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THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Vol. XXXIV, No. 1]

[April 1961

N. K. Smith's Interpretation of the Transcendental Deduction

by

A. C. MUKERJI,

Retired Professor of Philosophy, Allahabad University, Allahabad

That Kant's analysis of knowledge admits of diverse interpretations needs no justification at this late hour. In the following lines an attempt is made to bring to prominence some of the eminently debatable, if not misleading, statements by a reputed scholar of the Critical Philosophy who is justly regarded as one of the most careful exponents of Kant. It is the considered opinion of the present writer that N. K. Smith, in spite of his outstanding scholarship and extra-ordinary analytic power, has been responsible for giving to Kant's epistemology a few unfortunate turns that cannot but conceal the perennial importance of the contribution Kant made to the nature of human knowledge. Here one may recall the dialogue between Sanatkumāra and Nārada of the Upaniṣadic age of India. In this dialogue, Nārada admitted to his teacher that he was well versed in the different branches of learning, and yet he felt that he was only a dry scholar or *śāstravit* and not a possessor of insight or *ātmavit*. N. K. Smith's scholarly Commentary seems to me to be a work in which insight has often lost itself in the meshes of scholarship. Even if my judgment on Smith be considered as perverted, my reasons as set forth below will be important for a more careful study of a really epoch-making thinker of the west.


My second reason for this essay is that Smith is regarded in India as a reliable exponent of the Critical Philosophy, and consequently some of the Indian thinkers have unhesitatingly accepted his exposition as the right interpretation of Kant's philosophy, particularly the transcendental deduction, and have thus tried to find in some of the Indian doctrines an echo of the transcendental deduction. This practice has put the Kantian position as well as the Indian position in a definitely wrong perspective. It is therefore necessary to guard ourselves against an interpretation which is not confined within the field of western philosophy alone but has important repercussions in the field of Indian philosophical speculations.

Before we come to the proper subject of this essay, a word of explanation may not be out of place. Why, it may be asked, spend time on the right interpretation of a philosophy which, to say the least, is now only of an antiquarian interest, or is no better than an outmoded system which has played its parts at a particular stage of human civilization and valueless in the context of the modern developments of science and technology? Our first answer to this often-repeated question is that Kant's philosophy is not a mere ephemeral and temporary phenomenon like the linguistic puzzles of the present age masquerading as a system of philosophy, but a serious attempt at reconciling the first principles of the positive sciences with the demands of our moral and religious consciousness. It is not a mere display of sterile ingenuity, but an earnest endeavour to go to the root of the conflicting demands of human life. Our second answer is that the systems of philosophy that have grown and are still growing across the oceans have not yet established themselves in such a position as to deserve the respect and attention that are due to the great philosophical achievements, such as those of Kant or Hegel, Śāṅkara or Rāmānuja. In this respect one may profitably remember the instructive remark of an able British philosopher whose scholarship and insight are justly respected all over the English-speaking world. At the concluding part of a searching critical exposition of the recent trends of British philosophy, Professor G. R. G. Mure makes the important observation that "the twentieth-century return of British philosophy to a second childhood makes it both otiose and tedious". (*Retreat From Truth*, p. 243.) This perhaps does not mean that these fashionable tendencies in England should be summarily ignored or dismissed from the courses of philosophical studies; because in an adventure

like the speculative exploration of the universe, every attempt, if not entirely childish, helps the development of the correct vision of the truth. It has, therefore, been a useful tradition with the Indian philosophers to develop their respective theories with a critical estimate of the rival doctrines.

Professor Mure's observation on the modern philosophical and pseudo-philosophical British thinking should open the eyes of our over-enthusiastic Indian teachers who are mainly responsible for framing the syllabi of the Indian universities. A glance at these university courses of philosophical study will show a ruinous tendency to replace as far as possible the classical thinkers by the obstreperous modernists who have, in conformity to the democratic craze for equal rights, mastered the techniques of winning popularity at the expense of insight. At this critical juncture it is important to remember that a philosophical position, however original, is but the continuation of the same search for truth which was at the root of the life and prestige of the old positions. It is indispensable, therefore, for a correct start to possess a correct vision of the past achievements before they are rejected as wrong. Kant is certainly one of the builders of the philosophical heritage. To ignore his contribution to the cause of truth would be to build an edifice on sand. T. H. Green's remark that no one is a competent student of modern philosophy who has not gone through the ordeal of understanding Hume and Kant must be taken as a corrective against the hasty jostles for original system-building.

We must, therefore, try to develop a genuine appreciation for the great heritage Kant has left to all students of philosophy, a service which has won him the honour of being an epoch-making thinker. As some of us have made this attempt even in India to come to a just appreciation on a comparative basis, it will be needless to repeat the discussions here. What is universally admitted, to confine ourselves to the main issues, is that Kant's contribution to an analysis of human knowledge is chiefly contained in the transcendental deduction of the categories. And it is also generally admitted that this is the most difficult part of his critical philosophy. Leaving aside the controversial matter that has gathered round the deduction,—which we have discussed on a former occasion,—what seems to be needed at present is to narrow down the sources of error by a re-formulation of the essence of that deduction. The most outrageous observation is to be found in the "Heritage of Kant". It is said that "Kant's



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presuppositional argument is the hypothetical method masquerading as demonstrative proof". A distant innuendo to the same misinterpretation is contained in Professor N. K. Smith's remark that "considered as a method, there is nothing metaphysical or high-flying about it save the name". (A Commentary, p. xxxviii). This is because "it is really identical in general character with the hypothetical method of the natural sciences". In elucidating further, it is added: "It proceeds by enquiring what conditions must be postulated in order that the admittedly given may be explained and accounted for". These observations appear to be very strange indeed coming as they do from a really accomplished scholar of the Critical philosophy. "Starting from the given", it is held, "it also submits its conclusions to confirmation by the given".

This interpretation, we submit with all the deference due to a real scholar, is highly misleading. One point that is clearly and repeatedly stressed by Kant is that the categories are those basic concepts which make an object of experience possible. It follows from this that the transcendental deduction neither starts from the given nor does it submit its conclusions to confirmation by the given. In other words, the categories, being the very conditions of the 'given', can neither provide the starting-point of the deduction, nor does the 'given' confirm the conclusions of the deduction. A hypothesis, to put the same truth in another form of language, is always a supposition about the object not yet known in order that it may explain what is known, and as such, it needs verification by the known. Neptune, before it was discovered, was a hypothesis made to explain the irregularities in the movements of Uranus. It needed confirmation which came later on. But a category, unlike a hypothesis, is not a mere supposition standing in need of confirmation. The objects do not exist as the given elements before the application of the categories; they are the forms which, when abstracted from the objects, reduce them to nothing for us. These, we think, are the well-known and clear implications of Kant's deduction. Professor Smith's interpretation on the other hand is almost on a line with the misinterpretations that were prevalent in an earlier age when Stirling, Schopenhauer and their followers were accepted to be the only exponents of the Critical Philosophy.

A second point which is put in a misleading light must also be corrected by the modern students of Kant. There are many thinkers of eminence who undervalue the status of the funda-

mental laws or concepts by calling them assumptions. Even F. H. Bradley accepts a dualism between logic and metaphysics, and has thus made himself open to the charges of inconsistent thinking. You must either reform your logic or your metaphysics; this was at the root of H. H. Joachim's remark that the Metaphysician cannot acquiesce in logical theories, when their success demands that he should accept within the sphere of logic assumptions which his own metaphysical theory condemns. Also Bosanquet, according to Professor G. R. G. Mure, drew a questionable distinction between logic and metaphysics (*Retreat From Truth*, p. 162). We are naturally glad to find our own impression supported by such an eminent scholar. An assumption, as we have repeatedly contended, is always liable to be modified or rejected in future or in another context. A necessary principle, on the other hand, is such as its validity is accepted in either denying or refuting it. In this sense, it is irrepressible. This is also the nature of the categories as envisaged by the Critical Philosophy. They are not assumptions, though the views of such scholars as Professor N. K. Smith tend to reduce them to mere assumptions. Those principles which lend countenance to our arguments at every step are beyond the ordinary processes of proof and disproof; but they cannot be dubbed as mere assumptions. We may further observe that even what are generally called assumptions are, when carefully traced to their logical basis, dictated by the irrepressible principles. 457

It is true, as known to every exponent of the Critical Philosophy, that Kant has not tried to investigate separately the nature of the assumption, which is called the "fundamental presupposition upon which Kant's argument rests", namely, that universality and necessity is not given in sense but is imposed by the mind. But he has emphatically and repeatedly urged that *the categories as a priori conceptions are independent of experience*, and as such, to derive them from experience "would be a sort of *generatio aequivoca*". This clearly means that every theory of derivation, whether it be conceived as a derivation from heredity or racial evolution, from social intercourse or historical reason, must at every step presuppose the necessity and universality of those very categories which are in this sense independent of experience or *a priori*. Kant's careful distinction between what he calls empirical deduction and the transcendental deduction requires therefore a renewed emphasis, as an important corrective against the empirical prejudice ingrained in our nature.

The confusion has been partly due to the dualistic implications of our terms such as, mind, understanding, sense, thought, etc. Here is what may be called the root-difficulty of indicating the universal principles illustrated by the particulars. A universal Law is not a particular item of thought by the side of the other items which illustrate it; on the contrary, the Law is universal in the sense that it governs all the particulars and is present in all the particulars. This is nicely conveyed by the illustrations used in the non-dualistic exposition of the relation between the *Brahman* and the finite egos or *jīvātmas*. A pinch of salt, when put into a tumbler of water, cannot be said to be here and not there. Similarly, the universal Mind is not to be conceived as another mind externally related to the finite minds, as in the idealism of Berkeley. This has been seen by the objective idealists of the west; it is clearly and unambiguously envisaged by a large number of post-Hegelian idealists. The universe, as put by H. H. Joachim, "is not a whole of independent and reciprocally-exclusive parts, and a universal is not another entity alongside of its particular". No genuine idealist, it is emphasised by Joachim, has ever acquiesced in the interpretation which identifies spirit, mind, consciousness—the spiritual, the mental—with purely particular, self-contained, exclusive existents capable of *external* relations to one another. (*Ibid*, p. 63). This misinterpretation of a universal is "tantamount to the negation of all universals". It may be apparent from this analysis of the true universal, that the critics of T. H. Green are at least guilty of a hasty interpretation when they urge confidently that the so-called objective idealism has a common basis with the subjective idealism of Berkeley, or that transcendental idealism "is just Berkeleyan idealism in excelsis".

The more significant and far-reaching consequence than what has just been explained following from the true universal is this that no epistemology is an exposition of the purely subjective and private knowledge of an individual. Kant, for instance, has not considered his Critique of Pure Reason to be this man's or that man's knowledge. It is obviously absurd to expect or think that Kant had made an attempt to write or describe the history of a particular individual's subjective processes. We are no doubt in the habit of contrasting the subjective with the objective processes, and then either try to evolve the objective from the subjective, or make the knowledge of the objective, as with Kant, the precondition of our knowledge of the subjective. This point need not be

discussed here beyond observing that Kant's difficulties in presenting a consistent theory of knowledge were mainly due to his fluctuation between these two alternatives, that were open to him. The categories, and this is the most vital point, are the universal forms of human knowledge; they enter into man's experience or, to put it less ambiguously, they make experience possible. Here there is no question of your experience or my experience. When it is said that the sun is the centre of the solar system, the universality of this knowledge oversteps the limits of individual minds. This is the clearest implication of an epistemological as distinct from merely psychological meaning of the universal. The term 'mind' is used in a hopelessly ambiguous way in many systems of speculative analysis. In Indian philosophy this ambiguity has been generally avoided. Among the Western thinkers, Green has successfully indicated this ruinous ambiguity by his insistence on the distinction between the subject-object relation and the mind-matter-relation, and it has been rather carelessly dismissed by many predominantly realistic attitudes that developed after Green.

The present writer, in a private controversy with the late H. W. B. Joseph, made an unsuccessful attempt at convincing him that this ambiguity was mainly responsible for the current subjectivistic interpretation of Kant. It is of course true that his theory of 'thing-in-itself' was also partly responsible for the subjectivistic elaboration. But we need not go into the controversy here. What should be stressed at this place is the unfortunate fact that of all the loose threads that went to make up the tangled skein of Kant's analysis, his use of the term 'mind' created a major havoc to his interpreters. 'I think', 'consciousness in general' etc. have stood in the way of an adequate appreciation of his insight in the sphere of human knowledge and experience. We must therefore practise circumspection in interpreting the technical terms used for the first time by Kant.

That Kant's epistemology admits of development in a hitherto unsuspected direction, which would liquidate a large number of apparent inconsistencies in his analysis of knowledge, has been partly indicated by some Indian thinkers. But here we are mainly concerned with the western exponents, particularly bearing on the transcendental deduction. It may have been apparent by this time that the only important point on which we have found ourselves unable to accept the current exposition of the deduction relates to the assimilation of it with the hypothetical method of the natural sciences. The categories are neither mere suppositions framed

for future verification by reference to experience which is there independent of them; nor is such a verification, if it had been possible, tantamount to proof. This is roundly admitted by Professor N. K. Smith when he observes that Kant has used the transcendental method in a new sense and it constitutes the very heart of the *Critique*. It is "proof by reference to the possibility of experience." The "conditions which can alone account for it as psychological fact, also suffice to prove its objective validity." In view of this clear recognition, it is of no importance how far Kant kept consistently to this central nerve of his analysis of knowledge. It may be only added that experience as psychological fact may be taken in any sense you like. It may, for example, be, in the words of W. James, a buzzing blooming confusion, or a simple apprehension prior to the development of relational knowledge, or a sense-continuum not yet differentiated, or, to borrow the language of Indian philosophy, nirvikalpa perception or *ālocana jñāna*. The psychological theories of the nature of the beginning of perception do not affect the epistemological analysis of the factors involved in knowledge. We have therefore always distinguished the psychological *a priority* from the epistemological *a priority*.

We have devoted a fairly large space of this essay to the important and highly original method of Kant's theory, particularly the transcendental method of proof and its distinction from the hypothetical method, a distinction which is almost obliterated by some of the current English exponents of Kant. We may now turn to some of the contemporary Indian thinkers who, on the assumption that this assimilation is correct, have found in what is known as *Arthāpatti* an anticipation of Kant's transcendental method of proof. Professor P. T. Raju is perhaps the ablest advocate of this view, and he has consistently entertained this opinion for a considerable period. It is first explained in his *'Thought and Reality'*, published in 1937, and he sticks to the same characterisation of Kant's deduction in his recently published work, *"Idealistic Thought of India."* This is one of the instances where Indian thinkers manifest an undesirable tendency to accept as true every tenet on the simple ground that it has been propounded by a western thinker. It is true that Mr. N. K. Smith is not an ordinary commentator of Kant; his ability and understanding of the intricate turns of Kant's arguments are marked by an extraordinary scholarship and penetration. But, we think that his characterisation of the transcendental deduction as similar to the hypothetical method has been an unfortunate lapse. Kant has rightly claimed that his aim, unlike mystical idealism, is "comprehending

the possibility of knowing the things of experience *a priori* — a problem never solved, nay, never even proposed." When it is said that "it is indeed quite plain that what I must presuppose in order to cognise any object at all, I cannot also cognise as an object," the contrast of his method with the hypothetical method is placed beyond any controversy. It has misled some Indian thinkers, and stands in need of correction. To put the contrast in a short way, *Arthāpatti* is but a type of inference and presupposes the existence of objects, whereas Kant's aim is to enquire into the very conditions of there being an object at all.

