


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
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Untouchability in the Early Indian Society

BY

SASANKA SEKHAR PARUI, M.A.

The problem of superiority complex appears to be inherent to the very nature of human society and it has troubled our society in various ways from the ancient days to this century when the world has advanced much through the path of civilization. The white people of pre-Lincoln America and of South Africa are so blind that they are not ready to give the black their due share of rights and liberty at any cost. This is nothing but political touch-me-notism or political untouchability—a developed form of social untouchability.

Social untouchability had so deep a root in Indian soil that even to-day the upper sections of the Hindu society avoid the touch of those considered low by them. The number of the untouchables even to-day is so high that it is a problem to our society and government. The number varies from three crores to six crores. The Simon Commission Report of 1930¹ gives a figure about forty three millions, and according to P. V. Kane,² the total number of "Harijan population" in India is about fourteen 'per centum' of the total number of the people.

The theory of untouchability is not an isolated phenomenon of a single century. It develops and changes throughout centuries and embraces new groups of people within itself. Collectively, the untouchables are known as 'antyās' or 'bahyās'—the people living outside villages or towns.³ They are: *Nisīdas*, *Ayogavas*, *Medas*, *Andhras*, *Cuncus*, *Madgus*, *Kṣattrṣ*, *Pukkāsas*, *Dhigvanas* and *Venās*; they all, live outside the villages.⁴ The *Chandālās* and *Svapākas*

1. Simon Commission Report of 1930, Vol. I, p. 40.

2. Kane, P. V., History of the Dharmaśāstras, Vol. II, Part I, p. 179.

3. Sharma, R. S., Śūdras in Ancient India, p. 130.

4. Manu, X, 48-50.

are also regarded as untouchables. According to Dr. Sharma, the *Dombas* come from a numerous section of the untouchables in northern India. The sons begotten by a *Sūdra* on a *Vaiśya* woman⁵ and on a *Brāhmaṇa* woman are *antāvasāyins*. It is not that those begotten in this way form the class of *antāvasāyins*, but they are reduced to the position of *antāvasāyins*. According to Dr. Sharma, the whole population of tribal villages are condemned to the position of untouchables by the *Brāhmaṇas*.⁶ The number of the untouchables is not so high at the time of the origin of this group as it is in the Maurya period and, later on, in the Gupta age. It can be evidenced by the fact that the classical writers like Megasthenes and others do not say anything about the *Chandālas*, while Fahien gives special attention to it.

A lot of people of this country are affected by the principle of untouchability of the Hindu religion, but all of them are not equal in status, or all of them are not 'treated equally'. A broad examination of the matter will classify it into two types—temporary and long term. Sometimes we find that a caste Hindu is treated as untouchable for a fixed period of time. To illustrate from Manu,⁷ the wife in her monthly period, or during the first ten days of her delivery, a person who has carried a corpse and has not yet bathed, etc. are not pure, till the period of impurity is over. Any people, even the Brahmins, may come within the jurisdiction of this temporary untouchability. But there is another kind of untouchability—long-term untouchability, though not permanent, and the untouchables, belonging to this, form a separate group. The *Chandālas*, for example, belong to this group.

It is, indeed, very difficult to have a fixed date for the growth of any historical phenomenon. It takes its shape through the process of evolution, and a long period is required to have its shape visible. The date of untouchability is very ancient, no doubt, but controversy arises with the actual age of its growth. Two views are forwarded in this connection: (a) According to P. V. Kane, it was not present at the time of the Vedas, (b) Dr. Sharma

5. Vasistha, XVI, 113.

6. Sharma, p. 131.

7. Manu, V. 85.

thinks that "untouchability appeared probably towards the end of the pre-Mauryan period."⁸

In favour of his view P. V. Kane has mentioned a passage from the *Chāndogya Upanishad* which states that for good deeds one comes to the family of a *Brāhmaṇa*, a *Kshatriya*, or a *Vaiśya*, but for bad works one becomes a *Chandāla* or a boar or a horse. In this passage there is no mention of *Sūdra*; *Chandālas* are looked upon as the lowest; therefore, *Chandālas* are *Sūdras*. Moreover, Kane says that all the dogs are not dirty and the flesh of a boar is recommended in the *Sradhdha* ceremony.⁹ Therefore, in the days of *Chandogya Upanishad* *Chandālas* are not untouchable. But, the opinion of P. V. Kane is a matter of criticism. The word *Sūdra* is familiar, yet, it is not used in this passage, but why?—that is not explained by Kane. Moreover, a *Sūdra* cannot in any way be equal to a boar or a dog, how much pure it may be. In our days the goat is used in the sacrifice. In spite of that, do we regard a goat superior to a human being? Certainly not. P. V. Kane has referred to another passage¹⁰ which mentions about the sin (death) of the *Dhevatāsis* thrown to the end of the quarters. Hence, one should not go to the people there (outside the Aryan pale). According to Saṃkara, those people oppose the Vedic culture. Kane says that they are the *mlecchhas*, not the *Chandālas* who only stay outside the village. Hence, untouchability is not present at the time of the *Bṛihadārannak Upanishad*. But what is meant by 'Aryan pale' is not clear. It may be that *Chandālas* opposed the fundamentals of the Vedic culture.

In spite of that, we have to think seriously over the points raised by P. V. Kane, but it is very difficult to agree with him without further examination.

To establish his opinion Dr. Sharma has referred to *Āpastamba Dharmasūtra*¹¹ where it is said that to see and touch a *Chandāla* is sinful. In the earlier manuscripts, as he thinks, this

8. Sharma, p. 126.

9. Manu, III, 270; Yājñavalkya Smṛti, 1.259.

10. *Bṛihadārannak Upanishad*, 1.3.10.

11. *Āpastamba Dharmasūtra*, II, 1.2.8.

is not found, and as such, the theory of untouchability appears towards the end of the pre-Mauryan period. If we take it for granted we have to face some difficulties. Long before the Maurya period, in the Vedic Age, there is a group of people known as *Chandālas*.¹² If they are not untouchable before the Mauryas, then, what was their actual social status? That is not clear, Dr. Sharma flashes no light on this point. Moreover, it will be too much to say that temporary untouchability is absent before the Maurya period.

No single phenomenon is enough to explain the origin of untouchability, it is the product of a chain of causes acting simultaneously. The difference between the culture of the touchable and the untouchable is so wide at a time that the upper classes of the Hindu society think it better to check the contact with them. Even the converted Hindus who thought themselves as "The unique Brahmana" are very conscious on this point (Dr. S. K. Maity, "Man in India" vol. 40 No. 1. 1960). The blind love of their own culture, the sense of protection through isolation and the unpractical reasoning faculty of the intellectuals have a great contribution to the growth and development of untouchability.

In the early days of the Aryan settlement in India the aborigines of this country were not always hostile to them. We find the reference of conversion of the *dāsas* into *Āryans*.¹³ But some of them were not ready to embrace the new order, though they remained friendly and served the brahmanical society in various ways.

In spite of the friendly attitude the aborigines were the object of fear to the Hindues specially the *Brāhmaṇas*. The low material culture of the aborigines might affect their rich culture. The *Chandālas*, *Śvapākas*, and *Antyāvasāyins* executed the criminals and used their clothes, beds and ornaments.¹⁴ *Nisādas*, *Medas*, *Andhras*, *Medgas*, and *Cuncus* lived on fishing and hunting animals. *Ayogavas* and *Dhigranas* were wood-cutters and leather workers

12. Chāndogya Upanisad, V.10.7.

13. Rig Veda, VI. 22.10.

14. Manu, X. 56.39.

respectively.¹⁵ *Venas* play on drums.¹⁶ And the *Śvapākas* cook the flesh of dogs and sell bowstrings.¹⁷ All these are dirty works according to the brahmanical view. Sometimes this cultural difference gives birth to religious hatred and abhorrence. Thus, on touching Buddhas, *Pāsupatas*, Jains, *Lokāyatikas* and others one has to be pure through such process as prescribed for one touching the untouchables.¹⁸ Even those among the upper classes performing unpardonable crimes are regarded as culturally low. Thus Manu says that those who are guilty of *Brāhmaṇa*—murder, theft of *Brāhmaṇa*'s gold or drinking of spirituous liquors should be excommunicated.¹⁹ They are treated as untouchables. Under these circumstances it is quite natural for the developed Brahmanical culture to protect itself. And this the Hindus did by guarding their culture through various rules and regulations against the very low culture of the unconverted friendly aborigines. The Hindu intellectuals like Kaūṭilya, Bṛihaspati and others of the later ages composed strict rules to continue this process. Their arguments, sometimes though logical, are unpractical and remain ideal to the brahmanical society. This ideal nature of their rules is clear in the very adjective of the *aborigines*—the untouchable, not the untouched.

Incidentally, Dr. Sharma has tried to reject the view of Ghurye—theoretical impurity of certain occupations is the origin of untouchability. Mr. Ghurye's examination²⁰ may not be exclusive, but what he says is nothing but the cultural inferiority of the aborigines, and this culture is impure, because, the Hindu *Śāstra-kāras* think it so. Impurity explains the sense of fear that led to the isolation. But Dr. Sharma is right and just to oppose the theory of N. K. Dutt²¹ and Mr. Ambedkar.²² According to N. K. Dutt the tradition of untouchability is borrowed from the Dravidians in the South. But, he fails to notice that this tradition comes among the

15. *Ibid.*, 48.39.49.

16. *Ibid.*, 49.

17. Vyavahāra Bhāṣya, 3.92.

18. Aparārka, p. 923; Smṛiti—candrikā, 1, p. 118.

19. Manu, ix, 235-239.

20. Ghurye, Caste and Class, p. 159.

21. Dutt, N. K., Origin and Growth of caste in India, I, pp. 106-7, cf. p. 31.

22. Ambedkar, untouchables, X.

Dravidians only after their contact with Hinduism. In the opinion of Dr. Ambedkar, those who continue beef-eating are untouchable. But, in the earliest period of Hinduism beef-eating is practised. It may, at best, be that this rule is adjusted later on, but it is not in any way responsible for the growth of this phenomenon.

Thanks to Islam, there is no strict division of classes among the Mohammadans; but Hindu society in India is overburdened with the problem of class division. The sense of purity had divided the Hindus into two blocks—touchables and untouchables. The *Śāstras* have sanctioned fourfold division of Hindu society. Under these circumstances it is very difficult to find out the true social position of those regarded untouchable in relation to the system of fourfold classification.

N. K. Dutt²³ regards *Nishadas*, *Chandālas* and *Paulkāsas* as the fifth *varṇa*. But P. V. Kane with the help of the *Śāstras* has proved that Dutt is not right in his view. To him, this group of untouchables is originally a part of the *Sūdra* class, but in course of time a distinction is made between *Sūdras* and the caste like *Chandālas*—untouchable. But, both Kane and Dutt bear extreme views and draw our curiosity. Manus says that there are only four *varṇas* and there is no fifth *varṇa*.²⁴ Pāṇini²⁵ and Patanjali have included *Chandālas* and *Mṛatapās* among *Sūdra*. The *Sāntiparva* states that *Vaidehika* is called *Sūdra* by learned *Dvijas*.²⁶ In view of these opinions, it is difficult to agree with Dutt. But, the opinion of Kane also cannot be justified fully. He has in support of his view, used Manus who says that all *pratiloma* castes (*Ksatṛ*, *Sūta*, *Vaidehika*, *Māgadha* and *Ayogava*) are similar to *Sūdras* in their *dharma*. But, in the *śāstras* it is not said that the son begotten by a *Sūdra* on a *Brāhmaṇi* is reduced to the position of *Sūdra*, but *Chandāla*. Why is the difference made frequently in the *Śāstras*? To conclude, the untouchables are not hostile to the Hindu order, but they are probably outside the *Sūdra* Class, and, as such, they are not allowed to have the position of an independent caste in the Hindu Society.

23. Dutt, N. K., I, p. 105.

24. Manus, X, 4.10.

25. Pāṇini, II, 4.10.

26. *Sāntiparva*, 297. 25.

UNTOUCHABILITY IN EARLY INDIAN SOCIETY 7

Most of the ancient authors are least interested in the life of the untouchables. They have said something here, and there only for the sake of the upper classes of the Hindu society. This led to the difficulty of having a full picture of the life of the untouchables.

The seat of dwelling of the untouchables, as said before, is outside villages or towns. This is clear by the word '*antyajas*',²⁷ but this is not *dhīśāmantā*²⁸ i.e. outside the Aryan pale. Those regarded as untouchable for a short period of time i.e. woman during the first ten days of her delivery, one who carries a corpse etc.²⁹ live within their family but remain secluded for the fixed period.

The standard of living of the untouchables is very low. They live on fishing, the rejected articles of the executed criminals, hunting even dogs, woodwork, leather work, drum beating, singing, etc.—all kinds of professions which are avoided by the upper classes.³⁰ They are habituated to take the flesh, even of the lower animals like dogs and to drink regularly. It is not denying the fact that the Hindu laws and customs recommend meat eating and drinking in special ceremonies like the sacrifice. But, these are special cases and the upper classes do not live on meat and liquor. The untouchables are given inferior garments.³¹ They have to take food in broken dishes and are allowed to use only the ornaments of iron.³² Such a picture is enough to show that the standard of living of the untouchables, undoubtedly permanent, is very low.

Very little is known about the religion and religious duties of the untouchables, perhaps, on account of their negligible role in this platform of life. They have respect for Hinduism and Hindu deities, but the enmity of the *Brāhmaṇas* excludes them. From Yājñavalkya³³ and Gautama³⁴ we come to know that in

27. Atri; Manus, X, 49-50 and others.

28. *Bṛihadārannak Upanisad*, I, 3.10.

29. Manus, V, 85.

30. Vyavatāra Bhāṣya, 3.92 Manus, X; Dr. S. K. Maity, Note on caste in Ancient India, published in 'Man in India', Vol. 40, No. 1, 1960, p. 65.

31. Gautama, XIV.42.

32. Manus, X, 54-55.

33. I, 93.

34. IV, 20.

ancient days they worship the Hindu deities and perform the Hindu rites and duties. According to Yājñavalkya³⁵ the *pratiloma* section of the untouchables have the right to perform *vratas*, but, they can not perform *upanayana*.

"It is difficult to imagin anything more brutal and more material than the theology of the *Brāhmaṇas*.³⁶ This spirit of brahmanical enemism is responsible for the imposition of a lot of restrictions on the social, as well as, political rights and interests of the untouchables. They cannot enter the town, if they violate this rule people beat them and render them senseless.³⁷ If they have to enter, they are bound to give a previous notice—to strike a piece of wood to announce their arrival, so that the people of the upper classes can avoid their contact.³⁸ If they deliberately touch the higher castes they should be punished by beating.³⁹ According to Brihaspati, a *chāṇḍāla* cannot approach within sixteen cubits of a caste Hindu. If a *chāṇḍāla* touches an Aryan woman he has to pay a fine of hundred *paṇas*,⁴⁰ but, he has not to pay if he touches *Sūdra* woman. The Veda is forbidden to the *Bāhyas*, the *Ugras* and the *Nisādas*.⁴¹ The public roads and some other things touched by a *chāṇḍāla* and others, like a dog, are impure, but, they become pure by the wind over them.⁴² The untouchables can appear as witness only in their own cases, they have no right to witness in favour of any of the upper classes.⁴³ The punishment due to the damage to the birds and animals of *chāṇḍālas* and other by upper classes is half the fine due to the damage of that of the upper classes by the *chāṇḍālas*.⁴⁴

Certain restrictions are sanctioned by the *Sāstras* for the upper classes in relation to the untouchables. According to the

35. III 362.

36. Rhys-Davids, T. W., Buddhist India, p. 132 said by M. Sylvani Levi.

37. Jātaka, IV, 376, 391.

38. Legge, Fa-hsien, p. 43.

39. Viṣṇu-dharma-sūtra, v. 104.

40. Kautilya, III, 20.

41. Apastamba Dharmasūtra, I.3.9.18.

42. Yājñavalkya, I, 197.

43. Vasistha, XVI, 30.

44. Kautilya, IV 10. "Candālararyacarānāmardhadandāh".

Buddhist sources,⁴⁵ those who eat meat are born again and again in the family of the untouchables. A *Snātaka* must not have any connection with the untouchables. A *Brāhmaṇa* is no more a *Brāhmaṇa*, if he has intercourse with an *antyā* woman. The higher *varṇas* must not give the untouchables even the grain with their hands.⁴⁶ A *chāṇḍāla* must not be seen, air that touches him must be avoided, food seen by him is not worth to be taken.⁴⁷ There is a reference to the loss of caste of sixteen thousands of *Brāhmaṇas* for taking the leavings of *Chāṇḍālas*' meals. A *Brāhmaṇa* father dwelling with the *antavasāyins* with one of their women should be rejected.⁴⁸ The tank of water used by the *Chāṇḍālas* cannot be used by anybody else.

There are several cases of exception to the general rules of restrictions. To come in contact with the untouchables is sinful, but it is not so if the ground of mixing be the battlefield, the public road leading to the market, religious processions, temples, religious festival, sacrifices, sacred place, calamities, riverbank, presence of great persons etc.⁴⁹ There is no harm, if a *Chāṇḍāla* takes water from a big tank (not small) used by the upper classes.⁵⁰ There is no question of untouchability in fairs, marriages, Vedic sacrifices etc.⁵¹

A list of rules of recovery is also sanctioned by the ancient lawgivers. If a *Brāhmaṇa*'s limb other than the head comes in contact with the untouchables, he can be pure by washing that particular limb.⁵² In the Jātaka⁵³ we find that the daughter of *seṭṭhi* of Benaras, who sees a *Chāṇḍāla* becomes pure by washing her eyes. Those who are untouchable on account of the murder of a *Brāhmaṇa*, theft of *Brāhmaṇa*'s gold or drink of spirituous liquors may recover by *prayas citta*.⁵⁴ Those who touch-

45. Laṅkāvatāra sūtra, p. 258.

46. Manu, X 53-54.

47. Jātaka.

48. Gautama, Xx. I. ef. XXIII. 32.

49. Smṛtyanthasāra, 79.

50. Parāśar Mādaviya, Vol. II, part I, p. 115.

51. Atri, p. 33.

52. Aparārka, p. 279.

53. Jātaka, IV 376. 390-91.

54. Manu, IX 235-239.

the temporarily untouchables may become pure by taking bath with their clothes on.⁵⁵

An *antyaśāyīn* also becomes purified on listening to the name of Hari, repeating His name and by contemplating on Him.⁵⁶ The temporary untouchables become purified at the end of their fixed period.

All these rules of restrictions, exemption from restrictions and recovery do not develop at one and the same time. There are several contradictions e.g. once it is said that to touch a *Chandāla* in the market is sinful, in the other place it is said that the contact with a *Chandāla* in the public place is not restricted. It is natural, the system, developed throughout ages and that the different *Śāstrakāras* of different ages impose these in their own way. Moreover it is doubtful, how far these rules are followed in practice. The law-givers give an ideal picture before the society, but the society does not move always along the path directed by them.

To conclude, when the Aryans at first settle in this country they find that a great number of Indian aborigines while accepting some Hindu practices and religious functions, do not embrace Hinduism in entirety. They are considered as culturally low, and thus remain untouchable. Their life in society is suppressed at every step by the upper sections of the Hindus and they find hardly any scope to raise their status in society. A large number of rules are imposed by the *Śāstrakāras* to keep them isolated. Of course, some process of recovery is found out. The system is inhuman, as well as, illogical; it simply raised a bar against the natural rights of a group of people.

It is a problem before the historical thinkers—though the ancient Indian authors have spent a lot of their energy and time on the question of untouchability, nowhere in the inscriptions do we find a trace of its existence. True it is that the ancient writers, in most cases *Brāhmaṇas*, forward it as an ideal before the society. But, the practice is not out of existence in the early days, however less effective it may be. The cause of this non-reference lies

somewhere else. Most of the early Indian inscriptions are erected to commemorate the political achievements of the mighty Kings, or donations of land to the priests or some other organisations, or to increase the religious merit. But, the untouchables, from the political, economic and religious points of view, are insignificant, and have nothing to do with the great achievements and donations. Thus, it is quite natural that they are not mentioned in the inscriptions.

55. Ibid. V. 85.

56. Bhāgavata purāṇa, X. 70. 43.

Dost Muhammad Khan, the Founder of Bhopal State

BY

IQBAL KAUL

In Afghanistan, near the Khaiber pass, existed a small village named Gunda, in the Tehsil of Tirah in Khaiber District,¹ where the Warakzai Afghans² of Mirazi Khel³ (clan) had lived. Here, Khan Muhammad Khan, great grand father of Dost Muhammad Khan had lived. His son named Jan Muhammad Khan had a son named Nur Muhammad Khan who was the father of Dost Muhammad Khan.

Almost all available authorities, Hindu, Muhammeden and English, differ on the date of the arrival of Dost Muhammad Khan in India.⁴ But they all agree upon the fact that before

1. Bhopal State Gazetteer, Genealogical Table; Taj-ul-Iqbal Tarikh-Bhopal, by H. H. The Nawab Shah Jehn, Begum of Bhopal, trans. by H. C. Barstow, Calcutta; Thakar, Spink & Co. 1876 (hereafter as TI), p. 1; Part VII. Report on the Province of Malwa and Adjoining Districts, submitted in 1821; Calcutta; Government of India Central Publication Branch, 1927 by Sir John Melcolm (hereafter as Melcolm), p. 153.

2. Bhopal in 1939-42. Publicity Officer, Govt. of Bhopal: Bombay. The Times of India Press (hereafter as Bpl. in...), p. 69. Cyclopaedia of India and of Eastern and Southern Asia, Vol. I, London, 1886, (hereafter as Cyclopaedia), p. 251, mentions as Dowlatzai sect of Orakzai: Tarikh-i-Bhopal, by Mehnidi Mian, 1922 (hereafter as TB), p. 9. Tarikh-i-Ulka Bhopal; by Munshi Syed Mehnidi Ali: Published for private circulation, Gwalior, Alijah Press; Under the Superintendence of Pandit Uma Charan, 1898 (hereafter as TUB), p. 4: Bhopal State Gazetteer, p. 9.

3. TI, p. 1: Cyclopaedia, p. 351:—Doctor Hunter says, the Mirazi Khel: Melcolm, p. 153: Bpl. in 1939-42, p. 69: A Pilgrimage to Mecca, by H. H. The Nawab Sikander, Begum of Bhopal, Calcutta: Thakar & Sons, 1906: (hereafter as Pilgrimage), p. 143: TB, p. 9: TUB, p. 4: Bhopal State Gazetteer, p. 9.

4. Bhopal State Gazetteer, p. 9:—"Dost Muhammad Khan's father, Nur Muhammad Khan arrived in A.H. 1109 (1696-97), the thirty-seventh year of the reign of Aurangzeb". Pilgrimage, p. 143:—"He (Dost Muhammad Khan) went to Delhi in A.D. 1695 and first entered the service Jehal (Jalal)

joining the Mughal Court, he took services and settled in Lohari Jalalabad, where Jalal Khan, of his own tribe was the ruler⁵. Hence it is calculated that he came along with his father, in the reign of Aurangzeb, may it be the closing years of the last decade of the 17th Century.⁶

Soon after his joining the services at Jalalabad, Dost Muhammad Khan quarreled with a Pathan there, and killed him.⁷ Alarmed of the onsequences of his acts, he fled and joined the Imperial Army of the Mughals then on march against the Marathas in Malwa.⁸ His arrival in Malwa was the turning point of his life and career. Soon after the death of Aurangzeb, he resigned from the Mughal Army service⁹ and became a soldier of fortune, seeking employment here and there.

Services under Raja of Sitamau:

The first seat of his employment, immediately after his resignation from the Mughal Army, was a small Rajput State of Sitamau under Raja Kesho Das (1695-1748)¹⁰ where he seemed to have stayed for a short time.

Lease of Berasia and services in Gujarat:

Soon after, having left the services of Sitamau, and depositing his personal belongings with the Governor of Bhilsa,¹¹ Muhammad Faruk, he went in search of another Court in Malwa. In the

Khan, a noble of his tribe". TUB, p. 4:—He came to Malwa in A.H. 1120 (1703-1704): TI. p. 1:—He "emigrated to Hindustan...in the beginning of the reign of Bahadur Shah, son of Alamgir, in the year 1120" (according to its foot note 1716): A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, Vol. IV, 1933 by Atchison (hereafter as Atchison), p. 89:—He "went to Delhi, during the first years of Bahadur Shah" (1708). Bpl in 1939-42, p. 69.

5. Bhopal State Gazetteer, p. 9: Pilgrimage, p. 143: Malcolm, p. 153: TB. p. 9: TI. p. 1.

6. Mill and Wilson—History of British India, Vol. VII, p. 47.

7. TI. p. 1: Bhopal State Gazetteer, p. 9. The cause of the quarrel is, however, not mentioned in any record.

8. Ibid. TB. p. 9 says: He joined on the post of Harawal; Bpl. in 1939-42 says: "Distinguished himself as an officer in the Imperial Guards", p. 69. Malcolm, p. 153 says: He "took service at Delhi in the Imperial Army".

9. Cyclopaedia, p. 350; Bpl. in 1939-42, p. 69; TB. p. 9.

10. Bhopal State Gazetteer, p. 9, (see footnote), hereafter as BSG).

11. Ibid., TI. p. 1.

mean while, he attacked the Zamindar of Bans Barla(?) in which he was wounded.¹²

Confusion and anarchy had prevailed after the death of Aurangzeb. The pargana of Berasia (23°-38' N and 77°-27' E), 26 miles from (modern) Bhopal, which was then held by Taj Muhammad Khan, a Noble of the Imperial Court, presented a scene of insecurity, and highway robbery was quite common and life was never safe in the territory. The agents of Taj Muhammad Khan, Kazi Muhammad Salah,¹³ Sundul Rai and Alum Chand Qanungo,¹⁴ were unable to cope with such a chaotic situation. Dost Muhammad Khan offered to accept Berasia on a lease of Rs. 30,000 a year, which was readily granted by Taj Muhammad Khan.¹⁵ This grant made Dost Muhammad Khan the master of the land.

It is probably after taking Berasia on lease that he went to Gujarat in search of services.¹⁶ But having no sufficient resources there, he had to face a precarious situation when his own men imprisoned and confined him for non-payment of their allowances. He consequently wrote to his wife, Fateh Bibi for an advance of some money, who after sending the amount requested him to come back to Malwa.¹⁷

Services in Mangalgarh:

Most probably after the skirmish at Bans Barla where Dost Muhammad Khan had received a severe wound, and his disappearance from Malwa for a short while for Gujarat, that a rumour spread and reached the Governor of Bhilso about his death. This resulted in the confiscation of his personal property by Muhammad Faruk, under whose protection he had left it. Consequently, he went in person to Bhilsa and demanded his pro-

12. TI. p. 1. No further detail or location of Bans Barla is given in any account. It may, therefore, be the modern Bareli or Bari in Bhopal State.

13. TB., p. 10.

14. TI., p. 2.

15. Pilgrimage, p. 143; Dost Muhd. Khan was "appointed Superintendent of Berasia". Atchison, p. 89 gives 1709 A.D. as the dat of grant.

16. TB., p. 11.

17. Ibid., p. 11. (It is noted that neither BSG nor TI, has mentioned this account).

perty from the Governor. But he seemed to have been given only a part of it, which made Dost Muhammad Khan quite indignant.

He went then to Mangalgarh¹⁸ (near Berasia) where he entered in the service of Solanki Rajput¹⁹ Anand Singh. Here he was made Kamdar of the estate by Anand Singh's mother.

After the death of Anand Singh at Delhi,²¹ he left Mangalgarh with a huge amount of money, valuables and jewels²² belonging to the estate. According to another account, "Dost Muhammad obtained the daughter of Anand Singh in marriage, and with her inherited greater portion of this Raja's property".²³ The account, however, does not seem to be correct due to the following:

a. Had it been so he would have rather preferred to continue at Mangalgarh, and

b. He would have preferred to make Mangalgarh his seat for future activities. But decidedly Dost Muhammad Khan became more powerful financially, and by the time he left the services of Mangalgarh, he became more secure politically as well.

Subjugation of Parason:

After settling himself at Berasia (26 miles north from Modern Bhopal), Dost Muhammad Khan's first object was to sub-due the neighbouring Rajput free-looters, who were a regular source of disturbance to the general peace and the prosperity of the country around. He, therefore, needed his own kinsmen and relations to help him in foreign land. Consequently, he "induced his relations, the Pathans of his clan from Afghanistan, to join him".²⁴

Thus after making this arrangement, he sent his agent to find out a suitable time, to attack the chief of Parason²⁵ (near Mangalgarh in the Nazirabad Tehsil of Bhopal). It was during the Holi festival that he decided to attack, and at midnight he

18. *TI*, p. 2; *BSG*, p. 9.

19. *Ibid.*

20. *TI*, p. 2.

21. Melcolm, p. 154; *BSG*, p. 9.

22. *BSG*, p. 9; *TI*, p. 2.

23. Melcolm, p. 154.

24. *TI*, pp. 2-3; *BSG*, p. 10.

25. *Ibid.*, *TB*, p. 11.

reached Parason. All including the chief were drunk and enjoying merriment. Dost Muhammad Khan suddenly fell upon them and killed most of them, including the chief.²⁶ Thus he made himself master of Parason treacherously, and declared that any kind of plunder, decoity or murder would not be tolerated and defaulters would be severely punished.²⁷

Immediately after this he subdued Kichwara and Umatwara²⁸ (near Bhaora), and then attacking Shamsabad (north of Berasia, in the then Bhilsa territory) killed Raza Khan, and Shumsher Khan, who were the deputies of Muhammad Fraugh, the Hakim of Bhilsa.²⁹

Jagdishpur conquered and renamed as Islamnagar:

His ambitious career of regular acquisition, if not of conquest, actually began with the occupation of Jagdishpur (23°-22' N & 77°-27' E), a fortified village³⁰ about 18 miles towards south from Berasia. It proved in his later life a place of strategic importance, and consequently he made it the seat of his activities.

Jagdishpur was held by a Deori Rajput,³¹ who was a notorious robber³² in the surrounding area. Dost Muhammad Khan, shortly after received information from the Thakur of Raipur (modern Raipura village in Dillod pargana of Bhopal State), that the chief of Jagdishpur, together with his followers and relatives, had gone "on an expedition to rob a caravan",³³ leaving only few old persons in the village.

Dost Muhammad Khan availed of this opportunity and under the pretext of sport reached the bank of Tahal river, quite close to Jagdishpur, and pitched his tents there.

On hearing of Dost Muhammad Khan's arrival for hunting, the Rajputs supplied him with all necessary provisions. Then they also paid a visit³⁴ to him. He cordially received them all in

26. *Ibid.*

27. *TB*, p. 11.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 12; *TI*, p. 3; *BSG*, p. 10.

29. *TI*, p. 3.

30. *BSG*, p. 10; *Bpl.* in 1939-43, p. 69.

31. *TI*, p. 3; *BSG*, p. 10; *Bpl.* in 1939-42, p. 69.

32. *TI*, p. 3; *TB*, p. 13.

33. *TB*, p. 13; *TI*, p. 3.

34. *TI*, p. 3; *BSG*, p. 10; *TB*, p. 13 says they were invited by Dost Muhammad Khan on a feast.

the tent, and then soon after left them under the pretence of arranging for 'attar and Pan'.

According to pre-arranged plan, "his own followers had been posted close round the tent as if for parade and pomp, and had been instructed that, as soon as their leader (Dost Muhammad Khan. All the mortal remains were thrown into the Tahal river, the tent ropes, throw down the tent, and cut down the Rajputs".³⁵ The plan proved successful. Each and every individual was cut down and the town came under the possession of Dost Muhammad Khan. All the mortal—remains were thrown into the Tahal river, which henceforth came to be known as Halali³⁶ or the river of slaughter. Jagdishpur was given a Muslim name, Islamnagar.³⁷

Then the power of the Rajput chiefs of Sanchi (then known as Sansi) and Bhojpur was destroyed by Dost Muhammad Khan who sent the booty to the court of Faruqsiyar at Delhi. This pleased the Emperor so much that in a Firman (dated the 3rd Ziqada, A.H. 1130 or A.D. 1717) he honoured Dost Muhammad Khan with the title of "Sardar Diler Jung".³⁸

Thus, watching the growing power of this Afghan adventurer in Central India (Malwa), it may be concluded that he was laying the foundation of his future activities which was shifted to Bhopal, only during the closing days of his life.

Battle of Jamal-Bagri (Bhilsa): His status as a ruler of a vast territory was legitimatised:

His rising power could hardly escape the attention of the neighbouring rulers, but before it could be fully realised, he started conquering one place after another and thus established himself as an important figure in Malwa. Having acquired considerable territory, he became "ambitious to measure his strength with Muhammad Faruk, the ruler of Bhilsa":³⁹ the victory

35. *TI*, pp. 3-4; *Pilgrimage*, p. 144 gives A.D. 1716.

36. *Melcolm*, p. 154; *TI*, p. 4; *TB*, p. 14; *BSG*, p. 10; *Pilgrimage*, p. 144.

37. *BSG*, p. 10; *Melcolm*, p. 154; *TI*, p. 4. According to *TB*, p. 14, the Mughul Emperor Faruqsiyar in A.H. 1128 gave Islamnagar, through a Firman, to Dost Muhammad Khan who was also honoured with the title of "Khan".

38. *TB*, p. 15.

39. *TI*, p. 4.

over whom was to pave for a reputable status, and politically sound position among the chiefs of Malwa.

He assembled a huge force to attack Bhilsa, and mobilised it under the command of his brother, Sher Muhammad Khan.⁴⁰ The armies of Dost Muhammad and Muhammad Faruq met near the villages, Jamal and Bagri, close to Bhilsa.⁴¹ A fierce fight took place in which Sher Muhammad Khan was killed by a Mewati chief of Doraha.⁴² The Bhopal force turned and ran away. Dost Muhammad Khan was watching the battle from a close distance, under the shadow of a small hill. He suddenly fell upon Muhammad Faruq, who was watching the retreat of the Bhopal force, with delight.⁴³ The Bhilsa army was pursuing the retreating Bhopal force, and thus Faruq was left unprotected. So Dost Muhammad Khan, having overpowered Muhammad Faruq, killed him in the 'hauda'. The Pathan having killed Faruq, ordered the Bhilsa drummers to beat the drums of victory and proceeded towards Bhilsa. It was dusk, late in the evening. The garrison of the Fort of Bhilsa mistook Dost Muhammad Khan to be Faruq and opened the gates of the Fort, thinking the victorious Governor Muhammad Faruq was coming back. "Dost Muhammad Khan then threw down the corpse of Muhammad Faruq before the very eyes of the garrison, and made himself master of the Fort".⁴⁴

This victory over the Governor of Bhilsa was the turning point for Dost Muhammad Khan. His position became respectful and authority more secure. In a short time by A.D. 1719, he had taken possession of the following places.

- | | |
|------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. Gyraspur (Gyaspur). | 4. Icchawar. |
| 2. Doraha. | 5. Devipura. |
| 3. Sehore. | 6. Gulgaon. ⁴⁵ |

40. *Ibid.*, *BSG*, p. 10; *TUB*, p. 5. But *TB* on p. 14 mentions that it was Faruq who first attacked Barasia, in which Dost Muhammad's father, Nur Muhammad Khan was killed. But this is not supported by other accounts, though a plain tomb of Nur Muhammad still stands at Barasia, as a doubtful testimony of the attack on Berasia. To avenge the death of his father, as is asserted by *TB*, Dost Muhammad attacked Bhilsa. But most probably it was the property-case which was the main cause of his attack on Bhilsa;

41. *BSG*, p. 10; *TI*, p. 4; *TB*, p. 14.

42. *BSG*, p. 10; *TI*, p. 4, mentions the name as Raza Khan Mewati.

43. *TI*, p. 4; *BSG*, p. 10.

44. *TI*, p. 5.

45. List according to *TI*, p. 5 and *BSG*, p. 10.

- | | |
|-----------------------|----------------------------|
| 7. Mahalpur. | 12. Ahmedpur. |
| 8. Untkhera. | 13. Bagrod. |
| 9. Ambapani. | 14. Sat. ⁴⁶ |
| 10. Chorasi Chhanwah. | 15. Bhojpur. ⁴⁷ |
| 11. Khamkhera. | 16. Ashta. |

A Coalition against Rao Raja Budh Singh of Bundi :

Dost Muhammad Khan had joined Bhim Singh Hara of Kotah, in 1719 A.D. This Hara Chief was the friend of Sayad Hussain Ali of Bara (Rajasthan), who was the Nizam's great rival in the Mughal Court. Having been recommended by the Kotah Chief, Dost Muhammad Khan had received a high Mansab.⁴⁸

On the 17 November, 1719, Dost Muhammad Khan and Bhim Singh started against the Bundi Chief, Budh Singh, who was urging Chhatarsal Bundela to revolt against the authority of Sayad. Budh Singh was ultimately defeated and his territory, east of Chambal, was annexed by the Kotah Chief.⁴⁹

This coalition and expedition against Bundi secured prestige and position for Dost Muhammad Khan. He was "Legitimised by his recognition at the Imperial Court."⁵⁰

Defeat of Girdhar Bahadur (Subah of Malwa) : Surrender of Shujalpur :

Getting alarmed by the rising influence of Dost Muhammad Khan, Girdhar Bahadur, the Governor of Malwa, drew out his army from Ujjain to meet this Pathan. But with the assistance of his petty chiefs, Dost Muhammad Khan inflicted a crushing defeat upon Girdhar Bahadur.⁵¹ This defeat of the Governor of Malwa warned Bijey Ram, the Amil of Shujalpur so much that he made a voluntary surrender of Shujalpur to Dost Muhammad Khan, and accepted services under the Pathan.⁵²

This Bijey Ram in later times became Dost Muhammad Khan's minister to whom he dictated "the memoirs of his life and experi-

46. List according to TI, p. 5.
 47. TI, p. 5; TUB, p. 5; TB, pp. 14-15.
 48. BSG, p. 11; TB, p. 15.
 49. Ibid.
 50. Bpl. in 1939-42, p. 69; TB, p. 15.
 51. TI, p. 5; BSG, p. 11.
 52. Ibid.; TB, p. 17.

ence which throw many a welcome side-light on the general Indian History of that Period".⁵³

Assistance rendered to Dilawar Ali Khan against Nizam-ul-Mulk :

The mighty Mughal Empire was already on its wane. Some figure heads of Mughal dynasty were playing like puppets either in the hands of veteran politicians or shrewd diplomats. Such was the condition when Syed Brothers rose to prominence. Emperor Muhammad Shah was raised by them to the throne though these brothers were the *de facto* rulers.

Nizam-ul-Mulk, the Governor of Deccan, was the rival of these brothers in Delhi diplomacy. To supplement, therefore, the forces of Dilawar Ali Khan, who was a trusted partisan of the Syed Brothers, they issued a firman to Dost Muhammad Khan,⁵⁴ to render all possible help to him against the Nizam. In compliance, Dost Muhammad Khan sent help under his brother, Mir Ahmed Khan.⁵⁵ In the battle of Ratanpur (30 miles from Burhanpur), which was fought on 11th May, 1720,⁵⁶ Mir Ahmed Khan was killed.⁵⁷

Dost Muhammad Khan, however, never wanted to displease the Nizam. So, in 1723 while he was proceeding to Deccan to punish his rebellious son, Nasim Jung,⁵⁸ he had encamped on the way at Nizam-ki-tekri⁵⁹ (known afterwards after his name), near Islamnagar. He wanted to punish Dost Muhammad Khan, who had in 1720, helped Dilawar Ali Khan against him.⁶⁰ But the Pathan, very tactfully sent his son, Yar Muhammad Khan as a hostage to the Nizam.⁶¹

Thus he averted the impending danger on Bhopal.

53. Bpl. in 1937-38, p. 2.
 54. TB, p. 16.
 55. BSG, p. 12.
 56. TB, p. 16; Melcolm, p. 155; TI, p. 6; helped with 500 horses and 250 camel men.
 57. TI, p. 6; Melcolm, p. 155; BSG, pp. 11-12.
 58. BSG, p. 11; but TI, on p. 6, wrongly mentions that the Nizam went to Deccan in this reference, after the war between Nadir Shah and Muhammad Shah, which took place in 1739.
 59. BSG, p. 12, TI, p. 6.
 60. TI, p. 6; Melcolm, p. 155.
 61. BSG, p. 12; TB, p. 19.

Visit of Kurwai Chief Diler Khan at his Court at Berasia :

After assisting the Imperial Power in the battle of Ratanpur (1720), Dost Muhammad Khan's position grew so strong that many petty chiefs in Malwa felt necessity of keeping good relations with him. Hence the Chief of Kurwai, Diler Khan⁶² went to pay him a complimentary visit⁶³ at Berasia⁶⁴ in 1722 A.D.⁶⁵ In their conference they decided to help mutually in their projects of conquests. But a quarrel arose between them, in which Diler Khan was killed.⁶⁶ This year Dost Muhammad Khan assumed the title of Nawab, which enhanced his position to an independent status of a chief.⁶⁷

Ginnorgarh Annexed and Bhopal Ceded :

Regarding the annexation of Ginorgarh (38 miles from Bhopal, situated on 22°-49' N and 77°-36' E), and Bhopal, various controversial accounts are given in different sources. They differ from source to source. Hence it is hardly possible to come to definite conclusion. However, the following accounts are to be examined.

1. According to Sir John Melcolm : Dost Muhammad Khan established some sort of "connection with Nawal Shah, Raja of Gunnor,"⁶⁸ who was at war with Alum Shah, a chief of Chainpur Bari,⁶⁹ during those days. Nawal Shah defeated Alum Shah with the help rendered by Dost Muhammad Khan. This made Nawal Shah so pleased that he bestowed Bhopal to him.⁷⁰

2. But according to a manuscript written by a Muhamadan writer (name not mentioned in Melcolm's account), Dost Muhammad Khan was led by some men to make Bhopal (where he had gone for hunting), as his future residence.⁷¹ But this does not seem

62. BSG, p. 11; TI, p. 5, mentions the name, Dalel Khan who came to Berasia.

63. BSG, p. 11.

64. TI, p. 5.

65. BSG, p. 11.

66. TI, p. 5; BSG, p. 11; according to Kurwai Annals.

67. BSG, p. 11; Melcolm, on p. 156 mentions the assumption of the title of 'Nawab' after the death of Aurangzeb, seems to be too early.

68. Melcolm, p. 154.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

to have any historical value as such tales were not uncommon "in India regarding the origin of every town of celebrity."⁷²

3. Regarding the capture of Ginnor, Melcolm narrates a different story to make the subject more confusing. In a battle between the Raja of Ginnor and the Imperial army, Dost Muhammad Khan helped the Raja.⁷³ The Raja won the battle. It delighted him so much that he invited Dost Muhammad Khan along with his numerous females and others to Ginnor.⁷⁴ This was a chance for the "unprincipled Afghan."⁷⁵ In a hundred 'Palkis,' Dost Muhammad Khan admitted his armed men to the Fort and thus the place was surprised and taken.⁷⁶

This might have been the mode, adopted by Dost Muhammad Khan, to capture the fort.⁷⁷ But Melcolm does not seem to support this positively. He has based his account upon a Hindu narrator,⁷⁸ who does not mention the name of the Raja. Nor does Melcolm mention the name of the narrator. This Hindu narrator simply concludes that the Raja had no issue but two nephews, one of whom had endeavoured to poison the Raja,⁷⁹ who though not killed, was reduced to a state of debility.

4. Nawab Shah Jahan Begum gives a short account of the Ginnor episode. It reveals a different story, which runs thus : —

"Gunnur was a famous fortress of the Gonds, and Nizam Shah Gond, lord of Gunnur, had been poisoned by his relative, the chief of Chainpur-Bari. Rani Kamlapati, the widow of Nizam Shah, and her son Naval Shah were living in the fort of Gunner. The Rani hearing of the valour of Dost Muhammad Khan, invited him secretly to avenge the death of Nizam Shah on the chief of Bari. Dost Muhammad Khan collecting his forces and being vic-

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid., p. 155.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid., Melcolm writes: This, though an old stratagem in Indian History may have been the mode adopted of seizing the place".

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid., p. 155.

torious, added the territories of Bari to his dominions, and became a manager for Rani Kamlapati. When she died, he seized the fortress of Gunnur also, put to death those Gonds, who rebelled, bestowing grants according to their degree upon the rest earned their gratitude."⁸⁰

5. And according to Bhopal State Gazetteer, "Gunnurgarh was then held by a Gond Chief, Nizam Shah, who had been poisoned by the chief of Chainpur-Bari."⁸¹ The Rani Kamlapati, Nizam Shah's widow, then called Dost Muhammad Khan to assist her minor son, Nawal Shah.⁸² After the Rani's death, as it reveals, the Pathan seized Ginnorgrah.⁸³ Later on attracted by the situation of Bhopal the Pathan decided to erect his capital on that site.⁸⁴ But it does not reveal any fact about the annexation of Bhopal during the life time of the Rani.

Tarikh-i-Bhopal, on the other hand, mentions that Bhopal was restored to Dost Muhammad Khan as a reward of his help to defeat the Ruler of Chainpur-Bari. This account, however, is not mentioned in any secondary source.

Thus examining the accounts above alluded to, the following may be inferred: —

A. According to Melcolm's Report: —

- i. Dost Muhammad Khan came in contact with Nawal Shah of Ginnor or (Gondwana territory).
- ii. There is no mention that Alum Shah of Chainpur-Bari⁸⁵ was related to Nawal Shah.
- iii. Nawal Shah was helped by Dost Muhammad Khan against the Imperial army.
- iv. Melcolm's accounts are mostly based on a Hindu narrator, and thus led him to confusion.
- v. He also asserts (based upon the narrator) that the Raja of Ginnor had no son but two nephews.

80. *TI*, pp. 5-6. Almost the same account is given in *BSG*, p. 11; and *TB*, pp. 17-18.

81. *BSG*, p. 11.

82. *Ibid.*

83. *Ibid.*

84. *Ibid.*

85. *TB*, p. 13.

- vi. That one of them poisoned the Raja Nawal.
- vii. Nawal Shah's Ranies survived till the time of Nawab Faiz Muhammad Khan (1742-1777) of Bhopal.
- viii. As the records reveal, Melcolm seemed to depend upon the tale narrated by a Hindu (name not mentioned), he could not come to his own conclusion.

B. According to Shah Jahan Begum's Account: —

- i. Nizam Shah was the Gond Ruler of Ginnor.
- ii. Rani Kamlapati was his widow.
- iii. Nawal Shah was Nizam Shah's son.
- iv. Rani Kamlapati had invited Dost Muhammad Khan to avenge the death of her husband, Nizam Shah.
- v. At the time of Nizam Shah's death his son Nawal Shah was a minor.
- vi. Dost Muhammad Khan ceded Bari, one of the two towns of Alum Shah (relative or nephew is not clear).
- vii. Dost Muhammad Khan served the Rani as manager of Ginnor.
- viii. Ginnor was seized by Dost Muhammad Khan, after the death of Rani Kamlapati.

C. According to Bhopal State Gazetteer: —

- i. Nizam Shah was the Ruler of Ginnor.
- ii. He being poisoned, the widow Rani Kamlapati invited Dost Muhammad Khan for her help.
- iii. After the Rani's death Dost Muhammad Khan annexed the Ginnor territory, in which Bhopal, was an ordinary village.

Hence the following may be established: —

(a) Nizam Shah was the Ruler of Ginnor (or the Gondwana territory). Kamlapati and Nawal Shah were his wife and son respectively.

(b) Alum Shah, one of the relatives of Nizam Shah, succeeded in an attempt to kill Nizam Shah by poisoning him.

(c) To manage the affairs of the state and to avenge the death of her husband, Kamlapati invited Dost Muhammad Khan.

(d) Nawal Shah was a minor at the time of his father's death.

(e) The 'unprincipled Afghan' being opportunist accepted the invitation of the Rani, defeated the enemy (Alum Shah), and annexed the territory of (Chainpur) Bari.

(f) Dost Muhammad Khan during the life time of the Rani, virtually ruled Ginnor, as manager.

(g) The site of Bhopal (then an ordinary village in the Gondwana territory), attracted him, who laid the foundation of a fort there,⁸⁶ during the life time of the Rani.

(h) After the Rani's death the entire territory of Ginnor and Bhopal was annexed by Dost Muhammad Khan in his Kingdom.

During his long period of thirty years⁸⁷ active life, he thus added "the whole of Eatsern Malwa, Khandesh and parts of Bundelkhund and Gondwana including Hoshangabad and neighbouring territories",⁸⁸ and Raisen in the east of Shamsabad in the north, to his territory.

