


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THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Vol. XXXIV, No. 2]

[July, 1961

The Concept of Self in Buddhism

by

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I

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika apart, the minimum that is connoted by the word "self" is that it is a *subject*, and the minimum that is connoted by the word "subject" is that it is something to which objects — non-mental or mental — are revealed: it is that which looks at things called *object*. The definition of subject in terms of feeling and will would only be secondary. Whether this subject may, in its turn, be an object, either to itself or to another self, is a question that may be kept open at this stage. The minimum that we insist on is that it is more than object — in common language, it is the knower in contrast with which objects are merely known.

If Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has not agreed to this, it is because in that system the word "self" never means the knower in the usual sense of the term, but only a locus — which is an object among objects — where mental states are said just to occur.

It may, then, be accepted that the self is a subject. What, now, is the relation of this self to mental states, particularly to the states that are called *cognition*? Are these states also subjective or are they never more than *objects* to the self? There are all varieties of answer to this question in Indian philosophy. We select here only one of them and defend it just in order that it, coupled with the view that the self is subjective, may form the background against which we may in later sections develop the different Buddhist views of self.

The particular view of mental states that we take up here belongs to Advaita, Sāṅkhya-Yoga and a few other allied Schools. It is that all mental states, cognition included, are mere objects, never subjective. If they appear different from other objects, called physical, this is because they are phosphorescent of a kind which physical objects are not; and if on account of the luminosity of light and the ordinary phosphorescence of certain materials they are not regarded as subjective, there is no reason why the peculiar phosphorescence of mental states should be treated otherwise. The idea is that mental states, in spite of their phosphorescence, are yet known as *objects* by the self and never occupy the position of knowers or selves. They may be felt immediately as they occur,¹ it may also be granted that nothing that is non-mental is felt that way. But this does not prove that they are subjective. This primitive feel of mental states is entirely at the unreflective level where the subject self has not yet learnt to *look at* these states as in introspection and cannot, therefore, at this stage understand its own relation to them. What happens at this stage can only be inferred from the stage of reflection where the self stands aloof and looks at the states from the outside, so to say. The only retrospective account of the unreflective stage, from the point of view of reflection, would be that the self, as always capable of dissociating itself and, therefore, metaphysically a separate entity, was somehow, at this stage, fused with mental states. Were these states themselves subjective there could be no intelligible account of reflection. At the unreflective stage, therefore, as in reflection, mental states are objects only, not subjective.

If Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Prābhākaras have pleaded for exception for *cognitive* mental states, that is for another reason. To Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika there is no unreflective mental state in the sense that such a state could be apprehended without there being introspection (reflection), and the Prābhākaras hold that unreflective cognition, as distinct from other mental states, is already half reflective, the only distinction between it and reflective cognition being that in the latter the sense of "I" as the knower is explicit while at the unreflective stage it remained implicit. But these two views of cognition appear unusually desperate. Mental states are as a matter of fact felt even though there is no introspection, and the distinction between implicit and explicit is always a too easy solution.

1. Unless they are unconscious states of which we are not speaking here.

We grant, then, that mental states are never more than objects and that, as distinguished from them, the self is, to speak the least, *also* subjective.

II


It is mainly in contrast with these two Hindu points that one may best understand the Buddhist views of self. All Buddhists, irrespective of whatever School they belong to, have repudiated both the points.

Like the Hindus the Buddhists have offered different theories of self. But all agree that a self as dissociate from mental states is never *definitely assertible*. Some may have gone further and held that there is no such self at all, some that even as not so dissociate it cannot be definitely asserted and some, again, that as dissociate it cannot be even definitely denied. But all agree that as dissociate it cannot be definitely asserted.

The Buddhists have demonstrated this either through psychological analysis or through logical arguments. The logical arguments they have offered are well known and need not be re-stated. We are concerned in these Sections with their psychological demonstration.

Why should the Hindus speak at all of a dissociate self? Is it because mental states are objects and the self views them from apart? But, first, the Buddhists refuse to recognise mental states as objects; and, secondly, they insist that even from a distance the self has always to view some mental state — there is no occasion, and we cannot imagine one, where there is a self and yet no mental state to look at. From the first it follows that the self the Hindus speak of is a gratuitous concept, and the second proves that even if there be a self over and above mental states its distance from these can never be eliminated and is, therefore, no evidence for its self-containedness. This distance they will explain otherwise than by postulating a dissociate self.

The Buddhists, particularly the Yogācāras, hold that mental states are subjective. Against the Hindu view delineated above they would hold that this subjectivity is constituted precisely by the peculiar luminosity of these states. They are subjective precisely because they are felt immediately as they occur. This luminosity cannot be a type of objective phosphorescence. It is so very different from ordinary types of phosphorescence that we cannot class it with them. To the objection that all this is only



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at the unreflective stage of feeling which has to be retrospectively interpreted in terms of reflection where the subjective self finds these as objects and objects only—to this objection they would reply by interpreting reflection in a new manner altogether.

According to the Hindu view in question reflection is the fact that a self which is subjective views mental states as objects. But is the *viewing* itself intelligible on this view? Is it subjective or only an object? As belonging in whatever capacity to the self it cannot be an object; yet, for these Hindus, cognition is an object, and is not this *viewing* a form of cognition? One cannot say that the viewing in question is the very nature of the self, not cognition as a mental state to be viewed. For, then, there would be another difficulty. Is it a never-ceasing affair or does it occur only when there is a mental state to be viewed? If the latter, it cannot be the very nature of the self which, according to those who admit such self, is eternal. Nor can it be an eternal affair as it does not differ in nature from cognition as mental state. If it reveals mental states, cognition also reveals things outside the mind. Is not the relation between cognition as a mental state and an object outside the same as that between the self's viewing and the mental state viewed? No difference in nature should be postulated merely on the ground that the objects related to are different or that while one of them resides in the self the other does not. This is why in Advaita both are called *jñāna* (cognition). But if so, why call them different affairs? Is it because one is in the context of reflection and the other is in connection with the primitive feel of a mental state? But, then—to come back to our old question—what exactly is the distinction between reflection and unreflective feeling? The Advaitin holds that at the stage of unreflective feeling the self somehow stands fused with mental states and cannot, therefore, be aware of its intrinsic separateness evident in reflection. The Buddhists, however, would offer a new account altogether which is much simpler. They would say that in reflection a cognition as a mental state comes to be related to another mental state (which may well be a cognition) in a way different from how at the unreflective stage a cognition stands related to it. All cognitions are mental states and all of them are subjective, and the difference between unreflective stage and reflection is to be explained by the different ways in which a mental state stands related to a cognition. At the unreflective stage a cognition stands undistinguishedly fused with a mental state, and in reflection a cognition stands in a different relation to a mental state.

III

According to the Buddhists, then, mental states are themselves subjective. From this it is only an easy passage to a more far-reaching conclusion, viz., that there is no need any longer of a self as the Hindus claim. The self as a subject would have been a necessary postulate if mental states were mere objects. But once they are taken as themselves subjective it is no use postulating another subject.

So far with the self as subject which the Buddhists would never admit. The self, however, is popularly understood as also a unitary core-point round which personality develops. How would the Buddhists react to this notion of self?

They have nothing against this popular notion. They would only demand a clearer idea of what this core-point could actually be. Is it something other than mental states, in the sense that it can hold its own even in the absence of these states? Or is it an other in a less rigorous sense? They hold that it cannot be an other in the sense of being self-contained. Dispositions (*samskāras*) apart, with which we are not for the present concerned, we never come across—they hold—a self standing all alone with no mental state to give it company. They would even wonder how at all there could be the idea of a lonely self. The question of absolute loneliness could arise only if there were gradual lessening of accompaniments. But in the actual state of affairs there are never more than a few mental states at a time, and every time they are so few in number that nobody ever thinks of reducing that number. Many Hindus even hold that there is never more than one mental state at a time.

Even in swoon or dreamless sleep there is no self as subject standing all alone in the midst of nothing. Whatever core-point there is at these stages is either no subject and, therefore, no self in the usual sense of the term, or not alone.

It is not a subject, because at these stages it is not conscious of itself. There cannot be a subject which is not conscious of itself either through primitive feel or reflectively. By definition, we have seen, the subject is that which looks at...., and looking at would be a misnomer if the subject to do this work were not conscious of itself.

It would be equally senseless to argue, as the Advaitins have done, that though we do not actually at this stage find the self as conscious we may yet infer this from what we feel when we wake up. Only an unconscious state could be inferred retrospectively.

To say that there was some consciousness though it was not felt would be a blatant absurdity. The subjective, we have seen, is by nature phosphorescent.

Further, even in swoon or dreamless sleep all mental states are not absent. There may not be a patent mental state at such stages. But traces or dispositions are continuing. *Samīskāra-Skandhas* are also mental states, though not patent or phosphorescent, and at no stage of our mental life are *Samīskāras* wholly absent. These *Samīskāras* may be *kṣaṇika* (momentary), but that matters little. One *kṣaṇika samīskāra* lapsing, the vacuum is immediately filled by another similar *samīskāra*, and there is no knowing as to how long a series of particular *samīskāras* will continue. One has no right, therefore, to postulate its cessation.

But how, then, could there be *nirvāṇa*? The reply depends on what exactly the Buddhists mean by that term? With them it does not mean factual cessation the Hindus speak of. To the Buddhists of all denominations, except the Mādhyamikas, it means just the awareness that there is nothing more than the series of mental states,² and the Mādhyamikas add that we cannot assert the series even. What has kept us in darkness is precisely the Hindu notion that there is a permanent self over and above mental states.

But how at all to explain personality if there are only series of mental states (*samīskāras* included)? The Buddhists also have not denied personality, they have recognised it in their doctrine of rebirth and the Law of Karma.

It appears that the Sāmmitiyas and Vātsīputriyas were most worried over this problem, and we are told that unlike other Buddhists they admitted the self. But was it the self which the Hindus have pleaded for? We venture to suggest that the self these Buddhists speak of is no *definite assertible*, nothing that is self-contained. It is *indefinite* in the sense that though, on the one hand, it is not self-contained, it, on the other hand, cannot be denied. It cannot be denied because otherwise the fact of personality and the notions of *Karma* and rebirth would go unaccounted for. That it cannot also be a definite assertible, i.e., self-contained, may be shown through an analysis of the relation between a series and the items of which it is a series.

A series of items is nothing *over and above* the items, and yet it is not absolutely identical with them. The relation in question

2. We are not concerned here with non-mental *dharma*s.

is like that between a relation and the terms it relates, assuming that the relation that relates is not an acknowledged separate item or items like the series of events that relate two men as teacher and pupil. When a relation is not of this type it is impossible to postulate another relation between the relation and the terms, which means that in a sense it is not different from the terms. Yet, on the other hand, we never take it as absolutely identical with them, nor as nothing but mere words as in cases like 'and', 'together with', 'different from', etc. The only reasonable solution would be to hold that the relation, though different from the terms, *gets exhausted* in them, "exhaustion" meaning that though the relation is different the difference does not amount to its actual or possible separateness. There are various kinds of difference. Sometimes the different is a clear self-contained entity, sometimes, again, it is never found actually separate (self-contained) but we believe that though factually it always goes with another it is yet capable of being separate. But the relation we are speaking of is, as different, never even possibly separate. In other words, it has no self-identity, though it is not for that reason identical with that from which it is different. Relation is, in this sense, *indefinite*, nothing self-contained though undeniable at the same time.

What is true of relation is true equally of a series that is different from the items of which it is a series. The series is in this sense indefinite. The self is nothing but a series of mental states. Hence it too is indefinite. By "self" the Sāmmitiyas and Vātsīputriyas may have meant nothing more than this indefinite self, a self which, though undeniable, is neither actually nor possibly a self-contained entity. Personality can as much centre round such indefinite self as round a self that is definite.

IV

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No Buddhist, to whatever School he belongs, can possibly admit the self as a *definite assertible*. That would go straight against the Buddhist fundamentals. We have seen how we should interpret the "self" of the Sāmmitiyas and Vātsīputriyas. The self which the Yogācāras admit under the name *ālaya-vijñāna* is not also fundamentally different; It too is indefinite.

Ālaya-vijñāna is subjectivity par excellence which the Yogācāras seek to dissociate through different stages of mental life. But is it necessary for them to finalise this process of dissociation in the sense that at a certain stage they will have the pure subject all by itself—the pure heart that does not remain as the heart of

something? To the end it may well remain the ultimate informing principle, but one that after all informs mental affairs at different levels. Could it ever be found all by itself it must have been recognised as an enduring substance, which no conscientious Buddhist can allow. Nor is *ālaya-vijñāna*, at whatever stage, momentary. Mental states are momentary, but not so their informing principle. As thus uncharacterisable either way it cannot be a substance or a state. It is no other than an act, the act of consciousness, which is never factually a separate entity, though undeniably as an informing principle it is different from the mental states it informs. A parallel doctrine of non-substantive act-self we find in Kant. He too could not deny the act-self—in his language, the act of transcendental apperception—and insisted that there is no possible assertion of it as an enduring substance.