The fundamental contrast of the transcendental method from the hypothetical method is easily comprehended when the question is shifted from the categories to the self. In a significant observation Dr. S. Radhakrishnan has put his finger on the nerve of Kant's transcendental method. The transcendental self, he emphasises, cannot be even called the self except through a sort of inevitable licence and "applying to noumenal reality a category of the phenomenal world." What this implies is that "while the empirical self is always correlated with a not-self, the universal self includes all and has nothing outside to limit it." It is needless to add that this conception of the ultra-relational self is an important contribution of the Hindu thinkers to the solution of the problem of self; and it was the inescapable implication of Kant's theory of the transcendental unity of apperception. The method of proving its existence is entirely different from proving a hypothesis through verification.

The Concept of Philosophy

by

J. N. CHUBB,

Elphinstone College, Bombay-1

Before attempting to give a definition of Philosophy, it is worth while inquiring what is implied in such an attempt. It is a characteristic of the philosophic mind that it always seeks to be aware of the full implications of what it is doing. Such implications are of two kinds: (1) those ideas which are implicit in the thought-system and can be explicated by a forward movement of thought. This process gives rise to what may be called 'constructive philosophy'; (2) the implications may lie at the very root of the thought-system; these cannot be explicated by the prospective regard of thought or by a deductive process. They are recovered by, what I may call, a process of epistemological introspection, in which thought moves inwards towards its own origins, and attempts to achieve the maximum degree of self-consciousness. This gives rise to critical philosophy. What passes by that name, e.g. in the philosophy of Locke and Kant, is only a very partial degree of self-awareness and, on the whole, a half-hearted attempt at criticism, as these systems rest on unexamined presuppositions and fail to discover the true origin of thought. This mode of self-consciousness is not a deductive process as used in the mathematical and the logical sciences. Nor is it a form of generalisation such as we find in the inductive sciences. It is a distinctive mode of thought and, I believe, peculiar to philosophy, though philosophers do not necessarily make this arduous attempt at achieving self-awareness.

Idealist philosophers understood this process of inwardisation in thought. Their methods are now discredited, partly because their procedure, though sound in principle, was not sufficiently adequate, and carried them along the high apriori road into the serious error of believing that there are such things as 'postulates' or inescapable necessities of thought; but mainly because contemporary philosophers, with their gaze outward turned and fixed on experience, have denuded their minds of a great gift, that of self-awareness in thought. They have retained the capacity which

raises man above the level of the beasts, but have lost — temporarily, we hope — the capacity which raises the philosopher above the level of the scientist. The idealists have discovered 'necessity' as the logical prius of thought, probably because they wished to justify the claim of philosophy to be knowledge of a trans-empirical reality; but epistemological introspection reveals that thought rests not in necessity but in contingency, and that the real prius of thought is nothing logical at all, but an act of commitment which is alogical.

In this age of analysis, one would have expected philosophers to ask, what kind of a proposition are we making when we define philosophy or determine its scope in one way rather than another? A statement about the nature, scope and aim of philosophy is not a generalisation from experience; nor is it a proposition which can be arrived at deductively from any other proposition. If it is neither an induction nor a deduction, what kind of proposition is it? It will not help to say that it is a definition, for the question precisely is, what do we do when we define philosophy? For instance, I do not think it could be suggested that what we are doing when we are defining philosophy is to explain in what sense the word philosophy is used in the English language, by those who speak that language. We do not define the word philosophy in the same way in which we define the word table. A table is "a smooth, flat slab or board, with legs, used as an article of furniture." It is not open to anyone to disagree with this definition, for definitions in this sense are neither true nor false. In the case of philosophy, such a dictionary definition is not possible, as is evident from the fact that there is no agreement among English speaking people, let alone among philosophers, as to how the word philosophy is to be used. A definition of philosophy given by one philosopher is promptly challenged by many others. If this is so, it should be clear that the basic problem of critical philosophy is the problem of the definition of philosophy. A philosopher who does not admit that there is a major philosophical problem confronting us at the very outset of philosophical inquiry is really confessing that he is choosing to give an arbitrary definition of philosophy and he does not care whether other philosophers accept his definition or not. But I think it is obvious that all philosophers, including the present-day empiricists, are claiming to do more than merely to announce that they propose to use the word philosophy in a particular way. They all claim that their definition of the word is the correct definition, and if only other philo-

sophers would reflect on the problem with sufficient clarity they would accept the proposed definition. I do not think the contemporary philosophers have asked themselves what they are doing when they define philosophy as linguistic analysis. They may be analytic philosophers, but they are not sufficiently analytical and critical, of the origin of their philosophical thinking. They think ingeniously, clearly and admirably, but they have not achieved self-consciousness in their thinking.

Philosophy, among all intellectual disciplines, is in this peculiar position that any statement that is made either in philosophy or about philosophy is a philosophical statement, and therefore presupposes a philosophical point of view. A definition of mathematics is not a part of mathematics; and the same is true of the natural sciences. But a definition of philosophy is itself a philosophical theory, and necessarily a controversial one. An objective, neutral and impersonal definition of philosophy is, in the very nature of the case, impossible. By an objective definition I mean a definition that is stripped of all philosophical preconceptions. We cannot indicate the province or nature of philosophy, as it were, from the outside. There is no approach to philosophy, no getting into it by merely keeping our minds open and asking, what is philosophy? It is as impossible to divest the mind of a philosophical point of view while talking about philosophy as it is for a person to view his own body objectively by jumping out of his own skin. Thus we find that an inescapable bias is present in all philosophical thinking. We can never *begin* our philosophical inquiry as an activity arising out of thought which is non-philosophical, since philosophy, like religion, is present at its beginning. What does this situation signify? It signifies, as I hope to show, that philosophical thinking, unlike scientific thinking, does not move forward towards a conclusion, but merely explicates foregone conclusions.

Let us see whether we can arrive at a definition of philosophy in terms of its method, rather than its scope or subject matter. Philosophical thinking is said to be categorical, i.e. it is thinking without assumptions. This view contains a partial truth. In philosophy we cannot take anything for granted, because if we do, there will be a need for another inquiry to examine the truth of what we have left unquestioned. While this is true, it does not follow that the philosopher thinks, questions and examines with an altogether open and uncommitted mind. Thinking, we have seen, from the beginning presupposes a point of view and a goal. There is no such thing as thinking-in-general. All thinking is

directed thinking and is conditioned by some fundamental assumption. Just as there cannot be a neutral definition of philosophy, so also there cannot be a neutral way of thinking that is common to all thinkers. Our very questioning presupposes a criterion of what will satisfy our minds and the criterion will not necessarily be the same for all philosophers. Our demand for explanation is conditioned by a particular ideal of explanation, which shows that the mind is always loaded with preconceived ideas.

Yet there is a partial truth in the statement that philosophical thinking is without assumptions. It is true in the sense that once we have chosen or committed ourselves to an ideal of explanation, we do not make any further assumptions in our inquiry. Every question that arises is thrashed out to the very end. At no stage do we stop and say, this is something that cannot be further examined. Nevertheless our whole inquiry rests on a definite point of view which we do, as a matter of fact, take for granted.

Can we say that scientific thinking rests on assumptions and that scientific knowledge is necessarily limited? If so, we can give an objective definition of philosophy by saying that the task of philosophy is to examine the limitations of scientific knowledge. This, however, is not possible, since the statement that science is limited is itself a piece of philosophy and presupposes a point of view, and a system of philosophy. There is no open-minded transition from science to philosophy.

This view has an important consequence. Since all thinking has a definite direction and operates with a preconceived notion of intelligibility, it is not possible for philosophical thinking to end either in a proof or a demonstration or in a refutation of any philosophical proposition. In this philosophy differs from science. In science, thought moves towards a conclusion, while in philosophy, the conclusion is already present in the starting point and the reasoning merely exhibits the cogency, but does not prove the truth, of what is already assumed. In the inductive sciences, the mind moves forward to fresh discoveries which are tested experimentally, and are in this sense proved, though the proof never amounts to a demonstration. In the deductive sciences, we have proof in the sense of demonstration, but the proof consists merely in the unfolding of a system of implications based on certain axioms and definitions. Mathematical propositions achieve certainty, but at a cost. They do not claim to be

factual statements and their starting point may be arbitrary, as is shown by the existence of alternative systems of geometry.

In philosophy, we can have proof in neither of these senses. Philosophy does not make fresh discoveries about the world through observation, discoveries which are capable of experimental verification. Nor is philosophy content, like mathematics, to spin out a system of implications that, so to speak, hang in the air. Philosophical statements are controversial, and this shows that they are factual, though what the facts are to which they refer may itself be a matter of controversy. From this it follows that philosophical reasoning is not a movement towards a new conclusion, for this could only be reached through observation; it is the explication of what, in a sense, are foregone conclusions. Hence to ask for a proof of philosophical propositions is to misunderstand the nature of philosophical reasoning and to confuse philosophy with science.

We must now consider the views of the idealist thinkers who, while agreeing that philosophical conclusions are foregone, since they are apriori, would yet say that they can be proved or shown to be necessary. They assert that proof in philosophy consists in showing that something cannot be denied without the denial leading to self-contradiction. A proposition is proved which, in the very process of being doubted, indubitably asserts itself. The mind moves inwards towards its presuppositions in order to show that they are inescapable. These presuppositions are then converted into postulates, as they are seen to be the necessary conditions of all thinking. Descartes used this method to prove the existence of the self, and it may be held that the validity of the laws of thought can be seen in this way to be indubitable; for to doubt is to think, and to think is to conform to the laws.

The idealists believe that by the application of this method the entire idealistic system of philosophy can be proved. Now, since idealist metaphysics has not gained universal acceptance, it seems reasonable to hold that there is no apriori system of philosophy which can be seen to be a necessity of thought. It is surprising that what is 'inescapable' should nevertheless have escaped the attention of innumerable thinkers of the front rank.

Descartes' argument, if it does not result in a trivial proposition, at any rate does not prove the existence of a self transcending the momentary thought. As regards the laws of thought,

they are really the most general conditions of intelligibility. They are not so much the presuppositions of thought as thought itself in its most general character. There are no presuppositions of thought which can be shown to be necessary or indubitable. But we must explain why the idealist method appears so satisfactory to the idealist and so rich in its results.

Every system of philosophy operates with two criteria of truth or conforms to two conditions of intelligibility, one general and the other special. The general conditions of intelligibility are, as I said, the laws of thought, but nobody thinks merely in accordance with the laws of thought. A specific condition of intelligibility is needed to give thought a concrete form and a particular direction. The idealist thought operates with the specific criterion that "Truth is the whole" or that nothing is satisfactorily explained until it is resolved into the Infinite. Thus the 'Absolute' of the idealist is not the conclusion of his thought, nor is it the necessary presupposition of thought in general; it is simply the presupposition or the prius of the idealist's thought. The presupposition is in no sense a postulate.

Reasoning in philosophy is different from reasoning in science, and that is why it cannot be regarded as a way of proving or disproving anything. In science we reason towards a conclusion, in philosophy we reason, as it were, from a conclusion. This means that philosophical reasoning always has an alogical starting point. This starting point generates its own logic, by which I mean its own coherent system of thought. Coherent thinking is not the monopoly of any one school of thought. Alternative standpoints in philosophy can each result in a coherent logical system, which means that there can be no logical transition from one system to another. The recognition of this important truth would change entirely the purpose of philosophical discussion and controversy. Philosophical thinking, if it were to become fully self-conscious, would cease to be polemical and become, instead, a sharing of ideas and points of view. This would result in the maximum degree of toleration and in the ending of all disputes, not, as the earlier critical philosophers hoped, by achieving by a new method a unanimity of opinion among philosophers, but by making them see that all disagreement rests on and results from different starting points which are strictly alogical.

It might seem that this view of the nature of philosophical reasoning must lead to relativism and scepticism, because it would

imply that there are many philosophical systems which are not mutually commensurable from a logical point of view. If so, there is no objective truth, or what is true for one philosopher is true for him alone and not for others who do not share his point of view.

We may answer this charge of relativism in thought in two ways. (1) We may regard these alternative systems as not mutually contradictory, but as complementary aspects of an all-embracing truth. Conflict and opposition may be the result of a too passionate adherence to limited points of view. If we widen our philosophical perspective we may see the partial truth of each philosophical system and recognise that it reveals an aspect of a many-sided reality, through a process of exclusive concentration. (2) There is, however, another consideration which enables us to overcome the relativism implied in the alogical character of philosophical reasoning, and this is concerned with the nature of the starting point. From the point of view of spiritual philosophy, the starting point is not merely alogical in the sense of being just non-logical. It is regarded as something higher than logic and may be described as an act of faith. Faith implies a relationship of the individual to the Supreme Reality through the veil of ignorance. It is a direct relation based on union, but obscured by the ignorance which creates a sense of separation. This act of faith is dynamic in the sense that it seeks to convert itself into direct knowledge of Reality. In this direct experience, thought is transcended and Reality shines forth as a self-luminous Presence. In the last resort our relationship with Reality must be direct and our acceptance of Reality unconditional. It cannot be mediated by a process of reflection and calculation. Man chooses God for no other reason except that man is man and God is God.

Is reasoning in philosophy deductive or inductive? Obviously it is not a process of generalising from experience. If we call it deductive we still have to recognise an important difference between reasoning in philosophy and reasoning in mathematics. The main difference is that in mathematics we start with axioms and definitions and draw out implications which are contained in them, but we do not return to the starting point and develop it in any way. The reasoning is linear. In philosophical reasoning the starting point is in constant process of development. There is an organic relationship between the alogical starting point and the process of reasoning. Our philosophical activity consists wholly in explicating and enriching the basic concepts with which it starts. We may compare the philosopher to a hen who sits brooding on

an egg and transforms it into a chicken. The mathematician leaves his starting point behind, but the philosopher carries it along with him, developing it at every step and giving it a comprehensive and coherent form. There is a difference between extracting the formal implications of a concept and developing a concept into a full-fledged system.

Is philosophical reasoning *apriori*? To answer this question we must examine more closely the alogical concepts which lie at the root of spiritual philosophy. The most fundamental concept is the concept of the Infinite. Since the Infinite does not lie within our experience, the concept of the Infinite has to be a product of revelation.* It cannot be arrived at by thinking, since all thinking, as I have explained, is nothing but a process of developing a basic concept. Thought cannot create or formulate its starting-point out of itself. It either extracts it from experience, as in the case of secular philosophy, or it must receive it from above. In view of this alogical character and supernatural origin of the basic concept of spiritual philosophy, a straightforward answer to the above question is not possible. I think the dichotomy of *a priori* and *a posteriori* does not apply to philosophical reasoning. It is not a *posteriori* in the sense in which inductive generalisations are. But if by *a priori* we mean what forms a part of the structure of the mind itself and can be elicited from it by a process of reasoning, then philosophical reasoning is not *a priori*, since its starting point is communicated to it through revelation. With reference to revelation, the reasoning may be called a *posteriori*, while with reference to sense-experience it could be regarded as *a priori*. It may also be regarded as *a priori* for a further reason and in a different sense. The revealed concept is not external to thought and is not accepted as a premiss from which conclusions are to be drawn. It is not merely presented to thought, but in and through the act of revelation the capacity for thought in its metaphysical function is itself generated. The act of revelation thus performs two functions simultaneously. It awakens the capacity for metaphysical thought and gives this thought a particular direction, i.e., provides it with a criterion or a specific notion of intelligibility. This simultaneous action is necessary because there is no such thing as neutral or uncommitted thought or thought-in-general. All thought is necessarily direct-

*By revelation I mean the communication of the content of direct experience to those in ignorance and its formulation or translation in conceptual terms.

ed to a specific goal and therefore committed to a point of view. Even if the goal is stated as truth, the statement will be found to be charged with assumptions when we define what we mean by 'truth'. Now this specific notion of intelligibility to which thought is committed may be described as *a priori*, since it is found operating in the first act of thought and is neither arrived at by a process of thinking nor set up as an arbitrary definition of the notion of intelligibility. To say that what lies at the root of thought is alogical and not a necessity of thought is not the same as to say that it is set up by convention, for there is no such conventional agreement among all philosophers. Undoubtedly the alogical represents an act of choice, but different philosophers choose different starting points; nor is the choice consciously made, and for the most part philosophers remain unconscious to the last that their system rests on an alogical act of choice. It is a part of the problem of critical philosophy to become aware of the fullest inward implications of our thought, and this has to be done by a process of epistemological introspection.

