class by itself. Originality is absolute individuality, a uniqueness, a *viśeṣa*. The original could not be, therefore, assimilated to anything else, because there is nothing similar to it. It could not be brought under a wider class or genus, and hence the originality of the creative act is indefinable and inexplicable. The original neither could be compared with anything, nor significantly contrasted with anything, nor could it be analysed into anything simpler and more elemental. Originality is thus opposed to imitation, copying, repetition and reproduction.

Novelty

This originality leads to novelty as an important feature of creativity. The novelty is not merely in degree but in kind, not only in quantity but in quality. It is a passage from confusion to

configuration, from chaos to order, from nonsense to sense. The creativity leads to something 'more', something 'different', which is not merely a resultant like the parallelogram of forces, or a derivative like the conclusion from the premises, but an emergent like the lotus from the mud. In short, creativity leads to a sort of new value. In fact, bringing out new values into existence is perhaps the most distinctive and striking criterion of the creative process. That which is reducible to the already existent, that which could in some sense be assimilated to the past has no novelty or creativity in it. It is freshness of being that defines creativity. There is in it an element of happy surprise.

Unpredictability

In this novelty, again, we get another characteristic of creativity, and that is unpredictability. There is a very interesting and a thought-provoking controversy in Indian Philosophy regarding the question. Is the effect contained in the cause? The Vaiśeṣikas say, "No, the effect is new, it has got its own *viśeṣa*." This is aptly called '*ārambhavāda*', because the effect is to them a new beginning. The Sāṅkhyas answer the question by saying, 'Yes, the effect is already there in the cause'. This is known as '*pariṇāmavāda*', where the effect is looked upon as an evolute or an unfoldment of the cause. The latent becomes patent, the unmanifest becomes manifest. Very good arguments, which have become classical since then, have been given on both the sides. And there has been a general tendency to side with the Sāṅkhyas as expressing theoretically the stronger position. But a slightly critical, and at the same time a sympathetic, understanding of the two positions will show that both are right, only from their respective points of view.

The Vaiśeṣikas take the pragmatic, or the prospective view, and then the effect is practically unpredictable, because it could not be foreseen. This could be extensively illustrated from the fields of chemistry and biology. Whereas the Sāṅkhyas take the theoretical and a retrospective view of the situation, and declare that the fact of the effect being contained in the cause is logically unassailable.

The Paradox of Creativity

This, in fact, is the paradox of creativity. That it must hold together the old and the new. The present must somehow unite the past and the future. Creativity is a mysterious phenomenon

in which the logically invariable practically manifests itself in variations, the ideally immutable actually expresses itself in mutations. It must be at once identical and different, one and many, homogeneous and heterogeneous, universal and particular, being and nothing.

The Jain and Vedānta Views

It is with reference to the possible differences in the attitudes that could be taken towards a certain problem that the Jain position of *syādvāda* could be justified here. To the question 'Is the effect contained in the cause?', the meaningful answers are: (1) Possibly it is, (2) Possibly it is not, (3) Possibly it is and is not, (4) Possibly it is indescribable, (5) Possibly it is and yet indescribable, (6) Possibly it is not and yet indescribable, and (7) Possibly it is and is not and yet indescribable. Whether we accept all these attitudes to the question or not, these attitudes reveal the mysterious character of the relation between the cause and the effect. The Vedānta system also joins in emphasising the mysterious character of the relation. What the Jain calls *avak-tavya*, the Vedānta calls *anirvacanīya*.

All the six systems accept that every event has a cause. This is what is known as *satkāraṇavāda*. Only they have held different positions regarding the relation between the cause and the effect. Excepting the Vedānta, they accept the reality of both the cause and the effect. Both are *sat*. But while for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika the effect is new, for the Sāṅkhya it is not new. For the Vedānta, the cause is *sat*, but the effect is *asat* and *anirvacanīya*.

Creativity ex nihilo: The Nyāya and Bauddha views

As opposed to these positions the Buddhist position is that the cause also is *asat*. In spite of the apparent absurdity of the Buddhist position there is a modicum of truth in it. The question is: has the concept of nothing to play any important part in creativity? It will be observed that all those who have accepted the possibility of creativity have either directly or indirectly accepted the role of nothing in creation.

Either the being alone is and there is no possibility of the experience of variety. But variety and plurality are actually experienced. This is not possible unless there is a reference to a principle which alone could explain change, mutation, plurality, variety and novelty. That principle is no other than 'nothing'.

In so far as the Vaiśeṣikas have accepted the novelty of the effect, they have recognised the part that the idea of nothing plays in creativity. There is a posterior non-existence (*pradh-vanīśābhāva*) of the cause and prior non-existence (*prāgabhāva*) of the effect. This means that there is a gap, a vacuum as it were, in between the cause and the effect. Logic does not allow any such gap, it insists upon continuity between the cause and the effect. The Nyāya definition of cause recognises it as *niyatapurva-vartī* in relation to the effect. If there is really nothing in between these two, then what separates them and makes them different? 'Nothing' is the principle that is responsible for newness of the effect. If the effect is absolutely identical with the cause, the effect is no more there as an effect. If it is different from the cause, the being of the cause cannot account for this difference in the effect. Whence this novelty of the effect which the being of the cause cannot explain? The novelty must be regarded as having sprung into existence from nothing. That which was not has somehow come to be. The Nyāya Vaiśeṣika position is regarded as half-nihilist, *ardha-vaināsika*, in so far as the reality of the cause is recognised. But once the principle of the creation of novelty of being out of nothing is accepted, the Buddhists cannot see why there should be such a half-hearted recognition of this principle. All this world of novelty and variety could be regarded as springing epigenetically from nothing. This position of the Buddhists is known as perfect nihilism or *pūrṇavaināsika*. Creativity thus cannot be explained unless the original being of the cause or the subsequent being of the effect is somehow made to pass through nothing. All creativity is in essence *ex nihilo*. The idea of nothing is so very important that it alone supplies the clue for the understanding of the several characteristics of creativity.

Sportivity:

The next characteristic of creativity is sportiveness. Sportiveness implies three things: playfulness, motivelessness, and joyfulness. Playfulness is opposite to laboriousness and drudgery. The playfulness of the creative act consists in its naturalness, simplicity and ease. There is no experience of hardship, no feeling of difficulty. Creativity is opposed to studiedness, artificiality and sophistication.

Creative activity is without any ulterior motive. It is an end in itself. It constitutes an intrinsic value. The poet composes, the singer sings, the painter paints, because they cannot help it. These activities may serve some purpose, but they do not

originate in purpose. The utilitarian value of creative acts is only a by-product. Utility is not the motive power behind creation.

Creativity springs in an overflowing joy, is attended with joy, is replete with joy and ends in joy. Joyfulness is probably the hall-mark of creativity. In fact, joyfulness is the very life and substance of creativity. The joy of creativity is its own reward.

Progressiveness

All true creativity is, in spite of itself, an onward march, an upward process. In this lies its progressive character. The creative act is not merely a change, it is of necessity a change for the better. Creation thus is opposed to destruction, though destruction may sometimes form a moment in creation. Creativity is not a regress, but a progress, not a suppression but an expression, not a decrease but an increase, not an impoverishment but an enrichment, not a diminution but a fulfilment.