No act is assertible either as over and above or as absolutely the same as the events it informs. The relation between the act-self and mental states is largely similar to that between a series and the items of which it is a series. Largely similar, not wholly similar! For there is a difference which ought not to be overlooked. A series is neither actually nor even possibly dissociate from its terms, it has no self-identity whatsoever; but the difference of the act-self from mental states points after all to a possible dissociation which may not, as a matter of fact, materialise. "Dissociable but not actually dissociate" is a novel concept. It indicates either a perpetual task of dissociation, a never-ending effort, or just a quiet self-conscious feeling of the pulsation of life without any effort for factual distinguishment. In either case the situation is romantically indefinite. If the Yogācāras have not meant the former they must have meant the latter. In plain language, *ālaya-vijñāna* is nothing transcendent, it is only an immanent ultimate. Unique personality may well centre round such indefinite self.

V

The Buddhist view of self, discussed so far, can be put in a nutshell as follows:

- (i) No definite self can be asserted.
- (ii) The indefinite self cannot be denied.

These are two basic propositions acceptable to all classes of Buddhists. It is only in their further elaboration that we find the Mādhyamikas parting company.

While for others the proposition (i) is readily reducible to "The definite self is denied" and the proposition (ii) to "The indefinite self is asserted", the Mādhyamikas would never allow such reduction. For them, non-assertion of X is not analytically the same as its denial, and non-denial of Y the same as its assertion. With others these have happened to be identical only as a matter of historical fact. Otherwise, for logic there is always a third attitude, viz. absolute non-committal.

When, for example, one feels intellectually convinced that all answers offered to a question are correct it is possible that he commits himself to none of them, and when all the answers are shown to be equally wrong non-committal is indispensable. When all the answers are correct it is still possible to prefer one to others on some non-rational ground, but not so when all are equally wrong. The Mādhyamikas are for this second attitude of absolute non-committal which, for them, is the panacea for all the ills of life and precisely to promote which they have harnessed all their dialectical skill.

In our daily practical life we do indeed move between assertion and denial as the only two alternatives and disparage non-committal as sheer lack of decision. But the absolute non-committal of the Mādhyamikas is no mere privation. It is positively based on reason, every conceivable view being exposed as fallacious. One who is convinced that every view is wrong is no longer at the level of daily practical life, though he is not for that reason impractical altogether. He does not indeed aim at this or that, but he is supremely cautious—and in a sense this is practicality at its highest—that he is not misled by dogmatic commitments that cause suffering. The attitude is practical par excellence as it removes suffering and engenders active sympathy for sufferers.

The Mādhyamika non-committal is not wholly negative either. Though technically called *śūnyatā* it is really the supreme knowledge (*prajñā*) that every commitment is wrong, with its inevitable feeling and will co-efficients which are equally positive. The seer stands in the midst of everything and reacts to everything though he is committed to none.

Applying this supreme attitude to what is called self the Mādhyamikas come to the following conclusion, remaining all the time conscious that this conclusion too is really no commitment, for it is not one among many possible conclusions meant, but

just what is "shown" or "expressed" as the modern Analysts would say:

Granted that no definite self can be asserted, from this it does not follow that it can be denied. So far it is neither assertible nor deniable. But this lack of assertion or denial should not for that reason be taken as itself a commitment. Those who propose to take it that way would be equally wrong. This does not, again, mean that the definite self is none of these, for this too would be a commitment. The only way out is to commit nothing, this committing nothing being equally no commitment but just non-committal.

So the Mādhyamikas would neither assert nor deny the self by way of commitment. If there is no empirical evidence for its existence, neither is there any for its non-existence.

One might ask whether, if in spite of all our best search we do not find the self, this would not be a sufficient evidence for its denial. The Mādhyamikas would reply—It would have been so if we had assertion and denial as the only two alternatives. Once, however, we rise above both and prefer non-committal the whole picture is altered.

Thus the definite self which the Hindus speak of is, for the Mādhyamikas, neither assertible nor deniable in this peculiar sense of non-committal, and similarly with regard to the indefinite self. The Mādhyamikas will have nothing against the thesis "the indefinite self cannot be denied", but from this they will not draw the conclusion that therefore it is asserted. Further, to assert an indefinite would be a contradiction in terms. Whatever is asserted as existent is *ipso facto* a definite entity, a thing which is at least possibly self-contained. Normally when an indefinite is asserted as existent it is so asserted only as involved in some definites which have intrinsic existence, so that the existence which is predicated of it is only borrowed or transferred from those definites. This means that the indefinites by themselves cannot be asserted. They can be asserted only as exhausted in definites, which means that they are only presuppositions of definites which are existents and, therefore, not themselves existent. Nor are they, as we have just seen, non-existent for that reason.

The attitude of Mādhyamikas is to a large extent similar to that of Kant in his "Critique of Pure Reason" or of Husserl in his "Ideas". Strange though it may sound, it may even be understood from the point of view of the modern Analysts. Kant has

repeatedly said in his first Critique that the self as subject is neither assertible as existent nor deniable, it being only a transcendental presupposition of the empirical mental life. Husserl too, in his "Ideas", has taken the (pure) subjective at different levels as only phenomenological presuppositions, not existent (natural) facts. In the language of modern Analysis also we may say that the self is only a *postulate* necessary for describing the mental life, nothing meant as real.

Agreeing so far with these philosophers the Mādhyamikas, however, differ with them in other respects. While with Kant theoretical non-committal is only a preparation for a true Existentialist assurance of the self in pure moral life, with the Mādhyamikas it is cognitive attitude par excellence, the *prajñā*,—moral life, the calm compassion that expresses itself into synthetic moral life, being only *parallel to*—one might say, only another side of—this supreme cognition. The difference with Husserl lies in another direction. Even as unasserted (and non-denied) Husserl tried to catch the pure subjective acts at different levels and represent them in a complete chart, a venture which the Mādhyamikas would never approve. In general attitude the Yogācāras might to an extent be compared with Husserl in this respect, but not so the Mādhyamikas. As against the modern Analysts, the Mādhyamikas would point out that the subjective is no mere postulate, neither a mere dead cold requirement nor a mere linguistic convention. With them it is a living process, though neither assertible as existent nor deniable—either way an untenable but a living hypothesis all the same.

From the general Mādhyamika position it follows also that neither definiteness nor indefiniteness is a constitutive character of the self. From the beginning to the end it is epistemic, only a way of commitment to the self. Other Buddhists—the Sāmmittiyas, Vātsīputriyas and Yagācāras—did not talk of the definite and the indefinite self that way. With them definiteness or indefiniteness was understood as a constitutive character of the self.

Seeing and Dreaming

by

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Seeing, in the widest sense of the word, is awareness of an object which exists independently of the awareness and which is itself the cause of the awareness. *Dreaming*, on the contrary, is awareness of an object which we conjure up from our own inner resources and which is therefore an effect of the awareness. The distinction is vividly realized in the experience of waking from a dream. We may regret the loss of the dream if it was pleasant, but we respect the objects of waking experience, even if unpleasant, because we attribute to them a reality coordinate with our own. Reflection, however, leads us to question this apparently clear distinction and to ask whether our waking experience is really seeing or only dreaming.

Philosophers have disagreed radically on this problem. Realists maintain that objects, at least the objects of ordinary waking experience, exist independently and cause our awareness of them (*sr̥ṣṭi-dr̥ṣṭi*). Subjectivists maintain that they exist only insofar as, and because, we are aware of them (*dr̥ṣṭi-sr̥ṣṭi*). Surely there is some truth in both. I cannot deny that the things which I see or touch or smell really exist, but I may well be attributing to them attributes which they do not really possess, attributes which have their ground not in the objects themselves but in my way of thinking about them. The Jain system of *anekāntavāda* provides a terminology for stating this situation. Somehow the world really exists (*syāt asti*)—when I consider its independence. Somehow it does not really exist (*syāt nāsti*)—when I consider it as phenomenal. Somehow it exists and does not exist (*syāt asti nāsti*)—when I consider the successive contrast of waking and dreaming. Somehow it is indescribable (*syāt avaktavyah*)—when I consider the simultaneous fusion of objective and subjective elements.

Anekāntavāda, however, is a statement of the problem, not a solution of it. The problem is found in the word *somehow*. *How* does it really exist, and *how* does it not? Which aspects of the

world are objective and *which* are subjective? This is equivalent to asking: when are we seeing and when are we dreaming? A clear formulation of this question is found in Locke's distinction of primary and secondary qualities. We *see* the objectively real primary qualities, but we ourselves produce the subjective secondary qualities which have no objective existence, and so the thing as experienced is a fusion of objective and subjective aspects. But, although Locke stated this problem very clearly, it is not at all certain that he solved it correctly. Plausible arguments have been raised against the way in which he sorted out the qualities. But the problem of sorting them is a valid one. The basic problem of the theory of knowledge is to distinguish between those aspects of things which are objective and those which are subjective, that is, between those aspects of experience which are seeing and those which are dreaming.

Seeing is involved in any kind of intuition. Intuition includes all varieties of sense perception, and there may also be other kinds of intuition besides sense perception. Direct intuition cannot be refuted. It is the immediate evidence of existence. When I open my eyes and see something, I cannot deny what I see. I cannot reject the evidence of my senses, but I can subject this evidence to cross-examination by asking whether I really see what I suppose I am seeing. By such examination seeing is distinguished from any dreaming which may be mixed with it. Ordinarily, however, we do not make any such examination, but accept our experience uncritically.

Dreaming has many sources, the most obvious of which is phantasy. We all engage in phantasy or day-dreaming, an experience in which we attend to objects produced by our own thinking while we ignore the evidence of the senses. When we are asleep, there is no sense perception to compete with the phantasy for our attention, and the dream, consequently, occupies the whole of consciousness. When we turn back to reality from the day-dream, or wake up from the sleep-dream, the phantasy is sublated and usually soon forgotten.

Bias is another source of dreaming. We all have many biases and prejudices. These have a psychological cause in our mental history but no logical ground in objective reality. Unlike phantasies, biases are usually not sublated, and so we are not usually aware of them. We see them clearly, however, in other persons. In a political campaign the enthusiastic voter sees only good in his party's candidates and only bad in the opponents. In

religion the sincere believer sees obvious truth in the dogmas of his own faith and only absurdity in those of other faiths. We all wonder how other people can be so stupid as to believe the things they do. These biases and prejudices are a large factor in shaping our consciousness. They are sublated only in the rare experience of conversion. Being subjective, they also are a form of dreaming.

A more radical source of dreaming is found in the categories of understanding. These, as Kant pointed out, are subjective, and we can hardly deny this, though we may question the details of his list. Logic and mathematics are based on our ways of understanding. The world as experienced is often serenely indifferent to our logic. The history of science shows many conflicts between the facts of observation, which are seeing, and the demands of reason, which are dreaming. In ancient times the Pythagoreans discovered that the square root of two cannot be expressed by any ratio of integers, and this objective fact was a great scandal, because it opposed their categories. When Kepler discovered, by observation, that the orbits of the planets are not circular, this was another scandal, because scientists had always assumed, by reason, that they must be circular. And still today nuclear physicists keep making observations which cannot be formulated in terms of our accepted mathematics. Insofar as the scientists are honest empiricists, they must revise their categories, but this sublation is a violent shock for the rational mind.

Space and time, our forms of intuition, are a still more radical source of dreaming. While philosophers may acknowledge theoretically that they are subjective, these forms are never sublated in experience, except perhaps in the abnormal experience described by mystics. Phantasies are peculiar to each individual, biases are characteristic of all members of a group, categories of understanding are common to all who are brought up in the same cultural tradition, but the forms of intuition are shared by all human beings.

Ordinary experience is an inextricable (as the Jains say, indescribable) mixture of intuition, phantasy, bias, categories of understanding, space, and time. We perceive, that is, intuit, a real world, no doubt—but a world in which the objective intuition has the subjective forms of space and time, is arranged in accordance with subjective categories, is colored by subjective biases, and shares our attention with subjective phantasies. Experience is a fusion of seeing and dreaming, and the problem of knowledge is to distinguish these aspects of it.

We must not suppose, however, as Locke and Kant seem to have supposed, that this mixture is the same for everyone. Individuals differ in temperament. Some are primarily seers, some primarily dreamers, and others combine the two in all possible proportions. Different persons in the same environment, consequently, may have very different experiences. I, for example, am primarily a dreamer. When I walk through the forest with my daughter, who is a naturalist, she sees every flower and hears every bird. In a sense I see and hear them also; there is nothing wrong with my eyes or ears. But they do not enter into my consciousness, as I, instead of observing what is there, am apt to be imagining what I would be doing if I were somewhere else. The distinction between seer and dreamer must not be confused with the popular distinction between extrovert and introvert. An extrovert is concerned primarily with the phenomenal world, which is a mixture of seen and dreamed aspects. A person who considers only what he intuits and one who considers only what he imagines would both be classified by the psychologists as introverts, although they differ from each other more than they differ from the extrovert. Individuals vary all the way from pure seers to pure dreamers. The normal man (the so-called extrovert) is half seer and half dreamer.