The empiricists seem to be vaguely groping towards this view when they say that their theory is the result of a definition and all definitions are tautologous. They merely record our determination concerning verbal usage. The fact that their verbal recommendation is not acceptable to other philosophers should give them pause, but apparently it does not. Their view drives them to regard even logic as a result of verbal conventions. This view is not revolutionary; it is silly. The empiricists are obviously carrying a point of view to what they regard as its logical conclusion. This point of view inspires their reasoning, it is not the conclusion of their reasoning. And having used logic to work out the full implications of their point of view, they find themselves saying in the end that logic is a game with arbitrarily framed rules and that there are many such games which do not or need not have any rule in common. If this is so, why have they persistently driven their thought in a particular direction? Why have they followed out the logic of their argument to the bitter end? They present us with a system of philosophy which is acceptable to them and is felt by them to be acceptable to all those who think clearly. But what is it to think clearly? And according to the rules of which game of logic is the system to be found acceptable? To accept their propositions or their system of philosophy can only mean, on their theory, that we consent freely to play the game the empiricist is playing. But what if we do not consent? Why, further, are the

empiricists so passionately fond of one game rather than another? The answer seems to me to be obvious. Philosophy starts not with a definition which is tautological, nor with anything which is logical in the sense that it is logically necessitated, but with a point of view which is alogical. When this starting point is developed into a system it conforms, and necessarily conforms, to the general conditions of intelligibility expressed in the so-called laws of thought. These conditions are not conventions, but are necessary and inescapable since they express the determinate character of thought. But within the alogical starting point, and necessarily present in it, are more specific conditions of intelligibility which are not necessarily the same for all; and it is these specific conditions which give thought its particular direction and explain why there are divergent systems of philosophy.

The alogical starting point is *a priori* in the sense explained. It is a mistake to think that what is *a priori* is also a necessity of thought. It is equally a mistake to think that what is not a postulate of thought or an empirical statement is only an arbitrary definition. The question that remains is, is the starting point analytic or synthetic? In the case of spiritual philosophy the starting point is certainly synthetic. It owes its synthetic character to the fact that it is the product of revelation. In the case of secular philosophy, I would be inclined to say that the starting point is the result of making a selection from experience, concentrating exclusively on an aspect of a totality. Is this starting point then to be treated as a proposition concerning which we can ask whether it is analytic or synthetic? Or is it a mere proposal to work out the logical system implicit in the partial aspect of experience? The answer cannot be given from the point of view of secular philosophy, because the secular philosophers have not carried out the critical process of epistemological introspection. The roots of their thought are not attended to by them and are left in the unconscious. From our point of view we may say that the whole of secular philosophy is the carrying out of an unconscious proposal, and if the starting point is to be taken as a proposition it is a false proposition, for it would amount to the assertion that the selected aspect of experience is all and there is nothing outside or beyond it. If, however, we take the proposition to mean that the selected aspect of experience is an aspect of experience, having a value of its own, the proposition would be true, but the truth would be comparatively trivial and uninteresting. It would however, be synthetic.

The Formal Character of Logic

by

DR. RAJENDRA PRASAD,
Patna University

It is not uncommon to find a philosopher starting his enquiry into the nature of a philosophical discipline with a definition of it. This is true of a good number of writers on the nature of logic. Consequently, logic has been defined in various ways. Sometimes it has been called a science of the laws of thought, sometimes a science of reasoning, sometimes a science of valid reasoning, sometimes a normative science of reasoning, etc., etc. To call logic a science of thought or reasoning is faulty for several reasons, the most obvious of which is that to do so would make it look much more akin to psychology than it in fact is. A philosopher who defines it in this way may not intend to psychologize it, but his words would suggest that he does. Therefore, such a definition, being misleading, should be avoided. It is not even correct to call it a normative science of reasoning or thought, though this definition will not psychologize it; because, in my view, it is not a normative enquiry. In what follows I shall make no attempt to present any definition of logic; rather, I shall only try to characterize, or analyze, the jobs one does, or is expected to do, when what one does is, or can be, called logic.

We can very well start the discussion with the remark (realizing that it is not very precise but hoping to make it precise as we proceed) that logic is an enquiry about arguments. Arguing is a linguistic activity, and arguments are linguistic objects. But 'linguistic' in this context does not mean 'referring, or peculiar, to a particular language'. An argument enunciated in German is not a German argument. The same argument can be enunciated in English or French. In the three cases we certainly shall use three different kinds of linguistic expressions, but all of them will express the same argument. To understand the former we shall need to be familiar with three different sets of grammatical rules, the rules for the use of certain words in German, English and French. But to have an appraisal of the argument we shall have to be familiar with only one set of rules, i.e., certain rules of logic, which hold

good without being in the least affected by the peculiarities of the particular language in which the argument is, in a given case, enunciated. If it is valid, it is valid, and that is the end of the matter. If I know only English and find that, when expressed in it, it is valid, I also know *ipso facto* that it will remain valid, whichever be the language into which the English sentences used to express it are translated. In this respect arguments are independent of their linguistic garbs, the garbs which are of different shapes, being tailored in the different styles in the different language-shops. But 'language' is also used nowadays in a different sense in which it does not mean a particular or historical language, say, German, English, etc., but something more basic, fundamental, or general. In this sense it means something akin to 'human discourse', 'human speech', 'human communication', etc. It is in this, and only this, sense of 'language' that arguments are linguistic objects and logic, or philosophy itself, is concerned with language.

It is no business of logic to offer any argument for or against anything concerning the world of facts. If arguments about factual matters occur in it, it simply *mentions* them and does not *use* them to prove any factual proposition. It is not an enquiry about the world of facts, but about arguments concerning anything, factual or non-factual. If in a logical work any argument is used, it would not be about any factual matter, but about the nature of arguments themselves. If arguing about the nature of things, real or imaginary, is called a first-order activity, arguing about this activity can be called a second-order activity. The logical activity is of the latter kind, and, therefore, logic can very well be called a second-order enquiry. From all this it is clear that it is not an empirical or factual discipline and therefore is different from empirical sciences, both natural and social. Its conclusions are not factual, and its method is not the one of observation and experiment. Therefore, factual confirmation or disconfirmation is not relevant to the truth or falsity of its laws or principles. Being independent of facts, their truth (or falsity) is not determined by reference to them (i.e., facts).

An argument is enunciated in the form of a finite set of linguistic expressions of which one, the conclusion, is said to be supported, justified, or entailed, by the rest of the set taken together, which constitute its premises. The premises claim to supply sufficient reasons for the truth of the conclusion. According to the strength of the bond between the premises and their conclusions,

arguments are said to be *deductive* or *inductive*. In a valid deductive argument the premises entail the conclusion. They supply absolutely conclusive evidence for its truth; they *prove* that it is true. No such thing is done by the premises of a sound inductive argument. They supply only such reasons which show that the conclusion is probably, or is likely to be, true. Probability (or likelihood) is a notion which admits of degrees. Therefore, inductive arguments vary in the amount of probability they confer upon their conclusions. Of two arguments one is said to be better than the other if it confers upon its conclusion a greater amount of probability than what the other confers upon its own. But in no case the premises of an inductive argument entail the truth of its conclusion. In a given case the probability of an inductive conclusion may be shown to be so high that we may, in practice, take it to be incontrovertibly true, but, in principle, we would not be justified in doing that. This fact is mentioned only to underline the difference between deductive and inductive arguments, and not, as some others have done, to justify philosophical scepticism.

Corresponding to the two classes of arguments there are two sub-divisions of logic, traditionally known as deductive logic and inductive logic. In distinguishing one from the other, their common points are very often missed and they are represented as two entirely different kinds of enquiries. This would definitely be a wrong characterization of the nature of logic and hence should be avoided. In this paper, though I shall discuss separately what we do in deductive and in inductive logic, one of my objectives will be to show that logic is basically a single, unitary, enquiry, and the differences which exist between deductive and inductive logic are there because they deal with different kinds of arguments, and not because they are different kinds of enquiries.

It is nothing but a truism, then, to say that deductive logic is an enquiry about deductive arguments. It was customary among older logicians to think that deductive arguments (or any argument whatsoever) can be enunciated only in terms of indicatives, i.e., sentences in the indicative mood, which express propositions. For them the non-indicative moods were not as much logically respectable as the latter. But it has recently been pointed out by some analysts that the prejudice in favour of indicatives is unjustified; they have shown that non-indicatives, e.g., imperatives and ought-sentences, can quite unreservedly figure in an argument. It can consist of both indicatives and non-indicatives or

even of only non-indicatives. The following examples will show that what I am saying is quite obvious.

(a) A mixed argument which contains sentences in both indicative and imperative moods:

Drop all air-letters into the green mail-box.
The one in your hand is not an air-letter.
Therefore, do not drop that in the green mail-box.

(b) An argument which contains sentences only in the imperative mood: (a man to his friend who does not love his wife who is quite innocent and helpless):

Either love her or kill her.
But for God's sake, do not kill her.
(Therefore), love her.

(c) A mixed argument which contains sentences in both indicative and normative (ought-) form:

You ought to respect all old men.
Mr. X is an old man.
Therefore, you ought to respect Mr. X.

(d) An argument which contains only normative sentences:

All mothers ought to be respected.
All those who ought to be respected ought to be loved.
Therefore, all mothers ought to be loved.

In the rest of the paper, just for the sake of convenience, if necessary, I shall meet my illustrative requirements by means of arguments consisting only of indicatives, and henceforth whenever I shall speak of an argument I shall mean one such.

Deductive logic is mainly concerned with the ascertainment of the conditions of validity (or invalidity) of arguments. The logician discovers the rules, conformity (or non-conformity) to which is necessary as well as sufficient to make an argument valid (or invalid), and also the best possible techniques of proving validity. But his objective is not to enumerate all actually valid arguments; that is practically impossible. What he aims at is the discovery of the valid *argument-forms*. That is why deductive logic is also called formal logic. The latter term is more fashionable nowadays than the former. Many logicians use 'logic' and 'formal logic' synonymously, and what we have been calling 'inductive logic' they call 'scientific method'. But I do not like the dichotomy of formal and inductive logic, because it seems to me that even inductive logic is formal in a very important sense.

A deductive argument (in the restricted sense mentioned above) is a finite set or sequence of propositions of which one is said to *follow* from the rest of the set taken together. A proposition is that which is expressed by indicative sentences and is either true or false. It is not the same as the sentence which expresses it. For example, the sentence 'snow is white' is different from the sentence 'baraf safed hai' because the former is an English sentence while the latter is a Hindi one, but the proposition expressed by both of them is the same. It is the same for all the sentences which have the same meaning, irrespective of their grammatical forms or the languages to which they belong. If I know that the proposition expressed by 'snow is white' is true, I *ipso facto* know that the proposition expressed by all sentences equivalent to it, whether they belong to English or to any other language, is also true, though I would not understand the non-English equivalents if I do not know any language other than English. A *propositional variable* is a letter which can assume as its value only such expressions which express propositions. Small letters from the middle part of the alphabet, i.e., p, q, r, ... are the symbols generally used as propositional variables. The subject-matter of the propositions which may be substituted for a propositional variable is of no consequence. A *propositional form* is a sequence of propositional variables which yields a proposition when propositions are substituted for its constituent variables. Thus 'snow is white' and 'grass is green' are propositions, p and q propositional variables, and ' $p \vee q$ ' a propositional form. 'Snow is white or grass is green' is a proposition which we get from ' $p \vee q$ ' by substituting 'snow is white' for 'p' and 'grass is green' for 'q'. We can get any number of propositions from a propositional form so long as the procedure of substitution is correctly followed. The procedure is this: the same proposition is to be substituted for the same variable in all the places it occurs; and different propositions for different variables, with the restriction that one simple proposition is to be substituted for one variable.

An *argument-form* contains only propositional variables (or propositional forms) and no propositions. It yields an argument if propositions are substituted for its propositional variables in accordance with the rule of substitution mentioned above. The argument thus obtained is called a *substitution-instance* of it. It can have substitution-instances referring to anything, real or imaginary, and any number of them, so long as the substitutions are correctly made. If an argument-form is valid, all of its substi-

tution-instances are valid. An argument-form, hence an argument too, is valid only if it is impossible that its premises are true and its conclusion false, i.e., only if the implicative proposition, whose antecedent is a conjunctive proposition containing all the premises as its conjuncts and whose consequent is the conclusion, is a tautology. Whether or not it is a tautology can be effectively decided by the use of a suitable truth-table, i.e., by examining all the possible arrangements of the truth-values of its constituents. It will be a tautology if it is true in whichever way the truth-values assignable to its constituents are arranged.

In any argument there are some expressions which can be replaced by others without affecting the validity of the argument, while there are some other expressions which cannot be so replaced. In abstracting the forms of arguments variables are used for eliminable expressions, but not for the uneliminable ones. The latter are called *logical constants*. 'All', 'some', 'if-then', 'and', 'or', 'not', etc., and expressions synonymous with them, are logical constants. A valid argument-form can also be treated as a rule of inference.

Arguments of the same form possess the same logical characteristics. If the form is valid, they are all valid, otherwise they are invalid. To illustrate all this let us suppose that A, B, C, and D are simple propositions. Then the following are actual arguments consisting of them

- | | | |
|-----------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| (a). $A \vee B$ | (b). $C \vee D$ | (c). $A \supset B$ |
| $\sim A$ | $\sim C$ | A |
| $\therefore B$ | $\therefore D$ | $\therefore B$ |

(a) and (b) are of the same form though their constituent propositions are different, while (a) and (c) have different forms though their constituent propositions are the same. The form of (a) and (b), using variables, is represented by $p \vee q$, $\sim p$, $\therefore q$, and that of (c) by $p \supset q$, p , $\therefore q$. These forms are valid and hence all of their substitution-instances are valid. One can easily see that $((p \vee q) \cdot \sim p) \supset q$, or any conditional of this form, as $((A \vee B) \cdot \sim A) \supset B$, $((C \vee D) \cdot \sim C) \supset D$, etc., is a tautology. So is the case with $((p \supset q) \cdot p) \supset q$ and all conditionals of its form.

A rule of inference is also called a logical law or truth. All logical laws are tautologies, i.e., propositions which are true in any universe in which the logical constants are used in accordance with the same rules which govern their use in ours. In the body

of a logical law only logical constants occur essentially, while other expressions occurring in it can be replaced by variables. That is why in its formal statement only logical constants and variables are used. Its truth does not depend upon the nature of facts, but upon linguistic usage. To be more precise, it is guaranteed (and therefore determined) by the definitions of the logical constants occurring in the statement of the law.