To summarise, creativity is a mysterious activity conjugating being and nothing, and characterised by spontaneity, freedom, originality, novelty, unpredictability, sportiveness and progressiveness.

Tagore, the Poet-philosopher

by

S. K. CHATTOPADHYAYA

Between philosophy as logical analysis and philosophy as esoteric plunge in the boundless ineffable, between philosophy as rationalisation and philosophy as silence, it is possible to discover a mean, and this is philosophy as enlightened experience. While our class-room philosophies are all mere talk and hair-splitting without a prescription for practical life, and the mystical philosophy is all intoxication, incommunicable and private, this philosophy of enlightened experience is a knowledge of truth with a programme for revaluation and reform. Philosophy in this sense is not so much informative as it is transformative. And this it cannot be without an emotional flare-up, without inspiration. Transformative philosophies are all inspired. There is no inspiration in a passionless objective attitude, in tabulating impressions just as they arrive. There is no inspiration either in subjective rendering of things. The source of inspiration lies beyond the subjective, but inspiration as a felt experience bursts in upon some subjective and personal consciousness changing its colour as well as tone. It brings in self-transcendence, an extension of the personal beyond its normal limits. It results in the widening of vision and deepening of consciousness. The man becomes a seer, an enlightened person, a lamp of the world. So was Tagore the man with a message.

Classical Indian thought understood philosophy in the sense of enlightenment. This experience, like any other experience, is *given*; but it is not given in the way our ordinary experience is given. The seer sees the truth in silent contemplation and comes to be possessed by it. The truth sighted is beyond him and impersonal, and cannot therefore be a creation of any personal obsession. His experience then comes to develop its own logic for self-articulation. One peculiar characteristic of this 'truth-seeing' is that the seer does not arrogate to himself the credit of a new discovery. The truth he realises is felt to be independent of him; it is understood as an eternal principle, a self-accomplished fact. It is not revealed through any mysterious communication from above. It is *discovered*. It is not taken to be a new fact pre-

viously unknown. It is recognised as the most ancient of all themes and known intimately by other explorers long before, only mystified subsequently through unclear and ambiguous language. This belief in the objectivity, unity and non-temporality of truth permeates all schools of Indian philosophy, and this has been most emphatically asserted in the Vedānta. Tagore, the man and the poet, belongs to this vedāntic tradition.

It is doubtful if the Vedānta (which is the philosophy of the Upaniṣads) stands for a specific philosophical doctrine. The Vedānta claims to be non-sectarian (*a-sampradāyika*). It is a universal philosophy, symbolic of highest knowledge and truth—*parā vidyā*. Although there are various schools of the Vedānta, the Vedānta *as such* should not be taken as a particular school standing alongside other schools with rival claims to truth. The advaita, the viśiṣṭādvaita, the śuddhādvaita, the dvaitādvaita,—all claim close adherence to the upaniṣadic texts and arrive at conflicting views. To release the sublime Vedānta philosophy from the thralldom of sectarian schools, a non-scholastic and humanitarian approach became necessary. This demand was fulfilled in the neo-vedāntism of the day, and Gandhi, Tagore and Aurobindo are apostles of this new movement.

The peculiarity about these three neo-vedāntists is that they were all non-academicians. They did not attend to the basic tenets of the Vedānta, prompted by any scholarly interest or theoretical need. Gandhiji was a man of simple faith, deeply religious. He discovered in the Vedānta ethics a political law and weapon which admitted of universal application and was thus immune from contradiction. Shri Aurobindo was an intellectualist who, driven by the practical urge to free his country and people from foreign bondage, sought realisation of the Absolute Power in yogic trance and discovered a cosmic principle or force on the line of the Vedānta which promised emancipation of all mankind. While Gandhiji secures a method wherewith one can fight social and political aggression of the modern world and reinstate the rule of the vedāntic law of non-aggression and universal brotherhood; and while Shri Aurobindo, the prophet, visualises ultimate triumph of the vedāntic law of life through an evolutionary process of progressive integration, Tagore, the poet, sees freedom of mankind in man's aesthetic participation in the sustaining principle of the universe, the principle of harmony, symmetry and concord, which the Upaniṣads describe as *Ananda*. In this neo-vedāntism of Aurobindo, Gandhi and Tagore, the Vedānta seems to emancipate

itself from scholasticism and sectarian bias, and reaffirms itself as a universal philosophy. The truth of the Vedānta remains no longer dependent on close and faithful interpretation of the Vedānta sutras of Bādarāyaṇa, or on a harmonious rendering of the so-called revealed texts of varied import. The Vedānta as now processed through moral perception of Gandhiji, yogic intuition of Shri Aurobindo and aesthetic revelation of Tagore no longer remains the philosophy of an age or a people; it becomes the ethics, religion and philosophy of man,—the 'master plan' for international understanding.

The neo-vedāntism of Tagore, Gandhiji and Shri Aurobindo promises a new kind of liberation different from the classical idea of liberation of the scholastic vedānta. Liberation in this new context is not to mean realisation of Brahman in abstract aloofness from the world of empirical pluralities; it is to be the free and harmonious life for all mankind through concrete realisation of their spiritual one-ness. In this respect, this neo-vedāntism replaces the traditional idea of *individual mokṣa* by a new idea of collective and universal mokṣa for all living beings, participating in a life richer, nobler and freer. It not only promises emancipation for man from racial arrogance, economic rivalry, political aggression, and social injustice, it also embodies an emancipation for the Vedānta as such from theoretic abstraction, selfish individualism and arrogant mysticism.

It is strange that although our principal Upaniṣads are more aesthetic than esoteric in their suggestions and appeal, and although the intuitions they embody are poetic rather than intellectual, we should be so very half-hearted in our recognition of Tagore as a philosopher on the ground that he was a poet. The idea of philosophy as a method or a logical technique for interpretation of experience reduces philosophy to mere methodology as distinct from knowledge of truth. Knowledge is a matter of enlightenment, and is not limited to any particular method or any conventional mode of expression. Truth is in the whole, in the concrete integrated totality, for this alone can be the absolutely uncontradictable, the absolutely tranquil and blissful—*śāntam*, *śivam*, *advaitam*. This is the fundamental note of Tagore's philosophy, the basic tune of *Tanpurā* to which all notes rigorously conform. For Tagore every thing—an experience or an event—has two aspects, the merely individual and the universal. The individual, the fragmentary and the limited is empirically evident, the commonly understood and known. Not so the universal aspect, not

so the context of the whole and the total which constitutes the inner and the deeper meaning. This needs a philosophical exploration, an inner vision, an aesthetic intuition. It is aesthetically evident, grasped by *rasa dṛṣṭi*, not sensuously evident. There are two kinds of the evident—the evident of the ordinary sense-life regulated by gross physical needs, and the evident of the aesthetic vision (*rasa dṛṣṭi*) which by its very nature implies complete freedom of the mind from all conditioning. Limitation to the empirically evident has been described by the Upaniṣads as *avidyā*, limitation to the aesthetically evident has been called *vidyā*. Philosophical wisdom (as different from mere vision) consists, however, in regarding the empirically evident under the form of the aesthetically evident and arriving at an organic understanding of the two. Freedom (*amṛtam*) is attainable through this philosophic understanding alone.