The extreme form of dreaming is insanity. An insane man accepts his phantasies as real, just as we all accept our sleep-dreams, no matter how absurd. If his phantasies conflict with the evidence of the senses, that makes no difference, because he ignores this evidence. He is obsessed, as we say, by his biases, and so accepts them regardless of evidence to the contrary. In short, he does not see at all but only dreams. The extreme form of seeing is mysticism. The mystic claims to intuit objective reality as it is. He aspires to be a perfect mirror reflecting absolute truth. He finds reality eternal because he has freed his intuition from the subjective form of time. He finds it immaterial because he has freed his intuition from the subjective form of space. He finds it ineffable because he has freed his intuition from the subjective categories of understanding. Insofar as he is truly a mystic, he does not dream at all but only sees. If he can keep from dreaming only for a short time, his mystical experience is a transient ecstasy (*samādhi*). If he has freed himself from dreaming forever, his mystical experience is eternal (*mokṣa*).

Few individuals, perhaps none, are completely free from either seeing or dreaming, but there are many who approach one or the other extreme more or less. From habitual day-dreaming it is

a short step to that form of insanity which accepts the dream as real. From strong bias it is a short step to delusion and obsession. From concentration on mathematics it is a short step to a purely non-empirical frame of mind. From the study of nature, on the other hand, it is a short step to that "nature mysticism" which intuits the inner reality of things, and from this it is a short step to the religious mysticism which contemplates absolute Being.

Men are either seers or dreamers. This does not mean that there are two classes into which men can be divided. It means that there are two opposed tendencies in human nature. The interaction of these tendencies creates our experience. But our experiences are different, even under the same circumstances, because some men have a greater tendency to see while others have a greater tendency to dream. Pure dreaming is found only in the insane, who have freed their experience from all objective elements by completely ignoring their intuitions. Pure seeing is found only in mystics, who have freed their experience from all subjective elements by ignoring their phantasies, biases, categories, and forms of intuition; and manuals of mysticism describe disciplines by which such freedom from subjective or self elements is attained. The ideal of the mystic is to negate himself and so to be perfectly passive in his awareness of God the absolute object. The corresponding perfection of the insane is to negate the truth and so to be perfectly active, with no external restriction, in forming one's own experience.

This discussion of facts concerning seeing and dreaming is not meant to imply any evaluation. I believe that seeing and dreaming are different from each other, but I do not claim that either is preferable to the other. Certainly the seer's ideal of absolute truth through perfectly passive intuition is a great ideal. This is the religious and scientific ideal of submission to truth, an ideal approached in all intuition and fulfilled in the vision of the mystics. If the ideal of seeing be conceded as an end, any step toward it is good and any step away from it, a prejudice for example, is bad. But why need this ideal be the only possible end? Is not the opposite ideal also tenable—the ideal of dreaming, that is, of activity, freedom, self-assertion, and creation? It is in our dreaming that we exercise the God-like activity of freely creating in accordance with our own nature. If our ideal is not to negate ourselves but to assert ourselves, any step toward this is good. Be this as it may, the two ideals are mutually opposed. Every step toward one is a step away from the other. We can

compromise between them, as indeed most people do, by taking some of each, partly seeing and partly dreaming. But the more we have of one the less we have of the other, and if we have one absolutely we have the other not at all. To attain absolute truth is possible, although difficult, or to attain absolute freedom is possible. But absolute truth, that is, absolute seeing, and absolute freedom, that is, absolute dreaming, reject each other and cannot be united. They are alternative forms of absolute experience.

Educational Philosophy for Today

by

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1. Philosophy and the Philosophy of Education

Historically speaking the relations of philosophy and education have been very intimate. The great philosophers, beginning with Socrates himself, were primarily teachers. Similarly, outstanding educators, such as Froebel, Herbart, and W. T. Harris, were profoundly interested in philosophy. The current reaction against philosophy is undoubtedly a manifestation of the *Zeitgeist* and will pass.

The term philosophy, as everyone knows, comes from a combination of two Greek words, *philein* (to love) and *sophia* (wisdom). Hence, from the etymological standpoint, philosophy simply means the love of wisdom. Yet, while this is helpful, it is hardly sufficient. In actual practice philosophy has meant the appeal to reason in the very highest and profoundest sense of the word; that is, in terms of its two most basic aspects, namely, the empirical and analytical, and the synoptic.

As analysis, philosophy means a critical evaluation of experience; the latter is not accepted at face value, as it appears. In this respect philosophy resembles the descriptive sciences upon which, of course, it is dependent for some of its data. Unlike these disciplines, however, philosophy cuts much deeper; its *Gedankenexperimente* (thought experiments) seek what is final and ultimate. In this search all presuppositions are likewise subjected to the most rigid scrutiny.

The synoptic aspect of reason is even more characteristic of philosophy. As the *scientia scientiarum*, the latter seeks to embrace all experience in all of its richness, in the totality of its vision. Its final purpose is nothing less than the attempt to fathom the ultimate meaning of the "togetherness" of things—with the hope of finding the most adequate *Weltanschauung* (world view) possible. This, in truth, has been the goal of the greatest philosophers since the time of Plato. For the latter, the

philosopher is really the synoptic man who seeks "the whole truth" and contemplates "all time and all existence."

That this task is as difficult as it is ambitious, no philosopher will deny. He is also ready to admit that he cannot hope to be nearly so precise as the scientist. Yet two facts give him encouragement in this most significant of adventures. On the one hand, the fact that man is driven by his very nature to philosophize, so that even the avowed foes of philosophy turn out to be philosophers of a sort; and on the other, the further fact that the human mind, in spite of obvious limitations, has the ability to transcend the narrow range of sensations and particulars by means of universals. This seems to indicate that the human mind was made for such lofty endeavors. Hence, even though finality is impossible, it seems safe to conclude that no sincere search for truth is likely in the end to be doomed to absolute failure.

As far as philosophy of education is concerned, we may begin with the simple statement that it is that division of philosophy which deals with the educational aspects of experience. It is the difference in subject matter rather than fundamental method of approach which differentiates the former from such other divisions as philosophy of history, religion, science etc. Really it is philosophy itself as applied to education.

Thus, philosophy of education has the same fundamental functions as the more general discipline of which it is part. It deals with education critically and analytically, subjecting the various theories to drastic criticisms. Refusing to take any theory or practice at face value, it attempts to go behind the appearances in a much deeper and more ultimate sense than the sciences.

Even more significant is the synoptic aspect. Philosophy of education is profoundly intercultural and universal in its total outreach. It seeks to encompass the educational process in its totality. Thus the philosophy of education is vitally related to the history of education. Moreover, it is decidedly integrative, seeking to relate not only the various aspects of education itself, but likewise the entire process to life and its needs and its pressing problems.

In terms of synopsis, philosophy of education is therefore concerned with values, norms, goals. In short, while science furnishes means, we must look to philosophy of education for ends, direction. Indeed, this question of direction is so important in this "time of troubles" that it must be considered at some length.

Perhaps it is best to consider it in terms of a general or ultimate goal, in which all immediate and lesser goals are embraced and find their consummation.

2. The Question of an Ultimate Goal.

While there is a striving for ends on the animal level, in man this tendency becomes paramount; for, in him the consciousness which fitfully dreams in the plant and is only partly awake in the animal, really becomes intense. He is truly, in the words of William James, "*a fighter for ends*"; with him "real ends appear for the first time . . . upon the world's stage." The more reflective man becomes the larger his goals. They stretch into the far future daring even, as it were, to storm the very gates of death. Hence, since education must of necessity involve man as learner, it cannot avoid this question of goals.

The existence of so many competing and conflicting aims, however, makes it exceedingly difficult to single out an overarching or ultimate goal. How then shall we proceed? Obviously, our first task is the search for some impartial umpire or criterion. The appeal of dogma or mere intuition is, of course, unthinkable. The most adequate possible is undoubtedly reason itself. While no absolute proof is possible, yet three things are decidedly in its favor: (1) sooner or later the appeal to reason, as to a kind of supreme court of the mind, is inevitable; (2) it, more than any other possible criterion, has the means of going back and correcting its own mistakes; and (3) it underlies, not only any and every attempt at a solution of life's practical problems, but also such learned disciplines as legal procedure, philosophy, and science itself—including experimentation.

Closely related to what has been said concerning philosophy, reason as criterion of educational goals would involve the following processes: (1) critical analysis (no aim or goal must be accepted at face value, but must be carefully scrutinized); (2) consistency (any goal deemed worthy of acceptance as final or ultimate must be consistent both with all the significant and relevant facts involved, and also with all lesser goals and principles, that is, insofar as they have proven themselves); and (3) inclusiveness (besides passing the tests of critical analysis and logical consistency, the general or ultimate goal must be capable of embracing all the relevant and significant facts in the total situation, as well as all that which is valid in all the lesser or partial goals).

In the light of reason the total or ultimate goal of education might well be termed as the *humanization of man*. As such, it will be recognized as the child of what has been called *self-realization* or *perfectionism*. Yet, in view of the criticisms of thinkers such as John S. Brubacher (*Modern Philosophies of Education*, pp. 106-108), and James Bissett Pratt (*Reason in the Art of Living*, p. 91), it is better to discard the old names and to define the total goal somewhat differently. After all, the word *self-realization* does sound egoistic, while *perfectionism* seems rather formal and stilted.

The *humanization of man* as ultimate goal implies four very significant things, the first three, taken more or less directly, of course, from *self-realization*. First among these is the *dignity of man as person*. This means a rejection of all mechanistic and behavioristic conceptions of the mind or self. Mind is understood primarily in terms of the conscious, purposeful activities of a real self. As a matter of fact, the self seems to be something more than the sum total of its organic processes or its environment—including the subconscious in the latter. Much as man as creature is undoubtedly influenced by mechanical, biological, social, and subconscious processes, yet to a remarkable degree he is also capable of transcending them as evidenced by his ability not only to stand over against them but even to understand, evaluate, and direct them.

If man were merely an aspect of blind, impersonal processes—no more self-conscious than these—he might be treated impersonally as a thing; indeed, this temptation is always present. If, however, he truly transcends the impersonal, then he really has superior status and must be treated in this light. This view also fits in best with our heritage from Greece and Palestine, and with democracy.

In the second place, *humanization* involves wholeness or inclusiveness. Like its parent (*self-realization*), it seeks nothing less than the development of the whole man, involving all the creative aspects of his total nature—physical, social, esthetic, intellectual, metaphysical, moral and spiritual. The primary emphasis, nevertheless, would be on the perfection of the *highest* and most truly *human* capacities. Similarly, this concern for wholeness and inclusiveness would embrace the values in all such lesser goals as citizenship, discipline, knowledge for its own sake, and growth.

Third, the total goal includes *excellence*. Educators must never be satisfied with the shoddy and the mediocre. Every possible effort must be made to perfect the highest and most truly human potentialities of every man from the potential ditch digger to the statesman. Yet this does not mean that everyone, regardless of his lack of ability or interest, should be encouraged to go to college. In fact, the time has come for a more careful screening. At the same time, however, everything possible must be done to induce the gifted not only to go to college but also to graduate school. This means that adequate scholarships must be provided, particularly for those of superior ability who come from the lower income brackets. Our country has suffered even more from wasting the talents of its gifted sons and daughters than from the shameful way in which it has wasted its natural resources.

Fourth, and finally, there must be emphasis on *social responsibility*. Whatever their failings may be otherwise, Theodore Brameld and the Reconstructionists are right at this point. It is easy for the educated to become selfish, either in terms of ivory tower escapism, or the prostration of knowledge for merely private and personal ends. To counteract these unsocial tendencies, everything possible must be done, on all the various educational levels, to emphasize a sense of social obligation. One of the hopeful signs of the times is the fact that our scientists, shocked by the nuclear crisis, are beginning to come down from their ivory towers. Certainly, if knowledge is power, a heavy responsibility rests on the educated. The times are perilous and the hour is late.

3. Earmarks of a Philosophy of Education

As a means of bringing order out of confusion and enhancing the constructive forces at work during this "time of trouble", nothing is more important than a sound educational philosophy. In what has preceded the basic ideas have already taken shape. It remains now to complete our task by depicting in bold relief the earmarks or essential aspects of such a system.

(1) A Realistic-Idealistic Experimentalism

A philosophy of education adequate for these times must, first of all, be genuinely realistic. Instead of running away from problems and situations just because they are unpleasant, students must be taught to face the world as it actually is. Toynbee points out that in a disintegrating society, there is a tendency to follow some miracle man, usually "the savior with the sword" (the

military hero), or "the saviour with the time machine" ("the archaist" or "the futurist"). Against these delusions the realist serves as a protection, insisting as he does that his own more critical approach will in the long run result in more real and lasting progress.

Idealism, especially in terms of personalism, has three outstanding contributions to make: (1) its emphasis on the absolute-ness of ideals as aspects of Reality rather than mere subjective appearances relative to taste, convention, and culture; (2) the dignity of man as person; and (3) self-conscious mind as the clue to Reality. This last has vast significance both practically and philosophically; for it leads to theism with all that this implies. Basically theism means that man is not so much flotsam adrift on the great cosmic ocean, but by virtue of God's existence life has an underlying purpose and goal.

It a dynamic situation such as ours experimentalism must also be given a place. We must not be afraid to try the new; frontiers must be crossed and new seas explored. This new experimentalism, however, must be much broader and deeper than that of John Dewey and his disciples. Along with the scientific and the social, it must also dare the rough seas of metaphysics and theology. Dewey's system is too tame.

