


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


THE ANNALS

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PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENT AND SCIENCE

Special Editor of this Volume

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
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FOREWORD

An issue of *THE ANNALS* devoted to government and science needs no justification. The challenge to our scientific and technological position, implicit in Soviet space conquests, has resulted in a virtual consensus that government should act to correct such deficiencies as may exist.

But this consensus disappears amid the welter of diagnoses as to what is wrong with our system and an even greater quantity of prescriptions and panaceas as to what should be done.

The national government is clearly committed to a dominant role in stimulating, promoting, and supporting science, scientific research, and technological development. Since World War II numerous programs have been initiated and tremendous sums have been made available for research and development. And the willingness of Congress to underwrite further expansion is not flagging. Cold war threats and general competition with post-Sputnik Russia effectively deter tendencies toward niggardliness or economy in this sector of public expenditure.

Yet the very ease with which financial support for scientific programs can be secured may obscure many difficult and perplexing policy and administrative problems connected with the role of government in scientific research and development. Money alone will not eliminate shortages of trained manpower. It may even complicate scientific progress by, among other things, intensifying bureaucratic tendencies and increasing restrictions on desirable freedom for research. Money may also distort the content of research programs and divert the application of research energies. And in any case, financing is but one part of a complex problem.

In a recent address Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky, the President's scientific adviser, suggested the fundamental character of the challenge facing the American people, by emphasizing that the country needs a general upgrading of its citizens' intellects, if we are to progress scientifically. He pointed out that even the generally held concept of science is usually erroneous in that the average citizen gets technology all mixed up with science and confuses products that enhance human comforts with ideas of science.

"Our national objective," Dr. Kistiakowsky declared, "should not be the creation of an elite corps of intellectuals, but rather one of raising and improving the intellectual tone of our whole society. . . . We cannot achieve a desirable level of scientific activity until there is not only its acceptance by society but a conscious desire to cultivate and encourage intellectual excellence."

If indeed Dr. Kistiakowsky's description of the problem is somewhere near the truth—and I fear that there is much evidence to support his views—then the problems facing us are truly tremendous. They will not be solved by mere tinkering; they will require a reshaping of public attitudes, a redirection of public energies, for we are then talking about social, political, and economic change.

This issue of *THE ANNALS* presents no consensus of views, but it does present some clear and appropriate analyses. Selection of the topics for treatment was no easy task. Some subjects which are obviously important are not dealt with. Articles on rocketry and space research, on science and foreign policy, on scientific manpower, on geophysics, and on many other topics would have been appropriate

and significant additions to those which are included. But space limitations prevented their inclusion. Nevertheless, an impressive start has been made by the several authors in exploring the subject of government and science and in laying a foundation for an understanding of some of the complex policy and administrative problems in this critical field of national interest. Unquestionably, it is only through such exercises in critical analysis that we can move in the direction of creating the values which Dr. Kistiakowsky feels are so necessary. If this issue contributes in a small way to such a re-examination of basic values, it will have justified itself fully.

I would, incidentally, like to express my appreciation to Mr. Edward Dawson, who assisted with the preparation of this issue during the four months that I was out of the country.

NORMAN WENGERT

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The Challenge of Government Science

By JOHN C. HONEY

ABSTRACT: The failure of government science to meet Russian accomplishments in space research poses fundamental questions about American governmental and social institutions which are of deep concern to public administrators. These questions do not find their solution in relatively minor adjustments of the administrative machinery such as have been made since the fall of 1957. They relate to our pluralistic values, our lack of a sense of national purpose and our system of Presidential leadership made weak by the checks and balances which are grounded in the Constitution.

The contrast between Russian and American scientific capacities, and the relative ability of the two societies to plan and to direct resources to those activities which further the national interest, lead to the following basic questions: do we need constitutional reform to provide for a stronger Presidency and for a modification of the costly and inefficient federal system? Must we not anticipate national planning so as to assure that the creative and productive capacities of the country go first to efforts of high national importance? Beyond these basic questions there are a number of urgent matters which challenge public administrators, for example, the quick development of an effective research communications system and the treatment of scientists in government in a manner commensurate with their importance to the national well-being.

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IT COMES as a shock to realize that the challenge of government science to public administration today lies largely in the failures of governmental science. The challenge, of course, reaches far beyond public administration, even when broadly conceived as embracing every aspect of the governmental processes. American society as a whole is involved in this failure of governmental science.

Although federally financed research and development amounts to something less than half of all science in this country it is, from the public point of view, the most responsive and responsible. Industrial firms pursue research as an adjunct to their individual productive efforts and economic objectives. Universities encourage it to advance knowledge in general and to enlarge the capabilities of their faculties. But government conducts and supports science in the fulfillment of its national responsibility. When the national interest suffers a severe setback through the inabilities and failures of major government research programs, as it did in the fall of 1957, and has on numerous occasions since, it is unavoidable to conclude that the processes of government—public administration—face a serious challenge indeed.

How could failure arise out of the great structure of American governmental science with its thousands of dedicated and creative servants, its hundreds of laboratories—some governmental, some located elsewhere but financed with public funds—its unending flow of marvelous achievements? And how on the other hand was it possible for the Soviet Union, which only forty years earlier had been in the throes of revolution, which less than two decades before had been physically wracked by the greatest war in history, to show scientific progress well beyond American capacity?

These are questions which thoughtful citizens, including many directly engaged in the governmental processes, have been driven to ask. In spite of early assurances from some politicians that the gap in accomplishment between Soviet and American science was nonexistent or of little moment, the continuing evidence belies such views. The notion that we had never intended to be in the race with Soviet science in the exploration of space reassured only the most naive. Governments are responsible and effective only insofar as they succeed in meeting national needs and interests. It could scarcely be argued, for example, that the impetus given by Russian accomplishments and American failure to the nations of Asia and Africa to find their solutions in the Communist pattern, were of no significance to the national interest.

Weaknesses in government science

Observers of the government scene had been concerned prior to 1957 with a number of weaknesses in the relationship of government to science. The organization for the conduct of scientific affairs was clearly chaotic. At the top there were several bodies, notably the National Science Foundation, the Interdepartmental Committee for Research and Development, and the President's Science Advisory Committee, in addition to the National Security Council, all with responsibilities for advising the President on national science policy. The respective roles of these organizations, as policy framing and advising agents on scientific matters, were at many points unclear. Furthermore, several of the most important research bureaus were illogically and inhospitably housed in major departments. Others existed in a kind of "power limbo" as independent agencies.

Leadership in this period was a mat-

ter of special concern to those who saw the government's research programs as particularly crucial. The interest in scientific affairs in the White House was tepid; the advisers on science policies were timid or distracted by other responsibilities, or unsure of their authority. The derogation of basic research by a Secretary of Defense in this period and the vacillation over defense research budgets were symptomatic of executive branch attitudes. It was not possible, either, to detect extraordinary Congressional leadership.

As for the scientist in government, he had been assaulted by McCarthyism and had witnessed the spectacle of a Secretary of Commerce siding with parochial business interests against the detached findings of the National Bureau of Standards in the famous battery additive case. Furthermore, the government scientist was paid as other civil servants; no better in spite of the unique function he fulfills. He could rarely attend professional meetings; could almost never travel abroad. His communications and publications were restricted by security regulations, many of which transcended the bounds of sense and utility.

The government's current and anticipated needs for scientists and engineers were largely unknown. This was equally true for the universities and industry. In consequence it was not possible to give informed attention to the potential supply in the universities of the country and to provide guidance and incentives for spurring the output of technically equipped manpower. Education proceeded as it always had, a highly individualistic operation.

Science in the Soviet Union

Since October 1957, there has been a gradual realization of the true nature of the status of science and education in

Russia. We have learned of the national dedication to learning which pervades the Soviet Union. We are beginning to understand the extent to which the communist leadership is willing to divert resources to education and science. The able, technically trained person occupies an honorific position quite different from that which is his lot in the United States. His material rewards are high, so high in fact that it would be a severe downward adjustment for him to exchange positions with American university and government scientists. He is aided in his work by excellent equipment; he has access to practically all important foreign scientific works, in translation. Perhaps of greatest significance is the evidence that Russian science is largely carried on in a context of social purpose and that creative talents still produce with remarkable vigor.

New American response

The last two years have witnessed two levels of response with respect to American science and the research programs of the government. The first of these is action-directed, and is evidenced by many administrative steps described in other articles of this issue. The second level of response is found in a greater sense of urgency and a growing feeling that more profound problems and more fundamental changes may be implied in government science than have yet been widely articulated.

This deeper, second level of response probably reflects an expanding awareness among American citizens that Russia's achievements in science threaten the United States and all democratic governments, not only militarily but in the very essence of their institutional arrangements for implementing the philosophy of popular sovereignty. Some of the problems related to national pur-

pose, leadership, goal-setting and planning which come to the fore as we look at the current state of governmental science are discussed in the following pages.

NATIONAL PURPOSE AND LEADERSHIP

With growing frequency these days one hears in responsible quarters that the United States lacks a sense of national direction. Contrasts are drawn to the Soviet Union where American visitors are finding a widespread urgency and purpose in every type of activity. The Soviet problem is simple, of course. National purpose has been predetermined by the leadership. It is unitary, easily articulated, and constantly pressed upon the citizen. In essence it is the development of communist society and its extension to other parts of the world. What is meant by "communist society" is growing in attractiveness: in terms of security, increasing material comfort, excellent educational opportunities, health benefits, recreational and artistic outlets. Of great importance is the sense of national *esprit* associated with accomplishments in space research and exploration.

In the United States the noble ideal of individual self-fulfillment has been and remains the central theme of the nation. This objective, worked out in a frontier environment and under the aegis of a governmental structure designed to dilute authority, has resulted in an astonishing pluralism. Every man sets his own goals, and in ordinary times his conscience as much as his government dictates the degree to which he will actively contribute to the national interest. The multitude of goals and the high degree of similarity in range of interests of the two national political parties reflect the pluralistic nature of our society. It also suggests, as does the history of third parties in this coun-

try, that unitary approaches seem to be antithetical to our national make-up.

The problem which presents itself in the competition for national progress between Russia and the United States is well illustrated in the treatment of scientists and engineers and in the provisions for technical education in the two countries. The success of communism depended in great measure on the expansion of the technical base of Soviet society. In consequence attractive conditions have been provided for scientists and engineers, and scientific accomplishments are widely rewarded and honored. Technical education and scientific education have been made the birthright of the able and gifted and are provided without cost, in fact with subsidization of the individual. In the United States, while we admire the creative scientist, we have done relatively little to reward his unique capacities and contributions, in part, on the grounds that egalitarianism forecloses undue attention to the gifted. Few special educational opportunities have been available to the potential scientist. Talent has risen to the top through the interplay of many social and individual forces and it has been smothered and lost in a similar manner. The planned emergence of the gifted to posts commensurate with their capacities has been unheard of in the United States.

Our national purpose

The only occasions upon which it has been found fitting to enunciate a national purpose have been emergency ones—in this century the two great wars and the great depression. And in the latter case national purpose rapidly dissolved into partisan feuding as soon as the first remedial steps to avert economic collapse had been taken. In these periods science found its place in the scheme of the national effort;

through the National Research Council in World War I; through the National Resources Board's report, "Science—A National Resource"; and through the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) of World War II.

It grows clearer with each emerging piece of evidence on Soviet Russia and Red China that the purposes of the state are exercising a powerful influence on the peoples of those nations. Lacking the physical threat of depression or war our own national purposes remain as diffuse as during any peacetime period in the past.

The fundamental question is thus posed whether the United States, given the highly individualistic character of the goals which move its citizenry, can meet the competitive challenge of communism. In the abstract and ideal situation, each citizen would be animated so that his energies would be distributed in appropriate amounts to meeting social responsibilities and to fulfilling his own capacities. The practical problem for the student of government is to determine whether measures may be taken which would provide clearer opportunities for the enunciation and implementation of national purpose.

Limitations of our constitutional system

This being a time of national and cultural peril unparalleled in American history, it is perhaps not too imaginative to speculate about some elements of our constitutional system and their utility for the present. We seldom reflect on the possibility that the act of genius of 1789, if blindly adhered to in the twentieth century, may spell national failure. We infrequently ponder on whether the rate of adaptation to modernity which our system of judicial review permits is so slow that as a nation we may already be on the brink of

displacement as a great power. The economic and political values which motivated the framers of the Constitution were eighteenth-century responses to mercantilism, autocratic government, and the needs of a loosely knit agrarian community. The tightly interwoven, heavily populated, complex society of today may not be able to function effectively upon terms set so long ago.

Do we find, for example, a frustration of the means for framing and enunciating national purpose in the built-in competition between Presidency and Congress? History, and administrative experience, demonstrate beyond doubt that strong institutions have strong spokesmen. Under our prevailing system of checks and balances, Presidential leadership of a high order comes about only through the juxtaposition of crisis situations and forceful personalities. We have no assured continuity of leadership in the office of the Presidency and hence one of our primary sources for the generation and articulation of national purpose is in constant ambiguity. The Office of the Presidency, freed from some of the constraints of Congressional review, less limited in ultimate program and fiscal responsibility, and more able to move at home and abroad—that is, unhampered by Congressional and judicial pressures—might be a source of national purpose which is now seriously wanting.

Important issues

Under such circumstances there could be a resolution of one of the important issues affecting science that has confounded the federal government for many years, namely, the level of support to be devoted to fundamental research. There is no absolute answer to the problem; whether we encourage basic research depends on many fac-

tors. For example, does the scientific community find the flow of basic knowledge adequate or is much applied and developmental work frustrated because we lack underlying facts? Are other nations supplying us with basic knowledge and is this a reasonable arrangement given our own strong inclinations to applied and practical work? Are the talents of the scientific community for fundamental research being adequately utilized or are they being diverted to the production of hardware? These considerations and many others go into the ultimate formulation of a position on fundamental research. If the national interest suggests, after reasonable exploration, that increased funds must be diverted to basic research, the strong Presidency could effect such a move. As it is, the currents that flow around the processes of making funds available for fundamental research are so numerous and unpredictable that real doubt remains as to how well the national interest has been served.

While we tend to argue that what emerges from the prevailing system of give and take serves, in general, the common good, this supposition too must be questioned. It is conceivable in an age of rapid change and ever rising challenge that the pressures exerted through this system reflect a parochialism which has little bearing on the true national interest.

Similar doubts must be raised about the efficacy of the constitutional distribution of responsibilities between states and central government. The trend has long been toward the modification of the states from sovereign powers within the federal framework to administrative units. Can we risk awaiting the outcome of the evolutionary process or are more radical measures implied, such as possible constitutional reform?

These are profound and serious questions, ones which students of govern-

ment and administration may need to explore in earnest as the challenge of communist accomplishment grows.

POLICY AND PROGRAM FORMULATION

In the absence of clear national goals which the nation is striving to fulfill it is not possible to develop in our research and development programs the sharp sense of direction and purpose which will permit a determination of priorities and emphases. The technically trained man in automotive engineering is, under the prevailing scheme of things, performing work no different in value from that done by the engineer engaged in government rocket research. Indeed, if wages be the criterion we place a considerably higher value on automotive engineering.

There are profound implications for American society in the realization that the communist competition is demanding that we set priorities and direct application of our inevitably limited resources to those activities which most directly affect and serve the national interest. One can foresee the modification of our entire system of production and distribution, with controlled output of consumer goods and a severe restriction on the peculiarly American institution of "want-creation" as a likely development. Public service oriented activities would expand faster than at present since the government would divert a higher proportion of the national income to education, research, health, housing and cultural endeavors.

If such predictions are accurate the national government will need to devise and administer systems to control production and distribution. It will have to find means of diverting resources to socially desirable ends while retaining such essential ingredients of democratic society as widespread consultation and channels for the expression of dissent.

A tremendous challenge will be presented to public administration under such circumstances.

Planning of research and development

Exploration of these larger social, economic, and cultural implications of the present crisis goes beyond the intended scope of this paper. However, we can appropriately look at the existing arrangements for program planning especially with reference to how they affect the government's research and development activities. For in this area it is possible that some practical moves for improved practice can be made with relative ease. Thoughtful attention to the program-planning process inevitably forces a concern for clear articulation of national objectives, knowledge about the current status of the nation's strategic position, and knowledge about manpower and resource supplies.

At present, planning for the government's research and development activities is no more well developed or long range than is planning for any governmental functions. Since nearly all such research is carried on for practical purposes it is bound, in its conception, to reflect the approaches taken in the government to planning and programming generally. Characteristically, federal operations are conceived on a short-term basis, reflecting the budget and appropriations systems. Lacking long-term goals, government thinking is usually dominated by a "crash" and *ad hoc* atmosphere. The research and operating problems being faced reflect the questions which have previously been posed and these in turn depend in great measure on the machinery employed.

Planning under the National Security Council

At present, the broadest issues related to the national security and de-

fense are handled in the National Security Council (NSC), which assesses the nation's security posture at any given time in the light of the evidence available, and arrives at judgments which are then recommended to the President. The military research and development program is designed to be consonant with the policy positions which emerge from NSC deliberations and subsequent Presidential decisions. Crucial to the matter of how foresighted the NSC can be—how anticipatory of the major future lines of action which the government must pursue—is the nature of its planning. Authoritative critics say that since it is composed of several Department representatives it suffers on two counts: first, the immediacy of operating responsibilities colors its sights and forces it to concentrate on the here and now rather than the future; and second, it can never serve as a detached, reflective agent to examine future needs and responsibilities of the government since it must try to resolve conflicting departmental views and come up with compromise solutions for the President.

Given such national security planning machinery it is not surprising that research and development planning has been too little oriented to the more distant future but rather too much concerned with immediate problems and conflicts. While there are many contributing factors, certainly the foregoing explains in part our failure with respect to space research. Farsighted planning would have included a vigorous program of outer space experimentation, recognizing the extreme significance to the free world of maintaining a posture of pre-eminence in this technical and scientific realm.

In another respect the National Security Council arrangement is highly unsatisfactory for planning purposes; one which bears directly on research

and development. While the NSC has been concerned with the national supply of technical manpower, it has never been in a position to see this problem in the context of the entire problem of education in a democratic society. This is precisely because of the security orientation in the NSC mandate. Until the training of scientists and engineers can be dealt with as one facet of the national problem of future manpower needs, until their training can be planned for a substantial period ahead, say at least ten or fifteen years, taking into account industrial, university, governmental, and other requirements, we are bound to come up with fragmentary and distorted results.

Other federal agencies

In recent months the Office of the Science Adviser to the President has expressed the view that we have need for long-range planning to determine the direction in which the national scientific effort should move. Indeed the intention has been expressed by that office to engage in such planning. However, it seems certain that the planning of research and development, including attention to the problems of education and to the encouragement of basic research, needs an environment of greater generality and more detachment from operational demands than can be found in either the Office of the Science Adviser or the NSC.

The other agency at the Presidential level which is, in fact, concerned with all activities of the executive branch is the Bureau of the Budget. Its functions of policy and fiscal review and the limitations inherent in this review process are almost too well known to mention. The Bureau has been, especially in recent years, the President's agent for effecting economy and for striving to bring expenditures and income into balance. But at no time in

its history has the Bureau been sufficiently detached from the annual budget process to permit the kind of perspective on departmental and agency plans and programs, to allow it to qualify as a planning body.

In the departments and agencies planning is still in a most rudimentary state. A few departments have had, or now possess modest units concerned with policy and program development which use secretarial services in common. In some instances research has been considered beyond the scope of the planning units. By and large, in spite of the heavily applied character of departmental research, there has been little interplay at a planning level between policy, operating and research people.

A POSITIVE PROGRAM

One can readily construct a formula for the rational determination of goals and program plans to embrace the totality of government responsibility including research and development. This formula might consist of a Presidential planning board or Chief of Planning in the White House, equipped with staff and authority to muster the extensive information required to formulate long-term, five- or ten-year, goals and schedules of annual programs. With such a central planning body in the White House, complementary planning units might be found in each department and agency, and in the major subunits thereof. These would have access to a common pool of basic data about the national condition, for example, population projections, economic indicators, available and anticipated resources, and manpower supplies.

Formulas of this kind are easy to construct in the abstract, and are perhaps far from the reality of any national planning machinery of the future. But they serve to suggest the nature of the need, and speculation may be warranted

since few public administrators, be they students, scholars or practitioners, if the literature is indicative, are directing much thought to the development of such machinery. The public-planning function has been given lip service for a generation as an element in the administrative process. But the planning which receives most attention is directed to urban government and to physical planning, in a quite limited sense.

Numerous other opportunities for administrative inventiveness are at hand in the government's research endeavors. We need to develop really adequate arrangements for communicating research findings and to provide rewards and incentives to the scientist in the public service which are commensurate with his value and not simply with egalitarian philosophy. We need to channel funds to the secondary schools and universities for classroom and laboratory construction purposes, as well as to as-

sure scholarships for all persons of sufficient ability to profit from higher education. We need to discover better means of expeditiously concentrating large-scale resources on major research problems, where the national interest is involved, and where the heavy cost of research tools precludes ordinary approaches. It would also be desirable to work out with the states allocations of mutual research responsibility in shared program areas.

However, attention on the part of public administrators to such specifics as these should not convey an impression that the government is now successfully meeting the competitive challenge from Soviet Russia.

Only when we see a widespread public interest in facing the fundamental problems inherent in our own political and social structures can we feel hopeful that popular government may be able to meet the challenge of communist accomplishment.

Recent Developments in the Relationship of Government to Science

By E. R. PIRE and R. N. KREIDLER

ABSTRACT: National concern for science has increased as the recent developments in the relationship of government to science testify. The government's extensive role in scientific activities is witnessed by the numerous agencies and department divisions which have been created or extended in their scope. The growth of government-science operations has brought with it the present experimentation for a better administrative structure. One of the newer attempts to promote co-ordination in governmental science was the Presidential appointment of a Special Assistant to act as a liaison between government and science in the executive branch. He is particularly well suited for this role of co-ordinator as chairman of both the Science Advisory Committee and the Federal Council for Science and Technology. The augmentation of the government's role in science and the accompanying proliferation of scientific agencies has created a need for scientists who are both versed in technical subjects as well as in the operations of the government. These specialists may be secured if the academic institutions realize the nation's growing need.—Ed.

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DURING World War II and in the period following, members of the scientific community have evolved relationships to government and national policy quite similar to those developed by economists, lawyers, and social workers during New Deal times in the nineteen thirties. Beginning with Vannevar Bush, a succession of men, including Oliver T. Buckley, L. A. Du Bridge, I. I. Rabi, Detlev W. Bronk, James R. Killian, Jr., and, at present, George B. Kistiakowsky, have served both as chief delegate of the scientific community and as symbol of the involvement of science in national policy.

This involvement, which started with the restricted technological requirements of a "hot war," has grown with the mounting diplomatic and economic pressures of the "cold war" to include a far-reaching concern with problems of national survival and world leadership. Indeed, its present scope may be described as "intellectual preparedness" for the requirements of national and international life in today's revolutionary world.

The first outlines of this broadening involvement of science with government are recorded in the Senate hearings of the Seventy-ninth Congress. At that time the Senate was exploring the problems of transition from war to peace and assessing and evaluating alternatives for the postwar period. Out of these hearings, especially the testimony of Vannevar Bush, came the first of a series of new government agencies which were to codify and give substance to the newly important and newly identified relationships between science and national life, and between scientists and public policy.

This article will seek to explore some of these relationships and the need for public understanding of the reasons for their existence. It also will be con-

cerned with what can be expected of them, and how these new relationships are developing into an institutional framework, the normal device by which citizens manage their public affairs in a democracy.

THE NEW AND THE OLD

Before beginning this discussion, a large part of which will be concerned with the creation of new government agencies dealing with science, two observations need to be put on the record.

First, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Office of Naval Research, and the National Science Foundation, the major innovations in the family of new federal agencies for science, were truly a new approach in a major sense. Yet, they also were logical outgrowths of wartime agencies, such as the Office of Scientific Research and Development and the National Defense Research Committee. Moreover, they had historical roots in a whole family of institutions going back to the early years of the Republic. The Public Health Service, the Department of Agriculture, the Geological Survey, the Weather Bureau, the Coast and Geodetic Survey, the National Bureau of Standards, and the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences are only a partial catalogue of the long involvement of government with science.

While recognizing that something new between science and public policy began to happen in the postwar years, it also is clear that it was not so new as to be without roots and precedent in our national past. To emphasize this continuity is not only useful to those with a taste for the threads and patterns of history, but also is of some significance in understanding the evolution of the broadening relationships of government to science which are still in midstream.

Parallel with the 1930's

The second observation takes us back for a moment to the parallel with the New Deal when a new family of agencies was created to carry out public policy in the economic and social areas. At that time, many new public functions which might have been lodged within existing cabinet departments were vested, instead, in newly created agencies outside of departments. This proliferation of independent agencies was motivated, in part, by the pragmatic urge to get on with the job, but also by the desire in Congress and the Executive Office to observe the efficacy of these operations in some detail. Independent agencies had their own hearing in Congress and their own review in the federal budget process. They also had a certain prestige position in the Washington complex. The White House social calendar included receptions for heads of independent agencies who, in number and by protocol, did not quite fit into the more traditional White House nights for the Judiciary, the Congress, and the Cabinet. In passing, we might observe that after the first Sputnik was launched, science, too, was included in the White House social calendar.

After nearly two decades of administrative experience, the government began to change the status of the host of independent agencies generated in the prolific days of the New Deal. Some were moved under the roofs of existing cabinet departments, others were pulled together in the new Department of Health, Education and Welfare, still others remained independent.

Although this analogy to the New Deal period can be overdrawn, the government still responds in similar ways in its search for new scientific and technical functions that are required, and in its experimentation with alternative formulas for getting these functions per-

formed. Presently, there are many patterns. The structures of several cabinet departments have been modified to strengthen the role of science, and new policy groups have been established in the Executive Office of the President. In fact, since World War II, there have been two major modifications each year in the organization of science in government. All these actions have been motivated by a compelling desire to find coherent and orderly ways for undertaking a growing number of scientific activities. With the federal government supplying half of the total national expenditure in science and technology every year, it has not been easy to determine which scientific and technological activities should remain in independent agencies, which should be brought together within some existing cabinet department, and which should be the province of a new agency. Moreover, it has been difficult to determine the best way to formulate a government-wide policy for science, and the best way to incorporate scientific judgments and assessments in the formulation of national policies, both domestic and foreign.

Effective administrative structure

The present ferment and the present experimentation with the administrative structure are symptomatic of the search for ways to have the total job done most effectively, that is, government operations, and ways to make it possible for Congress and the executive branch to observe, understand, appraise, and govern. To the extent that Congress, on the one hand, and the executive branch, on the other, should, and must, control and direct all public agencies in fulfilling their responsibilities to the electorate, the search is bound to continue.

Part of the difficulty stems from the fact that the term "science" is used broadly and loosely within government

and without. It includes, in this paper, technology. For it covers the broad spectrum of basic research, the search for new knowledge and understanding; applied research, the early attempts to convert science into technology; and, finally, engineering or development, the design and building of something new and useful. Unless "science" is understood in this broad context, important elements in the relationship of government to science are irretrievably lost.

The relationships of science to military operations and to such things as public health and agriculture are well understood. But in the contemporary age of the cold war—thaw, or not—science has intruded into diplomacy, disarmament, psychological warfare, and the development of economically depressed areas of the world. In these broader aspects of national policy, the scientist now joins hands with the government policy-maker, the educator, and the economist, in his concern with the total vigor and dynamics of the nation's economic and intellectual life. The new "age of science" has greatly enlarged the responsibility of government not only for the economic and social well-being of the nation but also for the health and progress of its scientific and technological achievement. Under these conditions, the scientific community, no less than the body politic, and the technical "braintrusts," no less than the man on the street, need to understand better the relationships of government to science.

SCIENCE IN GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

In order to detail some of these relationships, it may be useful to describe the responsibilities of a few government agencies, both independent agencies and cabinet departments, which illustrate the variety of ways in which government and science interact.

The oldest postwar independent agency is the Atomic Energy Commission. It uses science and technology to meet the nation's needs within a vast area of responsibility from the development of nuclear power to the manufacture of nuclear bombs. The spectrum of its technical operation ranges from sophisticated manufacturing to the conduct and support of fundamental research. The size and scope of this effort illustrate only slightly the working-out of Parkinson's law; for aggressive technology requires an intimate association with basic research to uncover fundamental knowledge, and forge it, through engineering activities, into realities. Inevitably, the scope of the Commission's responsibility requires close relationships with industry and academic institutions not only in the physical and engineering sciences but also in the biological and medical sciences. Atomic energy has wide international aspects too, as the discussions on peaceful uses and suspension of nuclear tests serve to remind us. Thus the Commission's uses of science and technology cannot be confined to its own operations; they become inevitable factors in the formulation of domestic and foreign policies.

Chronologically, the next postwar scientific agency to be established was the National Science Foundation. The Foundation is charged with the major responsibilities for the support of basic research and education in the sciences, and this obviously cannot be done without the direct participation of the nation's universities. So it is that the Foundation has become greatly involved in, first, graduate education, and then, of necessity, with undergraduate education and even high school instruction and curriculum. The Foundation's interests overlap with those of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and with most federal activities in science

and technology. The National Science Foundation is concerned also in the foreign field, as its roles in the Antarctic Program and the International Geophysical Year amply attest.

The nation's youngest scientific agency is the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Historically, it is the successor to the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, an agency which provided the scientific and technological basis for the aircraft industry. The Space Administration's emphasis now, of course, is on space activities, but its operations likewise extend to industry and education. For whether we like it or not, we are heavily involved in a cold war rivalry for technological and scientific supremacy, and space has become a battleground, both in the technology of vehicles and the elegance of scientific experimentation.

Although the public responsibilities in atomic energy, basic research, and space exploration were placed in independent agencies, the lack of an obvious cabinet department to house them was in all likelihood the least compelling reason. More probable was the desire in Congress and the executive branch to deal with these areas directly in order to facilitate the identification of problems and objectives, to control budgets, and to more easily evaluate performance. In two instances—the Atomic Energy Commission and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration—Congress also established special committees of its own in response to a heightened public interest.

Science in the departments

A number of cabinet departments also have scientific and technical activities either in support of their own departmental operations or to provide government-wide technical services. The largest of these, of course, is the De-

partment of Defense, where there is a critical need for maintaining close working relationships with the scientific community in order to stay in the forefront of weapons technology. Since time and again, scientific research has resulted in major improvements in weapons and the development of revolutionary new weapons, the Department of Defense must conduct and support a vast program of scientific research and development. Because of the size, character, and scope of its scientific operations, the way in which the Department of Defense uses and supports science and technology has a major impact on the economic and educational life of our own and other nations and on domestic and foreign policy.

The ever-growing role of science in the operations of the Department of Defense has brought with it many managerial changes in the last decade. The most recent reorganization resulted in the appointment of assistant secretaries for research and development in each of the military departments, the creation of the Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the establishment of a new post, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, to which Dr. Herbert York, a scientist, was appointed.

In the State Department, the post-Sputnik reaction led to the appointment of a science adviser to the Secretary and the re-establishment of scientific attachés in six major missions abroad. Similarly, following the meeting of the heads of government of the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) Organization countries in December of 1957, a science adviser to the Secretary General of the NATO was appointed and a Science Committee established to advise the North Atlantic Council.

These changes in organization in the State Department reflect the enlarged role of science and technology in foreign affairs. We are witnessing their

increased use on many international problems ranging from disarmament to world economic development. There is, furthermore, a rapid extension of scientific co-operation among nations. New programs for furthering scientific exchange are providing manifold opportunities for scientists to work together on common scientific problems.

There are other government departments, however, which have scattered scientific and technical activities, originally placed there for historical reasons, which are no longer of major departmental interest. These technical bureaus, despite a government-wide or national need for their services, do not always receive proper attention from their parent department. They have become, in effect, a bypass along the new roads the department has traveled. In the Department of Commerce, for example, the National Bureau of Standards receives over sixty per cent of its support from other federal agencies. The Weather Bureau has similar problems. Originally, the Weather Bureau was located in the Signal Corps of the Army, but it was later transferred to the Department of Agriculture. This might suggest that "weather" was more important to farmers than to the Army. When the Civil Aviation Agency was established in the Department of Commerce, the Weather Bureau was moved from Agriculture to Commerce. Was "weather" now more important to aviation than to farmers or the Army? Last year, aviation was moved out of the Department of Commerce into the new Federal Aviation Agency, but the Weather Bureau stayed where it was. Was "weather" now less important to aviation than it had been, but more important to commerce than to farmers and the Army? Obviously, the services of the Weather Bureau are important to many federal agencies and to the nation as a whole. If it cannot obtain

proper support for its operational programs and research activities from a parent department, even though it serves other public agencies and numerous private institutions, its technical services are bound to be inadequate to the needs of all.

Similar observations can be made about the Coast and Geodetic Survey, another scientific and technical organization in the Department of Commerce, and the technical bureaus of the Department of the Interior. In the latter department, the Geological Survey, the Bureau of Mines, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries all conduct scientific activities not only in support of the Department's own mission, but in order to provide other government agencies and private institutions in industry and education with scientific and technical data. In all these cases, adequate support must either be forthcoming from the parent departments, or these activities must be identified and studied to determine the feasibility of regrouping them.

SCIENCE IN THE WHITE HOUSE

A partial enumeration of the independent agencies and cabinet departments which use science and technology in the conduct of their operations indicates the scope and depth of the government's reliance on the nation's underlying scientific resources, and the interactions of science and technology with government operations. Obviously, broad guidelines are needed that adequately provide for dealing with common problems and competing needs, but which recognize that science and technology cannot be isolated from agency missions and operations.

Within the last two years, the President has taken three major steps to increase his use of advice and assistance in the development of policies governing the over-all relationships of

government to science in the executive branch. He appointed a Special Assistant for Science and Technology, moved the Science Advisory Committee from the Office of Defense Mobilization to the White House, and created the Federal Council for Science and Technology by executive order. These three actions reflect the seemingly paradoxical needs of the Presidency. The first two grew out of the President's need for informed scientific advice as free as possible from personal or departmental positions in the development of national policies. The third, recognizing that policy cannot be made in a vacuum, provided for the participation of policy officials from those government agencies with major operating programs in science and technology in the formulation and execution of policies.

Although the Special Assistant has unique responsibilities that differ from those of the Science Advisory Committee, together he and the Committee can serve the President in a number of ways. They can make intensive studies for him on various aspects of research and development programs. They can undertake other assignments for him of an advisory kind and provide answers to specific questions. They can mobilize the best scientific advice of the country and make recommendations with regard to ways in which American science and technology can be advanced by the government to serve the nation's interests. And they also can take the initiative in three specific policy-making areas: (1) in identifying and calling attention to the need for policy; (2) in securing the most competent examination of problems; and (3) in recommending alternative solutions.

A reading of the Committee's public reports on space, research policy, and science education reveals that a broader approach was undertaken than merely a merging of the views and objectives of

federal departments and agencies. In trying to define what the government should do by direct action or stimulation and what the private sector of our society might be expected to do, these reports were a first attempt at dealing within the federal government with the totality of the nation's problems in these areas.

A large part of the work of the Special Assistant and the Committee, of course, is taken up with certain problems of national security whose major content is technological in character. In dealing with many of these problems, such agencies as the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the State Department naturally will have their own departmental views. These individual positions may be valid from the point of view of the agency's statutory responsibilities and functions, but they will not always include an analysis of the technological choices open to the policymaker which would permit an evaluation of possible alternatives. Since the Special Assistant and the Committee are not directly concerned with supporting agency objectives they frequently can provide the President with an opportunity to examine more than one course of action.

Special Assistant as liaison

The Special Assistant, although a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee and, in fact, its chairman, has individual functions to perform for the President that the Committee cannot undertake. He is in a position to inject daily the scientific and technological judgments required in formulating public policy. While the Committee advises, the coupling of this advice with administration policies is the particular responsibility of the Special Assistant. In addition, because he is in constant contact with government agen-

cies and departments, the Special Assistant can present within the inner operations of the White House his own views on achieving integrated operations in science and technology.

Although the Committee and the Special Assistant provide advice on policy matters, a means for obtaining the participation of the operating agencies is needed both to develop and execute government-wide policies. The Federal Council for Science and Technology was established, also under the chairmanship of the Special Assistant, to perform this function. Now broad scientific and technical programs, such as oceanography which is of interest to the Departments of Defense, State, Commerce, Health, Education and Welfare, and Interior, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Science Foundation, can be evolved for the government as a whole. For the participation of all interested agencies is necessary in achieving coherent planning and mutual support. In this way oceanography can be viewed as a national resource, and the needs of this science, the needs of the agencies, and the needs of the nation can be considered as a whole. The interactions of the President's Science Advisory Committee and the Federal Council for Science and Technology, through their common chairman, the Special Assistant, may ensure that special fields of science vital to the nation can be given attention even though they do not fit into any specific department or agency. The procedures of the past, where every scientific field was viewed in terms of a narrow departmental need which, in turn, cut it into bits and pieces in the annual budget cycle, can now be modified.

WHERE DO WE STAND?

The ferment in the relationships of government to science and the rash of

experimentation with the structure of science in government are producing a pattern that, although evolving slowly, is taking definite shape. The structure created at the White House level in response to the need for broad policies and direction will most likely continue.

The cabinet departments, too, are getting their houses in better order. Greater attention is being given to providing, at the secretary's level, for a policy official who can oversee all of the scientific and technology activities of a department and provide policy guidance for their activities. At the same time such an official can supply the secretary with technical advice in the formulation of broad policies. The existence of the Federal Council for Science and Technology has been an important factor in this regard, since it required the departments to send, as representatives, policy officials who could speak for their departments as a whole. Ultimately, it may be necessary in some of the older departments to have a special assistant for science and technology or an assistant secretary. For this pattern, which already exists in the Department of Defense with the appointment of a Director of Research and Engineering, has strengthened the scientific and technological operations throughout the Department. The Department of State, on the other hand, has special problems and has yet to evolve a satisfactory structure for properly relating science and technology to its responsibilities.

Among the independent agencies, the National Aeronautics and Space Agency and the National Science Foundation found early in their history that it was valuable to have technically trained people as directors. The Atomic Energy Commission has not had a technical person as chairman but has always numbered one scientist among its commissioners.

SCIENTISTS TO FILL THE NEW POSTS

Underpinning all the recent developments in the relationship of government to science, the creation of new scientific agencies and new government posts, are people. The many new jobs created in response to the increased importance of science and technology in our national life must be filled by people not only who understand the importance of science and technology to the nation but also who understand scientists and engineers.

Although it is not obvious that we will have enough scientists and engineers with the background and breadth of understanding about problems of government and public policy who can contribute the insight and understanding of their specialties, there are some hopeful developments. The scientific mobilization that occurred during World War II produced technical people who, by participating in new enterprises for the design of weapons, gained invaluable experience in industrial operations and in the operations of the military departments. They learned, as scientists learn, by doing and by experimentation of the interactions of science with government.

The current generation of young scientists and engineers is not gaining this experience and knowledge in anything like the same degree as the special environment of wartime provided. Nor is it adequately recognized as an important skill in our society to which our academic institutions should more fully respond. Yet people are being trained. One major training ground has been in

the government itself. The Atomic Energy Commission, National Aeronautics and Space Agency, and the Department of Defense, to name a few agencies, are training hundreds of young people. The younger staff members at Geneva, who participated in the nuclear test cessation negotiations, for example, were given a rare and unique kind of training. Similarly, the laboratories in universities and industry that do work for the government provide an experience similar in many instances to that provided at Los Alamos and the Radiation Laboratory during the War. These are valuable potential sources of a special type of talent that the nation may soon find indispensable.

Although a more rational handling of the relationship of government to science will depend heavily on finding qualified people to fill the new jobs, it is well to remember that in 1930, hardly anyone was called a "labor relations expert;" now every industrial company has one. The climate that will pull well-trained scientists and engineers into public service is dependent upon an increased understanding of the role of science in society, and this understanding is growing.

From time to time in the history of our nation, progress often has depended upon new approaches to problems and issues. In the last few decades this nation took far-reaching actions in the economic and social fields. At present, national attention is focussed on science. History would again seem to indicate that it is no time for despair, but, rather, a time of great opportunity and challenge.

Influence of the Past: An Interpretation of Recent Development in the Context of 200 Years of History

By A. HUNTER DUPREE

ABSTRACT: Although the eighteenth century spoke bravely of internationalism in science, its scientists were put under heavy pressure by the rise of the nation-state. Ease of communication in the nineteenth century made it seem as if science were the product of an international community, while at the same time science was becoming more dependent on nationally divided institutions for support. When in the twentieth century the free flow of information ceased, it became clear how closely science was tied to the various national units. The same pattern can be traced in the relation of basic to applied research. The eighteenth century saw the two brands of research as closely linked, but in the nineteenth specialization drove the two activities wide apart to form separate traditions. In the twentieth century military problems brought basic and applied research together again. Likewise the same pattern can be traced in the evolution of institutions within national units. The eighteenth century could envision comprehensive scientific institutions, but the nineteenth century created government, industrial, and university research institutions in separate compartments. The problems of the mid-twentieth century are defined by the basic relations among the various institutions within the nation, the very relations which the peculiar characteristics of the nineteenth century had obscured.

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SIR Joseph Banks, President of the Royal Society of London, was writing to his counterpart of the Institut de France in 1804, at the time the war had recently been renewed. He insisted that it had "always been my wish to promote the scientific intercourse among Nations—notwithstanding any political divisions which might subsist between them." Yet the hard facts of the struggle with Napoleon put his ideal under strain. If "I cannot maintain a correspondence with learned Englishmen in France, without being accused of employing them for political objects; and if gentlemen of known reputation and honour cannot visit your Country for the purpose of giving and receiving scientific information, without being exposed on every turn of public affairs, to the vile imputation of acting as Spies, . . . it will be impossible for me—either to preserve a constant intercourse of good offices between the Men of Science in the two Nations; or to insure for learned Frenchmen, who may come to England, those marked attentions and civilities, which it is my wish that they should receive in time of war as well as peace."¹

The scientist of the middle of the twentieth century will smile at this lofty ideal of the age of the philosophes. He well knows that national interest has become a paramount force in the affairs of science, that continued intercourse between the scientists of warring nations is beyond the imagination of practical men. Even while he smiles, however, the scientist harried by security checks and the demands of military research looks back at the eighteenth century with a feeling that it was a paradise for science and a model which

¹ Joseph Banks, London, to the President of the First Class of the National Institute of France, January 30, 1804, manuscript in the historic letter file, Gray Herbarium, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

might apply in the nuclear age if only men would be reasonable. Science knows no nation, and any connection between national interest and science, where it cannot be ignored, is a matter for shrugging apology.

THE RISE OF NATIONALISM AND SCIENCE

Admiration for eighteenth-century internationalism in science usually leads to the quotation of sentiments such as those of Sir Joseph, which can be found in great numbers in the documents of the years between 1770 and 1815. Nevertheless one must go on to ask: Why does the ideal of the complete internationalism of science become so explicit in the very years that the modern nation-state was taking shape? Is there no historical connection between science and the rise of nationalism? Is science, unlike art, literature, religion, politics, and philosophy, completely divorced from one of the primary forces at work during the past two centuries? The very explicitness of the pronouncements of the men of the era of the American and French Revolutions is a sensitive indication that the rise of nationalism was in fact straining the internationalism of science. Sir Joseph Banks was eloquent about the rights of scientists in wartime precisely because he was under attack in London by pamphlets, aptly signed "Misogallus," which accused him of being a collaborator with the French. And he was writing to the President of the First Class of the Institut de France not because communication was really so free between the two warring countries, but rather because the unsporting Napoleon had thrown so many vacationing Englishmen, members of the Royal Society as well as others, into jail with the collapse of the Peace of Amiens.

The difference between the eighteenth century and the twentieth lay not so

much in the absence of a connection between science and nationalism as in the fact that science had not yet made itself practically relevant to the affairs of nations. The eighteenth-century man took an intimate connection for granted. The great exploring expeditions of the late eighteenth century, the very ones which developed the scientific corps of naval expeditions to a high peak of specialization and efficiency, were inseparably mixed in their objectives. Louis Antoine de Bougainville went around the world in the joint service of science and France. Captain James Cook combined his objectives in the same way. For explorations of such scope, both military support and a nationalistic motive brought success where science alone was insufficient. Hence the eighteenth century knew well that an intimate connection between science and the nation-state existed.

Illusion of internationalism

The insight of the eighteenth century was lost, however, because of the peculiar experience of the nineteenth century. The general peace which lasted from 1815 to 1914 provided the backdrop for scientific accomplishments of unprecedented splendor. It was the century of the rise of chemistry. It was the century of Charles Darwin and the coming of age of biology. Even physics, seemingly so well worked out, moved into a new period of creativity before 1914. The great accomplishments of the nineteenth century seemed to be the work of an international community. None of the Western nations had a monopoly on science, and there was little to suggest that the two overshadowing phenomena of the century, the rise of science and the rise of an exclusive nationalism, had anything to do with one another.

The peculiar characteristic of Western civilization in the nineteenth cen-

tury which masked the connection between science and nationalism was ease of communication. Not only did the fruits of technology provide steamships and railroads to make communication easier, but the possibility of the migration of people, and hence of knowledge, from one part of the world to another came within the reach of the masses in Europe. This easy flow of people and ideas over national borders, a flow which had much to do with building the United States into a great and populous nation, gave an illusion of the existence of an international community for at least the Western world. Science flowed over national borders even more easily than other kinds of ideas. Those who lament American backwardness in science in the nineteenth century often overlook the fact that the very ease of communication with the scientific centers of Europe contributed to seeming backwardness. Alexis de Tocqueville is often quoted on the lack of American interest in abstract science. He is less often given credit for pointing out that the availability of European research removed the necessity of the repetition of such work inside the American national unit.

The ease of international exchange of scientific information all over the world produced such striking results that most scientists made the unspoken assumption that science was exclusively an international phenomenon completely divorced from the interests of nation-states. This assumption made it easy to overlook a profound dependence of science on the nation-state which was growing up all during the century almost unnoticed. Science is dependent on the institutions which house it and give it support, however much individual reputations outshine their institutional setting. During the whole of the nineteenth century after 1815 the support of science polarized around na-

tional institutions. Even the universities, German, British, and American, increasingly differentiated themselves from one another along national lines. Certainly government efforts in science, which were reaching huge proportions before 1914, were very much tangled with considerations of national interest. This connection did not worry anyone very much, however, because national institutions, even government ones, participated in the free flow of information which fed science such a rich fuel.

Impenetrable barriers

The first World War gave science a considerable jolt, and patterns of a close relation between science and weapons research emerged. The generation of scientists which fought the war nevertheless concluded from their experience that the national implications of scientific research belonged to that one horrible episode alone, and they emphasized a more self-conscious international feeling than they had before the war.

George Ellery Hale shifted his attention from the National Research Council, which he had been instrumental in creating for the purpose of the United States war effort, even before hostilities ceased. He saw the International Research Council, to which he turned his energy, as the logical institutional development for the postwar world. Hence American scientists shared little of the isolationism of their fellow citizens during the 1920's, and some of them could believe, in the interwar eddies of history, that a true international community of science not only existed but provided all the support which science needed.

But under the blows of depression, totalitarianism, and war the illusion of a true international community for science vanished, along with all sorts of other aspirations for a true international

community. A lack of free flow of peoples and information became a major characteristic of the mid-twentieth century. Speed and ease of transportation were irrelevant as national boundaries became impenetrable barriers to the movement of ideas. The scientists were rightfully dismayed, for the feeder of science in its great age, the nineteenth century, was gone. At the same time, they became aware of the hold that their national institutions had on them.

Nations such as the United States found uses for scientists which were intimately connected with survival. Much as they regretted the loss of the old feeling of world-wide community, many saw that the national interest in science represented new opportunities as well as inconvenient restrictions. The rapidity with which this adjustment was made is one of the great themes of the history of science during the second World War.

OTHER HISTORICAL DILEMMAS

The scientists who had reached maturity in 1939 had to make other adjustments. These adjustments were necessary in realms where history had placed them in situations that were completely obscured by the scientists' own ideas about their place in history. Just as internationalism in science had, like free trade, seemed the natural order of things because of unique factors operating in the nineteenth century, the relation of applied to basic research presented a historical problem to the generation entering the war. They were also ill prepared to understand the division of responsibility among the institutions in their own national units. The movements sketched in the ideas concerning nationalism and science can also be traced in the relation of basic to applied science and in the institutional development within the nations.

Applied versus basic science

In the eighteenth century, while science was largely in the hands of the genteel and technology largely in the hands of artisans, the happy lack of specialization allowed a free movement between basic and applied research. Alexander von Humboldt, Count Rumford, and in America Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson all showed the ability to combine an interest in science as a system of philosophical ideas and as a tool of men. If the eighteenth-century accomplishment in science as "ideas" overshadowed the practical results of science as "a tool of man," the philosophes still kept the two enterprises in close range of one another.

The order of the nineteenth century was specialization. The sciences themselves fragmented into specialties. In addition, the spectrum which runs from basic to applied science also became specialized. It would be easy to compile long lists of the accomplishments of basic research before 1914 and then match them by equally impressive and unprecedented achievements in technology. Even though basic science played an increasing part in these technological marvels, quite clearly two different groups of men wrought the discoveries in basic and applied research. So far apart did these two groups drift that they lost touch with one another. The basic scientist reserved his feeling of fellowship for other basic scientists like himself. He felt independent of the man concerned with practical problems and superior to him. And the results on both sides of the gulf were so spectacular that the parochialism of both basic and applied scientist became entrenched. In the last third of the nineteenth century a fundamental change took place, that is, the systematic harnessing of science to the problems of technology. Applied science began to earn its repu-

tation as the servant of man. Yet the two separate groups tended to go their separate ways as long as they had reasonable latitude in choosing the lines of research they wished to follow.

The experience of the first World War suggested that a marked acceleration in applied research, for instance concerning weapons, would quickly lead to questions for which basic research had no answers. At the same time the urgency of applied research drew off potential manpower from the supposedly cloistered haunts of basic science. The policy of the postwar period attempted to perpetuate the separateness of the two guilds. Occasional laments in the 1920's and 1930's indicate that thoughtful men feared that basic research was somehow losing out to applied research, but they did not explain clearly how advance in the applied area could detract from basic research, and they did not do very much about it. Weapons research was generally so unpopular a field in the interwar period that it provided little impetus to applied research and almost none at all to basic science.

On this theme too the generation of scientists who had matured by 1939 found that they had to make most difficult adjustments. Many of them were proud of being basic scientists, the choosers of their own problems by criteria fiercely divorced from practical considerations. Yet in the war effort they found their skill as scientists stretched to the utmost in solving problems which were, undeniably, terribly practical in their immediate results. What they had confidently left to the engineers before the war now became their business. And the engineer found that he was dealing with basic questions. All along the spectrum from basic to applied the gradations between the bands became blurred. The myriad definitions of basic and applied research which have sprung up since the second

World War have only emphasized the impossibility of drawing a line. And the basic scientist can no longer avoid many of the dilemmas which the admitted practicality of his work entails.

National institutional structures

A third line of historical development has played directly into the confusion of the scientific scene since 1940. Because many scientists were not aware of the close tie between science and their own national units, which the support of science entailed, they did not understand clearly the internal institutional organization in which they worked. In the United States especially the institutional structure was hard to understand because it was less centralized than in many of the other great scientific nations. Here again the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century had produced plans for the organization of science. Jefferson, John Quincy Adams, and others in the early Republic, had clearly envisioned a national university and a full set of scientific institutions for the country. They failed not in conceiving the structure of the institutions but in reducing their plans to working organizations. Their successors, who incidentally profited unawares from the great peace of the nineteenth century, created institutions as they needed them without asking ultimate questions about their nature and orientation. Great government scientific research agencies arose under the guise of mundane functions such as a Depot of Charts and Instruments or to meet the need for medical care among merchant seamen. Even the American university, which rose rapidly as the home of scientific research after 1870, asked few questions about its relation to other scientific institutions, such as those in the government, which were actually senior to it.

Shortly after 1900 a division of labor

among the scientific institutions of the country became firmly entrenched. The government limited itself to those areas of applied research which aided its own operations or which served some special segment of the population unable to provide for its own scientific service. The farmers were the most conspicuous example of the special segment. The government had no responsibility for basic research except in a few enclaves like the Smithsonian Institution, and indeed, congressmen asked very embarrassing questions when an agency such as the Biological Survey launched a program too evidently basic science. And even though government science prospered, the men who chose its service seemed somehow less pure than their confreres elsewhere. Industry looked neither to the government nor the universities for research, but began to develop its own laboratories. While one or two pioneers allowed considerable latitude to their scientists, the universal rule in industrial research was to stick close to the problems related to the products of the company. The industrial research laboratory developed a world of its own, with its own traditions.

Universities foster basic science

The universities, formed between 1870 and 1900 and financed to a new state of affluence in the twentieth century by the largesse of great wealth, were the keepers of basic research. It was their business to foster science independent of the vulgar uses which filled the minds of the government or industrial scientist. In their graduate schools, the universities trained scientists to a new pitch of specialization, but those who went into government and industry to undertake applied science usually had little effect on the academic institutions in which they had been trained. Indeed the scientists who dwelled in the halls of basic research had little sense

of being encased in an institution at all, much less one limited by its nationality. The instances were few where equipment was so expensive and complicated that the scientist had to think in large scale terms as an institutional administrator rather than as an individual.

American society possessed no mechanism for adjusting the relations among science as housed in the government, industry, and the universities. As long as the comfortable division of labor seemed to work, no one felt the need of adjustment. Industry and government accepted their role; the universities gloried in theirs. Co-ordination of their activities seemed not only unnecessary but also dangerous. The scientist of 1939 accepted this division as the natural order of things. He took his institutional arrangements so completely for granted that he tended to deny he had any. He was a free agent in the universe, and anything modifying his complete and untrammelled individualism was the worst of disasters.

New patterns emerge

In the despised haunts of applied science, however, new patterns had long been emerging which changed the scientist's relation to his underlying institutions and indeed his whole way of conducting research. As early as 1880, the Department of Agriculture stopped trying to be a university organized by divisions of knowledge and began shaping itself around the problems it needed to solve. Thus discovery did not come out of nowhere. The unsolved problem came first. Then specialists from various fields worked until a solution was found. Specialists remained in their own fields, but the problem brought them together with other kinds of specialists in a team. A generation later industry took up the same general approach. The results of this change of method are spread across the face of

the twentieth-century world. But the scientist was no longer the lone hero, choosing his problems and assaulting by his unaided individual wit. The problem approach and team organization were the engines which revolutionized the relation of science to the military at the outbreak of the second World War.

In all three of the lines briefly sketched above there was plenty of fuel for the disillusionment of the scientist who had reached maturity by 1939. He thought science was international, soaring quietly above the fevered interests of nations. He thought basic science was unconcerned with the uses to which it was ultimately put. At least that was none of his professional affair. He thought that his position in the institutional structure of his nation was either unimportant or nonexistent. The world since 1939 has seemed triply horrid.

Had the second World War joined the first as a temporary disruption of these three views of science in a vacuum, the postwar organization of research, and with it the life of the individual scientist, might have reverted to its nineteenth-century mold. Yet the postwar scientific scene has shown no sign of resembling even remotely the dominant beliefs of the 1930's. A new age has arrived which seems to be but a beginning.

THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY OUTLOOK

Internationalism in science in the mid-twentieth century is not a description of an actual state of affairs but rather the glimmer of a distant goal. The free interchange of information which wrought such miracles in the nineteenth century would do good service today, but the factors which made it possible have vanished. The national unit, with its military stake in science, is more robust than the international commu-

nity. Any increase in flow not only requires painful negotiations but is tied to the cause of internationalism in general. Science is not a separate sphere which can be gaily international while the world remains sundered. Scientists' hopes lie with those of the rest of mankind.

The harnessing of whole national scientific establishments to military applications pulled all scientists, whether they tagged themselves as basic or applied, into the same network. The most seemingly esoteric of basic discoveries are credited in advance with the possibility of practical applications. On the other hand the most practical of problems call for theoretical solutions far beyond the dreams of basic scientists. The world is no longer amazed when a formula becomes a bomb. And physicists working on bombs can complain that the mathematicians who furnish them formulae only work on the easy questions. Nothing in the postwar world, certainly not the thermonuclear bomb or the penetration of space, has lessened this interwoven pattern.

In the new institutional patterns the other two changes are clearly reflected. The national research establishment has laid bare its underlying structure. The neat, logical division of labor among the government, industry, and the universities has broken down. In its place stands a single structure linked together by a network of grants, contracts, and research corporations. The government, by the very nature of its interest in survival, is the major component in the new structure. Both the universities and industry look to it as the prime source of research funds and clues for the direction which research must take. Yet the government has not simply taken over science in the United States. The phrase "federalism by contract"

more accurately describes the state of affairs. Moreover, the problems of adjustment among the institutions of science are impossible to ignore.

None of the problems facing science in the postwar world can be solved by pointing to the limitations of the understanding of the generation which went into the second World War. In a very real sense that generation acted in response to the underlying historical realities instead of to their partial analysis of the place of science in history. In the free world they quickly chose a more limited allegiance than some distant and unembodied internationalism. They immediately turned brains versed in theory to practical problems which were relevant to the immediate crisis. They began changing their institutions and their relation to the government even before the outbreak of hostilities. Although some in 1939 believed that science could go its way without facing the problems of society, and although some still talk as if they wish it were so, scientists have not persisted in acting as if they live in a special vacuum.

It should help in perspective if not in finding solutions to realize that science has never operated in a vacuum according to rules of its own, however much the nineteenth century made it seem to do so. The major characteristics of the postwar scientific establishment have been many years in the making. Society faces a serious problem in digesting science as an integral part of its structure. But this is not a completely new problem or one more intractable than many others. Scientists can still seek solutions which recognize internationalism, the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, and individualism, but they must seek them in the same context as the rest of mankind.

The Need for a Department of Science

By HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

ABSTRACT: The Senate Committee on Government Operations, in which Senator Humphrey has taken an active role, has concerned itself with the need for a science department in the government. A Department of Science and Technology they have found would be a very necessary and essential adjunct to our governmental system. Its main purpose would be the co-ordination and centralization of the now dispersed federal scientific activities. The new Department would promote the clear-cut responsibility and authority in government science needed for the enhancement of our national security. Yet the reorganization of the existing science units contained in various departments and agencies of the government, has met strenuous opposition from sources in the Administration. In addition to the proposed bill providing for the creation of the Department of Science and Technology, the Senate Committee has initiated another bill now before Congress which provides for a Commission to study the various problems connected with the creation of such a science department.—Ed.

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THE *First Finding* of the original Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, submitted to the Congress in February 1949, and upon which the reports of the Commission were based, was that "the executive branch is not organized into a workable number of major departments and agencies which the President can effectively direct, but is cut up into a large number of agencies which divide responsibility and which are too great in number for effective direction from the top."¹

The proposal to create a Department of Science and Technology within the executive branch of the federal government, which I first proposed more than two years ago, was based upon that sound principle of government. This was three months before "Sputnik" brought the Congress and the American people to the realization that extensive reorganization of federal science programs was necessary if we, in co-operation with other free nations of the world, were to reassert our leadership in the field of science.

During the last decade the United States and the entire world have been caught up and swept along by fantastic advancements in the scientific world. The executive branch of the federal government and the Congress have, fortunately, taken the initiative, through more or less haphazard and unrelated actions, to provide a spearhead for progress to meet the challenge of greater technological advancements. It is imperative, however, that this country continue to be the motivating factor and maintain its lead in scientific development, and be prepared to carry on a comprehensive and constructive pro-

gram to meet the challenge of world communism. To continue this leadership, a complete re-evaluation must be made of present federal operations in science, research, and technological fields, and effective steps taken with the least possible delay to co-ordinate and improve the existing organizational structure of our government which carries on these functions.

DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENTIFIC AGENCIES

To meet the many problems as they arose, new agencies were created and efforts made to bring about improvements in the federal science programs. The Congress has provided necessary funds as required in support of such programs, and I am confident it will continue to do so. Among the most progressive steps taken to meet the objectives in the civilian science field were the appointment of a Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology; the creation of the President's Advisory Committees on Science and Technology and on Government Organization; the establishment of the Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific Research and Development, later superseded by the Federal Council for Science and Technology; the extension of the authority of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics through the creation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; and the establishment of Committees on Science in the House and Senate.

While these steps have been helpful and undoubtedly are necessary actions in pursuit of the over-all objective of efficient government operations in the field of science, further consideration must be given to still existing inadequacies not only in these agencies but in other areas which must be co-ordinated with operations of a similar or related character and reorganized under more cohesive administrative controls.

The basic approach to reorganization recommended by the Hoover Commission was prophetic in regard to the present status of science operations of the federal government. There are approximately fifty agencies which perform some science and research activities having direct application to the over-all science program of the government. In addition to the four Presidential advisory groups dealing with science, there are three major independent science agencies or commissions and more than forty components of other departments and agencies which operate science and engineering programs supposedly related to the major departmental mission for which the departments were established, or for which special agencies were created.

Some of these internal agencies, such as the National Bureau of Standards and the Office of Technical Services in the Department of Commerce, are performing services not directly associated with the primary mission or even related functions of the departments in which they are now located. Consequently, they do not receive the technical administrative direction necessary to insure operation at their highest potential. On the other hand, some of these internal agencies, which include the National Institutes of Health, the Agricultural Research Service, the Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Science Advisor to the Secretary of State, perform services which most authorities on science programs of the government feel do have direct application to the program areas of the respective departments in which they are located and should retain their present status.

CO-ORDINATION OF FEDERAL ACTIVITIES

From the beginning, the Senate Committee on Government Operations, on which I serve, in its studies of the prob-

lems, studiously avoided involving the civilian science activities with the applied science and research programs of the military departments which pertain to national defense and come within the jurisdiction of other committees, or with advisory or co-ordinating agencies or officials within the Executive Office of the President performing high administrative and policy functions under the direction of the President.

The major objective of the science and technology act of 1958, which I introduced as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Reorganization and International Organizations, was to bring about, under a Secretary at the Cabinet level, co-ordination and centralization of those federal activities now scattered among existing departments, as well as those which had grown haphazardly following World War II in the field of civilian science.

It was proposed, as an approach to these problems of reorganization and improvement of science programs and for the purpose of eliminating duplications and waste of scientific, technological, and engineering manpower, to (1) promote closer co-operation between federal agencies which carry on science activities; (2) improve, co-ordinate, and expand the federal science information and documentation programs; (3) afford adequate federal support for education in physical sciences and engineering; (4) encourage the establishment of institutions in areas of broad basic scientific activity, such as oceanography, meteorology, etc.; (5) to establish and maintain science programs abroad through the use of foreign currency credits; and (6) to improve and elevate the status of science within the legislative branch by creating standing committees in the House and Senate which would have direct jurisdiction over civilian science programs of the

¹ Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, *First Finding*, a report to the Congress, February 1949 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 3.

federal government. Thus full Congressional evaluation of all such activities and the relationship of these widely scattered agencies to similar programs and operations would be assured. All of these committee recommendations, except the proposal to create a Department of Science and Technology, have been activated in varying degrees, although continued re-evaluation and further appropriate actions to fully implement these programs are necessary to achieve fully the objectives sought.

A new department

The Committee on Government Operations was confronted from the beginning with four primary problems: (1) Would a Department of Science and Technology afford the necessary administrative controls and science leadership required to correct existing deficiencies in federal operations in science and research; (2) Would such centralization of functions and supervisory control afford an answer to the multitudinous duplications and waste that presently exist in our federal science programs; (3) Would it in any way impair any of the independent activities and basic objectives of certain of the specialized agencies which had been established by the Congress and the President, or cause any disruptions in existing science and research programs; and (4) If a Department of Science were to be created, which independent agencies, or components of existing federal departments, should be incorporated within such a department?

Provisions of the bill

In an effort to avoid disruptions of existing programs and to ensure that full appraisal of these problems could be made before any permanent reorganization was proposed the bill introduced in the Eighty-fifth Congress, and again in the Eighty-sixth Congress, to create

such a Department of Science and Technology merely provided for grouping of federal science agencies. The proposed Secretary of Science would have administrative control over certain of the independent agencies: the Atomic Energy Commission, the National Science Foundation, and the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, now the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; and certain components of existing departments: the National Bureau of Standards and the Office of Technical Services of the Department of Commerce, and the science functions of the Smithsonian Institution. The bill provided for no change in the basic statutes governing the operations of any of these agencies. Rather it was designed to promote more administrative efficiency in the government's scientific activities and to provide a framework for better co-ordination of all scientific functions. The committee proceeded under the assumption that, if a department was established, internal reorganization could be effected as experience and operation needs required.

There have been other suggestions relative to the creation of a Department of Science, which involve entirely different approaches. The proposal outlined by Dr. L. V. Berkner, President of Associated Universities which operate the Brookhaven National Laboratory for the Atomic Energy Commission, has received a considerable amount of support from scientists and administrators of science programs. Under Dr. Berkner's plan, the National Science Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Atomic Energy Commission would retain their independent status as specialized agencies, while the proposed Department of Science would set up centralized components in various areas of physical sciences, such as oceanography, meteorology, climatology, and standards.

OPPOSITION TO REORGANIZATION

In recognition of the varying points of view held by those who were active in the federal science program, the staff of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, in carrying out the committee's directive to draft suggested legislative proposals to meet the needs of the government, made numerous contacts with officials carrying on various science programs. Except in one or two instances, there was strenuous opposition to any change in the present organizational structure.

The Hoover Commission in its concluding report also warned of this type of resistance to any proposed reorganization efforts, as follows:

It is natural to expect vigorous opposition to reforms from agencies and groups, each of which approves heartily of reorganizations that do not affect its own immediate interests. The Congress must be prepared to accept this fact and give careful attention to the validity of arguments of those who would seek to escape reorganization, as many have so successfully done in the past.

... While honest differences of opinion certainly may exist as to the best method of accomplishing any particular reform, such differences should not be accepted as valid arguments against the desired objective. Once the practice of exempting certain agencies and excepting particular functions has begun, the chances of achieving substantial improvements in the efficiency of the Government will speedily diminish.²

At the hearings which followed the introduction of the bill proposing the creation of a Department of Science and Technology in the present Congress, all officials of the federal government who

testified were vigorous in their opposition to any legislation to bring about better co-ordination of science activities, and insisted on maintenance of the status quo.

Political interference with science

Objections were also expressed on the premise that it would inject politics into science activities; that the establishment of a Department of Science and Technology would bring scientists under bureaucratic control, which would be detrimental to the performance of the functions presently vested in various federal agencies.

This fear apparently exists only with reference to the brand of political overlordship emanating from an executive department; the brand of political control which could issue from the Executive Office of the President, and it seems to me most inconsistently, is apparently regarded as a benevolent variety of political control. This attitude ignores the fact that the President enjoys complete authority over the administrative functions of the executive departments, all independent agencies, and over the policies he establishes within his own office. In all instances, the appointees are named by the President. Those whom the President sees fit to vest with wide authority in the Executive Office of the President are his own selections, while those who are at the head of the departments and agencies must undergo close scrutiny as to their qualifications in their respective fields of operation before they receive Senate confirmation.

With particular reference to political interference, it is important to remember similar alleged forebodings in relation to the establishment of the present Department of Health, Education and Welfare, under which socialized medicine and federal control of education in the United States was said to be in-

² Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, *Concluding Report*, a report to the Congress, May 1949 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 47-8.

evitable. Nothing could have been further from the truth. It is a matter of common knowledge that, in the world-renowned laboratories and clinics of the National Institutes of Health of the Public Health Service, an arm of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the freedom of the research scientist to pursue his investigations, wherever they may lead, is a zealously guarded personal prerogative. Of course there is political control, but a control executed by a government of laws; a control which has enabled this country to take a pre-eminent position in today's world.

It is necessary to remember, too, that a Department of Science and Technology would be new in name only; its constituent agencies would be taken from those which now administer the relationship between science and the government. The need for the new Department exists because these relationships are being administered without the co-ordination so urgently demanded by the exigencies of the time. This objective is in accord with another recommendation of the Hoover Commission, that "The numerous agencies of the Executive Branch must be grouped into departments as nearly as possible by major purposes in order to give a coherent mission to each department."³

Progress in other areas

It is fortunate that real progress is being made in some scientific areas, as originally proposed in the Science and Technology Act of 1958, despite the present continuing disorganization. An illustration of this is afforded by Title

³ Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Recommendation No. 12, *Report on General Management of the Federal Government*, February, 1949 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 34.

IX of the National Defense Education Act of 1958 of which I was also a sponsor. This legislation requires the National Science Foundation to form a Science Information Service and an advisory Science Information Council to provide for the accumulation, translation, indexing, retrieval, and other services necessary to promote more effective availability and dissemination of the scientific literature of the world. Pursuant to this enactment, the Science Information Service was established and the Science Information Council was appointed.

Further, the National Science Foundation announced formation of the Federal Advisory Committee on Scientific Information, composed of representatives of seventeen federal agencies engaged in scientific information activities, the purpose of which, according to the Foundation, is to provide "an integrated approach to the Government phase of the intensified national science information effort." Also, the National Science Foundation supported the establishment, within the National Bureau of Standards, of the Research Information Center and Advisory Service on Information Processing, primarily to encourage automation in the processing of scientific information. However, the progress thus far made, through the information program and other programs now actually under way, toward effective co-ordination of all the government's scientific interests is grievously outweighed by that which still remains to be done.

Operations differ

One of the most persistent arguments constantly advanced against the creation of a Department of Science and Technology is that the programs, responsibilities, objectives, and operations of each of the federal agencies engaged

in science activities are different in character and have special fields of responsibility, which must be rigorously preserved. Those who make this contention insist at the same time that there must be a uniform science policy. Thus, while contending that a Department of Science would drain off manpower and scientists now engaged in the various programs operating within their own areas of activity, the fact that a centralized agency would bring all related science activities into closer contact and tend to eliminate the existing competition for and wastage of scientific and technological manpower, is completely ignored. The heart of this argument, as I understand it, is that the only way to ensure co-ordination is to continue the multitude of independent agencies operating in specialized fields and to have superadvisory or co-ordinating scientific groups within the Executive Office of the President act as their guardians.

Clear-cut responsibility

Those who place their reliance on co-ordinating devices such as interagency committees for improving communications and for providing stimulus to government science activities fail to recognize the built-in limitations of these approaches. By their very nature interagency committees cannot be creative except at a very low level of operation. They are inevitably restricted by the views of the most pedestrian and unimaginative members. Their product will almost certainly be a kind of lowest common denominator of their combined ideas. What is needed is dynamic, forceful, and continuing leadership which could best come from a cabinet department with clear-cut responsibility and authority in the field of science and technology. For it seems to me that the present structure of the federal gov-

ernment in other areas, with the programs devised and implemented by the concerted action of the Chief Executive and the Congress, is the obvious answer.

STUDY COMMISSION

At the hearings held before my subcommittee in April of this year, a number of witnesses suggested that, in order to solve some of the above outlined problems, a Commission patterned along the lines of the Hoover Commission should be established to make a study as to whether or not a Department of Science and Technology should be created. If such a department were found to be desirable, the Commission should then recommend to the President and the Congress which functions now being performed by other departments and agencies of the government should be transferred to such a department. It was suggested that the Commission should be composed of eminent authorities in the field of science, representatives of the federal government agencies which were engaged in basic civilian science activities, and members of the legislative branch of the government.

At the conclusion of these hearings, the staff of the Committee on Government Operations drafted a bill providing for the establishment of such a Commission. The bill was introduced as Senate bill 1851 on May 5, 1959. It was the view of the Committee that its provisions were broad enough to authorize the Commission to study: the need for strengthening American science and technology, one of our essential resources for national security and welfare; the reorganization of the existing departments and agencies to promote better centralization and co-ordination of federal science programs and operations; and the formulation of effective policies for training, recruiting, and utilizing scientists and engineers.

Witnesses testify

At the concluding hearing of the Committee, which was held on May 28, 1959, witnesses were invited to direct their testimony not only to the bill proposing the creation of a Department of Science and Technology, but also to the proposed establishment of a Commission on a Department of Science and Technology. Some of the spokesmen for the administration who testified at these hearings contended that there was no need for legislative action and opposed both proposals. Their opposition to the creation of a study commission to determine what might be done to improve and co-ordinate federal civilian science programs was based on the contention that the President's Science Advisory Committee and the Federal Council for Science and Technology, both of which were then headed by Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., would provide all the necessary information upon which the President could take appropriate action to bring about governmental reorganizations to correct deficiencies in present operations.

Government witnesses who opposed the creation of a commission to study these problems repeatedly placed heavy emphasis upon the personal ability and qualifications of Dr. Killian and the confidence placed upon him by the President and the scientific community. Yet, at that very moment, Dr. Killian's resignation had already been submitted to the President. Without reflecting in any manner upon the qualifications or potential leadership of any of the science advisors to the President, I think Dr. Killian's resignation makes it more imperative than ever that Congress reassert its legislative prerogatives in the field of science. An accountable officer, whether a member of the Cabinet or otherwise, should be made responsive to the needs of Congressional committees

which are attempting to eliminate the existing deficiencies in the science program of the federal government.

A real need exists

An analysis of the testimony of spokesmen who were representing the President at the hearing, will force the inevitable conclusion that it is the desire of the present administration to center within the Executive Office of the President all control over civilian science operations. If these recommendations are accepted, they would deny to the Congress access to information which is essential to the legislative branch if it is to perform its normal constitutional functions. It tends to pre-empt the scientists who are thoroughly informed and conversant about governmental science operation for the benefit of the President alone, and effectively prevents the Congress from obtaining information from qualified experts in the fields of science.

It was the conclusion of the Committee that a real need exists for a bipartisan Commission to study the problems related to the proposed creation of a Department of Science and Technology. Such a bipartisan Commission could find an equitable solution to the present chaotic conditions of federal science. The bill to establish such a Commission is now awaiting approval by the Senate and the House of Representatives next session.

It has been stated by many who oppose a Department of Science that scientists must be free to learn through observations and contacts with other scientists in order to cope with the problems of science in their own fields. It would be hard to imagine a better means of effective observation than to have the basic science programs co-ordinated under central administrative control, where daily observations and contacts

could be made as required, without having to make separate approaches to a number of individual officials and agencies carrying on related science programs with no central co-ordination of policy or operations.

Decision with respect to a creation of a Department of Science and Technology, or of another kind of authority

of no less eminence, is, in my judgment, the overriding issue and the obvious need. Fettered leadership, which experience has so often demonstrated, is all that can be expected from makeshift, compromise arrangements devoid of statutory authority and totally dependent upon voluntary co-operation for its achievements.

Research and Development, Economic Growth, and National Security*

By HAROLD J. BARNETT


ABSTRACT: Vital interest exists today in government research and development. Thinking people will discuss the underlying causes for the new interest. They may question, as Dr. Barnett does, the prevalent belief that research and development can be equated with economic transformation or that an increase in economic growth necessitates only an increase in government-sponsored research and development efforts. Accepting the fact that a correlation exists between research and development and economic growth, it is necessary to examine the paths open to the government in selecting its policy. Does not the uncertainty involved in research for future military innovations demand a recognition that multiple paths must be tried to achieve the desired results? The ends may best be achieved if government policy indicates only the objectives and allows the decisions for research-in-particular to be made by the separate research organizations. In the nonmilitary fields of research and development, it may be useful for the government to allocate funds to the universities for their research candidates and for the equipment to be used. Though research and development efforts do not necessarily cause economic transformation, there have been some demonstrable positive results, such as the revision of the negative premises for economic growth of natural scarcity theory.—Ed.

SINCE World War II, there has been a strong surge of public interest in research and development. There is wide belief that government should undertake and stimulate larger efforts. The new interests and attitudes, however, do not arise from new findings and deeper understanding of the social effects of research and development. Rather, the activism has developed out of yearnings and fears—a society's aspirations are always largely compounded from emotional drives. These may, in this case, be exerting a most desirable social thrust. But the origins of the beliefs and explicit forms of social improvement which they contemplate should be examined.

RECENT INTEREST IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

One origin of the wide interest in acceleration of research and development efforts is simply excitement over recent developments in pure science and the spurt of applied technical advances of the past fifteen years or so. Great advances in the pure science of chemistry and physics, and in atomic energy, computers, automation, satellites, plastics and other synthetics, miracle drugs, and so on, have whetted our appetites for their fruits, for more advances, and for more excitement.

The other two origins of the awakened interest in research and development are based on more reasoned premises. They are beliefs that research and development play a unique role in economic welfare and in national military security. The causation, which we now briefly discuss, is indicated in the following diagram.



It is generally asserted—we inquire into its truth later—that the rate of economic growth depends upon the pace of research and development. In turn, economic welfare is thought to depend upon economic growth. In one respect, this latter proposition is necessarily and obviously true, that is, if economic welfare is defined as output per capita and economic growth is defined as the rate of increase in output per capita. In addition, however, there is a more complicated hypothesis of the dependence of economic welfare upon economic growth. Since the thirties, very large powers for governmental intervention have been legislated into permanent United States statutes to prevent cyclical recession and depression. For the discharge of this responsibility, there is a substantial body of opinion which believes that rapid economic growth must be the major weapon. Since the rate of economic growth is believed to depend upon the rate of research and development, it is held that research and development should play a major role in promoting economic welfare, through averting depression.

Industry and ideology compete

Let us now turn to the chain which runs "research and development fosters economic growth which fosters military security":

(1) Soviet industry is reported to be growing at two or three times the United States 3 to 4 per cent yearly rate. If sustained, such difference in growth rate would have the Soviet Union surpass the United States industrial size in a generation or less. If, as is widely believed, industrial size and military strength may be equated, then the laggard relative rate of growth of the United States renders it militarily insecure, and the rate should be stimulated.¹

¹ For a view that industrial size and military strength should *not* be equated in view of changed military technology, see H. J. Barnett.

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* I am indebted, for critical comments on an earlier draft, to P. Cootner, K. Dofis, P. Glick, W. Hirsch, C. Hitch, H. Jarrett, S. Miller, G. Perazich, and N. Wengert. The errors which remain are mine.

(2) The United States philosophy of political and economic freedom is in a serious cold war competition with Soviet type communism in the underdeveloped nations of the world, particularly in the Far and Middle East. In these nations, political and economic freedom are not firmly established; and democratic and communist parties must contend for popular support. The ability of Western-oriented democratic parties to retain leadership depends upon achieving rapid advance in economic welfare; the advance is necessary to meet the demands of impoverished masses seeking betterment. The view is held that if the United States can achieve sustained and rapid growth, guide these growth-aspiring nations, and provide economic assistance, then extension of the Soviet dominion can perhaps be halted. If, on the other hand, the growth rates of the democratic nations fail to satisfy aspirations and fall short of demonstrated growth rates in Russia, China, and other communist countries, then, it is feared, most of the underdeveloped nations will fall into communist party hands. In summary, the cold war is viewed as a complicated contest in economic growth between the United States and the Soviet spheres, with vast populations in Asia and Africa at stake, and wherein the United States plays the principal role as example and leader in the free world.²

Arms race

Finally, a major reason for heightened public concern for research and development is the recent, rapid Soviet advance in military technology. The Soviet Union has almost caught up to the United States in nuclear weapons, she has surpassed us in missiles and rockets; we face an arms race in a modern form, a race for military research and develop-

ment. Indeed, in the present fluid state of military technology, there is considerable danger that the nuclear stalemate—"the balance of terror"—will be broken if we do not at least overtake Russia's missile technology lead, and match the technological pace in other major arms. These considerations indicate an apparent need for more and more effective research and development in the military sphere.

We may summarize the recent increased interest in research and development in the following way. There is great concern on the part of our government and leading citizens over the economic growth required: to maintain the industrial capacity necessary for the national security; to exert United States leadership in the free world; and to promote domestic economic welfare. If, in addition, research and development are considered major determinants of growth, then much of the interest in growth shifts to research and development. Thus research and development, already foci for reasons of military technology and scientific excitement, also become poles for the concern over economic growth.³ For these reasons research and development have leaped into social prominence since World War II, after having been relatively ignored in public policy, with the exception of the specialized patent discussions and agricultural research programs.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES AND THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

The upper line of Figure 1 shows "real" national output—gross national product in constant prices, that is, ad-

³ "The significant part played by research and development activities in impelling growth as well as improving our defense capabilities is now generally recognized." 1959 *Joint Economic Report*, 86th Congress, Senate Report, No. 98, p. 11.




FIG. 1. Gross national product, gross private investment, and population.

The Changing Relation of Natural Resources and National Security," *Economic Geography* 49(57).

² Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon has stated both relations of economic growth and national security, stressing the latter, in a speech "The Challenge of Soviet Economic Expansion," Washington Evening Star (May 7, 1959).

justed for price level changes—and its growth since 1870. The long term growth rate is approximately $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent per year. There are also shown some of the determinants of the growth rate—population; and investment in producer durables and construction. Figure 2 compares gross national product, gross private investment, and expenditures on research and development as defined and reported by the National Science Foundation; these data are not adjusted for price changes.

The research and development expenditure figures were 1.5 per cent, 2.2 per cent, and 2.3 per cent of the national output in 1953, 1956, and 1958, respectively. These are small ratios. Research and development expenditures in 1956 were about the same as aggregate outlays on tobacco products, toilet articles and barbershops, and the same as advertising outlays; they were only 30 per cent of automobile and automobile service costs and about 60 per cent of recreation outlays.

Or, to further show that annual research and development expenditures are relatively insignificant in size in the United States economy, we note that they are only one-third as large as the loss of output which the nation experienced from excessive unemployment in the 1957–58 recession. On the average annual research and development expenditures cost the American economy only about \$200 per family. This total outlay is less than the average yearly increase in family income. The impact of doubling or trebling research and development expenditures therefore, even if no benefits were received therefrom, would in magnitude involve no more than deferring income advances for a year or two.

Now if the outlays are of such small size, how does one arrive at the prevailing popular belief that the rate of expenditures on research and develop-

ment plays so compelling a role in economic growth and should be increased? I can only surmise that the general reasoning might go about as follows:

The rate of increase in real national output has been roughly two and a half times the rate of increase in labor input. Real output has increased perhaps twice as fast as the sum of labor and capital input, measured in constant prices. Then, half of economic growth is due to improved productivity of labor and capital. That is, half of economic growth is due to economic transformation. The origin of improved productivity or economic transformation is improved knowledge, which is the result of research and development. Thus, research and development can be inferred to have played a major role in economic growth. Therefore, if we increase research and development expenditures, we can hasten economic growth.

To the extent this reasoning underlies the popular belief, it permits detection of possible errors.

The major error is that which equates economic transformation with the results of research and development expenditures. In the above statement economic transformation is a residual, a catchall, for all causes of increase in the ratio of output to the labor plus capital input. Economic transformation thus includes economies of scale; social innovation of all kinds; increased quality of a literate and educated populace; shifts in composition of economic output away from low productivity sectors to high productivity ones; spatial and geographic shifts of population and economic activity; the effects of mineral exploration and findings; vocational training of labor force entrants in schools; factor (input) substitutions in the most comprehensive sense. It includes the effects of Colonel Drake's oil well discovery; of Henry Ford's tin lizzie; of Einstein's off-duty scribbling while a patent clerk; of railroad installation of diesels twenty years after their




FIG. 2. Gross national product, gross private investment, research and development, in billions of dollars.

invention, financed from profits of the war and postwar years; of a great increase in international trade; and of a substantial substitution of capital for labor. It is an error to equate economic transformation, which by definition "does" account for perhaps half of our growth, with knowledge, however broadly this might be defined and even though this is one source or cause of economic transformation. Increased knowledge is not a sufficient condition for such transformation.

Errors in definition

Further error occurs if "knowledge" is equated too readily with research and development results. The major activity which perpetuates and extends knowledge and creates knowledgeable people is education, not research and development. In the year ended June 30, 1958, we produced 9,000 Ph.D.'s and other nonmedicine doctors, some of whom presumably made original research contributions in their dissertations. We also produced 365,000 bachelor's and first professional—including medicine—degrees; and 65,000 second level, master's, degrees. We educated tens of millions of school children. If we are seeking understanding of knowledge as an origin of economic transformation, should we not add education to research and development? ⁴ If we do so, if we have to add the nation's annual education bill of \$15 billion to the \$10 billion of research and development expenditures, then the cost of originating economic transformation becomes much greater. It is then more difficult to

⁴ Since writing this, I find that Professor T. W. Schultz has attempted to relate economic transformation to education in a more ambitious effort. For this interesting analysis, see "The Emerging Economic Scene and Its Relation to High-School Education," *The High School In a New Era*, edited by Francis Chase and Harold Anderson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957).

contemplate decisions which would require very large percentage increases in these outlays.

It is a further error to equate a broad definition of research and development with the much narrower concept which the National Science Foundation, for practical reasons of measurement difficulty, has had to use in its survey data of research and development expenditures. These surveys are of organizations formally engaged in research and development; wherein groups and efforts could be classified as to their purpose or aim. They are also surveys of input, not of results. But the broad definition of research and development which relates to economic transformation is one which captures not input efforts, but rather results, however informal the effort and however accidental or by-product the results are from other activities. Until it has been shown that national research and development results correspond very closely with national research and development expenditure as defined by National Science Foundation, it is a matter of faith to assume very close correspondence, and it is naïveté to assume an identity.

Finally, the very notion of a single factor cause of economic transformation—research and development expenditures, knowledge, or any other—is quite simpleminded. No one condition can ever be sufficient in a complex, dynamic economy. If we transposed all United States technical libraries to Uganda, how much economic transformation would necessarily result? For economic effect, knowledge needs capital investment to serve as carrier of the techniques; trained manpower as operators; entrepreneurs or other agents as innovators; incentives for the various parties, including, in a free economy, buyers for the goods, and profits for the risktaker; economically adequate legal and social institutions; and so forth.

We now have, in our kit of technical knowledge, tools to generate mammoth increases in output, but have not the social desire, drive, understanding, or social capacity to do differently. An economy is an extremely complex social organization, a fact which the technocrats of a generation ago never seemed quite able to grasp. Why should it then be thought that further increments of technical knowledge necessarily would or should produce economic effect?

Of course it is true that availability of a large fund of technical knowledge, at home or which can be borrowed abroad, permits more rapid economic development than if the fund is small, provided that other conditions for economic change are present. The Chinese annual growth in heavy industry of about 20 per cent in its first five year plan and the reported Soviet industrial growth of 10 per cent last year demonstrate this, if the reported figures are true. But technical knowledge alone is not enough; social drive and other economic conditions are also necessary.

PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT

Most of us subscribe to the belief of our political and military leaders that Soviet expansionism and adventurism are likely to precipitate world war if the United States does not at least match the pace of Soviet weapon development and strength. If the view is valid as a basis for policy, then the probable cost of United States failure in this regard is at best vast destruction and conquest of the free world by the Soviet Union, and at worst something approaching world suicide. Preservation of the stalemate by matching military weapon development during a period long enough to permit reason to become dominant in international relations is, I assume, a prime national objective.

Military research and development

If we have such an objective, then there is a corollary for military research and development behavior. We should, I think, act in spite of our substantial ignorance concerning correspondence of results with research and development input efforts. If we observe Russia outpacing us, as is true today, I see no alternative to thrusting greater funds and manpower into the military research and development effort in the hope that results will at least move somewhat in the same direction as effort. If we act in this manner, we may be committing error; it is possible that the combination of expansion in this sphere and our lack of management skill may, particularly in the short run, produce just the opposite of the result intended. This has happened before in economic affairs. But the greater probability is that the increased effort will help, not hurt, both the pace of military research and development results and the pace of improved weapon procurement. This tends to be the greater probability because in individual narrow spheres—a company, an industry, in this case military hardware—we have been able to observe substantial correspondence between research and development results and research and development efforts. The reason it tends to be more true in individual spheres than in the economy as a whole is because other economic sectors can be robbed of their talent, and because the objective is not so ambitious as generalized economic transformation of a free society.

But with respect to programming and management of the military research and development effort, the evidence is piling up that uncertainty of the outcome, of specific results, is the most basic characteristic of military research and development. The corollaries to this finding, which has analogies in a

great variety of other areas characterized by high uncertainty—from raising children to the economic principles appropriate for a free choice society—are:

1. to confine high level programming and direction to statements of objectives, leaving to research personnel the choice of pathways and techniques for achieving them;

2. to conduct research and development in discreet sequential stages, in order to "buy" information and remedy ignorance, so that expensive final development and procurement decisions will, to a maximum degree, rest on valid, knowledgeable premises;

3. to foster substantial competition and "duplication" in research and early prototype efforts—where the uncertainty and unpredictability are greatest—both to buy information and to spur inventive genius.

There is a great deal of direct evidence that centralization and strong, detailed, and early programming of military research and development tend to be less productive of major advances and more costly than more competitive, uncontrolled, and exploratory approaches. Two exemplary cases are the World War II Manhattan District and Office of Scientific Research and Development. The former sponsored vigorous competition among different groups working separately toward the same objective, with great success. The latter could not have been more un-co-ordinated and still be called an organization. Yet it was also spectacularly successful.⁵ For the postwar period the example of missiles, in which the United States is still not out of the crisis stage of having fallen behind the Russians, is instructive. We made the mistake of deciding early that long range ballistic missiles had prospects too poor to justify major research and development efforts. And then, when the Russians proved this wrong and we started to rectify the error, we almost made the

⁵ See C. J. Hitch, *op.cit.*, below.

mistake of too early decision as to which missile research and development efforts should be pushed. Fortunately, inter-service rivalry kept competition alive sufficiently long to prove its practical necessity in the uncertain research and development sphere of ballistic missiles. Burton Klein's comment on this point is informative:

Ten years ago the experts generally agreed that ballistic missiles were not likely to be nearly as promising bets as long-range cruise missiles. Things went wrong when the government, on the basis of these shaky predictions, chose to spend fortunes—and large fortunes they were—in the development of cruise missiles and to spend comparatively negligible amounts on ballistic missile technology . . .

A recent instance, and one that shows the value of having independent agencies sponsor research and development, is the Navy's development of a solid-fuel rocket engine. Several years ago none of the services was much interested in such an engine. But when the Navy decided to develop a submarine-launched ballistic missile capability, the Polaris, it had to develop a solid-fuel engine. A liquid-fuel engine just wouldn't do. As a result it found that this was a surprisingly promising engine—so promising that now all three services plan to use solid-fuel engines.⁶

Multiple paths

C. J. Hitch, head of the RAND Corporation's economics division, has tried to indicate how the competitive principle can be brought to bear in military research and development. He points out that the most expert predictions of the results of research and development efforts have been notoriously unreliable. Frequently the only way to learn whether an idea will work is to test it; therefore, the quickest, and frequently cheapest, device is to try multiple paths. The greater the importance of the prob-

⁶ B. Klein, *What's Wrong With Military R & D?*, RAND Corporation, P-1267, pp. 15-16 and 21.

lem and the greater the uncertainty, the more is such "wasteful" behavior required. Also, the cheaper the multiple paths, the more sensible to try, and they are cheaper at the early stages of the research-development-procurement chain. Finally, the competitive spur among people and groups is a most effective one, a fact the Russians have also learned and successfully exploited in research and development.⁷

B. H. Klein's and W. Meckling's other RAND case studies of past research and development results also emphasize the inherent uncertainty and the error potential of too precise and too early programming. They point out that of twenty-four aircraft developed since World War II, in only three was the final engine the one initially planned. Some engines were designed for fighters, others for bombers, but original intent had little influence on ultimate use. One engine, originally designed for a bomber, was so successful it was used in eight fighters and five other bombers. With respect to missile uncertainty, Klein and Meckling paraphrase a *Time* magazine report as follows:

The ICBM program suffered from a lack of support because the guidance problems were so severe that the rest of the program was not pushed. The unexpected development of the H-bomb suddenly made even very inaccurate ICBM's useful. We were

⁷ C. J. Hitch, "Character of Research and Development in a Competitive Economy," *Proceedings of a Conference on Research and Development and Its Impact on the Economy*, National Science Foundation (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1958). An early seminal and general statement of the danger of too detailed or too distant programming under conditions of uncertainty appeared in an internal RAND paper by A. Alchian. The Committee for Economic Development has recently come to similar conclusions—see *The Problem of National Security* (July 1958), cited in *Proceedings of a Conference on Research and Development and Its Impact on the Economy*, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

unfortunately at that time in no position to benefit immediately from this development. We would have been in an even worse position but, luckily, an entirely different program—the rocket booster for the Navaho cruise type missile—had been pushed so far that we could use it as a basis for the ICBM engine.⁸

Three main points stand out from the evidence. First, the type and degree of programming should be related to the degree of ignorance and uncertainty. In early stages of exploration—compare the Lewis and Clark expedition—it is frequently the greatest wisdom merely to point the explorer in the desired direction and state a general goal. Second, research should be viewed as a dynamic process because even unsuccessful efforts reduce ignorance. The new information should be used in making revised decisions of goals, directions, and ultimately, pathways. Third, the competitive drive and process are powerful instruments to research accomplishment; they can be robbed of potency by bureaucratic constriction.

Nonmilitary research and development

Outside the military area, we have a major concern for sensible government research and development policies in the interest of economic welfare and growth. Both welfare and growth are new statutory social objectives of the federal government—in the Employment Act of 1946, as amended, and elsewhere—and so there is no question of the propriety of government activity, even on a large scale.

But there is a question of what is sensible behavior, in view of our great ignorance of the social relation of government research and development to national welfare and growth. I think it follows from our ignorance that our

⁸ B. Klein, and W. Meckling, "Application of Operations Research to Development Decisions," RAND Corporation, P-1054, pp. 13-16.

first priority should be economic and other social research on the subject of research and development. We should become very active in sponsoring study designed to learn and understand how significant additions to technical knowledge are made, what are their economic and other social effects, and what these analyses suggest for government research and development behavior. Until we know more, there is a danger in being overly active in government-sponsored research and development.

While in general we should be initially quite passive with respect to government stimulation of nonmilitary research and development, there are some probable exceptions to the generalization.

One possible exception is that of government grants to higher-level educational institutions, without specification as to purpose beyond their use in university education and research. This would be more an act of faith than a reasoned step to economic welfare and growth. But it has several virtues over the more purposive device of trying to improve welfare and growth through technical research and development programmed in its particulars by the government. First, our belief that economic progress derives from higher education—including the research and development that faculty and graduate students do of their own choice—is stronger than that such progress results from programmed technical research and development. Second, general grants of the type suggested avoid the danger of distorting the production of Ph.D.'s and other graduate students, and of malforming or unbalancing the accumulation of understanding and knowledge. For example, most of our intellectual leaders believe that the limiting factors in growth and welfare are more to be found in inadequate economic and other social knowledge and understanding than in physical science areas. This is

why, for example, outstanding technical schools like Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Carnegie Institute of Technology, and California Institute of Technology are now giving increased emphasis to the social and behavioral sciences. I would suggest that the objective of advance in knowledge can, both with respect to the areas selected for emphasis and with respect to the forms of activity necessary for knowledge acquisition, be better managed by the universities, traditionally responsible for this function, than by government legislators and administrators.

Research equipment allocation

Another possible exception to the generalization that government, pending improved understanding and skill, should be extremely passive in economic allocation to nonmilitary research and development concerns research tools. If, somehow, the government could sponsor improvement in the quality, and perhaps quantity, of research equipment and information available to be drawn upon by independent research efforts, then government would be improving productivity within research and development, without, however, risking distortion or misdirection of research and development efforts. In part this is already an active government function: library and information dissemination work, translations, research on and production of radioactive tracers, research on computers, standards and measurement research, geological exploration, and so forth. The cases in which tool improvements—such as tracers and computers—permit research never before possible are very exciting.⁹ But the question is whether such efforts—making available tools and information, and training in the use of new tools—should

⁹ Re tracers, see H. J. Barnett, *Atomic Energy in the United States Economy*, Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University (August 1952), Chapter 2.

be expanded. The danger is that in some of these functions the government inevitably implicitly favors certain areas and prejudices others. And what starts out to be a neutral effort to increase productivity in research and development could turn out to be economically very "unneutral," even apart from the direct influence of political pressure groups.¹⁰

Other areas for economic research

A long-standing problem concerning technological change is its possible tend-

¹⁰ I am dissatisfied with my discussion in the four preceding paragraphs. First, as noted, it is rather subjective. And, second, the implicit premise of optimality in the structure and processes of research and education is suspect. Thus, I am uncomfortable about some of the questions which my critics have asked. For example, Professor Norman Wengert has asked, "Are you assuming an unseen hand operating in the choice of Ph.D. major fields and dissertation subjects? The idea of knowledge for its own sake is appealing, but in fact many pressures are at work, some of which are completely irrelevant and irrational in pushing graduate students in one or another direction." And, at another place he points out, "The universities, of course, also program their activities, and except for the top institutions, I am not at all sure they do as good a job as some federal agencies. It is my feeling that the manner in which our agricultural research has developed, especially that undertaken by the land grant colleges, represents a desirable kind of programming, because it is so largely permissive, resting on agreement as to general areas of investigation but leaving specific implementation to the several research stations and their personnel. The role of pressure groups in agricultural research, of course, poses a special kind of problem." Professor Werner Hirsch has raised a different embarrassing question, "I am greatly intrigued by the problems that arise when government, and the same holds for foundations, steps in and finances research and development activities. Whose work should be financed? If we agree that we do not know in advance which is the most promising area of research, what guide lines do we have to allocate funds? In the past we have given money to those who have the best reputations and are associated with the institutions having the best reputations. In doing so we run a

ency to create unemployment, at least in the short run. This obviously deserves study. For example, it is clear that distress among farmers is to some extent attributable to rapid technological change in agriculture, deriving in part from government-fostered research and development. Another important area for economic research is the role of research and development in making the economy effectively competitive. Research and development results can play a major role in the creation of "countervailing power"—that is, in developing substitutes for commodities subject to private market control. On the other hand, there are clearly cases in which research and development have, at times, operated significantly to reduce competition—the aluminum and shoe machinery cases are examples.

There are many other areas which need economic research before we may with assurance become active in artificially stimulating research and development. For example, it has been alleged that research and development play a most important role in growth and full employment by increasing the demand for consumer and capital goods; that the research and development sphere operates under increasing returns to scale, since each new piece of knowledge can be connected with all other preceding pieces; that research and development activity promotes economic stability, since it is not subject to cyclical recessions; and that there is no necessary relation between the industry

most serious risk of weakening our research system and our system of higher education. A few institutions have bushels of research and development funds. They actively recruit researchers from middle-sized and small institutions; particularly the better people are induced to leave the second-echelon institutions. If this continues, we will end up with relatively few excellent institutions and masses of very poor ones, obviously a very narrow base on which to build research and development in the long run."

of research discovery and the industry of application of research results. Some of these are discussed in the recent National Science Foundation volume, particularly in the articles by Professors Slichter and Fox.¹¹

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT VERSUS NATURAL SCARCITY

I close with a few affirmative paragraphs on an exciting economic and social accomplishment of research and development, the gradual erosion of a basic premise of "the dismal science"—a premise which was once believed so certain it was viewed as natural law. I refer to the accomplishments of research and development in undermining the economic significance of natural resource scarcity, both in doctrine and in fact.

The Malthusian dilemma was that population would grow rapidly, and that the pressure of population on limited agricultural land would inflict diminishing average and marginal returns to future increments of population. Ricardo's subsequent innovation indicated that natural resource scarcity obstructs growth long before the Malthusian limits are reached, because incremental unused land is of persistently declining quality. Jevons transposed the Ricardian position to coal availability, which he viewed as a *sine qua non* of economic welfare; and he introduced another force responsible for natural resource scarcity, that is, depletion. The American conservation movement extended the doctrine of natural resource scarcity as an obstacle to eco-

¹¹ S. H. Slichter, "Technological Research as Related to the Growth and Stability of the Economy," and B. Fox, a discussion of an article by R. E. Burgess, "Impact of Research and Development in the Chemical Industry," *Proceedings of a Conference on Research and Development and Its Impact on the Economy*, National Science Foundation (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1958).

nomie growth. It found the natural resource limits to be multidimensional; and, since natural resources are a system of interdependent variables in ecological balance, then over-all scarcity can be engendered by quantity or quality limits of a single resource.

These and other warnings of strenuous conflict between natural resource scarcity and economic growth were not trivial expressions. Yet, with hindsight, we may observe that their authors, some of them great thinkers, committed a major error, and so their prophecies, at least for our time and the foreseeable future, are wrong. They neglected or gave inadequate attention to the results of future research and development and of other increments of knowledge. What the brilliant scientist, Sir William Crookes, did not foresee when he predicted only starvation for growing populations from diminishing supplies of nitrogen, was that fixation of nitrogen from the air would be discovered a generation or so later and remove this threat of disaster. Prophecies of crises from exhaustion of favorable coal reserves have similarly failed, due to the inability to foresee other research and development results—the opening of alternative energy sources and advances in coal mining technology. Gifford Pinchot's forecast of economic blight from timber famine has failed because he did not foresee a further research and development result—technological substitutions sufficient to make the economic effect of reduced timber supplies and higher timber costs of very minor national economic importance.

In agriculture, research and development have facilitated the economy's transition to engine and electric power and relieved agricultural land of the burden of providing calories for work animals. If the United States today had to rely upon work animals for its horsepower, the feed for these animals

would require fifteen to thirty times as many acres of crop land as are in use in the United States. Land shortage has been further averted by more recent research and development which have made possible the production of synthetic fibers, releasing natural fibers equivalent to five to ten million acres. Recent developments in chemical fertilizers, insecticides, hybrid plants, and so on, have greatly increased crop yields per acre.

In minerals, natural resource shortage, in the face of vast increases in mineral demand—more than thirty-fold since 1870 and four-fold since 1900—has been averted by a combination of two means. One is not research and development in a narrow sense—the finding of new reserves as fast as known ones are used. But the other does rest on research and development—improved methods of production, extraction, transportation, refining, and utilization, which have offset the fact that the new reserves are frequently of lesser physical grade or less accessible. Further, baneful economic effects of incipient shortages in individual minerals have been averted by research and development of inexpensive substitutes based upon economically more plentiful resources—aluminum, taconite, magnesium, and plastics are examples.

In modern economies, the meaning of goods and resources has changed radically because of research and development. For example, more than 90 per cent of the increase in real gross national product in the United States since 1870 has been of nonagricultural origin. The method of transforming materials into final goods has become far less merely a mechanical one; rather it is now, to a considerable degree, a controlled heat and electro-chemical process. Finally, the natural resource building blocks have changed very radically; they are now atoms and molecules. This

has changed the meaning of natural resources for societies which indeed have access to modern technology and capital. The same ultimate world physical limits still exist, of course, but not the same economic limits. How many taconite iron atoms and sea-water magnesium atoms and bromine molecules constitute plentitude, and how many scarcity? Furthermore, recent research and development have given us a three-dimensional world, as compared with the one which was economically sustained almost entirely by surface resources.

Of course, research and development have not vanquished once and for all the threat of natural resource economic scarcity. Indeed they can never do so with certainty, so long as populations continue to increase—the galaxy itself is not large enough to sustain infinite demand. This is what accounts for considerable apprehension among some students of natural resources and population growth. But I would point out that we have come very far from Malthus, yet have only penetrated a tube four miles into the earth's crust, still have not mined the ocean floor or the seas themselves, still have vast areas of the globe which have never been seen by man. We should not underrate the further results of research and development—assuming we avoid world destruction while we employ the most recent achievements.¹²

¹² For bibliographical references and more extended discussion of natural resource scarcity and its relation to economic growth, see S. V. Ciriacy-Wantrup, *Resource Conservation* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1952); A. Scott, *Natural Resources: The Economics of Conservation* (Toronto, Ont.: University of Toronto Press, 1955); H. J. Barnett, *Malthusianism and Conservation* (Resources for the Future, Inc., 1958); and H. J. Barnett, *Measurement of Natural Resource Scarcity*, to be published by Princeton University Press in a National Bureau of Economic Research volume on *Income and Wealth*.

Science, Government, and Society

By VINCENT HEATH WHITNEY

ABSTRACT: Historically men have sought knowledge in a variety of ways both for its own sake and in order to increase their control over the environment. Science has increasingly made its impact on society through technical applications of scientific findings. Science has thus helped to alter social structure. At the same time increases in population, in social differentiation, and heterogeneity have made necessary large-scale organization. The effect has been felt in the structure of science and the role and status of the scientist; for example, the individual scholar has been replaced to a considerable extent by the scientific organization man. Government encouragement of some areas of scientific research has expanded enormously in the United States, inevitably within a bureaucratic framework. In the process the scientist has come to be valued not for his scholarship but for his ability to provide solutions to specific problems and thus to increase national power. Bureaucracy has a price, but it is an organizational form which is understandably and functionally necessary and to which science must adapt.

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EVERY article in this issue of THE ANNALS illustrates the relationships among science, government, and society. The majority deal with specific consequences of the expansion of scientific activities by American federal, state, or local governments. As a result, I do not propose to repeat here the specific history of scientific development in the United States, especially of the use of science and scientists in government, nor to re-examine the particular illustrations of the consequences of such development for the economic system, the universities, the field of public administration, and the many other concrete areas which have already been presented in some detail. Instead I shall try to indicate in general terms and from the perspective of sociology the significance and some of the possible consequences of the recent rapid expansion of scientific activity in and out of government.

THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN SOCIETY

The search for understanding is as old as the history of mankind. Understanding has been sought for two related but distinct reasons. The first is to satisfy the desire to know for the satisfaction of knowing, and the goal is "pure" knowledge. The second is to gain control over some aspect of the material or human environment, and the goal is power. Each era has had its predominant method of seeking understanding. In small preliterate societies trial and error or magic has served as the approved way to search for new knowledge and control. Philosophy, religion, and science are other ways of formulating problems and seeking answers which have come to characterize the intellectual activities of specific times and places. Probably no one approach has ever had exclusive ascendancy; and this is especially true in modern civilizations which are characterized

by a high degree of differentiation and variation. But even here some dominant method of seeking the answers to intellectual problems can be identified for each society. This method is a reflection of the prevailing organization of human activities in that society and consequently is also a function of the accumulation of prior knowledge and understanding at any given historical moment.

Stages of scientific inquiry

This suggests why—although the tradition of science is one of long standing¹—the utilization of science as the characteristic method of inquiry in any society is so recent, if indeed it yet stands clearly above alternative approaches. Certainly not until the nineteenth century did science achieve wide acceptance anywhere. Earlier, scientific inquiry had been the exclusive property of a tiny group of persons, generally men of unusual education, leisure, and wealth, who were uniquely able to pursue knowledge for its own sake. For these private enterprisers science was not a profession nor an occupation. Neither was it a way to find solutions of immediate practicality to current technical or social problems. It was rather a predominantly intellectual activity, pursued in a spirit of disinterested inquiry, and so it remained until very recent times. Ultimately the findings of these independent scientists, mostly through the applications made by other men, were to alter social structures and related individual attitudes and behavior profoundly. For the moment the knowledge that resulted from their patient searching remained

¹ See George Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science* (Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins Co., 1927). Volume 1 uses nearly 800 pages to cover the period from the time of Homer to that of Omar Khayyam, that is, to the second half of the eleventh century.

the property of a fragment of the population and served the important function of raising new questions which demanded still further search for answers. It did not directly affect the lives of hunters and fishermen, peasants, serfs and nobles, guildsmen and merchants, nor did it alter the organization of families, economies, religions, or governments. In short, it was not an activity affected with an apparent public interest.

The impact of science gradually came to be felt by a wider segment of society through the applications of scientifically derived knowledge. In those nations which were undergoing the series of technological innovations and social changes customarily called the Industrial Revolution, individuals who were not themselves scientists were able to utilize scientific findings to create wealth. Their medium was the technical application, and their interest in science was its use to increase their control over some aspects of their environment. Ownership, or even use, of such applications was the basis for the rise of a new business élite and was so clearly associated with improvement of social status and economic and political power that science and technology came into an inseparable association. Science was increasingly seen as useful and practical to the extent that it promoted productivity and higher standards of living. Since these were valued positively in nations undergoing modernization, it is not surprising that the scientist was increasingly in demand to provide specific kinds of knowledge which could solve technological problems or improve technical processes of production. As a consequence the scientist as a learned scholar working in relative isolation on problems of no immediate practical worth was rather rapidly replaced by the scientist as a member of an organized profession

whose work was dictated by problems requiring immediate, concrete answers. Inevitably the demand for scientists rose sharply with this new estimation of their practical worth. Scientists came less and less to work alone, more and more to form a part of a team associated most frequently with industry and with certain private organizations, particularly the universities. Although the latter were sometimes viewed as the last refuge of the scientist as true scholar, such a picture was itself imaginary. The university scientist, as much as his colleagues in industry, found organization necessary both because of the nature of the problems on which he was now working and in order to win the support of industry. Moreover, a high proportion of the students who filled the classes of the university scientists were being trained for positions in industry.

Science and society

Science was one factor producing pronounced alterations in the social structure. It was inevitable that the new organization of society would similarly alter the role and status of the scientist and the position and character of science itself. The leading sociological theorists, from Auguste Comte to Max Weber and Karl Mannheim, have always emphasized this close relationship between the social structure and the personality and behavior of the individual. One cannot be understood apart from the other.²

To explain the alterations in the position of science in the United States and the changes in the role, attitudes, and behavior of the scientist it is essential to explain the parallel changes which have occurred in the several institutional systems, such as work, family, religion, and government. This is because of

² C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 5-8.

the interdependence of persons, families, and communities—and, in a broader context, of nations—and the multiple linkages among social institutions. Obviously, not every person influences every other person, even indirectly. It is equally true that not every institutional change produces a direct and immediate reaction in all other parts of the social organization. Yet there are long chains of subsequent effects set in motion by prior effects which can at least in theory be traced back to an initial change. Ultimately, innovations of sufficient importance modify an area of societal organization, such as government, and require either further modifications in that particular institution or adaptations in related institutions. This is because a society is an organized system and not a series of discrete systems without linkages. It is impossible to maintain science today as a disinterested inquiry into purely intellectual problems by lone individuals utilizing their own leisure and funds. It is as impossible as it would be to maintain the federal government as a weak agency of a federation of jealous states limited to a few hundred employees at most and restricted to a small number of clearly defined tasks such as raising a militia and defending the nation against actual invaders.

Changes in American society

Science is a part of, and one among many causes of, the thoroughgoing transformation of society which has taken place in all those nations which have undergone modernization and, to a lesser extent, in those which have not. There is no space here to trace these enormous changes, but they are known in a general way to all of us. A few of the most important can simply be noted. First, knowledge has been vastly multiplied and is still enlarging at an increasing rate. In anthropological

terms, the culture base has been extended. The longer the base, the greater are the opportunities for recombining items already in existence, which is the basis for developing new artifacts and new ideas, in short, new knowledge. Man's increasing inventiveness is a function of his ever widening understanding rather than of an increase in his innate intelligence. This increasing inventiveness produces, second, a higher rate of technological and social change than past societies have known. Paradoxically, change has become a constant—to the point where some educators insist we can train our children only to be flexible. Third, our population in the United States has increased fairly rapidly and is continuing to do so with the result that there are now nearly 180,000,000 people in the country. Fourth, despite our increasing population, we have raised even more rapidly our per capita income. This has been based on increasing specialization and differentiation of functions made possible by rises in many technological and economic factors such as utilizable innovations, capital per worker, and quantity of output,³ and by social inventions and changes as diverse as new forms of business organization, contraception, and the increasing employment of women outside the home. Fifth, heavy immigration and high internal mobility, coupled with a high level of specialization, have produced a nation characterized by wide differences in beliefs and behavior, in status and wealth, in occupation and type of residence, in short, a heterogeneous nation.

If we attempt to summarize this great transformation of American society, we see that it represents a fundamental change in social structure based princi-

³ Some of these are discussed in Sumner Slichter, "Some Economic Consequences of Science," *The Annals*: Vol. 249 (January 1947), pp. 99-110.

pally on discovery and invention, which have been greatly augmented as basic research and applications have both increased our knowledge and our ability to acquire additional knowledge. Closely related have been a rapid rise in population, made possible by the increase in our ability to support human life adequately, and the development and spread of metropolitan communities, in which some half of the American people are now living.

Organization displaces the individual

The United States is a big country both in area and in population. That is the explanation at the most elementary level for the fact that it has developed big businesses, big labor organizations, big government, big religious organizations, and big research organizations. Organization reflects the demonstrated fact that goals involving the separate actions of a number of persons can ordinarily be attained more effectively when each person is assigned certain duties than when each is allowed to act as he thinks best at the moment. There are exceptions to this in the actual execution of much scientific research, where the individual worker can secure the best results if he is simply given an understanding of what is sought and the freedom to pursue whatever approaches seem to him most likely to be fruitful. But even such activity ordinarily takes place within an organizational framework; and this kind of freedom is in fact part of the plan, a sign of good organization.

Large size, elaboration, and complexity themselves cost something in terms of waste of time, effort, funds, and enterprise. I am not arguing that they do not; sometimes the price is prohibitive. Neither am I insisting that in the United States today there is no place for the individual scientist working largely on his own. I am saying that

in an era of large-scale organization and in human societies where institutional systems are interrelated, it is not possible for one area of activity, scientific research, to retain the characteristics which were associated with it in a society in which small-scale operation was predominant. Scientific research is a type of behavior which requires certain predisposing attitudes such as a recognition of the necessity for objective observation and the desire to report results honestly. It is a patterning of relationships among men based on understood rules which have been developed over time to support those values which scientists believe necessary if their goals are to be achieved. These attitudes and relationships undergo modification as the social structure, of which they are a small part, is altered. They have clearly been affected by the increase in size and complexity both of large segments of contemporary society and of the more limited area of scientific inquiry itself.

This means that the individual has been superseded as the customary unit of scientific investigation. He has been replaced by the organization. In physical science, and increasingly in social science, problems to be attacked are too big for one man. They require the approaches of several types of specialists, of men from several disciplines. They demand more knowledge than one man may possess or readily acquire. They cannot be answered without laboratories and computers and other types of equipment which are expensive and often not available to one investigator. I hope there will always be scientists who can reflect on grand questions on a grand scale or pursue small projects of no immediate apparent consequence without organizational help or interference. I hope that organizational structure can be greatly improved to create the freest possible effective work-

ing conditions. But these are matters to be discussed at another time. Scientific research cannot proceed on a seventeenth-century basis in the twentieth century.

SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH WITHIN GOVERNMENT.

So far I have purposely avoided any reference to government interest and involvement in scientific research. Many of the points which have already been made help to account for the tremendous increase in scientific research and research training under government auspices, described in other articles. Clearly, large-scale government, despite its ineptitudes and even harassments, is the single organization big enough to cope alone with the requirements of large-scale science. The federal government today is inevitably immersed in power politics on a world scale. The steady flow of technological applications which, rightly or wrongly, is thought to be essential to the maintenance of national power and status, and in some areas to impose requirements of secrecy, makes necessary not only vast numbers of technologists with some training in science but also an ever increasing number of scientists, some of whom are presumably engaged in basic research.

There is a need for social scientists and social science research although in comparison with the demand for scientists and research in the natural sciences this need is perceived only dimly.⁴ For if American society is to continue along present lines it must strive to avoid war, maintain full employment, and develop controlled use of natural resources essential to an industrial economy.⁵ There

⁴ See the article by Harry Alpert in this issue.

⁵ Detailed statements will be found in Harrison Brown, *The Challenge of Man's Future* (New York: Viking, 1954) and Richard Meier, *Science and Economic Development* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1956).

is a noticeable need for basic research in the area of population—studies of fertility, population growth and distribution, and migration—since all of these profoundly affect American life. The very size of these problems again clearly indicates that they can be studied adequately only with the support of the federal government or some other large organization. Of course, state and local governments can and will be involved as well but to a much lesser degree. Similarly, government will utilize the facilities of private research institutes, colleges, and universities, principally the latter, to support particular research projects. Industry too is spending many millions of dollars each year on research, but this is understandably research for private purposes. Some of it may be of great significance ultimately for the American economy and society. But this in no way obviates the fact that research on problems of national import cannot be left to the chance interest of individuals, private organizations, or lower levels of government.

There is still a sharp inclination in the United States, strongest perhaps among laymen but also readily identifiable among scientists, to emphasize the desirability of independent individual effort and to deprecate the necessity for increasing involvement of government in all aspects of life including research activity. This is one variation on the nostalgic wish for a return to the "good old days." Such a wish when examined carefully usually turns out to be a wish to recapture certain selected attributes of a total situation which would no longer be acceptable. Many of us in our longing for grandmother's homemade ice cream forget the laborious task of turning the hand freezer; and in the last analysis we prefer to take our ice cream factory-made after all. Similarly many of us have a per-

sonal preference for the older conception of the scientist as a disinterested scholar pursuing truth for truth's sake according to his own interests, and some of us may still be able to assume such a role. By the same token we resent, and up to a point, resist, the bureaucratic structure which develops around all large and unwieldy activities. As an alternative, we accept bureaucracy and become "conformers," a term which is frequently used as an accusation or an epithet today. I am not arguing for conformity when I repeat that as increases occur in the size, differentiation, and complexity of any structure, for example science, increasing organization of activities is a functional necessity. The problem for the scientists who seek to defend such values as freedom—which I purposely leave undefined—is not how to prevent organization but rather how to shape organization to maximize their own goals and to minimize practices and procedures which they believe to be inimical to the pursuit of their activities. One way is obviously through organizations of their own.

Some consequences for society

In itself the interest of the American government in scientific research is not new. As Louis Wirth has pointed out, "Franklin and Jefferson urged it, and our Constitution provides for it. Federal, state, and local agencies have themselves for many decades carried on scientific research in many fields."⁶ The National Academy of Science was created by Congress in 1863 at the request of President Lincoln. President Wilson established the National Research Council at the time of the first World War. In June 1941 an executive order of

⁶ Louis Wirth, "Responsibilities of Social Science," *The Annals*: Vol. 249 (January 1947), p. 144.

Franklin Roosevelt set up the Office of Scientific Research and Development.⁷ Specific departments and agencies have sponsored research of diverse character for some time and have clearly established the principle that science is invested with a public and indeed a national interest.

But this is not to say, as Wirth does, that there is "nothing new" about scientific research activities of government and their consequences both for the scientific community and for the larger society. The vastly increased scope of government involvement is itself new and the impact of such a program is far more wide reaching than anything previously known in this country.

A fundamental consequence of government in science is the shift in emphasis both as to what constitutes the main concern of science and also as to the proprietorship of scientific findings. The scientist assumes importance in the eyes of Congress, the government administrator, and the general public not because of his erudition or his scholarly aims or his ability to add to the total of human knowledge but because he can provide practical solutions to specific problems. To use my earlier figure, the scientist can help the administrator to control the environment and thus to increase his organization's power relative to inanimate objects or other organizations of human beings, for example a foreign government.

The scientist thus becomes a unit in a more or less impersonal structure developed initially at least for some rather specific purpose. He may work with relatively great or relatively little freedom but he will be working for an organization which provides him with necessary support, including his own livelihood, and which in consequence claims for itself the right to "own" his findings, permitting them to be dis-

⁷ *Idem*.

bursed if it sees fit or restricting them for any of a variety of reasons. It may be because an administrator believes there are legitimate grounds for enforcing secrecy. It may be because Congress or rival agencies or other "bodies" can less readily assess the value of information or the need for continuing specific programs when materials are classified. It may be simply a reflection of the fact that bureaucracies tend to self-aggrandizement.

Bureaucratic organization can hamper science and introduce inefficiencies and frustrations. These may be fatal for individuals but they are unlikely to hamper the advancement of science itself seriously, particularly if scientists act in a mature and responsible way to make clear to administrators the conditions under which scientific work thrives and to insist on free exchange of all possible knowledge not only beyond bureau or agency boundaries but beyond national boundaries. Though problems develop when science becomes an organized activity one must not forget the vast stimulus to the training of scientists and to their use which is provided by the great increase in government scholarships and employment, described elsewhere in this issue.

In this expansion, just as the role of the scientist changes from that of scholar or intellectual to that of organization man, changes in status will also occur. The demand for trained men is likely to increase economic status. The increase in numbers and anonymity may decrease social status and prestige for the average scientist although the exact nature of such changes, especially in the face of the scientist's already ambivalent status, is hard to predict.

Overemphases

It is entirely possible that some areas of science will be disproportionately emphasized at the expense of others.

To cite two examples, government has recently seemed more willing to put funds and men into nuclear research than into acoustics; into natural science than into social science. In the latter case there is frequently a failure to realize that science not only solves problems but also creates them and that many of these are at heart problems of human relations. Controlling the use of nuclear devices demands more research in political science, sociology, and economics. Despite the requirement to do so in the Atomic Energy Act, the Atomic Energy Commission has yet to undertake research assessing the social and economic impact of nuclear development on the American economy. Other examples might be cited, but the point is that a heavy concentration of research activities in government or under government sponsorship can hinder the development of specific fields at the same time that it promotes that of others. The same thing is true if overemphasis is placed on research applications at the expense of basic research. The results can be costly if scientists working in the neglected fields fail to make themselves heard. This is especially so with respect to social science since the major consequence of the increased emphasis upon natural science in recent years has been to extend the ability of individuals to produce and to destroy material objects without a compensating extension of knowledge required to assure that society will benefit from these technical advances.

In sum, the changes which are taking place in scientific activity reflect similar changes which can be observed in other areas of American society. Here we find that there have been a great many changes in the role and status of workers associated with the proliferation of occupations and the general rise in skills and the employment of skills. Notable has been the shift from self-

employment to employment within large organizations on a wage and salary basis. These are changes in social structure which are reflected in the lives of individuals as problems requiring personal adjustment. At this level such changes will continue to affect the individual scientist as he moves more and more into the role of scientific organization man.

On the societal level these changes serve to re-enforce similar changes in business, education, government, reli-

gion, and other areas of life. They are in line with increasing specialization and the organization of specialties into bureaucracies. As long as such organizations of scientists can contribute to the long-run increase in material well-being and can help to maintain American society in a world of competing and co-operating societies, present trends will probably be accelerated and the popular faith in the scientific method as the "proper" approach to solving problems will be strengthened.

The Government's Growing Recognition of Social Science

By HARRY ALPERT

ABSTRACT: Important new developments have strengthened the standing of the social sciences in the federal government. Historical analysis emphasizes the recency of the government's recognition of the national contributions of social science research. Significant progress has been made despite critical fluctuations. Five factors contributing to the more favored governmental position of social science research are (1) changing congressional attitudes; (2) acceptance of the social sciences at the White House level; (3) inclusion of the social sciences as part of broad definitions of scientific disciplines; (4) the general post-Sputnik interest in American education; and (5) the concern with redressing imbalances in American higher education. Research support for the social sciences is growing but a critical shortage remains in funds for fellowships and assistantships. The social sciences approach the next decade in a climate of acceptance and encouragement.

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THEY never had it so good." This vernacular phrase may startle grammarians, but it describes accurately the present position of the social sciences with respect to support and interest by the federal government. As the result of important new developments which have served to consolidate the standing of the social sciences in the federal government, there is every likelihood that the ten years from 1950 to 1960 will be viewed as the "March" decade of the social sciences. March, according to folk weather lore, comes in like a lion and goes out like a lamb. Similarly, the nineteen-fifties may be said to have come in with a roaring antipathy to the social sciences and to be departing with attitudes of positive interest and quiet acceptance.

That it has taken so long for the federal government to develop a *modus vivendi* with the social sciences is quite ironical, for its involvement in social research was written into the United States Constitution. By providing for a decennial census and making this count of the population the basis for representation in Congress, our founding fathers made a social science activity the ultimate basis of political power.¹ In fact, the gathering, analysis, and dissemination of social and economic statistics has continued to be one of the three major ways in which the federal government relates itself to the social sciences. The other two are: exploitation and utilization of the findings and results of social research; and direct support of social sciences through the intramural conduct of social science research in the federal government's own research laboratories and units or through contracts and grants for extramural social science studies at colleges and universities, other nonprofit organi-

zations, and business and commercial establishments.

PRE-WORLD WAR II STATUS

Up to World War II, the role of the federal government in the social sciences consisted largely of the first two of these functions, namely, producing mass statistical series and exploiting social science findings produced outside of the government. During the nineteenth century, the social sciences played a modest but effective role in the development of government powers and programs. Don K. Price has called attention to the contribution of economic and statistical series in the growing development of the regulation of business, as well as to the impact of John R. Commons' institutional economics on labor legislation and of Charles Francis Adams' studies on the regulation of railroads.²

Even as late as 1940, the government's direct activities in the social sciences were still predominantly confined to the collection and analysis of statistical information.³ However, the roots of later developments in the government's social science programs were discernible in the 1920's. The appointment by President Hoover of a research committee on recent social trends provided significant White House endorsement of a major social science enterprise. Further impetus for governmental support of the social sciences came in the thirties from the practical programs of the New Deal. An outstanding example was the Department of Agriculture's Division of Program Surveys which assumed the leadership in introducing the sample interview survey as a basic social science

² *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

³ The several paragraphs which follow are adapted from the author's chapter on "The Growth of Social Research in the United States" in Daniel Lerner, editor, *The Human Meaning of the Social Sciences* (New York: Meridian Books, 1959), pp. 73-86.

tool and as an instrument of governmental policy.

IMPACT OF WORLD WAR II

But the defense mobilization period and World War II itself were undoubtedly the major catalytic events leading to the expansion of the federal government's programs of social science research. The events of the war on both the military and civilian fronts and the problems of postwar adjustment as they affected the nation and the individual provided the social sciences with dramatic opportunities to demonstrate their practical value and essential role in modern society. A brief review of illustrative uses of social science during World War II lists eight examples of problem areas in which important social science research accomplishments were achieved: soldier orientation and morale; analysis of command problems, particularly among Negro troops; more efficient use of psychiatry; venereal disease control; analysis of the American soldier's problems of adjustment, combat performance, and response to mass communications; evaluation of Japanese morale; estimation of war production requirements; and regulation of prices and rationing.⁴ To this list may be added the media analysis activities of the Office of War Information and the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service; the propaganda studies of the Library of Congress, Department of Justice, and various intelligence agencies; the surveys of war bond purchases and other evaluations of the effectiveness of drives; the testing of the public comprehension of governmental information materials; and research on national character and other problems related to a better understanding of the behavioral characteristics of foreign peoples.

⁴ Russell Sage Foundation, *Effective Use of Social Science Research in the Federal Services* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1950).

POSTWAR DIFFICULTIES

The immediate postwar period of demobilization witnessed the dismantling and disappearance of many of these wartime programs. Dissatisfaction with the limited accomplishments of some of these social science activities was expressed, largely as the result of the disillusionment which set in when excessive promises of achievement were unfulfilled. Social scientists became their own worst enemies by promising too much, too fast and accepting funds in excess of what could be effectively expended. Moreover, the social sciences have suffered from their minority group status among the scientific disciplines. Like minority groups on the labor market, they are subject to the rule of "last hired, first fired." Thus, many social science programs were speedily demobilized because of their relatively low priority and because of a failure to appreciate their long-range implications and future contributions.

Nevertheless, significant efforts were made to continue programs which had demonstrated their effectiveness during the war. The Office of Naval Research, created shortly after World War II, supported research on manpower problems, personnel and training, group morale, organizational structure, and related social psychological areas. The Army continued, in abbreviated form, its studies of opinions and attitudes of American soldiers. The new Department of the Air Force, proud of the accomplishments of the Aviation Psychology Program, organized units to undertake and support research in problems of selection and training, manpower, leadership, human relations and morale, and psychological warfare. When the Research and Development Board was established in the Department of Defense it included a Committee on Human Resources.

¹ See Don K. Price, *Government and Science* (New York: New York University Press, 1954), p. 5.

However, the skepticism and disenchantment which many of these programs engendered did not provide a favorable environment for their persistent growth and development. There set in, consequently, a period of recurring ups and downs, of "acute, and sometimes critical fluctuations," as Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr. has described it.⁸ A "starts and fits" pattern became evident: an activity got started and then was curtailed or discontinued when some congressman or general threw a fit. The Division of Research of the Housing and Home Finance Agency, the excellent survey research unit of the Veterans Administration, the Air Force's Human Resources Research Institute at Maxwell Field and its Personnel and Training Center at Lackland Air Force Base were but a few of the research units which experienced difficulty.

Despite the "on again, off again" character of some of these programs, the long term trend was toward increasing appreciation of the social sciences as valuable national assets. As the post-war pattern of extramural support developed, the social sciences, too, received encouragement, although not at the same rate and magnitude as the physical and life sciences.