It is possible to distinguish between truth as a fact and truth as a vision. In the absence of an independent apparatus or means whereby truth can be apprehended as 'given', it is not possible to know the conformity between the two. In inspirational philosophy as different from philosophy as logical construction, the premises are not merely postulated but are furnished by an independent source of knowledge such as aesthetic or spiritual intuition. As thus 'given' and immediately apprehended, the objective principle at the first instance figures as a criterion merely, and it is left to the understanding to realise it subsequently *in rebus* and to establish it as inviolable. In Tagore, this task of concrete formulation of the principle by supply of details was not left to the manipulation of constructive understanding. It was not logic which furnished the details. The details were drawn from his varied experience, and understanding only helped schematisation of his diverse experiences under the law of unity envisaged already in aesthetic intuition. The result was that his philosophy remained an experience with him from beginning to end, and did not get dissipated into more constructive thought. This explains why his more representative poetic composition invariably moves from a lower pitch of articulation to an upper level of exploration, from the details of pictorial representation to the unity of some deeper, symbolic, transcendental meaning. This also explains why every deeper theme of his philosophical contemplation expresses itself invariably in an endless array of sense-representations and pictures. His philosophy does not consist in interpretation of given experience by intellectual forms or logical categories; it consists

in the interpretation of experience of one level by means of experience of another level, and the logic that moves between the spheres is the logic immanent in the higher experience, not one imported from outside. It is true that he was brought up in the upaniṣadic tradition, but it is equally true that it was not this tradition which helped in the development of his unique power of observation. This was undoubtedly a gift, not the result of training. The poet, the inspired artist, grew into the philosopher, not the philosopher into the poet.

Tagore is not a new commentator of the vedānta. He was not interested in interpreting the various upaniṣadic aphorisms by means of logic or experience. He interpreted his own experience, and the immanent logic of that experience led him to the apprehension of certain metaphysical truths which he felt were allied to, nay, identical with, the upaniṣadic truths. The upaniṣadic aphorisms which he quoted served only to illustrate his point of view, to confirm or elucidate the truths of his experience. In him, then, were the upaniṣadic truths experienced anew—it was a re-discovery and re-statement rather than interpretation. This explains why the problems which baffle the dialectician did not present any difficulty to him. The simultaneous transcendence and immanence of the Absolute, the co-eternity of the empirical and the transcendental, the unity of the formless One and the concrete Many did not present themselves as 'problems' or 'puzzles' to his understanding. The reason is he had an alternative source of light, and he was not forced to take recourse to the resources of logic alone to frame answers as to the 'how' and the 'wherefore' of things. He was not therefore baffled by *acintya* or *anirvacanīyatā*; because that is not any special characteristic of Absolute Experience, it is the general characteristic of any and every experience provided it is an experience and not a sophistry.

Reality, to Tagore, is a super-personal spiritual principle which not only underlies and sustains the world of pluralities and change, but also expresses itself in and through them in playful enjoyment of the limitless abundance of its nature. In the former aspect, it is the transcendent principle of peace and rest; in the latter aspect, it is the infinite sportive, the restless and the ever-renewing. In-so-far as it is transcendent, it is aloof and distant; in-so-far as it is immanent, it is thick with us, the nearest. As the underlying principle of the cosmic process it is not a part of the process and is not involved in it. The formless (*nirākāra*)

and the quality-less (*nirguna*) Brahman of the upanishads is Reality viewed in this transcendent aspect. But an aspect of Reality is not the whole of it. The underlying is also the moving, the truly transcendent is also immanent. The symphony is beyond the partial notes, the symmetry of the whole is not identical with the parts, but it is also nothing without them. Reality is the whole; but this whole is not a nominal unity, a bare sum-total of parts; nor again is this whole a pure unity, simple and undifferentiated, a logical abstraction in which the plural can merely appear but cannot figure and stay. The conception is not however Hegelian, and there is no evidence to show that Tagore knew Hegel's philosophy and was influenced by it. Tagore claims that his conception is the traditional upanishadic conception and no innovation of his imaginative mind. Reality is not any dialectical unity of the Hegelian type, and dialectic does not play any part in the apprehension of its nature. It is not also an organic unity of the Neo-Hegelian brand. The reason is: it is not the product of any ingenious logical construction. It is experienced.

Reality is non-dual (*advaitam*); there is nothing outside it. It comprehends all and does not therefore admit of any *saṁjātiya* or *viśāṁjātiya bheda*. But does it have any internal difference or *svagata bheda*? Tagore, I believe, is not a Rāmānujist. The plural forms are not enjoyed differently or separately in the symphony or symmetry of the whole which, though a whole, is apprehended as one, indivisible and immutable. Brahman not only is one, but he also realises Himself as one; and this He does by overcoming progressively the many, by bringing them into order, the harmony of His own nature. "The many" are nothing outside of Him, nothing given in opposition or given independently. Brahman has posited the many, Brahman for ever repeats and renews them. This is Brahman as *Anandam*, an aspect which was repeatedly stated by the vedāntists of the classical schools, but not understood by any one before Tagore, the poet-philosopher.

With Tagore this conception of Brahman as *Anandam* forms the central principle of vedāntism. In it is solved the problem of the relation of the one to the many, of the transcendental to the phenomenal, of the non-sensuous principle to the sensuous facts and forms. *Anandam* is not a category of logic, nor is it an article of faith,—it is an experience of the integral type. It can be grasped in aesthetic intuition only. The austere logic of Sankar was naturally incapable of grasping this principle, and this is clear in his laboured and pronouncedly arbitrary interpretation of the

sutra—*ānandamayobhyāsāt*. Nor were the members of the various devotional schools of Vedānta more successful in grasping the significance of this principle. *Ananda* is inaccessible to the spirit of self-abandonment and self-surrender.

It is given in the very nature of *Ananda* that it should fulfil itself, should realise itself *in rebus*. An unrealised or unrealisable *Ananda* is a contradiction in terms. It necessitates therefore the many, the plural forms, in the exigency of its self-realisation. If there is to be any reason why the pluralities should at all be there, the only answer that can be given is that they are necessitated by the very nature of *Ananda*. It is from *Ananda* alone that the multiplicities can arise, by *Ananda* alone these can be sustained and finally, in *Ananda* only the clashing and conflicting many can be resolved. Tagore was not anxious for an ontological proof. His proof is empirical. Even in our day to day experience we can see that there is no enjoyment of life in isolation. Enjoyment is through participation, and this is possible only if there are others with whom joy can be shared. So when the upanishads described Brahman as *Anandam*, the clear intention was not to denounce the world-pluralities as merely illusory. Sankar had grasped the nature of Reality so far as it is *satyam*, *jñānam* and *ānantam*, but he completely missed the other aspect which is *ānandam*. To Tagore the former stands for the transcendent aspect of Brahman, and the latter stands for the immanent aspect. But without the latter the former is a mere sound without sense.

This is not the place to give an elaborate exposition of Tagore's philosophy. But his universalism, humanism, dynamism and pietism had their roots in the upanishads. And in this discovery logical construction did not play any part. The truth was seen by him in an aesthetic intuition which was spiritual and inspired.