His Brothers and Children :

No record is available in which the serial order of his brothers and children given. There were six brothers in all. Dost Muhammad Khan was neither the youngest nor the eldest; most probably he was the third⁸⁹ or the fourth⁹⁰ son of his father. The death account of his brothers is given below :—

1. Alif Muammad Khan was killed in fighting against Baji Rao Peishwa.
2. Sher Muhammad Khan was killed in the battle of Jamal Bagri (Bhilsa).
3. Shah Muhammad Khan was killed in fighting against Dewa-Bhau, a Commander of Dhar.
4. Aqil Muhammad Khan was Diwan of Bhopal, who was killed in a riot at the Holi festival during the reign of Yar Muhammad Khan.

86. BSG, p. 11. (The fort of Fatehgarh and the boundary wall were built in 1722 A.D.)

87. Bpl. in 1939-42, p. 70; *TI*, p. 6.

88. *Ibid.*

89. BSG. See Genealogical Table.

90. *TI*. See Genealogical Table.

5. Mir Ahmed Khan was killed in fighting by the side of Dilawar Ali Khan. Dost Muhammad Khan had six sons⁹¹ and five daughters⁹² (names not mentioned). The names of his sons are as under:—

1. Yar Muhammad Khan.
2. Sultan Muhammad Khan.
3. Sadar Muhammad Khan.
4. Fazil Muhammad Khan.
5. Wasil Muhammad Khan.
6. Khan Bahadur Khan.

His Death and Estimate :

It is difficult to fix the date of Dost Muhammad Khan's death. A stone in the well of Ashta records his death before A. H. 1140 (corresponding to 1727 A.D.).⁹³ But this date does not lead to any specific time. Melcolm gives the date of his death as 1723 A.D. which seems to be too early.⁹⁴

Bhopal State Gazetteer, however, mentions that Dost Muhammad Khan, after thirty years of strenuous exertions, "died in A.H. 1139 (1726) at the age of 66, leaving a well established state behind him."⁹⁵ This date agrees with other events of his life, recorded, while the other dates do not.

Dost Muhammad Khan was a man of practical wisdom and natural courage. From the beginning to the end, his life was full of daring acts, and persons of his kind were the necessity of the day.

Various Hindu writers have rightly "imputed cruelty and perfidy"⁹⁶ to his diplomatic feats (particularly the Jadishpur episode), though this is not supported by his Muslim biographers.⁹⁷

91. BSG, p. 2; *TI*, p. 7.

92. *TI*, p. 7; BSG, p. 12.

93. BSG, p. 12 (see foot note).

94. *Ibid.*; Cyclopaedia on page 350 gives his date of death as 1725 A.D. seems to be too early.

95. BSG, p. 12. State Records also mentions this date.

96. Melcolm, p. 156.

97. *Ibid.*

Dost Muhammad Khan was ambitious. His "ambition is allowed by all, and every account agrees as to the combined art and violence, which he used"⁹⁸ in subjugating Chainpur Bari, Parason, Ginnor, Bhilsa and various others. He treated the Nizam skilfully who "wanted to dispossess"⁹⁹ him of his possession. He was fully aware of the fact that he was not in a position to burn his boat against the Nizam.¹⁰⁰ Hence without any hesitation he submitted his son, Yar Muhammad Khan, as a hostage to the Nizam.

Thus he won the favour of the Nizam. After his death, the Nizam proved a paternal ally to his son, Yar Muhammad Khan, in helping him to ascend the masnad of Bhopal.

Dost Muhammad Khan, without any doubt, was a man of talent and courage though like other founders, he never hesitated to act treacherously. In various actions he had received more than thirty wounds,¹⁰¹ and "his memory as a soldier is to this day fondly cherished by the family of which he is the founder".¹⁰²

India, America and Cornwallis

BY

DR. B. G. GOKHALE

I

The two most outstanding events of American history are the American revolution and the Civil War. Of these the Civil War undoubtedly influenced the development of the cotton trade of India and thus produced an economic impact of far-reaching consequences.¹ The impact of the American Revolution has been considered to be of a more indirect nature though this view would merit a closer examination. It is the aim of the present paper to undertake this examination so as to direct attention to areas of India's political and economic history where the impact was directly felt. The closing decades of the 18th century were of momentous significance in the history of Europe, India and America. In America they saw the emergence of a sovereign United States. In India the result was quite the reverse, for it is in this period that the foundations of the British Empire were laid. The loss of the British Empire in the American Colonies was thus made up by the acquisition of a new empire in India and these events were inter-connected by processes of the history of British Imperialism.

II

The impact of the developing British-Indian Empire was felt in the Colonies in several interesting ways. The trade monopoly enjoyed by the East India Company created reactions of hostility from the mercantilist elements in the Colonies.² By 1773 the

1. See Gadgil, D.R., *Industrial Evolution of India*, Bombay, 1950, Chapters on cotton cultivation and the textile industry.

2. Schlesinger, Aathur Meirer, *The Colonial Merchant's and the American Revolution*, Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, edited by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University, Vol. LXXXVIII, New York, 1918, p. 264.

financial affairs of the Company were in a very unsatisfactory condition which threatened the annual payment of £400,000 to the British Government. The way out of this predicament was sought by making the American Colonies a kind of captive market into which the unsold tea and Indian goods held by the Company's warehouses in London could be profitably unloaded.³ The Company had spent enormous sums in the course of its military adventures in India and "to save it from bankruptcy, Parliament loaned it £1,400,000. Along with the Tea Act went an India Regulating Act, which submitted the affairs of the company to a greater degree of supervision on the part of the Crown. The Company hoped that the sale of its tea in America under favourable terms to consumers might help to right its affairs."⁴

What happened by way of resistance to these moves is too well known to need repetition here. The actions of the Company in India were also conveniently used to stir up trouble in America by some pamphlet-writers of the time. John Dickinson, writing under the name of "Rusticus" stated: "Their conduct in Asia, for some years past, has given ample proofs, how little they regard the laws of Nations, the Rights, Liberties, or Lives of Men. They have levied War, excited Rebellions, dethroned Princes, and sacrificed Millions for the Sake of Gain. The Revenues of Mighty Kingdoms have centered in their Coffers. And these not being sufficient to glut their Avarice, they have, by the most unparalleled Barbarities, Extortions and Monopolies, stripped the miserable Inhabitants of their Property, and reduced whole Provinces to Indigence and Ruin. Fifteen hundred thousand, it is said, perished by Famine in one Year, not because the Earth denied its Fruits, but this Company and its Servants engrossed all the Necessaries of Life, and set them at so high a rate, that the Poor could not purchase them. Thus having drained the Sources of that immense Wealth . . . they now, it seems, cast their Eyes on America, as a new Theater, whereon to exercise their Talents of Rapine, Oppression and Cruelty. The Monopoly of Tea, is, I dare say, but a small part of the Plan they have formed to strip us of our

3. Miller, John C., *Origins of the American Revolution*, Stanford University Press, 1959, p. 337.

4. Gipson, Lawrence Henry, *The Coming of the Revolution, 1763-1775*, New York, 1954, pp. 217-128.

Property. But thank God, we are not Sea Poys (sic), nor Marrattas (sic), but *British Subjects*, who are born to Liberty, who know its Worth, and who prize it high".⁵ And finally the success of the American Revolution gave the Americans new opportunities of expanding their own trade with China and India.⁶

At the other end the impact of the American Revolution on Indian affairs was no less interesting. The extension of the Revolutionary War to the East disturbed the normally smooth relations among the Europeans in India.⁷ As Holden Furber points out "Old relationships were broken as commercial ties snapped, but there were compensations for all, whether belligerents or neutrals. For the British the war provided new ways of making money at the expense of their own East India Company. For the French and Dutch, the war lessened political power and prestige, but still left opportunities for profit in co-operation with the British. For the neutral Danes, "Ostenders" and Portuguese, war always meant increased business from the carrying of cargo goods on British, French or Dutch account."⁸ On the outbreak of the Revolutionary War the Company's Bombay administration had to borrow heavily from its own servants to meet expenses of the military operations (wars against the Marathas and Mysore) and in return open to these officers ways of making profits through the "country" trade.⁹ But one of the most vital impacts of the Revolutionary War was seen in the real stimulus given to the European ship-building industry in Bengal and elsewhere.¹⁰

III

Perhaps it is in the career of Charles Cornwallis that an exploration into the inter-relationships between certain aspects of events in America and India becomes both interesting and significant. The career of Cornwallis spanned three continents during a period when empires were disintegrating and new dominions

5. Schlesinger, Op. Cit., p. 275; also Miller, Op. Cit., p. 342.

6. Greene, Everts Boutell, *The Revolutionary Generation, 1763-1775*, New York, 1954, pp. 217-218.

7. Furber, Holden, *John Company at Work*, Harvard University Press, 1948, pp. 19-20.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., p. 21.

10. Ibid., p. 183.

arising out of the decay of old civilisations. But Cornwallis has not been very fortunate in attracting much attention from historians and biographers in the matter of detailed biographies and studies of the activities. Perhaps there is something of an explanation for this in the nature of his personality. It had nothing of the flamboyance of a Clive or Wellesley. He had neither the vision of a social reformer like Bentinck nor the dash of a Dalhousie. Even as an imperialist he does not show as much colour as a Dufferin or a Curzon. Nor does his career have around it the air of scandle and tragedy as that of Warren Hastings. A recent judgement on him describes him as "essentially a soldier, a man of physical courage and a competent general with a high sense of honour and duty but of quite ordinary abilities."¹¹ Born on December 31, 1738, Cornwallis belonged to a family of Irish origin living then in London. He was educated at Eton and was commissioned as an Ensign in the First Guards in 1756. At the age of 36 he was promoted to the rank of a Major-general and was sent to America in 1776 on the outbreak of the Colonial Rebellion. In 1777 he won the battle of Brandywine and occupied Philadelphia. He was then promoted to be Lieutenant-General and appointed second-in-command of the British forces. In 1778 he sailed to England to be near his ailing wife and returned to America shortly after her death. On his return he won the battle of Camden and took Charleston. But then came disaster and the Colonial Revolt became the triumphant American Revolution with his surrender at Yorktown on the 14th of October, 1781.

On his return to England after a spell as a prisoner of war in America, attempts were made to persuade him to accept the Governor-Generalship of the East India Company's territories in India. This he accepted after some initial hesitation and worked in India during 1786 and 1793 working out important administrative reforms and winning the Third Mysore War in 1790. After his return to England he served in Ireland from 1798 to 1801. Four years later he was appointed to a second term in India but died soon after his arrival on the 5th of October, 1805, and was buried at Ghazipore near Banaras.¹²

11. Mersey Viscount, *The Viceroy's and Governors-General of India, 1757-1947*, London, 1949, p. 26.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 21-25.

Cornwallis thus had served in military and civil capacities over quarter of a century in America, Europe, and India. He was intelligent but not brilliant, a devoted soldier but not much of a diplomat. He had the aristocratic ideas of his time and represented all the stolid virtues of the English squirearchy of his days. His personal involvement with events in the American Revolution certainly must have strengthened in him aristocratic convictions and he shared the aristocratic English reactions to the French Revolution, its ideas and consequences of those ideas. It cannot be denied that there was a vital difference between conditions in America and India and this difference must have been plain to Cornwallis. On the other hand there was a good deal of similarity between social elements in the two areas, elements which loyally supported the English in America and those likely to play a similar role in India. Let us now examine these elements in the two areas and attempt to find out whether the American experience had any impact at all on some of the important administrative measures taken by Cornwallis in India.

IV

From the planting of the Colonies in the opening decades of the 17th century to the outbreak of the Revolution in the closing decades of the 18th century, life in America had undergone many changes. There had grown prosperous mercantile and land-owning communities whose interests either harmonized with the larger interests of the Empire or were in acute conflict with the demands of imperial economy and policy. There were also the bureaucratic and clerical elements in the Colonies such as to make conflict with the Empire almost inevitable. The Colonies, in social and cultural terms, were after all projections of England shaped by the peculiar conditions obtaining in the New World. English ideas and institutions had struck deep roots in the emergent American mind whereas destruction, partial or complete, of old ideas and institutions in India was essential before Western ideas could take root. This process naturally took a long time and that explains the time-differential between the rise of nationalism in the American Colonies and the appearance of the same phenomenon in India. On the eve of the outbreak of the Revolution there was a small but determinedly revolutionary minority which expressed ideas and raised slogans breathing defiance of English authority. On the other side there were

numerous and scattered elements who were loyal to the Mother Country. It is this group of "Loyalists" that is of immediate interest to us here. An examination of the social contours of the Loyalist group reveals the bases of its economic interests. Jameson states that "as a matter of course, almost all persons who enjoyed office under the Crown became Tories, and those were a large number."¹³ Similarly among the merchants many whose economic interests were threatened by the rebellion supported the royal cause.¹⁴ Among the farmers the richest tended to be Loyalists though to this there were quite a few illustrious exceptions like George Washington and others. We must not forget, too, the British credit crisis of 1772 and its impact on the Colonies. Many of the planters were heavily in debt. As Sheridan points out: "Dependence upon British credit was widespread and debt pervasive that the great planter had a common bond with his fellow countryman on the lower rungs of the social ladder." In New York the bulk of the property owners belonged to the Tory Party and likewise Tories were active in the Carolinas.¹⁵ When Howe left Boston some 1100 persons, who formed the aristocracy of the province, left with him and this group formed one tenth of the people (including soldiers and sailors) who were evacuated.¹⁶ Generally speaking among the exiled loyalists a majority were landowners, substantial men of business and a great number of public servants.¹⁷ The Loyalist strength, thus, lay among the mercantile and propertied groups as well as professional men who were strong in the middle and southern colonies.¹⁸ These represented not only the aristocracy of wealth but

13. Jameson, J. Franklin, *The American Revolution Considered as a Social Revolution*, Princeton, University Press, 1940, p. 13; There has been a tendency to question some of the assumptions and conclusions of Jameson but such criticism does not affect the ideas quoted in this paper. See Tolles, Fredrick B., "The American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement: A Re-Evaluation", *The American Historical Review*, Vol. LX, No. 1, October, 1954, pp. 1-12.

14. Jameson, *Op. Cit.*, p. 13.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 13, 16, 17; also see Richard B. Sheridan, "The British Credit Unions of 1772 and the American Colonies" in *The Journal of Economic History*, XX, No. 2, June, 1960, p. 183.

16. Trevelyan, George Macaulay, *The American Revolution*, London, 1905, Vol. I, pp. 373-374.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 374.

18. Trevelyan, George Macaulay, *History of England*, London, 1928, p. 553.

also of culture, satisfied with the existing order of things and afraid of the threats posed by the Revolution to their social status, wealth and privilege.¹⁹ Their natural conservatism based on prosperity tended to strengthen loyalist sentiments whereas the radicals appeared to the then English observer as "of a disposition haughty and insolent, impatient of rule, disdaining subjection, and by all means affecting independence" in sharp contrast to the "remarkable plaint and submissive disposition of the inhabitants of Bengal."²⁰ The strength of the Revolutionaries lay among the plain people, the sturdy peasant proprietors, the aspiring small merchants, artisans, craftsmen and frontiersmen who scoffed at the pretensions of aristocracy and chafed against the restraints imposed by English economic and political control.²¹ And while New England had an urbanized aristocracy and few large estates "throughout the rest of the country the English system of large properties was extensively followed" and gave considerable strength to the Loyalist cause.²² The records of the confiscations of Loyalist properties in North Carolina and other areas shed a good deal of light on the interrelationships between loyalism as a political phenomenon and landed properties of a substantial and hereditary kind as its economic basis.²³ As Jameson points out "The feudal ages had discovered that, if men desired to give stability to society by keeping property in the hands of the same families generation after generation, the best way to do this was to entail the lands strictly...."²⁴ This pattern had already made substantial inroads into the agrarian economy of the Colonies and it expressed itself in some ways in loyalism.

The American evidence thus shows that England had been able to secure considerable support from loyalist elements that clung tenaciously to the privileges which they had secured under

19. Van Tyne, Claude Halstead, *The Loyalists in the American Revolution*, New York, 1929, p. 5.

20. *Ibid.*, also see Miller, *Op. Cit.*, p. 3.

21. Jameson, *Op. Cit.*, p. 18.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

23. See DeMond, Robert O., *The Loyalists in North Carolina During the Revolution*, Duke University Press, Durham, N.C., 1940, pp. 240-250; also Harrell, Issac Samuel, *Loyalism in Virginia*, Chapters in the Economic History of the Revolution, Duke University Press, Durham, N.C., pp. 113-132.

24. Jameson, *Op. Cit.* p. 36.

the aegis of the Empire. Among these the most important were the big merchants and the equally big land-owners. This had obvious implications for the situation in India.

V

Though the English beginnings in India go back to the opening decade of the 17th century, almost the same period as the planting of the Colonies in the New World, it was not until the middle of the 18th century that the East India Company emerged as a major factor in the politics of continental India. The English Factory at Surat was established in 1608 and the Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe (1615-1618), though not very spectacular in its results, was able to emphasize the political position of the English at the court of Jahangir (1605-1627). The earliest Bengal factory was set up at Hariharpur on May 14, 1633²⁵ and Madras was settled by 1640. The Hooghly factory began functioning in 1651 and between 1658 and 1680 at Kasimbazar, Dacca and other places. In 1668 Bombay was occupied and by 1690 Calcutta had become one of the major settlements. By 1680, the East India Company had an annual investment of £150,000 in Bengal alone.²⁶ Between 1717 and 1729 the Company's investment in Bengal rose from £ 278,593 to £ 363,927.²⁷ All this investment of capital and mercantile activity constituted a great economic revolution in Bengal and other areas of the country. Rafail Danibegov, a Georgian traveler to India in the closing decades of the 18th century, describes Bombay as "particularly famous for its merchants who are extraordinarily rich", and he observed somewhat similar conditions in Calcutta also.²⁸ There was thus the growth of a mercantile aristocracy²⁹ comprising fabulously rich bankers who maintained branches in many parts of the country.³⁰ As pointed out by K. M. Panikkar, under the impact of European trade, there had developed a powerful Indian capitalist class whose

25. Bruton, William, "News from the East Indies or a Voyage to Bengalla", published in Hakluyt's *Collection of Early Voyages, Travels and Discoveries*, London, 1812, Vol. V, p. 55.

26. See Bhattacharya, Sukumar, *The East India Company and the Economy of Bengal. From 1904 to 1740*, London 1954, p. 164.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 33; see Richard B. Sheridan, *Op. Cit.*, p. 164.

28. Kemp, P. M., *Russian Travellers to India*, Delhi, 1959, pp. 103, 109.

29. Bhattacharya, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 134-135.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 223.

interests were closely intertwined with those of the European merchants. K. M. Panikkar's perspicacious observations on this phenomenon are worth quoting at some length here. He says:

"During the eighteenth century, as a result of the growth of Bengal trade, the commercial community of North India had flocked to Murshidabad and Calcutta. The Marwari millionaires of Bengal had become the equivalent of the compradore classes of Shanghai of a later period. While the nawabs and generals were able to squeeze them occasionally, there was no doubt that effective power in the form of control of the economic life of the province had passed from the decrepit Mogul nobles to the *bania* capitalists who fawned on them in their *durbars* but held their purse strings tightly.

"The emergence of this powerful class, whose economic interests were bound up with those of the foreign merchants and who had an inherited hatred of Muslim rule, was a factor of fundamental importance to the history of India and Asia".³¹

The Virji Vohras of Western India, the Anandaranga Pillais (*Dubash* of Dupleix), Pachiappa Mudaliars of South India and the Jagat Seths of Northern India were representatives of this new class who not only profited from the commercial revolution brought about by a change in India's trade but also were willing to throw their weight behind such political revolutions as were likely to sustain their prosperity. Plassey is an eloquent instance of this change. The battle of Plassey (June 23, 1757) is traditionally described in the chronicles of Anglo-India as a glorious clash of arms enlivened by the swashbuckling heroism of Robert Clive. But it was really a "transaction, not a battle, a transaction by which the compradores of Bengal, led by Jagat Seth, sold the nawab to the East India Company. The nawab's generals, already in league with the Hindu merchant princes and their British allies, did not fight and the treacherous general, Mir Jafar, received, as the price of his betrayal, The Nawabi of Bengal".³² A few years later in 1764 the Company defeated the armies of the Mughal emperor and his allies and secured the *diwani* of Bengal, Bihar

31. Panikkar, K. M., *Asia and Western Dominance*, London, 1959, pp. 77-78.

32. *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79.

and Orissa. The Company had arrived on the political stage of India.

The interests of the mercantile classes of Bengal and other parts of India could not continue to be in harmony with the interests of the growing British empire forever. There was to come a time when these twin interests would clash and the classes that helped the British consolidate their economic and political hold over India in the initial stages would be ranged in open hostility against the Empire they first helped come into being. This was demonstrated later when the class of Indian merchants and industrialists threw their support behind the growing force of Indian nationalism in the opening decades of the 20th century. The Marwari, Gujarati and South Indian businessmen ardently supported the nationalists when they called for movements like *swadeshi* (Buy Indian) and "Boycott of British goods" and contributed financially in a generous measure to the activities of the Indian National Congress. In another study the present author has shown how Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the organizational leader of the Congress, was able to exercise such control over the Congress and make of it a fighting machine with the help of the rich financiers of Gujarat, Rajasthan and elsewhere.³³

British rule, therefore, could not rely at all times and completely on the allegiance of this class of merchants and industrialists. Such an unvarying support could come only from those groups that came into being under the aegis of British rule and depended for their continued prosperity on the continuation of that rule. On the assumption of the Diwani the immediate problem confronting the Company's administration in Bengal was that of revenue collection. After the first few years spent in the delectable pastime of "Shaking the Pagoda Tree" the administration had to set its own official house in order and get seriously down to the business of evolving a viable and efficient system of revenue collection. We need not go into the details of these efforts marked by annual, quinquennial and decennial assessment tried out by

33. See Gokhale, B. G., "Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel", *Leadership and Political Institutions in India*, Edited by Richard L. Park and Iren Tinker, Princeton University Press, 1959, pp. 87-99.

the administration. Under Warren Hastings the first serious efforts were made to gather information on patterns of land-holding and systems of collection of assessment in the past. This work was done with commendable thoroughness by Sir John Shore and others. During the time of Warren Hastings it was his rival Phillip Francis who had made the suggestion of a Permanent Settlement for the first time. In the old Mughal days the principal agency of land-revenue collection was the Zamindar who was put in charge of a specific area for the purpose of land-revenue collection and general administration. This Zamindar was an administrative official and often the office passed on in a hereditary succession. To Philip Francis the Zamindar appeared "peculiarly like an English country squire", an opinion entirely at variance with the facts of the situation as revealed by the evidence collected by Sir John Shore.³⁴ The English land-lord system rose from the concept of private property in land which in itself was a survival of the past feudal tradition.³⁵

There were three distinct ways in which the Company could attempt to work out a system of revenue collection. One was to entrust the task to its own civil servants. The second was to come to some settlement with the individual peasant-proprietor and the third was to use the old Zamindari system. The first was impracticable since the Company did not have the requisite number of trained civil servants for the purpose. The second had obvious disadvantages since it involved dealing with hundreds of thousands of farmers, a task cumbersome in itself and one which required intimate knowledge of local customs and usages which the Company naturally did not have at that time. The third alternative offered the maximum advantages. Instead of dealing with a numerous peasantry the Company could ask a few thousand Zamindars to collect revenue from the individual peasant-proprietors, allow them to keep a stated part for their maintenance and expenses of collection and submit the rest to the

34. Weitzman, Sophia, *Warren Hastings and Philip Francis*, Publications of the University of Manchester, Historical Series, No. LVI, Manchester, 1929, pp. 76, ff.

35. Desai, A. R., *Social Background of Indian Nationalism*, Bombay, 1959, p. 35.

treasury.³⁶ The administrative convenience of the Zamindari system was accepted by all concerned; the dispute concerned decennial and permanent systems of settlement. Sir John Shore had urged the decennial settlement. His reasons were that "even after all the investigation that had been entered into, many questions had been decided on imperfect grounds, that in some cases injustice might have been done, by ignoring rights which had not been fully explained and that in others the Government might have suffered through concealment or fraud. For these and many other reasons he urged the advantage of leaving everything open to revision, after ten years' experience should have thrown fresh light on many obscure questions".³⁷ This debate on decennial versus permanent settlement went on for some years and when Cornwallis came on the scene he was deeply involved in it. The Directors had urged him to settle the issue of settlement as soon as possible. His own experience of loyalism in America and his personal ideas of the superiority of the system of squirearchy are cited as weighty factors which made him finally decide on the Permanent Settlement which he announced on March 22, 1793. Thus Kaye states that the Cornwallis settlement was "the aristocratic plan of an aristocratic statesman".³⁸ Mill stated "Full of the aristocratical ideas of modern Europe, the aristocratical person now at the head of the Government avowed his intention of establishing an aristocracy upon the European model".³⁹ Sir Richard Temple noted that the Cornwallis settlement was "a measure which was effected to naturalize the landed institutions of England among the natives of Bengal".⁴⁰ The most recent view is of Mishra who observes that Cornwallis seemed to have in view the formation of a new class of Zamindars, comprising the Company's regular farmers, its bunyans or agents and also the inferior Zamindars and talukdars who, from the identity of their economic

36. Forrest, G. W. (Ed.), *Selections from the State Papers of the Governors-General of India*, II, Warren Hastings, London, 1901, pp. 265-269.

37. Ross, Charles, (Ed.), *Correspondence of Charles Cornwallis, First Marquess*, London, 1859, Vol. II, p. 195.

38. Kaye, John William, *The Administration of the East India Company*, London, 1853, p. 181.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 181, Note.

40. Temple, Sir Richard, *Men and Events of My Time in India*, London, p. 30.

interests, formed a social group which differed in habits and character from zamindars descending from ancient families. Though yet predominantly feudal, a considerable part of this class operated under the influence of the Company's commercial capital, and invested their savings in the purchase of landed property. The gradual rise of this new social element perhaps caught the imagination of Cornwallis who observed in a letter of March 6, 1793, 'that the large capitals possessed by many of the natives, which they will have no means of employing when the public debt is discharged, will be applied to the purchase of landed property as soon as the tenure is declared secure.' Perhaps he also foresaw the consequences of the rising free trade movement in Britain, since he suggested that, in case Indian industries became completely engulfed by British capital, the security of tenure would convert land into a regular source of investment for Indian capital, leave the field open for the operation of British free trade in India, and avoid the possibility of antagonism arising from important avenues of investments being closed to the inhabitants of the country".⁴¹

What the Cornwallis Settlement then did was to bring into existence a new class of landed proprietors. Overnight the mere tax-gatherer became owner of the land and the farmer was turned into his tenant. It is not possible to argue that Cornwallis was unaware of the change in land-relationships he was introducing for he had at his disposal the evidence collected by Shore and others. He was not simply interested in questions like who owned the land farmed and if there were injustices involved in making the Zamindar the owner of the soil these were more than compensated for by the loyalties of the class the system was creating. The following extract from his correspondence makes clear the aim in view:

"In case of a foreign invasion it is a matter of the last importance, considering the means by which we keep possession of this country, that the proprietors of the lands should be attached to us from motives of self-interest. A landlord who is secured in the quiet enjoyment of a profitable estate

41. Mishra, B. B., *The Central Administration of the East India Company, 1773-1834*, Manchester, 1959, pp. 190-191.

can have no motive for wishing for a change. On the contrary, if the rents of his land are raised in proportion to their improvement—if he is liable to be dispossessed, should he refuse to pay the increase required of him—or if, be threatened with imprisonment or confiscation of his property on account of the balance due to Government upon an assessment which his lands were unequal to pay, he will readily listen to any offers which are likely to bring about a change that cannot place him in a worse situation, but which hold out to him hopes of a better".⁴²

Sir John Malcolm, Private Secretary to Lord Wellesley, writing to Mr. Barlow further confirms this motivation when he says: "We can only hope that a sense of gratitude will be the primary feeling in the breasts of those who benefit by this admissible system and that they will repay the State for the care it takes of their interests by a firm and lasting attachment".⁴³ Some attempts have been made to question the assumption that Cornwallis' aristocratic ideas were behind the introduction of the Permanent Settlement but the evidence before us does not warrant such doubts.⁴⁴

The Permanent Settlement thus created the "first breach under the British conquest of India in her old land system based on village right over land".⁴⁵ It led to the rise of a new class of wealthy loyalists who benefited from the British connection. To this class was added another, that of the administrator who manipulated the law for his own advantage. This class eventually developed into a new landed class.⁴⁶ It is noteworthy that these new classes, with a few exceptions, generally supported British rule in India and loyally supported the Raj against commotions within and wars without. It was the conservative class to whom the British looked for continued support and to whose interests they paid special attention by giving it weightage in representa-

42. Ross, *Op. Cit.*, II, p. 473.

43. Kaye, *Op. Cit.*, p. 185.

44. Weitzman, *Op. Cit.*, p. 197.

45. Desai, *Op. Cit.*, p. 35.

46. See Cohn, B. S., "The Initial British Impact on India; A Case Study of the Banaras Region", *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. XIX, No. 4, August 1960, pp. 429-431.

tion in the reforms of 1909 and 1919.⁴⁷ As Desai states "for political-strategic reasons, the young British Raj in India needed a social support in the country to maintain itself. It was expected that the new class of landlords, which owed its existence to the British rule, would naturally support it".⁴⁸ And this is confirmed by no less a person than Lord William Bentinck (Governor-General of India 1828-35) in the following words:

"If security was wanting against extensive popular tumult or revolution, I should say that the Permanent Settlement, though a failure in many other respects and in its most important essentials, has this great advantage at least of having created a vast body of rich landed proprietors deeply interested in the continuation of the British Dominion and having complete command over the mass of people".⁴⁹

A question may now be asked as to why, if the political advantages of the Zamindari system were so significant, it was not extended to other parts of India where other systems like the Ryotwari and the Malguzari were preferred. The explanation for this must be sought in two causes. First, the Zamindari system was not so well-entrenched in the western and southern parts of the country under pre-British rule as in Bengal and Northern India. Secondly the peculiar disadvantages of the system were great. The Permanent Settlement benefited the landlords who were often absentee landlords not interested in the improvement of agriculture as it was thought they would. While they grew rich the Government's share of their increased riches did not proportionately rise. And by the time Western India had been annexed the superiority of British arms was unquestionably firmly established. As the cost of Government increased the Government had to find new avenues of increasing revenue which the Permanent Settlement could not allow if extended to all parts of India.

But where it was introduced the Settlement produced its own results beneficial to British rule. It created a "Class of rural

47. *Op. Cit.*, pp. 167-169.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

49. See, Keith, A. B., *A Constitutional History of India*, London, 1936, p. 215.

capitalists, interspersed by several layers of absentee land-holders, whose care was confined to the rent they received from their under-farmers. This class constituted a new feature in the social history of the country. It possessed neither the nobility of the old aristocracy nor the progressive outlook of the nascent capitalism which grew in Europe from the centres of Industrial production, broke the bonds of feudal relations, and established liberalism as the guiding principle of life. It was indeed a class of commercialized feudalism, possessing neither an independent status in commerce nor a natural interest in land".⁵⁰

Our analysis of the American experience in the closing decades of the 18th century and British actions during that period in India has revealed a similarity of certain aspects of group interests aligning themselves on the British side. While there is no decisive and clear evidence to say that it was the American experience that led Cornwallis to finally decide in favour of the Permanent Settlement in Bengal in 1793, the possibility of the American experience influencing certain aspects of British decisions in India cannot be altogether ruled out. Seen in this light certain events in American and Indian history do assume a significance.

Was Rana Pratap to Blame for not Joining Akbar ?

BY

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Dr R. P. Tripathi writes in his scholarly work, "The Rise and Fall of the Mughal Empire," that in the contest between the Mughal empire headed by Akbar and Mewar under Rana Pratap the latter unnecessarily prolonged the struggle and committed the mistake of keeping himself aloof from the Indian Confederation. The Rana must, therefore, be held responsible for preventing the consummation of the political unity of India. "Rana Pratap's heroism, sturdy independence, love of freedom, readiness to suffer and sacrifice have inspired," writes the learned historian, "a large number of modern writers to read in his struggle facts not quite justified by sober history.....However one may admire the courage, determination and indomitable will of Rana Pratap, it will have to be admitted that he stood for a principle quite different to that which inspired his contemporary princes of Rajputana. While he fought for the independence of Mewar and the supremacy of the Sisodias, the other princes could not feel enthusiastic about it, for, their past experiences of the policy of the great rulers of Mewar were not very happy."¹ He continues: "The reasonable and generous terms offered by Akbar, viz., freedom from interference with social, religious and internal administration knocked the bottom out of the case against joining the Mughal Confederation.....It was not possible to make much of the bogey of matrimonial relationship enforced by the Mughal Emperor, for there is very little evidence outside the propagandistic compositions of the bards of Mewar to show that matrimonial alliance was a general policy of the Mughal empire to be enforced ruthlessly on all the Rajput princes. Indeed there was hardly any novelty in such relationship.....There is no positive evidence to

50. Noshra, *Op Cit.*, p. 196.

1. Rise and Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. I, pp. 222-223.

show that Akbar was bent upon enforcing it or there was *any great social upsurge or upheaval* against such an alliance amongst the Rajputs."²

Referring to the long indecisive contest between Akbar and Pratap Dr Tripathi writes: "Looking at the whole affair in cold historical perspective, it is a matter of regret that the refusal of Maharana Pratap Singh to recognise the fact of the superior military power and unlimited resources of the Delhi Emperor, cost so much bloodshed and suffering and continued to inspire the conflict for twenty years more after his death. *If Rana Pratap had offered the terms which his successor offered to Jehangir, in all probability Akbar would have gladly welcomed them.*" The learned scholar concludes: "The rulers of Mewar strained every nerve and spared no pains humanly possible to keep the crimson banner of State independence lying. Therein lies their glory. *But their inability to appreciate the force of facts produced nothing except a brilliant romance which all lovers of chivalry will undoubtedly treasure.*"³

If a writer of lesser eminence than Dr Tripathi had propounded the above theories, it would not have been necessary to notice them. As Dr Tripathi not only enjoys a high place among modern writers of medieval Indian history, but has written his "Rise and Fall of the Mughal Empire," with the professed object of restating the history of the great Mughals for whosoever interested in it, in the light of the latest studies and researches" and of correcting the mistakes of all previous writers, it is well to analyse and examine his views in the light of the contemporary evidence.

In the first place, the responsibility for not joining the so-called Mughal Confederation does not rest with the Rana, but with Akbar, who insisted throughout on the Rana's personal attendance at his court, whereas the demand of Mewar was that her ruler should be exempted from going to the Mughal capital and attending the imperial court. There is no recorded evidence to show as to what terms Akbar had offered to Pratap's father, Udai Singh, before

he undertook the siege of Chittor in September 1567 and the Rana's reaction to them. We have it on the testimony of Abul Fazl that when the siege had lasted for sometime and the Rajputs had noticed Akbar's grim determination to capture the fort without caring for sacrifices involved, the garrison of Chittor opened parleys, offering to recognise the Mughal suzerainty and to pay an annual tribute; but Akbar insisted on the Rana's personal attendance which the garrison declined to agree to and hence the negotiations fell through.⁴ As far as Rana Pratap was concerned, the first recorded attempt of Akbar to persuade him to submit peacefully was made in September 1572 when the Mughal emperor was about to march on an expedition of conquest of Gujarat. Consequently he despatched an embassy under Jalal Khan Qorchi who returned to court at Ahmedabad on November 27, 1572.⁵ Unfortunately no details of the terms offered to the Rana are mentioned by any of the two contemporary writers, who referred to this first Mughal embassy to the court of the new Rana. Nor is there any reference to the factors that led to the failure of the mission. The emperor now felt that a Rajput envoy of an exalted status and influence might be more suitable for the delicate task and consequently he directed in April 1573, Prince Man Singh of Amber to proceed to Udaipur to contact Rana Pratap. But though the Rana accorded a friendly reception to Man Singh, he declined to attend the court at Agra and Man Singh had to return disappointed (end of June). Abul Fazl records the failure of the mission in these words: "The Rana came out to welcome them (Man Singh and his colleagues), and received him (Man Singh) with respect and put on the royal khilaat. He brought Man Singh to his house as his guest, but owing to his evil nature he proceeded to make excuses (*about going to court*), alleging that 'his well-wishers would not suffer him to go'. He made promises about going to the sublime court, but raised objections, and gave Man Singh leave to depart, while he himself stayed and procrastinated".⁶ It is clear from the above account that Pratap did not altogether reject Akbar's offer of an alliance and

2. *Ibid.*, 224-225.

3. *Ibid.*, 378.

4. A.N. III, 320.

5. Tarikh Akbar Shahi of Muhammad Arif Qandhari, 255; Tabqat Akbari of Nizam-ud-din Ahmad, Vol. II, 240.

6. A.N. III, p. 40; Eng. Tr. III, 56.

that he put on the royal khilaat which implied that he was not unwilling to submit. But he refused to go to court. In other words he wanted exemption from personal attendance.

A third Mughal mission under Raja Bhakwant Das, father of Man Singh, followed in September-October, 1573, with no better results. Regarding this mission the historian Abul Fazl writes: ".....when the victorious army reached Gogunda, which was the Rana's residence, Rana Kika expressed shame and repentance for his past conduct and prolonged deficiency in service, and by way of submission came and visited Raja Bhagwant Das. He also took him to his house and treated him with respect and hospitality. He sent along with him his son and heir, and represented that by his ill-fortune a feeling of desolation (*tawakhushi*) had taken possession of him, and that now he presented his petition through the Raja and was sending his son as a mark of obedience. When his desolate (or savage) heart should become soothed by the lapse of time, he too would come and do homage in person".⁷ Thus the Rana not only expressed his desire to submit but also sent his son and heir, Prince Amar Singh, to the royal court. Of course, he made excuses regarding his personally going to the court and attending it. A little after this another notable envoy was sent to Rana Pratap. This time it was the famous Todar Mal, who on his return journey from Gujarat, called on the Rana at Gogunda. He too was well received. But again the Rana declined to go to Fatehpur Sikri. Abul Fazl is silent on the cause of Pratap's refusal to attend the imperial court and only says that he visited him (Todar Mal) also on his way and displayed flattery and submissiveness".⁸

This cryptic remark shows that the Rana had not brushed aside the proposal of his joining the Mughal Confederation. As is clear from an account of the four unsuccessful Mughal missions, Rana Pratap had not ruled out his willingness to submit to Akbar and recognise him as his suzerain. All that he wanted was that as a condition precedent to such a recognition he must not be forced to attend the Mughal court in person. The royal Khilaat that he accepted and put on was an indication of the fact

7. A.N. III, p. 67; Eng. Tr. III, 92-93.

8. Ibid., 67; Eng. Tr. III, 93.

that he was not averse to acknowledge the Mughal suzerainty. The fact that he sent his son and heir to Akbar's court was a further proof of his desire to make up the quarrel with so mighty a ruler as Akbar. It is surprising that a scholar of Dr Tripathi's ability should have ignored the main issue involved in the dispute between Akbar and Pratap.

Secondly, it must not be forgotten that even before Akbar had realised the futility of peacefully settling the Mewar problem, he was doing his very best to exert military pressure on the Rana and to bring about an encirclement of his territory. In fact, while refraining from any direct military expedition against Mewar, Akbar pursued the policy of blockading it at the very time when he was sending one after another of the above-mentioned four missions of peace to the Rana's court. Besides occupying eastern half of Mewar, arranging for its survey and settlement, establishing powerful garrisons of the ferocious Central Asian troops in the interior of the country, he surrounded Mewar on the north, east and west by Mughal territory before he had sent his first mission to Pratap's court. It should also be remembered that the alienation of parts of eastern Mewar which Akbar granted in assignment to Muslim officers and deserters from the Rana, such as Jagmal (who was given Jahazpur) or as the endowment land to the Khwaja's shrine at Ajmer, amounted in effect to a pincer movement from within. At the same time Akbar tried to isolate Mewar from its natural allies, Idar, Sirohi, Dungarpur, Banswara, and Bundi. In the face of these hard facts, he would be a bold man who would accuse Rana Pratap of intransigence. Dr Tripathi's assertion that "if Rana Pratap had offered the terms which his successor offered to Jahangir, in all probability, Akbar would have gladly welcomed them", makes little sense. Pratap had in fact offered these very terms atleast as early as the time of the second Mughal mission to his court, if not earlier.

Thirdly, it is easy in the second half of the twentieth century to ridicule the so-called bogey of matrimonial relations when the entire world is drawing closer together and racial and religious prejudices are dying out. But in the medieval age even inter-caste marriages among the Hindus themselves were taboo. These are by no means common even today, and except for a case here and a case there, marriages between Hindus and Muslims are very rare indeed in the present age. Raja Bharmal of Amber

was compelled under extra-ordinary circumstances, which threatened the extinction of his kingdom, to offer his daughter in marriage to Akbar. Honestly speaking it was not a willing alliance. As for the earlier marriages of this nature to which Dr Tripathi refers the less said the better. Those who are in touch with Rajasthan know that the modern descendants of medieval Rajput rulers are so ashamed of those alliances that they have tried to propound a theory that the ladies given in marriage to the Mughal rulers were the daughters of the Rajas' concubines, not their daughters by their Rajput queens. Thus the marriages of Rajput ladies with Mughal princes were and are in Hindu eyes *mēsalliances*. Dr Tripathi probably is the first prominent Hindu writer to commend such matrimonial relationship.

Fourthly, it was only after the failure of the peaceful negotiations and the use of naked force by Akbar that Pratap decided *not to recognise Akbar's suzerainty at all*. From 1572 to 1578 he was willing to submit on the condition that he should not be called upon to appear at the Mughal court, but after the battle of Haldighati in June, 1576 his stand was that *he would not recognise Mughal suzerainty at any cost*. Modern writers have failed to take note of Mewar's two different stands at different periods of Rana Pratap's relationship with Akbar.

Fifthly, the unconditional submission of Jodhpur, Bikaner and Jaisalmer was due in a large measure to the persuasion and diplomacy of the ruling house of Amber, which persistently and for obvious reasons earnestly wanted the principal Rajput ruling dynasties of Rajasthan to fall in line with it. This is clear from all contemporary Persian chronicles. Akbar and his court on that account displayed an unusual regard for the Kachchwahas. Sometimes no action was taken even when the members of the Kachchwaha ruling family of Amber and their relations were guilty of unbecoming conduct.

Finally, the contention that after all Mewar lost her independence in the time of Pratap's son Amar Singh and that it would have saved immense sacrifices, if Pratap had done the same in 1572, seems to be based on a misunderstanding. The honourable terms secured by Amar Singh in 1615 were due to the long and stubborn resistance put up by Pratap and for 18 years by Amar

gh himself. Without these sacrifices Mewar could hardly have hoped for a preferential treatment; treatment different from one meted out by the Mughal emperor to Amber, Jodhpur, Bikaner, Jaisalmer and Dungarpur. It is because of his successful resistance of Akbar the Great without reckoning the sacrifices that Pratap has been rightly called the embodiment of "the elemental spirit of India", that up-holds her traditional glory and defies anything that tarnishes that glory.

Maratha Nizam Relations

THE MASIRE ASAFI OF LAXMI NARAYAN SHAFIQ
AURANGABADI

BY

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Among the historians of the 18th century Deccan, Laxmi Narayan Shafiq holds an important place. His grandfather was a trusted servant of Firoz Jung, the father of Niam-ul-mulk, the founder of the Nizam dynasty of Hyderabad. Laxminarayan's father, Lala Mansaram, was the secretary of Nizam-ul-mulk. He was with Nizam-ul-mulk till the latter's death in 1748. The family settled in Aurangabad and as such Laxminarayan is known as Aurangabadi. Lala Mansaram, the father of Laxminarayan, is the author of two books in Persian, dealing with the life of the first Nizam and his court. They are the Masir-e-Nizami and the Risale-Darbar-e-Asafi.

Laxminarayan was born in 1743 A.D. According to the prevailing scholarship of the age he studied and soon obtained mastery of Persian and Urdu. He was a disciple of the great scholar and critic Gulam Ali Azad Bilgrami (1704 to 1786) the author of Khazanai Amira. He was also a friend of the celebrated Urdu poet Siraj Aurangabadi. Laxminarayan is the author of two works in Persian dealing with prominent Urdu and Persian poets and their poetry. These two works, the Chamanistane shora and the Gule rana are considered indispensable to this day by students and scholars of Urdu and Indo-Persian literature. Laxminarayan is the author of three works on history. His first work, the Masir-e-Asafi was written in 1794 A.D. and deals with the Nizams of Hyderabad from the migration of Khwaja Abid to India in 1658, upto 1794 A.D. The second work, the Bisatul Ganaim was composed in 1799 A.D. and deals with the history of the Marathas upto the death of Nanasaheb Peshwa in 1761. This work is small and consists of only 114 pages. The third work of Laxminarayan,

the *Haqiqate Hindustan* is mainly of statistical nature. The revenue and the divisions, districts and paraganas of the Mughal empire are described in great detail in this work. This work seems to have been composed in about 1804 A.D. Laxminarayan seems to have died shortly after. In the following lines a brief description of Laxminarayan's work, the *Masir-e-Asafi* to the extent it deals with the Maratha Nizam relations will be attempted.

Masir-e-Asafi

This work has not been published so far. Manuscript copies of the book are available in a few libraries. Through the kind courtesy of Shri Marshall, the Head of the Library Department, the University of Bombay I was able to get the manuscript copy of this work from the Asiatic Society Library of Calcutta.

The bulk of the work is enormous. The number of pages of this volume runs to 1057. One would suppose that Laxminarayan must have dealt in very great detail with the history of the Nizams to have covered more than 1000 pages. But a close look at this work dispels this illusion. Following the example of other Indo-Persian historians, Laxminarayan reproduces hundreds of pages from the works of other historians. It may be said to his credit, however, that he acknowledges the debt fairly and frankly, a practice not resorted to, it may be admitted with regret, by many Persian historians. The result, however, has been that there is very little of Laxminarayan's own contribution until one-half the bulk of the volume is gone through.

Thus, for the origin of the family of the Nizam until the establishment of Nizam-ul-mulk in the Deccan in 1720 A.D., Laxminarayan has reproduced in full the account given by Khafikhan. He has also laid under debt Gulam Ali Azad Bilgrami by borrowing copiously from the latter's work, the *Khazanai Amira*. About the history of the Marathas, Laxminarayan has reproduced in full the Persian chronicle, the *Tarikhe Shivaji*, itself a translation of a Marathi *Bakhar*, and translated into English by Sir J. N. Sarkar from the Persian manuscript of the India Office Library in the *Modern Review* of 1907 A.D. It is only when we come nearer to 1757 A.D. that we see Laxminarayan giving account of undoubtedly much that he saw and observed, as he was attached to the court of the Nizam.

It is well known that Shahanawaz Khan who was the Prime Minister of the Nizam Salabat Jang from 1753 to 1757 A.D. lost the favour of the Nizam in that year and fled to the fort of Daulatabad. At his invitation the Marathas invaded Aurangabad. To meet this danger, the Nizam brothers Salabat Jang, Nizam Ali Khan and Basalatjang joined hands and effected a reconciliation with Shahnawaz Khan. After the Maratha campaign had ended and they had departed, the Nizam brothers, with the help of Bussy, effected the arrest of Shahnawaz Khan. At this time Hyderjung, the agent of Bussy came to power. He rightly understood that Nizam Ali Khan, who, at that time held the Governorship of Berar was the most capable and ambitious of the Nizam brothers. He proceeded to divest Nizam Ali Khan of all power and persuaded the Nizam Salabatjang to transfer Nizam Ali Khan from Berar to the province of Hyderabad where Hyderjung hoped to put him in detention. Seeing the net closing around him Nizam Ali Khan decided to get rid of Hyderjung. On 11th May 1758 Hyderjung was invited to the tent of Nizam Ali Khan. This is what Laxminarayan has to say about the murder of Hyderjung in page 564.

On the third of Ramzan, Thursday, in the year 1171 Hejira, Nizam Ali Khan invited Hyderjung, saying that, as he was to depart the next day he wanted to have conversation with him about two or three important items. Accordingly Hyderjung repaired to the tent of Nizam Ali Khan accompanied by a few attendants and two guards. Nizam Ali Khan called in his companions one by one and putting their hands in those of Hyderjung said, "These are my faithful and favourite companions. I entrust them to you. Please be considerate to them." After this he left with the intention of going to the closet. His faithful servants then joined together and finished Hyderjung in this way. Qamqamjang caught hold of the two arms of Hyderjung and held them to his neck in a grip. Zabardast Khan and Shawsawariang plunged their daggers in his stomach in close proximity. Vithal Sunder Raja Pratapwant smashed his head with a blow of the sword. They then wrapped the corpse in a white sheet and threw it in a corner.