THE "MARCH" DECADE

The "March" decade, 1950-60, will perhaps be viewed historically as the turning point in federal government recognition of the social sciences. The full measure of the change from the "lion" to the "lamb" phase of this decade may be observed in comparing the National Science Foundation Act of 1950 with the National Defense Education Act of 1958. In the former legislation, the social sciences are included only on a

⁸ Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., in Foreword to Morris Janowitz, *Sociology and the Military Establishment* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1959), p. 5.

permissive basis and are referred to only as "other sciences." In the 1958 act, the section dealing with graduate fellowships mentions no limitations whatsoever with respect to disciplines. Moreover, a separate title provides for research and experimentation in more effective utilization of television, radio, motion pictures, and related media for educational purposes. This act also recognizes the importance of improving statistical series in the field of education.

Note must be taken, also, of other evidences of changing attitudes toward the social sciences, such as the establishment, in December 1958, of an Office of Social Sciences within the National Science Foundation; the appointment, in the Spring of 1959, of a sociologist, President Logan Wilson of the University of Texas,⁹ as a member of the National Science Board; and the expansion of the social science research activities of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

In the vernacular of the boxing ring, it may be said that the social sciences were, for several years, definitely "rocky and punch drunk," but were still on their feet when the fight was over. They have survived Cox Committee and Reese Committee investigations. They have endured pariah status and innumerable reorganizations. They have weathered appropriation storms which threatened to cut off funds for studies of child-rearing practices, mother-love among lambs, population dynamics, message diffusion, and other projects which became the pet peeves of individual legislators.

MAJOR DYNAMIC FACTORS

In attempting to assess the major factors that account for the more favorable position in which the social sciences

⁹ Dr. Wilson was subsequently required by Texas law to give up his membership on the National Science Board.

find themselves at the end of this decade, I am able to identify five important considerations: (1) changing Congressional attitudes; (2) acceptance of the social sciences at the White House level; (3) inclusion of the social sciences as part of broad umbrella definitions of scientific disciplines; (4) the general post-Sputnik interest in American education; and (5) the concern with redressing the imbalances in education which stemmed from the earlier almost exclusive emphasis on natural science and mathematics. Brief comments on each of these five factors follow.

CHANGING CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES

In his report on the crucial Senate debate in 1946 which preceded the vote to exclude from the then pending bill to establish a National Science Foundation the specific provision which created a Division of Social Sciences, George A. Lundberg concluded that the Senate thought of the social sciences as at best "a propagandist, reformist, evangelical sort of cult."⁷ The unfortunate phonetic confusion of social science with socialism reinforced such viewpoints. Just a few years later, however, more positive attitudes were being expressed. In 1953, the Cox Committee, in its "Final Report," noted the special importance of the social sciences in the contemporary world. It stated:

It is entirely possible that in a time when man's mastery over the physical sciences threatens him with possible extermination the eventual reward from the pursuit of the social sciences may prove even more important than the accomplishments in the physical sciences.⁸

⁷ "The Senate Ponders Social Science," *The Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 64, No. 5 (May, 1947), p. 399.

⁸ "Final Report" of the Select Committee to Investigate Foundations and Other Organizations, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, House Report No. 2514, Union Calendar No. 801 (Washington: Government Printing Office, January 1, 1953), pp. 9-10.

Other important turning points in Congressional expressions toward the social sciences were the vigorous statements by Senator Estes Kefauver's Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency in 1955, 1956, and 1957; the 1955 recommendations of Representative Richard Bolling's Subcommittee on Economic Statistics of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report; Senator Hubert Humphrey's report to the Senate in 1957 of his experiences in the Middle East; and speeches by Senator Wayne Morse, Representative Charles O. Porter and others.⁹ This year neither house of Congress raised any objections to the National Science Foundation's request for \$2,000,000 for support of basic research in the social sciences in fiscal year 1960, even though this represented a considerable increase over the \$850,000 appropriated for this purpose for fiscal year 1959. (The actual budgetary allowance for social science research in the National Science Foundation for fiscal year 1960 is \$1,600,000.)

This is an encouraging picture, indeed. But Congressional confusion regarding social science has by no means been completely eliminated. Negative attitudes still persist and need to be reckoned with.¹⁰

WHITE HOUSE INTEREST

The White House, too, has shown increasing interest in the support of the social sciences. In his State of the

⁹ For details and references, see Harry Alpert, "Congressmen, Social Scientists, and Attitudes Toward Federal Support of Social Science Research," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 23, No. 6 (December, 1958), pp. 682-686.

¹⁰ See, for example, *Independent Offices Appropriations For 1960*. Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 86th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 527. For a discussion of persisting negative attitudes, see Harry Alpert, *op. cit.*

Union message delivered on January 9, 1959, President Eisenhower expressed his desire to undertake a systematic study of American values, goals, and social trends, comparable to the earlier Hoover Committee study.

The objective, President Eisenhower said, would be "the establishment of national goals that would not only spur us on to our finest efforts but would meet the stern test of practicality." He hoped that this new study would be concerned, among other things, "with the acceleration of our economy's growth and the living standards of our people, their health and education, their better assurance of life and liberty and their greater opportunities." He noted that the report of Hoover's Recent Social Trends Committee "has stood the test of time and has had a beneficial influence on national development." Here, indeed, is a significant compliment to social science.

And in its report on "Strengthening American Science," issued December 27, 1958, the President's Science Advisory Committee included social psychology among the scientific disciplines for which a strong case could be made for intensifying the nation's scientific effort. The Committee stated, "And advances in social psychology might help to reduce tension and conflict at every level of human intercourse—in our communities, in business and industry, in Government, and even among nations."¹¹ Furthermore, as previously noted, President Eisenhower has appointed a social scientist to the National Science Board. This policy-determining body for government science on January 23, 1959 adopted the following statement:

The National Science Board recognized the importance, as well as the complexity

¹¹ *Strengthening American Science: A Report of the President's Science Advisory Committee* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 4.

and difficulty, of research in the social sciences. It is clear that the intellectual, economic, and social strength of our Nation requires a vigorous approach to social problems, with scientific techniques of study making their maximum contribution.¹²

PROTECTIVE UMBRELLAS

The social sciences have prospered best in the federal government where they have been included under broad umbrella classifications of the scientific disciplines such as agricultural sciences, military sciences, medical sciences, and health sciences. Under such umbrellas and in close company with scientific areas which enjoy the prestige and status of biological or physical sciences, the social sciences have enjoyed a protection and nourishment which they normally do not have when they are identified as such and stand exposed, "naked and alone."

Agricultural research has been heavily supported by the federal government from its very inception. Quite early the concept of agricultural sciences was broadened to include not only biological research but agricultural economics and rural sociology as well. In fact, for many years the Department of Agriculture's Bureau of Agricultural Economics was internationally famous for its leadership in significant areas of social and economic research. Although from time to time specific social science projects of the Department of Agriculture have suffered Congressional attack, there has been little question of the legitimacy of the inclusion of social research in the scientific program of the Department. In fact, one appropriations committee, with remarkable indifference to the distinction between biological and social science research, once included, in a list of fields for

¹² Reproduced in *Congressional Record* by Representative Charles O. Porter, March 10, 1959, pp. A 1969-70.

which research funds were not to be expended, the orchids of Guatemala, the flora of Dominica, child-rearing practices, research methodology, and population dynamics.

The Medical Sciences and Health Sciences rubrics have also provided generous hospitality to the social sciences. Social science research projects are given careful and sympathetic consideration by at least five study sections of the National Institutes of Health: Behavioral Sciences, Hospital Facilities Research, Mental Health, Nursing Research, and Public Health Research. Social scientists serve as members of these study sections as well as on several other committees of the National Institutes of Health. The National Institute of Mental Health's Laboratory of Socio-Environmental Studies is outstanding in the quality of its research program.

Research undertaken by the military establishment in relation to the defense needs of the nation develops strong immunities to Congressional or other attacks if military authorities certify its importance to the mission of the Department of Defense. Despite the ups and downs previously referred to, the Army, Navy, and Air Force have arrived at a realization of the importance of basic research in the social sciences. The Office of Naval Research includes a Psychological Sciences Division. The Air Force has established a Behavioral Sciences Program in its Office of Scientific Research. And here is the testimony of an Army General presented recently before an appropriations committee:

We can never afford to neglect basic research and the Army wants to do more of it whenever we find applicable projects to further this increase of scientific knowledge. Such research is not confined to the physical sciences. Investigation of the social sciences to help us to utilize more effectively our manpower and insure man-

machine compatibility with complex engines of war being developed is vital. Should we neglect these important considerations we only aggravate the trend in which the physical sciences are outstripping the social sciences and may, in time, reach a point where the machine may destroy its maker.¹³

These are the words of Lieutenant-General Arthur G. Trudeau, Chief of Research and Development, Department of the Army.

Another important umbrella for the social sciences is Operations Research. The various operations research units supported by the federal government have invariably included a social science component.

IMPACT OF SPUTNIKS

The social sciences have not been indifferent to the whirl of the Russian Sputniks and have directly felt the impact of these successes in space technology. It was recognized that Soviet Russia's accomplishment was not only the result of advances in science and engineering but also the consequence of a social system that was capable of making and carrying out significant decisions. Interest developed in studies of the social, economic, and political implications of the space age. It became imperative that we keep ahead of the Russians in the social science fields. For this reason, Vice-President Richard M. Nixon encouraged the formation of a committee on National Support for Behavioral Science which reported on social science needs to the President's Scientific Advisory Committee. Substantially increased appropriations were made available to the National Science Foundation, and in the National Defense Education Act of 1958, Congress

¹³ *Department of Defense Appropriations For 1960. Hearings Before The Subcommittee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 86th Congress, 1st Session* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 339.

officially declared as national policy the doctrine that the defense of this nation depends upon the mastery of modern techniques developed from complex scientific principles, and, as well, upon "the discovery and development of new principles, new techniques, and new knowledge."¹⁴

REDRESSING IMBALANCES

For a time, it looked as if only the natural sciences and mathematics would be the beneficiaries of the increased responsibilities of the federal government toward research and education. Programs were quickly organized to improve the quality of science teaching, to train more scientists and engineers, and to intensify the pace of research in the physical, mathematical, and biological sciences. It became evident, however, that the neglect of other areas of scholarship and learning would spell national disaster. The government's difficulties in international relations led to intensified interest in language study. Soon voices were heard calling attention to the need to redress the imbalances in American education which a predominant concern with the natural sciences and engineering was creating.¹⁵ Cognizance of this requirement is found in the newly released report of the President's Science Advisory Committee on "Education for the Age of Science." This report stresses the fact that, "Today in America we need a very wide variety of human talents."¹⁶ It goes on to urge that "a proper balance be maintained in our educational offerings."¹⁷ To achieve such a balance we

must encourage intellectual leadership in the humanities and social sciences as well as in the natural sciences and mathematics.

HEALTHY PROGNOSIS

The social sciences thus face the nineteen-sixties in an atmosphere of encouragement and with the active support of influential well-wishers. Research funds are becoming more plentiful. The federal government alone will soon be spending in the neighborhood of \$60,000,000 a year in support of the social sciences. This estimate does not include the \$100,000,000 or so that the Decennial Census of 1960 will cost.

MORE FELLOWSHIPS NEEDED

A major problem, however, remains. The most urgent need of the social sciences is expansion of the pool of available trained, specialized manpower. Recent studies have indicated that the length of time required to obtain the Ph.D. degree is strongly influenced by the availability of financial support to graduate students in the form of assistantships and fellowships. It is here that the social sciences, and humanities, too, are most seriously disadvantaged vis-à-vis the natural sciences. The major bottleneck in the advancement of the social sciences is not research funds, but fellowship and scholarship opportunities for basic and advanced training. If the social sciences are to fulfill the general public's expectations of them, they must double, at least, the number of trained practitioners. To make the training process more productive and more effective, however, additional fellowships and other types of financial support for training are an imperative and critical necessity. Title IV of the National Defense Education Act has been extremely helpful in this regard. Almost a fourth (23 per cent) of the first 1,000 graduate fellowships

were awarded in the social sciences. The various training programs of the National Institutes of Health also provide valuable opportunities for social science education. But more needs to be done. The National Science Foundation, for example, has the basic legislation to include the social sciences within its "Education in the Sciences" program. It also has reasonably adequate funds for training and education. It has broadened its conception of the social sciences in its research support program. Only administrative nearsightedness prevents it from giving the social sciences, broadly conceived, their deserved place within the various program activities of its Division of Scientific Personnel and Education.

COMPLACENCY TO BE AVOIDED

We can be proud of the achievements of the social sciences in government, but we cannot afford to be complacent. Certain past mistakes must be avoided: premature promises, excessive expectations, hasty growth, disastrous indifference to the political process, unwarranted impatience with the administrative processes of justification and review, and lack of concern with

the public image of the social sciences. By careful planning and effective operations a solid basis can be established for future growth.

Advance in the social sciences will depend most immediately on what in fact social scientists do: how well they teach at the undergraduate level, how well they communicate with the general public, how effectively they respond to calls from industry and government for help in resolving practical problems, and how much they devote to fundamental research. It depends also on their willingness to cultivate patience and humility.¹⁸ Charles Dollard has well defined the problem: "The long-term contract of the social scientist with society is not to perform miracles but to bring to the study of man and his problems the same objectivity and the same passion for truth which have in the past given us some understanding and control of the physical world."¹⁹

¹⁸ See *The Saturday Review*, Vol. 41, No. 5 (February 1, 1958), p. 38 and *The Saturday Review*, Vol. 42, No. 14 (April 4, 1959), p. 64.

¹⁹ "Strategy For Advancing The Social Sciences," in Social Science Research Center of the Graduate School, University of Minnesota, *The Social Sciences At Mid-Century* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1952), pp. 19-20.

¹⁴ Public Law 85-864, Section 101.

¹⁵ See, for example, statements by Pendleton Herring and Harry Alpert in the February 1, 1958 issue of *The Saturday Review* (Vol. 41, No. 5).

¹⁶ "Education For The Age Of Science," *President's Science Advisory Committee* (May 24, 1959), p. 3.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

Special Problems of Military Research and Development

BY WILLIS H. SHAPLEY

ABSTRACT: Many of the problems of military research and development are not special, either because they are common to other comparable research and development programs or because they are common to other parts of the military programs. The military programs are concerned with research, but the main emphasis is on development and on the entire chain of activities necessary to improve the capabilities of the operational forces. The magnitude and complexity of the programs are tremendous; these factors, particularly the complex nature and interrelations of their objectives, are at the root of most of the problems of military research and development. The basic organizational problem is to find a way to centralize responsibility for the crucial decisions involving selections among alternative military capabilities and technical approaches, while at the same time decentralizing detailed management to allow a maximum of freedom and flexibility in the actual conduct of research and development work. The problems of military research and development culminate in the budget process. Making the proper allocation to military research and development within the over-all limitations and distributing this amount to individual research and development projects are the most difficult problems of our time.

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PARADOXICALLY, the most useful way to open a discussion of the special problems of military research and development seems to be to consider the contrary proposition that there are no special problems of military research and development. Two principal lines of argument can be advanced to support such a proposition, and while they may not in the end be fully convincing, they carry a large measure of truth and will serve to put into perspective the problems of military research and development, be they special or otherwise.

One can argue with some cogency that what appear to be special problems of military research and development are, for the most part, problems in non-military research and development as well, and that they become identified with military research and development because their counterparts in nonmilitary research and development are not so conspicuous or so well publicized. The many problems resulting directly or indirectly from the sheer size and complexity of the military research and development programs cannot be fairly charged either to the military content or to the military environment of the programs. Corresponding problems of large-scale administration exist in varying degrees in the larger nonmilitary programs, and the same bureaucratic frustrations for which the military agencies are traditionally blamed are all too often encountered in civilian government agencies, in industry, and even in universities. Shortages of first-rate scientific and technical personnel are a continuing problem for nonmilitary and military programs alike. Even some of the problems scientists have with military secrecy and security have counterparts in proprietary research in industry. The counterpart of wasteful interservice rivalry is usually called healthy competition.

Taking a different approach, one can make a strong case that many of the problems of military research and development are not peculiar to research and development, but are manifestations of broader problems of military policy or management. The difficult problems that arise from the interplay between technical possibilities and military requirements are fundamental problems of military planning, and involve strategy, tactics, and logistics as well as research and development. The budgetary problems of military research and development are a part of the broader problems involved in the total military budget, both in the determinations of the total amounts and in the decisions on complicated and interrelated details. Instances of duplication and confused or overlapping jurisdiction in military research and development are for the most part the result of deeper problems of roles and missions and arise from inherent complexities in the variety and interdependency of military requirements. Problems of administrative competency and technical qualifications and training of military personnel are not limited to the research and development area. The reluctance to discontinue programs which have passed their period of usefulness, one of the principal present problems in military research and development, was also evident in the persistence of the cavalry and the battleship.

Considerations such as these do not prove that there are no special problems of military research and development, but do suggest what is perhaps the main conclusion of this article, that the principal problems of military research and development in the United States are either inherent in the conduct of a large-scale organized research and development effort or, more importantly, the consequence of the dynamics and dilemmas of the broader problems of

national defense we face today and in the years ahead.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

It is advisedly that we are speaking of research and development, not just research. The spectacular and well-publicized successes of scientists in World War II and the importance which has rightly been attached to establishing broad and continuing support for basic research have occasionally had the effect of distracting attention from the importance of development, and have created somewhat the impression that scientific research by itself produces national or military strength. It has long been customary to justify additional expenditures for basic research on the grounds of its contributions to national strength, and more particularly, except perhaps in the medical field, to national defense.

At the same time it is fashionable in scientific circles to deplore the large sums going into development, especially for military weapons and equipment, and to urge a redistribution of budgetary wealth in favor of more research. This suggestion may have merit in particular cases, but the notion that there should be more emphasis on research and less on development as a matter of principle is clearly fallacious. To the extent that research is justified by possible practical applications, military or other, the role of development must be recognized, not as a menial adjunct to the higher efforts of pure science, but as an equally essential link in the chain of achievement.

In military research and development, the primary concern is with development, but the chain does not stop there. Newly developed weapons and equipment must be tested and evaluated, both for technical performance and for suitability for use by military units. Appropriate tactics and employment concepts

must be evolved; combat troops and maintenance personnel must be trained in the intricacies of the new equipment; and sufficient quantities must be produced for deployment or stock-piling. And there are other vital links at the other end of the chain. Operational military requirements must be carefully analyzed in the light of technical possibilities and possible countermeasures within an over-all strategic framework. Before specific development can begin there must be design and feasibility studies.

In all this effort, scientific research plays an important and essential role in providing new knowledge, ideas, and techniques. It is a necessary part of the process, but not sufficient to achieve the goals. In an important sense, the prime problem of military research and development is to make the entire developmental process work from pure research and analysis to practical operational equipment in the hands of trained troops.

MAGNITUDE AND COMPLEXITY

The magnitude and complexity of the present military research and development programs are difficult to comprehend. Using dollars as the most convenient yardstick, one can identify a total of almost \$6 billion of the Department of Defense fiscal year 1960 budget as going for research and development expenses of one sort or another, including expenses of the directly related activities of test and evaluation, but excluding production of new items for equipping and training operational forces or for stock-piling. This total—more than one-seventh of the total military budget—can be regarded, in round numbers, as being made up of about \$700 million for research, about \$4,800 million for development, including test and evaluation, about \$200 million for pay and allowances of military

personnel, about \$150 million for construction of facilities, and another \$150 million set aside as an emergency fund for unforeseen requirements in the research and development field.

In addition to all this, substantial but hard-to-define portions of the research and development activities of the Atomic Energy Commission and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration are essential parts of or directly support the military research and development programs. In total, military research and development currently accounts for approximately 80 per cent of the government's total annual outlay for research and development, and provides the financial support for a little over one-half of all the research and development in the United States.

Some aspects of the complexity of this vast effort on military research and development can be seen in the scope and variety of the activities it encompasses. There is basic research in almost all branches of the physical, engineering, life, and behavioral sciences, including theoretical work, laboratory research, and large-scale experiments, such as those involving high altitude balloons, satellites, or polar expeditions. There is applied research and technical development in almost every field of technology—metallurgy, electronics, propulsion, and so on—so various are the requirements and problems of the military development programs. The development programs themselves cover thousands of different kinds of items, ranging from prosaic but vital improvements to paints and preservatives to fantastically complex aircraft, missile, and electronics systems. Test and evaluation programs may, at one extreme, involve only simple, small-scale tests on a shake-table in a laboratory; at the other extreme, the test and evaluation of each new type of aircraft and missile requires a major manufac-

turing effort to produce dozens of costly test articles and the use of elaborate test facilities and ranges stretching as much as a quarter of the way around the world.

Then there is the great variety in the methods by which military research and development activities are carried on. There are many different types of government laboratories, development centers, and test installations, some operated directly by the government with civil service and military personnel, others by operating contractors, and a few by a mixture of both. All sorts of industrial concerns, universities, and other private institutions perform military research and development by contract. There are many different kinds of contractual arrangements, and the contracts themselves range all the way from a few thousand dollars for several months of theoretical research by one or two university scientists, to hundreds of millions of dollars a year for the development of a major weapons system by a prime industrial contractor with a whole host of subcontractors and associates.

OBJECTIVES

However, the most complex aspect of the military research and development programs lies in the relationships of these programs to their objectives. This type of complexity is at the root of most of the problems of military research and development.

In general, the ultimate objective of the military research and development programs is to provide or enhance military capabilities in support of national military policy. This is easily said; the difficulties arise in translating such a general statement into specific objectives for individual research and development programs. The ends of national military policy are not always clear, change

from time to time, and are often controversial.

Even if one assumes general agreement on certain basic objectives—such as (a) maintaining an offensive and defensive military posture that will deter a Russian attack on the United States or its allies and (b) maintaining an adequate capability for dealing with limited war situations that are likely to arise—the range of possible objectives of military research and development is not appreciably narrowed. Many different types of military capabilities can contribute to each of these basic objectives; many different kinds of weapons systems can be conceived to provide each type of military capability; and many different technical approaches can be followed in developing each kind of weapons system. Each weapons system development presupposes or requires the development of components; the development of components depends on general technical development; and technical development in turn is based on principles and possibilities that have emerged from applied and basic research.

For these reasons, the objectives of the thousands of separate projects in the military research and development programs cannot be simply and directly related to national policy objectives. In the case of the development programs, the projects fall into groups comprising alternative technical and military approaches for the same or related objectives. At the research end of the spectrum, it is more a matter of attempting to anticipate the nature of future developmental requirements and choosing the lines of basic and applied research which appear most likely to uncover technical possibilities of future military significance.

Thus the establishment of objectives for both research and development involves difficult problems of selection

among alternatives which themselves are seldom clear-cut. The fact that the entire complex of interrelationships is continually changing as time goes by—with changes in the international situation, intelligence estimates, military requirements, technical evaluations, scientific knowledge, and so on—further complicates the problems of selection and creates the need for continuous reappraisal of the relative contributions the various projects can be expected to make to the ultimate objectives. To working scientists and to enthusiasts for particular programs, the repeated reappraisals and the resulting frequent changes in programs and objectives often seem to be an unnecessary bureaucratic harassment, but from the standpoint of the management of the programs as a whole, they are a painful necessity.

ORGANIZATION

One of the most serious problems raised by the size and complexity of the military research and development programs is how the effort should be organized. It is obvious that so large an enterprise cannot, as a practical matter, be planned and administered in detail from one central point, such as the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It is also clear that to promote and secure the advantages of initiative and imagination on the part of creative scientists and engineers, a high degree of freedom and flexibility should be allowed to laboratories and other organizational levels directly concerned with actual scientific research and specific development projects.

These considerations point in the direction of a highly decentralized organization. The answer is not so easy, however, because, as we have just seen, military research and development is so much a matter of selecting among alternative approaches. The judgments in-

involved in making these choices, and the appraisals of the relative importance of the military requirements on which they are based, cannot be made unilaterally by people or organizations that are directly concerned with only a part of the problem and are not in a position to appraise all of the alternatives in relation to the pertinent over-all policy considerations.

The complexity of the program, sketched above, is such that to be made properly many of these decisions have to be made, or at least carefully guided and reviewed, at very high levels in the hierarchy—at the headquarters levels of the military departments, for example. With the increasing variety of alternative technical possibilities cutting across the historical organizations and missions of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the situation is developing more and more to the point where almost every significant technical program choice or decision has ramifications which transcend any one military service, and thus requires appraisal, decision, and perhaps active direction or co-ordination from the broad central point of view of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

This is the organizational dilemma. Too much central direction will lead to an impossible bureaucracy that would stifle progress. Too little central direction will permit competing alternative programs to run wild on a unilateral basis. Scientific discoveries and technological break-throughs cannot be decreed by the Pentagon, but, on the other hand, crucial national decisions on choices among weapons systems should not be left by design or default to those down the line who have less than the full scope of responsibility and competence for making them.

In theory, the answer is obviously to centralize only the decisions that have to be made at the top and decentralize

everything else. The practical difficulty is that merely to identify on a current basis the problems that need to be resolved at the top requires a complete and continuing review of the entire program on a fairly detailed basis. The central staff organization required for these purposes is necessarily large, and inevitably gives rise to knotty problems of internal organization and co-ordination of the central staff itself. These problems are formidable and discouraging, but should not be forever insurmountable. It is to be hoped that the evolution of the office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, established by the Department of Defense reorganization act of 1958 as the latest attempt to improve central leadership and control of military research and development in the Department, will demonstrate that a balance can indeed be achieved which will give at the same time both more effective central control of major decisions and more decentralized responsibility for detailed management and actual conduct of research and development work.

Role of civilian agencies

The question is sometimes raised whether it would not be better to have military research and development performed by a civilian agency outside the Department of Defense. The success of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) during the Second World War, the contributions made over so many years by the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, and the present important role of the Atomic Energy Commission can each be cited as different ways in which significant aspects of the military research and development program have been carried on by civilian agencies.

It will never be possible to re-create the environment in which the Office of Scientific Research and Development

made its contributions. It is no longer a question of mobilizing science for defense purposes—the present annual peacetime level of effort is already much greater than the total of all OSRD expenditures during World War II—and it is doubtful whether in any future major war we will have the time and safety to do research and development on weapons and equipment that will influence the outcome.

The success of both the Atomic Energy Commission and the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics in operating large government-controlled laboratories is at least partly attributable to their civilian setting. At the same time, the fact that each of them has operated in areas of specialization which, while highly important, are relatively narrow compared to the total range of military research and development activities, has kept the task of co-ordination with the purely military programs within manageable limits. By contrast, the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 did not give the new National Aeronautics and Space Administration a clearly defined role in relation to the "space" activities of the Department of Defense, and the initial experience has been that the problems of co-ordination have tended to offset the hoped-for advantages of a separate civilian agency.

The establishment early in 1958 of the Advanced Research Projects Agency as a civilian organization within the Office of the Secretary of Defense represents a new approach which provides a mechanism whereby military research can be done under full control of the Department of Defense but without assigning it to any one of the three military departments. It is too early to say whether a new pattern is being established or to appraise its merits, but it seems clear that the future evolution will be in the direction of centralizing

responsibility for military research and development in the Secretary of Defense and his Director of Defense Research and Engineering.

For the foreseeable future the importance of close integration of military research and development with other aspects of the military programs and the need for authoritative central determination of military research and development objectives will undoubtedly outweigh the advantages that might be gained through the establishment of a separate civilian agency for military research and development.

THE BUDGETARY PROBLEM

Of all the problems of military research and development, the ones that generate perhaps the most controversy and confusion are those that involve, in one way or another, the budget. To some, these all seem to boil down to a very simple problem with a very simple answer: not enough money is the problem, and more money, the answer. Of course, one of the basic budgetary problems is always the question of how much money is enough, and the answer always at some point comes down to a matter of judgment. But the question seldom if ever arises in such simple terms, and the most difficult problem of all is to identify the areas where such judgments have to be made and to define the problems in such a way that the relative merits of each claim for money can be evaluated. This, of course, brings us back to the problems of reappraisal and selection discussed above.

An important point, which is often lost sight of and misunderstood, is that the apparent preoccupation with budgetary problems at all levels of the military research and development program does not stem from an exaggerated concern for money, economy, or book-keeping as such, but from the fact that virtually all of the substantive and pol-

icy problems of the programs necessarily have significant budgetary implications. Budgetary decisions are one of the principal regular administrative mechanisms for making substantive program decisions.

This is not to say that financial limitations do not play an important part in the budgetary problems of the military research and development programs. Over-all limitations on the total budget do in fact exist at any given time, and even though they are not necessarily expressed as rigid ceilings in specific dollar amounts, they have to be taken as the framework within which the forward planning of all federal programs, civil as well as military, proceeds.

As a practical matter in the development of the federal budget, once the general magnitude of the over-all totals has been tentatively determined—a major decision of national policy based on consideration of the urgency of the demands on the budget and the economic and political implications of prospective alternative budget totals—it is necessary to establish tentative planning figures for the principal agencies, including the Department of Defense. These planning figures guide the preparation of detailed budget proposals which show the impact on the programs of the assumed planning figures and permit the consideration of alternatives, including, if necessary, reconsideration of the initial planning figures themselves.

Impact of limitations

In this situation, it quite naturally seems inconceivable to the managers or proponents of any single military research and development program that it is really their project that has to suffer in the budget decisions. It is

hard for them to see why their sometimes quite modest requirements cannot be met by a slight adjustment in other programs without changing the planning totals, or, failing that, why the economy of the country would be ruined by such a relatively small increase in the over-all totals.

It is true that the immediate impact of any particular budgetary restraint can be alleviated either by "robbing Peter to pay Paul" or by a decision to increase the total by the amount required. The first course merely results in a different set of decisions in the selection process. The second represents a chipping away at the economic and political judgments which led to the planning figures in the first place, and the question of how rigidly they are to be adhered to is again a matter of economic and political judgment.

But neither course will satisfy all claimants, especially in the military research and development programs. The almost unlimited proliferation of military requirements and technical approaches, together with the inexorable increases in cost as projects move from research into development, will conspire to generate pressures for additional funds within any foreseeable plausible total budget. The distribution of the total budget between military and non-military, the division of the military budget as between research and development and the other essential costs of national defense, and finally the selective allocation of research and development funds to the myriads of individual projects, taken together, constitute one of the most formidable and awful problems of our time, and one which should command the best efforts of the officials and scientists who have to deal with any of its many ramifications and the sympathetic understanding of the public.

Budgeting for Science: Presidential Responsibility

By WILLIAM D. CAREY

ABSTRACT: "Science," as it is categorized without verbal exactitude, is a new and troublesome concern of the Presidency. Executive oversight of science as it impinges on public policy is in part exercised, and can be appraised, in the context of budgetary decision-making. Political scientists will find it rewarding to ponder the adequacy of the Presidential machinery for evolving science policy and balancing priorities within the discipline of the federal budget. Can the scientific community reasonably look to the federal government for the degree of sufficiency, stability, and venturesomeness of support which it seeks, given the competition of other urgent public needs for budgetary sustenance? Upon reflection, the institution of the Presidency for choosing priorities and tackling vexing technological questions is found to contain reassuring strengths. At the same time, preoccupation with the snarled traffic of relentless decision-making leaves unresolved a number of basic, long-term problems in the design of the relationship of science to government.

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LAST May, before a blue-ribbon audience of scientists and business and philanthropic leaders gathered at the Waldorf-Astoria, the President prefaced a major address on science with the greeting: "Fellow Innocents." Though said in jest, the words were indicative of the problems of the Presidency in establishing the rightful place of science as a new and at times bewildering partner of the national government.

Few aspects of public policy afford such tantalizing opportunities for exploration and discovery as the interaction of government with science and technology. We are still on the fringes of understanding the significance and future implications of this trend. We are, indeed, fellow innocents.

Popular attitudes cloud rather than illuminate the government's search for a comprehensive policy toward its role in science. When science is viewed as an all-absorbing investigation of the basic nature of man's environment, it plays to nearly empty seats. But if science is a subpolar pageant, or a multi-million-dollar effort to hurl a mouse into outer space, it acquires a curiously high value. The distinctions between science and technology, between research and spectacular demonstration, are still unclear, and so they are all vaguely fused into "science." The beginning of wisdom would necessitate defining some terms.

FEDERAL SUPPORT OF SCIENCE

Budgeting for science (and technology), like all budgeting, is an art of making choices, hopefully if not precisely conforming to the scale of contemporary social values. When the desirable equilibrium between resources and requirements is lacking, or, more baldly, a shortage of funds exists to satisfy all petitioners, this process of choosing becomes a very considerable undertaking. In the national govern-

ment, the institution of the Presidency assumes much of the responsibility for the fiscal decisions which determine the direction and distance of public policies. The Presidency has, accordingly, been a target for criticism on the part of those who have felt, at one time or another, that the budget did not provide enough support or assurance of stability for science.

How much support is "enough"? That is a question by no means the monopoly of the advocates of science. It has been raised in every area of public policy, and will always be raised because the nature of budgeting produces what might be called a fiscal law that dissatisfaction shall be distributed uniformly. As for "stability," no one can be against it as an objective to be pursued, but the fact must be faced that when science becomes an instrument of public policy, it serves an essentially unstable master. To seek optimum stability through so dynamic and unpredictable a device as the budget, is to expect more than it can deliver. In such a setting, science runs some calculated risks which are basic to the political process. The same public opinion which urges greater scientific and technological achievement is capable of simultaneously demanding economy in government, along with tax relief.

The inescapable fact is that the policymakers in the national government, including those in the executive branch, have no special intuition to guide them toward absolute values where science and technology are concerned. Science, Dr. Vannevar Bush has said, is "the endless frontier," and it follows that any level of budgetary support is at best only relative justice. Like everything else associated with the equities of budgeting in the national government, the claims and aspirations of science must run the gauntlet of relative priorities in a setting of acute competi-

tion for funds, and under the handicap of a "language barrier." At the same time, we cannot view the role of science and technology in our affairs by the comparatively simple standards of an earlier and less complex era.

All things considered, science and technology have not fared badly in the budgetary sweepstakes. Only two decades ago, federal support for all science was at the level of 100 million dollars annually. In the budget for fiscal year 1960, a special analysis reveals that expenditures under the head "research and development" will reach 5.5 billion dollars. Of course, these are not wholly comparable figures, but they do have comparative meaning. The clue to all this prosperity is, of course, suggested by the fact that over four-fifths of the 1960 amounts are directed primarily to the needs of national security, and the totals are heavily distorted by the fantastic costs of hardware development.

Even so, the blush is not entirely off the rose. The same budget analysis brings out the additional point that at present the federal government supports about half the research and development of the nation. "Science" is doing very well at the hands of government, if the aggregates can be taken at their face value.

But can they be? Do the sheer weight and built-in fertility of research and development effort on this scale really control the final totals which appear in the budget, or is there an apparatus of decision-making which lends a reassuring tone of deliberate choice and validity to the astronomic results?

"Reasonable austerity"

Even the scientific community itself is not wholly without apprehension in this regard. While its general tendency is to rejoice in the latter-day miracle of the loaves and fishes, an occasional dissenter rises up with a minority report.

Such was the case at a recent symposium on basic science, when Dr. Merle Tuve of the Carnegie Institution of Washington spoke of the dedication to pure research which characterized those private research institutions established many years ago "when there was less financial and technical exuberance, with regard to the support and administration of research effort, than we see all about us today." And he observed that "suitable provision for the recruitment (of the lively individual investigator) and his welfare and increase in his number is unquestionably of much greater importance than the provision of spectacular facilities carefully calculated in tons and dollars by the business men and politicians of science surely to outdo the Russians in the same field."¹

Dr. Tuve then proposed the guideline of "reasonable austerity" to protect the researcher from becoming a manager or "big operator." As Merle Tuve explained:

Austerity as an essential requirement for creative research may sound harsh and out of date to most of the big operators and many of the young technical men in research today. For our discussions, however, I wish you would just recall to yourselves some of the examples of finished basic research which you most honestly respect and then answer the austerity question silently for yourself. . . . The undeniable fact is that creative work is nearly always done with limited resources and under difficult conditions. I suggest that this austerity is to a considerable extent a necessary discipline for the critical faculty and a basis for the Spartan choices which must be made by the investigator as to emphasis and deletion in the course of any basic research. . . .

¹ "Basic Research in Private Institutes," Carnegie Institution of Washington, preliminary draft of paper read to the Symposium on Basic Research, New York City, May 15, 1959.

This is quoted at some length, though only in capsule, not as an illustration of the majority view but, to use Dr. Tuve's own words, as "a little mustard." It is the sweet relish, however, that is more popular. Spartan austerity is possibly an acceptable abstraction to which many would subscribe but few would be prepared to embrace, in or out of the scientific fraternity.

DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

It is inevitable that as the costs of research and development assume large and increasing proportions, while federal fiscal policy attaches a central importance to balanced budgets, the criterion of budgetary priority looms larger in the decision-making process. This is true not only in the vast and troublesome area of weaponmaking, but even in the "austerity" zone of basic research. For example, some of the most tempting adventures in basic science are to be found in the field of high energy physics, but it is a costly path to follow when the instrumentation turns out to be a two-mile linear accelerator the construction price of which is more than 100 million dollars, to say nothing of annual operating expenses.

This illustration affords us a useful peep-hole into the anguish of decision-making. Here is only one facet of basic science, albeit a strategic one. The entire scale of government-supported basic research is in the vicinity of one-half billion dollars, if the statistics can be trusted to yield a credible measurement. Across the wide spectrum of the subject matter of basic research, the plea is made for greater support. Possibly, the fertilization of the entire area through spreading another 100 million dollars would provide a massive tonic to American science. Would this be a wiser application of scarce tax dollars than a rifleshoot investment of so much in a single instrument, of speculative ur-

gency, for high energy physics alone? To the lay administrator, the answer could seem obvious. But the lay administrator must not forget that he is an innocent. His views are weighed, along with those of the scientists. The decision to underwrite the project is forthcoming only after a blend of scientific opinion is formed and the need for leadership in a critical area of proficiency is apparent. It may well be the right decision. In any case, the circumstances illustrate the heavy and not always black-or-white choices which are submitted to the Presidency.

But the decisions arising in the area of military weapons development are of an even higher order of difficulty. The adoption of missile-type weapons by the three branches of the services, each branch conscious of its missions, has necessarily led to some profusion of missile systems and incidentally to the identification of status with competing missile programs. To complicate the situation, extensive private contractual interests are involved in the ultimate fate of each of the weapons systems. To bring order out of such a complex, without committing serious error, constitutes one of the most severe modern tests of Presidential management, as well as one of the most thankless.

Presidential aids

An extensive managerial apparatus has evolved gradually to aid the President in dealing with these problems. Within the Department of Defense, responsibility has been focused in a Director of Defense Research and Engineering who advises the President from one tangent while the Joint Chiefs of Staff advise him from another. In the field of space technology, the President is guided by the new National Aeronautics and Space Council, comprising the heads of the military and civilian agencies with an interest in the subject matter. The

broader field of general-purpose research and development is gradually being brought into perspective through the Federal Council on Science and Technology. Ranging across the entire military-civilian complex, as the chief agent and adviser of the President, is the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.

But except for the Special Assistant to the President, the role of the consultative bodies is essentially that of agreeing on goals and needs, and defining agency jurisdictions. They do not, and probably could not, due to the well-known limitations of interagency consultative mechanisms, undertake the evaluative process of selection and decision on the particular merits of individual scientific or technological efforts within their limited funding capabilities. Nonetheless, they perform a positive role in the larger structuring of executive management, planning, and co-ordination. The newly created Federal Council on Science and Technology has contributed a great deal, for example, to the over-all understanding within the executive branch of the needs and opportunities for research in the fields of oceanography, basic materials, and meteorology.

The evaluative, or critical, role at the Presidential level is performed in large part by the Bureau of the Budget and the Special Assistant for Science and Technology. In the case of the Bureau, this role is deeply rooted in its institutional character as it has evolved under successive Presidents. The Bureau has developed to a high degree the art of critical examination, and although its skills are predominantly nonscientific, the techniques and processes it employs have been shown to be applicable to the President's decision-making role in science and technology.

Nothing could be more natural in a complex government than to employ the

budget process to facilitate decisions for the President. In a way, the budget is a digestive organ with financial limitations on how much can be fed into it. In federal management practice, the budget is the arena of deliberate decision, and the function of budgeting carries with it the corollary of unlimited examination of expenditure requirements.

Budgetary Process

A rare glimpse of the Bureau of the Budget's technique of challenge was afforded in the printed record of hearings held on May 20 and June 17, 1959, by the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. The subcommittee had before it the Director of the Bureau, and was questioning him on the extent of the Bureau's role in determining the defense budget for fiscal year 1960. In explaining the Bureau's doubts as to the justification for certain expenditures on missile programs, the Director's testimony was as follows:²

Now with respect to the three programs, Atlas, Titan, and Minuteman, our projections indicated that the financial implications over the years 1959 to 1962, inclusive, that is 4 fiscal years, amounted to almost \$7 billion for those programs. Now our question was do we get \$7 billion worth of value in developing all three of these programs? First of all, there is the protective factor of the SAC Force and the other striking forces in being and the other programs under development, including Polaris.

Now Atlas, however, is our earliest available ICBM capability. It has presumably less growth potential than Titan, it may be quite vulnerable to surprise attack under certain conditions. Titan at that time was

² Testimony of Maurice H. Stans, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Hearings, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, U. S. Senate, May 20 and June 17, 1959 (Washington: Government Printing Office), pp. 231-32.

far less developed. It was entering a crucial period of flight testing. It appeared to be, from what we could learn, the most formidable of the ballistic missiles that were being planned.

On the other hand, it was going to be very expensive, and if it were succeeded promptly by the Minuteman, the question was whether it represented an expenditure that would be justified, and whether our defense would be adequate without it.

As a liquid-propellant system it involved major problems of maintenance and readiness, and while the introduction of storable propellants was feasible, that still involved a considerable amount of research and development.

There was some concern on our part as to whether there was an indication of slippage of the capability dates of Titan, and if that were the case, then it would even narrow the time period between the successful Minuteman and the introduction of the Titan.

On the other hand, Minuteman was in a very early stage of development at the time of our budget consideration. Once it was successfully developed and in large-scale production, it would be the least expensive of the deterrent systems. It would require a minimum level of maintenance. It would be much easier for Minuteman to be hardened and put underground.

However, we were not quite certain that the development of the Minuteman could be successfully accomplished with the level of costs estimated by the Air Force. Or whether or not the timetable could be wholly relied upon. And finally, we had no estimate of the cost of hardening the Minuteman system that we could rely upon.

Now, we took all of those things into consideration and suggested that consideration be given to these three alternatives:

First, phase out the Atlas program as rapidly as possible, relying on manned bombers until the availability of the Titan and the Minuteman. Alternatively, continue the Atlas program as currently planned to provide that initial intercontinental capability, cancel the Titan, and

proceed with the Minuteman on a rapid but orderly basis. Or third, continue the Atlas program but with some reduction in the number of squadrons, continue the Titan program with a relatively small number of squadrons but still adequate to provide a heavy striking power, and at the same time proceed with Minuteman on an orderly basis.

Now those are the questions we raised. Those are the factors we developed and discussed with the Secretary of Defense. And from there he, with the advice of the scientists that were involved in the programs, and with the President, came to the conclusion that now appears in the budget.

From the sequence of thought described by the Director in the foregoing instance emerges the function of "staffing" of a difficult budgetary problem in the light of the significant factors. This function of the Bureau has come to be valued by all modern Presidents. The final decision is that of the President, but the quality and relentless tenacity of the staff work of the Bureau continue, in the era of "exuberance" in science and technology, to figure prominently in the final outcome.

Science Advisor to the President

Of more recent vintage, but overriding all else in terms of its impact on the changing character of the Presidency, is the role of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology. Born of the incredulous national reaction to the Soviet success in launching the first earth satellite, the office of the Special Assistant has grown in less than two years to a level of status and effectiveness that has little, if any, precedent.

The reasons are diverse. First of all, the traffic of science and technology into the circle of Presidential decision is heavy enough to sustain a full work program for the Special Assistant. Secondly, the President has made it unmistakably clear that the Special Assistant

for Science and Technology is his right-hand man in his assigned area, and that he speaks on behalf of the President. Thirdly, the President has assigned a positive responsibility to the Special Assistant for leadership in strengthening United States science and the federal government's part in it. Finally, the first incumbent of the position has demonstrated the personal qualities of vigor, energy, and capacity that the situation has required, while at the same time he has successfully created a *modus operandi* with the heads of government departments and agencies. In addition, he has had the benefit of diligent work on the part of a Science Advisory Committee, comprised of many of the country's ablest educators and scientists. While the natural tendency of the student of administration is to doubt the workability of unattached special Presidential assistants, the history of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, on all counts, runs to the contrary.

In a recent address before the National Press Club—itsself a significant indication of the stature of the office and its occupant—the departing Special Assistant has given his estimate of the role of a high level adviser to the President on science and technology.

In his remarks,³ Dr. Killian recognizes the role of the President in motivating effective staff work.

Let me first express some unabashedly enthusiastic sentiments about my experience. I have derived deep satisfaction from working for the President. I have always found him to be an *enthusiasm amplifier*, and always interested in scientific and technological developments. I have never been in to see him, nor has the Science Advisory Committee, without coming out with a sense of lift and renewed zeal—and usually, I might add—some new task or as-

³ Remarks of Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, at the National Press Club, July 7, 1959. Washington, D. C.

signment. He is persistent in his desire for information—the rough with the smooth. If his science advisers at any time have not advised, it was not because he failed to afford them the opportunity.

Relationships with Scientists

In Dr. Killian's estimation, the real significance of his assignment has been the "creation of a new and more useful relationship between science and government at the policy-making level." As proof, he declares that government has more readily secured the services of the country's scientists, who have responded with enthusiasm. It is a revealing observation, suggestive of the disposition of citizens not only in science but in other occupations to absent themselves from the wedding feast unless and until the summons is delivered by a courier of their own persuasion. Perhaps this is harsh, but the difficulties of the President in securing skilled help are too well known to require elaboration. To the extent that Dr. Killian has moderated the problem with respect to science and technology, the benefits are considerable.

In Dr. Killian's view, moreover, there now exists a larger universe of reciprocal understanding between the scientist and the public official.

... It is now easier for the policy-maker to get the scientific input he needs in his policy-making and to use it with confidence. The generalist and the specialist, the administrator and the scholar, have devised better ways of matching impedances, of working together, each respecting the other's domain and special talent. The scientists have learned to relate themselves better to policy-making without stepping out of their objective role as scientists. The scientists have been able to observe at first hand the way in which many decisions, even those with a large technical content, turn on factors other than technical—social, diplomatic, economic, military, or political. Thus, the policy-makers better understand

the role of science in many policy decisions and the fact that these decisions can go wrong if the scientific component is overlooked or wrongly handled. There has also been a growing understanding that scientific method and analysis, contrary to popular opinion, do not always yield a single, mathematically exact, incontrovertible answer; that the scientist and engineer, however objective and competent, must sometimes be limited to dusty answers or multiple answers when policy-makers are "hot for certainty."

With these observations, the present writer categorically concurs. Whether the particular issue has arisen in any one of the possible contexts of basic research, applied science, or weapons development, the role of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology has been effective as interpreter and mediator between disagreeing parties, as a mechanism for developing new approaches and needed facts in the framing of policy decisions, and as a helpful device for appraising research needs against the stern facts of budgetary life.

Although Dr. Killian has not expressed it in these terms, the elevation of science and technology to the level of the Presidential office has tended to mature the political responsibility of the scientific community. Scientific advice has now been stitched into the fabric of statesmanship, and with the success of the coup, so to speak, the revolutionary fever is abated. Science may still be critical of public policy, but its criticism is increasingly more informed, confident, responsible, and constructive. The great beginnings have been taken to close the long-standing gulf between science and public policy, to the benefit of both, and in particular to the advantage of Presidential responsibility.

SIGNIFICANT QUESTIONS

Nevertheless, there is more to be done. The foundations for effective

Presidential action in matters of science and technology have been built well, and show promise of enduring. In this framework, it may now be possible to proceed with the search for solutions to some of the great issues that have been generated by government-in-science. Even though we may have to be content, for a time, with "dusty answers" when we would rather be "hot for certainty," government and science in their new-found nuptials must deal with these nagging questions:

Is government tending to mobilize science too much for national security reasons, with the result that hardware requirements are overinfluencing the course of scientific innovation?

Is there an optimum plateau for government support of science in the United States, apart from the pressures of defense?

Will the national interest require permanent support of science and technological effort at somewhere close to current levels, even if international tensions ease?

When 70 to 80 per cent of university research is dependent upon the flow of federal funds, can we continue to believe that education and science will remain truly independent and free?

Should public policy undertake larger and continuing sponsorship of basic science in the nation's long-term interests, even at the expense of curtailing the present emphasis on spectacular developmental work and outer space exhibitions?

These questions illustrate the background concerns of government in this age of preoccupation with science, technology, education, and survival. They have been on our conscience for a decade, with the solutions still no closer. Because public policy is both fragile and transient, the present contentment which pervades the partnership of science with government cannot justify deferring these fundamental problems merely because our hands are full with

today's and tomorrow's problems. A great change, under the pressure of contemporary dangers and imperatives, is being wrought in our time in the relationship among government, science, and higher education; however, it is a change in which the hand of deliberate design should be in greater evidence.

The process of budgeting for science and technology in the context of Presidential responsibility shows encouraging elements of quality, depth, and perspective. It would be a better process than it now is, however, if it had the needed flexibility for the adequate reflection of changing national values. As things now stand, the annual budget is leashed by the costs of national security, debt charges, and a formidable array of "untouchable" benefit and subsidy expenditures which, in the aggregate, reflect yesterday's priorities rather than the new values toward which we might prefer to move. In such a setting of limited Presidential discretion in budget-

making, new opportunities can be accommodated only in small measure, or through the escapist route of deficit financing. If, for example, fundamental science is not supported with the largesse so religiously urged by its proponents, the reason is not a lack of sympathy on the part of the budgetary authorities but more accurately the inertia of the political process which prevents coming to grips with the task of restating the prime concerns of public policy. To the extent that the budget is treated by the political process as a kind of gift catalogue, rather than an instrument of deliberate national progress toward worthwhile goals, it will not fulfill its potential.

For all that has been accomplished in the structuring of Presidential leadership and responsibility, much more awaits doing in the design of public policies, both coherent and stable, for the fabulous future. Innocents all, we have work to do.

Congress and Research: Experience in Atomic Research and Development

By CLINTON P. ANDERSON and JAMES T. RAMEY

ABSTRACT: Congress has delegated much of its work in relation to atomic research and development to the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. The Joint Committee has certain advantages for dealing vigorously with atomic research, including its ability to act for both Houses as a unit, its right to be kept fully informed by the Atomic Energy Commission, and its legislative jurisdiction including annual authorization legislation. The role of the Joint Committee has been evolving from an interest primarily in the weapons program and security to an equal emphasis on peacetime research and development, international co-operation, and declassification. Recently the Joint Committee has tended to stress its informational function through the conduct of various public hearings and dissemination of reports. Of particular importance in recent years has been its policy-making function in atomic power development, basic research facilities, and research in atomic hazards.

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THIS article will be concerned with the interest of Congress in atomic energy research and development, and more particularly with the role of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The editors have wisely permitted the authors to concentrate on a subject with which they are familiar, rather than to attempt to cover the entire breadth of the relationship between Congress and science. It is hoped, however, that this examination may cast some light on the larger problem and may illuminate the question of Congressional leadership vis-à-vis the executive branch. It also may indicate some unique adaptations of governmental institutions to new forces and circumstances.

ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANIZATION

Congress has applied Woodrow Wilson's maxim—that it does much of its work through committees—in full measure to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was established by law in 1946 at the same time the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was created. It consists of eighteen members, nine from the House of Representatives and nine from the Senate. No more than five from each House may be from the same political party. The 1954 amendment to the basic Atomic Energy Act of 1946 provided that the chairmanship of the Committee should rotate every two years between the House and the Senate.

Congress did not break precedent in establishing a Joint Committee on nuclear energy, as such, in 1946. There were other joint committees, such as on taxation, on printing, and on the economic report. It did break precedent in giving the Joint Committee legislative functions, and also in requiring the AEC and other executive agencies to keep the

Joint Committee fully and currently informed. The latter requirement was of immediate importance to the Joint Committee in the early days when its role of "watchdog" over the secret activities of the AEC was paramount. The legislative function of the Joint Committee, as discussed below, has become more important in the last few years with the passage of the 1954 amendments.

FUNCTIONS AND ROLE

Generally speaking, the Joint Committee engages in four types of functions: legislative; investigative; informational; and policy-making. These functions will be outlined below.

Legislative function

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, by statute, is the legislative committee for referral of all bills relating to the Atomic Energy Commission or primarily to atomic energy, and may on its own initiative introduce or return bills in either House.

The 1954 amendment and subsequent legislation have had considerable effect on AEC research and development programs. Of particular importance has been Section 261 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended in 1957, which requires legislative authorization of appropriations for (1) the construction or improvement of facilities, including research facilities, and (2) the atomic power demonstration program carried on in co-operation with private and publicly owned utilities.

Investigative function

The Joint Committee has not found it necessary to utilize this traditional Congressional tool to any great extent in relation to the research program but on occasion pursues AEC reports to see what is actually being done, and makes studies as discussed below.

Informational function

Under Section 202 of the Atomic Energy Act the Joint Committee is directed to make continuing studies of problems relating to the development, use, and control of atomic energy. This Section specifically directed the Joint Committee to hold hearings during the first sixty days of each session to receive information on the development, growth, and state of the atomic energy industry. The Section also provides that the members of the Joint Committee shall report to their respective bodies as to matters within the jurisdiction of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

The Joint Committee also conducts special hearings of an informational nature on the Commission's basic research programs from time to time. Thus, in 1954 the Joint Committee held hearings on progress in research on agricultural, medical, and other applications of radioisotopes; in 1956 this information was brought up to date, and another series is planned for 1960 or 1961. In 1958 a series of hearings was held on basic research in the physical sciences. In 1957 and again in 1959 extensive hearings were held on the problem of radioactive fallout from nuclear weapons tests, and considerable attention was paid to the status and needs of research in connection with this problem.

These hearings on research and development programs are published and distributed quite broadly by the Joint Committee. For example, 20,000 copies of the 1957 fallout hearings were printed in two large volumes and an index, totaling 2,200 pages. The Joint Committee also publishes, in the form of Committee prints, various reports on hearings, collections of materials prior to hearings, and staff studies.¹

¹ See Joint Committee print "Membership, Legislation, and Publications of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy" (Washington,

Although in the early days the Joint Committee tended to give emphasis to the problem of security for information, the Joint Committee, beginning in 1949, came to recognize the positive aspects of a vigorous declassification and publication policy in the field of research. Particularly since 1954 the Joint Committee has urged a greater degree of declassification in such fields as controlled thermonuclear research and reactor development. Sometimes members of the Joint Committee have had to stimulate the executive branch to declassify research results which were being held up for policy rather than security reasons. Thus, the Defense Department's report on its High Altitude (fallout) Sampling Program (HASP) in March 1959 was made public by the Chairman of the Joint Committee rather than the Defense Department. Although it was conceded that no security classification was involved, it was held up with a "confidential" label because it contradicted the predictions of an AEC Commissioner as to the rate of fallout.

Policy-making function

Possibly the most unique function of the Joint Committee has been its policy-making or recommending role in the atomic energy field. This function is explicitly recognized in Section 202 in relation to Congress itself by authorizing the Committee to report its "recommendations" to Congress by "bill or otherwise." However, it remained for the Joint Committee to apply this concept to the executive branch.

In the past and particularly in relation to the military development of nuclear energy, the Committee's policy recommending function has been carried on informally. Classified discussions

D. C.: Government Printing Office, March 1959), for a complete list of Committee hearings and publications.

and executive sessions with top AEC and military officials and the White House have been the principal means of persuasion. The original decision by President Truman to proceed with the vigorous development of the hydrogen bomb was influenced more by Senator Brian McMahon, then Chairman of the Joint Committee, and some of his associates, than by the members of the Atomic Energy Commission. Senator Jackson, in his article in the November 1953 issue of *THE ANNALS*,² pointed out that the corollary effort to increase the AEC raw materials program and to add facilities for the production of the fissionable materials uranium 235 and plutonium was initiated and spurred on by the Joint Committee. The efforts of the Joint Committee in supporting the development of the "Nautilus" nuclear submarine and a nuclear Navy against some determined opposition are now well-known history.

In the past several years, the efforts of the Joint Committee to initiate various policies and projects has not only involved informal methods, but has also taken on more of a public and formal character by means of public hearings and debate, followed by legislative action in some cases. This has been particularly evident in regard to the peaceful uses of atomic energy, but it also has been applied to certain military projects as well.

With regard to so-called "classified projects," the Joint Committee in July 1959 held the first public hearings ever conducted on the status and prospects of the aircraft nuclear propulsion (ANP) program. As a result of Joint Committee efforts this project has been kept alive over the years despite various attempts of the budgetary planners in the Defense Department to bury it. In

² Henry M. Jackson, "Congress and the Atom," *The Annals*, Vol. 290 (November 1953), pp. 76, 78.

a report following these hearings, the full Committee endorsed efforts to get a prototype in the air, and recommended that, if the delay continued, Congress might want to consider placing responsibility during this developmental phase in the AEC rather than the Defense Department.

Recent programs sponsored

In 1958 the first public hearings on nuclear propulsion for outer space were held, and efforts by the Joint Committee were continued to accelerate the AEC's nuclear rocket project ("Rover") and auxiliary power sources for satellites program ("SNAP"). In 1959 the first experimental reactors for both projects went into operation successfully. At this juncture the question facing the AEC and Joint Committee would seem to be: How large and at what pace should this nuclear outer space propulsion effort be conducted?

Perhaps the most controversial problem which the Joint Committee has considered in recent years, other than the fallout question, is the matter of atomic power development. Since 1948 and 1949 when the Joint Committee first became interested in the peacetime potential of atomic power, the Committee has sponsored various studies and reports on the need to expand or accelerate the program, and has initiated various efforts to accomplish these objectives.

In 1953 the Joint Committee, under the leadership of Representatives Carl Durham and Sterling Cole, saved the AEC's experimental reactor projects from substantial cuts by the executive branch, and sponsored a five-year experimental reactor program. In 1954, the Joint Committee sponsored the Cole-Hickenlooper bill to amend the 1946 Act to provide, among other things, for greater private participation in atomic power development. In 1956 the Joint

Committee passed, without a dissenting vote, the proposed Atomic Power Acceleration Amendment of 1956, which was the Committee's version of the original Gore-Holifield bill. This bill, which was passed by the Senate and narrowly defeated in the House, would have authorized \$400 million for the development of prototype demonstration power reactors to be built by the government at AEC sites with the electricity absorbed in connection with operations at the site.

Since 1956, the Joint Committee has focused its efforts in the atomic power development field to adding projects in the annual AEC Authorization Bill. In 1957, among other things, it added a project for a gas-cooled reactor prototype, which was cut down in conference to a design study. In 1958, the Joint Committee authorized the gas-cooled project as well as a plutonium production reactor which would be convertible to electric power production, and various design studies. In 1959, the Committee added three reactor prototype projects to the AEC Authorization Bill, as well as the enlargement of the Shippingport reactor, and several design studies.

Friction with the AEC

The history of the atomic power program has not been entirely harmonious. In 1954 there were differences within the Committee and with the AEC. Again in 1956 and 1957, the AEC and the minority party in Congress opposed the Joint Committee's efforts. In late 1957 and 1958, the Joint Committee and AEC attempted to work out a mutually acceptable compromise. Although much progress was made, AEC came out with a separate statement in June 1958, and a Joint Committee staff report was issued in August 1958. Both statements attempted to provide a compromise be-

tween a program composed solely of wholly government owned projects or wholly privately sponsored projects.

During the fall of 1958 the new AEC Chairman, John McCone, appointed an Ad Hoc Committee which provided a report in January 1959 which supported most of the recommendations of the Joint Committee staff report. As of this writing relative peace prevails, with AEC proceeding with projects initiated by the Joint Committee, such as the gas-cooled prototype. The Commission is also assuming a more positive direction of the program, including a statement to undertake the development of a ten-year atomic power program, steps long advocated by the Joint Committee.

Basic research projects

A further example of the Joint Committee's creative efforts is in the field of basic research facilities. The story begins when the Joint Committee's Subcommittee on Research and Development held nine days of public hearings in February of 1958 on the AEC basic research program in the physical sciences.³ In due course the Subcommittee adopted a unanimous report recommending among other things additional facilities for basic research, and increased operating expenditures in the range of 50 to 150 per cent for research activities.

Following this consideration of basic research, some Committee members became concerned when the AEC authorization request for fiscal year 1959 provided for only two small facility projects totaling about \$1,000,000. Under its authority to be kept fully informed, the Committee obtained the information

³ Some fifty of the nation's leading scientists presented testimony on their methods and results. A record of some 800 pages of testimony on the latest data in the fields of chemistry, metallurgy, physics, and controlled thermonuclear reactions was amassed.

that the AEC Division of Research had originally recommended fifteen new facility projects totaling approximately \$45,000,000. These projects included new and improved particle accelerators, "hot" laboratories, and research reactors. The full Committee passed substantially all of these projects in the AEC Authorization Bill.

Following enactment of the AEC authorization legislation, the Joint Committee Chairman wrote to the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee calling attention not only to the desirability of providing funds for the basic research projects added by the Joint Committee, but also to the need for funds held up on prior year projects by the Bureau of the Budget. The letter also pointed to the need for additional operating funds. The resulting AEC Appropriation Act for 1959 provided for all funds for prior year projects and half the projects added by the Joint Committee, with the stipulation in the House Appropriations Committee report that cancellations and unused funds on other projects might be used for the remainder.

Upon enactment of the AEC appropriation law for fiscal year 1959, the Joint Committee's Subcommittees on Research and Development and on Legislation announced an investigation of the Commission's research program to discover what bottlenecks, if any, there were to the prompt undertaking of the research and development projects which had been authorized. This was an attempt to forestall the delaying of funds by the Bureau of Budget, an agency which previously had held up some projects for as long as three years and some entirely. Fortunately this red-tape inquiry, together with the new AEC management, produced a fine result, namely that all authorized basic research projects were funded and that work was actually undertaken with reasonable

promptness. Such are the somewhat peculiar ways of getting jobs done in the federal government!

The Joint Committee has also been concerned with less understood research needs in the atomic energy field, particularly in relation to radiation hazards. In 1957, for example, following its extensive hearings the Committee urged greater research on the problems of radioactive fallout from weapons tests. In its subsequent report of August 1959, based on hearings held in May, the Committee pointed out that although some progress had been made, the program was still not getting the high-level attention or support which was required. The Committee's reports in 1959 on its extensive hearings on radioactive waste disposal and radiation hazards to employees also called attention to the need for more research on these hazards.⁴

AUTHORITY, METHODS, AND APPROACH

The sources of the Joint Committee's authority in the field of atomic energy are both formal in the statutory sense, and practical in the sense of the realities of government.

Reference has already been made to the Joint Committee's principal statutory sources of authority, namely, acting as a joint unit for both houses of Congress, its right to be currently informed, and its enlarged legislative responsibilities. Also of importance have been the statutory requirements of Joint Committee review of important domestic atomic power development arrangements, as well as international arrangements for co-operation with foreign governments covering the peaceful development of atomic energy and military uses.

From a practical standpoint the success achieved by the Joint Committee

⁴ These radiation hearings, except for employee hazards, have been conducted by the Special Subcommittee on Radiation, Representative Chet Holifield, Chairman.

over the years has resulted from the continuity in membership of many of its leading members, and its efforts to keep the United States in the forefront of atomic energy development. The tenure of many of its senior members goes back to the original Joint Committee appointments in 1946, and several other members number eight or ten years of service. This is in contrast with the Atomic Energy Commission which currently has four new Commissioners and a new General Manager.

The Joint Committee has exercised its powers vigorously, buttressed by a faith in the importance of atomic energy, and assisted from its inception by an able and devoted staff. The Joint Committee staff comprises a total of approximately twenty employees, including seven or eight professional employees. The Committee and staff utilize extensively the services of the Library of Congress, and the General Accounting Office, organizations which are responsible primarily to Congress. For example, the Library of Congress, at the request of the Joint Committee, prepared in 1956 a report on Soviet manpower and education which foreshadowed the current popular concern with Russian advances. The General Accounting Office, in response to a Joint Committee request, has reviewed the financial and contractual arrangements of each atomic power development arrangement submitted to the Joint Committee for review.

The Joint Committee has also utilized consultants and expert panels to a considerable extent to supplement its own staff and to obtain the benefit of outside advice.⁵

⁵ In the development of the Committee's staff report in 1958 on the expanded atomic power program, the following representative panel of reactor and industrial experts participated: Dr. Henry DeWolf Smyth, Chairman, Board of Scientific and Engineering Research, Princeton University; Dr. Chauncey Starr,

Most informational hearings held by the Joint Committee in the past few years have been planned with the assistance of an ad hoc steering committee of outside experts who advise on the scope and outline of the subject matter of the hearing and on possible expert witnesses. The Joint Committee normally obtains an outside expert consultant to assist on the technical aspects of the hearing and report. In addition, the assistance of the AEC and Defense Department staff is used considerably, particularly in checking factual statements in reports and otherwise obtaining technical information.

Informal approach

Sometimes the Joint Committee has dispensed with formal hearings and used informal seminars where it is believed that less formal proceedings would facilitate frank exchange of information and ideas. This technique was instituted in the development of legislation on power reactor insurance and indemnity, and was carried over into consideration of the atomic power program itself. In these seminars, leaders and technical representatives of the atomic equipment companies, the private and public utilities, engineering and construction companies, and various atomic laboratories, have participated.⁶

President, American Nuclear Society, and Vice President, Atomics International; Mr. Titus LeClair, Manager of Research and Development, Commonwealth Edison Company, Chicago, Illinois; Mr. James Grahl, Director, Atomic Energy Service, American Public Power Association; and Dr. W. H. Zinn, President of General Nuclear Engineering Corporation.

⁶ Perhaps it was this technique which led an authoritative atomic industry publication to state: "JCAE's assumption of leadership has been quiet, imaginative and efficient, though not unchallenged. From the first, the move has been marked by a deliberate effort to consult the industry's executives and the reactor experts in both industry and government." See Roundup: "Power Shifting Away from

It will be noted that a primary means used by the Joint Committee in keeping informed is by direct contact with technical representatives of the various atomic laboratories and industrial concerns. These Washington discussions are supplemented by field trips to the various domestic atomic energy installations. Perhaps the most interesting field trip of the Committee in the last session of Congress occurred on April 11, 1959, when the full Committee held an official meeting aboard the nuclear submarine "Skipjack" to receive a report from Admiral Rickover on this most advanced type of underwater atomic propulsion. It was during this trip that the Skipjack achieved new records of depth and speed.

Joint Committee members have also participated as Congressional Advisors at a number of international atomic conferences, such as at the Geneva scientific conferences in 1955 and 1958, and the conferences of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957, 1958, and 1959.

The Joint Committee's approach or philosophy with respect to nuclear research and development has been that of informed laymen with a vast respect for working scientists and engineers and an abiding faith in the potentials of atomic energy in peacetime.

Encouragement and improvement

The Joint Committee's main tools have been the great reservoir of experience and familiarity with atomic programs described above, together with a considerable amount of common sense and ability to utilize and sift advice and information from many sources. Generally speaking, the Joint Committee's role is not to substitute its judgment for that of the AEC or Defense Depart-

ment, but rather more to encourage the government to recognize the facts and situations, and sometimes to fill gaps in programs or policies which should be filled. Rarely does the Joint Committee recommend against an AEC request.

It is true that the Joint Committee on occasion does add projects and strongly urge certain policies. This has usually occurred where the AEC or Defense Department has been restricted by budgetary ceilings, or where, as in the atomic power field, AEC was unduly tied to the policy abstraction of private development.⁷

The general philosophy of development followed by the Joint Committee has been one of encouraging orderly improvement in the art. This has caused the Committee to question the construction of atomic reactors for the so-called "Peace Ship" in 1955, and for a Puerto Rico power station in 1957, which would have been virtual carbon copies of existing reactors, rather than improvements. Generally speaking, the Committee has favored diversified and parallel approaches on the important research and development programs, believing that both small improvements and large break-throughs are important in the field of technology. In this connection the Committee has followed a policy of "live and let live" whereby various competing project directors have been encouraged and supported.

The Joint Committee's philosophy in the field of basic research is that facilities and personnel must be augmented in order to keep the United States in a position of leadership in the Western world and in competition with the So-

⁷ For example, the Joint Committee, in its gap-filling role and based on good technical advice and the British experience, insisted on AEC sponsoring a gas-cooled prototype reactor. AEC, after initially opposing this type of technology and project, now admits that it is a field which must be explored by government and private development.

viets. The Committee in 1956 called attention to the need for an upgrade and an extension of our whole educational system, particularly in the field of mathematics. In 1958, as mentioned earlier, the Joint Committee substantially increased the authorization of facilities for basic research, particularly in the high energy field. The Joint Committee has also called attention to the need for increasing AEC operating expenditures to support the research carried on in the new and improved facilities.

General attitude of Congress

Congress by and large has accepted the legislative recommendation of the Joint Committee with respect to research and development. Occasionally in relation to atomic power development in recent years, the House has refused to agree on federal government construction of prototype demonstration plants. But even here, as a result of Joint Committee and AEC efforts, means of proceeding with such projects have been agreed to and authorized.

OTHER CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

As the peaceful uses of atomic energy expand and the military uses broaden and are better understood, it is inevitable that other Committees of Congress will take more of an interest in atomic energy research and development. For example, the Disarmament Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Policy Committee has evidenced an interest in research on weapons test detection.⁸

⁸ The House and Senate Committees on Outer Space and Astronautics have an obvious interest in nuclear rocket propulsion. The Maritime Committees of the House and Senate also have an evident interest in nuclear ship propulsion, regarding an atomic reactor as just another power plant. The Congressional Government Operations Committees have an interest in the organization and management of the atomic enterprise.

The Subcommittee has indicated, however, that it regards the Joint Committee as the "technical" committee in this field, and the Subcommittee is primarily interested in the policy implications of the detection problem.

One of the principal problems in the relationship between Congressional committees is the established practice of not communicating with one another, particularly in regard to classified information or matters discussed in executive session. This practice, in addition to normal jurisdictional interest, tends to encourage committees to find their own facts and information, rather than relying on the work of another committee. Duplication and time wasting of executive agencies and Congressional staff are the result.

IMPORT OF CONGRESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Perhaps the most pervasive criticism which has been implicit in reviews of the Congressional role in atomic energy research and development, has been that Congress in acting through the Joint Committee majority "has been encroaching persistently on the domain that normally is reserved to the Executive."⁹ This criticism has largely been aimed in recent years at the Joint Committee's role in the atomic power development program. It is believed that the review of Joint Committee experience in this article indicates that the Joint Committee from its inception in 1946 has exercised a major policy function in all aspects of the atomic energy field. This role has been carried on without regard to which party had a Committee majority, with most of the Committee actions being unanimous or without dissent.

Whether the results of this active role of Congress in the field of atomic re-

⁹ See David F. Cavers, "Atomic Power: The Quest For a Program," *The George Washington Law Review*, Volume 27, No. 4 (April 1959), p. 470.

AEC on Reactor Plans; Joint Committee, Budget Disputing Leadership," *Nucleonics*, Vol. 16, No. 8 (August 1958), p. 22.

search and development have been good is not for the authors to determine.¹⁰ Suffice it to say that there has been no criticism of the fact that the United States now has additional and better nuclear weapons, more raw materials and fissionable materials, a growing nuclear Navy, and an expanding research and development program for the peacetime atom, all of which have been urged by the Joint Committee and supported by the Congress.

From this review of the Congressional experience in atomic energy research, perhaps the following conclusions may be drawn:

(1) The Joint Committee device has worked reasonably well over the thirteen years of its existence.¹¹ During this period, the Joint Committee's interests have broadened from considerations of the weapons program and security, to research and development on the peaceful uses, international co-operation, and declassification of information. Public hearings and published reports are an important part of its activity.

(2) The Joint Committee experience throughout its existence has shown that Congress can show initiative and exercise leadership even in a complex field.

(3) The Congressional experience in atomic energy does not support the idea of establishing a Joint Committee on Science and Technology to cover all scientific and technical matters coming before Congress. The present scope of activity of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is a heavy responsibility, and not much more could be added without overburdening the Committee and staff.¹²

¹⁰ For a detailed review and appraisal of the Joint Committee's activities and role up to 1956 see Morgan Thomas, *Atomic Energy and Congress* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1956), pp. 139, 183-84, 229-41.

¹¹ This is not to say that other devices may not also be of great value. The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare has done a fine job in the field of medical research.

¹² Notwithstanding the establishment in 1958 of the House Committee on Science and

A forward look

In conclusion, we believe it might properly be said that what was started as a device to permit a handful of members of the Congress to receive and evaluate the facts concerning a top secret endeavor and stand as guarantors to the Congress and the nation that things were all right has become a useful Congressional instrument at a time when the country requires less secrecy and more free discussion. Perhaps the biggest problem faced by the Joint Committee during this transitional period is that it may lose some of what Representative Mel Price, Chairman of its Subcommittee on Research and Development, calls "its adventurous spirit." But as the pendulum swings away from national secrecy to world co-operation, it is believed that there will be much in the field of research in which a contribution can be made, even in relation to co-operation on the other side of the Iron Curtain.

Plans of the Joint Committee for the current session of Congress include a series of hearings on "The Frontiers of Atomic Energy Research" and a report on a "Review of International Atomic Energy Policies and Programs." It is hoped that these hearings and reports, and others like them, will provide nourishment for the Joint Committee's spirit and will continue to make a contribution by Congress to science and technology.

Aeronautics and the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, a majority of the committees of both Houses have continued to be concerned with aspects of scientific research and related subjects. See Report of the Committee on Government Operations, U. S. Senate, "Progress Report on Science Programs of the Federal Government" (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, September 1958), pp. 58-67.

Research Planning and Control in the United States Department of Agriculture: The Experience of an Old and Well-established Research Agency

By BYRON T. SHAW

ABSTRACT: Our publicly supported agricultural research has been a joint responsibility of the Department of Agriculture and the state land-grant colleges since 1862. Methods evolved for its planning and control are based on voluntary co-operation between the states and Department agencies, with assistance from farmers, industry, and other groups. This system, nearly as complex and diverse as agriculture itself, has been very successful. Today it involves some 13,000 scientists at hundreds of locations throughout the country. It is financed by nearly \$238 million in public funds, about half from the states and half from the federal government. The work concerns all phases of production, marketing, utilization, and consumption of farm and forest products. It is organized generally around specific problems and includes about 14,700 projects. However, more than a fifth of the federal funds support basic studies. Advisory committees, composed of members who represent users of research results, aid extensively in planning. Control procedures, including thorough project review and co-ordination, permit a well-integrated and dynamic program. In the administration of this research, encouragement of creative contributions by individual scientists is a prime consideration.

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FOR nearly a century, agricultural research in the United States has been mainly a public effort, financed and conducted jointly by the federal and state governments. This research is largely responsible for the unparalleled efficiency and productivity of American agriculture.

In no other field of effort has state-federal co-operation been more effective. Our agricultural scientists have been outstandingly successful also in developing close working relations with farmers, farm organizations, marketing associations, industrial concerns, universities and research foundations, and other public and private groups.

The methods gradually evolved for planning and control of this highly complex, co-operative effort are based on the experience and thinking of hundreds of scientists, public administrators, and interested laymen in all sections of the country. They have continually faced the problem of meeting the scientific needs of our rapidly expanding agriculture on relatively limited budgets. Their efforts have resulted in one of the best planned and co-ordinated research programs in the world.

Publicly supported research in agriculture on a nation-wide scale began in this country in 1862, following enactment of two federal statutes creating the Department of Agriculture and the state land-grant colleges.

Subsequent acts passed by Congress established the state experiment stations and provided them with federal-grant funds, extended the scope of scientific work by the Department, and strengthened the bonds between federal-state research in agriculture and agricultural education.

Public institutions developed as a result of these laws have provided the leadership for our agricultural revolution.

ROAD TO ABUNDANCE

Farming technology in the 1860's had progressed little beyond that of Colonial days. Our fast expanding population was fed chiefly by more and more farmers working more and more acres. This trend, accompanied by a slow rise in farming efficiency, continued until the end of World War I.

Productive farm acreage tripled between 1860 and 1920, reaching a total of some 500 million acres cropland equivalent. Although important shifts in land use have since occurred, this total amount of cropland remains the basis of our agriculture today. Farm employment rose to an all-time peak of 13.6 million during the years 1910-16 and then began a steady decline.

Since 1920, advances in technology, rather than additional land and manpower, have been the key to our agricultural progress.

From 1920 to 1940, production of all farm products rose about one-fifth, while cropland stayed the same and farm employment dropped almost a fifth. But this was only the beginning.

In the twenty years since 1940 we have raised our total agricultural output by more than half. Farm employment has fallen by one-third. Farm output per man-hour has doubled.

Besides giving us a greater variety of higher quality farm products, agricultural research has developed more efficient methods for marketing and distributing these products to consumers. It has improved the diets of all our people, lightened the work of homemakers, and contributed in other ways to better family living.

The dark side of this picture of progress is well known. Farm production has been running ahead of demand. The burden of surpluses is felt by the entire economy. Prices received by

farmers have declined relative to prices of goods they must buy. As a result they have not shared equally with other segments of the population in the country's general prosperity.

THE RESEARCH JOB TODAY

Most of the phenomenal increase in farm output achieved in the last twenty years has been vitally necessary to meet the needs of a population that has grown by nearly 48 million people since 1940. Research owes no apology for its contribution to our bountiful harvests. But it does recognize a responsibility for doing something about the surpluses and the "cost-price squeeze" on farmers.

We are endeavoring to find new and wider uses for farm products, especially as industrial raw materials. We are seeking ways to help farmers make needed adjustments in production—away from commodities in surplus, and toward commodities for which demand is expanding, or can be expanded.

At the same time, we must continue to increase the quality of farm products and lower the cost of their production, further improve the efficiency of farm-product distribution, find ways to prevent soil deterioration and loss, and halt the waste of our water resources.

Looking ahead, we can expect a doubling of our present population in the next fifty years. For our people then to be as well fed as they should be, we must at least double our present crop output and more than double production of animal products. The job will have to be done on about the same acreage we have now, and with probably still fewer farm workers.

Federal-state responsibilities

In doing its share of this research job, the Department of Agriculture directs most of its efforts toward problems

of regional or national significance. The state agricultural experiment stations are free to investigate any problem of interest to the people of their states, but on matters of regional or national interest they usually work in co-operation with other states and the Department.

These stations conduct about three-fifths of the total federal-state research program. About 78 per cent of their work is currently supported by state funds and the remainder by federal grants.

Both state and federal research administrators endeavor to maintain voluntary working relationships that will avoid unnecessary duplication in their research and yet provide scientific answers to the most important problems, whether they are local, state, regional, or national in scope.

The Department and the experiment stations co-operate formally on more than half their research and informally on most of the rest. We are proud of this system and the way it operates. No other country has anything like it.

Size of the effort

The Department employs about 4,800 scientists, including specialists in practically all of the biological sciences, most of the physical sciences, and many of the social sciences. They work at more than 300 locations in all the states. The facilities at two-thirds of these locations are state owned, and the remainder are in federal establishments.

The state experiment stations have about 8,400 scientists, some of whom are engaged part time in teaching or extension work and part time in research. They work side by side with Department people at many of the research stations in each state.

Public funds appropriated for federal-state agricultural research have doubled since 1953. For the current fiscal year

they total about \$238 million. A little over half—\$124 million—is provided by the federal government and the remainder by the states.

The federal portion includes about \$92 million to be spent by Department of Agriculture scientists and \$32 million in federal grants to the state experiment stations. The state portion includes some funds provided to the experiment stations from private sources.

Since 1946, the Department has had authority from Congress to contract with outside groups for research, under its supervision, that can be done more rapidly, more effectively, or at less cost by other institutions, than in its own facilities. At present, we have more than 200 such contracts in force.

Under the Agricultural Trade, Development, and Assistance Act (Public Law 480), we recently began developing an extensive program of contract and grant research in foreign countries, financed by local currencies from the sale abroad of United States surplus farm commodities.

Industrial research in agriculture has also nearly doubled in the last half dozen years. It is supported today by an amount roughly equivalent to that for state-federal research. The work by industry is heavily concentrated in relatively few fields, mainly in processing and marketing, though substantial funds are spent also on agricultural chemicals and biologics and on farm equipment.

DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION

During most of its history, research in the Department was a function of several tightly organized bureaus. Each bureau provided its own administrative services and presented its own budget estimates to Congress. Most of the bureaus were responsible not only for research, but also for certain regulatory activities that required research support, such as federal meat inspection and the

control or eradication of livestock and crop pests and diseases.

Since 1942 a series of changes has been made in the Department's research organization. These changes, reflecting the increased complexity of both agriculture and agricultural science, provided for the redirection and closer coordination of the Department's research efforts to meet changing national needs. In the process the old bureau structure has been abolished.

But the general principle of conducting research along with other activities in multifunctional institutions has been maintained, both in the Department and in the state colleges. The Agricultural Research Service and other Department agencies engaged in research continue to have regulatory and other responsibilities. Although similar regulatory activities in the states are largely a function of the state departments of agriculture, the land-grant colleges conduct teaching and extension work in addition to research.

The administrator of the Agricultural Research Service is delegated responsibility for the co-ordination of all the Department's research and for the administration of federal-grant funds to the state experiment stations.

Research activities of the Agricultural Research Service cover four broad areas:

1) Seven divisions, under a Deputy Administrator for Farm Research, work in the fields of livestock, poultry, and dairy husbandry; animal diseases and parasites; entomology; soil and water conservation; agricultural engineering; crops production; and farm economics.

2) Four divisions, under a Deputy Administrator for Utilization Research and Development, are concerned with expanding industrial and other uses for farm products.

3) Two divisions, under a Deputy Administrator for Experiment Stations, administer federal-grant funds to the states

and direct our territorial experiment stations.

4) The Institute of Home Economics, headed by a Director, conducts research in human nutrition, household economics, and clothing and housing.

Four other Department agencies are responsible for important additional phases of the total program. These include the marketing research and statistical functions of the Agricultural Marketing Service; research on forestry and forest products by the Forest Service; research aid to farmer co-operatives by the Farmer Co-operative Service; and foreign market development work by the Foreign Agricultural Service.

ADMINISTRATIVE METHODS

The diversity of American agriculture, the growing interdependence of all science, and the complexity of a research organization composed of some fifty autonomous state experiment stations, plus nation-wide activities by several Department agencies, make the planning and control of our state-federal research program a formidable undertaking.

Administrators of this research must insure that the important problems receive adequate attention; that shifts in economic and other conditions are properly reflected in the research program; that unnecessary duplication of work is avoided; and that the benefits expected from particular lines of work justify the effort devoted to them.

Choosing the best available ideas for incorporation in any research program is of course important. It is equally important to stimulate a flow of good ideas from which a choice can be made.

Accordingly, in our federal-state system we encourage both the inflow of ideas from outside and the generation and interchange of ideas at all points within the system.

Advisory committees

We make a continuing effort, formally and informally, to solicit comments on our research program from those best acquainted with the problems we are trying to solve. Valuable mechanisms for this purpose are the Department's Agricultural Research Policy Committee and the twenty-five advisory committees established under provisions of the Research and Marketing Act of 1946. Members of these committees represent the major segments of United States agriculture and the consuming public.

The Agricultural Research Policy Committee meets quarterly and advises the Department on policy matters and broad adjustments needed to maintain a dynamic research program.

Seventeen of the advisory committees are concerned with particular farm commodities, and the other eight offer counsel in various functional areas, such as food and nutrition, transportation, and economics. They meet annually to review current research and recommend adjustments, including termination of existing projects, expansion of current work, and initiation of new work.

The state experiment stations seek advice concerning their own research from similar advisory committees, composed of representatives of farmers, consumers, and other groups having agricultural interests in the various states.

The project system

Scientists at all levels of the federal-state research organization play an important part in the initiation and planning of research. They recognize problem areas where new facts are needed, and they can be counted upon to consider the usefulness and originality of projects they submit to their supervisors. The administrator's job is to determine in each case whether a pro-

posed project will contribute to solution of the most urgent research problems and fit into a well-balanced total program of research.

The administrator of the Agricultural Research Service provides for the examination and analysis of all Department research activities, current and contemplated; for review and approval of all proposed projects before they are initiated; for advice and consultation with agency heads on the planning of research; and for submission of reports and recommendations to the Secretary of Agriculture. He is assisted in this work by a Central Project Office and an Agricultural Research Council.

The Central Project Office is a control center in the review and approval of research proposals. It maintains records on about 2,800 Department line projects. Each proposed project is examined in this office in relation to the existing program and referred for comment to all agencies of the Department doing related work, including subject-matter specialists in the State Experiment Stations Division of the Agricultural Research Service, who consider it in relation to research at the state stations.

The Agricultural Research Council includes the deputy administrators for research in the Agricultural Research Service and in the Agricultural Marketing Service, the director of the Institute of Home Economics, the assistant chief for research of the Forest Service, and the administrators of the Foreign Agricultural Service and the Farmer Co-operative Service. It provides a forum for discussion of research problems of Department-wide concern.

Federal-state research

Relations between the states and the Department involve both the administration of federal-grant funds and a great volume of co-operative research which is formally documented by co-

operative agreements and memoranda of understanding.

The Department's role in the federal-grant research program of the state experiment stations is primarily one of service. We are charged with seeing that the funds are spent as intended by Congress, but we have a further responsibility for giving technical assistance. This includes comprehensive reviews of federal-grant research, participation in planning of regional research, and co-ordination of research effort among the states as well as between the states and the Department.

Before research projects using federal-grant funds can be initiated by a state station, they are reviewed in the State Experiment Stations Division. Division specialists make annual visits to each station to discuss the progress of the research with the scientists doing the work. At most of the stations, this annual review covers all state projects and is not limited to those receiving support from federal-grant funds.

The Division keeps detailed records on about 5,900 projects at the state experiment stations financed wholly or in part by federal funds. In addition, information is maintained on some 6,000 projects financed entirely by state funds.

These records, along with those on federal projects kept in the Central Project Office, provide background information on current work in progress against which all proposed new projects to be supported by federal funds are examined. This is the key to effective co-ordination and prevention of unnecessary duplication in the total effort.

In co-operative research on all problems of mutual interest, state and federal workers decide jointly what portion of the work each will undertake. To aid in co-operative planning, we make use of various devices that have proved useful over the years.

They include standing technical com-

mittees of state and federal scientists in major subject-matter areas, such as cereal crops, beef-cattle breeding, and other areas of general interest and importance. From time to time we also establish special research panels to plan an attack on emergency problems, such as new plant or animal diseases.

An important provision of the law on federal-grant funds is the authorization for co-operative regional research. It encourages joint planning and conduct of work on problems of broad regional significance by several state experiment stations and, frequently, one or more federal agencies. About 12 per cent of the research funds available to the state stations is devoted to regional projects. We maintain a variety of federal-state co-operative arrangements for this work.

Co-operation with industry

For the most part co-operation with industry is less formalized than state-federal co-operation. However, industrial research grants, endowments, and fellowships play an important part in co-operative industry-state research. Industry also co-operates extensively with the Department. Facilities, materials, and services made available by private concerns aid many phases of both federal and state research.

RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT

In developing our methods for the planning and control of research, we keep continually in mind the fact that successful research depends mainly on the ability of individual scientists. To generate those new ideas on which scientific progress depends, they must be talented and well-trained people, and they must have the freedom to use their imaginations.

Co-ordination, integration, and supervision of research are necessary. But we have to face the fact that a large element of self-direction is essential for

productive work by scientists. A research environment favorable to creative accomplishment by individual specialists must be provided.

A scientist should be able to conduct his research in an atmosphere of free inquiry, to publish his results freely, and to take advantage of free discussion with his colleagues.

One powerful incentive in scientific work is the opportunity to gain prestige and recognition. A liberal policy on attendance at scientific meetings and the holding of office in scientific organizations is therefore important.

In publishing their research results, scientists should be able to state their findings in their own words. Excessive review or editing of scientific papers, unrealistic security classifications, and too-rigid style requirements should be avoided. Accuracy of published papers is vital, but within the limits of accuracy and reasonable clarity, the individuality of the scientist as expressed in his reports should be maintained.

Pay is of course important to scientists, even if it is not the most powerful incentive for their work. We are making progress toward higher salaries for research work and better recognition of the value of research genius as distinguished from administrative ability.

The number of positions in the Agricultural Research Service in which senior researchers can work without administrative responsibilities has been increased. And our scientists now have opportunities in several positions to receive compensation fully equal to that of the agency's top administrators while continuing to pursue individual research.

Team research

We find that productive individual effort and the team approach can be effectively combined in a good research environment. Team research, though sometimes condemned as segmented,

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can help achieve co-ordinated effort, economy, and desired results.

Our co-operative relationships with the state experiment stations, as well as the diversity of our own work, call for a great variety of arrangements of this type. More and more team research is being done, because the nature of the problems to be solved demands it and because we have learned how to do it successfully.

BASIC RESEARCH

Our traditional "problem approach" in agricultural research has resulted in a strong emphasis on work aimed at finding practical answers to immediate questions. Such an emphasis is not inappropriate in a research effort supported by the public.

But many of our problems today, as well as those likely to arise in the future, call for more basic research. It is the only means we have for discovering the new scientific laws and principles that will enable us to deal more effectively with all problems.

Over the past dozen years, the proportion of the total effort in public agricultural research devoted to basic studies has risen from about 7 per cent to better than 22 per cent. In the Agricultural Research Service, we look forward eventually to putting at least 50 cents of every research dollar into the quest for new basic discoveries.

Most of our basic research will con-

tinue to be associated with problem solving. But we are increasing our efforts also in pioneering research—fundamental studies aimed at advancing basic knowledge without direct concern with practical problems.

We have established in the various divisions of the Agricultural Research Service during the past two years fifteen Pioneering Research Groups. Scientists chosen for this pioneering work have none of the supervisory or administrative duties usual in government positions.

They are free to seek answers to some of the basic mysteries of plant nutrition, physiology and virology, plant fibers and enzymes, seed proteins, the allergens of agricultural products, animal genetics, animal proteins, blood antigens, cellular metabolism, insect physiology and pathology, the chemistry of micro-organisms, and the economics of interfirm integration in farming.

Our pioneering researchers labor at the very frontier of knowledge. Many of our other scientists also are helping to advance that frontier. Their job, like that of the Western pioneers in the 1860's, calls for individual initiative. It puts a premium on co-operative enterprise. It demands a free environment.

The Department's experience of nearly a century teaches that in all our research planning and control we should strive to maintain the freedom of research, encourage co-operation, and stimulate the initiative of individual scientists.

Research Planning and Program Development in the National Institutes of Health: The Experience of a Relatively New and Growing Agency

By HERBERT H. ROSENBERG

ABSTRACT: Research planning and program development in the National Institutes of Health (NIH) have emerged over the past decade in a context of rising national interest, steadily expanding funds, shifting program emphasis, and constantly broadening scope of scientific inquiry. NIH basic philosophy seeks to maximize creative potential and regards research planning as a totality encompassing the limiting resources of manpower and facilities as well as conduct of research itself. Planning has evolved as a continuous, flexible, adaptive process in which administrators and scientists possess considerable discretion within a framework of goals and priorities established by Congressional action. It represents a balance between the spontaneous interests of individual scientists and organized effort designed to meet needs and opportunities vital to the nation's health. Responsibility for over-all planning has grown as expenditures have increased, program interests have enlarged, and NIH has become a more significant factor in support of university research and training of scientific manpower. The nature of the process requires further adaptation to deal more effectively with the problems of the future such as total impact of NIH programs upon an institution as a whole, strengthening the nation's research structure, and administering a co-operative research program on a world-wide scale.

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IN a growing agency,¹ the scope of planning constantly enlarges to meet program needs and opportunities in consonance with broadening interests and expanding responsibilities. As this development takes place in a research organization, new perspectives must be reconciled with the goal of maximizing the creative potential of scientific talent. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) confronts these problems as it grows within a context of rising national interest, steadily expanding funds, shifting program emphasis, and constantly broadening scope of scientific inquiry.

The past decade has crystallized the national interest in medical research. Extending beyond the support of science as an end in itself, the national interest recognizes that medical research deals

¹The views expressed are those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the official views and positions of the National Institutes of Health, the Public Health Service, or the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

directly with the ultimate resources of the nation—the lives and health of the people. It emphasizes the contribution of medical research to economic capability. Better health and longer lives mean a larger, more productive labor force and reduction of individual and social costs of illness. Finally, medical research serves as a hopeful avenue toward peaceful coexistence between the free world and communist ideology.

The rapid but steady growth of the National Institutes of Health represents the development of a large-scale medical research program to promote the national interest. Facilitated by bipartisan support, NIH research appropriations have increased 20 to 30 per cent annually (Figure 1). This evenly paced growth pattern has expanded research funds more than thirty-fold since 1947, from \$8 million to \$285 million.

Concomitantly, program emphasis shifted from the infectious to the chronic and degenerative diseases. The scope of medical research broadened to em-

brace the creative energies of men from all fields of science. Increasingly, the study of biological processes utilizes the concepts and methods of the physical sciences. Behavioral scientists also devote their talents to medical research, especially as it touches mental health and related problems of individual and social well-being.

A "NEW" FEDERAL AGENCY EMERGES

Within this milieu, the National Institutes of Health has emerged as the federal agency with primary responsibility for medical and health related research. Beginning with a brief sketch of historical, organizational, and philosophical influences, this article describes NIH experience with research planning and program development in the light of past and present approaches and future problems.

Historical background

NIH is not exactly a "new" agency; its research tradition is deeply rooted in the Public Health Service established in 1798. The Hygienic Laboratory, opened by Dr. Joseph Kinyoun in 1887, preceded NIH as the Service's major research activity. This one-room laboratory expanded into a research organization with separate divisions of chemistry, bacteriology, pathology, zoology, and pharmacology. Its research interests broadened further in 1912 when the Public Health Service was specifically empowered to "study and investigate the disease of man." In 1930, the National Institute of Health was created and took over the functions of the Hygienic Laboratory; it moved from its five-acre site near 25th and E Streets, N.W., in Washington to the 305-acre campus at Bethesda eight years later.

New knowledge resulting from research coupled with public health measures drastically reduced the death toll from infectious diseases between 1900

and 1930. The challenge of the future loomed in the major killers—cancer and heart disease—and the cripples such as mental illness, metabolic and neurological diseases.

Recognizing that research offered the best hope of combating such diseases, the Congress established the National Cancer Institute in 1937. The statute, which served as a prototype for the creation of additional Institutes for other disease categories, empowered the Cancer Institute to conduct and coordinate research, make grants, and provide fellowships and training, and created a National Advisory Cancer Council. These actions marked a break with the past; they gave the National Institutes of Health a key role in the stimulation and support of research aimed at improving the health of the people.

Structure and functions

The National Institutes of Health is one of several bureaus of the Public Health Service within the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Its research programs are administered by seven National Institutes which cover the following categories: Cancer, Heart, Mental Health, Arthritis and Metabolic Diseases, Neurological Diseases and Blindness, Allergy and Infectious Diseases, and Dental Research. Each Institute receives a separate appropriation; each conducts intramural and extramural research and training programs. In addition, the Division of General Medical Sciences supports research and training not directly related to any specific disease and operates the Center for Aging Research.

The Director of NIH provides executive leadership, directs programs and co-ordinates the Institutes. In discharging this responsibility he is assisted by a Deputy Director, two Associate Directors—one for intramural research and one for training programs




FIG. 1.

—and three senior staff members in the areas of research planning, administration, and information.

This summary oversimplifies a multifaceted structure. In reality, NIH operates simultaneously in four different organizational contexts: (1) A bureau functioning as the principal research arm of the Public Health Service; (2) a national research institution at Bethesda carrying out what is perhaps the world's most comprehensive medical research program; (3) a major national agency whose policies and programs in support of research through grants and contracts have a far-reaching impact upon the scientific and academic communities. For example, during the past year NIH supported more than \$140 million in research grants covering about 10,000 projects in nearly 1,000 institutions; and (4) the federal agency responsible for continuing appraisal of research needs related to human health and disease as well as opportunities and resources required to meet those needs.

While the character and scope of research planning differ markedly for each of these organizational contexts, the basic philosophy remains constant.

Basic philosophy

Research planning at NIH seeks to maximize the creative potential of the limited supply of high-quality scientists. This basic philosophy encourages the scientist to follow his own curiosity in search of truth. It assumes that support of men and ideas in an environment conducive to creative effort enhances the probability of significant findings. This view has shaped the development of intramural research. In the extramural grant program, it has fostered terms and conditions of support that nourish free inquiry.

NIH also regards research planning as a totality which encompasses the limiting resources of manpower and facili-

ties as well as the conduct of research itself. This philosophy calls for a continuing appraisal of resources and requirements and the development of programs to: (1) assure an adequate supply and improve quality of scientists in all fields which are basic to medical research and (2) help provide the costly, complex research facilities required to advance the frontiers of knowledge.

WHO PLANS WHAT AND HOW

Planning at NIH has evolved as a continuous, flexible, adaptive process. It has to be because plans are influenced by the fusion of so many forces: Congressional interest and understanding, executive branch policies, values and views of the scientific community, attitudes and actions of lay groups concerned with specific diseases, recommendations of advisory groups, the vision and strength of NIH staff at all levels, and the leadership of three men who share administrative and political responsibility—the Director, NIH; the Surgeon General, Public Health Service; and the Secretary, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. As a consequence, NIH research planning has developed as an integral part of the politico-administrative life of a growing organization, not as an isolated, autonomous study process.

In large measure, the Congress sets the goals by creating separate Institutes which focus upon specific diseases or health problems; it establishes priorities and allocates resources through the annual appropriation and accompanying reports. Within this framework, administrators and scientists possess considerable latitude for planning and program development. The problems they face vary substantially, however, for each of four major areas: intramural research, extramural grant support, target research, and over-all planning for the future.

Intramural research

The problems which NIH has experienced in its intramural research programs prevail in most large-scale research organizations.² First, NIH has sought to attract creative scientists, to give them adequate assistance and research facilities, and to provide an environment conducive to productive effort. The second set of problems involves the translation of statutory missions such as "to conduct . . . research . . . relating to the cause, prevention, and methods of diagnosis and treatment of heart disease . . ." into specific programs. Third and thorniest is the reconciliation between the freedom essential for productive inquiry and the planning, direction, and control which any large-scale organization must exercise to assure responsible performance. Problems such as these are not "solved"; they are worked at and lived with.

The Director and his staff play a role with respect to the level of effort, broad areas of investigation, and general direction. The degree to which the Director's office influences the substance of research fluctuates among institutes and over time.

Scientists determine the substance of the intramural research program within the constraints imposed by available funds, talent, space, and time. These decisions hinge upon judgments of research needs and opportunities, state of knowledge, and particularly the scientific interests and competence of the staff on hand.

The broad scope of "heart disease," "cancer," "mental health," and other fields confers ample discretion for the development of specific research pro-

² For an excellent, comprehensive discussion of NIH experience which is as pertinent today as when it was written, see W. H. Sebrell and C. V. Kidd, "Administration of Research in the National Institutes of Health," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. LXXIV, No. 3 (March 1952).

grams and projects. Moreover, because history has demonstrated that fundamental inquiry accelerates understanding of basic disease processes, research is not narrowly confined to the diseases associated with each Institute.

At each successive layer, the scientific director, laboratory chief, section head, and so on, allocate resources and determine the degree of freedom for those beneath them. Freedom is not inherent in the individual's status as a scientist but is an earned right. NIH policy is to provide the degree of freedom consonant with the scientist's performance and promise. This evaluation is crucial because men, not projects, govern research productivity.


While informal peer judgments influence this appraisal, regularly scheduled promotion reviews furnish a more systematic evaluation of research accomplishments. In addition, an annual review of intramural research begins with the individual investigator, progresses through successive levels, and culminates in a document which serves as a springboard for the discussion of future and continuing research plans.

In addition to the assessment of men, another problem plagues most research organizations: How to identify changing needs, new opportunities, and shifts in scientific promise and how to modify research content accordingly? To provide a fresh and uncommitted appraisal, NIH utilizes boards of scientific counselors, drawn from the nation's top scientists. These groups review the intramural research program semiannually and make their recommendations for consideration by the Scientific and Institute Directors and the Director of NIH.

Extramural research

The National Institutes of Health invests eighty cents of its research dol-

TRENDS IN FEDERAL SUPPORT OF RESEARCH AT ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS, 1952-1959



FEDERAL FUNDS FOR SUPPORT OF UNIVERSITY RESEARCH (millions of dollars)					
CODE	AGENCY	AMOUNT		PERCENT	
		1952	1959	1952	1959
	TOTAL	\$151	\$383	100	100
□	NIH	14	106	9	28
■	Dept. of Defense	106	124	70	32
▨	Other Federal Agencies	31	153	21	40

Source: Derived from National Science Foundation Federal Funds for Science, I and VIII

FIG. 2.

lar in extramural research. Moreover, this investment has increased to the point where it now comprises a significant proportion of all federal research expenditures in academic institutions (Figure 2).

Despite this rapid but steady growth, the fundamental principles adopted in 1945-1946, when NIH agreed to take over the active contracts of the Office of Science Research and Development's Medical Research Committee, continue to govern extramural research planning and program development. These principles are: (1) support of the best men and most promising ideas will produce

the new knowledge required to combat disease and improve health; (2) the best men will seek support only if NIH gains and holds the respect of the scientific community; (3) support for the best men and ideas is most likely to emerge from open competition based upon scientific merit; (4) the judgment of one's scientific peers provides the wisest and fairest method for evaluating scientific merit, promise, and feasibility; and (5) terms and conditions that assure reasonable stability of support and foster freedom and flexibility for the investigator will facilitate productive inquiry.

The first step toward translating principles into action occurred in 1946 with the establishment of study sections organized around scientific disciplines, such as biochemistry and physiology, and problem areas, such as mental health and radiation. Composed of eminent scientists drawn from the scientific community, these study sections review all applications for research support in their particular discipline or problem area and assign priorities based upon scientific merit, promise, and feasibility.

The next level of review consists of eight twelve-member National Advisory Councils, each composed of six specialists in the appropriate medical field and six outstanding experts in fundamental science and public affairs. No grant may be made unless recommended for approval by a Council. The Councils also deliberate and advise on broad issues and policy questions.

Thus, with some significant exceptions, the substantive content of the extramural grant program is *not* planned. It emerges from the interaction of the research interests of qualified investigators and peer evaluation of scientific merit. Clearly, the scientific community plays the dominant role in shaping the content of the extramural grant program.

Target research

There are, however, significant exceptions where conscious planning supersedes purposeful nonplanning. The stimulus for conscious planning and direction may come from the scientific community, from NIH staff, from Congress, from health groups, and, most likely, from a combination of these sources. Conscious planning is essential to:

1. Nourish new fields of science. Study sections survey the status of research in their field to ascertain current emphasis and future needs. Biophysics is an excel-

lent case in point. The survey of this nascent field concerned with the relationship and interaction of matter and energy in life forms took several years, involved scientific leaders throughout the world, and resulted in specific recommendations to Congress, study sections, Councils, and NIH staff, and culminated in programs to stimulate research and expand the critical resource, trained manpower.

2. Identify and remedy gap areas. As the proportion of older persons in the population rises, the need for more intensive study of the physical, biological, and social aspects of the aging process becomes more acute. While several of the Institutes had long supported some research on various aspects of gerontology, NIH staff and Advisory Councils recognized the need for a concentrated, comprehensive approach. To provide a focus for such an approach, the Center for Aging Research was established in 1956. The program has grown since then, particularly through grants to non-federal research centers for long-term multidisciplinary studies.

At the opposite extreme of the life cycle, we find that more research is badly needed on the problems of perinatal morbidity and mortality. Because even a slight reduction in the mortality rate would yield substantial individual and social benefits. NIH has planned and initiated a nation-wide collaborative study of these problems.

3. Accelerate break-throughs. The evidence that virus can cause cancer in animals has been well established and scientists have developed vaccines that protect mice and chickens against virus-induced malignant tumors. Because scientists feel that the present state of knowledge seems ripe for a break-through, the Congress earmarked an additional \$4 million for research to determine whether viruses cause human tumors.

4. Evaluate intensively new methods of diagnosis or treatment. The primary illustration is the cancer chemotherapy contract program created by Congressional directive in the 1957 appropriation. It represents a highly organized program for screening and testing chemical therapeutic agents. It is altogether possible, however, that the scientists involved in this intensive effort may

stumble upon new knowledge of a fundamental character outside the target area.

In summary, because of these widely divergent approaches to the support of extramural research, the program represents a balance between: (1) the spontaneous interests of individual scientists and (2) organized effort designed to meet specific needs and opportunities considered sufficiently vital to the nation's health to warrant central planning and direction.

Stability versus flexibility

When research planning focuses upon policy rather than substantive content, the scientific community participates but does not control. NIH staff consults with study sections and Councils in planning for terms and conditions that nourish free, creative inquiry. Policies have encouraged grants for broader areas of investigation and for longer periods, three to seven years, thereby promoting greater stability and flexibility for the investigator.

These policies commit a substantial share of each year's program for a minimum of two years ahead. Rising research costs offset the apparent flexibility achieved by terminations and continuing evaluation. Consequently, program development must take place at the margin in terms of support for new men and ideas.

This fact is often overlooked in headlines publicizing NIH appropriations. However, NIH must plan for annual increments adequate to support a reasonable proportion of *new men and ideas* if the nation is to benefit from the constantly expanding supply of scientists seeking support for medical research.

Over-all planning

As research expenditures have expanded and program interests have

broadened, NIH responsibilities for over-all planning have grown with respect to the nation's total medical research effort. Ideally, over-all planning seeks to: (1) achieve desirable balances among competing objectives; (2) formulate long-range plans for future growth; (3) develop policies which will facilitate the attainment of these balances and plans; and (4) adjust and modify programs in consonance with this over-all framework, taking into account shifting scientific opportunities and health needs, changing economic and social conditions and pressures, and political realities.

In its over-all planning, NIH has become increasingly conscious of the dilemmas of balance. One of the early problems was to strike a desirable equilibrium between the intramural and extramural research programs. Another problem was to reconcile freedom for the investigator with specific disease missions. What relative emphasis should be given to today's research, construction of tomorrow's facilities, and training research scientists for the decade ahead? How should research funds be allocated between the advancement of new knowledge and the rapid translation of existing knowledge into practical application? How can NIH achieve a better balance between its research objectives and its broader responsibility for strengthening the nation's institutions dedicated to education, research, and medical care?

Questions such as these necessitate planning and continuous re-evaluation. The NIH experience has divined no magic solution to these complicated issues. It has, however, demonstrated the need for better long-range planning to provide a perspective for viewing these issues within a framework of probable future developments.

Long-range plans for the future growth of medical research rest upon assumptions which take into account a host of

variables such as population and economic growth, the prospect of substantial scientific achievements, the enlarging horizon of investigation and the penetrating depth of inquiry, the long lead-time required for training of manpower and construction of facilities, and the growing internationalization of the scientific community. The development of such assumptions requires a steady flow of relevant data and systematic analysis of all factors bearing upon the nation's resources and requirements for medical research. In 1957, the Resources Analysis Section was created to perform this function within the Office of Research Planning which has rendered staff assistance to the Director on policy-planning matters since its inception in 1949.

Long-range plans estimate the future level of medical research, approximate the resources required, and assess the feasibility of alternative courses of action designed to assure their availability. Because foundations, voluntary health agencies, unorganized private giving, corporations, and the states play such a vital role in the financing of medical research, these plans contain assumptions about the level of future support from nonfederal sources. This does not imply a parity formula for freezing the federal share in perpetuity. On the contrary, long-range plans assume that the federal share should be responsive to the rapidly changing needs of society and shifting scientific opportunities.

Long-range plans often connote fixed goals and a static situation between the present and the distant future. However, by a continuing appraisal of the situation as it exists rather than as it might have been, plans can be revised in the light of changing conditions. Such an appraisal necessarily calls for a look ahead at the problems that NIH

must meet in planning its programs for the future.

A LOOK AHEAD

Most of the problems of the next decade are already of immediate concern. These problems relate to the rate of growth and level of medical research expenditures, the challenges beyond the chronic diseases, the shifting policy focus from the individual investigator to the institution as a whole, the strengthening of the nation's research structure, increased emphasis upon co-operative research on an international scale, the financing of medical education and the quality of its product, and the adaptation of organization and management to cope with these problems.

The level of research expenditure

Many unpredictable factors will influence the future growth of medical research. However, assuming continuation of past trends, health research expenditures may again increase four-fold or more within a decade, reaching \$2.5 to \$3 billion by 1970. Achievement of such levels will demand substantial enlargement of resources, both manpower and facilities. Federal support seems essential to assure the availability of these resources needed to fulfill the national interest.

Beyond the chronic diseases

While the leading causes of death, heart disease and cancer, will continue to receive top priority, we can look for a steady broadening of research in many directions. A society geared to maximizing its potential in the continuing struggle for competitive coexistence will demand research in the etiology and prevention of accidents, the leading

cause of death during the first years of life. More research is also needed on those diseases that diminish individual and social productivity, for example, virus respiratory diseases. An increasingly urbanized, industrialized society will support more research on environmental health hazards. Fundamental research will receive increased support to gain greater knowledge and understanding of the basic biological, physical, and social structure of man.

The institution as a whole

The support of individual investigators on a project-by-project basis gradually accumulates into a research "program" for an academic institution, hospital, or research institute. The criterion of scientific merit is adequate for evaluating applications from individual investigators; it will not suffice when one considers the impact of an agency's grants upon an institution as a whole.

To meet this problem, NIH needs new and better ways for dealing with the institution as a whole. Why? Because NIH programs now constitute the primary source of research support at many institutions; because the cumulative impact may strain the institution's teaching capabilities, may weaken its control over its own destiny, may impose unforeseen financial burdens; because NIH desires to foster the more effective integration of research, education, and service; and because NIH aims to strengthen the resources, independence, and integrity of academic institutions, recognizing that a nation's research potential is relative to the quality of its educational system.

Consequently, NIH is actively exploring ways and means for dealing with the institution as a whole. One way would be to secure institutional participation in the policy and program planning process by expanding the advisory structure

which now provides representation for fields of science through the study sections and for national attitudes through the Councils. A complementary approach would use institutional research grants to furnish fluid funds and thereby better enable the institution to guide its own destiny.

Strengthening the nation's research structure

The NIH programs for support of research, training, and research facilities have greatly strengthened the nation's research structure. Looking ahead, one can see clearly the need to create regional biomathematical and electronics applications centers, environmental health research centers, germ-free life laboratories and similar, costly, specialized research resources becoming increasingly strategic for advanced biological investigation. A recent report of a good ad hoc advisory group to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare recommended regional dispersal of such facilities so that they might serve many institutions and areas of inquiry.³ In this connection, the Congress has directed NIH to report upon the need for such facilities, including a thorough exploration of financial requirements.

The weaker institutions constitute another less dramatic but vital deficiency in the nation's research structure. The competition of excellence yields scant benefit to those who require substantial nourishment before their potential can be realized. Indeed, as in all walks of life, those with an advantage tend to increase it; faculty, funds, students, facilities all flow toward institutions with research reputations. More imaginative

³ *The Advancement of Medical Research and Education*, Final Report of the Secretary's Consultants on Medical Research and Education (June 27, 1958).

mechanisms and new criteria must be conceived to build up the marginal producers in our national research and intellectual structure.

International research programs

In his 1958 State of the Union Message, President Eisenhower called attention to the need for expanding medical research on an international scale. Legislation introduced by Senator Hill to establish a new Institute for International Health and Medical Research within the NIH framework passed the Senate on May 20, 1959, and is now being considered by the House. Follow-

ing the recent visit of Premier Khrushchev, the Ministry of Health of the Soviet Union and the United States Public Health Service signed an agreement expanding the medical exchange program between the two nations. These developments augur increased emphasis upon co-operative research on an international scale; when realized they will greatly expand both the resources and scope of medical research. Recognizing the shape of things to come, NIH is exploring the needs, the nature of the arrangements which will be required, and the diverse and complex problems which can be anticipated in the administration of a truly world-wide program.

What Federal Funds Mean to the Universities Today

By JOHN C. WEAVER

ABSTRACT: The accomplishments of higher education, regardless of their local significance, have been justifiably swept into the public consciousness as matters of grave national concern. As a result, federal aid to our universities and colleges has arrived, and clearly arrived to stay. Neither theoretically nor practically is there anything basically wrong with the concept of such federal aid; indeed, it has become prerequisite to the future growth and attainments of higher education. As things are presently constituted, federal aid is in a position to influence directly the conduct and development of higher education along two basic lines. One of these is through the powerful range of support flowing into our institutions under the multifarious arrangements of sponsored research; the other is through fellowship and loan aid to students, and other provisions of the National Defense Education Act. There can be little argument that our universities and colleges need this help, but it is bringing with it a whole new way of academic life, and there are a variety of influences calling for thoughtful caution and wary appraisal as the transforming tide rolls over our scholarly community.

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HOW did your legislature treat you this year?" Wherever men from state-supported universities gather, even as complete strangers, they need never resort to the weather as a subject for an opening conversational gambit. This is the question that will instantaneously provide a point of mutually absorbing and sympathetic contact. Indeed, among those who toil in the vineyards of public higher education, and rather particularly among those involved in the responsibilities of institutional administration, this "clutch" question and its associated implications reveal preoccupying apprehensions and virtually obsessive concerns.

An adequate understanding of this situation and the trend of its development calls for more than the usual analyses of such contributory factors to spiraling institutional operating costs as national inflationary pressures, mounting undergraduate and graduate enrollments, mushrooming research commitments, and necessary physical plant expansions. It demands more than an appreciation of the shortages of well-trained faculty and the frantic scramble for men that are causing universities to plead with their constituencies for higher and higher salaries in order that they can compete effectively with their sister universities around the nation for top-quality professorial services. And what heavily belabored state legislature has not in recent months heard the agonized assertion: "We must have a substantial increase in salary support if our university is to be able to recruit and hold a competent staff."

Perhaps most fundamental of all in the harassment and brow-furrowing consternation of legislator, benefactor, and educator alike is the direction of taxation that is inexorably increasing the concentration of both private and public resources in the federal treasury. Embattled state legislators, closer and

therefore understandably more sensitive to the taxpayer's woes, find their budgets creaking at every joint as competitive pressures for the locally available tax dollar grow in severity. At the same time, the great personal fortunes which initially endowed many of the nation's private institutions of higher learning can no longer form in the face of the powerful prescriptions of the federal income tax laws. Notwithstanding this confiscatory influence, the support of private institutions is being augmented, and increasingly so, by corporate and personal giving in escape of taxes. The need, however, far exceeds the available supply of such donations, in part because of such competition for funds as the establishment of foundations supporting many enterprises other than higher education.

GROWTH OF FEDERAL SUPPORT

If one were to pursue a gross oversimplification of a vastly complex problem, the accomplishments of higher education, regardless of their local significance, have justifiably elicited grave national concern among the people. There is ample precedent for pulling national needs under the sprawling federal fiscal tent on political, if not specific constitutional, grounds. Just as the trunk highway system is an economic burden that can no longer be dealt with at the exclusively state and local level, and just as the excellence of our major highways is recognized as serving far more than local demands, so likewise do the costs of achieving a healthy and necessarily massive growth of the facilities of higher education transcend both the available resources and interests of any single state or local community.

Such, then, are the factors that have been responsible for an enormous growth of federal support to the nation's public and private colleges and universities. In 1940, the federal government pro-

vided \$15,000,000 to the colleges and universities for research and development. Almost exclusively, this was traditional support to the agricultural experiment stations of the land-grant institutions. Less than two decades later, in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1958, federal agencies spent \$440,000,000 for research and development and training in a wide variety of public and private colleges and universities. Every year the total continues to rise. The National Defense Education Act of 1958 is adding many additional millions to the federal subsidy of higher education.

Federal aid to education is here, and clearly here to stay. Neither theoretically nor practically is there anything wrong with the basic concept of federal aid to higher education; indeed, it has become prerequisite to the future growth and attainments of higher education. The Northwest Ordinance and the Land-Grant Act long ago established the precedent, and education developed under their provisions has clearly demonstrated the efficacy of the practice.

There can be little argument that our institutions need this money. Indeed, its availability is adding great strength to our general operations. It is providing the direct support for a major proportion of the research of the faculty. This research is predominantly scholarly endeavor of a type which brings a fresh vitality to the classroom and offers opportunity essential to high staff morale. Federal funds also provide much of the expensive equipment and some of the physical facilities which a university presumably would have no other way of obtaining. Modern graduate education is hereby supported and strengthened in the form of assistantships and fellowships, as well as in the challenging and diverse staff research facilities in which the students can participate.

It is apparent that, as things are presently constituted, federal aid is in

a position to influence directly the conduct and future development of higher education in two basic ways: the powerful range of support flowing into our institutions under the multifarious arrangements of sponsored research, and the fellowship and loan aid to students, and other provisions of the National Defense Education Act.

INFLUENCES ON UNIVERSITY ACTIVITIES

The outside funds received by an institution in support of sponsored research bring influences that touch university activities, and particularly graduate education, at a number of significant points. This rapidly growing program at a level anywhere near the present, has only comparatively recently come in the back door to take up lodging in the academic household. At some institutions the magnitude of the involvement is colossal; in others it has not even been adequately measured. Significantly, however, almost everywhere, people find themselves somewhat uneasy in its sprawling presence.

Perhaps the prevailing state of apprehension derives in the first instance from the fact that the creature is so enormous, so subtle and persistent in movement and growth, that it is extremely difficult to get one's intellectual "hands" on it. One thing is sure. It has brought with it a whole new way of academic life, and although it is far too complex to permit the generalization that it is either "good" or bad," it has had a staggering impact and is bringing tremendous change. Deep concern undoubtedly also arises from a feeling of sheer helplessness in the face of inexorable forces that seem to be sweeping our institutions along in a transforming tide, over which no one has any measurable influence, let alone effective control.

Along with teaching and public service, research traditionally has been ac-

cepted as one of the three primary obligations of a university. Not only does this commitment grow out of the academic values inherent in research itself, but also from the fact that effective teaching and public service are indispensably grounded in research and creative scholarship. According to recent data from the National Science Foundation, two thirds of all research expenditures in our American institutions of higher learning this past year came from federal grants and contracts. The utter dependence of our universities on such governmental aid is now firmly established.

Despite all of the obvious advantages, however, this vast involvement in government-sponsored research is not a completely unalloyed blessing. There is reason for thoughtful caution and wary appraisal of the effects which it is having on the over-all academic effort. As a recent National Science Foundation study rightly emphasizes, we must remember that while the federal agencies have the research and development money to spend, and the universities are willing to accept it, and while both are seeking to operate in the public interest, each group operates in a different area of that interest, and each holds its own distinctive objectives, which in many instances are anything but identical, or even compatible. It is only common sense to be watchful when nonuniversity agencies, whose goals are of necessity not coincident with academically oriented ones, come into a position to influence such basic university functions as research and graduate education.

Certainly no attempt can be made here to explore all of the tangled and crisscrossing avenues of concern which lead out from this central problem, but a selection of them should be given brief mention. As every college administrator well knows, it costs money to accept money. One vital matter to consider,

as sponsored research grants mushroom in number and size, is how far is it feasible to let such developments go before the point is reached where further expansion is more expensive than institutional resources can afford? Accurate and trustworthy measuring sticks are difficult to find. In spite of all of the negotiations that have been carried on over recent years, a majority of universities still seem to feel that the indirect costs of government-sponsored research are not adequately covered by the variously computed overhead allowances which the institutions are permitted to charge.

Most universities are quick to concede that while sponsored research is putting a new and substantial drain on general operating funds, it has brought benefits which more than justify the over-all costs. Nonetheless, the size of the venture continues to increase, and inevitably a critical point must somewhere be attained at which any given institution will be compelled to concede that it has reached a degree of saturation beyond which it is unwise for it to go. The problem of weighing advantages against disadvantages and resources against costs is extremely difficult, simply because most institutions have not developed valid criteria. And added to this circumstance are the seemingly omnipresent motives of expansion and empire-building, which all too often lure various academic specialty enterprises to look with favor upon even the most rigid grants and contracts.

Disproportionate emphasis

Another point of general concern with sponsored research is the manner in which it tends to throw some segments of the academic enterprise out of balance with others. An educational institution is under obligation to maintain strength of scholarship in all of the intellectual fields it seeks to cover, the

social sciences and the humanities no less than the natural sciences. Because many of their objectives are particular and legitimately different from those of a university, government agencies have placed 95 per cent of the nearly half billion dollars of research money given to universities in the natural sciences. This presents the university with some fundamental problems in providing equality of opportunity and sound morale throughout its operations.

Significantly and fortunately, the men in the natural sciences are as worried about the "have not" areas in the academic scene as anyone. Adequate support of the social sciences and humanities, in the presence of this overwhelming subsidy of science and technology, is a troublesome and difficult matter. To be sure, the thoughtful distribution of research support from the internally derived funds of an institution can do something to alleviate this situation, but it is only a comparatively small number of the financially strongest schools that have sufficient available resources to achieve the proper balance. And all too clearly, unfortunate discrimination is a problem not only in the area of research opportunity, but in the adequacy of the support for teaching facilities and existent academic salary rates as well.

Unhappily, this growing state of imbalance is, at least potentially, even more severe than on the surface it appears to be. If, as is so widely claimed, the government research grants do not carry sufficient overhead to pay the costs incurred by the university in handling them, and the institution is therefore forced to dip into its basic operating funds to make up the difference, those areas which have no direct outside support stand to lose a second time around. It was in recognition of these very problems that the Canadian government made a major appropriation

designed to give compensatory aid to the nonscience divisions of their universities. One is strongly tempted to believe that our own federal Congress should give consideration to the same proposition.

It is this area of concern that likewise causes one to wince over the National Defense Education Act provision which largely restricts loan funds to undergraduate students who wish to pursue programs in science or technology. As the 1958 Parliament of Science conducted by the American Association for the Advancement of Science last March so rightly emphasized, "Efforts to advance science at the expense of other fields of learning (will) harm all fields of learning and the society they serve."

Direction of research activities

Aside from the types of financial problems already noted, there are a number of other questions raised by our sponsored-research activities. One issue centers around the effect of these funds on the faculty. A university is anxious to have a staff member pursue those basic lines of scholarly inquiry which are strictly of his own choosing. No academic administrative officer would think of telling a member of his faculty what specific program of research he should undertake. Yet, with money to offer in support of some lines of investigation and not in others, government agencies are in a position to wield a powerful and dangerous influence in "directing" the research activities of many of our scholars. The practice in some institutions of permitting extra salary compensation from research grants or contracts can place an especially unhealthy monetary lure before the staff. This may well result in specific research projects being selected for economic reasons rather than, as should be the case,

because of intrinsic intellectual or academic merit.

Not only do we have reason to take a dim view of the possibility of direction *per se*, but should we not also be watchful lest the immediate practical ends of those in a position to make grants of money do not too often divert many of our able scientists and technologists into routine programs of testing and development, when by inclination and ability these men are equipped to do, and by definition of the university idea should do, fundamental research? According to the National Science Foundation, the federal government devoted approximately three billion dollars to the support of research and development work of all types during the fiscal year 1958. Of this amount some 63 per cent is estimated to have been devoted to the conduct of development activities, 29 per cent to applied research, and a relatively small, remaining 8 per cent to basic research. Predominant among these over-all expenditures were applied research and development associated with products, systems, and processes related to defense or defense-oriented programs of specific practical concern.

Because differences of opinion are inevitable in defining the essential character and purpose of many projects, it is extremely difficult, if not patently impossible, to achieve an accurate breakdown of the \$440,000,000 of research and development funds spent in the colleges and universities during the fiscal year 1958. The National Science Foundation estimates, however, that probably not more than one third of the funds spent in the academic institutions could justifiably be categorized as basic research—study prompted by no more than scholarly curiosity—the pursuit of which generally has no immediately foreseeable practical utility. As two thirds of all academic research funds are now derived from these federal sources, the

de-emphasized position of the fundamental search for truth for its own intrinsic sake is an element in the scene that can be ignored or defended only at our great peril.

The institution of higher learning should always be held essentially inviolate as the primary bastion of pure scholarly inquiry. It is the place of the industrial or government laboratory or the private research institute to develop and apply the research. The initiative of the university and its faculties should be roving the far, creative, and theoretical horizons of knowledge, the frontiers where the new ideas and principles are born that two decades hence will be appearing on classroom blackboards. The business of the university is those fundamental truths upon which non-collegiate workers of another generation will base their developments and applications.

We must not permit the academic preoccupation with the attainment of such priceless insights to be overwhelmed or subverted by the restraining, inflexible demands of momentary expediency. The mandates of a handful of governmental agencies such as the National Science Foundation fortunately permit an increasingly effective and desirable weight to be thrown into these scales, but the essential incompatibility of the unique obligations of the academic community on the one hand, and the pressing needs of the federal agencies on the other, must be clearly seen for what it is, if we are not to do irreparable damage to our collegiate highroad of intellectual advance.

Institutional diversity

Truly, one of the greatest strengths of American higher education is the diverse character and behavior of the institutions that comprise the system. An even casual acquaintance with the universities and colleges of the United

States gives the observer a profound sense of the existence and critical significance of the essential uniqueness of the individual institutions. Each university has evolved its own peculiar personality. Each has developed by circumstances unique in place and time. Each bears the distinctive imprint of the men who have shaped its traditions, points of view, and goals, and the methods and customs designed to achieve them.

As one travels among the universities, one finds that certain common problems and aspirations reveal themselves with impressively consistent regularity. Generally applicable or widely accepted solutions are much harder to obtain. Indeed, it is clearly dangerous in the extreme to assume that a satisfactory solution hammered out within the personality of one institution will be wise or workable in another.

In any event, surely we stand to maximize our ultimate achievements by sustaining this highly diverse approach to our problems. Herein lies a basic resource of immeasurable value in accomplishing our common objectives. Whatever long-term effects federal aid may have, higher education must be watchful that its omnipresence shall never serve to routinize or standardize this diversity.

Effect on graduate students

In the relations of sponsored research to graduate education, there are a group of interrelated matters that must not be overlooked or minimized. Grants commonly carry provisions for research assistantships which can be made available to graduate students, usually on the basis of part-time employment. The positive values of these aids are obvious enough. In many instances, they represent the financial support which makes it possible for an able student to be in the graduate school. Beyond that, the

intimate involvement of such students in the research program of a mature scholar of the faculty has clearly discernible values for the person being trained for investigative work.

But there are negative forces in the situation, too. An essential ingredient of learning in research is experience in finding and delimiting a problem, and then in preparing an effective design for its solution. All too often, in aiding a faculty member with a broad, sponsored research commitment, students are permitted to satisfy their thesis requirements with work done as an assistant on a small segment of a large current project. This procedure, unfortunately, can rob the student of the independent selection of his own research problem. He may well have been drawn into a problem primarily because of the availability of financial support, and he may have had little or nothing to do with the definition of the problem and the basic approach to its solution. Graduate students, like staff, certainly should not be directed into specific lines of research activity solely by monetary inducement.

There is yet another element in this situation which is a matter of inevitable concern. At best, we have as a nation only a limited number of men of high-level creative talent in the sciences and technologic arts. Because a large proportion of these men are found on university faculties, the government and other nonacademic agencies are seeking to "job out" their ever increasing number of problems to the academic establishment. While faculty members are encouraged to engage in research, they also have their primary commitment to teaching and the training of the professionals who are desperately needed in enlarged numbers to meet the demands that lie ahead.

If the able research people of our universities become so encumbered with

specific project work that they are largely unavailable to students, no matter how important and urgent the investigation may seem to be, a real question of the long-run national interest is clearly involved. Many an outstanding teacher is failing to plant the invaluable seed for another generation of scholars, simply because some government agency believed his research services were indispensable to their immediate purposes. We must protect the basic educational resources of our institutions of higher learning from extensive internal decimation of this type. Whenever plans appear which will remove an outstanding professor from the classroom and seminar table, we have an obligation to take a long look at whether the research results will weigh as heavily in the scales of posterity as will the Ph.D. students he will train and who will carry his multiplied skills and insights into the future.

"NEW OR EXPANDED" PROGRAM

Perhaps the problem having the broadest and most significant implications among all of the matters affecting graduate education has to do with the scope of our institutional resources and the wise and efficient use of them. The National Defense Education Act of 1958 specifically and restrictively provides support for "new" graduate programs and the "expansion" of old ones. This action would appear to be based on what is almost certainly a wholly erroneous presumption concerning existing capacities to handle graduate students. There is abundant and persuasive evidence that the top fifty graduate schools of the country could as a group, with a reasonable distribution of enrollment, double the total number of graduate students, at present levels of instructional quality, without major expansions of either staff or physical equipment.