The Psychological Aspects of Kathopanishad

by

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I. Introductory:

It is well-known that there are very valuable insights into the psychological aspects in the Upanishads. From one point of view it may even be asserted that the end and aim of Upanishads is self-culture through understanding, after realising the relationship between the individual self and the reality of universe as a whole. In this paper an attempt is made to bring together the various passages in the Kathopanishad which are of value to modern students of psychology and philosophy. In doing so it is inevitable that some kind of systematization is made where none was intended by the original author of the Upanishad. This basic fact should be borne in mind when one goes through this paper.

II. The Self, Mind and Senses:

*Analogy of the chariot:*¹

In the third Section of the first Chapter there is the analogy of the chariot in order to show inter-relationship between the self (atma), the intellect (buddhi), the mind (manas) and senses (indriyas).

I.3.3. Know the self as lord of the chariot and the body as, verily, the chariot, know the intellect as the charioteer and the mind as, verily the reins.

I.3.4. The senses, they say, are the horses; the objects of senses the paths (they range over); (the self) associated with the body, the senses and the mind—wisemen declare—is the enjoyer (Bhoktr).

These two passages very clearly set down the analysis of the various aspects of mind. They distinguish between the body, the senses, the *manas*, the *buddhi* and the self or the *atman*. It should

1. Compare Rawson, J. N.—The Katha Upanishad, O.U.P. 1934, (123-127).

be remembered that for the Upanishadic thinkers the senses, the *indriyas*, include both the cognitive and the executive organs, what are called the *gnānendriyas*, the eye, the ear, the skin, the nose and the tongue as well as the *karmendriyas*, speech, manipulation, walking, evacuation and reproduction (the generative organs). Another distinctive feature of these two passages is the analysis of the central part into the *manas*, the *buddhi* or the discriminative intellect and the self or the *atman*. Yet another feature is that the ultimate development of the human body consists in developing the self as the sole controller using discrimination and the mind in controlling the cognitive as well as the executive sense organs which are ever ready to pursue their own ends.

In the next two passages (I.3.5. and 6) the analogy of the chariot is extended to show that an individual, who has no understanding (*avignānavan*) and whose *manas* is unrestrained (*ayuktena manasā*) with his senses out of control, has senses which behave like wicked horses, while the persons with understanding and whose *manas* is restrained will have all his ten senses under his control. In I.3.9. it is asserted that the individual who has understanding and the control of his sense organs reaches the end of his journey, the goal of human development.

In I.3.10 as well as in II.3.7 a hierarchy is built up to show that the objects of the senses are higher than the senses themselves, that the *manas* is higher than these objects which the senses seek, that the *buddhi* (discrimination) is higher than the *manas*, and that the great self is higher than the *buddhi*. In I.3.13 it is shown that the wiseman is one who restrains his speech by the mind, restrains the mind by the understanding and the understanding by the self. This leads to *shānti*, tranquillity and peace, or to use the modern terminology emotional stability and the maturity of personality.

Similarly in II.3.6 it is asserted that the wiseman does not grieve when he knows that the senses are separate, and in II.3.10 it is asserted that a man reaches the highest state (*Paramāṅgatim*) when the five cognitive sense organs and the *manas* cease from their normal activities and the *buddhi* does not stir.

III. Desires and the Pleasure Principle:

When Nachiketas requests Yama to teach him the highest knowledge, Yama tries to avoid this by offering a number of temptations. In I.1.23 to 25 he asks Nachiketas to choose vast expanses of land, cattle and horses and elephants, gold, sons and grandsons

who will live long, long life for himself and noble maidens with chariots and musical instruments. In I.1.24 Yama asserts *Kāmanām tva kāma bhajam karomi* "I shall make thee the enjoyer of thy desires." However, Nachiketas is set on attaining knowledge, and so in I.1.26 he refers to the fact that life itself is brief and all the pleasures, arising out of senses, are transient.

In I.2.3 Yama refers to the fact that Nachiketas rejected after examining all the desires (*kāmān*) which are pleasant, *priyān*, *prīyarupān*. He further asserts that by renouncing pleasures Nachiketas has avoided the path which generally leads human beings to sink, to be ruined. He also asserts that the various desires (*kāma-ha*) did not distract him (*na alolupanta*). In I.2.1 and 2 Yama speaks of two paths, the one which is good (*shreyaha*) and the other which is pleasant (*preyaha*), and he shows that of these two paths, which are both effective in leading a man into action, that which is good leads him to well-being, whereas that which is pleasant leads to a failure in the attainment of his aims and goals of life. The man who is thoughtful and wise ponders over the good as well as the pleasant and chooses the good in preference to the pleasant, whereas the simple-minded, the dull and the stupid (*mandaha*) person will choose the pleasant (*yogakshema* — the getting and the keeping). Thus this Upanishad has very clearly anticipated the Freudian Pleasure Principle and Reality Principle (*Preyaha* and *Shreyaha*).

In I.3.1 there is also a reference to the two selves which partake of the fruit of actions and which the *Brahmajnanis* distinguish as the shade and the light (*Chaya Tapov*).

In II.1.2 it is shown that the childish persons go after outward pleasures (*parāchahakāmān*) which leads them inevitably to death (destruction of personality). Thus in the different passages which have been referred to in this Section, we see clearly strong anticipations of modern psycho-analytical conclusions regarding the difficulties and inevitable destruction which an individual faces who values the pleasure principle and abandons the reality principle.

In I.1.12, Nachiketas asserts that in the *Svargaloka* (heaven) there is no fear of any kind (*na bhayam kinchanaasti*), no death, nor any fear of old age; that because we can cross over both hunger and thirst, we will be leaving sorrow behind. Thus it is indicated that our sorrows arise, due to our efforts or their failure to satisfy hunger and thirst, and due to the fears of old age, death and other reasons.

IV. Self-realization:

There are many passages in the Kathopanishad which indicate the characteristics of an individual who has self-realization. There are also many passages dealing with the means to be adopted to attain self-realization.

In I.1.10 and 11 Nachiketas requests the boon which will enable his father to be tranquil in his thoughts and serene in mind (*shantha sankalpassumanaha*) and that he should be free from passions (*veetamanyuhu*). Yama indicates in I.1.11 that because of freedom from anger, he should be able to sleep peacefully through the night (*sukham rātrisahita veeta manyuhu*).

In I.2.20 it is asserted that the self is smaller than the small and greater than the great (*anoraniyam mahatomahian*), that when a man strips himself of the active will (*a-kratu*) he can uphold his self freed from sorrow (*veetashokaha*). It is also stated that sitting he moves far; lying he goes everywhere (*āsino 'duram rajati sayano yāti sarvataha*). In other words he gets over the limitations imposed upon one-self by time and space.

In II.1.4 it is asserted that the wiseman will not grieve when he knows that it is through the self that he perceives both the dream and the waking states.

V. The Means to Self-Realization:

In II.1.11, it is asserted that self-realization can be had only through mind (*manasa yeva*). In I.2.23 it is maintained that the self cannot be attained by instruction (*pravachana*) nor by the intellectual power (*medhāsakti*) nor by hearing (*srutena*). It is asserted that the self can be attained only through the self, by the choice of the self (*ātmā vivṛnute tanūm svām*). We see that there is an apparent contradiction, according to Indian terminology, between II.1.11 which asserts that the self-realization is only through the *manas* and I.2.23 which asserts that it is possible only through the *ātma*. Secondly, there is another apparent contradiction that self-realization is a matter of spontaneous occurrence, and not due either to instruction or to intellect. To use the modern terminology a man attains self-realization in a spontaneous way through "insight." In I.2.24 it is shown that self-realization is not possible for an individual who does not desist from evil ways. This may now be interpreted that the evil way is the attempt to satisfy the Id without taking into account the needs of ego and super-ego, the needs of the physical, social and moral reality. It is also asserted that self-realization is not possible to a person who is not tranquil (*asamahitaha*) who is not calm (*ashāntamanasaha*) and composed.