At this point it would be worth while to discuss the relationship between truth and validity. 'Truth' is applied to propositions, and 'validity' to arguments. The premises and conclusion of an argument can be true or false but not valid or invalid, whereas the argument itself can be valid or invalid but not true or false. There is no uniform relationship between the validity (or invalidity) of an argument and the truth (or falsity) of its constituent propositions. An argument can be valid when all its constituent propositions are true as well as when all of them are false; it can also be invalid in both the cases. But if the argument is valid and the propositions constituting its premises are true, then the conclusion must be true. The logician is concerned only with the validity of arguments and not with the truth of their constituent propositions. To determine whether or not a proposition is true is the work of scientists. Sometimes a distinction is made between a valid and a good argument. A good argument is one which is valid and whose conclusion is a true proposition. An argument is valid if its conclusion follows from its premises. It is wrong, therefore, to say, as several text-book writers on logic do, that logic is a science concerned with the attainment of truth. The study of logic does not, as that of an empirical science does, add to the existing stock of one's true propositions about the world.

Another thing to be noted here is the distinction between proving an argument to be valid and getting it accepted. The logician is interested in discovering the conditions necessary for the former and not in discovering those necessary for the latter. I can prove the validity of an argument to you without succeeding in securing your agreement with me, if you choose to be irrational. Similarly, by the use of sophistry or persuasive language I can succeed in making you accept a certain argument of mine without proving it to be valid. Such things happen quite often in our everyday life.

We shall be underrating the work of the formal logician if we think that his only objective is to simply discover the various

valid argument-forms; rather, his main aim is to systematize them in as rigorous a manner as the subject-matter allows. He constructs a formal system for which he makes the minimum number of assumptions and formally deduces everything else by means of them. Such a system is called a *logistic system*. The most important characteristic of a logistic system is its rigour. It is rigorous in the sense that proofs and demonstrations in it can be done quite mechanically. It consists of the following: (a) A set of primitive undefined symbols in terms of which all the other symbols used in the system are defined. These symbols being uninterpreted, any sequence of symbols formed by putting some of them together is not a proposition but a formula. (b) A set of axioms which are well formed formulae or sequences of well formed formulae. The axioms are not proved within the system but assumed arbitrarily. (c) Purely formal criteria for deciding whether or not a formula is well formed. (d) One, or more than one, rule of inference conformity to which by an argument guarantees its validity and which is used in making inferences within the system. Besides these, purely formal or syntactical definitions of such terms as 'proof', 'demonstration', 'validity', 'theorem', etc., are given. Everything is made absolutely precise; nothing is left to the imagination of the reader. A theorem about the theorems of the system is called a meta-theorem. The system must be consistent and functionally and deductively complete. It is consistent if it is impossible to prove within it as theorems both a formula and its negation. It is functionally complete if it can express as its well formed formulae all the possible propositions relating to the subject-matter it formalizes. It is deductively complete if all the relevant propositions or formulae are provable within it. There can be different types of logistic systems depending upon the different types of propositions whose logic is formalised, and different systems can be constructed even with regard to one type of propositions by making use of different primitive assumptions.

The logistic systems which formalize the logic of truth-functional propositions are called *propositional* or *sentential calculi*. Some of the famous propositional calculi are those constructed by Whitehead and Russell, Rosser, Quine, Lukasiewicz, etc. A truth-functional proposition is a compound proposition the truth-values of which are completely determined by the truth-values of its components. There are certain logical connectives which are truth-functional, e.g., 'and', 'or', 'if-then', 'not', etc. The compound

proposition 'A.B' is true if and only if both 'A' and 'B' are true and it is false if either 'A' or 'B' is false. A conjunction is true if all of its conjuncts are true and false if any one of them is false. The *decision problem* of a propositional calculus is solved if it is proved that there is an effective procedure for deciding whether or not a well formed formula is a theorem in it. The development of a propositional calculus is so rigorous and mechanical that its theorems can be proved by machines. Computers have been designed and some actually constructed to do such works. Professor Arthur Burke and some others have done very admirable researches in this field.

The *functional calculus* is a higher discipline than the propositional calculus. It contains all the theorems and rules of the latter and many things besides. It formalizes the logic of non-truth-functional (non-compound) propositions. A non-truth-functional proposition is a proposition the truth-values of which are not completely determined by the truth-values of its constituents, for example, 'All men are sometimes cruel'. Functional calculi are of different orders, and several calculi, even of the same order have been constructed. The *functional calculus of the first order* includes, and is more complex than, the propositional calculus, while that of the second order includes, and is more complex than, the functional calculus of the first order. The latter is also called the *lower or restricted functional calculus*. It contains, in addition to the notions of the propositional calculus, such ones as those of propositional functions, individual variables, individual constants, functional variables, functional constants, qualification rules, etc. But it is restricted only to the quantification of individual variables. The second-order calculus contains, in addition to the notions of the first order calculus, rules for the quantification of propositional and functional variables. Being a logistic system the functional calculus of any order possesses all the features of a formal system. But it differs from a propositional calculus in a very important respect. There exists an effective decision procedure for the latter, but not for it. Its decision problem has been solved only with regard to some special cases. Rather, it has been proved by Alonzo Church that its complete solution is impossible.

It is a characteristic of modern formal logic that it uses a highly technical or artificial language which consists mainly of purposely coined notations. An artificial language is constructed because the ordinary language is ambiguous and vague. The use

of symbols helps the logician to put things in a precise, neat and easily intelligible manner. Arguments which are unmanageably long can be presented symbolically in a handy form and easily seen, or proved, to be valid or invalid. The use of logical symbols is also made in the philosophy of science or inductive logic. Many social and natural scientists have also begun to use in their works the symbolism of logic.

After the above description of what we do in deductive logic I shall not say much about what we do in inductive logic. As already pointed out, the inductive logician studies the logical properties of inductive arguments. An inductive argument is also a finite set of propositions, but its peculiarity is that its conclusion makes an assertion which is much more general than what is asserted by any one of its premises or even by all the premises taken together. That is why an inductive conclusion does not *logically follow* from its premises. The premises supply only such reasons which tend to show that it is likely to be true or a belief in its truth is not unreasonable. Every inductive argument can be enunciated in the following form:

$$\begin{array}{c} Pa_1 \\ Pa_2 \\ Pa_3 \\ : \\ : \\ Pa_n \\ \hline \therefore (x) Px \end{array}$$

when $a_1 \dots a_n$ are individual constants, P is a property constant, and x an individual variable which can assume as its value any a or anything similar to any a . The existence of the universal quantifier in the conclusion shows that it *claims* to be true of all instances of a certain type. But this claim always remains a claim; it is never transformed into an *absolute right*. The premises on the ground of which it is asserted to be a universal truth do not *prove* that it is one; in fact they are not strong enough to do that.

The interest of the inductive logician is not in cataloguing all sound inductive arguments; he also, like the deductive logician, aims at finding out the various sound inductive argument-forms, i.e., the argument-forms all substitution-instances of which are sound arguments. He discovers the various rules according to which sound inductive inferences are made and tries to present them in as systematic a manner as possible. Here also the logi-

cian is concerned with the *forms* of arguments; his objective is to find out the conditions which must be fulfilled by *any* inductive argument if it is to be sound. If these conditions are not the same as those which are to be fulfilled by deductive arguments, it is because deductive and inductive arguments are arguments of different kinds. The term 'material logic' is, therefore, a misnomer. Inductive logic is not concerned with the *matter* of inductive arguments; it does not establish the truth of any inductive generalization. That is the work of empirical sciences. The logician, as a logician, does not possess the equipments which one must have if one wants to show that a universal proposition is, or is likely to be, true. This can be done only on the basis of empirical research. In fact, we do not prove in inductive logic the truth of any factual proposition, singular or general. We only do the second-order, formal, work of finding out the correct methods of drawing inductive inferences, i.e., the methods which must be followed by sciences in order that their generalizations may be sound.

I shall conclude this paper with a few remarks in refutation of the age-old view that logic is a normative science. It has already been shown that it is not an empirical science but a formal enquiry, and now it will be shown, though very briefly, that normativity is not, in any important sense of the term, its distinctive or unique characteristic.*

The sentence 'Logic is a normative enquiry' may mean, because the word 'is' is ambiguous, either (i) 'Logic should be a normative enquiry', or (ii) 'Logic is in fact a normative enquiry'. (i) is not a statement of fact but a recommendation to the effect that the logical enquiry should be conducted in such a way that it becomes a normative pursuit. A philosopher is free to make any recommendation as to how the logical enquiry, or any philosophical enquiry, should be conducted, but he must offer an adequate justification for it if he wants it to be accepted by his colleagues. But no justification has been offered for *making* logic a normative enquiry. Rather, it seems to me that those who hold that it is a normative enquiry mean that it is so in fact. To examine their position we have to examine (ii).

* For a detailed discussion of the subject see the author's presidential address to the Logic and Metaphysics Section of the Fourth Session of the Bihar Darshan Parishad, entitled 'The Non-normativity of Logic', published in the Proceedings of the Parishad, 1958.

(ii) must mean that the logical enquiry as actually conducted by all, or at least by the majority of, logicians is normative. If it does not mean this, it would be of no theoretical value. Moreover, it would then be very easy to prove that it is true; one can point to a particular case, if there be one, and on the basis of that alone say that logic is in fact a normative discipline. I do not think that any existing system of logic is normative, and even if a few systems are, there is no justification for making an unqualified statement as (ii) does, unless all or the majority of the existing systems are normative. Then let us suppose, what seems to be natural, that (ii) means that the logical enquiry ordinarily or generally, i.e., in almost all cases, is normative. This may mean that (a) it has an ideal or norm which regulates its course. This ideal, as some text-books do, may be declared to be the attainment of truth. Now (a) may be construed in a broad as well as in a narrow sense. In the broad sense it will mean that the logical enquiry has a certain goal and that goal is truth. But to say so will be of no informative value as the attainment of truth, speaking generally, is the goal of every science. In the narrow sense (a) will mean that the ideal of logic is to discover truths about a particular area of knowledge. But this again is true of all sciences; all of them aim at discovering truths about the particular areas of knowledge they deal with. Moreover, if (a) means that logic discovers any factual truth, it is certainly false. As we have already seen, it is not concerned with the world of facts.

(ii) may also mean that (b) the principles of logic are normative. In this case also one will have to prove that all, or nearly all, of them are normative because one would not be justified in maintaining that logic is, in this sense, normative if only some of its principles are shown to be normative. But nobody has performed this task; no rule of logic has been shown to be normative. Rather, it seems obvious that logical principles are not normative. For example, it is doubtlessly true that none of the rules of Aristotelian syllogism, the axioms, theorems, etc., of a logistic system, Mill's experimental methods, or the rules of calculating probability, etc., is normative. Further, it has been very conclusively shown by Wittgenstein and others that the laws of deductive logic are analytic. Their analyticity is a sufficient reason for their not being normative because what is analytic, e.g., the law of excluded middle ($p \vee \sim p$), cannot function normatively.

There can still be another sense of (ii). It may mean (c) that certain meta-logical expressions are normative. If taken in a broad sense, (c) will mean that we can pass normative judgments about logic, e.g., we can say a logical system ought to use the minimum number of primitives. But such things we can do with regard to all enquiries. We can say of physics that it ought to help man in his efforts to preserve peace in the world. But that does not mean that it is a normative enquiry. In the narrow sense (c) will mean that all or the majority of the meta-logical laws are normative. For example, one may say that the meta-theorems of a logistic system are normative. But this would be simply absurd. Nobody has yet proved that any meta-logical law or principle is normative.

(d) Some people may say that the principles of logic are normative because, as is true of ethical ones, their truth is not affected even if they are violated in actual practice. But the property of not being affected by actual violations is only a necessary, and not a sufficient, condition of normativity. This means that if a law is normative, we can infer from its normativity that it will not cease to be true even if it is often violated; but from the fact that it does not cease to be true even if violated we cannot infer that it is normative. Actual violations of mathematical laws do not falsify them, but we do not say that they are for that reason normative.

The argument implicit in this attempt to prove the normativity of logic, if made explicit, can be formally presented as follows:

All normative principles (ethical, aesthetic, etc.), remain true even if violated.

Logical principles also remain true even if violated.

∴ Logical principles are also normative.

This argument is obviously fallacious because its middle term is undistributed in both the premises. It can be made valid by restating the major premise as 'All principles which remain true even if violated are normative'. But then the major premise will be certainly false because mathematical principles remain true even if violated though they are not normative, and, therefore, the conclusion will also be false, or will not at least be proved true by this argument.

The above seem to be the important senses in which the claim of logic to normativity may be interpreted. In none of these senses it seems, as I have shown, to be justified.

The Authority of Śruti or Revelation

by

G. R. MALKANI

Indian philosophy is mostly based upon the śruti or the revealed word. The question naturally arises, what is supposed to be the status of śruti? Dr. Radhakrishnan answers the question in the following words: "The Veda is the work of the ṛṣis or the seers. The truths of the ṛṣis are not evolved as the result of logical reasoning or systematic philosophy but they are the products of spiritual intuition, *dr̥ṣṭi* or vision. The ṛṣis are not so much the authors of the truths recorded in the Vedas as the seers who were able to discern the eternal truths by raising their life-spirit to the plane of the universal spirit....When the Vedas are regarded as the highest authority, all that is meant is that the most exacting of all authorities is the authority of facts." (A Source Book in Indian Philosophy, pp. 615-616).

This appears to rationalise the notion of the authority of revelation. It is not an arbitrary authority, imposed upon us from above. Competent persons have seen the truth and given expression to it. But does this interpretation make any sense? How is a person able to *see* the truth? And where is the guarantee that what a person sees is ultimately true? Different persons may see different things, and claim them to be absolutely true. In that case, there will not be one Veda, but as many Vedas as there are seers of metaphysical truth. There will then be no fixity about revealed truth. Can it be called truth at all? Revealed truth becomes simply another name for the personal claim of a seer. It is not truth *revealed* from above or *given* from above. It is truth seen by a seer from below. In what sense then is it revealed? Radhakrishnan again gives the answer: "Since the intuitive experiences are not always given but occur only at rare intervals, they possess the character of revelation. We cannot command or continue them at our will. We do not know how or why they occur. They sometimes occur even against our will.... But even the noblest human minds have had only glimpses of self-valid experiences. The moments of vision are transitory and intermittent. We therefore do not attain an insight, permanent and uninterrupted, where reality is present in

its own immediate witness. But we are convinced that such an ideal is not an impossible one.... The experience is felt as of the nature of a discovery or a revelation, not a mere conjecture or a creation...." 619.

It would appear that the experiences in question are too personal for any discussion of their validity. They partake of the nature of an inexplicable inspiration, which is not under our control and is rather casual in its nature. Such inspiration cannot be tantamount to *knowledge*. Knowledge arises only through the operation of a *pramāṇa*. If reality is there, and the appropriate *pramāṇa* is operative, knowledge is almost automatic. Nobody can check it. Accordingly, we are said to achieve knowledge only if we take to the proper means of knowledge, which means *pramāṇa* and the auxiliary processes for removing all possible obstructions (*prtibandha*). Knowledge is certainly not a matter of an inexplicable inspiration, which is not a *pramāṇa*. A *pramāṇa* is universal and impersonal, inspiration is purely personal and arbitrary.

The question then to answer is, what is the *pramāṇa* for a seer, if it is a fact that he sees an eternal truth or knows a fact of reality? Radhakrishnan's explanation affords no clue to this. It makes knowledge mystical and mysterious. Our contention is that the only way we can know supernatural or eternal truth is through the revealed word or *śruti*. *Śruti* literally means what is *heard*, not what is *seen*. The difference between these two functions of the mind is evident. Hearing can be a *method of knowledge*. Seeing is *knowledge itself*. We may hear and yet not know owing to certain obstructions (*prtibandha*). Only when the obstructions are removed, can we be said to know or to see. Hearing in this sense initiates the process of seeing,—but it does not amount to seeing. In order therefore that the seer should see, he must first *hear* and then *reflect* and finally *meditate*. Knowledge comes at the end as the fruit of the whole process.