To be sure, the graduate schools of a

handful of outstanding institutions have reached or even exceeded the saturation point in some fields, but the universities with broadly established and soundly operated graduate programs in which there are actual shortages of well-qualified advanced students are far larger in number. Unquestionably we need to locate and recruit a much higher percentage of the intellectually capable people who can profit by postbaccalaureate work, but what sense does it make to confine federal fellowship aid to those students for whom a given university can claim to have devised a "new or expanded" program? Surely an overwhelming majority of the people who should be attracted into graduate work would profit most from following already established standard sequences. It is of transcendent importance that we distribute any expanding enrollment on a basis consistent with present, or only moderately extended, institutional capacities to train them.

The compelling need is the stabilization and strengthening of graduate efforts already in existence, rather than the more widespread promotion of new activities. And if federal aid is to be extended to graduate education, why should it be given only to the students? Urgent and defensible as fellowships for prospective graduate students are, the graduate schools themselves merit direct aid, and not just in the oblique manner of erratically distributed and unpredictable cost-of-education payments for students who may be attracted by "new or expanded programs." What validity can there be to the philosophy of increasing graduate enrollment, without simultaneous concern for the institutions that are to receive the students and which wish to raise the basic quality of their offerings?

There is a genuine need for substantial and continuing block grants to graduate schools which they may uti-

lize at their own discretion in the bolstering of staff, the extension of library and equipment facilities, and even the improvement of space. Present legislation being what it is, a university can neither provide a place for students receiving federal fellowships, nor can it become eligible for any aid itself, unless it is fortunate enough to have surplus internal funds with which genuinely to extend its over-all operations, or desperate enough to succumb to the temptation to establish "phonies" or "gimmicks" which can, on paper, pass the scrutiny of the appropriate authorities in Washington.

As the large and financially strong schools grow larger and need more staff, they draw the best individuals they can find away from the smaller and more modestly supported institutions. Not having the financial resources to hold their top people in this frantic competition for talent in a market of short supply, the academic strength of the less wealthy institutions grows steadily weaker and the number of graduate students they can attract progressively dwindles. The long-range result is all too easy to envision.

Surely the last thing the institution of traditionally good quality but modest resources should be encouraged to do in this sort of environment, is further to

extend its operations. Many, if indeed not most, schools need to bring all available resources to bear on maintaining quality in the areas they have already chosen to develop. The present federal legislation which calls upon a university to embrace additional operations, clearly invites a thinning out of existing resources and may result in ultimate modicrity, or worse, throughout the institution.

The already large and rich universities have a vital stake in the well-being of the smaller and less wealthy institutions. Many universities have an important role to play in the total national effort in graduate education, if only they can be given aid to accomplish their mission. We should, therefore, encourage them with material aid to remain, as they have sought in the past to be, strong in specialties of their own selection. Let us then ensure that their thoughtfully developed capabilities are fully utilized. Is this not wiser than to promote the indefinite expansion of a few famous graduate centers, or the costly creation of a new array of competing ones in colleges not now in the business at all? Many a respected graduate school and university is in a fight as urgent as survival itself. We cannot afford to let them lose the struggle.

The Role of the National Science Foundation

By ALAN T. WATERMAN

ABSTRACT: The National Science Foundation was established as an independent federal agency by Act of Congress in 1950. The general purpose of the Foundation is the support of basic research and education in the sciences. Its significance lies chiefly in the recognition by the federal government of the continuing need for the support of science as a peacetime measure, following the striking demonstrations of the applications of science to warfare.

The National Science Foundation is expected "to develop and encourage the pursuit of a national policy in support of the sciences." It holds the view that such policy must be developed with the co-operation of the scientific community, with due regard to governmental interests. Sound bases for policy development are laid by periodic surveys of research and development among colleges and universities, industry, government, and other research organizations. Recommendations combining national policy and the role of the federal government in the support of science are made to the President.

The major programs of the Foundation comprise support of basic research by grant, the award of fellowships, both pre- and postdoctoral, to senior scientists and science faculty, and support of student and teacher training.

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THE role of the National Science Foundation in relation to government and science can best be understood when viewed against the general background of federal support of basic research.

Government support of research and development by contract with outside academic and other nonprofit institutions began during World War II as a result of the government's need for the quick solution of a wide variety of scientific and technical problems. It was initiated by the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD). As the war drew to a close, the President sought from the Director of the OSRD, Vannevar Bush, suggestions as to how the techniques and research experience developed by the OSRD could be used for the national welfare in the days of peace ahead.

In his report to the President, *Science the Endless Frontier*, Dr. Bush strongly advocated the creation of a National Science Foundation, but five years of Congressional debate ensued before the National Science Foundation Act of 1950 was enacted into law.

ORIGINS

In the meantime, the notion of the government's contracting for the performance of research directed to the solution of specific problems expanded to include the support of so-called "basic research," that is research in which the principal motive is the advancement of scientific knowledge. Policies and procedures for the support of original and imaginative research in the colleges and universities were evolved by the Office of Naval Research, established by Congress in 1946, and a support program by means of grants was started by the United States Public Health Service in the field of medical research.

In 1947 the newly established Atomic

Energy Commission began a program of research support, and somewhat later the Army and the Air Force initiated similar programs.

These agencies adopted the practice of providing support to research projects at colleges and universities on the basis of proposals submitted by the interested scientists with the endorsement of their institutions. Projects were selected for support on the basis of the scientific merit of the problem proposed, the competence of the investigator, and relevance to the interests of the agency. As a general rule, the agency was aided in the selection process by expert consultants or advisory groups of scientists. Each agency provided support by the means available to it, for example, the military agencies by contract and the Public Health Service—later the National Institutes of Health—by grants. When the National Science Foundation began to operate in 1951, support of basic research by the federal government at nonprofit institutions was probably around \$75 million.

The Foundation was created by Congress in 1950 to meet the need for a federal agency to develop national policy in science, serve as a focal point for the support and encouragement of basic research which is carried on largely in the universities and for the training of young scientists. Its principal statutory functions included the following:

To develop and encourage the pursuit of a national policy for the promotion of basic research and education in the sciences.

To initiate and support basic scientific research and programs to strengthen scientific research potential in the mathematical, physical, medical, biological, engineering, and other sciences.

To appraise the impact of research upon industrial development and upon the general welfare.

To award scholarships and graduate fellowships in the mathematical, physical,

medical, biological, engineering, and other sciences.

To evaluate scientific research programs undertaken by agencies of the federal government, and to correlate the Foundation's scientific research programs with those undertaken by individuals and by public and private research groups.

To foster the interchange of scientific information among scientists in the United States and foreign countries.

In fulfilling these responsibilities, the Foundation has considered its first objective to be the strengthening and encouragement of basic research. After careful consideration, the decision was made to support such research in the same general manner as other agencies, that is, by the support of individual research projects in response to requests. A guiding principle has been to ensure that the Foundation's research programs have the endorsement of the nation's scientists, and to this end liberal use has been made of individual consultants and advisory panels.

POLICY FUNCTIONS

The number and variety of federal research programs prompted the Foundation to consider the responsibilities of the several federal agencies which support extramural research and development in the sciences; its primary recommendations were contained in an Executive Order of the President in 1954. The Foundation, the Order states:

shall . . . recommend to the President policies for the promotion and support of basic research and education in the sciences, including policies with respect to furnishing guidance toward defining the responsibilities of the Federal Government in the conduct and support of basic scientific research.

The Order further directs that the Foundation shall be increasingly responsible for the support of general-purpose basic research but recognizes, also, the importance and desirability of

other agencies conducting and supporting basic research in fields closely associated to their missions. The Foundation is not expected to have responsibility for the applied research and development programs of other agencies, and each agency is accountable for the scope and quality of its developmental effort.

The Foundation's mission with respect to research is primarily the support of a comprehensive program for basic research aimed at encouraging the research most significant to the advance of science in each field. The Foundation also encourages distribution of support—among small as well as large institutions, on a wide geographic basis, and with special attention to promising young investigators. It endeavors, also, to strike an optimum balance among the various fields of science.

Comprehensive surveys

As background data for its own research programs and for policy formulation concerning the role of the federal government in the support of science, the Foundation established a series of studies of the nature and extent of the national effort in research and development. A comprehensive survey was undertaken, for the years 1953–54, of the research and development effort at colleges and universities, industrial laboratories, foundations and other nonprofit institutions, nonprofit research institutes and commercial laboratories, and cooperative organizations. These studies were in addition to the Foundation's analyses of the support of research and development by federal agencies published annually in *Federal Funds for Science*. The whole series carries out the directive in the Executive Order "to make comprehensive studies and recommendations regarding the Nation's research effort and its resources for scientific activities. . . ."

The 1953–54 surveys are now being

repeated in order to measure again the national research and development effort in terms of dollars expended and numbers of persons employed, and to make comparisons with the earlier year. The results of present studies will be useful in discovering trends.

The most striking fact that has emerged from the Foundation studies is the magnitude of the total national research and development effort, which, according to preliminary estimates, is now more than \$12 billion annually. Also impressive is the rate of growth, which has more than doubled in half a dozen years.

As would be expected, colleges and universities have the most important role in the conduct of basic research. In terms of dollars, almost one-half of the nation's basic research is carried on in colleges and universities. However, educational and other nonprofit institutions are the source of only 19 per cent of the funds involved. The government supplies the largest percentage of funds, 48 per cent, with industry providing 33 per cent. In terms of scientific and engineering manpower, slightly over one-half of those engaged in basic research are employed at educational and other nonprofit institutions; about one-third are working in industry; and the remainder, about 15 per cent, in the federal government.

A question that concerns us is how the federal government's contribution to basic research can produce fruitful results without encroaching upon the traditional independence of institutions of higher learning. In the development of policies designed to achieve this end, the Foundation is expected to exert a role of leadership with respect to the government's over-all program of basic research support.

Thus we conceive the real significance of the Foundation to be measurable not only in terms of activities sup-

ported, important as these may be, but as judged by the course and direction of federal support of basic research and its effect upon progress of science in the country as a whole, both in basic research and in training.

RESEARCH SUPPORT

The Foundation is guided by the twenty-four member National Science Board, and the Director, all of whom are appointed by the President. The research support programs are administered by the Biological and Medical Sciences Division and the Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences Division for the natural sciences, and by the Office of Social Sciences for the social sciences. Of the two methods available to the government for providing basic research support—the grant and the contract—the Foundation elected to use the grant because of the freedom and flexibility it allows the principal investigator and his institution in the utilization of funds awarded. Responsibility for the completion of work for which a grant has been made is shared by the institution and the principal investigator, and freedom in the research of the investigator is emphasized.

It should be noted, however, that the research contracts of the Office of Naval Research and the Atomic Energy Commission have been handled in such a way as to afford much the same leeway and flexibility as the grants administered by the Foundation and the National Institutes of Health.

The usefulness of the grant as a mechanism for the federal support of basic research in the universities prompted the Foundation to seek extension of the grant-making authority to other federal agencies. Furthermore, contracts for basic research entail troublesome administrative problems in the disposition of property and equipment acquired in connection with federally sponsored re-

search in colleges and universities to which the government retained title. As a result of the Foundation's efforts, the Eighty-fifth Congress passed Public Law 934, which extends the grant-making authority to appropriate federal agencies and permits them, also, in the case of basic research grants, to vest title to research equipment with the institution, provided such equipment is not needed for government purposes.

Continuity and stability are most important in the support of basic research. This can be achieved in two principal ways: one, by making the grant or contract for a term of years rather than for a single year and renewable; the other, by setting aside a revolving fund for the renewal of grants or contracts when their term expires, without reference to the annual appropriation. The average Foundation grant extends over a two- to three-year period, but a considerable number of grants are made for the five-year period. Several agencies lack authority to make a grant or contract for more than one year; it is hoped that steps may be taken to provide this authorization, thereby helping to provide needed stability in basic research.

Consistently the Foundation has urged, as a matter of federal policy, that in supporting research conducted in institutions of higher learning, agencies of the federal government, if requested, should reimburse these institutions for full indirect costs associated with the direct cost of research supported.

Loyalty issue

"Loyalty" in relation to the support of unclassified research was another issue that called for fundamental policy decision. The Foundation came face to face with the problem during the period of intense national preoccupation with loyalty and security, when the question was raised of federal support to scientists whose loyalty and security

were questioned, even though their research was unclassified. The matter was thoroughly discussed within the context of the grants program and a resolution submitted to the National Science Board.

As approved by the Board in November 1954, the policy is that the Foundation, in its appraisal of proposals for the support of unclassified research, will be guided by the judgment of scientists having a working knowledge of an individual's experience, competence, and integrity. It further states that the Foundation does not knowingly give or continue a grant in support of an avowed Communist or an individual convicted of sabotage or other crimes involved in the nation's security.

Subsequently a Special Committee of the National Academy of Sciences on Loyalty in Relation to Government Support of Unclassified Research considered the whole problem and made its report to the President. In releasing the report, the White House noted that its principles were essentially those which supported the policy of the National Science Foundation. The departments and agencies of the federal government were directed to follow practices consistent with the resolution contained in the report of the Academy's committee.

SUPPORT OF RESEARCH FACILITIES

The growing complexity of modern scientific apparatus has increased commensurately the need for major research facilities. Many of these are too costly for a single institution to procure or maintain without outside support. Examples are wind tunnels, high-energy accelerators and high-speed computing machines. Following World War II, such facilities began to be developed or provided principally by the military services, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, and the Atomic Energy Commission. Gradually, how-

ever, the universities accumulated needs for such facilities to be used for basic research. The National Science Foundation made a study and report of federal policy in this area, entitled *Federal Financial Support of Physical Facilities and Major Equipment for the Conduct of Scientific Research*. It then initiated a program to provide universities with capital facilities for basic research purposes. In the case of nuclear reactors and large computing facilities, universities share the costs.

The Foundation has paid particular attention to astronomy, which, as a typical fundamental science, has had little support from agencies concerned primarily with the applications of science. Two national astronomical observatories are being built that will supplement the overworked facilities of private institutions. The Kitt Peak National Observatory in Arizona, being built and operated by the Association of Universities for Research in Astronomy, will provide an eighty-inch reflecting telescope equipped primarily for application of photoelectric techniques to astrophysical problems, and a unique solar telescope. At the National Radio Astronomy Observatory, a new intellectual center being established at Green Bank, West Virginia, by Associated Universities, Incorporated, an 85-foot radio telescope presently available and a 140-foot instrument under construction will make it possible for astronomers in the United States to have access to large instruments of high precision.

In the biological sciences, field stations have struggled, in the face of inadequate budgetary support, to maintain their position as research units in the universities and colleges. In 1955, the Foundation, acting upon the advice of special advisory groups, initiated a systematic support program for biological field stations and other specialized biological laboratories. Among such fa-

cilities assisted by the Foundation are the White Mountain High Altitude Research Laboratory of the University of California, a Prairie Research Station at the University of Missouri, the Marine Biological Laboratory at Woods Hole, and an international research center, the Naples Biological Station.

What began as a "specialized facility" support program has now been broadened to include the support of the development of graduate-level research laboratories in the natural and engineering sciences. Undertaken on a modest pilot basis in fiscal year 1960, the program is designed to help meet the urgent need of university research laboratories for the physical facilities required by modern scientific techniques and methods. The new program is on a fifty-fifty matching-funds basis.

EDUCATION IN THE SCIENCES

The Foundation has worked to acquire an understanding of the nature and magnitude of the problems that the nation faces in maintaining a supply of competent scientific manpower. The programs that have been developed have been based generally upon the following principles and assumptions:

(1) Quality is of primary importance: The education in the sciences programs has consistently emphasized quality. Selection of fellowship recipients, for example, is based on national competition where ability is the primary factor.

(2) The training of scientists, mathematicians, and engineers is the responsibility of the scientific and educational community: Scholars in all fields of learning have traditionally assumed responsibility for the replenishment of their numbers. The role of the National Science Foundation is one of providing a focal point for federal government concern in science education, and of making available necessary funds to the scientists and science teachers

through their institutions and their associations to accomplish the advances which they agree must be made.

(3) Science education in this era has dual responsibility: The character of our expanding technological society requires that every citizen have enough knowledge and understanding of the substance and the aims of science to enable him to make decisions intelligently. The Foundation's programs stress the importance of imparting adequate knowledge of science to nonscientists, through different kinds of emphasis at various levels in the educational system.

(4) Balance must be maintained between science and other fields of scholarship: Although the Foundation's first responsibility with respect to education in the sciences is to ensure that the necessary level of scientific work can be maintained through the training and support of scientists and engineers, it also feels a moral obligation to guard against overemphasis on science and imbalance in the utilization of our intellectual resources.

The Foundation's programs in education in the sciences are administered by the Division of Scientific Personnel and Education and fall in three principal categories: (1) support of students and advanced scholars in science, mathematics, and engineering, (2) training of science teachers in modern scientific theory and knowledge, (3) development and dissemination of modern and realistic subject-matter materials for instruction.

Fellowship program

A most urgent problem is the support of graduate students and advanced scholars. Those students whose capacity for research and teaching has been demonstrated and who have completed their basic studies should be pro-

vided means to continue their work. The predoctoral fellowship program was the first program established by the Foundation and has grown in accordance with evaluations of the relative need. Currently, the Foundation conducts five fellowship programs, exclusive of two additional fellowship programs designed primarily for teachers. These programs provide support for students ranging from first-year graduate students to postdoctoral scholars engaged in advanced study at the highest levels.

Additional significant numbers of graduate students receive support as research assistants through the Foundation's programs of basic research grants.

Direct Foundation support for individual students has been restricted to the graduate level. The evidence indicates that, with scholarships presently available, students in the upper ten per cent of the classes graduating from our secondary schools are generally able to obtain assistance toward financing a college education. The Foundation has not recommended the enactment of science scholarship legislation because it believes that a scholarship program should not be limited to science and engineering.

Teacher training program

Another important part of our program for education in the sciences involves in-service training of science and mathematics teachers at every level. Probably the best known is the support program for summer institutes conducted by participating colleges and universities. During the summer of 1959, 300 such institutes provided subject-matter training for about 15,000 high-school teachers of science and mathematics. Academic-year institutes enable teachers on leave of absence to take a full year of specially designed

study. Through the in-service institutes, teachers are able to increase their subject-matter knowledge by study at evening or Saturday classes. A new program of summer fellowships for high school science and mathematics teachers supports selected teachers in independent study in their fields of specialization.

Programs of the Foundation for college and university teachers range from postdoctoral and science-faculty fellowships, which provide support for study and research to summer institutes for college teachers and numerous kinds of short conferences and special field institutes. About 6,000 college and university teachers of science, mathematics, and engineering participated in last summer's programs and in the current academic-year programs.

Curricula and courses in mathematics and science have failed to keep pace with the rapid growth of scientific and technological knowledge during the past half-century. To meet this problem, the Foundation has provided support for comprehensive studies, under the aegis of colleges, universities, and professional societies. These efforts are co-operative, enlisting the aid of high-school teachers to ensure that the new materials are prepared in a way that will meet the needs of students.

Under this program, a fundamentally new approach to the teaching of high-school physics is being developed by the Physical Sciences Study Committee, with present headquarters at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in which many of the leading physicists of the country are involved. New materials prepared by this committee are being tried out in selected high schools. Another large-scale effort is being made by the School Mathematics Study Group, with headquarters at Yale University where new courses in mathematics for grades seven through twelve are being

developed. A program in biology for elementary, secondary, and college levels is in its beginning stages, and similar efforts are being planned for new course materials in chemistry and other fields.

The Foundation maintains liaison with other agencies of the federal government that have responsibilities in the field of education, particularly the United States Office of Education. The basic methods of approach used by the two agencies are essentially different, and the result has been re-enforcement and strengthening of the total effort.

The Office of Education operates generally through the state departments of education in co-operative enterprises. The National Science Foundation works very largely through the scientific community, dealing for the most part directly with colleges and universities and scientists and science-educators and working primarily with the subject matter of science. To ensure the necessary degree of co-operation, numerous conferences have been held between representatives of the two agencies and by staff members in the operating programs who have common interests. Each agency has an official liaison officer with the other.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion does not cover the Foundation's entire program. Considerable activities in international science and in the dissemination and exchange of scientific information, for example, have not been touched upon. Since it was not possible, in a limited space, to give a comprehensive picture of operations, emphasis has been placed upon activities that have tended to establish policy with respect to the support and encouragement of basic research and education in the sciences by the federal government. Recently, the Foundation published a compilation of

some fifty recommended *Science Policies of a Government-wide or National Character*.

Despite the rate at which the federal research and development effort has grown, the government is now better than ever prepared to manage it effectively. Responsibility is assigned in this way: The National Science Foundation with its National Science Board has the primary responsibility for dealing with policy concerning federal support of basic research throughout the country. The Federal Council for Science and Technology, which reports to the President, deliberates on matters of policy-co-ordination and future planning among federal agencies and makes recommendations regarding federal programs. The President's Science Advisory Committee, comprising nongovernment scientists and engineers, considers important scientific and technical matters in relation to government policy, with special reference to national security. The presence in the White House of the Special Assistant to the

President for Science and Technology makes available to the President at all times advice and counsel on the wide range of scientific and technical affairs.

The past and present degree of strength and effectiveness of federal programs in research and development should not, however, give rise to complacency. It is clear that the potential of the country in science and technology is far from being realized. Both basic research and the education and training of scientists and engineers require a far greater degree of support throughout the country. In order to realize our full potential there must be widespread public recognition, understanding, and appreciation of the importance of intellectual and scholarly activity, and the pursuit of excellence in all fields of intellectual endeavor. Above all, there must develop a determination to accomplish these ends. Only by these means will the United States be capable of leadership and collaboration among the nations of the world in the vast new vistas that science is disclosing.

The Philosophy and Objectives of The National Defense Education Act

By ARTHUR S. FLEMMING

ABSTRACT: Considered in its historical context, the National Defense Education Act expresses a Congressional attitude that has characterized federal legislation in this field from the beginning of the Republic. The variety and scope of its concerns, the number and size of its grants, and its widespread public acceptance indicate that this Act will exert influences beyond and in addition to its specific defense intentions. The National Defense Education Act recognizes that education is a national unifying force, and it regards an educated citizenry as the country's most precious resource. Its ten Titles are designed to motivate the discovery of intelligent and talented young men and women and stimulate them to devote themselves to the sciences, foreign languages, technology, and in general to those intellectual pursuits that will enrich personal life, strengthen resistance to totalitarianism, and enhance the quality of American leadership on the international scene. The Act is also a contract that reasserts the partnership of federal and state governments in education, the former assisting with funds and counsel, the latter exercising full control over their own educational systems and programs.

Arthur S. Flemming, Washington, D. C., has been Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare since August 1, 1958. From 1948 to 1958, he served as President of Ohio Wesleyan University. He was a member of the U. S. Civil Service Commission from 1939 to 1948. During this period he also served on a number of federal commissions and agencies concerned with government organization and war manpower problems. In 1951 he was appointed Assistant to the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization and later served as Director. Upon completion of that assignment, he became a member of the Hoover Commission on government reorganization. He is currently a member of the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization.

THE objectives of the National Defense Education Act have their source in a political philosophy that has consistently characterized federal aid to education from the beginning of our nation's history. This philosophy or, rather, this traditional principle, is based on two empirically derived premises. The first confines federal aid to specific programs devised to help the states solve those problems that bear upon national needs and that surpass the states' capabilities to resolve them unaided. The second asserts the sovereign right of the states to administer educational policies, devise curricula, select textbooks, educate and license teachers, supervise methods of instruction, and in general to maintain, manage, and direct the forms, substance, and tempo of their own systems of public education.

These premises have been constant factors in determining the objectives and scope of every act of Congress in aid of education from the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 to the National Defense Education Act of 1958.

THE GROWTH OF A TRADITION

In our country's formative years, total reliance on local autonomy in the management of schools was a practical necessity. Out of the self-contained and socially isolated nature of American communities in those early years, a unique and powerful sense of local responsibility for the schooling of children developed. Nevertheless, despite this strongly held conviction and the fear of the tyranny believed to be inherent in centralized government, the states accepted numerous grants of federal aid with no consequent loss of autonomy nor diminution of their control.

From the Revolution to the Civil War, the federal government encouraged and financially aided education in the states. It endowed higher and common schools

with lands and granted funds to supplement these endowments. On no occasion did the federal government seek to control public education in the states.

In 1862, under the Morrill Act, the federal government provided an eventual grant of eleven million acres of land for the endowment of at least one college in each state and territory that would provide much needed instruction in agriculture and the mechanic arts. The recipients of the Morrill Act's benefits, the so-called "land-grant colleges," have not experienced any difficulty in maintaining control of their academic programs. Moreover, the extensive public services rendered by these institutions are proof of the enduring value of federal-state co-operation.

This pattern of federal stimulation without federal domination characterized such subsequent legislation as the Smith-Hughes Act and the George-Barden Act, both of which helped the states to strengthen and extend vocational education. It determined the numerous legislative provisions for education during the depression years, the post-World War II provision of tuition and maintenance assistance to veterans under the "GI Bills," and programs in aid of federally affected areas. These were all manifestations not only of the national concern for education, but also of the federal government's recognition of the supremacy of state responsibility.

To guarantee the continuing separation of federal and state functions, the national government must constantly be on the alert to avoid jeopardizing the vital role of pluralism and thus of freedom and experimentation in education. Indeed, if it is to remain true to its proper purposes, the federal government must clearly define and delimit the scope of its educational role through unrelenting scrutiny of the letter and spirit of proposed legislation lest it be

interpreted as permitting trespass on state and local jurisdictional supremacies.

DEMANDS OF THE PRESENT

Present times and immediate circumstances have heightened the national concern for education. In the last half century our society has become an intricate network of diverse but related interests, each dependent on all others for effective functioning.

The obligations of world leadership, the increasing demands of industry and the armed forces for highly trained personnel, the requirements of foreign trade and international diplomacy for personnel having mastery of languages other than their own, and the increasing complexity of our economic and social arrangements have imposed on every school district and on every institution of higher learning insistent demands for a greater quantity and improved quality of educational opportunities and facilities to create an adequate national resource of well trained and intellectually enlightened young men and women.

To help solve these problems and to ease the fiscal burden carried by the states are prime purposes of federal aid to education. Accumulated experience over more than 170 years enables us to perceive that, properly utilized with due regard to state responsibility, federal funds can be useful in many ways to both the states and the nation. The National Defense Education Act of 1958 is an excellent illustration of this fact.

BACKGROUND OF THE LEGISLATION

Marion B. Folsom, then Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, appointed a committee to review the recommendations of the President's Committee on Education Beyond the High School and to draw up legislative proposals based upon them. Many of the

provisions of the National Defense Education Act had their source in those proposals.

After the bill was drawn, there still was doubt that it could win Congressional approval. The reception and fate of school-construction bills in the years immediately preceding did not provide an optimistic outlook.

Impact of Sputnik

When Sputnik rose into orbit, it aroused more than incredulous amazement; it was a blow to American pride. Yet, its advent had positive consequences. It awakened and spurred us into rigorous self-examination of our total educational system. This in turn provided an excellent climate for the consideration of the provisions of the proposed National Defense Education Act.

NATIONAL DEFENSE EDUCATION ACT

The National Defense Education Act of 1958 was passed by the Senate on August 22 and by the House of Representatives on August 23. It was signed into Public Law 85-864 by President Eisenhower on September 2.

The Act authorizes a billion dollars in federal aid for a dozen separate programs as described in its ten Titles.

The philosophy of the Act is exemplified in the Findings and Declaration of Policy of Section 101, Title I, which states in part:

The Congress hereby finds and declares that the security of the Nation requires the fullest development of the mental resources and technical skills of its young men and women. . . .

We must increase our efforts to identify and educate more of the talent of our Nation. This requires programs that will give assurance that no student of ability will be denied an opportunity for higher education because of financial need; will correct as rapidly as possible the existing imbalances

in our educational programs which have led to an insufficient proportion of our population educated in science, mathematics, and modern foreign languages and trained in technology.

Title I also emphatically prohibits federal control over the curriculum, program of instruction, administration, or personnel of an educational institution or school system.

Educational opportunities extended

The succeeding nine Titles of the Act are very closely dovetailed. Their relationship is made clear by considering the interlocking contents of the Titles rather than by recounting them in numerical sequence. Moreover, the fundamental significance of the National Defense Education Act as a whole is the more effectively understood if its Titles are reviewed in the context of their unifying purposes. For example, one of the most disturbing educational problems of the day emerges from conditions that force able young men and women to withdraw from high school before their secondary education is completed or to discontinue their education upon graduation from high school. Thus, every year about 200,000 gifted students are deprived of the rewarding disciplines of higher education for which they are eminently well qualified. In consequence, the nation suffers a loss of intellectual competence of incalculable magnitude.

The prevention of such personal and social deprivation is the fundamental objective of the National Defense Education Act. It is, therefore, enlightening to consider the Titles of the Act as having the following progression:

Find through strategically located testing programs especially gifted young people and guide them by means of competent counseling to adopt and to act upon educational plans suited to their interests and aptitudes.

Make it possible for them to enter and stay in college by providing liberal loan programs for students who otherwise would be unable to pay the costs of higher education.

Give them better and more easily accessible educational opportunities, improved quality of instruction in greater quantity, and adequate facilities.

Enrich for them the whole educational process by sensitizing administrative responsiveness to educational needs.

Ways and means

The Titles of the Act are designed to stimulate the achievement of these ends in the following specific and concrete ways:

Title V authorizes and assists in the establishment of testing programs to discover able students, guidance and counseling programs for the purpose of advising them to undertake courses of study best suited to their abilities, aptitudes, and skills, to encourage them to complete their secondary education, and to prepare themselves for admission to colleges and universities of their choice. To ensure the effectiveness of these programs, this Title recognizes the serious shortage of qualified testing and guidance personnel and provides for training institutes to meet demands for competent practitioners in this vital field.

Titles II and IV provide financial assistance to needy students, graduate or undergraduate, and fellowships to graduate students.

Title II authorizes the establishment of student loan funds, administered by the participating institutions, for the purpose of ensuring that worthy students will not be denied opportunity for higher education for lack of money. Loan funds have been allotted on the basis of the institution's particular needs and full-time enrollment. The institutions contribute one dollar for every

nine dollars of federal money. Students may borrow a maximum of \$5,000 over a five-year period, principal and interest to be repaid over a span of ten years, beginning one year after graduation.

Title IV is designed to foster an increased supply of well-trained college and university teachers by assisting in the expansion of facilities for their training, promoting a wider geographical distribution of such facilities, and granting 5,500 fellowships over a period of five years.

Titles III, VI, VII, and VIII have the objective of creating more and better educational opportunities and strengthening instruction.

Title VI has the specific aim of providing increased curricular opportunities for the study and mastery of the languages of those countries with which the United States has business or diplomatic relations. Title VIII is designed to aid the expansion of area vocational education programs to provide skilled technicians for occupations requiring scientific knowledge.

Title III authorizes financial assistance for strengthening science, mathematics, and modern foreign language instruction. Title VII is designed to stimulate research and experimentation for the sake of achieving a more effective utilization of television, radio, motion pictures, and related media as techniques of instruction.

Title X reinforces and complements the other objectives of the Act by encouraging the development of efficient methods of gathering and disseminating statistical and other data so that state education agencies will be able to provide reliable and current information and thus enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of program planning, administrative policy formation, and the provision of services. This Title also directs the Secretary of Health, Educa-

tion, and Welfare to develop policies and procedures to achieve the co-ordination which has been needed for so long between the several departments and agencies that conduct federal scholarship, fellowship, and other educational programs.

Although it reinforces the science and mathematics programs assisted by the Act, Title IX is not directly chargeable to the United States Office of Education. It authorizes the National Science Foundation to establish a Science Information Service and a Science Information Council. The latter will advise and consult with the former, and both will have one objective: providing the scientist with the information he needs, quickly and adequately, through indexing, abstracting, and translating materials from all domestic and foreign sources. Programs to develop better and faster methods of disseminating scientific information will also be undertaken.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACT

Except for Title IX, the fiscal, technical, and policy aspects of the National Defense Education Act are administered by the United States Office of Education of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. About three fourths of the appropriated funds will be distributed as grants to state educational agencies for strengthening instruction in elementary and secondary schools, testing and counseling, providing vocational education, and improving statistical services. The remainder will go to institutions of higher education for student loans, fellowships, institutes to train counselors, and foreign language centers; and to agencies, organizations, and individuals for research in the educational uses of television, radio, motion pictures, and related means of communication.

Before these funds can be made avail-

able, however, the Office of Education and the recipient states and institutions must meet certain prerequisites.

To this end, the Office of Education has drawn up regulations for the administration of details not specified in the Act but necessary to assure consistency and impartiality. The Office also has made changes in its organizational structure to meet the demands of new administrative duties.

The states must have authorization from their legislatures to receive and administer federal funds for the purposes of the National Defense Education Act. Moreover, except for the provisions of Title II, the states must match federal funds dollar for dollar. In order to do so, their legislatures must appropriate sufficient funds. In some states, however, local funds may be used for the purchase of equipment and facilities without state legislative action.

Each state is required to submit to the United States Commissioner of Education a four-year plan for using federal funds before it can become eligible as a recipient. No state, however, is irrevocably bound to its first outline; it may make such revisions as changing circumstances impose.

Institutions of higher education that wish to participate in the student loan program authorized by Title II are required to establish loan funds and contribute one tenth of the monies utilized. The participating colleges and universities administer their own programs. Under the provisions of Title IV, colleges and universities are required to establish new, or expand current, graduate programs.

The whole intent of the administrative aspects of the Act is to ensure an equitable distribution of available federal funds, to maintain standards of efficiency, and to assure proper expenditures of federal funds.

THE ACT'S ACCEPTANCE

Although it has been in force only a year, the National Defense Education Act has had enthusiastic acceptance.

Approximately 65 per cent of the nation's 2,000 institutions of higher education, representing 80 per cent of full-time college and university enrollment, are participating in the student loan program, as authorized by Title II of the Act. The federal share, in terms of funds actually appropriated and funds requested for fiscal year 1960, amounts to \$61.5 million. In addition to the federal contribution, the participating institutions provide one tenth of this amount, bringing the total to \$67.6 million.

The plans of fifty states and territories have been approved under Title III which authorizes the provision of funds on a fifty-fifty matching basis to strengthen instruction in science, mathematics, and modern foreign languages. Federal funds amounting to \$51.1 million have been certified for this purpose.

Title IV at present provides a maximum of 1,000 graduate fellowships. All of them were approved in fiscal year 1959. An additional 1,500 such fellowships have been requested and approved for fiscal year 1960.

Plans for the creation of state programs for guidance, counseling, and testing to identify and advise superior students, as authorized by Title V, have been approved for fifty states and territories, and \$8.65 million has been certified. This Title also provides for the establishment of guidance and counseling institutes. Fifty colleges and universities were given approval to establish such institutes in the summer of 1959. Funds for fiscal year 1959 made possible 4 academic-year institutes in 1959-60. Funds for fiscal year 1960 will make possible the creation of an additional 67

summer and 26 academic-year institutes.

Under the provisions of Title VI, contracts are being negotiated for the establishment of about 20 language and area centers and 12 summer language institutes and 4 academic-year institutes. Modern foreign language fellowships, also made possible by this Title, have been awarded to 171 graduate students. In addition, 20 research projects were started with fiscal year 1959 funds.

As authorized by Title VII, a total of 68 research grants and 14 contracts for research designed to develop more effective educational media and techniques have currently been approved.

Area vocational programs are being initiated, in response to the provisions of Title VIII, in fifty states and territories for the purpose of training students in technical skills essential to the national defense effort.

Forty-nine states have had their plans accepted under the terms of Title X for the purpose of improving the statistical services of state education agencies.

Of all the aspects of the Act, only the affidavit and loyalty oath requirements have evoked adverse reaction. Included without due consideration of the reactions they might provoke, these provisions, quite properly regarded as inadmissible by the academic community, have proved to be meaningless and discriminatory.

On May 4, 1959, the author addressed a letter to the chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare urging an amendment of the National Defense Education Act that would repeal those provisions requiring affidavits of loyalty and allegiance.

The following reasons were expressed:

1. The Act's provisions make clear that, without the exaction of formal oaths, persons who belong to or support organizations dedicated to the violent overthrow of the government are not entitled to receive federal funds.

2. The formalities involved in signing affidavits and taking oaths do not deter or reveal disloyal persons. Generally, these persons are not scrupulous about the falsification of legal instruments.

3. The loyalty and allegiance requirements are discriminatory in that they single out educators and students for special treatment and in no sense ensure national security.

4. The argument that disloyal persons who sign the affidavit can be prosecuted for perjury introduces unnecessary legal skirmishing. If a person receiving assistance under this Act is identified as a violator of our internal security laws, he can be and should be prosecuted under pre-existing and current laws that are amply effective in dealing with treasonable and subversive offenders.

A LARGER MEANING

The variety and scope of the National Defense Education Act's provisions make them applicable to many of the most urgent educational needs of the day. Moreover, the Act's wide acceptance by parents, educators, students, and government leaders ensures its nation-wide utilization in solving problems that the states, communities, and private institutions could not attack separately and unassisted. Such adaptability and utilization strengthen the belief that this Act will have positive effects greatly surpassing its immediate defense intentions and thus enrich and reinforce the total educational process.

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POLITICAL THEORY

HERBERT H. HYMAN. *Political Socialization: A Study in the Psychology of Political Behavior*. (A Report of the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University.) Pp. 175. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959. \$4.00.

Fifty years ago Graham Wallas deplored the harmful separation of the study of politics from the study of psychology and hopefully observed "that there are already signs that it is coming to an end." One would have to conclude from an appraisal of what has happened in the intervening years that Professor Wallas' prediction was rather slow in materializing but that it has now clearly come to pass. Whether the union has been as fruitful as he confidently expected is a matter of conjecture.

Recent reviews of the literature in that amorphous area called political behavior reveal an extraordinary profusion of studies intended to illuminate some aspect of politics through the use of psychological concepts. They show a great deal of effort, a certain amount of ingenuity, and an overall impression of great scatter. As is true with so many fields in the so-called "behavioral sciences," the bits and pieces of theory with which researchers in the area are concerned are so weakly integrated that their studies do not ordinarily relate very strongly to each other. We still seem to

be exploring the terra incognita of political behavior rather than plotting the total topography.

In this book Professor Hyman undertakes to set himself at one remove from the search for new data and to seek out "the distinctive and systematic contribution that psychological analysis can make to the understanding of political behavior." He proposes to organize his examination of this contribution around three areas of inquiry, the areas of learning, motivation and emotion, and perceptual processes. The present monograph deals only with the first of these; it is presented as the first of a series which the author has in process.

Dr. Hyman was not confronted with an embarrassment of riches in his attempt to demonstrate the manner in which Americans learn their political attitudes and behavior patterns. Political socialization, as he points out, has been virtually ignored by psychologists. Systematic longitudinal studies of early politicization do not exist. Still, he has unearthed an impressive collection of research fragments which he has organized around his central theme with great skill.

Dr. Hyman does not attempt to apply a very refined set of categories to the evidence which he reviews; the diversity and lack of connectedness in the studies available to him preclude such a possibility. He has, however, made effective use of a

rather broad system of abstractions and has taken us a step forward in a research area which badly needs organization.

ANGUS CAMPBELL

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University of Michigan

SIDNEY HOOK. *Political Power and Personal Freedom: Critical Studies in Democracy, Communism, and Civil Rights*. Pp. xviii, 462. New York: Criterion Books, 1959. \$7.50.

Political Power and Personal Freedom is essentially a defense of what Professor Hook calls democratic socialism, which he defines in terms of three characteristics, more profitably reduced to two: first, an economy partially controlled and planned in the interests of political and cultural freedom and, secondly, an economy maintaining full employment, efficiently utilizing all its natural resources, and giving its population a decent standard of living (p. 366). In terms of these characteristics, one would have to say that most countries of the world from the United States to Thailand are, to the extent of their achievement, democratic-socialistic; the differences between them are essentially a matter of degree: to the extent to which their governments have legal control over small- and large-scale industry and services and to the extent to which they have achieved a developed economy.

Professor Hook's defense of democratic socialism—which seems to me his special name for the types of political economies found in the West—involves a sharp and thorough attack on Soviet communism. Soviet communism, he says, is opposed to all the great traditions of freedom in the West, and it can be recognized by three important characteristics. It believes that humanity's welfare depends upon the victory of the proletariat over the world; that the proletariat depend upon the dictatorship of the Communist party to achieve this; and that the Communist party's victory depends upon the dictatorship of its leaders. These three propositions logically involve the conclusion that communism must inevitably attempt to conquer the world by whatever means, fair or foul, and mostly foul, at its disposal. Accept this conclu-

sion and it logically follows, says Professor Hook, that peace or peaceful coexistence is impossible between the Soviets and the Western democracies. This hard opinion undergoes a subtle kind of softening in Chapter 32. Here Professor Hook suggests but does not directly admit that the Soviet countries may modify their dogmas by giving them a new, more libertarian interpretation. Hesitatingly Professor Hook implies that this might mean the practical possibility of peaceful coexistence between the West and the Soviet Union.

Of course, this book is more than a brilliant defense of democratic socialism; it ably covers a wide variety of topics from academic freedom to ritualistic liberalism. The most interesting of these discussions are the debates between Hook and Eastman and Hook and Bertrand Russell. The first debate deals with the possibility of democratic socialism; the second with East-West policy and human survival. Despite its liveliness and dialectical pyrotechnics, I think the first is largely a verbal dispute. The second reaches into issues that trouble thinking men everywhere such as how to prevent total nuclear warfare. Although to this "ritualistic liberal," Russell seems to have a more cogent argument, Professor Hook still makes a contribution in terms of the warnings and dangers of a policy like Russell's.

My main difficulty with Professor Hook's book is that, despite his brilliance both of invective and of dialectic, the book never seems to offer a practical policy for action against totalitarianism.

Typographically speaking, the book has a serious fault. For some reason unknown to me, pages 366–398 were omitted, and pages 335–365 reduplicated.

RUBIN GOTESKY

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University of Georgia

JEAN MEYNAUD. *Introduction à la Science Politique*. (Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, No. 100.) Pp. 369. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1959. Fr. 1.300.

This book deserves recognition for more than one reason. It is the first full-scale exploration of contemporary political sci-

ence contributed by French scholarship. It is the work of an able man—academic director of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, faculty member of both the Institute of Political Studies in Paris and of the University of Lausanne, and author of *Les Groupes de Pression en France* (1958). What is still more important, the present volume is not only a systematic exposition but also an incisive critique, distinguished by great resources of expression as well as of knowledge. Together with Maurice Duverger's new guide to the research techniques applied to politics, Meynaud's *Introduction à la Science Politique* will make it much harder in France to discount political science as a luxury-import from the United States.

The author begins with a survey of the different types of political analysis, proceeds to the question of a suitable theoretical framework, and then deals specifically with such matters as the object of political science, the focus of study, the sources of data, the range of measurement, and the treatment of variables. He singles out for special attention the place occupied by political science within the social sciences and particularly its relations with economics. A recurrent theme in all of this is the development of a "general theory." The concluding chapter sets forth the conditions which the author deems essential to furnish political analysis a truly scientific foundation.

It is remarkable how well the book succeeds in providing its readers with a cross-section of the methodological literature. For the most part, the footnotes bring together, as should be done more frequently, the best references of different national origin, especially French, British, and American; but the United States column is by far the longest. Although by no means uncritical, Professor Meynaud does not belittle the role that has fallen to American research. On the other hand, he is very sensitive to the possibility that political science may commit itself to the defense of a particular system of government or the values that underlie a particular culture. For both he cites examples in the United States, as he does also for the related tendency to look at the world abroad

through glasses different from those used for viewing the scene at home.

Thus it is not surprising that scientific advance and rejection of "moralism" (pp. 330 ff.) are here presented as necessarily linked—at least at the present stage, sternly characterized as the "age of hypothesis" (p. 34). One should add, however, that the author neither denies the formative influence of values nor stipulates for research an unattainable requirement of absolute neutrality toward them. Perhaps we must temper Professor Meynaud's zest for verification with the modest acknowledgment of a condition better than bankruptcy. After all, mankind is in possession, and has been for quite some time, of a considerable body of working knowledge to draw upon in the study as well as in the conduct of political affairs. In the utilization of this knowledge, it is true, great benefit flows from a continuous sharpening of our insights. The discipline of fresh hypothesis and the irreverent testing of commonplace are prime movers in the pursuit of truth. Professor Meynaud's admirable work will add significantly to the momentum which political science needs to become a science of politics.

FRITZ MORSTEIN MARX

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BERNARD CRICK. *The American Science of Politics: Its Origins and Conditions*. Pp. xv, 252. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959. \$5.00.

CHARLES S. HYNEMAN. *The Study of Politics: The Present State of American Political Science*. Pp. xi, 232. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1959. \$4.50.

To introduce the authors of these two kindred volumes: Dr. Crick, an Englishman and an Assistant Lecturer on Government at the London School of Economics, wrote *The American Science of Politics* under a Rockefeller fellowship at the University of California. Dr. Hyneman, author of *The Study of Politics*, is Professor of Government at Indiana University.

Although Crick's style is heavier and less sprightly and his humor more subtle

than Hyneman's, and although Crick uses a largely chronological approach, while Hyneman deals topically with contemporary problems confronting political scientists, they are remarkably in agreement concerning the nature and solutions of current controversial issues within the profession. And each has done an excellent job within the brief compass of two-hundred-odd pages of text.

If there is a single theme central to both these books—and this reviewer believes that there is—it is that of modern attempts, by such groups as the "Chicago school," to develop a methodology, somewhat akin to the "scientific method" employed in the physical sciences, designed to make the social sciences "exact" and primarily quantitative disciplines. In the view of these groups, such immeasurable areas of political science as philosophy, ethics, morality, values and ends have little or no place in the legitimate activities of "scholars," since they cannot be validated by incontrovertible evidence.

Crick and Hyneman agree, however, that this restricted, descriptive approach is rather sterile and meaningless. For, as Crick points out, it tends to reduce political scientists to mere tabulators of largely irrelevant data and enables them to escape responsibility for value judgments and personal commitments with respect to social ends and means. Admittedly, adds Hyneman, because of the multiplicity of "variables" in human relations, political science may never reach the exactitude or provability of chemistry or physics. Hence, the political scientist must arrive at his "personal preferences" as to values, ends, and means primarily through speculation based upon incomplete empirical data, logical reasoning, and intuition. But, he cogently continues: "People cannot wait until science provides answers to their questions about how to use government to achieve a good life. They will act, and their acts will be shaped by the advice available to them. Thoughtful political scientists can provide better advice than other people on many things relating to government (p. 190).

Both authors also consider the relevance of fields impinging upon political science, such as psychology, sociology, economics,

anthropology, and geography, and the competence of political scientists to integrate them with what Hyneman defines as the knowledge of "that kind or part of government that speaks through law (pp. 26-27). Both maintain that these cognate areas are indeed relevant, and that political scientists must prepare themselves to deal with them, if maximum understanding of the process of government is to be attained. And although Hyneman expresses apprehension lest political scientists "tackle too much," at the expense of depth and quality, he concurs in Crick's condemnation of overspecialization which the "bureaucratic" American university forces upon ambitious faculty members.

Finally, these authors agree, the contemporary tendency to separate "theory" from the "policy sciences," or, in some cases, to scorn the "unscientific" former in favor of the "scientific" latter, has given rise to much controversy concerning the distinction between "power" and "authority." If the study of politics is to be practically useful, it must answer the vital question: "Power for what purpose?" Crick deplors the type of political science which "loses touch, by scorning history and philosophy, with its roots: the protestantism of conscience against mere power" (p. 227).

Obviously these two men are unfashionably willing to take stands on issues and to urge their colleagues to do likewise. To all of which this reviewer breathes an unscientific but fervent "Amen!"

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ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON and RICHARD H. LEACH. *In Quest of Freedom: American Political Thought and Practice*. Pp. viii, 568. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959. \$9.25.

Under the title of *In Quest of Freedom* Professors Mason and Leach have presented a stimulating account of the main currents of American political theory from its background in England of the Puritan Revolution to current controversies over decisions of the Warren Court. The em-

phasis throughout is on the long debate over the rights of the individual versus the rights of property, but in the course of their exposition, the authors have occasion to discuss, among other things, diverse theories of the eighteenth-century British Empire, the assertion of American independence, the making of the Constitution and its interpretation by Hamilton and Jefferson and their schools, Jacksonian democracy, the controversy over slavery and the nature of the Union, the laissez-faire philosophy of the "Gilded Age," the reforming spirit of the "progressive" era, the Republican reaction of the 1920's, New Dealers and anti-New Dealers, the advocacy of "welfare capitalism" as an alternative to the welfare state, and the as yet unsolved problem of reconciling the freedom of the individual with the security of the state in troubled times like the present. The school desegregation issue is treated only briefly.

In a book whose leading author is a biographer of Justice Louis D. Brandeis and Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone, special interest attaches to the analysis of events of the last fifty years. Possibly the most interesting question which the authors raise and attempt to answer is: Why has a Supreme Court which since 1937 has given legislatures an increasingly free hand in narrowing the rights of property, at the same time swung toward more severe restraints upon the same legislatures when they have attempted to narrow or repress civil rights? An answer, which the authors clearly endorse, is found in a pronouncement of the late Justice Robert H. Jackson (quoted on page 556): "... the presumption of validity which attaches in general to legislative acts is frankly reversed in the case of interferences with free speech and free assembly, and for a perfectly cogent reason. Ordinarily, legislation whose basis in economic wisdom is uncertain can be redressed by the processes of the ballot box or the pressures of opinion. But when the channels of opinion or of peaceful persuasion are corrupted or clogged, these political correctives can no longer be relied on, and the democratic system is threatened at its most vital point. In that event the Court, by intervening, restores the proc-

esses of democratic government; it does not disrupt them."

The volume is for the most part admirably objective, though no one will mistake the authors' position on such questions as nationalism versus state rights or laissez-faire versus public regulation of property interests. The brief Index is less than adequate, and there are a few indications of hasty proofreading.

JULIUS W. PRATT

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H. G. NICHOLAS. *The United Nations as a Political Institution*. Pp. 222. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959. \$3.40.

Candidly, the reviewer approached his task with some misgivings, as he has not forgiven the United Nations for what he conceives to have been its responsibility for the dismissal of General MacArthur and for the losses in the recent Korean conflict, the first instance in which American arms suffered actual defeat. Also, some recollection of the proceedings at San Francisco that launched the United Nations led to a search of the Index for any mention of Alger Hiss. Subsequent verbatim reading of the text confirmed the Index. He was not mentioned.

Careful reading, however, led to growing respect for the author, whose organization of highly technical material is excellent and who is doubtless justified in contending that an institution now in its second decade and embracing most nations of the world is not on trial, but should be examined without prejudice for what it is in theory and in practice. Moreover, since the work is institutional rather than historical, only incidental reference is made to achievements or to failures.

Frequent allusions suggest comparisons with the British Parliament. But governmental institutions in a homogeneous country after all have slight resemblance to the Parliament of Man. The United States, with fifty states, comes closer to the political pressures of over fifty nations. Even here the analogy is imperfect. Americans are fellow citizens. Only the most ad-

vanced "One Worlders" can ignore their national origin. So that the United Nations comes closer to a permanent conference of ambassadors. Here the author manifests an excellent comprehension of reality and at the same time great skill in demonstrating the niceties of constitution-building which insure autonomy to and, in some sense, parity with the Five Great Powers and their outnumbering juniors. International jealousies being what they are, the fashioners of the United Nations have demonstrated remarkable acumen.

The reader will be delighted by frequent evidences of literary skill. This the author possesses in good measure, though opportunities to utilize it are limited.

The United Nations as a Political Institution is essentially a work of erudition. Its value is enhanced by an Appendix which quotes in full the "Charter of the United Nations." There may never be a Gladstone to call that Charter the noblest document ever composed by the mind and pen of man. But Mr. Nicholas leaves no doubt of its significance in man's evolution as a political being.

LOUIS MARTIN SEARS

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STEPHEN S. GOODSPEED. *The Nature and Function of International Organization*. Pp. xi, 676. New York: Oxford University Press, 1958. \$7.25.

Dr. Goodspeed has written a useful text which provides a broad survey of contemporary international organizations, their objectives and activities. The approach is primarily descriptive, but there is a substantial amount of analytical material, particularly in summaries, conclusions, or appraisals at the end of chapters. The first part of the book deals with experiments in international organization antecedent to the United Nations, with special attention to the League of Nations and its activities in the field of security. This serves as a general and historical introduction to the United Nations, the principal subject of the volume. The emphasis is upon security matters, with chapters on pacific settlement, collective enforcement measures, and the regulation of armaments. Treatment

of the specialized agencies, with the exception of the World Health Organization, is so brief that the student will only be able to get the barest flavor of these international organizations from the material presented. The author may have felt himself limited with regard to the space he could give to them. In any event, the presentation would have been strengthened by devoting less attention to the details of organizational structure and more to the need for international organization in the various functional fields and to the activities of the agencies discussed. The volume also includes an examination of international regional organizations, with considerable attention devoted to the highly significant contemporary organizations in Europe like the Coal and Steel Community and the Common Market. The above matters by no means comprise all the subjects covered in this comprehensive survey of the field of international organization. The focus is broad throughout. There is no attempt to give detailed treatment to any subject.

The most important deficiency of this text is its dearth of conceptual analysis. Collective security aspects of the League of Nations and the United Nations constitute a major part of the book. Yet there is no real effort to present collective security as a concept in international relations and to consider the extent of its embodiment in the basic instruments and in the functioning of these organizations. It is true that concepts in international organization are far from being perfected—this is, of course, the case with regard to the whole field of international relations. Nevertheless, there have been considerable efforts directed toward concept formation in recent years, some of which could be presented profitably to an undergraduate student. Balance of power theory is nearly as essential to an understanding of contemporary international organization as collective security. How can the creation of the League of Nations or the United Nations be explained except with reference to balance of power in theory and practice? It is, of course, basic to an understanding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

In his analysis of the recent Korean

crisis, the author makes the point that "the United Nations was utilized as a disguise for unilateral action by the United States whereby the policy of that nation was to be made the policy of the United Nations." The use of the collective security apparatus of an international organization as an instrument for the promotion of national interests, narrowly construed, has been a familiar practice of Great Power foreign policy in the past. But Mr. Truman makes it clear in his memoirs that the American response to the North Korean invasion of South Korea was made on the basis of a coincidence of national security and collective security interests. In the present stage of development of the international community, it is probably necessary for a Great Power to lead the international action against aggression. The difficulty, as Hans Kelsen has pointed out, is that there is no objective way of determining whether the Power is leading an international hue and cry, acting, in other words, for and in behalf of the international community as well as itself, or only mobilizing the organization for its own selfish purposes. Intent, therefore, is of prime importance.

HENDERSON B. BRADDICK

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M. S. RAJAN. *United Nations and Domestic Jurisdiction*. Pp. xiii, 679. Bombay: Orient Longmans under the auspices of the Indian Council of World Affairs, 1958. RS 25.

With this pioneer study of a complex and controversial subject, M. S. Rajan, of the Indian Council of World Affairs, has made a substantial contribution to the study of international organization. One may differ, at times, with the author's interpretation and emphasis. Occasionally his language is vague or prolix. But the importance of his subject, his painstaking research and analysis, and the objectivity and thoroughness of his presentation make this volume a valuable addition to the literature of the field.

After a lengthy Introduction dealing with the development of the domestic jurisdic-

tion concept, the author takes up the drafting of Article 2, Section 7 of the United Nations Charter and its legal interpretation. There is much of interest and importance here. A more complete explanation of the content of the domestic jurisdiction article, its vaguenesses and ambiguities, would doubtless require, among other things, a fuller examination of American politics, with particular reference to the views of certain Senators and of the American delegation at San Francisco. The problem of getting the treaty through the Senate was a major preoccupation of the State Department. But with regard to this matter of American intent, we can thank the author for reproducing the following statement of Mr. Dulles at the Conference: "... future generations will thank us for what we do in adopting simple phrases and allowing them to evolve as the state of the world, the public opinion of the world, and the factual interdependence of the world, make it necessary and appropriate that it should evolve."

Problems involved in the legal interpretation of the domestic jurisdiction clause are examined in very considerable detail. More attention might have been devoted to the first part of the clause, however. This says that nothing in the Charter "shall authorize the United Nations to intervene" in matters essentially within the jurisdiction of states. The language does not forbid such intervention; it only states that the Charter does not empower the Organization to do so. The question arises, therefore, whether there may be inherent rights, privileges or powers possessed by the states of the international community according to general international law enabling them to intervene under certain circumstances in the domestic affairs of states. It may be noted that the Charter itself expressly recognizes one inherent and collective right: self defense.

The largest section of the book deals with United Nations practice regarding domestic jurisdiction. This the author interprets and evaluates. The evidence is overwhelming that United Nations organs consider themselves able to determine their own competency with regard to the disposition of matters involving domestic jurisdic-

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by James N. Murray, Jr.

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diction issues. It is also evident that by and large, as Mr. Rajan states, "legal considerations were not of decisive importance to the issue of competence but that, on the other hand, political considerations were." This state of affairs is doubtless due to several factors: first, the lack of agreement on the interpretation of Article 2, Section 7 by the states signatory to the Charter; second, the failure to provide that problems of interpretation were to be resolved by the International Court; third, the fact that many of the most serious threats to international peace and security have arisen out of situations which, it can be argued, are within the domestic jurisdiction of a state; and fourth, the intense power struggles which have rent the international community into fragments during the last fifteen years.

The volume concludes with a note by Simone Dreyfus on French literature in the field of domestic jurisdiction and one on German sources by Gerhard Heuer.

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SOCIOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY

JULIA ABRAHAMSON. *A Neighborhood Finds Itself*. Pp. xiv, 370. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. \$5.00.

If what happened in the University of Chicago neighborhood has ever happened before, this book still verifies what few realize, that (1) cities need not destroy the characteristic human community; (2) something short of war can bring modern Americans to act together idealistically and effectively; and (3) nothing at the socio-cultural level can be called impossible or inevitable.

In 1949 Hyde Park was a proud middle-aged neighborhood fated to be engulfed by the expanding Negro ghetto that, due to an old pattern of residential segregation, was overcrowded and hence blighted. Those who were blind to the future did nothing; those who saw what was coming moved away and hastened its arrival. Only a very few both saw and denied the future.

Julia Abrahamson, a Quaker housewife, came to a meeting with forty neighbors; they learned what was going to happen. Eventually she became the resourceful executive of the Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference. This remarkable organization set as its goal a good rather than a white neighborhood and set in motion machinery and ideas that reversed the trend.

This is Mrs. Abrahamson's intimate story of the Conference with enough detail and analysis to provide guides for other communities with race problems compounding all those others of our cities. Any troubled citizen or community leader who wants sharply practical advice should read the book, an exciting adventure story that leads into details of the hard work that lie behind genius and history, and ends with a careful and useful Appraisal.

The history described is the more remarkable because impossible moral issues were frankly faced but left hanging while moral people acted. Those who gain by the saving of the community do not forget but cannot repay others who wished and worked as hard as they only to be squeezed out of it by the "redevelopment" that promises to save the neighborhood. Survivors in a lifeboat from which some jumped to keep it from foundering must live uneasily indeed if the selection of those forced overboard was not even based on principles clear to all. For a moral community requiring consensus, this should have been fatal.

Hyde Park succeeded in doing the improbable not only because an old community of well-to-do, well-educated, resourceful, and determined people wanted to continue to live in it, but because the liberal spirit was strong enough to convince people that their racial prejudices interfered with their interests, and because the action required was consonant with the democratic ideal to which all were publicly committed. It succeeded also because the need to compromise was accepted by enough uncompromising idealists to keep resolution from dying on the sharp horns of a thousand moral dilemmas.

It does not happen often; but what this book describes can happen anywhere and

anytime in any community or in the whole world.

SOL TAX

Professor of Anthropology
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RENÉE C. FOX. *Experiment Perilous: Physicians and Patients Facing the Unknown*. Pp. 262. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959. \$5.00.

Experiment Perilous is a sociological study of the physicians and patients in a metabolic research ward. It is based on one of the early studies sponsored by the Bureau of Applied Social Research of Columbia University and the Commonwealth Fund. It deserves a considerable knowledge of two and possibly three professional "languages" for thorough appreciation: medical, sociological, and psychological. Nevertheless, the well-informed lay reader will understand most of it without recourse to a dictionary.

Depending on the background of the reviewer, the work may strike different notes. This reviewer has a medical background. He finds the study of the patients, many of whom were chronically ill with fatal or at least irreversible diseases, particularly illuminating. On the other hand, the studies of the attitudes and problems of the physician members of the research team seem less revealing, probably because personal experience has provided the reviewer with some earlier insight in this field. The objective approach of the student of sociology is nevertheless interesting to the physician. The author categorizes the problems of the research physician as problems of uncertainty, problems of therapeutic limitation, problems of reconciling clinical and research responsibilities, and problems of finding suitable motivated research subjects. She then proceeds to study "ways of coming to terms," among which she mentions membership in the group, a rather special brand of humor, the "game of chance," behavior of the group, and the rather intimate relationships built up between the doctors and their patients. She states, "However, it should be stated that on several occasions that we observed, the same patterns of behavior

which ordinarily served as ways of coming to terms made it harder for the physicians of the Group to carry out their clinical and research activities with detachment and efficiency. The instances of this sort we can cite seem to have resulted from the close relationship that existed between the Group and their patients. For example, when a patient died, the members of the Group were inclined to feel 'upset' or 'depressed' in a 'rather personal sort of way' . . ." (pp. 107-108). Possibly some physicians and patients would agree about the lack of detachment without agreeing that this impaired the group members' efficiency as physicians.

The book is illuminated by many quotes from interviews with patients or from their letters. These are of special significance because many of the patients on the metabolic research ward had extensive insight into their diseases and the unfavorable prognosis thereof. While most older adults know some of the adjustments that individuals make to impending death or continuing disability and practicing physicians are in daily contact with such problems, the cases described were characterized both by unusual understanding and a group situation. This combination is comparatively rare and of great interest. Both laymen and physicians will find insights in this interdisciplinary study.

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RALF DAHRENDORF. *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*. Translated by the author. Pp. xvi, 336. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959. \$6.50.

This passionate and self-important book is, according to its author, a thoroughly revised English version of his *Soziale Klassen und Klassenkonflikt in der industriellen Gesellschaft*, published in Germany in 1957. The first of its two major parts is a lengthy exposition and critique, not particularly new, of the analysis of class and class conflict by Marx and some more re-

cent social thinkers, such as Nemchinov, Djilas, Schumpeter, Burnham, Croner, Renner, Geiger, Marshall, Schelsky, Drucker, and Mayo. The second part contains the author's own analysis of class and class conflict and his application of this analysis to what he calls "Post-Capitalist Society." The whole book is animated by the author's unquestioning conviction that "there is today a considerable need for reorienting sociological analysis to problems of change, conflict, and coercion in social structures, and especially in those of total societies."

Dahrendorf has rewritten his book to deal with the criticisms made against the earlier German version. Unfortunately, many fundamental errors and shortcomings are still present. For example, his allegation that Western social scientists have recently neglected change, conflict, and coercion is not supported by any evidence. Indeed, his book contains many references to analyses of these problems by Western social scientists. Until Dahrendorf tries to provide support for it, his allegation remains an expression of his values, not an empirical generalization. The author's abstract analysis of class and class conflict is still quite unsatisfactory. By class he seems to mean a broad and not precisely specified range of socially structured differences of interest within formally organized associations, from the nation-state to the myriad interest associations within nation-states. And by conflict he means a variegated set of social processes which may be distinguished from each other. "I am using the term 'conflict' in this study," says Dahrendorf, "for contests, competitions, disputes and tensions as well as for manifest clashes between social forces. All relations between sets of individuals that involve an incompatible difference of objective—in its most general form, a desire on the part of both contestants to attain what is available only to one, or only in part—are, in this sense, relations of social conflict." As one might expect from such inadequate conceptual equipment, Dahrendorf's discussion of conflict in "Post-Capitalist Society" does not add anything to the understanding of the main structures, cultural patterns, and basic processes of change in that type of society. His last two chapters, which are

about industrial and political "conflict," contain only familiar generalizations, some plausible, others not.

The impatient enthusiasm of a young scholar who thinks he has discovered something quite new and the ideological partisanship of one who feels that the social science community is utterly neglecting what he alone values as of the first importance can become high barriers to good work. In this case, it seems, they have prevented an obvious talent from making a contribution to social science knowledge.

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ELTING E. MORISON (Ed.). *The American Style: Essays in Value and Performance*. A Report on the Dedham Conference on May 23-27, 1957. (American Project Series, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.) Pp. ix, 426. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. \$5.00.

The Center for International Studies at Massachusetts Institute of Technology is concerned with the study of various parts of the world from the standpoint of their relationship to the foreign policy of the United States. According to Max F. Millikan, its director, who wrote the Preface to this book, underlying these investigations was "the implicit premise widely held in this country that the difficulties with which we are confronted in our international relations spring primarily from the nature and evolution of the foreign countries with which we deal. . . ." It occurred to the staff of the Center that this assumption was lacking in dimension, that it should be broadened to include the nature and evolution of the United States as well, because all too often promise of American accomplishment in international affairs is forestalled by internal obstacles rather than external ones.

This thinking led to a conference of specialists in various aspects of American character and society at Dedham, Massachusetts, in May, 1957. The agenda of the conference, or more properly, the guiding framework and points of departure for those who wrote background papers, was a

series of "issues": theory versus practice in American values and performance, American concepts of administration, the meaning and content of individuality in an increasingly bureaucratized and specialized society, the manner in which the problem of evil is confronted in American society, and evolution of effective values within American society in the past twenty years.

The American Style resulted from the conference. It is divided into two parts, the first consisting of the six chapters which constituted the original work papers, and the second a group of formal commentaries, a selection of transcriptions of the informal discussion, and a summary description of "the course of the discussion" by the editor, Elting E. Morison.

It is in the second part that the excitement which the conference clearly generated among the participants shows through. Until this point is reached, the book has a miscellaneous quality stemming from differences in length, form, tone, point of view, and lack of connection among the individual chapters which is disturbing. This is felt in spite of the merit which they separately possess. For example, the opening chapter, "American Ethics and Public Policy" by Abraham Kaplan discusses critically the relationship between morality and power and the implementation of morality through political force in an essay of more than 100 pages, not a page of which is wasted. The second chapter, "Theory Versus Practice in American Values and Performance" by J. Robert Oppenheimer, about one-tenth its length, has the *déjà vu* quality of an endowed lecture in a mixed series designed for the thoughtful layman. Other chapters, in the order in which they appear, are "America's Administrative Response to Its World Problems" by George F. Kennan, "Have There Been Discernible Shifts in American Values During the Past Generation?" by Clyde Kluckhohn (for this reviewer, the most nourishing single contribution), "Individuality" by Henry A. Murray, and a final chapter, "The National Style" by W. W. Rostow, which establishes with notable success the relationships of the diverse themes and approaches of the preceding essays. Professor Rostow's ordering of the earlier discussion transforms

the record of what must have been an exhilarating conference into a book.

Contributors of commentary on the chapters are Elting E. Morison, David M. Potter, Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Richard Hofstadter, and David Riesman. I intend a double compliment when I say that the commentary is often as thoughtful and provocative as the original chapter upon which it is based.

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W. LLOYD WARNER. *The Living and the Dead: A Study of the Symbolic Life of Americans*. (Yankee City Series, Vol. 5.) Pp. xii, 528. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1959. \$7.50.

Nearly twenty years separate the publishing of the initial and this final volume of the Yankee City Series. Surely no other community study of this generation has had so much influence on sociologists in particular and on intellectuals in general as has this analysis of a small city on the North Shore of Massachusetts.

Part I of this book deals with the colorful career of Yankee City Mayor "Biggy" Muldoon. His successes and defeats are described in terms of kinship, class, and other symbols.

Part II is a study of the city's 1930 tercentenary celebration. This is perhaps the best part of the book. A great number of ceremonies, historical reconstructions, and other activities comprising the festival are analyzed with reference to the status and myths of the participating groups. In the symbolic representations of the past are indirectly expressed the social organization, aspirations, and anxieties of the present.

Part III turns to the symbolic meanings of Memorial Day, Abraham Lincoln, funeral rites, and the cult of the dead. In Part IV are discussed both sympathetically and analytically the symbols of Protestant and Catholic Christianity—its buildings, ceremonies, and social organization.

The last section on methods of studying social symbolism will appeal mainly to specialists. The other parts, although they seem unduly long and not always clearly

organized, should interest not only social scientists but also many laymen.

Such limitations in the *Yankee City* study stem largely from the one-place, one-time approach characteristic of American community studies. In a modern industrial society, however, many if not most of the decisive forces in a locality are manifestations or local variations of the structure and processes of the national society.

For the theoretical framework of his study of symbolism, Warner relies mainly on the generalizing, nonhistorical approach of such writers as Frazer, Durkheim, Robertson, Smith, Radcliffe-Brown, and Freud. "The influence of the moral order on the creation and maintenance of symbol systems [is emphasized], the influence of the human species as an (organic) animal organization is also stressed Most religious beliefs are fundamentally based on the simple realities and on the relations of family deities" (pp. 447, 506). In practice, however, Warner devotes much attention to class and economic factors as well as to moral and familial elements.

This book is a fitting conclusion to a monumental community study.

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VANCE PACKARD. *The Status Seekers. An Exploration of Class Behavior in America and the Hidden Barriers That Affect You, Your Community, Your Future.* Pp. viii, 376. New York: David McKay Company, 1959. \$4.50.

That the author of *The Hidden Persuaders* should follow with another best seller was to be expected. The same spicy, subtly satirical earthiness carries the reader along on a wave of almost hypnotic persuasion. The author is again sad and frightened at the picture he delineates. His artful innuendos convey a feeling of impending disaster, of national failure. Unless something is done, the country will fall to the "status seekers," who in an era of abundance since 1940, are now allegedly located throughout the United States (p. 255). The lines are formed. Five social classes are definitely emerging. National

sclerosis has already begun to set in. To many who have enjoyed *The Hidden Persuaders*, however, this new book may come as a disappointment. So many positive factors are overlooked or ridiculed that one may complete its reading with a bad taste.

Since this is a short review, some questions will merely be mentioned here. For example, competent sociological studies of American classes go back at least as far as the turn of the century. Again, the five classes said to be forming now have already been in existence for a long time. Moreover, the author's use of statistics is sometimes rather cavalier, as in his citations concerning "a vast amount of brain power going to waste" (p. 347). Matters like these lead to the conclusion that as an unbiased analysis *The Status Seekers* is considerably lacking.

To this reviewer, despite such shortcomings, the chief difficulty with *The Status Seekers* lies in its apparent double frame of reference—one realistic and the other fanciful. The first benchmark accepts class distinctions as inevitable and suggests that, within this framework, "much can be done to promote contentment, mutual respect, and life satisfaction" (pp. 329-30).

Two ways to promote this end—by achieving better understanding and by discovering and encouraging real talent regardless of station—are then developed in two concluding chapters. But these are constantly marred by a repeated lapse into the other frame of reference or goal.

This goal is to show apparently how far we have deviated from the American Dream—the dream of a classless society. We can endure and prevail, the author concludes, only if we "really believe in our system" (does he mean the classless kind?) and are convinced that it "offers fairer rewards and opportunities for the fulfillment of human aspirations than any other."

The Founding Fathers did state that "all men are created free and equal," a dictum which has received many interpretations. The most realistic, perhaps, is that the early settlers and later arrivals in America were anxious to be free from the oppressive class distinctions that existed in Europe and England as a result of innumerable wars of conquest and enslavements of peo-

ple; they also wanted an equal chance to develop their talents. But this certainly was not and could not mean a classless society. People of various classes came over on the "Mayflower," and many others have come here since. Classes and groupings have continued to develop in America and within them most people are living wholesome and happy lives. If they seek to better themselves, is that something to be sad about? If in the period of affluence since 1940, they have bought many gadgets, is this to be viewed as frightening, except as the Park Avenue persuaders have coerced them into buying what they do not want or cannot afford?

As Clifton Fadiman sums it up, this new book is most provocative, whether the reader is a status seeker, has "thrown in the sponge," or is a status enjoyer. Most people in this country would seem to be status enjoyers. Through their neighborhood groups, their civic and service clubs, their churches, and various other associations and societies, much is being done for human welfare and understanding that could not otherwise be accomplished.

These are matters the author does not emphasize. There are, to be sure, hidden and blatant barriers to honest achievement in America. It is well that they be pointed out. The author does this excellently. His observations are always pithy, and they touch on many obscure matters. *The Status Seekers* is a book everyone should read. A better and more realistic title, however, would have been "Status Barriers: Hidden and Overt," with reference to classlessness omitted. Moreover, in economics classes go hand in hand with division of labor and specialization, and without these a society of abundance would be impossible.

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ANSELM L. STRAUSS. *Mirrors and Masks: The Search for Identity.* Pp. 186. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959. \$4.00.

This is a stimulating, but discursive essay on identity-formation motivated by the author's dissatisfaction with personality development theories. According to

Strauss, psychologists and psychiatrists have erred in underestimating the influence of social structure upon individual behavior, assuming an ingrained and early-formed personality structure, and neglecting the historical dimension in their theories and research. To develop a more fruitful perspective for viewing the traditional problems of social psychology, he combines the symbolic interactional and social organizational approaches. His primary concerns are the social processes from which identity emerges and the symbolic and cultural foundations of its structure. The author does not discuss the organization of identity which he considers of more central concern to psychiatry and psychology. Thus, the essay covers only one facet of identity and does not present a complete theory of personality development.

A basic theme of the essay is the importance of language for human action and identity, particularly "naming" as an act of placement or classification of the self and others. Identities are viewed as being perpetually indeterminate because of constantly changing social contexts. Yet some stability of identity does occur because continuities in the social structure provide, although not assure, continuities of personal experience. Incidentally, Strauss believes that if serious identity discontinuity does result it need not be necessarily hazardous, as usually assumed by sociologists, but may be creative. Throughout the book, interaction is viewed as a symbolic and developmental process, operating within the setting of group structure. Since groups have a past, historical, as well as autobiographical materials must be included in a study of personal identity.

Psychologists and psychiatrists should profit from Strauss' emphasis upon social organization and language in identity formation, while sociologists should find useful his attempt to integrate social psychology and social organization. However, the author's style and approach often obscure his significant contributions. Apparently, he believes that a theoretical essay need not be as rigorous and direct as a research report. Terms are seldom defined, including the key concept of identity. At times, his theoretical ideas become so abstruse

and divorced from empirical data that the reader not only has difficulty following them but may even question their soundness. Although Strauss defends his essay style, this reviewer feels its looseness and unevenness weaken an otherwise outstanding work.

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GOTTFRIED EISERMANN (Ed.) in collaboration with Paul Honigsheim, Georges Gurvitch, Frederick Lenz, and J. Allan Beegle. *Die Lehre von der Gessellschaft: Ein Lehrbuch der Soziologie*. Pp. xi, 452. Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1958. DM 35.50.

Since the end of the last world war German publishers have tried steadily to overcome the lack of up-to-date sociological handbooks, readers, surveys, and teaching materials in general. The one before us wishes to serve a number of purposes: (1) to fill the gap between traditional German sociology and its international development since the coming of Nazism, (2) to inform interested readers—not necessarily members of the profession—of the present trends of thought, (3) to give to the student of sociology the opportunity to acquire “a general view of problems, and state results concerning his discipline and its different principal branches” (p. x).

Hence we find in the first chapter a “History of Sociology,” written by Paul Honigsheim and Gottfried Engelmann which, with the help of only brief indications, achieves a rather comprehensive view. The explanatory statements made in regard to Emile Durkheim and his school appear strange, particularly so in view of the fact that out of an abundant literature concerning these basic teachings quite a number of the most important ones have been overlooked. Written by the editor, G. Eisermann, the second chapter entitled “General or ‘Pure’ Sociology” presents a remarkably well constructed summary of the different schools of sociological thinking, more precise and much clearer in its definitions than many of the brief surveys which have appeared so far. The chapters “Sociology of Religion” and “Sociology of

Art, Music and Literature” have been compiled by Paul Honigsheim, whose special knowledge in these fields is well known. From the pen of Georges Gurvitch comes the articles on “Sociology of Law” and “Sociology of Knowledge.” Both might or might not be written specifically for this handbook. In any case, they do not seem to concur at all times with ideas expressed by the eminent French sociologist in his more recent publications. They excel, however, in their systematic way of expounding the development and the different tendencies of the two branches—underlining expressly the frequently proposed theorem of the author, that sociology can only develop properly, when able to collaborate intimately with philosophical doctrines in respect to perceptive knowledge.

Chapters on “Wirtschaftssoziologie” by F. Lenz, on “Soziologie der Politik” by G. Eisermann and on “Agrar und Stadtsoziologie” by J. A. Beegle and Paul Honigsheim complete this valuable contribution to the noteworthy enlivenment of sociological activities in present-day Germany. The fact that the book contains no Index may reduce its usefulness to students considerably.

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PHILIP M. HAUSER and OTIS DUDLEY DUNCAN (Eds.). *The Study of Population: An Inventory and Appraisal*. Pp. xvi, 864. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959. \$15.00.

This monumental appraisal of the status of demography as a science was undertaken at the suggestion and with the financial support of the National Science Foundation as a necessary first step in the Foundation's new program of providing support for population research. In view of the formidable scope of the investigation, the directors commissioned by the Foundation decided to divide the labor by assembling a symposium of papers from twenty-seven individual scholars, in addition to the editors' own substantial contribution. The objectives of the project were “to provide a description and evaluation of the data, the

fund of knowledge, the theory, and the methods of demography and its various subfields; to examine its relationship to other scientific disciplines, and to indicate important circumstances bearing on the development of demography in various parts of the world. The successful achievement of these specific tasks would, it was hoped, provide a comprehensive picture of demography as a science and a profession as of mid-twentieth century.”

The volume is divided into four parts. In Part I, Demography as a Science, the editors themselves have attempted to assess the field by summarizing and evaluating the papers obtained from the contributors, although these papers do not constitute the sole basis for their comprehensive appraisal which runs to almost 120 pages. Part II opens with an historical review of demography on a world-wide scale and goes on to describe the development and current status of demography in a number of different countries selected to “provide representation both of areas where demographic research has a relatively long and distinguished history and of those in which promising beginnings in the development of demography and rapid initial progress have been made in recent years.” Part III, Elements of Demography, consists of a dozen papers in which the various substantive fields of demography are taken up, preceded by a comparative appraisal of demographic data available for population research. Here one finds analyses of fertility, mortality, migration, population distribution and composition, as well as other topics which form the core of contemporary demographic research and training. Finally, Part IV considers the relationship of demography to several other sciences with which it is closely interrelated. These include ecology, geography, physical anthropology, genetics, economics, and sociology.

The quality of the individual contributions varies but it is a pleasure to report that many of the chapters are excellent. This felicitous result was achieved not only by a judicious selection of contributors, many of whom rank as foremost experts in their fields of specialization, but also by the careful, detailed guidance provided by the editors. Unlike so many other sym-

posia which are woefully inadequate in organization and lack any over-all point of view, this volume greatly benefits from the fact that its editors have firm, outspoken views about the nature of demography and state their position clearly and unmistakably. On the other hand, this also accounts for some obvious defects of the undertaking. As the editors themselves frankly avow, their point of view embodies their personal biases and predilections. Although such frankness may be refreshing, it raises serious questions of scientific propriety. For example, is it justifiable in a symposium intended as “an inventory and appraisal” of the entire field to criticize editorially the psychosocial theories of fertility without at the same time inviting a single proponent of this currently influential “school” to state his point of view?

On the whole, however, the merits of this volume greatly outweigh its defects. For once it is possible to accept the claims made by the publisher on the book's cover without cavil: this book provides an encyclopedic summary of the field of demography, and as such it will serve as a standard reference work for years to come.

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ROBERT W. SMUTS. *Women and Work in America*. Pp. vi, 180. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. \$4.50.

Here is a book on a highly significant topic: the increasing gainful employment of women, especially married women, outside of the home in the United States since 1890. The discussion is reliable, concise, and lucid. Four chapters, totaling 155 pages, discuss the changes in the work women do, the women who work, the demands and rewards of women's work, and underlying values and attitudes. The quality of the material is good, but still \$4.50 is a lot to pay for the quantity, 155 pages. The price may reflect the publisher's expectation of a small market.

This book is for the intelligent general reader, not the professional student of the family, for there is little here with which

the specialist will not already be familiar: the changes in women's occupations since 1890, mainly a relatively sharp decrease of work on farm, in factory, and household service, and a marked increase in clerical, sales, teaching, nursing, and nonhousehold service jobs. Even more striking is the increase in employment of wives and mothers. In 1890 almost all of the white working women were young, single, of immigrant stock or native farmers, working because of economic necessity. Today all types of women are well represented in the labor force; the young and the middle-aged, the poor and the not-poor, the single and the married—all except young mothers of preschool children and women over 65. As to working conditions, women now receive more pay for less work than in 1890, have more job security, and work under pleasanter circumstances. In 1890, employment for women was widely regarded as a threat to femininity, morality, and male supremacy. Today this concern has been greatly diminished as more recognition is accorded woman's right for self-realization.

All of this is quite familiar, but what makes Smuts' account distinctive is his use of literary, biographical, and other historical sources to illuminate and vivify the narrative. For the general reader this is perhaps the best brief account available of the changing occupational role of women in the United States since the beginning of the century.

This reviewer believes it would have sharpened the perspective of the book if the author had, as an extension of his historical viewpoint, included material on non-American working women. Highly instructive for us is the situation in other industrialized societies, such as the Netherlands where religion limits the number of married women workers. Also the book under review focuses on the causes rather than the consequences of changes in women's work, although the author acknowledges, in a brief reference near the close, that the consequences are momentous.

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HERBERT GARFINKEL. *When Negroes March. The March on Washington Movement in the Organizational Politics for FEPC.* Pp. 224. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959. \$4.00.

In his efforts to improve his lot the Negro of the twentieth century has lent his support to a variety of programs, among them the vocational training approach of Booker T. Washington, the better-living-conditions goals of the National Urban League, the legal defense and court-case emphasis of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and, most recently, the technique of Ghandian resistance as given expression by Martin Luther King's Montgomery Improvement Association. Distinctive among these Negro-betterment programs was the dramatic March on Washington movement initiated in the spring of 1941 by A. Philip Randolph, president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters.

As related by Professor Garfinkel of Dartmouth College the March on Washington was a last-ditch effort to focus attention on the plight of the urban Negro worker on the eve of America's entry into World War II. In 1941 the long-existent discriminatory practices in hiring, in on-the-job training, and in upgrading were more aggravating than ever to the Negro as he noted his country's eagerness to contrast the American creed of liberty and equality with the suppressions that characterized the fascist nations. Unable by conference-table methods to induce the Roosevelt administration to take effective action against employment bias, Randolph called for a national Negro March on Washington. This bold proposition could not be ignored. Faced with the possibility of an embarrassing large-scale demonstration in the nation's capital, President Roosevelt yielded, issuing on June 25, 1941, an order—Executive Order 8802—prohibiting discrimination in defense industries.

After this victory Randolph attempted to organize his March on Washington supporters into an ongoing organization. But his spirit of dedication and his great personal integrity were not equaled by his administrative ability; moreover, the March

on Washington movement faced the competition of the older Negro-betterment groups, some of whose leaders distrusted Randolph's more forthright "direct action" techniques. In a larger sense, however, the March on Washington movement was no failure inasmuch as it paved the way for "a steady increase in minority-group economic opportunities," and it established among Negroes a greater "collective self-reliance."

Skillfully organized, *When Negroes March* is a thoroughly documented, penetrating analysis of a remarkable mass movement which made use of political pressure techniques to achieve an economic goal. Hence this admirable study should be of interest to the social psychologist and the economist as well as to the political scientist and the historian of contemporary America.

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CLEMENT E. VOSE. *Caucasians Only: The Supreme Court, the NAACP, and the Restrictive Covenant Cases.* Pp. xi, 296. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959. \$6.00.

"The court is a mirror, an excellent mirror, of which historians for some reason have little availed themselves, of the struggle of dominant forces outside the Court." This observation by Felix Frankfurter, which is used as the epigraph to *Caucasians Only*, very aptly describes the subject of this book. Mr. Vose heeds Mr. Frankfurter's advice, and we see, albeit darkly, as through a glass, the sordid struggle of particular interest groups to maintain what they regard as their best interests.

Mr. Vose focuses his attention minutely on particular court cases, both state and federal, in which the legality of residential restrictive covenants was tested. The result is a chronicle of a forty-years war between the segregating white society, represented in the field by white property-owners associations and real estate boards, and, on the other side, an aroused Negro citizenry, led by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). The legal battle ended with

the momentous decisions of 1948 and 1953 when the United States Supreme Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment forbade the judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants. The nonlegal contest goes on, however, wherein white citizens seek through essentially illegal means to maintain the racial exclusiveness of their neighborhoods. Author Vose concentrates almost exclusively on the legal fracas, not on the "reconstruction" which is now underway in so many American communities.

One of the most provocative features of this book, though the theme is insufficiently emphasized, is the role of social science, and particularly sociology, in affecting the development of legal precedent and constitutional law. Although Vose discusses the various forces and variables affecting judicial decision, one wishes he had attempted a more systematic analysis of the interplay of these forces. Among the most important of these forces are public opinion and the research and thinking of scientists, particularly social and behavioral scientists. Which way do the currents of influence flow? Grossly oversimplifying the matter, we might ask, is the "order of opinions" scientific opinion to public opinion to judicial opinion? Or is it something else? Mr. Dooley, in his famous observation that Supreme Court decisions follow the latest election returns, seemed sure of the force of public opinion. In contrast to this view, Henry Steele Commager, quoted by Vose, was of the opinion that, by 1937, the sociological method of basing decision on sociological and economic findings had become "all but the official doctrine of the Court." Although there are many permutations according to which the threefold order of opinions may occur, there is a wealth of evidence which suggests that the order, scientific opinion to judicial opinion to public opinion, is becoming more and more common. It is not difficult to find numerous examples in which the courts, in the face of contrary wishes of particular groups, have outlawed various forms of discrimination, to base their decisions on the findings of the social and behavioral sciences.

The author not only demonstrates considerable legal acumen; he also reveals a

good measure of sociological insight. Like a good teacher he raises, without actually asking, many basic questions about social and legal processes in a democratic society. So many of these questions are evoked by this book that the fact that it is the most penetrating analysis of restrictive covenants seems almost incidental.

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PAUL H. JACOBSON. *American Marriage and Divorce*. Pp. xviii, 188. New York: Rinehart & Company, 1959. \$12.00.

Students of the family have been painfully aware that the United States is the only major nation without a centralized method for the collection and publication of marriage and divorce statistics. Impeded by budgetary and other considerations the National Office of Vital Statistics (NOVS) has done a commendable job in compiling and publishing such data as are available; nevertheless, social scientists working in the family field have been severely handicapped because of informational gaps in statistics dealing with interracial marriage rates, migratory marriage and divorce, remarriage, children affected by divorce, occupational and educational differentials, and so forth. Jacobson has attempted to "fill in" some of the gaps, and by so doing has come up with one of the most valuable books ever written in the field of marriage and divorce.

American Marriage and Divorce is a classic in its field. The book is a mine of information, and in this respect is not likely to be surpassed in the foreseeable future. It must have taken Jacobson the better part of a decade to collect, tabulate, and organize his material, and he can take pride in the fact that the finished product represents a genuine contribution to the family literature.

In publishing its regular marriage and divorce statistics, NOVS must rely on data that are forwarded by the individual states. Since many of the latter have not had centralized reporting procedures, and since, over the years, statistical recording has varied a good deal from state to state, the NOVS "clearing house" has been able to

publish only fragmentary and relatively nondetailed information. Jacobson carried out the painstaking task of collecting not only centralized information but also of reaching down to the city, county, and local court level in order to collect and present statistical series not heretofore available.

The net result is a sorely needed compilation of facts dealing with the seasonal pattern of marriage, trends in the marriage and divorce rate, marital patterns by race, age, locale, and occupation, as well as geographic variations and urban-rural differences, marriage and divorce proceedings, alimony, custody of children, mortality and the duration of marriage, and a host of other factors that are of concern to family sociologists. Although not written within any theoretical framework, Jacobson's volume is more than a collection of statistical facts. The facts hang together, and the accompanying explanations have been clearly thought out by the author. In consequence, the book will appeal to both the statistical and nonstatistical-minded reader.

The book sells for twelve dollars, and doubtless there will be some who feel the price is too high. Viewed from this corner, the price is right. As a matter of faith, if you are willing to take the word of an old, experienced horse trader, the book is a bargain.

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JEROME K. MYERS and BERTRAM H. ROBERTS. *Family and Class Dynamics in Mental Illness*. Pp. ix, 295. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959. \$6.95.

This volume is the second part of a research report on the relationship between social class and mental illness. The first part, *Social Class and Mental Illness* by Hollingshead and Redlich, demonstrated that the prevalence of mental illness, its diagnosis, and the kinds of psychiatric therapy were all associated with the patient's position in the class system. Relying on an epidemiological approach, with the use of mass data, no attempt was made in the first study to throw light on the question of how patients become mentally ill, nor

on the social and psycho-dynamic factors in the development of mental illness. These are the problems attacked in this study.

Specifically the research seeks to test two hypotheses: (1) social and psycho-dynamic factors in the development of psychiatric disorder are related to the patient's position in the class order; (2) mobility in the class structure is associated with the development of psychiatric disorder. These two propositions were tested through an intensive study of fifty patients, half schizophrenics and half psychoneurotics, carefully selected from two social levels, a lower middle and a lower working class. The research was carried out by a team of social scientists and psychiatrists in a New England metropolitan area, and covered a period of ten years.

The findings of the research completely support the first hypothesis. In part they also support the thesis that a significant factor in the development of illness is the tension associated with mobility in the class structure. This was found to be true in the middle but not in the lower class. Statistically, significant differences between middle and lower class patients were found in intrafamilial role relationships, in sex role development, in kind and intensities of community pressures, and in attitudes toward mental illness, as well as to therapy, and in development of symptoms. At each class level, external pressures and internal tensions were more severe and more frequent among schizophrenics than among neurotics. Among middle class patients, pressures clustered around two basic value systems, respectability and success. Out of these developed inner tensions arising out of conflicts between instinctual, especially sexual drives and moral values as represented by parents, especially mothers. In other cases they grew out of the failure to live up to the rigidly internalized values of middle class culture. Tensions associated with the strivings of the upwardly mobile, or fear of loss of status, once achieved, were marked correlates of mental breakdown in the middle class patient.

In the lower class the picture was quite different. Here the pressures of economic adversity and exclusion from participation in the life of the community were the

sources of the inner tensions. Lower class, much more than middle class patients, displayed a family history marked by absence of affection and warm interpersonal relations, and by conflict with and fear of parents. Excluded from community participation there was little internalization of conventional norms, hence fewer inhibitions and little guilt feeling over violation of convention. Constant conflict with teachers, social workers, police, employers, and the like, bred feelings of hostility but at the same time of rejection and self-worthlessness. In both cases intrafamilial and community pressures bore more heavily on the schizophrenic than on the neurotic. Both intensity and frequency of pressures were directly related to the severity of mental illness.

The authors repeatedly emphasize that they do not take the position that social class is the only or even the most important factor in mental illness. Psychiatric disorder is confined to no one class. Rather, membership in certain social classes exposes persons more frequently and more intensely to the kinds of pressures which are closely associated with the development of functional mental illness. At the same time most persons exposed to these same pressures do not succumb. But interpretation of the etiology of mental illness and its successful therapy can be achieved only in light of understanding the role of class background.

Family and Class Dynamics in Mental Illness is a worthy companion to the Hollingshead and Redlich volume. It should be read not only in academic circles but by psychiatrists, clinicians, social workers, and laymen who have an interest in the problems of mental health. It has important implications not only for the student of mental illness but for those interested in delinquency and crime as well as for other forms of deviant behavior. The book demonstrates again the importance of expanding the horizon of research in the mental health field to include the contribution of the social scientist as well as those whose orientation is purely psychiatric and clinical.

C. T. PIHLBLAD

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DERRICK SHERWIN BAILEY. *Sexual Relation in Christian Thought*. Pp. viii, 312. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. \$4.50.

Since Comte there has in general been no close meeting of minds between theologians and sociologists. The present book by an Anglican theologian does, however, command respect for its impressive scholarship. Sociologists who have written about historical aspects of the family from secondary sources could well be humbled by Dr. Bailey's command of Hebrew, Greek, and Latin documents interpreted in the light of Biblical criticism.

Chapters of the book cover primitive Christianity, the New Testament, the Patristic Age, the Mediaeval Western Church, the Reformation and seventeenth-century Anglicanism, the tradition today, and, finally, present a theology of sex. There is a lucid analysis of the Christian tradition concerning the relations between men and women as influenced by countless writers, many unknown to the average sociologist. The views of Jerome and Tertullian concerning lust and women are placed in perspective, but Dr. Bailey freely grants that the Christian tradition by virtue of antagonism to a pagan world and for other causes was deeply pervaded by hostility to genital sex expression and by androcentricity.

Much can be learned from this book concerning concepts and disputations over the ages which left significant residues in civil laws and church doctrines of the present day. Affinal relations, impediments, consent, consummation, sacrament, indissolubility of marriage, sacerdotal celibacy, digamy, and "syneisaktism" receive especially illuminating treatment.

It is only toward the end of the book that Dr. Bailey seems other than an objective, scholarly historian familiar both with ancient documents and modern biological and social science. The theologian finally emerges, influenced somewhat by Barth and Buber, lucid, aware of semantic pitfalls, eager and prepared to reason profoundly in a liberal tradition from certain assumptions. The unstated assumptions seem to be a Creator God, a divine Son, special creation of generic Man, and au-

thoritative revelation in Scriptures theologically interpreted. Man is seen as an image of God and as Mankind having equal masculine and feminine components. Man and woman are complementary in a richly variegated association, the potentialities of which are known only by experience free from preconceptions of culture and tradition.

Perhaps sociologists and theologians need not be on widely separate planes of human thought.

CLIFFORD KIRKPATRICK

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JOHN VINCENT BARRY. *Alexander Maconochie of Norfolk Island: A Study of a Pioneer in Penal Reform*. Pp. xxi, 277. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959. \$6.50.

In this book, Mr. Barry attempts to negate the prevailing legend of Maconochie's failure and to elevate him to his rightful place of distinction. Maconochie, of course, was the superintendent of the penal colony on Norfolk Island, over 900 miles east of Sydney, Australia, from 1840-44. Mr. Barry succeeds eminently in his mission.

Many in the United States have assumed that Maconochie had much to do with establishing the "ticket-of-leave" system, which has been considered a precursor of the parole system in America. No less authorities than Barnes and Teeters have labored under this erroneous impression as has the reviewer. From Barry's documentation, it seems clear that ticket-of-leave antedated Maconochie's advent to Van Diemen's Land in 1837 and his superintendency at Norfolk Island. Maconochie did use ticket-of-leave more constructively than heretofore.

The mark system was really the core idea of Maconochie's penal philosophy. Maconochie contended that "prisoners should be punished for the past but trained for the future." The offender would be incarcerated until he had performed a specified quantity of labor. This idea would make imprisonment a task rather than a time operation. In addition to the mark system whereby the prisoner earned marks by his labor, Maconochie introduced

on Norfolk Island the system of group responsibility: prisoners who had proved themselves ready were assigned to parties of six who were collectively responsible for the performance and misconduct of their members. This was hard to administer. Furthermore, Maconochie introduced several other progressive measures which sought to rehabilitate prisoners and create a good social climate for personal improvement.

From reports, it appears that Maconochie had a most favorable impact on the Norfolk penal colony and that after his removal it fell once again into a subhuman jungle. American penologists will also be interested to note that Maconochie had a rather direct influence on Sir Walter Crofton's development in approximately 1854 of the progressive stages system in the Irish prison system.

WALTER C. RECKLESS

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L. S. PALMER. *Man's Journey Through Time: A First Step in Physical and Cultural Anthropochronology*. Pp. xv, 184. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. No price.

Man and Culture are in a sense synonymous, yet "Man's cultural development has proceeded in a manner quite different from his physical development." Palmer aims to evaluate progress in each area. Three problems in the physical area at once arise: (1) the unit of evolutionary time; this is now solved by accepting a "Darwin" as a unit, that is, "when any dimension changes by 1/1,000 of its original value in 1,000 years"; anatomical indices were not developed with reference to measuring evolutionary change; no particular skeleton is available as a standard. Palmer adopts an "average modern European adult male." In the cultural area there is an obvious limitation to objects, largely stone, rather than concepts and values. Man, the toolmaking animal, is Palmer's over-all concern.

After developing mathematical formulas to equate physical and cultural rates with time, the author establishes four major criteria in each area. In the physical they are: I1, Nuchal Area Height Index; I2, Condylar Position Index; I3, Cranial Ca-

capacity; I4, Lower Dental Arcade Convergence Angle. I1 and I2 are related to erect posture, I3 to brain, I4 to speech. In the cultural they are: C1, The Number of Different Materials Used; C2, The Number of Different Occupations Engaged in; C3, The Speed With Which Man Moved by Mechanical Means; C4, Cultural "Grading of Man-Made Objects." C1, C2, and C3 relate to concrete objects and methods and are largely quantitative; C4 is qualitative.

The major inferences on the physical side suggest that erect posture, brain size, and speech developed in order. All graphs extrapolated to several million years ago come close to the values given for Proconsul. The rate of evolution is about one "Darwin," and for periods not exceeding 500,000 years the approximate equation $H = (100 - at)$ expresses the relation between "percentage humanity" and time (Table II and Fig. 53).

On the cultural side it is concluded, on the basis of graphing the data, that the similarity of the graphs demonstrates that the four criteria chosen measure "the same cultural factor." Further, the shape of the graphs betokens an accelerating developmental process that is currently in a terrific phase of acceleration (Tables III-IV and Fig. 54).

Dr. Palmer has brought together a lot of data and has developed a very useful evaluatory and discriminatory technique. I think we can all agree with his major objective of relating rate of development, physical or cultural, to time. We can argue an almost unsolvable problem, that is, the weighting of the criteria used. On the physical side are nuchal area, occipital condyles, cranial capacity, dental arch the best single measurements to evaluate fundamental evolutionary biological change? If so, which tells the most? If not, what others should be considered? The same questions may be asked of the cultural criteria which range from flint-tipped spear and bone needle in carved bone case to supersonic jet plane and radar-controlled automatically fired antiaircraft gun battery. Palmer's method equates and rates all of the criteria chosen in each area, to be sure, but the choosing of the traits is the moot point. Incidentally, by implica-

tion at least, cultural evolution is assumed. The book is clearly written, well illustrated, and excellently printed. It should be read, studied, and evaluated by all biologists and all anthropologists.

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EDWARD NORBECK. *Pineapple Town: Hawaii*. Pp. xii, 159. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959. \$4.00.

In this book an anthropologist examines Maunaloa, a pineapple plantation community on the island of Molokai.

After a sketch of the growth of Hawaii's comparatively young pineapple industry, built upon imported labor, mostly Asian, the author describes the scientific and highly mechanized operation of the Maunaloa "factory farm" and reports on the ethnic backgrounds, skills, and rewards of the corporation's employees. There follows a generalized portrait of the town, with attention to such factors as the racial and cultural composition of the residents, education, religion, languages used, town layout, housing, and community facilities.

Because the peoples of the community still "remain culturally as well as socially distinct," the Filipinos, Japanese, Haoles (Caucasians) and Cosmopolitans—persons of mixed national and cultural backgrounds—are next examined separately, with attention both to "old-country" attitudes and customs which have persisted within the first two groups and to forces which are gradually obliterating various of these survivals. Of prime importance in the latter connection is the corporation's pressure toward elimination of attitudes and habits inimical to efficient industry.

Though they are to some extent influenced by the racial and cultural affiliations of the individual, the author maintains that social classifications are very largely determined by occupational status. Though Haoles still have both top jobs and social prestige and are followed in rank by Japanese and then the Filipino majority, it is stressed that this ranking is based not solely on "race" but on cultural considerations which derive partly from corporate

needs and partly from social traditions uniquely Hawaiian. Opportunities for, and obstacles to, individual upward mobility are described in some detail. The non-Haoles chances for advancement have greatly increased in recent years.

The final chapter summarizes changes in community social relationships since the plantation's origin in the 1920's. These include trends away from paternalism and social solidarity by kinship and ethnic grouping toward impersonality in economic relations, individualism, and a class-structured society. They are viewed not solely as the results of a general diffusion of American culture, but as the unplanned "functional correlates of industrialization," which can be observed in other Hawaiian pineapple towns, and reflect similar tendencies in plantation owned communities in other areas of the world.

Readable and well organized, this book provides indubitably authentic, and sometimes most interesting detail on the lives and relationships of Maunaloa's residents. The chapters on "The Filipinos" and on "Community Social Relationships" are especially noteworthy. Photographs, maps, statistical tables, and an Index are provided.

THOMAS D. MURPHY
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ARTHUR R. M. LOWER. *Canadians in the Making: A Social History of Canada*. Pp. xxiv, 475. New York: Longmans, Green & Company, 1959. \$7.50.

Perhaps every historian after a certain age becomes a philosopher. He reaches a time in life when he wants to reflect on history and leave to younger men the work of filling in the small, scattered gaps in historical knowledge. This, certainly, would appear to be true of the distinguished Canadian historian, A. R. M. Lower. The author of *Colony to Nation* might well have been expected to turn to a work of an even more general nature, a history of the Canadian people, and no historian had more earned the right. Only one with the breadth of historical knowledge and the insight of Professor Lower could have written *Canadians in the Making*. This is a

good book for the reason that nothing that Professor Lower writes can be anything but good.

Had a lesser historian, however, undertaken to write such a book the result might well have been disastrous. It would in no way please Professor Lower who reserves some of his most acid comments for references to sociology to suggest that to write the history of the Canadian people he needed to be more of a sociologist than he was. Professor Lower fancies himself as something of a philosopher of history, and *Canadians in the Making* opens on a note that suggests that there, in a sort of stage-theory of development, has been discovered the key which will give meaning to the history of the Canadian people. But as attention shifts from the early years of the growth of the Canadian nation to the more complex developments of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the stage-theory is fortunately forgotten and what might be described as a philosophical approach disappears. What develops in its stead is a sort of rambling commentary on Canadian life, the social class relations of the Canadian people, their style of architecture, their religious beliefs and ethical practices, their cultural achievements, and such. There is much good history crowded into even the later sections of the book, particularly history with a strong local flavor, but as the story of the Canadian people unfolds, and the guideposts directing historical analysis become more obscure, the temptation of the author to give free rein to the expression of his views about various things becomes irresistible. By the time Professor Lower has done, there remain few facets of Canadian life on which he has not passed judgment.

Those familiar with Professor Lower's earlier writings, and particularly his scattered articles and papers, will discover much in *Canadians in the Making* that they had read before. But there is a pungency about whatever he says that can scarcely fail to make what he writes interesting. Few sacred cows are left peacefully munching their hay after Lower has done with them. Never one to criticize his neighbor without subjecting himself to the same kind of searching analysis, Professor Lower

directs his most deadly barbs at that Canadian society of which he has been most a part. However, he says little that is unkind about his French-speaking Catholic compatriots. No one perhaps who was not intensely Canadian could have written *Canadians in the Making*. And it is only those few perhaps who are as deeply attached to their country as is Arthur Lower who will fully appreciate this book.

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DAVID L. MILLER. *Modern Science and Human Freedom*. Pp. xiii, 297. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1959. \$6.00.

This volume, seeking to resolve the oppositions between the deterministic postulates of science and man's freedom to set goals for himself and devise means to achieve his objectives, is in fact a complete philosophy of science. To prove his theses, Dr. Miller finds it necessary to investigate, in Part I, The Physical Bases of Science, and here problems of the place of Observables, Explanation, Laws, Cause, Valuation, and related scientific debatables, are dealt with—in the course of which Positivism fares badly. The discussion is clear and comprehensive.

In Part II, The Ethical Bases of Freedom are discussed. Problems concerning the nature of life, biological organization, evolution, the place of mind, and the like, are surveyed. The discussion, in Chapter XII, of problems in the social sciences is related to the concepts of freedom, institutions, and values, which then leads into the investigation of a possible science of norms, and here the previously hard-won conclusions are brought to a focus. In the formulation of his philosophy Dr. Miller was, and is, much influenced by the views of his former teacher, George H. Mead. Following this approach, Dr. Miller indicates, in terms of physiology and psychology, how human freedom emerges in a natural way as the culmination of evolutionary processes wherein the symbolic process and reflective thinking make possible planned behavior of individuals as members of society. The co-ordination of the symbolic

function with bodily behavior—as man acts on physical objects and social processes to create and transform ends (goals)—is the source of man's freedom.

This book appeals to me as an excellent survey and affirmation of a viewpoint. My major criticism of it relates to the limited manner in which the author states his problem: one of his aims (pp. 3, 4, 12, and *passim*) is to reconcile the Greek rational tradition, as the historic source of science, with the basic tenets of the Hebraic-Christian tradition which, the author believes, gives us our cultural components of freedom, responsibility, and the hope of improving the world through human effort and ethics. Surely this frame of reference is too narrow and limited for modern science and philosophy. Is not our task precisely that of rising above this traditional and obsolete antithesis to a higher plateau of thinking whereon we may discuss and settle problems on the level of a new world synthesis? Our coming civilization, if it comes at all, will not be merely "Western"—it will represent a planetary level of integration in which the Greek-Hebrew-Christian provincialisms will be transcended. Given his own context, the author has produced a useful and readable volume.

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ECONOMICS

MASSIMO SALVADORI. *The Economics of Freedom: American Capitalism Today*. Pp. xxii, 242. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1959. \$4.50.

Professor Salvadori's book is "written by a layman for laymen . . . on the assumption that . . . any citizen can acquire the knowledge necessary to an understanding of an economic system." This word "system" is central to the book's whole scheme of exposition. Our "people's capitalism" is a philosophical system, not circumscribed by naturalistic scientism, as were the doctrines of the classical economists, deductively constructing their dismal science.

Ours is a positive system based on the constructive use of individual liberty. He says, "Some Americans and a good many foreigners, baffled by the complexity, the apparent contradictions, and the variety of the American economy, maintain that there is not a system but simply something which has grown without direction and without purpose, which holds precariously together and which is likely to disintegrate in the near future. . . . Clearly they are wrong: we know intuitively that the system exists and we know empirically how it operates—there must therefore be something holding together the elements of which it is composed" (p. 31).

This system in its material aspect (Chapter 4) embraces the institutions of property, capital, free enterprise, and the market. In terms of "man as an economic agent" it embraces (Chapter 5) labor organization, business administration, and government guidance. The "driving forces" (Chapter 6) behind or within the system "that represent the core (one may say the soul) of our economic institutions" are individualism, rationalism, liberty, equality, respect for work, materialism—in its best sense, solidarity, and evolutionary revolutionism.

Out of all this unsystematic system we have, in Salvadori's estimation, achieved something that "as it is—with its innumerable defects, weaknesses, and dark spots, not as intellectuals, businessmen, labor economists, [and so forth] would like it to be—represents an improvement over all other economic systems past and present. . . . If Americans make a mess of their lives, as many do, it is of their own doing, not the responsibility of the economic system."

This book is an essay in persuasion and, as such, is a forceful and inspiring document. But to this reviewer it would seem that if the general reader is to understand the "system" of people's capitalism he must have more in the way of concrete exposition of its *modus operandi*—for instance, its credit structure, the nature of professional management of corporations and professional administration of unions and their federations, and the income redistributions characterized by individual

and corporation taxes and social security payments and business subsidies.

EDWIN G. NOURSE

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JOHN M. LETICHE. *Balance of Payments and Economic Growth*. Pp. xiii, 378. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. \$6.00.

One of the more interesting recent explanations of the dollar shortage links the strong payments position of the United States to greater rates of productivity growth in American import-competing industries than in foreign exporting industries. That this can serve as a partial explanation of Britain's postwar dollar shortage but definitely not as a general explanation of the difficulties faced in Western Europe is one of the fundamental points Professor Letiche makes in his new book. Recent hypotheses are examined by him with the aid of interwar and postwar data for the United States and Europe.

The relationship stressed by Professor Letiche is that between actual levels of output and full capacity levels of output. In his opinion, the United States is distinguished from other countries in its ability to generate excess capacity. This tendency, according to the argument, results in an excess of domestic production over domestic expenditure, which, in turn, is the export surplus. To the extent that the export surplus is not matched by an outflow of capital, that is, foreign investment, the rest of the world suffers from a dollar shortage. The weak link in this chain of reasoning, insufficiently supported in this book, is the assumption that excess capacity is associated with an excess of actual production over domestic demand.

Only the second part of the book is devoted to exploring the relationship between economic growth and the balance of payments. Part One is a critical appraisal of classical, Keynesian, and neo-Keynesian analyses of the process of adjustment to disturbances in the balance of payments. He rightly points out that adjustments usually involve many prices, employment, and incomes, but seems to go too far in rejecting traditional arguments couched in terms of elasticities of demand and supply

for exports, imports, and foreign exchange. In working out a "more general mechanism theory" Professor Letiche ignores recent work by economists wedding the elasticity arguments with income effects and essentially repeats much of the elasticity argument in different terminology.

The book attempts to reach the nontechnical reader, by minimizing the use of algebra and symbols. However, in so doing Professor Letiche runs the risk of not satisfying the technicians without communicating with the others; his long verbal accounts of the adjustment mechanism (for example, pp. 131–149) will be difficult for the uninitiated. The discussion of Part Two, however, should be of general interest to all concerned with the development of the present payments position in Britain, Western Europe, and the United States.

RONALD W. JONES

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RENDIGS FELS. *American Business Cycles 1865–1897*. Pp. 244. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959. \$6.00.

In this useful study of business cycles in the United States from the end of the Civil War to the end of the century, Rendigs Fels helps fill a major gap. Save for unpublished dissertations and articles in journals, there has been no book dealing competently with the cycles from 1865 through 1897. Drawing on the work of the National Bureau of Economic Research, on contemporary accounts, as well as on various though not all available sources of information and analysis, Fels has managed to join in felicitous fashion empirical data and theoretical analysis which has illuminated both the nature of the cycles under study and business-cycle theory in general. In this regard his work is a helpful contribution to both the historian and the economist. Basically historical in its approach, the book leans heavily on the theoretical foundations of business-cycle theory.

The book is divided, roughly, into two parts: the first part deals mainly with the theoretical framework and tools to be used; the second part contains historical accounts and analysis of the particular cycles in

the period under review. After making his case for the historical approach rather than the inductive, deductive, or econometric, Fels painstakingly synthesizes a theoretical framework of eclectic quality, drawing mainly on Schumpeterian theory but including important additions from Hicks and R. A. Gordon. This framework is filled out by taking into account certain other significant elements in the business cycle: price and wage flexibility, long-wave depression, and the role of external events. The result is a set of theoretical benchmarks which help greatly to further understanding of each cycle and of the underlying forces which transcended the particular cycle.

In the second part of the book Fels goes through a historical analysis of the main aspects of the various cycles starting with 1865: the cycles of 1865-79, 1879-85, 1885-88, 1888-91, 1891-94, 1894-97. These analyses of the various cycles, the turning points of which generally are National Bureau dates except where occasionally the author critically modifies the month of peak or trough, include an explanation of the major forces shaping the particular cycle within the context of the author's modified Schumpeterian system where appropriate. The explanation in some instances departs widely from the Schumpeterian model in which case the author develops it in accord with Gordon's investment opportunity concept or brings in Hicksian concepts or a combination. Fels' explanations are often a happy intertwining of contemporary accounts and judgments with the most important statistical series which measure more concretely the dimensions of the fluctuation. In some instances he accepts uncritically the validity of contemporary judgments, and his notion that the depression of the eighteen nineties was intensified by net outflow of capital from the United States is subject to serious questioning. But on the whole the account is balanced and penetrating. Constantly referring causal relationships to his theoretical framework, the author succeeds in putting each cycle into a clearer focus.

As the author takes the measure of the cycles from 1865 to 1897 he concludes that "on the one hand drastic modifications need

be made in Schumpeter's theory, and on the other hand the model is exceedingly illuminating." Innovation, Juglars, and Kondratieffs all proved very useful concepts while Kitchins did not. Gordon's minor cycles were more useful than Schumpeter's Kitchins. Hicks' theory contributed least to the study of the cycles. Fels concludes further that the framework applicable to the 1865-97 period seems to hold valid for the 1945-58 period. Regardless of the validity of this, Fels' work does provide a solid historical and statistical study with much material enhancing our understanding of both economic history and business-cycle theory.

CHARLES HOFFMANN

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DOUGLAS VICKERS. *Studies in the Theory of Money, 1690-1776*. Pp. ix. 313. Philadelphia: Chilton Company, 1959. \$6.50.

This book is based on a doctoral thesis presented at the University of London. It re-examines economic literature in this period to elucidate the theories presented on money, employment, and to some extent on interest and economic growth. Successive chapters deal with Locke, Barbon, North, Law, Berkeley, Vanderlint, Cantillon, Hume, and Steuart. In general, the view is taken that there was more "wholeness" in the ideas of the later mercantilist and transitional writers whom Vickers studies than often has been recognized. Vickers makes it appear that in substantial degree these men were macro-economists of modern type, concerned particularly with full employment. He marshals his evidence to build a good case and is to be congratulated on it.

It is generally conceded that mercantilism was a "macro" system so far as it was an economic system at all. The mercantilists professed to look at the economy in a broad way and expected the government to run it properly. From Misselden onward, the argument was presented that more money meant more employment. It was suggested frequently that banks should be chartered to give loans and issue money;

why buy specie from abroad with goods exports when paper would raise prices just as well? This is where later writers parted company with the earlier mercantilists.

Vickers has done good service in bringing to notice aspects of the literature in his field that have received relatively little attention in standard histories of economic thought. However, his book suffers in some degree from the limitations of its scope and, partly because of this, seems sometimes to overstate its case. The omission of reference to Misselden, who wrote before Vickers' period, makes some ideas dealt with appear more novel than they really were, and Vickers' concentration on analysis of the writings to the neglect of their background perhaps puts Berkeley in a somewhat different position than he ought to occupy. Berkeley, in the *Querist*, was concerned with Irish poverty, which was a different and more lasting condition than the trade depressions that interested some of the English writers who made comparable suggestions. Vickers' statements that Barbon's ultimate criterion of policy was employment, and Law's that of power through employment, are difficult to accept without reservation. Barbon's *Discourse of Trade* suggested consumers' goods as an objective and Law probably was as much concerned as earlier mercantilists with wealth and social stability.

EDMUND WHITTAKER

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W. PAUL STRASSMANN. *Risk and Technological Innovation: American Manufacturing Methods During the Nineteenth Century*. Pp. x, 249. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1959. \$4.00.

Inspired by the speculation of economists, especially Schumpeter and Veblen, on the impact of innovations on our economy, the author in this study makes an empirical examination of segments of American industry in the nineteenth century, endeavoring to determine the relationship among business enterprise, technological change, and the risks assumed by entrepreneurs in fostering the innovations that were undertaken. He studies the his-

tory of the production of iron and steel, textile machinery, machine tools, and electric power equipment to find out when innovations took place, the entrepreneurial problems and decisions that led to these developments, and the degree of risk encountered by the promoters of new manufacturing methods in these fields.

Strassmann defines innovation as the time when a first decision is made to alter the routine of production and funds are used to implement a new, untried technological change. His investigations disclose that innovators were more creative and less passive than Veblen thought them to be, but that they proceeded with a larger degree of caution as well as a more certain chance of success than would the speculating gamblers that Schumpeter described as innovators.

In the iron and steel industry, most early mill owners were not enthusiastic about experimenting with technological changes, and simply followed Europe's lead. After 1870, however, American entrepreneurs became less cautious and at last effected technical improvements. In the textile industry, Europe again took the lead. The expense of changing heavy machines made Americans overly cautious and limited most innovations to attachments and gradual increases in speed. The low risks in the machine tool field, because the cost of these tools was not great, permitted considerable innovation, but the number of innovating firms was small, most enterprisers preferring merely to copy. Caution and the experience necessary in the electric power industry limited the field to a very few firms, most of which, however, made many successful innovations.

To this reviewer, the book seemed disappointing. It closely resembles a Ph.D. thesis in format and confirms the oft-made observation that doctoral dissertations do not normally make good books. In addition, the constant references to the technical processes and equipment used in the industries studied makes it quite difficult for the average reader to follow the discussion. Finally, the limitation of the investigation to only four industries, all involved with heavy producers goods, makes the validity of the thesis questionable for any

generalizations to be applied to the entire economy.

SIDNEY I. SIMON

Associate Professor of Economics
Rutgers, The State University

CALVIN B. HOOVER. *The Economy, Liberty and the State*. Pp. 445. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1959. \$5.00.

The events of the first half of the twentieth century—two world wars, the rise of communism, important modifications in political and economic institutions in the countries of classical capitalism, fantastic technological and scientific advances—initiated a new period in the history of mankind.

Dr. Hoover has undertaken the task of presenting the development, during several recent decades, of countries with different socio-economic structures, and of showing how their development has affected personal freedoms. He discusses the possibility of the rebirth of freedom in the "peoples' democracies" and the possibility of maintaining freedom in the capitalist countries, under the assumption of uninterrupted evolution of their socio-economic structures.

The book consists of eleven chapters, excluding the Prologue and the two concluding chapters. The first chapter is entitled "Old-Style Capitalism," four chapters are devoted to the Soviet Union, one chapter discusses "The Nazi Totalitarian System," three chapters analyze the economic system of the United States and two chapters cover "The British Economic System" and "The Economic System of Western Europe."

In probing this theme, Dr. Hoover also discusses a number of other questions closely related to the freedom of the individual in countries with contrasting socio-economic structures.

Lack of space does not permit a more detailed description of the contents of this valuable book, saturated with quantitative data, examples, facts, and the author's personal observations. Dr. Hoover is a leading economist and an expert on Soviet practices. From the reviewer's point of view the most interesting chapters are de-

voted to the Soviet political and economic system. The author presents many ideas, facts, observations, illustrations, and comparisons pertaining to the Soviet economic system, which make the book valuable to a specialist and interesting to a layman.

It is important to note that the author sees the Soviet economy as it is in actuality, and not as we would wish to see it or as the Russians would like us to see it. Although the author knows well the shortcomings of the Soviet economic system, he was not lulled by these deficiencies into underestimating the Soviet potential. It cannot be said that Dr. Hoover did not see the forest for the trees. He stresses that "a Soviet rate of economic growth almost twice the past rate in the United States, if the writer's crude estimates were assumed to present reality, would represent a factor of great force in the present world conflict" (p. 164).

It is necessary to note an unfortunate inaccuracy in the book. Discussing the 1932-1933 famine in the Ukraine, the author writes: "Since the season turned out to be a poor crop year in the Ukraine, the harvest proved insufficient to maintain life. The peasants appealed for grain from the state grain reserves. Stalin said 'No!' Hundreds of thousands in the Ukraine died from starvation or diseases of malnutrition" (p. 73). Actually the situation was somewhat different. Famine was quite deliberately employed by the Soviet government as an instrument of national policy, as a last means of breaking the resistance of the peasantry to the new system where they are divorced from personal ownership of the land and obliged to work under the conditions which the state may dictate to them and deliver whatever the state may demand from them.

According to estimates of various authors, between three and five million people died of hunger in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic at that time. Famine, as a political tool, is the cruelest invention of the communist system.

Although Dr. Hoover's book will be especially useful for those who are working in the Soviet field, it is wholeheartedly recommended to all who are interested in

and take to heart the more disturbing problems of our times.

T. SOSNOVY

Specialist in Soviet Economy
The Library of Congress

J. FRED RIPPY. *British Investments in Latin America, 1822-1949, A Case Study in the Operations of Private Enterprise in Retarded Regions*. Pp. xii, 249. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1959. \$5.00.

Dr. J. Fred Rippy, who has dedicated many years to the study of Latin America, in the volume under review has presented an interesting and important survey of a special phase of the economic development of that region. It is in fact a case study in the operation of private enterprise in retarded regions. It considers from all possible angles the operations of the British investors in Latin America from the era of independence until 1949. The author has investigated carefully all the evidence available regarding the chronicle of private English investments in Latin America, and directs attention to the unequal economic progress among the various nations and peoples. Details of the size, nature, chronology, and rates of return of the British investments are presented.

The introductory chapter deals with recent problems in private international investment and details the crisis which has occurred in the British experience in Latin America. Then three parts are devoted to the various phases of the problems involved. Part one comprises a general survey of the British investments in Latin America. The various periods into which the investments fall are indicated, showing great activity at times and much reluctance at others. There are chapters devoted to a detailed analysis of investments at the end of 1913, British investments at their peak in 1928, and a decade of rapid contraction which closes the period covered to 1949.

Part two is devoted to a study of the British investments made in the various countries of Latin America. The importance and results are set forth. The amounts invested, the returns obtained by the investors, and the importance of the

development in each country are indicated. Part three comprises chapters dealing with the nature and results of certain British companies and the income from British overseas investment during a recent decade. It concludes with chapters on some British views of foreign investments and the view of the Latin American recipients.

Many statistical tables are included and the Appendices list the British gas companies in Latin America and the British investments in Latin American electric utilities. Thus it can be said that Dr. Rippy has made a valuable contribution to the study of certain aspects of the economic development of Latin America during the period of its independence. The volume should be read by all who desire to understand the course of events in the Latin American countries.

ROSCOE R. HILL

Washington, D. C.

Wages, Prices, Profits and Productivity. (Background Papers and the Final Report of the Fifteenth American Assembly, Arden House, Harrison Campus of Columbia University.) Pp. ix, 193. New York: American Assembly, Columbia University, 1959. No price.

The relationship among wages, prices, profits, and productivity was the subject for discussion at the Fifteenth American Assembly, Arden House, Harriman, New York, April 30 through May 3, 1959, under the auspices of Columbia University. Some sixty Americans from business, labor, government, agriculture, communications, and the clerical, legal, and military professions participated.

Special papers by a group of distinguished economists provided background material for the conference. Professor Charles A. Myers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, edited the papers and contributed the Introduction titled "Central Issues in Wage Price Relationships." The papers, which constitute the major part of the present volume, include: "Patterns of Wages, Prices and Productivity," Professor Albert Rees, University of Chicago; "Productivity, Costs and Prices," Professor John W. Kendrick, George Washington University; "Underlying Factors in Post-

war inflation," Professor James S. Dusenberry, Harvard University; "The Impact of Unions on the Level of Wages," President Clark Kerr, University of California; "Wage Behavior and Inflation," Professor Lloyd G. Reynolds, Yale University; "Policy Problems," Professor John T. Dunlop, Harvard University.

Also included in the volume are an address by Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell on "Productivity and the Consumer," an address by the late Professor Sumner H. Slichter of Harvard University on "Labor Costs and Prices," and the "Final Report of the Assembly."

Analysis of the relationships among wages, prices, profits, and productivity indicates the need for more complete data and more accurate measurement. Considerable attention is given to the relation of wages to inflation. While wages are seen as an important contributing cause, the consensus is that in addition to the upward push of wages and other costs it is essential to recognize the impact of the upward pull of demand resulting from such factors as the backlog of purchasing power, easy credit, heavy public expenditures, and increasing population.

Viewed as desirable national goals are: sustained economic growth, increased productivity, full employment, reasonable price stability, national security, industrial peace, and a higher standard of living. Illustrative of the means of attaining these goals are: appropriate monetary policy; free markets; reduction of tariffs and other impediments to international trade; vigorous enforcement of anti-trust laws; and an annual conference of labor, management, and government to examine the trend of wages, prices, profits, and productivity in relation to national objectives.

Comprising as it does a series of brilliant analyses of the diverse facets of inflation and the elements of sound public policy, this volume is a very important addition to contemporary economic literature.

GORDON S. WATKINS
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Chancellor, Emeritus
University of California
Riverside

RICHARD HARTSHORNE. *Perspective on the Nature of Geography*. (The Monograph Series of the Association of American Geographers.) Pp. 201. Chicago: Rand McNally & Company for the Association, 1959. \$5.00.

This book is both a summary and elaboration of Professor Hartshorne's previous methodological work entitled, *The Nature of Geography*, published during 1939 in the *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*. In 1946 the original monograph was reprinted in book form with minor additions and alterations by the author. American geographers were, and still are, given to frequent discussions of the nature and scope of their field. As the most comprehensive analysis of the subject in English, the monograph helped to give us perspective in the light of European concepts, particularly those of Ritter, Humboldt, Ratzel, and Hettner, and became the credo of the postwar generation of graduate students in Anglo-America.

Although the new book cannot replace the earlier work because it does not duplicate the exhaustive treatment contained therein, it expresses briefly and in a more affirmative manner a logical framework of geographic investigation and scholarship. It brings together references to subsequent writings in the English, French, and German languages, and takes cognizance of more recent thinking. In view of the present rapprochement between Russian and Western scholars and scientists, the paucity of references to the literature in Slavic languages and the lack of discussion of Russian geography might be considered a deficiency.

Consideration is given to ten basic questions, each of which forms a theme of a chapter: "What Is Meant by Geography as the Study of Areal Differentiation?" "What Is Meant by the 'Earth Surface'?" "Is the Integration of Heterogeneous Phenomena a Peculiarity of Geography?" "What Is the Measure of 'Significance' in Geography?" "Must We Distinguish between Human and Natural Factors?" "The Dualism of Physical and Human Geography," "Time and Genesis in Geography," "Is Geography Divided between 'System-

atic' and 'Regional' Geography?" "Does Geography Seek to Formulate Scientific Laws or to Describe Individual Cases?" and "The Place of Geography in a Classification of the Sciences."

In this, as in the earlier work, the author's endeavor is to report and document the concepts of the field found valid by others in Europe and America. Yet I detect a somewhat stronger expression of his personal views, particularly in regard to the place of genetic geomorphology (pp. 93-96), which is likely to arouse adverse criticism on both sides of the Atlantic. Anyone who seeks in this volume a set of final conclusions to end all arguments will be disappointed. No methodology should be considered complete.

Few will doubt, however, that many fundamental issues have been resolved and many illusions dispelled, including the notion that geography is an offshoot of geology despite the nurturing it received from geology in American colleges and universities during the early twentieth century. The value of Hartshorne's labor will be evident if it promotes general agreement among geographers and releases their energies for substantive studies built in an organized system.

JOHN E. BRUSH

Professor of Geography
Rutgers, The State University

F. ERNEST JOHNSON and J. EMORY ACKERMAN. *The Church as Employer, Money Raiser, and Investor*. (Series on the Economics and Ethics of Society.) Pp. xvi, 184. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. \$4.00.

Two competent authorities, clergymen skilled in social research techniques including questionnaires and statistical tabulations, present a reasonable although not exhaustive interpretation of the relation of American Protestant churches to the current economic picture. They ask: do religious groups live up to the accepted standards of corporate practice, and should they apply even stricter standards to themselves? Often the evaluation favors the churches; lags and inconsistencies seem due to inadequate funds or lack of acquaint-

ance with business and financial techniques.

Investigation reveals that some nine well-established denominations have higher salaries than do the smaller sects. Including allowances for house rent and car, three denominations average more than \$6,000; six others about one thousand dollars less. As a rule, the larger the community and plant, the higher the salary. Even the best averages are judged inadequate for the proper support of a family with children. Major agencies, like national denominational boards and the National Council of Churches, have better salary scales and fringe benefits. Pension systems, reinforced by social security, although insufficient are improving. The income of pastors is higher than that of directors of religious education, parish workers, office secretaries, and sextons, whose remuneration drops in that sequence.

The securing of funds, with or without the aid of professional money-raising organizations, is too commonly based upon excessive promises and directed toward givers motivated by forces other than purely dedicated stewardship. Ownership and investment practices approximate those of the business world, at times applied skillfully through the counsel and service of devoted laymen, but frequently based upon expediency rather than principle.

The authors consider that conditions are improving in regard to self-examination and effectiveness. They suggest further application of approved personnel practices such as job classification, racial integration, equal pay for women, and better provisions for illness, health, and vacations. They conclude with the caveat that the more the churches succeed in the realm of business and finance, the more they may take on the color of their secular environment. It would seem then to be the concern of sensitive Christians to lead rather than conform or follow, to strengthen the spiritual power of the churches, and to make their character and mission more visibly moral and socially beneficial.