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In II.1.1. it is asserted that the self is not to be sought through the senses. In this passage the statement is made that the individual, to start with, peers outward from the openings of the cognitive sense organs and so at the early stages of life the individual looks outward (*parang pasyati*) and not within the self (*na anta-ratman*). However, the wiseman is one who seeks the life eternal by turning his eyes inward (*āvṛttachakshuhu*). In passing it may be asserted that in Patanjali's Yogasutra it is clearly laid down that in the beginning the individual is *bahirmukha*, to modify Jung's terminology he is extrovert, and it is only with growth that the individual turns inwards and becomes introvert, *antarmukhi*. One of the beliefs in Indian society through the ages is that even during childhood or adolescence an individual may turn inwards. Such an individual is regarded with the greatest admiration by the society.

In the five passages in third valli of the second chapter, a brief description of yoga is given. In II.3.10 it is asserted that when the five cognitive senses and the *manas* and the *buddhi* cease from their normal activities, then the individual reaches the highest state (*paramangatim*). Such a state of steady control of the senses is considered to be yoga. Then one becomes undistracted. It is reiterated that the self cannot be realized either by speech or by mind or by sight. It can only be affirmed that "he is" (*asti-iti*). It is also stated that he should be apprehended only as existent. This state is possible when all the desires (*kāmas*) are cast away, when all the complexes (*hridayasyeha grantayaha*) are rent asunder (*pravidhyante*).

VI. Conclusion:

Thus we have quite a wealth of psychological material in Kathopanishad. We have seen how this Upanishad discusses and describes the relationship between the self, *atma*, the intellect, *buddhi*, the mind, *manas*, and the sense organs, the *indriyas*. We have also seen that the Upanishad describes the different motives and desires which impel an individual to act. Such desires are classified into two groups, the good, the *shreyas*, and the pleasant, the *preyas*. It unequivocally maintains that the individual who chooses the path of the pleasant, the *preyas*, fails in his aim as a human being. It further asserts that such a person is behaving like a little child (*bālaha*). We have seen next a description of some of the characteristics of the individual who has attained self-realization, and finally we have seen that the Upanishad describes the means to attain self-realization.

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Concept of Spirit

by

G. R. MALKANI

The terms,—mind, intelligence, soul, self and spirit,—are often confused with each other. We propose to put them in their proper place, and to show what is really spiritual about each of them.

Soul is supposed to be a specific kind of entity, different from the body but residing in it. We know practically nothing of it directly. It is more or less a theological concept. Possibly it can never be destroyed and is by nature immortal. Possibly also, it can sin and suffer the penalty of sin, which may be death. So far as our experience is concerned, it is a hypothetical entity only; and as a hypothetical entity, it is supposed to give unity to the mind. We need some intelligent substance as the basis of the various and diverse activities of the mind. The soul is therefore conceived as the substantial ground of the mind. But no-one has been able to isolate this ground and have a look at it. The result is that the hypothesis has remained a hypothesis only. Whether the hypothesis is useful has also remained a matter of doubt. All that anybody can say is that if the soul exists, it must be essentially non-material and so spiritual in nature. This raises the whole problem of the spirit. We understand spirit as essentially opposed to matter and as capable of intelligent activities.

The question naturally arises, do we ever know an intelligent substance as opposed to material substance? Perhaps we might have to admit that we do not. All that we know of an intelligent substance is that there is something we call a self; and further that, this self is indicated by the use of the innocent word "I". But different analyses have been given of this word from an empirical stand-point. To say that *I am* is to say that there is a peculiar mental state called *I-ness* (*ahamkāra*). To say that *I think* is to say that there is a thought. Even if it is conceded that the 'I' is distinct from the mental states which are said to belong to it, it can be argued that it is necessarily related to them. It thus forms part of a larger mental entity, and is therefore as momentary as all mental acts and states. What is certain is that we do not find a *permanent entity* which is distinct from all the states of the mind and which has a nature of its own.

Whatever the merit of this kind of analysis, it is presumed that the self or the *I* is something mental, and that it can only be found by looking into the mind. There is nothing more spiritual or more inward than the mind. It is the only thing that is essentially non-material, if anything is. We know our mind in a way we do not know any material substance. This, then, is our meaning of *spirit*.

There are philosophers who find difficulty with the mind itself. They cannot accept any ultimate dualism of mind and matter. Their argument is simple. If the mind were a spiritual substance somehow lodged in the body, it would only be another form of material substance. Only a material substance can contain another material substance. Again, the mind and the body are said to interact. But all the interaction we can conceive is between material substances only. How can the mind-concept then be said to be superior to that of matter or indicate a higher kind of reality? If we cannot drop it altogether, we must at least be honest about it. It is no kind of entity distinct from the body. It is nothing mysterious or inward or personal or spiritual. We can account for all the acts of the so-called mind in terms of the body and its behaviour. As Hywel D. Lewis summarises this view: "My mind will thus be my observable behaviour or disposition to behave, or the point of view or context of my body, and the seeming unavailability of using the first person singular will be, in varying ingenious ways, accounted for in these terms." (Prospect for metaphysics, edited by Ian Ramsey, p. 208).

This is, in our opinion, no solution at all. It is blowing up the whole problem. Mind may be a substance or it may not be. If it is a substance, it may be spiritual or non-spiritual. But we cannot fail to recognise a distinct sphere of experience called the mind, which cannot be confused with the body and its behaviour. We know *with the mind*, feel *with the mind*, etc; and we know all this without resort to sensuous perception of the behaviour of the body. It is only when we want to know the workings of the mind of another that we have to take the aid of the behaviour of his body which can be observed from the outside only. That is certainly not the case when we want to know our own mind. Our behaviour is only an expression of what first occurs in the mind. This expression can be halted or even varied by the mind; and we can know all that without resort to the observation of any explicit behaviour.

We shall go a step further. We know our mind in a rather intimate way. We reach the outside object through its action upon

our body, and we can have a sceptical sort of attitude to this kind of knowledge. We do not reach the mind through any such mediation. We may be said to reach it quite directly. Some philosophers go so far as to assert that we only know our mind and its states directly. We do not know the physical world in the same way,—we at best infer it from its action upon the mind. The fact of the mind cannot therefore be denied. But the question can be raised, is it our only meaning of what is called *spirit*?