(2) Authority Without Authoritarianism

While unthinking conformity and blind submission are deadly enemies of democracy, yet authority—rightly conceived—can be ignored only at our peril. The capable teacher must be both a wise guide and a discerning disciplinarian; otherwise chaos descends on the classroom. There can be no doubt but that extreme Progressivism has been guilty of a false romanticism.

Two kinds of authority are essential today as never before. The first is that mature wisdom which many possess, even though they have had very little formal education. The second is the special training and skill of the expert. Both types are needed if the teacher is to inspire that respect which reduces the discipline problem to a minimum. This implies a mastery of the subject as well as methods and techniques.

Above all else, there must be a genuine respect for truth. This implies two important facts. First, that some things are really true, that is, they are as they are regardless of what men may think or desire. There can be little argument about the

multiplication table, the well established facts of history, the existence of the self and other selves, and certain natural laws. A second like unto this is the fallibility of all human conceptions of truth. While experts are much more likely to approximate truth in their fields, yet even they may be mistaken. It is well to remember the words attributed to Oliver Cromwell: "By the bowels of Christ, I beseech you brethren to remember that you may be mistaken".

(3) Freedom Without License and Anarchy

There is still an uncritical fear of repression abroad in the land. William Ernest Hocking points out that the distinction must be made between an "abnormal" type of repression which brings havoc, and the rational type which is "inseparable from personality" and the achievement of the good life. The real "liberator" is also "the disciplinarian"; for, after all, there is no greater bondage than that which comes from the tyranny of desire and impulse.

Real freedom is the child of inner discipline. Only as reason stands in the chariot and drives his two horses, as Plato saw long ago, can there be true self-realization. The genius with his unusual sensitivity, above all people, must learn discipline. Without it, in spite of his high IQ, he is likely to fail as he enters the final stage of his academic career. True freedom is realized only through the disciplined mind—which takes care to develop its highest creative powers to the point of excellence.

(4) A Genuine Humanism and Universalism

If there is any one thing which most current philosophies of education have in common, it is a basic ethical humanism. Yet, too often it has been conceived altogether too narrowly. To be adequate for these days, it must spread in at least two important directions.

The first is the metaphysical in terms of the best possible world view. While ultimately the most important task confronting this generation, still, like a cathedral, it cannot be finished in a day; and as long as we are advancing in their general direction ultimates are patient and long-suffering. The second, the expansion of the humanistic principle in the direction of universalism and internationalism, requires haste. If we tarry the elemental forces at work may bring the final explosion. Educators have no greater task than to develop a global consciousness out of which one day a new world may arise.

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Concept of Evolution

by

G. R. MALKANT

Evolution may be understood in two different ways. There is the evolution of spirit from matter, and there is the evolution of matter from spirit. Generally speaking, the term is understood in the former sense. In the latter sense, it is more appropriately called creation.

Evolution of spirit from matter may also be said to involve a form of *creativity*. It can be argued that matter is not dead or static. It is essentially something dynamic. The power latent in matter becomes creative when a new quality is brought into being in the original stuff. Whatever the nature of this stuff, there is a leap from one form of its being to another form,—from the non-living to the living, from the living to the conscious, and from the conscious to the ethical. It is in this way that life, mind and value are successively created. Creation is only a name for the leap; and that which is created is always something new. It was not literally contained in the causal substance. Inorganic matter, for instance, did not contain life, and yet it threw up life in course of time in the evolutionary process. Similarly, this living matter threw up consciousness or intelligence. This conscious living matter threw up value when man was created. Thus creation or the production of the new is fundamental to any notion of evolution.

Prof. P. T. Raju, while considering the relation of matter and spirit in the larger context of ultimate metaphysical reality, opines that we have no clear evidence of the direction of evolution and of determining with absolute certainty the nature of the original substance with which we must start. He says, "Now, one may begin with matter and derive from it other levels, upto and including spirit, as evolutes; or one may begin with spirit and derive the rest from it. Theoretically both derivations have a claim to be called evolution, and there is no *apriori* reason to reject the claim. The question as to which derivation is true remains open and must be answered on other grounds. Personally I believe, that, in our present state of ignorance concerning the world and

man, it is at least useful to accept and work with both alternatives. As a source of ethical principles, spirit is necessary as the foundation of the world and of human life and activity; but as a basis of man's physical life and as a field of his activity, we want matter. Each kind of derivation, therefore, will check the excesses and mistakes of the other; for we cannot regard man as a conglomeration of material particles only; neither can we view him as nothing but spirit. He cannot live and act merely as the one or as the other." (The Concept of Man—by S. Radhakrishnan and P. T. Raju, p. 238).

The solution here indicated is worse than useless. It is no solution at all. It merely repeats what is common knowledge. We know that science starts with matter and derives all the evolutes from matter. Matter is therefore for it the primary substance. The religious man, on the other hand, relying upon the evidence of the scripture, holds just the opposite view,—the primary substance is spirit, and all the evolutes are derived from it. What is certain is that both these stand-points cannot be equally true. They are clearly opposed to each other. If the one is true, the other must be false. We are however being advised by Prof. Raju to regard both these views, advanced by science and religion respectively, as being on a par and so equally true. Each *may check* the supposed vagaries of the other. But where do we stand in our understanding of the nature of the ultimate metaphysical substance? We are shirking the metaphysical problem altogether—or perhaps persuading ourselves that there is no metaphysical problem here. But then we are putting up with a contradiction, in order to avoid an inconvenient question. The real reason for this neutral attitude appears to be that we are unable to decide between the opposite claims of science and religion. Science has prestige,—and we cannot therefore go against it. Religion too has its own claims in the life of man,—sometimes more important than the claims of science. We cannot therefore go against religion either, particularly in India. We are in two minds. So far as theoretical evidence is concerned, the evidence on which religion relies is no evidence. Science can at least point to certain facts by way of evidence, religion can point to no such facts. Its only evidence is that of supernatural authority.

We now contend that we cannot rest with the so-called facts of science. What we need, in philosophy, is *understanding* or *explanation*. Can the facts of science be made intelligible? Is it intelligible to suppose that all forms of being are mere modifica-

tions of matter, and that matter by itself can explain the whole range of known reality? If it cannot, we need some other explanation. May be, spirit too cannot explain. May be, no adequate explanation is to be found anywhere. In the latter case, we ought to scrutinise the question. Is the question legitimate? A legitimate question cannot be insoluble. It is possible, in science, that certain questions will remain insoluble for us, because of the limitations of our powers of investigation. But those questions cannot be insoluble *in themselves*. All questions of fact are fundamentally soluble. We know what we want, if only we could devise the means of getting at it.

In the case of a philosophical question, we simply cannot plead our helplessness. If the question is illegitimate, it can be seen as illegitimate, and that is the end of it. But if it is legitimate, it must be completely and wholly soluble. Its solution is not dependent upon our investigation of inaccessible situations. It is dependent upon a certain analysis of experience; for all philosophical questions arise within our experience,—and this is nothing beyond our reach. We contend that the question of the nature of the ultimate reality or substance and its possible derivatives can be understood as a philosophical question. It is not a question which can be shirked, because of our so-called "present state of ignorance concerning the world and man".

On a superficial view, we can say that we know matter, we do not know spirit. Spirit appears to be only a quality inhering in matter. We do not know anything which can be called a *spiritual* substance, while we all undoubtedly know what is called material substance. The derivation from matter of the higher forms of being thus appears at least more plausible, if not also more intelligible. But then, as we said, this is only a superficial view of the matter. The derivation of spirit *from matter*, for example, is mysterious and wholly unintelligible. The same cannot be said of the derivation of matter *from spirit*. In no case can we retain both forms of derivation as equally true, much less as complementary. Each of them has the tendency to render the other form of derivation non-sensical. We have to choose. There is no room for compromise. If derivation of spirit from matter is the scientific way, and derivation of matter from spirit is the religious way, we have to choose between science and religion. To accept both is not to face the real problem.

God as the Creator of the material universe is not part of our experience. He is supposed to be the infinitely great and the ulti-

mate form of all spiritual being. Man is created in His own image. But all this is only a religious dogma, and we may well disbelieve it. What we cannot, at least should not, disbelieve is that the human individual is an intelligent self in his own right. We cannot go behind him to a more fundamental reality or a primary spiritual substance called God that can explain his spiritual being. The self of man is *the only* spirit we know, and know directly. There is no other. All other spirits are conceived on the analogy of this self. All other spirits are merely various embodiments of the same sort of spiritual being. If God is spirit, He is like the spirit in me. May be, He is disembodied. May be, He has a body as large as the visible universe, and a mind as great as the one He is credited with by the scripture. But *as pure spirit*, He can be no more and no less than what I know as the core of my spiritual being, the essentially intelligent self. The being of God is naturally a matter of speculation, the self of man is not a matter of speculation,—it is what every-one of us can directly intuit. If there is any-one who cannot intuit his own self for what it really is, he should have no meaning for any kind of spiritual substance or spiritual reality. The problem of the reality of the spirit ceases to be significant for him. Spirit can be no more for him than what it was for the Cārvāka school, — a transient quality of matter. If there is spirit, it is within us or it is nowhere at all. It is not to be found in the whole wide world or even beyond that world in a hypothetical heaven.

Matter is evident to all. Spirit must be equally evident if not more so, if it is to set us a problem. Those to whom it is not evident are naturally therefore inclined to deflate the claims of philosophy to any kind of knowledge and correspondingly to inflate the claims of science to all legitimate knowledge. This is so, because philosophy is, in the end, nothing but the science of the spirit. If we do not accept the reality of the spirit, what sort of knowledge is philosophy to give us? If nevertheless it does give some kind of knowledge, will it be *genuine knowledge* of reality?

There may be such a thing as the spirit, and the self may be the only reality of the kind. What now do we find in it? The self is essentially *intelligent*. It knows, if anything knows. It is to be distinguished from all *phenomena*. It is not a phenomenon of any sort or variety. All phenomena are presentable to it, but it cannot be reduced to a phenomenon however hard we try. It also does not come into being or begin to be. It is never known

as an occurrent. It is only known as *what always was*, and so essentially substantial. However far we go in mental life, we can never arrive at the *birth* of the self. It is birthless, changeless, immutable. It is in very literal sense what can only be described as "intelligent substance" or substance that is through and through intelligence.

This self has the *power of creation*, if anything has. Indeed, it is not conceivable how an immutable being can act or create. But it is not inconceivable that it can be *said to act* when joined to some kind of body, gross or subtle, physical or mental. In fact, the intelligent self *alone* can be said to will or to act or to create. Unintelligent matter cannot will, and cannot therefore create. If evolution starts with matter, it becomes wholly inexplicable. Matter, by its very nature, cannot be said to have the power of creativity. If it does have the power in question, however, we are only surreptitiously introducing the power of intelligence where it is, by hypothesis, absent. It is possible to argue that matter is not wholly unintelligent, and that *all* being is endowed somehow both with *prehension* and *creativity*. But then we have changed our conception of matter to approximate as far as possible to that of the spirit. Or what is the same thing, we have introduced spirit within matter and made matter alive and full of creative potentialities on the analogy of our embodied selves. Instead of universalising matter and making it the basic material, we are universalising spirit under the garb of matter.

If creativity is fundamental to all evolution, however understood, we cannot start with matter as the primary substance, but only with the spirit. Spirit alone can create if anything can create. It is the primary substance, and all other evolutes are brought into being through its powers of creativity. In the beginning was the spirit. Religion is in this sense more rational than science. It points to a form of reality, usually called by the name of God, which alone has the capacity to create. The scientific account of evolution is only a factual account, not an intelligible account. Philosophy seeks an intelligible account; for that alone can explain facts. We cannot therefore agree with Prof. Raju's contention—"If the world of matter is common to all according to some, Spirit or God is common to all according to some others. So both are justified, so far as their ultimate objective principles go, in deriving other forms of reality from the ultimate principle, whether it is matter or Spirit". (The Concept of Man, p. 238). The most important question to settle

is whether matter or spirit can be *intelligibly derived* from the other. This question is not answered by remaining neutral or accepting both the opposite stand-points. We must decide whether creativity can belong to matter, or to spirit or to both. Here there can be no two opinions. Spirit alone is known to be creative. If, however, we suppose that "matter is not static but dynamic, and is creative of higher forms" (p. 239), do we not impregnate matter with spirit, and make this spiritualised matter the primary substance? But then such spiritualised matter is itself a problem. It is not a simple or unmixed entity. We can only conceive it as a body with a soul within. Matter as we know it in sense-perception is never spiritual, it is essentially non-spiritual. Spirit is the invisible soul within. It is never known directly at the level of sense-perception where matter is known. It is only known at the human and the reflective level,—and then it is known as the inmost self.

An important question arises here: Can we be said to *understand* the process of creation of the cosmos from the ultimate spiritual principle, or is this a complete mystery? If it is a mystery, we explain nothing. To say that matter is the creative principle is no better and no worse than to say that spirit is that principle. The whole subject-matter of creation is shrouded in mystery whichever principle we accept. It makes no difference whether we accept the one or the other. We merely use two different words, "matter" and "spirit", for the same mystery, to satisfy our pre-conceived notions. In point of truth, we have little to choose between them.