EARL CRANSTON

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AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY

MAX BELOFF. *The American Federal Government*. Pp. vii, 213. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959. \$4.50.

Professor Beloff set himself "in this book only a limited task: to give an account of the general principles of American government and of the manner in which it functions from the point of view of non-Americans, whose main concern is naturally with those aspects of American institutions and policies that affect the outside world." His viewpoint is necessarily that of the British subject, firmly committed to "responsible government" by a cabinet accountable to parliament. His critique of American government is couched in British terms. It might have started a debate about the relative merits of the two systems, if the late Harold J. Laski and Don K. Price had not pre-empted that field.

The book seems to have been meant as another in the series of European commentaries upon the United States, to which the contributions of De Tocqueville and Bryce have been the most distinguished ones. It impressed this reviewer more as a primer on American government for literate Britons. The core chapters deal with the Constitution, the President, the Administration, the Congress, and the parties. They do so at equal length, except for the Administration, to which more space and criticisms are offered. Mr. Beloff is especially unhappy about the Civil and Foreign Services. The latter "is forced in its recruitment to accept Congress' prejudices in favor of a spread by region, which may not necessarily correspond to the distribution of the universities and colleges most likely to turn out the best candidates." This overlooks the nationwide recruitment of students by these universities. And it is simply not true "that the highest posts are barred to the career man. . . ."

The conclusion favors constitutional reform. Of this, Mr. Beloff writes: "Where those relatively qualified to speak have been silent, it is not for the foreign student to make himself heard." Before the reader can applaud this thought, he continues:

"But he cannot help seeing the United States as the extreme case of the common fate of modern governments in being unable to cope effectively with the ever growing burden of day-to-day responsibilities, and in being forced to postpone or neglect important decisions of principle, including the shape of government itself." The merit of this book is directly related to the irrelevance of the conclusion to its core. However, on the whole, it presents an informed and balanced view of American federal government.

HERBERT JOHN SPIRO

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Harvard University

RICHARD F. FENNO, JR. *The President's Cabinet: An Analysis in the Period from Wilson to Eisenhower*. (Harvard Political Studies.) Pp. xii, 327. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press under the direction of the Department of Government, 1959. \$5.50.

Several approaches might be followed in studying as unmanageable and desultory an institution as the President's cabinet. A purely chronological one would be of interest to the historian, a purely analytical one to the political scientist. Mr. Fenno, in his study of that body from Wilson to Eisenhower, has managed to incorporate both with results of interest to both and by keeping his style relatively free from professional jargon has provided a study of value to anyone interested in American politics.

Beginning with a discussion of cabinets in general, "A cabinet originates in the universal need on the part of any single Chief Executive to consult with others and draw upon the advice of others in exercising his political power. It persists as an aid to intelligent and informed decision making," Mr. Fenno proceeds to analyze the appointment process, cabinet meetings, inter-cabinet and interdepartmental co-operation during and outside of formal meeting, the relation of the cabinet to the President, Congress, political parties, and pressure groups and concludes with a contemplative discussion of a series of proposals for and attempts at cabinet reform.

In all instances, he draws on examples over the last forty-five years for generalizations and conclusions.

And his conclusions are sane and perceptive. Generally they are that the cabinet is and ought to be an agency flexible enough to serve the best interests of the President in a variety of fashions. This, however, makes specific obligations vague, and Mr. Fenno makes clear that those obligations are not fixed or formal and can and have changed with individual Presidents and diverse cabinet personalities. Certain Presidents, for example, have expected their cabinets to serve as policy-making bodies. Harding felt his team of "best minds" could make up for his own inadequacies and chart an intelligent course for the nation. Hoover, on the other hand, made his own decisions, and Franklin Roosevelt used advice when it suited his general purposes and rejected it when it did not. But policy making is only one function. The cabinet is also a vital sounding board of public opinion, with different members responding to different sources of such opinion, and a popular member, popular that is with his particular "constituency," often serves admirably to draw support to the President. Here however lies a paradox. To be most useful the member must have non-Presidential "public" prestige, party following, legislative support, or roots of influence in his own department. And this means the member operates, not as part of the formal body but independently, and frequently means that he operates to get for his supporters the bigger piece of the pie before a fellow member moves in to do the same for his. In this sense the political help which the President receives comes not from the group but from individual members operating quite outside the group and often with ferocious individualism.

However, although Mr. Fenno discusses at length the problems of "departmentalism," he does not decry it too vigorously. On the contrary, he generally takes a dim view of proposals to formalize and institutionalize the cabinet and force it to work as a team. In this regard his discussion of the Eisenhower Secretariat approach is of interest. However, again, his analysis of

this experiment is properly detached. In some respects it has worked for Eisenhower, yet, as Mr. Fenno states: "one should remain reluctant to prescribe it or any other specific reform as the solution to the President's problems, lest a rigid prescription or an over-institutionalization of the means defeat the very ends of executive leadership."

In all, then, the cabinet is a vital part of American political life, not perfect nor even valuable in many instances but potentially very useful and well worth keeping in its "unreformed" status for just this reason.

PAUL L. MURPHY

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LEWIS MAYERS. *Shall We Amend the Fifth Amendment?* Pp. x, 341. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. \$5.00.

Until the last decade, the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution was chiefly known for its double jeopardy and due process clauses. Buried in its verbiage was a fifteen-word phrase—"No person . . . shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself"—about which most Americans then knew little or nothing. Yet today there is probably no constitutional provision that is more notorious than this so-called "privilege against self-incrimination."

Now Professor Lewis Mayers, long a fixture in the law department of New York's City College, has joined the growing ranks of the Fifth Amendment's detractors. This book, *Shall We Amend the Fifth Amendment?*, is the last of three significant recent books on the privilege. The first two, Dean Erwin Griswold's *The Fifth Amendment Today* and Professor Sidney Hook's *Common Sense and the Fifth Amendment*, were clearly inspired by the use or misuse of the privilege before congressional investigating committees and were mainly concerned with the inferences to be drawn from its invocation. Curiously enough, Professor Mayers' critical book, which is incomparably more comprehensive than its predecessors, not only defends the right of all witnesses except public officers to plead the Fifth Amend-

ment before these committees but even recommends its further liberalization. His opposition stems from what he considers its harmful effects insofar as law enforcement is concerned, an area in which legislative committees play little part.

His attack on the privilege is on two levels: its use by criminal suspects during preliminary interrogations by police, magistrates, and grand juries; and by nonimplicated witnesses in the trials themselves. In both cases, he advocates its outright abolition provided the prosecution is prohibited from offering the compelled testimony in evidence at any subsequent trial of the witness in question. He urges this approach to the abrogation of a constitutional right as a proper balance between the needs of law enforcement on the one hand and the individual's civil liberties on the other.

It is a constitutional necessity that even sacrosanct First Amendment rights must occasionally yield to compelling necessity. But Professor Mayers has not convinced me that lawlessness has reached the point where it can only be controlled by the destruction of fundamental rights. And the abolition of the privilege cannot be justified by the granting of a limited immunity which can never be as broad as the right it replaces. All he offers is the proposal that the compelled testimony cannot be used later against the witness. But there is nothing to prevent the prosecutor from utilizing the information gleaned from it to build a substantial case against the testifier. Mayers' suggestion is clearly unconstitutional, and as he somewhat querulously points out, today's Supreme Court would quickly invalidate any federal or state legislation incorporating his panacea.

It is not easy to sit still when Dave Beck stands on his constitutional rights and refuses to concede the paternity of his own son. Admittedly, it is exasperating, time-consuming, costly, and often even fruitless to force those responsible for the administration of justice to rely on secondary evidence because material witnesses sit smugly silent. But it is still better, even at the expense of some dead-end investigations or unfortunate acquittals, to retain these dif-

ferences in coloration that mark us from the totalitarian states. Jerome Frank saw this more clearly than Professor Mayers seems to when he wrote "Before we . . . sacrifice all our other values to effective law enforcement, we should reflect on the brutal consequences of the totalitarians' alleged efficiency in pursuing suspected criminals."

WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER

Associate Professor of Law
New York University Law School

RICHARD H. LEACH and REDDING S. SUGG, JR. *The Administration of Interstate Compacts*. Pp. vi, 256. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1959. \$4.50.

This book breaks new ground in the field of public administration, being the first comprehensive attempt at an appraisal of the organization, staffing, and practices of interstate compact agencies. It is the outgrowth of a project begun while the authors were staff members of the Southern Regional Education Board, an interstate compact agency established in 1949 and operating with notable success in the southern states from Maryland to Texas.

The authors have produced a well-written and readable book, without excessive details or extraneous matter. They have summarized the development of interstate agencies under the compact clause, discussed the relations of interstate compact agencies with state and federal governments, analyzed the powers and personnel of interstate bodies, and treated the staffing and operations of these bodies at some length. They have selected six interstate agencies—the Pecos River Commission, the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, the Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission, the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, the Interstate Oil Compact Commission, and the Southern Regional Education Board—for special case studies. Finally, they have added some interesting conclusions and predictions about interstate compact agencies, and they have commented helpfully in a bibliographical note on available reports and other materials.

In discussing the development of interstate compact agencies, the authors point out that these agencies have been used to any extent during the past forty years only, more particularly since World War II, that they now provide "a new dimension for state power," and that "they permit the states to take continuing cooperative action in fields where they cannot act effectively or do not wish to act alone, fields which might fall by default to the federal power if not occupied through the initiative of the states." Of more than sixty interstate compact agencies established in recent years, thirty have set up administrative facilities to carry on their work and consequently are the ones which the authors have chosen to discuss. In all cases, these compact agencies are identified administratively with the states they represent rather than with the federal government.

While the idea of interstate compacts is as old as the federal constitution, the authors observe that the use of such compacts is still too new for any well-defined relationship to have developed between the states involved and the compact agencies themselves. But they think that the point has been reached where it is apparent now that the compact agencies can do new kinds of work hitherto inhibited to the states on account of "their adventitious physical and administrative boundaries." And the success of such agencies, they find, depends directly upon the ability and continuity of the staffs recruited by these agencies to carry on their work.

Sparked by the general attitude of the Eisenhower administration and the findings of the Kestnbaum Commission, there is currently renewed emphasis on the position and powers of the states in the federal union. So the authors conclude that "interstate compact agencies can play a tremendous role in the states' resumption of power."

A. E. BUCK

Norwalk, Connecticut

MRS. THEODORE ROOSEVELT, JR. *Day Before Yesterday: The Reminiscences of Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.* Pp. 478. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1959. \$5.95.

Although Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., nee Eleanor Alexander, has previously been largely unknown to students of the American scene, she should now gain her richly deserved place as one of America's great ladies of the twentieth century. This book, which is, first of all, a generous, unselfish autobiography, approaches the status of a biography of Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., the author's distinguished husband. Here for the first time are revealed many interesting anecdotes of the "off season" Roosevelts, as they are termed.

Theodore Roosevelt is mentioned, but this is not a book about him. Nor does it treat to any appreciable degree the life of Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt or of the author's well-known sister-in-law, Alice Roosevelt. Indeed, when the author ushers her in-laws into her fascinating narrative, it is the brothers of her husband who are introduced. Most of the information about Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.'s brothers is connected with their gallant records in military service during World War I. From her position as an employee of the Young Men's Christian Association (Y.M.C.A.) in France in 1917-1918, Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. has told of a most unusual segment of her life.

This book gives the American public an excellent example of how partisan politics sometimes intervenes in war activity. Woodrow Wilson refused to permit Theodore Roosevelt to lead a division to France during World War I. That fact has been widely known but not so well known was the order issued during World War II, apparently by the Commander-in-Chief, Franklin Roosevelt, that in all reports of heroic feats performed by Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. or by his son, Quentin, the name of the Roosevelt in charge was to be deleted from all information sent to the United States. Although both father and son were recognized by foreign governments for meritorious service, not one word of this heroic military action was known in America. Only after Theodore Roosevelt died in France in July, 1944, was publicity given by his country to his distinguished military career during World War II. He was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor posthumously.

Notice of

ANNUAL BUSINESS MEETING

of the members of
**The American Acad-
emy of Political and
Social Science**

In accordance with the by-laws of the Academy, the Annual Business Meeting of the members will be held on Monday, February 8, 1960, at 2:00 P.M., at the offices of the Academy, 3937 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, Pa.

The Annual Report of the Board of Directors will be presented, directors elected, and other important business transacted.

James C. Charlesworth
President

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Not all of the author's life, nor that of her husband, was consumed in military action. For several years Theodore was Governor of Puerto Rico and following that he was Governor General of the Philippine Islands. In both areas, the author reports the career of her husband as an efficient colonial administrator. She also weaves into her story much interesting material about herself and her children.

Another significant phase of Mrs. Roosevelt's life was spent in accompanying her husband to Asia on hunting trips for the Field Museum of Natural History. This accomplished lady proved herself to be an excellent rifle shot and a good companion on a safari.

From helping to organize the American Legion in 1919, Theodore entered politics. As Assistant Secretary of the Navy in 1921, he played a significant role in the Washington Disarmament Conference. Although Roosevelt was almost brushed by the Tea Pot Dome Scandal, he emerged without stain to run for governor of New York in 1924. Defeated by Al Smith, Theodore, assisted by his devoted wife, found another outlet for his boundless energy.

This well-written and informative book will be read with delight by many people. It records the life of a warm and wonderful family. At the same time, it evokes the history of the last half-century with great grace and charm.

GEORGE C. OSBORN
Professor of Social Sciences
University of Florida

HARRY V. JAFFA. *Crisis of the House Divided: An Interpretation of the Issues in the Lincoln-Douglas Debates*. Pp. 451. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1959. \$6.50.

Professor Harry Jaffa, a political scientist, has written an important book about one of the great episodes in the history of the sectional controversy, the Lincoln-Douglas debates. To evaluate or even to discuss the book is a difficult task. It is a deeply thoughtful work and at times a tedious one. It is at once profoundly philosophical and ponderously pretentious.

It is also a very angry book. The author lashes out constantly against the views of such writers as Avery Craven, Richard Hofstadter, George Fort Milton, Allan Nevins, Charles W. Ramsdell, J. G. Randall, and T. Harry Williams. This is a distinguished list, but Professor Jaffa has every right to differ with these scholars; indeed, on many scores his criticisms are justified. But like so many writers who want to prove that everybody else is wrong, he sometimes gets carried away by the exuberance of his opinions and voices too extreme statements.

The principal targets of Professor Jaffa's thrusts are the so-called "revisionists" and particularly the leader of that school, J. G. Randall. In brief, the revisionist view was that the Civil War was not the product of slavery or of any fundamental cause, that it was artificial and brought about by a fanaticism, mainly Northern in origin, that ignored realities, and that it could have been avoided if the politicians had acted more responsibly. It so happens that I agree with many of Professor Jaffa's strictures on the revisionists. He has performed a service by calling attention, even if too bitterly, to their errors. But he does not see that the revisionists were influenced by the intellectual currents of their time, as all historians are, as he himself is influenced by certain concepts of our own day. He rightly finds more principle, more idealism, more consistency in the antislavery movement than previous writers—but he finds too much.

Professor Jaffa's thesis is too complex to explain in a short space. Briefly, he examines Lincoln's early thought, especially as expressed in the Lyceum and Temperance addresses, and finds therein a depth and duality not previously appreciated. In expounding Lincoln's arguments in the famous debates, he properly emphasizes Lincoln's devotion to the principle of equality, and he has some sensible things to say about the meaning of equality in the American ethic. This part of the book is excellent and should be read and pondered by every serious student, regardless of whether he agrees with the author's argument. It breaks new ground and opens a

new view of Lincoln's significance as a political thinker.

Of one of Professor Jaffa's criticisms of historical writing, I can speak with direct knowledge. He attacks me for saying that Lincoln held the Negro to be inferior and that the superior whites would always oppress the blacks. On the first point, he complains that I do not specify in what way Lincoln thought the Negro was inferior or how long the inferiority would last. Lincoln himself probably could not have defined his feelings on this issue exactly. On the second, Professor Jaffa argues that Lincoln said only that one race or the other would do the oppressing. It is obvious, I think, that Lincoln felt if any oppressing was done the whites would do it. Of course, he did not say, nor did I so report him, that one race would always oppress the other; he was talking about prospects in the foreseeable future. Professor Jaffa is correct in saying that Lincoln's racial ideas have been the subject of some "loose" scholarship. They may now become the victim of some dogmatic moralizing.

T. HARRY WILLIAMS
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JOHN R. CUNEO. *Robert Rogers of the Rangers*. Pp. xii, 308. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959. \$6.00.

Few figures of any real importance in our eighteenth century have been so ignored by historians as has Robert Rogers of the Rangers. This does not mean to say that he is unknown. Kenneth Roberts' novel, with the resultant movie and television programs, have made "Rogers of the Rangers" almost a household word. The reputation of Robert Rogers has been swollen by legend and festered by prejudice. Until the present volume, however, there has been almost no attempt at serious and thorough research into the facts behind the legend.

That Robert Rogers deserves the attention of a serious and competent biographer cannot be challenged. Rogers volunteered to fight against the Indians at fourteen; at twenty-four he became a scout for Sir

William Johnson, on the shores of Lake George. There followed many gallant forays against the French and Indians; the dramatic destruction of the St. Francis Indians; the generally unsuccessful but glamorous expeditions into the West. Rogers won generous and powerful support in England, wrote and published volumes that were critically acclaimed, organized and commanded battalions of scouts and rangers, demonstrated the possession of military intelligence and insight of a high order, and married a beautiful and socially prominent girl.

Rogers also failed in business, contracted heavy debts, provoked the bitter animosity of such important men as Sir William Johnson and General Gage. Unjustly and maliciously accused of treason, he was acquitted only to find his career blasted. Years in debtors' prison were followed by permanent separation from his family, a lack of conviction during the American Revolution, and a final decade or more in England that was marked by debauchery and failure. As a gallant figure in the final English wars for possession of North America, as an untutored New Hampshire farm boy who demonstrated great courage, leadership, and military insight but almost no ability to adjust to civilian life, Rogers warrants attention, analysis, and understanding.

Mr. Cuneo, a Connecticut lawyer, has devoted many years and amazing perseverance to the difficult task of separating myth from fact and of identifying motives. His Chapter Notes are provocative and inspire confidence, and complete documentation, we are told, is available. His style is lucid and even brilliant, and his understanding of the complex Rogers and his frequently confused and complicated background, is unusual. Some scholars may feel that Mr. Cuneo has been too severe on Johnson and Gage; the fact remains that for the first time a brave and colorful soldier has found an adequate interpreter.

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EUROPE

WILLIAM DIEBOLD, JR. *The Schuman Plan: A Study in Economic Cooperation 1950-1959*. Pp. xviii, 750. New York: Frederick A. Praeger for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1959. \$6.50.

An incredibly large literature has been produced on the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) since its formation in 1951. However, it is gratifying to say that the stout volume under notice is not just another addition to the studies. It is a major scholarly work on the ECSC during its period of transition to one of the institutions of the wider European economic integration—the European Economic Community.

The Coal and Steel Community derives from the Schuman Plan, proposed in May 1950, which had both a political objective and an economic purpose: to make war between France and Germany "not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible" by placing their entire production of coal and steel under a common organization open to other countries and developing a free trade market for these two basic economic sectors. It was established by the Treaty of April 18, 1951, that integrated the coal and steel industries of Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Mr. William Diebold, Jr., who is Director of Economic Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, here presents the most substantial appraisal of the achievements of the ECSC and of the problems that it still faces that has so far appeared. The product of seven years of intensive research in documentary materials and interviews with leading Community officials and industrialists in Europe and the United States, it is likely to become the standard text on the subject in the English language.

In the four parts into which the book is divided Diebold discusses the background of the Schuman Plan and the developments that led to the ratification of the Treaty which came into force on July 25, 1952; examines the effort in the six member-countries to put the Treaty into practice by opening the common market for coal,

iron ore, steel, and scrap among them and the Community's experience with transportation rates, subsidies, taxes, prices, investments, cartels, and labor; analyzes the relationships of the ECSC with external areas and American interests and policies toward the Community; and offers an evaluation of the institution in terms of "its economic impact, what it has meant to each participating country and to outsiders, the character of the coal and steel economy that has emerged, the kind of entity the Community has turned out to be, its relation to other measures of European integration and the consequences of 'partial integration.'" In a final chapter on "The Future of the Community" he attempts to clarify some questions that the ECSC will have to face and "to post a few markers by which the future course of the Community may be gauged."

The picture of the Coal and Steel Community which emerges from Diebold's elaborate study is that of a vital, functioning organization which has effected major accomplishments but has achieved only partially the task of integration. The common market for coal and steel is a reality. The Community has abolished barriers to trade in coal and steel; has progressively eliminated aids and subsidies and ended discrimination in prices and transportation rates; has subjected cartels, mergers, and investments to international regulation; has borrowed in the money markets of Europe and America where its credit is firmly established; and has developed new relations with governments, employers, and labor. Although problems of production, technology, and stability in the two sectors await solution, "The Community is now a part of the political and social furniture of Western Europe, one of the realities of its coal and steel economy." It "has changed Europe simply by existing. By surviving through its transitional period the Community proved itself something more than a good idea, a new hope, the latest expression of an ideal to which many had long paid homage. That so old a dream should have taken on institutional form, with organization, procedures, a daily routine of problems and activities, is itself the main fact

about the Schuman Plan and a major statement about Europe of the 1950's."

ARTHUR LEON HORNIKER
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TIBOR MERAY. *Thirteen Days That Shook the Kremlin*. Translated by Howard L. Katzander. Pp. vi, 290. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. \$5.00.

Behind the dramatic cliché of the title there lies a serious and sober account of one of the most significant turning points of recent Central and Eastern European history. The subtitle of the book, "Imre Nagy and the Hungarian Revolution," must be closely considered by the interested reader since Meray's account is in reality a brilliant combination of the events of the short-lived Hungarian revolt of October-November 1956 and of a full-fledged biography of Mr. Nagy, Prime Minister of the country for those few exciting days.

Tibor Meray is obviously qualified for this delicate assignment. An outstanding writer and literary figure, he was once greatly favored by the communist regime of his native country, but later became a major protagonist in the revolution and finally was forced to flee to Paris where he is now living. His book is a microscopic—often far too detailed and technical for the nonspecialist reader—account of the bitter fighting within the ruling circles of the Hungarian Workers' party during the "New Course" period preceding the revolt. Imre Nagy emerges from these sordid and frightening struggles as an honest, serious, and sincere man, a lifelong communist with certain deep-seated convictions and scholarly interests. Unhappily he was also a clumsy tactician, an irresolute administrator, and a mediocre student of human nature. When forceful and aggressive leadership was required, Nagy missed the historical requirements of the moment, withdrew into himself, and by his irresolute bungling generally disappointed even his closest friends and collaborators.

Meray's book has several shrewd and significant "asides," in addition to presenting a plastic and reliable portrayal of Imre Nagy. He reports that the strong United Nations resolution against the deportations

of Hungarian youth had "succeeded in making an impression, the deportations having thereby been stopped" (p. 250). He also correctly stresses the steadily increasing influence of the Chinese Communist leadership in demanding a share of the decision-making process in the affairs of international communism. "The influence of Mao Tse-Tung and his friends had increased, their words carrying more and more weight" (p. 262 *et seq.*).

On the whole, although one might disagree with some of the author's editorial remarks and judgments of individual personalities on the Hungarian scene, he presents a valuable insight into Eastern European politics. This book will be indispensable for the student and the general reader alike.

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ISAAC DEUTSCHER. *The Prophet Unarmed, Trotsky: 1921-1929*. Pp. xii, 490. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959. \$9.50.

With the present volume Mr. Deutscher has passed the halfway mark in an ambitious effort to tell the story of the Bolshevik Revolution in biographical-ideological histories of its principal actors: Stalin, Trotsky, and Lenin. He has completed his life of Stalin in two volumes. For Trotsky he is taking three, of which this is the second. Lenin is yet to come.

The first Trotsky volume, *The Prophet Armed*, carried the story from the latter's birth to that moment in 1921 when, as Commissar of War, he had just brought the Civil War to a victorious conclusion. At that moment he was at the height of his power and glory. The present work shows the "Prophet" unarmed, thwarted in his efforts to turn his talents to economic and political reconstruction, stripped of his badges of glory, and covered with badges of infamy and dishonor. It ends in 1929, with the "Prophet" expelled by the Party he helped to bring to power, deported by the government of which he was a founder, exiled from the land in which he was born to the limbo of the West.

The tragedy is told with great literary skill, with complete mastery of the documentary sources, always limited to Bolshevik documents, acquaintance with the intricacies of Bolshevik controversy, a deep understanding of most of the major and minor personages involved, with the notable exception of Bukharin, and, of course, no understanding for non-Bolsheviks. Since Mr. Deutscher was once an organized Trotskyist and is still an ardent admirer of his protagonist, he has shown an uncommon knowledge of what goes on within Trotsky's spirit.

Sometimes his admiration of Trotsky leads to uncritical absurdities. Thus this arrogant, dictatorial, and authoritarian man is declared to have been "almost equally sensitive to the claims of authority and freedom." He was sensitive only to authority as long as he exercised it, and to freedom—strictly limited to Communists—when he was forced into opposition. So, too, Mr. Deutscher proclaims his hero to have been "Russia's chief intellectual inspirer and literary critic in the twenties," then admiringly cites some monstrously cruel and insensitive remarks on poets like Blok, Gippius, and Biely, and his preference for "the very last louse on the most uncouth of our bagman-speculators" to the intellectuals who neither glorify nor oppose the regime but seek refuge in "in inner immigration" of their own thoughts and private creation.

The most interesting feature of the present volume is its ambivalence towards Trotsky's tragedy. Mr. Deutscher's admiration serves him well as biographer, but the ideological prepossessions he shares with both Trotsky and Stalin and, of course, with Lenin make him steer the tragedy towards a "happy ending." Defeated, expropriated of his program, slandered, expelled, deported, in the next volume to be murdered, yet . . . "Trotsky was the authentic inspirer and prompter of the second revolution of which Stalin was to be the practical manager." Now, under Khrushchev, according to the author, Trotsky is beginning to come into his own, a sort of macabre resurrection. "I see him as the representative figure of pre-Stalinist communism and the precursor of post-

Stalinist communism." But the ruthless work of Trotsky's great and cruel antagonist was "the *sine qua non* for the ultimate fulfillment of the revolution's promise." It remains only to note that, for Deutscher, that promise includes not only a utopia in Russia but a winning of the world for the same blueprint, amended only by some touches derived from the benefit of hindsight and some traces of the utopian expectations of pre-Bolshevik Marxism.

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STANLEY W. PAGE. *Lenin and World Revolution*. Pp. xviii, 252. New York: New York University Press, 1959. \$5.00.

Stanley Page's *Lenin and World Revolution* differs from most other studies of Lenin in the degree to which it emphasizes insatiable personal ambition as being the sole dominant motive of Lenin's whole political career. While this motive was rather unconvincingly disguised as political evangelism and care for the oppressed, it did not make him any less sincere a disciple of Karl Marx, whom indeed he closely resembled in the temporary use which he made of individuals, and whom he later disowned as soon as they started to endanger his determination to maintain supreme command.

Lenin's constant aspiration to international, rather than Russian, proletarian leadership, his seizure of power in 1917, his peculiar relations with Trotsky, his policy towards Germany during and after the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, his interest in stirring up the Asian countries, are all studied and revalued in the special light of Mr. Page's thesis.

There is a reasonable case for giving more encouragement to an approach which does not pander to the prevalent hero worship of temporary political success, built up by Lenin's admirers, still less to the myth that he embodied some inevitable forward movement of historical destiny. Lenin's concern for training chosen Asians to become anti-Western national socialists, under Russian control, is shown by his establishment in Moscow as early as 1920 of a so-called "Institute for Eastern Studies." These and other aspects of Lenin, referred

to in this book, have not always received the attention which they deserve.

RICHARD HARE

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EDGAR MCINNIS. *The Atlantic Triangle and the Cold War*. Pp. viii, 163. Toronto: University of Toronto Press under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1959. \$4.50.

Edgar McInnis has performed a remarkable service through his concisely and brilliantly written monograph, entitled: *The Atlantic Triangle and the Cold War*. According to the author, the Atlantic Triangle—United States, United Kingdom and Canada—is the "fundamental bone structure" of the western alliance, though he does not disparage the important roles played by France and West Germany.

Within the Atlantic Triangle, the United States must be the "leading and at times the decisive element," while both Britain and Canada recognize their "primary national interest is harmony" with the United States.

The author's thesis, very simply stated, is "to hold the line against the threat of aggression by force" and to "consolidate the unity of the non-communist world on a broad basis of social and economic advance." He is deeply concerned that the Atlantic Triangle has not, as yet, "evolved a global strategy" to effectively deal with "global interests."

McInnis, who is President of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, advocates the basic requirement of military deterrence. Yet, he weakens another wise, sound military analysis by equivocation. On the one hand, he submits that "limited war remains a very real possibility," and, on the other side, declares that "both parties may be involved in a competition of increasing destructiveness whose end is unlimited war," thereby accepting the P. M. S. Blackett thesis.

Moreover, on the crucial German question, McInnis argues persuasively for the "continued presence of American troops" as a tangible assurance to our European Allies, and yet he suggests a policy of "disengagement" even to the point of acceptance of the Rapacki Plan.

In the economic arena, the author is on more solid ground, with the recommendation that the West must go beyond normal commercial contacts with the Afro-Asian nations and "become a major source of economic and technical aid." Yet, he is realist enough to advocate political strings by the West "as a lever to bring about the kind of [internal] changes that are needed if aid is to make the optimum contribution to economic and social improvement."

Several other pronouncements by McInnis lend interest to this authoritative little volume, such as the differences within the Atlantic Triangle over the Red China question and over the validity of the "northern tier" policy of the Bagdad Pact. All sober analysts, who are not fearful of facing the inevitable dilemmas that confront a coalition of nations, even though bound by a unity of purpose, should read this instructive monograph.

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HENRY PELLING. *The British Communist Party: A Historical Profile*. Pp. viii, 204. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959. \$3.75.

The British Communist party has known little but frustration and failure. In the late 1940's, Communist influence in some important British trade unions reached dangerous proportions, but it began to crumble as soon as the situation became generally recognized. Otherwise, the Communists' main achievements have been negative and unintentional: their existence provided an excuse for those who wanted to maintain the diplomatic isolation of the Soviet state in the 1920's; they also helped, by their clumsy attempts, to infiltrate the Labor party, to keep that party unshakably loyal to democratic practice and the parliamentary system even when, as in 1919-20, 1926, or 1931, there was some temptation to abandon these restraints.

Mr. Pelling's book is admirably straightforward and unpretentious. There is no attempt to inflate the feeble British party into something of universal importance. The author is well aware of the ironies, often grotesque, in which the party's his-

tory abounds. The vanguard of the proletariat achieved even the relative successes of the later 1930's only by enrolling a coterie of bourgeois intellectuals; as a party that was ever ready to sacrifice both principle and consistency for the sake of power it never managed to capture more than two parliamentary seats at a time. But Mr. Pelling wastes no time on preaching or polemic; the style throughout is economical and clear. Sometimes it is brilliantly succinct, as in the account of the Comintern's demise (pp. 121-124), or the paragraph about the self-deception of Communist intellectuals (p. 105).

A book of this size, written mainly from published sources and with an almost austere self-restraint, cannot answer all our questions about communism in Britain. To say that the party failed because "throughout the whole period, the British people have never been in a revolutionary mood" (p. 182), is perhaps not so much an explanation as it is a rephrasing of the central problem. But it would be unfair to charge Mr. Pelling with failing to provide the last word on his subject; this was plainly not his intention. *The British Communist Party: A Historical Profile* is a very useful book, the more so for being carefully and attractively produced at a comparatively sane price.

RICHARD W. LYMAN

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LORD BEVERIDGE. *A Defence of Free Learning*. Pp. xiv, 146. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959. \$2.90.

In March 1933, the author was in a Vienna cafe when the evening paper was brought in giving the names of a dozen leading German professors dismissed by the Nazi regime on racial or political grounds. He returned immediately to the London School of Economics, of which he was at that time director, to organize an effective answer to Hitler's attack on scholars. "On my way home from Vienna, I had my first intimation of what terror may mean to the individual when justice has become the will of a sadistic tyrant. There travelled with me a German professor slightly known to

me, not one of those already listed for dismissal but one who might be on a new list. He was in a state of panic all the way because in the next compartment was a youth, little more than a boy, whom he took for a Nazi agent, detailed to keep watch on him and hand him to the police. My friend's fears may have been imaginary, but his panic was real."

By May of that same year the Academic Assistance Council had come into being, because of the spontaneous and emphatic reaction in British universities to Hitler's racial policy. John Maynard Keynes was among the first to contribute. Under the stimulation and guidance of Lord Beveridge, the Council became something of a specialized labor exchange, always putting displaced scholars into contact with universities. Originally conceived as a temporary body to deal with a temporary persecution, the Council in 1938 became the more permanent Society for Protection of Science and Learning, as its founders realized that persecution, in one form or another and in one country or another, was here to stay. Lord Beveridge, now president of the Society, has written the story in *A Defence of Free Learning* of British efforts in the last twenty-five years to alleviate that persecution. The book is less dramatic than its subject would indicate, being largely an organizational history of the Council and its successor, the Society. However, it comes as a relief to find a dispassionate account of an explosive topic. The vast majority of books dealing with Nazi racism, understandably but regrettably, give vent to an intense emotionalism which obscures, paradoxically, the true extent of the horror and tragedy involved. Lord Beveridge and the others who actively took up the Nazi challenge by defending "free learning"—actively, since, as he once remarked, "protests butter no parsnips"—performed a remarkable service, both to England and to the free world. His brief account is worth reading, if only to serve as a timely reminder of the relative values of western and totalitarian societies.

KENNETH HOLLAND

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LEO F. SOLT. *Saints in Arms: Puritanism and Democracy in Cromwell's Army*. (Studies in History, Economics and Political Science, XVIII.) Pp. 150. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959. \$4.00.

This small book has a large and complex theme, the relationship of Puritan theology to democratic thought. For some time the students of English constitutional history have looked to the seventeenth century for the origins of democratic ideas, and especially to the religious radicals of Cromwell's army. This interpretation has rested on the analogical extension of equality in the church to equality in the state. Somewhat sceptical of this, Professor Solt has re-examined it in the light of the polemical tracts and sermons of the chaplains in Cromwell's New Model Army, whom he treats as the official educators of the troops in both religion and politics. He selects for his study especially the writings of William Dell, John Saltmarsh, and Hugh Peters.

The author subjects the polemical tracts and sermons of the chaplains to a careful logical analysis. His several chapters set forth the polarities of such religious and political ideas as liberty and authority, unity and uniformity, separatism and millenarianism, grace and nature. The key to understanding seventeenth-century political thought, the author thinks, is the argument whether government should be by "good men or good laws, whether by grace or nature" (p. 4). From the study of the chaplains' Antinomian theology, Professor Solt concludes that they believed "in government by the saints" (p. 69). He finds no suggestion of the social contract in their thought. Because the chaplains did not hold the doctrine of universal salvation, he concludes, they could not have believed in equality within the state; because they did not hold to a specific form of church government, they could not have developed a specific form of political government; because they held millenarian views, they therefore favored an authoritarian government by the saints (p. 72).

The analytical method of deducing political systems from theological premises has its difficulties. It is difficult, indeed,

to deduce a system of thought from the sermons and tracts of men who were not systematic thinkers. The analysis of meaning hardly explains the power of the sermons which instilled a fighting spirit into Cromwell's soldiers. It may be just as useful to view Puritan theological ideas as social symbols which produce group and class solidarity, or as myths which defy analysis but which stir men's emotions and move them to act. Although Professor Solt's study is useful in pointing out the complex relationship of political and religious ideas, it will hardly put an end to the perennial debate over the origins of democracy and over the character of Puritanism.

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ARTHUR LAYTON FUNK. *Charles de Gaulle: The Crucial Years, 1943-1944*. Pp. xv, 336. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1959. \$5.00.

The two event-filled years between the fall of France in June 1940 and the invasion of North Africa in November 1942 are recounted in this book as the setting for De Gaulle's emergence as a political figure. The "crucial years" 1943-44 are then analyzed in terms of their most significant events—successive chapters dealing with the Casablanca Conference, formation of the French Committee of National Liberation, its recognition by the Anglo-Americans, the Liberation of France, and the installation in Paris.

The account has merits. The prose is fluent; the story engages our interest. Even the plot is clear—no small accomplishment with so varied an array of characters and events to be brought into orderly sequence. The book is thus a useful addition to the conventional history of international relations. It will be read with pleasure and profit by all concerned with the critical role of France in the Allied coalition during World War II.

The other commitment taken by Mr. Funk, however, is less well met. He offers us international history as the matrix for biography. As biography, however, the

book is sterile. Once again we are shown De Gaulle as Churchill's "cross of Lorraine" and Roosevelt's "unwilling bride." But this familiar clash of public personalities is not illuminated by insights or data of any explanatory value. The goal of this book is, as I understand it, to explain De Gaulle's triumphant rise to French leadership despite the latent and manifest hostility of the Allied leaders. What in De Gaulle appealed so powerfully to Frenchmen while alienating others? What inspired popular trust in him among the peoples of the Allied coalition while generating deep distrust among their leaders?

For clarification these complex questions require investigation of the relationship between power and personality in contemporary political life. Had Mr. Funk dealt successfully with these questions, he would surely have enlarged our understanding of the political malaise from which the West still suffers today. The route which led the Allied coalition from a conservative military strategy in World War II to a defensive political posture in the postwar years would have been clarified.

But Mr. Funk shows neither the range of interests nor the array of skills needed for this task. The concepts and techniques of inquiry which have brought individual personality and political behavior into a single research focus in recent years lie outside his ken. Accordingly, he is content to conclude his labors with the banal comment:

"Between 1940 and 1945, De Gaulle developed enormously from the unknown specialist in tank warfare to the statesman coping with international and domestic affairs; but in spite of a considerable and often unacknowledged diplomatic skill, he never acquired that magnanimity, that breadth of view, or that sense of humor which might have altered the tragic course of his career and rendered his achievement far greater than it was."

But the profound questions underlying this "tragic course"—a great achievement undermined by its own intrinsic limitations—are never confronted.

DANIEL LERNER

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ALEXANDER L. GEORGE. *Propaganda Analysis: A Study of Inferences Made from Nazi Propaganda in World War II*. Pp. xxii, 287. Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson and Company, 1959. \$6.00.

Several wartime agencies as well as the intelligence divisions of the Armed Services concerned themselves with foreign and especially enemy propaganda during World War II, but none did so as comprehensively and intensively as the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS) of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). To the Analysis Division it intrusted the task of examining all broadcasts and available newspapers for indications not only of the policies and purposes behind propaganda but also of the military and other intentions of the governments in question. The resulting inferences were circularized to the interested offices.

While the author has not undertaken the probably futile task of studying their influence upon the conduct of the war, Dr. George, a junior official in the Analysis Division and presently a member of the staff of the Rand Corporation, has checked the inferences relating to Nazi Germany with the voluminous but incomplete historical evidence in captured documents, memoirs, and interviews to determine their accuracy. The difficulties incurred in this endeavor prevented a completely reliable result, but he believes that the analysts were successful in more than 80 percent of their inferences. This record of achievement constitutes, in his view, a sound basis for the formulation of a rational technique of propaganda analysis, itself in large part the product of inferences since the wartime analysts rarely explained the reasoning behind their conclusions. The case was first developed in reports to the Air Force whose funds financed this investigation, and the present study was accepted by the University of Chicago as a doctoral dissertation.

In its essentials, this highly rationalized technique of propaganda analysis, whose complexities are not always clarified for the layman by the author's abstruse terminology, largely centers on a detailed breakdown of "the logic of the situation," a concept which he accepts too readily as

having the unreserved approval of historians. The final result is doubtless an advance over wartime procedures, but that it goes far towards transforming what he calls "intuitive art into science" is less certain. Unlike other intelligence methods, the reliability of its results can only be determined much later and in some instances only after the enemy's complete defeat as in the case of Germany.

E. MALCOLM CARROLL

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EARL R. BECK. *The Death of the Prussian Republic: A Study of Reich-Prussian Relations, 1932-1934*. (Florida State University Studies, 31.) Pp. x, 283. Tallahassee: Florida State University, 1959. \$6.00.

In this most interesting volume, Earl R. Beck, of Florida State University, makes an extensive comparison of what he calls the two Prussias. The old Prussia, with its *Kadavergehorsam*, Uhlan, and Junkers, dominated the politics of the German nation from 1871 to 1919. This was the militaristic, autocratic, authoritarian Prussia, epitomized in the iron-and-blood Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, and lauded by Hegel and the school of Prussian historiography.

But the second Prussia emerging in 1918, says Dr. Beck, was a republic, one of the eighteen states making up the Weimar Republic. The political leaders of this second Prussia—the Otto Brauns, the Heinrich Brünnings, the Carl Severings, the Wilhelm Marxs, the Joseph Wirths, and many others, sought zealously to transform democracy from vision into reality. These men, says the author, typify a tradition far more worthy of the name of Prussia than did Frederick William I, Bismarck, and von Hindenburg. They made the new Prussian government stable and efficient; they successfully countered communism on the left and Nazism on the right; they were the bulwark of the Weimar Republic.

This new Prussia died on July 20, 1932, when Chancellor Franz von Papen, utilizing the famed Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, the clause which gave emer-

gency power to the President, deposed the legal government of Prussia and took over control as "Reich Commissioner." From this time the Prussian Republic slid to its doom. Hitler enveloped it in even tighter federal controls and eventually throttled it. What might have been a leading democratic European state, a state that might have played a most important role in European history, died.

The author concludes with this hope: "May a new generation of German historians, those who are now searching the past with open and critical eyes, seek more their ideal among the little men of the day than among those who towered over the time by ruthless will and autocratic actions. The old Prussia of 'blood and iron' is dead. The Republic of Prussia still lives as an experience and a tradition from which a new republic and the new states that compose it may well draw strength and pride" (p. 220).

The author tells the story of the death of the Prussian Republic by unraveling the complicated strands of politics and legal actions of the period. Readers will be impressed by his painstaking documentation and by the care he has taken to substantiate his main thesis. Others will feel that he has underestimated the capacity and staying power of his first Prussia, which by no means was obliterated by Versailles. Still others will disagree with the author's conclusion that republican Prussia was "a bastion of democracy." Neither the liberal nor the democratic tradition, in the Western rationalistic rather than the Prussian sense, was given a chance in Prussia since 1848 and in Germany since 1871. Even today there are many who are wondering what will happen in West Germany once the "strong, sure, authoritarian-democratic hand" of Adenauer is gone.

LOUIS L. SNYDER

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JOACHIM REMAK. *Sarajevo: The Story of a Political Murder*. Pp. xv, 301. New York: Criterion Books, 1959. \$5.00.

Forty-five years after the assassination of the Austrian Archduke and his wife the

actual planners and their motives remain uncertain. For almost five decades suspicions have centered at one time or another upon the youthful assassins, Russia, Serbia, Austrian enemies of the Archduke, and countless other suspects, many simply products of hyperactive imaginations. This book, the latest recreation of the Sarajevo events, advances yet another point of view in an absorbing and adroitly written narrative that frequently takes on the air of the best in suspense fiction.

A history teacher at Lewis and Clark College in Oregon, Dr. Joachim Remak's thesis is that the entire conspiracy was planned and directed by Serbian Army Intelligence chief, Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević, known also as "Apis," and his Black Hand society. Nikola Pašić, Serbia's prime minister, was aware of the plot and ultimately sent an "inadequate warning . . . neither formal nor specific" to Vienna's finance minister who promptly belittled and ignored it. Serbia, Dr. Remak argues, certainly believed it could benefit from the conspiracy and their politicians used the Black Hand whenever convenient or necessary to advance grandiose dreams of a Greater Serbia. As it happened, in 1914 Serbia's aims coincided with the ultranationalistic Black Hand, namely to destroy the Heir Presumptive because of his support of Trialism—transforming the Dual Monarchy into a Triple Monarchy, with the Empire's Serbs receiving autonomy—and the danger that presented to Serbian expansionists.

How valid are these conclusions? In the light of Dr. Remak's own reservations for in one footnote he concedes ". . . having considered all the fragmentary evidence that is available, it seemed plausible. . . . What cannot be claimed for it is that it is based on incontrovertible fact" and considering that no concrete primary evidence linking Apis and the Black Hand with the murders has ever been offered, it is difficult to accept this well-told tale as absolute truth. Since neither Apis nor the Black Hand were ever mentioned at the trial of the assassins, Apis' dubious final testament alluding to Sarajevo and implicating no one is hardly suitable supporting evidence. Moreover, it should be emphasized that by

1914, the Archduke had abandoned Trialism as unworkable. What, then, becomes of the motive?

One day Serbia's still closed diplomatic archives may reveal what really happened. Until then, while the definitive apportionment of responsibility will have to wait, it appears that a more accurate version would have Princip and his friends, aroused by Pan-Serbian nationalism, planning and committing the murders themselves with the encouragement but not the outright co-operation of Avis, the Black Hand, and the Serbian government.

MURRAY POLNER

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GIORGIO LOLLI and others. *Alcohol in Italian Culture: Food and Wine in Relation to Sobriety among Italians and Italian Americans*. (Monographs of the Yale Center of Alcohol Studies, No. 3.) Pp. xv, 140. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press with the Publications Division, Yale Center of Alcohol Studies, 1959. \$4.00.

This excellent monograph is the third in a series: the first dealt with the Jews, a group distinctive for the absence of alcoholism, and the second with the "skid-row" type of chronic alcoholic. The present volume deals with Italian Americans in New Haven, Italians in Rome, and a stratified sample of Italy's entire population. The study concentrates on the place of liquids, particularly milk and alcoholic beverages, in the informants' diets from infancy through adulthood. It is made abundantly clear that the purposes, values, and social contexts of drinking in the Italian and Italian American cultures are markedly different from those of American society at large.

The discussion compounds sociological, psychiatric, and nutritional theory and data to show: (1) breast feeding is supported by Italian culture, being an almost universal practice considered both good and natural, (2) breast feeding minimizes the risk of an undifferentiated craving in adulthood for this physiological and psychological satisfaction which the alcoholic in American culture missed—or thinks he missed—in infancy, (3) alcoholic beverages, particu-

larly wines, are food for Italians, drunk mainly at meals or as a fortifying thirst-quencher during manual labor, (4) the drinking of alcoholic beverages on a full stomach, especially with the slowly absorbed carbohydrates of Italian cuisine, reduces the effects of alcohol on the central nervous system, (5) drinking among Italians does not have the purpose of inducing sociability or providing escape, (6) Italians generally drink alcoholic beverages in the bosom of the family, (7) drinking alcoholic beverages is supported by Italian culture, being an almost universal practice from childhood, and it is considered both beneficial and normal.

The authors' interpretative scheme leads to one important question. What is the dominant factor in Italian sobriety or the principal cause of widespread alcoholism in many other cultures? It would seem that breast feeding and familism, the two most striking features of Italian culture in the authors' analysis, are insufficient even though necessary conditions for sobriety. It is the reviewer's impression that several familistic cultures where breast feeding is general, such as rural Ireland and Poland, have a high incidence of inebriation. It is hoped that further cross-cultural comparisons in this series will seek to show specifically what it is in Italian nursing practices and family life which reduces alcoholism. However, the monograph admirably fulfills its purpose by narrowing the field of inquiry to this area, thus pointing the way for additive research which promises to be of great theoretical and practical importance.

JOHN S. McDONALD

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CYRIL EUGENE SMITH. *The University of Toulouse in the Middle Ages: Its Origins and Growth to 1500 A.D.* Pp. vii, 244. Milwaukee, Wis.: Marquette University Press, 1958. \$7.00.

Professor Smith, in order to explain "obvious lacunae" in the present volume, which is devoted to a narrative of "the origin and external history of the university," states that he hopes to publish another volume on the constitutional and administrative history of the university. The wisdom of this organization may be questioned, for in the

present volume the failure to discuss the structure and function of the university is felt as a very obvious gap. The author touches on many subjects: the early history of Toulouse and previous educational activity in the region; the circumstances and personalities connected with the foundation of the university in 1229 to combat heresy, possibly the third instance of deliberate foundation rather than gradual growth in the Middle Ages; initial difficulties in a hostile land; the growth in personnel and privileges; relationships with monastic houses; the foundation of colleges, particularly numerous at Toulouse; the close ties with the Avignon papacy; conflicts with civic officials of Toulouse; conflicts with royal officials and relations with the monarchy; and the increasing litigation in and control by the *parlement* of Toulouse in the later fifteenth century.

Unfortunately, the organization by chronological narrative and the focus on external influences prevent the author from giving a coherent picture of the core of his study, the university itself. Institutions are elusive and complex historical subjects whose structure and function need careful description and analysis before the relevance and significance of many facts about the institution can become clear. The disadvantages of a chronological treatment are very apparent in the chapter on "The University and the *Parlement* of Toulouse, 1434-1500," where, interspersed among descriptions of relations with the *parlement* and paraphrases of litigation on diverse subjects, the author discusses royal visits to Toulouse, the requiem mass for Charles VII, university participation in the Council of Basel, the financial situation of the university, fire and plague, a disputed archiepiscopal election at Toulouse, the appearance of printing, abuse of letters of scholarship, the foundation of a college, and financial affairs of other colleges.

Although the book is little concerned with medieval education as such, does not focus on any central problem, and has no unifying thesis, it is rich in details about personalities connected with the university, sedulous in correcting mistakes in dating of other historians, and valuable for its description of many incidents in the univer-

sity's history. It is unlikely to be of interest to general readers wishing to understand the nature of a medieval university, but as a meticulous chronicle it will be useful for specialists.

GAVIN I. LANGMUIR

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H. H. SCULLARD. *From the Gracchi to Nero: A History of Rome from 133 B.C. to A.D. 68*. Pp. xi, 450. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. \$6.00.

As the title indicates, this work by the well-known author of *A History of the Roman World from 753 to 146 B.C.* and *Scipio Africanus, Roman Politics: 220-150 B.C.*, covers a most critical period in Roman history in which the collapse of the Republic and the formation of the Principate or Empire took place. This is one of those historical epochs which evokes perennial interest, and consequently a fresh treatment of it is always welcome, particularly at this time, for many specialized studies written in recent years and some newly discovered source materials require evaluation or interpretation.

The author does not advance any one special cause for the breakdown of the Roman system of republican government. Rather, he wisely lets the sequence of events from the Gracchan attempts at reform to Caesar's victory in the civil wars speak for itself. As a result, we see that the responsibility rests upon the human factors involved, not upon economic or social forces. The "fall" of the Republic was not inevitable; it was the result of conflicting class and individual interests which could have been resolved, at least in their early stages, by statesmanlike and patriotic courses of action taken at various crises by the parties involved. As it turned out, however, the major share of blame falls upon the dominant faction in the senatorial oligarchy which adopted an attitude of no compromise whenever their traditional position of power and privilege seemed threatened by proposals for reasonable and necessary reforms. But their opponents cannot be held guiltless, especially when their personal ambitions led them into actions ne-

cessitating the overthrow of constitutional authority. After Caesar, some form of monarchy was inevitable, and it is to the credit of Augustus that he created one which, in spite of its potential weaknesses, revealed already under his immediate successors, served the needs of the Empire so long and so well.

Anyone reading this book will be struck by the author's realistic and judicious appraisal of the leading characters of the period. The Gracchi, Marius, Sulla, Pompey, Caesar, Antony, Augustus, and the Julio-Claudian emperors appear as intelligible human beings neither wholly evil nor wholly above criticism. Scholarly as it is, this work can be read with appreciation by all those interested in historical narratives and interpretations. Students of Roman history in particular will appreciate the Notes which offer useful discussions of the sources for each chapter and also select Bibliographies. There is a good Index and some useful maps.

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ASIA AND AFRICA

DAVID S. NIVISON and ARTHUR F. WRIGHT (Eds.). *Confucianism in Action*. Pp. xiv, 390. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959. \$8.50.

Chinese and Japanese studies in the United States and Great Britain have come of age. A generation or so ago there were good monographs on the founders of Chinese thought in the classical period and on some of the principal spokesmen from the first to the seventeenth centuries, but there was little depth and no intimate picture of the chief institutions of government or of social life. Now, due to the awakened interest in our universities and to the support of foundations since World War II, there are a number of scholars, well trained in the languages and in their disciplines, working on neglected areas of eastern history, social, economic, intellectual, and other aspects.

Here we have a fine analysis of the rules

of Chinese clans based on a long series of genealogical records, which shows how the elders of the clans tried to force their members to behave. Here too is a study of a well-kept record of a charitable estate, founded in 1050 and continued to 1760, revealing the efforts of the founder and his successors to benefit the less fortunate members of his clan by establishing ancestral halls, charitable schools, and income-producing estates as well as a perspicacious study of the Chinese censorial system in government which did so much through remonstrance and surveillance of the entire bureaucratic machinery to preserve the best in the state—a system which grew out of both Confucian and legalist streams of thought. It is noteworthy that even the Mongol conqueror Kublai Khan who reigned from 1260 to 1294 was so imbued with the need of this arm of the government that he remarked: "The duties of the Censorate's officials lie in speaking out straightforwardly. If we should by chance commit improprieties, let them speak out vigorously, without concealment and without fearing others."

The classics of the Confucian school were long known to the Japanese and studied at Nara and elsewhere for a thousand years before Confucianism became in the 17th century "the strongest intellectual and ethical force in Japan." The teachers of this school of thought and their part in Japan prior to the restoration of imperial rule are given their rightful due in one essay, followed by an intimate picture of the tutor and chief advisor to the Meiji emperor from 1871 through 1890, a man who began his work when he was fifty-three and the young monarch eighteen, and who saw him nearly every day of those twenty years. So did Confucianism exert its power during the period when the influences of the west were nearly at their peak.

These remarks touch on only five of the dozen papers published herein, all of which are worth reading for their penetrating and realistic appraisal of a major way of life and thought in eastern Asia.

L. CARRINGTON GOODRICH

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R. P. DORE. *Land Reform in Japan*. Pp. xvii, 510. New York: Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1959. \$8.80.

At last we have a comprehensive, objective, well-documented, and interesting evaluation of the much-touted land reform brought about under the Allied occupation in Japan. Tenant-cultivated rice land was reduced from over 50 per cent to only 10 per cent, and now only 5 per cent of farm families rent more than 90 per cent of their land. No landlord may retain more than 1 *cho* (2.45 acres) of tenanted land. Thus, land is hardly an issue in Japanese politics any longer. That is, tenant-farmer movements of the prewar type, which are well treated in the book, find no strong *raison d'être* which is a loss to the Left. It is rather the small and ex-landlords who find sustenance for their discontent in the residual tenancy, and this is "the greatest single cause of dissension in Japanese villages today." The land reform was also incomplete in that it did little to do away with fragmentation of the land. Nevertheless, the conservative politicians have accepted the reform and give the discontents little encouragement, for the mass of votes come from the owner-cultivators who were formerly tenants.

Actually the book goes well beyond a narrow discussion of the land reform as such. It dissects the whole problem of tenancy in the development of Japanese agriculture and develops the implications of the land reform for the farm economy, the village social structure, and national politics today. By relieving the cultivators of the rent burden, by giving them responsibility for improving their own land, and by making the small and medium owner-cultivator more important politically, land reform can be counted high among the factors that have raised the standard of living of farmers in postwar Japan. Also, by reducing class divisions, land reform has paradoxically strengthened village solidarity, something usually denounced as "feudal" but which the author shows can also lead to progress. Finally, the solidarity of the agricultural population, encouraged by the land reforms, has caused

a congruence between conservative and socialist agricultural policies. Both appeal to the village as a whole. The socialists are trying to outbid the conservatives; they apparently seek in vain for a new departure.

The author, a sociologist and associate professor of Asian studies at the University of British Columbia, has a fine command of Japanese. He was thus able to detect and record the nuances of socio-political attitudes of respondents in the extensive conversations and interviews he conducted as well as make full use of Japanese research, sources, and statistics.

In the opinion of this reviewer, *Land Reform in Japan* will take its place among the classics in the field of studies of modern Japan. In addition, it will undoubtedly prove of great comparative importance for all who are interested in the "land question" in any industrializing society.

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GEORGE ALEXANDER LENSEN. *The Russian Push Toward Japan: Russo-Japanese Relations, 1697-1875*. Pp. xv, 553. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1959. \$10.00.

This very large and solid volume by Professor Lensen of Florida State University is likely to prove the definitive work in English on Russo-Japanese relations between the earliest contacts and the border settlement of 1875, which assigned the whole of Sakhalin to Russia and all the Kuril Islands to Japan. It seems improbable that enough further material will be uncovered to induce other scholars to retrace in detail the whole of this story he has covered so fully and well.

As the title suggests, the subject is presented mostly from the Russian point of view rather than the Japanese. The author has described in some detail the Russian background of the relations with Japan and has ably exploited the accounts of the Russian naval officers, explorers, adventurers, and diplomats whose acts form the main line of the narrative. He has also made wide use of Japanese and other sources, though usually as supplementary

materials to the Russian. Those interested primarily in Japan will wish that he had given as much attention to the Japanese background as the Russian and had made a greater attempt to present the story from the Japanese point of view. As a consequence, the first two chapters of Professor John A. Harrison's *Japan's Northern Frontiers* (University of Florida Press, 1953) will still be useful as a look at this subject from the Japanese point of view, though Harrison's much briefer book is devoted primarily to the Japanese development of Hokkaido rather than to Russo-Japanese relations.

To call a book "definitive" may make it sound ponderous and dull. This is not true of Professor Lensen's volume. For all its length and detail, it makes fascinating reading. Such accounts as the flight of the prisoner Benyovszky from Kamchatka by way of Japan to the West, the mission of young Lieutenant Laxman, the imprisonment of Golovnin, the negotiations of Rikord and Takadaya, and the missionary work of Bishop Nikolai all make excellent stories, wholly aside from their broader historical significance. The author has told these stories well, letting the original records speak for themselves where possible. His balance and historical judgment seem sound, his writing is competent, and the volume is handsomely published with good maps and illustrations. One can only look forward with great expectation to Professor Lensen's promised second volume on Russo-Japanese relations since 1875.

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GEORGE MCTURNAN KAHIN (Ed.). *Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia*. Pp. xvii, 531. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1959. \$6.50.

This is a most welcome book for at last we have a single volume that provides a reliable introduction to the countries of Southeast Asia, and that can be strongly recommended to the student, the general reader, and all who have a professional interest in the region. Professor Kahin has worked out with his contributors a common framework within which they are able

to elaborate the distinctive features of each country and also point up the shared characteristics. The separate contributors follow a common outline in treating the six major countries of the region. Each country study begins with a brief historical résumé covering the pre-European period as well as colonial and postcolonial developments. With the advantage of this long-range perspective each author turns next to the contemporary scene and describes the outstanding social and economic characteristics of his country. The sections on the political process are divided between descriptions of the formal institutions of government and the informal patterns of behavior. The final sections are devoted to the major problems confronting each of the countries.

Southeast Asia is in such a state of flux that one cannot but feel sympathy for the authors and their problems of choice. They have sought to give a clear and precise picture of the ways in which the various governments of the region operate, and yet they are also aware of the fragile and ephemeral nature of most formal institutions in these developing societies. This situation calls for a judicious balance between general analysis and description of the current scene. The contributors have attempted to give more complete reports on the formal arrangements of government than are common in books on Asia, and in doing so they risk attributing excessive permanence to what are probably only temporary phases of institutional change. In the main, however, they have resisted the temptation of being unduly concerned with most recent developments. Possibly they have been less successful in weeding out accounts of developments which at an earlier time seemed significant, but which have not had lasting consequences. Here again is the problem of finding the appropriate perspective for viewing an erratically changing world.

The composite picture of Southeast Asia that emerges from the country studies is one of diversity and confusion on the surface and a few all-pervasive fundamental problems. Throughout the region there is a desperate need for economic growth, but such development is inhibited by a lack

of political unity. Governments can dominate the scene, for other groups are all so weak; but they lack the capacity to control and direct events. In spite of periods of high hope the basic theme of Southeast Asia is still that of a vicious circle of economic stagnation and political disunity. In countless ways this volume points to all the problems that must be overcome if the modernizing leaders of Southeast Asia are to realize their aspirations.

Although Professor Kahin is not the author of any of the chapters, his influence is to be noted throughout the book, and not just because of his editing skills and his respect for clean, precise prose. Even more, this book is a testament to the remarkable role that George McTurnan Kahin has played in training a generation of American scholars of Southeast Asia. This book is built out of the relationship between teacher and student, and it is rare for each to do so well by the other.

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OLAF CAROE. *The Pathans: 550 B.C.-A.D. 1957*. Pp. xxii, 521. New York: St. Martins Press, 1959. \$12.50.

Sir Olaf Caroe was right in superimposing a portrait of a Pathan militiaman upon one of Alexander the Great on the cover of his book, just as it is right that most Western visitors should first meet the Pathans at Peshawar airport looking out toward the gaunt hills of the Khyber Pass, as the Pathan history and geography have played a very great part in molding their character. But Caroe was also right to devote a long, though difficult, first chapter to the semimythological genealogies of the Pathan tribes and subtribes. These genealogies form the basis of the folklore of the Pathans, and it is only through some understanding of these genealogies and this folklore as well as of the history and geography that one can hope to understand the Pathans and their attitude to the modern world. These attitudes are so different from those of the West that among the Westerners who have met them there must be very few who do not have strong feel-

ings either for or against the Pathans. It seems likely that even the misguided few who detest them will find Sir Olaf's account illuminating and fascinating; and what is more to the point, it should help them to mend their misguided views.

But it should not be only those who have or will have dealings with the Pathans themselves who will find this book useful. The Pathan homeland stretches across the mainland communications between India, the Middle East, and Central Asia. In telling the history of the Pathans, Sir Olaf necessarily sees the complicated history of all three regions from a Pathan viewpoint which though sometimes difficult should be illuminating for those concerned with any one of them. It is useful to be reminded that the Pathan contact with Europe stretches back at least as far as the Greeks. It is startling to realize that in the judgment of many of them the contact with Alexander is still of more importance than their more recent contact with the British, but by the end of this book the reader begins to understand this judgment.

It is extremely difficult for anyone to understand and explain the ideals and values of another people. Sir Olaf has succeeded admirably. One only wishes that similar books were available on all the many peoples of Asia. In the meantime anyone interested in the complexities and differences between the different cultures of South Asia would do well to read *The Pathans*.

T. F. WISE

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SAUL ROSE. *Socialism in Southern Asia*. Pp. 278. New York: Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1959. \$4.50.

The importance of the author's subject lies, in part, in his conclusion that socialism is the "predominant ideology" in Southern Asia and that there are at least six national governments that describe themselves as "Socialist," these countries embracing the majority population of the region. Beyond this, his subject gains added significance from the fact that some form of demo-

cratic socialism is the only real alternative to communism or indigenous totalitarianism in South Asia, as the author implies but does not, unfortunately, develop in a comparative manner. By South Asia, he means South and Southeast Asia, from Pakistan to Indonesia, an area, he feels, in which socialist movements have "certain common features" not shared by others, such as Japan or Israel. Examples of such shared characteristics are the newly won independence of those nations, with the exception of Thailand and Nepal, an embryonic development in the womb of nationalist movements which is responsible for a special type of affinity between socialism and nationalism peculiar to South Asia, and common problems of economic development and national cohesion.

A central problem is to differentiate between competing socialisms in each country where all or most parties, those in and out of power, claim to be socialist. This is a problem not only for the scholar attempting to understand the politics of these countries but also from the practical standpoint, for the Asian Socialist Conference, which, as the self-constituted organization of Asian socialism, has the onerous task of selecting the true Socialist party in each country and rejecting the others. This difficulty also plagues the various national electorates who are asked to choose, as in India, for example, among the socialism of Nehru's Congress party, the Praja Socialist party, and the Communist party of India.

The author treats socialist parties descriptively on a country-by-country, brief survey basis, sandwiching them between valuable chapters on the first and second Asian Socialist Conferences held in 1953 and 1956, which have sometimes appeared as a potential rival to the established Socialist International based in Europe.

One must take issue with his assertion that differences between Asian and Western socialism can be reduced to mere questions of "tempo," over the rate of colonial liberation and industrialization and that the former is gradually moving in the direction of Western socialism. This conclusion must seem doubtful, even to the author, when, in a latter part of the book, he indicates the primary importance of the charis-

matic leader, points to the acute problem of the peasantry, and reveals recent Asian socialist doubts about the all-important role of the state as a means and a newly found appreciation of the need of decentralization and local autonomy.

Nevertheless, this is a valuable book for understanding of Asian and socialist politics.

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SYDNEY NETTLETON FISHER. *The Middle East: A History*. Pp. xiv, 650, xxxi. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959. \$8.95, trade edition; \$6.75, text edition.

He who reviews a history of the Middle East is confronted with some of the difficulties of its author. The perplexities of this reviewer are augmented by reading Elizabeth Hardwick's "The Decline of Book Reviewing" in the October Harper's Magazine with her comment about reviews written by one "... who had written a book like it, or about the same country or the same period."

So complex are the problems of a historian who undertakes to write a one-volume history of the Middle East, that only carping critics would expect more than a competently written book useful for those who wish to increase their knowledge of the area. Such a book Professor Fisher has written. He has accomplished well his stated purpose of providing "... a brief account of the contemporary Middle East scene so that the beginning college student or general reader" can obtain a historical background for an understanding of its present-day problems.

Over half of the book is devoted to presenting such a background. The first chapter deals inadequately with the physical features of the area, the second briefly with pre-Islamic history. Byzantine Christian heritage is given little attention in both chapter two and chapter eleven. In striking contrast Fisher writes in considerable detail of Mohammed, the Koran, the spread of Islam and Moslem theology, and law and culture under Arab leadership.

The author's special interest is in the Turks whose history he traces in eight

chapters from the advent of the Seljuks to the end of the eighteenth century. He vividly describes the rise, the achievements, and the stagnation and subsequent decline of the Ottomans.

Part III entitled European Imperialism is not an analysis of the nature of European imperialism as it functioned throughout the Middle East and of its complex and multiform impact upon internal development in the Ottoman Empire. It is no easy task to weave into a meaningful pattern all the threads of Middle Eastern history from the reforms of Sultan Selim III and Napoleon's invasions of Egypt in the nineteenth century to the Young Turk Revolution and the rise of Arab nationalism.

The latter part of the book falls into two divisions: the first dealing with the period of World War I and its aftermath, and the second with World War II and developments up to 1958. Fourteen chapters are so crowded with factual data that there is little space for reading between the lines. The flood of events from 1914, which inundated and obliterated many of the old landmarks and fertilized the Middle East, are treated in a way which tends to overwhelm the reader.

WILLIAM YALE

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WALTER Z. LAQUEUR. *The Soviet Union and the Middle East*. (Praeger Publications in Russian History and World Communism, No. 81.) Pp. x, 366. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. \$6.00.

In this volume, Mr. Laqueur, editor of *Soviet Survey* (London), and author of a number of works on the Middle East, traces the development of Soviet attitudes, policies, and interests in the Middle East from the period of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 to the present. Written under a research fellowship from the Harvard Russian Research Center and the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, the work is a welcome addition to our information and knowledge concerning that troubled area.

Essentially, Mr. Laqueur's volume is

divided into two parts, the first of which treats of the development of "the Soviet image of the Middle East as it grew and changed since 1917." The second is devoted to the "great break through," especially after the Soviet-Egyptian arms arrangement of September 1955, and discusses in some detail the development of policies during the critical and decisive years between 1954 and 1959. In the latter section the author discusses not only the arms arrangement, but the Suez conflict of 1956, the Syrian crisis of 1957, Soviet trade and aid in the Middle East, Soviet cultural policy, the development of Middle Eastern communism, and the evolution of Middle Eastern nationalism. In the end, the author believes there will be an inevitable conflict between Arab nationalism and communism. Three Appendices conclude the volume, dealing with (1) China and the Middle East, (2) Israel in the Soviet Mirror, (3) Iraq, Nasser, and the communists.

While the volume has perspective and balance, and is well written, the author *might* have provided his readers with a brief background of the Russian past in the Middle East, as necessary to any basic understanding of Soviet imperialism in that area. Secondly, there could have been a more ample treatment of Soviet policy and interest in connection with such specific Middle Eastern problems as those of Turkey and the Straits, Iran and oil, Palestine and Israel. While Mr. Laqueur has evidently used Soviet sources extensively, aside from his annotations, he provides no extended Bibliography and cites few of the detailed western studies which have been made of various aspects of Soviet policy in the Middle East—studies which would guide the student beyond the confines of this relatively brief volume. Mr. Laqueur's volume, however, represents only a beginning. It is now necessary to plunge more deeply into a most important and fascinating subject.

HARRY N. HOWARD

Beirut, Lebanon

ROM LANDAU. *Islam and the Arabs*. Pp. 298. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959. \$4.95.

If an objectively minded American wants to know "What makes an Arab tick?" he can find a dispassionate answer in Rom Landau's book, *Islam and the Arabs*.

Current developments in the Arab World are understood primarily by the so-called "experts" in that area or by emotional national partisans. Mr. Landau's book makes it possible for the average American citizen to understand more thoroughly why issues and conflicts arise in the Near East and in North Africa.

Most people in the United States rely unwittingly upon "spot news" in their daily newspapers for their basic knowledge of international affairs—a rather tragic dependence upon a kind of reportorial coverage that overemphasizes assassinations, coup d'états, and violent upheavals. Too often "spot news" fails to provide a balanced interpretation concerning impacts that directly or indirectly brought about the current crises. Obviously, what has happened yesteryear influences what is happening today, and Mr. Landau's book provides the necessary background so essential in any fair-minded attempt to understand a foreign people whose culture and religion contrast sharply with those in the West.

In this concise and well-arranged history of the Arab peoples, the author emphasizes the extremely important role that the Islamic religion has played, and is still playing, in the social, economic, and political life of the Arab. Americans who sincerely want good will between the Arab world and the United States cannot impartially evaluate the political events now occurring in the Near East and in North Africa without first realizing what Islam means to the Arab. Mr. Landau's book fills such a need.

In a broad sense *Islam and the Arabs* can serve as a well-tempered study for anyone who goes to the Arab World in the diplomatic service, as an employee of an American corporation or simply as a tourist. In its thirteen chapters the book outlines the developments that led Mohammed to found a new monotheistic faith, the expansion of the Muslim empire under several dynasties, the impact of the Crusades, and the effect of Islamic institutions

on Europe through the Muslim conquest of Spain.

The significant role that Islam played in bringing philosophy, astronomy, mathematics, geography, medicine, and chemistry to Europe then living in darkness is neatly documented in succeeding chapters. Each chapter concludes with a detailed chronology that links the Muslim World with developments contemporary to events in the West. This is an excellent reference.

In the final chapter, "Problems of the Present Arab World," the author explains why Arabs in the present decade are "strongly anti-colonialist and therefore almost automatically anti-West" (p. 239). He also explains why the Arabs feel they were betrayed "by the West after World War I" and how this betrayal led to "the subsequent deterioration in the relations between the Arab World and the West" (p. 240).

From his long experience in Muslim-Arab affairs, Mr. Landau gives this piercing summary that every Westerner should remember whenever political crises in the Arab World seem to perplex him:

"To understand the trend of modern Arab thinking and Arab policies we must try to view the relevant problems not from our Western point of view, but from that of the Arabs themselves. For it is ultimately their point of view and not ours—however erroneous and prejudiced the former may appear to us to be—that decides their attitude towards the world and their decision to prefer one set of ideas to another" (p. 235).

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WILLIAM R. BASCOM and MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS (Eds.). *Continuity and Change in African Culture*. Pp. ix, 309. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959. \$7.00.

The collection of papers in this volume, all prepared by professional anthropologists, is noteworthy for its demonstration of the magnitude and nature of the problem of cultural change in Africa, south of the Sahara.

One of the most momentous develop-

ments of our decade is the rapidity with which political change is taking place in Africa. Less than ten years ago, besides the Union of South Africa, three independent states existed in Africa—Egypt, Liberia, and Ethiopia. Since then Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Guinea, and Ghana have become independent, while the former French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa have achieved a degree of autonomy in the French Community. Within the next year, Nigeria and Somalia will become independent, and there are indications that some of the members of the French Community and other African territories will shortly move towards complete independence. The independence snowball is rolling rapidly in Africa, and its momentum apparently will not be stayed until political independence and autonomy is attained by most of its people.

These climactic political changes are part of the process of transition from traditional and primitive society to modernism which is taking place in Africa under the impact of western civilization. It is no secret that the attainment of independence and self-government does not mean that the new African states have completed the transformation to modern society. Political independence, particularly when achieved rapidly as is the case in many of the African territories, hardly changes the people and their pattern of life overnight. It must be borne in mind that the changes resulting from western influences in Africa take place not only in the political realm, but also in other areas, such as marriage and the family, language, art, music, mode of life, and so forth. Not all of these changes are taking place at the same pace. Furthermore, traditional cultural patterns persist and affect the new political entities.

If we are to understand the peoples of Africa and the problems they face and create, particularly in their adjustment to modern political life, it may be stated axiomatically that we must pay close attention to the problem of cultural change in all its aspects. In this connection, the volume, *Continuity and Change in African Culture*, can serve a most useful purpose. Anthropologists and ethnologists will find much of interest in this volume from the

viewpoint of their discipline and its methodology. But over and above this, other social scientists and laymen seeking an understanding of what is happening in Africa by going behind the headlines will find this volume of inestimable value. For example, the title focuses attention on what is changing and what is not changing; where change is taking place and where it is not. Not all of Africa is changing at the same rate, nor is all of Africa accommodating readily to change. Some societies are resisting it. One of the main themes of the book, often overlooked by students, is that the current African scene is marked not only by change but also by cultural continuity and that the emerging African states synthesize western culture and traditional African patterns.

BENJAMIN RIVLIN

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

September 30, 1959

Dear Sir:

I have read with some astonishment the review of my book, *The Spartacist Uprising*, by Professor Ralph Haswell Lutz. I am perfectly aware that neither my approach to the subject nor the conclusions reached will find the approval of everyone. However, I fail to see how any critical and open-minded reader of this book can come to the conclusion that it supports "the communist viewpoint of the German revolutionary movement of 1918-19" and "the line of polemics of the Communist parties." For example, Chapter 6 of the book entitled "The Revolution in Retrospect" contains a careful analysis of the communist interpretation of the German revolution and takes a very strong stand against the purposeful distortion made by the communist misinterpretation of historical facts. It is one of the author's main findings that the communist assertion that the showdown of forces between the left-wing radicals and those who wished to consolidate the political gains of the November revolution

was not the result of deliberate actions by the Social Democratic Provisional government but "was the out-growth of the tension which existed between the highly antagonistic camps within the socialist movement . . ." (p. 214).

In his review, Professor Lutz employs the rather unfortunate method of attempting to discredit a factual statement by claiming that the same statement was also made by communists. This is hardly an academic approach. On the strength of it anyone can be discredited who happens to cite statements of fact which are also recognized as such by the communist side. How can Professor Lutz, an experienced and respected historian, disparage the findings of the author by stating that he had used readily identifiable communist source materials? How else would Professor Lutz want one to characterize the communist position and buttress, as the author has done, an effective critical view?

Professor Robert G. L. Waite, in a review to be published by the *Journal of Modern History*, has no difficulties in understanding the author's position which is neither in support of the communist point of view that the Social Democratic Provisional government deliberately provoked a showdown in order to destroy physically the left-radicals nor the "right-wing" version which places all the blame for the events on a premeditated communist attempt to seize power at that time.

Had Professor Lutz read the book more carefully he might also have appreciated the reasons which led to the inclusion of the introductory chapters preceding *The Spartacist Uprising* proper. They serve to underpin the author's thesis that the January uprising was the upshot of tensions which had been in the making for a considerable period of time.

ERIC WALDMAN

Marquette University

October 26, 1959

Dear Sir:

I have seen Professor Waldman's letter and do not find in it any reason for changing my original statements and conclusions. My review was based upon a careful reading of the text including "The Revolution

in Retrospect," "Conclusions" and "Summary," which "modify points of view which are presented in the main chapters." The author commented on only two of the criticisms listed in the review.

The communist "view point of the revolutionary movement" was generally established by Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Radek, and a number of Soviet experts and social scientists who are partly listed in the scholarly, annotated Bibliography of T. I. Rainov (*Istoriik Marksist*, 1933, Nos. 5 and 6), which includes all viewpoints from monarchists to anarchists. Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Wilson, Hoover and a galaxy of experts and scholars at Versailles presented western viewpoints of this revolution, but none agreed with Lenin and his lieutenants. My considered opinion is that Professor Waldman's evaluations resemble generally the communist viewpoint until he modifies them in the last twenty four pages of his monograph.

Furthermore, "the line of polemics of the Communist parties" was fairly well drawn when the first so-called "anarchist Soviet Republic" was formed April 6, 1919, in Munich, which was then followed by the proclamation of a Communist state on direct instructions from Moscow.

The polemics of western statesmen, generals, and social scientists against the Socialist party were well known before the delivery of the Allied mantle note. The author's polemic again resembles that of the communist parties rather than those of the West. Professor Waldman should stress the difficulties of the majority Socialists, the historic ministerial mistakes and decisions of the Commissars, as well as Ebert's stubborn resistance to Allied demands and Reuters' propaganda.

I deny that in my review or elsewhere I attempt to discredit a factual statement by claiming that the same statement is also made by Communists. I have cited in documentary histories and narratives numbers of communist sources. The author's first citation to the admitted communist propaganda publication, *Illustrierte Geschichte* (p. 10), has nothing whatever to do with communism but is his authority for socialist and trade union membership figures. Why cite communist propaganda

when the best documentary sources are readily available? Professor Waldman has good reasons to quote from Lenin, Liebknecht, Luxemburg, Rosenberg, and other communist writers. To that I did not object.

The author states that "one of his main findings" is that the showdown of forces between the communists and the socialists was not as the communists assert, the result of deliberate action by the government (p. 214). But what communist social scientist makes the preposterous charge that it was? Moreover, who are the American economists and historians who support this "widespread assumption"? Liebknecht had accepted money, guns, and an alliance from Lenin, and with Pieck voted in the revolutionary committee for the overthrow of Ebert's government. Had the uprising succeeded, the armies of the victors would have occupied Potsdam-Berlin and the heartland of the Junkers. Professor Waldman should know and state forthrightly that the Allies would never have made peace with a Berlin Communist government which in January 1919 had far more than merely a majority of organized labor in the capital against it.

Yours truly,
RALPH H. LUTZ

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
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LAGGING JUSTICE

Special Editor of this Volume

GLENN R. WINTERS, LL.B.

Executive Director

American Judicature Society

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FOREWORD

When Attorney-General Herbert Brownell, Jr., called the first Attorney-General's Conference on Court Congestion and Delay in 1956, he focused national attention on a problem that had been growing year by year since the end of the last war and was then approaching crisis proportions.

At the close of the war, the federal courts were abreast of their work, and court delay was nowhere a serious problem. New factors then clouded the scene. The moral aftermath of the war swelled criminal dockets everywhere. Population zoomed. Anchorage, Alaska, a village of a few thousand in the early 1940's, can now count nearly 100,000 and is still growing. Phoenix, Albuquerque and many cities have a similar story to tell. Business activity of all kinds has expanded on an unprecedented scale.

The judicial machine, organized by Constitutional directives and its manpower determined by legislative action, is not quickly adaptable to such changes, and it is a tribute to the hard work and devotion of the courts and their staffs that as much of the increased load has been absorbed. Today, most American courts are operating without delay, and most cases are heard and decided promptly. It is only in certain classes of cases, in certain courts, and certain localities that delay is a problem.

Although the number and the percentage of these courts and their cases is relatively small, their relative importance is great. The cases most affected—automobile accident damage suits—are in most instances a once-in-a-lifetime experience for the plaintiffs, with home, savings, and livelihood affected by the outcome. At the same time, those cases represent a large part of the business of an important segment of the business community—the insurance companies.

The obvious answer to more work is more judges, and their number has been increased, although by no means enough. While awaiting legislative action on bills for more judges, professional and community leaders concerned about court delays may find other things to do to increase both quantity and quality of the present judicial output.

More efficient calendar practices can avoid needless waste of judges' time. Encouragement of settlements can dispose of many cases without going to trial. Pre-trial conferences can shorten trial time. Use of auxiliary judges and quasi-judicial personnel can ensure that the judges' time is spent on the hard cases that need it most. Statistical reports and assignment systems, under an administrative officer, can put idle judges to work relieving the burdens of their overworked brethren. Simplification of procedure, modern discovery practices, impartial medical testimony—even adoption of a rule of law like comparative negligence—all have their place in increasing the productiveness of the courts of justice.

In the various chapters of this volume, one of a long series of ANNALS volumes devoted to various aspects of judicial administration, the background and present status of court congestion are reviewed, its causes examined in detail, and experience with the outstanding measures that have been invoked against it is described and explained.

It is the hope of the editor and of the authors who have co-operated to produce the volume that it will help its readers to understand the true nature and extent of court congestion and that in its chapters may be found the one or more ideas needed to correct the situation in each community where the monster of delay stands between American citizens and their legal rights.

GLENN R. WINTERS

Glenn R. Winters, LL.B., Chicago, Illinois, is Executive Director of the American Judicature Society and Editor of the Journal of the American Judicature Society. A graduate of the University of Michigan Law School, he is a member of the bar of Missouri and of Michigan, a member of the American Law Institute, and honorary member of various legal organizations. He is a member of the American Bar Association's House of Delegates and of various of the Association's committees, including the Special Committee on Court Congestion. His published writings include Selection of Judges in New York and in Other States (1943), Bar Association Organization and Activities (1954), and other monographs and articles in legal periodicals.

Historical Review

By JOHN ECKLER

ABSTRACT: The problem of congested dockets and delay of justice has been witnessed invariable times in past history. The real and ever present delay in the legal remedies afforded the people has permeated the public consciousness and has instilled an awareness of responsibility among the servants of the judiciary. Those ministering justice have instigated legislation in various states to accelerate the judicial process. Concern for the civic effects of delay in our courts and for the legal effects on our judicial system has fostered conferences, committee studies, and projects on congestion and delay in the administration of justice. A determined public, bar, and judiciary can implement positive programs and methods enabling the judges to grant speedier trials.—Ed.

John Eckler, A.B., J.D., Columbus, Ohio, is an attorney engaged in the active practice of law and a partner of the firm of Bricker, Evatt, Barton, Eckler & Niehoff. A graduate of Ohio Wesleyan University and the University of Chicago, Mr. Eckler is the Chairman of the American Bar Association's Special Committee on Court Congestion, and is a past president of the Columbus Ohio Bar Association and past chairman of the Board of Bar Examiners for the State of Ohio. He is the President-elect of the National Conference of Bar Examiners and a member of Phi Beta Kappa and Order of the Coif.

WITH and from the dawn of civilization, man has sought to establish and preserve his individual and property rights through systems of rules and laws. The early family and tribal rules, the Code of Hamurabi, the Justinian Code, the modern elaborate systems of constitutional, statutory, and judge-made law, all impose restraints on the conduct of individual members of their respective societies in order to secure for such societies, as a whole, the opportunity and right of adjusted and productive existence. Any such system, however, enjoins upon society the responsibility to assure that its members have a *just* and *ready* means of resolving their differences within such rules of conduct.

All but the most primitive systems of conduct provide a judiciary and courts as the means of resolving those differences. Modified only by the imperfections of the humans who have created and administered the courts, they have been *just* means of resolving differences. Unfortunately, however, all our courts have not been and are not now *ready* means of resolving differences. Fortunately, the imperative need to solve the problem of delay in the administration of justice resulting primarily from court congestion is engaging the attention of an increasing number of the members of the bench and bar and responsible laymen.

HISTORICAL AND LITERARY REFERENCES

The phenomenon of lagging justice is not the exclusive, though uncomfortable, possession of our immediate decade. Judge Ulysses S. Schwartz in his thoughtful opinion in *Gray v. Gray* suggests the temporal nature of the problem as evidenced in literature and song:

The law's delay in many lands and throughout history has been the theme of tragedy and comedy. Hamlet summarized the seven burdens of man and put the law's

delay fifth on his list. If the meter of his verse had permitted, he would perhaps have put it first. Dickens memorialized it in *Bleak House*, Chekhov, the Russian, and Moliere, the Frenchman, have written tragedies based on it. Gilbert and Sullivan have satirized it in song.¹

It is not without significance, as Judge Schwartz indicates, that in Act III, Scene 1 in the *Tragedy of Hamlet*, first published in 1604, Shakespeare has Hamlet, in his "to be, or not to be" soliloquy, give attention to the law's delay. The bad company that law's delay was keeping over 350 years ago is indicated by the following from Hamlet's musings:

There's the respect
That makes calamity of so long life;
For who would bear the whips and scorns
Of time,
Th' oppressor's wrong, the proud man's
contumely,
The pangs of dispriz'd love, the law's delay,
The insolence of office, and the spurns
That patient merit of th' unworthy takes,
When he himself might his quietus make
With a bare bodkin?

Messrs. Zeisel, Kalven, and Buchholz in a definitive analysis of the delay problems of the Supreme Court of New York County and their relation to the problems generally, recently published under the title, *Delay in the Court*,² have called attention to further historical and literary reference to the problem:

Goethe, after having received his doctor juris degree, practiced law for a while before the Reichskammer Court in Wetzlar, about which he writes in the twelfth chapter of his autobiography:

An immense mountain of swollen files lay there growing every year, since the seventeen assessors were not even able to handle the current workload. Twenty thousand cases had piled up, sixty could be disposed of every year,

¹ 6 Ill. App. 2d 571, 578-579, 128 N.E. 2d 602, 606 (1955).

² (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1959), pp. XXVII and 313.

while twice as many were added. It was not unusual for a case to remain on the docket for more than a hundred years. One, for instance, involving the city of Gelnhausen, began in 1459 and was in 1734 still waiting for the court's decision. A dispute between the city of Nuremberg and the electorate of Brandenburg had begun in 1526 and remained for ever undecided when in 1806 the court was dissolved. The piteous state of the court created the unique profession of "solicitors" whose sole job it was to secure preferments for their clients. This custom resulted eventually in the jailing of its leading practitioner and in the removal of three judges from the court because of bribery.

The effects of this delayed court on Goethe were profound and in the end salutary. It made him lose whatever taste he had for the law, gave him sufficient leisure (the court had 174 holidays annually) to fall into desperate love with Charlotte Buff, the heroine of *Werther*, the novel which was to catapult him firmly into world fame.

FOREMOST MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY

The problem of lagging justice has not escaped the attention of this nation's chief judicial officers. Chief Justice William Howard Taft observed:

If one were asked in what respect we have fallen furthest short of ideal conditions in our government, I think we would be justified in answering, in spite of the glaring defects of our system of municipal government, that it is our failure to secure expedition and thoroughness in the enforcement of public and private rights in our court.

In a recent series of speeches and articles, Chief Justice Warren has underlined not only the existence of the delay problem but has delineated its serious impact on our system of laws. In 1958 at the annual meeting of the American Bar Association the Chief Justice said:

. . . interminable and unjustifiable delays in our courts are today compromising the basic legal rights of countless thousands of Americans and, imperceptibly, corroding the very foundations of constitutional government in the United States. Today, be-

cause the legal remedies of many of our people can be realized only after they have swallowed with the passage of time, they are mere forms of justice. And, to the extent that this is so, there is created a disrespect for law at a time when everyone should be continually conscious of the fundamental principle that it is primarily the law and its adequate enforcement which makes individual liberty possible.³

PUBLIC AWARENESS OF DELAY

The extent of the delay problem and the urgency of its solution have, as might be expected, engaged the attention of the public. Articles and editorial comment have appeared in *The Christian Century*,⁴ *Life*,⁵ *This Week Magazine*,⁶ *The Rotarian*,⁷ *Saturday Evening Post*,⁸ *Time*,⁹ *Readers' Digest*,¹⁰ *U. S. News and World Report*,¹¹ and *Coronet*.¹² Many of our great daily newspapers have evidenced the general public's awareness of and concern over the delay problem. Two significant series dealing with court congestion have been published in the *Washington Post and Times Herald*¹³ and the *Cleveland Plain Dealer*,¹⁴ and editorial comments have recently appeared in the *New York Times*¹⁵ and *New York Herald Tribune*.¹⁶

As evidence of the fact that court congestion is not new in the law, Herbert Brownell, Jr., then Attorney-General of the United States, opening the first At-

³ See also, Chief Justice Warren, *Delay and Congestion in the Federal Courts*, 42 (No. 1), J. Am. Jud. Soc'y, 6 (June 1958).

⁴ December 26, 1956 and January 30, 1957.

⁵ November 10, 1957, p. 126.

⁶ September 1951, p. 2.

⁷ July 1953.

⁸ November 1951, p. 10.

⁹ October 17, 1955.

¹⁰ November 1956.

¹¹ December 1954 and October 1955.

¹² September 1956.

¹³ November 6, 7, 8 and 9, 1956.

¹⁴ June 17, 18 and 19, 1956.

¹⁵ August 7, 1958.

¹⁶ August 12, 1958.

torney-General's Conference on Court Congestion, turned back the legal clock 120 years. He reported that David Dudley Field speaking of the New York Courts in 1839 had said, "Speedy justice is a thing unknown; and any justice, without delays almost ruinous, is most rare." A half century ago, Roscoe Pound, Dean Emeritus of Harvard Law School, then a young lawyer from Nebraska directed the entire nation's attention to the difficulties in our judicial administration. His 1906 address, "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfactions with the Administrations of Justice," delivered to the annual meeting of the American Bar Association has served as a guide to judicial reform since that date.¹⁷ Fifty years later, the voice of this renowned scholar was again raised in the cause of more efficient judicial administration when he addressed the Chicago Bar Association.

It has been suggested that the problem of lagging justice is rather like Mark Twain's observation about the weather, that is that everybody talks about it, but that no one does anything about it. This, however, is not the fact.

PROGRAMS TO SPEED JUSTICE

The legislature of Massachusetts, faced with congested courts, adopted legislation in 1818 to establish the auditor system. This is considered an emergency procedure and is not invoked when calendars are current. In spite of its great age, the auditor system retains remarkable vitality. Recently, in 1934 and again in 1942 the system was employed to clear a congested docket, resulting in the disposition of some 47,000 cases. In 1956 the system was reinstated but limited to motor vehicle court cases. The following year it was made applicable on a selected basis to cases involving general liability.

¹⁷ 1906 ABA ANN. REP. pt. I, at 395-417.

The use of quasi-judicial personnel under legislative authority is provided in Pennsylvania. In 1958 the procedure was started in Philadelphia with some 6,200 cases being handled under Pennsylvania's compulsory arbitration procedures. It is reported that the program has been intensified where more than 1,000 cases a month are being handled in Philadelphia.

The Wayne County (Detroit) Michigan Circuit Court under the leadership of Judge Ira Jayne is credited with first establishing a pre-trial system in 1929. The more recently adopted Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for nonmandatory, pre-trial procedures. The system has been adopted by many state trial courts. A large segment of the bench and bar is convinced that increased and skilled use of pretrials will significantly reduce current court congestion.

The Judiciary Act was adopted by Congress in 1789, but "modern" court administration was not anticipated in the federal system until Congress authorized the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges in 1922. Finally in 1948 Congress provided for the administration of multi-judge courts.¹⁸ The administrative tools available and the invaluable statistics being compiled by Warren Olney, Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, indicate that marked inroads should be made on congestion problems facing some federal courts.

It is generally conceded that a necessary ingredient to basic judicial reform is interest and support of lay groups. A classic example is the seventy-one year effort, from 1836 to 1907, primarily by enlightened laymen, which won in England the right effective repeals of criminal convictions.

¹⁸ See, Chief Justice Warren, *The Problem of Delay: A Task for Bench and Bar Alike*, 44 (No. 11) A.B.A.J. 1044.

The Committee for Modern Courts, organized in 1955, is primarily a group of civic-minded laymen organized to "stimulate and develop an understanding among citizens generally of the problems involved in the administration of Justice." This organization has been particularly active in New York and Illinois. Similar groups have supported most successful judicial reforms accomplished in the various states. Spectacular among such reform efforts was the simplification of the New Jersey court structure in 1948.

CONFERENCES AND COMMITTEE STUDIES

In the entire history of the troublesome problem of court congestion, probably the most forceful and concentrated attack on the problem was made by the two Attorney-General's Conferences on Court Congestion and Delay in Litigation during May 1956 and June 1958. Eminent judges, lawyers and laymen, meeting together, defined the problem and considered its solution. The printed proceedings of the Conferences are a valuable source for corrective legislation and modernized court rules. Continuing implementation of the Conferences' work is assured by the recently appointed Attorney-General's committee on Scope and Procedure, of which Whitney North Seymour, New York lawyer, is Chairman.

The organized bar, through the leadership of the American Bar Association, continually studies the issues of judicial reform. In 1938 the Association's House of Delegates adopted a series of resolutions proposed by its Section of Judicial Administration related to needed judicial reform. In the fall of 1958, President Ross Malone of the American Bar Association appointed a Special Committee on Court Congestion, which has been charged with the responsibility to deter-

mine and report those solutions to the delay problem which can be best implemented by practicing lawyers. The Committee's recent report, "Ten Cures for Court Congestion," contains a synthesis of such solutions.

Many state and local bar associations have committees working in conjunction with local courts on the delay problem. Recently there was organized the Conference of State Trial Judges, which should prove to be an extremely effective organization in the attack of the delay problem.

From its inception, the American Judicature Society has fostered judicial reform. Its scholarly and influential *Journal* has given thoughtful and effective attention to the problems of lagging justice. Since early 1957, the Project on Congestion in the Courts of the American Bar Foundation, in addition to its own continuing studies, has in its monthly publication, *Court Congestion*, printed references to and frequently digests of the literature in this area and comments on significant developments throughout the country.

The important work of these organizations is being supplemented by detailed research now being conducted by a number of current projects. Numbered among these are the Jury Project of the University of Chicago Law School, the Project for Effective Justice of Columbia University Law School, the Judicial Administration Project of the Institute of Legal Research, and the Joint Research Project in Court Calendar Congestion of Columbia University and the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.

Numerous state legislatures and the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate are approaching the problem with a rolled-up-sleeves attitude. Pending and proposed legislation, designed to clear court calendars, is being

given intensive study and being readied for legislative action.

A DETERMINED WILL

In spite of the persistent history and current intensity of court congestion, the problem of lagging justice cannot be regarded as insoluble. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. has suggested a warning sounded by his former associate when he said, "Arthur Vanderbilt once said that this job of improving judicial administration is no job for the short-winded."¹⁹ In specific reference to the problem of lagging justice, Chief Justice Warren has added, however, a note of encouragement by quoting the same source. The Chief Justice has said,

¹⁹ THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S CONFERENCE ON COURT CONGESTION AND DELAY IN LITIGATION PROCEEDINGS 109 (June 16 and 17, 1958).

"Arthur Vanderbilt never tired of saying that the problem of delay could be solved. 'The practical solutions of these problems,' he said, 'given a real determination to do so, is much simpler than most people suspect. It is not knowledge of ways and means that we lack; it is the will to put them into effect.'"²⁰

This strenuous activity to find and implement solutions to lagging justice suggests, without much measure of doubt, that there is a "will" to do the job. It is as clearly demonstrable that a solution must be found. William Gladstone is given credit with having first said, "Justice delayed is justice denied." Irrespective of the authorship of that frequently repeated aphorism, it is nonetheless patently true. It remains and is intensely the responsibility of society to assure justice by removal of delay.

²⁰ 44 (No. 11) A.B.A.J. 1045 (Nov. 1958).

The Situation in 1959*

By MILTON D. GREEN

ABSTRACT: Delay in the courts, although not a new complaint, has been the subject of much current discussion. Delay, as used in the present article, is the time interval between the point when a case is "at issue" and the trial. In the federal courts this period varies from 4.1 months to 39.1 months. In the state courts it varies from 1.0 month to 52.9 months. During the last seven years delay in the federal courts has increased, whereas delay in the state courts has decreased.

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* The data was assembled and most of the charts and tables were prepared by Arnold B. Firestone, Research Assistant of the Institute.

THE law's delay is not a new disease of our social order. It is a chronic complaint. In recent years, however, it has been the subject of widespread comment in the press,¹ in popular magazines,² and law journals.³ The Chief Justice of the United States has repeatedly stressed the seriousness of the problem in his annual addresses to the American Law Institute. Last May, in an unprecedented action, he suggested to the Institute that it undertake a comprehensive study of certain aspects of the problem. The Judicial Conference of the United States, in its annual meetings, has struggled with the question. The Attorney-General of the United States has called national conferences on Court Congestion and Delay in Litigation. The American Bar Association has appointed a special committee on the subject, and it also publishes *Court Congestion*, a monthly newsletter, which digests recent articles, speeches, and projects.

With so much activity in the field one would expect that the nature and scope

¹ *New York Times Magazine*, February 21, 1954; *New York Times*, January 18-24, 1954 (series of six articles); *New York Times Magazine*, February 27, 1955; *Chicago Tribune*, September 14, 1955; *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, June 17, 18, 19, 1956; *Chicago American*, May 2-5, 1956; *Los Angeles Examiner*, July 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 1956; *Pittsburgh Post Gazette*, September 3-7, 1956.

² *Life*, November 10, 1952; *This Week Magazine*, September 1951; *The Rotarian*, July 1953; *Saturday Evening Post*, November 1951; *Time*, February 1, 1955; October 17, 1955; *Reader's Digest*, November 1956; *U. S. News and World Report*, December 1954; *Coronet*, September 1956.

³ Fannie J. Klein, *Congestion and Delay: A Selected Bibliography of Recent Materials* (Institute of Judicial Administration, May 1958). It lists 250 items, a majority of which are articles in law reviews and bar journals, and appears also in U. S. ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S CONFERENCE ON COURT CONGESTION AND DELAY IN LITIGATION PROCEEDINGS at 213-45 (June 16, 17, 1958).

of the problem would have been clearly defined. Is court congestion a general condition throughout the United States? Is the problem more acute in the state courts than it is in the federal courts? Is it getting better or worse? Contrary to what one might expect, accurate and comprehensive answers to these questions are not readily available.⁴ There are several reasons why this is so. In the first place there is no uniform method of keeping and reporting judicial statistics. This observation does not apply to the federal courts for which excellent statistics are available from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. In the state courts, however, the situation is quite different. The administrative organization of the courts varies from state to state, as does the method of keeping records and reporting statistics. In the second place, the practices and procedures in the state courts may vary to such an extent that accurate comparison is difficult or impossible. In the third place, there is no general agreement upon the yardstick that shall be used for the measurement of delay.

DELAY DEFINED

In common parlance the term delay is used to signify abnormal lapse of time.

⁴ This statement should be qualified. Ever since the establishment of the Administrative Office of United States Courts (28 U.S.C. § 601) accurate statistics have been kept, and annual reports made on the business of the federal courts. Studies have been made of a few state courts in large metropolitan areas. H. Ziesel, H. Kalven, Jr., and B. Buchholz's *Delay in the Court* (Little, Brown, 1959) is a detailed study of the Supreme Court of New York County (Manhattan); *A Survey of Metropolitan Trial Courts—Los Angeles Area* (Haynes Foundation, Los Angeles, California, 1956); *Survey of Metropolitan Courts—Detroit Area* (Michigan Legal Studies, University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1950); and *Delay and Congestion in the Superior Court of Maricopa County, Arizona*

When we say a shipment of goods was delayed in transit we are not referring to the normal amount of time it would take to send the goods from one point to the other; we are referring to the extra, or abnormal time consumed. If there has been a delay—extension of the time which might reasonably be expected—it is chargeable to some cause. The cause may have been a flood or a fire or some other circumstances beyond the control of the carrier. On the other hand, the delay may have resulted from the negligence of someone or the inefficiency of the operation.

Delay in the administration of justice should likewise signify the extra or abnormal time which might reasonably be expected to bring a case to trial. Here again delay is chargeable to some cause. It could be due to the negligence of the party who has waited an unreasonable length of time before consulting a lawyer. Or it could be due to the negligence of the lawyer in failing to prosecute his client's case with reasonable diligence. Or it could be due to the inefficiency of the machinery of justice. Or it could be a combination. What we are concerned with, in the present article, is delay resulting from inefficiency in the administration of justice, or, in brief, court-caused delay.⁵

THE MEASUREMENT OF DELAY

Even choosing a yardstick to measure delay "turns out to be a complex and interesting matter," as the University of Chicago Law School study shows.⁶ The authors point out that the numerical size of the case backlog of a court is not a

(Institute of Judicial Administration, 1955). Other studies of individual courts have been done or are in progress.

⁵ The present study is restricted to civil actions in which the problem is most acute. Criminal cases are not included.

⁶ H. Zeisel, H. Kalven, Jr., and B. Buchholz, *Delay in the Court* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1959), pp. 43-57.

reliable guide because such a small fraction of cases filed ever reaches the trial stage. Nor is the waiting time between the date the suit was filed and the date of trial a satisfactory measure due to the fact that much of the elapsed time may have been due to the voluntary action of the parties. The situation may be further complicated if the court establishes separate calendars for different types of cases and gives priority to certain categories.

For the purposes of the present article the yardstick which has been chosen to measure delay is the time interval (recorded in months, or fractions) between the date when the case is "at issue" and the date when it reaches trial. Without a detailed field study of all the state courts this seems to be a relatively fair way to measure court-caused delay. Theoretically a case is ready for trial when it is "at issue."⁷ Practically this may not be so. In some jurisdictions a case automatically goes on the trial calendar when it is "at issue," in others the attorneys must take the initiative of placing it there, and in still others it will not be placed upon the calendar until the parties have filed a certificate of readiness.⁸ Moreover, even after a case is on the trial calendar the parties may agree to voluntary post-

⁷ Considerable difficulty is encountered in ascribing a precise meaning to the term "at issue." It usually refers to the status of a case when final pleadings on both sides have been filed and preliminary motions have been disposed of. In some jurisdictions, however, the term is used in a different sense. For instance, in New Jersey a case is considered "at issue" when the first answering pleading is filed, whereas in New York a case is not considered "at issue" until the pleadings have been completed, all preliminary motions made and determined, and a certificate filed by the attorneys indicating that the case is ready for trial.

⁸ This point was demonstrated by a pilot study conducted by the Institute of Judicial Administration. See its *Calendar Status Study* (1957), pp. 11-13.

ponements which should not be charged to delay. Notwithstanding the infirmities inherent in choosing "at issue" as the starting point in computing delay, it is believed that it yields more accurate average results than if some other point were chosen, especially in view of the absence or dearth of reliable statistics on other possible starting points. The terminal point for measuring delay is the date the trial begins. It could, of course, be argued that by choosing this point, delay occurring during the course of the trial is left out of consideration. This is true, but to use the end of the trial as the terminal point would be impractical due to the fact that the length of a trial varies according to the type and complexity of the case. The simplicity or complexity of a case may have impacts on time intervals before the case is "at issue" and after it comes to trial, but should not appreciably affect the time interval between those two points.

Ideally, a case should be tried as soon as the parties are ready; hence any time interval between "at issue" and trial could be labeled delay. Practically, there is almost always some time interval which is regarded as necessary, inevitable, or normal.⁹ Without attempting to specify what this interval is, or should be, the present article will simply undertake to indicate the current condition of court congestion by reporting

⁹ What constitutes a "normal" time interval is, of course, a matter of opinion. The Judicial Conference of the United States has taken the position that six months is a "normal" interval from the filing of the case to trial. See its 1958 ANN. REP. 5, 72; also 1956 ANN. REP. 5. The Executive Committee of the Attorney-General's Conference on Court Congestion and Delay in Litigation also adopted this six-month period "as a guide in determining whether trial court calendars are current." Arthur T. Vanderbilt, *Improving the Administration of Justice—Two Decades of Development* (University of Cincinnati, 1957), p. 5.

the number of months elapsing between "at issue" and trial.

SOURCES OF DATA

The information about the federal courts was taken from the *Annual Report* of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.¹⁰ This information may be regarded as official since the act of Congress establishing the office makes it the duty of the director to "examine the state of the dockets of the courts" and to submit an annual report of "the state of the business of the courts."¹¹ No such official source is available for the state courts. The information in regard to them was obtained from the Institute of Judicial Administration, a nonprofit corporation which was established in 1952.¹² Beginning in 1953, the Institute has published an annual *Calendar Status Study* of state trial courts of general jurisdiction. Until 1957 the study contained compilations of figures showing the average time required to obtain a trial in all cases, jury and nonjury, personal injury and otherwise. Since 1957, the figures are limited to personal injury jury cases.¹³ Information for the present article was obtained from the 1959 study.¹⁴

¹⁰ Submitted to the Chief Justice of the United States on September 2, 1959.

¹¹ 28 U.S. Code § 604.

¹² The Institute's offices are located at 40 Washington Square South, New York 12, New York.

¹³ The reason for the change is explained in the 1957 study: "Past studies included jury and nonjury cases, personal injury or otherwise. As a result of experience, as well as conferences and discussions with court administrators and others, we believe that personal injury cases are the principal source of calendar delays. Furthermore, we feel that time intervals in personal injury jury cases are often correlated with intervals in other cases and therefore furnish an index of calendar congestion in general."

¹⁴ This study reports on 99 trial courts of general jurisdiction located in 48 states and the District of Columbia. The study contains

The federal statistics measure delay in terms of median time intervals whereas the state court statistics use averages. This is unfortunate but unavoidable, since no other statistics for state courts on a nation-wide basis are available. It is not as serious, however, as it might appear at first blush. Valid comparisons between individual federal courts and between individual state courts can be made, because the method of computation within each system is uniform. It is only when comparisons are made between federal courts and state courts that the results are open to question. Even here the results are illuminating because medians tend to be slightly shorter than averages.¹⁵ This gives the federal courts the advantage, but in spite of it they make a poorer showing, as the subsequent analysis will demonstrate.

THE FEDERAL COURTS

There are eighty-six United States district courts, apportioned among ten judi-

the following cautionary statement: "In many jurisdictions the figures furnished are not based upon genuine statistical studies. Such studies are conducted in only a relatively few jurisdictions. Where they are, the Institute is happy to use the resulting figures. Where they are not, however, only estimates can be obtained. It is impossible for the Institute to look behind the figures reported by its sources. This would call for on-the-spot studies of almost a hundred courts, the cost of which would be beyond the resources of the Institute."

¹⁵ 1959 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U. S. COURTS DIRECTOR'S REP. at II-24 states: "The median in general is shorter than the average in judicial time figures." The accuracy of this statement is demonstrated, in respect to the federal courts in Delaware, by THE OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS FIELD STUDY (Cotter Report, 1959), p. 11, footnote 5. It is also verified by an analysis of delay in state trial courts in thirteen counties in New York, where, in every instance, median delay was shorter than average delay. 1959 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ANN. REP. 48.

cial circuits. They entered the year on July 1, 1958, with a backlog of 68,168 civil cases to which were added an additional 57,800 new filings during the course of the year.¹⁶ Approximately 45 per cent of the litigation occurs in twelve of these district courts, all of which are located in large metropolitan areas.¹⁷ Fifty-one of the district courts had fewer than 25 cases which terminated on jury trials during 1959, and as to those, statistics on delay are not available.¹⁸ Of the balance of 35 districts courts the period of delay varied from 4.1 months in Maryland to 39.1 months in the eastern district of New York (Brooklyn).¹⁹ Figure 1 indicates the amount of delay existing in each of these district courts for the year 1959.

If six months should be considered a normal period of delay between the time a case is "at issue" and the trial date, it would appear that thirty of the district courts are experiencing excessive delay in periods ranging from 0.3 month to 33.1 months.

In order to see how the situation in


¹⁶ 1959 U. S. DISTRICT COURTS ANN. REP. at I-1. Taken in isolation the work-load of the federal courts appears large. It should be remembered, however, that they are courts of limited jurisdiction. The great bulk of litigation is carried by the state courts. In fiscal year 1959 the number of new civil cases filed in the New York State Supreme Court was 59,073 more than the total filings of civil cases in all of the federal courts. (Information supplied by The Judicial Conference of the State of New York in letter dated October 19, 1959.)

¹⁷ 1959 ANN. REP. at I-25, 26, 27.

¹⁸ 1959 ANN. REP., Table C 6, footnote 1, which explains that "figures based on less than 25 cases are not considered statistically reliable."

¹⁹ These statistics and the ones immediately following are taken from the 1959 ANN. REP. Jury Tried Cases portion of Table C 6. Jury tried cases, rather than all cases, were selected in order to equate them with the state court statistics and thus secure a better basis of comparison.

Fig. 1. DELAY IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, 1959



1959 compares with previous years, charts have been prepared for seven district courts located in large population areas. (See Fig. 2.) It will be seen that in the eastern district of New York (Brooklyn) the trend has been irregular but upward, increasing from 24.1 months in 1953 to 39.1 months in 1959. In the western district of Pennsylvania (Pittsburgh) there is also an upward trend, but a more regular rise, from 18.7 months in 1953 to 34.4 months in 1959. The eastern district of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia) shows a rather sharp increase, from 20.1 months in 1953 to 30.8 in 1956, but then a decline in 1957 and 1958 with a small rise in 1959 for a net rise of 3.1 months for the period. The southern district of New York (Manhattan) shows a marked improvement from 38.3 months in 1953 to 18.8 months in 1959. In the northern district of Illinois (Chicago) the irregular

trend has been upward from 11.9 to 14. In California the southern district (Los Angeles) shows a slight increase, while the northern district (San Francisco) shows a slight decrease.

Viewing the country as a whole, one will find that during this seven-year period delay in the United States district courts has increased from 7.5 months in 1953 to 11 months in 1959.

STATE COURTS

Seven years ago the Institute of Judicial Administration began its calendar status study of delay in state trial courts of general jurisdiction. Obviously it could not undertake a study of all such trial courts in the United States. It chose the principal trial courts in each of the forty-eight states. This year, in its published study, it has presented, in tabular form, not only the current pic-






Fig. 3. DELAY IN STATE COURTS: NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREAS, 1953-59.

ture but the figures for previous years. Herewith reproduced is the table from the 1959 study. (See Appendix, Table 1.)

As in the case of the federal courts, charts have been prepared for courts in large population areas, corresponding as nearly as possible with the federal courts in the same areas.²⁰ Also, as in the case


²⁰ Complete correspondence is impossible. For this reason the four courts in the metropolitan area of New York City have been reproduced on one page.

of the federal courts there is very little uniformity of patterns or trends. For example, of the four courts in the area of metropolitan New York, during the period in question, two show a marked decrease in delay,²¹ one shows a moderate decrease,²² and one shows a slight increase.²³ (Fig. 3.)

²¹ Kings County, decrease of 32 months; New York, decrease of 19 months.

²² Bronx, decrease of 6 months.

²³ Queens, increase of 2 months.



Cook County, Illinois (Chicago) shows an increase of 20.3 months. Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania shows an increase of 16 months. Allegheny County, Pennsylvania (Pittsburgh) shows a decrease of 6 months. San Francisco County, California shows an increase of 6 months. And Los Angeles County, California shows an increase of 3 months. (Fig. 4.)

The individual differences which are reflected by these graphs have a tendency to offset each other. Nevertheless, viewing the country as a whole, a trend can be detected, and it is in the right direction. Over the seven-year period, there has been a modest improvement of 1.4 months.

The current condition of delay in the state courts for 1959 is shown in figure 5.









Fig. 4. DELAY IN STATE COURTS IN METROPOLITAN AREAS, 1953-59.



Upon the assumption that a time interval up to six months between "at issue" and trial is reasonable, or normal, then, of the ninety-nine courts covered by the study, forty-nine are subject to excessive delay.²⁴

FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS COMPARED

The greatest single instances of delay occur in the state courts. The two major state courts in Cook County, Illinois have average delays of 52.9 months and 50.3 months. Each exceeds the federal court showing the greatest delay,²⁵ one by 13.8 months and the other by 11.2 months. The other state court which exceeds the federal court exhibiting the greatest delay is the New York Supreme Court for Queen's County which shows a 4.9-month excess.

These special situations are not, however, typical of the general picture. During the seven-year period covered by the present study, the state courts make much the better record. In 1953 average delay in the state courts stood at 11.5 months, which was 4.0 months higher than average delay in the federal courts for the same period. But the state courts improved their average position by 1959, reducing the period of delay by 1.4 months. The federal courts, on the other hand, showed an average increase of delay of 3.5 months.

²⁴ The following are the states, together with the number of months which each exceeds the assumed norm of six:

Alabama	2.0
Arizona	6.5
California	
Los Angeles	9.0
San Francisco	8.0
Alameda	5.5
San Diego	11.0
Sacramento	7.0
Connecticut	
Hartford	14.3
New Haven	18.6
Bridgeport	18.4

This comparison is graphically illustrated in figure 6.

Figure 6 is designed to depict trends

Florida	
Miami	1.0
Georgia	4.0
Illinois	
County Ct., Cook Co.	44.3
Superior Ct., Cook Co.	46.9
Indiana	
Sup. Ct., St. Joseph Co.	6.0
Kansas	
Sedgwick County	6.3
Wyandotte County	3.0
Maryland	5.6
Massachusetts	
Suffolk Co.	3.0
Worcester Co.	5.0
Hampden Co.	5.0
Michigan	
Wayne Co.	10.0
Genesee Co.	3.0
Minnesota	
Hennepin Co.	7.0
Ramsey Co.	5.0
Missouri	
Jackson Co.	15.0
Nebraska	14.3
New Hampshire	16.0
New Jersey	
Essex Co.	7.7
Hudson Co.	9.5
Mercer Co.	2.3
New York	
Kings Co.	15.0
New York Co.	18.0
Queens Co.	38.0
Bronx Co.	18.0
Erie Co.	8.0
Ohio	
Cuyahoga Co.	14.0
Franklin Co.	12.0
Lucas Co.	6.0
Pennsylvania	
Philadelphia Co.	18.0
Allegheny Co.	13.0
Rhode Island	5.4
South Carolina	7.0
Tennessee	
Knox Co.	4.0
Texas	
Harris Co.	12.0
Dallas	3.0
Washington	
King Co.	.1
Wisconsin	.4
District of Columbia	10.0

²⁵ New York, 2d Circuit, Eastern District.




Fig. 6. COMPARISON OF DELAY IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, 1953-59.

based on national averages. Table 2 is a specific breakdown of the situation as it exists in 1959, to illustrate the comparative position of state and federal courts in each of the states. (See Appendix.)

SUMMARY

Delay is measured by the time interval which elapses between the point when a case is "at issue" and the trial. In the federal courts this period varies from 4.1 months to 39.1 months. During the seven-year period from 1953 to 1959 the trend in individual federal

courts has varied, but on the whole there has been an increase of delay from 7.5 months to 11 months. In the state courts, where the delay varies from 1.0 month to 52.9 months, there has also been a variance in individual courts, but the over-all picture shows a decrease in delay from 11.5 months to 10.1 months. As of 1959, both the federal courts and the state courts are suffering from excessive delays in the trial of civil cases, but the state courts are showing more progress in solving the problem than are the federal courts.

APPENDIX

TABLE 1—INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
Calendar Status Study—1959

STATE	CITY AND POPULATION	TRIAL COURT OF GENERAL JURISDICTION (and County Population)	AVERAGE NUMBER OF MONTHS ELAPSING FROM "AT ISSUE" TO TRIAL (for years 1953-1956 inclusive, figures refer to all jury cases. For 1957, 1958, and 1959, figures refer only to personal injury jury cases)						
			1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
Alabama	Birmingham (326,037)	Circuit Court, Jefferson County (558,928)	6	6	6	—	6	7	8
Arizona	Phoenix (128,841)	Superior Court, Maricopa County (331,770)	—	—	10	10	10.5	10.5	12.5
Arkansas	Little Rock (102,213)	Circuit Court, Pulaski County (196,685)	5.5	5.7	3.5	5	4	4	3.5
California	Los Angeles (2,243,901)	Superior Court, Los Angeles County (4,151,687)	12	11.5	13	15	11.5	14	15
	San Francisco (775,357)	Superior Court, San Francisco County (775,357)	8	8	9	12	16	12	14*
	Oakland (384,575)	Superior Court, Alameda County (740,315)	6.5	9	7.5	6	9	11	11.5
	San Diego (494,201)	Superior Court, San Diego County (556,808)	10	11	11	8	12.5	14	17
	Sacramento (157,182)	Superior Court, Sacramento County (277,140)	4	4	3.5	3	5	7.5	13
Colorado	Denver (415,786)	District Court, Denver County (415,786)	6	—	8.5	12	8	9	6
Connecticut	Hartford (177,397)	Superior Court, Hartford County (539,661)	30	24	27	25	28	28.5	20.3
	New Haven (164,443)	Superior Court, New Haven County (545,784)	24.3	26	22	20	21.5	15.1	24.6
	Bridgeport (158,709)	Superior Court, Fairfield County (504,342)	29	30	34	34	36	31.5	24.4
Delaware	Wilmington (110,356)	Superior Court, New Castle County (218,879)	—	2	2	—	6	6	3
Florida	Miami (259,035)	Circuit Court, Dade County (850,000)	6	6	6	6	6	6	7
	Jacksonville (204,517)	Circuit Court, Duval County (304,029)	2.9	2.4	3	2.8	2.8	3	3†
	Tampa (124,681)	Circuit Court, Hillsborough County (249,894)	2	2.5	3.7	—	2.7	3.2	4.0
	Atlanta (331,314)	Superior Court, Fulton County (473,572)	5	4.5	9	17	9	9	10
Idaho	Boise (34,383)	District Court, Ada County (70,649)	—	—	2	2	2	3	3
Illinois	Chicago (3,620,962)	Circuit Court, Cook County (4,508,792)	24	36	30	30	30	38.2	50.3
		Superior Court, Cook County	32.6	36	40	—	54	57.3	52.9

* Figure is median interval for pre-tried civil jury cases.
† Current figures not available. 1958 figure is used.
Population figures are taken from the 1959 World Almanac, except Dade County, Florida, which is based on a study by the University of Miami.
For explanation of specific figures, consult study for the year concerned.

TABLE 1—Continued

STATE	CITY AND POPULATION	TRIAL COURT OF GENERAL JURISDICTION (and County Population)	AVERAGE NUMBER OF MONTHS ELAPSING FROM "AT ISSUE" TO TRIAL (for years 1953-1956 inclusive, figures refer to all jury cases. For 1957, 1958, and 1959, figures refer only to personal injury jury cases)						
			1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
Illinois—Cont.	Rock Island (48,710)	Circuit Court, Rock Island County, etc. (133,558)	4	4	4	4	4	4	5
Indiana	Indianapolis (461,654)	Circuit Court, Marion County (551,777)	5	4	8	2	2†	2†	3†
	Fort Wayne (144,879)	Circuit Court, Allen County (183,722)	3	3	3	2	6	3	§
	Gary (168,884)	Circuit Court, Lake County (368,152)	3	3	3	5.5	3.5	4	5
	South Bend (131,770)	Circuit Court, St. Joseph County (205,058) Superior Court, St. Joseph County	8	8	3	3	3	3	3†
Iowa	Des Moines (177,965)	District Court, Polk County (226,010)	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2	2.5	2.5
Kansas	Wichita (168,279)	District Court, Sedgwick County (222,290)	—	8.8	8	13	8.9	8	12.3
	Kansas City (129,553)	District Court, Wyandotte County (165,318)	—	—	15	12	12	10	9
Kentucky	Louisville (369,129)	Circuit Court, Jefferson County (484,615)	7	5	1.5	1.5	4	4.8	4.8
Louisiana	New Orleans (570,445)	Civil District Court, Orleans Parish (570,445)	2.5	3	3	1.5	.9	.9	1
	Shreveport (127,206)	District Court, Caddo Parish (176,547)	2.5	2	2	2	.9	.9	2
Maine	Portland (77,634)	Superior Court, Cumberland County (169,201)	4	4	4	4	4.5	2	3
Maryland	Baltimore (949,708)	Common Law Courts, Baltimore City (949,708)	10	10	14	—	15.6	11.3	11.6
Massachusetts	Boston (801,444)	Superior Court, Suffolk County (896,615)	32	34	31	30	30	11.2	9
	Worcester (203,486)	Superior Court, Worcester County (546,401)	42	42	46	40	11	10.2	11
	Springfield (162,399)	Superior Court, Hampden County (397,971)	24	25	27	26	21	8.2	11
Michigan	Detroit (1,849,568)	Circuit Court, Wayne County (2,435,235)	—	—	13	9	17	17.2	16¶
	Grand Rapids (176,515)	Circuit Court, Kent County (288,292)	3	3	6	5	4.3	5.1	4¶
	Flint (163,143)	Circuit Court, Genesee County (270,963)	2.8	2.5	2.5	1.2	17	9.3	9¶
Minnesota	Minneapolis (521,718)	District Court, Hennepin County (676,579)	18	12	12	12	12	12	13
	St. Paul (311,349)	District Court, Ramsey County (355,332)	9.5	10	15	12	12	12	11
Mississippi	Jackson (98,271)	Circuit Court, Hinds County (142,164)	—	3	3	—	2.5	2.5	2.5

† 1957, 1958, and 1959 figures not available. 1956 figure for all civil jury cases is used.
‡ The Court Clerk has advised that "In the past year no personal injury case has been tried before a jury."
§ Figure is for all civil jury cases.
¶ Figure used is median figure for all civil jury cases.
† Current figures not available.

TABLE 1—Continued

STATE	CITY AND POPULATION	TRIAL COURT OF GENERAL JURISDICTION (and County Population)	AVERAGE NUMBER OF MONTHS ELAPSING FROM "AT ISSUE" TO TRIAL (for years 1953-1956 inclusive, figures refer to all jury cases. For 1957, 1958, and 1959, figures refer only to personal injury jury cases)						
			1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
Missouri	St. Louis (856,796)	Circuit Court, City of St. Louis (856,796)	4.5	9	11	11	6	6	5
	Kansas City (456,622)	Circuit Court, Jackson County (541,035)	24	24	14	10	21	21**	21**
Montana	Great Falls (39,214)	District Court, Cascade County (53,027)	9	—	9	—	4	3.5	4
Nebraska	Omaha (251,117)	District Court, Douglas County (281,020)	—	3	3	10.4	10.4††	10.4††	20.3
Nevada	Reno (32,497)	District Court, Washoe County (50,205)	3	3	3	4	3	3	4
New Hampshire	Manchester (82,732)	Superior Court, Hillsborough County (156,987)	30	30	27	—	18	18	22
New Jersey	Newark (438,776)	Superior and County Courts, Essex County (905,949)	5.5	6	—	8.3	10.7	11.6	13.7
	Jersey City (299,017)	Superior and County Courts Hudson County (647,437)	6	6	—	9.4	12.3	10.5	15.5
	Trenton (128,009)	Superior and County Courts Mercer County (229,781)	5	5	—	6.1	6.3	6.9	8.3
New Mexico	Albuquerque (96,815)	District Court, Bernalillo County (145,673)	6	6	6	6	6	10	6
New York	(Kings County) (2,738,175)	Supreme Court, Kings County (2,738,175)	53	45	38	26	25.4	13	21††
	(New York County) (1,960,101)	Supreme Court, New York County (1,794,069)	43	37	39	41	31.4	23	24
	(Queens County) (1,550,849)	Supreme Court, Queens County (1,550,849)	42	49	44	46	39	38	44††
	(Bronx County) (1,451,277)	Supreme Court, Bronx County (1,451,277)	30	36	38	39	38.9	23	24††
	Buffalo (580,132)	Supreme Court, Erie County (899,238)	7	9	9	12	1	4	14††
	Rochester (332,488)	Supreme Court, Monroe County (487,632)	5	5.5	6	6	4	2	5††
	Syracuse (214,252)	Supreme Court, Onondaga County (395,279)	3	3	3	3	3.5	3	1.5††
	Charlotte (134,042)	Superior Court, Mecklenburg County (195,052)	12	12	16	—	11	11	5.5
North Carolina	Greenboro (74,389)	Superior Court, Guilford County (191,057)	10	13	9	—	5	5.8	4
	Fargo (58,256)	District Court, Cass County (58,877)	8	7	6	4	4	5	5
Ohio	Cleveland (914,808)	Court of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga County (1,389,532)	17	18.9	—	23.5	30	26.5	20

** Current figures not available. 1957 figure used.

†† 1957 and 1958 figures not available. 1956 figure for all civil jury cases is used.

|| Figure is for all civil jury cases except contract cases.

|| Figure is for all civil jury cases.

TABLE 1—Continued

STATE	CITY AND POPULATION	TRIAL COURT OF GENERAL JURISDICTION (and County Population)	AVERAGE NUMBER OF MONTHS ELAPSING FROM "AT ISSUE" TO TRIAL (for years 1953-1956 inclusive, figures refer to all jury cases. For 1957, 1958, and 1959, figures refer only to personal injury jury cases)						
			1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
Ohio—Cont.	Cincinnati (503,998)	Court of Common Pleas, Hamilton County (723,952)	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	Columbus (375,901)	Court of Common Pleas, Franklin County (503,410)	18	17	22	18	16	18	18
	Toledo (303,616)	Court of Common Pleas, Lucas County (395,551)	—	9.5	—	6	11	11	12
	Akron (274,605)	Court of Common Pleas, Summit County (410,032)	14	14	20.8	—	7.5	5	4
	Youngstown (168,330)	Court of Common Pleas, Mahoning County (257,629)	6	8	3	5	7.5	7.5	4.5
Oklahoma	Oklahoma City (243,504)	District Court, Oklahoma County (325,352)	1	1	1	1	2	3	4
	Tulsa (182,740)	District Court, Tulsa County (251,686)	2	2	3	3.5	4	6	3.5
Oregon	Portland (373,628)	Circuit Court, Multnomah County (471,537)	10	7.5	6	—	6	8	3
Pennsylvania	Philadelphia (2,071,605)	Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia Co. (2,071,605)	8	9.5	10.5	10.5	14	14	24
	Pittsburgh (676,806)	Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County (1,515,237)	25	21	23	24	26	22	19
	Scranton (125,536)	Court of Common Pleas, Lackawanna County (257,396)	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	3
	Allentown (106,756)	Court of Common Pleas, Lehigh County (198,207)	5	5	3	2.5	1.5	3	3
	Media (5,726)	Court of Common Pleas, Delaware County (414,234)	5.5	5.5	5	2.5	3	2.5	2.3
Rhode Island	Providence (248,674)	Superior Court (Providence & Bristol Co.'s—604,052)	10.5	12.6	13.5	15	11.3	11.3	11.4
South Carolina	Greenville (58,161)	Circuit Court, Greenville County (168,152)	18	12	12	14	9	6	13
South Dakota	Sioux Falls (52,696)	Circuit Court, Minnehaha County (70,910)	1.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	1.6	2.2	1.5
Tennessee	Memphis (488,550)	Circuit Court, Shelby County (482,393)	3.2	4	3	2	2	3	3
	Nashville (174,307)	Circuit Court, Davidson County (321,758)	4	4	4	3	2	3	2
	Chattanooga (131,041)	Circuit Court, Hamilton County (208,255)	3	3	3	3	3	3	5.5
	Knoxville (124,769)	Circuit Court, Knox County (223,007)	9	10	4	2	3	6	10
Texas	Houston (596,163)	District Court, Harris County (806,701)	18	18	16	16	16	12.5	18

|| Figure is for all civil jury cases.

TABLE 1—Continued

STATE	CITY AND POPULATION	TRIAL COURT OF GENERAL JURISDICTION (and County Population)	AVERAGE NUMBER OF MONTHS ELAPSING FROM "AT ISSUE" TO TRIAL (for years 1953-1956 inclusive, figures refer to all jury cases. For 1957, 1958, and 1959, figures refer only to personal injury jury cases)						
			1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
Texas—Cont.	Dallas (434,462)	District Court, Dallas County (614,799)	9	9	15	15	14	11	9
	San Antonio (408,442)	District Court, Bexar County (500,460)	18	12	12	6	6	3	3
	Fort Worth (278,778)	District Court, Tarrant County (361,253)	3	3.5	4	—	3	5	3
	El Paso (130,485)	District Court, El Paso County (194,968)	28	18	18	2	6	4	3
Utah	Salt Lake City (182,121)	District Court Salt Lake County (274,895)	5.5	8	8.5	10.5	14	1	1
Vermont	Burlington (33,155)	County Court, Chittenden County (62,570)	4.5	6	6	6	6	6	6
Virginia	Richmond (230,310)	Law and Equity Court, City of Richmond (230,310)	—	8	2	2	3.7	3.5	3.5
	Norfolk (213,513)	Circuit Court, Norfolk City (213,513)	2.5	2.5	3	1	3.6	2	2
Washington	Seattle (467,591)	Superior Court, King County (732,992)	3	3.5	5	5.8	7	6.7	6.1
	Spokane (161,721)	Superior Court, Spokane County (221,561)	1.5	1.5	1.5	1	1.5	2	2
West Virginia	Charleston (73,501)	Circuit Court, Kanawha County (239,629)	6	6	8	3	6	6	2
Wisconsin	Milwaukee (637,392)	Circuit Court, Milwaukee County (871,047)	30	24	—	—	9	8.5	6.4
Wyoming	Cheyenne (31,935)	District Court, Laramie County (47,662)	11	7	7	3	6	6	6
District of Columbia	Washington (802,178)	U. S. District Court, Dist. of Columbia (802,178)	—	—	22	21	24	21	16

|| Figure is for all civil jury cases.