It appears to us that this is not the case. We can go beyond the mind to what is more spiritual than the mind and in relation to which the mind can only be regarded as non-spiritual. If the mind can be acted upon by the body, there must be such a thing as mental stuff or substance. It is called *antahkaraṇa* in Indian philosophy. It is a kind of subtle or luminous stuff. It is nothing spiritual. It is in the end material (*jaḍa*) like all material bodies. There is therefore no qualitative distinction between this mind-stuff and the body-stuff. There will be distinction only in subtlety, and may be 'durability'. Physical death can only destroy the physical body, not the subtle mental body, which can possibly continue its existence in some other physical body in accordance with the mental dispositions and traces implanted in it. This will be a sort of physico-mental immortality for the individual. The mind-stuff changes in accordance with our acts, and yet maintains its continued existence. It constitutes the basis of the continuity of the historical individual. If we accept this view, which is very reasonable, mind and matter cease to be two diametrically opposed substances, such as matter and spirit. They can interact. Mind or *antahkaraṇa* is only a subtler matter which can affect the body and also be affected by it. There is no insoluble problem about their relationship. Mind and matter have the same basic nature. They are both non-spiritualistic or *jaḍa*. Only matter is known by one set of phenomena and mind by another. If somebody argues that we do not know what is called mind-stuff here, we can equally well argue against him that we do not know what is commonly called material stuff. We only know certain phenomena, physical and mental. There is accordingly absolutely no harm in accepting mind as some kind of stuff on the analogy of matter.

This naturally raises the question, what then is *spirit*? What is that entity which is *essentially intelligent*, and so absolutely opposed to all forms of materiality, both physical and mental? Is there any such entity? If there is not, the word *spirit* becomes quite meaningless. Most philosophers will naturally think that

there is no such entity beyond the mind. The mind alone is capable of intelligent operations, of anything is. The mind knows, feels and acts freely. There is clearly nothing beyond the mind that can account for these intelligent operations. If the spirit is only indicated by its intelligent functioning, the mind is the thing. Whether the mind is a kind of stuff or not may be disputed. But that it is the name of the only thing that can function intelligently cannot be doubted.

We now contend that it is possible to go beyond the mind to what alone is truly intelligent and truly spiritual. Mind is not intelligent in its own right. In its own right, it is material or *jaḍa*. It is some kind of substance which is capable of modifications we call *vyttis* (states and acts). Its intelligence is borrowed intelligence only. It is borrowed from some other entity which is transcendent to the mind and intelligent by its very nature. This entity is *spirit* par excellence. We can say that there is no other strain in it except that of *pure and undiluted intelligence*. The mind becomes the knower and the actor, and thus discharges spiritual functions, because it has falsely identified itself with the real or the intelligent Self.

But can we really go beyond the mind to any such intelligent reality called the Self? We can, if we draw the line of distinction at the right place. The common distinction between the body and the mind is relatively unimportant. Bodily phenomena and mental phenomena are both phenomena only. There is no qualitative distinction between them so far as metaphysical status and fundamental nature are concerned. The distinction we are suggesting is a different-level distinction,—it is a distinction between phenomenal reality as such and non-phenomenal reality. All phenomenal reality is comprehended under the general term “this”, i.e., objectivity. The non-phenomenal reality is only *discriminately indicated* by the term “I”, understood as what is opposed to all objectivity.

We can claim to have an intuition of *thisness* (*idam*), and an intuition of ‘I’ (*aḥam*). If we are serious with this distinction, we can solve every problem arising from the supposed dualism of matter and spirit. The real ‘I’ or the Self beyond the mind refuses to be *an entity* enclosed in the body. It is just the reverse. The body subsists on the intelligent Self and is an adjunct (*upādhi*) to it, and so *adjectival* in nature. It is *my* body and so thrives by *me*. The same is true about the mind and all its activities. The

Self *informs* them and is their true ground and substratum. In general, both mind and matter constitute *my world*, and they demand the pure intelligent Self as their only true and ultimate ground. There can be no *real dualism* between the substance and its adjectives. For the adjectives have no independent reality. They are necessarily *grounded* and so dependent. Dependent reality is no reality at all. It is only appearance; and appearance cannot challenge that which it demands as its own ground. The dualism of matter and spirit is accordingly an unreal or an apparent dualism only. It is bound by its logic to give place to the ultimate monism or non-dualism of the spirit. This is in direct conflict with certain western views, according to which matter constitutes the basic material of all that is. The truth is that a dualism of matter and spirit has got to be resolved either at the upper level or at the lower level. We cannot put up with an ultimate dualism of intelligent substance and unintelligent substance. Monism of substantial reality is an ultimate necessity. Only this may be at the lower level of matter or at the higher level of spirit. The East and the West are likely to pull in the opposite directions here.

Hywel D. Lewis, in “Prospect for Metaphysics”, seeks to justify the dualism of matter and mind or consciousness, and sticks staunchly to it without being drawn as he says into false analogies. “In the last resort the dualist must insist that what consciousness is cannot be described. We may contrast different mental activities with one another, but that is not to say what it is for them to be mental” p. 209. This is really evading the whole issue. Consciousness may not be like anything else. But do we really know it for what it is? Are we prepared to accept *pure consciousness*, which is not the consciousness of anything whatsoever? And how is this consciousness related to the body? If the two are really distinct and can exist side by side, will not consciousness be reduced to some kind of material stuff? Will not the analogy with matter force itself upon us, whether we want it or not?

It is well for him to say that we know consciousness in being conscious ourselves, although “we cannot turn round and look at ourselves being conscious”. But then how do we know consciousness at all? Is there any alternative to introspective, observation or some form of objective knowing? Introspectively, however, we can only know particular conscious acts. We can never know consciousness *as such* or some kind of *pure mental substance*

without the acts and the states. When the conscious acts lapse, consciousness appears to lapse also. How then do we know this term of the dualism? At best, we have a concept of *consciousness-in-general*, which does not prove any substantival entity called consciousness or mind. Are we then justified in accepting the reality of consciousness as some kind of spiritual substance co-ordinate with matter and as standing on the same level as matter?

We now contend that if we are serious with the term of the dualism which stands for a spiritual reality, we must cease to equate it with the mind and its activities. The latter we know in the objective attitude. We know mind more or less in the way we know all matter. If we have a right to speak of material substance, we have equally a right to speak of a mental substance. We know neither the one nor the other without its phenomenal appearance to us. If we want to know a truly spiritual and non-material reality, we must be able to intuit it directly for what it is, i.e. as substance, and not as phenomena. We think that this is possible. Every phenomenal appearance points to a reality behind it. It is an appearance of something real that itself does not appear. There is however one appearance which is pre-eminent for our purpose. This is the 'I', understood as the empirical ego. That we know the ego as a mental object will be generally admitted. But what will not be generally admitted is that we have here a *mixed intuition* of the spirit and the non-spirit or the real self and the apparent self. We contend that those who want to give meaning to the term 'spirit' must recognise the fact of this mixed intuition. It is not a matter of forced acceptance or of imagination. It is a matter of a subtle kind of *perception*. The empirical ego is always found in the relation of unity or of false identity with the real self. Accordingly, the term 'I' stands for both. The empirical ego or *ahamkāra* falls apart, is impermanent, and is known as object. That which does not fall apart, that which is continuous, permanent and revealing of the ego itself is the real self, and the true meaning of what is called 'spirit'. Those who fail to make the distinction will take some spurious entity to be the real meaning of the term 'spirit', and they will naturally refuse to be argued out of their position. It is well therefore to recognise that there is a limit to all argument. Ultimately, what convinces is actual perception or direct intuition or some substitute that goes by that name. In our opinion, the argument for the reality of spirit must end by pointing out the possibility of this special kind of intuition appropriate to the real Self. The intuition is a common

fact, universal in its scope, but little recognised. We certainly do not demand an extra-ordinary perception of an extra-ordinary or uncommon reality. Rather we may turn round and assert that nothing is more fully and intimately known than the Self. Nothing is more immediate to us, and our knowledge of it can be made absolutely certain and beyond all doubt.