Laxminarayan is the only author according to whom, it was Vithal Sunder Pratapwant who struck the blow. The other works such as the *Tarikhe Rahatafza* do not mention the presence of Pra-

tapwant. The author of the Rahatafza says that "as soon as Nizam Ali Khan had left the place, Mohamad Ghous Khan and Gulam Sayyad Khan (the latter rose to be the prime minister of Hyderabad under the title of Mushir-ul-mulk) attacked Hyderjung and killed him with their daggers."

About the campaign of Udgir in 1760 we get some details from Laxminarayan. There is a school of thought in Maharashtra which holds the view that in the final battle, the Marathas had surrounded the elephant carrying Nizam Ali Khan and could have captured or killed him but for their mistaken notions of generosity. This is what Laxminarayan has to say about the final battle fought on 3rd February 1760 in page 584. The Marathas surrounded the rear guard (chandawal). The Nizam's army fought with great determination but it was not even one tenth of the enemy's army. At last Shaukatjung, the Nizam's general was killed. Qadirsahib Jalaluddowla, Hasan Munawar Khan, Gulam Naksh Band Khan, Basantrai, Gourbaksh, the brother of Bhalerao, Ballkrishna Pandit and Raja Balawant sacrificed their lives for the Nizam on the field of battle. On the enemy's side 1000 horsemen, and officers lost their lives. After destroying the rearguard of the Nizam's army the Marathas advanced with their elephants who were equipped with swords in their trunks, and fell upon the centre of the Nizam's army. Nizam Ali Khan was engaged in person against them. He discharged a few quivers of arrows with great effect. Very little distance remained between the Marathas and the elephant carrying Nizam Ali Khan. At this time by divine dispensation innumerable bullocks full of grain loads which were in the Nizam's camp rushed into the field of battle and created a great obstruction. In the fight, what was the advanced guard turned into rearguard and rearguard turned into advanced guard, Saifuddowlah, the Mirbakshi, exerted his utmost in that battle and returned to the camp in the evening. Seeing the destruction of his rearguard and the condition of his army Salabatjung became very anxious and was inclined to sue for peace.

After the battle of Udgir the Maratha army marched towards the fatal field of Panipat. Laxminarayan has reproduced entirely the account of the battle of Panipat as given by Gulam Ali Azad Bilgrami, in his Khazanai Amira. He has also reproduced a Persian version of the Marathi despatch said to have been sent by Malharrao Holkar to Nanasahib Peshwa. This despatch is known in Marathi

as "Holkarachi Thaili". When the late Shri Rajwade came across a copy of this despatch, the first 19 and the last 2 pages of the Marathi despatch were missing. He published it in its incomplete form in 1901 A.D. During the last 60 years students of Maratha history have been searching for the lost pages without success. Fortunately we now have the complete despatch of Malharrao Holkar as translated into Persian by Laxminarayan in the Masir-e-Asafi.

While the Maratha forces were engaged with the Afghans at Panipat, Nanasahib Peshwa had left his brother Raghunath Rao with a sizeable army in the Deccan to watch the movements of the Nizam. Nizam Ali Khan soon came into conflict with Raghunath Rao. In page 636 Laxminarayan gives an account of the brief conflict between the Nizam and Raghunath Rao. Raghunath Rao advanced with his army in the province of Medak. Nizam Ali Khan advanced to meet him. In the meanwhile Nizam's younger brother, Nasir-ul-mulk Mir Mughal Ali Khan had been appointed the Governor of Nanded. He, along with Ismail Khan Panni, advanced from Hyderabad and met Nizam Ali Khan near Medak. Raghunath Rao was aware of the small number of troops with Nizam Ali Khan. He had a large army with him. With a view to force a conflict he approached Nizam Ali Khan. Just at this time the news of the disaster to Vishwas Rao in Northern India reached Raghunath Rao. He lost heart and was forced to ask for peace. Nizam Ali Khan seized this opportunity and agreed to the peace between the parties.

After the death of Nanasahib Peshwa, Madhav Rao succeeded his father in 1761 A.D. Laxminarayan says in page 638 that, dissatisfied with the accession of his nephew Madhavrao, Raghunathrao collected forces and suddenly descending upon Aurangabad laid siege to that city. Nizam Ali Khan becoming aware of the highhandedness of Raghunathrao marched against him in 1175 Hejira. He had reached Dharur when he heard that Raghunathrao had moved towards Aurangabad. Although Motminuddowlah Dargah Kuli Khan, the governor of the city of Aurangabad protected the city with bravery, Raghunathrao destroyed the suburbs and parganas of Aurangabad. Nizam Ali Khan rapidly crossed the ghat of Dharur. Raghunathrao raised the siege of the city and moved to oppose the Nizam's army. He found the enemy strong. He therefore decided to draw the army of Islam towards Daulata-

bad and engage them at that place. He therefore retreated towards Aurangabad. Nizam Ali Khan pursued him and reaching Aurangabad, where he left his heavy baggage, he made arrangements for the provision of his army. He left Aurangabad on the 23rd of Rabiul Akhar 1175 Hejira and turned towards Ahamadnagar, which was in the hands of the Marathas. He passed through Toka and Chambhar-gonda. Raghunathrao appeared from behind the hills, and started firing cannon and discharging rockets. Under the orders of Nizam Ali Khan, Raja Pratapwant and Saifuddowlah engaged Raghunathrao in battle. Janoji Nimbalkar hurried to their help. The victorious army of Nizam Ali Khan reached the environs of Ahmadnagar. At this stage Raghunathrao collected his forces once again and fell upon Raja Vinayak Das who was posted at the left wing of Nizam's Army. Sultanji Nimbalkar and Murad Khan rushed to the help of Raja Vinayak Das and successfully beat off the attack of Raghunathrao. When the Nizam's army reached Turkabad, Raghunathrao once again attacked the Nizam's army. Nizam Ali Khan left the Nizam Salabatjang under the protection of the camp and pursued Raghunathrao for a distance of ten miles before he returned to his camp. To cross the ghats Nizam Ali Khan marched at night. He crossed the ghats and camped on the river Ghodnadi. Raghunathrao camped on the other side of the river. He started a fierce cannonade. The shots falling in the camps of the Nizam produced great consternation. Nizam Ali Khan did not like to give the impression that his tents were removed due to fear. He ordered a march to the rear for a short distance. The next day the Nizam's army crossed the river. They fought the enemy every day and reached the environs of Poona. On the night of 27th Jamdil Awal, Nasir-ul-mulk, the younger brother of Nizam Ali Khan, due to his inexperience and the persuasion of some people deserted Nizam Ali Khan. He and Raja Ramchandra (Jadhav) who was leading the vanguard of the army joined the Marathas with a large army of their own. This caused great shock and anxiety in the army of the Nizam. Nizam Ali Khan called together all his officers and said, "Those who want to serve me with heart and soul should remain and those who want to leave me can partake of the betel leaf and leave the camp freely." Janoji and Sultanji with tears in their eyes said that the treachery of Raja Ramachandra would drag them also into blame but they begged

Nizam Ali Khan to observe how faithful they were. Nizam Ali Khan instilled confidence in his army and marched forward. The Marathas tried to oppose him but could not succeed. Raghunathrao saw that even the desertion of Nasir-ul-mulk and Raja Ramchandra had not affected the march of the army of Islam which was now only a few miles from Poona. That city was in danger of being burnt and destroyed. Raghunathrao felt that it would bring great discredit to him. He therefore started negotiations for peace. Nizam Ali Khan sent Janoji and Sultanji to him and pointing out his lapses to Raghunathrao warned him against the repetition of the same. At the same time he agreed to peace. Raghunathrao handed over territory yielding an annual income of over 27 lakhs of rupees from the subhas of Aurangabad and Bidar to Nizam Ali Khan. Afterwards he returned to his country. The Nizam also returned and on his way devastated the fief of Pancha Mahal held by Ramachandra Jadhav as a punishment for his treachery. (643).

After his return from the campaign Nizam Ali Khan put his brother Salabatjang, the Nizam in internment at Bidar, and seized all power. Nizam Ali Khan spent the rainy season at Bidar. At this juncture Murad Khan sent a letter to the Nizam the purport of which was that differences had broken out between Madhavrao and Raghunathrao. The counsellors of the Peshwa had divided themselves into two parties, one supporting Madhavrao and the other Raghunathrao. Finding his position untenable at Poona, Raghunathrao fled with a few horsemen on 3rd safar 1176 Hejira and took the road to Nasik. He had sought refuge, Murad Khan said in his letter, with Islam. It would be necessary for the Nizam to help him.

On receipt of this letter the Nizam ordered Janoji and Sultanji Nimbalkar to act in league with Murad Khan and march to the assistance of Raghunathrao. The three generals accordingly marched to the river Bhima. Madhav Rao too arrived with his army on the other side of the river. As the river was in flood, the armies could not cross it, nor was there any possibility of fight. Murad Khan took note of this situation. Accompanied by a few horsemen, he swam across the river during night and suddenly appeared before Madhav Rao. He succeeded in securing the person of Madhav Rao and brought him to his camp on the other side of the river. Next day he arranged a meeting between

Raghunath Rao and Madhav Rao in his tent. Murad Khan succeeded in resolving the differences of the parties. He then started with them to meet the Nizam. On receipt of this strange news, the Nizam marched from Bidar and reached the province of Bijapur. On the 10th of Jamadil Akhar 1176 Hejira Raghunath Rao and Madhav Rao met Nizam Ali Khan through Murad Khan at Pedgaon. Raghunath Rao handed over a territory yielding an annual income of 50 lakhs of Rupees including the fort of Daulatabad in return for the assistance he had received from the Nizam.

Nizam Ali Khan then held consultations with Raghunath Rao. The subject was the putting down of Hyder Ali Khan, who was becoming bold year by year. The combined armies marched to the fort of Miraj. As the success of the Nizam's campaign this time had been achieved through the efforts of Mohammad Murad Khan, this was viewed with great displeasure by Raja Pratapwant. Even before the territory and the fort of Daulatabad mentioned in the treaty had changed hands, peace between the Nizam and Raghunath Rao was shattered by Pratapwant. He persuaded Nizam Ali Khan that Raghunath Rao should be dismissed. Janoji, the son of Raghuji Bhosle, was promised the power and status of Raghunath Rao and was induced to join the Nizam. Nasir-ul-mulk, the younger brother of Nizam Ali Khan, had joined the Marathas. Due to their lack of appreciation of his services he became disappointed and returned to the Nizam on the 14th of Shaban 1176 Hejira. Oppressed by Raghunath Rao, Gopal Hari, the Governor of the fort of Miraj, appealed to the Nizam through Raja Pratapwant. The Nizam recommended Gopal Hari for consideration to Raghunath Rao. Raghunath Rao refused to entertain this representation. On this, Nizam Ali Khan resolved on punishing Raghunath Rao. Seeing himself unable to resist the Nizam, Raghunath Rao started devastating the territory and appeared before Aurangabad from the West.⁶⁴

He demanded a large ransom from the city of Aurangabad. Motmin-ul-mulk Dargah Quli Khan, the governor of the city, in spite of insufficient forces and provision of war material, strengthened the defences of the city and entrusted the fortifications for defence to Himmat Khan the uterine brother of Murad Khan and the Kotwal of the city and other officers. He prolonged talks with Raghunath Rao, while awaiting help from Nizam Ali Khan. Raghunath Rao came to know of these designs and decided to cap-

ture the city. He constructed ladders and other necessary requisites for the capture of the city. On the 28th of Shaban, his army descended upon the suburbs of the city. Raghunath Rao along with his select troops, took his stand to the north of Aurangabad. His soldiers erected ladders to scale the walls. They brought the elephants to the proximity of the walls. There is a gate in the walls of the Gulabi Baug of the Quila Ark. The elephants were brought to break this door. Himmat Khan, Mirza Mohamad Baqar Khan and others from the city showered arrows, and bullets and even stones and shoes upon them and repulsed the enemy. Many of the enemy were killed at the hands of the inhabitants of the city. In the thick of the fight, the elephant driver of Raghunath Rao was hit by a bullet. Raghunath Rao then withdrew from the attack. Hearing of the arrival of Nizam Ali Khan, he turned towards Baglana. On the 26th of Shaban Nizam Ali Khan arrived at Aurangabad. As the enemy appeared to be bent upon devastating Berar, Nizam Ali Khan left Aurangabad in the beginning of the month of Ramzan and marched towards Balapur in Berar. The Marathas turned from Berar and passing by the city of Aurangabad moved towards the city of Hyderabad. Nizam Ali Khan pursued them to the bank of the river Godavari. Here a consultation took place with his officers and it was decided to give up the pursuit of the Marathas and march towards the city of Poona. Accordingly the Nizam's army having crossed the ghats of Ahmadnagar divided itself into detachments. These were to devastate the country round Poona, while the main army marched towards the city of Poona. The Nizam's army was four miles from the city. The people fled from the city and took refuge in the forts in the vicinity. The Nizam's army burnt and destroyed the buildings of the city, razing them to the ground. They did not leave a stone unturned in their work of devastation in the country round Poona.

Meanwhile Raghunath Rao had attacked the city of Hyderabad in the beginning of the month of Zilqada. He tried his best to capture the city, but Bahadur Dil Khan, the governor fought, and protected it.

At the approach of the rainy season the Nizam's army left Poona. Similarly Raghunath Rao moved away from Hyderabad towards Poona, while the Nizam's army had reached Dharur on its way to camp at Bidar for rainy season. Janoji Bhosle opposed

the idea of camping at Bidar and instead, suggested a cantonment at Aurangabad on the ground that it was both near to Nagpur and Poona and that further operations could be undertaken after the end of the rainy season. Raja Pratapwant was not inclined to this view but in view of the reasons put forward by Janoji he had to yield. The Nizam's army accordingly marched towards Aurangabad. Verily the Angel of death was doing his work and dragged Rajabahadur away from his intention. The Nizam, with his principal officers, artillery, elephants and other material crossed the river Godavari. Rajabahadur Pratapwant stayed behind with a small army with some officers. Janoji Bhosle pretended that disturbances had broken out in his army and on this pretext he moved his army six miles away from that of Pratapwant. Just at this juncture Raghunath Rao came with forced marches and fell upon the army of Rajabahadur. Rajabahadur, inspite of his small army, fought with determination. A great battle took place. The brave soldiers of the Nizam cut their way through the enemy and approached the elephant carrying Raghunath Rao. They cut the ropes supporting the hounda. It was just a matter of time before they could cut off the head of Raghunath Rao. In the confusion, however, a number of elephants got mixed together and seizing this opportunity Raghunath Rao escaped safely. Murad Khan had a strong enmity towards Rajabahadur. He saw that the tide of the battle was turning in favour of Rajabahadur. He felt that if once Rajabahadur were to win, he (Murad Khan) would be crushed into insignificance. He, therefore, in the thick of the fight ordered his bodyguard to shoot Rajabahadur. The bullet reached its aim and the head of Rajabahadur fell on the plank of the hounda. Seeing the plight of Rajabahadur, the army of the Nizam broke and fled and what was certainly a victory was turned into a defeat. The distracted army could not face the attacks of bullets and blades. Many of them fled and threw themselves into the river where they were drowned. Many were put to the sword. In short a whole world was destroyed. Many of them were plundered and began to wander in wilderness. Mir Musa Ruknuddowlah fled from the field of battle on foot with only the dress he was carrying on his body and went to Hyder Yar Khan Sherjung.

Hyder Yar Khan Sherjung was at one time the Prime Minister of the Nizam Salabatjung. He was assisted in his work by

Rairayan Shambhulal, Hamidulla Khan, and Laxmanrao Khandagale. These four persons carried on the administration for Salabatjung. They were afraid, however, of Nizam Ali Khan who had been declared heir apparent. At that time Salabatjung was encamped at Elgundal. It is said that they decided upon the murder of Nizam Ali Khan and sent a person to Elgundal for this purpose, where Nizam Ali Khan was also encamped. The would be murderer entered the bed-room of Nizam Ali Khan but his courage failed him. He was arrested by the guards of Nizam Ali Khan when he made a confession. Nizam Ali Khan sent him to Salabatjung. He followed him almost immediately. On the news of the approach of Nizam Ali Khan, Shambhulal and Hamidullakhan poisoned themselves. On the day Nizam Ali Khan met Salabatjung, Sherjung and Laxmanrao Khandagale left the court of the Nizam without permission and fled. Laxmanrao had a detachment of 2 to 3 thousand cavalry with him. He fled from the court of the Nizam. Sherjung reached Poona and sought refuge with the Marathas where he started conspiring against the Nizam. His property at Aurangabad was confiscated by the Nizam. Sherjung's family succeeded in escaping from Aurangabad due to the carelessness of Dargah Quli Khan, who was related to Sherjung by ties of marriage.

In short, Sherjung, who was inwardly at the bottom of all the trouble, was delighted with the defeat of Islam and was in expectation of the capture of the Nizam's Officers. He welcomed the opportunity of the arrival, in distress, of Mir Musa Khan. He received him with all honours and in alliance with Mohamad Murad Khan started negotiation for peace. It was decided that Mir Musa Khan should be appointed the Prime Minister of Nizam in place of Raja Pratapwant. Mir Musa Khan was a straightforward man and was a companion of Nizam Ali Khan. But he was also inexperienced. Sherjung got a promise from Mir Musa Khan that as soon as he went to the Nizam and got himself appointed as Prime Minister he would get the mistakes of Sherjung pardoned by the Nizam and recall him from the Marathas. He would also see that Sherjung was put in full charge of affairs. Mir Musa Khan had understood that life would be very hard for him. But he had now been assured of appointment as Prime Minister. He considered this as beyond his capacity. He said to Sherjung "I am like your son and I owe my life to you. Leave aside the high

post which I am getting, I am perfectly willing to be Prime Minister only in name. I do not want anything else". In short at the bidding of Sherjung, Murad Khan went to the Nizam and initiated his proposal. As the Nizam had sustained a very severe defeat and the position of Raghunath Rao had become very strong, and as he (Nizam) knew that Murad Khan belonged to the party of Raghunath Rao, he agreed to the Prime Ministership of Mir Musa Khan. Twenty days after the defeat at Rakshasbhawan Mir Musa Khan approached the Nizam and received his orders of appointment. Sherjung got his mistakes pardoned through Musa Khan Ruknaddowlah. Sherjung was perfectly acquainted with the Marathas. He now returned to the Nizam and very soon took charge of all the affairs of administration, leaving Mir Musa Khan Ruknaddowlah Prime Minister in name only. Gulam Sayyad Khan was given the title of Muinuddowlah Sohrabjung and was appointed as the Governor of Berar. Soon after, news was received that Salabatjung who was in detention in the fort of Bidar had died on 20th of Rabiul Awal 1177 Hejira. It is said that the guards of Salabatjung were afraid that as a result of the defeat of the Nizam's army due to the death of Raja Bahadur the powers of Raghunath Rao had increased enormously. They therefore, under instructions secretly strangled Salabatjung and killed him. They were afraid that he would create disturbances. God alone knows the truth.

After a short while Nizam Ali Khan on the advice of some well wishers arrested Mohamad Murad Khan and his cousin Himmat Khan, for the former's complicity in the murder of Raja Bahadur and detained them in the fort of Golconda where they remained till their death (685).

After a while Ismail Khan Panni was appointed as the Governor of the province of Berar, while Muinuddowlah Sohrabjung (later Mashir-ul-mulk) was transferred to the province of Aurangabad, the Governor whereof Dargah Quli Khan Salar Jung was dismissed.

After the end of the rainy season Madhav Rao decided to punish the Bhoslas of Nagpur. He desired the assistance of Nizam Ali Khan, through Dhondo Ram his Wakil at the court of the Nizam. The Nizam's army marched towards Berar. Seeing this junction, the Bhoslas came to terms. At this juncture a

meeting took place between Madhav Rao and Nizam Ali Khan on the banks of the river Purna. It is said that in the pride of his youth Madhav Rao gave a stiff salute to Nizam Ali Khan without bowing his head. This was not liked by the Nizam. But observing restraint, he ignored this lapse and received Madhav Rao warmly. Great festivities and illuminations were held during this meeting (661).

In page 662 the author tells us that Madhav Rao imprisoned Raghunath Rao, as the latter had been at the bottom of trouble and disturbance. Ruknuddowlah, the Prime Minister, who had an understanding with Madhav Rao, left for Poona. He made many people at Poona inclined favourably to him through his lavish entertainment. At this time Madhav Rao had again decided upon punishing Janoji Bhosla, who had raised his head after the imprisonment of Raghunath Rao. Ruknuddowlah allied himself with Madhav Rao in this campaign which ended successfully after which Ruknuddowlah returned to Hyderabad. Shortly after the Marathas embarked on a campaign against Hyder Ali. The Nizam had earlier marched against Hyder Ali accompanied by British troops. Before any engagement was fought against Hyder Ali by the Nizam, the Marathas had come to terms with Hyder Ali. They now strongly advised Nizam Ali Khan to join hands with Hyder Ali. This is what Laxminarayan has to say in page 663. The agents of Hyder Ali Khan approached Nizam Ali Khan for his alliance, under instructions from Sherjung and through Moinuddhin Sahib a religious dignitary of Adoni. Letters of Madhav Rao urging alliance with Hyder Ali and fighting against the British were received continuously. On seeing, this, the British withdrew from the Nizam's army which now joined Hyder Ali. How the Nizam was worsted in his fight against the British and came to terms with them is well known.

In page 674, Laxminarayan gives an account of the death of Madhav Rao Peshwa. The chronogram composed by Laxminarayan; gives the Hejira date 1186 of the death of Madhav Rao. Laxminarayan says that due to illness the lamp of Madhav Rao's life was extinguished by the chill winds of death while he was still in the prime of his youth. He was succeeded by his brother Narayan Rao, while Raghunath Rao continued to be in prison (675).

While Raghunath Rao was in prison, Gaziuddin Imadulmulk who was at one time the Prime Minister of the Mughal happened to be in Poona on a visit of condolence to Narayan Rao following the death of Madhav Rao. Remembering the past relations with Gaziuddin, Narayan Rao granted Gaziuddin a jaghir yielding an income of 2 lakhs of rupees in the pargana of Kalpi. Narayan Rao was young and inexperienced in the etiquette of the court. Gaziuddin felt that he was not shown sufficient consideration. He obtained the permission of Narayan Rao and met Raghunath Rao. He whispered into the ears of Raghunath Rao "That you, in spite of your experience should be imprisoned by an inexperienced youth passes understanding. You ought to remove him and seize power yourself". This advice had effect on Raghunath Rao. After the departure of Gaziuddin, Raghunath Rao who was greedy for power started a conspiracy with the army. Sumersing had a risala of 5,000 infantry; Mahamad Yusuf Gardi had 4,000 infantry; Rais Mohamad Arab had a risala of 2,000 Arabs; Tulaji Powar had a detachment of 4,000 and Manaji Phakde was an officer of 2,000 cavalry. Raghunath Rao entered into conspiracy with them and promised them Jaghir and other considerations on condition of the imprisonment of Narayan Rao and his accession to power. He agreed to pay 3 lakhs of rupees to Sumersing and 2 lakhs rupees each to the other two officers. The wife of Raghunath Rao, putting their papers in a pitcher sent them to the officers referred to above. They unanimously decided on the murder of Narayan Rao, although this was not the intention of Raghunath Rao. A fresh agreement was arrived at and jewellery worth 7 lakhs of rupees were promised to Sumersing and others. On Monday Narayan Rao had gone to worship at the Parvati temple according to his custom. He returned from the temple and having dismissed his bodyguard entered his inner chamber to have his meals. The conspirators who had joined together armed themselves with weapons and entered the palace. They broke the doors. Tulaji Pawar, Mohamad Yusuf and Rais Mohamad seized Narayan Rao and dragged him out of his apartment. Sumersing entered the apartment of Raghunath Rao and bringing him out of his prison, seated him on the throne of the Peshwas. At that time Raghunath Rao repeatedly said that Narayan Rao should be put in confinement in his (Raghunath Rao) apartment. But the officers felt that were Narayan Rao to live, it would be against their interests. They therefore, attacked him with swords and killed him. They

1 congratulated Raghunath Rao. The secretaries then appeared in the presence of Raghunath Rao. Laxminarayan has composed a chronogram on the death of Narayan Rao, "Shud Raja Zaman Maqtul" (The ruler of the age was killed) gives the Hejira date of murder as 1187.

On his accession to power Raghunath Rao made demands of Chauth from the Nizam, Hyder Ali Khan and Mohamad Ali Khan, the Nawab of Karnatak. Within 15 days of his becoming the Peshwa he marched out of Poona with his army.

He first started on a campaign against the Nizam with an army of 30 to 40 thousand. The officers and statesmen of Poona outwardly declared themselves to be on his side but inwardly they were very anxious about themselves and they sent their families and belongings to various forts for security. Raghunath Rao started persecuting one and all. Balaji Pandit (Nana Phadnavis) pretended that he was ill and desiring medical assistance at Poona returned to that city. Moro Phadnavis took a similar step. Sakharam Bapu had already left the camp earlier and was staying in Poona. These three statesmen consulted one another on the future course of action. Raghunath Rao, confidence of his strength, paid no heed to them and marched against the Nizam. Nizam Ali Khan marched out of Hyderabad on 22nd of Shaban 1187 Hejira. Ruknuddowlah who was away on the affairs of Berar joined him on the 24th at the village Mokla, 28 miles from Hyderabad. The Nizam organized his army. The vanguard was entrusted to Sabitjung, the brother of Ibrahim baig Dhaunsa Zaf Ruddowlah Zabita Jung; the rear guard was entrusted to Hashamatjung; the wings of the army were placed under Sharfuddowlah, Ruknuddowlah, Shujauddowlah and others and the position between the vanguard and the centre to Samsam-ul-mulk. Other Officers in the army like Maharao Nimbalkar, Rao Rambha Nimbalkar, Gopalsingh Kandharwala, Narpatsingh, and Balaji Keshaw were allotted important positions in the army. It appears from the account given by Laxminarayan that minor engagements were fought with Raghunath Rao in which the Nizam's army suffered. An agreement was made with Raghunath Rao by which territory yielding an income of 12 lakhs of rupees was handed over to him. Next day however Raghunath Rao entertained the Nizam and returned the deeds of agreement. It would appear that Raghunath Rao must have become aware of the activities

of the statesmen at Poona due to which he became suddenly anxious to placate the Nizam. After this campaign the Nizam returned to Hyderabad. Laxminarayan then narrates the progress of the civil war among the Marathas and the support which Nizam Ali Khan gave to the cause of Sawai Madhav Rao. It was in the year 1775 when Nizam Ali Khan was on a campaign in Berar against Mudhoji Bhosle that Ruknuddowlah the Prime Minister of Nizam Ali Khan was murdered. At that time the trusted officers of Ruknuddowlah viz. his brother Sharfuddowlah and the general Zaf Ruddowlah were away from the camp. Ruknuddowlah had been stabbed while in the tent of Nizam Ali Khan. The attendants thinking that the wound was not serious carried him to his camp. Laxminarayan states at page 723 as follows. "It is said that Ruknuddowlah had come to a secret understanding with the statesmen at Poona. His general Zabita Jung (Zaf Ruddowlah Ibrahim Baig Dhausa) had a strong army at his disposal. His (Ruknuddowlah) brother Sharfuddowlah had an army of 10,000. Sharfuddowlah's son Dawarjung had 3,000 cavalry and 4,000 infantry at his disposal. Hashamat Jung had a similar army of 3,000 cavalry and 4,000 infantry. Other officers also had troops with them. All these had owed their rise to Ruknuddowlah and were attached to him. Ruknuddowlah had evil designs against the Nizam and had decided to achieve them once the affair of Mudhoji was satisfactorily settled. For this reason Bakshi Begam Sahiba, the chief wife of the Nizam, who had got wind of this affair carried out the plan (viz. the murder of Ruknuddowlah). After the death of Ruknuddowlah the Nizam returned from Berar. At this stage the grateful Karbhari of Poona handed over the fort of Daulatabad and certain parganas like Gangapur and Vaijapur to the Nizam in return for the help rendered by him in their war against Raghunath Rao. Soon after, the first Anglo-Maratha War started. The Nizam maintained a neutral attitude in this struggle. Nana Phadnavis for a time succeeded in rallying Hyder Ali, the Bhoslas of Nagpur and others to his cause against the English. In page 750 Laxminarayan reproduces the letter written by Hyder Ali to the Peshwa (756).

It is as follows:—After greetings. "Be it known that it has come to our ears that the British have started activities against your esteemed self and are waging war due to the anxieties of which you are not finding time to attend to your normal business.

Finding no alternative to this fight being waged in your country and Bengal, you have I understand, decided to treat with the English. Therefore in view of the interest of our countries I have decided to render assistance to your Government and for the pleasure of your good self I have collected a large army and am waging a campaign against the British. Kindly consider my activities as affording a sure foundation to your interest. Please do not in any way treat with the British either in your country or in Bengal. Await news of my activities. I am sure that by the grace of God it is the British who will solicit peace and send messages to that effect. Please do not treat with them in any case without consulting me. I have written this after full consideration of your inclination. If you have any other designs in view kindly communicate to me without delay. For the purpose of negotiations I have sent Nur Mohamad Khan to you. Whatever he will communicate to you may kindly be considered as my views. What more! May your days be spent in happiness". On receiving this communication Balaji Pandit (Nana Phadnavis) remarked, "We will be much pleased to act in accordance with his desires as we are sure that the efforts of Hyder Ali have been undertaken for the prestige and honour of Pandit Pradhan. God willing, till the end of our lives our friendship will be unchangeable. Nothing will be done against your wishes". After this the case of Peshkash or tribute from Hyder Ali to the Peshwa was taken up as during the campaign of Haripant Phadke, Hyder Ali had promised a tribute of 32 lakhs every year. Nur Mohammad Khan who possessed a smooth tongue said that as his master was at present engaged in a campaign which was to the interest of Peshwa he would like to retain 15 lakhs of this tribute per year for the expenses of the war.

As there was no other alternative and as Nana Phadnavis was not yet sure of his position due to differences between Maratha chiefs, he agreed to the request of Hyder Ali. Hyder Ali made a further request that an army of 5,000 Maratha horse should be attached to him till the duration of war against the English, to be maintained at his expense. Balaji Pandit replied that this would not be possible as Colonel Goddard's arrival was imminent, but that, after things settled down Hyder Ali's request would be granted.

We need not follow the vicissitudes of the Anglo-Maratha war as the details are available in ample measure in contemporary papers. Suffice to say that during the course of the war Hyder Ali died and Tipu succeeded him. A Maratha chief, Tatya Joshi had been attached to Hyder Ali. He was recalled. Tatya reported that Tipu was more than ever determined to push the war to a successful conclusion. Nana Phadnavis, on hearing this report conveyed his compliments through the Vakil of Tipu Nur Mohammad Khan. Tipu replied to Nana Phadnavis as follows "The late Nawab (Hyder Ali Khan) had, according to the desire of the Peshwa's Government, entered into struggle against the English and had rendered all possible assistance. During this campaign he departed from this fleeting world. At present I have succeeded to the throne and keeping in view the policy of my father, am still engaged in continuing the fight against the English and thus rendering assistance to the Peshwa's Government. During this campaign, due to the treachery of my servants the area of Bednore was occupied by the English. For that reason I was forced to turn my attention to this area. Taking into consideration the services rendered by my father, please send a strong army to my assistance as soon as possible so that in alliance with each other we can rid our countries from the presence of the enemies and then march towards Madras or any other place desired by the Peshwa's Government. If you are desirous of coming to terms with the English please do not do so without consulting me". In addition to this letter Tipu instructed his Vakil to strongly impress upon the mind of Nana Phadnavis that but for the help rendered by Hyder Ali, retention of Poona or the kingdom of the Deccan would have been difficult for him. If they sent the army to his assistance and were guided by his advice in treating with English, then friendly relations would develop between them.

When the correspondence was placed before Balaji Pandit, Tipu's Vakil made the additional communication that a strong army may be sent to the assistance of Tipu at Bednoor. Balaji Pandit (Nana Phadnavis) gave a reply as follows "We have not yet entered into any negotiations with the English. If we send our troops away from us, the ports of the English are near Poona. If, God forbid, they resume their activities on this side we will be placed in difficulties until the arrival of our troops. We are anxious to continue our friendly relations with you. If you send

the annual tribute as was done by Hyder Ali and stick to our agreement we will consider the sending of our troops from here. If the annual tribute is not received from you, movement of troops from this side will not be possible. Besides, differences will develop between us.

After sending this communication Balaji Pandit started negotiations with the English. Mahadji Scindhia also took a hand in these negotiations. As is well known, the treaty of Salbai marked the end of the Anglo-Maratha War. Raghunath Rao was handed over to the Marathas. Hari Pandit received him and after escorting him to a few places of pilgrimage fixed his residence at Kopergaon. Two thousand infantry and 1,000 horsemen formed the guard of Raghunath Rao. On the representation of Hari Pandit, Raghunath Rao dismissed about 200 of his confidential servants and attendants. During his detention Raghunath Rao and his wife Anandibai carried on a surreptitious correspondence with the Scindia, Tipu and the English. On receipt of their representation Scindia replied to them that he would have 1,000 horsemen ready at a distance of eight miles from Kopergaon. They were instructed to take into custody Raghunath Rao and his son as soon as they left Kopergaon and were to escort them to Jamgaon. As soon as Balaji Pandit received this information through his spies he doubled the guard round Raghunath Rao and the attempts of Raghunath Rao to free from Kopergaon were foiled.

To the East India Company Raghunath Rao wrote as follows : —

"Far from giving me a proper treatment Nana Phadnavis has put me in very strict custody. I am afraid for my life. Kindly get me relieved from this prison. My representation may be placed before the authorities of the East India Company and the king of England." This letter was also intercepted by Nana Phadnavis. When Tipu came to know of the design of Raghunath Rao he sent a spy Balaprashad with a sum of Rs. 1,000 to inform Raghunath Rao that if he, Raghunath Rao, could arrive four stages from his place of residence Tipu would join him with an army of 10,000. Balaprashad came to Poona but when he noticed the strict arrangement made by Nana Phadnavis he returned to Tipu without achieving his purpose.

At this juncture Raghunath Rao fell ill. He did not come out of his palace for two or three days. When Balaji Pandit heard of his illness he sent physicians to treat him. The wife of Raghunath Rao did not like that Raghunath Rao be treated by the physicians of Balaji Pandit. But the physicians through their flattery persuaded Raghunath Rao to take medicine at their hands. Due to their treatment what was an ordinary illness developed into a serious disease, and within 40 days Raghunath Rao died. Raghunath Rao's wife openly sent a message to Balaji Pandit saying "this event (death) had happened due to your instructions." Being afraid of the life of her children she took all precautions (770).

Now that Balaji Pandit had achieved security of his position and full power as a result of the treaty with East India Company and the death of Raghunath Rao, he thought of engaging in a campaign against Tipu. If Tipu were to send the fixed tribute, he said, there would be no war between them, otherwise he would enlist the co-operation of Nizam and Mudhoji Bhosle and invade Tipu's territory. Balaji Pandit and Hari Pandit called for Nur Mohamad Khan, the Vakil of Tipu and told him "the amount due from Tipu for the last two years has not been paid. Similarly the tributes are in arrears. It is two years that Tipu has ascended the throne. He has not paid the required amount. It is necessary that he should send the four years' arrears of tribute with an addition of five lakhs of rupees for default. Then alone there will be peace between the two states; otherwise there would be war." The Vakil wrote to Tipu saying that the Brahmins had a design of invading his territory. If Tipu desired peace he should send the required amount. But if however Tipu desired war it would be better that he (Vakil) should be recalled. Tipu replied as follows: "There is no trust left either in you or the Marathas. The Marathas had promised that they would not enter into negotiations with the English without consulting me. However when they saw that the English had taken possession of a part of my country they ignored their previous undertaking. They did not send my assistance to me. On the other hand they entered into negotiations with the English. Now they are planning to break the treaties with me. You are instructed not to ask for your leave from Balaji Pandit as it would mean that all means of information from that State would be stopped. I am not yet

free from all complications about the port of Codial. You should therefore stay there." In accordance with these instructions Tipu's Vakil had no other alternative but to make attempts at delay by representing that as soon as Tipu was free from his entanglement of the port of Codial he would send the arrears of tribute. Hari Pandit and Balaji Pandit were not satisfied with the replies of Tipu's Vakil. They deputed their Vakil Krishnarao Ballal to Nizam Ali Khan. He was asked to inform the Nizam that they would like to meet the Nizam if he would agree to travel 15 stages from Hyderabad. This was agreed to. They themselves left Poona to meet the Nizam. Hari Pandit was joined by Tukoji Holkar on the way. Balaji Pandit (Nana Phadnavis) entrusted Sawai Madhav Rao to the care of Appa Balawant and Amritrao and left Poona to meet the Nizam. They first arrived at Pandharpur where they stayed for 20 days. Meanwhile the Maratha Vakil saw the Nizam and it was decided that the meeting between Nizam and Balaji Pandit should take place at Yadgir on the river Bhima. Both the armies camped in each other's vicinity for one month. It was decided between the parties that a campaign be undertaken against Tipu next year and that both should recover the territory seized by Tipu from them. The Nizam said that he would go to the assistance of Balaji Pandit and desired that for the expenses of his army the district of Bijapur should be handed over by the Marathas to him. Balaji did not agree to this. He suggested on the other hand that as a result of the joint venture whatever territory would accrue should be justly appropriated between the parties, wherein due regard would be paid to the expenses of the Nizam. After the meeting Tukoji Holkar saw the Nizam.

The Vakil of Tipu informed the latter of the designs of the Peshwa and the Nizam. Tipu started his counter manoeuvres by conspiring with Holkar. He offered him a sum of Rs. 5 lakhs to ensure dilatory action on his part in the coming campaign. He also sent a Vakil Mahamad Ghyas to Poona. Mahamad Ghyas started diplomatic manoeuvres through Laxman Rao Raste. He (Vakil) informed the Peshwa that Tipu had not turned away from friendship with the Peshwa nor would he do so. The Vakil informed Nana Phadnavis that he (Tipu) had asked for help in the disturbances at Bednoor but it was not rendered by the Marathas nor had they consulted him before negotiations with the Eng-

lish and now they were planning to invade his country in consultation with Mudhoji and Nizam Ali Khan. Balaji Pandit asked the Vakil whether he had brought the arrears of tribute from Tipu with him. The Vakil replied that payment of tribute could be arranged if the Peshwa gave up the design of invading the territory of Tipu and did not enter into any agreement about the invasion with Nizam Ali Khan and Mudhoji. Nana Phadnavis replied that they would in no case change the decision unless the tribute was received quickly. With these words he dismissed the envoy of Tipu. Ten days after this meeting Nana Phadnavis sent Kishan Rao Ballal to the Nizam requesting him to march according to the agreement. He sent similar instructions to Mudhoji at Nagpur. Kishan Rao Ballal arrived in Hyderabad. The Nizam said that he would require 25 lakhs of rupees for the preparation of his army and that the district of Bijapur or Ahmadnagar should be handed over to him. Unless this was agreed to it would not be possible for him to march. Kishan Rao Ballal felt that correspondence on this issue might entail delay and possibly Balaji or Haripant might not agree. Nana Phadnavis had asked Kishan Rao Ballal to make earnest efforts to make the Nizam join the campaign. Considering all these matters Kishan Rao Ballal told the Nizam that he (Nizam) should postpone the demand for 25 lakhs of Rs. for the present. Once the Nizam joined the Peshwa the district of Bijapur would be handed over to him before invading the territory of Tipu. On this reply the Nizam agreed to join the campaign. He did not know that Kishan Rao Ballal's reply was only a diplomatic stunt. Accordingly the Nizam joined the campaign against Tipu. Nana Phadnavis and the Nizam met on the banks of the river Bhima.

We need not go into the details of the Maratha-Nizam invasion of Tipu's territory. The Marathas captured the fort of Badami from Tipu. A desultory warfare occurred between the two parties. Before the Marathas and Nizam had invested the fort of Badami the Nizam demanded the cession of the district of Bijapur from the Marathas. This was flatly refused by Nana Phadnavis. The Nizam reminded Nana Phadnavis of the assurance which Kishan Rao Ballal had given him about handing over the territory of Bijapur before invading the kingdom of Mysore. Nana Phadnavis then made enquiries of Kishanrao and his son Govind Rao Ballal and discovered that they had made

unauthorised assurances to the Nizam. Kishan Rao was disgraced but the Marathas stuck to their refusal to cede Bijapur. The Nizam left the Marathas in a huff. In the meeting with Hari Pandit the Nizam remarked as follows "In view of the departure from the agreement which you have resorted to, war would inevitably break out between us. But I have decided that until Swai Madhava Rao assumes full powers of administration, I would not fight against him." He however agreed to leave his contingents with the Marathas besieging Badami.

As is well known, Tipu captured the fortress of Adoni from Nizam. The war with the Marathas dragged on for two years without any party having advantage over the other. The war came to a close with the treaty of Gajendragad. Laxminarayan dwells on the discreditable role played by Tukoji Holkar in this campaign. At the close of the campaign, at the approach of the rainy season Tipu found difficulties in getting provisions for his army from Shrirangpattan as two rivers had to be crossed viz., Tungabhadra and Krishna, and they were in floods. The Marathas on the other hand were in their own country. They could ensure provisions for themselves and at the same time obstruct the flow of provisions to Tipu's army. Tipu sent his envoys to the Marathas. He offered the payment of the arrears of tribute pending for the last four years and also guaranteed prompt payment in future. He however desired that the districts of Badami and Nargund which had been captured by the Marathas should be returned to him. Under instructions from Nana Phadnavis, Haripant refused to part with Badami and Nargund. Ultimately the treaty of Gajendragad was signed and the long drawn campaign ended (825). Laxminarayan then dwells on the affairs of the Nizam. He deals with the rise of Zafruddowlah (Ibrahim Baig Dhousa) for a short period and the appointment of Gulam Sayyad Arastujah Mushir-ul-mulk as the Prime Minister of the Nizam. He next deals in detail with the Third Mysore War. Considerable literature being available in Persian and Marathi on the War which the Marathas, the English and the Nizam made on Tipu it is not necessary to repeat the account given by Laxminarayan in the work. Laxminarayan brings his work to a close to the beginning of 1794 A.D. when the Nizam was camping at Bedar.

Voluminous as the work of Laxminarayan is, it is not difficult to assess its importance. As has been remarked above, Laxmi-

narayan has followed numerous Indo-Persian historians in the method of his work. He has copied not scores but hundreds of pages from the works of historians like Khafikhan and Gulam Hussein Azad. About 120 pages from Khafikhan, about 80 pages from G. H. Azad's *Khazana-i-Amira*, about 100 pages from Tarik-e-Shivaji a Persian version of a Marathi chronicle have resulted in taking the bulk of the book to 1057 pages. He does not possess critical acumen in shifting material or in arriving at a judgment on any given issue. Laxminarayan gives an impression of being a very poor historian in repeating the stories of the origin of the Marathas or in reproducing the Persian translation of the letter alleged to have been written by Malharrao Holkar after the battle of Panipat. He does not stop even once to consider whether the material he was placing before the reading public belonged to the realm of fact or fiction. As such, till at least 1761 the account given by Laxminarayan in his work deserves to be skipped over lightly. It is only after 1761 when Laxminarayan became a witness to many of the incidents pertaining to Maratha-Nizam or Nizam-Mysore relations that he becomes readable. His father Mansaram was the chief secretary to the first Nizam. His grandfather Balmukund was attached to the father of Niam-ul-mulk. Laxminarayan himself was a courtier in the court of Nizam Ali Khan. He makes a reference to his own poetical compositions at the time of the marriage of Alijah the eldest son of Nizam Ali Khan. There are several similar references to Laxminarayan's contacts with the Vakil of Tipu. Laxminarayan worked for a long time as Secretary to Alijah. As such the account which he gives of the Nizam and Hyder Ali and Tipu is full and of an intimate nature. We cannot therefore brush aside lightly his treatment of some of the incidents the knowledge of which he must have obtained from intimate sources. Some of these are given below:

(1) At the battle of Rakhsas Bhawan, fought in 1763, the Nizam's Prime Minister Vithal Sunder was shot dead at the instance of Murad Khan an officer in the Nizam's Army.

(2) The appointment of Ruknuddowlah as the Prime Minister of Nizam after the battle of Rakshas Bhawan was practically forced upon the Nizam by the Marathas as a result of the machinations of Sherjung (the ancestor of the Salar jung family of Hyderabad) with the Marathas.

(3) Laxminarayan informs us that Sherjung was one of those who had conspired to get Nizam Ali Khan murdered. This point is ignored by the later historians of Hyderabad, probably because the Salarjung family was dominant in the history of Hyderabad throughout the 19th century.

(4) The death of Salabatjung under suspicious circumstances is referred to by Laxminarayan. He says that for fear of Raghunath Rao trying to release Salabatjung from captivity and placing him as the Nizam, Salabatjung was put to death, adding significantly that this was done "under instruction." We can easily understand why Laxminarayan does not specifically use the word "Nizam Ali Khan" and satisfies himself only with the expression "under instruction." When this book was written by Laxminarayan, Niam Ali Khan was still living. The author of the Persian work *Hadiquatul Alam*, which was written in 1807 A.D., 4 years after the death of Nizam Ali Khan is more specific when he says that Salabhatjung was strangled to death under the instructions of Nizam Ali Khan.

(5) Dealing with the circumstances under which the Prime Minister Ruknuddowlah was murdered in 1775, Laxminarayan specifically points out that one of the causes of the murder was the intimate relations which Ruknuddowlah had established with the Marathas and the wide suspicion that with the help of his contingents he was planning violence against the Nizam. The Marathi records require to be scrutinised on this question. The suspicion can be easily understood if it is realized that during the period Ruknuddowlah was Prime Minister of Nizam, the state of Hyderabad had very nearly become the protectorate of the Marathas. This must have been very galling to the anti-Maratha party of the Nizam's council.

(6) Dealing with the murder of Narayan Rao Peshwa, Laxminarayan emphatically states that Gajiuddin Imad-ul-mulk, one time Prime Minister of the Mughal emperors instigated Raghunath Rao, during his visit to Poona, to seize power. This point has to be examined in the light of Marathi records if any.

(7) The attempts of Raghunath Rao to escape from the custody of Nana Phadnavis and his conspiracies with the Scindia, the East India Company and Tipu have been related in detail by Laxminarayan. He gives vent to the widespread suspicion that Raghu-

nath Rao's death was hastened under the treatment of physicians specially deputed by Nana Phadnavis.

(8) As a side light of Nizam Maratha campaign against Tipu, Laxminarayan refers to the insistence of the Nizam to be given the district of Bijapur for assistance to the Marathas in the war against Tipu. It is amusing to read that, faced with the refusal of the Marathas to hand over Bijapur, the helpless Nizam could only say that it was sufficient to provoke a war between them but that as he had promised that he would not wage war against the Marathas until Sawai Madhav Rao assumed administrative powers he would keep quiet for the present.

The above are some of the points which deserve to be examined in the light of the extant Marathi, Persian and English papers. It can be said that while Laxminarayan's work is of practically no importance for the period ending in 1761, it will be extremely useful for the study of the period between 1761 and 1794.

The Teliki Community of Medieval Andhra

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The economy of medieval Andhra was primarily an agrarian one. But, from the 11th century to the 16th century, we find a progressive increase in the development of towns and cities, around the holy shrines and the capitals of the kings of different dynasties of the times. Demand arose for various kinds of goods. The communities that engaged themselves in industry and trade—the artisans, the oil-mongers, the weavers and merchants—attained a status and position of their own and became important 'social groups' within the compass of the medieval state. They carried a distinct numerical figure with their name, worshipped a distinct deity, cherished a mythical origin of their own, bore a *prāsasti* and had their own organization. It is proposed here to study the social history of the Teliki community in detail, the manner in which they led their lives through these centuries, the position they occupied in the society and the communal organization they had.

The Telikis were easily one of the important industrial communities of the time. They were the oil-mongers and like the other communities of a similar nature, they carried their own distinct number—Thousand, with the name of the community.¹ Their principal seat was Bezwada, the modern Vijayawada on the banks of the river Krishna, and they were known as Teliki Vēvuru of Bezwada. Not much information is, however, available to

1. The inscriptions of the period from Andhra area reveal that this association of a number is a common practice in Medieval Andhra. The purport, however, is not clear. Thus, if the oil-monger community was a Thousand community (Teliki Vēvuru), the artisan community was a seventy-four community (Debbayi Nālgū Ahaṇāla Pañcāṇambāru) while the Penugonda Vaiśya community was a Hundred and Two community (Nakaramu Nūta ribbandru).

reconstruct their social history. What little is known is to be gathered from a few epigraphs of the time and from a literary work known as "Manuvarṇśa Purāṇā" which deals exclusively with the history of the Teliki community.