We do not accept this neutralist view of the matter. Once we have decided our line of explanation, everything should become clear. If we accept matter as the principle of explanation, we are at a dead end. But that cannot be said, if we accept spirit as the principle in question. We can render the whole process of creativity intelligible through reflective analysis.

It is possible to argue that the process of evolution will not be intelligible to us, unless the evolutes are literally contained in the primary substance, just as a conclusion is contained in the premises. This is no doubt the Sāṅkhya view of causality. The effect is originally contained in the cause (*sat-kārya vāda*). It is merely *made manifest*. Taken literally, this should amount to saying that there is no problem of explanation; for the effect is already present in the cause. Nothing new has been brought

forth, nothing has been created. The already existent is simply made manifest. The effect requires no further explanation. It is not a novelty. But even here something remains unexplained. There is novelty in the effect in one respect,—and that is in respect of 'being made manifest' or what is called *abhivyakti*. This remains essentially inexplicable. It was not contained in the cause. If it had been contained, nothing would ever have happened, and there should have been no evolution. Evolution is in essence creation of novelty; and this naturally remains inexplicable. *We therefore reject this method of explanation.*

The cosmos cannot be literally contained in the primary substance or the spiritual ground. We now come to another sense of explanation which is more relevant to our purpose. That which requires explanation is always something new. But this something new has a *dependent existence*. It is *grounded* in something which is not dependent. We have an instance of this in our own experience. Something is created or put forth through an act of the will. The act of the will is not put forth through some other act, but it is wholly dependent upon the intelligent substance we call our self and is necessarily grounded in it. In this way, that which is willed is directly dependent upon the will, and indirectly upon the spiritual substance which is the ground of the will. Generally speaking, what is willed is an act, physical or mental. *Things* are not willed. But things also get created when, through an act of unconscious will, an idea of the imagination gets falsely identified with an existing thing or substance. This is what happens when the illusory is created. The illusory snake, for instance, is only an idea of the imagination which gets falsely identified with the existing rope, and thus gets an appearance of objectivity. Thus the illusory alone is created, the real is never created. Those philosophers therefore who think of the cosmos as a *real cosmos* can *never* satisfactorily explain its creation. It is not that the creation of the cosmos is a mystery which cannot be resolved. It is a mystery only when we have no clear notion of explanation, and the questions which we formulate are wrongly formulated. The first essential for solving a problem is that it should be correctly formulated. We should be clear in our mind what we demand when we demand explanation of an occurrent fact or thing.

All creation is in a sense creation out of nothing, i.e. creation of *something new* that did not exist before. It is also creation of the illusory, i.e. creation of something that has *apparent being* but

not real being. The most radical case of such creation is the dream creation. Here everything appears to be just as real as things do in waking life,—but they are simply not there. They are pure illusions. They demonstrate the power of the spirit to create something out of nothing. Only we have to add that this something is not real,—it is only an appearance. This is how we can trace things to the creativity of the spirit on the basis of our own experience, which alone counts in philosophical analysis.

There is no doubt still the question, how can the pure spirit, which does not act and does not move, create anything at all? To this also there can be a satisfactory reply. The spirit is indeed unmoving and does absolutely nothing. Movement is only falsely attributed to it. It does nothing and creates nothing; but it is spoken of, in our ignorance, as the doer and the creator. All things, both physical and mental, stand in the *relation of false identity* to the spirit, either directly or indirectly. Nothing can be conceived to have being which is not so related. But for that very reason it is necessarily grounded in the spirit. We are forced to the conclusion that the spirit is the only reality, and that everything else is only falsely identified with it and is real only in this relation.

We conclude that this is all the explanation that can be given, and that is ever demanded. All the facts of experience,—physical facts, mental facts and non-mental ignorance,—are capable of this explanation. They have a dependent sort of being. They have no being in themselves. They are in this sense illusory in character. Those who want some other explanation of the cosmos and its origin simply do not know what they want. They are satisfied to remain mystified and helpless. It is part of their intellectual conceit that no man can solve the mystery of creation, while the real truth of the matter is that they themselves suffer from certain prejudices and illusions. Our plain conclusion is that spirit can explain the creation of matter, if we carry the analysis of our experience consistently to its logical goal,—but not vice-versa. Evolution of spirit from matter is unintelligible and even meaningless; but the counter evolution of matter from spirit with the aid of such principles as ignorance or *māyā* or the relation of false identity can be rendered perfectly intelligible to reason. Our resistance to these principles is at the bottom of our mystification.

Moore's Paradoxical Defence of Common Sense

by

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In this paper I wish to argue that Moore's defence of common sense viewed in relation to his theory of perception is paradoxical. In his 'Defence of Common Sense',¹ Moore declares that material objects such as pens, clothes, hand, human body, etc., exist in the plain or ordinary sense of 'exist'. He says there, "There exists at present a living human body, which is my body....and, at every moment since it was born, there have also existed many other things, having shape and size in three dimensions (in the same familiar sense in which it has) from which it has been at various distances...., also there have (very often, at all events) existed some other things of this kind with which it is now in contact (in the familiar sense in which it is now in contact with the pen I am holding in my right hand and with some of the clothes I am wearing)".²

In his 'Proof of an External World', he claims to have given a perfectly good proof for the existence of material objects. Giving the H.H. Trust Annual Philosophical Lecture of 1939, which was later published under the title 'Proof of an External World', he showed his two hands and claimed to have proved the existence of two material objects.

It should be noted that Moore does not accept the existence of material objects in any subtle or unusual sense of 'existence', but in the ordinary sense in which 'existence of a material object' means the existence of an extra-mental object having shape and size in three dimensions.

That he accepts the existence of material objects in the sense in which the plain man accepts it is clear from what he said during the course of that Lecture. He said, "...from the propo-

1. *Contemporary British Philosophy*, 2nd Series, pp. 193-223.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 194.

sition with regard to anything which I am perceiving....there follows the proposition that it is external to my mind. But if.... I am implying that it is external to *my* mind, I am, I think, certainly also implying that it is also external to all other minds: I am implying that it is not a thing of a sort such that things of that sort can only exist at a time when somebody is having an experience".³

It hardly needs to be mentioned that the knowledge of the existence of material objects can be had only through perception. And Moore himself says, "I have often *perceived* both my own body and other bodies which formed parts of its environment including other human bodies...."⁴

Now I wish to argue that the account of perception that Moore gives does not substantiate his knowledge-claim that material objects, having qualities as are ordinarily assigned to them, exist. Let us see what Moore's theory of perception is. It, in short, is that in seeing or otherwise perceiving a physical object a sense-datum (or sense-data) of the appropriate kind is (are) involved. That is to say, in seeing, a visual sense-datum is involved; in hearing, an auditory sense-datum and so on. Now I wish to urge that Moore's defence of common sense is undermined by his account of sense-data, and thus his defence of common sense is negated by his theory of perception.

In the article in which he defended common sense he kept the question, whether a sense-datum is or is not identical with part of a physical surface, an open one. Had he opted for identity, he could have very well maintained the existence of a direct relation between a percipient and the material object perceived by him. And in that case the claim of the percipient to have observed the material object itself would be justified. Moore realized this, and so, even though he did not commit himself to the view that sense-data are identical with parts of physical surfaces, he was very much inclined to accept that sense-data are identical with parts of physical surfaces.⁵ But then it can be shown that his strong inclination to accept sense-data as being identical with parts of physical surfaces was not justified. For the account of the nature of sense-data that he gave at various places in his writings was very much detrimental to the acceptance of them

3. 'Proof of an External World,' p. 24.

4. *Contemporary British Philosophy*, 2nd Series, p. 198, (italics ours).

5. 'Proof of an External World,' pp. 12-13.

as parts of physical surfaces. He held that sense-data were things of the same sort as after-images and hallucinatory data. And he made a sharp distinction between things of the sort of after-images and hallucinatory data on the one hand and physical objects on the other. With regard to physical objects he held that they might exist unperceived, but with regard to after-images he said ".... there is contradiction in supposing a pain which I feel or an after-image which I see to exist at a time when I am having no experience".⁶

Now, if physical objects can exist unperceived, parts of physical surfaces must also exist unperceived; and if sense-data cannot exist unperceived, sense-data cannot be identical with parts of physical surfaces.

Later on Moore himself realized that the relation between sense-data and parts of physical surfaces could not be one of identity. He said in his 'Visual sense-data', which was perhaps his last writing on the subject, "....I have to own that I now think I was mistaken in supposing that, in the case of 'seeing' an opaque object, where in seeing it you are seeing only one visual sense-datum, the sense-datum can possibly be identical with that part of the opaque object's surface which you are seeing. I now think that it cannot possibly be identical with that part of the object's surface....".⁷

Moore's theory of perception then comes to be this, that in perceiving a physical object, a sense-datum also is 'perceived'; and that sense-datum is something different from the physical object.

Now, had Moore given the data of sensation an 'internal' status; in other words, had he regarded sense-data as internal aspects or contents of perceptual consciousness, he could have possibly maintained the existence of some sort of direct relation between a percipient and the physical object perceived by him. But instead of doing so he seems to be very much inclined to give sense-data a status of independence from perceiving mind.⁸

He seems to be inclined to regard sense-data as objects, only different in kind from physical objects. He says, "....in saying

6. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

7. *British Philosophy in the Mid-Century*, p. 210.

8. 'A reply to my critics', P. A. Schilpp (ed.): *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*, p. 659.

'This is a penny', I am asserting something about a sense-datum But I am 'referring to' and 'denoting' (but in different senses) two different objects and not one only'.⁹

Thus, if in a case of perception not one but two different objects are involved—one a sense-datum and the other a physical object—and if, as Moore maintains, the perceiving mind is directly related to the sense-datum and only indirectly to the physical object, it cannot be claimed in the manner in which common sense claims it, that there exists a world of physical objects. Epistemological consistency would then demand that physical objects as *substances* or *things* should altogether be eliminated as they were by Russell at one stage of his philosophical career, or be reduced to the status of bare physical solids devoid of all sensible qualities. A physical object, then, would either be a mere logical construction or an imperceptible 'something' postulated merely to account for the sensible properties a physical object is said to possess.

But then in neither case a physical object is what it is accepted by common sense to be and what Moore in his 'Defence of Common Sense' accepts it to be. It appears to me that Moore's theory of perception demolishes commonsense beliefs with regard to both physical objects and our perception of them. And, thus, his defence of common sense is undermined by his own theory of perception.

9. *British Philosophy in the Mid-Century*, pp. 208-9.

A Critique of Sense-Data

by

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Apropos of the epistemology of perception, H. H. Price writes: "A student of this subject cannot fail to be impressed by one feature of contemporary British philosophy. There is a widespread tendency to return to commonsense".¹ This tendency for return to commonsense or to what may be called a theory of Direct Realism in epistemology is to be heartily welcomed, for, it appears to me that for a pretty long time the theory of sense-data has simply befogged and bedevilled the minds of British and American thinkers. The doctrine of sense-data owes its origin to an attempt to explain the facts of error, illusion, different perceptions of the same thing by different persons, and so on. In the recent past, the doctrine has been gaining plausibility from what is known as "the argument from illusion". The general drift of the argument has been something like this. If the mind directly perceived the objects, then all perceptions would be veridical, and there would be no erroneous or illusory perceptions; all persons would have the same perceptions of the same thing, and there would be no differences in their perceptions; and, so on.

It has often been argued that if two persons have two different perceptions of the same thing, both cannot be veridical. Only one of them can be veridical, and the other must be illusory. But is there any reason why one of them *must* be illusory, and not both veridical? Price has ably argued the point. In his essay *The Argument from Illusion* contributed to the third series of *Contemporary British Philosophy*, he argues against 'the argument from illusion' which seeks to refute Direct Realism in epistemology by exploiting the fact of perspectival perceptual differences. Price argues that perspectival shapes and sizes, though varying from the different stand-points of the observer,

1. *Contemporary British Philosophy (3rd Series)*, p. 391.

are not for that reason illusory, for, if they were, all seeing would be illusory, because there is no seeing which is not in perspective. Perspectival shapes and sizes are as real and measurable as what we would call real things, only their magnitudes could be stated in terms of 'angular magnitudes'. Price rightly concludes that "so far as it relies upon the phenomena of perspective, the traditional argument from illusion seems to have no force at all, and no tendency to refute the Direct Realist epistemology which is the philosophical formulation of our commonsense assumptions".² This is not to deny altogether the fact of illusions. "There are indeed" Price says, "many different kinds of illusion, and still more if we include hallucinations. There is no getting away from the fact that objects do quite often look other than they are; sometimes too they feel other than they are when touched, the noises they emit sound other than they are, etc. Sometimes, moreover, there appears to be an object which does not in fact exist at all, for example, the pool of water there appears to be on the tarmac when we experience a familiar kind of mirage. But if the phenomena of perspective are not illusory, the genuine illusions which remain in our hands are much less troublesome".³ Yes, illusions *are*, and they have to be accounted for. But from the premise that some of our perceptions are illusory, the inference that no perception is a direct perception of the object is *non-sequitur*. The problem of erroneous or illusory perception cannot be solved by introducing sense-data in between the physical objects and our knowing minds. Even granting for argument's sake that we directly perceive sense-data and not physical objects, the question will still remain unanswered why *some* sense-data which are perceived should yield illusory perceptions, while others do not.