Once we accept the reality of this Self and appreciate its unique ontological character, it cannot be treated as a mere term of an ultimate dualism. It challenges the reality of matter itself. For it cannot co-exist with matter or be embodied in it. We shall have to say that the body itself and the whole material universe with which the body is in contact are grounded in it and contained in it. The reality behind everything is the Self. What appears to us is not reality, but something that is super-imposed falsely upon reality. A whole philosophy hangs by this logic of the spirit. It is a pure monism of the Spirit that liquidates every form of duality for ever. Matter goes the way of all appearances, and so does the mind. The truth is only known by rejecting all appearances and getting down to the underlying ground and substratum. This is how we can know absolute metaphysical truth, and at the same time give meaning to what is spirit par excellence.

Discussion :
On Defending Idealism

by

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In a recent article in this journal,¹ Prof. Malkani has offered a defense of a Vedantic form of Idealism which is not only interesting in its own right but which brings to light some of the issues dividing Eastern and Western Idealists. His argument points out that when idealists begin their case with an analysis of perception, they cannot be refuted unless it be shown that perceptual knowledge admits of a reality independent of cognition. He then avers that the fact of erroneous perceptions shows that perception is a "mediated form of knowledge" (24) and does not yield ultimate reality for "all mediation is distortion" (25). Accordingly, "only a form of knowledge which is non-judgmental, which is literally free from doubt and error and which is self-evidently true, can reveal reality for what it is" (25).

Now Prof. Malkani holds that Berkeley, Plato, and Hegel were correct in emphasizing the significance of ideas, the first pointing out that mind is more real than ideas, constituting their real ground (26). But Berkeley did not define the divine mind or discuss the nature of its reality. While the realm of pure ideas constituted the ultimate reality for Plato, "for Hegel it was the Absolute Idea which had this honour" (26). For these western thinkers, we read, "there was nothing beyond the ideas to which the ideas may be said to belong or to which they may be said to be related" (26). But ideas cannot exist self-subsistently even if one should hold that ideas are more fundamental than a mind or psychic activity.

Moreover, Western idealistic philosophers have stressed the ultimacy of mind, but Prof. Malkani asks: "can we not go beyond the mind?" Mind includes activities or states and these are known objectively, "but what is the intelligence to which they are

1. "A Defence of Idealism", Vol. XXXIII, #1, (April 1960), pages 23-29. All parenthesized numbers in this discussion refer to pages in Prof. Malkani's article.

objects"? (27) One could say there is a higher non-mental intelligence or that the mind knows its own acts and states, the later acts knowing those which precede them, and so on. But this second alternative would lead to an infinite regress.² We are thus required to go beyond mind to "an intelligence that is immutable, that is pure, and that reveals mental objects without any act." (27) —the ultimate Spirit. Sound idealism, Prof. Malkani argues, must lead to this spiritual ground of the mind itself for here "the urge for truth...is fulfilled" (28). Hegel and others have urged that the Absolute must be an experience, having both a subject and an object. "But the subject that is necessarily related to the object" constitutes together a whole which is objective, can be known, and in being known can be transcended (29). Such an objective whole "demands a higher grade subject that is subject only, never an object to be known" (29)—a pure subject which has "no necessary reference to anything whatsoever."

This Absolute Subject, Prof. Malkani concludes, cannot be known as an object for it thence ceases to be itself. Success is possible only if our knowledge goes beyond the subject-object dualism and we "conform to the pure subjectivity of the Absolute Spirit.... We must become the Truth,—Truth cannot come to us or reflect itself in the finite ways of our knowing." (29)

Now despite Prof. Malkani's ingenious and masterfully succinct argument just summarized, a number of questions might well be raised about his discussion. Since Berkeley, Plato, and Hegel are quintessential in the foundation of Western Idealism, we could discuss specific points of difference between their views and his, but we will limit ourselves to Berkeley whose empirical idealism is in sharp contrast with Prof. Malkani's view on several points.

(1) Berkeley holds that the Divine Mind is known by inference as are human minds. He writes: "The knowledge I have of other spirits is not immediate, as is the knowledge of my ideas, but depending on the intervention of ideas, by me referred to agents or spirits distinct from myself, as effect or concomitant signs"³; and he speaks of being "surrounded with....clear manifestations of

2. "Each act of the mind would demand to be known by the act that is subsequent to it; so that in order to know one act, we should have to undertake an infinite series of acts." (27)

3. Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge*, §145.

the Deity,"⁴ and being able to "perceive manifest tokens of divinity."⁵ Now such inferential knowledge is mediated knowledge, it is hypothetical, logically tentative and probable rather than certain and final. Yet, early in his article, Prof. Malkani advises that knowledge of the supreme be "non-judgmental and literally free from doubt." (25) Here is a sharp difference. Berkeley's idealism comes to completion through an act of inference to the Ultimate; Prof. Malkani's form of idealism demands that knowledge of the Ultimate be non-inferential.⁶ Is Berkeley's knowledge of God in some sense inadequate or irrational because it is not an immediate or self-evident type of knowledge? For what reason should one require certain knowledge of the ultimate? Must we ask more from metaphysical knowledge than we can expect from scientific knowledge? Is not coherently inferred knowledge of the Ultimate reliable and adequate even though not absolutely certain? On what rational grounds might one claim to have certain knowledge? Surely there have been claims to indubitable knowledge which have been about contradictory objects! How can one assert that he does indeed know the one true Ultimate? Perhaps Prof. Malkani would suggest that we are dealing with a qualitatively different kind of knowledge,⁷ whereas Berkeley and certain other contemporary Western idealists view knowledge of God as having the same epistemological status as knowledge of any other mind. "Hence it is evident", says Berkeley, "that God is known as certainly and immediately as any other mind or spirit whatsoever, distinct from ourselves."⁸ If knowledge of the Ultimate is a different kind of knowledge, what makes it so different? Berkeley would surely grant the holiness and mystery of the Ultimate but would say that even though the object of our knowledge is Ultimate, that knowledge does not in any way affect the ontological character of

4. *Ibid.*, §149.

5. *Ibid.*, §148.

6. This difference between Berkeley's and non-inferential views is noted by G. W. Kaveeshwar in an illuminating discussion in his *The Metaphysics of Berkeley Critically Examined*, (Indore: Sardar Printing Works, 1933), pages 224ff.

7. He says: "We must become the Truth,—Truth cannot come to us or reflect itself in the finite ways of our knowing". (29) See also his *Vedantic Epistemology*, (Amalner: Indian Institute of Philosophy, 1953). "Metaphysical knowledge belongs to a higher order." p. 93.

8. Berkeley, *op. cit.*, §147. Emphasis added. Though he says God is known as certainly and immediately as other minds, that knowledge is still inferential via notions.

the object known. It would seem that Prof. Malkani takes the view that if God ever became an object of knowledge He would somehow lose His ontological status. I fail to see how an epistemological relation can modify an ontological ultimate.