The earliest epigraph to mention the Teliki community of Andhra belongs to the reign of Cālukya-Cōḷa King Kulōttunga I (A.D. 1071—A.D. 1120).² Therein the community seems to have already attained a position of importance having close connections with the dynasty of Eastern Cālukyas of Vēngi. Rājarāja Cōḷa Gaṅgādēva, son of Kulōttunga, and viceroy of Vēngi, is known to have conferred great many honours on the members of the Teliki community in the year A.D. 1084. His Tēki plates, that register this, also contain interesting information about the community itself. The Telikis were about one thousand families. They had accompanied King Vijayāditya of Ayōdhya to the South and settled at Vijayawada. This Vijayāditya was the mythical progenitor of the Cālukyas of Vēngi.³ The Telikis served the Eastern Cālukya family ever since as hereditary servants, always intent on pleasing the minds of the kings with supreme devotion and with all resources of mind and body at their disposal. (Parayābhaktyā saktyā ca pragñayā sadā madiyānvayabhūpāla cittārādhanā tatparāḥ). They protected the Cālukyan kings at the beginning of their rule with their courage and other virtues (nijaiḥ yatnaih nijaiah prārow vikramādyaih). For their meritorious services, they were rewarded with privileges which were designed to assure for them a certain favoured position in the society of the times. The edict states that, when a member of the community marries at Vijayawada or any other town, city, village or hamlet, the bridal pair should proceed on the roads on horse-back, and later when the marriage procession drew to an end, they would place a pair of valuable clothes at the feet of the king and prostrate before him and they would then receive from him, betel served in a golden plate as the old custom would ordain.⁴

The oil-mongers would not have sprung to such eminence, as is established by the Tēki plates all of a sudden. It must have

2. E. Ind. Vol. VI, p. 334 ff.

3. Rānastapundi grant of Vimalāditya. E. Ind. Vol. VI, p. 359.

4. Tēki plates.

been a development, quite gradual and long incoming. Considerable amount of mystery, however, hangs over the origin of the Telikis and about the circumstances in which they secured such recognition among several communities of the land. The only source of information in this direction is the literary work 'Manuvarṇśa Purāṇa'⁵ which purports to give the origin and greatness of the oil-presser castes. The Purāṇa like the Tēki plates traces the origin of the Telikis to the North. They were Kṣatriyas and descendants of Manu. They incurred the wrath of a sage named Viśvambhara, who cursed them to be born as oil-pressers. This curse however was to come into effect in Kaliyuga. In the meanwhile, the kṣatriya forefathers of the Telikis performed great many exploits which the Purāṇa describes at length. But the interesting part of the exploits comes in the phase of Kaliyuga. King Viṣṇu Vardhana of Ayōdhya, conscious of the greatness of the scions of Manu race, who stood by the side of the kings of Hastināpura, made them occupy a pivotal position in the governance of his kingdom. Once, the king became intent upon conquering the Vēngi kingdom to reduce the pride of its ruler. Thereupon he summoned the scions of Manu race to his presence and commanded them to lead the forces against Vēngi and subdue it. For a reward, the king offered to make them the rulers of Vijayawada. This they accomplished quite expeditiously showing great valour. The king was pleased with the mighty act and installed them as rulers of Vijayawada. Thus the Purāṇa establishes the connection between the Kṣatriya ancestors of the Telikis with Bezwada. During their long stay as rulers, when the curse of Viśvambhara, began to take effect is not clear from the Purāṇa. But they had to forsake their Kṣatriya lineage to become the community of oil-pressers. They changed their former 'gōtras' derived from various sages to assume the ordinary 'gōtras' (Vyavahāra gōtra samanvitulai). The Purāṇa also gives the picture of the righteous life, the community led in Vijayawada, worshipping God Mallikhārjunadēva.

The concluding portion of the Purāṇa, mentions two 'dharmaśāsanās' given in favour of the Telikis by the kings who were pleased with the conduct of the community. The first is the

5. Manuvarṇśa Purāṇa (Manuscript). D. 160 of the Catalogue of Telugu Manuscripts. Oriental Mss. Library, Madras.

'śāsana' given by Bezwada Madhavavarma which, we are told, was inscribed on a stone, lying on the east side of the shrine of Mallikārjuna. This refers to the privileges given to the Telukula śeṭṭis of different places like Peda Vēngi, Niḍadavōlu Taṭikalapūḍi and Bezwada. They were made the Peda (Śeṭṭi chiefs) of the places. They would receive according to the 'dharmaśāsana' three māḍas of coin, three bundles of betel leaf and three hundred and sixty arecanuts and a shawl whenever a marriage was performed in the community. The second 'śāsana' refers to the grant of certain villages as 'ēkabbōgas' to Telikis by a king named Pratāpa Cōla. The villages were Bezwada, Peda Vēngi Vijayarāya Jananāthapuri, Dhanañjayapuri, Taṭikalapūḍi, Padmāvatī, Bhōgavati, Tāḍuvāyi, Chintalapūḍi, Kautavaram, Sākēta Pañcālapuravarāmulu, Mathurayātrāpuramu, and Maṇikarnikamu. Thus, with these acquisitions, the Telikis lived on enjoying supremacy in their vocation, worshipping the Brahmans and serving the poor.

The account of the Purāṇa thus contains much that is mythological and legendary and must be correlated to and verified by available evidence from the epigraphs of the times. Firstly, as to the question of their original home, the Purāṇa and the Tēki plates postulate, a northern habitation and a subsequent immigration to South, and this immigration is associated with the date of conquest of Vēngi by a king of Ayōdhya. The king is styled in the Tēki plates as Vijayāditya while the Purāṇa has him as Viṣṇuvardhana. It is known that one Kubja Viṣṇuvardhana was the founder of the Eastern Cālukya line of Vēngi. If he were to be the Viṣṇuvardhana of the Purāṇa, he was the brother of Pulakēśin II (A.D. 609—A.D. 642) of the Cālukyas of Bādāmi. He was in no way associated with Ayōdhya. The earliest epigraphical record to connect Vēngi Cālukyas with Ayōdhya is dated in Śaka 933 (A.D. 1111) and issued by king Vimalāditya.⁶ But according to it, the leader of the expedition to South from Ayōdhya was Vijayāditya and not Viṣṇuvardhana. The Eastern Cālukyas of Vēngi claim to be of the lunar race and descendants of Pāṇḍavas and the lunar line is always associated with Hastināpura but never with Ayōdhya. It is curious to find the attempt in the Purāṇa to bring Ayōdhya and Hastināpura together. But then it only speaks of earlier Teliki affiliations to

6. Ranastapundi grant of Vimalāditya. E. Ind. Vol. VI, p. 359.

Hastināpura and not of the Cālukyas. King Vijayāditya is mentioned in the epigraph as the forerunner of the Eastern Cālukya line. Thus, the question of the original home of Telikis is conjectural. It must remain so especially when the problem of the original home of Cālukyas with whom the Telikis associate themselves to tracing their original home is still unsettled.⁷

As regards their caste, it can be said that the vocation which the community followed, namely oil-pressing, was the one generally followed by the members of the 'śūdra' community in the medieval times. But in the Purāṇa we are told, they were originally Kṣatriyas who later took to oil-pressing because of the curse of the sage Viśvambhara. This only shows the general desire of a community, which had recently come to affluence, but in the lower social strata, to reach a higher social status by making a claim to a caste acknowledged on all hands to be distinctly superior. The Manuvamśa Purāṇa was obviously written to enhance the social status of one such community. There is no wonder if it traces the origin of the Telikis to the Kṣatriya caste. Nor is the claim a vain boast. The 'śūdra' community of the medieval times, possessed to the full the valour of the kṣatriyas and in fact, supplied recruits to the royal armies of the day.

It may be fairly certain that the first Cālukyan conqueror of Vēngi had some Teliki contingents in his army which must have proved to be of exceeding help to him. And that was the basis of their later prosperity, as that was what enabled the community to establish itself in Bezwada. The Tēki plates describe the Telikis as those whose valour protected the early Cālukya kings. Some of the members must have distinguished themselves as captains and generals, as did Śūrana of the Viśvakarma community,⁸ and this could have made the community prominent in the land. In any case, the history of the Telikis seem to have started with that of the Cālukyan rule in the Andhra country.

The Manuvamśa Purāṇa attributes the issue of the two 'dharmaśāsanas' mentioned therein to two kings, Mādhavavarma

7. For the different arguments on the question of original home of Cālukyas, see Prof. N. Venkataramanayya's "The Eastern Cālukyas of Vēngi", p. 5 ff.

8. S.I.I. Vol. VI, No. 117; Bhārati; Vol. 36, Śāñchika, 11.

and Pratāpa Cōla respectively. It holds no key to their identity, nor does it provide us any more information to go by. History knows of several Mādhavavarmanas who ruled from Bezwada. But they are of the Viṣṇukundin dynasty. It is from Viṣṇukundins that the early Cālukyas wrested the lands of Andhra. Could this Mādhavavarma of the Purāṇa be of the same line? If this were so, then the Telikis must have been already residing in the Bezwada area at the time when the Cālukyas attempted its conquest. Highly needed and immense must have been their assistance to the Cālukyas for gaining mastery over the country. How this was secured by the conquerors or what induced the Telikis to go over to the invader cannot be known. They must have been at least assured of undisturbed enjoyment of all that they earlier had under king Mādhavavarma. Of the king, Pratāpa Cōla again nothing is known. The Purāṇa gives him a compendious name Cālukya Viṣṇu Vardhana Maharāja Dēvabhallāna Viraperumallu Pratāpa Cōla Narēndra and the date given to him is Śaka 1190. The king might be a Cōla. But then by the year A.D. 1268, on the Imperial Cōla throne was seated Rājendra III (A.D. 1246—A.D. 1279) and not Pratāpa Cōla. On the basis of his Cālukyan extraction and Cōla suffix, we can say that he was a local ruler ruling somewhere near Bezwada who strove for the betterment of the Teliki Community.

Finally, a word may be said about 'The Thousand' that is attached to the Telikis. The Tēki plates, as mentioned earlier, describe that the community is known to have subdivided itself into thousand families, ten of which are mentioned by name. The Manuvamśa Purāṇa likewise speaks of the thousand Ṛṣi 'gōtras' of their ancestral Kṣatriyas which they had to exchange, under Viśvambhara's curse, for 'Vyavahāra Gōtras'. Thus the members of the community had a notion that they originally consisted of thousand families.⁹ Thus the number 'Thousand' became sacred to them and they referred themselves in their records with it.

9. It may be mentioned in this connection that the oil-monger community of Tāmīlnāḍ of certain areas entertained the same notion that they were originally produced of thousand 'gōtras'. It may be possible that this tradition travelled from Andhra to Tāmīlnāḍ in later years. See A.R.E. 1912, ii, para 72.

We may now set forth the account of the community thus. The original home of the Telikis is not clearly known. If the Mādhavavarma of the Manuvamśa Purāṇa were Viṣṇukundin, their earliest known habitat was in Andhra, near about Bezwada. They were of the fourth caste. Having attached themselves closely to the dynasty of Eastern Cālukyas and served in the king's armies from the very beginning of their rule, they were recipients of great honours and privileges. This infused them with a sense of importance that made them love to be regarded as Kṣatriyas, though now fallen. Soon, royal patronage added to their importance in other towns of Andhra as well. The corporate nature of the community was the recognition which it received from the Cōla Viceroy in Vēngi, Rāja Rāja Cōla Gaṅgadēva.

A few inscriptions from the Kṛṣṇa and the Guntur districts furnish us with further information about the later activities of this community. Two inscriptions from the Bhāvanārayana temple at Bāpaṭla of the years A.D. 1163 and A.D. 1164, register a gift of gold for lamp by members of Teliki Thousand.¹⁰ Two other inscriptions, one undated from the Mūlasthāna temple at Nādenḍla¹¹ in Narasaraopet Taluk of the Guntur District, and the other of the year A.D. 1409 from Bezwada itself record the donations of the community as a whole. The former records a gift of sheep to Mūlasthānēśvara at Nādenḍla while the other records an endowment to the Mallēśvara Dēva shrine at Bezwada. The inscriptions recording the endowments of the community may be taken to indicate the flourishing state of the community during these centuries. They also show that the community acquired so high a status that they adopted a 'praśasti' of their own, after the fashion of other industrial and mercantile communities of the time.

The 'praśasti' of the Telikis, given in their records, cited above, describes them in glowing terms, with a string of epithets. Bent upon observing 'yama', 'niyama' and 'dharma' they became illustrious for maintaining truth and the purity of the rituals

10. S.I.I. Vol. VI, I, No. 149 and No. 152.

11. S.I.I. Vol. IV, Nos. 668 and 774: It may also be noted in this connection that still another inscription from Bhṛḡubāṇḍa in Guntur District records the construction of the temple of Nārāyanadēva by the members of the Teliki community, Local Records, Vol. 12, p. 259.

(Yama niyama dharma parāyaṇulu, satya śaucāra virājītulu). They were recipients of the grace from goddess Bhagavati, the worshippers of the feet of the gurus and adepts in all śāstras (Bhagavati labdha varaprasādulu, gurudēva pādārādhakulu, sakala śāstra viśāradulu). They sprang from the lords of the progeny of Manu, the son of Brahma (Bhama sambhava Manuvamsādhinātha sambhavalu). They were born in the line of Manu, descended gradually from the family of Paulastya, an offspring of Brahma (Brahma sambhava Paulastyakula Manuvamsōdbhavalu). They were the 'gōtrins' of the one thousand branches of families which sprang from Paulastya (Paulastyakula sahasra śākhānvaya gōtrulu). They were the lords of Kanakapura, Gajapura and the servants of the lords of Ayōdhya (Kanakapura Gajapurādhināyakulu Ayōdhyāpuravarēśvara bhṛtuyulu). Of the one thousand 'gōtras', they were the rulers of Bezwada, devoted to the lotus feet of God Mallīśvaradēva. They came to be regarded as the main support of the kingdom of Cālukyas (Sahasra śākhānvaya gōtrulu, Bezwada śāsanalu, Bezwada Mallīśvaradēvadvīya śrī pāda padmārādhakulu, Cālukyarājyamūlastambhāyamānulu).

This 'praśasti' of the community, does not however add any more to the information than we already have of the community. It praises the personal virtues of the members of the community, traces their mythical origin to Manu and connects them with the kings of Ayōdhya. The title 'Cālukyarājyamūlastambhāyamānulu' which the community applies to itself, reaffirms its claim to have served the Cālukyan kings as captains and generals of the army. Finally the phrases 'Bezwada Śāsanulu' Bezwada Mallīśvaradēvadvīya Śrī Pāda Padmārādhakulu, confirm the view that Bezwada was their principal seat.

How was the community organised? Did they enjoy any corporate life, functioning as a single unit, with facilities for joint action? The Telikis are described in their records as 'akhila dēśāla Teliki Vēvuru', the Teliki, one thousand, of all the regions. This word is significant as it emphasises the corporate nature of the community, their awareness of one another, no matter where they lived. A few records are also available which speak of their communal transactions. An inscription from Zuzzūru in Nandigāma Taluk of the Krishna District of the year A.D. 1202 records a gift by the Teliki Thousand to a tank constructed by themselves

(tāmu kaṭṭincina ceruvu).¹² We have epigraphical evidence to show that the Telikis had an assembly, which acted as the custodian of the interests of the members. It had jurisdiction to enquire into and settle questions of succession of property and pass rules and regulations regarding the conduct to be followed in marriages. A record from Nādenḍla refers to the transactions of such an assembly where all the 'Thousand' effected an agreement (Teliki Vēvuru cēsina samayamu).¹³ It was about the right to the jewels of a deceased wife. The assembly decided in favour of the surviving husband as against the relatives of the deceased woman. Another mutilated record from Bezwada of the year A.D. 1253, records another Samaya of the Telikis, fixing certain formalities to be followed in the course of a marriage (Vivāha maryāda).¹⁴ These two records show that the Telikis had an assembly of their own which, as a body, imposed on the members certain rules of conduct to be implicitly followed as Samaya Dharma. This would justify the assumption that a vigorous corporate life existed in the community of the Telikis of Andhra. But these records do not yield us any information about the organisation of the assembly of the Telikis. Probably as the Manuvamsa Purāṇa depicts, there was a chief called Peda Śeṭṭi in every important town as the head of the community. Whenever the occasion required, these chiefs might have assembled in a town and decided matters concerning the interests of the community.¹⁵

12. S.I.I. Vol. X, No. 200 of the year A.D. 1202.

13. Ibid., No. 221.

14. S.I.I., Vol. IV, No. 797.

15. It is interesting to note that an inscription (A.R.E. 261 of 1909) from Tirukkachchūr in Chengulput District of the time of the Cōla monarch Rājādhirāja II (A.D. 1173—A.D. 1178) acquaints us with a communal assembly of oil-mongers of Kāñchi, its suburbs and those of 24 nagaras. It is stated in the inscription that these people assembled in a local temple at Kāñchi and agreed to raise a communal cess to be paid to the temple. This decision, the members had to observe as 'Jātidharma'. The picture of the communal life presented in this epigraph is in conformity with the communal life of the Telikis of Andhra.

The Later Imperial Pratiharas: Bhoja II to Vijayapala

(A Revised Study) *

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Bhoja II

As Bhoja II is not mentioned in the inscriptions of Mahīpāla's reign and has his feet "meditated on" by his brother Vināyakapāladeva, whose Bengal Asiatic Society Plate was issued in V. 988 (931 A.D.) from Mahodaya, i.e., Kannauj,¹ it is reasonable to assume that he ascended the Pratihāra throne before 931 A.D., during the interval between the reigns of Mahīpāla and Vināyakapāla. Mahīpāla must have had a fairly long reign; his achievements were so many and in so many different directions. If we give him about twenty years, say from 910 to 930 A.D., Bhoja II could have ruled for about one year only. And this view gets confirmed by the facts that not only we have no inscriptions for Bhoja II's reign but that he is also referred to only in one Pratihāra record, namely, the Bengal Asiatic Society Plate of his brother and immediate successor, Vināyakapāla.

Regarding Bhoja II as a contemporary of Kokkalladeva Chedi I, though this is extremely unlikely,² and then to assume on the basis of this unwarranted hypothesis that Kokkalladeva I, assisted by the Rāṣtrakūṭa ruler Indra III, intervened in the affairs of Kannauj put Bhoja II on the throne in 910 A.D., which till then had been occupied by Mahīpāla, is perhaps going a little too far

* Continued from the last instalment in the *JIH.*, 1960, p. 626.

1. *IA*, XV, p. 140.

2. See our account of Mahīpāla.

and drawing more on one's imagination than one should as an impartial recorder of facts.³

Nor need we assume that Bhoja II and Mahipāla were identical.⁴ The absence of the former's name in the latter's inscriptions and of Mahipāla's name from the Bengal Asiatic Plate of Vināyakapāla, who was one of Mahipāla's successors, can be explained better in the manner suggested above, and we can further contend that Bhoja's name cannot be had in Mahipāla's inscriptions for the simple reason that he was the latter's successor.⁵ In Vināyakapāla's grant, it was unnecessary to mention Mahipāla, not only because Bhoja's reign intervened between those of these two but also because there is no general rule obliging a ruler to mention all the collaterals who preceded him on the throne.⁶ "The Paramāra ruler Naravarman", as Dr D. C. Ganguly points out, "devotes a large number of verses to eulogising the merits and achievements of his elder brother, Lakṣmadeva, in his Nāgpur inscription, dated 1104 A.D. But in his Madhukargaḍh inscrip-

3. This is the position taken up by Dr. R. N. Puri in his *History of the Gurjara-Pratihāras*, pp. 80-81. He assumes also that Bhoja II was removed from the throne of Kannauj by Mahipāla with the help of Harṣadeva Chandella and presents his further reconstruction of the Pratihāra history in the following words:

"The Chandella ruler was amply rewarded for his services. The absence of Bhoja's name in the works of Rājasekhara is not surprising. The court-poet knew the real claimant to the throne, and he could hardly associate himself with the usurper. Further, as the play itself was staged before Mahipāla, it would have been bad taste to bring in Bhoja unnecessarily, reminding the king of old and sad memories."

In our opinion all this is unnecessary theorising, because a dramatist mentions only the patron, and sometimes also the patron's father, if he be an outstanding personality. No dramatic convention of Sanskrit and Prakrit literature requires him to mention a patron's brother.

4. The identity of Mahipāla and Bhoja II has been advocated by Dr. Nihar Ranjan Ray and Dr. H. C. Raychaudhuri respectively in the *IA*, 1928, pp. 230-31 and *Indian Culture*, XII, pp. 199 ff

5. See our account of Mahipāla.

6. The Bengal Asiatic Society Plate of Vināyakapāla brings the genealogy up to Mahendrapāla, then mentions Bhojadeva as his *pādānudhyāta*, and ends by speaking of Vināyakapāla as the *pādānudhyāta* of both his father, Mahendrapāla and his own brother, Bhojedeve, too, obviously because he was Vināyakapāla's immediate predecessor. The name of Mahipāla, a collateral, who was Mahendrapāla's immediate successor, has been left out for reasons explained above.

tion, dated A.D. 1107 A.D. and Kadambapadraka Plate, dated 1100 A.D., he does not mention the name of his brother, though takes particular care to mention the names of his father grandfather and grandfather's brother".⁷

Nothing is known of the political events of Bhoja II's reign.

Vināyakapāla I

Bhoja II was succeeded by his brother, Vināyakapāla, a son of Mahendrapāla I by Mahidevi-devi.⁸ For him we have two inscriptions, the Bengal Asiatic plate, the contents of which have been noticed above, and the Rakhetrā (Gwalior State) Tablet inscription of V. 999 and 1000, recording "apparently the construction, at a cost of 95 or 96 crores of (coins) of some water-work connected with the Orr river".⁹ He thus ruled for at least twelve years. He is mentioned also in Hariṣeṇa's *Bṛhatkathākośa* imposed at Wadhwan, within Vināyakapāla's dominions, in 989.

Vināyakapāla's dates do not, as already stated,¹⁰ overlap those of Mahipāla. Therefore the only grounds for identifying these rulers are the equations originally proposed by Kielhorn and later on accepted by many scholars.¹¹ These equations can be represented as follows:—

Hayapati Devapāla of Yaśo-	=	Paramabhaṭṭāraka — Mahā-
varman's Khajurāho ins-		rājādhirāja — Paramēśvara
cription of V. 1011		Devapāla of the Siyadonī
		inscription.

7. *Bhāratiya Vidyā*, IX, p. 196. The argument that Mahipāla could call himself Bhoja because all the Pratihāra rulers of Kānyakubja were known as Bhoja is unconvincing. No other prince of the line, excepting Bhoja I and Bhoja II, was known as Bhoja.

8. Bengal Asiatic Plate, *IA*, XV, p. 140.

9. *Bhandarkar's List*, No. 2110. Garde's notice of the inscription in the *ASI*, 1925, on which Bhandarkar's note is based can hardly be regarded as satisfactory. The inscription, obviously is important both as a political and economic record.

10. See the account of Mahipāla.

11. Notably by D. R. Bhandarkar, R. C. Majumdar, D. C. Ganguly, R. C. Majumdar and H. C. Ray. Dr. G. H. Ojha criticised the identification. Dr. B. N. Puri follows the lead given by Dr. Ojha. My reasons for the differentiation between these two rulers are in some respects different from those already advanced by other scholars.

- ∴ *Hayapati* Devapāla's father, = *PMP* Devapāla's father, *PMP* Herambapāla Kṣitipāladeva.
 Herambapāla is synonymous with Vināyakapāla.
 Kṣitipāla is synonymous with Mahipāla.
 ∴ Vināyakapāla (Herambapāla) Mahipāla (Kṣitipāla).

The large number of assumptions involved in this process of identifying Vināyakapāla with Mahipāla has always made me sceptical about its correctness. *Hayapati* Devapāla of the verse given below in the footnote¹² probably is not *PMP* Devapāla of the Siyadoṇi inscription, for the Pratihāra rulers, as pointed out by Dr G. H. Ojah,¹³ never called themselves *Hayapatis*. Further, as the title *aśvapati* (which is synonymous with *hayapati*) has traditionally been assigned only to rulers of North-western India, Hindu as well Muslim,¹⁴ it is probably a north-western ruler, and not one of *Madhyadeśa*, who is designated in this verse also as *hayapati*, i.e. *aśvapati*. Can he not be a *Shāhi*? Kielhorn's translation of the verse makes one think of the *Kīrarāja* as such. But the natural construction of the verse makes the word *Shāhi* a little more applicable to Herambapāla;¹⁵ and if this view of mine be regarded as correct, his son Herambapāla could, as a north-western ruler, be aptly designated as a *hayapati*. Thus we would have two absolutely different Devapālas, one a *Shāhi* of North-western India and the other, a *PMP* of the Imperial Pratihāra dynasty.

With the rejection of this vital identification, the rest of the edifice built upon it naturally topples down to the ground like a building without any foundation. And even if we assume the correctness of the identification and also the correctness of the

equation, Herambapāla = Vināyakapāla, there is, as already shown,¹⁶ no reason why Kṣitipāla of the prose records of Siyadoṇi and Rājor should be identified with Mahipāla of the two prose records of the years 914 and 917 A.D. In none of these can we plead that metrical exigencies required the change of Mahipāla to Kṣitipāla and *vice versa*. We shall therefore, as already decided, treat Vināyakapāla as a ruler different from Mahipāla, and the latter also as different from Kṣitipāla, even though that is not the generally accepted view, and put Vināyakapāla's reign-period tentatively between the years 931 and 945 A.D.^{16a}

During Vināyakapāla's reign the Pratihāra empire had once again to suffer at the hands of the Rāṣtrakūṭa raiders. At some time between 937 and 940, during the reign of Amoghavarṣa III, his Crown-Prince, Kṛṣṇa, ignoring all old family ties, attacked and defeated the Chedis¹⁷ and, advancing further to the north is said to have deprived the Pratihāras of all hopes of holding Kālañjara and Chitrakūṭa.¹⁸ This might mean that the Rāṣtrakūṭas captured these strongholds. They could not, however, even if they captured them, retain them for long, on account of the quickly changing political conditions of the times. Chitrakūṭa, which is perhaps Chitor as suggested by some scholars,¹⁹ was probably recaptured by Bhartṛpaṭṭa II, who though continuing to recognise the supremacy of the Pratihāras, assumed the proud title of *Mahārājādhirāja*,²⁰ a fact indicative not only of an increase in his power but also of his comparative independence from central control. In central India, the Chedi ruler, Yuvarāja I, rallied his forces and succeeded not only in driving out the Rāṣtrakūṭas from his kingdom²¹ but also in occupying Kālañjara, though only to lose

12. Kailasād=Bhojanāthaḥ suhṛditi cha tataḥ Kīrarājaḥ prapade
 Sāhis=tasmād=avāpa dvipa-turaga-balen=ānu Herambapālaḥ
 tat-sunor=Devapālāt tamatha Hayapateḥ prāpya ninye pratiṣṭhām
 Vaikuṇṭham kuṇḥitāriḥ kṣitidharatilakaḥ Śrī-Yaśovarma-rājaḥ//

13. Ojah-nibandha-saṅgraha, Part 4, p. 9.

14. It was the title of the rulers of Kekaya in the Upaniṣadic Period. In the *Prthvīrājaviṣaya*, X, 39, the word *hayapati* itself has been used for the ruler of Ghazni:

Marudīva diśi paśchimottarasya-
 mati-balavān=adhipas=samasta eva/
 Tadupari paramārtha-pauuruṣardhyā
 Hayapatireva tiraskaroti sarvān//

15. See footnote 12 for the verse. The sequence of the transfers of the image is indicated by tataḥ in line 1, anu in line 2, and aitha in line 3.

16. See Mahipāla's account already published in the *Journal*.

16a. We may keep in view also one of the reasons advanced by Dr. H. C. Raychaudhuri against the identification. Mahipāla was known also as Kārttikeya. This should differentiate him from Vināyaka which is the name of another son of Śiva.

17. See Karhād Plates, E.I., IV, p. 284.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 289, v. 30; *Ibid.*, V, p. 194, verse 25.

19. See Dr. G. C. Raychaudhuri's *History of Mewar*, pp. 37-8; D. C. Ganguly, *The Age of Imperial Kanauj*, p. 109.

20. E.I., IV, p. 187.

21. It is probably this Chedi success which is referred to in the Bilhari inscription, verse 24, E.I., I, p. 256. This is the view also of Dr. Ganguly in *The Age of Imperial Kanauj*, p. 89.

it soon; for while Yuvarāja's hostilities with the Rāṣtrakūṭas were continuing, Harsa's son and successor, Yaśovarman Chandella, swooped down upon Kālīnjara and captured it. And it had to be so, unless he was prepared to have his territories dominated by the Chedis. To the ambitious Chandellas even the Pratihāra yoke was getting irksome. To change it for the yoke of their neighbours and rivals, who had so far been no more than their equals, could hardly be to their taste. So they decided to fight against Yuvarāja I. The Chedi governor of the fort appears to have put up stiff resistance, for the Chandella records tell us not only that Yaśovarman "brought down shame on the shameful Chedis"²² but also that "free from fear, he impetuously defeated in battle the Chedi, whose forces were countless and who put down his lotus-foot on rows of diadems of famous princes."²³

Had Vināyakapāla been a strong ruler, Yaśovarman would probably have made over the fort to the Pratihāras. But he kept it, in spite of the Pratihāra attempts to recover it. Thus not only did he bring distress to the Chedis, but proved, as he claims, a scorching fire to the Gurjaras, i.e., the Pratihāras of Kanauj,²⁴

22. *E.I.*, I, verse 23.

23. *Ibid.*, verse 28. H. C. Raychaudhuri, A. S. Altekar and R. S. Tripathi believe that Yaśovarman captured Kālīnjara from the Rāṣtrakūṭas. But there is nothing in the Chandella records to indicate enmity between the Rāṣtrakūṭas and Chandellas. If Yaśovarman had scored a minor victory even over the Rāṣtrakūṭas, Chandella panegyrists would not have refrained from magnifying it a hundredfold. Nor can we agree with Prof. N. K. Sastri's view that Yaśovarman captured Kālīnjara with the co-operation of both the Chedis and the Rāṣtrakūṭas. Kṛṣṇa III's wanton attack on the Chedis, referred to above, had made such an alliance impossible. As to the Chandellas and the Chedis the relations between the two were mostly of a hostile nature; and that they were so in Yaśovarman's reign would be obvious from the quotations from the Khajurāho inscription given above.

24. *E.I.*, I, verse 23. Though the verse ascribes the achievements detailed in the verse to Yaśovarman, without much scope for ambiguity, Dr. B. N. Puri assigns them to Harṣa (*History of the Gurjara-Pratihāras*, p. 89). Dr. D. C. Sircar assigns the achievement to Yaśovarman but thinks that he captured the fort of Kālīnjara from a feudatory Pratihāra family, of which two records have been discovered so far, one an inscription at Chanderī, Madhya Bhārat, and the other a copper-plate now at Kalā Bhavan, Banaras. These Pratihāras, according to him, were Viceroys from Kanauj *I.H.Q.*, XXXIV, p. 83; footnote 4. My reading of the Siyadonī inscription, on the other hand, leaves me with the impression that the Kālīnjara-maṇḍala was

whose other territories, Mālwa, Kośala, and Kuru-pradeśa must also have been raided by him, if there be any substance in the claims made in Khajurāho inscription II, dated V. 1011.²⁵ And a similar conclusion can, we believe, be reached, on the basis of the statements that he had made the Gaṅgā and Yamunā his pleasure lakes²⁶ and that his cavalry and elephant force had reached the Himalayas.²⁷

Another feudatory who defied Vināyakapāla's authority, though a little less openly was Vākpatirāja I²⁸ of Śākambhari who was the first in his family to assume the title of *Mahārāja* and is said to have beaten back the attack of a *tantrapāla*, i.e., (a Pratihāra) Provincial Governor. Proud of the authority that he wielded the *tantrapāla* reached the Chauhān dominions. He was fully confident of success. But Vākpati's cavalry proved more than a match for the Pratihāras' elephant force, and the *tantrapāla* had to go back thoroughly humiliated.

In Gujarāt, Mūlaraja Chaulukya laid the foundation of his kingdom by conquering land on the Sarasvati river and establishing his capital at Anahillapattana. Signs of deteriorating political conditions can be seen also in Mālwa. Perhaps influenced by the rebellious spirit in every direction, Vairisimha Paramāra, known popularly as Vajraṭa, tried to make himself the independent ruler of Dhārā.²⁹ He had some success even; and his soldiers rejoiced that he had after all succeeded in establishing himself as the inde-

ruled by a different family, some members of which are described in this record as follows:—

- (a) *Mahāpratihāra samadhiगतपाञ्चमहाशब्दा महāsāmantādhipati* Undabhata (line 5), V. 960.
- (b) *Mahārājādhirāja Śrī-Dhūrbhata* (line 28), V. 969.
- (c) *Mahārājādhirāja Niṣkalaṅka*, V. 1005, V. 1008 and V. 1025. *Kālīnjara*pati Bhīmata mentioned by Rājasekhara as the writer of *Svapnadaśanana* and four other plays may have been Undabhata's successor.

25. *E.I.*, I, p. 126, verse 23.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 128, verse 39.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 127, verse 30.

28. For his career see the writer's *Early Chauhān Dynasties*.

29. *Jatas=tasmād=Vairisimhonyā-namnā*
loko brute Vajrata-svāminam yaṁ/
śatror=vargam dharay=āser=nihatya
śrīmad-Dhārā sūchitā yena rajnā//

Udepur prasasti of the Kings of Mālwa, verse 11, *E.I.*, I, p. 235.

pendent ruler of Dhārā, when he was attacked by Vināyakapāla's general, Bhāmanadeva Kalachuri, and deprived of the fruits of his victory.³⁰ Thus Mālwa, at least, was saved for the empire for some time more.

Dr. V. S. Agrawal described in the *Journal of the Numismatic Society of India* a number of *drammas* issued by Vināyakapāla. These were found at Bhondri in Sisendī Rāj, District Lucknow, and their weight varies from 62 to 69 grains. On the obverse they have the name of Vināyakapāladeva in three lines and a standing figure similar to that found on Bhoja's *Ādi-Varāha* *drammas*.³¹ Dr. A. S. Altekar also discovered some coins of Vināyakapāla with the boar on the obverse and the king's name on the reverse.³² In his *Dravya-parīkṣā*, Ṭhakkura Pheru describes *Vināyakī mudrās*, along with the *Vārāhī mudrās*, i.e. the coins of *Ādivarāha* Bhoja I, and gives the weight of silver in one hundred of them as 8 *tolās*, which is less by 2 *tolās* and 7 *māsās* than the weight of 100 *Varāhī drammas*.³³ The rest of the metal in them was copper.

Vināyakapāla died in c. 943 A.D. Putting together the numismatic as well as epigraphic evidence, for his reign we may conclude that the Pratihāra empire, in his time, was, despite some losses, moral, as well as material, respectable enough in dimensions and prestige to have a currency bearing his name, even though

As Buhler says (footnote 86), *E.I.*, I, p. 237) the verse signifies "Smiting the foe with *dhārā* (edge) of his sword the king indicated that Dhārā belonged to him."

We are putting the event in the reign of Vināyakapāla, because Vairisimha's son, Śiyaka, ruled from C. 949 to C. 972.

30. The conclusion given above, can be drawn on the basis of the verse from the Udepur *prāṣṭi* quoted above and the description of Bhāmanadeva in the Kahlā plate as "*nija-vijayipa (do) ddhāra-Dhārāvanīsa- (rṣya) t-senā-jaya-śrī-hathaharāna-kālā-dhāma Bhāmanadevaḥ*", i.e., Bhāmanadeva who had by force snatched *jaya-śrī* from the army of the lord of the land of Dhārā, which had been rejoicing on his attainment of victorious status. For further discussion of the question read Miss Pratipāla's History thesis on the Paramāras.

31. *JNSI*, X, pp. 28 ff.

32. *Ibid.*

33. Verses 90-91. I am thankful to Muni Śrī-Jinavaijayaji for giving me the advance proofs of the book. Dr. Puri is mistaken in the thinking that 8 *tolas* is the weight of 100 coins. See his (*History of Gurjara-Pratihāras*, p. 153). This is the weight of silver in them.

this currency, was getting debased on account of the serious economic strain of wars as well as rebellions.

Mahendrapāla II

Mahendrapāla II's name is known to us from the Partābgarh inscription which describes him as a son of *Mahārāja* Vināyakapāladeva and Prasāadhanādevī.³⁴ He granted on the 5th day of the dark half of Mārgaśīrṣa, V. 1003 (946 A.D.), at the request of Dhanaśūra, the village *Kharpara-padraka*³⁵ which was in the holding of *talavargika* Hariṣaḍa and situated in the vicinity of Ghontā-vārṣikā³⁶ in the western *pathaka* of Daśapura^{36a} to the goddess Vatayakṣiṇī whose shrine was connected with the monastery of Hari-ṛṣīśvara. At the end of the epigraph is the sign-manual of Śrī-Vidagdha.

The second grant recorded in the same inscription mentions *tantrapāla mahāsāmanta daṇḍanāyaka* at Ujjayinī and Śrī-Śarman, a nominee of the *balādhikṛta* Kokkaṭa as transacting work at the *maṇḍapika*.³⁷ Mādhava granted at the request of *mahāsāmanta* Indrarāja Chāhamāna³⁸ the village of Dharapadraka³⁹ for repairs and daily services at the temple of Indrādityadeva at Ghontā-vārṣikā which had been built by the said Chāhamāna chief. The grant bears the sign-manuals of Śrī-Mādhava and Śrī-Vidagdha and purports to have been made by the former "for increase in the merit, fame and welfare in the next world of his parents and himself". It was communicated to the people who had come to the village perhaps for giving *bhoga* dues to Vidagdha.⁴⁰

34. *E.I.*, XIV, pp. 182 ff; *Ojha-nibandha-saṅgraha*, part 4, pp. 1-21.

35. Kharot, seven miles south-east of Partābgarh.

36. Ghotārsī, seven miles east of Partābgarh.

36a. Mandasor.

37. Dr. Ojha equates the word with Māndū, a famous fort of Mālwa. But as Māndū is never found being called *Maṇḍapikā*, and the nominee of a *balādhikṛta* is not big enough to be in charge of a fort, I give the word its usual sense of a "customshouse". The *Lekhapaddhati* (G.O.S.), p. 14, gives four instances of a *balādhipa* with a *pañchakula* in charge of a *maṇḍapikā*. *Balādhipa*'s connection with *maṇḍapikā* can be seen also from the Jhamvera inscription of Kethana, v. 1219. See also the Siyadoni inscription, *E.I.*, I, pp. 193, 175, 177 for the importance of the *maṇḍapikā*.

38. For the account of Indrarāja and the feudatory family to which he belonged see the present writer's *Early Chauhān Dynasties*, pp. 19-21.

39. Identified by Dr. G. H. Ojha with Dharyavad in Mewār.

40. The significance of the expression, "*Vidagdha-bhogāṇḍaptaye*" is not clear. Literally it means "for having Vidagdha's *bhoga*".

Another grant included in the inscription, which is dated the 1st day of the bright half of Śrāvaṇa, V. 999 (942 A.D.), was made by Śrī-Bhartṛpaṭṭa, son of Śrī-Khommāna,⁴¹ and is followed by a number of minor grants of no political importance.

Dr G. H. Ojha, who edited the record, regarded Vidagdha as the name of the Governor (of Mālwa). But considering the fact that it is Mādhava who is described as the *tantrapāla* stationed at Ujjayinī along with a *balādhikṛta*; and also the fact that it is not only the grant of the *tantrapāla* Mādhava but also the grant of Pratihāra emperor which bears Vidagdha's signature one should regard Vidagdha, I think, as a *nom de plume* of Mahendrapāla himself. Like some of his ancestors he might have been fond of patronising as well as writing good poetry, and thus entitled to the title Vidagdha.

The inscription provides incontestable proof of the Pratihāras' hold over Mālwa, with their provincial capital at Ujjain. But the fact that the *tantrapāla* granted villages on his own from a territory near Prātāgarh shows that he wielded considerable powers; and the fact that neither in Mādhava's grant nor in the grant of Dhavalappadeva, it has been necessary to refer to Mahendrapāla II as suzerain proves that the Pratihāra control had weakened a good deal, and that the rot which had begun in Vināyakapāla's reign continued unchecked its destructive work.

Kṣitipāla

Mahendrapāla is not referred to in the Siyadonī inscription. But we find in it a reference to PMP Devapāladeva, son of PMP Kṣitipāladeva with *Mahārājādhirāja* Niṣkalaṅka as his feudatory there, in Māgha, V. 1005, i.e., in the beginning of 949 A.D.⁴² As we have not found it possible to equate Kṣitipāla with Vināyakapāla and Mahipāla, perhaps the best thing to do would be to put Kṣitipāla between V. 1003, the only known date of Mahendrapāla II and V. 1005, the date of Kṣitipāla's son, Devapāla. Nothing can be said about his relationship with Mahendrapāla II or of the way in which he came to the throne. Short reigns probably betoken a period of political trouble which might have been used

41. For rommāna see Dr. G. C. Raychaudhuri's *History of Mewar*, p. 38.

42. See above footnote 24.

by ambitious rulers like Yaśovarman Chandella to increase their power still further.

Devapāla

Devapāla was on the Pratihāra throne in 949 A.D. Niṣkalaṅka of Siyadonī recognised his suzerainty. Devapāla must therefore have retained some hold over that area, even though real power had probably passed into the hands of big feudatories who styled themselves not only as *mahāsāmantādhipatis* but also as *mahārājādhirājas*.⁴⁴ Mūlarāja who had founded the kingdom of Aṇahillapaṭṭana in V. 998 added further territories to it during Devapāla's weak reign. The Paramāra chief, Siyaka II, whose father Vairisimha had been deprived of the fruits of his earlier victory by Bhāmanadeva Kalachuri more than avenged his people's discomfiture by operating from the Ahmedabad area against chiefs like Yogarāja who continued till then to recognise the Pratihāras as their overlords.⁴⁵ As his ally Siyaka had a chief of the Kheṭaka-maṇḍala (present Kairā district), who perhaps was a descendant of Prachanda of the Brahmvāk family, the governor or feudatory put in charge of the principality by Kṛṣṇa II, after its reconquest from the Pratihāras.⁴⁶

The Pratihāra relations with the Chandellas also worsened.⁴⁷ Yaśovarman had raided Pratihāra territories and conquered Kālāñjar. His son and successor, Dhanga, was even more aggressive. By 954 A.D., he succeeded in depriving the empire of (1) Gopagiri or Gwalior, in the conquest of which he was assisted by

43. See our account of Mahipāla and Vināyakapāla. Mere synonymity should not from our point of view form the basis of any identification.

44. Niṣkalaṅka for instance is a *Mahārājādhirāja*. That the situation had become worse by 959 A.D. will be seen from our account of the Rājor inscription below.

45. See the Harsolā plates of Siyaka II, *El.*, XIX, pp. 236 ff. Avani-varman II Chālukya, for whom we have the Unā plates of V. 956 (890 A.D.) called himself Yoga. I am not sure whether Siyaka's adversary, Yogarāja, of 249 A.D. can be identified with him. Yogarāja may have been Yoga's grandson.

46. Dr. D. C. Ganguly identifies Devapāla with *Hayapati* Devapāla and, on that basis, concludes that Yasovarman Chandella had come to terms with his overlord Devapāla (*The Age of Imperial Kanauj*, p. 45). But we neither agree with the identification nor with the statement about reconciliation in view of Yasovarman's activities detailed above.

47. See above the account of the preceding reigns.

his feudatory Vajradāman Kachchhapaghāta,⁴⁸ (2) Bhāsvat on the *Mālava-nadī*,⁴⁹ (3) the lands lying between the river Yamunā and the boundary of the Chedi kingdom and (4) probably some other territories too, intervening between Bhāsvat and Kālāñjar.⁵⁰ And having done all that he perhaps supported even the claims of a pretender to the Pratihāra throne, who called himself Vināyaka-pāla II and is described at the end of Dhanga's inscription of V. 1011 as "ruling the earth which was not taken possession of by enemies who had been annihilated."⁵¹ Dhanga, of course, being a friend did not fall within the category of enemies meriting destruction".

48. I.A., XV, p. 36. For a detailed account of the relationship between Dhanga and Vajradāman read Dr. S. K. Mitra's paper in the *IHQ*, XXIX, pp. 88: That Vajradāman was a mere feudatory of Dhanga can be proved on the following grounds:—

- (a) Dhanga captured Gwalior in or before 954 A.D.
- (b) Its continued possession by the Chandellas is proved by the testimony of the historians of Mahmud Ghaznavi's invasion who put Gwalior within the kingdom of Vidyādhara Chandella and state that it was being ruled by Vidyādhara's *hākim* or Governor. This man might have been Kirtirāja Kachchhapaghāta.
- (c) If during this period, the fort is described as captured also by a Kachchhapaghāta chief whose descendants are found ruling as Chandella feudatories at no distant date from the capture, it can only mean that the fort passed into the hands of the Kachchhapaghātas while they led their suzerain's, i.e., Dhanga's forces.

49. Bhāsvat is generally identified with Bhilsā on the Vetravati or Betwā river. But as the *Mālava-nadī* mentioned in Dhanga's inscription might not be Betwā but Avanti, the identification of which, according to Dr. D. C. Sircar, is uncertain, Bhāsvat might actually be a place different from Bhilsā, though not far from it. Further, as regarding the clan from which Dhanga captured it, I am not sure of its having been a possession of the Pargamāras in c. V. 1011, for in Vināyakapāla's reign the Pratiharas had succeeded in driving away the Paramaras from Mālwa to some territory near Lāta where they lived on until the recapture of their old territories either late in the reign of Siyaka II or early in the reign of Muñja.

A-Kālanjaram ā-ca Mālava-nadī-tira-sthite Bhāsvataḥ

Kālinḍī-saritas=tatād=ita itopy=ā-Chedi-desāvadheḥ/

ā-tasmād=api vismayaika-nīlayād=Gopābhīdhānād=girer=yah

śasti ksitim=āyatorjita-bhuja-vyāpāra-līlārjitam//

(E.I., I, p. 129, verse 45).

50. E.I., I, pp. 129 and 135.

51. *Ibid.* The writer of the Chaudella inscription of Madanavarman (E.I., I, 197) represented the facts better when he wrote that Dhanga had secured the high imperial status by defeating the ruler of Kānyakubja, the overlord of all kings'.

Some assume even the occurrence of a Rāṣtrakūṭa invasion on the basis of the *Jūrā praśasti* of Kṛṣṇa III, the date of the incision of which is now generally put after 947 A.D.⁵² But as the *praśasti* does not mention the Gurjaras, and the territory where it has been found might not have been within Pratihāra dominions, the assumption of the invasion of the Gurjara territory by the Rāṣtrakūṭas is not probably correct. The invasion, which resulted in the incision of this epigraph, might actually have been directed against the Chandellas who, in Yaśovarman's reign, had deprived Kṛṣṇa III of Kālāñjar and whose ruler, Dhanga, claimed having his orders listened to with respect by many rulers, including the Kuntala.⁵³

Vijayapāla

In the beginning of 960 A.D. or perhaps a little earlier Devapāla was succeeded by his brother Vijayapāla, who, however, is mentioned in the Rājor inscription not as meditating on the feet of his brother, Devapāla, but his father, Kṣitipāla, even though he was not his immediate successor. Under him, at Rājor, ruled his Gurjara-Pratihāra feudatory, MP Śrī-Mathanadeva, son of Mahārājādhirāja Sāvaṭa, who is described in the inscription as granting a village and giving various other donations for the worship of the idol and the maintenance of the temple of Lachchhukēśvara Mahādeva, a deity named after Mathanadeva's mother, Lachchhukā.⁵⁴

It was probably during Vijayapāla's reign that the Gurjara dominions were invaded once again by the Rāṣtrakūṭas, this time under the leadership of Kṛṣṇa III himself and his trusted general and feudatory, Mārasimha of Gangāwādī. In the Śravaṇa-Belgola inscription of this chief we are told that he acquired the title of Gurjararāja by conquering the northern region for Kṛṣṇa III; and he Kuḍlūr Plates of Mārasimha, dated in 963 A.D., probably refer to the same invasion when stating that Kṛṣṇarāja (Kṛṣṇa III)

52. See E.I., XIX, p. 88. As the *praśasti* refers to the destruction of the Chola power it has naturally to be put after the battle of Takkolam, the date of which according to Sri N. Lakshminarayan Rao is 247 A.D. The generally accepted date is 949-950 A.D.

53. E.I., I, p. 145, verse 45.

54. E.I., III, p. 266. The village Vyāghrapātaka, granted by Mathanadeva probably is modern Bāghor near Rājor which lies 28 miles to the south-west of Alwar.