TABLE 2—STATE BY STATE COMPARISON OF DELAY IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS, 1959

The Figures in the Right Hand Column Indicate the Number of Months Delay by which One Court Exceeds the Other

(f) Federal courts exceed state courts

(s) State courts exceed federal courts

STATE FEDERAL CIRCUIT & DISTRICT COUNTY (COUNTY SEAT)	STATE TRIAL COURT OF GENERAL JURISDICTION	MONTHS GAP
Alabama		
5th—Northern Jefferson (Birmingham)	Circuit	s 2.7
California		
9th—Northern Alameda (Oakland)	Superior	s .8
9th—Northern Sacramento (Sacramento)	Superior	s 2.3
9th—Northern San Francisco (San Francisco)	Superior	s 3.3
9th—Southern Los Angeles (Los Angeles)	Superior	s 6.1
9th—Southern San Diego (San Diego)	Superior	s 8.1
Florida		
5th—Southern Dade (Miami)	Circuit	f 3.4
5th—Southern Duval (Jacksonville)	Circuit	f 7.4
5th—Southern Hillsborough (Tampa)	Circuit	f 6.4
Georgia		
5th—Northern Fulton (Atlanta)	Superior	f 9.6
Illinois		
7th—Northern Cook (Chicago)	Circuit	s 36.3
7th—Northern Cook (Chicago)	Superior	s 38.9
Kansas		
10th— Sedgwick (Wichita)	District	s 1.6
10th— Wyandotte (Kansas City)	District	f 1.7
Kentucky		
6th—Western Jefferson (Louisville)	Circuit	f 1.5

TABLE 2—Continued

STATE FEDERAL CIRCUIT & DISTRICT COUNTY (COUNTY SEAT)	STATE TRIAL COURT OF GENERAL JURISDICTION	MONTHS GAP
Louisiana		
5th—Eastern Orleans Parish (New Orleans)	Civil District	f 12.0
5th—Western Caddo Parish (Shreveport)	District	f 13.4
Maryland		
4th— Baltimore City (Baltimore)	Common Law	s 7.5
Massachusetts		
1st— Suffolk (Boston)	Superior	f 4.1
1st— Worcester (Worcester)	Superior	f 2.1
1st— Hampden (Springfield)	Superior	f 2.1
Michigan		
6th—Eastern Genessee (Flint)	Circuit	f 1.8
6th—Eastern Wayne (Detroit)	Circuit	s 5.2
Minnesota		
8th— Hennepin (Minneapolis)	District	s 8.2
8th— Ramsey (St. Paul)	District	s 6.2
Missouri		
8th—Eastern City of St. Louis (St. Louis)	Circuit	f 4.1
8th—Western Jackson (Kansas City)	Circuit	s 7.
Nebraska		
8th— Douglas (Omaha)	District	s 9.9
New Jersey		
3d— Essex (Newark)	Superior & County	s 3.6
3d— Hudson (Jersey City)	Superior & County	s 5.4
3d— Mercer (Trenton)	Superior & County	f 1.8

TABLE 2—Continued

STATE FEDERAL CIRCUIT & DISTRICT COUNTY (COUNTY SEAT)	STATE TRIAL COURT OF GENERAL JURISDICTION	MONTHS GAP
New Mexico		
10th— Bernalillo (Albuquerque)	District	s .4
New York		
2d—Eastern Kings (Kings County)	Supreme	f 18.1
2d—Eastern Queens (Queens County)	Supreme	s 4.9
2d—Southern Bronx (Bronx County)	Supreme	s 5.2
2d—Southern New York (New York County)	Supreme	s 5.2
2d—Western Erie (Buffalo)	Supreme	s 3.1
2d—Western Monroe (Rochester)	Supreme	f 5.9
North Carolina		
4th—Western Mecklenberg (Charlotte)	Superior	f 3.4
Ohio		
6th—Northern Cuyahoga (Cleveland)	Court of Common Pleas	s 4.7
6th—Northern Lucas (Toledo)	Court of Common Pleas	f 3.3
6th—Northern Summit (Akron)	Court of Common Pleas	f 11.3
6th—Northern Mahoning (Youngstown)	Court of Common Pleas	f 10.8
Oregon		
9th— Multnomah (Portland)	Circuit	f 6.1
Pennsylvania		
3d—Eastern Philadelphia (Philadelphia)	Court of Common Pleas	s .6
3d—Eastern Lehigh (Allentown)	Court of Common Pleas	f 20.4
3d—Eastern Delaware (Media)	Court of Common Pleas	f 21.1
3d—Western Allegheny (Pittsburgh)	Court of Common Pleas	f 15.4

TABLE 2—Continued

STATE FEDERAL CIRCUIT & DISTRICT COUNTY (COUNTY SEAT)	STATE TRIAL COURT OF GENERAL JURISDICTION	MONTHS GAP
Tennessee		
6th—Western Shelby (Memphis)	Circuit	f 2.0
6th—Eastern Hamilton (Chattanooga)	Circuit	f 1.3
6th—Eastern Knox (Knoxville)	Circuit	s 3.2
Texas		
5th—Northern Dallas (Dallas)	District	s 1.3
5th—Northern Tarrant (Fort Worth)	District	f 4.7
5th—Southern Harris (Houston)	District	s 8.3
5th—Western Bexar (San Antonio)	District	f 3.6
5th—Western El Paso (El Paso)	District	f 3.6
Vermont		
2d— Chittenden (Burlington)	County	f 1.3
Virginia		
4th—Eastern City of Richmond (Richmond)	Law & Equity	f 6.5
4th—Eastern Norfolk City (Norfolk)	Circuit	f 8.0

Judicial Manpower Problems

By ROGER A. JOHNSEN

ABSTRACT: The overriding fact in any study of judicial manpower is that the American judiciary is undermanned. Therefore, it is increasingly important to use more efficiently the existing judicial manpower. Closer supervision of the number of days worked per trial-term and the number of hours worked per day may increase the amount of time spent in court by judges. Other suggested improvements include a more even distribution of the work-load through the use of the central case assignment system, fuller utilization of nonjudicial personnel not only for clerical matters but also for the hearing of routine motions where consent of counsel is obtained. Furthermore, to utilize fully the judicial manpower of America, a central authority in each court system should have the power to reassign judges to districts with overcrowded calendars. Lastly, certain courtroom measures could be taken to expedite the trial of cases and thereby to permit each judge to hear more cases per term. These measures are designed to use more fully the supply of judicial talent. They are not a cure for the shortage of judges which is now a problem in many of the courts in America.

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THE proper use of judicial manpower is extremely important today as we face crowded dockets, congested calendars, and excessive delays. It will be the purpose of this chapter to discuss methods of assuring the maximum utilization of our judicial manpower.

The need for a more effective utilization of our judicial resources is evident. Since 1900 the business of the federal courts has almost quadrupled while the number of federal judges has little more than doubled; state courts seem to be similarly understaffed. Moreover, the cases coming before courts today are often more complex than those heard at the turn of the century. One only has to recall some of the recent antitrust litigation or the involved medical testimony in an automobile accident case to see the complicated questions which our courts are called on to resolve.

Looking to the future, it is certain that the load of our courts will continue to grow at a rapid rate. Current thinking on such matters as labor-management relations, civil rights, and related problems can only result in increased litigation, while on the national scene, Congress continues to add to the load of the federal courts as it passes new legislation. One of the more recent examples of this tendency is the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 which, through Section 102, will probably bring many more cases before the federal district courts. The exploding birth rate and our continuing economic development as well as the spectacular advances in technology all point to an increased case-load for the judiciary. Add to this list problems world-wide in their scope which result from our position as the economic and military leader of the free world and the reader can imagine the weight of the work-load facing all levels of the American judiciary today.

THE CURRENT SHORTAGE OF JUDGES

The Chief Justice of the United States, the Honorable Earl A. Warren, described the current situation in the federal system in these words:

There is an immediate and most pressing need for additional judges. No new judgeships have been authorized for more than five years and, indeed, during that period we have lost three positions as a result of the expiration of judgeships created on a temporary basis. The last Congress had before it recommendations by the Judicial Conference for forty-five additional judgeships, many of which were contained in the Omnibus [Judgeship] Bill introduced as long ago as 1955.

This year, again, the Judicial Conference has recommended forty-three additional judgeships. These are not just requests from localities for more judges. They are recommendations of the Judicial Conference of the United States based upon serious study of statistics and conditions facing particular districts and circuits for which the additional judges have been recommended.

I regret to report that this legislation—so vital to the administration of justice in the Federal courts—has still not received the consideration of Congress.

In many places, this failure is throwing a burden on judges which they are not able to bear. If it were not for many of the retired judges who continue to serve so faithfully, we would, indeed, be in a terrible condition.¹

This then is the situation confronting the American judicial system.

Several remedies have been proposed. The most obvious of course is the creation of additional judgeships, as proposed in the omnibus judgeship bill. Of equal importance is the elimination of excessive delay in the nomination and the confirmation of new appointees. A

¹ Earl A. Warren, Chief Justice, Address before the American Law Institute, April 1959 Session.

recent report of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts states that the manpower lost in the federal courts because of these delays was the equivalent of the service rendered by approximately seventeen judges. Warren Olney, III, director of this office, states that last year approximately eleven years and ten months of judge-time were lost in the interval between the occurrence of a vacancy and the nomination to fill it. Five years and two months were lost from nomination to confirmation. The fact that this delay continues regardless of the party in power demonstrates that it may not be attributed to any political party's administration. The elaboration of a more efficient system of appointment would increase our judicial manpower without an actual increase in authorized judgeships.

A third remedy lies in the more efficient utilization of our existing judicial manpower. The absolute need for focusing attention on this measure is quite evident from the situations outlined above. This third remedy will be our major point of interest during the remaining portion of this chapter. This emphasis on the utilization of judicial manpower in no way reflects a lack of concern for the shortage of judges, nor should it be inferred from this chapter that fuller utilization of our judicial resources would be a complete substitute for the new personnel so urgently needed. In reality, improvement must be sought in both areas if the American courts are to operate without the pressure of excessive backlogs.

Judicial manpower is a rare and unique resource and should be treated as such. It is the result of intensive training, extensive learning, and introspective thinking. To waste it or to permit it to be wasted is as unthinkable as to squander any other unusual talent. On the following pages we shall con-

sider (1) methods of ensuring that this training will be at the disposal of the judicial system for the longest practical period of time during the year, and (2) those measures which will ensure that while it is at the disposal of the judicial system, it is neither squandered nor used inadvisedly.

LENGTH OF THE JUDICIAL TERM

Our first consideration is the length of the judicial term, or in other words, the number of days worked per year. A thorough study of hours worked by judges is to be found in *Delay in the Court*, by Messrs. Hans Zeisel, Harry Kalven, Jr., and Bernard Buchholz of the University of Chicago. Those portions of this chapter dealing with the New York and New Jersey courts rely heavily on their research. In the Supreme Court of New York County the sessions of the trial branches of the court commence after Labor Day and ordinarily terminate at the end of June. In 1957 there were 207 official trial days, after subtracting official holidays; this figure fell to 196 if one considered semiofficial court holidays.² The average number of trial days per judge was approximately 170 days for an over-all loss of potential trial time of 26.2 court days, or approximately 13.4 per cent of the total trial days available. The authors of *Delay in the Court* noted in passing that 36.1 per cent of the loss fell on Fridays.

The reasons for the loss of trial time are multiple. It would be erroneous to conclude that this loss could be eliminated completely. In some cases, religious holidays were involved while in other instances illnesses were a factor. In still other instances it might have been that there were no other cases ready to be heard. In any event the

² Zeisel, Kalven, and Buchholz, *Delay in the Court* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1959), p. 173 et seq.

loss represents a significant amount of unused judicial manpower.

In neighboring New Jersey, the same authors found that the judges of that state average 14 more trial days per term than their brethren in New York.³ This represents an 8.2 per cent increase in the number of trial days per year.

Statistics furnished by the Honorable Louis H. Burke, presiding Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,⁴ indicate that the average judge of that court takes a vacation of approximately one calendar month, or 21 court days per year. Time off for illness averages about 6 days per year.

Since both the judiciary of New Jersey and the Superior Court of Los Angeles County are under close managerial supervision and judges are required to file time sheets, it would appear that this requirement is one of the most effective means of reducing the loss of trial days.

In the past, the New York court has tried a different approach: it has increased the number of trial days per year by establishing a summer session. In 1956 the summer session consisted of one calendar part and five trial parts, staffed by various members of the bench who worked two weeks more than the normal term. As a result of this effort, the backlog was reduced by 134 cases, or about one seventh of its total. Stated in other terms, they accomplished the equivalent of about 1.5 judge-years. The summer session was repeated on a reduced basis in 1957 but has not been employed since. This interesting experiment warrants further study and consideration by those interested in the fuller utilization of judicial manpower during the calendar year.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

⁴ L. Burke, "Problems of Court Administration in a Metropolitan Court." Address before the National Conference on Judicial Selection and Court Administration, Edgewater Beach Hotel, Chicago, Illinois, November 23, 1959.

LENGTH OF THE TRIAL DAY

Let us now turn and consider the length of the judicial day. The authors of the New York study to which we have already referred found that the average New York court day, in those divisions under study, was 4.1 hours.⁵

This figure must be used with caution. It was derived from the records maintained by the courts' clerks of the number of hours required for the disposition of each case. The sum of the hours so recorded would be the total judge-hours per year. This figure when divided by the number of days worked gives the average number of hours per day. It must be remembered that this figure represents only the number of hours devoted to the disposition of cases and does not reflect time spent in chambers or in dealing with such administrative matters as might require attention.

It should be noted immediately that in many cases the 4.1-hour court day is determined by factors other than those under the control of the individual judge. For example, the termination of one case late in the day when another cannot be brought on for trial often causes a time loss of this type.

Since the average trial day is of less than a five-hour duration, it is easy to see the important results that could be achieved through lengthening the day by only thirty minutes. Although this might be accomplished by lengthening the duration of the judge's presence at court, it might also be accomplished through the process of freeing the judge of administrative details on which he may have to spend thirty minutes per day. One extra half-hour per day would permit the average judge to perform the equivalent of 20.7 more judge-days per year. Thus, he would have 12 per cent more judicial time at his disposal each

⁵ Zeisel, Kalven and Buchholz, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

year without lengthening the court term or resorting to summer sessions.⁶

There are basically two methods of securing this extra thirty minutes per day: (1) By freeing the judge of unnecessary administrative duties outside the court; and (2) by making certain that as rapidly as one case is terminated, the next is ready to be heard. We shall discuss both of these remedies in that order.

NONJUDICIAL ASSISTANTS

Initially, of course, there must be established a clear distinction between those duties calling for the use of judicial personnel and those which might be performed just as adequately by clerical or other nonjudicial employees. This principle is a bit more difficult of application than it might seem. Certainly the routine clerical matters are properly within the domain of the clerical personnel, and in most cases this principle is already applied. However, there are certain administrative functions which clearly require a decision by a judge and it would be unfortunate if, in our desire to free him from his administrative obligations, we strip him of the administrative authority necessary to accomplish his task.

The Superior Court of Los Angeles County has developed an interesting system of administration which gives due consideration to this dichotomy. The court has an administrative officer, who, subject to the approval of the presiding judge, is responsible for the appointment, management and discharge of all personnel, other than the commissioners who

⁶ Judge Burke, *op. cit.*, stated that judges of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County begin work at 9:00 A.M. and, with one short recess, continue until noon. Court reconvenes at 1:30 or 1:45 P.M. and adjourns at 4:00 or 4:15 P.M. A recent increase of one-half-hour trial time per day, included in the above figures, was the equivalent of adding five or six full-time judges to the court.

are directly appointed by the court. In addition, the administrator is directly responsible for the problems of recruitment, selection, and disciplinary action concerning employees, all budgetary matters, all record keeping, the gathering of statistical information, the making of special studies in the problems of administration, and the work of the jury commissioner.

On the other hand, the system recognizes that certain administrative tasks are best performed by a member of the judiciary. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County has a presiding judge who generally serves for a two-year period. His administrative responsibilities include such matters as the assignment of judges to various departments, divisions, and branches of the court and his responsibility extends to the operation of the master calendars of both the civil and criminal divisions.

Between these two fairly clearly defined areas lies an area containing questions not purely administrative but which do not necessarily warrant the close attention of a member of the bench. In Los Angeles, the call of the civil master and the hearing of motions of various kinds formerly required approximately two thirds of the time of the presiding judge. In 1958 the procedure was changed to permit a court commissioner to call the calendar and to hear the more ordinary motions such as consolidation, continuance, or change of venue. Under this system it is understood by counsel that the commissioner functions as a judge pro tempore. Should any counsel object to the procedure, he may request that the motion be heard by the presiding judge, in which case it is placed at the end of the calendar and is heard by the judge. Apparently, such requests are infrequent.

These are a few of the methods being considered by those wishing to make it possible for judges to devote more of

their time to the actual disposition of cases.

MOVING CASES TO JUDGES

As was pointed out earlier in this chapter, occasional gaps in the trial day appear with a resultant waste of the judge-time. This occurs, for example, when a case is terminated at 11:00 A.M. and it is not possible to schedule another case until 1:30 or 2:00 P.M. If this should occur several times in a month, it would have the effect of shortening trial time during that period by one judge-day.

It is frequently suggested that an even flow of cases could be attained more readily through a central assignment or master calendar system. Under this method judges do not maintain separate schedules of cases but rather each case is assigned to a central pool. When a judge disposes of one case he is immediately assigned another from the pool. Proponents of this system point out that litigants are free to have their cases heard in the first court available rather than forced to wait while the judge assigned to their case becomes involved in an unusually lengthy matter.⁷ The central assignment system is employed in Los Angeles and New Jersey as well as in several other state jurisdictions. In the criminal division of the Los Angeles Superior Court, each judge is assigned three cases a day. If at any time it should appear that for one reason or another one of the courts will

⁷ The central assignment or master calendar system has disadvantages as well as advantages. One of its most serious shortcomings is that it does not fix on each judge a personal responsibility to try a proportionate share of the court's case-load. For a very good discussion of both methods of case assignment, as well as many other problems in the field of judicial administration, see SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMM. REP., FIELD STUDY OF THE OPERATION OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (Washington, D. C.: United States Printing Office, April 1959), p. 22 *et seq.*

be unable to handle the three cases assigned for that date, the clerk of that court will call a member of the staff of the presiding judge to request the transfer of the excess cases for trial elsewhere. The staff member is in constant contact with all of the judges in the criminal division and usually is able to assign the excess cases to other courts for hearing that day. Through this procedure an even and steady flow is maintained through all of the judicial departments, thereby eliminating the one- or two-hour break during the judicial day.

MOVING JUDGES TO CASES

While it is apparent that in the larger courts, where many parallel departments or divisions exist, it often is fairly simple to transfer a matter from one division to another, the problem is not so readily resolved where great distances separate parallel courts in the same system. The problem is particularly acute on the federal level. Statistics for 1958 indicate that of the ninety-four federal district courts there were twenty-seven districts with less than one hundred private civil cases filed per judge, while twenty-two districts reported more than two hundred such cases filed per judge. The national average was one hundred sixty-seven.

Obviously in these circumstances the cases cannot seek out the judge but rather the judge must be transferred where the actions are commenced. Of course, there are often delays between the time when the need develops and the time when the transfer is finally made. A major factor restricting the wider use of transfers on the federal level has been the inadequate judicial expense allowance. Effective August 7, 1959, this allowance was increased from \$15 to \$25 per day.⁸

⁸ Pub. L. No. 138, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. 7, 1959).

It would appear that similar situations of imbalance exist in the state court systems. According to figures compiled by the administrative assistant to the Supreme Court of Ohio, the 157 common pleas judges of that state have an average of 573 filings per judge. While forty-seven judges average only 275 filings per year, 17 judges, at the other extreme, average 695, with at least 760 dispositions per judge per year. One could conclude that the placing of all common pleas judges under the administrative control of the state's Chief Justice, who would have full power of assignment, would permit a more proportionate distribution of the work-load and at the same time provide for a fuller utilization of the judicial resources of the state. The reassignment order should be binding on the reassigned judge, not dependent on his personal wishes or desires. Clearly the lack of power to enforce assignments seriously handicaps the administration of the court system.

Certainly no article on the full use of our judicial manpower would be complete without reference to the unselfish services rendered by retired members of the judiciary who are recalled to alleviate a temporary shortage of judges. In 1958 there were four assignments of two retired Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to the Court of Claims; two assignments of a retired judge of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals to the District of Columbia Circuit; and one assignment of a district judge of the Ninth Circuit to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.

FULLER USE OF COURT TIME

We have until now concerned ourselves with methods designed to increase the number of judicial hours spent in court. It is also important to consider ways of assuring that the time spent by a judge in court will be devoted as much

as possible to those problems which require his attention. We will not consider in detail the various recommendations made by the many commentators concerned with this problem, for they are thoroughly discussed in other chapters of this publication. In brief, however, one may note that there is a growing tendency to reserve the use of judicial manpower to those matters which require the decision of a judge. The Pennsylvania arbitration system, which affects all civil suits where the value claimed is under \$1,000, demonstrates a desire manifested in some quarters to substitute arbitration panels where it is felt that substantial justice might be rendered without resort to the courts.

At least equally important is the growing use of the pre-trial hearing wherein the attorneys involved in a case meet with the judge, agree to proper stipulations and provide for the marking of evidence so that the case, once in court, will be tried more quickly. This measure is designed to reserve the use of the judge's in-court-time for the central issues of the case.

Although it has not been the subject of extensive comment, it would appear that additional trial time could be saved through the enlightened assistance of the judge's court aids. As has been pointed out by Judge A. Sherman Christenson, Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Utah, often the service of marshals or bailiffs is not fully utilized by the courts. The bailiff is expected only to maintain order, but he could just as well be entrusted with routine responsibilities which speed the trial. In the words of Judge Christenson:

His function may be more than to open court and then to sit and, perhaps, doze until time for recess, unless aroused by some unusual noise. It has been found helpful for him, as each prospective juror

takes his seat in the box, to call out the number of the juror corresponding to his seat for the benefit of court and counsel and to make sure that the seating is in that order. He well may escort each witness to the clerk's desk for swearing and direct him to face the clerk and raise his right hand; indicate that the witness take his place in the witness chair, and assist him, if necessary. We take much for granted, but the ordinary witness is acting an uneasy role on a strange stage.⁹

These then are the various methods by which our resources of judicial man-

⁹ A. S. Christenson, *Shortening Trials Without Sacrificing Essentials and Efficiency*, 9 OKLA. L. REV. 365, 367.

power may be conserved and at the same time utilized more effectively. We have considered ways of augmenting the number of hours at the judge's disposal, of limiting his nonjudicial responsibilities, and of assuring that he will be called on only for those matters which require the application of his judicial talent. Lastly, we have seen some of the methods by which the trial itself may be made a bit more efficient.

Truly, the full utilization of our existing judicial manpower is as important as is the creation of new judgeships. Both are key factors in any plan to alleviate the current congestion of our courts.

The Bar, The Court, and The Delay

By HARRY KALVEN, JR.

ABSTRACT: The trial bar has often been made the whipping boy for the court congestion problem. The trial bar is often blamed for contributing to the congestion of the courts by providing an insufficient number of trial lawyers and by deliberate delay tactics. An investigation of these charges reveals that while much civil trial work is indeed concentrated in a few law offices, this concentration is not big enough to cause congestion, if trial schedules are well laid out and adhered to. Nor need delaying tactics, while then affecting the individual case, increase congestion. If the courts assume a sufficiently firm policy of scheduling and refusals of last minute delays, the trial bar will be forced to respond by enlarging its ranks.

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THE problem of court congestion is frequently approached from a misleading perspective. The approach is in terms of causes rather than remedies and it may prove misleading for at least two reasons. First, since delay comes gradually into any court system, the actual causes are likely to be buried in a history which is difficult to recapture. To write a sound history of the emergence of court congestion is almost certain to be more difficult than to remove the congestion. Second, the quest for causes is likely to be a quest for someone, or something to blame. And this proves to be a fruitless and divisive quest since there is no villain in the backlog. Perhaps no facet of the problem illustrates this view more vividly than do current complaints about the role of the trial lawyer. And the bar, always acutely and ineffectively worried about its public image, finds itself in congested urban centers with a serious public relations problem.

If, then, lawyers were to act or feel differently, or there were more of them, would there be less court congestion? A jumble of points are revealed when the bar's role in congestion is considered and we shall attempt briefly to sort them out and assess them.¹ As a matter of convenience the discussion will be divided loosely into two parts: first, a consideration of a variety of possible connections between the bar and delay which generally tend to evaporate on analysis; and second, a look at the one rather serious challenge to the bar—the consequences for court delay of the alleged small monopoly of trial lawyers.

THE BAR'S DILATORY STRATEGY

We begin with delay as a tactic. It is part of the popular image of the lawyer

¹ This article draws heavily upon the data and analysis in H. Zeisel, H. Kalven, Jr., and B. Buchholz, *Delay in the Court* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1959), and particularly that in Chapter 17.

that he can exploit the red tape of legal procedure and, if he really wants to, to continue a case in court almost indefinitely. The tension between the desire for expediting the disposition of controversies on the one hand and the desire for full and fair examination of all sides of the controversy on the other is an old story in the development of procedure. The difference between seeing the law in terms of procedural safeguards or red tape may very well be determined by which side of the case one is on. But there is no doubt that dilatory strategy is possible and is used. The question is, what significance does it have for court congestion?

The answer is, I think, that it has very little significance. At the threshold there is the distinction between delay which affects only the particular case and delay which affects the system and hence all cases. What we mean primarily by the problem of court congestion is the problem of "system" delay, such that even though the parties are ready and anxious to try their case the court system cannot accommodate them promptly because there are other controversies waiting ahead of them for the court's time. The essential point is that continuances of the particular case will not affect other cases unless they serve to interrupt the continuous flow of trials and thus create gaps in the trial schedule of the court. If they create gaps they result in a waste of the court's most valuable resource, its own trial manpower, and the system as a whole suffers. But if there is no gap, the continuance raises issues only between the parties to that case; and, in fact, the cases waiting behind it to be tried are the beneficiaries of a small advancement to trial.² We know of no basis for con-

² The analogy to a group of people waiting in line to buy tickets may be helpful. If the continuance does not interrupt the flow of the line, its only effect is to remove one person and thus to improve *pro tanto* the position of

cluding that continuances which are the product of dilatory strategy loom large enough in any court to add appreciably to its delay by causing gaps in the trial schedule.³

We are left then with the impact of such tactics on the parties and the particular case. Admittedly there is some problem here, but it is not a new one and it can occur about as readily in a court system that is current as it can in one that is delayed.⁴ There is a legend that a leader of the New York bar began practice with the following motto on his wall: "If I am plaintiff nothing can stop me. If I am defendant nothing can move me." It is an apt reminder not only of the stake the lawyer has in timing but also of the safeguard that the adversary system, under the scrutiny of the trial judge,⁵ provides against serious abuse.

The bar and settlement

Another cluster of points concerns the trial bar's relation to settlement in a congested court. The first complaint is one frequently voiced by judges and plaintiff lawyers and it carries an air of hard-boiled insight into the crude facts

those waiting behind him. See Zeisel, Kalven and Buchholz, *op. cit.*, pp. 53, 193. It can thus be argued that a delayed court might well follow a liberal policy in granting continuances so long as both parties are agreeable. But judges have expressed concern whether such continuances may not be more in the interest of the lawyer than in the interest of his client. *Ibid.*, pp. 53-54.

³ The probable magnitude of scheduling gaps created by factors due to the lawyer in contrast to the judge is examined further in the discussion of the concentration of the trial bar, *infra*. The Bar's Concentrated Case-load.

⁴ Any system is likely to show some "overage" cases pending on its calendar, reflecting voluntary or half-voluntary adjournments. The court's statistics should be adjusted so as not to charge these cases against the court's efficiency. *Ibid.*, pp. 52-3.

⁵ The powers of the court to compel the case to proceed to trial are discussed *infra*. The Bar's Concentrated Case-load.

of legal life. It concerns the per diem arrangements under which some defendant counsel are paid by their institutional clients. One puzzling group of cases in any delayed court are those which start trial but are settled prior to verdict. Since in the end they do turn out to be amenable to settlement, it is tantalizing to speculate on what might have been done to move up their time of settlement so as to dispose of them without the necessity of using precious court trial time.⁶ The reason for these cases surviving to trial and only then yielding to settlement pressures are various, and an intensive study of this block of settlements would be most worthwhile. Our immediate point is that the per diem arrangement is said to provide one stimulus for defense counsel to delay settlement until they can be paid for a day of trial work. It is difficult to know how much there is to the point. The large institutional defendants deny it and argue with force that their scrutiny of settlement would disclose lawyers who were "feather bedding" this way. In any event in terms of the many forces contributing to delay this factor at worst cannot be a major one. But to whatever extent the bar does delay settlements on this ground it does add a cost to the whole system, and it engages in an unseemly practice.

A second point about the bar, the settlement process, and delay is one not frequently noted. A striking statistic for a delayed court is what we have called the attrition curve which plots the per cent of cases which remain on the calendar after any given number of months. At time zero all 100 per cent are on the calendar and they are gradually disposed of until none remain. Such a curve makes it obvious that in

⁶ For the New York court, for example, some 14 per cent of the cases were settled after trial had begun and required 31 per cent of the total court time. *Ibid.*, pp. 38-41, 107.

a delayed court the delay suffered by those cases which are disposed of prior to trial is substantially less on the average than for those which require trial and that for a considerable fraction it is dramatically less.⁷ The point then is that even in a delayed court there is considerable variation in the time at which cases destined ultimately for settlement are settled. And these constitute of course the majority of cases. What then is the bar's responsibility for accelerating the date of settlement of the case which will ultimately be settled? Certainly more prompt settlement of "setttable" cases would do much to soften the social hardships of delay. Without more detailed study of the whole settlement process we can do little more than raise the question. In a delayed court there are just a few occasions prior to trial when settlement is actively pursued; otherwise, the file lies dormant and there may be bargaining disadvantages in initiating another discussion. It is an important advantage both of pre-trial and of the New York certificate of readiness procedure that they create neutral occasions for renewing attention to the case and thus improve the chance of its being settled then rather than later, if it is destined for settlement. It may be that here, in the vast domain of cases destined for settlement, the lawyer has the most freedom to do something about the hardships of delay.

The bar's obligation

There is one further point about the lawyer and settlement. The basic fact about the economics of a congested calendar is that a case which is settled prior

⁷ Such an attrition curve is given for the New York court in Table 18, *Ibid.* Thus, at a time when the average age of all trial dispositions was thirty months, the average age of all dispositions of suits filed was twenty-one months and slightly over 40 per cent of all cases were disposed of within twelve months.

to trial takes only a small fraction of the time required to dispose of it through trial.⁸ Does the lawyer in a seriously delayed court system have any obligation to society to consider the general advantage if he were to yield a little and settle without trial? Does he have any obligation to weigh society's interest along with those of his client on the delicate scales he must use in deciding when to settle? Only for a moment does the affirmative answer have appeal. Even in a delayed court the lawyer on either side is entitled to—and is derelict if he does not—judge settlement solely in terms of the merits of his client's cause. Anything short of this exacts a subsidy from his client on behalf of a congested court. It is not the least of the evils of delay that it tends to foster the notion that settlement is always preferable to adjudication of a controversy. The bar undoubtedly has many obligations to assist in efforts to remove delay but among them is not an obligation to deny the propriety of litigation itself as a solution to controversy.

The bar's benefit

Another line of complaint goes to the bar's political role with respect to court delay. The point bluntly stated is that the bar in a delayed court system likes it that way. And the corollary is that without the momentum of the bar no serious reform of judicial administration will come about. The charge is not that the bar causes the delay but that it exploits it. What are the advantages for the trial lawyer in a delayed court?

The impact of a long waiting period⁹

⁸ Again using the New York figures as an example, only 15 per cent of the cases were tried through to verdict but required 53 per cent of the court's total time; and the 71 per cent of the cases which were settled prior to the start of trial took only 16 per cent of the court's time. Table 13, *Ibid.*

⁹ It is of course widely recognized that some waiting period is desirable to permit the case

on the preservation of evidence probably tends, on the average, to be offset between plaintiffs and defendants. And so in all likelihood does its impact on the evaluation of factual ambiguities such as whether a plaintiff is permanently disabled. But the impact on the bargaining and settlement position of the litigants, particularly in the all-important personal injury cases, may be quite another matter. "In almost every law suit," Justice Vanderbilt has written, "there is at least one party, generally the defendant, who is whole heartedly in favor of the law's delay."¹⁰ And the reason is not hard to find. The injured plaintiff is less able to endure the attrition of court delay than is the institutional defendant. In a delayed court the cases which are settled will be settled for less.¹¹ In fact it is just one more instance of the secondary evils flowing from calendar congestion that it tends to imbalance the justice of the settlement process.

Further this softening of claimants is not fully offset by the disadvantage that delay must then have for plaintiff counsel, for it permits them to build up a backlog of cases and thus a backlog of income as security for future years. On the other hand the institutional defendants argue that it is a diseconomy for them to have to keep open so long the contingent reserve set up for a claim; and plaintiff counsel argue that it is a burden on them to have to keep plaintiff's file open for so long, to have to

and the evidence to jell. Most estimates of such a minimum fall between six and ten months. *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52.

¹⁰ Arthur T. Vanderbilt, *The Challenge of Law Reform* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1955), p. 77.

¹¹ Nevertheless unless the delay is extreme, it is doubtful that it affects the frequency as contrasted to the price of settlement. Hence the removal of delay will not in general tend to adversely affect the settlement ratio. Zeisel, Kalven and Buchholz, *Delay in the Court* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1959), Ch. 10.

keep talking with him, comforting him, and so on.

Whatever the net balance of advantage and disadvantage to the lawyer and his client,¹² in the end, I think, the point tends to divert attention from more fruitful concerns. For at best it reminds us that court congestion is a curiously anemic public issue and that it creates no natural pressure groups. It may well be that more would be done about removing delay if the bar were goaded by its own self-interest to get rid of it. But in this sense to say that the bar is responsible for delay is really no more compelling than to assert it is responsible for juvenile delinquency or air pollution.

THE BAR'S CONCENTRATED CASE-LOAD

The points thus far examined do not in our view establish much of a case against the bar. There remains the point arising not from any conscious fostering or exploiting or tolerating of delay by the bar but from the economic concentration of trial lawyers. Is the scarcity of trial lawyers a significant factor in producing delay?

The popular version is that there may be enough judicial manpower but not enough trial lawyer manpower for the work-load at hand with the result that the courts from time to time stand empty waiting for the lawyers. If there were an extreme shortage of trial lawyers there is no doubt it would become a major bottleneck. If, for example, in a metropolitan court there were only five plaintiff and five defendant lawyers available, the limits of usable judicial manpower would literally be set by the number of cases these ten lawyers could

¹² In a court with substantial delay and a generous preference policy undoubtedly the impact of delay on the individual lawyer is further lessened since he is likely to have some power and freedom to get his important cases preferred for trial.

TABLE 1—CONCENTRATION OF PENDING CASES BY SIZE OF FIRM
(Attorney of Record)

FIRMS WITH CASES PENDING	REPRESENTING PLAINTIFF		REPRESENTING DEFENDANT	
	PER CENT OF FIRMS	HANDLE PER CENT OF CASES	PER CENT OF FIRMS	HANDLE PER CENT OF CASES
Over 1,000 cases			2.0	34.3
Over 500 cases	0.4	10.2	6.7	62.9
Over 100 cases	6.9	51.0	20.7	91.3
Over 20 cases	30.1	86.6	35.5	98.1

try in a year. Less drastic, and more plausible, assumptions will still yield a genuine problem however. If there are a small number of trial lawyers who have a large number of cases so that they frequently have conflicting trial commitments which require continuances, and if the granting of the continuances causes gaps in the trial schedule, then the concentration of the bar will have a genuine impact on delay.¹³ It is evident that the thesis involves several points of fact and we shall consider them in turn.

First, how great is the economic concentration of the trial bar? We have, for example, a set of figures for Chicago for 1958 showing the distribution among law firms of the jury cases pending in all state courts of unlimited civil jurisdiction. The concentration is striking. On the plaintiff side 6.9 per cent of the firms handle 51 per cent of all cases, and 6.7 per cent of the defendant firms have 62.9 per cent of the cases. A few plaintiff firms have over 500 cases pending and some 2 per cent of the defendant firms have over 1,000 cases pending.

Such economic concentration may be significant for a variety of reasons; it may invite inquiry as to how law business is recruited; it may suggest possibilities of "block" settlements of a num-

¹³ One of the most effective statements of the thesis ever made is that by Judge Ulysses S. Schwartz in *Gray v. Gray*, 61 Ill. App. 2d 571, 576, 128 N.E. 2d 602, 604-605 (1955).

ber of cases at one time; and it may indicate that there is a problem about the speed of settlement of those cases which are settled before trial. But whatever its significance for such issues, tracing its impact on court delay requires further analysis.

The bar's schedule-gaps

As we have already noted the economic concentration can affect court congestion only if it results in gaps in the trial schedule. Unfortunately only a detailed hourly time record for each trial part would show how frequently a scheduling gap results from conflicting lawyer dates, and such records are almost nowhere available.¹⁴ Judges often do mention this but because the gap appears to the judge a visible and irritating reason for delay, its frequency is likely to be exaggerated.

We can, however, approach the matter somewhat less directly. We were able for the New York Supreme Court to determine the degree to which the

¹⁴ For the New York court it was possible to set a rough outside limit. Taking New Jersey as a model yardstick we found that New York judges over a year worked 19 per cent less time on the trial bench. This relative loss of trial hours included however in addition to scheduling gaps other factors such as illness. Hence we concluded that for New York the maximum loss of judge time which the concentration of the trial bar could be causing was well under 19 per cent. Zeisel, Kalven and Buchholz, *Delay in the Court* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1959), pp. 193-94.

trial of law cases in the court is actually concentrated. Table 2 shows the number of plaintiff lawyers who had personal injury cases reaching assignment during the five-month period from March through September 1957.

Table 2 indicates that the busiest 1 per cent of the plaintiff lawyers had 6.4 per cent of the cases, and that each lawyer in that group appeared on the average 2.1 times per month in the court during the observed period of five court months. The busiest 5 per cent which include the busiest 1 per cent tried 22.5 of the cases and appeared on the average of 1.6 times per month, and so forth. The concentration among defense counsel is, as would be expected, somewhat greater.¹⁵

Such figures then indicate that there is serious concentration of actual trial work. Some 10 per cent of the active bar handles 35 per cent of all trials. Yet the concentration falls well short of taxing the physical capacity of even the busiest lawyers. At its very peak it is 4.3 appearances per month for defense counsel and 2.1 appearances per month for plaintiff counsel; and for the busiest 10 per cent the average appearances per month are 2.1 and 1.2, respectively.

On this perspective the problem may seem to have evaporated. But a qualification must be added to explain why

¹⁵ See Table 83, *Ibid.*

the concentration of the bar is nevertheless a problem.¹⁶ What matters in the end is not the *average* ratio of lawyers to cases but rather the *chances* of conflicting trial commitments if cases are assigned to trial in a random sequence. The important fact here is that even a relatively low ratio of lawyers to cases can imply a very great chance of conflicting dates. Perhaps the simplest way to illustrate this is by recourse to an instructive statistical anecdote. If there are twenty-four people at a dinner party, what are the odds that at least two of them will have identical birthdays? Although there are 365 days to choose from, the odds surprisingly are better than even. The underlying theorem applies equally to the odds that a lawyer who averages two appearances per month, or four for the busiest defense attorneys, will run into a conflict of trial schedules. When the selection of trial dates is made without regard to a lawyer's previous commitments, the odds are several thousands to one that some conflicts will arise. Hence although the figures will vary from one

¹⁶ For the New York court there is an additional qualification. Our figures referred to only one of several courts which draw upon the bar in the metropolitan New York area, and there is reason to believe it was more successful than the courts with which it was competing in getting and holding busy trial lawyers. *Ibid.*, pp. 196-97.

TABLE 2—CONCENTRATION OF PLAINTIFF LAWYERS* IN PERSONAL INJURY TRIALS
IN THE NEW YORK COURT

CUMULATIVE PER CENT OF COUNSEL	NUMBER OF LAWYERS IN EACH GROUP	APPEARANCES IN COURT OVER 5-MONTH PERIOD		AVERAGE NUMBER OF APPEARANCES PER MONTH PER COUNSEL IN THIS GROUP
		(PER CENT)	(NUMBER)	
Busiest 1%	3	6.4	31	2.1
Busiest 5%	14	22.5	109	1.6
Busiest 10%	28	34.6	168	1.2
Remaining 90%	258	65.4	318	0.2
Total 100%	286	100.0	486	0.3

* This Table, unlike Table 1, refers to the individual lawyers who actually tried the case, irrespective of what firm they belonged to.

urban center to another, we can readily conclude that there is enough concentration to multiply greatly the danger of conflicts even though there is enough trial-bar manpower to try all cases without conflict on an ideally planned schedule.

Proposed remedies

In so far then as concentration of the bar is a factor contributing to delay, what remedies are available? A court might of course attempt to limit by direct rule the number of cases a given lawyer or law firm is permitted to handle. But this would seem a clumsy and impolitic solution.¹⁷ In any event two alternatives deserve serious consideration. First, changes in scheduling procedures might considerably reduce the chance of a gap. Although the practical details might prove troublesome, the essential point is simply that in scheduling the court recognize the concentration as a fact of life and seek to accommodate it, remembering that the existing conflicts arise because of random assignment as well as scarcity of lawyers.¹⁸

But ultimately the court has the power to compel lawyers to go to trial and thus to force them, if necessary, to turn some of their cases over to other lawyers or to add additional trial personnel to their own firm. In *Gray v. Gray*, the Illinois Appellate Court squarely faced the trial court's power to

¹⁷ Somewhat less directly the court may differentiate in granting continuances between counsel in terms of the number of cases they have pending. Thus the District of Columbia requires that no lawyer without the consent of his opponent may secure a postponement on the grounds of an engagement elsewhere if he is counsel of record in more than twenty-five cases in the court. See the remarks of Judge Laws, Attorney-General's Conference, 1956, pp. 37, 140.

¹⁸ See, for example, the interesting scheme reported by Judge Evans of the Bronx City Court in *Calendar Congestion—A New Approach*, 26 N. Y. S. B. Bull. 368 (1954).

deny a continuance when counsel for one of the parties is engaged elsewhere. The plaintiff had filed a complaint for divorce and the case was originally assigned for trial on October 29, 1954. Then, over the objection of opposing counsel, the case was continued four times on account of engagements of plaintiff's counsel and finally November 22 was set for the trial date. On that day the trial judge denied a motion for further continuance, sought on the ground that plaintiff's counsel was still active elsewhere, and ordered the case to go to trial. Counsel who had appeared on behalf of plaintiff's counsel to request the continuance refused to proceed on the ground that he was not prepared to try the case and the court thereupon dismissed the plaintiff's complaint for lack of prosecution. On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court vigorously affirmed the power of the trial judge to take such action, saying it was the duty of the trial judge to do precisely what he had done.¹⁹ To the plain-

¹⁹ The English practice is in accord. I am much indebted to Professor J. A. Jolowicz of Trinity College, Cambridge, for the following comment in a recent letter to me: "It may interest you to know that the line taken in *Gray v. Gray* represents the general practice in this country. Counsel's convenience, as we call it, is never accepted as a reason for adjournment in the ordinary way, unless the barrister's other case happens to be in the House of Lords. Of course, sometimes the real excuse for an adjournment is that counsel is engaged elsewhere, but this is never the stated reason. One occasion I happened to be in court when a very young pupil sought an adjournment of one of his master's cases and simply said that his master was engaged elsewhere. The judge's reply was, 'Wrap it up a bit, Mr. Jones.'

"Of course it happens with us too that a member of the Bar may be required in two places at once, but the general rule is that he must return the brief in one of the cases, and he is supposed to do this as soon as the likelihood of a clash becomes evident. The English rule—one of etiquette alone—is put as follows in Boulton's *Conduct and Etiquette at the Bar*, p. 18:

tiff's argument that she had a constitutional right to select her own attorney and be represented by him in the trial of her case, Judge Ulysses Schwartz observed in a passage which merits quoting at length:²⁰

It is wrong in theory, in its premise, and in its conclusion. There is no constitutional, statutory or other provision which gives a party the right to choose a particular lawyer, without regard to whether that lawyer has the time to try the case or not. Such a doctrine would have results that would be disastrous. We cannot assume

'Briefs are as a rule delivered and accepted on the understanding that it is possible that a counsel may be prevented from attending the case. It is a paramount duty of a barrister not to embarrass his client and to allow sufficient time for another counsel to be engaged and to master the brief. A barrister is under a duty to give warning to his instructing solicitor as soon as there is any appreciable danger that he may not be able to attend to a brief and to return the brief if required. Only in the most exceptional cases should a brief for the defense of a person charged with a capital offense be returned when once accepted, and then only if sufficient time remains for another counsel to master the case.

'If counsel is instructed in a civil case which clashes with the defense of a prisoner in a criminal case, then he must return the brief in the civil case.'

"Of course it is sometimes the case that a barrister hangs on to two briefs too long, and then the result is that one of his cases will have to be handled by someone who has had little time to prepare, but at least our system does ensure that the engagements of counsel do little to cause delay. There is no reason why a firm of solicitors should not have several cases in court at the same time, each with different barristers, and it may be that there is here one of the advantages of a divided profession."

²⁰ 6 Ill. App. 2d 571, 580-81, 128 N.E. 2d 602, 606-7 (1955).

that there is only one lawyer who can properly represent the plaintiff in this divorce case. There are 11,000 lawyers in Cook County. The attorney for plaintiff is an able lawyer, well-known to the members of this court. His ability has attracted a large clientele. However, in times like these when litigation swamps the courts, it is the duty of lawyers to cooperate in the transaction of the business of the court. Therefore, as suggested by Mr. Justice Jackson,²¹ where business is tendered a lawyer to which he does not have time to attend, he should let it go to some other lawyer.

It is the duty of our profession to train younger men to take care of the legal needs of the community. This is done on a large scale in the medical profession. It is a matter to which trial lawyers in particular should give attention. We consider a baneful practice the custom which has grown in past years of a trial lawyer appearing alone, no matter how important the case may be, on the assumption that court or jury may be impressed by the lone advocate struggling to represent his client. The lawyer who represented plaintiff is a member of a large firm. We do not know the nature of his arrangement with his associates but the trial court had the right to assume that one of them would have come to his rescue in the emergency. If he has no such arrangement and has trained no one to assist him, the responsibility is his for his client's dilemma.

²¹ The court here refers to the following passage, quoted earlier in its own opinion at 578: "When more business becomes concentrated in one firm than it can handle, it has two obvious remedies: to put on more legal help, or let some of the business go to offices which have time to attend to it. I doubt if any court should be a party to encouraging the accumulation of more business in one law office than it can attend to in due time." Justice Jackson in *Knickerbocker Printing Corp. v. United States*, 75 Sup. Ct. 212 (1954).

The Jury and the Court Delay

By HANS ZEISEL

ABSTRACT: To save court time, and thereby reduce court congestion, it has been suggested that the civil jury be abolished. But the actual amount of time that could be saved is too small to warrant by itself such a move. So basic an heritage of our judicial system should be abolished only if we considered this to be an advisable step also in a nondelayed court system. Nor do the various proposals aimed at encouraging voluntary waiver of juries hold much promise. But while the number of jury trials should not be curtailed, much can be done to shorten them, through expeditious impaneling of jurors and especially through greater control of court proceedings by the judge. An innovation which promises considerable savings is to separate liability and damages in the jury trial and to try damages only if the jury finds liability. But whatever means are proposed to reduce court congestion and delay, none should be accepted unless it preserves the best in our legal system.—Ed.

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At a time when court congestion has become a local calamity and a national scandal, proposals for abolishing the jury in all personal injury cases or all negligence cases do not come as a surprise.¹ But such a move would cut so deeply into our legal tradition that it merits careful scrutiny.

ABOLITION OF THE CIVIL JURY

Since these proposals are made with the primary purpose of saving court time, the first question requiring an answer is, just how much court time abolishment of the jury would save. We must begin, of course, with the more basic question of how much longer it takes to try a case with a jury than without one. Until recently one could hear a great range of answers, but now it has been established with some confidence that it takes about 40 per cent less time to try a personal injury case without a jury than with a jury.² To arrive at the over-all savings for a particular court this figure must be applied to the number of jury trials that would be affected by the new rule. This computation has been made for one of the country's busiest trial courts, the Supreme Court of New York County, that is of Manhattan. If the jury were abolished there for personal injury trials, the court would save the equivalent of 1.6 judges annually. This substantial economy must be gauged, however, in its

context. These 1.6 judges would be saved in a court which has altogether some 26 judges, 19 of whom sit in the law division.³

Another way of putting into proper perspective this potential gain accrued from abolishing the jury is to compare it with another suggested remedy which would bring about a comparable saving of time. If each judge in the civil law division of the New York court were to curtail his summer vacation by two weeks—an experiment the court actually made in 1956—court time equivalent to 1.5 judges per year would be saved, almost exactly the amount that would be saved by removing personal injury trials from the jury.⁴

Abolishing the jury then is, relatively speaking, a small saving. To be sure, the New York court is not typical of most other courts. The proportion of contract cases among its law trials is much greater than anywhere else, because of the concentration of commerce in Manhattan. Nearly half of the New York court's trial time is spent on commercial cases. Moreover, for reasons which will occupy us presently, the number of cases tried already without jury is unusually high in the New York court. But even if such adjustments are made for other courts, the time saving to be expected from abolishing the jury is not large enough, on our view, to justify by itself abandoning so important a tradition of our legal system.

Juries' and judges' findings

The more thoughtful advocates of abolishment of the civil jury have seen this problem. They are making their point by suggesting that the ways juries and judges decide personal injury cases are not sufficiently different to warrant continuation of the costlier mode of trial by jury. If this were true, it would be

¹ See *The Symposium: Jury Trial on Trial*, 28 N.Y.S.B. Bull. 322 (1956), especially Justice David W. Peck's paper. The proposals aim variously at the abolishment of the jury in personal injury automobile negligence or all tort trials for personal injury or property damage. Proposals to transfer automobile negligence claims from the courts to a commission (as was done with workmen compensation claims) recently gained some ground in California, where the possibility is being investigated on the governor's suggestion.

² H. Zeisel, H. Kalven, B. Buchholz, *Delay in the Court* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1959), Chap. 6, esp. p. 81.

³ *Ibid.*, Chap. 7, esp. p. 83.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 176 ff.

a point. As matters stand, however, juries do decide cases differently, which will come as no surprise to the many trial lawyers who have such clear preferences for one or the other mode of trial.

For some 4,000 civil jury trials, in which the presiding judges told us how they would have decided the case, had they sat without a jury, we were able to determine with precision the difference in verdict between these two modes of trial. Following are a few preliminary findings from our analysis of the personal injury cases which form the bulk of civil jury trials.⁵

THE JURY'S AND THE JUDGE'S FINDINGS IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES			
JUDGE WOULD HAVE FOUND:	JURY FOUND:		
	FOR PLAINTIFF	FOR DEFENDANT	
FOR PLAINTIFF	44%	10%	54%
FOR DEFENDANT	11%	35%	46%
55% 45% (TOTAL = 100%)			

Judge and jury agree in close to 80 per cent of the cases, and their disagreement is almost balanced. The jury finds in as many cases for the plaintiff where the judge would have found for the defendant as the other way around. But the cases in which judge and jury disagree can be differentiated from those in which they agree; they are not mere random deviations, but imply

⁵ These data are drawn from the Jury Project of the University of Chicago Law School, of which Professor Harry Kalven, Jr. is the director. The project, made possible by a grant from the Ford Foundation, has been engaged in a long-range study of the American jury system. We are now in the process of writing up the research in a series of volumes to be published by Little, Brown and Company. *Delay in the Court*, the first of the volumes, appeared in 1959 and had its origin in the alleged connection between civil jury trials and court delay.

a different standard of adjudication. Moreover, judge and jury disagree markedly on the awards they make even if they agree on liability. Case for case, jury awards are on the average some 20 per cent above what the judges would have given.

Suffice it then here to state, that if we abolished the jury in civil cases, we would change not only the form of our trials but for a great many of them also the substance of the verdict. Against a balance of such far reaching consequences, the time saving must look even less compelling.

In any event, these savings are not great enough, to suggest abolishment without a thorough investigation of the jury trial on its merits. There may be reasons for abolishing the jury in personal injury trials, but the saving in judge time it would bring about cannot be the decisive argument.

VOLUNTARY JURY WAIVER

If abolishment, then, is put aside, could one not try at least to encourage voluntary reduction of jury trials through jury waiver by counsel?

Across the country the jury in personal injury trials is waived in some 20 per cent of all trials. Could this percentage be increased and thereby the time required for trying these cases reduced?⁶

The best way to begin answering this question is to see what motivates the present jury waivers. These motives fall into two groups. In the first group of cases no difference in verdict is expected if the case be tried before a judge instead of a jury:

The case hinges on a question of law, the facts are undisputed . . . Insurance on the case is limited in relation to damages: even a judge verdict would exhaust available funds . . . The damages are at best

⁶ Zeisel, Kalven, Buchholz, *op. cit.*, Chap. 8, p. 87 ff.

so small that any difference between jury and judge is negligible.

In the second group of cases the expected difference between jury and judge verdict is implicitly acknowledged, but offsetting advantages are seen.

Special preferments

Thus, if a court wanted to increase the number of jury waivers, it would have to follow either or both of these ways: put some kind of differential tax on the jury trial (or premium on the judge trial) or make the difference between them negligible. The first way is being used with some success in the New York court. There, waiver of jury trial is rewarded with special preferment. A personal injury case for which the jury is waived receives immediate trial instead of having to wait through the normal delay interval. As a result the New York court has a greater proportion of jury waivers than any major court in the country.

The main trouble, of course, is that any such device, to succeed, must move both litigants at the same time. To waive jury trial effectively consent of both sides is needed. And this is a most difficult job, because if the plaintiff sees the balance of advantages in favor of a jury trial, the defendant—provided neither side misjudges the situation—will see his advantage in a bench trial; and vice versa. The New York scheme, to give preferment for jury waiver, succeeds to some extent because sometimes the plaintiff will waive the jury to obtain an early trial, and the defendant will forego the advantage of a later trial date for a trial without a jury in which he expects a better verdict. At one time the Appellate Division of the Manhattan Supreme Court had assurances from the major defendants, the insurance companies and the city of New York, that they would waive jury trial any time a plaintiff chose to waive it, and consent

to an early trial. This agreement seemed to work for a while but broke down when the city of New York declared that it preferred jury trial in all cases, and other defendants decided at least not to commit themselves. Whether this was done out of genuine preference for the jury, or only to gain the time offered on the delayed jury calendar was never explored.

However, even if they worked, devices that tax the jury trial and reward its waiver do not recommend themselves. They smack of punishing a litigant for exercising his constitutional right and of trying to abolish the jury by subterfuge.

There seems to remain the other route: to eliminate the difference between jury and judge trial and thus make it superfluous for either party to resort to the more cumbersome jury trial. One of the efforts to be watched with interest is the establishment of a special panel of judges in the Los Angeles courts who are to try personal injury cases for which the jury has been waived. The judges have been selected for this job because they have acquired the reputation for adjudicating very much like juries would do in their place.

Comparative negligence rule

Another, less direct, effort in this area is the proposal to substitute comparative negligence for the rule of contributory negligence.⁷ The proposal is based on the assumption that presently one of the major differences between judge and jury is their respective treatment of that

⁷ This common law rule, stated briefly, prevents a plaintiff from recovering damages if his own negligence has contributed to causing the damage, even if his share of the guilt was considerably smaller than that of the defendant. Comparative negligence permits recovery under these circumstances, but provides that the plaintiff damages be reduced by the percentage the plaintiff's negligence constitutes of the total negligence.

rule. It is alleged that the jury, unlike the judge, in spite of the judge's instruction, is likely to apply some sort of comparative negligence.

It is hard to see how such a change could increase jury waiver. The plaintiff, for much the same reason that made him prefer a jury under the contributory negligence rule, will prefer it also under the new rule; not only because of the expected difference in the evaluation of the damages, but also because the jury may take a more sympathetic view of the degree of the plaintiff's negligence and discount the award less. In addition, we are satisfied that a different handling of the contributory negligence rule is not one of the major differences between judge and jury verdicts.

Thus a change in the law from contributory to comparative negligence—whatever other merits it may have—is unlikely to change the disagreement balance between jury and judge verdicts. Such a change, therefore, cannot be expected to lead to an increase in the frequency of jury waivers. If anything, it should increase the work-load of the courts because it is bound to increase the number of claims raised. Under the contributory negligence rule, some claims with major contributory negligence had clearly so little chance before either jury or judge, that no defendant would take them seriously. Under comparative negligence they would become legitimate claims and could increase, therefore, the number of trials. Data from Wisconsin, a comparative negligence state, provide statistical support for this suspicion. Its ratio of damage claims to automobile accidents is considerably above the average.⁸ There is

⁸ *Delay in the Court*, p. 229, note 7. See there also the discussion of comparative negligence in Chapter 8 (esp. p. 90 ff.), and especially Justice Peck's proposal to permit stipulation of comparative negligence as reward for stipulating waiver of jury trial. The problem has also been investigated by Colum-

a third possible way in which the change-over could affect the work-load of the courts: it may affect the proportion of claims settled without trial. But how it would affect it is yet to be explored. We know nothing about it.

One thing is again clear. It would be a mistake to recommend abandoning the contributory negligence rule if reducing the work-load of the courts is the proposal's sole purpose.

ACCELERATE THE JURY TRIAL

But while we cannot do much and possibly should not do anything to curtail the use of jury trials, there are a number of moves which could save court time by shortening the jury trial as it now exists in most courts.

Expeditions New Jersey Trials

Merely by comparing jury trials in two states, in the Manhattan Supreme Court and in New Jersey, we found that there is considerable leeway in the amount of time a court cares to spend on the conduct of its trials. Our data strongly invite the conclusion that jury trials of personal injury cases are tried more expeditiously in New Jersey than in the New York court. In fact the difference is so substantial as to suggest that the length of jury trials of roughly comparable cases under different court systems may differ as much as the jury trial has been shown to differ from the bench trial.⁹

bia University's Project for Effective Justice. After Arkansas had temporarily changed to comparative negligence, the Project conducted an interesting survey among lawyers and judges which led to, among others, the following conclusion: "Introduction of comparative negligence . . . did not drastically alter the size or quality of the courts' burdens . . ." (Maurice Rosenberg, *Comparative Negligence in Arkansas*, 13 Ark. L.R. 89, 108 [1959]).

⁹ *Ibid.*, Chap. 9, p. 9 ff.

LENGTH OF PERSONAL INJURY TRIALS IN
NEW JERSEY AND NEW YORK
METROPOLITAN COURTS

	AVERAGE NUMBER OF WITNESSES	AVERAGE LENGTH OF JURY TRIAL
NEW YORK	8.1	17.4 hours
NEW JERSEY	7.8	9.5 hours
DIFFERENCE	.3 (-4%)	7.9 hours (-45%)

Although the average number of witnesses per trial is almost identical for New York and New Jersey, the New Jersey courts require 45 per cent less time to try a case than the New York court.

In an effort to further corroborate this difference in jury-trial length between New York and New Jersey we obtained a sample of four personal injury trial transcripts in roughly comparable cases from New York and five such transcripts from New Jersey and subjected them to a detailed content analysis.

COMPARING 9 TRIAL TRANSCRIPTS FROM
NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY

	AVERAGE NUMBER OF TESTIMONY LINES PER TRANSCRIPT	AVERAGE NUMBER OF WIT- NESSES	NUMBER OF LINES PER WITNESS
NEW YORK	8,660	10.3	980
NEW JERSEY	7,280	12.6	580
DIFFERENCE			-40%

Also this second measurement of the court's efficiency yields a difference in the 40 per cent range.

Role of the trial judge

The causes of this difference are not entirely clear. Undoubtedly a great deal depends on the role of the trial judge, and his proper role in a jury trial has

long been a controversial and debated topic in America. Clearly, the judge can speed up a trial if he takes more vigorous charge of it, participates in the questioning himself, curtails repetitive testimony, and discourages purely formal objections. The extent of the trial judge's control may in turn depend also upon the degree to which such control is supported by appellate courts. Whether the trial judge is to remain a passive umpire, as in many American jurisdictions, or take full command of the trial, as in England, touches important values which go beyond the problem of removing delay. All that can be said with confidence is that the possibilities of accelerating the jury trial itself may have received too little attention. The questions raised by the relative brevity of the New Jersey trial should be an inviting and promising subject for further study.

There is one specific point at which higher judicial control could bring about considerable savings in some courts. It appears that jurisdictions vary considerably in the average time they require for the impaneling of the jury. Our studies have shown that where this procedure is time consuming, it is being used more for the indoctrination of the selected jurors than for the original purpose of selecting them.¹⁰

Separate liability and damage issues

A most promising, if radical, move to speed up jury trials has recently been made in the federal court for the Northern District of Illinois. The court put into action our suggestion¹¹ to separate also in jury trials the liability issue from the damage issue. To make this separation in bench trials is not an unknown

¹⁰ A study made by Professor Saul Mendlovitz as part of the University of Chicago Law School Jury Project.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 99, 292. See Judge J. Miner's article *Court Congestion, A New Approach*, Dec. 1959 A.B.A.J.

practice, but it is seldom applied. Now, the Chicago court has encouraged its judges to make this separation also in jury trials. If the jury finds liability, the trial after a pause resumes and the same jury now hears the litigation of the damages. If the jury denies liability, the trial, of course, is over.

This move is bound to save at least 20 per cent of the court's trial time. Since the jury in 45 per cent of the cases finds for the defendant, damage litigation in these cases will be obviated. And if we assume that the discussion of damages usually consumes about half of the trial time, we arrive at a saving of the indicated order.

This separation may also bring about collateral savings. Once liability and damages are tried separately, either issue might be stipulated and only the other submitted to trial, moreover, once liability is affirmed, out of court settlement of the remaining damage issue might be facilitated. And instead of hoping or fearing that the jury might not be able to compromise liability and damages, the litigants themselves may prefer to do this—and settle the case.¹² In case of trial, there accrues also a clear procedural advantage in that the order of presentation of the evidence becomes more coherent. The customary sequence: plaintiff (liability, damages), defendant (liability, damages) is replaced by the more logical sequence: liability (plaintiff, defendant); damages (plaintiff, defendant).

It is significant that this move required no change in the law and can probably be followed in other jurisdictions.

Of all the time-saving remedies, the split trial should prove the most powerful. It can probably be introduced in

most courts without change of the law¹³ and it can stand the supreme test of all remedies: the procedure recommends itself as superior also in a nondelayed court.

PRÉCIS

What, then, can we say by way of summary about the jury and the delay problem?

First, that the abolition of the jury in civil cases, though it would save some court time, would not save enough time to permit this to become an overriding argument for its abolition. Second, none of the proposed devices to increase the voluntary waiver of jury trials, unless they amount to objectionable curtailment of the jury by subterfuge, holds much promise of being effective. Third, there is ample room for expediting the jury trial in its present form: by a general tightening of court control over the impaneling procedure and the presentation of evidence and by the specific measure of permitting separate trials for the issue of liability and the damage issue.

One general rule emerges with respect to any permanent reform designed to remedy court delay, be it abolishment of the jury, or the removal of automobile accident cases from the courts to a special commission, as recently aired by the governor of California. No reform should be initiated that would not recommend itself also in a nondelayed court. The reason is obvious. Once such a reform has accomplished its purpose and delay is cured, the reform stays with us in the now nondelayed courts. And we better make sure that the price for bringing our courts up to date is not a lowering in the quality of our judicial process.

¹³ The Chicago federal court introduced the practice by a Rule of Court. The Philadelphia federal court, I am informed, has been using the device sporadically for some time, without a special Rule; it considers the practice covered by Federal Rule 42(b).

A Proposed Automobile Accident Compensation Plan

By SAMUEL H. HOFSTADTER *

ABSTRACT: Automobile accidents have kept pace with the steadily rising highway use. In a real sense these are not caused by man but by the automobile itself. When the blow strikes, the complainant can obtain redress only by proving the operator careless. But if his own negligence contributed in any way, he may not be recompensed, whatever the fault of the operator. These rules are so harsh that juries circumvent them, trial of these cases is largely a matter of chance, the courts are jammed, justice is delayed, and many accident victims are denied reimbursement. Alternative theories predicated on fault are more sound but miss the heart of the problem. The solution lies in granting compensation on a prearranged schedule regardless of fault—as in workmen's compensation. If immediate adoption of such a plan is not possible, automobile cases should in the interim be assigned to special tribunals consisting of a judge, a layman and a physician, with apportionment of damages substituted for the rule of contributory negligence. In the era of the automobile, no victim of its thrust should be required to carry the burden of his pain and suffering alone.

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* I am indebted to Jacob M. Dinnes of the New York Bar for assistance in arrangement and editing in the preparation of this article.

¹² An exact measure of the time saved by the split-trial rule will soon emerge from the experience of the Chicago court. There steps have been taken, with the co-operation of the University of Chicago Law School, to gauge the exact effect of the rule.

WHEN the automobile first appeared on the scene, it stirred the imagination as a marvel of the inventor's art; today it is a commonplace part of our daily life. Automobiles are everywhere; highways, thruways, and parkways have been and are being constantly built to facilitate their movement and their speed; practically every municipality in the country is grappling with the traffic and parking problem. In 1923 we had 15 million registered cars in the United States. By 1956 they had increased to 60 million. By 1970, they are expected to total 90 million! Nor does this growth in the number of automobiles on our roads tell the whole story. Not alone is the speed of which they are now capable substantially greater, but over the years the lawful speed limit has been progressively increased. This is the contemporary picture, of which the automobile accident is an integral part and inevitable concomitant.

Experience teaches that accidents have kept pace with the steadily rising highway use. Last year the New York Bureau of Motor Vehicles reported: "Motor vehicle accidents rose to a new high in this State during 1957. . . . Accidents involving personal injuries showed an alarming increase . . ." Because the use of the automobile is today so general, almost everyone, operator, passenger, pedestrian is exposed to its hazards. The Bureau observed that of the persons killed, 38 per cent were drivers, 26 per cent passengers, 35 per cent pedestrians, and 1 per cent bicyclists.

The late Dr. C. A. Kulp, Professor of Casualty Insurance, remarked: "The automobile liability hazard appears to be essentially quantitative. . . . The number of automobiles is controlling. Other factors mitigate or exaggerate hazards but they are essentially secondary." Dr. J. L. Malfetti of the Safety

Research Institute of Columbia University has just reported that drivers were responsible for 80 to 95 per cent of accidents, adding: "No driver, given cause enough, is immune to unsafe driving behavior." He cites as factors: highway hypnosis on dull stretches; losing the concept of speed and space when reducing speed from 60 to 25 miles an hour for an exit ramp; tension responses, and so forth.

Despite earnest safety campaigns, despite improved methods of testing and inspection, despite improved roads and highways, despite all the many other measures taken to reduce automobile accidents, they persist and are growing in ever increasing numbers. Thus, in the final analysis and in a real sense, the fault lies not with man, but with the automobile itself and its tremendous potential for mischief. Almost forty years ago, Cardozo referred to it as an instrument of danger to life and limb.

LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES

When the blow strikes, whether it causes death, bodily injury or property damage, redress can now be had only by resort to law on the basis of negligence. In layman's language, the word "negligence" may be changed to "fault." Unless the fault of the operator of the automobile caused the accident, the victim may not recover.

"Negligence is of a negative character. . . . the failure to conform to the standard of a normal man" in Professor Burdick's phrases.¹ But what is the standard of a normal man? When is the operator at fault? When does the fault cause the accident? The concept is so vague that ordinarily the answers are left to the sound judgment of a jury. Not infrequently, however, the judges take these issues from the jury, and, often disagreeing among themselves, de-

¹ William L. Burdick, *Law of Torts*, 4th Edition, Sec. 445.

cide the questions the way the majority of the highest court think proper. For instance:

A group of men, at 11:30 P.M., are travelling in three cars on Sunrise Highway in an easterly direction. Sunrise Highway is a street level, four lane road, two lanes going each way. The first and second cars are 100 to 200 yards apart; the third 75 feet behind the second. Near an intersection, a car going in the opposite direction suddenly swings left and stops in the outside (slow) easterly lane. The first car avoids him; the third stops in time; the second runs right into him. The second car had been going in the fast (inside) lane at 50 miles an hour, when 25 was proper. Passengers in both cars are hurt.

The jury found for the passengers against the driver of the second car. The appellate courts reversed, saying that the sudden unanticipated and unexplained dash across the highway of the car going in the opposite direction made the driver of the second car the helpless victim of an emergency.²

In a second case, tried by a judge without a jury, a car was going north on Taconic State Parkway, also a four lane concrete highway. It was raining and the road was slippery and wet. At the point of the accident, the road went downhill and curved to the east. Again the operator used the fast or outside northerly lane, but was traveling at 30 to 35 miles an hour. He skidded, crossed the white line, ran into cars going in the opposite direction and his passengers were hurt. The judges said he was not at fault and dismissed their claims for damages.³

Were these drivers at fault? Did their fault help cause the accidents? Opinions may differ. Certainly, the passengers

were not responsible for the accidents, yet they were denied reimbursement for their monetary losses as well as their pain and injury. Moreover, since they had guessed wrong when they brought their lawsuits, they suffered the additional expense of the litigation and the "costs" allowed the other side. This does not make sense!

EVOLUTION OF THE LAW

The cause of action for negligence did not exist in the early common law.⁴ In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a person was liable for injuries caused by him, whether inflicted intentionally, negligently, or accidentally, if the occurrence fell within the forms of action then recognized.⁵ The cause of action for negligence evolved in England from the development of the so-called "action on the case" and the growth of the law of "proximate consequence." It spawned in the law of contractual, quasi contractual and proprietary relations applied to bailees other than innkeepers and common carriers. To such other bailees, the Roman rules of liability for negligence were applied.⁶ Extension of these principles to accidents not connected with public callings, bailments, or prescriptions began in 1676⁷ and developed thereafter. In 1809, an appendix was added that the claimant must also prove himself free from fault before recovery was permitted.⁸

THE AMERICAN THEORY

In the United States, the early rule of strict liability, that is, responsibility regardless of fault, was abandoned in

⁴ Palgraf v. L.I.R.R. Co. 248 N. Y. 339, 345.

⁵ William S. Holdsworth, *History of English Law* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1956), pp. 446-53.

⁶ Coggs v. Bernard, 1704, 2 Ld. Raym 909.

⁷ Mitchell v. Alestree, 1 Vent. 295.

⁸ Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 61.

² Meyer v. Whisnant, 282 App. Div. 930, aff'd 307 N. Y. 369, 371.

³ Murphy v. Kittrinos, 6 App. Div. 2d 827;

aff'd 6 N. Y. 2d 849.

favor of the concept of liability only for fault in violation of a duty owed the claimant.⁹ To make matters worse for the victim, this was coupled to the presumption that every person performs his duty. Thus the burden of proving all the elements required by the courts is on the injured person. In short, the fact that an accident occurs or that injury is sustained does not establish the tort—the injured person must show not only that the driver was at fault but that his fault caused the accident. Even an affirmative wrongful act causing injury does not create liability if the victim is one to whom harm as a consequence of the act was not reasonably to be foreseen.¹⁰

The old rule of acting at one's peril survived in a sense, however, being inverted and transferred to the victim by adoption by our courts of the English concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar against recovery.¹¹ Under this rule, if the injured person's own negligence or unskillfulness in any way conduced to bring about the injury complained of, he may not recover, whatever might have been the negligence of the defendant. "The law will not, in such a case," said the court, "attempt nicely to adjust the degree of blame to be assigned to the respective parties, and will not recognize any act as an injury to either, which they mutually contributed to produce."

The absurd lengths to which this may lead is illustrated by a case tried some years ago. Following a correct and adequate charge to the jury on the subject of negligence and contributory negligence, defendant's counsel requested an express charge that if the plaintiff was guilty of even 1 per cent negligence, he could not recover.

⁹ *Losee v. Buchanan*, 51 N. Y. 476.

¹⁰ *Palgraf v. L.I.R.R. Co.*, *supra*.

¹¹ *Munger v. Tonawanda R.R. Co.*, 4 N. Y. 356, 358.

Resenting the harshness of the rule, juries circumvent what someone has called "the judicial nonsense," and the plaintiff gets damages—based on "crude 'kangaroo' adjustments"—notwithstanding contributory negligence. The citizenry shrugs off its application, and testimony to circumvent the anticipated judge's charge is at times clearly contrived. Judges, aware of the "complete fantasy" of the rule are among its severest critics. It was branded "barbaric" by one of our most thoughtful and scholarly presiding justices.¹²

The result is that "a jury trial in the ordinary automobile accident case is largely a matter of chance. To a great extent, the verdict and the amount of damages depend on who secured the best or the most witnesses, or who has the best lawyer, on the personal prejudices of the jurors, on the so-called 'breaks of the trial,' and on the intangible human element. They do not depend on a scientific ascertainment of the facts."¹³ The ultimate consequence is irresponsibility, a deterioration of the judicial process, debasement of public morals, capricious results, staggering underwriting losses, and congested calendars.¹⁴

Conceived in a period of industrial change, capital found a ready ear for its plea for protection against depletion; and rooted in economic factors no longer in being, these concepts of liability and exoneration from liability have fed one upon the other, producing unreal distinctions and confusion. Their philosophy does not ring true; and their sequelae are not viable. They have been discarded or substantially modified in fields

¹² Peck, *Report on Justice*, May 2, 1953.

¹³ COMM. TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES REP., Jan. 2, 1932.

¹⁴ COMM. ON LAW REFORM, ASSOC. OF BAR OF CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT ON COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE RULE, June 1, 1953.

where legislation was adopted;¹⁵ the concept of contributory negligence was never accepted in admiralty;¹⁶ and it has been bypassed where the doctrine of "last clear chance" was made applicable.¹⁷ Where these exceptions do not apply, however, we are confronted with a juridical problem of serious proportions which must be studied as a whole if long term solutions are to be found.

ALTERNATIVE THEORIES

Dean Pound tells us¹⁸ that the rule of exoneration for contributory negligence was based on the "Good Will" theory of liability—if plaintiff was also guilty of moral fault, he could not complain that defendant was blameworthy. His comment is cogent:

But, as Holmes has shown, negligence does not necessarily involve moral obliquity. . . . In connection with negligence we should not be thinking of the social interest in the general morals, but instead of the social interest in the general security. Moreover, there is nothing in the nature of things to require that in case of concurrent negligence the whole loss be thrown upon one of the parties exclusively.

The first step taken to ameliorate the harsh exonerating rule was the substitution of the doctrine of comparative

¹⁵ Workmen's Compensation Laws, New York Labor Law, Secs. 202, 240, 241a; Federal Employers Liability Act; Merchant Marine (Jones) Act; Death on the High Seas Act; *Koenig v. Patrick Constr. Corp.*, 298 N. Y. 313; *Pollard v. Trivia Bldg. Corp.*, 291 N. Y. 19; *Caspersen v. La Sala Bros.*, 253 N. Y. 491; *DeLee v. T. J. Pardy Cons. Co.*, 249 N. Y. 103; *Duncan v. Twin Leasing Corp.*, 283 App. Div. 1080, leave to appeal denied 307 N. Y. 943.

¹⁶ *Pope and Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn*, 346 U. S. 406; *Healy v. Erie R. Co.*, 259 N. Y. 40.

¹⁷ *Davies*, 10 M & W. (1842) 546; *Wolowzynowski v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co.*, 254 N. Y. 206.

¹⁸ Roscoe Pound, *Jurisprudence* (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1959), Vol. V, Chap. 32.

negligence, which apportions damages in accordance with each actor's degree of negligence. Based on Roman law and first embodied in the Continental Codes, it is gradually finding its way into common law jurisdictions both here and abroad.

But comparative negligence, though intrinsically a more equitable doctrine, is not a true solvent. Though more sound in theory, it cannot with any degree of certainty accomplish its intended purpose. So long as it is part of the concept of liability based on fault, unless fault can be measured precisely, it does not offer a just solution. The fact is that the effort of a jury, or, for that matter, of any other finder of fact, to determine the degree of fault allocable to each participant in an accident is a highly speculative adventure without possible exactitude in measure or result.

Moreover, it misses the heart of the problem. Fast moving objects of great weight, controlled by human beings with normal reactions and crowded highways make accidents a certainty. To be sure, the immediate occasion for an accident may be some carelessness, but the point is that such carelessness was inevitable, bearing in mind the nature of a motor vehicle, traffic and highway conditions and the needs, exigencies, and tensions generated by a complex society.

Legal rules reflecting earlier stimuli distort the present when dogmatically applied. An era of multimillion automobiles and the airplane, urbia and sub-urbia, heavy industry and wide diffusion of property, mechanized farms and an emancipated labor force over seventy million requires constant attention to the standards of liability flowing from its application. In the field of automobile accidents, fault as a basis of liability has outlived its usefulness and validity. Under modern conditions, the thesis that individual fault is a prerequisite to the right of indemnity for damage

due to an automobile accident is essentially unjust and unreal.

European experiment

Recognizing this fact, Europe has reverted to the standard of strict liability. In the 1890's French jurists applied this principle, under a revised interpretation of an article of the French Civil Code, to accidents caused by dangerous means of conveyance although no negligence could be proved. Eventually they extended the rule to automobiles. The German Code of 1907 imposed strict liability for motor accidents; followed later by similar liability for air accidents.

The application of strict liability—even tied to compulsory insurance—approaches the nub but does not reach it. For there remain the vexatious problem of assessment of the damage and its prolific offspring: the traffic jam in the courts.

Fundamental error

Neither a strict rule of liability nor insurance makes a bad driver good nor an unskilled one skillful; they are merely devices to assure a recovery and payment of that recovery. But the recovery must first be obtained before the insurer can be called upon to pay; and "how much" is an imponderable which often, after fruitless hours of negotiation, pre-trial conferences, discussions during the trial, and heroic effort by judge and counsel, is answered by the juries in as many different amounts as there are causes.

Their disagreement manifests the fundamental error in our present approach. Exact appraisal of personal injury is impossible—whether by judge or jury. At best, it is an approximation. At worst, it is based on the eloquence and experience of counsel, on sympathy and on emotion.

The inherent difficulties also reflect themselves in the pervading and prevailing evil of calendar congestion. In many courts delay is counted in years despite procedural expedients, free assignments of judges, rules of preference, and unceasing efforts to effect settlements.

The greater proportion of accident victims belong to the low-income group which can neither afford the burden of trial delay nor the cost of the accident itself. They are faced not so much with an outright denial of justice as with its circumvention by economic expediency. Society demands the automobile. It should provide an equitable method of meeting its cost. It is a common burden to be dealt with on a collective, not an individual basis.

THE PROPOSED PLAN

The solution will be found in a compensation plan. By such a plan, a system is contemplated analogous to that encompassed by the various state workmen's compensation acts. Underlying this legislation, long accepted in our states, was the recognition that accidents are an inevitable concomitant of modern industry and—as expressed by Lloyd George in a campaign slogan—"The cost of the product should bear the blood of the workman." The injured parties—except in those rare instances where the accident is caused by the deliberate willful act of the injured person—would be compensated, *regardless of fault*, as specified in a prearranged schedule of amounts for specific injuries, and payment would be made from a common fund set up for this purpose.

It is beyond the scope of this discussion to specify the details of such a plan; nor is it within the author's competency. The precise plan must await further study and the advice of specialists. It would, of course, include these

essentials: the accidents to be included and excluded, the benefits to be paid, and the method of determining coverage and assuring payment.

This suggestion is by no means wholly new. The idea was first projected by Arthur A. Ballentine, of this city, in 1916. It gained wide publicity in 1924, when specific proposals were embodied in bills introduced in the New York Legislature. In 1927, as a member of the Assembly, the author proposed legislation along these lines; as a member of the Senate in 1931, he introduced bills calling for a commission to study the problem. It was carefully re-examined in 1932 by the Columbia University Committee; the Committee's conclusions were embodied in a bill submitted to the New York Legislature in 1938 by the Joint Committee to Sponsor the Accident Compensation Plan. The conditions which commended a compensation system for automobile accidents in these earlier days are today far more acute and challenge prompt action.

Nor is it wholly untried. A modified form is now in effect in the Province of Saskatchewan, in Canada.

It is socially and economically sound. It is logically and juridically justifiable. It makes recovery more equitable and provides it speedily. It assures indemnification for loss regardless of fault. It spreads the burden; and, through "loss distribution," the group creating the risk carries the cost—a result that dilutes the financial weight on the individual and inures to the benefit of the whole community.

And as a collateral dividend, it will begin to clear the judicial channel of a roadblock so severe that former presiding Justice Peck of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York was moved to say, not too long ago, that if it is not removed "the grave prospect is that the courts will cease to be the accepted agency for the deter-

mination of litigation." Under such a program we will at least make provision to assure that though the highways may always be jammed with cars, the courts need not always be glutted with the cases that inevitably follow and are not always disposed of on an equitable and fair basis.

AN INTERIM PLAN

If ingrained conceptual habits of thought and loyalty, avowed and subconscious, make a compensation plan unlikely of adoption in the immediate future, I offer an interim—an alternative—proposal.

Until the public, bar and bench, and the insurance carriers will accept departure from present adversary practice, automobile accident cases should be assigned to special tribunals, consisting of a jurist, a layman, and a physician, with the principles of comparative negligence substituted for the rule of contributory negligence.

Under this alternative proposal, sole negligence as predicate of liability is modified but fault is continued as the ultimate basis of responsibility; and a collective, mixed judgment—as in the conventional jury trial—is retained as the method of adjudication and appraisal. Such a juridical forum can dispatch cases with a speed relatively equal to that of a court without a jury, yet meet the objection of those whose number must be legion who concur in G. K. Chesterton's doctrine: "I would trust twelve ordinary men, but I cannot trust one ordinary man."

Under this program, claimants would be thrice blessed: The assurance of recovery despite some fault of their own, adjudicated speedily, by a court of experienced mixed personnel. Defendants and their insurance carriers would likewise be benefited: While there may be a greater number of recoveries, inflated

verdicts will be less likely and the threat of bankruptcy to an underinsured car owner reduced substantially. At the same time, the fundamental characteristic of the jury trial—its multiple nature—will be retained in measurable degree.

The jurist will provide legal learning and experience; limiting the number to one will conserve judicial manpower. The leavening impact of lay thinking will be provided by the nonprofessional member. And the physician will provide that impartial medical guidance—not advocacy—which has already proved its great worth in the medical report office established some few years ago in our jurisdiction.

Midway between the present mode of adjudication and the proposed disposi-

tion by administrative boards, the alternate proposal, if successful, would mitigate the more pressing defects of our present rules and procedures.

For the sake of justice, we must face up squarely to our concept of liability for fault and revise it where modern conditions call for its modification. We should certainly be prepared to alter the apportionment of fault and, by allowing it in the front door, obviate the practice of subversion of the law at the back entrance. The United States of today is far different from that of the 1780's. In the era of the automobile—a potentially lethal agency—the victims of its thrust may not justifiably be left to carry the burden of their injuries alone.

Practice and Procedure

By CHARLES E. CLARK

ABSTRACT: In contrast to the hundred-year struggle for procedural reform in England the American movement for improved law administration has been professionally inspired and directed. Pleading, comprising the steps preparatory to the trial itself, by custom and precedent is an important preliminary stage of litigation where formalism has become rooted and reform is necessary. The first great reform of common law pleading was by the Field Code of 1848 in New York, which was copied in a majority of the states. Meanwhile federal practice lagged because of the statutory requirement of conformity to state practice. But with the adoption by the Supreme Court of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as drafted by its Advisory Committee, the federal practice became the outstanding system in the country and a model for reform in a constantly increasing number of states. It has also stimulated the movement for rule-making authority in the courts and for an integrated court system efficiently operated. While much remains to be done, the intelligent steps already taken toward improved law administration show that current criticism of the courts is overdrawn and the title of this symposium, "Lagging Justice," not apt.

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IT IS a paradox, of a kind not uncommon in the law, that the one lawsuit probably best known to the layman was not an actual case at all. For *Jarndyce v. Jarndyce*, the lagging proceeding in chancery pilloried in *Bleak House*, was but a figment of Charles Dickens' fertile imagination. But it became the outstanding symbol of the law's delays and played a substantial role in sharpening the demand for law reform in England. So it was a notable feature of that one-hundred-year struggle, first sparked by Jeremy Bentham in 1776, that it was lay-inspired and largely lay-executed. The bench and the bar tended to resist change, and improvements in law administration had to be achieved over strong professional objection. In this country the cause of reform has fared somewhat better with the profession. The great nineteenth-century movement leading to the Field Code of 1848 in New York and code pleading throughout the country was in large degree the work of David Dudley Field, leader of the New York bar. And the outstanding reform of the present era, that embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, was strictly professional in character. Since this development is itself a notable gain in operating efficiency in the courts and also affords a stimulus for other correlative advances, it is the chief subject matter of this paper.¹

¹ The legal literature on the historical developments here noted and on the recent federal reform is extensive. It is not thought desirable, however, to burden this article with detailed annotations. Interested readers may find these matters discussed, with extensive citation of authorities, in the author's *Code Pleading* (2nd ed., St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Company, 1947), particularly in Chapter 1 on the "History, Systems, and Functions of Pleading," in his article, *Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules*, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 435 (April 1958), and in the article by Professor Charles Alan Wright, *Procedural Reform in the States*, 24 (No. 2) F.R.D. 85

THE REFORM OF PLEADING

Doubtless the lay reader is puzzled to know why reform of pleading—the steps whereby a case is brought to issue and hence only prepared for trial—looms so large, often beyond the actual trial itself, in any account of steps to be taken in the improvement of law administration. But this it does, as all reformers have to realize; and the reasons are not too hard to appreciate. They are both historical and practical. The rise of written pleadings in England can be discerned in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries coincident with the development of the jury and as a response to the need felt to define the issues sharply for the lay jurors and to remove from them all questions of law. As red tape tends to settle into formal custom, so the written pleadings came to be more and more formalistic, and the strait jacket of procedure became even more a restricting influence. There was also the very practical need—still existent in perhaps more pressing form in modern court practice—of uncovering the matters really in dispute well in advance of the formal and portentous full-dress trial. This not only shortens the actual trial by focusing on the fighting points but even more renders the case subject to disposition without trial, either by some pre-trial action of the judge or perhaps more often by negotiation and settlement of the parties as they come to know and appraise the merits of their respective causes. At any rate such pre-trial disposition is an important, perhaps the most important, feature of litigation today; it is a rare

(Sept. 1959). For professional activity in the field see Arthur T. Vanderbilt, *Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration* (New York, 1949), a volume giving all developments listed state by state, and the A.B.A. pamphlets, *The Improvement of the Administration of Justice* (3rd ed., 1952), and *Justice Calling* (1958).

court where even a fifth of the cases actually go to trial and judgment. Hence this function of the court as a means of channeling litigation to settlement or prompt pre-trial disposition is so important that it must be carefully conserved and the litigatory procedures adapted to it, both to aid it directly and to avoid indirectly means of delay or obstruction by those so inclined.

Against this background, and with the professional and judicial propensity to be governed by precedents, it is not strange that procedure hardened and came to be unduly formalized, even to the extent of overlooking the parties' rights on the actual merits. Hence the movement for reform had necessarily to start with these overriding procedural barriers. This was true in both England and America. We have not occasion here for a full-length history of pleading formalism and its reform. Let it be said that by the nineteenth century pleading in the courts of common law had become unduly formalized, following what was technically known as "special" pleading; while practice in the quite separate courts of chancery was hopelessly bogged down in details presented not through the testimony of live witnesses, but through depositions, affidavits, and other written materials. The great change made by the Field Code, as adopted in New York in 1848, and thereafter copied in a majority of the states, was the merger of the courts of law and chancery and the union of law and equity. This was true also of the later English reform, the Judicature Act of 1873. A corollary was the greater freedom in stating the facts upon which the action was based, though the force of this reform was lost when the pleadings again became prolix. Almost a century under the Field Code—adopted as it was in a majority of the states—left the stage set for the modern reform embodied in the federal rules.

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND THE "CONFORMITY ACT"

Up to the time of the adoption of the federal rules, effective September 16, 1938, the federal practice had been anomalous. That was because of the attempt to follow the differing local procedures of the various states where the federal courts sat. Indeed the entire federal court structure had developed somewhat as a compromise. Strictly it was not necessary; the federal systems of Australia and Canada have found it sufficient that the provincial or state courts enforce also the federal law, capped only by a Supreme Court for the entire country. Our Constitution in Article III, Section 1, vests the judicial power of the United States only "in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." But the framers of the Judiciary Act of 1789 thought the prestige of the infant country would be enhanced by a separate court establishment, and thus our far-flung federal court system was initiated.

For convenience and to lessen objections and animosities, the procedure at law in the national courts was set to follow that of the state where they convened. At first, this procedure was held in static conformity to the local practice beginning with the date of the statutory enactment; but this date was advanced from time to time by successive statutes until the famous Conformity Act of 1872 provided for continuing conformity "as near as may be" to the local practice where the federal court was held. Meanwhile the equity practice was governed by the court's uniform rules originally based on the English chancery practice—there being no well-developed chancery system in many of the colonies or states—and ultimately by the Equity Rules of 1912, achieving a reasonably

uniform and simplified procedure according to the standards of the day.

The confusion and conflicts resulting from this system were so great that federal practice became an activity only for specialists and an abomination for the profession generally. A comparatively small portion of the procedure, that of equity, was reasonably up to date; but the great bulk of the cases was subject to a separate dual procedure which was neither state practice nor uniform. True, the basic practice in any federal district court was supposedly that of the local state; but from the beginning there were various items affecting the bringing of suit and the service of process which were necessarily subject to federal law. This area of general practice superimposed on local procedure tended constantly to expand as Congress passed more and more remedial legislation covering diverse matters such as amendments or the pleading of equitable defenses in actions at law. Thus a practitioner accustomed to a local system of merged law and equity would find as he came into the federal court of his own locality not only the ancient separation, but also for the procedure as a whole a system which was not local but was a confusing mixture of local and general law. In addition admiralty followed its own course based upon English maritime procedure. Naturally there was no attempt at uniformity from district to district. And since a case would not stay confined in its own slot but would jump the artificial boundaries thus set up among actions, the indigenous and unique practice of each federal district was a major factor in delaying federal justice and even in denying it because of the technical barriers thus imposed.

REFORM OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE

This was a situation which obviously cried out for reform. Almost from its

inception in 1873 the American Bar Association took an interest in improved federal procedure; and from 1912 to 1933 it carried on a campaign through a special committee directed to this one objective. The plan supported by the Association was to confer complete rule-making power on the Supreme Court—a supplement to its existing power embodied in the draft of the Uniform Equity Rules—with the expectation that the Court, thus empowered, would modernize the practice. When the American Bar Association, disheartened by senatorial opposition, gave up the campaign, it was taken up vigorously by Attorney-General Homer Cummings, who secured the enactment on June 19, 1934, of the very bill which the Association had formerly sponsored. The Department of Justice then formulated plans to recommend a system of uniform rules at law to supplement the existing equity rules; but to many of us, including the writer, this seemed altogether too limited a reform. The Supreme Court accepted our point of view and in May 1935 announced its purpose to achieve the merger of law and equity as authorized by the Act and to appoint an Advisory Committee to assist it in the formulation of rules of practice.

Thus in June 1935, the Court announced the appointment of a Committee of fifteen with former Attorney-General William D. Mitchell as Chairman and the writer as Reporter and Committee member. On the Committee as named were the Presidents of the American Bar Association and the American Law Institute, eight other practitioners, and five law professors from the procedural field. The Reporter immediately organized a research staff, and drafts were being studied by the Committee as early as the fall of 1935. A Preliminary Draft was issued and widely distributed for the invited criticism of the bench and bar in May 1936. The

criticisms and suggestions received were carefully studied, and a modified and corrected draft was published in a Report of April 1937 with a *Final Report* to the Court in November 1937. The Court adopted the entire draft with the exception of two minor recommendations of limited scope. The eighty-six rules thus adopted were reported to Congress as required by the enabling statute and went into effect on September 16, 1938—three months after Congress adjourned.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

The procedure adopted with such celerity was soundly based in part on accepted models from England, in part from advanced procedures here and there in the states, and in part from the unique blending and expansion of these various elements. Taken separately the various devices often appeared old and well tried; but combined into an ordered whole, they presented a system at once novel and the most advanced of its time. For my present purposes I shall classify the improvements as three basic advances and three notable, though perhaps less basic, changes, together with various improvements of detail too numerous to mention here. Obviously this classification is somewhat arbitrary; all the changes are important to those who have to deal daily with the practice. But I think this form of statement is illuminating to illustrate the improvements achieved.

Of the basic changes the first is of course the merger of law and equity. This, while long overdue, was not novel; it brought the federal system to the level of the better state practices. And the second was the manner of pleading the claim for relief and the happenings upon which it was founded. This, too, was not particularly original; it was the adaptation of the "general" pleading of

the common law to modern conditions pointedly illustrated by some important forms intended, as Rule 84 states, "to indicate the simplicity and brevity of statement which the rules contemplate." Thus the system quite properly walks between the confusing detail normal under the old "special" pleading and the code statement of "the facts constituting the cause of action" on the one hand and the vague indefiniteness of "fair notice"—the darling of some reformers—on the other. The third is both the natural corollary of the last point and the embodiment of the modern view against "surprise" as a procedural weapon or trial tactic, namely, the extensive pre-trial procedures for uncovering the merits at an early stage. These include the various deposition and discovery devices for ascertaining or taking the advance testimony of witnesses and parties, the summary-judgment motion for speedy disposition of a case found ready for early termination, and the pre-trial conference itself—a meeting before trial of lawyers and judge to settle the issues and admissions of things not questioned and generally to advance the case for trial only on essentials if, indeed, the more thorough knowledge thus obtained does not lead the parties to negotiate for a settlement.

Among the notable additional reforms must be included the free joinder of parties and of actions, the provisions for simple jury waiver by failure to make early claim for jury trial, and the wholly simplified method of taking appeals. All these improvements are so fully exploited in law texts, law review articles, and the cases themselves that documentation here is unnecessary. The literature is already vast.² Indeed some criti-

² See the references in note 1 *supra*. Professional texts for the practicing lawyer include William W. Barron and Alexander Holtzoff's *Federal Practice and Procedure* (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Company, 1950-58),

cism occasionally stresses this sheer volume of materials, suggesting that the rules must contain some inherent difficulty if so many printed pages of exposition are necessary. But this is patently a misconstruction. The great bulk of the informed comment is wholly favorable and represents in large measure the desire of professionals to associate themselves with a going and successful enterprise. This was a feature noted from the beginning: the stimulus afforded, for example, to trial judges, who took pleasure and pride in what they could accomplish under the new procedure and wanted to write about it. Practically none of the comment is critical of the system as a whole; such criticism as appears now and then is directed to details or the need for clarification of particular rules, such as was undertaken from time to time by the former Advisory Committee. So the general success of the rules has been phenomenal. This is shown not only by their successful operation as disclosed in the reported cases and by the uniform chorus of praise, but also by their adoption in the states.

THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE STATES

As of this writing the federal rules have been adopted substantially in toto—except for very slight details forced by local exigencies—in Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Puerto Rico, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. They have stimulated complete revisions largely, but not wholly, following their example in Flor-

already in 7 volumes, Moore's *Federal Practice* (Albany, N. Y.: Matthew Bender & Company, 1948-59), of which the second edition likewise requires 7 volumes, and the *Federal Rules Decisions* and the *Federal Rules Service*, which are continuing series of the reported cases on the Rules.

ida, Iowa, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Texas, and somewhat more limited and partial steps in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, Nebraska, New York, South Dakota, and Vermont. Hardly a jurisdiction remains unaffected; for example, the famous Rule 16 on pre-trial conferences seems all pervasive. And there appears to be promising movement for reform gaining momentum in Michigan, Rhode Island, and South Carolina.³

Three more things should be noted about this movement. The first is the general pattern which now almost invariably follows that of the federal reform of a grant of rule-making authority to the highest court and its exercise with the aid of an advisory committee selected by the court for the purpose. With the responsibility for the over-all reform committed to the courts, rather than the legislatures, there is complete and informed action in contrast to the spotty response to special interests so unfortunate a feature of legislative activity in this specialized field. The courts can command expert help and are not to be expected to do the detailed work of drafting themselves. And the organization ensures continuous supervision and responsibility for keeping the tools of justice always bright.

A defect of the original federal system was a lack of provision for a continuing committee and for amendment of the rules. The Court met this gap by continuing its original committee and by approving amendments drafted in the same manner as were the original rules. But by 1955 the members of the original Advisory Committee had grown old in the service and its effective personnel had been reduced by illness and death. So at that time it was discharged with the thanks of the Court. Then there

³ The movement in each state is carefully and precisely described in Professor Wright's article cited in note 1 *supra*.

developed a strong demand for an express authorization, which had been lacking in the original statute, for a continuous study of procedure and the recommendation of changes as needed. This was achieved by a statute passed in 1958 which places the responsibility for such continuing study upon the Judicial Conference of the United States and charges that body with the obligation to report to the Court its recommendations for changes or additions "to promote simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, the just determination of litigation, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay."⁴ The Conference has determined that there shall be set up to carry out this task a standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and five advisory committees, on civil, criminal, bankruptcy, admiralty, and appellate procedure.⁵ Thus the continuing responsibility is clearly defined for the federal system which without doubt will continue to be a model to the states.

The second matter to be noted is the extension of rule making to procedures other than civil. It is true that in a court of general jurisdiction most of the court's time is taken up in the disposition of civil business which is both extensive in amount and time consuming in consideration. But as shown by the present planning for the federal system outlined above, there are other practices to which the new principles are properly applicable. The federal civil rules already cover appellate practice generally, and they are also applied in maritime cases by usual analogy and custom and in bankruptcy litigation so far as not inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Act. In criminal procedure the Court in 1941

⁴ P.L. 85-513, 72 Stat. 356, amending 28 U.S.C. § 331.

⁵ [Sept. 17-19, 1958] PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U. S. ANN. REP. 6, 7.

appointed an Advisory Committee which recommended a set of rules adopted by the Court in 1944, effective in 1946. While not yet widely adopted in state practice, these rules appear to have been highly successful and comparably as useful in their area of operation as the civil rules. So there seems a wide field of potential usefulness for the modern federal principles in various new aspects of federal and state practice.⁶

The third matter to be noted is the stimulus to improvement in the entire court structure given impetus by the success of this reform. Now at least two thirds of the states are engaged in notable studies of their court organizations with a view of developing integrated organization under a single directing head—usually the State Chief Justice—and, with the help of such centralized control, of following businesslike methods in the dispatch of court affairs and the control of court finances. This movement, itself so vigorous and promising, has not yet had time to achieve success in wide areas. There has been notable improvement at the upper court level in New Jersey; but the most complete reform up to the present time, affecting all grades of judicial activity, has occurred in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.⁷ But most recently, Connecticut has established, to be effective in 1961, a major reform of its minor court system, involving police and traffic

⁶ Thus the civil rules have been adopted and are in successful operation in the Municipal Court for the District of Columbia.

⁷ Charles E. Clark and William D. Rogers, *The New Judiciary Act of Puerto Rico: A Definitive Court Reorganization*, 61 YALE L. J. 1147, 1165 (Nov. 1952); Sheldon D. Elliott, 'Our Faith in Justice': Puerto Rico Shows the Way to Better Courts, 42 A.B.A.J. 24 (Jan. 1956); William J. Brennan, Jr., *After Eight Years: New Jersey Judicial Reform*, 43 A.B.A.J. 499 (June 1957); Sheldon D. Elliott, *The Judiciary: Essential Elements of a Model Judiciary Article* (New York: Institute of Judicial Administration, April 20, 1959).

courts and the rural justices of the peace. The reform substitutes a centralized organization with career judges for the old outmoded and diffused organization. Undoubtedly the Connecticut Circuit Court Act will prove a model to other jurisdictions.⁸

INADEQUACY OF THE CONCEPT "LAGGING JUSTICE"

In my discussion the reader may sense a note of optimism concerning the status of law administration in this country which may seem at odds with much of the current complaints surrounding congested courts and delayed justice. But this is done deliberately as an accurate reflection of my own deep conviction that, in the area open to judicial and professional action, conditions are constantly improving and are brighter than they have been before. Nor can I think that the sharper criticisms currently directed toward the courts are altogether merited or indeed at times too well informed. Since I have spent a lifetime working for improvement in law administration, I cannot hold the courts beyond criticism and believe they can only benefit from constructive suggestions. The present extensive concern betokens a very worthwhile interest in the courts which may properly act as a goad and a stimulus to greater professional interest and efforts at improvement. I do have concern, however, lest the criticisms go so far as to suggest some crisis

⁸ Conn. P.A. 1959, Chap. 28. This follows in very substantial form the recommendations originally made by the Commission on State Government Organization appointed by Governor Bowles pursuant to legislative authorization in 1949. See 1950 COMM'N ON STATE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION REP. 62-66; Charles E. Clark, Final Report (Judicial Survey Unit No. 18), Dec. 1949; Charles E. Clark and Elias Clark, *Court Integration in Connecticut: A Case Study of Steps in Judicial Reform*, 59 YALE L. J. 1395 (Dec. 1950); Ernest McCormick, *The Struggle for Probate Court Reform*, 33 CONN. B. J. 267 (Sept. 1959).

requiring drastic measures of reform. For such an exigency is likely to suggest quick remedies of a gadget nature which may actually prejudice the somewhat slower approach of careful and expert study heretofore pursued.⁹ I am troubled, for this reason, by a recent rather hasty field study of the federal courts which is held to have revealed "Shocking Inefficiencies" in federal court administration;¹⁰ and I do not find the title of this symposium, "Lagging Justice," altogether realistic for the general purpose at hand.

For a proper approach to long-time improvements certain basic facts must be kept in mind. First, there are many, many courts in this country; and the caliber of judges, particularly as judicial administrators, varies greatly. In quite a few courts deliberation is a quality rather sought for than eschewed. Indeed a suggestion from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts that six months from the bringing of suit be considered as a normally desir-

⁹ An example in point is that of the English "summons for direction" as administered by the standing masters. This has proved an effective aid to the courts under the English practice with the concentration of cases in London, the outstanding ability of the masters thus available, the division of the profession making the responsible barristers alone in charge of litigation in the high courts, the comparative disuse of the jury, and the limited discovery which the masters somewhat extend. But it is hardly as useful here, and was rejected (for much more extensive discovery *inter alia*) upon adoption of the federal rules. See George Ragland, Jr., *Discovery before Trial* (Chicago: Callaghan and Company, 1932), pp. 227-40; Charles E. Clark, *The Evershed Report and English Procedural Reform*, 29 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1046 (May 1954); Charles E. Clark, *Difficulties Encountered in a System of Masters*, 23 F.R.D. 569 (1959).

¹⁰ "Shocking" Inefficiencies Found in Federal Court Administration, 43 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y. 56 (Aug. 1959), a review of the "Field Study of the Operations of United States Courts" prepared for the Senate Appropriations Committee by Mr. Paul J. Cotter, staff member.

able time within which trial should have begun in the federal courts has met strenuous objection from the judges, who consider this too short a time for the parties properly to complete trial preparation or to explore the possibilities of settlement—the usual outcome, as we have seen, of the vast majority of the cases. Then it must be noted that really delaying congestion in the courts is found in only a comparatively few metropolitan areas in the country and in only certain of their calendars. Furthermore, the delay centers almost wholly about a modern phenomenon, namely, the vast number of negligence cases, usually arising out of automobile accidents, where the rather slow moving trial by jury is a constitutionally protected form of delay.¹¹ So serious is this problem that one must look in the not too distant future for some really worth-while solution, perhaps the adoption of the so-called "compensation principle."¹² This, be it noted, is a problem

¹¹ A late survey of calendars for personal injury jury cases shows that even for this burdensome litigation there are now only three courts (instead of ten or thirteen at earlier periods) showing delays in excess of twenty-five months, and these were located in Chicago and New York City. *State Trial Courts of General Jurisdiction: Calendar Status Study—1959* (New York: Institute of Judicial Administration, June 30, 1959).

¹² COMM. TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES REP. (Philadelphia: International Printing Co., 1932); Fleming James, *The Columbia Study of Compensation for Automobile Accidents: An Unanswered Challenge*, 59 COLUM.

of general public policy, not merely one of judicial administration. Then, too, there is the phenomenon of an exploding population growing by leaps and bounds with which the increase by legislative action of court facilities, and particularly of judicial personnel, has lamentably failed to keep pace.¹³ Thus there are many serious problems which require the most determined and persistent consideration and which cannot be dismissed as obtruding solely because of judicial or even professional inefficiency. And judges for their part must accept an increasing burden of administration on top of the more congenial duties of adjudication.

Hence I would conclude that measurable steps have been taken in improving court administration, but there still remains a substantial task which offers an outstanding challenge to the judiciary and the bar. To the discharge of that responsibility it is to be hoped that this symposium will contribute effectively.

L. R. 408 (March 1959); Charles E. Clark, *Summary and Discussion of the 'Columbia Plan'*, 8 (No. 13) VA. L. WEEKLY DIGEST 1, 3, 4 (Dec. 18, 1955). As the cited articles point out, the plan seems to be operating with good success in Saskatchewan.

¹³ See *Shortage of Federal Judges Is Stressed at Court Congestion Conference*, 42 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y. 20 (June 1958); Earl Warren, *Delay and Congestion in the Federal Courts*, 42 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y. 6, 9-10 (June 1958); Earl Warren, *The Problem of Delay: A Task for Bench and Bar Alike*, 44 A.B.A.J. 1043 (Nov. 1958). See also H. Zeisel, H. Kalven, Jr., and B. Buchholz, *Delay in the Court* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1959), and the A.B.A. pamphlet *Ten Cures for Court Congestion* (1959).

Pre-Trial Procedure

By ALFRED P. MURRAH

ABSTRACT: A departure from traditional procedural concepts was launched by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. One of the major innovations instituted which diminishes the time required for litigation is the pre-trial conference. This conference between the adversary lawyers and the judge delimits the issues in an action, disposing of uncontested issues, fixing the essential points, and thus often preparing a case for settlement. Though a practical and effective procedure, the full rewards have yet to be reaped. The relative newness of the pre-trial conference and the unequal impact of the expanded litigation have limited its country-wide adoption. Pre-trial procedure recognizes the current conception of a lawsuit: one free from surprise, with all triable issues exposed prior to the courtroom.—Ed.

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THE years since World War II have been years of growth and prosperity for our nation. Research has opened to business new and expanding markets that transcend even those created by the expansion in our population, and the automobile and superhighways have opened new vistas of travel.

These changing patterns of American life have not been without significance to the courts of the land. The fiercely competitive struggles for new markets are finding their way into the judicial forum through antitrust proceedings, stockholders suits, patent cases, and contract actions. The automobile, combined with widespread insurance coverage, has deluged the courts with personal injury tort litigation. The slowness of the courts and the legal profession generally to adjust to these changes and to the increased case-loads in the courts has led to the condition which prompts the title of this symposium "Lagging Justice."

Of course the term "lagging justice" is not applicable to every court. The impact of new litigation has been borne primarily by the large metropolitan courts of general jurisdiction, both state and federal. And even among the metropolitan courts, there are those which have quickly adjusted to the trend and developed new techniques and procedures for dealing with an ever increasing volume of cases. Though the courts are daily fashioning new rules of substantive law to govern the conduct of society and the ever changing forms of business transactions in the manner in which they conduct their own judicial business, many courts have been regrettably reluctant to depart from traditional procedural concepts.

EMBRYONIC PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE

Just prior to World War II, however, giant strides in improving judicial procedure were made. These culminated in

1938 in the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a set of rules that emerged from the ideas and techniques pioneered by leaders of the bench and bar. One such technique included in the Rules of Civil Procedure has proven most helpful in the judicial control and management of court dockets. It is the pre-trial conference.

The modern concept of the pre-trial conference was developed in the courtroom of Judge Ira W. Jayne of the Circuit Court of Wayne County, Detroit, Michigan. In experimenting with a docket of mechanics' lien cases in 1929, Judge Jayne discovered that he could dispose of considerably more cases and manage his business more effectively by calling the lawyers to an informal conference in each case prior to trial. Informal conferences, he found, could dispose of uncontested issues and eliminate waste-motions at trial. Furthermore, the reluctance of the parties and of the attorneys to deal specifically with the issues in their case frequently vanished, and out-of-court disposition of the lawsuit ensued. In this respect the policy of the law to encourage the amicable solution of controversies between litigants was fostered.

Conferences between court and counsel before trial undoubtedly had been used by judges prior to 1929, but under the leadership of Judge Jayne these conferences were systematized and made a regular feature of court practice for the first time in Anglo-American jurisprudence.

From Detroit the pre-trial conference, as it was known, spread to Boston and to Cleveland, and then in 1938 it became not just a part of, but a fundamental cornerstone of, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Federal Rules liberalize considerably the way in which litigants procure the facts essential to the prosecution of their lawsuits. New discovery proce-

dures enable a party freely to examine his adversary by way of oral deposition on any question surrounding the case. Or he may elect to conduct such examination by written question or interrogatory to which his adversary must respond fully and completely. Witnesses may be examined in almost the same way. Documents relating to the lawsuit may be ordered produced and the injured party may be compelled to undergo a physical examination.

These discovery rules were designed to eliminate surprise insofar as possible as an element in the outcome of a lawsuit and to ensure that cases will be decided on their merits. They do just that. However, a lawsuit after thorough discovery frequently does not look the same. Legal and factual issues appearing in the original pleading papers filed with the court may have evaporated, and other issues may have taken their place. At this point it is the pre-trial conference that is designed to give unity to the case and prepare it for trial.

PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE: FORMULATING ISSUES

Rule 16, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is simply drawn. It provides as follows:

In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a conference to consider

- (1) The simplification of the issues;
- (2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
- (3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which will avoid unnecessary proof;
- (4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
- (5) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a master for findings to be used as evidence when the trial is to be by jury;
- (6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.

The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the conference, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the parties as to any of the matters considered, and which limits the issues for trial to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when entered controls the subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice.

The pre-trial conference catalytically links discovery with the trial of a civil action. As stated above, pleading papers may have become obsolete, and it is through the pre-trial conference that the court first finds out what the case is all about. What use the court makes of this opportunity to see that the discovery procedures have been completed, to distill the issues, and to crystallize them for trial depends on the skill and understanding of the individual judge.

CIVIL CASES: LIMITED PRACTICE

The simplicity of the federal rule and of similar state rules and their utility in preparing a case for trial are almost self-evident. After twenty-one years of the use of the rule, few lawyers or judges are ever heard to deny its efficacy and practicality. Yet today the pre-trial conference is used in all civil cases by only 50 per cent of the federal judges and by even fewer state judges. Just a few years ago, the percentage was even less.

No complete answer is possible, but part of it can be explained historically. The rules of discovery and the pre-trial conference were entirely new to federal judges in 1938, and a complete transition understandably was delayed. The burden of litigation then was not as heavy, and dockets, for the most part, were not congested.

Actually, there was very little time from the adoption of the Rules before the advent of World War II for them

to become established. The new Rules and the pre-trial conference held promise of a more efficient conduct of a large volume of court business, but wartime controls and limitations on travel brought a decrease in litigation and there was little opportunity for the new procedures to become firmly rooted. This was true both in the federal courts and in the state courts which have been gradually absorbing features of the new Federal Rules into state practice.

Then came the great tide of postwar litigation. In their struggle to keep pace with this tide, many courts either lacked the time or the interest to delve into what new procedural techniques might be helpful. The accident of war and the changing patterns of litigation, it seemed, had suppressed development of widespread knowledge of the Federal Rules and of the use of the pre-trial conference. The tools were there, but skill in their use was lacking.

But there were men of vision who knew and understood the utility of the Rules. Pre-trial procedures were introduced and tested in many jurisdictions by such men as Chief Judge Bolitha J. Laws of Washington, D. C.; Judge James Alger Fee of Portland, Oregon; Judge Arthur F. Lederle of Detroit, Michigan; Judge Ira W. Jayne of Detroit, Michigan; and recently, Judge Clarence Kincaid of Los Angeles, California. In 1945 the Judicial Conference of the United States established a standing committee on pre-trial procedure, and in 1950 a book by Harry D. Nims of the New York Bar, entitled *Pre-trial*, was published under the auspices of the Section of Judicial Administration of the American Bar Association. Under the leadership of the late Chief Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt of New Jersey, the pre-trial conference was made compulsory in New Jersey. California has recently followed suit. Each chief justice of the United States since Chief

Justice Taft has urged a wider and more efficient use of pre-trial devices.

The pre-trial conference has already proven to be an important device in the administration of justice, but experience with it has not been the same in every jurisdiction. However, it is fair to say that where it has not been productive certain fundamentals were not observed. For an effective pre-trial conference, it is essential that the discovery procedures intended to be used by the parties be completed prior to the pre-trial conference, and that counsel in the light of the discovery undertaken review their cases, preferably at a conference with opposing counsel, to re-evaluate the issues of fact and law they intend to litigate and to set aside the matters upon which they can agree. The court should likewise familiarize itself with the case file. No pre-trial conference can be successful without this preparation.

TRIAL WITHOUT SURPRISE

Many courts, both state and federal, have promulgated rules or orders, the effect of which is to require counsel to exhaust discovery and confer concerning the triable issues in the light of discovery. In this manner counsel comes to the pre-trial conference with knowledge not only of his own case, but his adversary's as well. Some courts have devised a pre-trial notice and check list in which counsel are informed of what is expected to be accomplished at the pre-trial conference. No lawyer, be he for the defendant or plaintiff, wants to go into court unprepared; no lawyer likes to be confronted with a surprise witness or surprise testimony; no lawyer who has any respect for the courts wants the judge to be confronted with a serious question of law upon which he might err if he were forced to make an immature decision.

Thus, we think it is in the interest of the administration of justice that each side of a lawsuit should have an opportunity to learn the adversary's contentions and prospective proof—his witnesses, lay and expert, and the law upon which he relies. It is only after learning of his adversary's case that a lawyer can fairly evaluate his own case in terms of money and properly advise his client as to settlement or other disposition. Pre-trial procedure is designed to bring about a fair and expeditious resolution of every lawsuit. A fair resolution means an open resolution; it means dealing with open hands without surprise or de-

ceit. A conscientious lawyer can recommend a sum of money to his client to settle his case only after positive proof of the possibilities of his adversary's contentions and facts upon which he may be able to sustain them.

Pre-trial procedure is in recognition of the concept that a lawsuit is a search for truth, not a game of chance. In the language of a famous lawyer, it affords the profession "a better chance to give a satisfactory answer to three questions uppermost in his client's mind, namely, what will it cost, how long will it take, and what are my chances of success?"

Impartial Medical Testimony

By BERNARD BOTEIN

ABSTRACT: An impartial medical testimony program provides in essence for the establishment of panels of outstanding, neutral experts in each of the branches of traumatic medicine. Whenever the medical claims of the contending parties in personal injury lawsuits seem irreconcilable, the court may designate a physician from the appropriate panel, who will report his findings to the judge and the respective attorneys and possibly testify if the case goes to trial. The program, in conception and operation, has a two-fold purpose. It is an important factor in the never ending campaign to reduce court congestion and delays, although far from a cure-all for that problem. It is also a very effective instrument in the pre-trial arsenal of measures designed to make a trial a fair and knowledgeable search for the truth. The impartial medical testimony program serves directly and indirectly to discourage the "battle of experts" in the courtroom, which often confuses lay jurors and judges, degrades the judicial process, and stigmatizes two great professions.

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OTHER articles in this issue indicate that the key to the problem of court congestion and resultant delay lies in the handling of the enormous volume of personal injury cases that has engulfed our courts in the past few decades. Many judges are concerned about the skill, as well as the speed, with which these cases are processed. The Impartial Medical Testimony Project was conceived in order to improve the functioning of the courts in both respects.

There are two essential issues to be resolved in the settlement or trial of personal injury cases: (1) liability and (2) damages. The question of liability requires a determination of where the fault lies in the occurrence of an accident. A disputed set of facts on the liability question usually poses problems comfortably within the competency of jurors and judges to understand and decide. Our adversary method for the trial of cases and determination of disputed facts is generally an effective medium for eliciting the truth in a courtroom. The self-interest of the contending parties can be relied upon to cause them to present their proof as fully and effectively as possible.

This does not always hold true, however, with respect to the element of damages in personal injury cases, which is determined upon partisan medical reports or testimony usually involving highly technical and conjectural opinions. Damages for personal injuries are awarded on the basis of the amount of money sufficient to pay the claimant for his past and, if there are any, his future medical and hospital expenses, loss of earnings, and pain and suffering. Computation and assessment of such damages require knowledge of the nature and extent of the claimant's injuries, whether the defendant's negligence was the cause of the injuries, the probable duration of the injuries and, if still per-

sistent, whether they are permanent or may be cured. Expert diagnosis and prognosis are required and, thus, the opinions of doctors are the controlling factor. In this area the adversary techniques too often serve to compound confusion.

The basic premise upon which the system depends is that the arbiters of the facts, be they judges or jurors, possess sufficient insight and experience to resolve factual issues knowledgeably. But in our complex society, there are areas in which technical facts can be the subject of learned and conflicting testimony that defies the comprehension of either judge or jury. And in such a framework the adversary system often degenerates into pure guesswork.

The problem becomes at times unbearably frustrating to jurors and judges when conflicting medical testimony is so elusive and baffling that they can feel no confidence in the validity of any resolution they may reach. If both doctors appear to be honorable and competent men, the finder of the facts faces an almost insoluble dilemma.

THE BATTLE OF EXPERTS

The courtroom scene is further complicated by the fact that, in New York City at least, and in many other large cities, both sides rely to a large extent on testifying experts—doctors who examine the plaintiff not for treatment or diagnostic purposes, but only for the purposes of litigation. These men appear in court frequently, unlike the average treating physician, who usually loathes and dreads court appearances; and they have all developed effective courtroom manners.

There can be little quarrel ordinarily with the courtroom conduct or good faith of the general practitioner or specialist who actually treated the plaintiff. Allowances must be made for the fact that most civil trials take on the color-

tion of private fights, that partisanship is infectious and doctors are human in that regard. The most that can be said of treating physicians is that they will not give their patients the worst of testimony on a close medical question.

The testifying expert, hired by the lawyer and not the patient, is usually much more plausible and ingratiating than the treating physician, and he is almost always fully co-operative. So the courtroom expert is hired, and too often the trial lapses into a battle of opposing experts.

These battles of experts are degrading spectacles in a courtroom—degrading for the legal profession as well as the medical profession. The disgust and bewilderment they arouse in jurors and everyone touched by the court processes breed disrespect for our courts. Medical advocacy, guided by legal advocacy, becomes a marketable commodity. The overwhelming majority of honorable practitioners in both professions are undeservedly stigmatized by a small fringe of unscrupulous or undisciplined or careless lawyers and doctors. This condition is the joint responsibility of the organized groups in both professions.

IMPORT OF LIABILITY DECLINES

Whether or not juries have grown more indulgent in finding negligence upon the part of defendants and absence of contributory negligence upon the part of plaintiffs, or whatever the reason, the liability factor is rarely a bar to a settlement nowadays. In fact, in most claims the vigor with which defendants contest liability has dwindled almost to the vanishing point. Over 95 per cent of all claims are disposed of by some payment to the plaintiff, large or small—payments which tacitly concede some element of liability.

These figures as a general rule reflect the experience of courts in urban centers throughout the country. It must

be borne in mind that in the city of New York most personal injury claims are settled before they reach the courts. In settlement negotiations, plaintiffs and defendants do not quite proceed on an assumption of liability without fault; but it is nevertheless fair to say that the issue of liability emerges as a seriously disputed factor with much less frequency than the question of the damages suffered by the claimant. Damages to claimant have now become dispositive in the settlement of almost all personal injury cases.

Since almost 90 per cent of the civil cases in the city's courts are personal injury actions, some idea may be gained as to the dominance of this branch of litigation in the over-all court structure.

LAUNCHING OF THE PROJECT

In 1952, the Justices of the Supreme Court in the First Department, which comprises New York and Bronx Counties, decided the conditions would not cure themselves and would steadily worsen if affirmative action were not taken. Conferences were initiated among officials of the Association of the Bar of the city of New York, the New York County Lawyers Association, the Academy of Medicine, and the New York County Medical Society. A committee of judges and lawyers, headed by the former presiding Justice David W. Peck of the Appellate Division, presented, for elaboration and refinement, the basic idea of establishing a panel of neutral, outstanding medical experts. It was envisaged that they could be called on by judges to examine plaintiffs, report their findings, and if necessary testify, in cases where there was irreconcilable conflict between the doctors representing the contending parties. The medical profession responded enthusiastically and generously.

Two considerations animated the judges, doctors, and lawyers who col-

laborated in launching the plan. One was an abiding belief that a trial is not a test of wits nor a game of chance, but a sober, logical search for the truth. The Medical Panel Plan was designed as another weapon in the arsenal of pre-trial devices, specifically designed to substitute truth and light for the battles of experts which had so long bewildered courts and juries.

Second, the judges were concerned with the hampering, disorganizing impact of these practices upon the healthy and expeditious disposition of the courts' business. While very few personal injury claims end in the verdict of a jury, nevertheless the amounts awarded by juries are the yardstick by which the parties measure the value of a case in settlement negotiations.

Threading all the conferences was the conviction that two great professions, manned largely by honorable and dedicated practitioners, were being undeservedly stigmatized by an outlaw fringe; and that this condition must be ended or at least checked.

The operative rule

The Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and the Ford Motor Company Fund financed the establishment and operation of a Medical Panel System in the Supreme Court, New York County, as an experimental program for the year 1953. To implement this project the Appellate Division, First Department, promulgated the following Special Rule:

1. There is established in the Supreme Court for the County of New York an office to be known as the Medical Report Office, which shall be in charge of a deputy clerk of the Supreme Court.

2. In any personal injury case in which, prior to the trial thereof, a justice shall be of the opinion that an examination of the injured person and a report thereon by an impartial medical expert would be of material aid to the just determination of the

case, he may, after consultation with counsel for the respective parties, order such examination and report, without cost to the parties, through the Medical Report Office of the Supreme Court, New York County. The examination will be made by a member of a panel of examining physicians designated for their particular qualifications by the New York Academy of Medicine and New York County Medical Society. Copies of the report of the examining physician will be made available by the clerk of the Medical Report Office to all parties.

3. If the case proceeds to trial after such examination and report, either party may call the examining physician as a witness or the trial justice may, if he deems it desirable to do so, call the examining physician as a witness for the court, subject to questioning by any party, but without cost to any party.

Characteristics of experts

The Academy of Medicine and New York County Medical Society jointly and exclusively, without recommendations from lawyers or judges, established panels of leading specialists in sixteen fields of traumatic medicine, such as orthopedics, roentgenology, neurology, neuro-psychiatry, and so forth. To secure as neutral a body of experts as possible, the medical organizations excluded from the panels any physician who had been employed to any appreciable extent by insurance companies or plaintiffs' counsel in personal injury actions.

The fees of the experts for examinations, reports, and for their infrequent trial appearances are now paid out of the regular court budget and have been so paid since 1956. The panel experts are asked to fix their fees in the amounts they would charge patients in moderate circumstances. They have been most reasonable in the bills they have submitted. An annual appropriation of \$15,000 is made each year, which amount generally is entirely exhausted through the payment of fees of panel doctors. In this respect the New York

project differs from those in Baltimore and in the federal court in Philadelphia, where the fees are charged against the parties. It has been the view of the sponsors of the New York project that to assure the appearance as well as the reality of true impartiality and to avoid increasing the already high costs of litigation to the parties, it was essential that the costs should not be shifted to the litigants.

At this point it cannot be stressed too strongly that acceptance and the success of an impartial medical testimony program in a community depends upon the integrity and professional standing of the experts who man its panels. No such project can survive if bench and bar lack faith in the panel members.

THE PLAN IN OPERATION

The mechanics implementing the rule of court are designed to inconvenience all the participants as little as possible. The justice directs the examination, usually after conference with the respective attorneys. He endeavors to allow a time interval of at least two weeks, preferably three, until the resumed conference date, if the case is on the pre-trial calendar; or until an adjourned date if the case has reached the Day Calendar for trial.

The form as filled in by the judge describes the nature of the medical dispute and indicates the specialty of the panel expert who is to examine the plaintiff. This form is entrusted to the attorneys, who proceed to the Medical Report Office. In the attorneys' presence, the deputy clerk in charge, by a process of strict rotation, calls the panel expert whose name next appears on the specialty list. The clerk fixes a date for examination at the panel expert's office which is mutually convenient to doctor, plaintiff, and the respective lawyers. He also arranges to forward to the expert, in advance of his examination, copies of the reports of the plaintiff's and de-

fendant's physicians, as well as the hospital records, if any, so that he may be advised of the respective contentions of the parties. The lawyers for both sides are encouraged to attend at the examination.

The impartial expert examines the plaintiff as thoroughly and in much the same manner as he would examine a private patient. The plaintiff recounts his ailments and medical history and the expert uses such tests and laboratory procedures as he deems advisable. Of course, no treatment is contemplated—only an opinion embodying diagnosis and prognosis. After the examination, the expert mails at least three copies of his report to the Clerk of the Medical Report Office, who sends one to each attorney and the original to the justice. The expert also sends his bill to the office. It is preferable that the reports be distributed a few days before the adjourned date so that counsel and judge will be prepared to appraise and discuss their contents.

At the resumed conference the case is discussed again in the light of the impartial report. If the impartial expert's report has resolved the major points of controversy, the case may be settled. If not settled, the case is remanded to await trial in normal course. The judge passes upon the bill rendered by the impartial expert, and has the power to disapprove payment of any fee he considers unreasonable. Upon approval, the fee is paid from the Project funds.

Medical experts testify

If the settlement attempts fail and the case goes to trial, the impartial expert may be called to testify either by the judge or by one of the parties. In such event arrangements are made for his appearance informally, without subpoena, through the Medical Report Office—never through an attorney request-

ing his presence. When the impartial expert takes the stand, he is qualified just like any other expert, except that the auspices under which he was designated to examine the plaintiff are explained to the jury. If his appearance was requested by the attorney for one side, the opposing attorney may cross-examine him. Sometimes, particularly in nonjury cases, the parties may stipulate to receive the impartial expert's written report in evidence.

Many factors combine to make the pre-trial climate a favorable one, such as the absence of impending trial pressures, the presence of representatives qualified to discuss settlement, and the various pre-trial techniques. The pre-trial conference is held in an informal, relaxed atmosphere, several months before trial, and is conducive to the kind of unhurried judicial inquiry that will elicit whether a report from an impartial expert will be helpful.

When the project was in its experimental stage, references stemmed almost entirely from pre-trial conferences; but now only about half emanate from that source. As the judges have become more familiar with the workings of the panel and more assured of its advantages, they have used it in many more aspects of judicial duties. The Medical Expert Panel is being employed more and more on motions for preferences, motions to remove cases from the lower courts to the Supreme Court, compromise orders in infants' actions, and after nonjury trials.