(2) Secondly, we might observe that one feels a certain circularity in Prof. Malkani's argument. The criterion of knowledge of reality is laid down before the defence of idealism is beyond the second page and seems to be operative in determining what that reality will be. Knowledge of reality "ought to be" direct, immediate, and intuitive, we read (24), and at once non-intuitional or inferential epistemologies are rejected. The quest for a certain type of knowledge and for a certain view of reality is begun. Other positions are discounted as not being complete or going far enough.

The Idealism that stops with the mind and its acts is unreflective and it contradicts itself. . . . Idealism must go beyond the mind. It must accept an intelligence that is immutable, that is pure, and that reveals mental objects without any act. (27).

But isn't that the very point to be decided? Of course, Prof. Malkani is not presenting a construction of an idealistic system from its beginning, but is rather offering a defence of a standpoint. And since this is so his argument is not strictly circular. In an earlier article on a similar theme he maintains that the philosopher "sees the whole truth first and then argues towards it later on. He does not rise to it step by step through reason. Reason is an instrument of exposition, not an instrument of discovery."⁹

But there is another issue here and that is whether or not epistemology is based upon metaphysics. The type of idealism developed by Berkeley and such other Western idealists as James Ward, Edgar Brightman, and Brand Blanshard manifestly seeks an empirical rootage shunning apriori metaphysical postulates. It derives the ontological object *after* epistemic and other inquiry. Prof. Malkani's metaphysical views are at work in the development of his epistemological defence of idealism.¹⁰ In his *Vedantic*

9. G. R. Malkani, "Is Metaphysical Knowledge Possible?", this journal, Vol. XIX, (1943), p. 104.

10. P. T. Raju in an article entitled "Idealism: Eastern and Western" in *Philosophy East and West* (Vol. V, #3, October 1955), comments on distinguishing Eastern from Western Idealism by noting that in India "philosophy started with some metaphysical intuition and in order to support this intuition epistemological theories were developed", p. 220.

Epistemology, he points out that "Reality delivers itself to us as essentially *indescribable*. It is too great and too intimate for description."¹¹ Knowledge must be appropriate to reality. The ultimate by definition cannot become an object of cognition for then it ceases to be the ultimate. And in the article under consideration, we read: "If we reduce it (the Ultimate) to an object of some sort, it ceases to be itself." (29) But again we may ask, why? Why does an epistemic relation change the object referred to in the relation? My knowledge of some past event or absent object surely does not alter that event or object. How can it be that my finite knowledge of the highest unconditioned being should itself condition that being? Here is a key difference between Western idealistic thought and certain phases of Vedantic idealism. We might also ask how one *knows* that the Ultimate cannot be known through rational categories. I think Prof. Malkani's answer would be that the Ultimate would be realized through an experience which transcends subject and object and which is prior to knowledge both psychologically and logically. But then, of course, idealists from Berkeley one would wonder how such an experience of "special access" to the Ultimate could be verified or how one is able to distinguish between *bona fide* realization and aberrant claims. In short, how does one "become the Truth" and know that he has become it rather than Falsity?

(3) A third point of distinction between the idealism defended by Prof. Malkani and that more characteristic of European or American idealism is that the latter would not make its case rest so strongly on epistemology. To be sure Berkeley's argument is primarily epistemic though he does refer to teleological evidences and discounts the Scholastic view of substance after rational analysis. Others would say that a case for idealism can be developed by including a consideration of value experiences, evidence from the sciences, and ontological analysis as well as an analysis of knowing.¹² Even Plato would not rest his case solely on epistemology but draws synoptically on all human experience to support his view. Of course, the article we are here discussing is a highly concentrated piece of reasoning, but unlike Western idealistic arguments it has a linear, even deductivistic character.

11. P. 100.

12. For example, see E. S. Brightman, *Person and Reality*, (New York: Ronald Press, 1958).

Of particular interest is Prof. Malkani's point that one must go beyond mind in knowing the Ultimate. "It may be", he says, "that the mind knows its own acts and states....But how is this possible? We think that the mind cannot be treated as a kind of internal sense." (27) Accordingly, each act of the mind would have to be known by an act that follows it "so that in order to know one act, we should have to undertake an infinite series of acts." (27) Prof. Malkani cannot see how a cognitive act can exist without being known. If it could, matter could then exist without being known, he concludes, and the idealist's case would totter. If the cognitive act is not known, he asks, "where is the evidence that it is there?" (27) It cannot be in mind for this leads to the infinite regress mentioned above. It must be in something beyond mind, namely, the Ultimate Spirit. This Spirit is Absolute Subject which can never become an object of cognition "or reflect itself in the finite ways of our knowing." (29)

For a type of idealism that finally rests on a realization of the Absolute, this line of reasoning, it must be said, has a highly rationalistic and abstract character, resembling the Thomistic argument for an uncaused cause. The point at issue with many contemporary Western idealists would be whether the mind could be treated as a "kind of internal sense". With Berkeley, one could affirm that the mind does indeed know its own acts and states and that is a simple, basal fact,—a fact which instead of needing further explanation is itself a principle of explanation. The mind as knower and knower of its own states transcends knowing acts but is aware that it is doing so and thus is itself both subject and object of knowledge. Further explanation is not needed, for this subject-object interrelationship is an experienced fact, discovered in a moment's introspection. As Borden P. Bowne once observed: "Intelligence has no means of understanding itself as product. It is the source of all products and for knowledge of itself it must fall back on experience."¹³ The materialist thinks he can explain this self-awareness and self-cognition in terms of brain activity; the Absolute Idealist requires an all-inclusive Self which encompasses finite modes of self-cognition; the Vedantic Idealist as typified by Prof. Malkani requires an ineffable Absolute Subject. We ask why cannot the fact of knowing itself as a conscious experience be taken as the key? Other attempts explain the mind in terms of some-

13. Borden P. Bowne, *Metaphysics* (Revised), (New York: Harper & Bros., 1898), p. 428.

thing other than itself, and, I think, in each case cited, one is led into obscurity. They are explaining the known through the unknown. Why must one seek for an explanation of that which in itself in its inwardness offers a clue if not the key to interpretation and explanation of the rest of experience? The empirical facts of consciousness with the experience of immediate self-awareness as well as the almost simultaneous experience of self-transcendence—where subject and object are temporarily united—are so fundamental that Prof. Malkani's argument from infinite regress (cited above) has a hollow and unconvincing ring. It is a case where a presumed logical requirement—that a cognitive act itself be known—is in conflict with an empirical certainty, namely that such cognitive acts are indeed known in one consciousness.


And yet our author may be pointing out to us that there are levels of finite consciousness which are not merely analogues of what the Ultimate Spirit must be, as Berkeley would say, but are direct manifestations of that Spirit. However, for the idealist tradition of Europe and America the question of verification would still have to be asked in spite of ineffable mystical assurances or injunctions that we "must become the Truth."

Books Received

(1) *Relativism and the Study of Man*, edited by Helmut Schoeck and James W. Wiggins, published by D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. New York, price \$6.50c.

(2) *The Art of Thinking*, by Dagobert D. Runes, published by Philosophical Library, Inc., New York, price \$2.75c.

(3) *Autobiography of a Yogi*, by Paramahansa Yogananda, published by Self-Realization Fellowship, Los Angeles, price \$4/-.



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METAPHYSICS OF ADVAITA VEDANTA

BY

G. R. MALKANI

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