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when starting for an expedition to the north performed the ceremony of crowning Mārasimha as the ruler of Gangāwādī.⁵⁵

The invasion had serious repercussions. Coming in the early years of the reign of Vijayapāla, it weakened seriously the Pratihāra hold over the outlying parts of their empire. The Chāhamāna ruler, Simharāja of Śākambhari, had after a run of success been killed in some action either with the Pratihāras directly or more probably with Pratihāra feudatories backed by the central power. But Vigraharāja II, who succeeded him, took the fullest advantage of the weakened position of the Pratihāras not only to re-establish his authority within his own kingdom but also to assume imperial titles and to carry on wars with his neighbours on his own account.⁵⁶ Parts of Mālwa probably passed under the control of the Paramāra chief, Siyaka II.⁵⁷ Mūlarāja Chaulukya expanded his kingdom, conquering Broach and probably also parts of Saurāṣṭra. The Chāhamāna chief, Lakṣmaṇa, set up an independent kingdom of his own at Nādol, in V. 1024 (967 A.D.).⁵⁸ And Chandellas, no doubt, were all the time there, undermining and challenging the authority of the empire. Even their own kinsmen, the Pratihāras of the family of Nilakaṇṭha, probably raised their heads against the Imperial Gurjara-Pratihāras of Kannauj in the second half of the tenth century.⁵⁹ The Chedi ruler, Lakṣmanarāja, claims having defeated the rulers of Vaṅgāla, Pāṇḍya, Lāṭa, Gurjara and Kaśmīra.⁶⁰ The Guhilas of Mewār attained a position of some strength under Allāṭa; and if Dr G. H. Ojha's opinion be accepted, he proved strong enough even to kill his powerful enemy, Devapāla Pratihāra in battle.⁶¹ Vijayapāla, as a successor of Devapāla, might have been on no good terms with Allāṭa as well as his successor, Naravāhana, who probably married a

55. *E.I.*, V, pp. 151 ff., *Mysore A.R.* for 1921, pp. 17 ff. Both these references are from Sri N. Lakshminarayan Rao's introductory note on his edition of the *Jūrā praśasti* (*E.I.*, XIX, p. 289).

56. *Early Chauhan Dynasties*, pp. 29-32.

57. Miss P. Bhatia's thesis (unpublished).

58. *Early Chauhan Dynasties*, pp. 120-122.

59. See D. C. Sircar's paper, *Candella Grants in Bhārat Kalā Bhavan, IHQ.*, XXXIV, p. 88.

60. *E.I.*, IX, p. 146. The Gurjara referred to in this inscription, however, is believed by some to be a Chaulukya ruler of Gujarat.

61. *History of Rājputānā*, I, p. 428, footnote.

Chahamāna princess.⁶² On one side, only, the eastern, the Pratihāras had some respite on account of the steadily increasing weakness of the Pālas during the reigns of Gopāla II and Vigrahapāla II.⁶³

Even in the areas which remained under the control of the Pratihāras and continued recognising their suzerainty, their authority underwent a serious diminution. We find *Mahārājādhirājas* at Siyadoṇī even before Vijayapāla's reign. In V. 1025 it was ruled by *Mahārājādhirāja* Śrī-Niṣkalaṅka who had been there in V. 1005, i.e., twenty years back also. But in V. 1025 there is no reference to an overlord, which in itself is proof enough of the diminution in the power as well as prestige of the central government. Fifteen years later, in V. 1040 (984 A.D.), Harirāja, a son of Nilakaṇṭha and probably a grandson of Niṣkalaṅka issued from Siyadoṇī a grant in which again there is no reference to the ruling Pratihāra sovereign.⁶⁴ At Rājor, Mathanadeva, who was a mere feudatory enjoying *Vaṁśapotaka* as an assignment from his imperial master, had in V. 1016,⁶⁵ the courage to call himself *Mahārājādhirāja-Parameśvara*. Obviously the day when such feudatories were to call themselves *Paramabhāṭṭārakas* also was not far off.

If Vijayapāla had an average reign of twenty-five years, in spite of having succeeded not his father but his brother, Devapāla, he might have died in c. 984 A.D.

62. See the Atpur inscription.

63. See *History of Bengal*, I, pp. 122-136 (Dacca University edition).

64. See Dr. D. C. Sircar's paper in *PAIOC*, 1957, Part 1, for the reference to Harirāja's grant. Harirāja is referred to also in a Chanderī inscription (*IHQ.*, XXXIV, p. 88) and *E.I.*, I, pp. 178-9. I presume that he had some relationship with Niskalaṅka on account of the proximity of their time, identity of locality, and some similarity between the names of *Mahārājādhirāja* Niskalaṅka and Harirāja's father, Nilakaṇṭha.

65. Mark the expression, *svabhogāvāpta-Vaṁśapotaka-bhoga*, of the inscription.

The Early History of the Nilgiris

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It is generally supposed that the English people were the first to colonise the Nilgiris and make it habitable. Col. Munro's visit to the place in 1826 and the great pains taken by his successor as Governor of Madras, Mr. Lushington, are generally mentioned as the first serious efforts made to bring civilisation to the hills of Nilgiris. But even a cursory study of the historical remains in the district must make one understand that there were civilised people living on these hills very much earlier.

Host are the attempts made by the English themselves to discover the truth of the people who had thus lived here in early times; but somehow they have failed to strike at the real truth. Talking on the early monuments here Mr. W. Francis of the Indian Civil Service writes as follows:

"Captain B. S. Ward, whose survey memoir of 1822 appears to be the earliest paper in which the monuments are referred to and who was a most careful enquirer, said that the people told him that they 'were built by the Boopalans, predecessors of the present race of the Toduwars' or Todas. Brecks, on a consideration of all the evidence, thought it more satisfactory to assign the cairns to the Todas than to an unknown race; but if the pottery found in them was really the work of the ancestors of the present Todas these latter must have greatly degenerated in aesthetic appreciation, for nowadays their domestic utensils, which are mostly made for them by the Kotas, are of the plainest description. Perhaps, however, just as they may have given up the use of weapons, when they found defence no longer called for, they gave up yearnings after the beautiful, when they found another caste would fashion sufficiently serviceable, if ugly, utensils for them."¹

According to Mr. W. Francis, Mr. Brecks thought it better to assign the ancient relics dug up in the old burial sites to the Tōdās

1. Francis, *Gazetteer of the Nilgiris*, 97.

rather than to an unknown people and argues that, if these finds are and look much better than the implements and the vessels used by the Tōdās to-day, it would only mean that in course of time they did not find any need to use better and more useful things to which their ancestors were customed. How very unreasonable is the surmise of Mr. Francis must be obvious to any one who reads this. Life always means progress and there is no question of any retrogression as age follows age. If the Todas used potteries and implements of a fine order in ancient times we must see them using better things to-day. To the old English investigator the possibility of some other race more civilised than the Todas having occupied the hills once upon a time did not occur and at the same time the examination of these articles of the ancient people was to him more in the nature of "curiosity-hunting", as Lt. Burton wrote in 1847,² than anything else.

Hence I propose to look into these antiquities here from a historical point of view to see whether something more plausible may not be found as an explanation of these articles of ancient usage. J. W. Breeks in his classical work *Primitive Tribes and Monuments of the Nilagiris*³ gives an almost complete account of these finds. In excavations carried out by him on July 7th, 1871 at the Egbōdi mound a figure of a low country bull with hump was found marked on the lid of a pot. Heads of perhaps sheep are also found in the cairn excavated. In two cairns dug up on the same day at Chiket-nāvaibetta near Tunāri a beautiful bronze vase with ornamentation done by hand has been found along with a bronze basin apparently on a stand now missing. In the excavation made on 24-10-1871 at the Nadubetta the pot-lid was found figuring the bullock and an animal with spots, probably a leopard. In a barrow on Hillavākunde hill west of Shālur neatly made spears and javelins, with their heads alone found, were unearthed on 19-1-1872. In many cairns dug up by Breeks a few iron bells and many clay bells have been found; and it has been properly surmised that they were bells hanging from the necks of the buffaloes. This has been clearly evidenced by the figures of buffaloes found in them always having the bells hanging from the neck.

2. *M.J.L.S.*, XIV, 77-146.

3. Breeks. *An Account of the Primitive Tribes and Monuments of the Nilagiris*, London, 1873.

Mr. Breeks, as has been pointed earlier, assigns these remnants of ancient times to the Toduwars (Tōdās) in preference to some unknown race. How he did not think of the Kurumbās, acceptedly an ancient people to occupy the hills, as those to whom these remains can be assigned, passes my comprehension. Perhaps he was under the impression that they had quickly passed on to Tondamandalam, where they made history in later times. On the other hand, it is plainly on the cards that of the four well-known primitive tribes—the Tōdās, the Kōtās, the Irulās and the Kurumbās—who have admittedly occupied the Nilgiris in early times the last alone became historically famous as a pastoral people who spread from the west coast of India through the region of Mysore down to the region of Tondamandalam, which is the region of the modern district of Chingleput. The great victory attributed to a early Cōla monarch is his victory over the Kurumbās.⁴ There is a division of territory in the west coast known to this day as Kurumbanād, meaning the land of the Kurumbās. Mysore is admittedly a land of pastoral people and even more so in early time, the very name Mysore being derived from buffalo (*mahishā*). That the Kurumbās entered in large numbers into the modern districts of Coimbatore and Salem during and even before the Śāngam times, i.e., in the first centuries of the Christian era, is clear for the following reasons:

(1) We hear of the Kurumbās both in North Malabar and in the Madras region. They could not have reached the southern or the south eastern point of the peninsula except through Coimbatore and Salem, coming as they did from the west coast.

(2) If they had come into Tondamandalam from the Mysore region, even then they would have passed through Coimbatore from the Nilgiris. This is further evidenced by the fact of the pig figure appearing in the pot-lid of Nadubettā cairn, already referred to, along with that of the buffalo. Not without cause *Tolkāppiyam* describes the country to the north of Coimbatore as *panrinadu* or the pig country.

(3) Numerous cairns in the Coimbatore region resemble those of the Nilgiris and the cromlechs here contain engravings as in the hills. Mr. Walhouse categorically says that these Coimbatore monuments must belong to some pastoral race.⁵ So also Mr. Walter

4. See *Pattinappalat*.

5. *J.R.A.S.*, VII, p. 29.

Elliot, who stated categorically at the International Pre-historic Congress at Norwich that the Coimbatore remains of the dead are those of a great pastoral people.⁶

(4) "Close to the town of Tangala is the country of the Batoi", so wrote Ptolemy as early as the II century A.D.⁷ It has been ever after interpreted that Tangala refers to the modern town of Dindigul. Now the term batoi is considered to be a variant of the Tamil *aye* or *āyar*, meaning shepherd. The meaning of Ptolemy is now clear. This is a strong evidence indeed showing that Kurumbar were in the Coimbatore region in very early times. This may be roughly the period during which this race must have flourished on the Nilgiris as well.

We shall now come back to the finds of the Nilgiri region. The depiction of the bullock, the pig, the leopard and the tiger, which is being speared, the ubiquitous bell, numerous remains of which are found in the cairns as in the cromlechs, the figures of comparatively civilised human beings (ladies are with top-knots), the figures of heroes apparently going to heaven as a reward for their heroic deeds performed in defence of others all bespeak of the Kurumbās, who are the best known of all the inhabitants of the Nilgiris in early times. Mr. Breeks himself tells us that very few of the human figures resemble the Tōdās and the ladies are represented well-covered and carrying water in pitchers, which is quite unlike of what the Tōdās and their womenfolk are to-day. If it is argued that they gave up things of beauty as useless, we cannot still argue that they gave up their dress and civilised way of life as well in course of time. The sickle and the javelin remains of which are found in these Nilgiri houses of the dead, indicate that they belonged to a pastoral and warring race, which is exactly the description of the Kurumbās of early times. The figures of water-carrying maiden and the remains of bells strewn profusely in the cairns here also point to the fact that those who made them were eminently a pastoral people. A song in *Ahananuru* describes an entry of these people into the low lands by describing the cows running for water with the bells ringing from their neck. The bronze stand of the basin found in the two cairns at Chiketnāvaibetta reminds one of the basin with stand found largely in Coorg. The Kongar, another well-known pastoral tribe

6. *Ethnological Journal*, I, pp. 103 ff.

7. McCrindle; Ptolemy, p. 184.

said to have entered into the Coimbatore region in early times, are mentioned in *Silappadikaram* as Kudagukkongar (Kongar from Coorg). It is just possible that the kurumbar also had passed through this region or at any rate had contacts with Coorg especially when we know that they had contact with Mysore, the land of the buffalo. Mr. Breeks tells us in his book already referred to that the Nilgiri cromlechs are carved after the fashion in Mysore and Coorg.⁸ Elsewhere he tells us certain female figures found on them are naked upto the waist and wear ear-rings after the fashion in Malabar.⁹ Mr. Fraser in an article written for the *Madras Journal of Literature and Science* tells us that the sepulchral tumuli in the river valleys of Coimbatore in Noyal and Bolumampatti and the base of the Analmalai hills strongly resemble those in the deep gorges of the Nilgiris.¹⁰ The choice of the river valleys is to be noted here. Further, the practice of burying the dead face down, which is noted on the Nilgiris, is the peculiar custom of the pastoral people and in Mysore.

The conclusion is obvious that the Kurumbās at some very early time entered the Nilgiris both from the West coast and through Mysore and remained there for quite a long time before their entry into the Coimbatore and Salem region on their way to Tondamandalam. They were great people who reared cattle and at the same time had fought many a good fight. They were great builders of forts (Tondamandalam was divided by them into 24 kottams (fort-areas). Now we can also explain the remains of mud forts still seen on the hills—standing unexplained to this day. Their history must form the first chapter of the early history of the Nilgiris.

Where then are the Kurumbās to-day? It may be asked that if the Tōdās are to be excluded from having any connection with the ancient finds of the Nilgiris because of the account they give of themselves now, we should expect at least the descendants of the Kurumbās giving better account of themselves. It will be accepted that these descendants are still to be found on the hills in a much better civilised state than any of the original inhabitants

8. Breeks, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 101-2.

10. *M.J.L.S.*, VI (N.S.), No. XI.

of the locality. Even the Badagās, who are the most civilised people of the place who can at the same time claim to be the sons of the soil, keep a kurumbā and only a kurumba as their priest. He is known as the *Kānikurumbhu* (probably a variation of *Kānikkaikurumbhu*), to whom they submit their prayers and pay their offerings and donations. In many places in the low country, which they had once occupied, they are known to-day with the distinct honorific *Gavundan*. The Kurumbā Goundans fill the modern districts of Coimbatore, Salem, Chingleput and the two Arcots.

Sher Shah, Akbar and the Link

BY

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Historians have ignored, rather overlooked Islam Shah, the son and successor of Sher Shah Sur, and they have failed to do him justice. He has been subjected only to a passing notice. Nirod Bhushan Roy in his "Successors of Sher Shah" concluding Islam Shah's reign pays him a glorious tribute.

Islam Shah's reign enjoys a unique position. He stands on a different footing as compared with other monarchs of Medieval India. Keeping our hands clean from the controversy regarding his character and being satisfied with the remarks of Abul Fazl, the arch enemy of Sur dynasty, when he says; "Few princes on record in military skill, in policy, justice and good government have ever equalled these two", that is, Sher Shah and Islam Shah and the contention of Erskine that "his (Islam Shah's) character, as given by historians, is not exactly what one would expect from the public transactions of his reign", are sufficient to allow him a noble portraiture of his character. His disgraceful conduct at Ambala where he ordered the Niazi women to be dishonoured and other fiendish acts are blots on his good name but it should be remembered that they belonged to the age and not to the man. Every monarch, without any exceptions, in the Middle Ages had occasionally fallen into such barbarities and beastly ways of revenge.

Delhi Sultans

In order to determine the real place of Islam Shah in Indian history, a brief survey of Delhi sultans prior to the accession of Sher Shah is the prime requisite. The Muslims came to India as early as 712 A.D., and were fully established on the Indian

soil in the thirteenth century. The native population of the country, mainly Hindus, rendered their submission and owed allegiance to a Musalman ruler only due to the fear of punishment and disaster. Muslims never identified themselves with the interest of the State nor did the Hindu subjects treat Muslim rulers as their lords according to the Indian conception of kingship. It was more or less a fearful bargain when Hindus bought their lives, happiness and freedom of conscience by paying arbitrary tributes and obedience. Hindus were out-classed from the affairs of the state. Sher Shah was the first who thought of a noble plan to govern the country in the interest of the people and based the administration on their goodwill. He realized that the loyalty of all the sections of the population could only be gained through a just and impartial government free from sectarian or religious considerations. Every person must be given full chance to develop his talents and serve the state according to his abilities. Intellect is not a monopoly of a particular person or race. Therefore he started this novel experiment and embarked upon a bold enterprise, which was almost foreign to the Hindus and the Muslims alike, and we find that he did all the spade-work, levelled the ground, and put the affairs of the state on the right lines. His reign is also remarkable for numerous institutions—their germination and growth—and the names of the few, for example, revenue, currency, commerce, roads and 'Sarais', Police and justice still herald his name with pride. He is also entitled to our praise for his army arrangements and his remodelling of the whole structure of the government from bottom upwards.

It is usual that after paying homage and tribute to the ideals and achievements of Sher Shah, historians pass on to Akbar. Sher Shah is treated as the precursor and forerunner of Akbar, a man who tried something but his ideas reached their logical conclusion and attained culmination in the reign of the other. But there is an important gap, a lacunae between the reigns of these two sovereigns. There is a straight pathway, a bridge between the two extremes. There stands one between the two shining personalities of the world, between the one who conceived and the other who achieved. The glories of these two great luminaries had eclipsed the soft and soothing glares of the moon which also deserves the same praise.

A Link

And he is Islam Shah. Islam Shah is a connecting link between Sher Shah and Akbar. The space between the death of Sher Shah and the accession of Akbar—a considerable interval of course—was period of transition. It covers nearly eleven and a half years, two third of which was occupied by Islam Shah. The Civil War which followed the death of Islam Shah and the Moghal Restoration on the throne of Hindustan practically had no effect and did not change or disturb the work done by Sher Shah and consolidated and improved by Islam Shah. In the case of the Civil War different claimants were competing, Humayun had no time and no inclination to attempt anything substantial in this direction. Islam Shah should not be treated or compared with Jahangir or Shahjahan who inherited a stable government, a full treasury and an equipped army and allowed the traditions of their "illustrious predecessor" to continue on in most respects. Islam Shah was given a dim notion, a bare outline and no one would blame him if he would have preferred a policy of complete departure. His real merit consists in realizing their utility and usefulness and his consequent adoption and adaptation of the same. If he had been reactionary like Aurangzeb, he would not have been accused of anything as he would have been reverting to the same old policy, which had become almost natural, and system of government based on military strength which was dominant note not in India alone but a characteristic feature of medieval ages.

Sacred Trust

Sher Shah, the Tiger Lord, the champion of Sur dynasty and the Morning Star of Indo-Muslim national revival, entrusted his son with a sacred trust of noble and beneficial institutions, a healthy project of the creation of an Indian nationality, a sound and just system of a administration and ground levelled for popular government to hold in trust for the "child of his age", Akbar the Great, and it is evident that Islam Shah discharged his duties well, and the preservation of the traditions of the previous rule is his greatest contribution. Islam Shah kept all the institutions of his father intact. He ordered the construction of "Sarais" in each of the intervals of the two built by his father. It is also a fact that the condition of the Hindus was never better before than

in the time of Sher Shah and Islam Shah. Like an honest trustee he removed the thorns, irregularities and defects of his trust, made it more bright and pure and caused them to be handed over to the beneficiary, in the same condition, when he assumed the reign of the government for himself. Under the Lodis the institution of sovereignty had fallen from its ideals, both Hindu and Muslim. It was nothing but a *primus inter pares*. Sher Shah though a lover of supreme authority, consulted the Afghan nobles on important matters of policy and action. It was Islam Shah who revived rather gave a clear cut interpretation to the office of kingship, which found its full scope at the hands of Akbar. If Islam Shah had not kept things in order or if he had reversed them altogether, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for Akbar to gather all the scattered links and proceed on so rapidly towards realizing the dreams of Sher Shah, and sow the seeds of new ideas and schemes of his own choice on the ground made equipped for the purpose. Therefore we may safely hold that Islam Shah, in a way, is responsible for the glories of Akbar.

Mahatma Gandhi as a Spiritualized Statesman

BY

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Is there any place for morality in politics? The worldly-minded politician would emphatically say, "No". He would urge that, in the materialistic world of ours, it is the end which counts, and not the means. For the realization of the end he thinks even questionable and immoral means may have to be adopted at times. But, Gandhiji's philosophy of politics was just the reverse of it. It did not recognise any contradiction between end and means. Gandhiji regarded them as convertible terms. That is why he deprecated all the artful diplomacy and manoeuvring which one associates with the conventional political life of today. As a fearless seeker after Truth, Gandhiji looked upon politics as a path of selfless service and not as a means of self-aggrandizement.

Gandhiji's politics was founded on Truth. Dishonesty or chicanery, according to him frustrated the very object of all political action. Politics could not be divorced from morality. He would not favour any wrong or immoral short cut to the end. He could not think of an improper short cut even to *Swaraj*, except through a process of self-purification and self-sacrifice. The higher moral value of nation's struggle for freedom appeared to him to be no less glorious than the end of *Swaraj* itself. *Swaraj* could not endure on foundations of untruth. So, Gandhiji believed that *Swaraj* would have to be secured honestly, truthfully and openly in the name of Truth and God. Secret or deceitful methods were of no use to him. He judged everything from the lofty stand-point of morality and considered all his political steps as so many selfless experiments with Truth. Politics based on morality might be slower, but it was bound to be surer. A delay of a few years was after all meaningless in the life of a nation.

Quest for Truth

At times, Gandhiji had to challenge or break a law in the course of his *Satyagraha*. But, in so doing he always made it clear that his action was prompted by his inner voice, which is

the call of God. He would not put up with wrong, or recognise evil or accept a state of affairs which could not be explained on the basis of Truth. He therefore refused to agree with those who stooped to questionable means in the interests of expediency. Morally viewed Gandhiji's political actions represented a form of spiritual striving which ennoble the mind and leads to the uplift of mankind. Freedom, in the eyes of Gandhiji, was not to be only a kind of political experience, but a process of self-purification which is vital to an individual, as it is to a nation.

Gandhiji came into politics not to seek power for himself. He placed himself at the head of a people's movement, because he wanted to serve the poor lowly and downtrodden. *Khadi* and the *Charkha* became the outward symbols of his movement, as they stood for the suffering and poverty no less than the ultimate redemption of the starving masses of India. As a leader, he lived in the manner of an ascetic. He did so, because he thought that an honest leader could not claim the ordinary comforts and amenities which the poverty-stricken masses could not afford. In his humble and meagre loin cloth he symbolised the life of the nation more truthfully than he could have done, if he had lived the conventional life of a leader. The stress he laid on the economic uplift of the country through *Khadi* and *Charkha* was meant not only to hasten the political emancipation of the country, but was calculated to make the poor villagers aware of their importance, and enable them to join in the freedom struggle as equal partners. Handspinning was, therefore, for Gandhiji, a kind of political education for the people.

Politics was never a matter of policy or expediency so far as Gandhiji was concerned. It was in actual fact always a quest for Truth, for God is Truth. His *Satyagraha* technique was the beacon light which reflected the Truth to him. This spiritualism of political action was a quality of the inner spirit. But, it was too deep for the average man, and so it was unintelligible to many. Still, the fact remains that Gandhiji uplifted politics to a spiritual plane in a manner in which it had never been done before. It was because his fight was on the moral level. He had no animosity or anger against the British people. He could not injure England to serve India, and refused to hate Englishmen, even though he would never bear their yoke. He led a freedom fight without rancour and malice. This was indeed unique, for the world had never seen anything like it in the past. Gandhiji proved

by his personal example that evil can be separated from the evil doer, and that moral detachment reinforces, instead of diminishing, the real efficacy of political methods.

As Gandhiji had nothing to conceal, he would never conceal even his worst mistakes. Once he realised that he had committed a grave blunder he would not hesitate to admit it freely. This open-hearted frankness was at times as irksome to his admirers, as it was perplexing to his opponents. An average leader is afraid of acknowledging his mistakes publicly, for he knows that his leadership might be jeopardised thereby. Gandhiji however, was never afraid of consequences. He would not only confess his error, but would go further and atone for it by purification and fasting in a spirit of penitence and sorrow. Politicians might regard this attitude as childish and ridiculous, but Gandhiji was fearless, and he never hesitated to own up a grievous error when he knew he had committed one. He believed that an error arises only from evil feelings, like anger, malice or greed. It is thus necessary, he thought, to fight and conquer these evil feelings which are innate in man's nature.

No Politics without Morality

Gandhiji's method of political campaigning may not be acceptable to the matter-of-fact type of politician but, like all great teachers of humanity, Gandhiji made no distinction between the secular and the spiritual, or between the political and the moral. Life was a single or integrated whole for him, and he refused to break it into watertight compartments. The mere politician would object that Gandhiji was not really political in his methodology, and that he was a saint who dabbled in politics. This objection, however, is not valid, for Gandhiji took politics seriously and tried to ennoble it. He taught *Ahimsa* in politics, and defined *Ahimsa* as a form of moral purity through non-violence in word, deed and thought. He made it clear that moral and spiritual values are as important in politics as they are in religious and spiritual matters. Moral purity was to be the necessary basis of all political action. Saintly in his private life, Gandhiji, in short, behaved as a saint even in the political sphere. His comprehensive constructive programme was as much a means to moral uplift as to political advancement.

To the query, then, as to whether morality should dominate politics, Gandhiji would reply that real politics could not be pos-

sible without morality. That is why in the last years of his life, he became increasingly disgusted with the growing immorality and corruption in political life, and he protested against the evils with all the emphasis at his command. It saddened him greatly when he saw that Indian politics was fast becoming a hunting ground for unprincipled and corrupt self-seekers. He sought to fight against the evils, and attempted to run the Congress on strictly moral lines. *Swaraj* was useless, if it brought in its train moral degradation. *Swaraj*, according to him, was of value only if it led to a better and nobler life.

Gandhiji therefore ushered in a novel trend in world affairs—a trend which possesses unknown potentialities for the world of to-morrow. This is nothing but the moral force which lies at the root of truth and non-violence. His philosophy of politics thus forms the dividing line between the attitude of realism in politics and the attitude of detachment. This philosophy was not invented by him, but was reintroduced in a field where it was previously supposed to have no place. The world of politics has become dirty and corrupt. Gandhiji at least emphasised an outlook which may yet transform politics into a form of social service.

Gandhiji was never a party leader in the strict sense of the term. He felt miserable when his followers desired him to function like a party boss. He refused to gather a faction or a clique round himself, and resolutely opposed the formation of a special group of his own. After the achievement of freedom in 1947, Gandhiji chose to break his connection with the Congress, and would not remain even a four-anna member thereof. When the political goal was reached, he lost all interest in politics, and sought to build up a new India based on communal amity and peace. He had renounced his all for the service of his country; he sacrificed his life for the Kingdom of God. A martyr's crown was an appropriate end for a man like him.

Gandhiji is a unique figure in world history. A morally elevated and humanised statesman of his kind is rarely seen in any age. He was not a saint gone astray in politics, but a spiritualised statesman who tried to become a saint. A wonderful blend of saint and statesman, Gandhiji took to politics in the same spirit in which a *sannyasi* takes to spiritual *sadhana*. If his ideal is still regarded as unachievable, it is because the spiritual transformation of man, which is essential to its success has yet to take place.

The Origin of the Hindu-Sikh Tension in the Panjab

BY

GANDA SINGH

For some time past there has been a good deal of misunderstanding about the origin of the Hindu-Sikh tension in the Panjab. It has become a fashion with some of our people to ascribe to the British or to the political policy of the British Government in India even things with which they had not the remotest connection. One such thing is the beginning of the Hindu-Sikh tension in the Panjab. The Hindu-Sikh tension, as we know, was a thing unknown during the Sikh rule up to the middle of the last century. And there were very happy relations between the two communities during the great uprising of 1857 and the following two decades. There could have been no better opportunity for the Britishers than the Mutiny days to exploit the Sikh sentiment against the Hindu Dogras and Poorbias who were mainly responsible both directly and indirectly, by secret alliances and open betrayals, for the downfall of the Sikh kingdom. Another opportunity offered itself to the British in the closing years of the eighteen sixties when a schismatic sect of the Sikhs, the Kookas, in their overflowing zeal and fanatical frenzy, pulled down a number of Hindu tombs and went about shouting: *Maṛhī masānī dhāi-ké kar dīo madānā*, meaning 'Pull down the mausoleums and crematories and level them with the earth.' But nobody took these activities of the Kookas very seriously and they provided no pretext for anyone to create hostilities between the Hindus and the Sikhs. It is, therefore, not correct to say that "the unfilial sentiments of Sikhs towards Hinduism were the creation of the British who, true to their policy of 'divide and rule' tried to create separatism." (Suraj Bhan, the *Tribune*, Ambala, September 25, 1957.)

Historically speaking, the tension had its origin in the unhappy language used for Guru Nanak and his followers by Shri Swami Dayananda, the founder of the Arya Samaj, in his book the *Satyarth Prakash* published in 1875, the year in which, on April 10, the first Arya Samaj was established in Bombay.

(I shall not quote extensively from the first edition of the *Satyarth Prakash* or from its later revised and enlarged editions to avoid unpleasantness.)

The word used for the Sikh Guru therein is *dhūrta*, which, according to Bate's *Dictionary of the Hindi language*, means "rogue, cheat, fraudulent, crafty, cunning, knavish, sly, dishonest, mischievous." The hymns of the *Guru Granth Sahib*, the Sikh scripture, he called *mithyā* (falsehood), and Sikhism, a *jal* (a snare) to rob and cheat simple folk of their wealth and property (*dhan ādik harné ké wāsaté*).

Two years alter, Swami Dayananda came to the Panjab and established the Arya Samaj at Lahore. In his discourses in the Panjab, he always praised the work of the Sikh Gurus. This attracted a number of Sikhs to the Arya Samaj. One of them, Bhai Jawahir Singh, later became the Secretary of the Lahore Arya Samaj and also of the D.A.V. College Managing Committee.

While Swami Dayananda was staying at Kanpur, on his return from the Panjab, Sardar Bhagat Singh, Sub-Engineer of the Ajmer Division, wrote to him in protest against his objectionable remarks in the *Satyarth Prakash* against the Sikhs and Sikhism. Swamiji wrote back saying that his opinion had undergone a change during his visit to the Panjab and that the remarks in question would be deleted from the next edition of the book. But nothing came to be done. It was, perhaps, due to the untimely death of Swamiji on October 10, 1883. The second edition of the *Satyarth Prakash* was, perhaps, then still in the press.

With the passage of time, the publication of the second edition of the *Satyarth Prakash* and the admission of some over-zealous youngmen into the Arya Samaj, the attitude of some of the leading Arya Samajists became increasingly hostile towards Sikhs and Sikhism. The columns of the *Arya Samachar* Meerut, and the *Arya Patrika*, Lahore, of those days bear witness to this.

The second edition of the *Satyarth Prakash* turned out to be more disappointing and hostile. In it the attack on the Sikh Gurus, the Sikh scripture and the Sikh people in general was more direct, more biting and more painful. Guru Nanak was given out as illiterate, self-conceited and hypocritical. The Sikh scripture was insulted and the tenets and symbols of Sikhism were ridi-

culed. And the Sikhs in general were dubbed as arrogant and slaves to lust.

This naturally disillusioned such of the Sikhs as were members of the Arya Samaj or were its active supporters. They felt very much hurt and dejected. What added to the tension was the fanatical attitude of some members of the Arya Samaj who went out of their way to flash the wrongful remarks of the *Satyarth Prakash* and unnecessarily wounded the susceptibilities of the Sikhs.

There were, however, some well-meaning members of the Arya Samaj who sincerely felt that a wrong had come to be done to the Sikhs by the objectionable remarks of Swami Dayananda. They wrote apologetic and appeasing letters and notes in the *Vidya Prakashak* and other journals and newspapers. To quote only one, Lala Amolak Ram Munsif of Gujjar Khan writing to the Editor, *Akhbar-i-Am*, Lahore, on September 30, 1887, said :

Mere piāre aur mukarram Editor Akhbār-i-Am, Kisī gumnām sāhib ne ap-ke Akhbār ke zarīye hāmāre muazziz aur fakhr-i-qaum Sikh bhāīyon ko Aryā dharm ke barkhilāf mushtāl karne ke wāste Swāmī Dayānand Surastī ke Satyārth Prakash se ek intkhāh shāyā kiya hai. Main sacche dil se umid kartā hūm kih yih us kī koshish-i-hasi-dānā bilkul rāigān jāegī.

Aryā Samāj Dayānand Saraswatī ko sirf insān samajhtā hai. Har ek insān se ghaltī honī mumkin hai. Swāmī Dayānand Saraswatījī aghlabān zabān Panjābī aur halāt-i-Panjāb se Satyārth Prakash likhte waqt pure wāquif nā the. Main yaqīn kartā hūn kih bashart mauqā milne ke woh is rāi ko zarūr tarmīm karte, magar afsos hai kih unko mauqā nā milā. Lekin sirf unkā yih rāi zāhir karnā Aryā Samāj ko pāband nahin kartā. Muje umid hai kih taqrīban har ek Aryā is rāi kī ghalī kā qāyal hai. Main khud Aryā hone kā fakhar kartā hūn aur main is rāi ko ghalat samajhtā hūn. Mujhe purā yaqīn hai kih mere Singh bhāi sirf Swāmī Dayānand Saraswatī kī ek ghaltī ke bāis us ke bāqqī nihāyat umdā kām ke hargiz mukhālīf nahin ho jāenge.

Translated into English it would read as :

My dear and respected Editor the *Akhbār-i-Am*,

Some anonymous person has published in your paper an extract from Swami Dayananda Saraswati's *Satyarth Prakash* with the object of instigating our respected and glori-

ous Sikh brethren against the Arya dharma. I sincerely hope this jealous effort of his will not succeed.

The Arya Samaj considers Swami Dayananda Saraswati a human being. Every human being is liable to err. At the time of writing the *Satyārth Prakāsh*, Swamiji was probably not fully conversant with the Panjab and Panjabi language. . . . Alas, he did not get a chance, otherwise, I am sure, he would have amended this opinion. But his expression of this opinion does not bind the Arya Samaj. I hope almost every Arya is convinced of this error. I am proud of being an Arya myself, and I hold this opinion [of Swami Dayananda] to be wrong. I am sure that or this one mistake of Swami Dayananda Saraswati, my Sikh brethren will not at all turn against the rest of his very good work.

Copies of this letter were sent to some other newspapers as well.

The Sikhs were to some extent soothed by the expression of regret and goodwill by those who had reasons to be grateful to the Sikhs for the help and co-operation which they had extended to Swami Dayananda and his movement in the early days. But this did not continue for long. Instead of improving the situation, it was worsened by the fire-breathing speeches of some of the leaders of the Arya Samaj at its eleventh annual session held at Lahore on Saturday and Sunday the 24th and 25th of November, 1888.

Pandit Guru Datt, the leader of the anti-modernist section of the Arya Samaj, in his speech on the morning of Sunday the 25th of November, not only repeated the anti-Sikh remarks of the *Satyārth Prakāsh*, but also entered into odious comparisons and launched an attack on Guru Nanak and Guru Gobind Singh. The discussions of Lala Murlidhar and Swami Swatmananda on the subject added fuel to the smouldering fire which soon burst out into flames.

Pandit Guru Datt's speech was followed the same evening by that of Pandit Lekh Ram who spoke with still greater force and hostility against the Sikhs. Not only this. At one stage in the course of his speech, Pandit Lekh Ram physically insulted the holy book of the Sikhs, *Guru Granth Sahib*, which had been unceremoniously placed there on the table before him. This was more than what the Sikhs present in the meeting could tolerate.

Thus publicly insulted and ridiculed, the Sikhs were left with the only alternative of finally breaking with the Arya Samaj.

There was then a large number of Hindus as well who felt disgusted with this attitude of the leaders of the Arya Samaj. A joint protest meeting was held on the next Sunday, the 2nd of December 1888 in the Baoli Sahib, Lahore, under the presidentship of Lala Nand Gopal. Lala Ladli Prasad was the principal speaker. The other speakers were Bhai Jawahir Singh, Bhai Dit Singh and Dr. Narayan Singh. According to the report of the meeting published in the *Civil and Military Gazette*, Lahore, of December 8, 1888, there was a great resentment in the city of Lahore at the ugly and unpleasant situation created by the leaders of the Arya Samaj in their eleventh annual session held in the last week of November.

This is, in brief, the factual account of how the Hindu (Arya Samaj)-Sikh tension began in the seventies and eighties of the last century, soon after the birth of the Arya Samaj.

In truth, it is a misnomer to call it Hindu-Sikh tension. It is, in fact, only Arya Samaj-Sikh tension. The new name has come to be given to it very recently. A reference to the columns of the *Arya Gazette* and the *Sat-dharm Pracharak* will show that the Arya Samajists for a long time carried on a campaign against the word *Hindu* and refused to associate themselves with it. But this is a separate topic of study.

For a more detailed study, the inquisitive reader is referred to :

The *Satyārth Prakash*, Hindi, first edition of 1875 and subsequent revised and enlarged editions and their translations into Urdu, English and Panjabi.

The *Civil and Military Gazette*, Lahore, November and December, 1888.

The *Akhbar-i-Am*, Lahore, the *Aftab-i-Panjab*, Lahore, the *Koh-i-Noor*, Lahore, for September to December, 1888.

These and other newspapers and journals published at Lahore during the last two decades of the nineteenth century contain very valuable material on this subject.

Some Unpublished Sculptures of Baladeva from Rajasthan

BY

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The depiction of Kṛishṇa and Baladeva in the sculptures of Rajasthan has been briefly discussed by me in *Indian Historical Quarterly* (Calcutta, XXX—4, Dec. 54, pp. 339-53); *Bhāratīya Vidyā* (Bombay, XVI—2, 1956, pp. 79-83) and *Journal of Asiatic Society of Bengal* (Calcutta, Mekhanad Saha Number, XXIII-1, 1957, pp. 63-64 and plates I-II). It is now proposed to present a brief account of some unpublished and early mediaeval (8th century A.D.) sculptures of Baladeva from this region because they have got an important bearing on the contemporary Brahmanic iconography of the country.

1. Baladeva from Osian:—

The famous Sun Temple at Osian (distant about 39 miles from Jodhpur) preserved an interesting image of four armed and standing Baladeva (Fig. 1) in one of the subsidiary niches on the exterior portion of the main sanctum. A canopy of serpent hoods, five in number, appears on his head above and he holds a *musala* (pestle) in the left upper hand and a *hala* (plough) in the right upper one. The left lower hand has been placed round the neck of the left wine-flask holder to the left below while the lower right one probably supported some wine cup which has been partly damaged at the present moment. Another flask bearer appears below, towards the right leg of Baladeva in an identical manner. A rope-like *Vanamālā* hangs up to the knees of the main figure, the details whereof can well be compared with somewhat identical pieces from Badoh (Madhya Pradesh; illustrated in the *Annual Report of the Dept. of Archaeology, Gwalior State*, 1933-34, *saṃvat* 1990, plate XII, fig. C.) and (*Ibid*, 1926-7, plate IV, A). The existing depiction of *Asavaṇḍ* Baladeva is really very interesting in the plastic art of the country.

2. *Baladeva and Revatī from Osian:—*

It is equally interesting to find the outer niche of a subsidiary shrine of the Harihara Temple situated in a solitary condition outside the village of Osian and presenting 4 armed Baladeva who embraces (FIG. 2) his spouse Revatī with the lower left arm and even touches her left breast. His left upper hand supports a wheel (*Chakra* of Vishṇu); the upper right holds a plough whereas the lower light one has been placed on the head of a female attendant gazing at the main deity. Revatī holds a round mirror (*darpaṇa*) in her left hand while the right one touches the right shoulder of her husband. Their looks and amorous pose are extremely graceful and the existing depiction is very rare in the realm of ancient Indian art. The Rajputana Museum at Ajmer preserves one "Balarāma-Revatī" Sculpture which was discovered at Kaṭārā in Bharatpur region but therein the *āliṅgana* pose is conspicuous by its absence. Still more interesting is the depiction of a *Chakra* (Wheel) as one of the *āyudhas* (weapons) of the male figure in the existing relief from Osian. This recalls to our mind the pilasters of the aforesaid Sun Temple of Osian bearing the figures of four armed Baladeva and like wise Vāsudeva and each seated on a Garuḍa. Here Baladeva holds a *hala* and a *musala* in the back hands, one of his front hands supports *śaṅkha* (conch) while the fourth has been placed in the *jñāna mudrā*. The canopy of the serpent-hoods appears in a traditional manner as also in the aforesaid images of the same deity (i.e. Baladeva) from Osian itself. In this connection Dr. J. N. Banerjea (*Journal of Indian Society of Oriental Art*, Calcutta, XIV—1946, pp. 26-7) has remarked with sufficient justification that this sculpture of Baladeva on the pilaster of the Sun Temple at Osian "is very interesting as Balarāma on Garuḍa, with a *śaṅkha* in his hand, is an extremely rare mode of depicting him. But this may typify one way of showing *Vyūha Saṃkarshaṇa*, the other being that where he is depicted like Vāsudeva in all respects but holding *gadā*, *padma* and *Chakra* in hands. The *jñāna mudrā* in one of the hands of Baladeva typified knowledge and it was he who expounded the *sātvata vidhi*".

3. *Haladhara from Abānerī:—*

It was from Abānerī (4 miles from Bāndikui in Jaipur region) that an interesting *Kṛishṇ-Keśi Vadha* sculpture was reproduced and described by me in the *Lalitkalā*, Nos. 1-2, pp. 131-32 and

PLATE I



Balarāma from Abānerī



FIG. 1. Baladeva—Sun Temple, Osian



FIG. 2. Baladeva and Revati from Osian

plate LIII, Fig. 4. A broken niche of the same temple of Harshat-mātā from Abānerī presents a vivid depiction of Baladeva (FIG 3). On both the sides of the deity have been carved lotus, vase and foliage motifs in an equally attractive matter. Still more noteworthy is the number (i.e., 2) of his hands and the weapons held therein i.e. a *hala* in the left and a cup on wine in the right. A female attendant holding a jar of wine appears below the plough of Baladeva. The utter absence of a canopy of serpent hoods and the depiction of a crown (*mukuta*) on the head of Baladeva are to be noted with great interest. Here he is not shown as an incarnation of Vishṇu and that enhances the importance of the relief still further. The dress and the ornaments of the main figure are equally graceful, specially the curly hair, rope-like *vanamālā* hanging below the knees etc. It is also an important relic of the eighth century A.D.

Anglo-Maratha Relations During Maratha— Mysore War (1785-1787)

BY

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The treaty of Salbai of 1782 which terminated the first Anglo-Maratha War enhanced the prestige of Nana Fadnavis, for it was from Poona that the terms of the treaty were dictated. But soon after this tremendous success Nana Fadnavis, the astute minister of Poona faced the dark clouds again—it was the infuriated son of Haider Ali who raised the banner of war against the Marathas. During the First Anglo-Maratha War, the Marathas and Haider Ali were allies. But unfortunately the Marathas alienated Haider Ali by coming to terms with the British in 1782 without his knowledge. It was a breach of faith. The proud Sultan of Mysore became a bitter of the Marathas.

Before the treaty of Salbai had been finally exchanged between the contracting parties, the great Haider Ali, died of cancer on 7th December, 1782. His son and successor, Tipu, who was in full vigour of his faculties, decided to challenge the Maratha hegemony in the Deccan by devastating Nargund, a small hill-post situated between the rivers Krishna and Tungabhadra, ruled by a Chitpavan Brahmin named Bhane.

Prior to the first Anglo-Maratha War, as the price of maintaining benevolent neutrality, Haider Ali had asked for and obtained from the Marathas the cession of all the territories between the two rivers, Krishna and Tungabhadra. He thus included Nargund in his possessions. The Desai had submitted and Haider had fixed his dues at the same figure as those paid by him to the Peshwa. After his death Tipu wished to confiscate Nargund. Therefore he raised the tribute of Bhane, the Desai of Nargund, to a larger sum than he could possibly pay. Bhane in desperation appealed to Nana Fadnavis. Nana represented with justice to Tipu, that the transfer of the Peshwa's rights between the two

rivers left all other rights unaffected. Therefore the Desai was not bound to pay more to Tipu than he had paid to Poona. Tipu replied discourteously that from his own subjects he could levy what he chose.

In March 1785, the Maratha-Mysore war began when Tipu sent a force to reduce Nargund. Nana Fadnavis sent to the relief of Nargund a body of troops under the command of Ganeshpant Behare and Parashrambhai Patwardhan. He also ordered Tukoji Holkar to march towards Tipu's borders. So Tipu took resort to artifice and expressed himself anxious for peace. Nana was for once deceived. For Tipu again started attack on the Desai and shocked Nana by his treatment of Hindus thousands of whom committed suicide to escape conversion to Islam. Nana was aware of Tipu's strength, for he was sure that the French would come to his aid. So the Maratha statesman hesitated to attack Tipu until reinforced by English and Mughal reinforcements. The Nizam of Hyderabad promised support to the Marathas, for he was deeply offended by Tipu's recent assumption of the title of Sultan. Against Tipu Nana decided to seek military support from British, their ally since the Treaty of Salbai. But the British declined an alliance against Tipu and so there started a new phase in the Anglo-Maratha relations in 1785 which threatened the newly born Anglo-Maratha friendship.

Warren Hastings had exhausted the treasury and even the defensive services of the Company by his long and expensive wars. After him when Macpherson became the Governor-General, the Directors of the company in London decided to follow a policy of non-intervention in the affairs of the Indian rulers. In spite of disavowing future expansions, the Directors aimed at securing Cuttuck¹ if possible by peaceful negotiations, so that their Indian possessions could be united. But as there was always the possibility of Cuttuck being annexed either by Tipu or the Marathas, the British motive after 1785 became not to allow any one of them to be so formidable as to threaten the British possessions and ambitions in this country. When Malet arrived at Poona as the British Resident at the court of the Peshwa, the Maratha-Mysore war had already started and so he was confronted with a very difficult situation. His work was to keep the matters safe

1. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. II, p. 27.

for the Company, to check both Tipu and the Marathas from becoming dangerously powerful and also to hinder them from entering into an alliance with any European power, for still the Company was suffering from Francho-phobia.

As soon as, Maratha-Mysore hostilities began, over the Nargund affair, the French, once more, became active in India. They were still endeavouring to gain ground against the British by giving military aid to the Indian powers. They tried to impress on Nana that the British were afraid of their strength. But Malet, with his sagacity, publicly as well privately, endeavoured his best to place the French politics in true perspective.² He contrasted the poverty, empty boasts and precarious treasures of the French with the actual deeds, wealth and established possessions of the British. Nana was also told that as there was peace between the two nations in Europe, there was no possibility of French joining either Nana or Tipu in a war against the British.³ Moreover the British Resident with his personal charm and diplomacy won the heart of the people of Poona.⁴ He at once became the most popular European in Poona by joining the Marathas in their festivals, games and merry-making. He regularly attended the Ganpati festival in the Peshwa's Palace.⁵ Consequently even though Monseieur Montigne offered aid to Poona through Mahadji Sindhia, Nana paid no heed to it. It was the diplomacy of Malet which rendered a Franco-Maratha alliance against the Company, at this juncture, impossible. Malet's diplomatic success was also due to the fact that Nana displayed undue anxiety about the projected Franco-Mysore alliance.⁶ Thus the Maratha diplomat made a serious mistake in rushing to Malet's embrace.

Before Malet's arrival at Poona Nana had thought that the English would join him against Tipu on any terms. So he made overtures to Boddam, the Governor of Bombay, offering on the part of the Peshwa to give up to the Company any two of Tipu's seaports

2. Ibid., p. 23.

3. Ibid., p. 38.

4. Parasnis, Poona in the Bygone Days, p. 53.

5. Choksey, A History of British Diplomacy at the Court of the Peshwas, p. 23.

6. Hattalkar, Relations between the French and the Marathas, pp. 278-280.

on the Malabar coast on condition of being assisted by body of troops to co-operate in subduing Tipu. Nana also appealed to the Treaty of Salbai. Boddam referred Nana to the Supreme Government. Macpherson replied that the Treaty of Salbai did not stipulate that the friends and enemies should be mutual, but that they would not assist the enemies of each other.⁷ The Supreme Government at Calcutta referred the case to the Directors for instructions and the line of policy to be adopted by the British towards the Maratha-Mysore war. In their letter⁸ of July 21, 1786 the Secret Committee of the Honourable Court of Directors wrote to the Governor-General-in-Council the aims of the British policy in India with reference to the various powers, internal and foreign, which specially laid down the policy which the Company should adopt towards the Maratha-Mysore war of 1785-1787. The Directors laid down (1) that the Company was completely satisfied with the possessions it already had and would engage in no war for the purpose of further acquisitions. (2) that a constant watch should be kept upon the conduct of all European rivals, particularly the French. (3) that peace should be the primary policy with the British. The Company should not take advantage of the jealousies of the Indian powers of one another in order to aggrandize the British power by the depression of any one of them. (4) While the Company would pursue this pacific and neutral system, it should remain strictly jealous of every interference from any other European Nation whatever which might either disturb the peace of India or endeavour to influence the princes or inhabitants against the British.