It is not possible within the scope of a short paper like this to give an exhaustive review and detailed criticism of all that has been said on the doctrine of sense-data by contemporary British and American thinkers. I shall only review here briefly, by way of illustrative examples, the theories of some of the representative thinkers and show that their theories have failed, principally, in two respects: (1) in giving a satisfactory account of the ontological status of sense-data, and (2) in making clear the relation of sense-data to physical things.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 399.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 399.

G. E. Moore

I begin with G. E. Moore. According to Moore, when we are said to perceive material things, what we perceive are *sensa* or sense-data. Moore gives as an example of sense-datum what one perceives when one perceives one's right hand. Whether this is identical or not with the surface of the hand, Moore leaves it an open question. The main points in Moore's account of sense-data to which I wish to draw attention, and which in my opinion yield no positive results about the ontological status of sense-data and their relation to physical objects, are: (1) A sense-datum is not the physical object of which it is the sense-datum, but only its representative. (2) The sense-datum is also not a part of the physical object of which it is the sense-datum. (3) Though the reality of sense-data cannot be doubted and we are absolutely certain about them, what they are and what is their relation to physical objects are unanalysable.

Regarding the first point, Moore says: 'I hold it to be quite certain that I do not *directly* perceive *my hand*; and that when I am said (as I may be correctly said) to "perceive" it, that I "perceive" it means that I perceive (in a different and more fundamental sense) something which is (in a suitable sense) *representative* of it, namely, a certain part of its surface'.⁴ For the second point Moore gives the following two reasons:

- (a) Two persons, say, looking at the same surface, one through his naked eyes and the other through a telescope, will have different sense-data of the same surface.
- (b) In case of double images, we have *two* sense-data of the same thing.

'It looks, therefore', says Moore, 'as if every sense-datum is, after all, only "representative" of the surface, of which it is a sense-datum'.⁵

If, then, the sense-datum is not a part of the surface of the object of which it is the sense-datum, what is the relation of the former to the latter? Moore says that there are two more possible answers to this question. One possible answer is this, that it is an ultimate and unanalysable relation R which may be expressed by saying that the sense-datum is an appearance or mani-

4. *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Vol. II, pp. 218-19.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 220.

festation of the surface of the object. Moore finds this answer unsatisfactory in so far as it does not rest on our *certain knowledge* of the relation of sense-data to the objects. The second possible answer to the question is that proposed by Mill when he said that material things are "permanent possibilities of sensation". This, says Moore, may be *possibly* true, but not *certain* or nearly certain.

On the whole question of the nature of sense-data and their relation to physical objects, Moore comes to this conclusion: "That I am now perceiving many different sense-data, and that I have at many times in the past perceived many different sense-data, I know for certain.....but as to what is the correct analysis of them there seems to me to be the gravest doubt".⁶

C. D. Broad

According to Broad, "sensa are various partial and fleeting appearances of relatively permanent and independent things".⁷ Sensa, thus, according to Broad, are not the physical things; they are also not parts of physical things, though, he says, they "are parts of the existing universe"⁸ and belong to the universe as "events" with certain short durations. They are the necessary conditions of our knowing physical things, "in some way the *ratio cognoscendi* of the physical world, whilst the physical world is in some way the *ratio essendi* of sensa".⁹ Broad calls his own theory of sensa "the Critical Scientific Theory". According to this theory, external physical objects and our own bodies "jointly produce in us the sensa by which these external bodies appear to us".¹⁰

That Broad is definitely opposed to the view that sensa are in any way parts of physical things is evident from two things—(1) from his characterisation of sensa as "fleeting appearances" of relatively permanent things; (2) from his criticism of Alexander's theory of sensa according to which the sensa are "sections" across the physical objects which are the four-dimensional strands of history. According to this view, says Broad, "Sensa are thus 'contained in' physical objects, as the various sections which could be got by slicing an ordinary cylinder in various directions

6. *Ibid.*, p. 223.

7. *Scientific Thought*, p. 269.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 279.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 287.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 488.

are "contained in" the cylinder it makes all sensa, whether sensed or not, exist as "parts" of physical objects, in a perfectly definite and intelligible way. They exist in physical objects, as the various possible sections of a geometrical figure exist in it".¹¹ Broad is emphatically opposed to the view that sensa could ever be parts or sections of physical objects. "When I see an image of a pin in a mirror, of what physical object precisely are my visual sensa sections? If they be sections of the pin's history, why are they optically present at a place quite remote from that which is occupied by the pin?"¹²

How, then, are we to understand the relation of the sensa to physical objects? I do not find a satisfactorily intelligible answer to this question in Broad's account of sensa. The production of sensa, says Broad, is of the 'creative' and not of the 'generative' type. According to Broad, the production of an event is of the generative type when the event is continuant with the generative conditions, and of the creative type when the event is the springing up of a *new substance of a specific kind* and not continuant with the generative conditions as part of their history. "If a change in my optic nerve or my brain generates a red sensum, there is no obvious way in which this sensum can be said to join up with and continue the history of my brain or optic nerve."¹³ This account leaves a gap between sensa and physical events which it fails to explain. Broad is clearly of opinion that the physical and the sensible parts of Nature have respectively different forms of unity "which do not stretch across from one to the other".¹⁴

The failure to understand the relation of sensa to physical things has puzzled Broad himself and confronts him with a difficulty "about the ontological status of sensa". That sensa are 'real' and *somewhere* and *somewhen*, Broad is unwilling to deny; but *where* are they and *how* are they, he is unable to say. Just to save the reality of sensa, he thinks of two possible alternatives: "either (1) sensible determinates (such as some particular shade of red) do not inhere in regions of physical Space-Time, but in regions of some other Space-Time; or (2) that, if they do inhere in regions of physical Space-Time, they must inhere in the latter in some different way from that in which physical determinates

11. *Ibid.*, p. 530.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 530.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 538.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 548.

(like physical motion) do so".¹⁵ Broad thinks that the difficulty is solved by taking these two alternatives as not mutually exclusive but complementary. But in the absence of any evidence and definite knowledge, it is a sheer gratuitous assumption to think that there are regions of Space-Time different from physical Space-Time and ways of inherence different from those in which physical determinates do so.

Bertrand Russell

I shall very briefly refer to the difficulties in Bertrand Russell's theory of sense-data. In Russell's account, the question of the relation of sense-data to physical things does not arise at all; for, the whole conception of a "thing" different from and underlying its various appearances is, according to Russell, an invention of "the prehistoric metaphysicians", something which belongs to "the useless menagerie of metaphysical monsters". Russell does away with "thing" and "matter" in the usually accepted sense of the terms. The "thing" for him is a 'logical construction' out of sense-data. Russell commends the method of substituting "logical constructions" for "inferred entities" which he has found useful in the sphere of mathematics in connection with irrationals and cardinal numbers. Russell comes to his belief in sense-data through the avenue of science. Physics tells us that the actual contents of the world are far different from what we directly perceive or from our immediate data of sense. These latter have been called by Russell sense-data. Russell describes them as "certain patches of colour, sounds, tastes, smells, etc., with certain spatio-temporal relations".¹⁶ Now, as these sense-data are far different from the actual contents of the physical world, the question arises: what precisely is their nature and ontological status? Are they mental? Russell's answer is very intriguing. He characterises them as "appearances", as existing in the private spaces of individual observers, as having their very existence doubtful when they are not data, but yet, in spite of all these, *not mental*. Russell gives the following reasons for regarding the sense-data as *not mental*: (1) The sense-data have simply physiological subjectivity, i.e., "causal dependence on sense-organs, nerves and brain".¹⁷ What the mind adds to the sensibilia is *merely awareness*. (2) Sense-data are distinguishable from sensations. (3)

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 543-44.

16. B. Russell: *Logic and Mysticism*, p. 145.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 149.

Sense-data cannot be regarded as mental simply on the ground that they do not persist unchanged after they have ceased to be data.

Sense-data, says Russell, are physical, but in what precise sense it is difficult to understand. The difficulty arises from two things. In the first place, Russell makes the actual contents of the physical world, the contents which physics knows about, totally different from the sense-data: "The supposed contents of the physical world are *prima facie* very different from these: molecules have no colour, atoms make no noise, electrons have no taste, and corpuscles do not even smell".¹⁸ Secondly, Russell makes the existence of sense-data when they are not data problematic: "We do not know, except by means of more or less precarious inferences, whether the objects which are at one time sense-data continue to exist at other times when they are not data".¹⁹ Well, if sense-data are physical and *objective*, they should exist as much when they are data as when they are not.

A. J. Ayer

The untenability of the sense-data doctrine has, to my mind, been most ably and convincingly shown by A. J. Ayer. His arguments against this theory may be summarized as follows:


(1) Modern philosophers say that we are "directly aware" of sense-data. But if direct awareness means awareness without inferential processes which precede it, then, I am directly aware of material things like tables and chairs and pens. I do not become aware of them as a result of inferences which I make concerning them.

(2) The sense-data terminology defeats the purpose for which it is introduced. It is introduced to mark off appearance from reality. But the distinction can be applied to sense-data themselves.

(3) The contention that we directly perceive sense-data and not physical things "is not an empirical statement". Says Ayer: "A philosopher who thinks that he directly perceives physical objects does not for that reason expect anything different to happen from what is expected by one who believes that he directly perceives sense-data. Each is claiming to give an account of all

18. *Ibid.*, p. 149.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 148.



perceptual experience, whatever form it may take, so that no experiment can settle the issue between them".²⁰

(4) The "argument from illusion" is fallacious. From the premise that things sometimes appear to be different from what they really are, the conclusion does not follow that they are *not directly* perceived. "It makes perfectly good sense to talk of perceiving things which look in some way different from what they are, and there is at least no obvious reason why we should here feel bound to add that these things are not perceived directly."²¹

(5) It is argued that the instance of a pure hallucination, such as Macbeth's seeing a dagger, makes the introduction of the sense-datum terminology indispensable. What else is Macbeth seeing, it is argued, but a sense-datum, when he is seeing a dagger, there being no real dagger at all? To this argument Ayer gives a telling reply. It is indifferent, he says, whether we say that Macbeth is seeing a dagger, or, that he thinks he sees a dagger. There can be no question of seeing a sense-datum when there is no object at all of which it could be the sense-datum. "It is only if we artificially combine the decision to say that the victim of a hallucination is seeing something with the ruling that what is seen must exist, that we secure the introduction of sense-data".²²

(6) The causal argument, of which much capital is made by the supporters of the sense-data theory, is, Ayer points out, by no means unassailable. The causal argument seeks to prove that we do not perceive things as they really are, but their effects on our nerves and brains. "The idea at work" as Ayer puts it, "is that if the object owes its properties to us, they are not legally its own". "But", as he adds, "what it owes, or partly owes, to the observer is its appearing to him in the way it does".²³ This does not lead to the conclusion that the thing really is not what it *looks* to be.

A variant of the causal argument seeks to prove that we do not directly see things because light takes time to travel from the objects to us. The things we are supposed to be seeing now, we do not see now. In some cases, for example in the cases of certain stars, the time taken may amount to thousands of years, during which it is possible they may have even ceased to exist.

20. A. J. Ayer: *The Problem of Knowledge*, p. 93.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 97.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 99.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 101.

This, Ayer points out, is by no means an unassailable argument. Why should we hold that all that we see must necessarily be present and deny that our eyes can range into the past? "We have to balance" says Ayer, "the oddity of saying that we can see what is past against the oddity of saying that we do not see physical objects; and to give our eyes access to the past may well seem the more reasonable course".²⁴

One cannot but agree with Ayer when he argues that "from the fact that the perceived qualities of physical objects are causally dependent upon the state of the percipient, it does not follow that the object does not really have them. Accepting what the physiologists tell us, we are still not committed to holding that we cannot perceive physical objects as they really are".²⁵

There is no incompatibility between the causal theory and naive realism: "In its purely scientific aspect there need be no conflict between the causal theory and naive realism. It is possible to maintain both that such things as chairs and tables are directly perceived and that our sense-experiences are causally dependent upon physical processes which are not directly perceptible".²⁶

Then, again, as Ayer says, "the causal theory is hardly a theory of perception at all, in the philosophical sense. It simply gives us the assurance that phenomena can be scientifically explained".²⁷

Conclusion

The critical survey which we have attempted above of the theories of sense-data advanced by some of the leading exponents of the subject force us to the conclusion that the introduction of the sense-data terminology has been altogether unnecessary and unwarranted. The interposition of the sense-datum as a *tertium quid* between the real object and the knowing mind is an unwarranted deviation from the plain, incontrovertible and common-sense view that when we perceive an object, we perceive it *directly and as it really is*. For want of space, I have not in this paper given an account of the sense-datum doctrine of the American Critical Realists, but what they say on the subject is, more or less,

24. *Ibid.*, p. 104.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 126.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 128-29.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 131.

the same as what the British thinkers we have discussed above, have said. They also interpose between the real object and the knowing mind 'sensa' which they variously describe as 'essences', 'character-complexes' and 'phenomena' with the consequence that perception becomes at their hands, in the pithy phrase of Santayana, "a salutation and not an embrace". From all this useless sophistication, a return to direct realism, i.e. a theory of direct perception of the object, such as that pleaded for in the recent writings of Ayer and Price, is now welcome. If at all we want to distinguish the actual content apprehended from the real object and choose to call the former a sense-datum, we may do so, but as Dawes Hicks pertinently warns "not as though it were one fact set alongside another", "not a *tertium quid* situate between the apprehending subject and the thing or event apprehended by him". "We may call it a 'phenomenon' if we please", says Hicks, "but in that case the contrast between the phenomenal and the real indicates no more than a contrast between a fragmentary and partial aspect of the real, and the real in its concrete richness and fullness—a contrast, in other words, between reality as it is but incompletely and as it might be completely known".²⁸ With this caveat, of course, the distinction between what is actually apprehended and the real object is permissible.