The question now is, what does he hear? He hears the revealed word or *śruti* explained to him by a competent person. The revealed word means the word that is not composed by *any person*, great or small, including God. What is composed originates from the person composing it. A finite mind can have no authority for any other mind. God is supposed to know everything and to be infinite in nature. But still what He *thinks* will be a product of His mind. It need have no relation to reality as

it is in itself. If God *knows* that reality and expresses His knowledge in words which are then communicated to individuals or even *ṛṣis*, the question as to the nature of God's own knowledge has still to be answered. He can only know, if reality is distinct from Him. May be, God is Himself that reality. In that case, how is He to *know* that reality. Besides, knowledge involves certain limitations. Knowledge *arises*. It cannot be *eternal*. It presupposes a *pramāṇa independent of knowledge*. And finally, it presupposes ignorance. The only way of knowledge is from ignorance to knowledge. Is God ignorant first, *and then* He comes to know? There can be no such thing as eternally knowing everything. Eternal knowing will not be something *mental*. It will be like intelligent being or pure intelligence. But if even God must go from ignorance to knowledge, then even God must require a method of knowledge or *pramāṇa*. What can be this *pramāṇa* for God? Can it be anything different from *śruti* itself? And if it is *śruti*, how can it be the *word of God* or something originating in the mind of God? As man, including the *ṛṣis*, cannot be the author of the revealed word, so God too cannot be the author. He can only communicate the word, but not make or compose it. He can at best receive and then give. The *word* is eternal in this sense. It is never composed. It is only received.

The relation between the word and God may be that of a certain unity. The word may be the eternal expression of an eternal God and not altogether distinct from God,—it has itself a divine character. It is an aspect of the Divinity. When God therefore communicates the word, He communicates His own nature in the word. This is something like the Christian idea of the word that is *in* God and *with* God becoming flesh. It may be that the word is independent of God, and God is only the First Person or *Adi-Guru* who knows it first-hand and without any intermediary, and then communicates it to lesser individuals or *ṛṣis*. This would be something like the Advaitic position. It may be that God is not necessary at all and that the word is communicated from person to person in the ordinary way. This would be the position of *pūrva-mīmāṃsā*, which does not accept a Creator-God, but which does accept the *Eternal Word*.

If it is true that super-natural reality cannot be known through any empirical method of knowledge, if it can only be known through what is called the revealed word or *śruti*, the word must necessarily be impersonal,—it cannot be said to originate in the mind of any person, human or divine. It is *beginningless and*

authorless. If it stands, it stands in its own right. It may be heard and communicated, but never made. This is the true significance of *śruti*. It is utterly wrong to suppose that *ṛṣis* are seeing the truth and then declaring it in their own language to lesser men. For how do *ṛṣis* themselves see without the word?

The revealed word reveals the truth to us. It reveals only that truth which is not known in any other way or through empirical methods of knowledge. In the sphere of religious activity, its truth can never be tested by us. It becomes therefore a matter of dogma only. But in the sphere of *knowledge* of the supernatural reality or of the world-soul, its truth can be tested after we have accepted it on faith. We are of course free to put our faith or not. But we cannot argue, on the basis of our present experience, that it cannot lead to the truth or that it has no value as a method of knowledge. We must give it a trial. Alternatively, we must indicate some other method of knowledge of the super-sensible and the super-natural. If we do neither, the super-sensible and the metaphysical can be no problem for us. We are relieved of the task of pursuing metaphysical knowledge. If however we cannot get away from metaphysics, the only rational course is to accept *śruti* as a starting point, and then subject it to criticism if possible within our experience. We should try to see whether *śruti* can be true and whether, properly interpreted, it can raise our experience to a higher level of truth. It appears to us that the acceptance of *śruti* and the possibility of metaphysical knowledge go together. That is why the revealed word plays such an important part in Indian philosophy in general and Vedānta in particular. That is also why Vedāntic philosophy consists mostly of commentaries, and commentaries upon commentaries. The basic truth is contained in the revealed word. This has got to be interpreted and understood through commentaries. Free reason, unattached to the word, can lead nowhere; but in the service of the word, it can give us a most satisfying philosophy.

Positivism, Skepticism and Morals

by

A. LAKSHMANA RAO,

Department of Philosophy, Andhra University, Waltair

It is not always that from a good influence arise good consequences; a good influence, by wrong direction, may actually lead to bad effects. Such has been the case, in my view, of the influence of Positivism on Ethics and Religion. The impact of Positivism on Philosophy and Psychology, I am inclined to think, resulted only in the barrenness of both.* But the same need not have happened in the case of Ethics and Religion. Positivism could certainly have been of help, on the one hand, in putting both on firm realistic and sociological foundations, and on the other, in eradicating the irrational and hopeless superstitions with which both were infested. Far from weeding out the undesirable elements, however, some forms of Positivism had even cut Ethics down mercilessly root and branch. With Ethics gone, where would religion be? It is frequently argued that it is God or some transcendental principle which furnishes an adequate foundation for morality. I, as an evolving ethical individual, believe, on the contrary, that it is morality itself that gives life, strength and support to any transcendental principle. Ethics provides motive forces for action and thereby sustains life; it is something like the Oxygen apparatus which helps the mountaineer climb the giddy heights under very difficult conditions. With Religion *minus* Ethics we will have neither a living goal nor the life-force which helps us in our assaults on the summit. At best we will be left with a dummy uninspiring God,—cold, colorless, vague, impersonal and lifeless!

One could understand a revolt against what George Bernard Shaw described as "our ideals which, like the Gods of old, are constantly demanding human sacrifices." Ethical Positivism has

*See my articles: (1) Philosophy, Philosophers and Philosophical Analysis (*Phil. Quarterly*, Jan. '58); (2) Metaphysics and Linguistic Analysis (*Ind. Phil. Congress*—Dec., '58); (3) Linguistic Analysis and Ideal Language Method (*Phil. Quarterly*, Oct. '59); (4) Critique of Psychological Positivism (*Ind. Phil. Congress*—Dec. '59).

a perfect right to lose patience, "tear up the old Scriptures", and repudiate superstition and blind belief; it was certainly a step in the right direction, scientific and progressive, and one would commend it whole-heartedly. One could hope besides that it would be a harbinger of an experimental Ethics, built on solid evolutionary and sociological foundations. That, in fact, is what any skepticism, healthy and strong, in any field, would aim at, and should ultimately lead us to; but a skepticism, blind and irrational, violent and destructive, calculated only to destroy everything in its wake, including reason, is certainly not what any well-meaning philosopher, however revolutionary he might be, would bargain for. Such unfortunately is the nature of the skeptical movement that we have allowed into the philosophical camp in the beginning of the 20th century. It is one thing to accept Ethical Relativity in a limited sense, but entirely another to repudiate morals altogether.

I shall now briefly analyse the grounds on which the skeptics base their arguments for the rejection of Ethics. They are:

- (1) Ethics is not a science and its imperatives are not capable of proof;
- (2) Ethics has no rational basis and its judgments are emotive;
- (3) Ethics is only a logical study of the language of morals and the problems of Ethics are linguistic.

Science and Ethical Imperatives

The broad division of Science into Positive and Normative, though convenient for certain purposes has, however, unfortunately given rise to a misunderstanding that positive sciences alone are sciences, in the strict sense, and normative sciences are 'pseudo'. It is argued, for instance, that a science is a system of propositions in the indicative and it always proceeds from indicative premises to indicative conclusions, whereas Ethics deals not with what 'happens' but with what 'ought to happen'; its propositions are imperative in character and not indicative; and as no imperative conclusions could be validly drawn from indicative premises, there can be no scientific validation of Ethics and so no science of Ethics. The above is the trend in which Poincaré

1. La Morale et la Science. (Summarised in *Systems of Ethics*, by Nelson, L.)

argued to prove the unscientific nature of Ethics. According to him, deducing imperatives from imperative premises would involve *Petitio Principii*. Nelson² counters this argument by saying that natural science equally involves the *Petitio* because its system is founded on unproved premises in the indicative, and that we have no right to reject Ethics on the ground that it begins with unproved premises in the imperative. I believe Nelson is right in his assertion even on strictly logical grounds, because of the alleged stigma on a syllogistic argument that its conclusion is already contained in its Major Premise. This brings us down to the fundamental question: What is a major premise and how is it arrived at? An answer which seems to me rational is that a major premise is solely arrived at on the basis of uniformity of Nature and uncontradicted human experience. I do not see why any stigma need be attached to an ethical imperative if it is derived from reasonably non-controverted experience, and not on the basis of self-evidence or supernatural grounds. In this connection, it would be pertinent to call attention to what Marcus G. Singer calls the 'generalisation argument' in an article, which appeared some time ago in the journal 'Ethics'. He argues that the 'ought' or the imperative is itself a generalisation. He illustrates his point by some examples: 'what would happen if everybody did that?'

'What would happen if no one voted?'

'If everybody refused to serve, we would lose the war'. Each of these cases provides an example of the use of application of a type of argument which the author calls the 'generalisation argument'.

'If everyone were to do that, the consequences would be disastrous (or undesirable); therefore no one ought to do that'; also, 'the consequences of no one doing X would be undesirable, therefore everyone ought to do X'.

I wonder why 'bona fide' principles like these could not be accepted as Generalised Imperatives in Ethics as unreservedly as generalised indicatives are approved as major premises in the physical or the so-called exact sciences. Mental evolution, being creative evolution, cannot be expected to be as exact, rigid, blind and unmodifiable as the evolution of nature. I believe it is in

2. *Systems of Ethics* — L. Nelson.

the nature of things that the ultimate in the course of evolution should be freedom and choice consistent with a flexible and rational uniformity. That these precious attributes 'ought to' replace rigid, unbreakable and blind laws must be quite evident to those who consider progress as nothing but a creative process toward that end. The psychology and Ethique of the laws of human behaviour should always be understood in this light and in the context of creative evolution. In the evolution, consciousness and perception should be viewed as evolving from the bottom stage of matter—where these attributes are only minimally present—to the present human stage, where they are so advanced as to have attained high self-conscious levels, which could most appropriately be designated physical or sensuous, aesthetic, moral and religious. There is no doubt that man has developed his sense-perception, purely in the physical sense, enormously during the course of the past several centuries, at the cost, to a large extent, of higher modes of perception. This lop-sided partial growth of his self has even led him to deny that there is any other kind of knowledge not directly dependent on sense-perception. We have thus an age of natural science now, skeptical of other fields of knowledge.

The priority of natural and physical sciences, according to Nelson, is due to an accident of history; for, he argues, if no one had dared question the authority of Socrates,—who, it will be remembered was reported to have said that God did not grant man the ability to penetrate the mysteries of Nature—a scientific physics could not have existed to-day. However, the role that philosophers once ascribed to Physics today belongs to Ethics, and vice versa. Nelson therefore predicts that if the current skeptical attitude toward the possibility of scientific Ethics were to become permanent, no scientific Ethics would be developed for millennia to come, just as no scientific physics was developed for several millennia in the past. The reason why we have no scientific Ethics today is precisely because up till now scientific ethics had been considered impossible. Abandon skepticism, and what was considered impossible would become possible.

That the above view is correct could be easily seen if one observes the contrast between the early trends of the Western and Indian Philosophy. Western Philosophy which had its origin in Greece was mainly cosmological in its early beginnings with its concern for and an absorbing interest in the ultimate nature of the external world. It mainly depended for its growth and

development on sense-perception; the result was rapid advances in empirical sciences. On the other hand, in India our ancestors in Vedic times began their philosophical investigations with attempts at exploration of the inner self, resulting in a deeper understanding not only of the self but also of the world. A realisation, for instance, of such a profound formula as 'that thou art' (*Tat Twam asi*) naturally must depend on keener and higher spiritual processes of Perception and Experience than would be required for a mere surface analysis of an object given to sense-perception. This is the other and more significant side of the picture which India presented a few thousand years ago.

Ethics — Rational Or Irrational?

The fashion of the day is to brush aside Ethics as altogether irrational. The Philosophy of Logical Positivism was one of the most potent influences mainly responsible for a radical revolt against traditional ethics, which finally culminated in the complete rejection of ethics. However, neither Ethical Relativity nor Ethical Skepticism and Nihilism is an entirely new doctrine; for, modern relativists and skeptics had their originals in ancient Philosophy, Greek as well as Indian. Ethical Skepticism of the present has no doubt derived its direct inspiration and guidance from modern philosophies of more recent times, namely, materialism of Hobbes, and Empiricism of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and the Positivism of Comte and Mach. Hobbes' irrationalism and Hume's empiricist extremism were, by and large, the main catalytic factors. Bertrand Russell, Wittgenstein, Rudolf Carnap, A. J. Ayer, Stevenson and others, in varying degrees, represent this kind of Ethical Skepticism. It is not my purpose in this paper to discuss or even to evaluate the distinctive contribution of each of these philosophers at length, but only to present, in their own words, their doctrine in its most general form in order to see whether there is any rationale behind it.

Moral distinctions, according to Hume, are not the offspring of Reason. Reason is concerned with discovery of truth and falsehood, agreement and disagreement; passions, actions and volitions are not susceptible of any agreement or disagreement. So they cannot be pronounced true or false. Actions do not derive their merit from conformity to reason nor their blame from non-conformity. Actions may be laudable or blameworthy; but they cannot be reasonable or unreasonable. Again, reason and judgment may indeed be the mediate cause of an action by prompting

or directing a passion; but it is not pretended that judgment of this kind either in its truth or falsehood is attended by virtue or vice. From the above, it is quite clear that Hume had once for all removed morals from the realm of reason, and relegated them completely to the realm of emotion and passion. Hume was thus the first most influential philosopher who sowed the seeds of irrationalism in Ethics and moral philosophy. His influence will be seen most conspicuously and effectively in Wittgenstein, A. J. Ayer, Carnap, Russell, Stevenson and others.

For Wittgenstein all propositions are of equal value. Ethical propositions cannot express anything higher. His concern was with the world only in which "everything is as it is, and happens as it does happen; in it there is no value, for if there be a value which is of value, it must lie outside all happening. Ethics thus being outside all 'happening' cannot be expressed" (Tractatus 6.4—6.421). Wittgenstein would, I believe, prefer to include ethical and aesthetic propositions under the head of the transcendental, inexpressible and the mystical, and not as would Carnap and Ayer under 'senseless' and the 'non-sensical.'

Carnap in his 'Philosophy and Logic of Syntax' declares that a normative Ethics is a pseudo-science, that its statements lie wholly in the metaphysical realm, and hence are unverifiable and meaningless. Value statements, according to him, are nothing else than 'Commands' in a misleading grammatical form. Russell in his 'Religion and Science' agrees with Carnap that ethical statements can neither be true nor false,—they merely show 'the philosopher's state of mind'; they express desires, but express nothing of value. A. J. Ayer in his 'Language, Truth and Logic' tried to give an account of 'Judgment of Value' consistent with his general empiricist principles. Ethical value judgments are not significant, but are simply expressions of emotions which can be neither true nor false. Ethical terms, according to him, are irreducible to empirical concepts—in this he rejects all naturalistic theories; but he does not accept the 'absolutistic' view of ethics either. He meets 'the difficulty by showing that the correct treatment of ethical statements is afforded by a third theory', according to which, 'the reason why ethical concepts are unanalysable is that they are mere pseudo-concepts' (p. 106-107). To describe the 'emotive' aspect of ethical terms is the task of Psychology. Ethics is nothing more than a department or branch of psychology and sociology (p. 112). What applies to Ethics applies equally well to Aesthetics also.