In the same letter the Directors wrote that the treaty obligations of the great powers in India should be chiefly consonant with the general principles they had prescribed and the policy they directed should be pursued vigorously in the British possessions. If the French did not interfere with either the Marathas or Tipu, the British had no business to take any part in Maratha-Mysore war. These instructions from the Secret Committee of the court of Directors in London made it absolutely clear that the British would adhere to the Treaty of Mangalore (1784) by which they were at peace with Tipu, and should not interfere in

7. Grant Duff, *A History of the Marathas*, p. 170.

8. *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. II, pp. 27-30.

the war as long as the French did not intervene. In another letter⁹ dated September 22, 1786 the Directors asked Lord Cornwallis, the Governor-General to intimate the Marathas that in the event of the French joining Tipu, they might rely on British assistance.

Charles Malet, the Resident at Poona, studied the political situation of the Indian affairs and wrote a letter to Lord Cornwallis pointing out how best the British could profit by the Maratha-Mysore war.¹⁰ Malet stated the following advantages which the British might gain by joining the Marathas in the war against Tipu.

(i) The war would give an opportunity to conciliate the friendship of the mighty Maratha Empire.

(ii) It would relieve the Company of the immediate expenses of a large body of troops.

(iii) All apprehensions of the introduction of the French would be removed.

(iv) It would bring about the reduction of Tipu Sultan's powers so low as to prevent any hostile designs against the Company's territories.

In the same letter this shrewd diplomat gave the following probable evils which might come out of an Anglo Maratha cordial understanding against Tipu.

(1) The Marathas would become dangerously strong by gaining ascendancy on Tipu.

(2) Tipu might take revenge on the company.

Because of these evils Malet suggested neutrality. No where can we find such a frank confession of British interests and aims as in Malet's suggestions regarding the advantages of neutrality. Neutrality, he wrote, would enable the Company to gain time to re-establish her affairs by adopting a rigid system of economy. The war would exhaust and incapacitate those powers which the English had reason to fear. The British diplomat further added that it could also result in the Poona Ministry advancing to the French. Any Anglo-French alliance would be ruinous to the Company's interest. But to Malet it was unlikely to happen for

9. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 63-65.

Nana's ancient predilection for that nation. Finally, he also thought, the Marathas not having British and the French aid might accommodate matters with Tipu, the terms of which might be hostile to the Company.

Mediation was the only other suggestion that remained to be discussed. Malet said that in case of a prolonged warfare, when both the hostile parties would be exhausted the Company could act as a mediator. He closed his report with the remark, "should the idea of assisting either party be relinquished as equally polite, the line of neutrality alone remains for adoption, and Your Lordship's will dictate the methods by which it may be most advantageously employed to the establishment of such a system both civil and military as may place us above all foreign hopes and fears".¹¹

Lord Cornwallis communicated to the diplomat at Poona to convey, to the Peshwa's Government their regret that the authorities both at home and in India had finally decided to adopt a policy of neutrality in the Maratha—Mysore War. Mr. Malet was desired to add any other expedient that might occur to him towards smoothing the matter.¹² He was to assure Nana's Government that should any danger arise from the interference of any European power against them, the British would be ready to consider how far they could venture to take rigorous and effectual steps for Maratha support. Such was the task allotted to the British Resident at the Poona Durbar in the November of 1786.

On the evening of November 29, the astute Malet paid a visit to Nana to convey the British decision. The Brahmin expressed much surprise at the sudden turn of British politics, for before referring the case to the Directors at London, Macpherson the Governor-General and Boddam, the Governor of Bombay had agreed to send aid for the defence of Maratha territory against Tipu.¹³ In reply Malet explained that the former offer was made on the presumption of the ascendancy of Tipu's power and the probability of an introduction of French force to Tipu's army. The change in politics was due to the change of circumstances and

11. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

12. Choksey, *A History of British Diplomacy at the Court of the Peshwas*, p. 38.

13. Grant Duff, *A History of the Marathas*, p. 172.

the necessity of a faithful observance of treaties. When the sound arguments failed, the wily diplomat turned his appeal to emotions. In spite of all this balm to soothe Nana's feelings the Resident could see that the arguments gave him the greatest anxiety and chagrin. After these points were discussed, Malet mentioned the Governor-General's intention of sending the largest and smallest elephant as a proof of his regard for the Peshwa. He begged, an early day might be fixed for his audience so that he might make the assurance of friendship.¹⁴ Thus Malet won a perfect diplomatic triumph. We can little imagine the feelings of the unhappy Nana. His main purpose of inviting a British Resident at the court of the Peshwas was for a time completely lost.

Four days after Malet's audience with Nana on 12th December 1786 Tipu surprised the Maratha camp at night and plundered the bazars and the baggage. Discontent spread in Maratha army due to bad payment and great arrears. By the end of the year 1786 discontent spread in Tipu's camp as well. The Sultan had lost from 15 to 20,000 men by desertion since his march from Srirangapatam. Tipu also apprehended that the English were about to take part in the war against him. Mr. Malet had joined Nana at Badame¹⁵ which to Tipu meant a very intimate connection. Moreover Cornwallis, who had come to India in September 1786 wanted to improve the military efficiency of all Presidencies. It created a bustle and apparent preparation convinced Tipu that the designs of the English were decidedly hostile.¹⁶

By January 10, 1787 it was rumoured that Tipu's agent was expected in Poona to negotiate peace. The Marathas too became anxious for peace. Holkar and Scindia were appointed arbitrators and in February 1787 the Treaty of Gagendragad was signed between the Peshwa and Tipu.

The Treaty of Gagendragad marks an epoch in Malet's mission to Poona. The diplomat had successfully carried out the wishes of both the Courts of Directors at home and Lord Corn-

14. *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. II, p. 78.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

16. Grant Duff, *A History of the Marathas*, p. 178.

wallis in India. Under his guidance and care British politics steered clear of a critical crisis in their relation with the Poona Durbar. What with the French intrigues and Nana's diplomacy to play one European power against the other, Malet faced the situation with a perfect insight into Maratha polity. Defeating French diplomacy he continued to maintain that harmony and friendly feeling with the Maratha's which he had been requested to do so by the Supreme Government. After the success of the British diplomacy at the court of the Peshwas on March 4, 1787, Lord Cornwallis wrote to the Secret Committee of the Directors, "However disappointed the Peshwa's Ministers may have been at our declaration of neutrality, there is no appearance from Mr. Malet's correspondence—of an intention on the part of those ministers to interrupt the former friendly intercourse between the two Governments.¹⁷ Even though the British greatly disappointed Nana Fadnavis the Marathas continued to remain an ally of the Company and helped Lord Cornwallis against Tipu by becoming a signatory to the famous Triple Alliance in 1790.

The Younghusband Expedition, an Interpretation—II*

BY

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VI

The Russian attitude was a study in contrast. Though her frontiers then, as indeed now, do not touch Tibet directly, yet neither in Mongolia nor yet in bordering Sinkiang has Russian influence been negligible.⁸⁹ Again to the Buriat Mongols—Russian subjects since the middle of the 18th century Lhasa has always remained the acme of human ambition to round off training, and education, in Lama Buddhism. It is among this group of Buriat monks that Russia has often discovered convenient tools whom she has employed without scruple to subserve her ends. And since territorial expansion at Tibet's expense has never been—indeed scarcely can be—a Russian goal, the Buriats have rarely been suspect in Tibetan eyes.

Towards the closing years of the 19th century one of these Buriat monks in Lhasa was Aguan Dorjieff. Dorjieff—his name has many variants viz., Dorji, Dorshieff, Dorzhiev, Dogiew, Dorjew—was by birth a Buriat of Choris skaia, in the province of Verchnyudinsk.⁹⁰ Well-versed in Tibetan theology he came to

* The first part of this article appeared in the *Journal of Indian History*, Vol. XXXIII, Part II, August 1955.

89. Professor Lattimore contends that a change has lately come about in the position both of Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang. No longer "buffers" they have become instead "zones" through which communication between China and Russia is now imperatively necessary. See his "New Political Geography of Inner Asia," *Geographical Journal*, (London), CXIX, March 1953, pp. 17-32.

For the early period see Mihel N. Pavlovsky, "Chinese-Russian Relations," (New York, 1949).

90. The lack of any authoritative account of Dorjieff who played so important a part in Russian-Tibetan relations, and the events leading to the British Military expedition to Lhasa is indeed pathetic. The well-known Russian Tibetologue, Dr Badmeyer, wrote some biographical details of him in the Russian press at the time of Dorjieff's visits, in 1900 and 1901. How

Lhasa in 1880, where he entered the famous Drepung monastery, and soon won a theological degree. His reputation as a scholar earned him the rare distinction of being appointed a tutor to the young Dalai Lama.⁹¹ Another version of the Dorjief story maintains that the Buriat was an employee of the Russian Foreign Office, and Intelligence Service, as early as 1885. While under training he is said to have visited all the capitals of Europe and become an accomplished diplomat. We are further informed that when the 13th Dalai assumed power "it was contrived" that the Buriat should become his tutor.⁹²

Close to the faith and person of the Dalai, and an ardent Russian at heart Dorjief appears to have told the Lama that because of their close contact with Mongolia more and more Russians were taking to Tibetan Buddhism and that it was not unlikely that even the Tsar might embrace the faith. One can picture the young Dalai afire with the vision of the all-powerful White Tsar standing by his side—a convert to Tibet's great religion! And how vivid and sharp the contrast must have appeared to him between a ruler who was moving close to his faith and another that seemed intent on destroying it.

Dorjief, it must be stressed, did not talk of trade or of opening up the country. And though the British protested time and

far these could be relied upon is, however, doubtful for Count Lamsdorff regarded Badmeyer as "an eccentric character". Bell's mention of him is intriguingly brief. See "Portrait", pp. 61-2. More details are in William Filcher, "Sturm über Asien," (Berlin, 1926) and A. Popov in "Russia and Tibet," *Norzi-Vostok*, (Moscow), No. 18, (1927), pp. 101-19. According to Professor W. A. Unkrig, who teaches Mongol and Tibetan in Frankfurt am Main in Western Germany, the correct spelling for Dorjief's name is Nag-dhan Dorje, the gifted orator, thunderbolt. (From a personal letter dated March 25, 1954). The variants used in the text for his name are from the Russian press in 1900-1901. See *Tibet Papers*, Cd. 1920, pp. 113-18. Panikkar's reference to him as the "dispenser of wisdom at Fontainebleau" is somewhat misleading. K. M. Panikkar, "Asia and Western Dominance", (London, 1953), p. 162.

91. Bell, "Portrait," pp. 61-2.

92. William Filchner, *op. cit.*, In two articles under the title, "A Story of Struggle and Intrigue in Central Asia," the *JRCAS*, XIV, (1927), pp. 359-68, and XV, (1928), pp. 83-103, summed up Filchner's book. Apart from a friend who translated parts of the book for the writer, these two articles have been drawn upon.

over again that their main objective was commercial intercourse, the Dalai was convinced that this was only a clever ruse behind which lay hidden their ulterior motives, that in fact under the guise of establishing trade relations they were "merely trying to over-reach us".⁹³ Meanwhile it had been widely accepted, thanks to Dorjief's advocacy, that the country of north Shambha whose Buddhist King—according to a Tibetan prophecy—was to break the Muhammadan power and re-establish the faith, was none other than Russia.⁹⁴ Was not the Tsar then the monarch who was to aid and succour lama Buddhism? Set against this background one need hardly wonder that while Lord Curzon's letters were returned unopened, the Dalai sent diplomatic missions of goodwill to the all—White Tsar and that it was to the latter that he looked for saving him from the intense attentions which his southern neighbour was bestowing on him.

There were two of these missions, one in October 1900 and the other in 1901. On the first occasion the official Russian journal described Dorjief as the "first transit Hamba to the Dalai Lama of Tibet."⁹⁵ It was the Buriat's second mission, however, which was to attract much greater attention. Described as "extraordinary" observers pointedly stressed its "diplomatic" character.⁹⁶ As regards its purpose emphasis was laid on the fact that it was intended "further to cement" the already existing friendly relations with Russia, that although Tibet was quite accessible to the Russians, the Mission's aim was to make it even more so. It was pointed out that as a result of Dorjief's first visit the Dalai had been confirmed in his belief that he must contract the friendliest relations with Russia for she was the only power that could counteract British intrigues in his domain—intrigues which had persisted for so long and were even then awaiting an opportunity to force an entrance into the country.⁹⁷

Dorjief's second mission which occasioned all this comment comprised eight Tibetans with himself as its leader. Officially des-

93. Quoted in Bell, "Portrait," p. 62.

94. Kawaguchi, "Three Years in Tibet," (London, 1909) p. 409.

95. *Tibet Papers*, *op. cit.*, No. 31, p. 113.

96. See extracts from "Odsskia Novosti" of June 12, 1901. *Tibet Papers*, *op. cit.*, No. 31, pp. 113-4, and the interview with Dr. Badmeyer, published in the *St. Petersburg Gazette*, *Ibid*, Encl., No. 34, pp. 114-5.

97. See "Novoe Vremya," of June 17, 1901, *Ibid*, Encl. in No. 34, p. 115.

cribed as "the Envoys Extraordinary of the Dalai Lama of Tibet" it was received among others by the Emperor, the Empress, the Foreign Minister (Count Lamsdorff) and the Finance Minister (Count Sergei Witte).⁹⁸ Despite all the publicity which it evoked—and the British were not the only power whose worst fears had been aroused—the Russian Foreign Minister was emphatic that the Mission had no significance whatsoever. He tried to allay British fears by suggesting that Dorjief made his visits for the purpose of collecting funds for his religious order from the numerous Buddhist subjects of the Emperor and that in fact his visit had no official character.⁹⁹ On a subsequent occasion when further pressed on the matter Lamsdorff emphatically asserted that the Buriat's mission had "no political or diplomatic character", that at best it could be compared to the Pope's goodwill missions to his faithful in many distant lands. While it was true, he told the British Ambassador, that the Dalai had sent him an autographed letter, in reality it was no more than an exchange of innocuous courtesies.¹⁰⁰

The British may have been extremely sceptical about these bland assurances but preoccupied as they were with the war in South Africa the best they sought was to pin the Russians down to their words, with an occasional warning appropriately thrown in. Thus their response to the Russians was to remind the Tsar's Government that "HMG could not regard with indifference" any proceedings that might tend "to alter or disturb" the status of Tibet.¹⁰¹ To Lord Curzon, however, Dorjief's activities came as a godsend. We have already noticed¹⁰² that early in 1901 he had been pressing the authorities in London for an "altered" policy. Now (middle of 1902) his warnings were to assume greater urgency: if Russian moves in Tibet's direction became per-

98. *Ibid.*, Nos. 36 and 43, pp. 117 and 125.

99. *Ibid.*, No. 35, p. 116.

100. *Ibid.*, No. 36, p. 117. A British writer's comment on Lamsdorff's "assurance", was: "We were asked to believe that these lamas travelled many thousand miles to convey a letter that expressed the hope that the Russian Foreign Minister was in good health and prosperous, and informed him that the Dalai Lama was happy to be able to say that he himself enjoyed excellent health." Edmund Candler, *The Unveiling of Lhasa*, (London, 1905), pp. 12-3.

101. *Tibet Papers*, op. cit., No. 39, p. 124.

102. See *supra* footnotes 64, 65 and 66, pp. 220-21, *Journal of Indian History*, XXXIII, Part II, (August 1955).

sistent, he informed the Secretary of State, "my answer... would be very simple. Without the slightest hesitation I would put a British army into Lhasa."¹⁰³

Confused as the situation was it became further confounded when, towards the fall of 1902, there spread rumours of a Sino-Russian agreement on Tibet. The pivotal provision of this 12-clause Agreement was said to be a complete renunciation by China of all her interests in Tibet, in return for a Russian guarantee for her territorial integrity.¹⁰⁴ Coming in the wake of the Tibetan missions it thoroughly alarmed the British and they warned the Chinese that in the event of any such agreement HMG would take steps "for protecting the interests of Great Britain," and that on the Tibet-Sikkim frontier they "propose to make effective our treaty rights."¹⁰⁵ It is thus evident that Dorjief's two missions, in spite of Russian protests that these had no significance, aided by the tall talk that Russia had "taken over" Chinese interests in Tibet had led to a considerable hardening of the British stand. Again it is noticeable that despite the yawning chasm that separated the Home Government from the views of their pro-consul in India—and to which a reference has been made earlier¹⁰⁶—the former had gradually veered round to the latter's policy of "enforcing" the agreements of 1890 and 1893, and thus of facing the consequences of any precipitate action that might ensue. It is no less plain that Russia—despite the carryings on with Dorjief face to face with the British demand to define her position was prepared to hold the most categorical assurances that she was not a party to any surreptitious deal on Tibet. China's stand was no less emphatic; she denied all secret "deals" with Russia.¹⁰⁷ The absorbing, if intriguing, developments whereby these respective positions harden, shift, and harden again will be the concern of the pages that follow.

103. Letter to Secretary of State, May 28, 1902. Ronaldshay, *Life*, II, p. 207.

104. The rumours were first mentioned in a despatch from Sir E. Satow, in Peking, dated August 2, 1902. Three days later Satow sent a cutting from the "China Times" of July 18, 1902 giving the text of the "Agreement." *Tibet Papers*, op. cit., Nos. 48 and 49, pp. 140-1.

105. *Ibid.*, No. 55, p. 143.

106. See *supra*, JIH, op. cit., pp. 221-22. JIH is being used for the *Journal of Indian History*, as an abbreviation.

107. *Tibet Papers*, op. cit., No. 55, p. 143.

VII

Symbolic of the stiffened tone of the British towards Tibet was their acceptance of the Viceroy's proposal, referred to earlier, that the Political Officer in Sikkim should undertake a tour along the Tibet-Sikkim frontier.¹⁰⁸ Accompanied by an armed escort Mr. Claude White was to assert "our rights in respect of the boundary," to demarcate it, and to remove "all Tibetan guards and officials," from this side of the frontier. This "assertion of authority" was deemed necessary by Lord Curzon for he had been left singularly unimpressed by Russian, or indeed Chinese, protests that there was no secret deal on Tibet, nor had Lamadorff's assurances that Dorjief's interests were religio-geographic in character carried much conviction with him.¹⁰⁹ And as for the post-Boxer Rebellion China her end appeared to be so imminent that flat denials of the "sale" of Tibet to the Colossus from the north seemed only to confirm the suspicions that had been aroused.

Another development in 1902 whose import for Tibet was not inconsiderable, albeit indirect, was the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Hailed as a historic event which marked an important milestone in the rise of Japan as a world power, the alliance did at the same time put England in a better position to watch her Indian frontiers, for by making a Russo-Japanese conflict well-nigh inevitable it thereby severely limited Russia's ability to influence events in that direction.¹¹⁰

Meantime the Wai-Wu-Pai (the Chinese Foreign Office) was showing a keener interest in settling the problem of the undemarcated Indo-Tibetan border. Thus early in December 1902 the appointment of a new Chinese Resident in Lhasa was announced, the new incumbent being instructed to proceed post-haste to his

108. See *supra*, Footnote No. 72, JIH, *op. cit.*, p. 223.

109. Among other duties assigned to Mr. White were: to make, as far as possible, a scientific survey of the frontier on both sides; to take a complete set of photographs; and to add to "our present knowledge of the natural history of the region." Tibet Papers, *op. cit.*, Annexure 3, Encl. 16, in No. 66, pp. 170-72. The apocryphal text of the published agreement, the Chinese Minister in St. Petersburg assured the British ambassador, "indeed its very form and wording," showed that it could not be of Chinese origin. *Ibid.*, No. 57, p. 145.

110. Wee Kuo Lee, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

assignment as to negotiate with Mr. White "in an amicable spirit."¹¹¹ The Secretary of State who viewed the announcement as an "implicit" acceptance of China's responsibility for the affairs of Tibet asked the Viceroy for his views as to whether "trade and general relations" should be included among the subjects for negotiations, and whether a Tibetan representative should be associated with these discussions.¹¹² It was in response to this query that the Viceroy penned his rather well-known despatch of January 8, 1903, outlining in considerable detail his views on the Tibetan problem. Since the despatch marks the opening of an important phase in our narrative it deserves close scrutiny.¹¹³

For the major part it was a historical review, and the Viceroy took his story back to the middle of 1901 when the second attempt to open a direct contact with Lhasa had failed. Even the third, through Kazi U-gyen, had borne no fruit and Lord Curzon had thereupon suggested some "more practical measures" which in turn had been over-ruled by the Secretary of State. Next in sequence had come the tour of the Political Officer in Sikkim. This tour, the Viceroy now reported, had been concluded in the previous summer "with expedition and success" and in fact it was an aftermath thereof that news came of the Chinese sending a new Amban to discuss frontier matters. What was to be their course of action?

Before defining his attitude the Viceroy made two points: firstly, that the main advantage of Mr. White's tour had been the fear engendered among the Tibetans that it was only a prelude to some further movement. Was it not important then that this advantage should not be lightly thrown away? Evidently this could be achieved only "if we are prepared to assume a minatory tone and to threaten Tibet with a further advance." Secondly, that "some sort of relationship" existed between Russia and Tibet. This, in the opinion of the Viceroy, was bound to invest the projected negotiations with considerable importance for they would

111. For the new Amban's appointment see Tibet Papers, *op. cit.*, No. 59, p. 146, for his instructions *Ibid.*, No. 60, pp. 146-47.

112. *Ibid.*, No. 61, p. 148.

113. *Ibid.*, No. 66, pp. 150-56. The enclosures and annexures accompanying it cover pp. 157-77.

involve not only "the question of our entire future political relations" with Tibet, but also "the degree to which we can permit the influence of another great Power" to be exercised in that country's affairs. Tibet's relations in the past, Lord Curzon argued, had been with China, the suzerain power, or Nepal, or the British in India and Tibetan exclusion had been tolerated because it had carried with it "no element of political or military danger."

Taking these factors into account the Viceroy now proposed that the Chinese invitation to a conference should be accepted subject to two provisos: that the meeting be held at Lhasa and that a representative of the Tibetan Government should be associated with the discussions. Thus alone, the Viceroy thought, could the "wall of Tibetan impassivity and obstruction" be broken.

The rest of this closely reasoned despatch—and it ran into six long pages of small print, with 23 enclosures and 19 annexures—was designed to convince the Home authorities that there was "nothing revolutionary" about these proposals, similar ones had been made as early as 1874, and in fact revived in 1885. Elaborating some of his points the Viceroy suggested that the commercial mission was to be accompanied by an armed escort, "to overcome opposition" on the way and to ensure the missions safety while it was in the Tibetan capital. To allay fears the Chinese and the Tibetans were to be assured that "our objective" was merely to establish "those amicable and friendly relations and means of commerce" that ought to subsist between neighbours. With Nepal a policy of the closest collaboration was to be followed.

In winding up the Viceroy was not averse from holding out some veiled threats. He reminded the Home authorities that any government or country in the Empire had a right to protect its own interests and that if these were imperilled seriously "as we hold ours to be" the Government of India, by the fundamental law of survival, "would have to take steps to avert these dangers." And should his warnings go unheeded the situation "might attain to menacing proportions."

Critics have charged Lord Curzon with inconsistency and rhetoric.¹¹⁴ A closer analysis would, however, seem to suggest

114. Lee, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-6.

that the real accusation against the baron of Kedleston was the brazen-facedness and the ill-concealed contempt with which he seemed to treat both China and Tibet. And here why should Lord Curzon alone be singled out? Have the fifty years that separate these events from our own day made any difference? Did not Tibet enjoy the privilege of being bordered by a "Great" and "civilised" Power? Had she not proved stupidly obstinate in refusing that Power's hand for "amicable and friendly relations—and means of commerce?" Indeed once we accept Lord Curzon's fundamental premise his whole case stands thoroughly irrefutable.

The arrival of Lord Curzon's despatch at India House (January 24) synchronised with the presentation of a Russian memorandum to the British Foreign Office. The Memorandum made mention of a British military expedition having reached Khomba-Ovaleka, in Tibet, and on its way to the valley of Tchumbi. Russia looked upon such an expedition, it was pointed out, as producing a situation of "considerable gravity," and it might in turn compel her "to protect her interests" in those regions.¹¹⁵ The contents of the note filled the British with the utmost indignation. Maintaining that the information in the Russian memorandum was "without the smallest foundation," Lord Lansdowne, the British Foreign Secretary, told the Ambassador that the language of the note was unusual, and indeed minatory in tone; that the Russian complaint was gratuitous; that it surprised him that the Russian Government evinced such interest in a matter which was "within our undoubted rights."¹¹⁶ A few days later Lansdowne returned to the subject—and with far greater vehemence. "Any sudden display of Russian interest or activity," he warned Count Benckendorff, "would have a disturbing effect" on regions, which hitherto had been regarded as altoge-

115. For the text of the Memorandum, in French, see Tibet Papers, *op. cit.*, Enclo. in No. 68, p. 178. Tchumbi is a rendering for the more familiar Chumbi, but Khamba-Ovalko though hard to unravel, could be none other than Khamba Jong. A student of both Russian and Tibetan languages has suggested that Ovaleko is more Russian than Tibetan, that it may be an adjectival form from *val*, "an embankment," (fortification), thus equivalent to the Tibetan *jong*; perhaps an incorrect adjectival form used by someone who did not speak Russian perfectly (Dorjjeff) and hence mistaken by Russians for a Tibetan word.

116. *Ibid.*, No. 72, p. 180.

ther outside of Russia's sphere of influence. Such interest, or activity, would entail on the part of HMG a display of activity not only equivalent to "but exceeding that made by Russia." In other words should Russia send an expedition the British would do the same, "but in greater strength." The Ambassador was further warned that the British Government had information that Russia had concluded agreements for establishing a protectorate over Tibet and that she had, or intended to have, agents or consular offices in Lhasa. Could the Ambassador state categorically that these rumours were without foundation?¹¹⁷

Count Benckendorff while sure that the rumours were without substance undertook to make specific inquiries from his Government. The Russian reply when it came was unambiguous and categorical. The Ambassador was able to say, without qualification, that there was "no convention about Tibet, either with Tibet herself, or with China, or with anyone else", nor had the Russian Government any agents in that country, "nor any intention of sending agents or missions there." And yet although the Russians had no designs on Tibet as such, they could not remain indifferent to any disturbance of the status quo there. Should, however, a change in status come about they might be obliged to "safeguard their interests in Asia." Again, though their policy in regard to Tibet was summed up in the words "*ne viserait le Tibet en aucun cas*," yet they did regard her as forming a part of the Chinese Empire in the integrity of which they took an interest.¹¹⁸

Meanwhile as London wrestled with the Russian indiscretions, in India Lord Curzon was getting impatient—urging "immediate action" and asking for permission "to make preparations for the proposed mission."¹¹⁹ When finally driven to take a stand on the question the Secretary of State was not prepared to commit himself to a policy that might precipitate a crisis.¹²⁰ After

117. *Ibid.*, No. 73, pp. 181-82.

118. *Ibid.*, No. 83, p. 187.

119. The Viceroy's despatch of January 8 had reached London on January 24. In two subsequent despatches, on February 6 and 11, Lord Curzon urged action on it. It seems not unlikely that the Viceroy's urgency in demanding action sprang from his anxiety to get the troops across the passes into Tibet that very summer. See *Ibid.*, Nos. 70 and 71, p. 179.

120. *Ibid.*, No. 74, p. 182 and No. 78, pp. 183-5.

Count Benckendorff's categorical assurances the Secretary of State again asked the Viceroy for his views on the scope of the negotiations with China and Tibet, and the means necessary "to ensure that conditions that may be arrived at are observed."¹²¹ It was in reply to this query that the Government of India modifying its earlier proposals put forth the suggestion for the Young-husband Mission.

In his despatch Lord Curzon stepped extremely warily. Faced with reluctant authorities in London he now informed India House that the Chinese delegates, whom Amban Yu had appointed for the talks, had suggested to him that the conference be held at Yatung—"or indeed, at any place acceptable to us." For the venue, therefore, he suggested Khamba Jong which, in the words of the despatch, "is the nearest inhabited place to the frontier in dispute, near Giaogong."¹²² Actually it lay between 20 to 30 miles from the frontier, and over 70 miles north of Yatung. The British representative—the Amban was to be asked to associate proper Tibetan delegates with the Chinese deputies—was to proceed to Khamba, accompanied by an armed escort of 200 men and, if the Chinese or the Tibetans failed to appear, they were to move forward to Shigatse or Gyantse "in order that the arrival of the delegation from Lhasa might be accelerated."¹²³ In a subsequent communication the Viceroy elaborated his views on the scope of the negotiations.¹²⁴ He wanted not only the disputed frontier and trading rights to be discussed but also "general and trade relations" as between India and Tibet. Special mention was to be made of the duty on tea, and of the ten percent tax levied at P'hari on all goods in transit. Again since Yatung had been found to be unfavourable as a trade mart P'hari, or indeed any other place in the Chumbi valley, was to be opened up. The Viceroy also thought it to be important that a British Agent be established at Gyantse—an important trading centre on the main route to Shigatse and Lhasa. "The best security, of course," Lord Curzon wrote, "was to have a British representative at

121. *Ibid.*, No. 85, p. 188.

122. Khamba Jong is rendered as Kampa Dzong in Bell, *Tibet*, p. 66. "Dzong" (or Jong) is a fort, the headquarters of a Tibetan district.

123. *Tibet Papers*, op. cit., No. 86, p. 189.

124. *Ibid.*, No. 89, p. 190.

Lhasa, but Gyantse would be a "suitable alternative." However, if the Tibetans did not deal directly with him, "it will be necessary to resort to the alternative of moving him (the British Agent) forward to Lhasa."

The head of the Mission, the Viceroy suggested, should be Major Younghusband, then Resident at Indore, "for I can safely rely on his judgment and discretion, and he has great Asiatic experience." Mr. White was to be Joint Commissioner and a member of the British Consular Service, in China, was to be associated with the two of them.

HMG accepted some of the Viceroy's suggestions: the site for the talks, the choice of Major Younghusband, and the proposition of the accompanying armed escort. Others, however, more crucial from Calcutta's point of view, were over-ruled. Thus the Mission was not to advance beyond Khamba without previous reference to London, and "even in the event of the failure of the Chinese and Tibetan parties to meet" with them. Again the Agent would entail "difficulties and responsibilities incommensurate with any benefits which... could be gained." And as Russia had denied any political interest negotiations "should be restricted" to questions concerning "trade relations, the frontier and grazing rights."¹²⁵

A word may be said here about Major Younghusband, the man chosen to lead the Mission.¹²⁶ In his younger days Young-

125. *Ibid.*, No. 95, p. 193.

126. Born at Murree, in the Punjab (Pakistan), in 1863, Younghusband's upbringing had been Victorian in the best sense of the term, viz., regular daily prayers, inculcation of filial piety, and the veritable Sunday School. At 13 he went to Clifton College—then a semi-army training School—and at 17 to Sandhurst where Allenby and Herbert Lawrence (later Lord Haig's Chief of Staff) were his contemporaries. At 19 he joined the 1st Royal Dragoon Guards, then stationed at Meerut, in India, as a subaltern. His "Relief of Chitral" was published in 1895, the "Heart of a Continent," in 1896, and "South Africa To-day," in 1897—all in London. His Tibet expedition is described in "India and Tibet," (London, 1910). In later life Younghusband was to turn increasingly towards mysticism—his works in this field are indeed numerous—and the fag-end of his life was spent in founding a World Fellowship of Faith. He died in 1942. Of a score or so of his works on the mystical themes the better known are: "The Heart of Nature, or the Quest for Natural Beauty," (London, 1921), "Life in the Stars," an exposition of the view that on some planets of some stars exist beings higher

husband had passed through Clifton and Sandhurst and while Curzon was globe-trotting, and drinking deep at the fount of the Empire, Younghusband, then in his early twenties, was busy exploring the Asian continent "to see how far the Chinese would resist any encroachments by the Russians towards the Indian Empire, from which they were only separated by the outlying province of Chinese Turkestan."¹²⁷ Curzon started his first journey around the world in 1888—Younghusband by 1887 had explored Manchuria and made his famous Peking to India overland journey across the open steppes of Mongolia the great desert of Gobi, and up the mighty Himalayas. By 1890 Curzon had completed his "Russia in Central Asia", and warned his countrymen "of the gravity of the menace which Russian ambitions constituted to the Imperial position of Great Britain in the East."¹²⁸ A few years previously Younghusband had concluded that "the Chinese were quite unable to assume the offensive against the Russians, and in Turkestan would not even be able to hold their own, the Russians would have little trouble in conquering the whole of Turkestan."¹²⁹ In mental-make up thus the resemblance between the two men is quite striking, and while Curzon had written of the irresistible march of the Russians towards the frontiers of India, to the heart of Persia, and to the warm waters of the Bosphorus; Younghusband had likened her southward drive to that of a glacier which under the inevitable pull of gravitation moves from the higher to the lower regions.¹³⁰

Apart from his early explorations—he was not yet 24—through Manchuria, the Gobi and Chinese Turkestan—, Younghusband had also undertaken some semi-military, semi-political missions to the northern frontier. Thus in June 1899 he had

than ourselves, and on one a world leader, the supreme embodiment of the eternal spirit which animates life." (London, 1927), "The Living Universe," (London, 1933), and "The Sum of Things," (London, 1939). Apart from stray sketches no "Life" of Younghusband has been written, his own, "The Light of Experience," (London, 1927), is partly autobiographical. A recent study is George Seaver, "Francis Younghusband." (London, 1952).

127. Younghusband, "The Heart of a Continent," *op. cit.*, 2nd Edition, (London, 1937), Introduction.

128. Ronaldshay, *Life*, II, pp. 142-43.

129. Younghusband, "The Light of Experience," *op. cit.*, p. 40.

130. Younghusband, "The Heart of a Continent," *op. cit.*, Introduction.

crossed the Shimshal pass and progressed through the Pamirs "to examine what passes there might be into Hunza from there."¹³¹ In the summer of 1890 he was sent to the Pamirs again—this time to ascertain the Chinese and Afghan claims to the Roof of the World.¹³² Between his Pamir adventures and the Mission to Tibet Younghusband had acted as Political Agent in Chitral, where later he was to spearhead a gallant relief to a worn-out group of beleaguered officers, and to act as the *London Times'* correspondent both there and in South Africa.¹³³ Before his appointment as head of the Mission Younghusband had known Lord Curzon fairly intimately: they had met K in London in 1892, in Chitral in 1894, and again in Simla in 1903. On this last occasion Curzon had asked the Younghusbands to stay with him, and had enjoined upon them "not to look upon him as Viceroy, but as an old friend and fellow-traveller."¹³⁴

On June 3, (1903) the Government of India officially notified Younghusband of his appointment, and briefed him on his "mission."¹³⁵ The briefing, in terms of the scope of the negotiations as finally defined by the Secretary of State, had been preceded by a long talk between the Viceroy and the Commissioner, and the former had confided to him how "mercilessly" he had been overruled by the Home authorities. Younghusband's feelings were somewhat mixed:

"I was proud indeed to have been selected....The whole enterprise was risky. His own party (Lord Curzon's) was very lukewarm over it....Disasters were sure to come.... He (Lord Curzon) was risking much in selecting me. I had never seen a Tibetan, nor served on the North-Eastern frontier.... I might make a hideous mess of it with the Tibetans.... I quite saw the risks that Lord Curzon was taking, and this made me all the keener to justify his choice."¹³⁶

131. Younghusband, *The Light of Experience*, op. cit., p. 45.

132. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

133. Younghusband's "Relief of Chitral," op. cit., has been regarded as "a model of military history within the limits of a minor campaign." Seaver, op. cit., p. 167.

134. Quoted in Seaver, op. cit., p. 198. The source, not indicated, appears to be some private correspondence.

135. *Tibet Papers*, Cd. 1920, Encl. 6 in No. 99, pp. 198-200.

136. Younghusband, "The Light of Experience," op. cit., pp. 81-2.

VIII

To set matters in perspective it might be useful to review these developments from the Chinese-Tibetan side as well. It has already been noticed that originally it were the Chinese who awakened to all the ugly possibilities inherent in Mr. White's tour (July 1902) had suggested negotiations. The Manchu Amban at Lhasa had been in communication with the Viceroy, but owing to his "illness" and later "important special business" at Lhasa his representative had not been able to meet the Political Officer during his tour. Later, in November 1902, His Excellency Z'u had written to his opposite number, Baron Curzon, asking that negotiations be resumed and "matters....thus amicably arranged."¹³⁷ On January 21, 1903, Mr. Ho, the Amban's representative had himself addressed Mr. White asking him "to come to Yatung for a few days....and discuss frontier and other matters in a friendly manner."¹³⁸ Tiring of—a response he had, on February 8, addressed another letter in which in an unguarded moment he had used these words:

"...and fearing that the suggestions contained in Mr. Ho's letter of the 21st January, 1903, to you that you might find it convenient to discuss matters at Yatung had not proved acceptable, we (Mr. Ho and Captain Parr) therefore hasten to assure you....quite prepared to proceed to such place as may seem to....the Viceroy more desirable."¹³⁹

Lord Curzon seized upon the words. Could he not have named Lhasa as the venue? But he chose to be merciful and named only Khamba Jong! In naming this site the Viceroy was

137. *Tibet Papers*, op. cit., Annexure 1, Encl. 22, in No. 66, p. 176.

138. *Ibid.*, Annexure 2, in No. 66, pp. 176-77.

139. *Ibid.*, Annexure 2, in No. 99, pp. 195-6. A word may be added here regarding Captain Parr, an Englishman who was a member of the Chinese Imperial Customs Service, which for nearly a quarter century was run by Sir Robert Hart, its British Inspector General. Parr's designation was Chinese Commissioner of Customs at Yatung, and he was decorated with His Imperial Majesty's Order of the Double Dragon, 3rd Class. It is not unlikely that his appointment at Yatung may have been made in anticipation of the negotiations with the British. Younghusband, later, found him "extremely helpful"—at the time of the Mission's advance over the Jelapla, in December, 1903, to Gyantse. (Younghusband, "India and Tibet," p. 155). A vital question concerning him remains unanswered: was he appointed at the suggestion of the British Minister in Peking, or was it on the initiative of the Chinese?

being deliberately oblivious of the terms of the Convention of 1890, and the Trade Regulations of 1893, whereby Yatung was the only place "open" to the British.¹⁴⁰ Was not Lord Curzon's manner, therefore, high-handed and his hoodwinking of the authorities in London deliberate? As for the Amban, the Viceroy left him little choice in the matter: "Khamba Jong," he wrote to him on June 3, and the meeting was scheduled for July 7, "is the nearest inhabited place to the frontier in question, where such a meeting can take place".¹⁴¹

On July 6 Younghusband—he had been temporarily promoted a full Colonel—accompanied by Captain (latter Sir William Frederick) O'Connor and Mr. White, with a full escort to boot, rode into Tibet. The frontier had been crossed in the face of repeated protests from the Chinese Commissioners who pointed out that Khamba "being on Tibetan side of the frontier is an unsuitable rendezvous".¹⁴² Earlier, on July 5, two Lhasa officials had met Mr. White at the border, at Giaogong and asked him to discuss matters, but had been informed that "any discussions must be held up until arrival at Khamba Jong". How earnest the Tibetans were in dissuading the British from crossing into their country is apparent from the following passage in Captain O'Connor's diary:

"They pressed forward on foot, and, catching hold of Mr. White's bridle, importuned him to dismount and to repair to their tents. At the same time their servants pressed round our horses, and seizing our reins endeavoured to lead us away.... The Khamba Jongpon, one of the Tibetan officials, afterwards followed us, and repeated efforts to induce me to halt.... He was in a very excited and agitated state.... He said, 'You may flick a dog once or twice without his biting, but if you tread on his tail, even if he had no teeth, he will turn and try to bite you....'"¹⁴³

It was against this background that Khamba was reached and "negotiations" started there.

140. A Macalumn Scott, *The Truth About Tibet*, (London, 1905), p. 30.

141. Tibet Papers, *op. cit.*, Encl. 7, in No. 99, pp. 200-1.

142. *Ibid.*, Annexure 1, Encl. 5, in No. 129, p. 223.

143. *Ibid.*, Encl. 15, in No. 129, p. 226. O'Connor's "Diary", inevitably detailed, makes very interesting reading. Jongpen or Dzong-pon is "Governor of Fort," the Tibetan official incharge of a district. In some districts a single Dzonpon holds charge, in others two of them exercise joint control.

There had been a fear that the Tibetan representatives would not arrive for the tripartite talks that had been envisaged. To forestall this the British Foreign Office, early in May, had urged their Minister in Peking "to lay stress on the necessity for associating a properly accredited Tibetan representative", alongside the Chinese Commissioners.¹⁴⁴ This, however, had not come to pass despite the Amban's exhortations to the Tibetan "barbarians" to discuss matters "on the basis of reason".¹⁴⁵ Thus on the eve of the talks at Khamba no Tibetan representatives were present. We have already noticed that the Khamba Jongpen—the Tibetan district official—had protested against the crossing of the border. Soon enough a further difficulty arose in the shape of the "discovery" that the Chinese representatives were of very low rank, that in fact the Assistant Amban, and the members of the Tibetan Council, should have been sent.¹⁴⁶ On July 22, however, the British Commissioner condescended to meet the "low rank" delegates. To his long and laboriously prepared peroration, which he confessed to his Government was meant "not for the benefit of these petty representatives here.... but to reach the ears of the Tibetan Government at Lhasa", the Tibetans raised two preliminary objections. Firstly, the negotiations should not have been held at Khamba, but at Giaogong; and secondly, the armed escort which the Commissioner had brought with him was redundant and should be sent back.¹⁴⁷ Younghusband's attempt to persuade the Tibetan official to transmit a copy of his speech to Lhasa proved of little avail: "he (the Lhasa official) could not have got rid of a viper with greater haste than he got rid of that paper". The Commissioner was indeed driven to the end of his tether, and he warned his government at the end of this first meeting about "the possible necessity for coercion" before the negotiations could be successfully terminated.¹⁴⁸

This first meeting was also to prove the last. For the next three months that the British remained at Khamba there were

144. *Ibid.*, No. 90, p. 191.

145. These words occur in an extract from the "Peking Gazette", of May 23, 1903 under "Supplementary Memorial from Yu Kang", and purports to be an address made by the Amban, Yu Kang, to the Tibetan bKa-blons (Councillors of State). For the text see.

146. *Ibid.*, Encl. 11 and 28, in No. 129, p. 243.

147. *Ibid.*, Annexure, Encl. 21, in No. 129, pp. 232-34.

148. *Loc. cit.*

hardly any negotiations for the presence of the British troops made the Tibetans suspicious, ill at ease and unwilling to talk. In fact it is amazing that in the face of an almost unanimous demand both from the Tibetans and the Chinese that Younghusband should withdraw to the frontier the Commercial Mission—eager to enforce treaty obligations!—found itself at the end of two months not indeed prepared to leave, but “entrenched in the open with maxims trained and ready”.¹⁴⁹ As a matter of fact the response to the withdrawal was to be a further advance into the heart of the country.

The story of this advance from Khamba to Gyantse—and beyond to Lhasa—was one of clever, adroit planning by the Viceroy and a hesitant, halting acquiescence by the Home Government, while the Tibetans and the Chinese played consciously-unconsciously into the hands of the unscrupulous Lord Curzon. In a brief survey like this only a bare outline at least can be attempted. As early as August 25 (1903)—Younghusband had met the Tibetans and the Chinese on July 22—the Viceroy had informed the Amban at Lhasa that he himself, or the Associate Amban, accompanied by a Councillor of the Dalai Lama and a high member of their National Assembly should proceed post-haste to Khamba, or else “my Commissioners” would choose “some other place in Tibet” to pass the winter.¹⁵⁰ A few weeks later (September 16) he appraised the authorities in London of the hostile actions of the Tibetans: they had “definitely” decided upon war, troops had been collected from all quarters in the country, two British subjects had been arrested—and suggested the occupation of the Chumbi valley and the advance of the Mission to Gyantse!¹⁵¹ HMG however viewed this move with “grave misgiving”.¹⁵² Sooner than he realised the Viceroy found his hands further strengthened by the growing conviction of the British Minister in Peking that even the new Chinese Amban at Lhasa was not likely to pull much weight with the “obstinate and stupid Tibetan barbarians”.¹⁵³

149. *Ibid.*, Encl. 54, in No. 129, p. 267.

150. *Ibid.*, Encl. 36, in No. 129, pp 250-1.

151. *Ibid.*, No. 112, p. 209.

152. *Ibid.*, No. 113, p. 210.

153. In this context a despatch of Sir Ernest Satow, British Minister in Peking, to the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdowne, bears quotation: “.... I am disposed to think that the Chinese Government are really

Could the Baron of Kedleston be right after all? On October 1, the Home authorities permitted the advance, “if it can be done with safety” and “if complete rupture of negotiations proves inevitable”.¹⁵⁴

Lord Curzon’s aim now was to prove to the satisfaction of his masters that both the conditions they had stipulated were in fact satisfied. Following Younghusband’s visit to Simla, where he had been summoned for ‘personal consultations’, the Viceroy telegraphed a long despatch to London on October 26 detailing reasons why a further advance into Tibet had become “indispensible”.¹⁵⁵ He repeated the old arguments: inadequate and inferior Chinese and Tibetan representation, the non-arrival of the new Chinese Amban, the Tibetans’ preparations for ‘war’. “They mistake our patience”, Lord Curzon wrote, “for weakness, reject our overtures with scorn, and despise our strength”, and asked whether “in these circumstances”, there was any alternative except the one to advance? And the advance must be to Gyantse—for the Tibetans did not regard the Chumbi valley as a part of Tibet proper, and would view its occupation as a “retrograde step”. Two fresh arguments were pressed into service: Younghusband thought it was extremely important that the Mission should come into contact with the Tibetan people, “who are quite friendly and prepared to enter into relations with us”, and as the British were pressing for a trade mart at Gyantse it would be best to go there quickly. As for the logistics part of it, no difficulties were anticipated.

In the meantime in London a change had come over India House with Lord George Hamilton giving place to the Hon’ble Henry St. John Brodrick, later Earl of Midelton. The new Secretary of State’s close ties with his old Eton-Balliol friend in India were well-known and Lord Curzon had anticipated no difficulties with his proposals on Tibet, and of course in regard to his other policies in general. Mr. Brodrick, however, had not been long in

desirous of seeing the matter brought to a satisfactory conclusion between India and Tibet, but from Prince Ch’ing’s (Chinese Foreign Minister) repeated allusions to the obstinate temper of the Tibetans and the difficulty the Resident (the Imperial Resident, or Amban at Lhasa) experiences in dealing with them, they are not sanguine as to the likelihood of Yu tai’s (the newly appointed Amban) being able to expedite the negotiations.” Tibet Papers, *op. cit.*, pp. 211-12.

office before he discovered that the Viceroy not only looked upon him "as his representative at the Court of St. James" but had hoped "from our intimacy I would....carry for him points of policy of which he had utterly failed to convince my predecessor....or the Cabinet". And since he did not always oblige, "from the first his view of me was that I was an unprofitable servant".¹⁵⁶ This growing lack of confidence between London and Calcutta is a key factor to a proper understanding and appreciation of the Tibetan problem in the months that lay ahead.

To the new Secretary in London the Viceroy pointed out again that a rupture in the negotiations at Khamba was not only inevitable, but that, in fact, it had already taken place.¹⁵⁷ A few days later he peremptorily reported an overt act of hostility: Tibetan troops had attacked some Nepalese yaks on the frontier, and carried off many of them.¹⁵⁸ With this unceasing, relentless pressure applied from Calcutta, HMG finally sanctioned the advance to Gyantse on November 6. The sanction, however, was hedged in by all possible limitations: this step was not to lead to "occupation or permanent intervention" in Tibetan affairs in any form, as soon as reparation was obtained, a withdrawal was to be effected, there was to be no permanent mission stationed in Tibet.¹⁵⁹ The Viceroy, however, was singularly indifferent to the ultimate shape of things, with the advance to Gyantse sanctioned his immediate objective had been attained.

It remained for the Government in London to justify their action to the Chinese and the Russians. As if to forestall any move on the Viceroy's part, the Chinese had intimated that the new Amban had been ordered to reach Lhasa by "forced marches",

154. *Ibid.*, No. 120, p. 213.

155. *Ibid.*, No. 123, pp. 214-15.