ESTIMATE OF THE RESULTS

Up to the present time, about 800 cases have been assigned to the Medical Report Office, an average of a little over a hundred a year. From the outset it was realized that the job ahead was a qualitative, not a quantitative one. For example, the first eighty cases that were referred to the Medical Report Office at

the pre-trial stage were selected from 1,500 cases handled in pre-trial conferences. The importance of these relatively small blocks of cases, however, cannot be overemphasized; they certainly cannot be measured in mere numbers. They are the durable cases—not just any hundred personal injury cases out of the several thousand we dispose of in our court each year. The drain of this small number of medically irreconcilable cases on the court resources and the trial judge's time and energy is out of all proportion to their limited number. An inordinately large proportion of these cases do not permit of settlement and therefore go to trial. When we realize that suit is brought in approximately one third of the claims in the city of New York and that only 20 per cent of the claims are placed upon the calendars of the various courts; that less than 6 per cent of personal injury cases placed on the calendar ever go through to completed trial; when we reflect that at most a few hundred personal injury cases are tried to completion in the Supreme Court of the busiest county in New York State in any given year, we can appreciate how substantial an impediment these cases represent in the routing of court business. We can only guess at how many cases were settled because one side feared that referral to an impartial expert would disclose the falsity of its medical claim; or the ratio of cases in which puffing of injuries is discouraged by fear of possible disclosure; or the prophylactic effect of the possibility that their findings will be reviewed by the leaders of their profession has on the excesses of that small band of doctors I referred to earlier.

More precise measurement

As of June 30, 1959, there had been 769 referrals to the Medical Panel from both New York and Bronx Counties. Of these, 500 cases have been settled;

17 have been transferred for disposition by a lower court by consent of the parties; and 34 were virtually marked off the calendar. One hundred twenty-three of the cases that were referred nevertheless went to trial and in a number of them the impartial expert testified.

As might be expected, a major proportion of the referred cases involved injuries with few objective symptoms. About 40 per cent of the cases involved claims of postconcussion syndromes, and about 7 per cent concerned claims of back injuries. In about 29 per cent of all the references there were fracture claims. The panels utilized most often were orthopedics, neuro-psychiatry and roentgenology.

About 5 per cent of the cases required the services of more than one specialist. Sometimes the judge ordering the reference recognized the need and referred the case to two or more men. Sometimes a panel member would request the services of another specialist—very often an X-ray expert. There was some confusion at first, but now when a panel expert seeks the assistance of another expert he clears his request through the Medical Report Office.

It is difficult to determine with any assurance how often the impartial experts have sustained plaintiffs' claims and how often they have rejected or minimized them. For whatever the comparison is worth, the records show that after the impartial examinations, plaintiffs' claims are revised downward more frequently than defendants' offers are revised upward. However, in a significant number of cases the medical claims of the plaintiffs have been found to be thoroughly justified and in some cases, even understated. As a result of the impartial experts' reports, many cases have been settled at figures much higher than defendants offered before the reference, and in a few cases the panel experts discovered traumatic in-

juries that had been overlooked by the plaintiffs' doctors.

THE ROLE OF THE EXPERT

In some cases, particularly in the neuro-psychiatry areas, we find that the panel specialists are unable to resolve the medical conflict; they cannot say whether the plaintiff's claims are valid or unfounded. Even then, the reports, if definite enough on the inability to make findings, have an affirmative value. Both sides must give weight to a statement by a leading physician that neither party can establish its contentions with anything like medical certainty. The tendency is for both sides to pull in their claims from the goal posts toward the fifty-yard line.

There are certain areas of medicine in which the outstanding men are divided into two or more responsible but bitterly opposed schools of thought. There should be no referrals at all in such fields. Neither party should be required to run the risk that mere chance, something akin to the turn of a roulette wheel, will determine whether the case will draw an expert whose previous conditioning will render him hostile or friendly to his side. For example, because of divided medical opinion on the causation of cancer from trauma, we have eliminated the panel covering such cases. It is noteworthy that no case had ever been referred to this panel.

The reports with which we find major fault are those which are vague, rambling, and discursive. They tend to feed and encourage the claims of both sides and heighten confusion in conference or trial. Happily, there are few of that type.

There has been some debate about calling the panel expert as a witness at the trial. Some lawyers and judges seem to feel that the jury will be unduly swayed by the prestige and court im-

primatur of the independent expert. The criticism generally takes the form that the expert should not testify, but only report for conference purposes.

Of course, with such restrictions upon the use of the expert, the value of the Panel would be minimized, if not destroyed. Corrupt or careless doctors or lawyers would not have to fear exposure in court. Also, there would be no settlement leverage if the party affected unfavorably by the impartial expert's report did not apprehend that he would have to contend with his testimony should he go to trial.

Most important, the wholesome purpose of enlightening the jury through objective and competent medical testimony would be defeated; and the overwhelming majority of judges in our Department feel that the jury should not be shut off from this source of enlightenment.

There is no doubt that the expert enjoys a special standing in the eyes of the jury, but this is something he earned before he was appointed on the Panel. His professional pre-eminence and independence were well established. No special privileges or kudos are given the independent expert when he is called to the stand. He is exposed to full examination and cross-examination just as is any other witness. The jury is instructed that his testimony is not to be accepted or given any particular weight merely by reason of his identification. Certainly, a jury charged with the duty of making sense of the conflicting and confounding testimony of paid, partisan physicians can be entrusted with evaluating and weighing the testimony of the independent expert.

POTENTIALS OF THE PROGRAM

It may fairly be said that the Medical Expert Plan offers a significant contribution in the two areas that most con-

cerned those who launched it—in the improvement of medical fact-finding in accident cases and to some extent in relieving calendar congestion.

A Special Committee of the Association of the Bar of the city of New York, composed of judges, doctors, and lawyers, had the original pilot project in charge. The Committee rendered a report which was published in 1956 in book form by The Macmillan Company under the title *Impartial Medical Testimony*. This book will prove rewarding reading for anyone interested in a detailed treatment of the subject.

A Special Committee of the Section of Judicial Administration of the American Bar Association, in reporting on the subject of impartial medical testimony, recommended the establishment of impartial medical panels in centers of population having a volume of personal injury litigation. Its report was approved by the House of Delegates of the Bar Association in 1957, and the Association has now authorized the Section of Judicial Administration to advocate the general establishment of such offices.

The success of the experiment in New York, the endorsement of the idea by many segments of the organized bar and of the medical profession and the educational activities of the Special Committee of the Section of Judicial Administration of the American Bar Association have resulted in the growth of a considerable ground swell of interest in other urban communities. In Maryland there has been in operation for some time an impartial medical plan which differs from that of New York principally in that the charges of the panel experts are borne by the parties rather than by public funds. The Federal District Court in Philadelphia has also adopted such a system and the rule there has been upheld in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit and in the Supreme Court of the United States.* Both in Maryland and in the Philadelphia Federal Court the plan is reportedly working with entire satisfaction. In California, Illinois, Minnesota, Massachusetts, and Ohio, both the medical profession and the legal profession are co-operating with the courts in projects looking toward the establishment of systems which would either follow the New York model exactly, or would adapt it to varying local

* *Hankinson v. Van Dusen et al.*, 3 L.Ed 2d 628.

conditions. In New Jersey the project is under study by an official committee of the Medical-Legal Society.

Thus, while it cannot be maintained that the program is in itself a panacea for all the problems of court congestion, it is generally found to have been of help in materially reducing its mischief. It is certainly regarded as an effective aid in promoting the more orderly, accurate, and efficient determination of the rights of the parties in the processing of the many personal injury cases that clog the dockets of our courts.

Decongestion Through Calendar Controls

By IRVING R. KAUFMAN

ABSTRACT: A dedicated group of judges in one of the busiest United States district courts in the country, the Southern District of New York, has analyzed its own enormous backlog problem with a success that merits the study of other courts in similar straits. A thorough survey of the cases then pending on the trial court calendars startlingly revealed that only a few cases were prepared for immediate trial. In the course of screening the nonjury cases, meetings between the judge and the lawyers and litigants generally resulted in pre-trial settlements. During the period in which these pre-trial conferences were held most of the calendar backlog was wiped out and docket currency restored. The results achieved, remarkable in themselves, point to several invaluable lessons about the nature of calendar congestion and the weapons with which it can be combatted. The experience of this district court, located in the business hub of New York with not only one of the largest dockets in the country but adjudicating some of the most complex and time-consuming cases, promises equivalent success for other congested areas where similar techniques are instituted.—Ed.

Irving R. Kaufman, LL.B., New York City, has been a United States District Judge, for the Southern District of New York, for over ten years. A graduate of Fordham University School of Law, Judge Kaufman has been interested in the problem of calendar congestion and its cure for many years, having written extensively on the subject. He is a member of both the Pre-Trial Committee and the Committee on the Administration of Criminal Law of the Judicial Conference of the United States.

BY June 30, 1955, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York had reached a critical stage in its continuing effort to administer justice. Over the preceding years the number of new suits instituted in our court each year had been increasing at an alarming rate. Our civil calendars contained a total of 5,630 cases awaiting trial. Parties in jury personal injury and death actions were forced to wait an average of three and one-half years from the time their case was placed upon the calendar until it could be reached for trial. Other calendars were as much as two and two and one-half years behind. Such a long wait for the final adjudication of a controversy threatened seriously to impair the rights of litigants. It was, therefore, a situation which the judges of our court could no longer tolerate.

In 1955 a three-judge committee, composed of Judges Sylvester J. Ryan,¹ Archie O. Dawson and myself, was created to study ways and means of combatting and eliminating our calendar backlog. The task that lay before us was indeed formidable. The first step in the search for a solution was an analysis of the cause of our problem.

CAUSE OF THE LONG DELAY

One fact was immediately apparent. Our backlog was not the product of judicial lassitude. Our judges were producing to the maximum of their capabilities. This, despite the fact that a relatively high proportion of the judicial business in this court, located as it is in the heart of the nation's greatest financial and industrial center, consists of patent, copyright and trademark suits, stockholders' derivative actions, anti-trust proceedings, admiralty litigation and other matters which tend to be more complex and time-consuming than the

¹ Now Chief Judge of the Southern District Court, New York.

average. For example, statistics released by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts reveal that the Southern District of New York handles annually roughly one fourth of the national total of copyright cases, one third of government civil antitrust actions, one fifth of private antitrust suits, 35 per cent of the admiralty and maritime actions, and more than one half of all Jones Act suits involving injuries to seamen. Because of this high proportion of complex commercial litigation in our court, mere statistics comparing the size of our case-load with that of other courts do not fully reveal the disproportionately large share of federal judicial business handled annually in the Southern District of New York. And yet, even on a bare statistical basis our workload is far above the average. For example, in fiscal year 1958, the national average "Civil Caseload Per Judge" for the federal courts, based upon new cases filed, was 259 cases, whereas 374 new cases were filed per judge in the Southern District. From the foregoing it is apparent that each judge in our district carries a staggering burden of judicial business. Any attempts to increase that burden would not only endanger the health and welfare of the judges but would seriously jeopardize the rights of the litigants by undermining the quality of judicial craftsmanship.

Judge's work schedule

An examination of the average judge's work schedule will further reveal the reason for this conclusion. Judges normally "sit," that is, are engaged on the bench between the hours of 10:00 or 10:30 A.M. and 4:00 or 4:30 P.M. daily, with an hour out for lunch. This is the time when the judge is "on display" and the layman's knowledge of what judges do is often limited to the view gained at that time. However, before the judge ascends to the bench in

the morning and when the judge descends from the bench and returns to his chambers in the evening, he usually carries with him an accumulation of problems that must be solved during the remaining hours of the day and which, indeed, do carry over into his evenings and week ends. Evidentiary problems must be studied and researched; jury charges must be drawn; voluminous motions decided, opinions written, and so on, all during the judge's nonbench hours. More frequently than not, cases previously tried without a jury and marked "decision reserved" await the judge's determination and the writing of an opinion whenever the judge finds the opportunity. Almost inevitably, many of these matters overflow into the judge's so-called "summer vacation" and must await the close of the court year for determination. The summer months are precious to the judge, not only as an opportunity to set in order accumulated work before the onslaught of a new court year, but as a time to attend conferences and symposia on problems of judicial administration, attend committee meetings of the Judicial Conference, and to become up to date on his reading of other court opinions, legal periodicals, voluminous reports of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, and so forth. Thus, between the pressures of ever-present reserved decision work, and the endeavor to improve their professional competence, it is not uncommon for conscientious judges in busy districts such as ours never truly to take a vacation, but to be engaged in the "business of judging" virtually twelve months of a year. Any solution based upon the imposition of an increased work-load on the judges, though it may have an appealing ring in newspaper articles, seeks in effect to find a thirteenth month in the judge's year. It is, therefore, quite obviously grounded upon an impossibility.

Though these facts make apparent the need for new judgeships in the Southern District of New York, this was a "solution" to which the committee did not address itself. The creation of new judgeships is a matter for Congressional action. Since our committee was created to suggest a solution based upon the best utilization of the materials at hand we turned our attention to the consideration of other possible approaches.

TRIAL COURT CALENDARS

As a start, we canvassed all of the 5,630 cases on our five civil calendars. For each case on the calendar, the attorneys were required to file a certificate with the calendar clerk of our court stating whether or not the case was ready to proceed to trial. The results of this poll startled us. Out of the 5,630 cases on the calendar only 799 certified that they were ready in all respects. It became apparent that the long delay between the time a case was placed on the calendar and the trial had caused many attorneys almost automatically to place every case on the calendars without waiting until their trial preparations were complete and with little regard being paid to the possibility or even probability of settlement. Thus our trial calendars did not present a true picture of the cases where litigants were ready and anxious for a trial. This meant that cases were often settled almost on the eve of trial or adjourned because of nonreadiness. The result was so-called "calendar breaks" which frequently caused judges in the most congested trial parts to remain idle until additional cases ready for trial could be summoned. Our poll made it apparent to us that to some degree at least our backlog was more specter than substance. We had pictured our calendar congestion problem as similar to a logjam on a river, where many logs accumulate along the river because they all

arrive at the same time at a narrow point through which they can go only one or two at a time. But if, in reality, the logs have not yet all arrived at the narrows, but are evenly spaced along various stages of the length of the river, then there is no logjam, though there may be the same number of logs in the river. So too, calendar congestion means a jam-up of cases which are all actually ready to be tried but can only be reached a few at a time. If, in fact, only a handful of cases are ready and the rest are still in various stages of preparation, then there would be no calendar congestion, though the court dockets might contain a great number of actions.

Pending cases reviewed

While the certificates filed by the attorneys were revealing, they did not provide us with all of the information needed. We wanted to know whether in certifying that their cases were ready to be tried, the attorneys meant that they were presently ready in all respects, or whether they were merely indicating their estimation that the case would be ready by the time it could be reached. We, therefore, determined that in order to gain an accurate picture of the present status of our calendars it was necessary for us to call in the attorneys on each case that had been marked "ready" and put this question to them: "Counselor, if you had the opportunity to try your case tomorrow, would you be ready to do so?" These calls could also provide us an opportunity to discuss with the attorneys the merits of their respective positions in order to determine whether the case might be disposed of without the necessity of a trial.

In October of 1955 Judge Ryan and I proceeded to call in these cases. I called in the cases on the three nonjury calendars of the court, while Judge Ryan was in control of the two jury

calendars. We each served a two-month term in this capacity as so-called "Part I Judge," after which we were succeeded by other judges of the court.

In the course of the nine-month court year from October 1955 through June 1956, our judges called everyone of the 5,630 cases pending on the calendars plus an additional 1,599 cases which were added to the calendars during the year. Of this total of 7,229 cases, 5,429 were terminated, largely as a result of the new screening procedure, eliminating a backlog representing over eight years of court time.

Nonjury calendars

Perhaps some insight into how this seeming miracle was accomplished can be gained if I tell you about my personal experience in calling the nonjury calendars.

In a two-month period, I called 1,856 cases, or three fourths of the then pending nonjury case-load. In the informal atmosphere prevailing at these screening conferences, I would encourage the attorneys really to reveal their claims and defenses. Each side would learn—often for the first time—the precise grounds on which the other party was actually basing its case. Excess claims and verbiage would be thrust aside, and the result was that one third of the cases called were settled. Thus, in those two months, pre-trial screening was responsible for 605 settlements in nonjury cases alone. Similar results were obtained by Judge Ryan in the jury part, and these achievements were continued by Part I judges throughout the year in a process which cleared not only our calendars, but those of the attorneys as well.

In numerous other actions which could not be settled, the issues were narrowed for trial, and vital stipulations were entered into. Where the parties to an action were not ready for trial, the case would be either marked off the

calendar subject to restoration, or adjourned to a later hearing in Part I, thus affording the ready case behind the non-ready cases a justified early trial. Sometimes if there were dilatory tactics on one side, and the other party was prepared, a case would be peremptorily marked ready for a set date.

Only when all parties to an action were completely prepared for trial and where settlement seemed to be completely out of the question would a case be placed upon the appropriate ready calendar.

Results achieved

This screening process bore fruit almost immediately. At the end of the first two months, the admiralty calendar, which had been two years behind, was current, as was the nonjury other than personal injury calendar, which had formerly accumulated a two and one-half year backlog, while the current status of the nonjury personal injury calendar was retained. I might add that this was a gratifying surprise to all of us, for when the new system was devised, we did not believe that the nonjury, nonpersonal injury calendars would lend themselves to disposition as effectively as the jury personal injury cases. As of June 30, 1956, all five civil calendars of the Southern District were current. This represented a fantastic achievement in case sorting.

Formerly the cases on our civil calendars ranged from the completely prepared to the absolutely unprepared—although, I must say, there were very few cases in the former category. The cases ranged from the necessary-to-be-tried to the never-to-be-tried, and from the one day case to the case which requires two months and longer. We screened them all and separated the wheat from the chaff to find out exactly what we were dealing with.

Indeed by January 2, 1956, most of

our calendars were current and we inaugurated a new rule designed to keep them that way. This rule requires that a notice of readiness for trial be filed along with the customary note of issue before any case can be placed upon a calendar of this court. That rule has dramatically cut the number of cases being added to our calendars—positive proof that attorneys were filing notes of issue prematurely. For example, in the three months before the rule was promulgated, we averaged 188 new cases per month. In the following three months, the average dropped to 56 cases per month, and that figure included many restorations of actions previously marked off calendar in Part I.

A further result of the Part I procedure was that we greatly reduced the problem of calendar breaks, and the judges were thus able to try a larger number of civil cases than ever before in our court's history. The trial judges worked with the calendar judges as a co-ordinated team which disposed of more business than has ever been disposed of in the Southern District. The judges of our court had a job to perform, and they did it with the utmost dispatch. The results could never have been attained without the enthusiasm and hard work of all the judges of this district.

JURY CALENDAR THREATENS

But amid this sunny picture, there were a few dark, threatening clouds hovering chiefly over our jury personal injury calendar. At the end of June 1956, there were over 630 jury personal injury cases which had been placed on the Ready Calendar awaiting trial. Since these cases had been through Assignment Conferences, we viewed them as a "hard core" of cases that must be tried. We were, therefore, fearful that another backlog was building up; that the cases which we removed from the calendar

last year would return as ready cases at a much quicker rate than we could dispose of them.

In October 1956, as the Civil Jury Part I judge assigned at the commencement of our term, I called these ready cases for another screening conference and for assignment to trial. The results were unexpectedly and overwhelmingly gratifying.

Before I get to these results, it would be well to review the background of the cases which were called. An action is not placed on the calendar until one party certifies that he is completely ready for trial; that all the necessary pre-trial examinations have been completed, and so forth, and that his adversary is ready or has had reasonable opportunity to be ready. The litigant must further certify, under our new Calendar Rule 5(b) (6), "that he has unsuccessfully approached the other party as to the possibility of settlement or the reason why he has not done so." When a party disputes the assertion that he has had reasonable time to complete his preparation and opposes the placing of the case on the calendar, a hearing is held before the Part I judge at which time inquiry may be made as to just what the issues in the case are, in order to discover whether more time is actually needed. To the extent that this results in the litigants unfolding their cases and discussing the merits of their claims and defenses, it resembles an informal pre-trial conference. To the extent that the relative weaknesses and strengths of their respective positions are revealed, settlement possibilities are enhanced. If the party's note of readiness and note of issue are accepted, the case is placed on the Permanent Calendar, shortly after which it is placed on the Reserve Calendar. The cases are then called, in the order in which they were placed on the calendar, to an Assignment Conference. The judge will

ask the attorneys, at that time, to further consider the possibility of settlement and he will offer his services to moderate a settlement conference if they believe that will make it more productive. At the conference the judge will encourage the lawyers to discuss their positions frankly and to make a concerted effort to settle the case. Where the parties request it, the judge will recommend a figure which he believes reasonable. If the parties cannot come to an agreement and if they signify their readiness for trial, they are placed on the Ready Calendar. In a great many instances, the attorneys seek adjournments or postponements for various reasons. In determining whether to grant the adjournment or mark the case off the calendar, the judge often suggests further settlement talks and again offers his assistance. Thus, before the case is placed on the Ready Calendar the attorneys usually have been before a number of judges, have discussed the basic problems with them, have rejected the possibility of settlement and, theoretically, are fully prepared and anxious to go to trial. Therefore, it was believed and assumed that the cases on the Ready Calendar represented a "hard core"—cases that must be tried.

Pre-trial settlement

Toward the end of the first year under our new calendar procedure, however, the judges began to notice that about 25 per cent of these actions were being settled by the judge assigned to try them. In order to avoid this wasteful consumption of precious trial time, it was felt that, despite the fact that these cases had undergone between one and three previous conferences, a final effort should be made to bring the parties together before they were assigned out for trial. This was called the Final Conference. The results were highly gratifying. With the period of time be-

tween placement on the Ready Calendar and call to a Final Conference to reconsider the weaknesses in their position and the strengths of their adversaries', and with the added anxieties accompanying the approach of trial, an exceptionally large number of lawyers decided to settle their cases at these Final Conferences.

Before the 1956 summer recess we started to build up a backlog of cases which had been through Final Conference but which were not reached for trial. The attorneys were told to be ready to go to trial the following October.

"Hard-core" cases settled at Final Conference

However, in view of our previous experience with "hard-core" cases, I decided, as Civil Jury Part I judge, to call these cases once again to a second Final Conference to see if there was any change in position over the summer, instead of simply assigning them to the judges in trial term. Of the 67 cases in the jury personal injury and death calendar, which had been through a previous Final Conference as well as at least one Assignment Conference, 38 were settled; 6 were adjourned to a future term; 4 were permanently discontinued or dismissed; 8 were found far from ready for trial and were marked off the calendar; and only 11 or about 16.5 per cent were really ready and willing to go to trial. Of the 11, one was settled at trial just before the judge was about to charge the jury. The number found ready for trial among the jury personal injury and death cases which had not been through a previous Final Conference but which had been through at least one Assignment Conference, was, of course, lower. Among jury cases other than personal injury or death the outcome was still more astounding. It was even more difficult to find cases

there which were ready for trial. During the six weeks in which the calendar was called, I screened a total of 1,107 cases of which only 120 or about 11 per cent signified a desire to go to trial. Of the 120, many were later settled in the trial part before actually going to trial and two were settled during trial.

The results of these six weeks indicated that our fears were premature. The backlog melted faster than the proverbial snowball in hell. During the October 1956 term, every case on the jury Ready and Reserve Calendars was screened, including cases which were first placed on the calendar the last day of October. During the last week of the term, cases on the Reserve Calendar were called for Assignment Conferences immediately after they reached that calendar. And there was one period when cases were assigned out for trial the day after they were placed on the Ready Calendar. Where there had been 630 cases on the jury personal injury Ready Calendar before that calendar was called for trial assignment, at the end of the term there were only about 18 cases which had to wait a few days for trial assignment. No case on the jury-other Ready Calendar was left waiting for trial assignment.

NATURE OF CALENDAR CONGESTION

During this period we not only wiped out our calendar backlog but we also learned some invaluable lessons about the nature of calendar congestion and the weapons which must be employed to combat it. We learned that congestion breeds more congestion, and, conversely, that the possibility of an early trial leads to speedy disposition of litigation, often without the need for a trial. It must be borne in mind that roughly 92 per cent of the actions instituted in our district are terminated without a trial. The great problem in calendar control is to keep the 92 per cent

from blocking the path to the courtroom of the remaining 8 per cent that must be tried. There are many cases which, for various reasons, will not be settled until the very eve of trial. Thus it is important in bringing about the early disposition of these cases that the trial calendars be clear so that the parties can feel the hot breath of a waiting trial part. In this manner, once congestion has been eliminated, the calendars help to maintain themselves in a current condition.

On the other hand, our experience has taught us that once the trial calendars begin to run several months behind, they no longer accurately reflect the status of the cases awaiting trial. In the months intervening between the conference and the time the case reaches the top of the calendar, the positions of the parties have often undergone a change. Further, as soon as an element of delay enters the trial calendars the attorneys once again begin placing cases on the calendars before they are truly ready; immediately the first ominous rumblings of the avalanche of calendar congestion can be heard. The only cure for such a condition is the rescreening process which I have already described.

COMPLEXITY AND QUANTITY

In the years since the introduction of our new calendar system, the number of cases commenced each year in our district has mounted at an accelerating rate. Since 1955 the annual number of new cases has increased over 55 per cent. In fiscal year 1959 alone, 6,561 new civil cases were commenced in the Southern District of New York. Had it not been for the increased efficiency resulting from the new calendar system, we would have been completely engulfed by this heavy influx of new business. So effective were our calendar procedures, however, that as of June 30, 1959, our five calendars contained a

total of 1,496 cases of which only 894 had been marked ready—this despite the fact the during most of the period that the new calendar system has been in operation, our district has been undermanned due to unfilled judicial vacancies.

These results would not have been possible but for an extraordinary effort on the part of all of the judges. During the 1959 court year, 334 cases were terminated per judge in the Southern District. This is almost 100 cases per judge more than the national average. But the mere fact that more cases were disposed of per judge in our district than in other districts does not reveal the full story. For "the problem of the complicated case" exists to a high degree in this district. Indeed, it has the largest number of "long and complicated cases" in the country.² More than one third of the government antitrust cases pending in the United States District courts are in the Southern District of New York. In addition, 117 private antitrust cases are presently pending in our district. Although precise figures are not available, it is believed that this represents approximately one half of the number pending throughout the country.

The long duration

These cases normally involve extensive pre-trial preparations not infrequently covering a period of several years. Often the trial of such cases lasts for many weeks in the course of which literally thousands of documents and other exhibits are introduced. As an illustration, an antitrust suit went to trial in the Southern District in which the pre-trial preparations alone consumed over two and one-half years of actual hearings. More than 100,000 pages of depo-

² April 1959 SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMM. REP., FIELD STUDY OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 25, 54.

sitions were taken of approximately 173 witnesses. As many as 45,000 documents were marked as exhibits and over 700,000 pages of documents were produced. While it is true that not every case is so complex, most involve a great deal of pre-trial preparation in which the court is frequently called upon to hold hearings and decide many issues that arise between the parties. But such preparation before trial is only a part of the picture. Once it has been completed a judge is then called upon to devote his full time to the trial of the case. The full services of such a judge are often lost to the court for a period of many months. Some years ago, for example, an antitrust case was begun in the Southern District which consumed the full time of the trial judge for over a year. During the course of the trial 40,000 pages of testimony were taken all of which had to be carefully weighed and considered by the judge. Complex conclusions of fact and of law had to be made upon the basis of this voluminous evidence. This is an extremely tedious and difficult process which continues to occupy the judge's time even after the actual trial has been completed. Litigation of this type constitutes a continual and severe drain upon the judicial manpower of the court from the moment of its inception, over a period of years in some cases, until judgment is rendered.

The antitrust cases are not the only ones which consume an extraordinarily large amount of judicial time. Patent, copyright, admiralty, and other commercial cases also often fall into this category. For example, the limitation of liability proceedings involving the *S.S. Andrea Dorea* and the *MV/Stockholm* are reported statistically as two cases. However, they actually represent many separate suits, one for each claim. In these two cases, there were approximately 3,500 claims filed, many of which involved settlement of infants' and de-

ceased persons' claims. Much time of the Court³ was devoted to informal hearings in chambers, discussions, and the approval of papers. The two cases represent approximately 5,662 typewritten lines in the court's dockets. Over 100 claims were settled and orders of compromise passed upon by the court.

Criminal cases may also fall into the category of the protracted case. Two years ago I presided at a trial of eighteen alleged narcotics conspirators. The trial lasted over ten weeks. Before trial could be commenced, much time was devoted to conferences and other preliminary and preparatory work.

The few cases I have cited are but examples of the many similar cases that arise regularly in our district. Indicative of the volume of cases that are filed in the Southern District of New York is the fact that during the 1959 court year a total of 10,350 motions were on our motion calendars. The number of large cases has been increasing steadily as is indicated by the fact that the number of motions has increased over 32 per cent since 1957. At the time of the writing of this article the writer is once again engaged in the trial of a long and complex criminal trial involving twenty-two defendants, which is expected to last three months.

During the weeks or months that a judge is engaged in a single large case, he would have been able to dispose of many smaller cases on our calendars with less strain on his physical energy. When several of our judges are engaged in these large cases it has a crippling effect upon our calendars, for the so-called "run-of-the-mill" cases must wait for the judge in the "big" case to return to these cases.

Despite these obstacles, because of the energy and ability of Chief Judge Ryan and all the judges of our court,

³ Judge Lawrence E. Walsh, now Deputy Attorney-General of the United States.

we have somehow managed to keep our calendars in order.

CONTINUOUS EFFORT

While we have had a large measure of success up to the present time, we have not lost sight of the fact that only through continued study and experimentation with improved techniques can we hope to keep abreast of our mounting case-load. Most important among the projects now under consideration is the employment of several standing masters or quasi-judicial officers to undertake some pre-trial duties. It is my hope that the use of standing pre-trial masters will bring about earlier disposition of many actions and also release judges from many administrative functions for their more important work in the decisional phase of cases.

In 1955 when our three-judge com-

mittee began to seek solutions to our calendar problem, the obstacles that lay before us seemed virtually insurmountable. We had hoped to make improvements—perhaps at some long-distant future date finally to bring our calendars to the point where they would be current. What actually happened was that our problem burst like a balloon when analysis and study showed us where to thrust the needle. We know now that proper calendar controls can prevent congestion, even in the face of a case-load as heavy as ours. But we have also learned that where new filings are as heavy as they are in the Southern District of New York, backlogs snowball rapidly once they get a start. Thus, only through constant vigilance, through a process of screening and rescreening of our cases, can we remain current. We are determined to afford all litigants a speedy resolution of their controversies.

Judicial Statistics

By ORIN S. THIEL

ABSTRACT: Judicial statistics are used by both the sociologist and the court administrator. What will satisfy one may be very unsatisfactory to the other. As this issue of *THE ANNALS* is devoted to the problems of the courts, the discussion of statistics is centered around their use as a management tool for the court administrator. The history of federal judicial statistics is reviewed and a detailed description is given of the statistics that are now collected and published by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. The problems that are faced by the statistician who prepares the statistics and their interpretation and use by court administrators conclude the article.

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THERE is no dearth of literature dealing with the subject of judicial statistics. The subject has received detailed attention from many experts. Depending on personal points of interest, the authors represent two fairly distinct groups. One group, the sociologists, wants judicial statistics presented in such a manner that it will help them to understand human behavior—criminal behavior, for example. As students of the social sciences they are interested in examining the judiciary and its functions as a segment of organized society. They rightly are disturbed by the lack of adequate statistics, especially at the state level, and the lack of comparability among the few statistical reporting systems that do exist. The other group, the professional managers of the courts, —the chief judges, the court administrators, and the bar which is interested in improving the administration of justice —looks for entirely different information in judicial statistics. To them judicial statistics are a matter of business, a tool to aid in good administration, the profit and loss statements and the balance sheets of a truly big business—the business of administering justice surely, quickly, and economically.

As this issue of *THE ANNALS* is devoted to the problem of congestion in the courts, this discussion of judicial statistics will be related to their use in the management of the affairs of the courts, rather than for their sociological implications.

If congestion is to be successfully attacked it first must be identified. And the more specifically the problems or bottlenecks are identified, the more likely adequate reforms will be applied. This is the role of statistics in the hands of the court administrator.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The first published statistics concerning the federal courts appeared in the

ANNUAL REPORT of the Attorney-General for the calendar year 1871. Civil suits to which the United States was a party were classified in five divisions. Presentation of criminal statistics began at the same time. A few years later the Reports began to give some data on non-government cases in the federal courts, but only admiralty causes were separately classified.

Through the years there were some changes and amplifications in the method by which the Department of Justice presented the statistics. Beginning with 1922 the government civil and criminal cases were classified in ten divisions. The published tables set forth the number of civil cases or criminal proceedings which were pending at the beginning of a fiscal year, the number commenced and terminated during the year, and the number pending at the end of the year. Private civil cases which by then were a substantial part of the work of the district courts were unclassified in the statistical reports except for admiralty suits.

The statistical information that has just been described was published separately for each United States district court, each district requiring one printed page. Thus almost one-hundred pages were required to present these data each year.

By the early thirties it became apparent to court authorities and scholars that the statistical tables in the Annual Reports of the Attorney-General had, in their present form, outlived their usefulness and were ripe for a general overhauling and revision. The ten general nature of suit or offense classifications no longer reflected the types of cases actually being handled by the courts, and although a more detailed classification was available for all district courts combined, the individual district court statistical tables failed to reflect what was going on in these courts.

THE PUNCHED CARD SYSTEM

In 1935 a major change was made in the method of collecting the statistical data. Likewise, a major change also was made in the final presentation of the data in the Annual Reports. This change was adopted on the recommendation of a committee appointed by the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (the Wickersham Commission). The committee's chairman was Professor Charles E. Clark, dean of the Yale Law School, and now chief judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and for the past fifteen years chairman of the Judicial Statistics Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States. With him on the committee were two of his colleagues from the Yale Law School faculty—Professor William O. Douglas, now associate justice of the Supreme Court, and Professor Thurman Arnold, who afterward became a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

The major change recommended by the committee was the adoption of an individual case-card system of reporting. This change was fundamental. Therefore, all of the reports were prepared from summary reports furnished by the clerks of the courts. This system of having the clerks prepare the reports while the headquarters office merely combined them had the inherent weakness of leaving to the discretion of almost one-hundred clerks the problem of classifying cases. In many instances this led to errors and inconsistencies. Too often clerks would not agree on the same classification category for identical kinds of cases, especially where the classification was on the borderline between two categories. To centralize responsibility for classification it was apparent that an individual case-card report giving only factual information would be highly

desirable. Classification could then be performed by a small, trained, and supervised group which would lend consistency and reliability to the final product.

Equally important was the content of the individual case cards recommended by the committee. Separate initial and final report cards were proposed. On the initial report, in addition to identifying information, the basis of jurisdiction was checked and a brief but complete description of the nature of suit or action was required. On the final report the clerk checked the nature of disposition of the case, the procedural steps through which the case had passed, and the nature of the judgment entered, if any. These cards are the prototype of the cards now being used by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.

THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM

With the establishment of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts during the closing months of 1939 most of the statistical functions that had been performed by the Department of Justice were transferred to the new organization. By section 604 of Title 28, United States Code, the Director of the Administrative Office is charged with the duty of collecting judicial statistics and transmitting statistical data and reports as to the business of the courts to the chief judges of the circuits quarterly, and annually to the Judicial Conference of the United States, to Congress, and to the Attorney-General.

The statistical system of the Administrative Office is built around the punched card. Clerks of all federal circuit and district courts report monthly on separate cards information concerning each case commenced and each case terminated in their respective courts.

From the information so received,

quarterly and annual reports are prepared and published. The annual report is especially replete with textual comments and detailed tables concerning the work of the federal courts for the previous year. Besides the usual tables showing numerically the volume of business, detailed information is given concerning the kinds of cases that have been filed and those which remain pending, the type of court activity required to dispose of various kinds of cases, and the median time interval from filing to disposition, from filing to trial, and from issue to trial in cases disposed of where a trial had commenced.

More detailed information concerning the statistical methods employed in the Administrative Office of the United States Courts is given in Appendix I.

Committee of judges advise

Often some form of judicial supervision over the collection and publication of statistical data is desirable. Throughout most of the years that the Administrative Office of the United States Courts has been functioning, it has had the benefit of the advice and experience of a Committee on Judicial Statistics, appointed by the Chief Justice on authorization of the Judicial Conference of the United States. Until recently the chairman of this committee has been Chief Judge Charles E. Clark of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, whose interest in judicial statistics has been life-long. The present chairman is Chief Judge Harvey M. Johnson of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The other members of the Committee are prominent judges known for their active interest in judicial statistics and court administration. They are: Chief Judge John Biggs, Jr., Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; Chief Judge Richard H. Chambers, Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; Judge Arthur F.

Lederle, Eastern District of Michigan; Chief Judge Royce H. Savage, Northern District of Oklahoma; Judge Leonard P. Walsh, District of Columbia; and Judge Harry C. Westover, Southern District of California. The collaboration of this Committee with the statistical organization produces two desirable results: First, the work is reviewed by the Committee and suggestions are made from the viewpoint of judges who are vitally interested in having statistics reflect as nearly as possible the status of the work of the courts; second, the judicial approval given to the work by the Committee encourages other judges to utilize more fully the services offered. Furthermore, the Committee makes recommendations directly to the Judicial Conference of the United States on such matters as the creation of additional judgeships, based on information collected and presented to it by the Administrative Office.

THE STATE COURT SYSTEMS

The establishment of state administrative offices for courts has been a highlight in the postwar progress of bringing business-like administration to the judiciary. Approximately half of the states now have statutory offices headed by court administrators, executives or coordinators. While there is little uniformity in the particular duties assigned the various officers, the collection of judicial statistics is one of the more common responsibilities imposed. In a number of states where administrative offices have not been created, judicial councils still perform the function of collecting and publishing court statistics.

At the present time around thirty-five states collect judicial statistics. This is a remarkable increase in number—as recently as 1955 fewer than twenty state organizations collected statistics.

But the statistics in their present state leave much to be desired. They suffer

from a number of serious defects. Some jurisdictions collect statistics, but do not publish them. And a number of administrators, either because of lack of funds to employ qualified personnel or for other reasons, collect only the most sketchy statistical information. This obviously makes it impossible to rely on any uniformity when comparing statistics of the various jurisdictions.

This is not to say that adequate statistics are an unknown quantity in the states. A number do a splendid job in the field, such as California, Michigan, New Jersey and New York, just to mention a few. A sample of the form of the quarterly report on judicial business made by the clerks of the circuit courts in Michigan to the Court Administrator appears as Appendix C of the report entitled *Court Administration—1959*, published by the Institute of Judicial Administration of New York City, which furnishes research assistance to the National Conference of Court Administrators. In the Michigan report the statistics show with respect to criminal actions, civil law suits, and chancery actions the flow of cases during the quarter, the age of the median case which was tried, the number of pending cases over two years old, the number of trials in which juries were empaneled and the number of days spent by juries, and the aggregate number of days or half-days in which court was in actual session.

All indications are that there will be a steady improvement in state court statistics. Because of their value to administrators in avoiding congestion and laying the foundation for the assignment of judges, their development appears assured.

JUDICIAL STATISTICS PROBLEMS

Scholars in the social sciences are all too aware of the difficulties that are inherent in attempts to assign definitive values to certain types of social activi-

ties. Judicial statistics, in their attempt to measure legal activities, are not free from these difficulties. There is more involved than the counting of cases, the posting of tables, and the drawing of charts.

Before any data are collected, the judicial statistician is faced with the troublesome problem of selecting and defining the unit of counting or reporting. As far as the reporting of civil litigation is concerned, the case is the usual unit. In criminal proceedings a number of choices are available—the defendant, the offense, and the case or indictment. As a unit of work-load in civil litigation the case is notorious for its unreliability.

Yet, despite the lack of blacks and whites and the tremendous area covered by the various grays inherent in the case unit, the count of civil actions by the case is effective when used with caution and discretion. It is when its limitations are forgotten that difficulties arise. The case count achieves greater reliability when limited to a single judicial system; it exhibits its greatest weakness when comparisons are attempted of statistical reports from diverse judicial systems. Within a single judicial system a certain amount of "averaging out" will occur among the component parts of a statistical report, especially as numbers grow larger.

Aids to the administrator

There are a number of aids to the user of judicial statistics that are based on a case unit which will help him to avoid pitfalls. It is imperative when a table is examined showing the number of cases filed during a period or pending at the end of a period that a table showing the natures of suit of these cases also be examined. This will give the reader some insight of the values he should assign to the numerical data appearing in the case-count table. The

casual user of judicial statistical tables will, of course, have much more difficulty than the experienced reader. One of the reasons why judicial statistics are often criticized is a failure to understand what is being presented and its limitations. The apparent inability to understand judicial statistical reports or to make any effort to learn about them by those who would profit the most from their use is discouraging. Whether he is aware of it or not, the administrator experienced in the use of judicial statistics subconsciously makes allowances for many of their shortcomings. He always remembers that certain districts are unusual because they have many cases of certain kinds that are not filed in volume in other districts; he remembers that one district may require that each tract of land being condemned in an eminent domain proceeding be filed as a separate case, while in another district one-hundred tracts may be filed as one case. He remembers that seaport districts will have many admiralty cases which will not appear in the inland districts. As his familiarity with his courts grows, his ability to use their statistics with increased reliability will grow. To the uninitiated, these statistics may be deceptive and unreliable; to the administrator in his battle against court congestion, they are indispensable weapons.

In order to eliminate some of the bias present in statistical tables where the case is used as a measure of the work-load, studies have been made for the purpose of establishing index figures which could be applied to various kinds of civil cases. This would make it possible to portray more accurately the burden factor of cases and to present statistically a weighted case-load table. With the help of a number of judges the Administrative Office of the United States Courts has conducted studies to determine the amount of time required by them to dispose of different kinds of

cases. The index figure does not indicate how much time one particular case will require. But when the index figure is applied to a number of cases, a reasonably accurate picture is given of the time that will be required to dispose of them. This information is of great value when determining the amount of congestion present in a court's pending case-load. The studies showed that civil cases between private parties in the federal courts took three times longer for their disposition than civil cases to which the United States was a party.¹

THE COURTS USING STATISTICS

There are a number of ways in which statistics will point out where effort should be expended to expedite the work of the courts. A few will be discussed here.

A very important function of statistical reports is to call to the attention of an administrator the areas where congestion exists. It would be more desirable to have the statistics point out those areas where congestion is beginning to exist so that remedial steps can be taken before the delays become chronic. It is usually not difficult to detect areas of congestion. To confirm the fact of congestion in a district, one can start with a statistical table showing the number of cases commenced and terminated over a period of years and the number pending at the end of each year. An increase in filings, a decrease in terminations, or both, showing an increase in the pending case-load, if substantial, require further investigation.

The currency of dockets

Next, a table showing the kinds of suit in pending cases and the length of

¹ THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U. S. COURTS, DIRECTOR'S REP. FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1956, at 173-193.

time they have been pending on the docket should be examined. This may disclose a number of possibilities. If an unusually large number of cases of a particular kind are pending, the increased load may not indicate congestion, but rather an unusual situation in the district out of which a number of identical and companion cases arose. In the next step, the number of cases pending in each nature of suit should be considered, bearing in mind the probable amount of time and effort that will be required of the court to dispose of each, in order to ascertain whether a greater than usual number of hard-core cases are pending. Old cases should be especially scrutinized. Where a number are pending in the same nature of suit, it may be advisable to examine the original, initial docket report cards. Names of parties and unusual descriptions of kinds of actions often contain clues explaining why cases have not been terminated.

The column showing the number of cases terminated each year should be examined. If the increase in cases pending is due to progressively fewer cases being terminated, the reasons for this decrease should be searched for and established. Perhaps there have been vacancies of long duration in some of the judgeships; perhaps long illnesses have kept judges from their work. A glance at monthly trial and pre-trial report tables may show whether an extremely long antitrust, patent, or criminal trial has taken all of a judge's time to the detriment of other cases.

The length of time it takes a court to reach the trial stage in a civil case has always been a good indication of the currency of its dockets. Throughout its history the Administrative Office of the United States Courts has computed and published tables showing the median time intervals from filing to disposition and from issue to trial for cases which

were terminated during a given fiscal year after having reached the trial stage. The information contained in these tables is made an integral part of every report dealing with the docket conditions in the district courts. Showing the minimum number of months, which in some districts has been as much as four years, that half of the litigants have had to wait to get their cases tried and disposed of, is a forceful way to impress the evils of congestion and to begin taking corrective measures.

Personal survey interviews

In many instances full knowledge of the operations of a court, the condition of its dockets, and the reason for any congestion which exists can only be secured through a personal survey conducted by a qualified person. Such surveys have been made from time to time in the past by the staff of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and a program for even more intensive and more frequent inspections is now under way in the federal courts. Talking with judges and their supporting personnel and with the clerk and his staff will often confirm or disprove tentative conclusions which were based upon the examination of the statistical material. In any court where congestion exists, the causes can be fairly well established from an inspection of sufficient statistical data and a personal inspection of the court.

State court administrators may find it difficult to find time for such surveys, but the importance of visiting the large courts cannot be overestimated. Exceedingly competent reports on docket conditions are made annually by some clerks of court in the federal system and a recent report by the Chief Judge of the Southern District of New York is a model of a thorough analysis of docket conditions, nature of the case-load, calendar operations, and court

needs of the largest district court in the federal system.²

Remedial steps indicated

The reasons for congestion often suggest what remedial steps must be taken. If a definite shortage of judge-power appears to be of a permanent nature, the creation of additional judgeships is an obvious remedy. In this process judicial statistics will play a most important part because Congressional committees considering requests for additional judgeships invariably want these demands adequately documented with factual information, that is, with statistics. If the shortage of judge-power is due to illness or long trials, temporary help from other courts may be the solution. Or, if the court is one of limited jurisdiction, as the federal courts are, a narrowing of their jurisdiction will reduce case-loads and possibly congestion. This is what happened when the Act of July 25, 1958 increased the jurisdictional amount required in diversity of citizenship cases from over \$3,000 to over \$10,000. The effects of such legislation were statistically examined when it was proposed and after it became effective. For the fiscal year 1959, in which the Act was effective, there was a decrease, during the last eleven months, of 17 per cent in the number of all civil cases filed in those districts with exclusive federal jurisdiction. Private civil cases commenced decreased 23 per cent. Cases filed in the diversity of citizenship category dropped almost 33 per cent. However, the effect on the pending civil case-load has been comparatively small.

It may be that a study of the statistical material of a district indicates little use of pre-trial conferences and other procedures of time-saving value. Per-

haps calendaring practices are obsolete and need revising. Throughout a thorough statistical survey of a court, a number of clues for improvement will reach the eye of the experienced administrator.

Temporary judge transfers

If there is a congested court which needs temporary help, the problem arises where this help can be secured. Again the court statistics are examined. But instead of looking for signs of congestion, the administrator will look for signs of currency and excess judge-power. Courts which can furnish help exist in the federal system, and their judges in the past have furnished a very considerable amount of assistance to districts with congested dockets. For example, in the fiscal year 1959, visiting judges served 3,559 days in other districts, including 499 days in the Eastern District of New York, 68 in the Southern District of New York, and 92 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

In the state systems very great inequities between the case-loads of judges have existed in the past and the transfer of judges to the metropolitan areas has been regularly employed. With the recent creation of administrative offices in a number of states, these transfers are increasingly made on the basis of the knowledge gained from the collection and analysis of judicial statistics on comparative case-loads.

Jury expenses

In addition to the state of the dockets, the administrator will be interested in having the courts operated efficiently and economically. Again he will need the information obtainable through statistics. A good example in this area is the control of jury costs. Unless statistical records are kept of the number of jurors who are paid after being summoned to report, and the number thereof

² Report by Chief Judge Sylvester J. Ryan to Chief Judge Charles E. Clark of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1959.

who are actually used to fill the jury box, the waste of money and of the time of jurors can reach surprising proportions. The Administrative Office for a number of years has collected monthly statistics on the number of jurors summoned and paid, the number thereof serving or challenged, and the number in reserve (not used). The publishing of data on excessive costs of jurors has resulted in tighter administrative control in many districts and the general improvement of the system by substituting more efficient jury pools for individual jury panels in multiple-judge districts.

An example of an excellent use of the punched-card system as an instrument of administrative control is the litigation-reporting system now in use in the Department of Justice. It is designed to give the Department up-to-date information on what steps are being taken by the United States attorneys to dispose of actions pending in their files. This, obviously, is information sorely needed by top-level management, for it permits the Attorney-General to review systematically all pending actions and to check on the currency of the field offices. A short description of this system is given in Appendix II.

Statistical reporting is imperative for any modern court system. Without it the judges and administrators are in the dark concerning their inventory of cases, the time it takes to dispose of them, and the causes, if any, of delay. The postwar establishment of many state administrative offices will undoubtedly hasten the development of more effective state judicial statistics.

APPENDIX I

The following is a short description of the statistical procedure used in the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. For the sake of brevity only the method used in processing civil

statistics will be described here. All district court clerks are supplied with blank initial and final civil docket report cards. These are unpunched IBM cards. Both cards provide for the entry of an established district, office, and docket code number. The docket number is entered on both cards as well as the names of the parties. The dates of filing and termination are likewise entered on the proper cards. On the initial docket card the clerk also reports whether the case is an original action, removed from a state court, remanded from an appellate court, reopened, or transferred from some other United States district court. The nature of suit or action is also briefly but completely described. Cards representing cases that are brought under the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction of the district courts also show the residence of the parties. The final civil docket report card shows the manner in which the case was disposed of, the procedural progress made by the case, the dates and length of the trial, if there was a trial, the results of any motions made for a summary judgment, the nature and amount of judgment, if one was entered, and the name of the judge disposing of the case.

The initial civil docket report card when received by the Administrative Office is checked for consistency, the nature of suit is reduced to a numerical code number, and the entire card is then punched. When all cards have been punched and verified, it is possible to make a number of important statistical tabulations easily and quickly on electric accounting machines. Among the more important of these are the tabulations showing the number of cases filed in a given period in each district and throughout the country as a whole by their natures of suit or action. Entering this information in a comparative table which shows this information for two consecutive periods immediately in-

dicates where changes in types of litigation are occurring.

By punching an initial civil docket report, it is possible to maintain a current file of pending civil actions, adding for each month new cases commenced and extracting those cases that have been terminated. Thus, at the end of any given period it is possible to list all cases pending in a district in docket number order or in nature of suit order. A very effective table is a tabulation of cases pending which have been arranged in nature of suit order showing the number of cases in each suit according to the time which has elapsed since the date of filing.

The final civil docket report card received by the Administrative Office contains sufficient information so that the time and effort required by the courts to dispose of cases can be fairly well gauged. Currently, the Administrative Office is publishing a table annually showing the type of disposition of civil cases by nature of suit. It is divided into three rough parts: those cases terminated by a judgment which was contested on the merits; those cases terminated without a contest or by the consent of the parties; and finally those cases which are transferred to another district, remanded to state courts, or consolidated with other actions. While this table is published for all districts as a whole, the Administrative Office records contain the same information in tables by district and they can be produced for each court, or even for each judge.

Other reports are received by the Administrative Office which will be mentioned briefly because of their importance in determining the degree of efficiency with which the courts are operating.

A report is received monthly listing every trial that has been commenced, showing the days consumed in trial, and

the judge presiding. A similar report, showing only jury trials commenced, is devised primarily to show the number of jurors summoned and used.

Initial and final report cards also are received for all district court criminal proceedings, showing the offenses charged and the type of disposition of the charges against the individual defendants. Probation officers report the number of individuals they place on and remove from their records each month as probationers, parolees, mandatory releasees, and military parolees, and the number of investigations they make. All bankruptcy petitions filed and concluded are reported monthly. Cases filed and terminated in the eleven United States courts of appeals also are reported monthly.

APPENDIX II

The basic tools of the Department of Justice litigation-reporting system are few and easily described. For example, a two-part, snap-out form measuring 10½ by 8 inches is used to report an initial civil claim. The first sheet of this form is printed on heavy stock and becomes the master record in the United States Attorney's office. The second, or carbon sheet, is mailed to the Department of Justice for use in preparing a punched-card record of the claim or action. The carbons are mailed the same day they are prepared. The top half of the form provides for the entry of all pertinent data in the claim, including such items as the names of the parties opposing the United States and their attorneys, the nature of the cause of action, the agency involved, and the amount claimed. All entries except names are entered in numeric code form, to expedite processing at headquarters. The bottom half and reverse side of the form provide space for entering all subsequent actions or proceedings and the dates they occurred. A detailed numeric

action code is used to report this progress.

When the carbon copy is received by the Department in Washington a docket card is punched. This card remains with the Department as its record of a pending claim. A mark-sense card is duplicated from the docket card and is returned at once to the proper United States Attorney's office where it is placed in his file of pending matters. Whenever any change in status of the claim or case occurs, an entry is made on the 10½ by 8 inch master-record form, the punched card for the action is pulled and the nature of the change of status is entered on the card in numeric code by means of the mark-sensing feature. This card is then transmitted to Washington, where it is automatically punched. If the change of status did not close the case or claim, a new dupli-

cate mark-sense punched card is sent to the field office to report the next subsequent change. This marking and punching of change of status cards continues as long as the case or claim remains open.

The Department's file is brought up to date monthly by adding new matters, making the necessary status changes, and eliminating closed claims and actions. Machine lists are then prepared for use by the staff in Washington and also by each United States Attorney, who is furnished a copy. For the larger offices matters are listed separately for each assistant attorney. When this monthly report of pending matters is run, the accounting machine automatically flags any matter when the date on which the last change occurred indicates that the claim is now in a delinquent status.

Court Administration: Housekeeping for the Judiciary

By LELAND L. TOLMAN

ABSTRACT: There is a growing popular and professional interest in court administration which has resulted in the establishment in some twenty-five American judicial systems of governmental agencies or officers concerned with the mechanics of running the courts. This is a hopeful sign, because though it will not be a panacea for congestion or delay in the courts, it will greatly help the courts to make their proceedings, facilities, personnel, and financing more efficient, and better enable them to meet the demands of the complex and voluminous litigation of modern society. The administrative machinery considered best for adoption in most states and which has been the pattern in those jurisdictions that have been most effective in this field is the Model Act of 1948, proposed by the Commissioners of Uniform State Laws. It is basically similar to the New Jersey law adopted as part of its constitutional reform of 1947, and provides for a centralized administrative control of all state courts and judges by the chief justice under supreme court rules of administration and with assistance from an administrative director and his staff acting under the direction of the chief justice.

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THE congested calendars of metropolitan trial courts throughout the country and the consequent delay in those courts in the disposition of cases have been the springboard for a heightened interest in the housekeeping problems of the judiciary both among members of the legal profession and other groups concerned with the public welfare. This has led to establishment in a number of the states and cities of new offices and techniques for the administration of the courts. A recent issue of *State Government News*, a monthly publication of the Council of State Governments, which is concerned entirely with the governmental activities of the states, devoted two of its eight pages to reports from the states of news items in the field of court administration.¹

This mounting interest in the methods of conduct of court business is a hopeful sign of the times. The better administration of justice surely requires the use of modern management techniques in the operation of the routine day to day business of the courts. And there is no doubt that the provision of modernized machinery that will bring sound administration to the procedures of the judicial establishment can do much to help in the elimination of the law's delay.

ADMINISTRATION AND DELAY

Although there is much to be accomplished by an improved and efficient court administration, it must not be thought that the need is keyed solely to calendar congestion and delay. Mr. Justice Brennan, of the Supreme Court

¹ *State Government News*, Vol. 2, September 1959, pp. 4 and 5, discussing developments in Alaska, Illinois, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Washington, and the National Conferences of Chief Justices and Court Administrative Officers convened in Miami, Florida, for their respective annual meetings.

of the United States, has observed that "... chronic calendar congestion is usually a sign of bad judicial administration. But, definitely, it is not true that the absence of calendar congestion is the sign of good judicial administration."² And, the mere existence of a generally approved system of court administration is not, on the other hand, a guarantee against calendar congestion or a cure for it. In the federal courts, where the attention given to court administration in the past twenty-odd years has been more devoted and intelligent than in any court system in the world, there has been at the same time a chronic and growing complaint that the calendars in many districts are unduly congested and the disposition of cases is increasingly delayed.³ And even in New Jersey, where the court system is highly efficient, the number of pending cases increased last year to such a degree that the Chief Justice, who heads the state's administrative system, emphasized the urgent need for remedial action at the annual meeting of all the judges with representatives of the Bar in May of 1959.⁴

Other factors discussed in other articles in this publication are at least as responsible as any lack of administration for the long standing difficulties in the federal courts and the temporary reversals in New Jersey. The very word "congestion" is a hard one to define in this context. It is extremely unlikely that it exists in all parts of any court system. The mere fact that there are

² William J. Brennan, *Modernizing the Courts*, (New York: Institute of Judicial Administration, 1957), p. 2.

³ ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U. S. COURTS ANN. REPORTS, 1949 through 1959; April 1959 U. S. SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMM. REP., FIELD STUDY OF THE OPERATION OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS.

⁴ No. 28 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, COURT CONGESTION 3-4 (Nov. 1959); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF NEW JERSEY, ELEVENTH ANN. PROCEEDINGS (May 8-9, 1959).

many cases on the calendars is not in itself bad. It is only when cases do not advance through the courts rapidly and in an orderly way that there is "congestion." Similarly, court "delay" generally exists to an extreme degree only in big cities. It is almost impossible and sometimes inappropriate for the courts to attempt to cure "delay" when it is caused by the wishes and acts of litigants and lawyers for both parties in the case. But these two conditions—"congestion" and "delay"—are certainly evils that strong administration in the judicial system would strive mightily to correct—to the extent that courts can correct them.

The broad power for administrative officers freely to assign judges from one court or area of the state to another will make it possible to use the help of judges who are not fully occupied in courts where dockets are light in the busy metropolitan courts where calendars are heavy and many cases cannot reach trial for years. The power given the court administrator to assist the judges in devising methods for the processing of cases will make it possible for the courts to act quickly and effectively to meet conditions causing delay or congestion in particular parts of the system and, like other organizations that handle a large volume of business, to experiment with new procedures, many of which are described elsewhere in this issue, that may expedite the disposition of cases generally.

COURT'S ADMINISTRATIVE NEEDS

To be sure, courts, old and settled as they are, have never operated without administration. The means for this were simpler when society was less complex, as they were for all the social functions. But the judicial establishment, like those that serve other fundamental social and economic needs of

community life, such as education, employment, communication, and distribution, has changed and grown in this second half of the twentieth century, so that administrative techniques adequate for a hundred years ago are more or less useless in our times. The courts of any modern city are so huge and complex that they can hardly function without provision for the central collection and analysis of current and accurate judicial statistics, the planned assignment of judges, the orderly and regular calendaring of cases, and the constant development and inauguration of new case processing procedures, not to mention the ordinary housekeeping functions of budgeting, purchasing, staffing, and building maintenance for an operation costing millions of dollars yearly. Indeed, it takes a surprising amount of ingenuity and it is a rather remarkable fact that in some states and municipalities the institution of justice does not collapse completely with the archaic and decentralized administrative machinery that must be made to serve the essential operational purpose.

The ancient and simple local administrative techniques are just not enough for modern justice. There must be a more or less centralized control, under the direction of the judiciary, capable of giving over-all administrative help in the administration of the courts. Such an institution will provide for a court system the services that come from the central executive offices of a large business. They will develop and supervise the functioning of personnel policies, the budgeting, purchasing and accounting procedures, and record keeping for the courts. They will assist the judges to devise procedures for the channeling of new cases through the various steps of the judicial process to the ultimate trial and disposition in a prompt and efficient way. They will install and operate accurate statistical systems that will

give current and meaningful inventories of pending litigation and reflect the magnitude and speed with which the incoming cases are being entered on the calendar and the outgoing cases terminated. Thus, judges can be promptly assigned by the appropriate official to courtrooms where they are most needed, and procedures can be geared to meet the changing conditions of court calendars.

PATTERN FOR CENTRAL OFFICES OF COURT ADMINISTRATION

The present interest in providing machinery for organized central administration of the courts has been directed primarily to plans patterned somewhat along the lines of the federal Judicial Conferences, Councils, and Administrative Office, which are described elsewhere in this issue, or a more centralized modification of that design, as in New Jersey under the constitutional reform of 1947. There the ultimate administrative responsibility rests with the Chief Justice of the State Supreme Court, under rules of administration formulated by the Supreme Court; and staff assistance in the performance of these administrative duties is provided through an Administrative Director of the Courts and his office, working under the supervision of the Chief Justice. In general, this pattern is considered more suitable in the states than the federal plan, although in some jurisdictions the federal design has been strongly recommended.

In New York, for example, for almost one hundred years the state has been divided into four more or less autonomous judicial departments, two in the metropolitan area of New York City, and two in the more rural upstate areas. In this respect, its structure corresponds somewhat to the judicial circuits which have long featured the organization of the federal judicial system and which now underly its administrative machinery.

In New York, also, each department has its own intermediate appellate court, each of which traditionally exercises a degree of administrative control over the trial courts within its appellate jurisdiction. Thus, it corresponds again with the federal judicial circuits and their courts of appeal which, as circuit councils, are the principal executive organ in the administrative structure. Like the Supreme Court of the United States, New York's highest court (called the "Court of Appeals"), has never actively exercised direct powers of judicial administration over the lower courts and judges except when questions of an administrative nature necessarily arise in litigation coming before it in the usual way. Thus as in the federal system, a Judicial Conference of representative judges of various courts appeared to be preferable to New York's highest court or its chief judge as the central administrative organ. In view of all these similarities, it seemed wise in New York to urge the development of an administrative structure for the courts following generally the lines of the federal pattern and this is the structural basis of the Judicial Conference of the State of New York, established in 1955, which will serve as a framework for the administrative powers to be vested in the courts under the pending amendment to the judicial article of the New York State Constitution.⁵

⁵ See, for example, NEW YORK TEMPORARY COMM. ON THE COURTS REPORTS, PRELIMINARY REP. (1954); REP. LEG. DOC. NO. 45, pp. 11 ff. (1955); LEG. DOC. NO. 18, pp. 7, 47 (1956); LEG. DOC. NO. 6(a), pp. 17, 52 (1957); NO. 1, LEG. DOC. NO. 36, p. 13 (1958); ASSOC. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, *Bad Housekeeping*, pp. 17-19, 150-159 (1955); Arthur T. Vanderbilt, *The Challenge of Law Reform*, (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1955), pp. 121 ff.; PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT RELATING TO THE COURT SYSTEM (S. Print, No. 4319); McKinney, 1959 *Session Laws of New York*, pp. LXI ff.

Aside from limited areas of adaptability such as these, there has been criticism that the federal plan is not sufficiently strong administratively.⁶ Indeed, no less an authority than the Chief Justice of the United States is reported to have said only a few weeks ago, in an address before the Federal Bar Association:⁷

It is certain that the Federal judiciary will simply be unable to keep pace with the great forward strides in the economic and social growth of our country with the acceleration and complexity of scientific progress as long as it lacks an adequate number of judges, lacks simplified procedures, and improved administration.

THE MODEL ACT

So it has seemed preferable in most jurisdictions where there has been a movement to strengthen the administration of the state courts to follow in general the New Jersey pattern. The most widely known version of this is embodied in "The Model Act to Provide for an Administrator for the State Courts," prepared and approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1948.⁸ That proposal is framed to fit the needs of a court system of smaller dimensions than those of New York State or of the United States Courts. It is designed to weld all of the courts of the system into a single administrative unit, with strong centralized direction centering in the highest judicial officer. This object is easier to achieve if it is accompanied

⁶ April 1959 U. S. SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMM. REP., FIELD STUDY OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 2-5, 10-11, 14 ff.

⁷ No. 28 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, COURT CONGESTION 3.

⁸ "Model Court Administrator Act," *Uniform Laws Annotated*, (Brooklyn, N. Y.: Edward Thompson Co., 1957), Vol. 9, p. 253 ff.

by and made a part of a modern and unified court structure, as it was in New Jersey and Puerto Rico and, most recently, in Alaska and Hawaii. But such a system can be extremely useful even without a wholesale reorganization of the courts. In Maryland and Michigan it was adapted to the existing court structure, seemingly with great success. And this year in Illinois, after the failure on popular referendum of proposals for extensive modernization by constitutional change of the plan for organization of the courts, an administrative structure with an administrator and, for the Chicago metropolitan area, a deputy administrator, under the control of the State Supreme Court has now been inaugurated by legislation, with strong expectation that it will achieve much in the way of improving court management and reducing delay, particularly in Chicago, where that problem is so severe.

The objectives of such an office of administration are well stated in the prefatory note published by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws with the Model Act of 1948.

There should be a responsible head to aid in directing the business affairs of the courts but without any power of supervision over the judicial function vested in the courts. The judiciary should be more closely integrated in order that the business end of the judiciary may be operated in a more efficient manner. In most states there are probably a sufficient number of judges to handle all of the judicial business promptly; but there may be congested dockets in some districts while in others the judges are idle. How many judges are needed in a county or district; is the judicial manpower so used that the services of all the judges is being fully utilized; are some judges overloaded and unable to keep their dockets current? An administrator could ascertain the facts and suggest the appropriate remedy. Efficient modes of

procedure may be in operation in some districts while outmoded methods prevail in others. To minimize delay the courts must be so manned, equipped, and organized that they may handle the maximum load promptly and efficiently.

POWERS OF AN ADMINISTRATOR

The powers of the administrators, in the jurisdictions where they exist, are various. Under the Model Act (1) the administrator is to examine the administrative methods and system employed in the offices of the clerks and other adjuncts of the courts; (2) he is to examine the state of the dockets and determine the need for assistance in any court; (3) he is to recommend to the chief justice the assignment of judges to courts in need of assistance and follow his directions in arranging assignments as needed. Here the Model Act presents an alternative which permits the administrator on his own initiative to assign judges. The proposed alternative has not been adopted in any state, probably because it is generally considered that this power involves questions of policy that should remain in the hands of judicial rather than administrative officers; (4) he is to collect and compile statistics and make reports on the transactions of judicial business and transmit them to the courts for appropriate action; (5) he is to prepare and submit court budgets. The Model Act limits this to state appropriations. It should probably be broadened to cover local appropriations as well, since in many states the courts are, in varying degrees, locally financed; (6) he is to draw requisitions for the expenditure of state appropriated funds; (7) he is to collect statistics and report on the expenditures of state and local money appropriated for the courts; (8) he is to obtain reports from clerks of court on cases delayed beyond specified periods of time;

(9) he is to act as secretary of the judicial council or conference of judges, if the state has such an institution; (10) he is to formulate and submit to the chief justice or highest court, recommendations of policies which he believes will improve the judicial system; and (11) he is to attend to any other matter assigned to him by the highest court or chief justice.

To make it feasible for him to exercise these powers, it is specified in the Model Act that judges, clerks, and all other officers, state and local, must comply with his requests for information relating to the business transacted by the courts and public moneys expended for the maintenance of the judicial system. The Act also provides for an annual conference of judges and lawyers to consider and advise on matters of court administration.

Exercise of powers

Offices established in the states after this pattern exhibit great variation in the extent to which their enumerated powers are exercised.⁹ Also, many of them have additional powers either conferred upon them by the judges under the general authority to do whatever is required or by specific enumeration in the basic act. Thus, most of the offices devote a great part of their time to the handling of complaints about the activities of particular judges or court officials and otherwise concern themselves with

⁹ The following jurisdictions have offices of court administration: Alaska, California (Los Angeles), Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, The District of Columbia, the United States Courts, and, soon, Hawaii. For details of their powers see Institute of Judicial Administration, *Court Administration*, (New York, 1959), 1959 symposium.

public relations. Some of them—but none so extensively as in the federal system—maintain specialized personnel offices, fix salaries, set standards of employment, and in general perform civil service functions for the courts. Others devote much time to the preparation and consideration of rules of practice and procedure for the assistance of legislative, executive, or judicial bodies or for bar associations, judicial councils, or conferences. In at least two states the court administrator arranges the editing, printing, and publication of the decisions and opinions of the courts. Most of them spend a great amount of time in work as liaison officers for the judiciary in its relations with the legislative and executive branches of state government or with the federal government or other state governments. All of them are at the beck and call of the judges for any administrative or research job that may be assigned to them. They investigate particular courts and talk with judges, lawyers, public officials, and court employees regarding the manifold and changing problems of their daily work with and in the courts.

THE MODEL ACT REVIEWED

In 1958, the National Conference of Court Administrative Officers received and considered a careful report of a special committee appointed by it to study the provisions of the Model Act in the light of the ten years that had elapsed since its publication and the experience of conference members. The National Conference includes in its membership thirty-four officials concerned in one way or another with the administration of the court systems of twenty-two states (including Alaska), the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. The report of its committee, which was approved by the con-

ferencees, recommended no change in the Model Act. It was the general view of the conference that each state must plan its own enactment to suit its own needs, and that the Model Act in its present form was as good a start for this as any. The conference directed, however, that the suggestions, comments, and criticisms regarding the Act collected by the committee be distributed generally for the information and help of those concerned with drafting legislation for the establishment of offices of court administration in particular jurisdictions.¹⁰

To illustrate somewhat the use of management techniques in the operation of courts, it may be helpful to say something here about the New York court structure and to mention one or two of the administrative problems in New York City.

THE NEW YORK COURTS

New York's courts have been variously described. Most of the descriptions have been uncomplimentary. It has been said that the first thing to notice about them is that they do not comprise a court system at all. Certainly they are not integrated to any substantial extent, and their operation lacks centralized administrative control to a marked degree. But they constitute one of the major operations of government in the state. In New York City alone, their total cost today is now probably close to \$40,000,000 a year. In recent years they have been a center of attention and great efforts have been made to better their methods of operation.

Organizationally, there are in New York City three tiers of courts dealing

¹⁰ COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS SECOND REP., COMM. ON THE REVISION OF THE MODEL ACT TO PROVIDE FOR AN ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE STATE COURTS (Chicago, 1958).

exclusively with civil litigation and three separate tiers which are concerned solely with enforcement of the criminal law. In addition, there are two specialized courts which do not fall clearly within either category; the Surrogate's Court, handling primarily the administration of decedents' estates and the Court of Domestic Relations, concerned primarily with problems of juvenile delinquency and marital support.

The courts for the settlement of civil disputes begin with the Municipal Court of the City of New York, which has jurisdiction of small claims and of suits where amounts up to \$3,000 are involved. Next in the scale is the City Court of the City of New York, which handles civil cases where the amount claimed is not more than \$6,000. At the top is the Supreme Court, theoretically possessing jurisdiction over all kinds of cases.

Each of these courts is handling a tremendous amount of litigation and each of them handles its own cases in its own way, without regard to the calendar arrangements of other courts. Thus, a single lawyer may find himself faced with a call to try a case in several different tribunals at the same time, while other lawyers, eager to have their cases tried in one court may find that they are unable to do so because their opponents, although willing, are tied up by the call of another.

EFFECTIVE CALENDAR SYSTEM

The two courts of intermediate appeal in New York City, called the "Appellate Divisions," have between them a certain amount of general supervisory and investigatory power over all of the courts of the city. This they exercise themselves, directly in some instances, through their review of decisions and their rule-making power in others, and through Departmental Committees of

Court Administration, which are a part of the structure of the over-all Judicial Conference of the State of New York. The administrative authority, however, is not extensive and generally not positive, but rather co-ordinating and advisory.

Laying aside ordinary administrative problems of management such as the qualification, employment, and compensation of personnel; the provision for adequate plant and structure; the installation of suitable record-keeping procedures and systems; and the general supervision of as large an organization as the New York court system, the most pressing problem of administration in the civil courts is the method by which cases are channeled through them from the time of their inception until they are ultimately terminated by settlement or judgment. This "calendar system" is truly the heart of the court process. For the orderly handling of litigation in such a tremendous volume would be impossible if the system should break down, and it is the cause of much of the complaint of "delay." The problem is particularly complicated because its solution does not lie solely within the courts' own organization. The judicial process, by its very nature, must necessarily involve a good measure of elasticity for the negotiation of adverse points of view before it is possible to perform the ultimate act of entering a judgment which will dispose of the dispute with legal finality. Indeed, the tradition of advocacy requires that the courts should not interfere unduly with the formulation by the adversaries of their respective contentions and the development of the issues between them. But good court administration does require that when a case is brought to the court's attention, the channels should be clear so that if both parties are ready for trial the case can be advanced to disposition at as early a date as possi-

ble. And the courts have a duty to see to it that neither party prevents adjudication simply by stalling for time. Difficulty in meeting these obligations arises because cases are often brought to court before they have been made ready for trial or before the parties even know their relative strengths or weaknesses. Thus, it has been almost impossible for the court to distinguish among the cases on its calendars: which of them are really ripe for adjudication and which are in court merely to preserve a place on the calendar or to achieve bargaining position so that they can be tried when they are ready if they have not been disposed of amicably before then.

"Notice of readiness"

The New York courts, under the administrative leadership of their Appellate Division judges, Judicial Conference, and Departmental Committees, have recently adopted a number of devices to assist in making this distinction. First of all, they now require that no case be placed on the calendar until it is actually at issue. This they do by predicated the filing of the case upon a so-called "notice of readiness." In the notice, the person bringing the case on for trial must state that the dispute is in all respects ready for trial, that all pre-trial maneuvers, such as the taking of depositions, have been completed or that they will not be necessary, that the possibilities of amicable settlement of the dispute without trial have been explored between the parties, or, if they have not been explored, the reasons why that has not been done must be stated. When this is filed the opponent, if he challenges any statements of the readiness certificate, has an opportunity to ask the court to keep the case off the calendar upon showing to the calendar judge the respects in which his case is not ready.

Other pre-trial procedures

Another device for the sorting out of personal injury litigation and the formulation of the true issues has been pre-trial procedure. This practice involves the examination of the case shortly after it is placed on the calendar, at an informal conference in a judge's offices. If the first of these pre-trial conferences does not dispose of the case, it will probably be called up for a second conference of the same character a year or so later. This brings about the disposition of many cases without trial.

Another device that is used to sift and solidify the trial calendars, recently established in New York County, is a Medical Report Office, authoritatively described in some detail in another article in this issue. It has been found that very often after the impartial expert's examination the case is settled without trial on the basis of the expert's report and so the case is removed from the calendar.

Supreme Court calendars

Although the jurisdiction of the various New York City civil courts is based on differences of amount claimed, lawyers have a tendency to bring their litigation in the court allowing the highest amount, that is, the Supreme Court, rather than in the city or municipal courts. This has resulted in overloading the calendars of the Supreme Court, while the lower courts are relatively less occupied. And, in spite of repeated requests the State Legislature has refused to give the Court authority to transfer cases which could adequately be handled in the lower courts. To meet this problem, the New York City Supreme Court has devised calendar preference rules which require that when a case is placed on the calendar it be accompanied by affidavits, showing exactly the

extent of damages claimed and the details on which the claim is based. These are examined by a justice of the Court and if it is found that the amount recoverable is below \$6,000, that is, is within the jurisdiction of the city or municipal courts, the case is classified as nonpreferred. This means that it will not be tried in the Supreme Court until all other cases which involve larger amounts have been disposed of and, in effect, that the Court may never be able to consider it. The alternative to having the case remain in this limbo is for the parties to agree to transfer it to the lower court. Thus the Supreme Court calendars are continuously weeded out to distinguish those cases that cannot be tried elsewhere from those that could as well be handled in a lower court and to give privileged treatment to those that cannot be handled in any other tribunal.

There are a number of other administrative "gadgets" that have been devised in the New York City courts to help achieve efficient calendar management. Without these, the courts would have been completely incapable of handling the onrush of personal injury litigation with which they have been deluged during the past decade. Of course, none of the gadgets in itself is a panacea. The basic administrative problem here is to devise various means of screening cases at an earlier stage so that those requiring prompt trial can have it. The judges and officials charged with the duty of administering the New York City courts are always looking for other ways to bring this about.

SUCCESS OF VARIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS

The degree of efficiency of the various recent state reforms in court administration cannot be quantitatively assessed.

For all "administration," by its very nature, depends largely upon subjective elements. The qualifications, energy, imagination, and interest of the administrator and the judge or judges who direct his work are of primary importance. Also, problems of court management differ in quality and degree among the states. The urgency of devising means to correct extreme delay in the disposition of cases in a heavily populated metropolitan area is not a problem for the court administrator in the more rural jurisdictions. He may be more concerned with the physical difficulties of transporting judges, jurors, and litigants over long distances, or with finding adequate facilities for holding court in the smaller towns, or securing for judges and other court personnel a living wage from economy-minded local officials. But, broadly speaking, it seems clear that the new devices have been a help in solving many of the daily problems of running the courts and have increased the efficiency of their operation. The success of the New Jersey system, and its older counterpart in the federal courts, and the improved condition of court dockets in some parts of New York State since the establishment of its Judicial Conference, are evidence of success. And, above all, the greater awareness of the problems of the courts, and the consequent increase in effort to solve them on the part of responsible judges, are intangible advances that brighten the prospect for more concrete future improvement.

For while court administration will not assure that justice will no longer lag, it will enable us to know when, where, and the extent to which delay occurs and thereby help show the way towards a speedier achievement of justice. Until the establishment of the Judicial Conference of the United States in 1922, there was no means in any

American court system to become thus informed. Today, thanks to the growth of the modern concept of judicial administration, there are in America at least twenty-five jurisdictions where the state of the dockets and calendars can be thoroughly known,¹¹ and there is more and more awareness throughout the na-

¹¹ See footnote 8, *supra*.

tion's court system of the need for knowledge concerning the facts of litigation. Delay cannot be truly measured—let alone cured—without such knowledge and to this extent, at least, an administrative organization is an indispensable prerequisite for the planning and installation of the means to put an end to the lagging of justice.

Arbitrators, Auditors, Referees, Pro-Tem Judges

By WALTER E. ALESSANDRONI

ABSTRACT: Congested judicial dockets have created the need for utilization of substitutes for judges. Legislative enactments which provide for appeal to a court satisfy the Constitutional guarantee of trial by jury. Various procedures are currently in use. The English system employs masters to prepare cases for trial; in Pennsylvania masters take testimony and make recommendations in divorce cases; in federal court bankruptcy matters and in state court Workmen's Compensation matters referees hear testimony and make awards. The decision of all of these judicial substitutes are subject to court review. The Massachusetts Auditor system utilizes with notable success lawyers to preside over cases in place of a judge. And in Pennsylvania Compulsory Arbitration or trial by lawyer panel has made dramatic progress in cutting judicial backlogs. More extensive use of these techniques seems to hold one of the keys to the problem of the congested court calendar.

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IT HAS long been recognized by judges and lawyers that one of the most satisfactory methods of coping with overburdened and congested dockets is to provide the courts with personnel who act in place of the judge under the general supervision of the court.

The authority for this kind of arrangement is generally found in acts adopted by state legislatures or Congress. These statutory enactments are usually implemented by more detailed rules adopted by the various courts and provide for appeal to the courts by the litigant who is dissatisfied with the conclusions reached by the arbitrator, auditor, referee, commissioner, or master, as they are variously called. As the matters in litigation are usually of a nature in which trial by jury is guaranteed by a state or the United States Constitution, it is mandatory that appeal to a court be provided for in the legislative enactment. Without such a provision the act would be unconstitutional and therefore void.

It has long been recognized that the courts have inherent powers to appoint "assistants" to preliminarily find certain facts, leaving matters dealing with law and the final conclusion or judgment to the judge. These "substitutes" for judges do not decree, but prepare materials upon which a decree may be made. In recent years the pressure of increased business in the courts has caused an awakening interest in the use of these inherent powers.

The use of quasi-judicial personnel has in various forms long been a part of our judicial system as it has in England from whom we have fashioned our own system of justice. As a matter of fact, the ability of the English courts to act more promptly in the disposition of cases can be traced in some measure to their use of quasi-judicial personnel.

The right to trial by jury is so deeply

rooted in our historical concept of justice that efforts to utilize procedures which do not provide litigants with its use immediately provoke strong objection, even though the right to trial by jury is only temporarily withheld pending a hearing before or action by quasi-judicial personnel. It is this historic attitude on the part of the average citizen backed up by most lawyers and judges, who see in such procedures a concept alien to all their training and ideals, that has prevented progress in this field. The right to have disputes settled in a courtroom with its dignified and formal proceedings, before an all-wise judge learned in the law and before a jury of one's peers is a concept for which free men have always fought. To depart from such a procedure even slightly is to provoke strong opposition.

EXTRA-COURTROOM PROCEDURES

Against such a backdrop it is no small wonder that a number of procedures for the full or partial settlement of controversies outside the courtroom have sprung up carrying with them general approval by the bench, bar, and public. The reason is obvious. They were born of necessity from the minds of lawyers and legislators who were forced to find other methods if there was to be even a semblance of democracy's claim to fair and speedy justice. Litigants deprived of a reasonably prompt trial made known their discontent to legislators, and judges and lawyers weighted down by sheer numbers of cases gave consent.

In spite of the effectiveness and general acceptance of these remedial procedures any suggestions for enlarging their use brings almost universal opposition from most segments of the bar. On the other hand, it is of interest to note that there have been few, if any, recommendations that the existing pro-

cedures be discontinued. The failure to demand retrenchment would seem to mean that there is greater approval of the various procedures than most lawyers and judges are willing to admit openly.

The jury system with all its faults is still the best procedure evolved by man to administer justice, settle disputes, and end controversies. However, this "ideal" in "all" litigation is today impossible. To argue the contrary is unforgivable wishful thinking. The normal trial process cannot hope to solve the problems of large backlogs. It is too technical, expensive, and slow moving except where court calendars are current.

No one who has studied the situation seriously doubts the need for more judges but the future demands on the courts resulting from an upsurging economy and the atomic era make it clear that we cannot afford the cost of the number of judges which will be necessary to meet our needs if we are to have them in sufficient numbers to produce impartial and speedy justice. Every new judge means extra courtrooms, offices, clerks, stenographers, and court officers. When the total cost is added up the cost of a judge's salary is not the largest item of expense. In New York City the "total" cost to maintain one judge is in excess of \$100,000 a year.

More study and evaluation must be made, therefore, of the successful procedures already adopted for many forms of litigation and pioneering efforts must be made in related methods if we are to meet the challenge. It is the purpose of this chapter to review briefly some of these procedures.

SOLUTIONS IN ENGLAND

The right to trial by jury in England in all but a limited class of civil actions was abolished over a quarter of a cen-

tury ago and made discretionary with the court, thus speeding the trial of cases. It is estimated that a jury trial costs as much as \$750 per day.

By the use of court personnel called masters the English system has improved the efficiency of its courts. The function of the master is to prepare the case for trial. He sits to hear preliminary matters and makes such orders "as are best adopted to secure the just, expeditious and economical disposal of the action." He simplifies the issues and obtains maximum agreement on facts and exhibits.

Contrast this informal, expeditious procedure with our own which provides for various pre-trial motions to be made in a formal way with detailed written statements being presented to the court for approval and sometimes placed on a list for argument in open court at a later date. It is not uncommon for a number of different judges to pass on these various motions, consuming a great deal of time. To illustrate the enormity of this problem, the New York Supreme Court annually decides on as many as 47,000 motions, of which 10,000 are for a bill of particulars.

Other court personnel could hear these interlocutory motions, call the calendar list, conduct pre-trial conferences leading to possible settlement and do all those things which will simplify the issues both as to fact and law. Especially does this seem worthy when it is realized that all but a handful of cases will be settled before trial anyway.

The problems in some of the federal district courts have grown so large, especially in connection with protracted or especially long cases that special masters have been appointed for the limited purpose of supervising pre-trial preparations. In the Southern District of New York, for example, there are 100 private antitrust cases pending and 20 government antitrust actions plus many other

cases of a protracted nature. Even if the judges forgot about the 5000 other cases normally filed each year in the district, they could not dispose of the pre-trial burdens of these long and difficult cases for some time to come. And even after this is accomplished the cases still must be tried.

To emphasize the enormity of the problem reference is made to an antitrust case assigned to a special master in which there were 100,000 pages of depositions from 173 witnesses, 45,000 documents as exhibits, and over 700,000 pages of documents produced. The master conducted hearings on 350 days over a three year period. Only on three occasions were the master's rulings asked to be reviewed and each time the master was sustained.

Here again is a procedure that has long been possible and, in fact, was used in patent and antitrust cases because of their complexity. The system fell into disuse when judges and lawyers opposed its operation. Necessity brings it back with some startling results, although it is clear that the cases in which a special master is used must be carefully selected.

MASTERS IN DIVORCE

In a number of counties in Pennsylvania the courts appoint masters to hear testimony in divorce cases. In Philadelphia, where 3,500 to 4,000 divorce cases are filed each year, it is not difficult to imagine what would happen if each case were heard by a judge. The plain fact is that they would have little time for anything else.

The judge to whom a divorce matter is assigned appoints a lawyer to take testimony from the parties and their witnesses. A court stenographer is present at the hearing which takes place in the master's private office. The master is paid for his services from costs which the plaintiff deposits with the court, re-

sulting in tremendous savings to the taxpayer.

After the hearing the master files a written report with the court containing specific conclusions and recommendations. Either party has an absolute right to be heard by the court before a final decision is made approving or rejecting the master's recommendations. A dissatisfied party may then appeal to the next higher court. Here we have full protection of the rights of the parties but a speedier and more efficient system that does not overburden the courts. In operation for a number of years no one has seriously questioned its merits.

REFEREES IN BANKRUPTCY

One of the most successful examples of a procedure which takes place outside the courtroom by the employment of an alter ego to the judge is in bankruptcy proceedings in the federal courts. A "substitute" or "deputy judge," called a referee, has been authorized to hear bankruptcy matters for over sixty years, showing that the use of court personnel other than a judge is not an innovation.

So marked has been their success that in 1938 they were authorized to grant or deny discharges, an authority only vested in a federal district court judge before that time. The determinations of a referee, of course, are subject to review by a judge but so well has the system operated that very few orders handed down by a referee are reviewed by a judge.

Bankruptcy proceedings by their nature are particularly susceptible to "trial" by a referee rather than by a judge because the hearing concerns itself with many detailed matters, some of which are technical and others routine. The informality of the hearing expedites the proceedings, saving time and money.

REFEREES IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

Generally a person can sue for damages caused by another only when the person causing the injury was at fault. Workmen's Compensation, however, is predicated on the theory of liability without fault and is found in the limited area of employer-employee relationship. By statute, an employer generally is responsible for injuries sustained by his employee injured while at work even though not the fault of the employer.

If these matters were conducted by a judge and jury most employees would be deceased before their rights could be determined. For example, in one year in New York, 207,927 Workmen's Compensation claims were filed and 564,829 hearings were held.

Referees hold hearings in these matters at which the claimant, his lawyer (he need not have one), and witnesses testify. The findings of the referee, in the form of an award, are final unless one of the parties desires to appeal. Here again the action of the person sitting in place of a judge is reviewable by a judge.

ARBITRATION

So discouraging has the use of the judicial process become even for the business man who wins his case eventually but not before he loses his business by delay in court, that more and more are turning to arbitration as the forum for settling disputes. Here again we do not have an innovation as arbitration is really an older way of settling differences between people, antedating the judicial process with its public courts.

Recently it has made great strides and is now used extensively in labor and commercial disputes and in many other types of civil controversy. More lawyers every year are writing into con-

tracts they prepare provisions to settle disagreements by arbitration. It is the "agreement" of the parties to resort to arbitration that makes it possible. The mutual agreement confers the jurisdiction, fixes the power of the arbitrators, and establishes the scope of the arbitration.

A number of organizations have grown up to provide the machinery for operating arbitration. The best known is the American Arbitration Association which now has a list of some 33,000 panel members, qualified in every field of endeavor, who are available to act as arbitrators. For a nominal fee the Association will arrange all the details to carry out an arbitration agreement.

PRO-TEM JUDGES

A successful "temporary" expedient has been the appointment of pro-tem judges by the courts. Where there is statutory and constitutional authority the appointment of special judges for the relief of the docket of a particular court has had beneficial results, especially where the problem is an inherited backlog. It has the advantage of decreasing the long-range costs of the operation of the courts where the problem is one that is not necessarily continuing. It provides a flexible, efficient method of providing judicial manpower in emergencies.

When coupled with the right of the highest court to temporarily assign judges from counties not having a full time work-load to counties with a serious backlog many of the normal problems presented by court congestion can be met. It will probably come as a surprise to most laymen that reassignment of judges is not done as a matter of course. In Tennessee, a statute provides that where all the cases cannot be disposed of at a regular term the chief justice may designate a retired or other

judge to assist, and the local bar may elect one of its members to hear and try cases.

It must be admitted, however, that our judicial administrative system is not easily geared to incorporating into it judges who do not have some rather permanent tenure of office; but under the special circumstances outlined here they can be of real value where the need is for a limited time only and not too likely to reoccur.

MASSACHUSETTS AUDITOR SYSTEM

One of the most dramatic procedures to effectively strike at the backlog of untried cases has been the Massachusetts auditor system. This system is not a permanent part of the judicial administration in that state, however, but is an emergency procedure invoked only when the court calendar is running behind. The success of this operation is apparent when it is noted that between 1934 and 1942 it disposed of some 47,000 cases. So successful were the results that only 2 per cent of these cases were appealed.

Subsequent use of the procedure was invoked in 1956 when a special attack was made on the backlog of untried motor vehicle cases. This was followed in the next year by making the activity applicable to matters involving negligence generally.

The system is simple: A lawyer, called an auditor, is appointed by the court to preside over the trial of a case. At the present time some eighty lawyers are serving in this capacity and are paid at the rate of nine dollars an hour. The auditor hears the evidence, determines its truth, makes written findings of the facts and reports them to the court. The trial can be said to be similar to a trial before a judge without a jury. The findings of the auditor must be approved by a judge. A party who feels aggrieved

has the right of appeal to a judge and jury, thus preserving his basic rights.

The authority for appointment of auditors in Massachusetts goes back to a statutory enactment of 1817. Even before this date the common law provided for appointment of auditors in connection with business transactions where detailed figures were involved. Appointment of auditors was infrequent however and not in general usage in these early days. It is difficult to understand why this procedure so successful in recent years has not been adopted in other states confronted with similar problems.

PENNSYLVANIA COMPULSORY ARBITRATION

I have left to last a discussion of the Pennsylvania Compulsory Arbitration system because I thought it would lend emphasis to my opinion that it is the most effective procedure yet devised for helping to meet the problem of "lagging justice." It can be argued that my own close personal association with this plan in Pennsylvania and in particular in Philadelphia does not make me an unprejudiced reviewer of its workings and accomplishments. To this, I only reply: the facts speak for themselves and prove conclusively that it is the most effective tool yet devised for reducing congested court calendars and speeding up justice.

There have been thousands of words written on the subject of "lagging justice," the timely and appropriate subject of this edition of *THE ANNALS*, and hundreds of theories and recommendations have poured forth from the minds and pens of distinguished legal scholars, practitioners, and judges. This final comment in this chapter however is neither theory nor mere recommendation but a story of actual accomplishment that has successfully met its objective: elimination of the backlog so that the

trial of civil cases is now current. It is a story of what can be accomplished when men of good will and dedication work together. It is a story of judges and lawyers and public officials determined to put an end to the unconscionable delays of two years or more of cases reaching trial in the Municipal Court of Philadelphia.

At the outset it should be noted that the title of Compulsory Arbitration may be misleading. The procedure is not a bargaining by the parties with the help of an arbitrator. In fact, a mere explanatory title would have been "Trial by Lawyer Panel." Voluntary arbitration, although fallen into disuse, has been on the statute books in Pennsylvania since 1836. When the present novel plan was advanced it was deemed easiest to amend the existing statute on voluntary arbitration rather than draft a new one: hence the name Compulsory Arbitration.

Procedure

The procedure is simple. By court rule, on authority of the state act, all civil cases, excepting those involving title to real estate, when the amount in controversy is \$2,000 or less *must* first be submitted to a panel of three lawyers sitting as judge and jury. The lawyers are selected by the court clerk from an alphabetical list of attorneys who volunteer to serve. The first named acts as chairman and a majority vote controls the decision. A fee of \$25 to each lawyer and \$10 extra to the chairman is paid by the county. The chairman sends out the notices, arranges all the details, and holds the meeting in his private office.

All parties, their counsel and witnesses are present at the hearing which proceeds in much the same manner as if before a judge and jury but with less formality and greater dispatch. No

stenographer is present. After all the evidence has been presented the panel of three lawyers, after the parties have left, confer and generally reach a decision at that time. Their determination is recorded on a simple one page form called an "award" and when filed with the clerk of court has the same effect as the verdict of a jury or a judgment rendered by a court.

Either party has an absolute right to appeal and have his case heard by a judge and jury and the new trial is *de novo*. This means that the second trial before a judge and jury takes place as if the hearing before the lawyer panel had never been held. No reference to the first hearing or the testimony given can be referred to, thus preserving unhampered the Constitutional right of trial by jury.

To discourage appeals without merit the party appealing must pay to the county the fees of the arbitrators, and this cost is not reimbursable even if the party appealing is successful. Litigants and their counsel have been so satisfied with the decisions of these lawyer panels however that only about 2 per cent of the cases processed have been appealed, and in most of the appeals taken the verdicts of the juries have been the same as the decisions of the lawyer panels. Where no appeal is taken it should be noted that there is no participation by a judge at any point and the decision is a final one. This differs from other procedures which require court approval of the findings of a master or some similarly titled official.

Phenomenal success

The plan, found constitutional by the Pennsylvania and United States Supreme Courts, has been in effect in all but a few counties in Pennsylvania for some six years with universal and startling success. In Philadelphia the re-

sults have been phenomenal. When the bar association asked for volunteers, 2,500 lawyers responded immediately. Many of the ablest Philadelphia lawyers are serving at a sacrifice of time. This enthusiastic co-operation of the members of the bar who serve on the panels for a relatively nominal fee has been of paramount importance in the successful outcome of this novel experiment.

During the first year 9,000 cases were processed. With the experience gained the plan can now easily process 1,000 cases a month or approximately 50 a day and the waiting time has been reduced from in excess of two years to three months. Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that it would take a judge and jury sixty years to process the cases handled by Compulsory Arbitration in the first year.

Dubious trust unwarranted

When a public hearing was had by Philadelphia's city council on the question of appropriation of funds to finance the plan, a number of interesting questions were raised:

Wasn't this a deprivation of the right of trial by jury? Why hadn't other states adopted such a plan? Could it be proved in advance that justice would be more efficiently dispensed at a cost that would in the long run be less expensive? With only the use of lawyers who volunteered, and on a rotating basis, wouldn't most of the panels be composed of young men without experience who could afford to take the time for such a small fee? Wouldn't many of the panels be composed of the least competent? Why shouldn't the litigants pay the arbitrators' fees? Wasn't it unfair to make the appealing party reimburse the county for arbitrators' fees when he was successful on appeal? Wouldn't lawyers without judicial responsibility tend to favor their lawyer friends, especially when the arbitrators might be appearing later be-

fore the lawyers who were then acting as counsel for the plaintiff and defendant?

Answers were made to these inquiries and now, after operation of almost two years in Philadelphia, it can be proved conclusively that the replies given then have all been substantiated and that the procedure has met the highest hopes of its proponents.

What can be said of the other counties in Pennsylvania? A survey of the courts of the several counties have found the following advantages: claims under \$2,000 have been permanently removed from the trial lists; calendar congestion has been relieved to a point where the backlog of other civil cases has been reduced over 50 per cent; the trial of cases has been speeded so that awards are rendered in about two months from the filing of suit; the time has been shortened between suit and trial of cases not under arbitration; judges find more time for other litigation; a smaller number of civil juries are empaneled; it has eliminated all motions for new trial; it has postponed the need for additional judges in some counties; substantial savings have resulted from reduction in the number of jury trials; because less costly and speedier, it is worthwhile to file small claims; no waiting for cases to be heard as matters are fixed for a time certain; informality of proceedings puts litigants, witnesses, and counsel at ease; matters over \$2,000 have been "voluntarily" referred to arbitration because of the obvious advantages; lawyers have gained experience in the problems of judges and juries.

Lesson to be learned

The Compulsory Arbitration plan for civil cases has now successfully run the gamut from small rural counties in Pennsylvania to the state's largest metropolitan center. None of the dire predictions listed as possible causes of fail-

ure have come to pass. The plan has been tested under varying conditions and there appears to be no reason why it cannot be made to operate with the same effectiveness in most sections of the country if the bench and bar are determined that it shall work.

If this be true it follows that every effort should be made in other states to take advantage of the lessons learned from Compulsory Arbitration in Pennsylvania. Hampering tradition should

not act as a deterrent to the use of new techniques in the administration of justice so long as the fundamental rights of the litigants are safeguarded. If we are to find solutions to the problems of lagging justice, lawyers and judges especially must be ever alert to study, research, and evaluate new ideas and new methods to meet the crushing burdens which our expanding economy and increased population are placing on the courts.

The Two Faces of Janus: Delay in Metropolitan Trial Courts

By MAXINE BOORD VIRTUE

ABSTRACT: Recent studies show that metropolitan trial courts have far larger case-loads than other courts. These loads differ in substance from those of nonmetropolitan courts, being disproportionately weighted with special types of cases, such as criminal, mental, alcoholic, traffic, domestic relations cases, and litigation otherwise related to the special behavior of metropolitan populations. Metropolitan court systems usually are complex, overlapping, and not adjusted to the geographic area to be served. Because of the special structural patterns of metropolitan courts, and the special conditions under which they operate, delay in disposing of cases is especially and predominantly a metropolitan court problem. In these courts, ever increasing pressure to speed up the tempo of justice is balanced by the need to avoid perfunctory routine disposition, so as to defeat the very purpose of seeking justice. To overcome both aspects of this leering monster—delay and perfunctory routine—is the special problem of metropolitan courts.

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* The material in this article is taken from the monograph now nearing completion.

FOR the last decade the staff and membership of the Section of Judicial Administration of the American Bar Association have been working with local leaders of bench and bar, and with scholars in various fields, to isolate and analyze the special problems of metropolitan trial courts. Conclusions from this series of inquiries are now being placed in final form. Special metropolitan court problems are thought to occur both in the structure and in the operation of metropolitan courts. As a consequence of these special problems, delay is likely to result both from the structural patterns characteristic of the metropolitan court system, and from the special conditions under which metropolitan courts must operate.

Therefore, delay is especially and predominantly a metropolitan court problem. Although not confined exclusively to metropolitan courts, delay is virtually always found there. It is more difficult to deal with there than elsewhere, because of the complicated nature of the metropolitan court system, the complex mechanisms necessary to move cases through the system, and because of the great numbers of cases handled in metropolitan areas. In such an environment the causes of delay are harder to find and eradicate than in a simple one-judge court with a small case-load, such as may serve smaller communities.

Then, too, in a metropolitan court system the problem of achieving prompt disposition of cases is further complicated by the other face of Janus: in the densely populated case-load of the metropolitan court, there is a special danger that some of the cases will be completed too fast, so that perfunctory, routine disposition will be made of some problems that should receive more prolonged or more specialized attention in order to achieve a just disposition. This danger is most feared in the personal problem cases, where too-prompt disposition

of a criminal sexual psychopath, a divorce, an adoption, a juvenile case may sow the wind that will later reap a whirlwind of community depredation and personal tragedy. It is true that the metropolis is likely to have more specialized facilities for assisting the court to arrive at a proper evaluation of such personal problem cases. On the other hand, the much larger case-load of the metropolitan court and the bewildering complexity of its departments as related to complex noncourt agencies, also concerned with such cases, combine to make it harder for the metropolitan judge to be sure of quickly assembling and consulting the sources from which that solution can be reached which will best protect the community and dispose of the litigation.

Thus, delay is a two-faced specter which confronts the judge of the metropolitan trial court whichever way he turns: from one side leers the danger of delaying disposition until the problem is insoluble; from the other, the danger of hurrying too quickly to a disposition which will result in further conflict and litigation.

METROPOLITAN COMMUNITIES

As Hawley and others have pointed out, the metropolitan community, embracing cities, villages, and other local governmental units within a radius of thirty-five or more miles from the mother city, has assumed a dominant position in the settlement pattern of the United States. In 1950, the 168 metropolitan areas contained 56 per cent of the nation's population. By 1956, the total population had increased 9.8 per cent; within the metropolitan areas the growth rate was 14.8 per cent, while outside, it was only 3.4 per cent.¹

¹ Amos Hawley, *The Changing Shape of Metropolitan America: Deconcentration since 1920* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1955). 1 et seq. Department of Commerce, Bureau

More than half our population is living in metropolitan areas, and the trend appears to be continuing strongly.

Moreover, the metropolitan area acts as a magnet for industrial, social, and other activities of people in the surrounding territory. Therefore, we expect to find, and we do find, that metropolitan courts have to deal not only with the litigation of the inhabitants of the metropolitan area, but also with the many cases caused by some aspect of the movement in and out of the central city, or some conflict in the complex of relationships between in-dwellers and out-dwellers. Where a choice of tribunals is possible, litigants appear to prefer the metropolitan court, since as a function of the metropolitan community it shares the magnetizing power and prestige of the metropolis.

GOVERNMENTAL COMPLICATIONS

Exaggerated proliferation of overlapping governmental units is a concomitant of virtually all metropolitan areas. Congestion and mobility of population, two characterizing factors of metropolitan communities, combine with other forces to push the real community beyond the original legal boundaries of the mother city and thus create pressures which result in the improvised and haphazard creation of special governmental units to meet the needs as they occur.²

This haphazard complexity of governmental units is in and of itself a breeder of litigation in metropolitan courts, adding to its already huge case-load. For example, the struggles of cities to annex

of the Census, *Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 71, "Civilian Population, by Metropolitan and Urban-Rural Residence: 1950 and 1956."*

² See, generally, *Council of State Governments, States and Metropolitan Problems* (Chicago, 1956), p. 15. *The Annals*, Vol. 314 (Nov. 1957), especially "Metropolitan Organization," by Luther Gulick, 53 et seq.

suburban territory and the resistance of such territory to inclusion in the city are currently a major source of litigation in all metropolitan areas—a function of their growth and change. Many metropolitan areas, indeed, now involve several states, and a few involve two countries.

The way in which this governmental complexity is reflected in the condition of the courts' load of litigation may be suggested by current efforts, as reported in the New York press, to develop a tristate legal tribunal capable of dealing with litigation arising out of waterfront labor problems.

Many of these overlapping governmental units, which occur in metropolitan areas, have the power to develop independent judicial tribunals, with competing or conflicting jurisdiction; moreover, they are not integrated to the needs of the metropolitan area. Thus, in 1932, Lepawsky found 556 autonomous courts in the Chicago metropolitan region, and 205 in Cook County alone. This writer found 145 judicial tribunals in the Detroit Metropolitan District in a study conducted in 1948–1950. And even in California, which has unified its court system, a recent study in Los Angeles has brought out the fact that unification of the major trial court, the Superior Court, is hampered administratively by rapid proliferation of separate branch courts, and that the multiplication of separate municipal courts in Los Angeles County is creating a problem.³

DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION

Presently, the impact of governmental multiplicity upon delay in metropolitan courts is further compounded by the dis-

³ James G. Holbrook, *Survey of the Metropolitan Trial Courts: Los Angeles Area* (Los Angeles, California: University of Southern California Press, 1956), pp. 36–37. This study is one of the series conducted for the Section of Judicial Administration.

tribution of the population within the metropolitan area: typically, the shift is towards the suburbs: "centrifugal drift," as population students call it. This tendency has accelerated in the decade since the Detroit study, which shows high growth rates shifting from the centers towards the outlying parts of metropolitan areas, and the population of satellite portions of such areas rapidly increasing.

Thus, to the problem of a multiplicity of overlying and overlapping governmental units within a given metropolitan area is now added the problem of scatter—a vast deconcentration towards the periphery into satellite settlements, occurring along with and as a major thrust of a continued vigorous over-all rate of growth of metropolitan areas as a whole.

Another characteristic of metropolitan population is density—in Detroit, for example, the population per square mile in 1950 was 13,249; in Boston, 16,767; in New York, 25,046; in Chicago, 17,450.⁴ Hawley reports that in some sectors of our largest cities, the density factor surpasses 100,000.⁵

As Professor Holbrook points out in commenting on the density of Los Angeles, "multi-million dollar lawsuits are commonplace and murder trials are daily occurrences which attract no attention unless a green orchid was found on the corpse."⁶

MOBILITY

The great mobility of metropolitan populations merits closer examination in terms of its bearing upon delay-producing conditions in metropolitan courts. Numerous kinds and levels of migration occur continually to and from the core

of the metropolitan area. These tidal waves of human movement are basic to the existence of the metropolis and set the unique tone and tempo of its life. "Each great capital sits like a spider in the midst of its transportation web."⁷

More than elsewhere, the residents of metropolitan communities are made up of recent migrants, many from outside the state, many from outside the country. The attraction of the large metropolitan area upon long-range migrants is one of its strongest characterizing attributes. This means that in the core-city, there will be more foreign born and negro population, less native-born white population. And, in turn, this comparative ethnic heterogeneity expresses itself, in terms of court problems, in class and race tension, in increased criminality, and in all sorts of personal problem litigation arising out of failure of migrants from different ethnic and culture groups to adjust to the demands of the new community. For example, the 1944 race riots on Belle Isle, in Detroit, are said by local court and police personnel to have been the result of a clash between native-born Detroit negroes, moving about the city with considerable self-confidence, and recent migrants brought in to work in the automobile plants from rural white settlements in southern and border-southern states. Similar incidents could be adduced concerning Mexicans in the Texas and California metropolitan cities, concerning Puerto Rican migrants in New York, and so on. The point here is that the ever present, large-scale mobility and congestion in any metropolitan city make such clashes an integral part of the city's life, and thus are

⁷ Wilfred Owen, *The Metropolitan Transportation Problem* (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institute, 1956), citing Holden, *City of London, a Record of Destruction and Survival*.

⁴ United States Bureau of the Census, *County and City Data Book*, (1956), "A Statistical Abstract Supplement," (1957), Tables 3 and 4, pp. 346 *et seq.*; 365 *et seq.*

⁵ Amos Hawley, *Human Ecology*. (New York, N. Y.: Ronald Press, 1950), 102.

⁶ Holbrook, *op. cit.*, note 3 *supra*, p. 11.

present as permanent elements of its law enforcement and court administration problem.

The daily commuter

Another aspect of the mobility factor, as it clogs the dockets of the metropolitan trial courts, is the daily commuter traffic. The large central cities continue to grow, and with them, their transportation problems. Improved transportation has also rendered these central cities accessible in a day to an ever widening circle of satellite city-dwellers. Thus, the problem now is not only how to move, but how to find room to move, and how to find a place to stop.⁸ Half of all motor travel is concentrated in the United States in central cities of metropolitan areas, and more than half of all persons entering and leaving metropolitan areas with populations of over 250,000 are moving by automobile, Owen reports.⁹

Consider, then, the commuter: the New Yorker in the five o'clock subway rush, the Angeleno caught in a vast rush-hour traffic jam on the Freeway. These are not occasional traumatic experiences, they are part of the daily rhythm of life of a substantial majority of our population. As Hawley points out, the entire tempo of life is quicker in the metropolitan city, relationships more transitory and enervating. It represents the extreme in modern life. Its nerve centers are the points of most feverish activity.

By bringing into instantaneous focus the opportunities, the risks, and the tragedies of life, man's behavior is made to resemble that of an animal treated to a rapid succession of electric shocks. It is not surprising that the incidence of mental disorder is highest in metropolitan centers.¹⁰

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 2, 3.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

¹⁰ Amos Hawley, *Human Ecology*, note 5 *supra*, pp. 306-7.

We find "mobility," then, which is a metropolitan characteristic, expressing itself in the metropolitan court's case-load in several ways: not only in a tremendous load of traffic, property damage, and personal injury cases, but also in a wide variety of cases, such as mental cases, arising out of human reaction to the repeated shocks of the metropolitan environment. It is important to note that many such cases cannot be adequately dealt with by the metropolitan court by application of the adversary process for a single day. Rather, many such require expert diagnosis, and some knowledgeable supervision over a period of months or years in order to rehabilitate or readjust the human being who has come into the case-load of the metropolitan court as a result of "battle fatigue" suffered in the daily routine of metropolitan life.

LITIGATION-PRONE POPULATION

The ingredients of the total human aggregate in the core-city of a metropolitan area differ, and differ in certain specific ways, from those of the aggregate of a nonmetropolitan area. As has been mentioned, there are more foreign born and nonwhite in the metropolitan area. It is also known that the percentages of single, widowed, and divorced persons are directly related to the size of the place.¹¹ Further, the phenomenon of "centrifugal drift" marks the consistent strong movement of stable family groups to withdraw from the central core of the metropolis, seeking the greenbelts of suburbia to bring up their children.

This means progressive deterioration of neighborhoods near the heart of the central city, the progression of which from single-family dwellings to boarding houses to blighted area to slum has been traced and diagrammed in a number

¹¹ Otis Dudley Duncan, *Social Characteristics of Urban and Rural Communities* (New York, N. Y.: Wiley, 1956), p. 33.

energy and hard work, honesty, confidence in the future, skills and knowledge, inventiveness, ambition and drive, and several others. Many of these qualities, essential to growth, fall into the category of "variables" which plague the mathematical economist. They call for value judgments which cannot be quantified and fed into the computing machine, however useful such computers may be in the planning of certain aspects of economic and social development.

To bring such qualities as initiative, self-reliance, and the will to improvement to the fore, and to achieve voluntary commitment in the less-developed countries, individually and as peoples, to the development effort, it is essential that they be given a share in its planning. Considering the complexities, national planning has to be largely left to the expert, subject to final approval by parliaments or other representative bodies. However, broad participation in planning can be achieved on the local level, which gives special significance to the various community-development programs which are dealt with elsewhere in this volume.

By contrast, the totalitarian approach, rather than taking into account the human element in planning, the more intangible variables, tries to minimize or even eliminate them. In order to have its econometric conclusions come true, this approach bends human nature, it regiments the individual, it deprives him of his liberties, it tells him where to go and what to do. In one word, it tends to turn the individual himself into a machine, to reduce him to the stature of a robot. Whole generations are sacrificed to future targets. Totalitarian planning of this type loses sight of the central purpose of economic development, which is the freeing of the individual, not only from poverty and disease, but from ruthless encroach-

that of 41,000 families receiving help from 109 tax-supported and voluntary health and welfare agencies in the area, a "small, hard knot" of 6,500, about six per cent of the families, accounted for more than half of the total case-load served by these agencies. It is these same families that wind endlessly in and out of the metropolitan courts, often in contact with four or five courts at once.¹³ Their presence, in the metropolitan case-load, tends to slow the already clogged dockets to an even slower pace.

Here we should insert a "caveat" against the other face of Janus. Persons coming from areas known to contribute more than their share of certain kinds of litigation—such as, juvenile delinquency—are subject to what sociologists describe as "categorical risk." That is, a boy coming before a juvenile court, if a member of a certain minority group living in a certain area, has—to be blunt about it—two strikes on him.

This means that the court, under tremendous pressure to move the heavy case-load faster, also encounters here the vital problem of assuring a fair hearing and an appropriate disposition to each individual defendant. To do this and do it properly takes time—the more categorical risk, the more time.

METROPOLITAN CONDITIONS REFLECTED IN COURT PROBLEMS

When we talk about a "metropolitan community," as referring to the behavior of all persons found within a geographic area, we are of course talking about not just one community but an infinity of communities. Thus, within any metropolitan area there are many people whose lives and movements are guided from a metropolitan center other than

¹³ Maxine Boord Virtue, *Survey of Metropolitan Courts: Detroit Area* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1950), p. 233 et seq.

the one in which these people happen to have legal residence. For example, air line personnel literally commute to international capitals; those in communications, entertainment, and the top echelons of the industrial, academic, and governmental worlds commute to Washington, New York, and abroad.

Likewise, within the territorial limits of one metropolitan area, there are an infinite number of lesser communities marked out by business, educational, aesthetic, and cultural categories: the Polish community, the neighborhood community in the dormitory suburb, the beatnik crowd, the union brotherhood, the faculty community of the local university, the dwellers in the world of music, and so on. Each of these has its regular orbit, which governs the movement of those tuned to it, within and as a part of the vast series of movements which make up the rhythms of the metropolitan community as such.

Clearly, we can't have a court for each of these "real," or cultural, communities, nor can we have a single gigantic metropolitan court for each metropolitan area as a whole. The physical distances alone would prohibit such a "supercourt" as the latter, and even if distance is left out of account, such a tribunal would be too unwieldy to cope with case-loads which move and change in many unpredictable ways. Two factors only are fully predictable: growth, and continuous change.

SIZE AND DELAY

A correlation between size of population and extent of court calendar delay has been shown to exist. See, for example, the current (1958) report of the Institute of Judicial Administration on *The State of the Calendars of State Trial Courts*, at page ii, with respect to personal injury jury cases. At page iii: "Only six courts appear on this year's list of jurisdictions having delay of over

twenty-five months, and all 11 are situated in counties with populations of over 500,000:"

MULTIPLICITY OF COURTS

Multiplicity of governmental units, as has been pointed out above, is found in courts as in other metropolitan units of government. Confusion, overlap, and conflict of jurisdiction among these courts is the inevitable accompaniment. As one of the Detroit reporters once expressed it, there is "one court for the corned beef, one for the cabbage": one court for the divorcing parents, another for the child suffering from the effects of that divorce; one court for the rapist, another for the victim, and so on.

The disadvantages of court multiplicity, then, are first and most obvious, jurisdictional conflict and confusion. This is aggravated by the great size of the case-load, by the large numbers of persons attempting to deal at any time with any given unit in the case-load, and, in personal problem cases, by the presence of a multiplicity of social agencies also concerned with the problems which have resulted in litigation, and by each agency's determination to solve the problem independently.

Administratively, then, we expect to find, and we do find, that delay and confusion result from the coexistence of many courts with wholly or partly duplicating jurisdiction. See, for example, the docket check of the Circuit and Superior courts of Cook County conducted by this writer for the metropolitan court studies of the Section of Judicial Administration.¹⁴

¹⁴ COMMITTEE ON METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, *PROGRESS REP.*, p. 26 et seq. (June 1953). In February 1953, a check of the printed calendar of the Superior Court showed 350 cases filed in 1945, and 342 cases filed in 1946, still undisposed of. The average docket life of a group of cases checked in this court was 32.6 months, the median case had a docket life of 36 months. In the Circuit

Multiplicity of courts has been regarded since 1913,¹⁵ and earlier, by students of judicial administration as one of the signal causes of delay, and as a shocking waste of judicial power in large cities. The delay, and the waste, is increasing rapidly with the surge of population into metropolitan areas.

A recent study has described the process of growth of competing and duplicating courts which has accompanied the urbanization of our people. The authors list relief from congested calendars, need for better disposition of special types of cases, and far-reaching social change, as causes contributing to still further development of multiple courts within metropolitan areas.¹⁶

SIZE OF CASE-LOAD

The most direct reflection of the population grouping known as "metropolitanization," as it affects the delay problem in metropolitan courts, is, of course, the sheer, overwhelming size of the case-loads in metropolitan courts. To convey some idea of the awesome size of this load, the writer's worknotes, taken in 1947 for the original Detroit study, contain the record of an attempt made to estimate the full work-load for the entire system of courts in the Detroit metropolitan area. A difficult task, for almost nowhere can be found proper statistical reports of the work of all trial courts in a metropolitan area, so integrated as to provide this simple information.

Court, a check of a small group of cases showed over-all average docket life of 24 months; the median case had a docket life of 26 months.

¹⁵ Roscoe Pound, *Administration of Justice in the Modern City*, 26 HARV. L. REV. 302, 313 (Feb. 1913).

¹⁶ Council of State Governments, *Trial Courts of General Jurisdiction in the 48 States*, (Chicago, Illinois: William L. Frederick and Sidney Spector, 1951), p. 2 et seq.

The total case-load disposed of in 1947 by trial courts convening in Detroit was 677,879 cases. This figure we know to be low, since it omits from the case-load of the juvenile division of the Probate Court several hundred adoption cases referred to that division for investigation. Also omitted are Recorder's Court condemnation cases and ordinance cases disposed of by that court's Traffic and Ordinance Division, since no figures were available. These figures include only cases disposed of in the immediate Detroit area, excluding the other two counties which are included in the Census Bureau's definition of the Detroit metropolitan area as it was defined for 1950.

According to the figures of the Michigan State Court Administrator for 1956, the Detroit area has a total case-load almost four times as large as that of any circuit outside the metropolitan area. Total cases commenced in all circuit courts in Michigan, as reported by the State Court Administrator for 1956, were 59,341. Of these 19,979 were filed in the Circuit Court of Wayne County; 6,311 in the felony division of Detroit Recorder's Court—city cases at circuit court level; 2,878 in Macomb County; 5,779 in Oakland County—a total of 34,947 for the entire Detroit metropolitan area, or far more than half the total for the entire state.

Professor Holbrook reports¹⁷ that in the fiscal year 1953-1954, more than 100,000 cases were filed in the Los Angeles Superior Court (general trial jurisdiction), and 1,154,401 in the Los Angeles Municipal Court that same year. In 1954, a total of 221,398 cases were filed in all the California superior courts; the total filings in that year in Los Angeles alone were 108,968—almost half the total for the entire state. This relationship is more impressive when one

¹⁷ Holbrook, *op. cit.*, note 3 *supra*, p. 12, and Table 2, p. 14.

recalls that there are several major metropolitan areas in California, the San Francisco area, in addition to Los Angeles.

Further multiplication of statistics would not further advance the point: the case-loads of courts in the large central cities of metropolitan areas are of such tremendous size as to confront courts convening in those areas with conditions quite unlike those anywhere outside such areas. This characteristic condition—gigantic case-loads—makes itself felt in the form of delay, and also in the form of many complex structural, administrative, quantitative, and qualitative problems—all of which also bear upon the problem of delay.

SPECIAL TYPES OF CASES

Is the metropolitan case-load not only bigger, but also different? Some difference in substance, in social texture, can be seen if only by reason of the fact that the bigger the case-load, necessarily the smaller each unit in it must be in relation to the whole. This fact alone indicates the importance, in considering delay, of looking hard at the special difficulties experienced by the metropolitan court in performing its judicial function adequately under conditions in which the aggregate case-load is so large as to render the individual case all but invisibly small.

This point aside, however, there is another way of looking at the difference in substance of the metropolitan case-load. Numerous studies have established the tendency of certain types of cases to predominate in metropolitan areas, and particularly in the central cities. Among these are criminal, domestic relations, traffic, mental, and certain other

cases coming into court by reason of the special conditions governing behavior of persons in metropolitan areas.

In the attempt to provide special facilities for dealing with the social problems in these special types of cases, the metropolitan court finds itself confronted with the danger of transformation into a general rehabilitative clinic for personal problems, on the one hand, and, on the other, with the danger of sacrificing the rights of litigants to the increasing pressure to speed up.

To go too far in either direction is to sacrifice the vital force of the judicial function as such. Our studies indicate that judges in metropolitan trial courts are well aware of the danger leering from either side and are confronting their unique problems with courage and sagacity, though the size of their case-loads and the complexity of their problems appear to be increasing.

CONCLUSION

Many students of judicial administration have emphasized the difficulties experienced by metropolitan trial courts in seeing to it that the enormous case-loads are handled expeditiously, yet with something more than perfunctory routine. It is essential that they do see to it, for our legal system since Magna Charta has rested upon the guarantee that every man, regardless of his rank, wealth or station, shall have ready access to the judicial process, and to justice at its hands. "To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice."

So says Magna Charta.

If metropolitan courts find this ideal difficult to achieve, they also know it to be worth the striving.

The State Court Systems

By WILLIAM M. TRUMBULL

ABSTRACT: Largely by historical accident, each of our states has a veritable maze of separate courts, each with its particular powers directly or indirectly derived from the state constitution. This atomized hierarchy of courts prevents efficient administration of justice, creates issues for litigation extraneous to the merits of the case, involves successive trials and successive appeals before final decision, and contributes in other ways to congestion and delay. England modernized its court structure in 1875, but in the United States it was not till the close of the first half of this century that Missouri, New Jersey, and California led the way of constitutional reform. The movement has gained considerable momentum during the past five years. Simplification of the court structure, central administrative authority, and procedural reform must be accompanied by measures designed to assure the quality and independence of the judiciary. Adversary election of judges in thirty-six states is a major obstacle. Here, also, Missouri led the way with a plan combining the best features of the appointive and elective methods. A handful of states have adopted variations of the plan, and arduous campaigns for its adoption have been, and will again be, conducted elsewhere.

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TWO important aspects of the state court systems, namely, the extent of central administrative supervision of the courts and their personnel and the use of procedural devices calculated to increase efficiency in the adjudication of cases, are dealt with in various other parts of this volume. The present chapter, therefore, is largely confined to the court structure itself and to measures bearing upon the quality and independence of the judiciary. In considering these matters, while one may properly be impressed either by the diversity obtaining among the several states or by those features which most of the states have in common, it is the latter which may more readily be described and more significantly related to the problem of delay in the administration of justice.

CONCEPT OF A COURT AND ITS JURISDICTION

A word may first be in order as to what is meant by a court. Surely a court is something distinct from the judicial and other personnel who staff it, for they are constantly changing, and it may function through personnel acting separately, but simultaneously on various matters; likewise, it is distinct from a courtroom or courthouse, for not only may it share these with other courts, but it may sit in different places both at the same and at different times. A court in our system of law is an agency of the government whose primary function is to decide specific controversies—known as cases—between specific parties, one of whom may be the government itself, by determining the facts in dispute and applying to them the appropriate provisions or principles of law. Sometimes in construing provisions of constitutions or statutes and in molding generalized principles to specific facts, courts are in a sense making law, but this they do only inter-

stitially in a system in which legislative and judicial powers are basically separate. Since every state court derives its powers—called its jurisdiction—directly or indirectly from the constitution of the state, it is limited to that particular territorial area, to those particular types or classes of cases, and to those particular functions of decision entrusted to it.

Classification of cases

An obvious classification of cases is that between prosecution for violations of the criminal law and all other controversies, the latter being known as civil cases. Subclassifications may be less obvious: among criminal cases, according to the penalty in the event the accused is convicted, the maximum authorized fine, the place or maximum authorized period of detention, or whether a death sentence may be imposed; among civil cases, according to the amount involved measured in dollars; or by the complexity of the subject matter, as where title to real estate is at issue; or on a basis influenced by the historical accident which conferred matrimonial cases and the probate of decedents' estates on the ecclesiastical rather than the royal courts; or according to the historical division between cases at *law*, such as to obtain damages for breach of contract or the infliction of an injury to person or property, as to which the right to trial by jury has been preserved, and cases in *equity*, such as to compel the conveyance of real estate, enforce a trust or enjoin irreparable injury, for which there has in general never been a right to trial by jury.

Classification by function

The basic classification of the functions of decision is between the initial *trial*, at which witnesses testify and other evidence is produced and the law

applied to the facts as found, and the *appeal*, at which the whole or some part of the initial process is reviewed by a higher tribunal and the original decision affirmed or reversed, with the possibility that because of errors committed in the process a new trial may be ordered. A subclassification of appellate functions exists when provision is made for a succession of appeals through a hierarchy of tribunals.

By superimposing the classification of trial and appellate functions upon the classification and subclassifications of cases and territorial limitations, a very substantial number of different combinations is attained. Now, of course, provision could be made for a single court whose powers or jurisdiction would, by internal division of labor among its judicial personnel, extend throughout the territorial sovereignty to every conceivable type or class of case and to both trial and appellate functions of decision. This has never been done anywhere, though it was approximated in the British Judicature Act of 1873, which was modified two years later before going into effect. At the opposite extreme, provision could be made for a distinct and separate court for each type or class of case and for the trial and appellate function in its decision. This, too, has never been done anywhere, though a situation approximating it existed in the mother country at the time of the first English settlements on this continent. The constitutions of our several states today, intermediate between the theoretical extremes, create systems of a greater or lesser number of distinct courts, each with its own jurisdiction. These we are now ready to examine.¹

¹ American Bar Association, *The Judicial Articles of the Forty-Nine States*, compiled for Committee on Model Judicial Article, Section of Judicial Administration. (Chicago, Illinois, 1959). These constitutions and that of Hawaii may also be found in the annotated statutes of the several states.

STATE COURT STRUCTURE

For the humblest functions at the trial level all but a handful of the states still provide inferior courts, properly so called, presided over by part-time justices of the peace, selected in and for townships, precincts, county districts, and occasionally the county at large. They have power to try minor misdemeanors, perform preliminary functions in the prosecution of more serious crimes, and to hear and decide civil cases of the supposedly simpler sorts and involving limited amounts, usually not to exceed two or three hundred dollars. In general, these officials are not required to be trained in the law or to make a record of the testimony and other evidence; they are provided with no courtroom or clerk; they are compensated by fees and costs assessed against the parties, with the result that the justice or magistrate has a financial interest in the outcome of cases he is to decide; and as a consequence of these facts, upon appeal the case is tried all over again before another court, making it necessary for the witnesses to appear once more and repeat their testimony.

While only a half-dozen states have abolished the justice of the peace, it is little wonder that elsewhere this crude system is in the larger towns and cities supplemented or replaced by tribunals ranging in nature from those presided over by police magistrates, who may be provided with a fixed place for holding court and even a small salary, to municipal and city courts more or less worthy of the name, but usually with part-time judges and very limited jurisdiction. The needs of the largest metropolitan centers have been sought to be met by a proliferation of separate courts, each with its special functions. In New York City, for example, in addition to the trial courts existing throughout the state, there are special tribunals known, re-

spectively, as the City Court, the Municipal Court, the Court of General Sessions, the Court of Special Sessions, and the Court of Domestic Relations; and in Baltimore, there are special tribunals known, respectively, as the Superior Court, the Court of Common Pleas, the City Court, the Criminal Court, and the Supreme Bench. Some of the courts just named are dignified, expert, and important tribunals and by no means typical of the small municipal substitute for the justice of the peace.

Other trial courts

In addition to the systems of local courts just described, nearly all of the states have in each county a court variously known as the county, probate, orphans', or surrogate court, whose primary function is the administration of the estates of decedents, incompetents, and minors. In most instances these county courts also have jurisdiction in minor criminal cases and in civil suits, more extensive than that of the justice of the peace, but still quite limited in scope. Less frequently, where such jurisdiction is not combined with probate powers, it is vested in a separate county-wide court. In a few instances these courts are empowered to try appeals from justices of the peace, but that function is more generally reserved for the next level of trial courts to be described. While the various county courts make records of their own proceedings, which could be reviewed on appeal, in most states an appeal in certain classes of these cases involves taking the evidence again in a completely new trial in a higher court.

We have now reached the level of trial courts of plenary or general jurisdiction, known usually as district, circuit, or superior courts, in a few instances as the court of common pleas and in New York as the supreme court. These courts are usually organized by

districts composed of two or more counties; but isolated exceptions to this are to be found in certain of the metropolitan counties; and in eight states—Arizona, California, Montana, Nevada, Ohio, Utah, Washington and Wyoming—every county constitutes a separate district. In Pennsylvania and two or three metropolitan counties elsewhere the criminal court is separate, though staffed by the same judges. In Alabama, Delaware, Mississippi, and Tennessee equity powers, derived historically from the Lord Chancellor in England, are exercised by separate courts. The prevailing pattern, however, is that of single courts of plenary jurisdiction at the trial level organized by districts and holding terms of court in each of the counties comprising the district. As indicated above, these courts usually try appeals from justices of the peace and police magistrates and to some extent from the various municipal and county courts.

Appellate courts

At the apex of the state judicial systems are the appellate courts proper—tribunals consisting of three or more judges who sit together to decide appeals from the trial courts last described, and in some instances appeals directly from county and municipal courts, on the basis of the record made of trial proceedings. In fifteen states the appellate courts themselves consist of two levels, an intermediate court of appeal and the court of last resort, usually but not always known as the supreme court. In three of the fifteen, Maryland, New Jersey and New York, the intermediate appellate tribunal is a division of the main trial court; in the others it is a completely separate court, though in one or two instances it is staffed by judges of the main trial court. In eleven states, including four of the fifteen which have intermediate appellate courts, the su-

preme court is authorized to sit in divisions, with a possibility of final review by the whole court in certain instances. This leaves twenty-eight states in which the sole appellate court proper is the supreme court (by whatever name known) convening as a whole.