Of all these Philosophers, it is only C. L. Stevenson who does not, like the rest, brush aside ethical statements as useless; he stresses their 'persuasive' and 'propaganda' value in effecting changes in attitudes ('Ethics and Language'—Chapter VII—i). Ogden and I. A. Richards, in 'The meaning of meaning' (quoted by Stevenson in his book), hold a similar view. The peculiar ethical use of 'Good' is, they suggest, a purely emotive use. The word stands for nothing whatever, nor has it any symbolic function. 'It serves only as an emotive sign expressing our attitude to 'this' and perhaps evoking similar attitude in other persons or inciting them to actions of one kind or other.'

To sum up: according to the "emotive theory", ethical judgments are strictly no judgments; they are merely exclamations expressive of approval or disapproval, a pro-attitude toward a thing or a person's contra-attitude. Value judgments, in short, are purely emotive.

When emotivists say that ethical judgments express an attitude of approval or disapproval they are right. To that extent, such judgments could also function as effective persuasive instruments used to influence men's attitudes. But if they conclude that the judgments themselves are purely emotive and as such irrational, they are definitely wrong. Judgments of approval or disapproval are almost always the result of intellectual decisions and are arrived at after a rational appraisal of the total situation; they are clearly above the emotive plane. If emotion or feeling precedes, follows or accompanies an ethical judgment, it need not make much difference, and all the better for it, I suppose! Man's judgment is never solely the result of pure reason or cold intellect, but always tempered by emotion. What is necessary is that the emotion must be noble and sublime so that there might be an enlightened judgment. But in any case, mere admixture of emotion need not make an intellectual judgment necessarily 'emotive' in the sense of 'senseless' and 'irrational'. Secondly, if ethical judgments depend entirely on the subject's attitudes, there can be no objective 'good' or 'right' and no objective values. It follows also that there can be no ethical disagreement or conflict because there is no objective standard to which one can refer his emotional attitudes. There can thus be no evaluation of judgments. Disagreements in ethical judgments are merely disagreements in attitudes, and there ends the matter. If this theory is true, nobody can ever be mistaken in his judgments because he is his own judge. Thirdly, the theory

exalts emotion and feeling above reason, and so no one need give any plausible reason for his attitudes.

Emotivism is a revolt against intellectualistic ethics. Taking Ethics out of the sphere of the rational, it handed it over to the irrational element of the human mind viz., wish, desire, feeling and emotion. If to be good is to be 'felt' good, then it means all values must depend on our feelings alone — with the result there can be no values, let alone their objectivity. Emotivism in Ethics is nihilistic and is the limit of ethical skepticism. In short, it is an instance of reason decrying reason.

I come now to the last of the grounds for the rejection of Ethics, namely, that the problems of Ethics are merely linguistic. There is no doubt that some Emotivists are also linguists in that they concerned themselves with imperatives and indicatives, and finally declared imperatives to be purely emotive. But Philosophers like Everett W. Hall and R. M. Hare made analysis their sole business, with the hope that the analysis of value sentences linguistically will somehow deliver to them the meaning and the status of value in the world. In a previous paper entitled 'Linguistic analysis and the Ideal Language method' (Phil. Quarterly — Oct. '59), I had already discussed at length Prof. Hall's analysis of 'What is Value?' Prof. R. M. Hare's views on this topic which he gives in his book 'Language of Morals' bear a close resemblance to what Prof. Hall held in his work; only Prof. Hare did in a much briefer way what Prof. Hall accomplished in a more elaborate fashion in his essay. Both have the same end in view, and used the same kind of analysis. Prof. Hall asked himself the question "what is value"?, and Prof. Hare "what shall I do?" The latter reminds us most powerfully of the question which the famous John Bunyan asked himself before he set out in imagination on his arduous journey as a Pilgrim to the Celestial City. But the resemblance is only superficial, because Prof. Hare's conclusions were supposed to be based on purely linguistic and logistic considerations, while the question Bunyan faced was a pressing problem which challenged his entire being. When Arjuna in the Kurukshetra battlefield was troubled by a question similar to the one posed by Prof. Hare, Lord Krishna in his own unique manner did some incisive Philosophical analysis of several ethical concepts, but his advice to Arjuna was not linguistic in any sense of the term, nor was it based on an "analysis of ought-sentences"! I agree that Prof. Hare's question in the language in which it was stated

was certainly what Ethics should concern itself about primarily, but the method he adopted to obtain the solution was sure to cause disappointment to those who expect something more than mere linguistic analysis of 'imperatives' and other 'prescriptive language'. Prof. Hare begins his essay with a definition of Ethics as a 'Logical study of the language of Morals' in the tradition of Rudolf Carnap, and proceeds to assert that it was only an analysis of the prescriptive language and imperatives that could deliver to us the solution to the question 'what shall I do?' To become morally adult, according to him, is to learn to use 'ought' sentences, and this learning process includes the study of the imperative mood and the linguistic analysis of "ought"!

I conclude this paper wondering in what way an analysis of the language of morals will help an individual in becoming "morally adult" or even morally "conscious"! Professors Hall and Hare, by their teachings, would be able at best to train up a good band of grammarians and Logicians of Morals, but not, by any means, moralists!

Is Indian Philosophy Deterministic ?

by

S. K. CHATTOPADHYAYA,
Ravenshaw College, Cuttack.

Is Indian philosophy pessimistic? — many have asked and some have answered, but very few seem to have realised that no answer can be given to this question without answering another question, is Indian philosophy deterministic? It can be seen that these two questions are interrelated and logically inseparable. Optimism and pessimism, unlike meliorism, are ultimate or final views regarding human prospects or destiny. Even as attitudes they are not purely psychological, but are enlightened attitudes involving *final* decisions. Both foresee or presage the ultimate destiny of the individual, the final end of his struggles in life. Optimism assures that all will be well in the long run, the seeming darkness that envelops us will ultimately lift, and argues that all is well since it ends well. Pessimism, on the other hand, believes not only in the *reality of evil* as meliorism does, but believes also in the *ultimacy of evil*. Both are final attitudes towards life fostered by total and ultimate views of things. Both imply determinism in some way. Although Professor James connected pessimism with every form of determinism, it may appear more reasonable to connect optimism with the 'soft determinism' and pessimism with the "hard determinism" of his conception.¹ So, it is pertinent to ask if Indian philosophy is deterministic before answering if it is pessimistic or optimistic.

To frame the question in a slightly different way : Does Indian philosophy believe in a 'block universe'? If this question can be answered in the affirmative, then only we shall be justified in asking further whether such a universe is essentially and intrinsically good or bad, in order to decide if the Indian view of life is optimistic or pessimistic. It may be true that the Indians generally believe in predestination and are consequently fatalists. But we are not here concerned with popular feeling. We are concerned

1. The will to believe, pp. 161-66.

with the philosophic view of life and the order of things as envisaged in the principal systems of Indian philosophy. Does Indian Philosophy believe in a block universe? Here, again, some clarification is needed as to what Indian philosophy means by the expression 'universe' or 'world-order'. To be sure, the expression 'world-order' *does not mean* to Indian philosophy what the Westerners and the westernised Indians understand by the term. The world-order of Indian philosophy is *not* any *neutral* objective order given ahead of man, of which man is supposed to be the latest product or evolute. It is not for sheer lack of knowledge in the so-called scientific data that Indian philosophy does not evince any interest in the notion of a problematic world-order shaping itself automatically in the womb of the primitive nebula and then evolving, through gradual changes and mutations, the physical, the organic, the sensible and the conscious forms in order of succession. The Indian approach is fundamentally different. The world-order is understood in the sense of the *lived* order, that is, the order of existence which is *commonly shared*, yet variously '*enjoyed*' and '*experienced*', by the infinite plurality of individuals or *jivas*. This is the only world-order which we know and experience. It is the sum of the individuals' worlds intersecting one another and forming a concentric whole or unity. This is the world that Indian philosophy seeks to account for and explain. But it does not stop at that. It seeks to transcend this world-order and achieve liberation.


Such a world-order is not *given*, it is *made*. The process of making this world (which is the totality of the individuals' lived orders) is beginningless; and if not cut short by right knowledge, it is interminable and endless also. This is the peculiar Indian conception of the world as *samsāra*, that is, fleeting cycles of existence. *It is only as a philosophy of life that Indian philosophy becomes a philosophy of the world*. If evolution means progressive formation from earlier simpler states to more and more complex and in that sense developed structures, and if the concept of evolution does not logically entail the idea of mechanical growth and chance-development, it can be seen that all principal systems of Indian philosophy, even the systems which uphold the notion of creation, believe in the evolutionary process in some sense. They all take *samsāra* as a growing, moving and rolling process. The evolution of the world-process however means only the evolution of the individuals and their experienced orders in a beginningless process. The individual *jivas* are not mere

participants in the world-process. Their lives and experiences, evolving in a beginningless process, make up the world-process as Indian philosophy conceives it. Indian philosophy, again, does not believe in successive appearances of the non-living, the living and the conscious forms. A theory which believes in successive appearance of those forms cannot rationally explain co-existence of all the forms, lower and higher, at the present developed stage. The non-living and the living, the inorganic and the organic, the vegetative and the animate are all simultaneous events. They all are subject to changes, while the living or the animate alone is capable of both ascending and descending in the scale; and this is what is meant by evolution. But there can be no development of a higher species from a lower in the manner the western theories of evolution propose. Lastly, there can be no freaks of nature, no chance-development and no surprises. There is nothing absolutely irrational, since everything is regulated and controlled by an inexorable causal law which is one with the moral law and the cosmic law.

Since the individuals themselves (*jivas*) are subject to change, the world, which is nothing but the totality of their 'lived' experiences, must be regarded as changeful. The individuals and their worlds grow and change concomitantly. In fact, they represent two sides of the same thing, the subjective and the objective rendering of the self-same stuff of experience or *bhoga*. Yet the subjective is allowed a relative precedence over the objective in the evolutionary process. The realistic schools which are either dualists or pluralists accord to the objective an equal metaphysical status, a certain independence of being. But in their explanation of the *ordered whole*, of the world as an experienced process of becoming, the objective is made to conform to the subjective irrevocably. Outside this ordering, the objective is either unmanifest (*avyakta*), as in the Sāṅkhya-yoga, or enjoys a hypothetical sort of being, as in the other realistic systems. So far as the idealistic systems and the transcendentalist systems like the Advaita Vedānta are concerned, the objective does not enjoy even this hypothetical independence of being. The objective is no longer regarded as a metaphysical entity. It is merely the *empirical* or the '*experienced*', and enjoys a mere '*being-for-experience*'. This is technically called *Vyavahārika sattā* as distinguished from *pāramārthika* or *metaphysical sattā*. To put it briefly, the changes in

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logically implies the idea of moral responsibility for such actions and freedom in their execution. The individual is not so much *determined* by his actions as he *determines himself* by his actions. Otherwise the very idea of determination falls through. There can be no inexorable law of determination, no objective guarantee for its unerratic behaviour, without the supposition that what determines a man are his own actions freely done. Determination, therefore, presupposes moral responsibility and this presupposes freedom of choice or action.

The law of determination proposed here is not a blind mechanical law. A mechanical law may be erratic. That is, a certain set of actions instead of determining A may as well determine B or C. Again, if the law is absolutely irrational, there can be no contradiction if it goes out of operation altogether. Now, if a law is not to be erratic or fallible, there must be a plausible objective basis for its operation. The only condition that can furnish this much-needed objective guarantee for the inexorable law of *karma* is this, that a man has moral responsibility for what he does by free-choice, and this action can have a determining effect on him and him alone. Determinism thus presupposes free-will. According to all schools of Indian philosophy, man is in bondage in the sense that he has bound himself by his free (although foolish) choice and can liberate himself by right choice of ends and means. Nothing is *given* to him or *thrust upon* him by any alien force or power. His bondage is of his own making, his liberation similarly will have to be secured by himself. Nothing comes upon him automatically. He is not destined to suffer and so there is no ground for pessimism. He is not also destined to attain liberation; so there is no ground for optimism either. He *may* continue to suffer for all time if he so chooses, or he may get release if he sincerely strives for it. The choice is open to him at present as it was open to him in the very beginning. Nothing can be so false in the context of Indian philosophy as the idea of complete determinism. So there can be no sense in saying either that it is all mere pessimism or that it is all mere optimism, or that it is initially pessimistic and finally optimistic. It simply gives a choice and suggests an alternative prospect capable of realisation, but does not make any commitment in advance of the individual's personal initiative in the matter. The individual is left free to work out his own destiny.

Karma no doubt determines the individual and his prospects, but not before the individual, choosing freely his line of action,

gives rise to karma-seeds. If his karma determines or fetters him, he no less determines his karma and controls it. And since his karma is not external to him, there is interdetermination of one part of the individual by the other part, and this is supposed to be a beginningless process. His *sañcita* (accumulated) and *sañciyamāna* (accumulating) *karmas* create certain *tendencies* for his future mode of living, but he retains the initiative to modify these tendencies in his chosen way always. He is free to suppress or sublimate them as he is free to allow himself to be blindly led by them. He is not an absolute product of his foregone past (*adṛsta*), nor is he absolutely bound to the yet-to-be (*apūrva*). All systems of Indian philosophy do not believe in the metaphysical reality of the individual or person, but the systems all agree in holding that the empirical individual or person is not a pure product of his circumstances, that it is he who binds himself and that it is he again who can emancipate himself. His world is not foreign to him, it is of his own free choice. Lastly, neither his empirical existence nor the world in which he lives and conducts himself has any claim to absolute ultimacy. He is free to suspend and terminate both as he is free to allow them to run for ever. There is no ground for optimism or pessimism, no absolute assurance and no final condemnation. He is absolutely free to condemn himself as he is free to liberate himself. But these are not the only alternatives possible. He may as well live a Socrates 'true to the kindred points of heaven and home', live a Buddha or *Jīvanmukta*.

Religious Experience and Language

by

Y. MASIH, PH.D. (EDIN.), D.LITT. (PAT.),

Head of the University Department of Philosophy,
L. S. College, Muzaffarpur

Incantations and hymns of propitiation and thanksgiving were probably the most primitive religious language, the main function of which lay in evoking a numinous experience in the worshippers. The religious experience of awe, dread, wonder and fascination was greatly intensified when such hymns and incantations were used in a congregation. In this paper an attempt is being made to show that inspite of many changes down the ages this continues to be the main function of religious language. Those who keep to this view would hold that the function of religious language consists in ushering a worshipper into the presence of a deity. Such a language does not pretend to give any information concerning the deity, except indirectly.

This view concerning religious language may claim indirect support from Otto. He holds that numinous experience is non-rational and so cannot be conveyed in clear-cut concepts. However, ordinary words can be employed for helping a worshipper to taste the Lord and to experience *mysterium tremendum et fascinans*. Here cognitive statements are used for non-cognitive purposes; words are uttered for directing a worshipper to feel the pulse of the unutterable. In other words, according to Otto,¹ the numinous experience, strictly speaking, cannot be taught, it can only be evoked, awakened in the mind. Little wonder, religious language consists of silence, negations and paradoxes. For example, Nagarjuna described the nature of Nirvana as silence, and the Brahman is stated to be indescribable. If *Sachness* or Brahman be described at all, then it has to be stated as 'not this', 'not this'. Similarly, St. Paul saw a vision which he declared was not lawful for any man to utter. However, the most popular religious language consists of paradoxes. For example,

1. *The Idea of the Holy*.—p. 7.

the Brahman is stated to be moving and not moving, to be far and near, to be the smallest of particles which cannot be contained in the largest of space. Again, man is said to be made in the image of God, Who has no form of His own. Similarly, Christ is stated to be the Son of the *eternal* God, because he was born of the *virgin*, and lived and died; and, He lives precisely because He died. St. Paul knew that 'the Christ crucified' was a stumbling-block to the Jews and foolishness to the Greeks. But for that very reason He is the Power and Wisdom of God to the Christians.