156. Midelton, Earl of (Henry St. John Brodrick), "Records and Reactions," (London, 1939), pp. 200-1.

157. *Tibet Papers*, Cd. 1920, No. 126, pp. 216-18.

158. *Ibid.*, No. 127, p. 218. The actual details of how "four mounted Tibetan officers" and some 60 to 80 Tibetans "with swords and knives" had "rushed" among some Nepalese yaks "terrifying and dispersing them in all direction" looks very different from the "overt act of hostility" by Tibetan troops that the Viceroy sought to represent. See also *Ibid.*, No. 130, p. 292.

159. *Ibid.*, No. 132, p. 294.

that the Resident then in the capital had been asked "to proceed at once" to meet Younghusband and "arrange matters", and that they were ready to exact obedience from the Government of Tibet to the Imperial commands to forthwith resume negotiations.¹⁶⁰ These pleas, however, were of no avail. The British stand was that they could not remain inactive; nor yet could they agree to "postpone" measures which the conduct of the Tibetans had "constrained" them to adopt—in fact, it was impossible to desist from what had already been sanctioned.¹⁶¹

The Russians' were a harder nut to crack. Their ambassador in London pointed out to HMG that "this present invasion" was calculated to involve "a grave disturbance" of the situation in Central Asia, and that it was likely to create mistrust in Anglo-Russian relations. Lord Lansdowne expressed considerable surprise at the Russian "excitement" and reminded them of encroachments in Manchuria, Turkestan and Persia. In the end they were persuaded to accept the construction which the British put on events: the "advance" had been undertaken with considerable reluctance, that it had been made inevitable by circumstances, and that its sole object was to obtain satisfaction.¹⁶²

IX

In the progress of the Mission from Khamba to Gyantse the major obstacle was not the physical prowess of the ill-equipped—they were armed with spears and the fanatical monks that lay athwart their routes, but the difficult nature of the country and the bitter, biting winter. Another fear that constantly preyed on Younghusband's men was the possibility of Russian intrigue: dread of Russian—trained and equipped soldiers, if not indeed the Cossacks themselves!

The winter had been severe and it claimed a large number of victims, particularly among the rank and file.¹⁶³ From Khamba

160. *Ibid.*, No. 143, pp. 299-300.

161. *Ibid.*, Nos. 145 and 148, pp. 301 and 302.

162. *Ibid.*, No. 141, pp. 298-99.

163. Apart from "war" casualties the number of deaths, upto June 10, 1904, were listed thus: British officers 2, men 1, native officers 1, native warrant officer 1, native rank and file 63, followers 118. It will be remembered that the period covered was the one of advance from Khamba to Gyantse, but not to Lhasa. *Tibet Papers*, Cd. 2370, No. 60, p. 20.

where the Mission had been encamped all this while Gyantse lay about 200 miles farther to the north-east—the route lying through the Jeiap-la, Yatung and P'hari. The crossing of the snow-laden passes in the bitterest of the blizzards was by no means an easy task. The Commission proceeded by stages: the original advance was to be made over the Jelep la, yet the reinforcements were to utilise the Natu la route through Gangtok and Gnatong over into the valley of Chumbi.

Some opposition had been expected at the summit of the Jelep-la (14,400 feet), none, however, was offered.¹⁶⁴ The Tibetans did indeed construct a wall at Yatung, but it was easily bypassed. On January 6, the entire force reached P'hari with no opposition, as yet, from man through much from nature, for the cold now was terrible: "piercing winds swept down the valley, and discomfort was extreme."¹⁶⁵ A day later they encamped at the foot of the Lang-la (15,200 feet) for the march to Tuna, a small village about 19 miles from P'hari across the Tang la, which was to serve as their base for a further advance into Gyantse. On January 12 three Tibetan monks from the Lhasa monasteries and a General, who had earlier met the Commission at P'hari, asked O'Connor again that the Mission withdraw to Yatung. Later they are reported to have agreed to discuss matters at Tuna itself.¹⁶⁶ Next day, however, they built themselves a wall at that place exactly where the open plain was narrowed by a large frozen lake and an outlying spur of one of the ranges. They, indeed, "ran it up in a night, it was their equivalent for a full-stop."¹⁶⁷

To the Commissioner the presence of the Lhasa monks, in fact their whole demeanour, was suspect for they had behaved "in a most unfriendly manner" at P'hari. The wall, and the organisation of supply and transport along the lines of communication, entailed three months of weary waiting at Tuna. It was felt that a very large number of stores must be accumulated in the Chumbi

164. Younghusband, in a telegram to the Viceroy on December 9, had given the information that the Tibetans were relying on Russian support and that Russian arms had entered Tibet: whence the opposition that was expected. *Tibet Papers*, No. 1920, No. 153, p. 306.

165. Younghusband, *India and Tibet*, op. cit., p. 159.

166. *Tibet Papers*, Cd. 1920, No. 173, p. 312.

valley before any advance to Gyantse was possible. Meanwhile the Tibetans had gathered at Guru, a place some nine miles away on the road to Gyantse. Here on March 31 took place the first armed encounter between the peaceful Commercial Mission and their adversaries in the latter's attempt to resist the advance. It may not be possible, in this short compass, to go into the details of how the shooting started. In the final analysis when completely surrounded by the armed escort, advancing in attack formations the Tibetans were asked to lay down their arms. On their refusing to do so an attempt was made to disarm them forcibly. In the excitement thus engendered the Lhasa general fired a shot. This proved to be the signal for the melee that ensued.¹⁶⁸ Edmund Candler, the (London) "Daily Mail's" correspondent, who was an eye-witness and was himself seriously injured in the fighting called it, "not a battle but a shambles, not a stand-up fight, but a massacre." For, "into the dense mass of the Tibetans" packed together on barely an acre of ground was fired volley after volley of fire from the surrounding troops extending in a scientific firing line. The Tibetans lost 700 men, dead and wounded, the British casualties numbered two wounded, one of them being Candler himself.¹⁶⁹

Younghusband himself described the fighting as a disaster, "a terrible and ghastly business" and, writing years later, wondered if it could possibly have been avoided.¹⁷⁰ Perhaps, apart from other factors, need was felt to boost the British prestige then "astonishingly low on the Sikkim frontier". The "Daily Mail" correspondent, referred to above, noted for instance: "There was no hope of them (the Tibetans) regarding the British as a formidable power and a force to be reckoned with, until we killed several

167. Pousse-Cailloux, "A Foot-note," *Blackwoods Magazine*, No. MCCCCLX, vol. CCXXV, February 1929, pp. 147-76. "Foot-note" has a double entendre. Literally Pousse-Cailloux is "pebble-pusher", French equivalent of the English, "foot-slogger." The writer, Lt.-Col. L. A. Bethel, was then a Lieutenant in the Gurkhas.

168. For details see *Tibet Papers*, Cd. 2054, No. 9, p. 5; No. 10, pp. 5-6; No. 11, p. 6 and No. 12, p. 6.

169. Edmund Candler, op. cit., p. 109. In a subsequent passage he called it "an inglorious victory" and expressed the opinion that the officers "who did their duty so thoroughly, had no heart in the business at all." *Ibid.*, p. 111.

170. Younghusband, *India and Tibet*, p. 178.

thousand of their men."¹⁷¹ Contrary to popular belief that the killing might deter them, the Tibetan resistance to the British advance—however futile it may have appeared—never actually ceased. In fact most of the fighting yet lay ahead, and only two weeks after the action at Guru Macdonald found his further progress barred¹⁷²—another 190 Tibetan corpses were to mark the trail of the advance to Gyantse.¹⁷³

The fighting—at Guru, and subsequently at Tsamdang George—had for once put an end to the embarrassments of the Indian Government. The Tibetan aggression being established the term "Tibetans" was replaced by the expression "the enemy" in all official correspondence. Diplomacy indeed was at a discount, and for long "military operations" were to dominate the situations.¹⁷⁴

And yet the facade of negotiations was kept up. Thus between the date of the arrival of the Mission at Gyantse, April 11, and its departure for Lhasa, July 15, there was considerable acti-

171. Edmund Candler, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

In a despatch to the Government of India on January 11, 1903, Younghusband noted:

"We have, in fact . . . not one ounce of prestige on this frontier. I have . . . nothing to work with in making a settlement . . . Rather than being afraid of us, the Tibetans here in Tibet think we ought to be afraid of them." *Tibet Papers*, Cd. 2054, Part II, No. 37, p. 18.

172. With the decision to advance to Gyantse the total force necessary to accompany the Mission was considerably increased. It was to comprise one battalion of Gurkhas and two of Pioneers, two companies of Sappers and Miners, two mountain battery guns, two maxims and two seven-pounders. The command of this force was entrusted to Brigadier-General J. R. L. Macdonald of the Royal Engineers. General Macdonald was, however, subject—for decisions concerning the active employment of the force or otherwise—to Col. Younghusband, who was the leader of the entire Mission. *Tibet Papers*, Cd. 1920, No. 150, pp. 303-4. This position was pretty odd. The Commissioner, chosen by the Viceroy, though senior in status was junior in rank to his military adjutant who had been selected, not by the Viceroy, but by his Commander-in-Chief, in this case Lord Kitchner. This "dual control was from the outset an anomaly and an embarrassment." Seaver, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

173. *Ibid.*, No. 25, p. 10. The encounter took place at Tsamdang Gorge. Besides 190 dead, "many" were wounded and 70 taken prisoners.

174. A. Maccallum Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

vity on the diplomatic front. The new Chinese Amban who had arrived in Lhasa in the previous December had written to Young-husband, very early in April, that he intended to come and meet the Commissioner, but that the obstinacy of the Tibetans was making it hard for him.¹⁷⁵ Earlier, on April 4, a certain General Ma had arrived at Guru as the Amban's delegate in place of "Ho, Chao and Li," and information had also been received that four Tibetan delegates were on their way.¹⁷⁶

To hasten their pace, and some fighting had already taken place in and around Gyantse, the Viceroy suggested to the Secretary of State the setting of a time-limit by which "proper" representatives of both the Chinese and the Tibetan Governments, "invested with full powers", were required to arrive.¹⁷⁷ Within a few days a tentative date, June 25, for the advance to Lhasa was being discussed.¹⁷⁸ Finally, on May 14, the Secretary of State agreed to an ultimatum being sent both to the Dalai and to the Amban. This was to be further reinforced by a direct communication from London to the Chinese Government.¹⁷⁹

The "ultimatums" were not without their effect. On June 25, being the last day for the negotiations to commence, Young-husband reported that Tibetan delegates were on their way and requested that the earlier time-limit be advanced by five days.¹⁸⁰ On the afternoon of July 1 the Ta Lama arrived at Gyantse, and along with the six representatives of the three Lhasa monasteries met Younghusband.¹⁸¹ Serious negotiations, however, could not start because the Commissioner insisted that as a necessary preliminary the Gyantse Jong must be evacuated "so that there may be no risk of further attack on the Commission." And as the Tibetans did not comply, the Jong was assaulted and taken. Thereafter, for some days Younghusband's efforts to get in touch with the Ta Lama proved futile.¹⁸²

175. *Tibet Papers*, Cd. 2054, Part I, No. 14, p. 7.

176. *Ibid.*, No. 16, p. 7.

177. *Tibet Papers*, Cd. 2370, Part I, Ni. 7, pp. 3-4.

178. *Ibid.*, No. 13, p. 6 and No. 18, p. 8.

179. *Ibid.*, No. 56, p. 19.

180. *Ibid.*, No. 63, p. 21.

181. *Ibid.*, No. 72, p. 24.

182. *Ibid.*, No. 83, p. 28.

On July 14 the Mission began its march to Lhasa. Two days later Younghusband received a letter, through the Bhutane-
nese envoy, from the Dalai Lama and the Ta Lama indicating a
readiness to negotiate.¹⁸³ On July 20 the Tibetan envoys—the
Ta Lama the Yatok Shape, and the Grand Secretary met the
British Commissioner at Nagartse and requested him to return to
Gyantse for negotiations. Younghusband repeated "for the fiftieth
time", that he had waited long and patiently, and as for any fur-
ther negotiations he had the Viceroy's orders "to go to Lhasa, and
go there I must."¹⁸⁴ That, in fact, was to become his constant
refrain until the Mission arrived at Lhasa. For both at the Chak-
sam ferry where the Tibetan National Assembly promised nego-
tiations, and asked the Mission not to proceed to Lhasa or again
at Camp Tolung where apart from the Ta Lama, the Tsarong
Shape, and an abbot in private attendance upon the Dalai Lama
alongwith representatives of the three Lhasa monasteries met him,
and asked the British Commissioner to refrain from advancing,
his reply was the same: "We must go there."¹⁸⁵

And thus it came about that early in August (1904) the
"Commercial" Mission that had arrived at Khamba on July 7,
1903, found itself at the gates of the Potala. Its initial purpose,
in the words of Lord George Hamilton, was to negotiate on "trade
relations, frontier and grazing rights." What was to be its ultimate
achievement?

(To be concluded)

183. *Ibid.*, No. 95, p. 32.

184. *Ibid.*, Part II, Enclo. 252, p. 211.

185. *Ibid.*, Part I, No. 118, pp. 48-9, and Part II, Enclo. No. 250, p. 217.

Lord Curzon and The Problem of European Racialism in India

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Speaking in October 1907 Gopal Krishna Gokhale said that
when Lord Curzon announced at the Delhi Durbar that the whole
of India was loyal he was stating a fact, but since then his policy
of centralisation, his openly expressed contempt for the Indian
standards of morality, his whittling down of the Queen's Proclama-
tion of 1858, and the measures carried out by him against the wish
of the people—the Partition of Bengal in particular—had all contri-
buted to alienate a very large majority of thinking men in India,¹
Curzon's unpopularity in India is never doubted; his rule was
greatly responsible for the Indian unrest that followed. But be it
said to the credit of that Viceroy that it was he who launched a
vigorous campaign against the European racialism in India. The
White man was in the habit of feeling superior to his Indian sub-
jects for long. His arrogance, insolence and misbehaviour had al-
most continued from the time of the establishment of his political
authority in the East. But the continuance of this racial hatred into
the twentieth century was rich in consequences. The general
awakening in the Eastern world, especially the national conscious-
ness in India, could not accommodate any longer the doctrine of
racial superiority as upheld by the foreign rulers. Lord Curzon
became aware of the harm which the European Community did to
the British Indian Empire.

Shortly after his arrival he came to understand that if a
European knocked down an Indian, and the latter died of the blow,
there was not the slightest chance of his being convicted by any
European Jury. The Viceroy engaged himself in investigating, with

1. Morley Papers, Minto to Morley, Vol. VII, Vide Note from Dunlop
Smith, 29 October 1907.

Mackworth Young, a sample case which occurred in the Punjab early in 1900. It was of the most patent and indisputable character, but, nevertheless, the Jury unanimously acquitted the defendant, who was an Irish, not merely on the charge of murder, but even upon that of having committed grievous hurt. "Such cases", said Curzon, "do more harm to the cause of British Administration in India than years of patient and upright labour do good."² To him, the fact that in analogous circumstances an Indian Jury would probably acquit an Indian defendant was really no excuse for the British, since the latter considered themselves the parents of the Jury system in India, and they could hardly blame the Indian for following an example which the English were increasingly setting him from day to day.

If the justice of the White man based itself on such racial discriminations, the British Civil Servants in India made the matter worse. Much of the strained relation which existed between Europeans and Indians was due to 'the low sense of duty' which animated a certain section of the Civil Servants. Theodore Morison, in his little book entitled 'Imperial Rule in India' described the system of administration as *the rule not so much of the British Government as of the British race*: and hence its unpopularity. The most favourable specimens of that race did not always come to India; and, in proportion as they lacked moral and intellectual qualities, so did they endeavour to assert themselves by roughness and harsh treatment of those under them.³

The worst however was coming from the military people. Curzon was sorry to feel that, in the whole of his campaign on the subject of so-called 'accidents and collisions', he met with nothing but tacit discouragement and sublatent antagonism from the soldiers. They were banded together throughout India in a compact body, animated by the fiercest *esprit de corps*. They winked at things done by a fellow-soldier, which they denounced if committed by a civilian. The moment one was censured, all the rest were up in arms. Curzon described:

"They cannot see why the poor soldier should not be allowed to go out, and shoot and harry at his own sweet will;

2. Curzon to Hamilton, Vol. XVI, 15 February 1900.

3. Vide Hamilton to Curzon, Vol. II, 18 April 1900.

and if in the course of the excursion a Native is killed, their attitude was that of a very fast bowler at cricket whom I once met, and who, having killed a man by the ball jumping up and striking him on the temple, said to me, 'Why did the d—d fool get his head in the way?' Nothing to me since I came to India has been more surprising or more disappointing than the attitude and capacities of the leading members of the Military Service. There are a certain number of good resolute men, not always known to fame, but conscientious and dutiful. But the majority that I meet impress me neither with character nor with ability."⁴

The bitter feeling of the European against the Indian got expression in quite peculiar ways. A soldier would go out on hunting, but instead of killing a game would shoot down an innocent man. The master would beat the servant or a traveller would knock down a coolie in a railway platform. In such cases the law did not protect the weak; more so, the law worked in a perverted way. Curzon could trace out a few of the many such glaring abuses of law. In the Fort William case, which occurred during his time, a European soldier murdered an Indian tailor against whom he bore grudge. The soldier confessed to the deed, all was going naturally; the evidence was overwhelming; the Commanding Officer of the Regiment testified to the man's sanity; when suddenly, on the third day of the enquiry before the Magistrate, the Counsel for the prisoner put forward the plea of insanity, and the man himself, who the day before was perfectly *compos mentis*, forgot his name and played the part of a besotted lunatic. When the case came before the High Court, three Calcutta doctors, who had seen and examined him for a few hours, and who were general practitioners, and not experts in mental physiology, but whom he had successfully befooled with his replies to their questions, testified that he was not in a state of mind to conduct his defence, and he was accordingly remitted to jail. As the Viceroy felt it, it was an amazing escape from the gallows. In another case, a soldier without any provocation, hurled a rock at an Indian boy, and 'hit him on the leg.' The Viceroy thought the phrase in the military report a little suspicious, and made further enquiries. "True the leg was hit, but it was also broken." Curzon did not want to incur the personal

4. Curzon to Hamilton, Vol. XVIII, 17 September 1900.

unpopularity and odium of inaugurating what might be misrepresented as a crusade against the British soldier. He knew that the soldier had not a very easy time in India, and the Viceroy had to sympathise with his drawbacks, but he felt certain that "if these collisions, and the temper that they indicate, proceed unchecked, the British soldier will come to be regarded as a scourge by the Native population; and no amount of unpopularity shall deter me from the effort to prevent this deplorable sequel."⁵

In another case in which a soldier shot an Indian dead, the usual explanation came up that the gun went off by accident. But it was almost evident that 'somewhere some almost criminal evasion of responsibility, or conspiracy to screen' took place. In another instance, Lord Ampthill's A.D.C. at Delhi kicked a coolie and the latter forthwith died. Of course the coolie had a big liver or a big spleen: and equally of course the kick was represented as a 'push with the foot'—the phrase which became 'an Indian classic'. The Delhi Magistrate fined the A.D.C. rupees one hundred, and the whole affair was hushed up. Even, the Indian Press could not get hold of the news. In the case of the 9th Lancers, the two troopers in the regiment murdered the cook, and it became known. But the evidence against them, consisting of their own confessions to their comrades, was not sufficient to take them into a Court of Law. Curzon commented: "this is a curious commentary upon Sir B. Blood's egregious attempt to prove that, whoever was guilty, it could not possibly be the 9th Lancers."⁶

The more painful aspect of all such incidents was that the racial feeling inspired the Europeans in India to tacitly approve of such crimes. When it became known all over India that the Viceroy took a strong view of the European attitude towards the Indian, and that he meant to hunt down the guilty parties, there was a reaction against him in the European Community. Of course, Curzon was not capable of interfering with the Law Courts. All he wanted to do was to diminish the number of racial collisions arising out of the arrogance of one community. In this noble adventure, the Viceroy could not enjoy the sympathy of even the best among the Englishmen in India. He wrote:

5. *Ibid.*

6. Curzon to Hamilton, Vol. XXIV, 5 November 1902.

I grieve to say that, since I came to India, I have not found a single man among 'the better class', to whose feelings you think that we might safely appeal, who either shares my views, or could be relied upon to back them, at the cost of clamour or unpopularity. They all admit privately that the occurrence of these incidents is regrettable, and that any failure of justice is shocking. But they think the collisions inevitable and normal; they, almost to a man, contend that the blame rests with the Natives (which I certainly, in my experience, have not found to be the case); and as for the judicial scandals—well, they shrug their shoulders and smile."⁷

The English newspapers were not with the Viceroy in his crusade against the so-called shooting incidents. Instead, the *Pioneer* was continually publishing anonymous letters from people who argued that the White man was invariably provoked by the insolence of the native. The *Englishman* did the same thing. Magistrates, District Judges, Juries, and Court-martials, all failed when it was a question of sentencing a European for an injury to a native. Even the High Court of Calcutta was not exempt. There occurred in Assam a case of the most gross and aggravated assault, by an Englishman in a Tea Plantation, upon one of his coolies. The District Magistrate who tried it sentenced the culprit to a fine only of Rs. 50. The Local Government in great anger at this utterly inadequate sentence took the case to the High Court, on a motion for enhancement. The two judges who tried the case rejected the appeal on the flimsiest grounds, which could scarcely impose upon any one. One of their number was the individual before whom was tried at Calcutta the soldier who successfully feigned madness in order to escape the consequences of his murderous deed.

At the end of Curzon's five years' rule, he had not only become unpopular with the Indian people for one reason or the other, but had become unpopular with his own community for his policy on racial questions. While away from India during the summer of 1904, his subordinates in administration apprehended that his return would not be welcomed by many sections of the community, and that unless he was very careful he would arouse an outburst of

7. Curzon to Hamilton, Vol. XVIII, 25 September 1900.

malevolence even worse than that which was raging at that moment. When a man claimed to rule and control and supervise everything and made vast strides in the centralisation of authority, it was natural for him to expect to be saddled with the responsibility of everything that was done. Curzon's personality had dominated everything in the Government of India during the past five years, and as it was said, there had never been such a personal rule so that while he got credit for the things that were popular, he also got the blame for everything that was unpopular. Like his most other works, his racial policy also marked him out as a lone crusader without followers or supporters, fighting against his own community. In July 1904, Ampthill said to Arthur Godley:

"The soldiers say that they are now 'cheeked' by even the lowest class of Natives in an intolerable way, and as they no longer dare to use or to threaten a good thrashing they are quite helpless. It is said that when a European raises his stick to chastise an insolent Native the latter frequently threatens to 'tell the Lord Sahib!' When Sir Michael Hicks-Beach was in India the thing which struck him most was the growing 'cheek' of the Native, and if this is apparent to the casual globe-trotter it is pretty certain that the change of attitude is a considerable one."⁸

Curzon's campaign ultimately ended in failure. The racial bitterness was increasing more and more. The European Community which did not even pretend to change its attitude for good, had to realise at length that the national movement in India which took so vigorous a turn soon after the departure of Curzon could not for the time rise above the feeling of racial antipathy towards the White men. The activities of the Indian terrorists which became a prominent feature of the post-Curzon era, no doubt were motivated mainly by political reasons; yet, there worked a spirit of retaliation against the insolent behaviour of the European towards the people of India.

8. Ampthill Correspondence, Ampthill to Arthur Godley, 27 July, 1904.

Reviews

BIHAR THROUGH THE AGES* by Professor Radhakrishna Choudhary, Ganesdatta College, Begusarai (Bihar).

The dawn of independence has brought in its train a series of cultural renaissance in different aspects of our life and it is in that very series that the rewriting of regional histories in recent times has been undertaken. Without paying due attention to the intensive and extensive studies of regional histories, we cannot rewrite in a scientific manner a comprehensive history of India. Though very good regional histories of different parts of India have been successfully written or edited, there was none till 1922 when for the first time "*History of Tirhut*" covering north Bihar was written and published by S. N. Singh. In 1956, came another learned volume on the same region, on a more scientific basis, the "*History of Mithila*" by Upendra Thakur. In the same year was published "*Bihar, the homeland of Buddhism*" by me relating to Buddhism and Bihar and in a way supplement to my previous book "*Siddhartha*" (in Hindi). In 1958 for the first time a complete and connected account of the history of Bihar was presented by me in my "*History of Bihar*" and "*Inscriptions of Bihar*". For a state like ours all these works were like drops in the ocean and we all looked forward for a much publicised volume to be known as "*Bihar through the Ages*", written by eminent scholars, "*some of international repute*" and edited by the Governor of Bihar, Sri R. R. Diwakar, already wellknown for his scholarly publications. It is correct to hold that the rebuilding of a growing nation depends on a clear and correct understanding of the past, but here it should be borne in mind that the past must be correctly and scientifically presented without any bias whatsoever and with full responsibility in respect of the facts of history and their presentation in correct perspective. Bihar has not only not filled the considerable portion of the canvas of our general history but it was once the cradle of Indian history. History of Magadha was

* Being a Review of "*Bihar through the Ages*"—General Editor—R. R. Diwakar, Orient Longmans, Calcutta, 1959; Royal Size, pp. I—XXVIII: 1-891; One Map; 36 plates. Price Rs. 20/- only.

the history of India and Chandragupta was the first ruler to have of Indian unity and made it a reality. It is a pity that we had no written history and even today we are lagging far behind other states in this respect.

Bihar was the homeland of a number of cultures. Bihar was the first state in ancient India to pronounce the idea of Indian nationhood and idea of republican government. Bihar was well acquainted with the most scientific technique of diplomacy much ahead of our European thinkers. It was Bihar which first pronounced the ideals of *Panchasila* and *concord*. If under Magadha India was united under the canvas of an umbrella, it was under the hegemony of the different schools of thought of Mithila, that India, nay the whole of the then civilised world, could get an inkling of real spiritual thinking. It is a rare occasion for any land to have a rule like Janaka Videha, legislator like Yajnavalkya and a mediator like Gautama (Gautama, the Buddha and Gotama, the logician. Upto 1000 A.D., Bihar, to a great extent demonstrated the scene of Indian history and culture. Between 1097 and 1325 A.D., a great portion of North Bihar remained comparatively free from Muslim onslaughts, though this area was one of the greatest centres of the Sufi saints of India. While Buddhist Palas tolerated different sects with due respect the Sufis of north Bihar flourished without any hindrance to their spiritual enlightenment. Sectarianism had no place in the general scheme of ancient Bihari life and our contention stands well attested by the account of Dharmaswami, the Tibetan Buddhist traveller, who was offered the post of a royal chaplain by an orthodox Hindu king Ramasimhadeva of Mithila. Contact between Hindus and the Muslims was growing daily and that is evident from the writings of Jyotirishwara. Under Shershah, Bihar again attained all India importance. Bihar did not prove to be a bed of roses for the Mughals. The Afghans and the Karranis held their own till a pretty long time and the Mughals had to feel their weight quite heavily. Bihar again came into prominence during the period of the later Mughals and in the early days of the East India Company. It was in Bihar that Mahatma Gandhi had his first experiment with truth. Bihar has given India the first President after independence. Such an important state like ours rightly deserved a special treatment. Bihar is yet the homeland of objects of antiquarian and historical interests. What Athens was to the Hellas, Nalanda was to India and it was

in the fitness of thing that the glory of Nalanda has again been revived and international cultural contact is being revived in the same old spirit of ours.

In view of these facts when the idea of "*Bihar through the Ages*" was mooted in the year 1954, it was hailed as a happy venture in all corners. The then Governor of Bihar, Sri R. R. Diwakar, took upon himself the arduous task of editing of such a voluminous work consisting of ancient, medieval and modern periods. Since some scholars of international repute were associated with this venture, high hopes were bound to be raised. It was nothing but "a labour of love" (as our revered Prime Minister puts it) for Sri Diwakar to have undertaken such a venture. Sri Diwakar claims to present every bit of information about Bihar in outline and in his *Note*, he claims to "attend to uniformity of language, to proper proportion and length of articles according to importance of the subjects" (General Editor's Note). This claim, to my mind, is wholly unjustified if one only carefully goes through this voluminous book. The following discussion would show the hollowness of above claim. Since some of the contributors are personally known to me I contacted them for clarification on certain points but they dissociated themselves from the findings in the book on the ground that they were not aware of the specific chapters to which their responsibility might be fixed. They have been mentioned simply as contributors and the readers are at a loss to decide as to their actual contribution and it is reasonable to presume at this stage that the entire responsibility regarding conclusions should lie with the General Editor. Since the work is a result of the co-operative efforts of scholars, it is desirable that the chapters along with their authors should have been specifically mentioned in order to enable the readers to contact them for clarification. As that has not been done the General Editor should assume all responsibilities regarding the lapses that are there in the book. The non-mention of the names of the contributors smacks of gross egoism and short of intellectual dishonesty. It does little credit to the General Editor as the mention of the names of the contributors would have saved him from unnecessary criticism. For such, a big venture, one can not even think of assuming the responsibility of even a part of it as Editor but in this case the General Editor has thought himself sufficiently qualified to edit all periods of the *History of Bihar*, a work which could not be done

by such eminent historians like Sir J. N. Sarkar and Dr. R. C. Majumdar in similar circumstances in connection with the History of Bengal. The two Volumes on the History of Bengal published by the Dacca University are yet the best in the field and should be taken as models in the preparation of other regional histories.

All aspects of Bihar have, no doubt, been compressed into a single volume of 818 pages. To these have been added valuable appendices, glossary, index and plates etc. Real interest has been stimulated and an attempt has been made to make the dry bones of history alive. The credit for all these goes to the contributors of the various chapters whose names unfortunately do not appear. These contributors have produced a fairly exhaustive story of stirring events and bewildering changes with utmost care, which, but for General Editors's scraping, would have been quite allright. Needless to say that for this arduous and stupendous task of editing such a big volume, in addition to his heavy official duties, one can not withhold one's admiration for General Editor's "labour of love". In spite of its being a very good contribution to the regional history, it falls short of our expectations. The work, no doubt, shall be the basis of a future gazetteer of the State of Bihar and shall elicit praise on that account. For a state which had no written history till recently, it shall continue to be one such but the general impression is bound to be created that the work, under review, is not only uneven in quality but also in the way of treatment. The so-called "Proper proportion" has been thoroughly disproportionate, the claim of the "uniformity of language" is a myth and other hyperbolic claims are totally baseless. The claim of "somewhat exhaustive bibliography" is not only baseless but confusing as well. In support of our above statement we shall cite below some specimens from the book.

Section B of chapter II dealing with the historical geography of Bihar, is full of confusing statements. It is not correct to state that Wideha "corresponds mostly with the modern Tirhut Division" (p. 51). Did Wideha consist of Darbhanga, Muzaffarpur, Champaran and Saran? Evidences regarding Karusha and Pundra are inconclusive. When and how did Anga "extend upto the confluence of the Sarayu and the Ganga at Chapra" (p. 52)? When and where the book named "*Political Dictionary of ancient and medieval India*" by H. P. Shastri was published? (pp. 455). There is no mention of Anguttarap at all. Can we think of the ancient

geographical divisions of ancient Bihar without Anguttarap, said to have been visited by Buddha? The *Saktisangamatantra* gives an account of 56 countries not 66 (p. 55). How the "southern part of the district was directly ruled by the Mughal governors (p. 57) "When southern Bihar was governed by Malik Bir Afgan? From where did the Mughal governors come during the reign of Firuz Tughluq? According to modern researches, Kikata is not to be identified with Magadha as has been done here (pp. 93-94). There are only scanty references to the Vratyas and even that that is full of contradictory statements on pp. 6, 94, 121, 129 and 297 etc. Even books not directly dealing with the history of Bihar have devoted more attention to the problem of the Vratyas while here, when the book exclusively deals with the history of Bihar, the problem has been summarily touched and scantily treated. Sasanka has been discussed in three pages (pp. 265-268) while North Bihar has been summarily rejected in few paragraphs (cf. p. 326). Any average reader is bound to arrive at the conclusion that North Bihar has not got its share in the so-called "proper proportion" scheme of this work. On page 317 it has been said that the Nepali Era began in 978-979 (?). The Nepali era actually started in 879-880. Lack of coherence in language is evident from the first six lines on p. 318. Without any *Pre-or Post-enunciation* of facts the paragraph abruptly ends with the sentence—"Therefore this Gangeyadeva is the son of Nanyadeva" (p. 318). There is no evidence to show that Vijayasena made Nanyadeva his feudatory as has been shown here (p. 324). Has the General Editor attended to the uniformity of language or to the proper proportion?

The Navya-Nyaya philosophy has been dealt with in two pages (p. 336-337) and without saying anything on the philosophy of Navya-Nyaya, the author (whose name is not known fortunately) simply states the names of philosophers and their works. The same list appears again on pp. 413-13 and 440-41. I wish the General Editor would have taken pains to cast a glance on S. N. Singh's *History of Tirhut* (Appendix) and the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal* (New Series), Vol. XI of 1915 to see if the List has not been copied verbatim without even a line of comment on any one of them Navya-Nyaya philosophy does not simply consist in the enumeration of the written by its propounder. The reviewer wishes if the writer of the chapter and the General Editor could consult the *History of Navya-Nyaya* by D. C. Bhatta-

charya and see what Navya-Nyaya is? While Navya-Nyaya is summarily rejected, the philosophy of Pandit Ramavatar Sarma is fully discussed because the writer seems to have specialised in the latter and the reviewer is more than certain in his assertion that this article on Pandit Ramavatar Sarma's philosophy is the same as was published in the *Indian Nation* (a Patna daily) few years ago. I want to make my position clear lest I might be misunderstood that I am one of the strongest admirers of Pandit Ramavatar Sarma. What I want to emphasise here is that the so-called claim of proper proportion is hollow. The Navya-Nyaya has not been treated with the seriousness it deserves. Same is the case with the *Mimamsa* philosophy though there is a very good book on the subject by the late Sir Ganganath Jha. Ganganath Jha's book does not even find mention in the Bibliography. *Mimamsa* gets hardly two pages (338-39) though it deserved more. No explanation has been given about the book "*Padarthachandra*" by Lachimadevi. It has been simply mentioned (p. 414). The most curious thing is that under the heading, the philosophy of Navya-Nyaya, the following names are given—Lakhima, wife of Sivasimha and Chandrakala. Were they Navya-Nyaya philosophers? So far as our information goes Lakhima was a writer of cretias and some such writings of Lakhima have been collected and published by the late Sir George Abraham Grierson.

Coming down to the description of Maithili, there are confusing and contradictory statements. Even without rejecting certain misstatement of facts, I should like to draw the attention of the editor and the writer to some glaring contradictions:—At one place *Varnanratnakara* of Jyotirishwara Thakur is placed at 1324 A.D. but on page 351, the same work is said to be a product of the thirteenth century A.D. while on page 442, Jyotirishwara is placed in the 12-13th century, A.D. There are other misstatements about the *Varnanaratnakara*. And what about the most well-known poet Vidyapati? At one place he is made a contemporary of Umapati (p. 86) and placed in the 15th-century A.D., at another he is placed in the 14th century (p. 434) and the most remarkable piece of research done in connection with Vidyapati is brought out when he is placed in the 13th century A.D. This is how the coherence has been maintained. The conception about the *Likhanavali* of Vidyapati is misleading. No critical or literary appraisal of Vidyapati as a poet has been done even in few sentences which

a master mind of his eminence rightly deserved. And what about Umapati? At one place he is made a contemporary of Vidyapati (P. 86) at another he is called the author of the *Parijatamangala* (?) (P. 447) & again on page 550 he is called the author of *Parijataharana*. No date has been given here but he has been placed between 1527 and 1707. It seems that no care was taken to identify and locate him, a work done by Grierson about fortyfive years ago. On page 447 the following lines are dubious..... "use of Brajabuli in Bihar in the work of the famous poet Umapati entitled *Parijatamangala* (?)", a poetic drama, in which songs have been definitely written in Brajabuli containing Hindi and Maithili forms simultaneously". On page 440, The *Dandaviveka* of Vardhamana has been mentioned as *Danaviveka*. The name of Taranatha has been wrongly written in diacritical marks. In the section dealing with the art there is absolutely no mention of Saran, Belwa, Naulagarh, Jayamanglagarh, Bheet-Bhagwanpur and other finds. The *Panchobh copper plate Inscription* does not find mention anywhere in the book. It is one of the major slips. Even the Bargaon copper-plate finds a casual mention. The assumption on page 380 that—"there were hardly any independent kingdoms in the region and seldom any assumption of independence"—does not hold good. The *Maheswara inscription* (discovered and edited by me in the *ABORI—XXXVI*) has been mentioned as *Mahadwara* and is said to have been found "on the banks of a river in the Begusarai district" (P. 389). Begusarai is not a district and the inscription was found on the bank of the river, Gandak. On p. 471, in connection with the same inscription it has been observed—"the inscriptional stone of the *Hisu-i-Haseen* has been recently recovered from the Ganges" (it should be "Gandak"). Mahmud Shah Mahmud Sharuqi's expedition to "Jayanagar in Tirhut" yet remains to be proved (P. 394). There are many more lapses of serious nature and the paucity of space deters me from going into greater details. Chapter XIII B (i) are full of contradictory statements.

Instances of carelessness are not few and far between. The following examples are sufficient to show that carelessness is writ large in this work of "proper proportion".

(i) P. 411—JBRS—neither volume, nor page or year mentioned.

(ii) JBRS—1938—In 1938 it was JBORS.

(iii) P. 415—JBORS—1942—No page, volume or part mentioned.

(iv) P. 416—JBRS—No year, no volume, no page.

(v) P. 418—JBRS of 1936—It should be JBORS—No page or volume mentioned.

(vi) P. 428—Chandreswara has been written for the correct form Chandeswara (cf. pp. 442, 846, etc.).

(vii) Karnata Period has been placed between 1160 and 1395. The correct position should be 1097-1324/25 (Cf.—my article *The Karnatas of Mithila*—in the *ABORI*—XXXV—pp. 90-121; Upendra Thakur—*History of Mithila*—Chap. V). No light has been thrown on the *Oinwaras of Mithila* (1325-1526) (Cf. my article—*The Oinwaras of Mithila*—in the *JBRS* of 1954; Upendra Thakur—*op. cit.*, Chapter VI).

Mithila Tattva Vimarsa (correct) has been incorrectly written as *Mithila Tatto Vimash*.

(viii) P. 841—Under the head "Philosophy", the following books are mentioned:

- (a) Foster—Travels in India.
- (b) Grierson—Bihar Peasant Life.
- (c) John Marshall—Travels in India.
- (d) Tavernier—Travels in India.

(ix) Dharmaswami's account is placed between 1334-1336. It should have been 1234-36.

(x) Subhadra Jha's *Songs of Vidyapati* has been written as *Vidyapati thakur*.

(xi) There is no such as *History of Bengal*, three volumes, by R. C. Majumdar as has been mentioned here on P. 839. Volume II of the *Cambridge History of India* is not yet out. Sir J. N. Sarkar is not the author but the editor of the *History of Bengal*, Vol. II.

Names have been misspelt. Rambriksha Benipuri has been written as Ramkrishna (P. 746). On page 497, Bharez has been written for Bahroj; on page 520, Kuleswara has been written for Kuseswara and on page 734 Chaturkavi has been written for Faturkavi. There are many more such instances.

To cite only a few printing errors:

Correct	Printed incorrectly
regnal	reignal (97)
Tarn	Taru (201, 843)
Visayapati	Bisayapati (330)
Jagaddala	Jagandala (351)
Vasal	Vaisali (268)
Review	Revue (840)

The following important books have not been mentioned in the bibliography—

- K. P. Jayaswal—*Chronology and History of Nepal*.
- D. C. Sircar—*Select Inscriptions of India*.
- A. L. Basham—*The Ajivikas, and the Glory that was Ind.*
- A. K. Narayana—*The Indo-Greeks*.
- S. K. Maity—*Economic Condition of India during the Gupta Period*.

Upendra Thakur—*History of Mithila*.

The Bibliography instead of being exhaustive is thoroughly incomplete and unscientific. Important Journals like the *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* and others are not mentioned. The Bibliography can be scanned more critically but the want of space deters me from going into the details. Readers of these pages are requested to consult the *Bibliography on the history of Bihar* given in my book of the same name in about forty printed pages.

Even a casual reader will be able to see that not a single claim of the general Editor has been satisfactorily established. A bit of carefulness either on the part of the writer or the Editor would have enabled him to avoid pitfalls. Contradiction of views is already there. Careless proof reading and confusing statement of facts and unscientific bibliography have landed this pioneer work into a quixotic quagmire. The publication does little credit to the publisher and stands in contrast to one published by the same firm, viz. *The Comprehensive History of India* (Vol. II—for the Indian History Congress). It seems that the work under review had none

to look after since the departure of the general Editor from Bihar. No uniformity in respect of diacritical mark has been maintained. Little attention has been paid to the study of social history. A full critical review of the work would mean an exhaustive treatment and I leave it for others to do the job.

In spite of all these defects, one is compelled to admit that the Government of Bihar may well feel proud of its achievement in the sense that it has succeeded in filling up a conspicuous void in the realm of regional histories of India. We congratulate the General Editor for this big venture though it has not appeared as we would have wished it in spite of the immense resources at his disposal.

RADHAKRISHNA CHOUDHARY

ILLUSTRATED, INCOME-TAX LAW by B. D. Nagpal. Kitab Mahal. Price Rs. 7.50.

The Income-tax has assumed increasing significance in recent years not only as a method of collecting vast revenue but also as a device for moderating the gross inequalities in income. With the introduction of the wealth-tax, the expenditure tax, the capital gains tax and the gifts tax the traditional Income-tax has imbibed a new complexion. Unfortunately however the structure and the nature of the Indian Income-tax remain a puzzle to the common man. The observation of Professor Kaldor that "the company taxation provisions of India are.....a perfect maze of unnecessary complications, the accretion of years of futile endeavour to reconcile fundamentally contradictory objections" is as valid to-day as it was when he made it.

The effort made by the author "to illustrate in easy and simple language every complicated point for clear understanding by an average student" is therefore welcome. Sri Nagpal has achieved fair success in explaining lucidly the content of taxable income, exemptions, method of accounting, computation and assessment. The short chapters on allied and new taxes are useful and instructive. So too is the addendum relating to the 1958 Finance Act. The book is written in a readable style and is well got up.

K. S. LAKSHMANA PANIKKAR

ELEMENTS OF LIFE INSURANCE by O. P. Bajpai, Kitab Mahal. Price Rs. 5.00.

"This book" the author claims "aims to meet the requirements of B.Com. and M.Com. students". Life Insurance has long had great fascination for the more prudent and provident section of society. The potentialities of insurance for mobilising funds for economic development however have been realised adequately only in recent times.

Life insurance now touches but the fringe of the insurable population in India. Any attempt to propagate the value of insurance is therefore welcome.

Sri Bajpai has succeeded in giving a clear exposition of the principles of life insurance. The author has given a satisfying account of the various types of policies and the development of life insurance in India. He has also discussed in a competent manner such topics as selection of risk, premium computation, insurance finance, insurance contract and valuation. The book is useful to students and field-workers alike.

K. S. LAKSHMANA PANIKKAR

SRI SIDDHESWARA CHARITRAMU: (Kakatiya Rajulu Charitra-Pratapa Charitra) by Kase Sarvappa. Edited by Lakshmiranjanam and published by The Andhra Writers' Association, Hyderabad, pp. CV. 175+12. Price Rs. 6/.

This edition of the *Siddhesvara Charitramu* by Kase Sarvappa (sixteenth century) is based on a paper manuscript of the work at the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras. The work which is in Telugu deals with the history of the Kakatiyas of Warangal who brought successfully under one sceptre the whole of Andhra Desa after the Satavahanas and furnishes useful hints for the reconstruction of the political and cultural history of the Telugu country from about A.D. 1200. The last part of the work was presumably done by another writer to complete the scheme of Sarvappa.

The Preface by Dr. P. Srinivasachar and the lengthy introduction by the Editor preceding the text are scholarly and informative. Part I of the introduction is devoted almost exclusively to Sarvappa himself—giving an account of his life and times the

nature and quality of his poetry and the historical value of his work. This is followed by a discussion of the Kakatiya history relying mainly on the *Siddheswara Charitramu*. The reigns of Prola II, Rudradeva, Ganapatideva Rudramadevi and Pratapa Rudra II are given special treatment as they deserve. An interesting account of economic and literary conditions is also furnished. The portion of the work dealing with the earlier period of the Kakatiya history is of course more legendary than historical but still it will be of value to the student of Telugu literature. The printing errors that one finds not infrequently might have been avoided by careful proof reading. Even to one who does not know Telugu the publication will certainly be of interest and value because of the running summary and the scholarly discussion of the contents of the work that he gets in the introduction.

T. V. MAHALINGAM.

LITERARY AND CULTURAL ACTIVITIES IN GUJARAT UNDER THE KHALJIS AND THE SULTANATE: Muhammed Ibrahim Dar: Edited and published by Dr. Z. H. Madani for the Bazm-i-Ishaat; Ismail Yusuf College, Bombay; pp. 62. Price Rs. 2/-.

This is a collection of three papers dealing with the history of Gujarat by the late Prof. Muhammad Ibrahim Dar. The first entitled *Early Muslim Settlers in Gujarat* is of particular interest because it reveals certain facts which are not popularly known. It shows that after the Arab invasion of Sind and before Alauddin Khalji's conquest of Gujarat in 1297-98 Islamic missionaries and merchants from abroad had come and settled down in Gujarat when it was under Hindu rulers. The Arab inscription, in the tomb of Baba Arjun Shah at Petlad dated 1236 shows that religious tolerance was extended to Muslim divines by the Hindu rulers. The next paper entitled *Cultural and Literary Activities under the Sultans of Gujarat* is scholarly and bears evidence of the author's study of the sources. It reveals that numerous Sultans of Gujarat extended patronage to Islamic scholars and that even from Persia and other foreign countries scholars came to their court. The third paper on *Gujarat under the Khaljis and the Tughlaks* is a review of its political history. It starts with Alauddin's conquest at the end of the 13th century and closes

with the establishment of the Sultanate in 1403. The author's interest is primarily cultural. Still the political history of Gujarat that he gives is authoritative. An interesting introduction by the Editor and a foreword by Professor M. S. Commissariat are special features of this small volume. Such studies on the history of particular regions during specific periods paying sufficient attention to various cultural movements and providing a useful political background are certainly to be welcomed.

T. V. MAHALINGAM.

JUSTICE AND POLICE IN BENGAL: 1765-1793. A study of the Nizamat in Decline by N. Majumdar. Published by Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 6/1 A, Banchchazan Akrur Lane, Calcutta-12.

Dr. (Miss) Majumdar attempts in this interesting book a detailed and systematic study of the system of criminal justice and police in Bengal in the latter half of the eighteenth century—a study of Mughal justice in decline from the accession of Najmud Daulah to the death of Mubarak Ud Daulah—just the period of the evolution of British sovereignty in Bengal. The book is divided into nine chapters. The first introduces the reader to the political condition of Bengal in 1765. Nandakumar who occupied the most prominent position in the state in the days of Mir Jafar owed no allegiance to the English and even sought foreign aid to reduce the Company's power. Therefore he had to be replaced by Rezakhan, a Persian domiciled in Bengal who would be favourable to the Company much to the disgust of the Nawab, an unnecessary intrusion into the already complicated politics of the state and justified by no canons of justice and fair play.

The British not only forced upon the Nawab the treaty relating to the appointment of Rezakhan but even went to the extent of asserting that 'everything must be done as we think proper'. [p. 7] Both in formulating and executing policies the Company was rather harsh and found little difficulty in enforcing it upon a tottering political seat. The succeeding chapter is a discussion of the frame work and functioning of the indigenous system of criminal administration about 1765. An exhaustive treatment of criminal administration in Bengal, the main theme of the work,

then follows. The period taken for study is divided into six divisions: 1766-1772, 1773-1775, 1775-1782, 1782-1787, 1787-1790 and 1791-1793; and each of them is discussed in separate chapters. The Faujdari jurisdiction which remained as the solitary vestige of the Nawab's authority had to disappear in 1770. The influence of the Diwani destroyed the efficacy of the Nizamat. The British system of criminal justice had to supersede the Mughal justice as the powerlessness of the Nizamat became thus a fact. The concluding chapter points to the several legal enactments made by the British which ultimately destroyed the Nizamat. Eight appendices, particularly the penultimate one referring to a few Benares cases illustrating how the inconsistency of Muslim penal law to natural justice was not overlooked by the British Administrators, are of interest.

T. V. MAHALINGAM.

THE ANNEXATION OF UPPER BURMA: D. P. Singhal:
Eastern University Press, Singapore: 1960; pp. 129.