COURT STRUCTURE AND DELAY

The complex patterns of multiple separate courts constituting the judicial systems of the several states become intelligible only in the historical perspective of the circumstances under which they and their antecedents were developed over the centuries. For present purposes we do not need—and space will not permit us—to unravel the tangled strands which would lead us to an understanding of this development. The reasons, as hinted above in the discussion of the concept of a court and its jurisdiction, lie in the exigencies of more primitive social and economic conditions, in feudal politics, in the medieval division of functions between church and state, in the chancellor's intervention to relieve hardships of the law under the last of the Tudors and the first of the Stuarts, in the adaptations of the English system to suit the needs of a new and larger country, and finally in the pressure to create additional and specialized tribunals to administer justice in the metropolitan centers of a mechanized age. In short, the typical state court system of today was not anyone's plan or ideal; haphazard development has made it what it is.²

Court administration hampered

Probably the greatest evil of the fragmented court structure existing in most of our states is the obstacle which it presents to any attempt at coherent administration of justice in the system as

² Arthur T. Vanderbilt, *The Challenge of Law Reform*. (Princeton, New Jersey, 1955), pp. 36-39.

a whole. The judicial department, the third great branch in our tripartite division of government, is such in name only; in reality, it usually consists of scores of separate courts, each a sovereignty in the exercise of its particular powers and functions, with no one responsible for the functioning of the department as a whole. This is all the more true because most of the judges are locally elected in the great majority of the states and tend, realistically, to regard themselves, subject to the oath of office, as answerable only to their constituents. Even in the seventeen states in which the constitution more or less explicitly confers control and administrative authority on the chief justice, the highest court, or a judicial conference or council, atomized court structure hampers administration. The result is inefficient use of judicial and clerical personnel, with consequent delay and expense.³ Further discussion of this, however, would carry us beyond the scope of this paper. Other evils are presently germane, of which those not requiring technical explanation follow.⁴

Other evils

One is the retrial of cases on appeal from inferior courts. This waste of time of litigants, witnesses, counsel, jurors, and judges is unnecessary where a competent tribunal is provided in the first instance and a record made of the proceedings for review on appeal.

Another evil of fragmentation both on the trial and the appellate level is the opportunity afforded for litigating the question as to whether the case was tried in the proper court or was reviewed in the proper court. No degree of art or

³ Arthur T. Vanderbilt, *The Essentials of a Sound Judicial System*, 48 NW. U. L. REV. 3-6 (March-April 1953).

⁴ William M. Trumbull, *Why Lawyers Should Support the Judicial Amendment*, 46 ILL. B. J. 4-8, 12-13 (Feb. 1958).

skill in drawing constitutional and statutory provisions will altogether prevent such questions from arising, as long as provision is made for separate courts, each with its distinct and limited jurisdiction. Time spent litigating such issues merely creates expense and delays final disposition of the case on its merits.

The prevailing system, under which the main trial court is organized in districts and sits infrequently in the less populous counties, results in delay in adjudication of important cases beyond the jurisdiction of the county and other local courts.

Provision for successive appeals of the same case is no more necessary than, and is as productive of delay as, provision for successive trials. Justice requires no more than one trial followed by the right to one appeal, each before a competent tribunal. The existence of a hierarchy of separate courts, however, invites provision for the right to successive appeals, and where the right exists a losing litigant often will avail himself of it if he can afford to do so.

Finally, atomized courts are a major cause of delay and inefficiency in dealing with problems of the family, domestic relations, and the custody and protection of children. In no other field does fragmented justice, with social services similarly fragmented, result in greater human waste, as well as delay in the merely temporal sense.⁵

IMPROVING COURT STRUCTURES

Mention has already been made of the British Judicature Act of 1873, which would have completely unified the courts. Even after the modification of the plan in 1875, all the main courts, trial and appellate, had been consolidated into one court with appropriate branches or departments, excluding only

⁵ Paul W. Alexander, *Family Court of the Future*, 36 J. AM. JUD. SOC'Y. 38-46 (Aug. 1952).

the inferior local courts at the bottom and the House of Lords at the top. None of our states has gone this far, though there is general agreement in principle as to the ideal of a unified court system.⁶ While the simplicity of our federal court structure may be due in part to the narrower range of matters for which those courts are responsible, the unified trial court of Puerto Rico and the simplicity of the court structures of Alaska and Hawaii, our newest states, are without question grounds for encouragement. They cannot be explained away on the basis of federal influence, for many of our states with hopelessly complex court systems were once federal territories.

Missouri in its constitution of 1945 replaced justices of the peace and other inferior tribunals by a magistrate court in each county. New Jersey by constitutional amendment in 1948 abolished a dozen or more courts, including justices of the peace, and though county and municipal courts were not consolidated into the main trial court, the experience of that state has demonstrated how much may be accomplished by effective provision for administrative authority coupled with a reasonable degree of unification of the court system. California amended its constitution in 1950 to simplify the court structure by eliminating justices of the peace and three other types of inferior courts. As a result, in the city of Los Angeles, for instance, there are but two courts, the municipal court and the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, into which other pre-existing county courts were merged.⁷

A long step toward simplification was taken by Delaware in 1951. In Minnesota justice of the peace courts were

⁶ Roscoe Pound, *Organization of Courts*. (Boston, 1940), pp. 273-294.

⁷ Illinois Legislative Council, *Judicial Articles of the State Constitutions*. File No. 1-559. (Springfield, Illinois), pp. 2-4.

abolished and other improvements of court structure effected by constitutional amendment in 1956. During the same years measures directed toward similar ends were pressed in a number of other states, but failed to obtain the legislative approval prerequisite to submission to a vote of the people.⁸

Recent developments

Finally, in 1957 the Illinois General Assembly by two-thirds vote of each house approved a resolution for constitutional amendment which, in addition to other improvements in the judicial system, would have consolidated all the trial courts into one, to be organized in such branches and divisions and to sit at such places as the due administration of justice might require. After an arduous campaign in which the leaders of both major political parties, the organized bar, and countless civic, women's, and professional organizations gave their full support, the proposal was submitted to the electorate in the general election in 1958 and, according to the official canvass, received 1,589,655 favorable votes and 893,503 opposed, thus failing by a few thousand to obtain either a two-thirds majority on the question or a simple majority of all votes cast at the election. At the time of this writing an election contest is pending in the Illinois courts.

In 1959, by legislation not requiring constitutional amendment, Tennessee all but completed the replacement of justices of the peace by courts of record having salaried judges trained in the law; Connecticut adopted even more comprehensive legislation to the same end; Wisconsin simplified its county and municipal court structure and placed

justices of the peace on a salaried basis; and Illinois took action to decimate the number of justices of the peace and to place the remainder on salary, effective in 1961. Finally, preliminary legislative approval was given to proposed constitutional amendments in Iowa and New York which would greatly simplify the court structure in those two states. Plainly, the movement has gained momentum.⁹

QUALITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY

The efficiency of the courts and the prospects for reducing delay in the administration of justice depend ultimately, though less directly and immediately, upon measures affecting the quality and independence of the judiciary. The objectives which a modern court structure and machinery for business-like administration would make possible can be realized only through the men and women serving as judges. The initial facet of this problem is the manner of selecting the judiciary. Following is a summary of the methods of selection applicable to the major courts in the several states.¹⁰

The original states knew two methods of selecting judges. The first, appointment by the executive by, and with, the advice and consent of the senate or council, which was incorporated into the Constitution of the United States applicable to federal judges, has continued in effect in Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New Jersey, and has been adopted by Hawaii. Under a variation in Connecticut the governor nominates, and both houses of the General Assembly act on the appointment. The second method was selection by the

legislature, and this has continued in effect in Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia. Before the middle of the last century a radically new method, selection by the voters in adversary elections, found favor and swept most of the southern and in turn all the midwestern and western states. Judges are so elected today in thirty-six states, which are all the states not specifically named in this, and the following, paragraph.

American Bar Association Plan

Variations of a fourth method, a composite of the appointive and elective methods and known as the American Bar Association Plan, are now in force in three states. Missouri by constitutional amendment in 1940 provided for a state-wide, nonpartisan judicial commission, consisting one-half of lawyers chosen by the members of the bar and one-half of nonlawyers chosen by the governor and presided over by the chief justice, to submit nominations to the governor for appointment to the supreme court and the courts of appeals. Similar commissions were provided for the nomination of circuit judges in circuits coming under the plan. Each judge so appointed serves a short probationary term, after which he must submit his name to the voters, without party designation and without opposition, on the sole question as to whether he shall be returned to office for a full term. Thereafter he has the same right at the end of each term.¹¹ Alaska has adopted this system, except that nominations are submitted by the Judicial Council, which has additional duties but is constituted in the manner of Missouri commissions. In California the gover-

nor appoints with the approval of a Commission on Qualifications, consisting of the attorney-general and judges representing the various courts; but from that point on the plan is substantially the same as in Missouri and Alaska. In California, as in Missouri, the plan applies to the supreme court and district courts of appeals but with respect to local judges only in counties electing to come under the plan. Kansas in 1958 adopted a variation of the plan limited to judges of the supreme court.

Tenure and retirement

Another major aspect of the problem of assuring an able and independent judiciary is tenure in office. In Massachusetts judges of the major courts serve during good behavior—for life, subject to impeachment—just as federal judges do; and the same is true in New Hampshire, except that there is a fixed age of retirement. In New Jersey the initial appointment is for seven years, but upon reappointment judges of the major courts have life tenure. In all the other states there are fixed terms which, with the notable exceptions of Louisiana, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia, are shorter where judges are elected by the voters.

A third major aspect of the problem of maintaining a judiciary of high calibre relates to procedures for removal of judges for cause and their retirement by reason of mental or physical disability. The greater their security of tenure in office, the more important this facet of the problem becomes. In the great majority of the states, judges of the highest courts may be removed or retired from office only by impeachment brought by the lower house of the legislature and tried by the senate, or by a vote of a specified majority of each house. Such cumbersome and onerous

⁸ Sheldon D. Elliott, *Judicial Administration, Annual Survey of American Law*, N. Y. U. L. REV., Vols. 28-32 (Jan. issues, 1953-1957).

⁹ 42 J. AM. JUD. SOC'Y 199-200 (April 1959).

¹⁰ See notes 1 and 7, *supra*; also The Council of State Governments, *State Court Systems* (revised). (Chicago, Illinois, 1951).

¹¹ Laurance M. Hyde, *The Missouri Plan for Selection and Tenure of Judges*, 39 J. CRIM. L., C. & P. S. 277-287 (Sept.-Oct. 1948).

procedures are seldom invoked. In a small minority of the states a judge is automatically removed upon conviction of crime. The constitutions of Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin provide for a fixed age of retirement; and in Alaska, Florida, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, and New York provision is made for a special tribunal with authority to remove for cause or retire for disability or both.

EVALUATION OF METHODS OF SELECTION AND TENURE

The philosophical principles of democracy which dictate popular election of the executive and legislative branches of government conflict with the principle of the separation of powers when applied to the judiciary. As noted at the outset of this chapter, the essential function of the courts is to determine the facts in any controversy and then decide it in accordance with the law. An undertaking to do exactly that is the only platform on which any self-respecting candidate for the bench could run. Now it is true that someone must assess his qualifications of legal ability, temperament, and character, but of these the first is beyond the competence of the electorate, and as to the latter two the voters at large are unlikely to be informed except under unusual circumstances or in the smallest communities. At best, therefore, adversary elections of judges degenerate into mere popularity contests.

Unfortunately, the methods of nominating and electing judges in thirty-six of our states are subject to even more serious objections. Faithful service in partisan politics tends to be a prerequisite to nomination. The expense of campaigning further limits the field to the wealthy or to those willing and able to borrow funds. Political as well as

financial debts are incurred. A lawyer who has abandoned his practice to serve a relatively short term of office is under pressure to remain in the good graces of those having the power to nominate or reject him for another term. Finally, in the eighteen states in which judges run on party tickets and also in the eighteen states employing a nonpartisan ballot, whenever a candidate's party affiliation is well known, his election or re-election may be affected more by popular reaction to national party platforms, the personalities of candidates for other offices, and other extraneous influences than by the voters' appraisal of the relative qualifications of the adversaries running for judicial office. When this factor is sought to be minimized by providing for separate judicial elections, the small turnout of voters enhances the power of the organized vote. The very consideration of these things discourages many well-qualified lawyers from seeking or even accepting nomination to the bench.¹²

It is well known that political considerations influence the appointment of federal judges, but life tenure gives them independence. The combination appointive-elective plans, whether in the Missouri, California, or Alaska form, are designed to minimize political influences in initial selection and give reasonable security of tenure, without sacrificing altogether an element of popular control which may operate as a safety valve in the event of wilful abuse or honest mistake on the part of the persons to whom the powers of nomination are entrusted.

Reform difficult

During the past decade the organized bar and civic groups in a large number

¹² Evan Haynes, *Selection and Tenure of Judges* (New York, 1940), pp. 247-259 (bibliography).

of states have been promoting constitutional amendments to put the American Bar Association plan into effect.¹³ Political obstacles have proved very great indeed, and experience indicates that only through a gradual process of education of the public, in the course of repeated efforts, can the goal be reached. The most recent victory came in 1958 with the adoption of the plan for

the selection of supreme court judges in Kansas. Preliminary legislative approval has been obtained in Iowa and Nevada. With perseverance measures calculated to improve the quality and assure the independence of the judiciary, as well as measures to modernize the organization of the state court systems, can and will be adopted.¹⁴

¹⁴ Harvey Uhlenhopp, *Judicial Reorganization in Iowa*, 44 IOWA L. REV. 6-74 (Fall 1958).

¹³ See note 8, *supra*.

The Problem of Congestion and Delay in the Federal Courts

By HENRY P. CHANDLER

ABSTRACT: In order to co-ordinate the work of the federal courts there was created in 1922 the Judicial Conference of the United States. In 1939 a law provided for a director of an administrative office to serve as executive assistant to the Conference and for judicial councils of the circuits consisting of the judges of the courts of appeals to exercise local supervision. The district judges have been given the assistance of law clerks; pre-trial conferences to reduce and simplify the issues before trial and incidentally to conduce to settlements have been promoted; and the judicial output of the individual judges has increased. But serious congestion and delay remain in some courts. For firmer administration the Judicial Conference should be authorized to prescribe administrative practices instead of merely to make suggestions; the chairmen of the judicial councils should have administrative assistants; and chief judges of courts should be appointed instead of succeeding by length of service. The paramount need is for more judges to cope with the present volume of litigation. The Congress is under a clear duty to provide for them.

Henry P. Chandler, A.B., J.D., Springfield, Illinois, was Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts from 1939 to 1956, when he retired. In 1957 at the instance of the territorial government of Hawaii, he made a study of the administration of the territorial courts and recommended legislation which with minor changes was enacted by the last territorial legislature and is now a law of the new state. Until September 1960 he is serving as the first court administrator of Illinois by appointment of the Illinois Supreme Court. He has written various articles for professional journals on court administration and on probation as a method of correction.

THE serious delays in the federal courts occur in the district or trial courts. This is natural because an overwhelming proportion of cases begun in those courts never reach appeal. In 1959,¹ 187,201 suits were brought in the federal district courts, but only 3,754 in the United States courts of appeals, and only 1,639 in the United States Supreme Court during its October 1957 term, the latest year for which figures are presently published.²

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES³

When William Howard Taft became Chief Justice of the United States in 1921, he brought his great influence to bear toward making the federal courts more efficient. He had been thinking of the problem ever since he left the presidency in 1913. He was attracted by the English court system which he said provided for "executive control vested in a council of judges to direct business and economize judicial force."⁴ In 1921 there was a large accumulation of cases in the district courts resulting from the increase of business after the First World War and Prohibition. In order to handle it Congress provided by law for twenty-four additional district judges in specified districts. Upon Chief Justice Taft's recommendation, the Congress authorized the assignment of any district judges by the Chief Justice to courts of other circuits with the consent of the senior circuit judge of their own

circuit. It also adopted a recommendation that there be created a council consisting of the Chief Justice and the senior circuit judges, then nine, to meet annually and "agree informally as to where the judges were needed and whence they can be had."⁵ Thus on September 14, 1922, the Judicial Conference of the United States was created.⁶

PROGRESS: 1922-1939

Chief Justice Taft had a strong incentive, due to his advocacy of the provision for temporary assignment of judges among circuits, to arrange for full use of this practice. The Judicial Conference had tried ever since to do so, and these efforts have by no means been ineffectual. Over the years many judges have been so assigned, particularly to the Southern District of New York in Manhattan.

In principle there is good reason for much larger use of the practice. In 1959 over one third of the districts had incoming case-loads at least one fourth less than the national average of 215 civil cases per judge.⁷ But there are practical obstacles to assignment between circuits.

Members of the Conference, desiring to make a good record for currency in their own circuits, are reluctant to part even temporarily with their judges. Another difficulty was explained by Circuit Judge Walter H. Sanborn of Minnesota in 1921:

We have found from experience that these cases where work is needed will not be tried by non-resident judges, because . . . the lawyers being unacquainted with the ability, learning, character, and wisdom of the

⁵ Testimony of Chief Justice Taft, Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2432, 2433, and 2523, 67th Congress, Oct. 5 and 11, 1921, at 11-19.

⁶ 42 U. S. Stat., 837, 838-39.

⁷ 1959 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE REP., note 2 *supra* (mimeographed) at II-49.

¹ Years in this article denote fiscal years ending June 30th of the numbered year unless otherwise indicated.

² 1959 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U. S. COURTS REP., Table C1, D1, F1a, B1 and 1958 REP., Table A1.

³ The original name was Conference of Senior Circuit Judges. It was changed to the one used here in the Revised Judicial Code of 1948, 62 U. S. Stat., 869, 902.

⁴ William Howard Taft, *Attacks on the Courts and Legal Procedures*, 5 Ky. L. J. 2, 3, 13.

judges sent into their districts, continue their cases until the resident judge . . . can hear them.⁸

Consequently, the assignment of judges from outside is not a substitute for enough resident judges.

In its first meetings in 1922 and 1923 the Conference took steps to bring about the removal from the dockets of cases which while nominally pending were really "dead," so that the judges could concentrate on the "live" cases. To this end it recommended periodic calls of the calendars and the dismissal of cases in which action had not been taken within a year.⁹ The Conference has always taken the view that while a client's lawyer has the primary responsibility for the prompt handling of his case, the court is under some obligation to see that it is fulfilled.

Chief Justice Taft and his successors have stimulated the members to spur lagging judges in their circuits. This has applied especially to holding cases a long time under advisement without decision. As Chief Justice Hughes said to the Conference in 1934,

I am entirely in favor of dealing very carefully and tactfully with a judicial officer, and not unnecessarily offending him, but after all, he has a duty and we have, in a sense, a responsibility for the general administration of justice in the Federal courts. . . . That is what we are here for.¹⁰

THE LEGISLATION OF 1939

In many ways the Judicial Conference exerted a beneficial influence between 1922 and 1939. But opinion grew that it was not enough. Former Attorney-General Homer Cummings pointed out that it was the only administrative

⁸ Letter of Judge Sanborn to Chief Justice Taft, dated December 20, 1921.

⁹ [1922-23] JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REP. 3-4.

¹⁰ 1934 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, Transcript of the proceedings 24-27.

agency in the federal judicial system except the individual courts, and it met only once a year for a few days.¹¹

The business matters of the courts were then being handled by the Department of Justice under the attorney-general who procured the appropriations for their maintenance and controlled their expenditure. The Judicial Conference, reflecting the attitude of the judges, disliked this arrangement. Attorney-General Cummings recognized that it was anomalous for the courts to have to look for their financial support to the attorney for the United States government, their principal litigant. He proposed that provision be made for an administrative officer chosen by the judicial branch to whom the business functions would be transferred and who would also collect statistics and information concerning the work of the courts, and endeavor in proper ways to bring about improvements in their practices. The American Bar Association under its dynamic president, the late Arthur T. Vanderbilt, supported his proposal enthusiastically, and in 1938 a bill was introduced.¹²

The proposed administrative officer would have acted as a kind of agent for the Chief Justice. In the words of Chief Justice Hughes this would have made him almost personally responsible for what went on in the various courts which might be subject to correction.¹³ To this the members of the Supreme Court were opposed. The objection was overcome by the acceptance of a suggestion of the Chief Justice to put the burden of supervising the individual courts on judicial councils, consisting of

¹¹ Letter to Congressman Walter Chandler printed in the hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 2973 and H. R. 5999, 76th Congress, at 74-75.

¹² S3213, 75th Congress.

¹³ 1939 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, Transcript of the proceedings 191.

the judges of the courts of appeals of the circuits acting in an administrative capacity. In that form a law was enacted August 7, 1939.¹⁴

The statute provided for a Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, to be appointed, subject to removal, by the Supreme Court, but to operate "under the supervision and direction" of the Judicial Conference. In addition to his duties in relation to the business and fiscal matters of the federal courts—except the Supreme Court—federal probation, and the offices of the referees in bankruptcy, he has a part in the following procedures designed to increase the efficiency of the courts.

1. He renders minutely detailed annual and quarterly reports of information and statistics concerning the judicial business, showing both nationally and for each court whether they are gaining or falling behind, and where there is delay, the causes of it.

2. The judicial councils are under a mandate in the statute to take such action on the quarterly reports "as may be necessary"; also to "make all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the courts" within their circuits and the district judges are obligated to comply.

3. The law provides for a judicial conference in each circuit to be held annually and attended by all the federal judges of the circuit and representatives of the bar to be selected according to rules of the court of appeals. In these conferences the problems of the federal courts can be candidly faced by circuit and district judges consulting together with the bar and often public-spirited laymen.

4. The Director and his staff act as a secretariat for the Judicial Conference and its committees, also for the judicial councils. This permits preparation for meetings, following up recommendations and taking steps to have them carried out, and

¹⁴ 53 U. S. Stat., 1223.

continuity of action that before was not possible.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS, 1939-1956

The usefulness of the Administrative Office to the Judicial Conference was demonstrated at its meeting in January 1940, two months after the beginning of the Office. While the Conference had been trying to end excessive delays of judges, the effort had not been systematized. The Conference now authorized the Administrative Office to inquire of all district judges the number of cases, motions, or other matters held under advisement more than 30 but less than 60 days, and the titles, dates of submission, and any explanation desired of cases held more than 60 days.¹⁵ The effect was prompt. The number of cases and motions so held dropped from 298 to 190 between February and August of 1940.¹⁶

On February 17, 1936 a law provided that a district judge might appoint a law clerk if his need was certified by the senior circuit judge of the circuit.¹⁷ But in the years immediately following, it was unavailing because there was no appropriation for such aid. In time the persistent recommendations of the Conference brought about the needed appropriations. Beginning in 1940 with provision for only two law clerks for district judges in each circuit, the limitations were gradually lifted until in 1945 they were removed altogether. Now every district judge who wishes a law clerk can have one.¹⁸ In conducting trials and hearing motions the district judges are called on to decide quickly numerous

¹⁵ Jan. 1940 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REP. 4-5.

¹⁶ 1940 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U. S. COURTS, DIRECTOR'S REP. 62.

¹⁷ 49 U. S. Stat. 1140.

¹⁸ Public Law 86-221, approved Sept. 1, 1959, does away with the previous requirement of a certificate of need by the chief judge of the circuit, which, however, was almost always given.

questions of law, and the help of law clerks has substantially increased their producing power.

Pre-trial conferences

The simplification of practice in the federal courts by the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure has helped to expedite the court processes. Particularly the Judicial Conference has repeatedly recommended holding pre-trial conferences authorized by Civil Rule 16. These conferences are informal consultations of counsel with the judge for the purpose of surveying the case, and reducing the issues to be tried to the heart of the controversy. Although settlement is not a stated purpose it often results and when it does it frees the time of the court for other cases.

Circuit Judge Alfred P. Murrah of Oklahoma, who since 1947 has been chairman of the Committee of the Conference on pre-trial procedure, has been a flaming evangelist for it. In every way that ingenuity could devise and enthusiasm prompt he has promoted it. With two districts omitted—in which pre-trial procedures are not strictly comparable to those in other districts—14,088 pre-trials were reported by the clerks of the courts in 1959.¹⁹

Some federal judges who have a notable record for production use pre-trial only in selected cases in which they think that it will have a definite advantage. Also a recent study, *Delay in the Court*, by Hans Zeisel, Harry Kalven, Jr., and Bernard Buchholz, which relates particularly to the Supreme Court (the trial court) of New York County but is of general application, comments that "On the basis of the evidence available we are not yet prepared to say that pre-trial is effective enough in this respect [promoting settlement] to over-

¹⁹ 1959 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U. S. COURTS REP. at II-38.

come the offsetting loss of direct judge trial time."²⁰

Nevertheless the pre-trial conference in civil cases has reason to support it aside from being conducive to settlements. The reduction of the controversy to its essentials can generally be better attained in a quiet conference with the judge than in the strife of trial. The elimination of distracting matters in advance is especially desirable where there is a jury. The jurors' time is saved and there is no flagging in their attention.

The federal courts have also tried to bring about the fullest use of all means of discovering pertinent information in advance of the trial. Whether or not the cumulative effect of these practices or increased efforts of the judges or all together are the cause, the judicial output of the individual district judges has risen significantly in the last two decades. The number of civil cases terminated on the average per judge was 236 in 1959 compared with 169 in 1941, an increase of 40 per cent.²¹

New judgeships

From the beginning the Judicial Conference has worked unremittingly for additions to the judicial force. Before 1939 it had to look to the attorney-general for support of its recommendations in Congress. Now they are submitted by the director of the Administrative Office, and accompanied by a detailed analysis of the business of the courts concerned, the number of cases collectively and per judge, and their rise and fall. The studies take account of local conditions such as an unusual proportion of long cases and illness of judges or judicial vacancies.

²⁰ (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1959), p. 12.

²¹ 1959 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U. S. COURTS, DIRECTOR'S REP. at I-2.

The most powerful support of the recommendations of the Conference comes from its own members and judges of the courts involved. For many years Chief Judge John Biggs Jr. of the Third Circuit has testified at all hearings on legislation of this nature, and his explanations have been able and persuasive. In the latter years he has been supported by Circuit Judge Charles E. Clark of the Second Circuit, chairman of the Committee on Judicial Statistics, which has carefully reviewed all the recommendations of new judgeships before they have gone to the Conference. This has also been done by the Committee on Court Administration under Judge Biggs as chairman.

In a decade the Congress has made two principal additions to the number of district judgeships. In 1949 it provided for twenty-one,²² and in 1954 for twenty-nine.²³ Since 1954 no new federal judgeships have been authorized. This has put a heavy strain on the district courts and is the largest factor in the delay there.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

In the last three years the membership of the Judicial Conference has been doubled from twelve to twenty-four and changed in nature. In 1956 the Chief Judge of the Court of Claims was made a member²⁴ and in 1957 provision was made for the representation of the district judges of each of the eleven circuits by a member to be chosen for a three-year term by all the judges of the circuit, circuit and district, assembled in their judicial conference.²⁵

Agitation for representation of the district judges began early in the last decade. It was truly said that the most

numerous and difficult problems of administration arose in the district courts. The participation of the district judges in the national body has begun well. Under the effective use of the committee system and the skillful guidance of the Chief Justice as chairman, the Conference requires no longer for its meetings than formerly. It is benefited by the first-hand knowledge of conditions in the district courts which its members from those courts supply, and its recommendations are more persuasive to the district judges because their representatives have had a part in shaping them.

A law which took effect on August 7, 1959 prescribed a maximum age limit of seventy years for chief judges of the United States courts of appeals and the United States district courts.²⁶ A chief judge reaching that age retains his powers as judge but ceases to be the head of the court. The effective administration of a court with a number of judges calls for vigor that often declines with age. The new law protects against lagging on that account although naturally it cannot guarantee that the chief judge will possess administrative talent.

On October 31, 1956, I retired as Director of the Administrative Office, and on January 7, 1958, Warren Olney III, who had been Assistant Attorney-General and head of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice from 1953 until 1957, succeeded me. Under him the Administrative Office has undertaken to increase its personnel in an effort to render larger service, particularly in studying more closely the causes of congestion and delay and suggesting to the courts means of overcoming them. The extent to which it can do this will naturally be limited by its appropri-

²⁶ 72 U. S. Stat. 497. The law excepts from its operation any district judge holding the position of chief judge of a district with only two judges at the time of its enactment, as long as he continues to hold the position,

²² 63 U. S. Stat. 493.

²³ 68 U. S. Stat. 8.

²⁴ 70 U. S. Stat. 497.

²⁵ 71 U. S. Stat. 476.

tions. But the appropriation for the fiscal year 1960 is \$159,000 more than the one for 1959 and aside from other purposes will permit an expansion of the present efficient staff of the Division of Procedural Studies and Statistics.

District court experiment

In the spring of 1959 the Administrative Office carried out a notable project in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York in Brooklyn. The congestion of the civil calendars in that court approached paralysis and was the subject of especially severe criticism in a report to the Senate Appropriations Committee by Paul J. Cotter, a member of its staff.²⁷ On the invitation of Chief Judge Mortimer W. Byers of the court, Mr. Olney arranged for the assignment to the district by Chief Justice Warren of fifteen district judges from other circuits, proficient in pre-trial techniques, to make a concerted attack on the backlog, leaving the resident five judges to handle their regular schedules.

The visiting judges held pre-trials and trials. Every case assigned to them was first pre-tried and the attorneys were required to complete in advance all preparatory steps such as discovery and the taking of depositions. By this course 681 out of 1,050 cases assigned were disposed of in twelve weeks. The greater number of the dispositions were by settlement, but there were 57 complete trials, including 33 jury cases, and trials were begun in 15 other cases which were settled during the process.²⁸ On June 30th there were 573 less cases on the civil docket than the year before, and the court's prospect for dealing with its

civil litigation was more hopeful than at any previous time in years.²⁹

SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS

The question arises what may be done to improve further the working of the district courts. I should say that the principal needs are firmer direction of administration and an adequate body of judges. Given sound organization and qualified personnel necessary improvements in practice will follow.

I recommend the following measures—without excluding others—which it seems to me would be beneficial and with concentrated effort might be secured.

First: Enlarge the power of the Judicial Conference, which is only to submit "suggestions," so that it can "make rules" governing the administration of the courts after the pattern of New Jersey.³⁰ The judicial councils can make orders binding on the courts within their circuits. But it is anomalous that the national body should be weak and the regional bodies in theory strong. The reason for the difference is probably that the conception of judicial administration has progressed from the "mild annual observation"³¹ thought of by Chief Justice Taft, in the seventeen years between 1922 and 1939. Now the time has come to attune the earlier provision to the present conception.

As Chief Justice Hughes said to the Judicial Conference in 1939, "The problems that concern more than one circuit . . . must be dealt with by this Conference."³² Plainly the general policies of administration, like the Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure, should be uni-

²⁷ SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMM. REP., FIELD STUDY OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (Comm. Print April 1959) at 53-54.

²⁸ 1959 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U. S. COURTS REP., THE DIRECTOR I, 18-22; THE DIVISION OF PROCEDURAL STUDIES AND STATISTICS II, 39-44.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, Table C 1.

³⁰ Constitution of New Jersey, Article VI, Sec. 11, paragraph 3.

³¹ Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2432, 2433, and 2523, 67th Congress, October 5 and 11, 1921, at 12.

³² 1939 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, Transcript of the proceedings 195-96.

form and determined upon a national basis. The Judicial Conference is the body to do this. The judicial councils would be strengthened in enforcing salutary practices if they rested on the authority rather than the recommendations of the national body.

Second: Give to the chief judges of all circuits except any in which the administrative problems are light the assistance of an administrative officer. Circuit Judge Warren E. Burger of the District of Columbia has criticized the judicial councils for not making sufficient use of their large powers.³³ May the trouble not be in part that they have not had the personnel to do this effectively?

With a larger staff the Administrative Office plans to give more help. But centralized assistance from Washington can hardly be a complete answer. A judicial council and its chairman who undertake to direct actively the administration of their courts will need the support locally of an executive assistant chosen by and responsible to them. Such an officer would be constantly at hand for consultation and assigned tasks, and his usefulness would be enhanced by his acquaintance not only with the judges but with the bar and people of the circuit.

Third: Provide for the appointment of the chief judges of the circuits and of the districts with more than one judge instead of succession by seniority of service. A high proportion of the cases brought in all district courts are disposed of in one way or another without contest. Efficient administration calls for segregating at an early stage the cases that will not be tried and procuring their disposition without delay, and setting aside those that present problems for hearing as expeditiously as con-

ditions will permit. This, and procuring harmonious team work among the judges require skillful management. Many judges with excellent qualities do not have the talent for it. It is a matter of pure chance whether the judge longest in service will have it.

It seems to me that the best arrangement would be to have chief judges, like the Chief Justice, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. I realize that there can be no certainty that the President would require administrative ability of his appointees. But at least his attention and that of the public would be called to the importance of such a qualification. Furthermore the attorney-general, by whose advice the President in any administration is guided in judicial appointments, will appreciate the need for prompt action of the courts not only in the general public interest, but for the disposition of cases of the government. The course recommended would be almost bound to result in a higher proportion of effective chief judges than the present random arrangement.

IMPORTANCE OF THE JUDGES

When all is done that can be to give stronger direction to the administration of the federal courts, their accomplishment will depend mainly on how well the judges do their work in the individual courts, as has always been the case. Most observers agree; I think, that the general level of judicial competency in the federal courts today is high. But the number of judges, especially district judges, is seriously inadequate. The number of civil cases filed annually in the district courts with exclusively federal jurisdiction increased 50 per cent between 1941 and 1959 but the increase in the number of judges was only 26 per cent.³⁴

³³ Address before the Southern Regional Meeting of the American Bar Association, Feb. 21, 1958, 22 F.R.D. 71, 77, 82.

³⁴ 1959 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U. S. COURTS REP. at II-15.

Undoubtedly the methods of handling cases in the district courts can be further improved. But it cannot reasonably be expected that by the most efficient practices those courts can make up for the present deficiency in judge power. Year by year the Judicial Conference has asked for legislation to grant additional judgeships. At its session last March it recommended forty-three, four circuit and thirty-nine district.⁸⁵ As Chief Justice Warren has said, these recommendations are "based upon serious study of the statistics and conditions facing the particular districts and circuits."⁸⁶ They have the unqualified support of the attorney-general and the American Bar Association.

All thus far to no avail. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary, in the last days of the 1959 session of the present Congress, reported a bill for twenty-five additional judgeships, three circuit and twenty-two district. But there it stopped.

To "establish justice" is still one of the fundamental purposes for which governments are established as it was in the days of the adoption of the Constitution. The United States is not doing its duty towards its citizens while it allows federal justice to continue as

⁸⁵ March 1939 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REP. 5-6.

⁸⁶ Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute, May 20, 1959.

tardy as it is today. An adequate number of judges are indispensable for correcting this lag, and only the Congress can provide for them.

It is recognized that the attitude of the present Congress is not unique. Congress, whether the majority has been of one political party or the other, has generally been reluctant to create judgeships for a President of the opposite party to fill. The last Congress in the administration of President Wilson is an instance. This does not lessen the baneful effects upon the people of undermanned courts.

The American Bar Association, at its last annual meeting, urged the President to adopt the principle that, "The number of judges in our federal courts from each of the two major political parties should be approximately equal." Attorney-General William P. Rogers reported at the time of the meeting that the President had authorized him to say that if the needed new judgeships were created he would fill them on that basis. It is much to be hoped that this assurance may open the door to action by the Congress at its present session. In the longer view it would be fortunate if the policy might become a precedent for succeeding administrations of whatever party. Nothing could do more to improve the prospect of maintaining the federal courts at requisite judicial strength.

Delay in State Appellate Courts of Last Resort

By JOHN R. DETHMERS

ABSTRACT: Delays in appeals occur first in filing them, second in preparing and submitting them for decision, third in the courts' consideration and disposition of them. The first may be met by court rule requiring filing within specified number of days after decision in trial court. Delays in submission, due to procrastination of lawyers, decrease upon adoption of a rule providing for dismissal of appeals, automatically or on a court's own motion, when not submitted promptly. Some delays in hearing appeals are due, as are delays in deciding them, to the courts' inability or failure to keep up with workloads. Suggested means of increasing productiveness of judges include change in methods of judicial selection and improved compensation and facilities to attract the ablest lawyers to the bench. Among proposals for meeting today's increased case-loads are elimination of requirement that highest courts write opinions in every case decided, enlarging court membership, divisional sittings of the courts, placing restrictions on right of appeal, furnishing courts with legally trained clerks or commissioners, or establishment of intermediate courts of appeal. Advantages and disadvantages are found in each. The object of proposals is not only to expedite appellate operation but to improve the quality of the product.

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POPULATION growth, economic development, and other factors, combining to congest antiquated judicial structures at the trial level, could not have been expected to leave the states' appellate courts of last resort untouched. Authoritative information is not readily available on the extent of the law's delays there. Assuming that it presents a minor portion of the over-all problem of lagging justice, its elimination is, nonetheless, an essential part of the entire program of making the judicial process more prompt and efficient.

THREE STAGES OF DELAY

Delays may occur at three stages in appeals: First, during the period between entry of judgment in the trial court and the filing of an appeal; second, after filing and up to the time the appeal is submitted to the appellate court for decision; and, third, following submission, the time taken by the appellate court for decision and disposition of the case.

LIMITED AVAILABLE STATISTICS

A survey and report on appellate courts, prepared by the Institute of Judicial Administration in 1957, indicates that, in the state courts of last resort responding to questionnaires—about twenty-nine on most questions—the estimated average time lapse between judgment in the trial court and filing the appeal is two and one-half months, between filing and submitting the appeal for decision, six months, and between submission and final court disposition, one and six-tenths months. This would make a total of ten months from date of judgment in the lower court until disposition of the appeal in the appellate court. Some wishful thinking or minimizing guesswork may be reflected in these estimates. Also, it may be conjectured that answers from the almost twenty states not responding to ques-

tionnaires would boost the national average very substantially over the above figures.

DELAY IN FILING APPEAL

The first stage may be controlled readily, as it is in many states, by court rule or statute requiring appeals to be filed within a limited number of days after entry of judgment. This should work an injustice on no one, so long as the method for filing an appeal is simplified by rule or statute, and provided that liberal provisions are made for the appellate court's granting of leave to file a delayed appeal in order to avoid undue hardship or a miscarriage of justice, when the delay is shown not to be due to the culpable negligence of the appealing party or his counsel. This is the least difficult part of the problem to solve. It perhaps affords an opportunity for cutting from one to two months from the above estimated average time now consumed at this stage.

DELAY IN SUBMITTING APPEAL

Delays in the second stage, after appeal taken and before submission, may be due, first, to dilatoriness on the part of lawyers in preparing the appeal and, thereafter, to inability or failure of the court to hear the case as soon as counsel are prepared to submit it to the court for decision. These two successive phases of the second stage are best discussed separately.

PROCRASTINATION OF LAWYERS AFTER APPEAL

With respect to the first phase, too many of the states' courts of last resort have considered the delays of lawyers in submitting their appeals a matter of concern for the opposite parties only, not for the court. Rules or statutes provide for the time within which successive steps, such as filing of records and briefs, and so on, must be com-

pleted by the appellant and likewise those required of the appellee. Failure of appellant to comply usually makes him vulnerable to a motion by appellee to dismiss the appeal, which the court may or may not grant, depending on the circumstances of the particular case. Too often the penalties provided for a party's noncompliance with the time requirements governing his part of the preparation of the appeal have been imposed only as the opposing party has invoked them. Thus the courts have left it up to the parties to determine when their appeals finally are to be submitted to the court for decision. Such indifference by the court and the reluctance of counsel to press one another combine to create a good-fellow sort of atmosphere, in which the rights of litigants and, ultimately, the public's confidence in our judicial system come in last for consideration.

COURT RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACCELERATION

More recently, the courts have come to realize that whether the delays be caused by court or counsel is of small moment to the parties, or to the public whose distress at the law's delays, wherever the blame may rest, results in diminishing esteem for courts and the administration of justice. In consequence, rules are being adopted calling for dismissal of appeals, automatically or on the court's own motion, except upon good cause shown to the contrary, when they are not completed and submitted within specified time limits. This takes away from parties and counsel exclusive responsibility for prompt submission of appeals and makes it a matter of concern, as well, for the court itself. Here is a progressive step which, coupled with greater firmness on the part of the courts in considering requests of counsel for time extensions, is calculated

to correct one of the real sore spots of delay in appellate practice.

LAGGING COURTS

We come now to what is styled above as the second phase of the second stage in appeals, namely, delay which results from the court's failure or inability to hear and consider appeals as soon as counsel are ready to submit them.¹ Because this involves solely the functioning of the appellate court itself, as does, also, the matter of delay during the third stage, after submission and until decision, these two are combined for discussion. Here we are confronted with the fact that many of the courts of last resort simply cannot or, at least, do not keep up with their work-loads. Let us consider some of the causes and possible corrective measures.

SELECTION OF JUDGES

To begin with, it may as well be recognized that judges differ in capacity, learning, skill, industry, efficiency, and productiveness. Some do their work not only thoroughly but quickly, others more slowly. Some turn out a great deal of work, others much less. This may be a matter of comparative abilities or of differences in disposition and inclination. Some have judicial temperament, some have not. Some are ideally suited to the judicial task, some are not. All these individual factors affect, inescapably, the efficiency and dispatch with which the whole court disposes of its business. The problem is, in part, one of judicial selection and tenure. A judge has been defined as a lawyer who knew a governor. The implication is obvious. In all the states partisan poli-

¹ In many, perhaps most, of the state courts of last resort the appeals are taken up and heard by the court as soon as they are ready for submission.

tics can be and often is a factor in judicial selection, whether elective or appointive. A reasonable and warranted expectation of a rise in average judicial caliber is to be found in adoption of the American Bar Association plan, or so-called "Missouri plan," of judicial selection and tenure on the basis of qualifications alone. It is designed to remove politics from judges and judges from politics. It is likely to produce better appointments in the first instance and permits the appointee to be a better, more independent judge after he assumes the bench. Under such plan, when a judicial vacancy is to be filled, a nonpartisan or bipartisan commission, composed of lay members appointed by the governor, judicial members selected by fellow judges and lawyer members chosen by the bar, after considering the qualifications of eligible lawyers, recommend to the governor the three they deem best qualified. He appoints one. At stated intervals, equal to usual terms of judicial office, the appointee submits his record to the electorate who vote on the question whether he shall or shall not be retained in office for another term. If a majority votes "yes" he stays, if not he steps aside and a new appointment is made as above outlined. There are no opposing candidates at the elections and, hence, no occasion for rival campaign histrionics and promises. The judge goes to the people solely on his record.

Adoption of something like the Missouri plan in the states calls for constitutional amendment. Invariably, it is opposed by politicians desirous of maintaining patronage or control over the courts. Equally lacking in enthusiasm for it are those lawyers, aspiring to the bench, who sense that under this system the call may go only to those who are more highly qualified than they. Solution is to be found only in an informed

and aroused public, determined to correct the situation.

COMPENSATION OF JUDGES

A related problem is the deterrent to aspirations for the bench, on the part of the more skillful and successful lawyers, inhering in inadequate compensation, retirement benefits, and working facilities, together with political involvements distasteful to them. To attract the ablest and best men it is essential that, even though some sacrifices be involved, they at least may be relieved of unnecessary financial worries while on the bench and assured of equipment, facilities, and assistants equivalent to those commonly enjoyed in up-to-date law offices. These are lacking in many of the courts. Here, too, the people and public opinion, ultimately, must come to the rescue of our courts, if they are to be elevated to the highest possible level of efficiency and competence.

INCREASE IN CASE-LOADS

There can be no doubt, however, that the chief cause for the current congestion in many of the state courts of last resort, is that their organization, structure, methods, functions, and facilities are geared to the customs and needs of an earlier day when they were set up, and these do not permit meeting the demands of the vastly increased number of cases appealed to them today. Under existing requirements and with the means at hand, no matter how able and hard-working the judges, the mountain of work to be accomplished is insurmountable. What is to be done?

DUAL FUNCTION OF HIGHEST COURTS

State appellate courts of last resort, where no intermediate appellate courts exist, have an exclusive dual function: first, to correct errors of the lower courts and cause justice in accord with law to

be done between the parties in the individual case, and, second, "to give authoritative expression to the developing body of the law and to see that justice is administered uniformly throughout the state."² The first is pretty well understood by the public to be the work of a reviewing court. That purpose could be served, in many cases, by that court's mere announcement of a decision for appellant or appellee, without accompaniment of a formal written opinion. With respect to the second function, however, usually arising in cases of first impression, involving some question of constitutional interpretation, of statutory construction, or of great public importance, and significant to more than the immediate parties to the suit, an opinion of the court, stating the facts of the case, the applicable law and the court's reasons for its decisions, is imperative. The nature and existence of this second appellate court function and the need for a formal opinion in that connection is not so generally understood by the lay public. All this becomes obvious, however, as soon as it is realized that in determining the rights of litigants, courts often find no statutory or constitutional provision covering the situation and, so, are compelled to have recourse to common law doctrines, equitable principles, analogical reasoning, previous decisions, and plain common sense in order to reach a decision in the case. All this is incorporated into the court's written opinion, which is published and thereafter stands as a precedent, controlling of rights in like situations and controversies in the future.³ These decisions and opinions, as precedents, make up a part of the body

of the law as well as do statutes enacted by the legislature and, in fact, compose the major portion of it. They guide lower courts in future cases, lawyers in advising clients, and members of the public in concluding what are their rights and duties, and determining their courses of action accordingly. This considered, it is clear that courts must write painstaking, concise, and accurate opinions in such cases, carefully developing, declaring and applying what they deem to be the principles and law in point.

WRITTEN OPINIONS

We see, then, that in cases where the courts' function is largely of the first type, written opinions are not overly necessary for the public good or for any other reason, but that they are in cases calling in play the courts' second function. Now the study of the facts and record of a case, the legal research, and all the other work attendant on the writing of a court opinion take up the greater part of the time and energies of a member of an appellate court and, of course, he must give like study to the cases in which his brothers write and to their opinions as well. One means, then, of lightening the work-load and, thus, of quickening the flow of cases through such courts to point of decision, would be to limit the writing of full-dress opinions to cases of the latter type only, leaving the others to be disposed of by mere entry of an order affirming or reversing the lower court or, at most, by filing of a brief memorandum opinion. Statistics are available which demonstrate that courts of last resort in states where that practice is followed are able to dispose of cases much more rapidly and in considerably larger numbers than is true of courts in states in which formal opinions are written in every case submitted to the court for

² Study prepared by the Institute of Judicial Administration on "Intermediate Appellate Courts," 2-U29, 1954.

³ Of course, opinions construing constitutional or statutory provisions and declaring rights and duties thereunder are also published and stand as precedents too.

decision. Unfortunately this solution, in states where not employed, is not available to their courts because of constitutional or statutory requirements that full opinions be written, filed, and published in all of the cases decided by the court. Here again, an informed and interested public may help by initiating and supporting moves to eliminate such constitutional or statutory shackles, leaving it to the courts' discretion to determine which cases merit written opinions.

SHORTER OPINIONS

With respect to time consumed in preparation of opinions, lawyers will perhaps suggest that judges could afford themselves some relief by producing shorter opinions and sticking, as they should in the interests of accurate pronouncements of the law, to writing succinctly and exclusively on the issue in need of decision, without further gratuitous offerings. Time of the court is wasted and the door thrown open to needless error in the development and exposition of the law, when judges write one word more than that which is necessary to decide the case. In writing opinions, they must rigorously resist, as some of them do not, the temptation to indulge a sense of humor or a taste for general literature. In the current effort to find additional aids and means to facilitate the flow of litigation through the courts, here is a "do it yourself" prescription for the appellate judges.

ENLARGING THE COURT

A remedy for overloaded dockets in reviewing courts, frequently resorted to in the states through the decades, has been adding to the number of judges, as a means of increasing the court's working capacity. The membership of the United States Supreme Court was increased in 1837 from seven to nine, no doubt for that purpose. Many states

had only three-man courts at one time. Today twenty-one have seven-man courts, nineteen have five or fewer, a very few have nine and equally few three. Enlargement of the court may still be a feasible solution in some states. It may be true, however, that the courts with the smaller numbers are the ones least in need of increase. On the other hand, the courts most overloaded with work, in states with large metropolitan areas, are likely to be the ones already having larger memberships, and increasing their size would give rise to the problem of diminishing returns. Experience of the states seems to be that seven, or certainly not more than nine judges, is about the limit on the number which can effectively deliberate and decide cases together. The time-saving advantage of increasing court membership is that it reduces the number of opinions each judge must write. It does not lessen the work of each judge necessary for the study of records and briefs, legal research, and examination of opinions in cases in which the other members write. This he must do, of course, in order to decide whether he agrees and will sign such opinions or write dissents. Enlarging a court does not decrease the amount of time required for listening to oral arguments of counsel and for conference, consultation, and discussion by the judges. In fact, increase of numbers increases the man-hours thus consumed and, perhaps, the number of court hours as well, because of resultant increase in number of questions addressed to counsel from the bench and more arguments and discussion by the larger number of judges in conference. Enlargement of court membership is, therefore, not necessarily 100 per cent gain.

DIVISIONAL SITTING

Another method designed to increase the working capacity of reviewing courts is to permit them to sit in divisions.

Thus, for example, with a six- or seven-judge court, three might sit in a division, hear the oral arguments, study records and briefs and decide a case, with no involvement or work on that case for the other members of the court who, meanwhile, would be doing the same thing with a different case. While this does not decrease the number of opinions to be written by each judge, at least none is required to listen to as many arguments of counsel or participate in the discussions and consideration of as many cases as when all cases are heard by the entire court. The latter gain is offset somewhat by the usual provision, with respect to courts having divisional sittings, that when a dissent occurs in a division, the case shall be reheard by the entire court. This would occasion two hearings of such case. Also, a usual requirement is that all cases involving construction of the state or federal constitution or some question of great public importance or, in some states, involving the overruling of a previous decision, shall be heard in the first instance by the full court. This materially diminishes the number of cases left for hearing by a division only. Criticisms raised against the system by some, but disputed by others, are that it tends to increase the number of applications for rehearings, that it presents the possibility of conflicting decisions by the different divisions, and that it results in two supreme courts in a state instead of one, with lawyers given an opening to select the one of their choice when the divisions are of a permanent character, as some are. The latter may be avoided by a rotating divisional scheme. A valid objection would seem to be that a state's court of last resort is charged with an obligation to see that justice is done in the state's entire judicial system, to exercise superintending control over lower courts, and to give

guidance and direction to orderly development of law in the state, and see that it is uniformly interpreted and applied throughout the state. That is not the work of a half, or even two separate halves, of a court, but a challenging responsibility of a whole court. It seems more in keeping with American tradition and thinking that the matters presented to courts of last resort, many of transcendent importance to the people, call for the composite judgment of more than a division of such court.

RIGHT OF REVIEW RESTRICTED

Restricting the right to an appeal will serve to reduce the number of cases coming before an appellate court and thus help to solve its problem of overwork and congestion. Some indirect methods of restriction are the following: increasing the costs of appeal, as by requiring payment of a large appeal fee to the clerk of the court, making the appellate process more complex or difficult, decreasing the time within which an appeal may be taken, or permitting the party prevailing on the appeal to tax and collect from the losing party his actual costs of appeal rather than mere nominal costs as is the custom and general rule in this country as distinguished from England. Direct restrictions may consist of fixing and increasing the minimum amount which must be involved in a suit to permit an appeal as of right, or prohibiting appeals as of right in specific types of cases or from anything but final orders, judgments, or decrees.

The mentioned indirect restrictions—except for the one fixing a reasonable limit on the time within which an appeal may be filed, which limit already exists quite generally in the states—run counter to every trend and program in this country for improving the administration of justice by making litigation as

simple, inexpensive, and nontechnical a means as possible for arriving at truth and justice, equally available to rich or poor, schooled or unschooled, or from whatever walk of life parties may come. This alone is compatible with the democratic system under which we profess to live.

As for the direct restrictions, the one limiting appeals to cases involving more than a specified amount may work a hardship on those who can ill afford it with cases involving small amounts, but, at the same time, it may be a boon in saving them from becoming obligated for heavy appeal expenses in matters which are not worth it. Restricting appeals as of right to final orders and judgments saves the appellate court the time and litigants the expense of having cases come to the appellate court twice, that is, both before and after the trial below is completed. On the other hand, an appellate court decision on some controlling question at an early stage of what might become a protracted trial below sometimes could end the lawsuit at that point with savings of time to the trial court and money for the litigants.

In discussing restrictions, so far, we have been talking of appeals taken as a matter of right, as distinguished from appeals permitted by the appellate court upon application for leave to do so. Restricting the number of instances in which appeals may be taken as of right and increasing those in which leave must first be obtained from the appellate court is a very effective means of reducing the number of cases finally to be heard on appeal. Obviously, some time of the court must be given to consideration of whether the application for leave to appeal shall be granted, but the time demands upon the court on that account are far less than those involved upon formal hearing and decision of the case on appeal, whether taken as of right or on leave granted.

The entire question of the desirability of decreasing appellate court case-loads, by any of the restrictive means, must be measured by the modern American concept of justice and due process, namely that every person is equally entitled not only to a fair trial in the lower court, but also, because every judge can and does make mistakes, to at least one appeal, as of right, to another court for the purpose of securing correction of those mistakes. By that standard, restrictions on the right to appeal, without leave, do not fare well. Restrictions there will be, however, if no other relief is afforded some of the courts.

AIDS TO APPELLATE COURTS

Previously we have mentioned that the assurance of necessary aids is essential to attracting able lawyers to the bench. It is equally so in order to enable the court to carry its work-load. The difficulty is that these cost money. The battle of the budget is ever with the state. The membership and staff of attachés of the court are relatively small in number compared with the divisions of the executive branch of government and without lobbying significance. At times courts declare legislative enactments unconstitutional, thereby scarcely endearing themselves to the legislature. The result of all this is that courts usually come in last in legislative determinations of where increased expenditures of the insufficient number of tax dollars shall go. Once again, as before suggested, only the interest and insistence of the public in seeing the courts adequately provided for will induce the legislatures to meet the need.

THE COURTS' ATTACHÉS

Included in the field of aids are law clerks, furnished the judges in some states. Unfortunately, the compensa-

tion permitted and the requirements of the statutes providing for them are usually such that the positions are held only by recent graduates of law schools, with no practical experience, and their tenure is limited to short periods. This materially impairs the value of their services to the judges. Their work varies, but usually includes study of records and briefs in the cases and reports thereon to the justices, legal research, and supplying the judges with memoranda on the law, critical analysis for the judge employing them of the opinions written by the other judges, and so on. This provides a sort of filtering process, saving some time for the judge. In some states the courts have the services of commissioners. These are trained and experienced lawyers, with qualifications comparable to those of the judges. They may study, report on, and make recommendations to the court on motions and applications. In some states they join in hearing cases, draft tentative opinions, and submit them to the court for possible adoption. This can be a real time-saving arrangement for the judges. A problem, of course, is that lawyers, litigants, and the public want the decisions to be those of the judges of the court and not of attachés. There is too much suspicion now among lawyers that decisions are being made and opinions written for the judges by law clerks and assistants. This does not make for public confidence in the courts. It is not easy to draw the line between what may properly be done by court aids, who are nonjudicial officers, and what is a strictly judicial function to be performed by judges only. If the commissioners' function approximates or becomes that of the judges themselves, the result, obviously, is nothing other in character than an enlargement of the membership of the court, with the attendant involvements previously considered. An inexpensive variation of this

system is to call in trial judges, temporarily, for such assistance. Inasmuch as the trial courts of the larger states are as overloaded as their appellate courts, the judicial manpower of the trial courts usually could be utilized to better advantage by assignment where needed on the trial level. The shortage there is even greater than in the reviewing courts.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTS

There remains for consideration, as a remedy for congested courts of last resort, the establishment of intermediate courts of appeal in states needing but not having them. They are functioning in thirteen states now. Depending on the size of the state and the amount of litigation in its courts, such intermediate court might be a single court with state-wide jurisdiction, or there might be two or more such courts, each in a definite district in the state, or one larger court might sit in rotating divisions in the several parts of the state. Under proper organization, rules, and practice this could relieve the court of last resort and save it largely for the most important appellate work of guiding the development of the law, leaving to the intermediate courts the less significant correction of trial court errors, and matters affecting little more than the rights of the immediate parties to a controversy.

Objections raised to the trilevel judicial system of trial courts, intermediate appellate courts and a court of last resort, are, (1) expense to the state of maintaining an additional court or courts, (2) occasions for controversy over the question of jurisdiction between the intermediate and highest courts of appeal, and (3) the additional cost of time and money to litigants of a double appeal, first to the intermediate court and then to the highest appellate court.

The question whether the results would justify the additional expense to the state is, again, one for the public to decide. The basis for jurisdictional conflicts or uncertainty between the two appellate courts, the resolution of which might occasion additional litigation, cost, and waste of time, is the common provision that certain types of cases may be appealed from the trial court directly to the court of last resort while others must go first to the intermediate court. There appears to be a lack of any sound basis upon which the jurisdiction of the two courts can be divided between them, thus creating a problem first, of how to word the statute governing the subject and, second, of judicially construing it. Hence the objection that only additional litigation, cost, and delay would result.

A suggested solution is that all appeals shall be taken in the first instance, as of right and without leave, to the intermediate court. At this point, we hear the next criticism, of double appeals. That there would be instances of double appeal is inescapable. Particularly is this true if appeals may be taken as of right from the intermediate to the final court. The best handling of this part of the problem would seem to be, then, to permit such appeals only on leave granted by the highest court. Merits and advantages of these suggested procedures for operating a trilevel court system, aside from relieving dockets in the highest court, would be that thus every party is assured of at least one appeal for correction of what he deems to be errors in the trial court, and the court of last resort would be freed, by the exercise of its discretion in allowing appeals there, to select only cases where dissents in the intermediate court or conflicting decisions of its different divisions leave uncertainties as to the law which need correction or harmonizing by the highest court in the

interests of certainty and uniformity in the state, or where questions of constitutional construction, statutory interpretation, or others of great public importance are presented, all giving occasion for the exercise of that court's highest function of guiding the development and giving direction to the growth and trend of the law.

CONCLUSION

A cautionary concluding thought is indicated. We have dwelt on what may be done to expedite business in the state courts of last resort. We should not be confused or misled into thinking that speed alone, or quantity rather than quality, is the ultimate desideratum in appellate work. The above proposals are offered not alone to solve the problem of lagging justice, but also as a means for securing more time for appellate judges, so that they may be enabled to do better work on all the cases before the court. Criticisms of appellate court decisions sometimes are that they rest on one-man opinions. If the judges are too busy, they may be driven to concentrating on the cases assigned to them for opinion writing, accepting, more or less as of course and without the necessary study and scrutiny, the decisions and opinions of their brothers in the other cases. This makes for one-man decisions, one-man opinions. There is no object in swapping what may be the erroneous decision of a trial judge for what may well be the equally erroneous decision of one appellate judge. What the parties and public want and are entitled to have, on appeal, is the composite judgment of the entire group of wise, skilled, and trained men, possessed of judicial temperament, who have been selected to sit on the court of last resort. In turn, the latter must not be placed on a beltline production basis. With great constitutional and other

questions to be decided, affecting the fundamental rights and duties of all the people and, possibly, the destiny of the nation, the judges must study, meditate, deliberate, consult, confer, and reach decisions in an unhurried atmosphere of calmness and serenity. This alone can insure the best prospects for avoidance of error and preservation of the liberties of our people and America's free institutions, of which the courts are the final guardians.

Acknowledgments for information and suggestions are due to the Research Study on the Organization and Operation of Courts of Review, made for the Judicial Council of Michigan, in 1933, by Edward O. Curran, Research Associate, and Edson R. Sunderland, Professor of Law and Legal Research, both at the University of Michigan Law School, and also to the report on Judicial Administration at the Appellate Level, prepared for the Supreme Court of Michigan in 1957 by Charles W. Joiner, Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School and Chairman of the Joint Committee on Michigan Procedural Revision.

Report of the Board of Directors to the Members of The American Academy of Political and Social Science for the Year 1959

(Presented by the President to the Annual Business Meeting of the Members,
held at the Academy Offices, 3937 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia,
8 February 1960.)

MEMBERSHIP

ON 31 December 1959 there were 13,422 members of the Academy, which may be compared with 13,254 for the previous year. The figure for 31 December 1957 was 12,919. These are only modest gains, but we are encouraged by them, considering the difficulties recently experienced by serious journals. We are pleased to report that our publication continues to have the largest circulation among scholarly journals in the field of the social sciences other than foreign affairs.

FINANCES

The total income from the 1959 operations of the Academy was \$120,576. "Operations" in this report does not include changes in the value of securities, or gains or losses from the sale of them, or changes in the value of inventory, real estate, or equipment. Total expenses amounted to \$118,482. With

money contributed by Senator Joseph S. Clark for the Leadership project—the cost of which we have been absorbing in our operations—and from money we had in our checking account, we purchased \$14,107 worth of securities. We did not convert any securities into cash during the year. The Academy still "owes" the Leadership project approximately \$3,000, but we expect to absorb this in 1960 or subsequent operations.

The totals in the Operations Report do not agree with those in the Auditor's Report. They should not agree, because the Auditor's Report reflects the depreciation of building and equipment, whereas our Operations Report does not deal with these matters. The loss through depreciation of our building and equipment—\$5,470—is compensated for by an enhanced inventory of salable magazines. The two reports have been completely reconciled in a conference between the Auditor and your President.

FINANCIAL STATEMENT ON 1959 OPERATIONS * AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1959

INCOME	OPERATIONS IN		BUDGET
	DECEMBER	CUMULATIVE	
Balance	\$ —	\$ 14,445.76	\$ 14,445.76
Dues and subscriptions	11,161.58	87,722.97	87,000.00
Sales	891.91	15,277.89	16,000.00
Advertising	823.95	5,092.67	5,500.00
Gross Inc. (investments)	895.00	12,350.78	11,000.00
Royalties and donations	—	10,236.25	10,250.00
	<u>\$13,772.44</u>	<u>\$145,126.32</u>	<u>\$144,195.76</u>
EXPENSES			
General office	\$ 1,261.90	\$ 13,444.43	\$ 15,000.00
Meetings	88.62	6,684.69	7,000.00
Accounts	685.78	5,151.62	5,500.00
New members	2,208.26	20,387.45	20,000.00
ANNALS	1,633.15	51,182.58	58,000.00
Member records	495.73	6,640.30	6,500.00
Sales	366.01	5,447.64	5,000.00
Advertising	98.60	2,265.49	2,000.00
Manpower project	983.66	6,132.20	4,000.00
Purchase of securities	2.93	14,107.10	14,000.00
Investments (commission and expense)	44.75	1,145.65	850.00
	<u>\$ 7,869.39</u>	<u>\$132,589.15</u>	<u>\$137,850.00</u>
Credit items (postage meter, etc.)		613.59	
Cash balance		11,923.58	
		<u>\$145,126.32</u>	

* "Operations" do not cover profit or loss from the sale of securities.

REPORT OF AUDITORS

THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

STATEMENT OF INCOME AND EXPENSES

FOR THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1959

REVENUE

Dues and subscriptions		
Regular—dues	\$53,389.67	
Student—dues	3,545.50	
Subscriptions	30,787.90	\$ 87,723.07
Sales of Publications	15,277.89	
Advertising and Royalties	5,224.75	20,502.64
Interest and Dividends		11,195.54
TOTAL REVENUE		\$119,421.25

EXPENSES

Membership		
Records	\$ 6,640.30	
Promotion	20,387.45	\$27,027.75
ANNALS—Publishing costs	50,580.87	
Sales costs	5,469.24	
Accounting and Finance costs	5,542.91	
Office operation	12,961.28	
Philadelphia meeting	6,684.69	
Advertising	2,265.49	
Gifts—Pattern Scholarship and bonds	687.50	
TOTAL CASH EXPENSE		111,219.73

EXCESS OF CASH REVENUE OVER EXPENSES OF OPERATIONS 8,201.52

Less: Depreciation		
Buildings	\$ 330.00	
Improvements	3,561.00	
Office equipment	1,579.08	5,470.08

NET PROFIT FROM OPERATIONS 2,731.44

OTHER REVENUE

Profit on sale of investment	24.81
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NET INCOME TRANSFERRED TO SURPLUS \$ 2,756.25

SAMUEL R. SAPIENZA
Certified Public Accountant

PUBLICATIONS

During 1959, the six volumes of THE ANNALS dealt with the following subjects:

January	<i>Contemporary China and the Chinese</i> , edited by Howard L. Boorman, Director, Research Project on Men and Politics in Modern China, Columbia University.
March	<i>Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency</i> , edited by Helen L. Witmer, Director, Division of Research, Children's Bureau, U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
May	<i>Partnership for Progress: International, Technical Co-operation</i> , edited by Richard W. Gable, Associate Professor, School of Public Administration, University of Southern California.
July	<i>Resolving the Russian-American Deadlock</i> , edited by James C. Charlesworth, President of this Academy.
September	<i>American Civilization and Its Leadership Needs, 1960-1990</i> , also edited by Dr. Charlesworth.
November	<i>Inflation</i> , edited by Dr. Alfred G. Buehler, Professor of Public Finance, University of Pennsylvania.

Also, the Academy published 4,000 copies of a special brochure on *American Civilization and Its Leadership Needs, 1960-1990*, which was essentially a reprint of the September ANNALS, but which contained an introductory article written by Senator Clark and Dr. Charlesworth. As this report is being written, these brochures are being distributed free to 1,000 college and university presidents and to key persons in legislatures, personnel agencies, foundations, departments of education, et al.

The publication program for 1960 includes, in addition to the January volume on *Perspective on Government and*

Sciences, edited by Norman Wengert, Professor of Public Administration, University of Maryland, the following volumes:

March	<i>Lagging Justice</i> , edited by Glenn R. Winters, Executive Director, American Judicature Society.
May	<i>International Co-operation for Social Welfare: A New Reality</i> , edited by Hertha Kraus, Professor of Social Work Administration, Bryn Mawr College.
July	<i>Whither American Foreign Policy?</i> , edited by Dr. Charlesworth.
September	<i>United States Agriculture: Policy, Politics, and the Public Interest</i> , edited by Charles M. Hardin, Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago.
November	<i>Religion in American Society</i> , edited by Richard D. Lambert, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Pennsylvania, and Assistant Editor of THE ANNALS.

(Not all of these are definitive titles.)

During 1959 the book department of THE ANNALS published 427 reviews. This represents an increase of 22 reviews over the number published in 1958. The majority of these reviews, 308, were written by college and university professors and lecturers. Presidents and deans of colleges contributed 13 reviews, and members of private and university-sponsored research organizations, 50 reviews. Government and United Nations officials, both active and retired, were responsible for 17 reviews; editors and journals contributed 4. The remaining 35 reviews were by individuals with no particular affiliation. Foreign reviews were from Canada, Venezuela, Great Britain, Germany, Uganda, Israel, Lebanon, India, and Ceylon. Three hundred and seventy-nine books were listed in the "Other Books" section. One hundred and thirty-two requests

were granted to reprint material from THE ANNALS. This represents an increase of 18 over 1958. Fifty-two of these were to professors and other authors for use in books under preparation, and 19 for classroom and adult education programs. Twenty-two requests were granted to various departments of the government, including 12 from the armed forces. Four requests from companies to reprint articles for training programs were granted, as well as requests made by independent organizations to incorporate articles from our volumes in their programs. Of special interest were the translations of the March 1957 volume on *Current Issues in International Labor Relations* and the January 1959 volume on *Contemporary China and the Chinese* into Japanese, as well as the utilization of "Continuing Education for National Survival," by C. Scott Fletcher in the September 1959 volume, by the Voice of America.

MEETINGS

The 1959 Spring Meeting, organized around the theme "Resolving the Russian-American Deadlock," was well attended, both from the standpoint of numbers and from that of attentive participation. The audiences, the largest to date, overtaxed the facilities of the Warwick Hotel, and we are accordingly taking the 1960 meeting to a larger establishment.

The subject of the 1960 Spring Meeting will be "Whither American Foreign

Policy?" We hope to have about five spokesmen of the Department of State, as well as some senators and ambassadors. Our main reliance, however, will continue to be on scholars and writers. We expect the tone of the meeting to be exposition and analysis, rather than criticism and contumely.

OFFICERS AND STAFF

No changes were made in directors or officers during 1959. Our Editor, Dr. Thorsten Sellin, was granted a leave of absence for the period from September 1959 to June 1960, to enable him to join the faculty of Cambridge University, England, for the academic year, and Dr. Richard D. Lambert was designated as Acting as well as Assistant Editor. Dr. Lambert also was granted a brief leave, for a scholarly sojourn in South Asia.

Respectfully submitted,

THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

James C. Charlesworth, *President*
 Stephen B. Sweeney, *First Vice-President*
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Book Department

	PAGE
AMERICAN HISTORY AND GOVERNMENT	169
EUROPEAN HISTORY AND GOVERNMENT	181
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POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY	211

AMERICAN HISTORY AND GOVERNMENT

EMMET JOHN HUGHES. *America the Victible*. Pp. 306. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1959. \$3.95.

The chief significance of this trenchant critique of recent United States foreign policy is that it was written by a man who was formerly one of President Eisenhower's ablest speech-writers. Much of what Mr. Hughes says has been expressed by other critics—though few have stated their misgivings with such eloquence—but this is the first strongly dissenting voice raised from within the circle of men who have worked for the Eisenhower Administration.

From this observation it must not be inferred that Mr. Hughes' often devastating strictures apply only to the conduct of foreign relations under the present Administration. His criticism applies with equal force to its Democratic predecessor and, above all, to the attitude toward foreign policy problems on the part of the American people as a whole.

Mr. Hughes is at his best when he dissects the myths, the legends, and the false slogans upon which so large a part of United States postwar policy has been based. Of particular interest in this connection is the author's powerful indictment of the superficiality, the sham, and the distortion which characterized the Republican campaign oratory of 1952.

A second distinguishing feature of this very readable book is its remarkable lack of personal animus—remarkable, that is, in view of the circumstances. The author must, at times, have found it trying to write speeches for a President so strongly under the influence of a Secretary of State with whose ideas Mr. Hughes was often out of sympathy. Yet the author's work is not only singularly devoid of personal criticism but distinguished by compassionate understanding of the sincerity and devotion of those overburdened public servants with whose policies and pronouncements he violently disagreed.

The last section of the book, which deals with the author's ideas and precepts for the future, is eloquent but, to this reviewer, disappointing. One would like to know what so able a critic of past policy would recommend with respect to the great questions which must be faced in the immediate future. What, for example, should be the American attitude toward the proposals for total universal disarmament? What precisely should be the American policy toward China or with respect to Germany?

Instead of answering such questions, the author lapses into a sort of sermon, reminiscent of the "government by preachment" so often practiced by President Eisenhower. It is a moving sermon, even though its eloquence is somewhat diminished by the fact that the author's skill as a wordsmith occasionally leads him to excursions into somewhat purplish prose. This, however, does

not detract from the great merit of the work which is its relentless exposure of the delusions which have been fundamental to postwar American policy.

America the Vincible, as the title suggests, is a much-needed warning—a warning which we shall disregard at our peril.

JAMES P. Warburg

New York City

JOHN W. SPANIER. *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War*. Pp. xii, 311. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1959. \$6.50.

It is sad that a doctor's thesis shows through the simple usefulness of a necessary and competent book. This study was needed: for nothing blurs as quickly as the details of an official battle royal, the echoes of which grow more confused without dying away, since few have the patience to arrange the facts and recover the issues.

This book is a meticulous assembling of these facts and a careful identification of the basic issues. More than this, the context of the controversy, the contributions of the political environment to it, the accidents of events and opinions are cautiously added to the picture. There emerges, consequently, a clear clash of character, with no doubt left as to which was the stronger and the more able to exalt the office and subdue the man. And this emerges naturally from the evidence, for the presentation is eminently judicious.

The usefulness of the book lies in an arrangement of its material that leaves the items in their natural relationship of cause and effect, action and reaction. And the moral—not, incidentally, the conclusion that the author draws—follows emphatically: the office of President, patiently managed with a sincere conviction of its value, will always rope and tie the bucking bronco.

At this point the doctorate manner appears. There must be a thesis to be demonstrated. In this case it is that the American concept of a military instrument as something that is employed only on its own professional terms cannot be applied

to limited war without straining the concept of civilian control.

This thesis is asserted, but the story does not demonstrate its validity. The thesis is not labored in the sense of distorting the facts, but it is insisted on to the extent of producing some oddly irrelevant commentaries. In truth, the events of the story cannot be generalized as a President "X" and a General "Y" relationship. It is far too plainly the story of President Truman and General MacArthur: the General with his past behind him and a possible future ahead of him, given to defining rather than accepting a role; the President, with qualities that were initially unknown but that turned out to be those of courage and a high sense of the requirements of his office. The rest is merely the familiar record of the possibilities for maneuver that are inherent in the American political system.

It is a pity that so well designed and well executed a study should have had so inapplicable a thesis imposed on it by the exigencies of graduate work. In spite of this, however, the book makes its contribution, for the irrelevant bit of academic machinery can be easily side-stepped.

WILLIAM REITZEL

Professor of Social Sciences
Haverford College

DONALD R. MCCOY. *Angry Voices: Left-of-Center Politics in the New Deal Era*. Pp. 224. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1958. \$4.00.

This is a brief, but well-documented, account of the churning unrest of the late nineteen-twenties and early nineteen-thirties of this century. The great depression had not only caused hardship, it had raised questions in many minds concerning the viability of the economy and the fundamental justice of society. In such situations there are always competing leaders who seize the opportunity to further their careers as well as those who are genuinely stirred by the conditions about them.

The state of the economy at this time was especially aggravating because of the apparently causeless paralysis. It was en-

tirely unreasonable, yet it persisted. It lasted longer than other disturbances of a similar sort had in the past and refused to respond to the ordinary orthodox remedies. It finally affected so many people in so many different ways that government at every level was, however reluctantly, forced to accept more or less responsibility. It was the comparative reluctance of the Hoover Administration and its unwillingness to accept any suggestion for drastic attack that caused the Republicans to lose the country's confidence.

In the obvious decline of Republican strength, there was bound to be a competition for its inheritance. That competition showed itself within the Democratic party; and Franklin D. Roosevelt had a severe struggle to gain the nomination in 1932 and only did gain it by belaboring Hoover and promising progressive changes. However, the Democrats were not successful, either, in conquering the depression; it was somewhat improved by forced inflation and "make-work" measures; but the situation in 1936 was not spectacularly better than that in 1932. But the psychological situation was revolutionized. Especially the relief of unemployment and the other reform efforts showed a willingness to try and a concern for welfare which were in contrast with the former Republican indifference, and Roosevelt was nominated and elected again without difficulty.

But the other aspiring leaders were not convinced at any time that the Democratic success was sufficient to foreclose other contenders, and there continued to be agitation, some of it wordily violent. With the Democrats in control of the electorate, there was actually not much chance of political success; but several minor parties did organize and present a certain challenge. What was more important, several leaders, of whom Huey P. Long was the most successful as a demagogue, did make political advances and did reach positions of some influence.

This agitation from the left undoubtedly had its uses for Roosevelt in his more moderate intentions of reform. He had to contend with extreme conservatism in his own party much of the time, and the leftist agitators tended to offset this. Mr. McCoy's

book is a useful account of the various movements and personalities involved in this interesting interlude.

R. G. TUGWELL

Professor of Political Science,
Emeritus
University of Chicago

MARIO EINAUDI. *The Roosevelt Revolution*. Pp. x, 372. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959. \$5.95.

The author has written several books previous to this one, all of which were on European subjects. Unfortunately, *The Roosevelt Revolution* will add little to his reputation as a scholar. Not only have no new facts nor interpretations been unearthed, but the very subject of the book has been presented with vague terms and with confused materials. The study lacks coherence and unity. In fact, the book consists of a group of essays under such titles as "Europe's Image of America," "Reflections on Tocqueville," "The Great Depression," and "Electricity and Freedom." One further grave fault in this book is that numerous, long quotations fill, or almost fill, page after page. Paraphrasing would have greatly improved the narrative.

Professor Mario Einaudi is an Italian immigrant who has sought to understand American political institutions. That, to a degree, he has failed is evidenced by the fact that he repeatedly tries to connect the Roosevelt revolution with European state socialism and especially with Russia's type of extreme socialism. Quotations from Lenin are intermixed with those from New Deal spokesmen.

Several of Mr. Einaudi's conclusions about the actual provisions of significant New Deal laws and, more especially, about the impact of New Deal social legislation on the American economy seem to be erroneous. For example, he states (p. 280) that corporations today must share their profits equally with the federal government through corporate income taxes. No mention is made of the universal practice of business passing on to the consumer in the form of higher prices the total productive cost, including taxes. A second illustration will suffice. In discussing the application of the Securities Exchange Act the author

apparently thinks that the requirement of full publicity concerning stocks before marketing will prevent another depression. Most of the stocks traded on the Wall Street market in 1929 which proved to be extremely insecure investments could still be marketed legally today.

By no means do all of the author's conclusions prove fallacious. He is on sound ground when he says that a lack of purchasing power among the people who would have liked to buy homes was a real contributory factor to the depression of 1929 and after. Equally logical is the mention of the unsound, and economically bad, distribution of American income in the causation of the last major depression. However, when the author writes of Franklin Roosevelt's re-establishing "the sense of Community" he never quite explains to the reader's satisfaction just what he means by the phrase.

Many Americans, including Professor Einaudi, have lavished praise upon the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). The writer does not show the recent trend in TVA of constructing plants to generate steam power and of the system's increasing dependence upon this source for its operating income and profits. Certainly, this was not in the original planning for TVA. Moreover, the Holding Company Act of 1935 abolished the holding companies only in the area of public utilities not in other segments of our complex economy. This type of corporate organization is not uncommon today.

The author has dealt with his adopted country with sympathy and admiration. Unfortunately he was not as successful in interpretation, in coherence of treatment, in unity of presentation as this reviewer hoped he would be.

GEORGE C. OSBORN

Professor of Social Sciences
University of Florida

JOHN C. CALHOUN. *The Papers of John C. Calhoun*. (Volume I, 1801-1817.) Edited by Robert L. Meriwether. Pp. xlii, 469. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1959. \$10.00.

The first volume of the Calhoun papers covers the most attractive period of his life—the years when he was young, hope-

ful, and dominated by a fine spirit of nationalism. Here are his college letters which present him as an idealistic young man, very serious and hard-working. His letters and speeches do not reveal any sense of humor or any interests in literature or art. At Litchfield, Connecticut, he studied law in Judge Tappan Reeve's famous school, but he disliked law and compelled himself to study it intensely out of a sense of duty. His great ambition was to attain honor which, in the Old South, was most available in the field of politics: money was never important to him. From 1810 to 1817 he was one of the most promising young members of the House of Representatives. He was an ardent War Hawk in 1812, motivated by a sense of outrage at Great Britain's practice of impressment of American sailors and denial of the right to travel the seas freely—not by expansionist feeling or economic considerations as some writers have maintained.

Calhoun's nationalism permeates his letters and speeches of this period. He was a bold advocate of measures strengthening the national government, such as the maintenance of an adequate army, the establishment of a national bank, a moderate tariff to protect infant industries, and a broad system of internal improvements with federal encouragement. At this time he was quite willing to interpret the Constitution liberally and to use the implied powers of Congress. All of these measures indicate a progressive spirit, but Professor Meriwether in his Preface rightly evaluates Calhoun as essentially a conservative even in these early years. Perhaps this is the clue to the remarkable changes in Calhoun after 1830, although the editor attributes his later policies, so different from his early nationalism, to his reaction to "an immediate peril."

One looks in vain in this volume to find evidence that changes the traditional picture of the Carolina statesman. There is very little personal material in it, chiefly the letters from New England and his remarkable correspondence with Floride Bonneau Calhoun, who became his mother-in-law. His speeches of this period are pithy, logical, and free from the rhetoric characteristic of the oratory of his day. They

represent fundamentally an appeal to the mind and moral sense rather than to the emotions or imagination. The editor has written an excellent short Preface and good critical Notes to the documents that contribute much to the understanding of them.

CLEMENT EATON

Professor of History
University of Kentucky

ALPHEUS S. WILLIAMS. *From the Cannon's Mouth*. Edited by Milo M. Quaife. Pp. x, 405. Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State University Press and the Detroit Historical Society, 1959. \$7.50.

General Alpheus S. Williams, whose letters to his two daughters make up this book, was born in Connecticut and educated in the law at Yale. After traveling extensively in America and Europe, he settled in Detroit in 1836 where he soon became one of the growing town's most important citizens. In 1847 he departed for Mexico as lieutenant colonel of the Michigan regiment but arrived too late to engage in any battles. After the firing on Fort Sumter in 1861 he was appointed brigadier general of state troops, and soon thereafter, Lincoln gave him a like rank in the United States volunteers. Strangely enough, or probably not so strange in the light of the all too prevalent methods used for advancement in the army, he remained in this rank throughout the war despite his military ability and effectiveness as a leader of troops. For a short time he was in command of a corps.

In his letters he shows his disappointment at receiving no advancement, and he amply comments on the reasons. He did not toady to the war correspondents who had much to do with the promotion of their pets. Referring to the Battle of Chancellorsville, he commented, "I have seen in the illustrated newspapers and in the *Herald* diagrams and drawings of furious onslaughts made by troops which never fired a gun" (p. 179).

General Williams was not a pessimist, and he did not let his disappointments and what he disagreed with sour his disposition or warp his judgment. But at times he was caustic in his comments on the way the war was being run. As for General

Sickles, he "would beat a Napoleon in winning glory not earned." He was "a hero without an heroic deed! Literally made by scribblers." Then, "People at home are fancying this war is waged for the Union and for a stable and united government, but it is a mistake. It is carried on exclusively to make heroes of charlatans and braggarts!"

General Williams fought with the Army of the Potomac from First Manassas through Gettysburg after which he was sent with General Hooker to the West where his activities were mostly concerned with guarding Sherman's railroad lines of communications in Tennessee until the campaign against Atlanta and the March to the Sea took place. General Williams participated in this campaign and marched up through the Carolinas and on to the Grand Review in Washington.

These letters are a valuable addition to the growing literature of the Civil War and are far better than the common run of such books because Williams was a close observer of both military affairs and of the country through which he passed, and he was able to express himself in an excellent narrative style. By no means least in the outstanding qualities of this book is the skill and scholarship with which Milo M. Quaife edited these letters. Also to be noted are the distinguished format of the book and the clarity of the illustrations.

E. MERTON COULTER

Regents Professor Emeritus of
History
University of Georgia

LOUIS D. RUBIN, JR. (Ed.). *Teach the Freeman: The Correspondence of Rutherford B. Hayes and the Slater Fund for Negro Education, 1881-1893*. Vols. I & II. Pp. lv, 236; 302. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1959. \$10.00 per set.

Rutherford B. Hayes, nineteenth President of the United States, is best remembered as the victor over Samuel J. Tilden in the disputed election of 1876. Little attention has been paid to Hayes the humanitarian. Consequently, this correspondence, selected from the collection in the Hayes Library in Fremont, Ohio, is valu-

able for what it reveals of the former President's humane activities during the first decade of operation of the John F. Slater Fund for the Education of Freedmen.

As a trustee of the Peabody Education Fund, Hayes was already interested in promoting education in the South when he was asked to assist Slater, a Connecticut industrialist, in the endowment of a foundation to advance Negro education. When the Slater Fund was formally established in 1882, Hayes became president of a distinguished board of trustees, a position he held until his death in 1893. Hayes' correspondence in connection with the Fund discloses his skill in working with others to promote a social cause in which he had a sincere interest. He was the cement which bound the trustees together and the link between the board and the agent who worked with the Negro institutions assisted by the Fund.

The Peabody Fund, which promoted universal public education in the South, served as a model, but, unlike the older foundation, the Slater Fund's purpose was "the uplifting of the lately emancipated population of the Southern States, and their posterity, by conferring upon them the blessings of Christian education" (I, xx). The Fund especially encouraged industrial training of the Negro to help prepare him to become a useful and respected citizen. Both funds continued to operate until 1937 when they merged with the Anna T. Jeanes Fund and the Virginia Randolph Fund to form the Southern Education Association.

In his Introduction the editor evaluates the early work of the Slater Fund in terms of the times and the conditions under which it functioned; the correspondence is placed in its larger context, and many of the persons mentioned therein are introduced. Notes are few and brief and are restricted to identifying persons and places. An Index facilitates use of the letters. This correspondence is a contribution to the history of Negro education as well as a portrait of Hayes' service on behalf of the Negro following his retirement from public life. The Louisiana State University Press has done an outstanding job in the

production of these volumes—the design is notable and invites the eye.

FRANK J. KLINGBERG

Professor of History, Emeritus
University of California
Los Angeles

JAMES MONROE. *The Autobiography of James Monroe*. Edited by Stuart Gerry Brown with the assistance of Donald G. Baker. Pp. xi, 236. Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1959. \$6.00.

Revisionists of the traditional Federalist interpretation of the early history of the United States will welcome this volume. It makes generally available for the first time the two long fragments of Monroe's unfinished autobiography.

These fragments were written in Monroe's old age in the hope that Congress would realize more fully his services to his country and would, therefore, relieve his financial embarrassment by an appropriation. They are the work of a man who had lost some of the partisan bitterness which inflamed the public mind when he was the American minister to France. The change in his mood becomes evident when his earlier writings are compared with his autobiography.

After he was recalled from Paris, Monroe had written a bitter political pamphlet entitled *View of the Conduct of the Executive* in which he enumerated the ways the Federalists had mishandled relations with France. One mistake, he alleged, had been their failure to inform him of the contents of Jay's Treaty with Great Britain until after it had been ratified by the Senate. B. W. Bond pointed out many years ago in "The Monroe Mission to France" (Johns Hopkins University Studies in the Political and Social Sciences, Volume 25) that Washington justifiably objected to this censure. In a calmer mood, Monroe wrote in his autobiography that he should not have been informed of the contents of the treaty because he had promised to let the French government know what they were when he received the information. He had believed in frankness in diplomacy.

On some of the other points, however, Monroe was as unyielding in 1830 as he

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had been in 1797. Jay's Treaty was the true cause of the strain in French-American relations, not any misconduct on his part as the American minister to France. He still would have saved Tom Paine from the guillotine even though his conduct in the matter should again be made a cause of his dismissal as minister. He continued to deny that he had engaged in financial speculations while he was in France. Bitterly, he still insisted that Secretary of State Pickering had mistreated him and that he should have been given an official explanation of the causes of his dismissal.

No mention is made of the Hamilton-Reynolds affair or a letter he wrote to Logan for the Republican press—an incident important in the decision to recall Monroe according to the Carroll and Ashworth volume of Freeman's *George Washington*. But Monroe was sharply critical when senators revealed the contents of Jay's Treaty to the press before it became known through official channels.

The autobiography also covers the generally neglected part of Monroe in the Louisiana Purchase and his Spanish mission of 1804–1805, concluding with its failure.

The editor and his assistant, Donald G. Baker, have provided an excellent Introduction, appropriate illustrations, a serviceable chronological Table, illuminating Notes, and a good Index.

ROBERT LEROY HILLDRUP

Professor of History
Mary Washington College

MARCUS CUNLIFFE. *The Nation Takes Shape, 1789–1837*. Pp. vii, 222. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959. \$3.50.

This is one of the volumes in the University of Chicago's History of American Civilization series, edited by Daniel J. Boorstin. Chronologically, it is the second in the series, following Edmund S. Morgan's *The Birth of the Republic: 1763–1789*.

The Nation Takes Shape is another illustration of the phenomenon that some of the best writings about America have been by foreigners. While Marcus Cunliffe is no Bryce or Tocqueville or even Brogan, he

is still in the tradition of those non-Americans who write about the United States with a freshness of insight and a cool sympathy that native historians often lack. Senior lecturer in American civilization at the University of Manchester, Cunliffe has a special competence in his chosen field. In addition, he has what more and more Americans seem to lose, namely, a respect for style and a gift for phrasing. While properly sober in his presentation of data, he is capable of casual aphorisms and even offhanded wit. Thus he remarks that "matter-of-factness was on occasion more valuable than intellectual discourse"; that "expediency was not an inherent vice"; and that the West and South were not well provided with "colleges, hospitals, jails, and other signs of high civilization."

Cunliffe's basic thesis is that American institutions and attitudes, "the American character," were set during the early days of the Republic and that, in their main outlines, they have remained the same. He traces the important political and intellectual developments of America's first four decades and sees the pervasive—and determining—characteristic of the United States as "an amazingly unformed and unfettered society."

The book is admirably readable, filled with relevant information, and pleasantly free of hackneyed emotions or procrustean theses. Cunliffe writes history as it should be written—cleanly and with a due respect for underlying ideas.

SAUL K. PADOVER

Professor of Political Science
New School for Social Research

R. R. PALMER. *The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, 1760–1800: The Challenge*. Pp. ix, 534. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1959. \$7.50.

The merit of this excellent book, the first of a projected two-volume study, lies in its highly successful exploitation of the idea of an "Atlantic Civilization" in the eighteenth century. It is the author's contention that a single "Great Democratic Revolution" against "entrenched aristocracy" swept

western culture between 1760 and 1800. The revolution, he asserts, was essentially democratic, not so much within the twentieth-century meaning of the word, but rather in that it was characterized by a new feeling of equality, a revolt against older forms of social stratification, and an attack on the possession of government "by any established, privileged, closed, or self-recruiting group of men."

A principle thesis of the author is that the American Revolution was the most important single event in precipitating the revolutionary era. This was not so much because the American upheaval was profoundly radical, for it had an essentially conservative constitutional character while the political ideas it propagated—natural law, natural rights, and human equality—were commonplace notions in contemporary European thought. Rather the significance of the American Revolution, apart from its inspirational example, lay in its successful assertion of the principle that the people were the ultimate foundation of all lawful public power, together with the resort to the constitutional convention as a device for putting popular sovereignty into practical operation.

As a consequence, the American Revolution precipitated a kind of "spiritual flight from the Old Regime." A rash of quasi-democratic revolutionary movements spread across Europe in the 1780's: the Association movement in Britain, the Dutch patriotic revolt against the House of Orange, the Genevese uprising against the city's ruling oligarchy, and the unsuccessful attempt to establish a "United States of Belgium" in 1789 with a constitution modeled on the Articles of Confederation. All these movements failed, in part because they lacked adequate mass support, but in part also because they did not understand the American idea of popular legitimacy; hence they fell victims to resurgent constitutional aristocracy.

But in France, the National Assembly in 1789 with the Abbé Sieyès as its principal theorist seized immediately upon the American idea of the people as the constituent power. Thereby, the French Revolutionists came into possession of an instru-

ment for destroying constituted aristocratic authority too strong to be denied.

ALFRED H. KELLY

Professor and Chairman,
Department of History
Wayne State University

RICHARD L. PERRY (Ed.), under the supervision of JOHN C. COOPER. *Sources of Our Liberties: Documentary Origins of Individual Liberties in the United States Constitution and Bill of Rights*. Pp. xxii, 456. New York: New York University Press for the American Bar Foundation, 1959. Distributed by Associated College Presses. \$5.00.

This is a documentary collection illustrating the foundations for constitutional guarantees of individual liberties in the United States. It was conceived by the committee on American citizenship of the American Bar Association as a means of informing the average man and woman about "the solid foundation on which the structure of our individual liberties has long stood." Given such a prospective readership and such an editorial purpose—and confined within such a relatively concise volume—the documentary material of necessity had to be highly selective, and its value as a reference tool for specialists is correspondingly limited.

In spite of this, the editor has managed exceedingly well with his material, ranging from the Magna Charta to the Bill of Rights. His introductions for each of the thirty-two documents, his annotations to the text, and his short list of references after each selection make the volume an excellent introduction to the study of personal freedoms within the Anglo-American legal system. In view of the fact that earlier documentary histories on this subject have long been out of print, the American Bar Foundation has performed a laudable public service in bringing out a new and up-to-date version.

As mentioned above, there are inevitable gaps in the selections—demonstrated early in the book by an interval of more than three centuries, 1297–1606, between the Confirmatio Cartarum of Edward I and the first charter of the Virginia Company. The

closing of the sequence with the first ten amendments to the Constitution of the United States in 1791, also, leaves the layman with the feeling that nothing new in the way of civil guarantees has been added since then.

The bulk of the documents are of the seventeenth century, and the author misses a good opportunity to emphasize the points of similarity and difference between English and colonial political thought for this era. However, he does document the complementary nature of the materials he has selected, and this is perhaps all that should be asked of a basic source book. From the so-called "great charter" of Virginia in 1618, and the Mayflower Compact of 1620, to the Bill of Rights in 1689, the milestones in the development of personal liberty and of the modern English constitution are carefully indicated. From the resolves of the Stamp Act Congress (1765) to the Bill of Rights, the rudiments of American constitutional development are also set forth.

For beginning students and the general public, this is an excellent introductory volume.

WILLIAM F. SWINDLER

The College of William and Mary

LOREN P. BETH. *The American Theory of Church and State*. Pp. vii, 183. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1958. \$4.50.

The author of this book explains his purpose with the observation that "those of us who agree with the Jeffersonian tradition have no reasoned philosophical basis for our position, for the writer of the Act for Religious Freedom [1785] and our modern court justices seem to have arrived at the concept almost intuitively." He concludes with the not excessively modest assertion that he has provided "the first completely reasoned theory of . . . 'partial separation' which has been produced in America since the time of Madison and Jefferson." Unfortunately, however, only thirty pages of the book are devoted to this "modern theory." The remaining five chapters provide a conventional historical account of the English background, the American colonial situation to 1775, the Revolution and

Constitution, the period of "testing" the principle between 1800 and 1958, and the major areas of contemporary conflict. Any brief survey of so vast a subject is necessarily cramped; and this one is not redeemed by extraordinary accuracy, brilliant generalization, or originality of interpretation, while the author's own deprecation of historical methods when used by the Court in its decision-making (pp. 87–89) tends to undermine the reader's confidence in so long an historical prologue.

Professor Beth's positive but lamentably brief case for "partial separation" is based first of all on a classification and reasoned dismissal of the seven other possible types of church-state relationship: Pure Theocracy, Total Separation, Mixed Theocracy, Total Identification, Total Conflict, Erastianism, and Totalitarianism. He then argues, as have J. N. Figgis, R. M. MacIver, and others, for a "pluralistic" understanding of the democratic state in which the "state" is by no means considered to be the only social organization of importance. He sees the churches, for example, as providing a major means for persons to exercise moral choice, and he recognizes the unfortunate way in which collective terms such as "church" and "state" veil the problem of personal liberty just as the institutions in actuality often limit that liberty. He holds that a policy of maximized separation, as defended by Jefferson and defined, for example, by the Supreme Court in the McCollum decision against "released time," frees the state of alien tasks, favors or hinders no groups, strengthens the churches, and brings to individuals as much religious liberty as is compatible with the general welfare. He recognizes, nevertheless, that "partial separation" will not eliminate conflict but only minimize it, since all people do not hold the same views of the "general welfare" nor, for that matter, do they agree on the meaning of democracy. Because the state is the only social organization to which everyone belongs, it must assume an adjudicatory role when conflict arises.

Professor Beth's argument is vitiated by a tendency to ignore the social and intellectual role of religious institutions and ideas and by a very narrow conception of

religion; but his position provides a valuable and persuasive basis for further discussion of a crucial American issue.

SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM

Assistant Professor of History
Yale University

ELEANOR FLEXNER. *Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Movement in the United States*. Pp. xiv, 384. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1959. \$6.00.

This author's purpose is to tell the full story of the woman's rights movement not only as a narrative of personalities and events but also as a mounting force of ideas and experiences involving many men as well as women, many states, many parties, many political and economic and historical circumstances. Its thesis holds that "the opportunity for complete human development could not and should not have been withheld from one half of the nation because opportunity inevitably brought with it new problems, for the extension of greater participation (and responsibility) to additional sections of the population is the essence of democratic growth" (p. vii).

This account of the suffrage movement is therefore interwoven in every decade with the activities of the growing numbers of women workers and their efforts for better hours, wages, and working conditions, as well as the classic struggles of women to enter institutions for higher education and the professions. The history of American social thought and the cultural lag between the leaders and the proletariat are not understood until such discrete but related histories are treated as one.

The devious and dishonest maneuverings of the "bosses" and the brewers are better known than the flagrant and pompous campaigns of the national party leaders, Lodge of Massachusetts, Wadsworth of New York, Reed of Missouri, Borah of Idaho, and the southern senators. The women who carried the movement from one decade to another are seen not so much as inspired and dedicated as forward-looking and intelligent, and above all as well trained and experienced. When they were anything less than hard-working and efficient, they merely aroused their opponents and lost their

cause. That there would be two national societies to promote the cause, working by quite different methods and from deeply opposing social ideologies, the conservative and the radical, this author takes for granted, as did the leaders themselves. This bifurcation of interests was inevitable in a period of intense economic development during which forces polarized in the midst of widespread unrest, and in the meantime victories would also continue to be won by each until one or the other became dominant.

The outstanding qualities of the book are the flexibility and elegance of the writing, the variety and scope of the evidence, the vividness of the detail, and the gathering force of the drama which builds up firmly to its final climax and unwinds briefly in the concluding chapter. Men as well as women have much to gain from the retelling of this revealing chapter of our nation's history.

KATE HEVNER MUELLER

Professor of Education
Indiana University

ROBERT H. REID. *American Degree Mills: A Study of Their Operations and of Existing and Potential Ways To Control Them*. Pp. xii, 99. Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1959. \$1.00.

Mr. Reid undertook this study in an effort to increase the prestige of American higher education abroad, to ascertain the scope and significance of diploma mill activities, and to explore some of the possible solutions to the problem. Degree mills are defined as institutions purporting to be colleges or universities which confer "quick-way" degrees, usually by mail order, upon payment of a fee of \$150.00 or more. The traffic involves bogus bachelor's as well as master's and doctor's degrees. It is estimated that such institutions operate a \$75,000,000 business affecting 75,000 students annually. The study indicates that there may be as many as two hundred unethical institutions granting such unearned degrees in thirty-seven states and involving nationals in at least forty-two foreign countries.

In an effort to find ways in which to

curb the activities of such fraudulent institutions, the author examined the efforts of selected voluntary organizations, federal agencies, and state governments. Twenty-two national professional organizations were canvassed. The replies revealed limited knowledge of specific activities, some misinformation, and numerous limitations on the possibility of definite control over degree mills (p. 15). Efforts of voluntary organizations have been sporadic and have had little long-range effect.

The study lists the following federal agencies as those most directly involved in exposing deceptive educational institutions: United States Office of Education, Department of State, Department of Justice, Veterans Administration, Post Office, and Federal Trade Commission. The author reveals that the files of these agencies contain extensive records, some dating back more than seventy-five years, describing federal effort to cope with the problem. He observes that federal agencies are not directly responsible for the control and supervision of education. As a consequence authority and effort have too often been ineffective and frustrating. This lack of authority is the basic factor in the whole diploma mill problem (p. 19).

Reid feels that the efforts of voluntary and federal agencies to control the activities of fraudulent institutions are unnecessarily hampered by the lack of responsible state authority. "It cannot be said that most States exercise even the minimum degree of control for the maintenance of educational quality among private degree-granting institutions" (p. 62). He traces the major weaknesses to inadequate statutes providing for granting of charters or rights of incorporation, along with what he describes as a widespread absence of specific minimum educational standards, and a total lack of uniformity in state laws.

The study results in two conclusions which are stated as recommendations. "Basic is the need for concerted action by the States leading to the adoption of uniform legislation which sets minimum standards for the licensing and operating of all higher education—with special control of degree-granting privileges" (p. 77). The suggestion is made that the Council

of State Governments is the appropriate agency to undertake this assignment and that the California law might serve as a model. Assuming that satisfactory state legislation will be enacted, the author sees the need for supplementary federal legislation to plug the "loopholes in interstate and international control." He therefore recommends a full Congressional hearing looking toward federal legislation.

This report is a valuable addition to the literature of a long-standing and vexing problem confronting American higher education. It should stimulate renewed efforts to find effective measures to cope with the problem.

HAROLD A. HASWELL

Director, Higher Education
Programs Branch
United States Office of Education

LYMAN A. GLENNY. *Autonomy of Public Colleges: The Challenge of Coordination*. (Carnegie Series in American Education.) Pp. xviii, 325. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1959. \$5.95.

Public higher education has refinements of problem areas which are usually neglected by all but the insiders. This book lucidly calls needed attention to these areas. Behind the scenes there are administrative tensions which need examination and new solutions demanded for the difficulties revealed.

The issue is the co-ordination of policy and practice among the educational units which compose a state's system of university and collegiate institutions. What should be the over-all policy body; what sort of administrative staff should it entail; what autonomies should remain vested in the individual institutions; how can quality, planning, economy, and fluidity of purpose be assured throughout the operation of a state system?

These are not easy questions. And the right answers—if there are some general principles to be accepted—have admittedly not yet been discovered. Diversity in practice among states is as prevalent here as in other phases of our pluralistic educational provisions. Much depends, it would

appear, upon the quality of leadership at the level of the administrative officer, the chancellor, executive director, or whatever of the state system. There must be a professional contribution of insight, of research, and of educational philosophy in the area of long-time planning in relation to future needs and sound educational provisions which can be placed persuasively before what should be an over-all trustee body chosen on nonpolitical grounds.

Much also depends upon the fiscal relation of the system to the state budgetary or other responsible state financial agency. It has certainly proved true that the authority of the exchequer can become the authority over policy and important internal college decisions. The need for a principle of relating agreed budgets to internal flexibility of allocation is clearly urgent. One detail here is that the so-called "line budget" should clearly be abandoned, and limitations should be imposed on budgetary or legislative committees' preaudit of needed expenditures. Another confusion arises from the lack of uniform agreement on personnel practices regarding salaries, promotions, tenure, and the like.

What of the control of educational policy which may well be eroded from autonomous judgments and may make the decisions actually reached stem from non-educational considerations?

It is all of these issues, deriving from actual experience, to which this book calls attention. Its conclusions, as far as they go, are sound and valuable. The author does make it clear that pioneering and constructive thought is now due in these mooted areas. Perhaps one of the functions of a new National Commission on Higher Education appointed from top educators, which has been proposed in several quarters, would be to move into this area with recommendations for consideration of the presently diversified state policies.

ORDWAY TEAD

Board of Higher Education
New York City

ROBERT J. ALEXANDER. *The Bolivian National Revolution*. Pp. xviii, 302. New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1958. \$7.50.

With *The Peron Era* and *Communism in Latin America* Robert J. Alexander has, some time ago, established himself not only as one of the ablest but also as one of the most reliable and detached reporters of the Latin-American scene. His work, more perhaps than anybody else's, has forced the revision of many a prejudice that previously blurred the vision of North American commentators. In his latest volume, *The Bolivian National Revolution*, he declares himself not so detached, as his sympathies are clearly on the side of the revolutionaries. Yet, his objectivity is little affected by this. He withholds neither criticism from Bolivia's new leaders nor sympathy and understanding from their antagonists.

With his customary exhaustive precision which, paradoxically, makes also for excellent reading, Alexander covers every aspect of the revolution of 1952 which, along with the Mexican and Cuban revolutions of 1910 and 1959 respectively, ranks as the most significant event of modern Latin America. There were numerous Bolivian revolutions prior to 1952. But most of these were in the nature of mere coups d'état resulting in little except turnovers in the ranks of those exercising but not actually holding power. The system itself had always remained unchanged: semifeudal; superimposed on two unassimilated and even largely unassociated national groups, one Spanish, one Indian; and operating for the benefit of an elite composed of Army, landowners, tin barons and, until the middle of the nineteenth century, the Church.

The revolution of 1952, led by Victor Paz Estenssoro and Hernán Siles, changed not only the government but the system. It was not a bloody affair, and its purpose was not vengeance. It lasted barely three days. Led by Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) and enjoying for once wide, popular support, it was able to sweep aside not merely a group of military leaders but the entire army which, for so long, had successfully maintained itself as the center of political power while otherwise doing little except losing "every war in which it was engaged, including the last one with Paraguay."

The ensuing policy measures reflect the magnitude of Bolivia's change. The army

was first abolished and then reorganized as a tool less of military than of educational, economic, and technological policy, functioning both as a corps of engineers and a school for Indians. Agricultural reforms brought large-scale distribution of land. The great tin corporations were nationalized with compensations still to be negotiated, a vital condition for restoring Bolivia's credit standing. Other natural resources were opened for exploitation, particularly oil and iron ore. Highways were built to establish for the first time a modern market economy. Small private industry was encouraged and diversified to free the country from its excessive dependence on outsiders. And a great deal of social legislation was adopted to ensure the Indian masses a more equal share in the anticipated benefits.

That so vast a program in so underdeveloped a country should run into difficulties was inevitable. It was opposed by the forces of the past: defeated colonels, expropriated tin barons, frustrated labor leaders, feudal business men who failed to be stimulated by the profit motive to make their firms more efficient. It was opposed by those who thought of themselves as the wave of the future: two kinds of communist parties, two kinds of Trotskyite parties, and several kinds of rightist parties which, as in France, sound the more to the left the more right they stand. It was opposed by its own sheer magnitude which has made Bolivia temporarily more dependent on foreign assistance than she was under the regime whose overthrow was partly explained on the ground that it kept the country excessively dependent on foreigners. And finally, reforms of this kind could not but be suspect of communist inspiration—a suspicion which may serve Poland well but hardly a country whose total deficits in recent years are taken care of by the United States. However, as Alexander amply shows, there seems no danger of this in the Bolivian Revolution. For, "the Communists," he writes, "have been most successful in those nations without a strong national revolutionary party or some other party with a mass appeal, capable of meeting them on their own grounds and

among the groups from whom they especially draw support."

Alexander gives the first complete picture of the continuing Bolivian Revolution and, beyond this, of Latin-American issues and trends in general. The book is soberly written, thoroughly documented and, what is particularly appreciated during a period when a country enters into a new epoch, full of excellent excerpts from basic writings and programs such as will delight the student of sources as well as permit the reader to make his conclusions independent of the author's judgment. In all, this is an authoritative contribution to the political literature on Latin America. One would have welcomed, however, a few additional maps illustrating geopolitical, ethnic, climatic, and economic factors of a country as yet so unknown and seemingly remote even to many Bolivians.

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EUROPEAN HISTORY AND GOVERNMENT

DANIEL H. THOMAS and LYNN M. CASE (Eds.). *Guide to the Diplomatic Archives of Western Europe*. Pp. xii, 389. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1959. \$7.50.

Research workers in many fields will extend a welcome to this volume prepared in honor of Dr. William E. Lingelbach, for many years Professor of European History at the University of Pennsylvania. Several attempts have been made since the war to provide an up-to-date guide to record repositories, notably R. H. Bautier's "Bibliographie selective des guides d'archives" in *The Journal of Documentation*, Vol. 9 (1953) and in the fifth volume of the journal *Archivum* (1955), which is entirely devoted to a directory of the record offices in all countries. By confining their scope to the diplomatic archives of Western Europe the editors have contrived to produce a work, which on its rather narrower

front, far surpasses in scale and usefulness its predecessors in the field. The historical introductions to each section, in particular, are very valuable since all too often a faulty understanding of the mode of growth of an archive can seriously mislead a researcher as to the nature of the materials which he may find there. Several of these introductions, that to the section on Belgium, for example, are readable essays in their own right. There follows in each case a description of the organization and classification of the records which used in conjunction with the bibliographies concluding most sections will enormously lighten the burden of scholars who are planning a visit to a foreign record office. Much useful information is added of a severely practical kind, such as conditions of access, hours of opening, arrangements for securing reproductions, and even some helpful suggestions on accommodation.

It is quite natural that in a volume prepared by a large number of contributors there should be some divergences of scale, presentation, and method. The section on the archives of Spain by Dr. Lino G. Canedo seems to be worthy of special praise for its lucid exposition of a complicated subject on which explicit information is not at all easy to secure. Parts of the section on Great Britain appear to be rather thin and not quite up to date: it was a pity, for example, that the great and comparatively recent accessions of Cambridge University Library in this field should have passed unrecorded, especially the papers of the Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, and the political and ambassadorial archives of the First Marquess of Crewe and the First Baron Hardinge of Penshurst, as well as the enormously extensive records of the great mercantile house of Jardine Matheson of great importance for the study of the opening up of China in the nineteenth century: and one would have also expected to find a reference to the Milner papers, vital to historians of South Africa, preserved at New College, Oxford. It may well be argued, however, that the space saved has been more usefully employed in recording the holdings of less accessible and familiar repositories further afield. It is hoped that this rather insular,

not to say parochial, criticism will not mask this reviewer's enthusiasm for the project and its execution upon which the editors are to be warmly congratulated.

A. N. L. MUNBY

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King's College
Cambridge

MICHAEL CURTIS. *Three Against the Third Republic: Sorel, Barrès, and Maurras*. Pp. 313. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1959. \$6.00.

Three Against the Third Republic is a study of the extremist critique of the governmental institutions and ideology of France at the start of our century. It draws this critique from the works of three men: Maurice Barrès, provincial aesthete, contemptuous of Paris and parliament and yet fascinated with them; Charles Maurras, terrible polemicist and rabble-rouser for aristocracy and the spiritual oneness of France; and Georges Sorel, technocrat and ex-engineer, who beginning at forty-five gave his full time to prophesying the end of politics. Barrès and Maurras sought a strengthening of the state, Sorel the reverse; egalitarianism and popular sovereignty were, though, loathsome to all three.

The author's choice of men is a good one, but his method is not. He rehearses their charges against the regime under successive heads: democracy, the Revolution, decadence, and so forth. The result is a dreary catalogue of their contentions complete with double entries. No full or credible picture of them emerges. Worse, much of their indictment gets lost in piecemeal paraphrase, and then to refute them is easy—and unconvincing. Nonetheless the author does sometimes refute them aptly, as when he opposes Sorel's praise of social violence to his stress on "juridical principles" or on industrial output, or when he points out the absurdity of Maurras' regarding France as more French in the seventeenth century than in the nineteenth and seeking national unity and strength through decentralization; not, however, when he calls Barrès paradoxical for mixing naturalistic sociology with the aesthetics of "individual sensitivity."

The book also has lesser faults. The

introductory chapters lack clear focus and rules of relevance. There is much showy scholarship throughout. Some refutations are merely counteraffirmations, and some quarrels are largely quarrels over words, for example, the one over "state" and "nation." But most irritating are the inadequately identified persons, institutions, and events. Knowing allusions abound. Writes Henri Peyre, "The author feels French history." He also understands it, but unfortunately he does not take the requisite pains to let his reader in on its secrets. One must come to him pre-equipped. The pity is the greater for his being an accomplished stylist, one able to make himself delightfully clear, as when he says of Barrès that he "preached discipline, sacrifice, and austerity, but not for himself," of Maurras that he raised "prejudice to the level of a science," and of Sorel, prolific and inconstant author, that "all his writings were rough drafts for a book he never wrote."

RUDOLPH BINION

Assistant Professor in History
Columbia University

KARL W. DEUTSCH and LEWIS J. EDINGER. *Germany Rejoins the Powers: Mass Opinion, Interest Groups, and Elites in Contemporary German Foreign Policy*. Pp. xvi, 320. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959. \$6.50.

This is a notable study of the basic situations and conditions at work in the making of contemporary German policy. It examines the seven popular views about predominant influences shaping foreign policy and considers the relationship of mass opinion with the influence of governmental institutions, private organizations, informal interest groups, and elites. The authors seek to determine what basic political images, values, and beliefs influence German decisions, especially those which shape foreign policy. After a scholarly scrutiny of the inventories of public opinion polls, they accept the reliability of competently conducted polls "within reasonably well known limits of accuracy."

The Chancellor's power and responsibility for determining public policy and the roles of governmental institutions and elites are

presented with remarkable thoroughness. These include members of parties behind the political parties, leaders of trade unions, the key employers, the directors of farm associations, the spokesmen of the major churches, effective leaders of the press, periodicals, radio, and television, and the university rectors with pervasive influence.

The authors analyze the aims of foreign policy-makers, the influences of mass opinion, internal civil and military elite groups, and the pressures of the principal foreign powers and certain smaller states. A detailed review of the system in operation considers the recovery of German influence through the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Paris agreements, the reparations settlement with Israel, the attempted negotiations with Russia, and the economic miracle of the 1950's. Meanwhile the patterns of influence in the foreign policy process are undergoing dramatic changes (pp. 204-216). In a brilliant concluding chapter the authors consider nine possible roles for the Republic in the early 1960's.

The first criticism of this study is the number of disparate chapters. The definition of an "elite" is too succinct for the general reader. The elite inventories are not examined for a critical evaluation of the conductors of one of the controversial public opinion polls. The present weight of the great historians and their historical philosophies is omitted from "Historical Memories and Present Aspirations."

This book reflects the superior quality of the scholarship of Professors Deutsch and Edinger and the adequacy of their source materials. They possess a profound knowledge of this important subject and give full credit to their German colleagues who have pioneered in elite and poll research. The authors show how able scholars doing research work involving several fields are capable of constructing an impressive synthesis. Their study should be read by all social scientists concerned with contemporary Germany and by general readers interested in the German problem.

RALPH HASWELL LUTZ

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Stanford University

WOLFGANG HIRSCH-WEBER. *Gewerkschaftler in der Politik: Von der Massenstreikdebatte zum Kampf um das Mitbestimmungsrecht*. (Writings of the Institute for Political Knowledge, Vol. 13.) Pp. xv, 170. Köln: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1959. DM 18.50.

Thirteenth in a series of monographs and books to be produced by the Institute for Political Science of the Free University of Berlin, this study competently summarizes the pre-World War II history of German labor unions and offers a rather detailed account of the maneuverings, strategies, and struggles leading up to the enactment of the codetermination laws of 1951 and 1952. The term "codetermination" refers to postwar arrangements providing labor union representation on the supervisory boards and in the day-to-day management of German industrial enterprises. The author of the present study bases his prewar history entirely upon published sources. For the story of the developments since World War II he relies both upon published sources and upon union documents and interviews with officials of the German Federation of Labor. An Appendix presents some useful statistics on historical trends in union membership in Germany.

A study of this sort is welcome, especially insofar as it reveals some hitherto unknown details and insofar as it indicates a growing interest of some German political scientists in empirical study of political process and in the politically significant activities of private groups. On the whole, however, the book must be set down as a rather pedestrian work which tells us less than American scholars have already done about the significance of codetermination. Herbert Spiro, for example, has more cogently analyzed the relation of the codetermination issue to German politics and social relations. William McPherson has far more systematically explored its meaning for the rank and file worker. Edwin Beal has more imaginatively placed codetermination in the perspective of history and ideology.

Hirsch-Weber sees codetermination and the 1919 general strike against the Kapp Putsch as the prime historical examples of German union militancy in behalf of workers' ideals, in contrast to the ignominious

appeasing posture of the labor movement when Hitler came to power in 1933. Because the institution of codetermination involved a rather extended struggle, a lot of fervent rhetoric, and the threat of political strikes, it can stand superficially as a symbol of labor militancy against business interests. In the years since it was introduced, however, it has served to knit unions more closely into the economic and social fabric, thus proving itself a highly conservative institution and one with relatively few economic advantages for workers. Hirsch-Weber would doubtless have seen it in clearer perspective if he had examined its history since 1952. Codetermination may be more significant as a facet of the feverish program of postwar German economic and military reconstruction than as a symbol of militant pursuit of labor's democratic ideals.

MURRAY EDELMAN

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University of Illinois

NORBERT MUHLEN. *The Incredible Krupps: The Rise, Fall, and Comeback of Germany's Industrial Family*. Pp. xi, 308. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1959. \$5.00.

There is much of interest for everyone in this scholarly, exciting book. In fact it is as incredible as the Krupps themselves. Norbert Muhlen has written with objectivity and sparkle about the 150-year life span of the Krupps and has managed in the process to inform and entertain us while exposing Europe's most controversial family, a family whose known roots go back to 1587.

From the "penniless refugee," Arndt Krupp, who made a fortune out of the tragedy of the Black Plague, to the present-day Alfred, who has rebuilt the Krupp dynasty, there are greed, determination, industrial genius, singleness of purpose, international intrigue, human frailty, and political nepotism in the Krupp men. There is also the industrial matriarchy of "Big Bertha" Krupp in an age when women had not yet publicly announced their superiority over men.

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is evidence of no love or warmth of self-sacrifice. Asthmatic, rheumatic "Little Fritz," son of "steel-tough" Alfred, made a halfhearted attempt at marriage for love, but the eight-years delayed nuptials to Marga Von Ende are explained by Muhlen: "No deep affection, let alone passion, bound Fritz to Marga or vice versa."

In the late sixteenth century Arndt converted a general store into great real estate holdings . . . "This Black Plague . . . Esseners believed the end of the world had come . . . offered their lands to the first buyer . . . Arndt Krupp bought all the real estate . . . at prices far below value . . ." In 1707, George Krupp, Essen's richest man, used his job of town clerk to such general and family advantage that he was tried after indictment on twelve counts . . . "he did not pay any of the taxes which he imposed on his fellow citizens, he gave no accounting of the town's financing, he hid the account books at his home, he appropriated building materials . . . rather than deny his guilt he tried to explain it away with a show of arrogance . . . in the end the judge found most charges true . . ."

Two hundred and forty years later in 1947, a fifth generation Krupp, Alfred, being tried before the American Military Tribunals at Nuremberg, Germany . . . "considered himself an innocent victim of old slanders against his family and his trade . . ."

Alfred Krupp of the mid-nineteenth century stole England's secrets of casting steel. Then he returned to astound them and the world with the first cast steel cannon. The Kings of Cannons have always sold arms of war to friend and foe. . . . "If it will improve business they are free to bash in each other's heads. As far as I am concerned I am satisfied . . ." wrote a Krupp from Paris in 1839. Fritz Krupp was a different Krupp. His homosexual cavorting on the Isle of Capri finally brought censure from Kaiser Wilhelm and world scorn.

The one thread binding five generations of Krupps is that of an inbred conviction that "Business is Business." No moral, political, or human considerations have been allowed to interfere with the production of goods, whether for war or peace, or to pre-

vent their free sale on world markets. Perhaps this is what Krupp manager and super salesman Berthold Beitz meant in 1959 when, having being attacked by Chancellor Adenauer for Krupp's growing business with the Soviet Union, he said, "I am a businessman, I do not understand politics. . . . Let Adenauer have his politics and let us do our business. . . . Private industry works without political considerations, while governments change. . . ."

As Norbert Muhlen so clearly shows, this incredible Krupp family has not yet learned its historic lesson, although it has recovered its industrial power. Today's head, Alfred, who was formerly incarcerated for war crimes, will pass on to his young son, Arndt, one of the world's six greatest fortunes. Perhaps young Arndt will continue to make for the world only the present instruments of peace for that is the direction of present-day West Germany, and as Norbert Muhlen ends his brilliant book "as Germany goes so goes Krupp."

FRANK L. HOWLEY

Vice President

New York University

JOSEF KORBEL. *The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia, 1938-1948: The Failure of Coexistence.* Pp. xii, 258. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1959. \$5.00.

The fall of democratic government in postwar Czechoslovakia still defies definitive treatment because important materials remain unavailable. But there is no dearth of writings which purport to reconstruct and analyze the developments leading to the 1948 crisis. The author of this latest contribution was an adviser to Jan Masaryk at one time and represented his country in Belgrade when the Communists took control.

Following a truncated introduction of Czechoslovak life and politics before 1938, the author documents the changing party lines of the Communists from the time of Munich until the Soviet Union joined the West against Germany. The account will not surprise readers already familiar with the litmus characteristics of native Communists when Moscow speaks. With the wartime alliance in effect, Communists as-

sumed "the guise of patriots" without lessening their determination to overthrow the bourgeois system in postwar Czechoslovakia.

Considerable attention is also given to the actions and views of Benes and other political victims of Communist duplicity. Benes' desire to escape the fate of Polish and Yugoslav governments-in-exile, his conviction that close ties with the Soviet Union were necessary, and his optimism, following the 1943 negotiations in Moscow, that democratic and Communist interests could coexist are appropriately noted. Benes' abstention from political haggling and democratic disunity were elements in the 1945 formation of a coalition government that strengthened the Communist position.

The increasingly illegal and demagogic activities of the Communists after liberation are recapitulated by various examples, but this "infiltration in width and depth" is not systematically investigated. The governmental crisis that brought Communist victory is treated at greater length.

This book does illustrate that Communist success was not an abrupt operation, but a culmination of infiltration and increasing pressures. It does not, however, come to grips with the relative collapse of the democratic opposition. Nor is the author consistent in his interpretations of Benes' position. He describes Benes' awareness of Communist dangers and elsewhere emphasizes that fundamental to Gottwald's victory was the naive assumption shared by Benes with others that Communists were Czechoslovakians first and that they respected democratic processes.

These and lesser shortcomings have resulted from the generalized treatment given to important problems. The book contains some unpublished documentation and personal records that are not revelational: they serve as corroborating evidence of earlier accounts. Written somewhat dispassionately, this work is useful as a summary, but it makes no major contribution to existing information.

STANLEY J. ZYZNIEWSKI
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University of Virginia

W. K. JORDAN. *Philanthropy in England 1480-1660: A Study of the Changing Pattern of English Social Aspirations*. Pp. 410. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1959. \$6.00.

Oftener than not college presidents who enter administration through the professional door find themselves forced to give up teaching, as well as research and writing in their former fields of interest. Happily W. K. Jordan, until recently the president of Radcliffe College, is an exception. He not only teaches a course in the Harvard Graduate School, but for some years has been engaged in a significant research project that now reaches the publication stage. The author describes his book as "the first of a series of volumes dealing with the changing pattern of man's aspirations" in a period in which he "began to move out into a new and unexplored terrain of social responsibility."

The most fully recognized manifestation of this movement hitherto has been the great body of social legislation passed under the first Elizabeth. Professor Jordan evaluates this program of "irreversible social gain" with great cogency. But the "mechanisms of relief" under which the state was ready after 1957 to enter if the need arose were intended, he thinks, more as "a system of co-insurance" to be used only if and when the resources of the community broke down. It is his contention that, broadly speaking, the burden of social responsibility throughout the period in question was borne by private charity.

A study of private charity then would presumably show the way in which the burden was met. But Professor Jordan's quest goes deeper still than that. A man's benefactions, he believes, mirror his own nature and aspirations. Hence a large-scale study of the private giving of all classes may be expected to furnish a key to those aspirations and the way in which they changed in an age that perceptibly moved from primarily religious preoccupations to secular concerns.

With this as his basic assumption, Professor Jordan has carried forward a task that matches in magnitude the bold and imaginative idea on which it was conceived.

Two urban centers and nine representative English counties are the laboratory and thousands of extant wills of all classes involved, the chief source for the study. The author is well aware of pitfalls. A whole section on Frailties of the Method warns, while at the same time it disarms and reassures the reader. The resultant data throw new light on differences of class as well as differences within class; and on local variables. The curve they plot shows a shift from primarily religious to secular giving that ranges all the way from bequests for public buildings and the founding of schools, to providing apprenticeships for apt young tradesmen and marriage subsidies for worthy young women. In general, the author sees an ever-widening sensitivity to human suffering and a turn from parochialism to a more national outlook. The three remaining volumes will deal more particularly with specific localities. Not everyone may agree with the author's basic assumption or with every detail of his interpretation. But the data alone are of tremendous significance, and will in the future furnish grist for many mills. I confess to thinking the book one of the most impressive pieces of historical scholarship that has come my way for a long time.

MILDRED CAMPBELL

Professor of History
Vassar College

ASHER LEE (Ed.). *The Soviet Air and Rocket Forces*. Pp. 311. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. \$7.50.

This timely and informative volume is edited by Asher Lee, an internationally known British expert on military aviation. He has written three previous books: one was on airpower in general and the other two treated of the German Air Force and the Soviet Air Force in particular. The nineteen chapters of the volume reviewed were written by experts who cover in broad strokes the history of the Soviet Air Force from the Russian Revolution to 1958. Also, there is an evaluation of Soviet air strength, about 20,000 combat planes.

Most of the chapters give technical information but should successfully hold the

lay reader's interest. "The Training of Personnel," "The German Legacy," and "Politics in the Soviet Airforce" have considerable background value. Much validity is derived from the writings of experts: Hanson Baldwin, Air Chief Marshal Sir Phillip Joubert; and among twelve well-informed contributors should be mentioned the ex-Soviet officers, Boris Kuban, and George Schatunowski, the Soviet aviator who was shot down three times in the Second World War. Asher Lee writes three terse chapters including a final chapter on "The Future of Soviet Air Power."

The information in these chapters came from many sources. Even though the Soviet Union is better constituted than nearly any other power to preserve strict military security, in the last nine or ten years, there were many major "breaks" from which new information was derived: Soviet-made planes were shot down in the Korean War; there was an unexpected display of new jet fighters, bombers, and transport planes at Soviet Air Force Days; information came from the "Institute of USSR," which contains hundreds of ex-Soviet citizens who were in the Red Armed Forces; and most important valuable information was secured from a "steady stream" of refugees—pilots, radio operators, and mechanics, who, although they came from Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, were all trained to use Soviet aircraft and equipment. Much of value has also been obtained from the German aircraft engineers who for a considerable time were engaged in Soviet laboratories, test facilities, and electronic factories. These bits from engineers and the competent, well-informed operators and technicians, when pieced together by experts, give a fairly complete general picture.

In short, Lee's book is a good up-to-date survey of present Soviet airpower, its historic background, its problems, and its possible future. There are twelve illustrations of aircraft and rockets; also concise biographical sketches of the twelve contributors.

LELAND P. LOVETTE

Vice Admiral
United States Navy (Ret.)

ASIA AND AFRICA

K. A. NILAKANTA SASTRI (Ed.). *A Comprehensive History of India. Volume II, Mauryas and Satavahanas 325 B.C.-A.D. 300.* Pp. xx, 918. Bombay: Orient Longmans under the auspices of the Indian History Congress and the Bhāratiya Itihas Parishad, 1957. 90/-.

Thirty-eight years ago there appeared the first volume of the Cambridge History of India, a volume which gave promise of initiating for India a type of reference work which has proved of constant use in the study of western history. Alas, the promise of this co-operative endeavor has remained unfulfilled. The second volume of the Cambridge History, which was to have portrayed the history of India from the time of Christ to the Moslem invasion, never appeared, while volumes three to six, dealing with the Moslem and British periods, were disappointing, showing neither the mastery of fact nor the interpretative ability characteristic of the other series of Cambridge histories.

There appears, therefore, to be some reason for initiating a new series of co-operative histories of India. To this may be added the natural desire of a new nation to produce its history as written by its own scholars. One such attempt, *The Bhāratiya Itihāsa Samiti's History and Culture of the Indian People* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1951-), is now in its fifth volume with seven more to follow. The work under review is the first volume to appear of a second attempt. If the work of which it forms part reaches completion it will be the second volume of another twelve-volume history.

A Comprehensive History of India, Volume II is not without merit. The chapters on South India by K. A. Nilakanta Sastri are painstaking and accurate and are based on this scholar's long years of productive research in this field. J. N. Banerjea, the well-known numismatist, furnishes competent chapters on the four great invasions of India in the period between the Maurya and Gupta dynasties: those of the Bactrian Greeks, the Parthians, Scythians, and Kushans. Dr. U. N.

Ghoshal writes two chapters on post-Mauryan economic conditions and social life which, even though poorly organized, still furnish valuable material for an understanding of ancient India. I find only one contribution in the volume which deserves condemnation—unfortunately, the first chapter of the book. Its lack of judgment and excess of rhetoric are not characteristic of the rest. King Nanda is made a conqueror of the Deccan on the basis of legends recorded in Mysore 1500 years after his death. Candragupta's minister is said to have instilled in this prince a desire "to free the fatherland," whereupon Candragupta organized "national resistance against alien domination." Justin, thinking of Rome, might use such terms. But the fact that no Indian document of Candragupta's time knows even the words for nation or fatherland should make us wary of following his example.

The question still arises in my mind whether volumes of co-operative endeavor like the one under review are the best way to present ancient Indian history. On the basis of the three series so far begun: The Cambridge History, The Bhāratiya Itihāsa Samiti's, and the present work, I must answer no. This answer may appear ungrateful, but is not so intended. I am impressed by the labor that has gone into these works, but I am equally impressed by the differences between the history of ancient India and that of ancient Europe or the Near East.

For vast stretches of Indian political history we have practically no facts at all. The evidence for the Sunga kings, for example, consists in a few coin names, a few references from uncollated editions of Purāṇas, four or five sentences from Patañjali, and a musical comedy written by Kālidāsa more than 500 years after the dynasty had ceased to exist. All this evidence has been known for many years, and I see no point in rehearsing it at length, trying to draw it out to the size of a chapter. The best form of reference for such facts is the briefest, such as we were given in de la Vallée Poussin's excellent volumes, *l'Inde aux Temps des Mauryas* (Paris 1930) and *Dynasties et Histoire de l'Inde depuis*

Kaniska jusqu'aux invasions Musulmans (Paris 1935) or in the recent manual edited by Renou and Filiozat, *l'Inde classique, Manuel des Études Indiennes*. 2 vols. (Paris: Payot, 1947 and 1953). On the other hand, the documentary evidence for the history of Indian religion, philosophy, and literature is immense, and it can be best treated not by cutting it down to the size of political history but by fuller treatment in special monographs of which several of the contributors to the volume under review have shown themselves eminently capable.