Of course, people seeking signs and pursuing wisdom cannot accept foolishness as *their* way of salvation. Preachers and theologians therefore had to transform a large part of mythical statements into cognitive statements. If this were done with the explicit aim of pressing cognitive statements into the service of non-cognitive, ineffable, non-rational, and inexpressible numinous experience, then probably a great deal of linguistic confusion in religious language might have been avoided.

In the past, stories of divine birth and life, myths of divine exploits, and even tribal histories depicting God as the Lord of events were told to the people with a view to evoking religious feeling in them. The divines intoxicated by the numinous experience felt God to be the Creator, sustainer of the world, and the ultimate judge of men. These attributes were ascribed to God so that people may return to Him and be saved. Whatever eschatological statements be made concerning the 'saved' man, the term 'salvation' described at least what happens to a worshipper. Thus, Zacchaeus was changed from an extorting publican into a repentant charity-maker; and the Saul of Tarsus was converted into Paul, only when he received a new vision of the risen Christ. Hence, some psychological change in the mentality of the worshipper is a necessary pre-requisite of his having religious experience. Thus, it is stated that only the pure in heart will see God, and only those who seek will find, and it will be opened only for those who knock. And the function of the religious stories, myths and histories is to convict a worshipper of his sins, to call him to prayer and worship and to stir within him an urge to become pure in heart and an earnest seeker after God.

Under the spell of religious experience, the worshipper feels highly elated and exalted above his normal feelings of insecurity, doubt, misery etc. It gives to the worshipper a sense of enlighten-

ment. Before this he was blind, and now he sees. Or, he may have peace which the world cannot give, or, he may have unbounded joy, unspeakable bliss, and so on. However, it is pointed out that for a worshipper belonging to Jewish-Christian tradition, the numinous experience cannot be described as his subjective state. The experience for him is always of a Transcendent Being who is felt as the most real of all things. Nobody can worship a fiction or even a deity who is yet to be and can never be. He is felt not only as the most real of all entities, but the fullness of His being is apprehended as filling up the whole universe.

'The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament sheweth his handiwork. Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night sheweth knowledge. There is no speech nor language, where their voice is not heard' (Psalms 19:1-3).

For such a worshipper in his sophisticated mood the religious experience seems to proceed from a holy, loving, omnipotent and transcendent Being.

However, our contention is that the Transcendent, the Beyond, or the Wholly Other is as much indicative of the worshipper's state of mind as his feelings of repentance, forgiveness, bliss are. The bipolarity of the worshipper and the worshipped, the numinous feeling and its transcendent reference is confined to and is within the psychical states of the worshipper. In maintaining this we are very anxious to avoid any pejorative statements. The experience is highly valuable and has to be cultivated, but we think that it is not a cognitive enterprise. The attributes of infinitude, perfection, omnipotence, love etc., are evocative expressions that call for worship. These terms, as existential expressions, indicate that the speaker of them is caught up by his religious frenzy. Apparently these expressions or like statements are cognitive, but are really empathic. The burning fire of intense experience spreads to its object. Hence when the wholly Other called God is felt to be intensely real, loving etc., then any such statements concerning God are really indicative of the highly elated state of the worshipper's mind. This can be easily shown in the case of Wordsworth: 'And I have a Presence that disturbs me with the joy of elevated thought'. Thus any reference to a transcendent Being is indicative of being affected mentally in the same way in which a paranoiac is said to be affected by a delusive appearance. Hence, any statement about a transcendent God cannot be treated as cognitive.

No doubt God does appear to be transcendently real, as something wholly other to the worshipper. But this psychic certainty is not equivalent to logical certainty. The theologians are apt to say that love, infinitude, beyondness etc., of necessity, belong to God as His *intrinsic attributes*. If we hold that love necessarily belongs to God in the same manner in which triangularity belongs to a three-sided rectilinear figure, then obviously 'love' does belong to 'God' as His definition. The statement, 'God is love', then becomes a tautologous statement. Loving God becomes a mere concept and a fiction, and nobody would worship a fiction. Hence the theologian will have to say that loving God is a fact, and 'God is love' is a contingent statement. But if it is a contingent statement, Love can be denied of God without involving us in any contradiction. Thus, if 'God is love' is a necessary proposition, then 'God' becomes a mere concept; and, if it is an objective fact statement, then love cannot necessarily belong to God.² The way out of the difficulty lies in holding that such statements are indicative of the worshipper's psychic affectation. After all religious experience is akin to aesthetic delights,³ and few people will think that aesthetic experience would vanish if it be not referred to some transcendent source.

But what is the evidence in favour of regarding the God of religious experience as a delusional projection? We do not want to use the expression 'delusional projection' because of its pejorative overtones. We do not maintain that such an experience is morbid. On the contrary, we think that it genuinely brings peace to the worshipper, and pertains to his lasting psychic health and happiness. But nothing is gained by holding that God is love or some such statement as cognitively meaningful. The difficulties of saying so are as follows.

A statement which cannot be "confirmed-disconfirmed" by other factual statements cannot be said to be cognitively meaningful. John Wisdom in his celebrated paper 'Gods'⁴ has shown that the statement concerning a wise creator of the world is compatible with all kinds of objective fact statements. As such, statements concerning the wise creator of the universe cannot be said to be

2. J. N. Findlay, "Can God's existence be disproved?" in *Philosophical Theology*—p. 53ff.; "The Existence of God—A debate", in B. Russell's *Why I am not a Christian?*—pp. 146-149.

3. H. D. Lewis, *Our Experience of God*, Chap. V, XIII.

4. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1944-1945.

cognitively meaningful. Again, a statement which is not falsifiable is not regarded as cognitive. But a theological statement like 'God is love' is not falsifiable. Are there any specific, particular instances which can count against the statement 'God is love'?

"Yes, suffering which was utterly, eternally and unredeemably pointless. Can we then design a crucial experiment? No, because we can never see all of the picture. Two things at least are hidden from us; what goes on in the recess of the personality of the sufferer, and what shall happen hereafter".⁵

The very condition of falsifiability is absurd. One has to show that a particular instance of suffering is so and so *eternally*, with reference to the *whole* universe which includes eschatological references as well. Obviously the demand of falsifiability can never be satisfied, and so such a statement remains unfalsifiable. Another reason of non-falsifiability is that religion is a matter of whole-hearted undertaking. The worshipper is so much possessed by his God that he commits himself wholesale to Him. No matter how adverse be the circumstances, enthralled and made captive by the love of God, the worshipper would say: 'Even though Thou slay me, I shall cling to Thee still'; or, 'The Lord has given and the Lord has taken away, blessed be the name of the Lord'. For this reason, I think, MacIntyre correctly holds that religious attitude is non-tentative.⁶ Thus, 'God is love' or any such statements concerning the objectivity of God cannot be cognitively meaningful.

Some prominent Indian thinkers like Radhakrishnan do not consider the objectivity of God as essential for religious experience,⁷ but in the Western theistic thinking this is taken to be essential. It is pointed out that religious experience is always said to be of God. Therefore, it is pointed out that there must be an objective entity called God. However, from the mere definition of 'religious experience' we cannot deduce the objective existence of God. We cannot bring anything into factual existence by definition. No doubt God is felt to be transcendent, but

5. I. M. Crombie, "Theology and Falsification," *Philosophical Theology*—pp. 124-125.

6. Leon Pearl, "Religious and Secular Beliefs," *Mind*, July 1960—p. 409-410.

7. *Eastern Religion and Western Thought*—p. 22.

He is felt no less as immanent. Thus, in the manner of Otto, we can say that the worshipper is aware of a Beyond that is within. In other words, under suitable conditions the worshipper apprehends a transcendent God in the same way in which after a good deal of tutoring an individual is led to see beauty in the paintings of Picasso. And this is how a worshipper finds his God. Nathanael heard the following words of Jesus, 'Before that Phillip called thee, when thou wast under the fig tree, I saw thee'. This was enough for Nathanael to see in Jesus his Rabbi, the Son of God and the King of Israel.⁸ Similarly, the Samaritan was forced into saying: 'Sir, I perceive that thou art a prophet'.⁹ Again, the Roman centurion who saw all the strange things that had happened at the crucifixion of Jesus, said, 'Truly this man was the Son of God'.¹⁰ Thus, religious language helps a worshipper to see his Lord, Saviour, Christ, Rabbi and Master.

The fact of 'visions' and 'voices' is also mentioned in favour of the objectivity of God. This point however need not be laboured too much since, notwithstanding St. Paul, the theologians themselves do not make much of it.¹¹ Determined by the nature of religious training, culture, climate and weather, a worshipper sees Ram or Krishna or Christ and so forth. But from mere such 'visions' and 'voices', the objective reality of the deity cannot be established. The God of vision and His voices stand on the same footing as the projected image of a devil and an abusing voice in a paranoiac experience.

"That seems to be an experience of the same sort as mystics' experience of God, and I don't see that from what mystics tell us you can get any argument for God which is not equally an argument for Satan".¹²

Such visions and voices really describe the mentality of the worshipper and give us no information concerning God. But of course the religious experience need not be described as morbid. It has its own logic and grammar which the theologians as yet have not attempted to decipher. It is perfectly healthy experi-

8. St. John 1: 48-49.

9. St. John 4: 19.

10. St. Mark 15: 39.

11. F. C. Copleston's statement in B. Russell's *Why I am not a Christian*—p. 156.

12. B. Russell, *Why I am not a Christian*, p. 157-158; also see A. MacIntyre, "Visions", in *Philosophical Theology*.

ence and contains within it a dynamic force of working out immense individual and social changes to the lasting weal of all. Hence there is an urgency for precision and clearness in religious language. Religion is a complex affair and its analysis is also difficult. But the following factors appear to me to constitute religious experience.

1. A certain proclivity for religious experience is necessary for the worshipper. This might have been brought about either by one's infantile fatalities, as the Freudians would hold, or, it might have been there as one's native endowment.

2. There is a religious community which evolves a religious language to direct and canalise religious experiences into shareable statements. Of necessity such statements are conceptual. Their object is to obtain more or less uniform numinous experience of awe, wonder, dread, majesty and so forth.

3. Some provocative circumstances like the sudden loss of one's prestige, love or even meaningfulness of life's vocation, serve as occasions for exploiting religious proclivities and to bring about numinous experience with the aid of the current religious language.

4. The religious language tends to objectify the projected image in the interest of standardising religious experience. It is immaterial whether the projected image is an 'archetypal image' welling up from the racial unconscious of the worshipper, or, is a projection of his repressed Oedipus Complex, or is built up gradually during a long course of tradition in a certain direction.

5. This objective reference becomes easy since religious quality or the theonomous virtue is super-added by means of 'interpretation' into the actual things around us.¹³ For example, the setting Sun, the round ocean, for Wordsworth were felt to be haunted by a Presence. Similarly, the historical figure of Jesus came to be invested with the theonomous quality of being the mysterious Son of God, by the Roman centurion.

6. As a result of religious tradition certain religious materials, for example, the whole gospel of Christ at the hands of the Church Fathers and the ecclesiologists, or, the story of Ram or Krishna with their legends, rituals and the credentials at the hands of a long list of worshippers, appear to have gained faked

13. John Hick *Faith and Knowledge*, Ch. 6, and H. D. Lewis, *Our Experience of God*, Ch. IV & V.

independence. Here, according to the predispositions and proclivities of a worshipper some definite religious materials become apt as the object of his religious experience. Because of this aptness or fittingness, Ram or Christ at once clicks numinous experience in the worshipper. To the worshipper himself, who is unaware of a long period of his mental incubation or preparation for such an experience, Ram or Krishna appears to encounter him objectively. But this encounter with something objective of the worshipper is fictional, being brought about by the linguistic habit of the religious community. The deity is an echo of the worshipper's mentality. However, the religious experience dichotomises into the subject and the object, the creator and the creature. In a way the most subjective is the most objective and *vice-versa*. Thus, God and his worshipper are co-respondent. The mental make-up of the worshipper determines the nature of his deity. In principle, therefore, the nature of God should determine the characteristics of his worshippers, and *vice-versa*.¹⁴ This point has been well elucidated by C. G. Jung. According to him, persons differ from one another variously with regard to their functional and attitudinal typologies and mental make-up. Some men have the mentality of a prehistoric man, others have the make-up of a medieval man, and still others may have an advanced mentality. As the mentality will be, so the deity will be.

"It is therefore psychologically quite 'legitimate' when a medieval man solves his conflict to-day on a thirteenth-century level and treats his shadow as the incarnate devil. For such a man any other way would be unnatural and wrong, for his belief is that of the thirteenth-century Christian".¹⁵

Again,

"I am firmly convinced that a vast number of people belong to the fold of the Catholic Church and nowhere else, because they are most suitably housed there. I believe, too, that there must be protestants against the Catholic Church, and also protestants against Protestantism...."¹⁶

The position outlined here has some resemblance with Zuurdeeg's 'situational analysis' of religion.¹⁷ He calls God as

14. S. Coval, "Worship, Superlatives and Concept Confusion, *Mind*, April 1959—p. 220.

15. C. G. Jung's *Foreword* to V. White's *God and Unconscious*—p. xxii.

16. C. G. Jung, *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*, p. 282.

17. W. F. Zuurdeeg, "An Analytical Philosophy of Religion,"

the Convictor and the worshipper as the convicted with the aid of a confessional language of a religious community. Thus, the convictor exercises an absolute spell over the worshipper, who because of his proclivities cannot but be overwhelmed, subdued and overawed by it. No matter however objective the convictor may appear to the worshipper, we hold, it continues to be an overtone of the worshipper's personality as it has been moulded and conditioned by a religious community.

7. Thus, the real aim of any religious language is to induce numinous experience, which it does through some 'ideograms' or myths. Most probably a careful demythologising would help the emergence of a sounder form of language which would suit better religious purpose. However, if worshippers can derive religious value from the current language in use, then there is no necessity for its discontinuance for them. But it is doubtful whether any religious language at the present time is fully adequate to its task for the contemporary religious thinkers. Some mythology will remain with us for some more time yet. Concerning a would-be modern religion, Samuel Alexander wrote in 1930: 'Even it will have its mythology in order to be humanly accessible, but its mythology will be credible to the man of to-day'.¹⁸ Our gloss is, it will have fewer pretensions to cognitive meaningfulness, but will be better suited to evoking numinousness.

8. Western thinkers are likely to be sceptical of religious experience without reference to an objective and transcendent God. However, a Jain or a Buddhist need not believe in a transcendent deity, and yet he passes through the same numinous experience of being elated, uplifted and exalted. Only here this experience is confined to the *Samādhin* himself.

18. "Science and Religion," *The Listener*, December 3, 1930—p. 923.

Freedom and Responsibility

by

SHRINIWAS DIXIT

Rajaram College, Kolhapur

I

'Freedom' has many senses which it will be convenient to distinguish.

(1) There is a sense of Freedom in which 'I am free' implies 'I can do what I choose'. When we have this sense of Freedom in our mind, we need not raise the question what determines our choice, or whether choice is determined by anything at all. Freedom in this sense means our ability to translate our purposes into overt acts and physical consequences. I am not free, in this sense, if I choose to raise my arm but I cannot do it owing to a sudden attack of paralysis or on account of the constraining power of somebody else over my arm. In the same sense an Indian house wife is not free because she cannot do what she chooses. People of a dependent country are not free, in the above sense, because they cannot put into action their own intentions.