Burma which neglected for a long time international contacts was unaware of the world situation for all practical purposes till the advent of the British. Perhaps the first significant contact worth mentioning came only with the three Anglo-Burmese wars in little more than a half a century. The present work by D. P. Singhal endeavours to analyse the third and the final clash between Burma and the British. Besides giving an account of the diplomatic relations of British India with Burma, it also tries to examine the considerations and events leading to the conquest of Upper Burma.

The book is divided into five chapters. A historical background is furnished to place the main theme of the work in its proper setting. The author argues that the annexation of Upper Burma did not come as a sudden act but was a deliberate and preplanned one, and thinks that the British fear of the danger of French intrigues at the Court of Ava and the politics prevailing in contemporary Burma were not well founded. He suggests that long before the danger, if any, of the French intrigues at Mandalay became a consideration in the British policy in Burma, Lytton and his government had been constantly pressing London for the

annexation of Upper Burma" (p. 88). It was her commitments in the Afghan and Zulu wars that delayed Britain from annexing Burma immediately.

The discussion is stimulating as the approach to the subject is objective. The author's statements and conclusions are correct and logical and he bases them all on evidences supplied by official papers both published and unpublished. Six appendices, all of them historical records, a bibliography at the end and a map to illustrate the account are useful.

T. V. MAHALINGAM.

WHERE THE LION TROD: By Gordon Shepherd: Macmillan & Co., London; 1960: pp. 177.

This is an assessment by a western journalist of the discernible paw marks of the British lion on the culture and everyday life of India. A subject of absorbing interest there is a prolific literature on it; but here the author's approach is entirely new and sympathetic, and is characterised by polished and subdued humour. The author's purpose is more to entertain than to educate and hence the value and interest of the work lies more in the manner in which it is written than in the matter it contains. In the 'Hindi-English tug-of-War' he throws himself on the latter's side. His accounts of the Anglo-Indian community in post-independent India and the spell of Britain on such varied fields ranging from politics to sports and clubs constitute interesting reading. He hints also at the problem of student indiscipline (p. 81), the spectacle of true and false parliamentary spirit side by side (p. 135) etc. The author is wrong in his statement that January 26, 1947 was India's Independence Day (p. 175). The book which contains a number of typical drawings will on the whole interest and entertain more a railway traveller on a holiday than a serious scholar.

T. V. MAHALINGAM.

AKOTA BRONZES, by Dr. Uma Kant P. Shah, *Archaeological Series*, No. 1, published by the Department of Archaeology, Bombay, 1959, pp. 78 with 80 Plates.

We welcome this first publication of the Department of Archaeology of the Bombay Government and the State Board.

Historical Records and Ancient Monuments. It is a neat volume and its author as well as Dr. P. M. Joshi, the General Editor of the Series, and scholars (such as Dr. Motichandra) who have helped the author with suggestions, etc., deserve our congratulations.

The bronzes were discovered in 1949 at Ākoṭā (Ancient Añkoṭṭaka) situated to the west of Baroda, and the author gives the story of their discovery along with some other information in a short Introduction (pp. 1-5). This is followed by four sections, viz. I. Historical Background (pp. 6-12); II. North Indian Metal Images (pp. 13-25); III. Images of the Akota Hoard (pp. 26-62), and IV. Conclusion (pp. 63-74). There is also an index (pp. 75-78). The treatment of the subject may be regarded as exhaustive. The printing of the Plates is satisfactory.

In the author's learned discussions on the various topics, there are certain statements and suggestions which we find it difficult to follow and with which we feel inclined to disagree. Thus the masson marks (consisting of some Brāhmī aksharas) found on stones in the temple of Bhīmanātha lying to the north of the Ākoṭā area are assigned to the second century B.C. "on account of their close similarity with Bhattiprolu and Junagarh scripts" (pp. 2-3). Apart from the fact that we do not assign the Bhatti-are certain statements and suggestions which we find it difficult to understand what this Junagarh script of the same age could be. Probably Dr. Shah means the alphabet of the Junagarh inscription of Rudradāman, which however belongs to the second century A.D. and not to the second century B.C. It is again very difficult for us to believe in the possibility of close resemblance between the characters of the Bhattiprolu inscriptions with those of the contemporary or later epigraphic records of Gujarat. Among the learned author's suggestions, we cannot accept the conjecture that the geographical name Añkoṭṭaka may have something to do with the name of the Indo-Greek king Antiochus (cf. p. 3, note 1).

But more important than such points of difference of opinion is the fact that, in most of the cases, we are inclined to disagree with the learned author in the dating of the images either on the grounds of style or of the palaeography of the epigraphs they bear. In our opinion, the images ascribed to the Gupta age—to 460-500 A.D., 500 A.D., middle sixth century and late

sixth century (pp. 26 ff.)—cannot be assigned to any date earlier than the seventh century. An object assigned to the early seventh century (pp. 31-33) before another ascribed to 600 A.D. (p. 33) appears to have been placed in the "Gupta Period" (before those assigned to the "Seventh Century" at pp. 33 ff.) through oversight.

As we are inclined to disagree with Dr. Shah in regard to the dating, reading and interpretation of most of the inscriptions, on the Ākoṭā bronzes, a few such points of disagreement may be noted here.

The letter 1 in Plate 13-a, Plate 74-a and Plate 74-g, all of which have been assigned by Dr. Shah to the sixth century A.D. (cf. pp. 29, 30 and 32) suggests a date not earlier than the eighth century. His ascription of Plate 75-c, etc., to a date later than that of the above inscriptions (cf. 35 ff.) is wrong in our opinion.

In Plate 75-d, Dr. Shah reads a female name as *Śagabharjikā* and regards her as "a Śaka lady, Bharjikā by name, or a nun (*arjikā*) of the Śaka community" (p. 37). But the use of the word *arjikā* (Sanskrit *āryikā*) meaning 'a nun' in a number of records on the Ākoṭā bronzes show beyond doubt that the name should be regarded as *Śagabh-arjikā* so that there is no mention here of a 'Śaka' lady or a nun of the 'Śaka' community.

In Plate 75-e, the learned author reads *Viyaharakuleyo Guṇa* and finds a reference in it to Guṇa[bhadra] of the Vidyādhara-kula (p. 38). But the reading is apparently *Viyahara-kule Yobhu[ṇa]*. In Plate 77-b, the personal name read as *Regaṭa* (pp. 53-54) is really *Jhoṭa*. The reading 897 in Plate 77-f and its interpretation as the Vikrama or Śaka year 897 (p. 56) are both quite impossible in our opinion.

D. C. SIRCAR.

INDIAN HISTORY — A STUDY IN DYNAMICS, by Yashavant Anant Raikar, M.A.; published by Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda, Baroda, 1960; pages 52 with 5 illustrations; price Rs. 5/.

This interesting essay contains the author's study of the operation of change and continuity in Time and Space, throughout Indian History' or of the principles underlying the process of

change', the operation being called 'the Dynamics of Indian History'. It is stated that the meaning of Indian history was not intelligible to him before he noticed Dr. B. Subba Rao's approach in the following sentence in the *Personality of India*: "Indian history, in one sense, may be defined as a struggle between centripetal and centrifugal forces engendered by geography." Mr. Raikar briefly analyses the general course of Indian history from the said angle of vision, the details being admittedly summarised from the works of various authors.

There are three chapters of which Chapter I (Introduction, pp. 1-10) discusses the meaning of Dynamics and the author's approach and method. Chapter II (Indian History through the Ages, pp. 11-39) contains a brief survey of the political history of India since the earliest times, while Chapter III (Epilogue, pp. 40-47) summarises the author's conclusion. There is an Index and some useful illustrations. We congratulate the learned author for the clear presentation of his case.

Since Mr. Raikar admits that facts of history summarily presented by him are not based on a scrutiny of primary sources but are borrowed from other authors, it is probably unnecessary to point to the facts (especially relating to the ancient period of Indian history) which we consider to be wrong. By way of illustration, however, it may be pointed out that we do not think it correct to refer to the Gurjara-Pratihāras before 936 A.D. as 'the Pratihāras of Malwa' (p. 25). We also do not agree with the generally accepted view that the aim of the so-called tripartite struggle (p. 30) among the Pālas, Pratihāras and Rāshtrakūṭas (the participation of the Āyudha kings of Kanauj in it being usually forgotten) was the occupation of the city of Kanauj which, a matter of fact, had no extraordinary political importance at the time when the struggle began.

Besides the above minor points, we are inclined to draw the attention of the learned author to a few facts which he may consider while revising the monograph for a second edition. In the first place, earlier authors who have dwelt on the topic may be mentioned. Thus the late Prof. H. C. Raychaudhuri's *Political History of Ancient India* (latest ed., pp. 184-86) contains a section entitled "Local Autonomy and Imperial Unity" in which we find the following statements: "The chief interest of the political

history of the post-Bimbisarian Age lies in the interplay of two opposing forces, one centrifugal, the other centripetal, viz., the love of local (*jānapada*) autonomy and the aspiration for imperial unity The predilection for local self-rule was in part fostered by geographical conditions The imperial ideal had to contend with the centrifugal tendencies of *jānapada* (provincial and tribal) autonomy. The two forces operated in successive epochs almost with the regularity of the swing of a pendulum. . . ."

Secondly, the conception of the political unity of India cannot be divorced from the ancient Indian idea of the *Chakravarti-kshetra* or the sphere of influence of an Indian imperial ruler. It is well known that originally one *Chakravarti-kshetra* was conceived as covering the whole of India bounded by the Himalayas in the north, the Indian Ocean in the south, the Bay of Bengal in the east and the Arabian sea in the west, though the conception of two *Chakravarti-kshetras*, one covering Northern and the other Southern India, gradually developed. This northern *Chakravarti-kshetra* was regarded as bounded by the Himalayas in the north, the Vindhya in the south, the Bay of Bengal in the east and the Arabian Sea in the west, while the southern *Chakravarti-kshetra* covered the rest of India lying to the south of the above territory. For a discussion on this topic, see *Sarūpa-Bhārati* (Dr. Lakshman Sarup Memorial Volume), edited by Agrawal and Shastri, Hoshiarpur, 1954, pp. 315-25 (cf also Sircar, *Studies in the Geography of Ancient and Medieval India*, pp. 1-16).

D. C. SIRCAR

REPORT ON KUMRAHAR EXCAVATIONS 1951-55, by A. S. Altekar, M.A., LL.B., D.Litt., and Vijayakanta Mishra, M.A.; published by K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1959; pages 142 with 42 figures and 82 plates; price Rs. 40/-.

This is Volume III of the Historical Research Series of the K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, published under the patronage of the Government of Bihar and the authors have to be congratulated for the speedy publication of this comprehensive Report on the excavations conducted by them during the period 1951-55. Generally, reports on excavations take a long time to appear. It is, however, a matter of great regret that the late

lamented Prof. A. S. Altekar, who wrote the Preface to the volume on the 1st of November 1959, breathed his last shortly after that date.

The work is divided into ten chapters, the first two of which are introductory. Chapter II contains an interesting account of what we know of the ancient city of Pātaliputra, the modern representative of which is Patna. Chapters III-IV give us respectively the summary of the results of the excavations recently conducted at Kumrahar and an account of the excavations as well as their stratigraphy. The remaining chapters (Chapters V-X) contain details of the excavated finds such as potsherds, coins, terracotta objects, minor antiquities and stone and iron objects. The treatment of the subjects is exhaustive; but the printing of the Plates is unsatisfactory.

D. B. Spooner excavated the Kumrahar site in 1912-14 and exposed a pillared hall which he regarded as a Mauryan palace that was burnt in the post-Gupta age according to that scholar. On the basis of their excavations, the authors of the book under review suggest that the said hall was not a palace but a monastic structure and that it was destroyed in the age of the Śuṅgas who succeeded the Mauryas. This is one of the notable contributions of these excavations and, if it is true, we may think that the Indo-Bactrian Greeks who occupied Pātaliputra about the end of Maurya rule may have been responsible for the destruction.

Among the interesting objects discovered, we attach considerable importance to the two copper coins of Indragupta discussed under the head 'Gupta Coins' along with the copper coins of the Gupta emperor Chandragupta II (p. 100, Nos. 1 and 3). These coins exhibit the bust of king to left on the obverse and Garuḍa above the legend *Indragupta* on the reverse. There is, however, no evidence as yet to show that king Indragupta who issued these coins belonged to the Imperial Gupta dynasty of Magadha. We have another king of the latter part of the fifth century A.D., who not only imitated a Gupta coin type and had name ending with the word *Gupta*, but seems to have claimed to be born in the Gupta lineage. He is *Mahārāja* Harigupta whose copper coin copied from the Chhatra type of the gold coins of Chandragupta II has been recently published (*Ep. Ind.*, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 95-98). Another type of Harigupta's copper coins has the *pūrṇa-kumbha*

on the reverse (Cunningham, *Coins of Medieval India*, p. 19, Plate II, No. 6) and this reminds us of *Mahārāja* Devagupta whose coin with the same reverse device and the legend *Mahārāja-Devaguptasya* was discovered by Cunningham in 1874 (*IHQ*, Vol. XXXIII, p. 378). Copper coins of a ruler named Rāmagupta, found in the Malwa region, are now well known (*JNSI*, Vol. XII, pp. 103 ff.; Vol. XIII, pp. 128 ff.). In the present state of our knowledge, it is not possible to assign such rulers, viz., Indragupta, Harigupta, Devagupta and Rāmagupta, to the Imperial Gupta house.

D. C. SIRCAR

INDIAN ARMED FORCES YEAR BOOK 1959-60. Ed. Jaswant Singh. Maneckji Wadia Building, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Bombay-1, pages 908. Price Rs. 10/-.

This consolidated reference book is now in the fifth year of its publication and bound to be welcomed by all persons interested in the defence and security problems of our country, internal and external. It is profusely illustrated by photographs of the defence personnel and diagrams of the formations of all the three arms of the defence forces. The book is conceived on broad lines and readers will find much valuable and authentic information not only on the facts of the current situation but on many allied historical topics like the evolution of armies, arms, navies, air forces, atomic power and so on. The chapters are clearly and simply written with a view to interest the lay reader. There are quite a number of telling quotations from leading authorities. Considering the mass of information it provides and the size of the book, the price named should be held very cheap; it is excellent value for ten rupees.

The book is divided into eight unequal parts. It opens with a short editorial of four pages entitled 'War Clouds', which draws sharp attention to the immediate needs of our defence and lays stress on the dangers from the infiltration and indoctrination from communist sources, particularly China. This is again heavily underlined at the end of the book in Appendix II on Communist China and India (900-903). Part I, the longest section of the book (5-358), is general, and comprises five divisions on war today, war

on land, sea and air, and push button war with nuclear weapons and rockets and missiles. Part II (361-538) traces the history and development of Indian warfare and armed forces from the Vedic times to the period of post-war free India. Part III (539-642) deals with the organization and administration of the Indian Armed Forces. Part IV (643-752) is devoted to the second line of our defence—citizen's armed forces, cadet corps, merchant navy, civil aviation and red cross. Part V (753-800) is on Training Institutions. Part VI (801-826) details the Honours and Awards open to the forces. Part VII (827-861) is a diary of events from January 1959 to June 1960 and the last part is Who's Who in the Indian Armed Forces (862-896). The military significance of the satellites is dealt with in Appendix I, while Appendix III reviews some recent books and publications, K. M. Panikkar's 'Problems of Indian Defence' coming in for appreciation as the first serious contribution to the important question as also for sharp criticism for the manner in which it is held to underrate the danger from Chinese aggression. Altogether an excellent and handy compilation which will doubtless be improved and expanded in future issues. Jaswant Singh is doing an essential service and his effort should be supported by public patronage of the book on an extensive scale.

K. A. NILAKANTA SASTRI

INDIAN HISTORY — A REVIEW, by Dr. Baij Nath Puri, Lucknow University, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1960, pp. xii and 120; 2 plates (4 figures). Price Rs. 6.50; sh. 10½; \$ 2.70.

Dr. Baij Nath Puri is well known as the author of several books in English and in Hindi on various aspects of Indian History and Culture. In the slender volume before us issued by the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, he attempts the difficult task of reviewing the long history of our country in some 120 pages. The task of selection and the distribution of stress in such an enterprise is bound to be highly subjective and vary with each author. All that the reader can expect from such a book is to gain a fair idea of the movements and trends of culture through the ages in the different parts of our vast subcontinent, and this, I think, Dr. Puri has eminently succeeded in putting across.

It is not surprising that the author of another survey of Indian History, Sri K. M. Panikkar, who has accepted Dr. Puri's invitation to write a Foreword, finds himself constrained to write: 'with many of his (Dr. Puri's) judgments I frankly confess I am not in agreement', and to deprecate dogmatic assertion on doubtful questions of which he has found instances in the book. For instance, Sri Panikkar objects to the categorical statement that Chandragupta Maurya was a Kshatriya, while Hindu literary tradition makes him a Śūdra and even partisan works favourable to him call him a Vrishala; Dr. Puri in his preface has replied that he has followed the Pāli sources. Doubtless if Panikkar had cited other instances, Dr. Puri would have cited evidence in favour of his findings. Croce and Collingwood have taught how highly subjective all historical writing necessarily has to be.

Dr. Puri states his objective in the book in the following words: 'In this short survey an attempt has been made to focus the attention of the readers on the grand conception of unity in diversity and universal brotherhood. The eclectic element in Indian culture was responsible for the assimilation of the foreigners, and the expansion of this culture beyond India was remarkably fruitful. It did not aim at colonialism, but at Asian solidarity, and the grand monuments of Indo-China and Indonesia are an eloquent tribute to that spirit of India'. Another idea stressed is that of what Freeman called 'the unity of history'. But the present reviewer is not convinced that 'Asian solidarity' was a conscious aim of the emigrants who carried Hindu culture across the seas — and mountains.

K. A. NILAKANTA SASTRI

THE FINANCES OF THE MYSORE STATE, 1799-1831, by M. H. Gopal. Orient Longmans, 1960, pp. xii and 267, Rs. 15.00.

'This book', says Mr. Gopal in his preface, 'is part of an attempt at re-writing and re-assessing one aspect of the history of the Mysore State. The period planned to be covered extends over nearly a century and three quarters — 1782-1951. The first seventeen years — 1782-1799, relating to independent Mysore under Tipu Sultan, have been studied under the title: *Tipu's Mysore — an Economic Study*. The present work deals with 1799

to 1831 when the Mahārāja ruled either through a regent or by himself. The third volume covers the next fifty years, from the time of the sequestration of the administration in 1831, because of misgovernment, to the 'Rendition' in 1881, when after a period of fifty years of direct rule, the British government handed back to the ruler a prosperous state with an efficient administration. The next volume will tell the story of the next fifty years (1881-1931) while the final one will continue the story till the new constitution of India came into effect in 1951'.

The material for the period prior to 1832 has been drawn primarily from 2500 volumes of manuscript records in the British Museum and the India Office at London. If there is perhaps another side to the financial history reconstructed here from these records, to be found in Indian records, the author's attempts to get at them have proved futile.

The narrative part of the book is divided into six chapters. The three first deal with Purnaiya's stewardship and end with a critical estimate of his administration, discussing in particular detail the question how far Purnaiya's efficiency in revenue collection led to the impoverishment of the ryots and created difficulties for his successors in the government. Chapter IV deals with Rama Rao's Diwanship (1811-14); V with the Maharaja's personal administration (1814-25) and the consequent changes; and VI with the attempt at reform and the final crash ending in insurrection and sequestration (1825-31). It is altogether a sorry tale of corruption and oppression, of extravagance and favouritism on the part of the Mahārāja punctuated by occasional remorse and promises of reform, very soon forgotten, and the helplessness on the part of Residents who were enjoined by their superiors not to 'interfere' in the day to day administration. Only once during Munro's visit in 1825 was any serious attempt made to bring the Mahārāja to his senses by a stern warning; but perhaps by then it was too late, for the British government had too long neglected to exercise their powers of control under the Treaty as both the Insurrection Committee in 1833 and the Mahārāja himself in 1865 pointed out. For fifteen long years since the Mahārāja assumed the administration at the age of 16 till he was 31 in 1825, mismanagement and misgovernment had been tolerated, if not encouraged. There seems to be little room to doubt that if a more

detailed and steadier control in some detail had been exercised from the beginning, both the insurrection and the sequestration might have been avoided, and we must hold that Mr. Gopal is fully justified in his view put forward in the concluding chapter VII: The moral responsibility for the mismanagement in Mysore rests as much on Purnaiya and the British government as on the Mahārāja himself (p. 198).

The text of the book is full of statistics and a lot more of it is reviewed in Appendix B (211-39). A glossary, Bibliography and index furnish welcome aids. We hope Mr. Gopal will complete his study and bring out the remaining volumes according to plan.

K. A. NILAKANTA SASTRI

THE ORDEAL OF CAPTAIN ROEDER: Translated and edited by Helen Roeder. London, Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1960, pp. 248. Four half-tone plates (containing five illustrations), six line drawings and three maps. 25s. net.

This is a skilfully edited translation of extracts from the diary of Captain Franz Roeder of the first battalion of Hessian Lifeguards during Napoleon's ill fated Moscow campaign of 1812-13. As a girl Miss Helen Roeder lived with her grandmother at Darmstadt for a short period. There she first heard about Captain Franz Roeder, her great great grand-father; but she gained access to his diary only when she visited her uncle in Bavaria after the war. She immediately recognized the originality and historical value of the diary which had lain for nearly 150 years among the papers of the family; few of his descendants were prepared to struggle with his beautiful but difficult German handwriting. In a Prelude of less than ten pages Miss Helen Roeder provides a brief introduction to the diary, giving a sketch of the Captain's life and experiences, and explaining the difficulty of following the diary and understanding its author. 'It is not easy', she says, 'to drag out the man himself from the torrent of words, facts and moral reflections which make up the greater part of his diary. Only when you have fought him every inch of the way does he begin to emerge'. No wonder, Miss Roeder has not attempted to give out the whole diary, but only telling extracts from it, which are made easy to follow by a well-written narrative commentary of

her own furnishing the necessary connecting links. In the form in which it has been presented, the informal day to day diary of the Captain gives ample proof of his ability to bring to life the rigours of the campaign and his unhappiness at the long separation from his adored family. Altogether, it is one of most vivid and immediate accounts of the sufferings of the Napoleonic army, of which the captain certainly got much more than an ordinary share.

The book, however, is far more than a description of the campaign, and attains high value as the story of a man of extraordinary character. Intelligent, eccentric, impetuous, he had frequent clashes with his superiors, particularly because he was determined to see justice done both to his men and to the population of the countries through which he passed; he could stand none of the arbitrary self-centredness of the usual run of military men. The Captain had also great charm, a caustic wit, and enduring vitality; it was his passionate longing for reunion with his family that alone enabled him to survive the horrors of the retreat. Miss Roeder has given us at once an impelling personal story and a very readable document of outstanding historical interest.

K. A. NILAKANTA SASTRI.

THE KARAVA OF CEYLON: SOCIETY AND CULTURE, by M. D. Raghavan, with a foreword by Christopher von Fürer Haimendorf, K. G. De Silva and Sons, Colombo, 1961, pages xx and 216, Twenty plates (nine in colour). Bibliography, Index, Rs. 20/-.

Dr. M. D. Raghavan conducted the Ethnological survey of Ceylon from 1946 till recently. His work, like that of others, was then generally confined to the study of minor and tribal groups and their cultures. Now he has brought his developed powers of observation, analysis and description, to the study of a major community which plays a prominent role in the economy and polity of Ceylon—the Karāva. Besides personal observation, Dr. Raghavan has made use of several written sources, Portuguese, Dutch and Sinhalese and the appendices and bibliography give the reader a very good idea of these. We have thus before us an authoritative study which seeks to describe the essentials

of Karāva culture before they change out of recognition under the impact of the rapidly changing conditions created by modern science and technology.

Karāva tradition, true to their name, claims that they are descendants of the Kurus who dispersed after the Great Battle of Kurukshetra between the Pāṇḍavas and Kauravas. But the many references to Kurukalarājas or Kurukalattaraiyans in the mediaeval Tamil inscriptions of South India, and the prevalence of the title *paṭṭabandige* (Cf. *paṭṭangatti* of Tamil records) give us the real clue to their true origin from S. India. The opening chapter in Dr. Raghavan's book is the longest and traces the history of the community with the aid of the documents mentioned above from mediaeval to modern times. Living mostly in the coastal districts they came early into contact with the Portuguese and the Dutch, some of them accepting the Catholic faith, and after the establishment of British power rose to great prosperity by developing the coconut industry and a wide field of wholesale and retail activities. From the beginning fishing was one of their chief occupations and they made good use of the outrigger canoe (the *oru*) for deep sea fishing, and Dr. Raghavan discusses the technique of these boats and their use in chapter VI; he does not seem to have noticed the earlier study of the subject by Hornell.

The caste group of the Karāvas has an extraordinarily wide range and includes speakers of Sinhalese and Tamil, Buddhists as well as Roman Catholics, simple fishermen and eminent intellectuals. Side by side with sections of the caste largely westernized in style of living are others that have retained extremely ancient ideas and folkways. The average Karāva villager may be said to profess simultaneously two distinct religions, namely Theravāda Buddhism and the cult of Yakka and local deities. He is evidently not conscious of any inconsistency in his practising the two different creeds together; Buddhist worship concerns the fate of man in his next life, whereas the far more elaborate propitiation of deities and demons aims at securing immediate benefits in this life.

The Karāva caste has somehow escaped the pronounced feature of the Indian caste system viz. a tendency to divide into endogamous sub-castes. Both Dr. Raghavan and Prof. Haimendorf

discuss this noteworthy feature: Raghavan ascribes it to the fact that different sections came to Ceylon at different times and developed 'nuclear' cultures in different centres and as these cultures lacked a religious basis the tendency to sub-divide on a hierarchical basis did not arise. This seems hardly to explain much, and Haimendorf puts forward the suggestion that the fundamentally egalitarian nature of Theravāda Buddhism furnishes the real explanation.

All the chapters in the book bear ample evidence of S. Indian influences at work among the Karāva through the centuries. The discussion of the Ge names roughly corresponding to surnames of European society and the psychological significance of the symbols and flags in use forms a striking contribution to our understanding the Karāva outlook and social organization. Of special interest is the collection of caste flags cherished in the remote Hindu Tamil village of Manampitiya near Polonnaruwa; 'whatever be the circumstances that led to the establishment of this far flung outpost of Karāva culture', says Dr. Raghavan, 'here today is seen the traditional Hindu Culture of the Karāva, preserved for posterity, with the flags and banners of the group in the hands of these humble peasants and cultivators'. (p. 66).

At p. 58 1.3 from the foot of the page, the word 'prototype' is used where 'replica' seems to be meant.

The book is exceedingly well produced and forms a welcome addition to the ethnological literature on Ceylon.

K. A. NILAKANTA SASTRI.

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF NORTHERN INDIA
(11th and 12th centuries) by Bhakat Prasad Mazumdar,
M.A. Ph.D. Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, Calcutta, 1960
pages xxiv and 418, price Rs. 20/-.

The book is a thesis approved for the Ph.D. degree of the Patna University. It seeks to interpret the working of the social and economic forces which shaped the political destiny of Northern India in the period between Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni (1030 A.D.) and the final conquest of Ajmer by Qutb-ud-din Aibak from Hari-
raja, the brother of Prithiviraja III (1194 A.D.). It thus con-

stitutes a detailed study of a decadent period which seeks to probe the causes of the pathetic indifference of the people to the paramount problem of defending the country against the foreign invasion and conquest. It makes full use of the epigraphic and literary sources, indigenous and foreign, Hindu and Muslim; the law books and digests, the semi-historical chronicles and ballads naturally come in handy. The result is a well documented description in fifteen chapters of the feudal, military, and economic organization of the country and its merits and weaknesses, the latter preponderating. The final chapters on the Daily Life of the people, Festivals, Tirthas and pilgrimages, and Standard of morality lay stress on the unsocial, superstitious and deleterious aspects of religion due to the growth of Tantrism and an unhealthy preoccupation with sex. The author just sets forth the details the cumulative effect of which is sometimes overwhelming. He wisely guards himself against wide or sweeping generalizations which may not bear scrutiny. There is naturally nothing notably new or original in such a work, but it is not the less welcome as a systematic study of a rather neglected period.

Nevertheless it is necessary to make a few reservations. It is a question how far it is proper to use Deccani and South Indian literary sources in a study of North India; Somadevasuri, Somesvara's *Manasollasa* and Apararka are drawn freely upon, and at times even southern epigraphs like the Malkapuram inscription of the Andhra country (158). Opinion is gaining ground of late that the *Sukramitisara* is really not a work of any considerable antiquity, but a nineteenth century compilation of the time when many historical and pseudo historical works were produced to satisfy the demands of curious antiquarians like Col. Colin Mackenzie, and there is much in the contents of the work to support such a view; but no blame can attach to the author of the book under review for not having become aware of this new point of view and for his having drawn rather extensively upon the alleged work of Sukra. There is a good Index, but the errata cannot be said to be exhaustive. The book is generally well got up.

K. A. NILAKANTA SASTRI.

INDIAN RECORDS SERIES—"Fort William—India House Correspondence", Vol. IX. Public Series 1782-5. General Editor: K. D. Bharbava. Published by the Manager of Publications, Delhi, for the National Archives of India. 1959—Price Rs. 20 50 nP. or 31sh. 6d.

This is the third volume of the Fort William—India House Correspondence Series, published by the National Archives under scheme I of its publication programme. Of this series, Volume I was brought out in April 1959 and Volume XIII in June 1959. The volume under review (Vol. IX), edited by Dr. B. A. Salatore, now Professor of History, Karnataka University, is the third of the series published in the course of 1959.

The letters reproduced in this volume cover the period extending from 1782 to 1785. Thus they deal with the last three years of the administration of Warren Hastings and with the opening year of Sir John Macpherson's administration. The letters do not provide a mere catalogue of political events; they form a storehouse of information bearing on the varied activities of the East India Company during the period 1782 to 1785. They contain plenty of data pertaining to maritime and naval matters, judicial and military administration, education and public health, agriculture and famine relief, which indicate that the Government of Fort William had already begun to concern itself with the welfare of people under its control.

In respect of political events the despatches throw light on the relation of the English East India Company with the contemporary powers like the Dutch, French and the Spaniards in India and with the native rulers like those of the Carnatic, Tanjore, Mysore, the Deccan, Gwalior, Oudh, Benares, Lucknow, the Punjab and Nepal and the leaders of the notorious band known as the Sanyasis.

Regarding the administrative history, the correspondence between the Governor-General and the Court of Directors sheds light on the consequences of the vague provisions of the Regulating Act and the serious difficulties which Warren Hastings had to face. The differences which frequently arose between the Court of Directors and the Councillors at Fort William the anomalous position which the Judiciary occupied at Calcutta and the disputes

between the Council at Fort William and Fort St. George are all found reflected in the correspondence.

We are able to get an insight into the character and personality of Warren Hastings, whose dealings have been the subject of acute controversy among historians. No doubt, he committed mistakes, but his difficulties should not be underrated. His unswerving devotion to the cause of the Company is well borne out by the despatches; and the Directors, too, ultimately in their Resolution of 20 October 1784 testified to their appreciation of the ability and sincerity of Warren Hastings and of the Council. The members of the Supreme Council at Fort William, too, despite their earlier differences with the Governor-General reveal their high esteem for him in their letter dated 22 February 1785 in which they record that few men had the 'talents the vigour of mind or command of temper' which Warren Hastings possessed.

In respect of civil administration the letters indicate the general policy of the Company towards the princes and the people as well as the measures adopted to improve the tone of the administration and the welfare of the common people. Corruption was rampant. Many civil servants had come to India with the object of amassing millions within a few years. No wonder that embezzlement and corruption were common. The Governor-General in Council adopted certain measures for checking these evils, and though some success was achieved, much more remained to be accomplished before the atmosphere was purified.

The letters which constitute the basic part of the volume are classified into two divisions: (1) those which proceeded from the Court and (2) those which were received by the Court. Certain letters which were not primarily addressed to or by the Court and miscellaneous papers which pertain to the period are given as Appendices.

Besides an Introduction and a list of the persons who occupied the high position in the administration, both in India and in England, several illustrations are provided including photographs of persons like Warren Hastings, Eyre Coote, Lord Macartney, Raja Chait Singh and Muhammad Ali Nawab Walajah of Arcot. Notes explaining the references to personages and events figuring in the letters are furnished. A select bibliography and an Index are pro-

vided. The volume is a welcome addition to those engaged in research on the period.

K. K. PILLAY.

MAIN CURRENTS IN THE ANCIENT HISTORY OF GUJARAT:

by Dr. B. A. Saletore. Published by Professor C. M. Shukla, Dean, Faculty of Arts, the M. S. University, Baroda. Price Rs. 3/-.

This booklet contains the reprint of two lectures delivered by Dr. B. A. Saletore, at the invitation of the Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda. In these lectures the author examines some of the principal currents of the ancient history of Gujarat. In his view these currents centre around the following: (1) the pre-historic times (2) the epic period (3) the age of the Mauryas (4) the rule of the Bactrians in Gujarat-Saurashtra (5) the epoch when the Sakas, Parthians and the Western Kshatrapas had contact with Gujarat Saurashtra (6) the invasions and rule of the Minhirs or white Huns and (7) the intrusion of the Dravidians represented by the early Chalukyas and Rashtrakutas. The intimate connection of Gujarat-Saurashtras, with the South in the political and cultural fields receives special attention at the hands of the lecturer.

Each one of these 'currents' deserves an intensive study; but within a limited compass the author has stressed certain features of the problems connected with them. Some of the issues raised are controversial in character and the last word has not been said on them on account of paucity of sources and liability for different deductions from the available sources.

Dr. B. A. Saletore, however, seems to be too venturesome in advancing the view that the two illustrious men of Modern India, Mahatma Gandhi and Sardar Vallabhai Patel who belonged to Gujarat-Saurashtra, embody in themselves the traditional characteristics of the Gujarati people. While few deny the sterling qualities of these two great heroes, particularly the tolerance of Gandhiji and the practical ingenuity of Sirdar Patel, it seems too sweeping to state that these two leaders are products of the age-long traits of the Gujaratis alone. It may be mentioned in this connection that in a certain measure, the appearance of 'the great

man' at a particular time and place is a matter of chance. Moreover, the course of events sometimes provides the scope for the rise and growth of 'the great man.' It is true that the influence of heredity and environment can not be ruled out. But the author's statement is at best only a partial truth.

Full notes and an index are provided. But there are many typographical errors in addition to those shown in the Errata.

K. K. PILLAY.

THE HISTORY AND CULTURE OF THE INDIAN PEOPLE, VOL. VI. "THE DELHI SULTANATE"—Published by the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Chaupati Road, Bombay-7. Price Rs. 35/-

This volume, which forms the sixth of the series in the History and Culture of the Indian People, purports to deal comprehensively with the history of India in the age of the Delhi Sultanate; in other words, it is concerned with the history of the period ranging from about the beginning of the 14th century down to A.D. 1526. The General Editor rightly points out that the apparent impression that during this period the Delhi Sultanate established its sway over the whole or major part of India, is erroneous. In fact, during the entire period under survey in this volume, there were but two spells when any thing like an all-India imperial position was attained. They were, in the first place, the epoch of the Khalji empire which had an extensive sway for a brief span of twenty years (A.D. 1300-1320), and secondly the empire of Muhammad-bin-Tughlak (A.D. 1325 to about 1335). Even during these two short periods there remained certain regions outside the authority of the Delhi Sultanate. For the rest of the age, the Sultanate had its sway over a considerable portion of North and Central India, the extent of the empire varying from time to time. For the major part, and especially after the disintegration of Muhammad-bin-Tughlak's empire, India remained divided into a congeries of states, both big and small. Among the bigger states which rose to prominence after the Tughlak empire, six were notably powerful. Three of them, viz., Bengal in the east, Gujarat in the west and the Bahmani kingdom in the Deccan were under the sway of Muslims, while their respective neighbours and rivals, Orissa on the eastern

coast, Mewar in Rajputana and Vijayanagar in South India were ruled by Hindu monarchs. Wars between these powers aided by their neighbouring small states constitute the dominant feature of the political history of the period.

During the age under survey two invasions occurred which brought about far-reaching consequences. The first was the invasion of Timur, the Turkish autocrat who aimed at 'destroying the infidels (Kafir) and at plundering the 'fabulous wealth and valuables of the infidels'. Timur's terrible massacres and ravages shook the tottering Delhi Sultanate and spread havoc and misery over a part of Northern India. His cruel actions are best known from Timur's own account which is made full use of in Chapter VII of this volume. There is little doubt that the rude shake which his invasion gave to the Delhi Sultanate made the position easy for the Mughals to establish their empire in India.

Nearly a century afterwards there occurred the landing of Vasco da Gama in Calicut. The Portuguese were the pioneers among the Western powers which tried their fortune at empire building, beginning no doubt as traders at the outset. The Portuguese, however, never had any thing like an Indian Empire at any period of their contact with India, although there were epochs when their political ambition reached a considerable height. There is no doubt that the motive of proselytisation was operative in respect of both the Portuguese and of the followers of Timur. But it seems to be beside the mark to suggest a close parallelism between Timur and Vasco da Gama. Though the religious motive was dominant in both the cases, the commercial aim, too, was pronounced in respect of Vasco da Gama. To state that 'Timur and Vasco da Gama were instrumental in establishing the supremacy, respectively, of the Mughals and the British in India' (p. xxv) is to read a little too much into accidental circumstances. Several other factors, too, were responsible for the establishment of the Mughal and British supremacy respectively. In fact Vasco da Gama's exploration of the sea-route to the east helped at the outset the Dutch and French, no less than the British.

In respect of political history a few topics have failed to receive the attention which they deserve. For instance, a fuller treatment of the history of the Pandyas of the age, than what has been provided, is desirable. Regarding Malabar again, the account

is sketchy; the history of Malabar as well as of Cochin and Venad needs adequate treatment. There is for instance no reference in this volume to Ravivarman Kulasekhara, the valiant general whose operations in the Pandyan country deserve notice. As mentioned earlier, the volume under review is not concerned only with the history of the Delhi Sultanate but with that of India as a whole during that age. Therefore, important events and personalities in all parts of the sub-continent have to find their proper places in this comprehensive history.

In assessing the nature and effects of the religious activities of personages like Timur and Sikandar Lodi and also the consequences of the impact of Islam on Hindu society, the General Editor rightly reprimands the tendency on the part of certain politicians and historians to white-wash the facts of history by minimising or denying the social antipathy and intolerance between the two communities. "Political necessities of the Indians during the last phase of British rule underlined the importance of alliance between the two communities and this was sought to be smoothly brought about by glossing over the differences and creating an imaginary history of the past in order to depict the relations between the two in a much more favourable light than it actually was". This attempt at importing political motives into the reading of history is an undesirable tendency, which in actual practice is unfortunately none too rare. History is an objective record of the past, and 'wishful thinking' should never be allowed to ignore the truth, however unpalatable it might be to the parties concerned. 'The real and effective means of solving a problem is to know and understand the facts that give rise to it, and not to ignore them by hiding the head, ostrich-like, into sands of fiction'. (p. xxix). It is idle to deny that there was religious persecution in India during the period under survey.

Nor can it be denied that as a consequence of the invasions and settlement of the Muslims, the two distinct communities, the Hindu and the Muslim, stood face to face with each other, possessing markedly different customs and cultures. This phenomenon of division into two major camps appeared for the first time now in the history of India. The earlier invaders like the Sakas and Kushans had all become absorbed into the Hindu community, but the position was radically different with the Muslims.

To be alive to this is not to deny the mutual influences that the two communities exerted on each other. 'Islam touched Hindu life and was itself touched by Hinduism at many points'. The mutual influences are not clearly discernible in respect of all details of social life because there was perpetual action and reaction, with the result that the intermingling became very intricate.

The interaction of one religion upon the other led to fruitful results, which were seen at their best in the rise of mystic saints like Kabir, Chaitanya and Nanak. These broad minded leaders absorbed in their own way the features of both the religions and laid stress on true devotion disregarding formal nomenclature. They were responsible for ushering in a catholic spirit in religion and for the rise of several schools of thought which laid stress on true devotion. In fact broadly speaking their teachings form a continuation of the spirit of the Bhakti movement which had its prominent development in South India during the 7th and 8th centuries A.D.

This volume, like the earlier ones of the series, deals with not only the political, social, economic and religious history, but also with the history of literature and art. Generally the advent of the Muslim power witnessed a setback in the development of Sanskrit literature and Hindu culture, although there were exceptional cases as those of Hussain Shah and his son in Bengal, who patronised Hindu culture. But in such of the Hindu kingdoms like those of Vijayanagar and Orissa which flourished during this age there was a remarkable patronage of the traditional literature and culture of the Hindus. Some admirable works appeared during this age both in Sanskrit and in the regional languages.

In the field of fine arts it must be observed that many temples which were treasures of art were destroyed by the iconoclastic zeal of the Muslims. But after the Muslims settled down firmly they tried to introduce their own style of art importing builders and craftsmen from the West, mainly from Persia. But the indigenous architectural traditions influenced the newcomers in no small measure and therefore a new and distinct style of Islamic architecture appeared, which was at once Islamic and Indian in their features. This Indo-Islamic style had a splendid development during this age both in the Imperial city and in the provincial capitals, though some of its best specimens appeared later under the Mughals. At the same time, the Hindu style, though

generally on its decline, was preserved and developed in some of the states like Vijayanagar and Rajputana.

In on respect the matter dealt with in this volume stands on a different footing as compared with that of the earlier volumes. The sources of information assume a remarkable definiteness. There is no doubt that with advent of the Muslims the original sources of information regarding history become precise and fairly reliable. The Muslim historians provide a detailed account not only of the Delhi Sultanate but also of many of the succession states which emerged out of its ruins. The difficulties that confront the historians thenceforth arise not so much on account of the dearth of materials as on account of their discrepancy and divergence. For the first time the historian of India is in a position to avail himself of materials 'which would not suffer in comparison with those on which the history of contemporary Europe and other Asiatic countries is based'.

But at the same time their limitations cannot be ignored. They were primarily court histories, and therefore, the greatest attention is paid to the history of kings and generals, wars and treaties. Moreover, like all court histories, they could not always take an impartial or unprejudiced view. It is almost a common characteristic of the authors of these histories 'to omit, minimise or explain away the grave crimes of their patron kings and their families and to give as favourable an account of their military campaigns as could be done without wholly violating truth, though cases are not rare where even this limit was not observed and defeats were either simply ignored or recorded as victories'. For example, the Muslim historians generally pass over the defeats suffered by the Muslim generals in the South, while the Hindu sources mention an unbroken series of Hindu victories over the Muslim troops. The fact is that the Hindu resistance was strong and the progress of Muslim arms was not as easy as Amir Khusrav and other Muslim chroniclers would have us believe.

Moreover, like the typical court historians, they have precious little to say about the common people. This deficiency is fortunately made up in some measure by the accounts of foreign travellers. In particular, the descriptions provided by Ibn Batuta, the Moorish traveller, who lived in India for thirteen years and travelled widely all over the country, are very useful.

This volume like its predecessors is the product of co-operative effort. Specialists in particular topics or periods contribute the various sections, and this has its obvious merits and defects. While the accounts furnished by experts are presumably accurate and well balanced, the differences in approach, outlook and objectivity, the disparities in style and above all the disproportionate treatment of topics are all serious shortcomings. We are told by the General Editor that in attempting to bring about a proper coordination of work of scholars so far as the preparation of this volume is concerned, he has had to take upon himself the responsibility of writing several chapters himself in addition to those originally intended.

Copious illustrations including four maps, a general bibliography, a chronological list of important events, genealogical tables of the Sultanate at Delhi and of rulers in the Provinces and a carefully prepared index are provided. The volume is on the age which it treats. The contributors, editors and publishers are to be warmly congratulated on the production of this volume.

K. K. PILLAY.

JOHN JACOB OF JACOBABAD by H. T. Lambrick. (Published by Cassell, London) Price Rs. 63/- Net.

This is an authoritative biography of John Jacob who served the East India Company for nearly thirty years in Sind and the neighbouring frontier region. The biography is based largely on manuscript material, in particular, on John's official and semi-official correspondence filed in the unpublished records of the Commissioner in Sind. The biographer has also drawn extensively on John Jacob's private correspondence with members of his family and with friends such as Sir James Outram, Lord Melville and Sir Bartle Frere. Besides, he has consulted many Baluch and Sindhi zamindars and other residents of Upper Sind and gathered anecdotes and traditions regarding John Jacob.

The biographer, H. T. Lambrick, had served as a member of the Indian Civil Service in Sind, where he became Special Commissioner ultimately in 1943. His previous publications include the notable book, 'Sir Charles Napier and Sind'. Commissioned by the Pakistan Government, he has recently produced two

volume of a large-scale History of Sind. Thus he is eminently fitted to undertake the study of the life and work of one whose activities centred round Sind.

John Jacob was the son of a country vicar. After nearly two years of training at the Military Seminary at Addiscombe John sailed to India to take service under the East India Company in 1828, when he was hardly sixteen years of age. The first ten years of John Jacob's army service passed in the routine of peacetime soldiering. Thereafter, in connection with the First Afghan War and the subjugation of Sind he received his apprenticeship in war. From the outset he distinguished himself as a brilliant Gunner and Cavalry leader. In all his activities John Jacob evinced unflinching courage and loyalty to the sworn cause. He had the opportunity of serving under veterans like Sir James Outram and Sir Charles Napier who have all recorded their warm appreciation of the character and ability of John Jacob.

Broadly speaking, during the first fifteen years John Jacob served in the fighting force, particularly in the Artillery, and for the next fifteen years he ruled the people of Sind. His work in the latter period was varied in character, and particularly between 1847 and 1853 he performed the duties of 'Political Agent, Magistrate, Superintendent of Police, Surveyor and Engineer throughout a large district under peculiarly difficult circumstances'. In 1856 he was appointed Acting Commissioner in Sind and in this capacity he continued his noble service of improving the public works. To the very last he worked hard till he died on the 5th December 1858 at the age of 45, 'worn out with exhaustion from excessive labour, having given all he had, even his life to the service of the State'.

There is no doubt that John Jacob was 'one of those rarest spirits who love work—good, true and noble work—for its own sake. He had something of the gift of a statesman; he was able to prophesy the outbreak of the Mutiny, though it must be remembered that Henry Lawrence had anticipated Jacob in this. Further, Jacob was able to evolve a plan for the permanent defence of the north-west frontier.

Not less important was his effort at introducing various reforms among the subject people in order to ameliorate their material and moral conditions. Valuable irrigation canals were

constructed. He made an effort to get a civil hospital established at the headquarters for the benefit of the people. In 1853 he instituted a survey of the frontier of Sind.

In the discharge of his duties he brought to bear admirable qualities. He was remarkably frank and outspoken. He took delight in telling the truth as he saw it. Moreover, he was kind and considerate to the poor. Many instances of Jacob's humanity and generosity to the poor are fondly cherished to this day. But, to the evil doer he was relentless. No consideration of position or prestige of the offender would dissuade him from inflicting condign punishment. In several instances the dishonest official was ordered to leave the district within twelve hours.

The biographer, however, does not appear to be a purblind hero-worshipper. He does not concentrate his attention only on the brighter side of Jacob's character and behaviour. His shortcomings, too, are systematically recounted. John Jacob had physical impediment in his speech, and he remained a stammerer to the last, a circumstance about which he was acutely sensitive. John was habitually reserved, but aggressively self-assertive, acrimonious and intolerant. Moreover, he was not above jealousy of credit given to others. Again, at times, his punishments were far too severe. Once he took an extraordinarily stern action against a party enjoying the popular diversion of cock fighting. Every man engaged in it was put under arrest, taken to his compound and given twenty lashes and the owners of the cocks were disgraced and paraded through the streets. John was often hasty in his assertion of the laws of political economy, as far instance, in his exaggeration of the virtues of free trade. Again, his views on the political future of India were little better than those of diehard British administrators. He held that Indians were not fit for self-government at any time. He was a believer in the view that Indians should be properly educated and ruled by the British people perpetually. He differed from several of his contemporaries who contemplated a time when India could be conscientiously left by Britain to rule herself. It was his firm conviction that the Indian character, under European control and guidance was capable of substantial improvement.

But, despite these shortcomings, he was a sincere administrator and an ardent well wisher of the people. Like John Nicholson,

John Jacob is enshrined in the traditions of the people, some of whom held Jacob to be next only to Mahomed. However, the author of the book seems to err on the side of exaggeration when he states that John Jacob approximated to the ideal of Plato's 'Philosopher King'. (p. 379).

The book provides two useful appendices, one on John Jacob's writings, and another on his 'Frontier System'. Full notes and references are provided, besides an Index. Two maps are furnished, one of Sind and the North Western Approaches to India as in 1856, and another of Upper Sind, Kachhi and the adjoining regions as they stood during 1839-1858. The book is well produced.

K. K. PILLAY

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