28. G. Dawes Hicks: *From Idealism to Realism, Contemporary British Philosophy, 2nd Series*, p. 127.

Vedanta and Ontology

by

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The question I wish to raise here is how can the Vedanta metaphysics, that the world is illusory and only pure consciousness is real, be offered as a philosophical thesis. Some sages are believed to have a first-hand experience of this reality and have described it in paradoxes. The students of Vedanta are asked to repeat and meditate on these paradoxes till their meaning flashes on their minds. But until this happens, what do those Vedantic utterances mean? Obviously they are not meant to be meaningful in the ordinary sense and self-evidently true in ordinary experience. The world is what proves our illusory experiences to be illusory, and the statement that the world itself is illusory cannot make sense unless some other experience replaces it in the same manner as the world does the dreams. The situation in dreamless sleep cannot do this job for we do not feel that the world ceases to exist when we sleep.

So the Vedantic metaphysics cannot be asserted as a meaningful statement in rational discourse. What then is the sense of the Vedantic statements? It is foolish to say that the Vedanta philosophers offered us pure high-sounding nonsense.

We can make sense of such statements if we take them as axiological instead of ontological. The Vedanta philosophers wanted to say that we should treat the world as if it were unreal and as if our consciousness in its pure undifferentiated state such as we have in dreamless sleep were real. Reality is a valuational term for them, and they asked us to realise what they said in the sense of making them real and not in the sense of their being antecedently real. It may be pointed out that even such apparently descriptive statements as "This is a chair" is prescriptive in a way, for the brute fact or hard data are but non-descript sense-data. We are asked by the speaker to put together certain sense-data under the concept of a chair. In the case of the metaphysical statement in question we are asked to imagine the world as a dream. This is a more difficult demand to fulfil. We have no experience of any real piece of world being illusory. Yet we can think,

after the analogy of dreams, that whatever we experience and take to be real may be a projection of a mind from behind our ordinary mind. The metaphysical statement is then metaphorical, it has a kind of significance instead of a direct literal meaning. The Vedanta asks us to think the world as an illusion and to live in this thought. It asks us to change our point of view.

That the Vedanta metaphysics is not meant to be a plain cognitive theory is apparent from other situations. Vedanta addressed to a very thin section of the people, the Brahmins, who were brought up in a very extraordinary manner. They were abnormal by our modern standards. The ethics of strict abstinence is integral to Vedanta. The Upanishads were never treated as philosophical texts available to all and open to rational discussion. They were secretly communicated by the sages to their worthy disciples who accepted the statements without a shadow of doubt. Thus it was not impersonal reason but personal faith that supported the metaphysics of Vedanta. The truth of this metaphysics was never claimed as public. A handful of people with a peculiar bent of mind, heritage and training, held them to be true.

But why then are the statements in the Vedanta indicative in mood? We may reply that what is believed to be more valuable thought on appearance may as well be called what really is, while what is obviously there but something regretted and sought to be escaped may be said to be only what appears. It is a matter of belief and language. Thus it is said by the idealists that we are what we aspire to be, not what we actually are. The demanded state of affairs is described as if it is achieved. Another question to ask is, why do Vedanta philosophers offer arguments in support of their view if all that they meant was an appeal for one's change of standpoint? The reply is that if we inspect the arguments, they will prove to be but persuasive and as psychological aids to our thinking the extraordinary kind of thought. The arguments from illusion and our dreamless sleep are plainly of this sort. Sankara makes it clear that since Brahman is transcendental it cannot be inferred from anything in the world. He speaks of revelation as the only source and support for his metaphysics. This is only a psychological support, for there is no logical relation between the biographical statement, "P experienced X" and the existential statement, "There is X". The relation is psychological in the sense that on learning that P experienced X, one may say to oneself, "if P experiences X and values it, may be I could also do the same".

DISCUSSION

Spirituality—Indian and American

by

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The article on "Spirituality—Indian and American" by Mr. Wilson Organ, published in the January 1961 issue of the Philosophical Quarterly needs, in my opinion, a convincing reply. It is written in a popular style. Mr. Wilson Organ is certainly competent to state the American view-point on the subject and in the manner he has done. When however I find that he has made certain references with regard to Indian spirituality and that too in a light manner, I feel it is my duty as an Indian to try to remove any wrong impression which might have been created in the minds of some of his readers. On page 245 of the journal mentioned, he has stated that he was shocked to hear at the 1958 Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress that in the Sannyasin stage of life, one does not need love; in his opinion such a view is against the teachings of modern psychology according to which "the human being never outgrows the need for love".

In my opinion, the Indian view about the stage of sannyās does not appear to be in conflict with the teachings of modern psychology. In India sannyās represents a particular state of mind in which the soul has a direct taste of the Life Divine. In this stage, the desires of the heart are completely renounced and the individual becomes wholly dispassionate and detached in spirit. Although he is detached, he is not isolated from the world. By isolation we mean isolation in spirit only. Since he has no desire in worldly pleasures, the so-called emotional indulgences of this world lose all charm and significance for him. His mind finds delight in the Supreme and he seeks refuge only in the Supreme. At heart he is unaffected by worldly losses and gains, love and hate, hope and despair. His whole heart which rests in the Supreme is peaceful, balanced and free. I am quite sure that a modern psychologist will not deny that if such a mental state could be attained, then in that state a man could become absolutely indifferent to worldly love and hate. It is, of course, true that an ordi-

nary human being does not outgrow the need for love, but a true sannyāsin in the Upanisadic sense is an *extraordinary person* who has risen above the consciousness of the body-mind to the realisation of the Supreme Being. Modern psychology does not deal with such an extraordinary and super-normal mind. It deals simply with the normal and abnormal constitutions and reactions of minds of ordinary persons.

I can appreciate the difficulty of an American to understand our viewpoint when we say that the true sannyāsin is nothing but a symbol of love and compassion for the whole creation. This love is not the narrow and limited love of an ordinary man. He does not become too much attached to anybody. To him all are equally lovable, because all are the sparks of the same Life Divine which is the main object of his devotion and adoration. In fact the true sannyāsin gives away his whole heart to the Highest Being, and receives also inspiration and encouragement from that source alone. Since the love of a sannyasin is directed towards the object of Supreme Value, he naturally becomes indifferent to all worldly things and events. But this does not mean that he is hard-hearted. On the contrary, the taste of Divine Love melts his heart in such a manner that he always feels love and compassion for all and eagerly extends his help to human beings whenever they are in distress. His equal treatment without any partiality for any particular soul may outwardly seem to be a sort of indifference; actually speaking, it is a form of self-less love which is devoid of all sorts of ego-centric attachment. Such true love can flood the heart of that person only who has tasted Divine Love.

On page 245, para 3, he remarks: "Spirituality for Indians means anti-materialism". Again on page 246, para 1, he says, "The American view of human life does not separate the material and the spiritual as does the Indian". I am afraid, this is a very superficial criticism. It is not correct to say that Indian spiritualism is anti-materialism. In fact, Indians also do not admit an absolute separation between the material and the spiritual. Material happiness and comforts are no doubt necessary, but they are of an inferior value. The highest value lies in the realisation of the spirit which is the essential being of man. Life begins in a material world, and this material world does charm a man, nourish him, and provide him with all the material necessities of life. The soul itself remains wrapped up in a material covering—a covering to which we have got to give such importance as is its legitimate due. But man has got to realise his inner essence

which is of the nature of the spirit. The realisation of this spirit constitutes the highest goal of Indian life. It is a case of transcendence, and not of antagonism, between spiritualism and materialism. As one ascends higher and higher in the scale of spirituality, his material happiness gets transformed into the happiness of the spirit. At the ordinary stage, the happiness of the soul remains mixed up with the happiness of the world; and in that stage, the happiness of the world gets prominence. This is the natural law of worldly life. Barring Cārvāka, no other system of Indian philosophy has given an independent significance to the material principle. Even in Sāṅkhya, Prakṛiti becomes meaningful only when it is intelligised by Puruṣa. Materiality is always deriving its significance from spirituality with which it remains in association. It is the spiritual which is of the highest value: so even in the case of material enjoyment and worldly actions, an adherence to spirituality must be prominent. *This is our Indian Culture.*

In another place he has stated that Indian philosophy teaches that a person must be poor and hungry in order to be spiritual and that attention to the needs or desires of the physical body necessarily disqualifies a person for spirituality. This impression of the writer is wholly wrong. Indian philosophy merely teaches that man should not regard material happiness as the ultimate goal of life and should not therefore get too much attached to material happiness emotionally, because in that case he will be psychologically incapable of giving his best attention to the spirit which is his real essence. In fact, one who realises that spirit alone is of supreme value becomes naturally indifferent to those things which he considers to be of inferior value. For that reason, it does not matter whether a free soul lives in a palace or under a tree. Janaka was a King, but he was also the knower of the Ultimate Truth.

Mr. Wilson Organ has quoted words of Swami Vivekananda:

"In the West they are trying to solve the problem of how much a man can possess, and we are trying to solve the problem on how little a man can live". What Vivekananda referred to is the virtue of *aparigraha*, which means a dispassionate attitude to material prosperity through the perception of its being tainted by cruelty and other defects. This is one of the most essential virtues of man according to the Indian view. It is the belief of Hinduism that all sorts of evils—social, political, moral, etc.—are the results of greed.

Book Review

The Concept of Mind in Indian Philosophy, by Saraswati Chennakesavan, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Pachaiyappa's College, Madras; Pp. 164 + X; Price Rs. 10; Published (1960) by Asia Publishing House, Bombay.

The importance of the problem of mind to philosophy can hardly be overemphasized. It has proved a difficult and somewhat puzzling problem of philosophy in the West especially because there the term *mind* has been used almost as a synonym for soul, self or spirit—terms which themselves are vague and ambiguous and not well-defined. It has a long and chequered history in Western Philosophy. It is a far cry from the respectable status once enjoyed by the *Psyche* at a time going back to Plato to its liquidation in ignominious terms e.g., the 'ghost in the machine', in the present time, when what is left in our hands is 'only the neurophysical brain and certain disposition of behaviour' (Preface, p. ix).

In Indian philosophy, too, the concept of mind admits of varying interpretations in the different systems. But here the terms *mind*, *self*, *soul* etc., are well-defined by the systems concerned, and the mind is not equated with the Self. Hence the study of the concept of mind in Indian Philosophy is both instructive and illuminating, especially in the present time when the very concept of mind is at a discount.

The present book by Prof. Saraswati Chennakesavan is "an attempt to understand the structure and functions of mind from the standpoint of Indian Philosophy" (Preface, p. vii). But Indian Philosophy is a wide term which is inclusive of various schools, both orthodox and heterodox. The author, however, confines her attention to the six orthodox systems for the sake of convenience of treatment. But within these limits the author presents us a deep and penetrating study of the subject. While doing so she has dived deep into the source books of the various systems, and the value of her study is enhanced by her knowledge of Western Philosophy. This enables her to maintain a comparative outlook and to present her arguments in the familiar parlance of Western Philosophy which can easily be understood by those who are not familiar with the typical idiom of Indian Philosophy.

The book consists of a *Preface* and five chapters entitled as follows: (1) The Nature of Mind; (2) Knowledge Through The Mind; (3) Knowledge and the Object; (4) Discipline of the Mind; (5) A Comparative Estimate.

In the *Preface* we get a sort of outline of the whole work. We may profitably note certain points in it. All the systems of Indian Philosophy deal with the concept of mind. In these systems we get both the psychological and the epistemological analyses of the concept with varying emphasis. The author, however, has endeavoured "to correlate the two aspects and arrive at a satisfactory explanation of the nature of mind" (*Preface*, p. vii). All the systems agree that mind is subtle matter. The mind is a sort of liaison between gross matter and the Self. "One important aspect of mind that emerges as a result of this study", according to our author, "is that mind cannot be equated to self as most of the Western thinkers do" (*Preface*, p. ix). The author disagrees with the more recent view in the West which "denies that there is anything like a mind at all" (*Ibid*). According to her, "Such a position deliberately flies in the face of evidence" (*Ibid*). The author comes to the following conclusion on the nature of mind: "... the problem of the nature of mind and its relation to matter may be satisfactorily solved only if we think of mind as a higher form of matter capable of reflecting the nature of self which is consciousness... the mind is an instrument, *antahkarana*, whose activity is an indicator of the existence of pure self. Till this fact is reckoned with, any amount of logical speculation about the nature of mind and the relation between matter and mind may prove to be futile (*Preface*, p. x)".