The existence of this sort of human Freedom can be empirically established. It exists to a certain degree and it is increasing, day by day, on account of the progress of science and technology.

(2) There is a second sense of Freedom which relates not to whether a choice can be made effective but whether an act of choice could have been otherwise than what it actually was. Freedom, in this second sense, means a genuine possibility of alternate acts of choice. It does not mean 'I can act in a particular way, if I choose'; it means 'I can choose—absolutely'. I am free in this second sense, if instead of choosing a course of action 'A', I could have chosen another, 'B', my circumstances, habits, history and dispositions being exactly what they were when I chose 'A'.

Does this Freedom exist? Are men free in this second sense?

By the very nature of the case, this issue cannot be decided on purely empirical grounds as it was possible to do in the previous case. For, whatever course of action is actually chosen, it

will be that one and not another. No appeal to experience can decide whether in place of the actual choice, some other choice was possible. Experience can vouch-safe for what *Is*; not for what *Could have been*. But the question at issue is whether something which is not actual could, nevertheless, have been actual.

But, then, there is the consciousness of Freedom. While making a choice I often *feel* that I can choose one or the other of several possible alternate courses of action. Even regarding a past act of choice our feeling is similar. We feel, we could have chosen what we did not choose.

Some people, however, argue that this consciousness of Freedom is an illusory consciousness. "If the falling stone had consciousness it would have felt that it gravitated towards the earth of its own free will".

What does it mean to say that consciousness of a free choice is an illusion? Could it be an illusion? Is not the whole essence of choice in its freedom? A choice which is not free is no choice. It is a contradiction in terms. An unfree choice is just as meaningless as a square circle. Whatever is meaningless cannot be experienced. But choice is experienced. Therefore, choice is free.

Why did people think that choice was not free? Presumably, because they thought that a free choice would involve a want of determination between an act of choice and everything else. It is thought that a free act of choice, if it existed, would cut itself asunder from the rest of the universe and make for chaos. But, nothing of that sort need really happen. There can be a *felt* determination between my self and my act of choice, whether I chose a course of action 'A' or 'B' or 'C'. A given self in the given circumstances can *determine* any one of a number of alternate acts of choice.

But what is determination? Determination in a general sense means a connexion between two entities. It can be of many varieties.

One is logical determination. The premises determine their conclusion. It cannot be that the premises 'A' and 'B' are true and their conclusion 'C' is false. This determination of the conclusion by the premises is logical determination. We express it by saying that the premises *imply* the conclusion. More popularly, we say, "When the premises are given, the conclusion also is given". Let us call this Implicative Determination.

If one denies this Implicative Determination between a self and its act of choice, does one deny every kind of determination? By no means. There can be a Creative Determination between a self and its acts of choice. It is determination in the sense that there is a *felt* nexus, connexion or bond, between the self as it is now and what it wills or chooses next moment. It is the author or creator of the modification of its own will. But the *existence* of a particular modification of the will is not implied by the *essence* of the self which creates it. Two antagonistic acts of will can be consistent with the same self in given circumstances, which is not at all conceivable in the case of two antagonistic conclusions and the same set of premises. The self is not a premise and its choice is not its conclusion. The reason is that the premises *imply* the conclusion while the self *creates* its act of will. Both Implication and Creation are, however, ways of determination. Freedom in the second sense, which we are discussing, means Creative Determination.

If in some given circumstances I have to make a choice between a trip to Bombay and a trip to Madras, after some deliberation I shall decide in favour of one alternative. But, whatever course of action I choose, my Freedom is equally true and real.

(3) The choice mentioned above, however, is not on a par with a choice between what I regard as 'right' and solicitations of animal impulses. Here, if I respond to the latter, I am not free. I shall have asserted my Freedom only if I chose the path of duty. Otherwise, I am declared a *slave* of passions. Freedom, in this third sense, consists in modifying the will in accordance with the concept of the highest good, as apprehended by reason.

This sense becomes clear, especially, in relation to a future choice. This minute, at ten O'clock in the night, I decide, after taking into account all relevant circumstances, to get up at five O'clock tomorrow morning. I convince myself that it is not proper to lie in the bed after the body has had sufficient rest. Human life is too precious to waste in that manner. If, tomorrow morning I actually get out of the bed at five O'clock, disregarding the severe cold outside, I have acted freely, because this was the decision of reason. If I continue to lie in bed, temporarily persuading myself to change the previous night's decision, on account of the warmth of the bed, I have *given way* to the solicitations of the senses. In the former case, that is to say in case I actually get up, one does not say, I have *given way* to reason. On the contrary, I will have established my Freedom.

This looks absurd if we apply, here, the second meaning of Freedom described above. For, in this case Freedom consists in acting in accordance with a past decision and not "in spite of all past history". The absurdity vanishes if we remember that Freedom has a third sense, namely, 'modifying the will in accordance with the concept of the highest good as apprehended by reason'. Morality requires that man should have the capacity to exercise Freedom in this third sense.

(4) This capacity to exercise Freedom (in the third sense) is also called Freedom in ethical discussions. When it is asserted, 'Man has Freedom', what is often meant is that man has the capacity to make reason the supreme guide of his conduct. It means he has the capacity to exercise Freedom in the third sense—a capacity which qualifies him permanently. This is the fourth meaning of Freedom. Freedom, in this sense, is an attribute which belongs to man by virtue of his being rational.

II

Having analysed four senses of Freedom, I turn now to 'Responsibility'. The two concepts are, obviously, logically related: There cannot be Responsibility without Freedom. Since Freedom has four senses, it is natural to expect as many senses of Responsibility to correspond to each one of them.

(1) Legal Responsibility comes first. A man is legally responsible to the extent that he could have done or refrained from doing what the law enjoins, *if he had chosen*. Legal Responsibility presupposes Freedom in the first sense. I am responsible for something implies, in this sense, that *I* did the thing in question—that the thing is the translation into overt acts of my purposes.

Responsibility, in this sense, is compatible with denial of Freedom in the second sense. If one holds that every act of human choice has certain necessary antecedents which make it inevitable, one is certainly denying Freedom in the second sense. But such a person can certainly give meaning to Responsibility in the first sense. He will argue that it is proper to award rewards and punishments (which is implied by Legal Responsibility) for certain acts, because the acts of human choice are (partly) determined by rewards and punishments. There is nothing wrong in punishing an act simply because the modification of the will from which it proceeded is determined by certain antecedents. By punishing the act we want to determine some future modification of the will.

In thus arguing, it is not realized that one is relating Freedom and Responsibility in their non-corresponding senses. If we take them at the same level, i.e., if we consider Freedom in the first sense and Legal Responsibility, we find that Responsibility becomes meaningless when that Freedom is denied. If a man cannot do what he chooses to do, there is no point in holding him responsible for what is done or left undone. It is no use arguing that Responsibility in the first sense is compatible with denying Freedom in the second sense.

(2) Our second sense of Freedom was—a genuine possibility of alternate acts of choice for a given self in the given circumstances. This is Freedom as the Existentialist conceives it. Life is a series of such acts of free choice. At every moment we are crossing the Rubicon. This involves the tremendous Responsibility of choosing one set of consequences rather than another. It gives meaning to the drama of Existence, to human predicament.

Responsibility in this second sense stands for the propriety of the consequences of a man's act of choice falling on his head. If I choose not to heed to my doctor's advice to take complete rest, I am responsible for my consequent illness.

(3) This Existential Responsibility is, however, different from Moral Responsibility. Moral Responsibility is the logical correlative of Freedom in the third sense. Morally I am responsible if I do not choose as reason dictates. In the third sense of Freedom, it is exhibited only in right acts. To act wrongly is to be unfree. It is interesting to note that Responsibility in the third sense is equally asymmetrical. I am responsible (morally) when my act of choice is not determined by reason guided by the concept of the highest good. There is no meaning in saying 'I am responsible for a morally good act' in the third sense of Responsibility.

(4) But it has a meaning in the fourth sense. I am responsible for both my right acts and wrong acts because, as a rational being, I am *always* a responsible agent. It is an attribute which (normally speaking) permanently qualifies me, just like Freedom in the fourth sense which is a permanent capacity to act freely (in the third sense). Responsibility in the fourth sense corresponds to Freedom in the fourth sense.

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Book Review

An Analysis of Knowing. By John Hartland-Swann. George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1958. Pages 141. Price 15 s.

In this book Mr. Hartland-Swann presents the decision-analysis of knowing *that* statements. To show the legitimacy of his analysis he feels the necessity of describing "the logical behaviour of 'know' in its various operational roles". How 'know' functions, namely, in knowing Jones, knowing French, knowing that the earth is round and knowing how to play Canasta etc. What sort of relationship exists between knowing *how* statements and knowing *that* statements. He acknowledges the importance of the similar attempts made by Ryle and others to understand "the logical status of know", yet he thinks that "these attempts do not go far enough". For example, in Ryle's work "there is not much clarity as to the precise relation of knowing *that* to knowing *how*". Mr. Hartland-Swann rightly thinks that "the recent attempts to understand the logical behaviour of 'know' have cleared up certain prevalent confusions", yet in their own turn these attempts "have generated a host of new and unnecessary problems". By undertaking the decision-analysis which he thinks is "more thorough-going", he hopes to remove these unnecessary problems. He also hopes that his analysis will "enable a number of essentially philosophical disputes to be discussed more fruitfully and settled more expeditiously".

Mr. Hartland-Swann uses the term 'analysis' in a slightly different sense than the way in which this term is used by most of the present-day philosophers. By 'analysis' is generally meant giving a logically equivalent statement or a set of such statements. But Mr. Hartland-Swann does not hold such a view for his decision-analysis. For example, when Mrs. Smith claims 'I know my daughter will marry you', Mr. Hartland-Swann thinks, "it would be unsatisfactory to translate Mrs. Smith's know-statement into 'I have decided that my daughter will marry you'." "Decision-analysis is offered merely as the essential *basis* of Mrs. Smith's know-statement". "When you say you know that S is, was or will be P, you are in effect announcing that you have made or accepted some decision".


Mr. Hartland-Swann attempts to disillusion philosophers about such falsehoods as, 'If you know you cannot be mistaken' and 'If you know you have to give a conclusive evidence'. The inventors of these falsehoods think that sometimes when we preface our sentences with the expression 'I know' we are really not having a know-frame of mind. In such cases we should preface our sentences with such words as 'believe', 'think it probable' and 'am sure' etc. These philosophers are really suggesting us to alter our linguistic habits. Their suggestions are based on the fact that there is always a logical possibility of our being mistaken about empirical statements. No empirical statement can be so verified that its truth may be conclusively established. Mr. Hartland-Swann partially accepts the view of these philosophers. He grants that all empirical statements, including sense-statements, are corrigible. However, this does not inhibit him from using 'I know' with some of the empirical statements. It is not only statements about the present but also future predictions and scientific generalisations that can legitimately be said to be known. Mr. Hartland-Swann thinks that the suggestions of his opponents to alter our linguistic habits are useless, since "neither a common man nor a scientist is disposed to accept them". However his disagreement with these philosophers does not imply that he is following common-sense as against a philosophical theory. He thinks that the question whether one should or should not use 'I know' with a particular statement "cannot be settled by an appeal to that nebulous authority called common-sense". "To obtain an unambiguous answer, we must appeal to some special theory of knowing".

Like all special theories of knowing Mr. Hartland-Swann's theory has difficulties of its own. Let us discuss a typical difficulty which his view entails. As has been pointed out above he does not accept the view of those who suggest to alter our linguistic habits, yet he himself makes similar suggestions. And his own suggestions, as we shall see, are not well-grounded. He thinks that when one makes such a claim as that 'there are mountains on the other side of the moon' one cannot have a know-frame of mind; one can have only a belief-frame of mind. One who believes in the ruling 'If you know you cannot be mistaken' can readily say that one cannot claim to know that there are mountains on the other side of the moon, for the reason that one can possibly be mistaken in his judgement. But Mr. Hartland-Swann does not accept the view that mere possibility of a mistake can check some-

one to make a know-claim. So he makes a fresh start for denying the legitimacy of a know-claim in this context. He argues, "What inhibits me from saying 'I know' here — ? Well — the answer seems obvious enough. We cannot see either with the naked eye or with a powerful telescope, the other side of the moon and therefore have no means of verifying or falsifying the proposition that mountains exist in the locality." This remark implies that one cannot make a know-claim concerning the mountains on the other side of the moon, for the reason that one cannot have a look at the other side of the moon. But in this sense it is also impossible to have a look at the world — either with one's naked eye or with a powerful telescope — which existed before there were human observers on the planet Earth. As a matter of fact, if Mr. Hartland-Swann's view is correct then most of the historical statements and future predictions fall outside the boundary of knowing. It is really very surprising how Mr. Hartland-Swann thinks it legitimate to make a know-claim concerning the statement that the world existed before there were human observers on the planet Earth, when he happens to deny such a claim concerning the statement that there are mountains on the other side of the moon. What inhibits him from making a know-claim concerning the latter should also inhibit him from making a know-claim concerning the former. He may say that there is a dominant scientific decision concerning the former which is lacking in connection with the latter. But this fails to support his position. For when he makes the above remark he wants to indicate the conditions in which a know-claim is to be made. It implies that if a know-claim does not fulfil these conditions it is not a genuine know-claim. So the fact that there already exists a know-claim or a dominant decision, fails to support his view, for it is possible that such a know-claim may not be genuine. On the other hand, to take the vote of the scientists on the issue whether one should or should not use 'I know' on a particular occasion is quite silly. A scientist would rather be surprised to hear such a question as "Do you know or merely believe that there are mountains on the other side of the moon?" It does not lie in the domain of sciences to discuss such questions.

On various issues one may find it difficult to be convinced by Mr. Hartland-Swann's arguments. Though the book is short, it deals with a good number of problems to which the concept of knowing has relevance. However, it does not seem to be as persuasive in solving any philosophical problems as in generating

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fresh ones. When describing the various operational roles of 'know', one may be surprised to find that Mr. Hartland-Swann presents even an ordinary house-wife and a scientist as if they have undergone a sufficiently high training in philosophical technique. They do not merely *support* but *speak* Mr. Hartland-Swann's philosophy. Nevertheless he should be congratulated for his new style of analysis. The book is sure to catch attention of those who are interested in the problems of knowing.

Indian Institute of Philosophy.

SURESH CHANDRA.

Books Received

1. *The Six Ways of Knowing*, (2nd Edition), by Dharendra Mohan Datta, published by University of Calcutta, Price. Rs. 12/-.
2. *An Introduction to Peirce's Philosophy* by James K. Fiebleman, published by George Allen and Unwin Ltd., price 50s./- net.
3. *The Concept of Man* (A Study in Comparative Philosophy), edited by S. Radhakrishnan and P. T. Raju, published by George Allen & Unwin Ltd., price 42s./- net.
4. *The Ethical Animal*, by C. H. Waddington, published by George Allen & Unwin Ltd., price 25s./- net.
5. *Self, Thought and Reality* (2nd Edition Enlarged), by A. C. Mukerji, published by the Indian Press (Publications) Private, Ltd., Allahabad, price Rs. 10/-.
6. *Letters of Swami Vivekananda*, published by Advaita Ashrama, price Rs. 6/-.
7. *The Western Intellectual Tradition*, by J. Bronowski and Bruce Mazlish, published by Hutchinson & Company, price 30s./- net.
8. *Morals for Mankind* (The Paul Anthony Brick Lectures) by Herbert W. Schneider, published by University of Missouri Press, Columbia, Price \$ 2/50.