In the first three chapters the author discusses the nature of mind, the role of mind in the various kinds of perceptual knowledge and the relation between the mind and the object. Indian philosophy is a *mokṣaśāstra*. Hence Chapter IV is devoted to a consideration of the discipline of the mind. It is the mind that is the source of bondage or liberation. Hence the mind must be weaned from the sources of bondage and wedded to those of liberation. "A study of the Indian concept of mind will not be complete", says our author, "unless it is viewed in the light of the Western concept" (p. 130). Hence Chapter V is devoted to 'A Comparative Estimate' and seems to be quite a useful chapter, in as much as it enables us to see how Indian Philosophy could avoid most of the knotty problems of philosophy by making a clear distinction between the mind and the Self. "The Western thinker, on the

other hand", complains our author, "very rarely sees any difference between the mind and the self, or he is not prepared to give any ontological status to self as an ontological existent (p. 130)...." "The trouble generally with Western thinkers is that not only do they view mind and matter disjunctively capable of mutual exclusion, but they imagine that these alternatives alone exhaust the field. Until this attitude is modified and the recognition of a self over and above mind and matter is made, there can be no satisfactory solution for the body-mind problem" (p. 153).

One more feature of Indian Philosophy may be noted here. Most of the schools of Indian Philosophy "believe that ordinary modes of perception do not set the limit to human cognition. The mind of man is capable of soaring up to higher levels of understanding which are not imposed by sense perceptions" (p. 107).

Our author critically examines, in this last chapter, the views of Russell and Ryle on mind and finds them unsatisfactory. "Ryle is only giving a new logical dress to the old behaviourism" (p. 147). Her conclusion of the discussion is that "... it is meaningless to talk of a purely physical explanation of mind" (p. 152).

The author concludes the work with a note on the nature of the Self which is one and indivisible, eternal and intelligent. There are, however, certain points raised by the author which need clarification. These are as follows:—

(1) According to our author, "The Advaitin agrees with the modern psychologists and says that mind is just a totality of conscious states and processes (*Preface*, p. viii)....". Here it must be noted that according to Advaita Vedānta the mind is not just a totality of conscious states and processes. The mind is a subtle body of which the various states and processes are modifications. It persists in all the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep and is not lost even when the physical body is lost. It transmigrates till the attainment of liberation.

(2) While discussing the discipline of the mind our author says, "... intellectual certitude is a necessary preliminary to the intuitive knowledge of Brahman. But the certitude is given in experience and not as a result of intellectual arguments" (p. 126). Here one may well think that the author is contradicting herself. To avoid this impression we must bear in mind that intellectual certainty is different from intuitive certainty. Intellectual certainty

is certainly a necessary preliminary, but it can come *only* as a result of intellectual arguments. Want of certainty in this sphere may well prove a source of impediment in the attainment of intuitive certainty. Hence it is that we find a logical discussion on a purely intellectual plane of the revealed truths in all Advaitic works. Hence also the teacher of *Brahma-vidyā* is expected to be well-versed in logic and ratiocination, (*śabda vidyā*) as well as in intuitive experience (*Para vidyā*).

(3) In the concluding portion of the last chapter our author raises the question of the relation between the Self and matter. Her solution of the problem is that "...this is no problem at all, since matter and its finer form mind are only instruments of the Self. This duality at the empirical level is unavoidable" (p. 153). Here the question seems to be quite legitimate but the reply seems to be evasive. The right sort of reply, consistent with the author's philosophical position, would be that the relation in question is that of false or illusory identity (*Ādyhāsik Tādātmya*). This relation is available not only in the case of Self and gross matter but also in the case of mind and the Self. It is this relation of false identity that explains the attribution to Self of what pertains to the body and the mind as e.g., when the body goes we say we go; when the mind is disturbed we say I am disturbed.

Lastly it seems necessary to do the unpleasant task of drawing attention to the numerous mistakes that one comes across in course of reading this small book of only 153 pages! Here we have mistakes of all sorts, of language, grammar, loose statements, diacritical transliteration and even misquotation. We may cite an instance of the last type. The author's quotation from Dr. Sinha's book on page 70 of her work is as follows:—"being of the object is not dependent of and separate from the being of the Self". The actual sentence in the book (*Indian Psychology of Perception*, p. 130) is as follows:—"being of the object is not independent of, and separate from, the being of the Self". We wish greater attention should have been paid to these things, since in philosophy a letter here or there may make all the difference to the philosophical position concerned.

This is not, however, to deny the value of the book which is a valuable contribution on the subject.

The Indian Institute of Philosophy
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S. M. CHINGLA

An Analysis of Morals. By John Hartland-Swann. George Allen & Unwin Ltd., Price 25 S. Pages—208. March 1960.

In this book Mr. John Hartland-Swann analyses moral language to show the logical structure of moral problems. The expression 'analysis of morals' means the same as 'analysis of moral language'. For, *morals* themselves are not the kind of things to be analysed. He defines moral philosophy exclusively in terms of 'the logic of moral discourse,' excluding 'non-linguistic moral philosophy' from consideration. He does not hesitate to declare that the kind of views expressed by Kant and Moore are the result of confused thinking.

Except the Appendix on Pacifism the book deals with familiar problems, treated in an unfamiliar way. The theories of utilitarianism and intuitionism are explained away by putting them to the test of the concrete situations where moral actions are performed and moral principles justified. For example, seeing my grandmother's illness the problem for consideration arises, "Ought I to tell my grandmother this lie 'Granny, the doctor says you're getting better' ". Hartland-Swann shows that the argument which leads one to solve this problem is neither utilitarian nor teleological. So also when one justifies in the concrete situations such a moral principle as 'One ought to tell the truth', there is no uniform set of replies as an intuitionist or a utilitarian would think that there is.

Hartland-Swann's analysis of the chief ethical concepts such as 'ought', 'good', 'right' and 'duty' etc., though sometimes highly penetrating and original, yet raises points of dispute. We shall limit ourselves here to some objections concerning his analysis of 'ought' and 'good'.

To show that 'ought' has not merely a prescriptive but also a descriptive use, Hartland-Swann gives the following example: 'Being a woman, she ought to take a long time to dress for the party'. He thinks that this sentence has been used as a description of the convention that women take a long time to dress for the party. Perhaps he is thinking that this sentence stands for an argument of which the premiss is a factual statement and the conclusion an ought-expressing judgement. But this argument may raise a host of problems. How can an 'ought-conclusion' be derived from an 'is-premise?' To be a genuine ought-sentence, the sentence 'Being a woman, she ought to take a long time to dress for the party' should exhibit the logic of the sentence 'Being

a just act it ought to be rewarded', when the latter sentence stands for the argument 'Just acts ought to be rewarded, this is a just act, so this ought to be rewarded'. But then the former sentence would not at all be a description of a convention. On the other hand, even if it is granted that Hartland-Swann's interpretation of the sentence 'Being a woman, she ought to take a long time to dress for the party' is free from all the theoretical objections, it is false to say in an unqualified sense that this sentence describes a convention. Such an unqualified claim is clearly falsified by the conclusion of the argument for which this sentence stands.

Hartland-Swann's further remarks on the analysis of 'ought' are even more startling. He compares and contrasts 'One ought never to cause unnecessary suffering' with 'two plus two equals four', and concludes that the former is synthetic since its denial is not self-contradictory. His view is startling since it is impossible to maintain on the one hand that an ought-sentence is a prescription and on the other that it is synthetic. Commands, questions and prescriptions are neither analytic nor synthetic, for these epithets are applicable to propositions alone. And commands, questions and prescriptions are not propositions. Hartland-Swann's criterion would make even such a command as 'Bring that book' synthetic since there is no contradiction involved in commanding 'Don't bring that book'. He forgets that language is just like a chess game, where sentences have various kinds of functions. A sentence may function as a command, a question, a prescription, an analytic or a synthetic proposition. To ask such a question as "Is the sentence 'bring that book' analytic?" is just like asking 'Can a pawn move like a queen?' And to argue "Since the sentence 'bring that book' cannot be analytic so it is synthetic" is just like arguing "Since a pawn cannot move like a queen so it moves like a horse." Hartland-Swann forgets that before asking the question whether an ought-sentence is or is not analytic, he has to ask whether an ought-sentence does or does not express a proposition.

In connection with the analysis of 'good' he opposes the view of Hare and Nowell-Smith. As against their view, he argues that though the use of value sentences can sometimes guide choices yet this is not their primary function. He approves the view that guiding choices is an 'Overtime task' of a value sentence. And this overtime task can be performed even by a factual sentence. Now, to say that a factual sentence can guide choices is not to deny that a value sentence can guide choices. What we have to

see is simply, whether or not it is the primary function of value sentences to guide choices. Of course sometimes the function of these sentences is not primarily to guide choices. If I am talking to my friend, and in between my talks I come to say 'Chicken-soup is good' or 'she is a Beauty', then the primary function of these sentences is not to guide choices. But if a restaurant-manager says 'Chicken-Soup is good' or a pimp points out 'she is a Beauty', then they most certainly are using their sentences primarily to guide choices. If guiding choices is merely an 'overtime task' with these people, then they do not know how to deal with their customers.

According to Hartland-Swann the sentence 'Gandhi was a good man' does not imply choosing and guiding. In using this sentence, "I am not ordering or prescribing that you become like Gandhi". But in the actual moral situations the use of this sentence most certainly implies choosing and guiding. And what is relevant here is the consideration of this sentence only in the actual moral situations. For example, I object to my friend's habit of moving with girls, and in his defence he says, 'Gandhi also used to move with girls'. Then my response 'But Gandhi was a good man' is primarily used in the sense of choosing and guiding. Of course in the non-moral situations 'Gandhi was a good man' has no more importance than 'Chicken-Soup is a good food'.

Hartland-Swann's own theory of what makes an action moral is also not sufficiently persuasive. According to him the moral quality of an action refers to the keeping of a custom considered socially important. This view may be falsified through several instances. Let us take the instance given by Hartland-Swann himself. For example, if I see a small child drowning in a canal and I rescue the child purely out of a feeling of sympathy, then I am not acting with a motive to maintain a socially important custom. This implies that my action does not have any moral quality. But Hartland-Swann cannot deny that an action done merely out of sympathy has moral quality. For, he criticises the view of Kant which implies that "a father is more 'moral' who is kind to his children from a sense of duty". He forgets that Kant is consistent in his view, whereas he himself is not. If duty and duty alone can decide the moral quality of an action, then my rescuing the child merely out of love or sympathy has no more importance than my drinking a glass of water or my rubbing the chin when I felt like doing so. So if Hartland-Swann grants that an action can have moral value even if it is done out of

sympathy rather than to maintain a socially important custom, he himself grants the falsehood of his view.

The style of Hartland-Swann's writing is very lucid. The problems and their solutions are clearly expressed. But it is wrong to say as the Publisher's remark on the cover-page means to say that the book should also appeal to the general reader. Though Hartland-Swann has sometimes given sociological and anthropological evidences in support of his views, yet this does not mean that the book can be understood and relished by the general reader, or even by the sociologists and anthropologists. One has to be sufficiently acquainted with the history of moral philosophy, specially its recent developments, to know the importance of this book. It is strictly meant for academic circles.

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Books Received

1. "Ways of Knowledge and Experience" by Louis Arnaud Reid, published by George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, price 40 s/- net.
2. "Metaphor and Symbol" (Proceedings of the Colston Research Society held in the University of Bristol, 1960), edited by L. C. Knights and Basil Cottle, published by Butterworths Scientific Publications, London, price 30 s/-.
3. "Poetry and Philosophy" (A Study in the thought of John Stuart Mill) by Thomas Woods, published by Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., London, price 25 s/- net.
4. "Spinoza in the Light of the Vedanta" by R. K. Tripathi, published by Banaras Hindu University, price Rs. 10/-.
5. "Indian Thought through the Ages" by B. G. Gokhale, M.A., Ph.D., published by Asia Publishing House, Bombay, price Rs. 10/-.
6. "Prospect for Metaphysics" (Essays of Metaphysical Exploration), edited by Ian Ramsey, published by George Allen & Unwin Ltd, price 25 s/- net.
7. "Reason and Goodness" by Brand Blanshard, published by George Allen & Unwin Ltd, price 42 s/ net.
8. "The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell", edited by Robert E. Egner and Lester E. Denonn, published by George Allen & Unwin Ltd, price 42 s/- net.
9. "Science and Human Values" by J. Bronowski, published by Hutchinson & Co. (Publishers) Ltd, London, price 12 s/6d net.
10. "Principles of Cartesian Philosophy" by Baruch Spinoza, translated by Harry E. Wedeck, with a preface by Dagobert D. Runes, published by Philosophical Library, Inc., New York, price \$ 4/75 c.
11. "Letters to my Teacher" by Dagobert D. Runes, published by Philosophical Library Inc, New York, price \$ 2/75 c.

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12. "*Types of Intuition*" by Archie J. Bahm, published by the University of New Mexico Press, price \$ 1/25 c.

13. "*The Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi*" by Dharendra Mohan Datta, published by the University of Wisconsin Press, price (paper) \$ 1/50 c.

14. "*Education and the Aim of Human Life*" by Pavitra (P. B. Saint-Hilaire), Sri Aurobindo International Centre of Education, price Re. 1-50 nP.