The sources for the ancient history of India at the present time are too disparate to be spun out and cut short into the fashion of European history. Such at any rate is my opinion of the present state of these sources. The future may bring facts to light which will change this.

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MICHAEL BRECHER. *Nehru, A Political Biography*. Pp. xvi, 682. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959. \$8.50.

This biography is an important book for many reasons. First, its subject has attained a unique place in history, becoming a man apart, widely misunderstood both by adulators offering uncritical admiration and denigrators whose response is no less automatic and inadequate. New light on such a man is always welcome, and the author was fortunate in having access to previously unpublished source materials. This book gains importance also from its scope; the author has set himself the ambitious task of surveying "the still unfinished Asian Revolution . . . in its Indian setting," utilizing the life of Nehru as "the binding thread" (p. vii). The publishers have done well by the book which is illustrated with 3 maps, 35 photographs, a select Bibliography, including a list of persons interviewed, and an excellent Index. As a narrative of events, this "political biography" deserves high praise for careful scholarship. As interpretation the book bears the stamp of courage and honesty throughout, although to this reviewer it

seems lacking both in depth and subtlety of perception.

In pondering my differences with the author, it appears to me that they stem mainly from what in my opinion is a too ready acquiescence in the views of a minority segment of the Indian opposition which has seriously affected his assessment of the present condition and future prospects of the Congress party and also his evaluation of the Gandhi-Nehru relationship. The question of the Congress party ranges so widely as to require far more space for elucidation than is at my disposal, but a few points concerning the Gandhi-Nehru relationship seem worth noting.

It would appear that Gandhi's "archaic ideas about economic policy" (p. 170) so repel Brecher as to lead him to overlook certain genuinely revolutionary aspects of Gandhi's leadership and to characterize him as a "mediaevalist" (p. 619). This is a not uncommon failing among contemporary analysts; what makes this book different is that Brecher's unusual candor and courage have forced him to pursue his convictions wherever they lead with the result that he virtually apologizes for Nehru's attachment to Gandhi, explaining it away as one example of a lifelong habit of dependence upon strong-willed older men arising out of Nehru's childhood relationship with his father. Were space available, I believe it could be demonstrated that Nehru, on the contrary, exhibited an independence, both in relation to his father and, later, to Gandhi most unusual in the Indian cultural context. If my interpretation is correct, the most enduring tie between Nehru and Gandhi lay in the deep concern they shared with respect to the building of true courage and manhood in the Indian people. Herein lay Gandhi's genius, as also his fundamental claim to Nehru's allegiance. After all, Nehru had little more sympathy than Brecher for Gandhi's economic ideas, and was only after long years of intellectual struggle convinced of the efficacy of Gandhian tactics. In the end, however, Nehru concluded that when measured by results achieved, Gandhi was "the greatest revolutionary of our country, of the present age, and of the previous age" (Jawaharlal Nehru, *Towards a New Revolution*, Youth

Congress Series No. 2. New Delhi, 1956, pp. 13-14). Brecher has not yet explicitly grappled with this aspect of the Gandhi-Nehru relationship. I here suggest that far from exhibiting infantile dependence, Nehru, precisely because of his long years of unsentimental and searching analysis of Gandhi and his role in history, has emerged as the least time-bound of contemporary leaders, the giant among men which Brecher has indeed perceived him to be.

MARGARET W. FISHER

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VERA MICHELES DEAN. *New Patterns of Democracy in India*. Pp. viii, 226. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959. \$4.75.

The subtitle of this little book might easily have been that of the television commentary on President Eisenhower's recent good will trip abroad—"Journey into Understanding." The only surprise is that seemingly expressed by the author at the exciting history of India, the grandeur of her early civilization, and the religious toleration of her famous rulers. At least half the book is devoted to a rather sketchy review of these cultural aspects. Although written in the clear and concise style the author has long used in her excellent Foreign Policy Association pamphlets, the book adds little if anything startlingly new to our understanding of events in the sub-continent. The chapter on "New Economic Patterns" is the best. It discusses the government's Five Year Plans endeavoring to integrate land reform supplemented by Bhavé's "land gift" movement, the drive for planned parenthood, the efforts to increase agricultural production by the use of newer techniques, and the mobilization of peasant financial resources through a rural credit system. Mrs. Dean also points out that, without resort to force or violence, India is trying to provide on a modest scale measures of social welfare regarded as essential by Western nations of the twentieth century within the framework of an economy, with a few exceptions, presently at an approximately fifteenth-century level of development.

The main thesis is concerned with the wooing of India by the United States and the Soviet Union. There is an attempt to prove that the Indian philosophy of accepting "this and that" will continue to be effective and that it may not be necessary to make a divisive choice of "this or that." If such a choice is ever forced, since the Congress Party is devoted to democracy as developed in India, the probability is that the temptations of totalitarianism will be resisted. This conclusion is probably correct and certainly welcome. However, this reviewer feels that just as the strong Chinese family system did not act as a formidable deterrent to communism, it is unlikely, as stated, that Indian emphasis on individual contemplativeness, on the necessity of the individual choosing actions for which he must assume responsibility, and on self-improvement if he is to achieve eventual liberation from his mortal lot will be a great deterrent to his acceptance of a Communist regime dictating the acts of every human being (p. 203). This will be especially unlikely if population growth continues, and living standards remain deplorable and show no improvement.

There are minor errors in the spelling of Chinese and Indian names (pp. 6 and 183), and there is evidence of hasty proof reading (p. 77), but this does not make the book any less welcome to those desiring a good, quick survey of current Indian problems.

ALBERT E. KANE

Bureau of Indian Affairs

S. L. POPLAI (Ed.). *National Politics and 1957 Elections in India*. Pp. iii, 173. Delhi: Metropolitan Book Company under the auspices of the Diwan Chand Indian Information Center in co-operation with the Indian Council on World Affairs, 1957. Distributed by the Institute of Pacific Relations. \$2.00.

The first and second general elections in India have understandably been a source of pride among Indians and an object of interest among informed Americans. But there has been relatively little research on the Indian electoral process among either Indian or American scholars. Methods of candidate selection, techniques of party campaigning, procedures of polling, pat-

terns of voting behavior—these and other aspects of the process merit further study which would contribute heavily to our comprehension of Indian politics and comparative politics in general.

For such study this source-book is of some utility. Published before the second general elections, it is devoted primarily to a compilation of the election manifestos and special campaign statements of the four main parties: the Indian National Congress, the Praja Socialist party, the Communist party of India, and the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. In addition to these documents it includes a short Bibliography of Indian periodical articles on the pre-election situation, a brief survey of the results of by-elections between the first and second general elections, and a note on the formal procedures of candidate selection within the main parties. Finally, it contains a forty-six-page survey of parties and issues from 1952 to 1957 by Sirir Gupta, one of the most capable of young Indian political commentators. By and large, this volume complements an earlier American monograph by Margaret W. Fisher and Joan V. Bondurant, *The Indian Experience with Democratic Elections*.

The value and limitations of the volume are well defined in its Foreword, contributed by the Director of the Indian Institute of Public Administration, V. K. N. Menon. He observes that such a compilation is valuable to scholars of a country lacking certain basic research materials. But he acknowledges that it is not enough to record the professed policies of parties or the formal rules of the electoral system, and he states the hope that this volume will be "a starting point towards a deeper and more intimate study of our party characteristics and processes."

GENE D. OVERSTREET

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T. H. SILCOCK. *The Commonwealth Economy in Southeast Asia*. (Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center Publication No. 10.) Pp. xvii, 259. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1959. \$4.00.

T. H. Silcock, professor of economics of the University of Malaya, a long-time resident of Singapore, and member of several postwar commissions appointed to investigate economic and political problems of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore, was a natural choice when the Commonwealth-Studies Center of Duke University looked for a lecturer to present the economic problems of Southeast Asia to an American audience. Frequent references to American interests in Southeast Asia and suggestions as to what the United States might do in the area reflect the author's efforts to relate the Commonwealth in Southeast Asia to the United States.

The study encompasses not only the Federation of Malaya and Singapore, but also Hong Kong, North Borneo, Sarawak, and Brunei, a highly diverse group of territories which has in common only the political ties with the British Commonwealth.

The core of the study consists of three chapters entitled "Basic Pattern," "Commonwealth Impact," and "Assessment and Suggestions," which are based on the lectures delivered at Duke University. To these the author has added a chapter on the relationship between Malaya and the European Free Trade Area. A final chapter deals with "The Determinants of Economic Development."

Silcock very skillfully sets the stage by means of a brief description of the economy of the various territories, underlining the salient economic characteristics and bringing out similarities and differences. This is followed by a discussion of the economic impact of the British system of economic development leading a territory from the status of a colony or a protectorate to independence and membership in the Commonwealth. Silcock stresses the absence of a general uniform policy and points out that the successful economic developments in British Southeast Asia have almost all resulted from *ad hoc* political solutions of local problems.

The chapter "Assessment and Suggestions" is especially valuable, despite its brevity, since it deals with the basic development needs of Southeast Asia under such headings as: the basic political requirements; transport; agriculture and fish-

ing industry; industrialization; currency and credit; cultural change and economic development; and finally, research and outside assistance. Many of the observations made in this chapter clearly show Silcock's great familiarity with the local problems of both Malaya and Singapore.

In his final chapter Silcock examines those determinants of economic development which are of special importance in Southeast Asia. He discusses, for example, the problem of capital formation and the need for new enterprise but expresses doubts about the usual argument that the chief requirement for the growth of new enterprises is low taxation. In his opinion, low taxation will hamper the development of a high level of technical education or prevent the building up of adequate transport and power systems without which local enterprises cannot flourish. He also maintains that "it is far more important to build up local enterprise and local capital formation than to create a generally favorable investment climate for the international capitalist" (pp. 190-191).

The author relates capital formation to population growth. He is gloomy about the prospect for a rise in standards of living based on capital formation in Southeast Asia and stresses the importance of avoiding an undue raising of the people's expectations (p. 195).

The little volume contains an annotated reading list of no less than thirty-four pages which will prove invaluable to anyone who is looking for further elaboration on problems which could only be mentioned in passing or were treated rather briefly.

KARL J. PELZER

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ROBERT S. ELEGANT. *The Dragon's Seed: Peking and the Overseas Chinese*. Pp. 319. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1959. \$4.95.

The time is ripe for the appearance of his honest, journalistic appraisal of the overseas Chinese. Most past books on the subject have been sociological surveys, historical analyses, or statistical compilations; now readers can profit from the objective craftsmanship of a working newspaperman.

Mr. Elegant, though only in his early thirties, is equipped by extended Far Eastern experience to interpret the current emotional and political pressures on the Chinese of Southeast Asia and the ominously successful efforts of the Peking government to draw the expatriates into a web of obedience to Maoism. The fact that the author is unencumbered by the paraphernalia of traditional academic research permits him the luxuries of daring speculation, broad generalization, and the vitalization of characters. There are of course hazards as well as benefits in this sort of approach, and the present volume is not without errors and inadequacies.

Elegant is at his weakest when he stumbles into the quagmire of history. It is patently untrue that early colonial Spaniards and Dutchmen were compelled by immediate reasons of self-preservation to massacre the Chinese communities under their flags. It is equally unsound to imply that polygamy and concubinage disappeared in China two centuries ago. Despite the author's counterclaim, the Chinese of nineteenth-century Indonesia had neither the protection of nor access to the European criminal courts. The record establishes that even the last imperial Chinese government came to be vigorously interested in its overseas subjects, though Elegant states that such interest came only after the 1911 republican revolution. The most disturbing of the author's historical inaccuracies is found in his repeated statement that officially directed "millennia of imperialistic tradition" supported the growth of Chinese colonies abroad. It is wrong to equate the tributary system of dynastic times with the expansionism of today. It is similarly incorrect to write that Chinese have always emigrated under the sponsorship of their home governments. Perhaps Elegant does not know that emigration was long a capital offense under Chinese law.

Though the bulk of this book is on Singapore and Malaya and on the relatively wealthy Chinese there, it is possible by extension to make the story relevant to the rest of Southeast Asia. Elegant's reporting skill is demonstrated with particular brilliance in his chapters on the commercial empire and on the pernicious virulence of

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the Communist-dominated schools of the overseas Chinese. Toward the end the presentation seems first to grow repetitious and then confused. There is no apparent justification for the insertion of an already familiar description of life in Communist China. Presumably the author has not been in that country, and his readers have access to the flood of travelogues on which his account must be based. Elegant's closing call for a solution of the overseas Chinese problem is commendable, but he is no better prepared than anybody else to promise salvation to twelve to fifteen million insecure people.

A final, mild reproach is necessary. The title of this book is too elaborately contrived to escape derision. It is almost as unpalatable as the author's heading of a chapter on Singapore's night life—"Confucius in the Cabarets."

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RICHARD K. BEARDSLEY, JOHN W. HALL and ROBERT E. WARD. *Village Japan*. Pp. xv, 498. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959. \$8.75.

This reviewer has had the unusual experience of reading and reviewing this study of rural Japan both before and after publication. It would be interesting to compare his reactions to it both prior to publication and upon reading the published volume. In January 1958, he wrote to a prospective publisher: "This is one of the best village studies I have seen, certainly the best I've seen on Post-war Japan. . . . An attempt is made here to view rural Japan through a single village and to attempt an analysis of the characteristics of rural Japan from several methodological points of view. There is, thus, a considerable balance to the book's contents, unlike most village studies which tend to be primarily ethnological or cultural anthropological, and often deficient in background and perspective. This strength is reflected in the high quality of the three major authors, anthropologist, historian, and political scientist, respectively."

Happily, this initial reaction to an as yet

unpublished manuscript has been substantiated by the finished volume, an extremely handsome product, well illustrated, and remarkably well written, with a marked integrity of organization and substance. This integrity is all the more remarkable since not only do the authors represent their own separate disciplines, but they were assisted in the early preparation of their study by a geographer, J. D. Eyre, and an economist, C. F. Remer, and they had the advice and co-operation of other social scientists associated with the University of Michigan Center at Okayama, Japan. The effective presentation of a world in microcosm that is the village under study demands a special kind of talent, one held in abundance by the authors. In short, this is the authoritative study of a modern Japanese village done with a remarkable sophistication concerning contemporary social science and in a degree of detail that makes it a basic handbook of data concerning rural Japan. The authors are careful to point out that Niiike, their village, is not "typical" of all of rural Japan, but they present their materials in a way that invariably casts light on all Japanese villages wherever they may be.

It is possible, of course, even in a brief review, to criticize some aspects of organization, presentation, or fact, but this would be quibbling. For example, though in general the maps are adequate, Figure 4 unfortunately uses the "hairy caterpillar" type of terrain presentation that was old fashioned forty years ago. However, graphics, including photographs, perspective drawings, and other sketches, are very well done and add substantially to the value of the text. A Glossary and detailed Index also are commendable.

Niiike is presented as an ecological, geographical, economic, and social unit, internally organized to satisfy the wants and aspirations of its inhabitants and in continuous interaction with its settlement peers and with communities higher in the settlement hierarchy in Japan. It is shown to be a unit of social and areal organization in constant change, with roots deep in the past, but influenced by current changes in the Japanese regional and national scene and in evolution toward an as yet dimly perceived variant upon contemporary

themes. New and revealing light is cast on aspects of social organization, political change, man-land relationships, which could only have been generated out of intensive and long-lasting field study. The authors appreciate the fact that as observers they also acted to a degree as participants in village life and no doubt influenced its course of change, but they argue that this should not invalidate most of their observations and conclusions.

Since the field portion of the present study was completed in the mid-1950's Niiike has become an experimental village, the subject of an experiment in mechanization and modernization, sponsored by the Asia Foundation. The new Niiike may, or may not, become very different from the old, but it will provide an almost unique opportunity for a "before and after" study in induced economic change. Although examination of this change is being undertaken by Japanese scholars, it is to be hoped that the authors or their students will not let this opportunity slip by to observe and appraise Niiike's changing character and use their findings to test and modify such models of economic and cultural change as at present exist.

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ROBERT C. BONE, JR. *The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem.* (Monograph Series.) Pp. x, 170. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1959. \$1.50.

GERALD S. MARYANOV. *Decentralization in Indonesia as a Political Problem.* Pp. vii, 118. Ithaca, N. Y.: Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1958. \$1.50.

These two reports add substantially to the reference library which the Modern Indonesia Project is issuing on contemporary problems in Indonesia. The monographs, translations, and papers produced are a continual aid to the area specialist and have made a significant contribution to the study of this young republic. The Interim Report Series, in which these two studies appear, is designed to fill the

gap between general articles and detailed, weighty monographs; as such it has proved an excellent method of circulating the results of research speedily yet in a scholarly form. The papers in this series are thus rather specialized accounts often tentative in nature; but they fill a useful function and must be judged on their own merits.

The two reports under review illustrate the widely differing approaches and products included as interim reports. Both suffer from an over-reliance on quotations at the expense of analysis, yet such a tendency is almost to be expected considering the nature of the reports and the intricacies of politics in Indonesia. Dr. Bone's study of the frustrating problem of Western New Guinea carefully documents the origins of the quarrel between The Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia, then traces the entanglement of the issue in the internal politics of both countries, and follows it into the arena of international affairs. He has wisely begun his report with a survey of the developmental potentialities of the island stating facts which swiftly puncture any ideas that the controversy concerns economic advantage. Rather the whole question has become enmeshed in national pride and the glorification of a "mission" so that any solution grows more and more distant. This study of the problem is clearly a draft for a more finished version that has already been announced for publication. The final product will undoubtedly condense many of the unnecessarily long quotations while providing the author with an opportunity to bring his material up to date and to deal more fully with the 1957-58 exodus of Dutch citizens from Indonesia as a result of the West Irian campaign which followed the defeat of the Indonesian resolution in the United Nations.

Dr. Maryanov's report, while also too liberally seasoned with quotations, is a discursive account concerning the meaning of the concept of decentralization to national political party leaders in Indonesia as evidenced by their speeches in Parliament. This is an illusive subject, particularly in a country characterized by complexities and vaguenesses. No one is more aware of the difficulties inherent in his topic than Maryanov himself, but repetitious apologies

for the work throughout the paper tend to detract from the merit of the material presented. Maryanov shows how the ideas of democratizing local government were incorporated in the concept of decentralization by most politicians; that this identification of two separate questions only further muddled already confusing demands is not sufficiently stressed, however. Recent events in Indonesia, as a result of the return to the 1945 Constitution, have not led to increased decentralization but to a curtailment of democracy at the lower levels. The basic disagreements over the powers and roles of the regional councils and the regional heads, which Maryanov amply illustrates, begged for the legal clarification which has been given them under the most recent regulations. The very inconclusiveness of Maryanov's paper indicates the obscurity of the problem; it is to be hoped that he too will write more fully on this fascinating subject at some early date.

IRENE TINKER

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KEMAL H. KARPAT. *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System.* Pp. xiii, 522. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1959. \$7.50.

Turkey's reputation as the first Muslim and "Eastern" country to achieve national independence and an advanced stage of democratic government had received popular acceptance in the West not long before reports of her economic difficulties and of her present Prime Minister's apparent abuse of populist and liberal principles raised doubts whether her success were real or illusory. Professor Karpas's history of developments and analysis of the political situation in his country will reassure most readers, although his presentation is so fair and so comprehensive that doubters could quote him to their own comfort.

Karpas utilizes Turkish and foreign sources—both wherever available—on each point covered. His Part I, tracing reform efforts from Ottoman beginnings to World War II, conceivably is the best brief history of this period in any language. Then he proceeds to elucidate the problems and

processes of completing what Turkey's first President, Atatürk, had begun: the transition from personal and party dictatorship, which had replaced the Sultanate, to the dynamism of a truly multiparty system. Without coloring shortcomings and backslidings of Atatürk's successors, our author gives full and due credit to İnönü, the second President, for his leadership in insisting upon unrigged elections in 1950 and for fostering reasonableness after his People's party, consequently, had been reduced to the role of Opposition. Although Premier Menderes receives possibly better marks for his previctory policies than for performance in office, to the Demokrat parti is credited economic reformation essential to progressing democracy. For the stabilization of democracy in Turkey, Karpas attributes importance both to American aid, encouraging consonance with American principles, and to acute awareness of the Communist alternative.

This reviewer wishes the author had described how isolation of villages from Ottoman administrative centers necessitated local self-government which conditioned the peasants for national suffrage. Other criticisms are so minor as to be carping. Acquaintance with the data and analyses presented by Karpas is essential to all students of Turkish history and affairs, of the Near East, and of nationalism. They may also perceive Turkish democracy's community of dilemmas and distress with those of governments and societies of older states, for example, the United States. They will appreciate Karpas as an able political scientist, competent to hold positions of Cabinet rank; and may hope that his expatriation is exceedingly temporary, for Turkey's sake, as well as for his future contributions to our knowledge.

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NEVILL BARBOUR (Ed.). *A Survey of North West Africa (The Maghrib).* Pp. xi, 406. New York: Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1959. \$5.60.

As indicated by the title, this book is a general survey of the *Maghrib*, or North Africa, though the term *Maghrib* has been broadened in this instance to include certain territories now claimed by Morocco but which ordinarily are regarded as belonging to sub-Saharan Africa. The area covered, therefore, includes not only Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya, but also Spanish West Africa and Mauretania.

Though many subjects are touched—such as geography, demography, social and economic conditions—most of the space in this book is devoted to political history. Historical events, however, are interpreted in a way that betrays an excessive concern with contemporary politics. The results, while not always illuminating, are sometimes amusing. To cite but one example: in the early part of the book (pp. 10-14) there is a discussion of the roles of two Numidian kings, Massinissa and his grandson Jugurtha, both well known to students of ancient history. Massinissa, it may be briefly recalled, fought as Rome's ally in the war against Carthage, and Jugurtha later unsuccessfully defied Rome's military power. In this book one reads that "we may be sure . . . that a certain nationalist sentiment lay behind the activities of the Numidian kings Massinissa and Jugurtha" (p. 14). This is a startling statement. One would have thought, at least until now, that nationalism was a relatively modern phenomenon. But even more startling is the statement that follows, since one then learns that the part played by nationalism in ancient Numidia "is not brought out in our historical sources; being entirely Roman, these credit the Numidian kings with no motive other than personal ambition."

To the advanced student of North African affairs, who may be looking for special material to be used in a particular research project, this book has little to offer. The factual information it contains is of a general and fairly elementary nature so that he is more than likely to be already acquainted with it. Such a student will do well to turn to other sources, Arabic, French, Spanish, and Italian. The beginner, on the other hand, particularly if his command of foreign languages is poor, will

find it quite useful as an introduction. Other works in English may go more deeply into certain aspects of that complex world which is the *Maghrib*, but none can be found today which is as comprehensive, as simply written, and as up to date as this one.

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ECONOMICS

HUGH G. J. AITKEN (Ed.). *The State and Economic Growth*. Papers of a Conference Held on October 11-13, 1956, under the Auspices of the Committee on Economic Growth. Pp. x, 389. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1959. \$3.75.

Ten of the thirteen papers in this volume are historical studies of the role played by the state in economic growth in various countries and at various times. The countries studied are the United States, Australia, Canada, Russia, Manchuria, Germany, France, Switzerland, Turkey, and the countries of Eastern Europe. The periods vary widely, covering different segments of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The unit of observation for most of the studies is the nation, but the papers concerned with France and Germany have a smaller focus. In addition to the country studies, the volume contains two papers of a theoretical nature and a final essay of summary and interpretation.

The intention of those who organized the volume was to make a series of parallel analyses of the state's role in economic development in different times and circumstances by methods which would permit comparisons to be made and conclusions of general applicability to be drawn. The desired results were not achieved. As Professor Kuznets says in a brief Foreword, "The conference that gave rise to the present volume resulted from prolonged discussion within the committee (on Economic Growth) regarding the feasibility of establishing an adequate basis for empirical

study of the influence of the state on economic growth. It will be evident from the contents of the volume that this basis is not yet established."

Indeed, it could be argued that the main contribution of the book is negative. Most students of economic development would guess that there is much to be learned by using a common approach to the historical analysis of growth in different countries. The lesson of this book is that to do this successfully will require a stronger analytical framework than that used here.

Countries were selected for study in the present case because they were thought to represent widely varying types according to three criteria: "Whether economic growth had been principally expansionist, through exploitation of unutilized resources, or intrinsic, through more intensive utilization of resources already in use; whether the economy was essentially self-contained and hence dominant, or highly dependent on foreign markets and resources and hence non-dominant or satellitic; and whether economic growth was autonomous as a result of decisions by private agencies in pursuit of private goals, or induced as a result of decisions by the same agencies that made political decisions." The authors of the various papers for the most part tried to apply this schema in their studies. The result was to demonstrate, as Professor Spengler says in his summary essay, that the schema "has little predictive and only limited explanatory value."

It would be wrong to conclude, however, that the book has only negative usefulness. Several of the papers, notably those by Butlin on Australia, Aitken on Canada, and Burgin on Switzerland, offer much valuable information and a number of stimulating ideas. And two of the papers seem to this reviewer to be very good indeed and to point the way toward more effective future research on the significance of state action in promoting economic progress. The first of these is E. P. Reubens' study of economic development in Manchuria, 1860-1940. Reubens explicitly discards the schema mentioned earlier and substitutes what he calls a "process model" as the theoretical foundation for his study. On the evidence of its application here, one

would hope that this model will be tested further. The second is a short piece by W. N. Parker contrasting the very different responses in France and Germany to similar economic opportunities in ore mining in the late nineteenth century—incidentally, the only attempt at straightforward comparison in the book. Parker's paper seems to this nonexpert reviewer to be a model of the comparative method: the focus of the comparison is sharp and clear, the limits to the meaning of the conclusions are carefully stressed, and the results are highly illuminating.

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ROLF SANNWALD and JACQUES STOHLER. *Economic Integration: Theoretical Assumptions and Consequences of European Unification*. Translated from the Swiss edition. Pp. xvi, 260. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1959. \$5.00.

The authors advance the following political and economic reasons for an integration of Europe: avoiding internal conflicts, assuming membership in the club of the World Powers, and getting rid of the economic stagnation which has plagued Europe since 1913. They are convinced that the European economy would become more efficient if it followed the example of the United States. The larger economic unit would help in securing more specialization, mass production, an increased disposition to innovate, a higher rate of business mortality and consequent mergers under the impact of market forces, less dependence on foreign trade, and a reduction in the distortions caused by the economic instability of trading partners.

Given these aims and assumptions the next question is: Why integration and not free trade? Why not follow people like Röpke and advocate a complete return to free trade as practiced before 1914? The authors choose economic integration for two reasons. First, the abstract and quite vulnerable principle of free trade will not convince the European countries of the necessity for closer co-operation. Second, mere scrapping of protectionism in inter-

national trade will not bring Europe back to the old-time type of free trade because of the increased participation of governments in economic life. The results of freeing trade depend to a large extent on internal economic measures. Hence, Sannwald and Stohler call for the co-ordination and unification of economic and social policies along with the removal of artificial barriers to the operation of free trade. This position implies the rejection of the concept of free trade area as insufficient to achieve the desired goals.

The analytical part of the book is devoted to a discussion of currency and stabilization policies, fiscal policy, and factor mobility. The approach is taxonomic. There is no new substantial contribution to economic analysis; the authors offer a useful and orderly presentation of theory drawn from various sources. As an indication of the sources which were utilized, the Index contains 27 references to Meade, 9 to Tinbergen, 8 to Viner, and 6 to Keynes. The authors feel that the choice of monetary and fiscal policies must satisfy the requirements of internal balance, of external balance between the members of the union and their external balance vis-à-vis the rest of the world. They feel, after Meade, that the method of variable exchange rates is the most suitable, especially if there were to be a European monetary fund. Common currency, they argue cogently, would require very close links between the banking systems of member countries as well as the existence of a common authority dealing with the stabilization of the economies of member countries, and these conditions would be difficult to bring about.

The chapter on fiscal policy explains the difficulties due to the fact that in various countries taxes on production are levied on its different stages. Besides, by shifting the tax incidence from a production to a consumption basis the governments can affect the intra-union trade. The authors suggest that under the conditions prevailing in Western Europe the proper solution is to adjust taxes at the stages on which they are levied and not to unify the tax systems.

As to factor mobility, they agree that, in

theory, mobility is not necessary to make optimum use of resources. As, however, many assumptions usually made in the theoretical models do not obtain in practice, free trade should be supplemented by some factor mobility. This mobility must be limited on practical grounds; it may be in conflict with the policies for stabilization; it may be caused by the differences in the policies for income redistribution which do not necessarily reflect the incentives based on optimal allocation of resources.

The authors have marshaled theoretical contributions of many writers to show that to secure free trade between modern advanced societies it is necessary to co-ordinate monetary, fiscal, wage, and price policies. The final problem is how to make sure that for the sake of freer international trade we shall not have to accept as permanent the powerful instruments of governmental and intergovernmental intervention developed and perfected in the creative period of economic union.

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CHARLTON OGBURN. *Economic Plan and Action: Recent American Developments*. Pp. xiii, 287. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. \$4.75.

The book is useful as a summary of reports issued by the National Planning Association. It is designed to support and spread the views of certain of its officers and employees concerning leading public policy issues, 1937-1957: Foreign aid, full employment, labor relations, farm aid, education, and so forth.

In general, it favors consumer spending, "growth" and larger incomes for the masses including "supplementary incomes," central government control resting on international requirements, creeping inflation, "democracy," and progressive taxation (pp. 161-162).

To me, the best points of the book seem to be: (1) Classification of different kinds of "foreign aid"; (2) list of weaknesses of such foreign aid, particularly to the underdeveloped countries (31 f., 193); importance of supranational trade groups, as in Western Europe and underdeveloped areas;

bases for effective collective bargaining; and the concept of "corporate managers" who are conscious of responsibility to corporations as "permanent institutions" (p. 152).

The chief shortcomings seem to be: (1) There is no discussion of labor monopoly as a factor affecting labor leader attitudes in collective bargaining. The treatment of organized labor is largely influenced by James B. Carey and C. S. Golden. (2) There is no discussion of population growth as a problem needing control, outside of Asia and some backward areas. (3) There is little if any discussion of credit problems or of currency inflation as affecting confidence in the dollar.

In fact, the "recency" of the work is clouded by the passing in 1954 of "dollar shortages" and of our favorable balance of international payments.

Beneath the rather unsatisfying or inconclusive treatment, I think, lies a confused and conflicting philosophy of values. The advocacy of materialistic means conflicts with idealistic ends. The basis of most of the planning in the book is materialistic. It centers in "economic development" or material growth. It emphasizes "natural resources." It pays no attention to innate differences among individuals at least in the United States. It relies on the "free play of self reliant individuals" (p. 165).

But many references are made to "moral purposes," "moral missions," and "moral inspirations." Even "spiritual problems" are mentioned. Institutions are emphasized in some cases. Innate differences among individuals are held to be important in underdeveloped countries. In general, the author relies heavily upon government leadership and control perhaps guided by certain social planners.

This confusion appears in the mixing of economic values and political values: "Economic growth" and "national security" are said to go together and involve large-scale organization in both.

Other questions suggested are: How can one rely so much on government, and at the same time point out the inefficiency and blunders of government (pp. 25, 27, and 33)? How can one argue (p. 252) that high incomes and prosperity are in

general a preventive of communism, after one has said (p. 32) that in underdeveloped countries this is not so?

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A. J. YOUNGSON. *Possibilities of Economic Progress*. Pp. x, 325. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1959. \$6.00.

The author of this timely book pursues three roads of analysis: the theoretical, the historical, and the political.

The first part offers a fragmentary philosophy of the subject. The author wrestles with the elusive idea of economic progress and tries—of course, in vain—to define it in contradistinction to economic expansion and economic growth and to statistical concepts such as increase in aggregate real income, total real output, gross national product, and net national income. He dips also into the abyss of causality by indicating the causal factors to be looked for by the empirical researcher. In spite of his philosophical, economic, and statistical scruples, he eventually settles on identifying economic progress with measurable material improvements and therefrom concludes that investment or, more specifically, net investment (p. 53) is an appropriate index of economic progress. Apparently he is captivated by the argument that the investment approach concentrates on what is "most manageable" and, within limits, measurable (p. 64). The limitations of such a pragmatic view are too well known to need further elaboration.

Some results of the theoretical inquiry are tested in the second or historical part which concentrates on one aspect of the crucial phenomenon: the acceleration of economic progress. To prove, disprove, or modify his basic conceptions, the author examines so-called "historical episodes" in four nations at significant stages of their development: Great Britain, 1750-1800; Sweden, 1850-80; Denmark, 1865-1900; and the Southern United States, 1929-54. The wisdom of this selection is doubtful. Can we generalize from such unique social and economic trends as prevailed during England's Industrial Revolution or from those during the struggle of the United

States with the Great Depression and the problems of World War II and its aftermath? Can we regard the experience of the two neighboring countries Sweden and Denmark as representative?

The inadequacy of the four case studies may finally explain why the third and last part of the book leads to another anticlimax. Here the author admits that the "lessons of history" cannot be applied by the economist. This task must be left to the administrator and the politician. Giving advice is "a matter of personal judgment" (p. 308).

Despite its shortcomings, however, the book is worth reading. Though it fails to give what its title suggests, a truly general view of the possibilities of economic progress, and though its conclusions are relativistic and tentative, it will be welcomed by all readers who value carefully assembled factual information and a synopsis of the intellectual hurdles still to be surmounted.

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JAMES S. DUESENBERRY. *Business Cycles and Economic Growth*. Pp. xi, 341. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1958. \$6.50.

Duesenberry lacks, he says disarmingly, the strength of mind to ignore the complications of reality. He also has a taste for prolonged chains of reasoning. Hence this book diverges both from the abstractions of Harrod and Hicks and the statistics of Burns and Mitchell. Obstinate and persistently, Duesenberry tries to put the realities and the theories side by side. Often this gives an exciting sense of discovery. It also blurs the simple lines of abstract theory: cycles are not left in a form that can be readily visualized.

Duesenberry criticizes the multiplier-accelerator theories of the cycle—Hicks, Goodwin, Harrod, Kaldor—as exaggerating both the rate of growth that can be obtained by the interaction of income, investment, and capital stock, and the instability of the income movements resulting from that interaction. He also criticizes Han-

sen's theory as exaggerating the importance of autonomous investment and underestimating the importance of the interactions of income, investment, and capital stocks (Ch. 3). He thinks that reasoning and fact coincide in indicating that depressions are of two sharply different kinds. One kind occurs when the structure of the economy is such that demand tends to fall behind the growth of output. The other results from no chronic deficiency of the system, but only because adverse shocks strike the economy: monetary crises, speculative collapses, trade shifts, and the like. If income falls below a certain level, a point of unstable equilibrium (p. 206), recovery will not come when the shock is past but only after a long period of capital decumulation or a favorable change in the economic structure. There is evidence (Ch. 12) that the United States economy was in 1929 more vulnerable to shock than it had been earlier in the nineteenth century.

In a book where there is so much original thinking, it is no serious criticism to note that there are patches where presentation and/or ideas seem confused (pp. 154, 261, 168, 208). The reasoning is often inherently involved: this is a book for the graduate student well advanced in his training, and it will be stimulating to the specialist—it is not, as the editor says, for adult education or for the informed general reader. It is too hard and too detailed. The analysis is usually government-held and constant which makes it more abstract than it might be. Would it not be as reasonable an assumption, as many advanced for the private economy, to make the government's lagged propensity to spend or to tax a function of income?

Duesenberry's continued amalgam of theory and fact is something new. Much of his treatment seems to interpret our cycle experience better than it has been before. The presentation is attractively modest. No serious future treatment of cycles can fail to take the ideas he expresses here into account.

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EDGAR LAWRENCE SMITH. *Common Stocks and Business Cycles*. Pp. 226. New York: The William-Frederick Press, 1959. \$10.00.

In 1924 Mr. Smith published his *Common Stocks as Long-Term Investments*; in 1939 his *Tides in the Affairs of Men*. In this book he strives to meet the criticisms of those volumes and makes visual comparisons to date of assorted series of recurring changes in sunspots, rainfall, temperature, mass psychology, pig iron production, and selected common stock averages, mostly since 1871, but with a glance backward as far as John Law's banking and stock adventures in 1720. His preliminary statement of his solar-economic theory runs as follows: "(1) All changes in quantity, content, and angle of solar radiation [emanation] reaching the earth's atmosphere cause relative changes in this atmosphere, and hence in the environment of man; (2) A preponderance of these atmospheric changes are recorded proportionately in changing types of weather, over shorter and longer periods, on a world-wide basis, and are recorded in relative weather data at widely separated weather stations; (3) The activities, health, and mental outlook of populations are affected by changes in environmental conditions, and these effects are measureable in records of man's behavior, notably in certain basic economic areas; (4) Because of these relationships, at different points on the earth's surface it is possible to find weather data that can be used as an index of probable human response to total environmental change" (p. 133).

His use of statistics and logic is bold. Thus, for example, without aid of net correlation coefficient or mathematical estimates of error, he finds similar graphical fluctuations in "(1) the rate of change in average rainfall at Bern, Switzerland, and (2) the change in the rate of change in the average New York bank clearings and debits one year later" (p. 117). In this way he compares "(1) New York weather data (measured by monthly deviations in barometric range), (2) physical change in a number of people in Chicago, hence change probably in many others, if not in

all the more sensitive and emotional individuals involved, (3) psychological change or change in attitude toward the same or similar economic premises and (4) consequent changes in the price level of representative stocks on the New York Stock exchange" (p. 104).

Curves on stock prices plotted by decade show ten-year cycles which when compared since 1871, he contends, show that in years ending in 5 stock prices are consistently strong, also years ending in 8 and part of 9. Prices of stocks in years ending in 2, 4, and 6 tend to be firm; those in years ending in 1 and 3 are weak, and in 7 and 0 weakest. Moreover he finds a long-term 89½ year swing, as witness the breaking in France and England of the Mississippi and South Sea bubbles in September 1720, followed 89 years and 4 months later, in February 1809, by the collapse of bank stocks in Boston, and on its heels the closing of the United States Bank; at the center of each being a distrust in the central bank.

Mr. Smith concedes that it is worth emphasizing that no single approach should be the basis for important investment decisions including timing of transactions. He calls for "as many confirmatory studies as possible," electro-magnetic, meteorological, pathological, psychological, and economic.

One can emphatically agree with Mr. Smith, however, that "it is not surprising that economists still reject the evidence" (p. 104).

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SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY

WINSTON EHRMANN. *Premarital Dating Behavior*. Pp. xvii, 316. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1959. \$6.00.

This admirable study is both honest and modest. Honest because it confesses all the procedural errors made and makes no attempt to give the illusion that there was an elegant design from the beginning.

Modest because it makes no great pretensions; it recognizes that the time, 1947-1953, the place, University of Florida, and the circumstances, the changeover to co-education, under which the data were collected, influenced the results. And anyone who has ever confronted the literally yards of figures that an IBM machine spawns can only be awed by the skill with which the author has mastered his materials. He must have wrestled manfully with his data, long and weary hours, to have emerged so completely in control. There is no endless procession of tables—these are available from the publishers in a separate *Supplement*—but rather meaningful summaries of complex data that the reader can digest as part of the text.

One major contribution of this study—though Ehrmann warns us of its limitations (pp. 278-279)—is the six-stage scale of intimacy which ranges from no physical contact or only holding hands to sexual intercourse. Now that he has given us this scale it seems remarkable no one has arrived at it sooner. It is superior to the old categories of light and heavy petting and illuminates the fact that the critical point in erotic play is between "hugging and kissing" and fondling of the covered breast and not, as he had anticipated, between fondling the covered and the bare breast. Young women seem to recognize or intuit that they are in control only until the genital responses are touched off by the breast-trigger; then, they flash the red light.

After detailed and comprehensive comparisons of male and female sexual behavior, codes, and cultures, Ehrmann feels that his most important empirical finding was the fact that female sexuality was primarily and profoundly related to being in love and to going steady whereas the same was not true of males (p. 269). He feels his most single theoretical contribution is the definition and analysis of sexual attitudes and behavior in terms of (1) his scale, (2) sex codes, and (3) standards of conduct. Omission of any one may, he points out, give fallacious results. He hopes his findings may make a contribution to programs for sex education, although he warns against the mistaken notion that sci-

entific data can solve problems of sexuality. He makes a plea for a tolerant and permissive attitude toward research on sexual behavior.

The compassion of the author shows throughout. Here is a man who has not only scientific curiosity about young people but also deep understanding of their problems. I believe him when he states his conviction that the young people he questioned and interviewed were completely candid with him. Why wouldn't they be? They probably got from him a great deal more than he got from them. In any event, clinicians, teachers, and students of American society will find this a valuable contribution to their thinking.

There is an Introduction by Margaret Mead and a Postscript on "The Sociological Significance of this Research" by Clifford Kirkpatrick.

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MICHAEL ARGYLE. *Religious Behavior*. Pp. xii, 196. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959. \$5.00.

The author describes his work as a "study in social psychology of religion in Britain and America since 1900" (p. xi). He has collected a considerable amount of empirical data dealing with such aspects of religious behavior as age, sex differences, personality, as well as the relationship between religion and mental disorder, the impact of religion on sex and marriage, and theories of religious behavior and beliefs. Because of the great breadth of the subject material and the relative brevity of volume, it is probably most useful as a reference.

Some findings should interest the clergy such as the statement that religious conversions occur most frequently in adolescence and that some persons are converted a number of times. The gradual conversion is more permanent than the sudden, violent one. Adolescents show grave concern over sin, heaven, hell, science versus religion, and what happens after death.

Another conclusion based on studies is that Protestants in the United States are more likely to vote republican than Catholics even when social class is held constant.

However, voting in the 1952 presidential election may raise some questions about the present validity of this statement. Furthermore, urban-rural differences are important. Urbanites are more likely to be democrats than republicans, and most Catholics are urban dwellers. This factor was not mentioned.

His summary of findings on racial and ethnic prejudice will interest social scientists. Regular and devout church members are less likely to be prejudiced than non-religious persons, but Catholics, it is stated, are most prejudiced, followed by Protestants. The author also reports that neuroses among Jews are two and a half times as frequent as among Catholics and Protestants. Since it is just about impossible to get any accurate statistics on the incidence of neuroses, this finding should be viewed with caution. It may well be true on the basis of diagnoses, but how many undiagnosed neurotics exist is anyone's guess.

Some of the studies on which the author's data are based go back thirty or more years. These indicate the need for replication of such research in the nineteen sixties. Neither has the author been very critical of the studies he has assembled. As pointed out above, the major value of this book will be as a reference to many studies made on religious behavior in the United States and England since the opening of the twentieth century. But for a careful evaluation of methodology, sampling and validity of the studies, the reader will still find it advisable to consult the original research.

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MAURICE HALBWACHS. *The Psychology of Social Class*. Translated by Claire Delavenay. Pp. xvii, 142. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959. \$4.00.

Maurice Halbwachs, renowned French sociologist, died in 1945 at Buchenwald, a tragic victim of the Nazi holocaust. One would like to report that the contents of this small volume published first in Brussels in 1938 and later in 1955 in a posthumous Paris edition, prior to the present American edition, will augment his reputation. Regrettably, this reviewer must de-

clare a contrary opinion. The substance of the work is a series of "thin" essays on social-psychological tendencies alleged to be characteristic of four major occupational groups indigenous to Western civilization: peasants, "entrepreneurs and bourgeoisie," industrial workers, and what Halbwachs refers to as the "lower middle or intermediate" class composed of the subgroups of "artisans and small tradesmen," clerical workers in private industry, and "the lower grades of the civil service." Some historical trends are discussed. Documentation is sporadic and plausible but unsupported generalizations abound. Some approach banality. For instance, peasants are emotionally attached to their land, entrepreneurs are individualistic and competitive, lower civil servants are bureaucratic, dominated by routine, and status conscious, and so on. The specialist in social stratification will find little or nothing new in this volume, and others are advised to seek elsewhere for a more effective discussion of the topics considered. In short, it is difficult to understand why Halbwachs published these essays, or why they were later reissued.

A touching tribute to the author and his life and work by Georges Friedmann, originally published in 1946, has been inserted as a Foreword, and a Bibliography of Halbwachs' writings is appended.

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AUGUST B. HOLLINGSHEAD and FREDRICK C. REDLICH. *Social Class and Mental Illness: A Community Study*. Pp. ix, 442. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958. \$7.50.

The purpose of the study reported in this volume was to determine the relationship between mental illness and social class, and the bearing that the social status of a mentally ill person has on the kind and amount of treatment he receives for his illness. The data of the study are from the greater New Haven community. Most of the analysis presented bears on the prevalence of mental illness in the community during the period June 1, 1950 to December 1, 1950. Thus, the rates com-

puted reflect not only new cases developing during the period but old cases still under treatment during the period. Some incidence rates, new cases appearing during the period, are presented, but the number of new cases in the higher social class levels is so small that conclusions based on them need to be made with great caution. This is unfortunate because it means that the problem of greatest importance, the extent to which class membership generates mental illness, cannot be answered satisfactorily with the data of the study.

However, the data clearly permit the conclusion that the prevalence of mental illness is *inversely* related to class position, that is, the lower the class the higher the prevalence. For the psychoses, the prevalence is much greater in the lower classes than in the middle and upper classes. To a marked extent the greater prevalence of psychoses in the lower classes is due to the fact that they tend to remain in treatment or custodial care for much longer periods than do higher status patients. But even when this factor is taken into account, the contention that psychoses rates are higher for persons of lower social status than for those of higher status is supported by the data. When the neuroses are considered separately, the prevalence of treated neuroses is higher for the upper than the lower classes. However, this may only be a reflection of the fact that a higher proportion of upper-class than lower-class neurotics ordinarily seek treatment.

On the second purpose of the study, it is clear from the data that there is a close relationship between the patient's social class and the treatment he receives. In general, upper-class patients receive psychotherapeutic treatment while lower-class patients are treated by means of organic therapies. Moreover, lower-class psychotic patients tend to remain in treatment or custodial care for much longer periods than do patients of higher status. The need for more effective treatment of lower-class patients is thought by the authors to be one of the serious challenges facing psychiatry today.

Despite methodological limitations of the study, this book provides the most comprehensive knowledge about the relationship

between social class and mental illness yet available. It merits the careful attention of all practitioners in the field of mental health as well as students of social behavior.

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DONALD J. BOGUE. *The Population of the United States*. Pp. xix, 873. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959. \$17.50.

This is perhaps the most comprehensive book ever written on population problems and trends in the United States. Some attention is given to earlier periods, but the chief emphasis is on trends since 1940. This concentration on recent changes has advantages, but the book appears on the eve of the 1960 census, and its value as a current reference will soon be greatly reduced.

After discussing the growth and distribution of the population, the author describes various types of composition: color, nativity, sex, age, occupation, industry, income, and religion. He devotes several chapters to the components of population change, fertility, mortality, and migration, and concludes the book with brief descriptions of the demography of Alaska and Hawaii and a discussion of the implications of future population trends. The chapter on fertility, contributed by Wilson H. Grabill, is the only one not written by Bogue.

Having used some of the materials in this book in his classes at the University of Chicago, the author apparently tries in part to meet the needs of teachers and professional demographers. However, the author emphasizes that an important purpose of this book is to tell the intelligent layman about the practical importance and varied ramifications of population trends. Having rubbed elbows with regional and city planners, the author has the gift of putting technical things into the business man's language, and he uses it.

Being a sociologist as well as a demographer, the author is perhaps most deeply concerned about the impact of demographic changes on social problems. To city fathers and social workers he may give some en-

lightenment but not satisfaction when he says "the nation can look forward to a 50 per cent increase in the number of juvenile delinquents in the twelve years from 1958 to 1970, simply on the basis of the increased number of children who will be living at the ages when delinquency occurs. Actually the great urbanization movement that has brought many thousands of Negro youngsters into a strange and disorganizing environment may result in an even greater increase" (p. 787).

In a volume the size of the present one, some errors, typographical or otherwise, are almost inevitable. The couples in the Indianapolis Study were erroneously described as having been married between 1920 and 1929 instead of 1927 and 1929 (p. 312). Of much more consequence is an error in the "billion" column of a set of world population figures. Thus, in a small table (p. 788), the estimated world population for 1950 appears as 1,497 million instead of 2,497 million. A regrettable error in the other direction is the appearance of the term "millions" instead of the correct term "thousands" at the head of the columns of a table giving projected populations for 1960 and 1970 for the United States and other countries (p. 790).

In view of the recent public interest in population and birth control, the author's efforts to write for the laymen may bear fruit. In the reviewer's judgment, however, the book will find its main use and value in college libraries and classrooms rather than the meeting places of book clubs or on the desks of the organization men.

CLYDE V. KISER

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RONALD FREEDMAN, PASCAL K. WHELPTON, and ARTHUR A. CAMPBELL. *Family Planning, Sterility and Population Growth*. Pp. xi, 515. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1959. \$9.50.

The research so lucidly reported in this book is a major substantive contribution to our knowledge of the social-demographic characteristics of the American population. A national probability sample, 2,713 married white women aged 18 to 39, was surveyed in 1955 with a variety of objectives.

Ultimately, one purpose is to improve population forecasts by securing American women's own estimates of their future fertility. In one sense this protects the authors. Should their forecasts be in error the responsibility lies with the respondents' deviations from expected behavior. The data on expected fertility are artfully woven into the "component-cohort" technique of projection and, at the end of the report, estimates of the population by age and sex are provided for the rest of this century.

Even should these forecasts go awry, the other equally important accomplishments of this research will survive. One primary objective was to secure estimates of parameters not previously known on a nationwide basis, relating to such characteristics as sterility, fertility rates by religion, the practice of contraception including methods used, attitudes toward family planning, and fertility-planning success. It is inevitable that this book will be the authoritative source of such bound-to-be quoted findings as: one third of all American couples have fecundity impairments; one tenth cannot have children in the future; voluntary childlessness has all but vanished from the American scene; fertility planning is widespread, and so forth.

In addition to the population forecasts of practical importance and the point estimates of scientific interest produced by this research, the reader is also led through a limited but detailed analysis of differential fertility. The upshot of the analysis is a corroboration of other research: Americans are becoming increasingly homogeneous in their fertility behavior as well as in other respects. Traditional factors such as socioeconomic and rural-urban factors no longer differentiate fertility as they once did. Aside from participation of women in the labor force, only religious affiliation seems to make a difference. But even here, the higher fertility of Catholics is a relative consideration. The large majority of all wives expect two, three, or four children. The implication for understanding the post-war "baby boom" that is still very much with us is that a rise in completed family size to an estimated completed average of 3.0 children for women born during 1931-35 is being accomplished by shifts within

the 2 to 4 range as well as the diminution of smaller sized families but not by a return to the large families of earlier years. Some evidence is mounting, however, that five-child families are becoming more prevalent and within a few more years the proportions with six children will probably also increase. If this happens the definition of "large" families may be problematic.

The authors also include a very sophisticated analysis of the effects on period rates of shifts in the patterns of child-spacing. On the whole, this volume embodies the most refined empirical techniques of population forecasting.

Professors Freedman, Whelpton, and Campbell are to be heartily congratulated for their work. It is good news indeed to learn that another survey of a similar sample will be conducted in 1960, five years after the first.

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ELI GINZBERG and others. *The Ineffective Soldier, Vol. I: The Lost Divisions. Lessons for Management and the Nation.* Pp. xx, 225. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. \$6.00.

ELI GINZBERG and others. *The Ineffective Soldier, Vol. II: Breakdown and Recovery. Lessons for Management and the Nation.* Pp. xvii, 284. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. \$6.00.

ELI GINZBERG and others. *The Ineffective Soldier, Vol. III: Patterns of Performance. Lessons for Management and the Nation.* Pp. xix, 340. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. \$6.00.

These three volumes comprise a comprehensive review and evaluation of the manpower selection and assignment procedures of the ground and air forces during World War II. They are the final reports of the "Conservation of Human Resources" project established at Columbia University under the directorship of Dr. Eli Ginzberg and represent the results of an elaborate research program carried out from 1950 to 1958 by a team of specialists representing psychiatry, personnel research, social psychology, history, and statistics.

While the study covers ground well known to specialists, it is of importance because it supplies definitive documentation. The major conclusion is that psychiatric screening did not operate effectively to meet the personnel requirements of the armed forces in World War II. The armed forces sought to develop a procedure which would eliminate ineffective soldiers and thereby facilitate the efficiency of combat units. Screening for ineffective soldiers, those who suffered psychological disabilities, illiteracy, and general inaptitude, employed the stringent criterion that all recruits should be potentially combat soldiers. In addition, the manpower planners operated as if the sources of manpower were unlimited and only later in the war modified their requirements.

As a result, many persons were excluded from military service, even though there would have been suitable occupational specialties for them within the military establishment. The screening system was defective because of shortages of trained personnel, pressure of the crisis, and lack of clarity of standards. With the exception of screening psychotics, the psychological standards were unable to distinguish between those who would and those who would not perform effectively in combat.

The authors seek to demonstrate that such screening procedures have inherent limitations for the military establishment and for industrial organizations. They argue that the effectiveness of a soldier is a function of his psychological predispositions, environmental stress, and the practices of management. Since psychological screening only measures one dimension, and this incompletely, it is at best a partial approach. Instead, they emphasize the need for training, placement, and organizational practices which will maximize the effectiveness of borderline personnel. This study is another example, and clearly the most comprehensive, in the growing body of literature which seeks to place psychiatric and psychological testing in its proper perspective as a device of administrative management.

MORRIS JANOWITZ

Professor of Sociology
University of Michigan

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ROBERT K. MERTON, GEORGE G. READER and PATRICIA L. KENDALL (Eds.). *The Student-Physician: Introductory Studies in the Sociology of Medical Education*. (A report from the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University.) Pp. xii, 360. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press for The Commonwealth Fund, 1957. No price.

One of the outstanding developments in Western civilization is the rise of medicine to the stature of a major social institution. Psychoanalysis and wonder drugs, victories over infant mortality, the continuously publicized fight against cancer, regular check-ups, and general concern with nutrition have increased the status of the physicians far beyond the status of the lawyers, ministers, and teachers. The specific ways in which physicians feel, think, and act, therefore, have become attributes of one of the most interesting subcultures in our society.

The book under review is a preliminary report on a research program which is examining the ways in which medical schools in this country change the viewpoint of their students toward self, the profession of medicine, and toward other persons in society, altering their views from those held by laymen interested in becoming doctors to those of certified physicians. In accordance with the book's character as a preliminary report, those parts which set the framework of the research program in theoretical and historical terms are much more rewarding to the reader than the individual chapters reporting on various facets of the concrete research program. Merton's introductory chapter entitled "Some Preliminaries to a Sociology of Medical Education" is an important contribution which all interested in medicine as a social institution should read. This chapter clarifies the essential position of the study to the effect that "learning and performance vary not only as the individual qualities of students vary, but also as their social environments vary, with their distinctive climates of value and their distinctive organization of relations among students, between students and faculty, and between students and patients" (p. 63).

For persons more specifically interested in medical education, Reader's report on

"The Cornell Comprehensive Care and Teaching Program" will prove equally interesting. He describes a shift in medical education away from emphasis on medical knowledge as such to an approach in which "the patient as a person is considered the appropriate focus of medical care and teaching," and in which "the student is recognized as coequal in many respects with the teacher in the learning process" (p. 93).

The remainder of the book, approximately 250 pages, seems to be intended for researcher and scholars in the sociology of the professions and is devoted to reports on such phenomena as "The Decision to Study Medicine," "Some Comparisons of Entrants to Medical and Law School," "Tendencies Toward Specialization in Medical Training," "The Development of a Professional Self-Image," "Preferences for Types of Patients," "Training for Uncertainty," and two reports on specific research problems encountered in "assessing an educational innovation." These reports vary in quality and appeal to interest. They are, however, of importance from a methodological point of view and deserve the attention of the research specialist. Although it does not promise more than it keeps, and in spite of some significant contributions, unfortunately the book leaves the reader with a definite sense of dissatisfaction. It starts with the roar of two basic papers and ends in the whimper of yet unfinished research. Probably the reports to follow will correct this impression.

OTTO POLLAK

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University of Pennsylvania

ALFRED J. KAHN (Ed.). *Issues in American Social Work*. Pp. xii, 354. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. \$5.00.

The twelve contributors to this book of essays are intellectuals in social-work teaching, planning, and practice. They are authors of books and are recognized authorities. Nevertheless, most of them display the usual social-work reliance on "authority" in the form of footnotes to arrays of articles which in their turn, this reviewer seems to recall, footnoted much the same literature. Still, these essays will interest

social work leaders and can be read by graduate students in the field with profit. Although similar in most respects to articles in *Social Casework*, *Social Service Review*, and *Social Work*, these essays more often peal a discordant note of discontent over the graveyard of old themes.

The adequacy of the social work profession to accomplish its tasks comes sharply into question when one reads the following evaluations: While only a social-work master's degree has been needed for membership in the field's national association, says one writer, "the majority of persons in social work positions were thereby [1955] shut out of membership." Henry J. Meyer of the University of Michigan charges that "the knowledge base for social work has hardly been identified," nor are there "clear descriptions of the technical competence that social workers may possess." Furthermore, "it seems likely, but it is not yet demonstrated, that trained social workers have greater skill in counseling, in working with groups and with communities, than persons of equivalent experience but less training." Moreover, "what social workers do has not yet been objectively described." Alfred Kadushin judges that there has been no systematic attempt to validate the part of the knowledge base of this field that comes from social work itself. "Facts" have derived from reiteration. He wants intensified research activity. Bertram M. Beck desires social work to be an agent of social change and a force. Unfortunately, "goals must be defined before we know how they may be attained."

In spite of these presumably educated judgments, the editor wants social work's function in the modern world broadened to include service to the normal as well as to the disadvantaged, thus planning the better life for all, while retaining a concern with pathology and social disorganization. Nathan E. Cohen finds the latter an attribute of our communities which needs to be "reversed." Dr. Kahn counts on social work to humanize our superurban society and do many other things. "How much of this is possible?" he asks.

It is strange, Samuel Mencher says, that with all our leisure the field of social welfare "has not moved toward enriching

rather than restricting the possibilities for voluntary effort." He hopes that volunteers will appear to serve government agencies with dedication. The need for this derives from his conviction that public demand for impartial and impersonal service finds its ultimate fulfillment in a democratic society through government services. Private bodies, it is alleged, are identified with particular elements or interests in a community and cannot give the public "classless justice" (p. 226). This generalization about such groups as American National Red Cross, Salvation Army, Catholic Social Service, and both Jewish and Protestant bodies oppresses this reviewer. Certainly it leaves much to be desired. *Grass Roots Private Welfare* (New York University Press, 1958) convincingly conveys a contrary orientation. Mencher's essay is on the whole, however, a knowledgeable one.

Dr. Kahn judges that "there are needs to be met, services to be created, vital functions to be filled," and he finds evidence that social work can meet "the challenge." One wishes these hardworking and dedicated people well. At the same time, it is reassuring that educators, physicians, attorneys, ministers, talented volunteers, and experts in many fields continue to shoulder partial responsibility for the welfare of American society.

VAUGHN D. BORNET

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DAVID DRESSLER. *Practice and Theory of Probation and Parole*. Pp. ix, 252. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. \$6.00.

A 1951 book by Dr. Dressler entitled *Probation and Parole* set the stage for the volume under review. It is, however, not conceived of as a second edition but as a new book. The earlier volume "... was intended as a rationale of the field and not as a textbook. . . . [present volume] is not a rewrite of the earlier book. It is planned as a text for college courses in probation and parole" (Preface, p. vii).

The author's explanation tells a good part of the story. Despite general similarity of format, style, and page length, the 1959

volume really is a new book. There are 17 chapters in all, not counting the Preface and an extensive 12-page Index. Valuable materials and sensible points of view are presented in a number of chapters carrying self-explanatory titles such as, "Etiological Factors in Delinquency and Crime," "Investigation in Probation and Parole," "The Helping Process," "Ways of Helping," "Newer Directions in Treatment," and so on. Designed as a textbook, the book under review gives more attention than its predecessor did to the historical origins and vicissitudes in the development of probation and parole as operational procedures. Examples and illustrations in the form of anecdotal case-history material constitute a principal methodological device and are relied on for substantiation of assertions made more often than systematic examination of data from the more important scientific research studies having some bearing on the field.

Dr. Dressler writes from the standpoint of a social worker, not that of a sociologist, or of a research criminologist. No attention is given to the large areas of criminality that flow from the conflict of interests in the community at large. Similarly, the role of politics and of politicians in the operation of parole and probation practice is largely ignored. Disenchanted negative aspects of these practices and their implications tend to be overlooked or rationalized as due to inadequate support and poor public relations.

The discussion seeks rather to stress the positive, constructive aspects of probation and parole as "helping services." In view of this approach, the book tends to take on more the character of a field manual seeking to bolster the morale of "in-service" agents rather than the character of customary textbook presentation of materials on all major issues, pro and con, as a basis for serious thought on the part of interested students. The emphasis, presumably, flows from the author's many years of experience as agent or supervisor directly involved with field problems in this area of correctional work.

In a field often characterized by doctrinaire interpretations, Dr. Dressler's sensible, well-grounded, middle-of-the-road,

position should be welcomed by practitioners and laymen alike. His book is a valuable addition to the literature in the field.

GEORGE B. VOLD

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JOHN FAYERWEATHER. *The Executive Overseas: Administrative Attitudes and Relationships in a Foreign Culture*. Pp. xi, 195. Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1959. \$4.00.

Driven by the needs of American world interests, students of business and economics are undertaking the analysis of complex cultures, a task anthropologists have tried to avoid. It means that literature on national character and personality types is being created by men who in this field are amateurs rather than by the most experienced professionals. But, as illustrated by John Fayerweather's book, this new literature is valuable and provocative, perhaps sufficiently so to set anthropologists to work checking the hypotheses.

Professor Fayerweather collected data on attitudes and behavior from forty-five interviews with local and United States executives in Mexico and tested the resulting hypotheses by an intimate four-month study of six United States and ten Mexican executives. Checks were made on some comparable data from India and Europe to note similarities and differences. Professor Fayerweather's considerable experience with foreign cultures made him an unusually acute observer.

The research points to two polar types of personality: the individualistic and the group-oriented. A man of the individualistic type in pursuing activities deemed essential to his success "walls himself off as much as possible from those around him." He sees his subordinates and peers as dangerous competitors, his superiors as men whose favor must be won by pleasing them. The group-oriented type has a feeling of union with those around him. His satisfactions are to a considerable extent achieved "in being part of a team." He expects to argue freely and equally with superiors. Mexican executives, and those of other less developed countries, tend to have personalities of the individualistic

type, United States executives to be group-oriented.

The book is a skillful analysis of why the individualistic type has come to prevail in Mexican culture, and how group-oriented executives should deal with this type. There is also good discussion of how differing value systems affect behavior. For example, while Mexicans are not opposed to following plans, being on time, or observing other aspects of industrial discipline, they put a higher value on the expression of personal inclinations and the maintenance of personal relationships. Consequently a mandatory plan may be ignored in favor of some more personally appealing course of action.

For what it purports to be I have no criticisms worth noting in a brief review of this well-developed study. I merely want to warn the reader that while Professor Fayerweather writes with a persuasive confidence that makes his observations seem reasonable and true, more specialized study of personality by psychologists may make the present conceptual schemes seem crude and inaccurate. As Professor Fayerweather admits almost no one is a pure type, and whether his are the most useful polarities for analytical purposes is not certain. Similarly whether short-run changes in adult environment can do much to alter basic personality types needs further proof. But in the meantime psychologists and anthropologists as well as business men should read this small book.

THOMAS C. COCHRAN

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PATRICK MCCAULEY and EDWARD D. BALL (Eds.). *Southern Schools: Progress and Problems*. Pp. viii, 174. Nashville, Tenn.: Southern Education Reporting Service, 1959. \$4.75.

The problems of desegregation in the public schools of seventeen Southern and border states have provoked one of the most bitter controversies of this era. Acts of violence in some cities have understandably provided headlines for newspapers in the United States and most other parts of the world. This report focuses attention upon "other important developments: not

sensational, fast-breaking headlines but nonetheless dramatic" (p. vii). Like other reports of the Southern Education Reporting Service, this one does not go into the pros and cons of desegregation. This reviewer regrets that it does not discuss recent federal court decisions. The first section, written for the layman by veteran newspaper men, analyzes Population, Enrollment and Attendance, Expenditures, Personnel, Transportation, Buildings and Equipment, and Special Services. The second section consists of seventy-seven statistical tables for the scholar and educator, gathered and analyzed by competent educators. The project was financed by the Fund for the Advancement of Education.

The Introduction, "Great Leap Forward," indicates the optimistic theme. This leap is "transforming all the old patterns, raising scholastic and physical standards, rewarding teachers, erecting new buildings, equipping them with libraries, lunchrooms and laboratories of the latest design, experimenting with advanced techniques in teaching, and most important, finding the money for still more such projects" (p. 1). One reason for this transformation is the belief of some Southerners that, if Negro schools were made really equal to white schools, some Negroes would bring less legal pressure to bear in favor of desegregation. On the other hand, even if segregated schools are frequently more expensive than desegregated schools, many white Southerners consider the additional expenditure well spent. The problem is aggravated by the fact that, while the South has a larger proportion of its population to educate than does the rest of the nation, it has less money with which to educate the students. But at the beginning of this century 85 per cent of Negroes were concentrated in the eleven states of the Confederacy as well as Kentucky and the Oklahoma territory. By 1950 the proportion in the same area had dropped to 62.5 per cent, and it is estimated that the next census will find less than 60 per cent still living in the traditionally Southern states. This reviewer, however, agrees with some competent demographers that migration of Negroes from the South is decelerating. Even if this is not true, desegregation will probably long

remain one of the nation's most difficult problems.

RAYFORD W. LOGAN

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JOSEPH S. ROUCEK (Ed.). *Contemporary Sociology*. Pp. xii, 1209. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. \$12.00.

Judged by the prolificacy of commentary evoked, no period of sociology has attracted so much attention as the post-World War II era. *Contemporary Sociology* joins the series of summaries, analyses, syntheses, and assessments which include, within the last four years, such endeavors as *Sociology in the United States of America* (ed. by Zetterberg), *Modern Sociological Theory in Continuity and Change* (ed. by Becker and Boskoff), *Review of Sociology: Analysis of a Decade* (ed. by Gittler), and *Sociology Today: Problems and Prospects* (ed. by Merton, Broom, and Cottrell). Both the short span of time from the publication of the earliest to the latest one and the paucity of cross-references suggest strongly that each volume was planned, and its papers contributed in virtual ignorance of the others. These independent interpretations should afford an unusual opportunity for comparative study of the degree of consensus on the state of recent sociology.

With 1,176 text pages and 59 chapters by 44 American and 18 foreign contributors, *Contemporary Sociology* is conspicuously the largest of the five treatises. Between Zimmerman's first chapter on trends in the discipline and Sorokin's last on physicalist and mechanistic approaches are the two basic sections of the work.

The first part is essentially an analysis of American sociology in terms of specific fields and methods. It contains chapters on community by Owen, personality by S. Riemer, institutions by Hanson, family by Zimmerman, social control by K. Wolff, social organization and disorganization by Lenn, methodology and research by Tiryakian, criminology by S. Koenig, race and intergroup relations by H. Smythe, political sociology by F. Gross, population by H. Doby, historical sociology by Barnes, social psychology by Frumkin, sociology of knowledge by L. Chall, urban sociology by

Ravitz, human ecology and human geography by G. Theodorson, rural sociology by J. Beegle and C. Loomis, educational sociology by P. Smith, social psychiatry by Nehnevajsa, sociology of symbols, language, and semantics by C. R. Jones, bureaucracy and professions by R. Stone, economic organization by Grigsby and Linden, social stratification by Lenski, religion by C. Hunt, public opinion and propaganda by J. Ford, military sociology by P. Walter, sociological aspects of psychological warfare by R. Sorensen, sociometry by Nehnevajsa, statistics by R. Francis, typology by J. McKinney and C. Loomis, role theory and sociodrama by J. Moreno and L. Zeleny, sociology and anthropology by Voget, sociology and social work by P. Smith, and sociology and American Catholics by Mundy.

The second part presents synthetic views of sociological developments in a variety of national or regional settings abroad. It involves chapters on Great Britain by MacRae, France by Cuvillier, the Low Countries by Gadourek, Scandinavia by Boalt Carlsson, and Öste, Germany by König, Austria by Knoll, Spain by Arboreya, Portugal by Machado, Switzerland by Girod, Italy by Pellizzi, Latin America by Williamson, Russia, the Ukraine and Satellite Europe by Roucek, Japan by Chikazawa and H. Smythe, China by M. Fried, India by Saran, Indonesia and Southeast Asia by van der Kroef, Middle East by L. Armstrong, Israel by Bar-Joseph and Weintraub, Africa by C. Williams, South Africa by Pauw, and Canada by Elkin.

ROSCOE C. HINKLE

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POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

RICHARD LAPIERRE. *The Freudian Ethic*. Pp. x, 299. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1959. \$5.00.

We stand thoroughly in need of a good sociological study of the impact of psychoanalysis on contemporary American cul-

ture; this book, however, is nothing of the sort. It is, in fact, an ill-tempered and ill-informed pamphleteering broadside.

One finds it hard to believe that someone who claims seriously to have studied Freud's work can write that "he was in all respects antagonistic to society" or that "the Freudian theory of man assures us that no one can really be expected to be socially responsible" or that "to Freud . . . men of enterprise are neither villains nor heroes—they are neurotics." Such passages, and they abound, cannot be said to be part of scholarly discourse.

Professor LaPierre distorts the past and caricatures the present. He lacks a sense of historical scholarship when he writes that medieval men of finance were "invariably Jews" or that the Church "had for long discouraged all enterprises except those undertaken under religious auspices (e.g., the building of cathedrals was sanctioned, whereas the construction of roads, harbors, etc., was not)." He caricatures the present when he writes that "organized labor . . . has given, to a considerable extent, organizational expression to such class qualities as irresponsibility, lack of enterprise, and lack of personal self-reliance."

The author's thesis is simple indeed: The Reformation gave birth to the emergence of a new ethic of enterprise, the enterprising bourgeoisie was responsible for the dynamism of Western and in particular of American society. This ethic is now being challenged by the "Freudian ethic" which is characterized by the absence of constraints and inhibitions, a "lack of any rigorous system of personal-social values and sentiments, and complete absence of any sense of obligation toward others." The "ethic of negation" undermines the sturdy virtues of the entrepreneurs. It threatens, in fact, to lead to the gradual euthanasia of the entrepreneurs and hence to utter depravity and decadence. The Freudian ethic insidiously destroys the fabric of American society and is largely responsible for such nonprotestant institutions as "the permissive home," "the progressive school," "the adjustment motif," "the condonation of crime," and the "political maternalism" of the welfare state. It is also, in a somewhat obscure manner,

held responsible for the decline in the age of first marriage, the rise in the birth rate, and the increase in divorce. "Should the upward trends of the past twenty years continue, the United States would be completely socialized by 1975."

It is, of course, anyone's privilege to look at the contemporary world with a jaundiced eye, but LaPierre's resentment-laden assault upon a psychological school brings to mind Gogol's injunction: "Don't break the mirror if the mug is ugly."

LEWIS A. COSER

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KARL L. POPPER. *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*. Pp. 479. New York: Basic Books, 1959. \$7.50.

This is the author's translation of his *Logik der Forschung*, published in 1934. A well-known and respected contribution to logic and the philosophy of science, it has stimulated many scholars to either vigorous support or heated dissent. Many consider Popper's ideas to be counter to the main stream of logical analysis, and he has initiated additional debates with his claims to Socratic midwifery. Those who know *The Open Society and Its Enemies* or *The Poverty of Historicism* will be gratified to have the logical foundations of Popper's theses available in English. The original text is unaltered but contains many new Appendices; and a new book, *Postscript: After Twenty Years*, is in press with the author's more recent reflections.

Popper's main contentions are these. First, that modern logicians are fallaciously neo-Baconian in their alleged attempt to convert the formalization of scientific language into an *organon* of scientific discovery. To formalize the statements in a scientific theory so that the path from observations to overarching hypothetical construct is syntactically delineated is, for him, the road away from empiricism and into "metaphysics," "essentialism," "post-rationalism"—and in social philosophy, "historicism." To maintain, for example, that quantum mechanics is in the last analysis only a particularly knotty problem for rational linguistic reconstruction is a prime example of such procrustean projects. He

levels this charge most especially at Rudolf Carnap.

Secondly, Popper rejects Carnap's belief that there are two kinds of probability—relative frequency in the long run and probability as the "degree of confirmation" or weight of evidence adduced to confirm an hypothesis. The latter, Popper insists, is mere neorationalism, not empiricism. What we need, he says, is not a mathematically inspired quasi calculation of "weights," but a straightforwardly observational criterion of "falsifiability." No number of supporting instances will exhaust the chances of finding an exception to a given generalization, but one such exception is sufficient to falsify and to disqualify any hypothesis which depended upon the falsified proposition.

Popper's third contention is that this criterion of "falsifiability" is the "principle of demarcation" between genuine science and pseudo or nonscience in both physical and social sciences. He has frequently emphasized that he was led to formulate this rubric while trying to evaluate the theories of Freud, Marx, and others. And, he has indeed applied it mercilessly to expose the "conventionalist stratagems" that have been used to "save" certain physical and social theories; especially the gambit of explaining exceptional instances by integrating them at presumably higher levels of explanation.

Having thus dismissed a large portion of the method of inference, Popper offers his own formalization to establish criteria for "confirmability" and "corroboration" instead of confirmation and verification. But notwithstanding the intellectual discipline and boldness which he exhibits, these ideas are not original with him. Although a "falsifiability" criterion was not explicitly stated by Hume, it is implicit in his views and in many subsequent writings on the "testability" of scientific theories. In construing the idea of "testability" so narrowly as to eliminate all formulations of "falsifiability" earlier and less formalized than his own, Popper has done justice neither to the logic nor the history of science. Even "degree of confirmation" depends upon tests which in practice can always result in falsification. This can be found, for

example, in Herschel (*Natural Philosophy* [1845], p. 10); Cohen (*Reason and Nature* [1931], Ch. 3), and in Cohen and Nagel's elementary text [1934]. Mach's view of scientific laws as "Einschränkungen der Möglichkeiten" is in the same general family. The "falsifiability" criterion itself is stated by Peirce (*Papers*, 7.182 and 7.206). The general view of scientific explanation to which Popper has contributed and which is best known, probably, through the work of Hempel, is also found unformalized in *Reason and Nature* and in F. H. Bradley's *Principles of Logic*, a work much respected by Cohen. Many of Popper's Appendices deal with these points, and a number of them are cluttered with elaborate chronological reconstructions of conversations, correspondence, and discussions (as an example, pp. 311-317), meant to corroborate his originality.

Popper does concede (pp. 206-207 and 206n) that he now sees some arguments as "rationally arguable" even though not falsifiable and still "metaphysical." Does this concession shift the demarcation line between pseudo and real science? Or draw two lines? Into what provinces will he now put historical explanation, macro-economics (especially welfare economics), and both historical and analytical sociology? Now, a triage criterion for theories is valuable when confronting a genuine ideology—any ideology. A characteristic of ideologies is the labyrinthine rationalization of "confirming" instances, according to pre-conceptions of relevancy and of what constitutes a social fact. Ideologists as different as Burke and Marx attack others' "perspectives," these criteria of relevance and factuality, with "confirmations" and "falsifications." And, indeed, overly soft theories are suspect. But it is also to be recalled that conservatives from Burke to Buckley have insisted that mere mortal man's myopia precludes the perspective required for any general descriptive theories of society, let alone any normative decisions allegedly warranted by them. Popper does not explicitly claim a necessary connection between his own logic of science and a social philosophy; but his insistence on a documented history of "stubbornness"—a commendable precaution—is hardly

conducive to creativity; it is rather, a modern sophisticated warrant for the social status quo, not totally incompatible with Popper's other writings on such issues.

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CONWAY ZIRKLE. *Evolution, Marxian Biology, and the Social Scene*. Pp. 527. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1959. \$7.50.

The present volume is unique among the books of the Darwin year. Professor Zirkle, who, in addition to botanical studies, has written numerous works on historical aspects of evolution and genetics, is also the author of *Death of a Science in Russia*. The latter deals at length with the Lysenko affair and its implications for science and society. This study continues the analysis on a larger canvas and in a larger sphere. To indicate "the extent to which Marxian biology has infected our culture and our learned specialties," Professor Zirkle has selected English and American literature together with sociology as typical. "Marxian quackery," the more insidious since specialism has driven a wedge in knowledge, has become socially pernicious because of the growth of population genetics and its increasing complexity. The rate of distortion, now intensified, threatens individual integrity and the future of society.

The ascription of a special variety of "quackery" to Marx and to the founders of communism is not convincing. Marx and Engels were frequently unclear, and their unclarity was confounded by their double role as social theorists and political propagandists. Followers of the Red Prussian, however famous for perfecting the art of the "official line," are notorious for a highly pragmatic use of history including their own. David Joravsky (*Journal of the History of Ideas*, XX, January, 1959, pp. 85-104) suggests that the data are much more complicated than Zirkle's interpretation indicates.

By endowing the communist line with a constancy it may not possess, Zirkle is able to establish connections between the "Marxian syndrome" and distortions of

social theory. The existence of distortions, conscious and unconscious, is not at issue. But the history of what is confusedly called Social Darwinism in America, for example, has a conservative side. Carnegie and Sumner have nothing to do with Marx and his colleagues. And it is hard to see how Lester F. Ward and James Harvey Robinson, two representatives of the "radical" wing, were in any sense affiliated to Marxian dogma. Like conclusions do not inexorably stem from the same premises. When they are assumed to do so, the result is likely to be confusion by intellectual association. The chapters which trace the history of evolutionary theory and genetic developments are excellent summaries; those dealing with social theory and literary expression are not.

BERT JAMES LOEWENBERG

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KARIN DOVRING. *Road of Propaganda: The Semantics of Biased Communication*. Pp. 158. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. \$4.75.

Road of Propaganda: The Semantics of Biased Communication by Karin Dovring professes to analyze systematically the uses and abuses of propaganda in mass communications. It is the work of a Swedish scholar who is now Visiting Professor at the International University of Social Studies, Pro Deo, Rome.

The book contains an Introduction by Harold D. Lasswell, Professor of Law and Political Science at Yale University, whose work in the field of propaganda analysis is well known.

Dr. Lasswell lauds Dr. Dovring's book and says it is an important step towards according the recognition it deserves to a technique of modern social sciences.

I cannot agree with him. "Gobbledygook" is often referred to as the bane of social science. The obfuscation social scientists practice in their works is a great hindrance, hazard, and handicap to public recognition or understanding of this important field.

This book caps the climax. It combines the worse features of obfuscatory "gobbledygook" with an apparent complete lack

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The book has a Table of Contents which lists chapter headings as "The Communication Process," "Attention," "Interest," "Influence or Understanding?," "Afterthought." But nowhere has the author or publisher been able to translate these headings into meanings comprehensible to the reader.

Some years ago a member of the Institute of Semantics came to see me and asked me to comment on a pamphlet explaining semantics to the public. I returned it with a short note saying that I could not understand a word of it.

EDWARD L. BERNAYS

New York City

LILLIAN PARKER WALLACE and WILLIAM C. ASKEW (Eds.). *Power, Public Opinion, and Diplomacy: Essays in Honor of Eber Malcolm Carroll by His Former Students*. Pp. xiv, 421. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1959. \$8.75.

The eleven essays in this volume, written "to illuminate certain aspects of the history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries" (p. v), were inspired by the desire of the contributors to express their gratitude for the guidance and inspiration furnished them while working for their doctorates by E. Malcolm Carroll, now Emeritus Professor of History at Duke University.

Except for the final essay, "Two Constants in Russian Foreign Policy," the writers employ the method of meticulous

and methodical historical research to reveal the foreign policy goals and maneuverings of European statesmen occupying high office or seeking to attain it at the expense of their rivals at home and their enemies abroad. Thus the actions, interactions, and motivations of strong political personalities playing for high stakes in a sharply competitive international struggle for power and prestige, are the chief concerns of the essayists.

The principal dramatis personae in the first essay are Pope Pius IX and Lord Palmerston. The Pope, "absolute ruler of the oldest institution in Europe," and the British Foreign Secretary, "the representative in international affairs of Europe's oldest national government," became estranged after Pius abandoned liberalism and constitutional government. Palmerston then ceased his efforts to have Protestant England draw closer to the Holy See and prophesied that the papacy eventually would disintegrate. However, since being divested of the temporal power, it has been able to "recover its spiritual ascendancy and carry its religious leadership to heights not hitherto reached" (p. 46).

Succeeding essays, with their minute probings of the political scene, make further contributions to a detailed understanding of European political alignments and rivalries in the decades before World War I and to the troubled aftermath from which World War II was to emerge.

The final essay offers the thesis that the prime factors which have determined Russian foreign policy "from the reign of the first prince of Muscovy to the present time are . . . geography and the Russian character" (p. 343). These "two constants" account for the "extreme consistency" of Russian policy through the centuries, whatever the regime. Russian rulers, chronically suspicious of and hostile to the West, asserted a "historic mission" to unite all the Russian people in one sovereign state. In the process they gathered in many non-Russians as well. Likewise under communism the Russian Empire has been further enlarged, and Russian domination extended through the medium of the so-called "people's democracies" (p. 344). Now the "mission" is to preserve communist doc-

trines from corruption and disseminate them throughout the world.

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JAMES COLLINS. *God in Modern Philosophy*. Pp. xii, 476. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1959. \$6.50.

This is a study of men who have tried to answer the question: How can we know God if such knowledge is possible? And if it is not possible, can belief in God be defended? The survey begins with Cusanus, Calvin, and Bruno. Cusanus and Calvin have little confidence in the natural powers of the human mind to gain knowledge of God. So they point instead to faith and revelation. Bruno rejects revelation and Christian faith, claiming to know God as cosmic unity.

These answers to the question are so unsatisfactory that they lead to the skepticism of Montaigne, Charron, Gassendi, and Huett. Some welcome skepticism regarding all knowledge because faith is then free to accept belief without hindrance from the claims of knowledge.

When the idea of God is thus released from claims to prior systems of knowledge it is appropriated by Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz to complete and give cogency to the comprehensive philosophical system developed by each. This use of the idea of God brings on the criticism of the empiricists, Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, and Hume. These thinkers reduce belief in God to a probability defended for its moral, political, and other practical uses. For Hume even this moral utility is lacking. This led Bayle, Holbach, and Diderot to reject all belief in God but they were opposed by the natural theology of Wolff, Voltaire, and Rousseau, although these three were very much opposed to one another in the way they defended belief in God.

All this was very unsatisfactory to Kant and Hegel who came forth to "prove" by comprehensive systems that belief in God is justified, Kant by pointing to what is necessary to render the moral imperative reasonable, Hegel by identifying God with the dialectical movement by which the Ab-

solute realizes itself in human consciousness.

Kant provided no knowledge of God, only justified the belief; while Hegel's absolute swallowed up the concrete individual and all actual existence into the absolute so that the concrete individual and all actual things became unreal when taken in their own right. This led Feurbach, Marx, and Nietzsche to atheism and induced Kierkegaard to repudiate all attempts to know God by intellectual inquiry, even while he defended belief in God with passion.

The author of this book thinks that none of the ways to God examined by him is convincing; but he claims there is a reliable way to know God even though it has not yet been fully developed. Throughout the volume he hints at what this better way might be but does not carry it far enough to show the outline of it.

HENRY NELSON WIEMAN

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PHILIP C. JESSUP and HOWARD J. TAUBENFELD. *Controls for Outer Space and the Antarctic Analogy*. Pp. xi, 379. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. \$6.00.

I mean it as a compliment—this is a scholarly Jules Verne. Under one cover we have Outer Space and the Antarctic Analogy. Without having been to either place, one can still feel—and I think "feel" is the right word for this forward-looking book—that the subject is urgently important and that the treatment is solid but imaginative.

Essentially this is an exploration of the problems and opportunities of international control. As the authors state, the book is concerned with a choice of alternatives: will there be in these areas the ageless national power struggles or an international solution? Perhaps the key paragraph in the book is: "Regardless of the nature of the activity involved, the record makes it clear that some form of international organization may readily be created and utilized when there is a conviction that it would serve a useful purpose. This is the

central point which must be kept in mind as one comes to look at the future of Antarctica and of outer space" (p. 116).

Will states so decide? The authors almost make one think that such will happen.

Something of a hero emerges—the co-operating scientist. And the well-known political scientists state, "It is difficult to assert dogmatically that national security would be prejudiced by seeking to secure international agreement on the future of outer space" (p. 221).

Indeed, after reviewing joint actions in history, including the International Geophysical Year, the authors are optimistic, in conclusion: "The experiences reviewed in this book show that through a long stretch of history states have evolved a variety of devices for co-operative and administrative activities whenever it seemed to them desirable to have a joint rather than a single nation regime. . . . The need and the incentive have never been greater than now. Steadily the trend on the face of the earth has been toward organized multinational action in the common interest. There will be no reversal of that trend as man moves on into outer space" (p. 282).

But before we relax into this comfort, or to the "comforting air" of "limited war," perhaps we should recall that some pages earlier (p. 269) the authors have written: ". . . Functionalism can be highly productive; it can never be what it is sometimes apparently intended to be, a substitute for a workable political solution."

RICHARD H. HEINDEL

President
Wagner College

REINHOLD NIEBUHR. *The Structure of Nations and Empires: A Study of the Recurring Patterns and Problems of the Political Order in Relation to the Unique Problems of the Nuclear Age*. Pp. xi, 306. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959. \$5.00.

Dr. Niebuhr's new book is the serious work of a man rightly perturbed by the overwhelming political problems of the nuclear age and rightly skeptical of all the fashionable panaceas for them. It is

marred by a number of errors of fact, historical and contemporary, some trivial, some, for example, an overestimate of the role of "aid" in Soviet penetration in the under-developed countries rather more serious. But none affect the basic argument.

We must, he tells us, give up believing that our age is unique except in the terror of the weapons at its disposal. History has always known of empires that have sought to justify themselves by an assumption of unique virtue; and much of the core of the book treats of this phenomenon as it has shown itself in the ancient world, in medieval Europe, Byzantine and Western, and in the Islamic world. It is in the last of these that Dr. Niebuhr sees the nearest approach to the secular utopianism of modern Soviet communism. Medieval western Europe perhaps illustrates the fundamental dilemma facing man who has to take note of both the absolute and the contingent. Either he may regard them as wholly disparate and thereby fall into the view that what happens in the earthly realm does not matter, as with some of the early Fathers and again in a different way with Luther. Or he may believe that the secular power can itself be wholly the instrument of righteousness and end up by obliterating the difference between the two realms.

But the failures of the medieval Empire and Papacy illustrate another important fact, the strength of the organic elements in human societies that contribute to the making of nations. What Dr. Niebuhr has to say about nationalism in its different forms is well worth saying; but his main point is that we in the West must also cease to regard our ways and views as the only possible ones, accept both the fact that we have overrated the importance of conscious contrivance in politics—a typically American error as the author sees it—and that we may have less to offer the uncommitted world than we believe. In other words, if we are to make anything of competitive coexistence with the Russians which nothing short of universal destruction can relieve us of—unless and until the Soviet system evolves internally into something else—it must be on a basis of greater modesty.

Some may say that Dr. Niebuhr is too modest on the West's behalf and too oblivious of the positive values of transcending our nationalisms not through imperialism or artificial devices for "collective security" but through the building of international communities intermediate between the nation-state and mankind as a whole. But anyone who wishes to argue in this way must think as deeply about the problems of authority and consent in many different settings as Dr. Niebuhr has.

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**INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION FOR
SOCIAL WELFARE—A NEW REALITY**

Special Editor of this Volume

HERTHA KRAUS, Ph.D.
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and Social Research
Bryn Mawr College*

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FOREWORD

This volume of THE ANNALS * was planned to inform interested readers about the current expansion of an area in international co-operation, as yet little known, and quite often seen in a rather limited perspective. American and international agencies have often solicited financial contributions so that they might provide help for victims of war, persecution, famine, and other catastrophes. We have thus become familiar with international relief activities designed to meet the minimum necessities for sheer survival. In a deeply disturbed world, harboring many pockets of intense human suffering, the need for such aid created by local emergency conditions and special pressures still exists.

In recent years, however, extending beyond this limited concept and traditional administration of international aid, there has developed an increasingly vigorous and inspired international movement—a beginning of concerted social action toward new long-range goals: a higher level of human welfare, a lesser degree of human wastage.

Across cultural, economic, and political boundaries, we have started to build a new pattern of sustained interaction, involving many levels of government, many types of agencies both national and international, and focusing on major social problems as they affect the common man. Thus, in an era of great instability and serious tensions, we also witness the slow unfolding of a new ethic of mutual aid expressed in a truly international exploration of policies and the development of programs which may eventually produce a higher level of living, more human satisfactions, and greater human opportunity everywhere.

Many different channels and relationships have been built to translate such novel objectives into operational programs. A wide range of methods and techniques are being tested: Civic participation technical competence; development of leadership on the grass roots level at every level in co-operative undertakings; fitting national and international resources to each country's priorities and social objectives.

The articles in this volume were designed to provide a balanced introduction to this complex, challenging field, which is still at an early stage of development. Inevitably, limitations of time and space have only allowed a very condensed presentation of much important material; they have also caused the omission of some helpful illustrative data that cover other approaches, as well as other areas of the world.

We are most grateful to the highly qualified authors who contributed so generously of their experiences, their insights, and expectations to this volume.

The American people, with a superb tradition of faith in the value and dignity of every human being, should be ready to accept social development as an independent goal—with all its policy, educational, and professional implications—and should be prepared to recognize the recent direction in the social field as a matter of deep national and international concern.

It is rightly demanded of us to provide effective contributions and an increasingly strong foundation of encouragement and moral support for this broadening area

of world-wide peaceful interaction, with its rich potential for human growth, greater productivity, and greater mutual trust.

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* Concerned with strengthening public awareness of the role of social welfare programs in the international field, the Committee on International Social Welfare of the Philadelphia Area Chapter of the National Association of Social Workers took the initiative in crystalizing this venture. The special editor would also like to acknowledge the encouragement and support, and many helpful suggestions, provided by a number of knowledgeable individuals consulted in the process of planning.

The Challenge of World-wide Social Conditions*

By JULIA J. HENDERSON

ABSTRACT: In the fifteen years since World War II, the international community has seen marked progress in prolonging life, providing education for children, and in increasing the world food supply. Progress in the struggle against poverty and bad housing is much less notable, and the achievements in lessening social tensions, in increasing human dignity, and other qualitative aspects of the standard of living are not measurable by the rough indicators we have at our disposal. The attempt to reach a new synthesis in the economic and social aspects of the development of less-developed countries, the widespread approval of governmental planning for social as well as economic development, the growth of public responsibility for welfare of the total population, and the attention given to rural as well as urban development are cited as important postwar developments in the philosophy and methods of international co-operation. The concern about extending assistance in ways which stimulate active participation of the people is a hopeful response to the world social situation. Finally, the importance of basing assistance on mutual respect—with every country acting both as donor and recipient—is stressed in this co-operation.

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* This article is based upon the relevant findings of the research staff of the United Nations Bureau of Social Affairs and the specialized agencies which co-operate in the preparation of the series of reports on the World Social Situation. It is also a brief presentation of Miss Henderson's own reflections on these findings so far as a program of international action is concerned. These views are stated on her own responsibility and not that of the United Nations Secretariat.

SEVEN years ago the United Nations set forth the challenge of world-wide social conditions in the following terms:

... more than half the population of the world is still living at levels which deny them a reasonable freedom from preventable disease; a diet adequate to physical well-being; a dwelling that meets basic human needs; the education necessary for improvement and development; and conditions of work that are technically efficient, economically rewarding and socially satisfactory.¹

THE POSTWAR PROBLEM

This picture represented the world, as we found it, at a point midway between the holocaust of World War II and the present day. The cost of the war in terms of broken families, orphans, homeless people, refugees, the physically and mentally handicapped, bad health, lost education, was still acutely felt in Europe, but the forces of recovery were at work. Millions of skilled and semi-skilled workers were back in the factories and on the farms, social institutions were being rebuilt, and natural resources remained in abundance in many parts of Europe. Thus when outside capital was forthcoming, economic recovery was achieved with relative speed. This is not to say that important social problems do not remain unsolved fifteen years after World War II but the basic question of economic security for the family is no longer a major problem in most of Europe or in North America.

The chronic problems of poverty, illiteracy, and ill-health in the economically less-developed countries have yielded much more slowly to widespread efforts to improve conditions. The lesser achievements result not only from the immensity of the areas and populations

¹ *The Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation* (United Nations, New York, 1952), p. 4.

affected but also from the deep-rooted social character of these problems. Nevertheless, United Nations surveys and special studies made by the specialized agencies as well as by national institutions show that considerable headway has been made during the last decade in achieving higher standards of health and of education in these regions. The battle against poverty has not gained as much ground. Poor housing and many forms of social disorganization remain serious problems in both industrial and nonindustrial countries, in some countries even appearing to increase in light of demographic trends.

The pages which follow will attempt to provide some perspective for judging the major social problems of our time and the efforts made by international, bilateral, national, and voluntary groups to "promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom."² It must be recognized at the outset that the statistical evidence which can be adduced to support generalization about the various components in the standards of living is still very scanty and unreliable in large parts of the world and that our judgments must often rest, therefore, on the testimony of national governments and of informed observers in the social field. It is difficult enough to measure in quantitative terms the rise in levels of health or nutrition. It is problematical to what extent an increase of school-age children in school measures a real advance in levels of education. The levels of real wages on a comparative basis are still more elusive.³ The problems of nonmaterial factors in

² Preamble to the *Charter of the United Nations*.

³ These problems of definition and measurement of standards and levels of living have been elaborated by a series of expert committees convened by the United Nations and the specialized agencies. See *Definition and Measurement of Standards and Levels of Living* (United Nations, New York, 1953).

the social situation such as human freedom remain completely in the qualitative realm. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights and its Subcommittee on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities keep these questions under review, not only through governmental reports covering the implementation of basic human rights through legislation and law enforcement but also through the reports of special rapporteurs on such subjects as discrimination in education and in religion.⁴ The status of women, which has an important bearing on the social situation around the world, also receives special scrutiny in terms of legislation for extending political and property rights and in terms of the opportunities of women and girls for education and employment.

No assessment of world social conditions—whether we speak of material or nonmaterial aspects of our lives—can be isolated from the basic demographic facts of our time. The rate of population growth may spell the difference between victory or defeat in our struggle to raise the levels of living in the economically underdeveloped regions and to protect and promote human freedom.

THE WORLD DEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION

The "population explosion" is now so widely discussed in America, in Europe, and among the leaders in most Asian countries that it is not necessary to belabor the question in this article. Quite apart from the fact that 2.5 billion people lived on the planet in 1950 and that present rates of growth would add

another 2 billion by 1980,⁵ a number of features in the demographic situation demand special attention by economists, social scientists, and planners. These are the geographic distribution of the world's population in relation to its natural resources, the age structure of the population, and the rate of urbanization.

With all the reservations which must be made on demographic statistics in large parts of the world, it can be reasonably estimated that one half of the world's population lives in monsoon Asia.⁶ Within this region, the concentration of population in countries already facing tremendous problems of poverty, illiteracy, and ill health, presents the most serious challenge to national and international economic and social policies and programs. All available estimates indicate that the share of the world's population living in this region will continue to rise.⁷ There is, of course, much discussion concerning the probable effects of increased industrialization on fertility rates in these countries but the action taken thus far has not stemmed the flood tide.

Asia is not the only region of the world destined to have its share of the world's population enlarged; in the course of the century in which we live, the population of Latin America is likely to grow tenfold. The rate of growth in Africa will be accelerated but its share in the total will change only slightly. If present trends prevail, there will be a continuing decline in the relative importance of Europe—including the Soviet Union—even though European population will double within the century. The proportions for Northern America and Oceania which rose until

⁴ See the *Human Rights Yearbook* of the United Nations and the reports of Mr. Charles Ammoun "Study of Discrimination in Education" (E/CN.4/Sub.2/181/Rev.1) and of Mr. A. Krishnaswami "Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices" (E/CN.4/Sub.2/200).

⁵ *The Future Growth of World Population* (United Nations, New York, 1958).

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *The Population of South-East Asia* (United Nations, 1958).

the middle of the century, are likely to fall off in the second half of the century.⁸ These facts are of crucial importance to the whole world and, in particular, to those directly concerned with development of natural resources, agricultural productivity, and industrialization.

Age distribution

Of even greater short-run importance to social planners than the over-all increase in the size of the population and its concentration in underdeveloped regions, is the age distribution of the population. With the success of health measures in reducing infant mortality and lengthening the life span, the percentage of the population in so-called "dependency" status is also growing in the countries which can least afford the burden of more food, clothing, shelter, and education. The continuing high birth rates together with the falling mortality rates have resulted in ratios estimated at 40 per cent of the total population in the age groups under fifteen, while the range of this ratio in European countries is 20-30 per cent. The effect of this situation on the problem of education is illustrated by the fact that if the Brazilians, the Muslims of Algeria, or the Chinese in Taiwan could reduce their ratio of school-age children per one-hundred workers to the level of the United Kingdom, the outlay on education per child could be doubled without increasing the share of national income devoted to education.⁹ The picture of dependency at the other end of the scale is not so clear since a vast majority of economically active males in Asia, Africa, and most of Latin America are still engaged in agriculture. In these countries, papers prepared for the last

⁸ *The Future Growth of World Population*, op. cit.

⁹ *Report on the World Social Situation* (New York, 1957), p. 26.

World Population Conference showed that 78.5 per cent of the male population of sixty-five and over was still economically active, while only 40 per cent of males in this age group in the industrialized countries was still active.¹⁰ The family structure in the economically less-developed countries as well as the economic organization makes it difficult to define dependency. While the expectation of life at birth is rising in these regions and the death rates are declining at a faster rate than the decline in the industrialized countries, the percentage of the population over sixty years of age is still between 3.5 per cent and 7.7 per cent in Asia while it ranges from 10.1 to 15.7 per cent in Europe and 12.2 per cent in the United States.¹¹

Urbanization

The third demographic factor of utmost importance for international cooperation in social welfare is the movement from rural to urban centers of population—the phenomenon known to demographers and other social scientists as "urbanization."¹² The additional billions of people on our planet are being concentrated to an increasing degree in our large cities. In 1950 there were some 900 metropolitan cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants whose total population had reached over 300 million; cities of more than 20,000 contained at the same date more than 500 million people or one fifth of the world's total population. Every eleventh person

¹⁰ "Age Structure and Labour Supply," *Proceedings of the World Population Conference*, Papers: Vol. III (E/Cnf.13/415), pp. 571-592.

¹¹ *Report on the World Social Situation* (New York, 1957), p. 23.

¹² United Nations findings on "Social Problems of Urbanization in Economically Under-Developed Areas" were published as Part II of the *Report on the World Social Situation* (New York, 1957), and were summarized by the author in an article prepared for *The Annals*, Vol. 314, November 1957, pp. 147-155.

in Africa, every eighth in Asia, every fifth in Central America, every fourth in South America, every third European, and almost every second person in North America was living in 1950 in a city of over 20,000 people.¹³ These regional averages hide wide variations among countries of each region. For example, in Latin America, the urban population varied in 1950 from 5 per cent in Haiti to 48 per cent in Argentina, from 8 per cent in Pakistan to 42 per cent in Japan, from 13 per cent in Yugoslavia to 69 per cent in England and Wales. Nevertheless the common and significant fact from a social point of view is the continuing movement of population to the cities and the rate of the growth of cities. While the rate of urbanization appears to have slowed down in England, France, and the United States since 1930, the rate was greatly accelerated in other countries. In the Soviet Union, for example, while the total population increased only 34 per cent in the period 1926-1955, the population in cities of 100,000 or more increased more than four times. The latest—1959—census in the Soviet Union indicates that more than 47 per cent of the population is now living in urban settlements of 3,000 and over.¹⁴ A number of countries in the less-developed regions such as India and the Federation of Malaya appear to be at the beginning of a period of acceleration of the rate of urbanization. Some of the implications of this movement for health, housing, and social welfare of the world's population will be elaborated in later articles in this volume. At this point, it suffices to say that

¹³ Philip M. Hauser, *Implications of Population Trends for Regional and Urban Planning in Asia* (Tokyo, 1958), prepared for the United Nations Seminar on Regional Planning.

¹⁴ *Preliminary Results of the 1959 All-Union Population Census* (census taken 15 January 1959), Communication of the Central Statistical Administration of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union.

the analyses of family structure, age structure, racial composition, and a multitude of other social, economic, and psychological facts about our present-day cities are essential contributions made by the social scientist to the practitioners in the social field. It is here we can economize our limited professional resources.

FAMILY INCOME

The most basic information about the "social condition" of the hundreds of millions of families living in cities or in rural areas concerns the income available to the family to satisfy its needs. Paradoxically it is the most difficult data to obtain because of the complexity of elements entering into such calculations. In the first place, a large part of the world's population is still living on subsistence agriculture, and calculations of money equivalents are not meaningful. Secondly, the prices of consumer goods which have fluctuated violently since the prewar period are as important as wage levels in determining the real wage levels. Thirdly, the number of working members of the family obviously has a tremendous impact on the family level of living, but the wide variations throughout the world in the pattern of working women, child labor, and the contribution of unmarried members of the household make cross-country comparisons mostly unrealistic. Finally, the amount of "social income" such as social insurance, family allowances, free medical care, and free education is highly significant in some countries and insignificant in others. It is little wonder that the countries reporting wage data to the International Labour Office on a regular basis are largely the industrialized countries.¹⁵

Nevertheless, after examining consumer price data and wage data for the

¹⁵ *Report on the World Social Situation* (New York, 1957), p. 106.

period 1939-1954 for twenty countries, the International Labour Office was able to conclude that "real wages in four-fifths of the countries surveyed increased by 10% or more." The median increase was approximately 26 per cent. Even though new inflationary pressures developed in many countries in the period after 1955, there appeared to be some further gains in real wages, even without reference to extensions of social benefits. In the Soviet Union substantial increases in real wages resulted mainly from reductions in consumer prices, increases in social security benefits, and increases in minimum wage levels. To a greater or lesser extent, the same trends were noted in other Eastern European countries. Increases in agricultural wages are also reported by most European countries, including the Soviet Union.¹⁶

The real income of families living on subsistence agriculture may also have shown some gains in recent years if conclusions can be drawn from the impressive increases in food production in this period. The serious food shortages of the early postwar period came to an end but the Food and Agriculture Organization reported in 1957 that "there is little indication that some of the longer-term fundamental problems of world food and agriculture have come appreciably nearer to solution. Food consumption per capita in many less developed countries covering a large part of the world's population still remains below pre-war levels . . ."¹⁷

There exist many other inequities in the distribution of the basic elements of subsistence both between and within countries. The varying increases in national income in the less-developed countries has been accompanied by a growing unevenness in the distribution of this income within the population. In some

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 107-109.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

cases, too, an over-all increase in national income has indicated only that part of the labor force has shifted from rural employment to nominally higher paid urban employment. This shift may not mean a higher level in actual consumption.

In this balance sheet on the family income, however, two further positive factors should be taken into account: first, family incomes have been augmented on a wider scale than ever before through the gradual extension of the scope of social security systems in terms of the risks covered, the new groups of beneficiaries, and the higher levels of benefits. Income from social security has been rising in relation to national income and in terms of per capita annual expenses for social security benefits. Measures have been taken in many industrialized countries to provide increases to meet rises in the cost of living as well as to improve the general level of pensions and of family allowances.¹⁸ The second positive factor is the continuing growth of the labor force, with unemployment held within modest bounds in most countries. However, it cannot be said that either of these factors is important in the less-developed regions where social security schemes still cover a very small percentage of the labor force and where wide-scale underemployment rather than unemployment is the root of continuing poverty.

HEALTH CONDITIONS¹⁹

In no aspect of our lives have more dramatic changes been introduced since 1946 than in the health of the world's

¹⁸ *International Survey of Programmes of Social Development* (United Nations, 1959), Chap. VII.

¹⁹ *Report on the World Social Situation* (New York, 1957), Chap. III. See also the *World Health Survey* (WHO, Geneva, 1959), for a country by country analysis of health conditions.

population. The best testimonials to the success of scientific advances in medicine and to planned and sustained efforts of national and international health authorities are the facts quoted above on the growth of population, the reduction of infant and general mortality, and the rising expectation of life at birth.

This is not to say that important problems do not remain to be solved in the health field—problems of great magnitude and great variety from region to region. Among the infective and parasitic diseases, while malaria, yaws, and syphilis have been brought under control in vast areas of the world, bilharziasis still affected 150,000,000 peoples in the middle of this decade and filariasis another 250,000,000. It is estimated that trachoma and infectious conjunctivitis affected no less than 400,000,000—sometimes whole villages in North Africa and as many as 78 per cent of rural school children in selected villages in India. Leprosy and sleeping sickness remain important health problems, especially in Africa although real progress has been achieved through new methods of treatment and public health measures of prevention and detection. Death rates from tuberculosis have continued to fall although this does not always mean that the prevalence of the disease has decreased. A number of surveys of the disease are under way in Asia and Africa; in some of these countries pulmonary tuberculosis seems to be less common in rural and more common in industrial areas. Virus diseases such as influenza continue to be widely reported but specific control measures are now available for some forms of virus infections. Considerable progress has been made against poliomyelitis which began to appear for the first time in recent years in economically underdeveloped areas. Pneumonia remains among the diseases causing the greatest number

of deaths even in the developed countries where antibiotics are widely used.

Most of these infectious diseases, however, are health problems today primarily in the economically less-developed regions. In the industrialized countries, the chronic degenerative and malignant diseases have become the important causes of mortality and morbidity. Heart disease is now the most frequent cause of death in Northern America, most of Europe, and among the more prosperous segments of the population in other parts of the world. The increased incidence of cancer, especially lung cancer, has caused growing concern.²⁰ The variations between mortality rates between the sexes as well as among industrial countries is now the subject of extensive research on the causes of cancer. Mortality from accidents, particularly motor accidents, has reached alarming proportions in the developed countries. It now appears that in these countries more children, especially boys, die from accidents than from all infective and parasitic diseases.²¹

A positive concept

The state of health throughout the world is not, of course, to be measured only in terms of mortality and morbidity rates nor even in terms of the prevention of specific diseases. The promotion of a positive concept of health, involving the general protection of the individual against sickness and the promotion of a general state of well-being, has been a major objective of the World Health Organization and is now accepted by almost all national health administrations. It is in this area that the ob-

²⁰ In November 1959, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution establishing international prizes for cancer research. (Res. 1398 (XIV) 30 November 1959.)

²¹ "Mortality from Accidents," World Health Organization, *Epidemiological and Vital Statistics Report*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1956.

jectives of health and social welfare specialists are most closely bound together.

The healthy development of children takes the foremost place in most countries dedicated to a positive concept of health. The growth of maternal and child health services and their extension to rural areas, under the stimulation of the United Nations Children's Fund-World Health Organization programs, has contributed materially to an improvement in the health of children. Much greater attention to nutrition problems around the world is required to ensure continued progress in child health; the diet of children in most of the underdeveloped areas is still deficient in animal protein. Research into ways and means of using locally available sources of protein for child-feeding is being carried out in Africa, Central America, and India through national and regional institutions with the assistance of the Food and Agriculture Organization and the United Nations Children's Fund.

Environmental sanitation is a problem which is not limited to economically developed or underdeveloped countries. In the developed group, continuing supervision of water supplies, sewage collection and disposal, and food hygiene programs have greatly reduced transmission of disease. The problems of air and water pollution, toxic effects of insecticides, food additives, and atomic radiation are growing in scope with our technological progress and our rapid urbanization. While the less-developed countries are also suffering the environmental sanitation problems of overcrowded and unplanned cities, the principal problems still lie in the improvement of water supply, excreta disposal, and control of insects for the rural population.

Finally, the state of mental health must be noted even though its assess-

ment on a world-wide basis is far beyond our existing knowledge—or our space in this article. We are informed that in some of the economically developed countries nearly half of the existing hospital beds are occupied by the mentally ill. To what extent this situation is related to the problems of old age, to psychological stresses and strains, to the attitudes of family and community toward mental illness, and even to the availability of mental health services no one is yet prepared to say. Because many studies have indicated that the causes of mental illness often occur in early childhood and that the normal development of the child in relation to his parents, his family, and his society is of vital importance, mental health activities are being given increasing attention by both health and welfare departments.

The availability of health services to the whole population is also an important element in the world health situation. The quality of service largely depends on adequate numbers of trained personnel and secondarily on physical facilities, equipment, and medical supplies. The wide variations between countries in number of physicians and hospital beds in relation to population are set out in the most recent *Report on the World Social Situation* (1957). These calculations show, for example, that while Israel had one physician for every 400 in her population, the Soviet Union one for every 600, and the United States one for every 760, Ethiopia had one physician for 210,000 and Afghanistan, Liberia, and Cambodia one for every 90,000. The number of hospital beds available also show tremendous variation, but since these beds as well as fully trained doctors are often concentrated in urban areas, the data are only significant if studied in conjunction with the availability of rural health centers and of auxiliary health personnel.

Extensive programs for training such auxiliary or "para-medical" personnel have brought health services within the reach of millions of people in recent years.

EDUCATION²²

The goal of creating a healthy and literate society has been accepted by all governments, and for many of the non-self-governing and newly independent countries it has become a major preoccupation in their political response to popular demand and in their public expenditure. In Ghana, for example, school enrollments increased from 183,283 to 578,249, that is, 315.5 per cent in the ten years, 1946–1956, immediately preceding independence and in French Equatorial Africa from 35,986 to 149,166, that is, 414.5 per cent in the same period. Throughout the world, a tremendous expansion of primary education has taken place, in particular, to reach the goal of universal, free, and compulsory education or to cope with the rising tide of school-age children. At some point between 1950 and 1955, the United Nations Economic and Social Council estimated that we crossed the half-way mark in school enrollments—that 300,000,000 children between the ages of five and fourteen were in school out of a total population of 550,000,000 in that age group. This represented a gain of 18 per cent between the years 1950 and 1954.

As in other factors in the world social situation, however, the progress is very uneven indeed. About seventy-five countries with more than 60 per cent of the world's population are still some dis-

tance from the goal of universal education. In twenty relatively small countries, mostly in Africa, less than 20 per cent of school-age children are in school despite considerable effort. In a few countries the number of children who do not receive any schooling is increasing because the child population is rising faster than school facilities. Nevertheless, analysis of the available statistics shows that most of the less-developed countries have made significant progress in raising their enrollment ratios since 1950.

During the same period, secondary school enrollment has increased, on the whole, faster than primary school enrollment in countries at all levels of development—in some cases because of legal measures to prolong compulsory education but in many instances simply because of a de facto lengthening of school life. In many countries this has led to a serious re-examination of the aims, form, and content of secondary education. The broad trend indicates a tendency to blur the distinction between "academic" and "vocational" education. This has taken place in countries as widely different as India, Sweden, and the Soviet Union, where Mr. Khrushchev introduced a great debate on secondary education by his speech in September 1958 "Concerning the strengthening of the ties between school and life and the future development of the system of public education." The demand for more technical school graduates has also been rising markedly as countries increased the tempo of their development programs and has received considerable attention from educators and administrators.

For all types of school education, both the industrialized countries and the economically underdeveloped countries are facing serious problems of teacher-shortage, heavy investment in school buildings, and adequate supplies of teaching

²² These facts are drawn from three main sources: *The Report on the World Social Situation* (1957); the *International Survey of Programmes of Social Development* (1959) and the *Report on Education in Non-Self-Governing Territories* (document A/4131), (July 1959). The relevant chapters have in each case been prepared by UNESCO.

materials. In addition, many countries without enforced compulsory schooling for a fixed period are confronted with problems of wastage and retardation. In India, for example, a study by the Ministry of Education showed that of every one-hundred pupils in class I in 1949-1950 only forty-three were studying in class IV in 1952-1953. In Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, this problem is especially acute among girls. In the view of all educational authorities, this situation represents an intolerable waste of scarce educational resources. In many cases, however, it does not only represent a voluntary withdrawal from school but also results from rural primary school programs which offer four years of schooling or even less. These difficulties are obviously not only budgetary problems for governments but also are closely interlocked with poverty and with the social values of the family and the community.

While primary, secondary, and technical education have received most of the funds available for education in recent years, the problem of reducing the widespread adult illiteracy has also required attention by governments seeking to raise their economic levels and their standards of living. At the mid-point in this decade, nearly one third of all countries still had less than 20 per cent literacy. Slightly more than half had estimated literacy rates of 50 per cent or more. Out-of-school education programs have been undertaken in a fairly large number of less-developed countries under the aegis of fundamental education or community development programs. The use of radio, public libraries, and museums and new attempts to provide reading materials for new literates have all been expended during the past several years. In the industrial countries, the broadening of adult education and the use of educational television to meet new technological needs of our

civilization have been noteworthy developments.

Finally one must look beyond the immediate problems of combatting illiteracy and extending education to all children of school-age to the smaller but equally vital question of providing higher education. The number of university students has been growing so rapidly throughout the world that the facilities in all countries are strained. There is no end in sight of the trend for a higher proportion of students to seek admission to universities as secondary education expands, job requirements become higher, and the increase in child population after the war arrives at university age. New universities are being established in many countries and old ones expanded. The variations from country to country are, of course, tremendous. In most of the African countries and territories, less than 20 students per 100,000 population are enrolled in institutions of higher education, while in India it was 147 per 100,000 in 1953, in the Soviet Union the number was 613 per 100,000 in 1955 and in the United States it was 1,816 in the same year. It is natural that the demand for educated leadership will drive the numbers of applications upward at a fast rate. The number of institutions will have to be expanded more rapidly or the access drastically limited.

HOUSING ²³

The limited successes which nations have achieved in the fields of health, education, nutrition, wages, and social security for the most part cannot be said to extend to housing. The stand-

²³ The summary of the world situation in housing is kept to an absolute minimum in this article in view of the special article in this issue on mutual aid for low-cost housing (see p. 107). See also the *Report on the World Social Situation* (1957), pp. 131-134 and the *International Survey of Programmes of Social Development* (1959), Chap. IV.

ards of housing have deteriorated in many countries for a multitude of reasons. These include the rapid increase in population, the augmented rate of urbanization, the higher investment required for urban housing, and the relatively low priority most governments attach to the problem. In particular the supply of housing available to low-income groups continues to be inadequate, even critical in some countries, exacting a heavy toll in terms of human health and happiness.

In the free-enterprise countries, the gap between the cost of dwellings that meet modern standards and the amount that low-income families can afford to pay continues to widen. In the centrally planned economies, the supply of public housing, although improving in recent years, barely keeps pace with natural population increase and migration to the cities.

For every traveller, the pattern of the urban peripheral slum, with its shacks of mud, tar-paper, and bits of wood, has now become commonplace. The dilapidated "old city" with its densely occupied tenements side by side with a modern commercial, administrative, and upper-class residential center is almost taken for granted. The condition of rural dwellings in much of the world is not so much remarked. There is a dearth of precise knowledge and there persists the romantic notion that housing is not so important as long as one has clean air and plenty of space. Unfortunately this picture usually overlooks the squalid huts huddled in villages with little or no ventilation, with one room for cooking, sleeping, and living during months of rain and torrid heat or bitter cold.

In this decade, housing has become a political problem in developed and underdeveloped countries alike. Most governments have assumed some degree of responsibility for housing, often be-

ginning with housing for their civil servants. In many developing countries, industries have been required by law to provide housing for their workers. Everywhere governments have found the financial burden of providing housing so great that private building is encouraged and in many areas ancient traditions of mutual aid and co-operation in house-building are being combined with technical aid to provide more housing.

GROUPS IN NEED OF SPECIAL CARE ²⁴

In addition to the basic problems which must be faced in raising the standards of living of whole populations and even of depressed areas within otherwise prosperous industrial countries, there exist in every country a series of special social problems which cannot be automatically "cured" by application of drugs, education, increased productivity of agriculture and industry, or even of outside capital. These are the social problems of the orphan, the handicapped, the refugee, the adult offender, or the juvenile delinquent. There has been little effort so far to measure the size of these groups in global terms since definitions vary substantially from country to country but as services to cope with each of these problems have expanded a clearer understanding of their scope and nature has emerged in many countries.

Children deprived of normal home life were, of course, a high priority problem in the Western consciousness after World War II but the extent to which the problem continues as a result of such political upheavals as the partition of India and Pakistan and events in Korea, Indo-China, and Hungary will be reflected in the succeeding ar-

²⁴ Information on these problems is included in Part II of the 1957 edition of the *Report on the World Social Situation* and in Chapter VIII of the 1959 edition of the *International Survey of Programmes of Social Development*.

ticle on refugees. Unfortunately it cannot even be limited to these man-made catastrophes but must also be related to the world-wide rural-urban migrations, to changes in family structure, and to continuing high birth rates in the face of poverty and bad housing.

The impact of these broad social and economic changes on the life of children is still ill-defined in many parts of the world. We know, for example, that African "urbanization" frequently means that the father goes to the city leaving his wife and children in the village where they may continue to be a part of an "extended" family. He may return to visit them frequently, eventually bring them to the city, or establish a new family in the city. Only a relatively small number of the children find their way into institutions. In Latin America, where the female population of the cities is greater than the male population, different problems predominate and considerable numbers of children born out of wedlock are to be found in institutions since their mothers must work. In many Asian and Middle-East countries it is still common to count many children in "orphanages" who have one or both parents whose willingness—and even eagerness—to place their child in an institution is the opposite face of their poverty, their large family, and their overcrowded housing. In a recent visit to a Central Asian Republic of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I found great pressure for the expansion of boarding schools ostensibly to improve the quality of education but obviously also as relief for the working mother with a large family and one- or two-room apartment.

Other tens of thousands of children with or without normal family attachments are "living by their wits" in the streets of our cities today. It is they who are the subject of mounting national and international concern about

juvenile delinquency.²⁵ The General Assembly of the United Nations has recently emphasized the widespread character of the problem of violence by youth "gangs" as well as the mounting rate of more traditional forms of juvenile delinquency by adopting a resolution urging increasing attention by the United Nations.²⁶

The problem of the physically handicapped, in spite of significant scientific and technical advances in rehabilitation, continues to be in most countries unable to provide minimum economic and social security for their citizens an aggravated and pitiful problem of beggary and human misery. The demonstration centers for modern rehabilitation which have been established in many Asian, Middle Eastern, and Latin-American countries since the war touch only a fraction of the men, women, and children who need special care to enable them to fulfill a useful role in society. The training centers for rehabilitation personnel and the expansion of prosthetic shops able to produce low-cost and effective prostheses offer our best hope for the future.

The question of aging populations, especially in the industrial countries, has been noted above in connection with demographic trends. Although the extension of social security and public assistance schemes in many countries has relieved to some extent the basic problem of subsistence, continuing inflation creates much hardship and anxiety among the aging in the developed countries. The problems of chronic disease and mental health for this group have far outstripped the resources of most communities, even in relatively rich countries. In the economically less-developed countries, where the aged in the

²⁵ *International Review of Criminal Policy*, No. 7-8 (United Nations, 1955).

²⁶ *Juvenile Delinquency* (A/Res./1394 (XIV)).

rural areas continue to find their place in the extended family, the strains produced by urbanization as well as a growing proportion of aged population will in all likelihood increase the scope of the problem considerably in our lifetime.²⁷

CONCLUSIONS

What then is the challenge presented to those of us who have a concern for social welfare on an international scale? Basically it has not changed since 1945 or 1952—in broadest terms, we seek (1) to raise the material standards of living for half the world's population; (2) to assist those groups in need of special care without losing sight of the place of such programs in the total social and economic action of the world community; (3) to give assistance in such ways which will increase the sense of fulfillment of the individual, develop a sense of responsibility in the community, and help to build a strong and developing economy; and (4) to achieve an international co-operation based on mutual aid and mutual respect employing all agencies, national and international, public and private, which have a contribution to make to the achievement of these goals.

There have been some notable developments both in our philosophy and our methods for attacking the social problems of the world over the past fifteen years. Most of these will be discussed in the articles which follow. It may be worthy of special note in this introductory chapter that we have increased considerably our understanding of the interrelationship of economic and social factors in raising standards of living and are perhaps reaching for a new synthesis in the work of social scientists, health

²⁷ *The Aging of Populations and its Economic and Social Implications* (United Nations, 1956).

workers, educators, welfare personnel, economists, and engineers. The attention to planning at all levels in both social and economic fields has grown continuously in the years since the war and has accelerated this search for a new synthesis in the development process. The spread of the idea of public responsibility for the welfare of the whole population, including groups in need of special care, has reflected itself in the demands made on international and bilateral agencies for help in planning, organizing, and administering governmental programs in the social field. The emphasis on developing rural areas, virtually unknown in prewar international efforts, has introduced a concept of "balance" in national development which has had a significant impact on international policies and programs.

Our concern about the manner in which we give assistance in the social welfare field reflects itself in many ways but perhaps most clearly in the community development program. Essentially we are advocating a policy which does not extend technical services to a passive population but which enlists their active participation, educates and organizes them, and creates the local institutions fundamental for continuing growth and adaptation to changing circumstances. We believe that this approach not only produces—or creates the potential for producing—a higher standard of living but develops the qualities in the people and the community which offers the best bulwark for freedom. Another way in which this concern for methods is evident is the growing attention in all international technical assistance to the training of local personnel. Not only the fellowship programs which touch a few thousands each year but also the multiplicity of efforts to train administrators, teachers, technicians, volunteer leaders through the creation and

strengthening of national and local institutions are indicative of this emphasis. Moreover these efforts show the common acceptance of the principle that the object of all assistance is to increase the capacity of the less developed countries and communities to help themselves.

Finally, the challenge of world-wide social conditions is manifestly the challenge to international co-operation itself. In the highly interdependent world which modern communications, economics, and technology have created for us, no nation or community is able to solve its social problems in isolation. It is fundamental not only to "coexistence" but also to co-operation that assistance should be based on genuine mutual re-

spect. It is not the function of international co-operation to export western culture to the "underdeveloped" countries. While western medicine and agricultural and industrial techniques may be welcome everywhere, western ways of life are not always so acceptable. If western countries could find the humility to ask advice on certain problems of family stability, juvenile delinquency, welfare of the aging, or integration of minority groups, it would make a considerable contribution to the climate of international co-operation. The challenge will only be met when we are willing and able to utilize all our resources, wherever they may be located, in the war against poverty, illiteracy, disease, and servitude.

The Refugee Problem: Joint Responsibility

By ELFAN REES

ABSTRACT: The refugee, a victim of political events, a man uprooted from his homestead and country, finds himself in a strange land where he is homeless, often stateless, and poverty-stricken. The refugee in Hong Kong, for example, who faces this predicament can find his fellow exiles dispersed globally in such countries as The Republic of Korea, India, Syria, West Germany, and Finland. The dimensions of the refugee problem in the postwar era estimated to include at least forty million persons are indeed frightening. Yet the enormity of the figure cannot describe the individual misery and human tragedy that have befallen these people. Moreover, neither the end of political upheavals nor the concomitant movement of peoples—the unabated dynamism of the refugee problem—are in sight. This situation demands global recognition. The United Nations is concerned with the problem but has been able to give support and succor only on a limited basis. The neighboring nations, who have been obliged to bear the brunt of the immediate crises, must not be left alone to alleviate the misery of these millions.—Ed.

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IT can be argued as to whether homelessness or hunger most epitomize the greatest single human tragedy of our age. Such an argument is however unprofitable because both homelessness and hunger so challenge the conscience of nations and the peace of the world that both must be regarded as endemic diseases of this century whose eradication will only be possible by international co-operation on a much more massive scale than has hitherto been achieved.

THE HOMELESS MAN

The essence of homelessness—the problem of the refugee—lies in its dimensions and its dynamism.

It is one of the tragedies of the refugee problem that so much of it is the consequence of, and incidental to, world-shaking events whose progress and dangers preoccupy the public mind to the exclusion of all thought for, and often any recognition of, their human consequences. We were rightly perturbed by events in Hungary, in Suez, and in Egypt in 1956, but generally overlook the fact that, as a result, 20,000 refugees from Egypt sought asylum in Europe and Israel, and 11,000 Hungarian refugees still await a solution to their problem. We are concerned about the reunification of Germany but reckon little that, while this seems indefinitely delayed, 25,000 refugees per month have fled the Soviet zone to seek asylum in West Germany. Since 1949 no less than 2,189,225 people have become refugees in this way. The official figure of flight in 1959 is 160,000. An annual and continuing problem of equal dimension to the Hungarian refugee crisis gets less than half its public attention. We are anxious about events in North Africa but scarcely aware that at least 200,000 Algerians have sought asylum in Tunisia and Morocco. Any recent year seems to add almost another million to the world refugee total. Nor

has the tide been stemmed. The year 1959 brought its continuing exodus from East Germany and Algiers while new flights erupted—as they constantly do in this age of exile—in quite unexpected places. There is flight from Tibet.

All over the Indian borderland including Kalimpong, Darjeeling and Sikkim the Tibetan refugees will come to about 10,000 men, women and children. Among these there will not be more than 500 people who can subsist on their own earnings, some 800 or a thousand can live for one year on their own resources; again, about five to 800 can be taken to survive on whatever they have collected while coming from Tibet and the remaining six to 7,000 people are just living on nothing.¹

Other explosions follow with the frequency of atomic tests.

Ghana is facing a mounting problem in the thousands of Ghanaian refugees who have been arriving from the French Ivory Coast since the "anti-foreign" riots there in October. Unofficial estimates were that 5,000 Ghanaians of Ewe tribe origin had now arrived in Ghana as refugees, and others were still coming by air and sea. This was apart from the thousands of citizens of Togoland and Dahomey who also fled from the Ivory Coast.²

South Africa enters the refugee orbit.

The Indonesian government also has provided relief for some 7,500 persons who recently fled from rebel-infested areas in North Sumatra.³ A conservative estimate places the number of Tamil refugees from Northern Ceylon at 20,000. They are now in and around Jaffna, being very well cared for by their government. So the disease is also in Asia.

The forty-year exile

No attempt is being made in this survey to indicate refugee problems that

¹ From a personal letter to the author.

² *The Times* (London), January 10, 1959.

³ This was due to rebel action which began in December 1957.

antedate World War II. At the same time there are problems which persist in raising their ugly heads as if to emphasize that the "Century of the Homeless Man" did not begin in mid-century.

The Greek government recently appointed a committee to draft a bill providing for the early housing of 30,000 persons who came to Greece as refugees from Asia Minor in 1922–1923 and are still living in camps or hovels after having been in Greece for thirty-seven years.

Since 1918 thousands of Assyrians have lived as refugees in Iraq and Syria, while there is a colony of some 5,000 in Lebanon. Recent events in the Near East have made their precarious position more acute.

The painful and intricate question of eligibility deserves special attention. It must be remembered that in all Eastern territories, the mere possession of a certificate of naturalization does not convey to its holder many tangible advantages. Thus, an Assyrian or, for all it matters, a Russian refugee who had become naturalized in Iran, Iraq or Lebanon remains for all practical purposes an underprivileged stranger: he may, perhaps, find work more easily than his stateless fellow-exile, but in illness or in the case of an accident he will get no help from the State, nor any support when he gets old. Social services in the East still remain totally undeveloped, so that the care of the sick and the aged remains the concern of the local clan and family, obviously barred to a stranger.⁴

It is small wonder that men's minds lose track of the immensity and the tragic dynamism of the refugee problem.

The minimum and maximum

Refugee statistics are a pitfall for even the most wary. There is a vast margin of error, for counting heads in a crisis is always difficult; moreover,

⁴ From a private report.

statistical procedures vary across the world from the scientific to mere guesswork. It is probably wise to assume that even the most conservative estimates are inflated. Indigent natives seeking the meager benefits of refugee status misrepresent themselves; governments anxious for maximum international assistance are not guiltless of inflation; and voluntary agencies desperately seeking support for their programs sometimes exaggerate, not indeed their needs, but the dimensions of their problem.

The validity of statistics will also vary considerably according to the definition of a refugee that is accepted and applied. The United Nations purist, faithful to somewhat narrow and restrictive definitions, will obviously arrive at a smaller total than the humanitarian whose concern and compassion is for uprooted people everywhere. It is not proposed here to indulge in yet another dialogue on definition. The member governments of the United Nations, in arriving at their definitions, were clearly concerned to contain to a minimum the numbers who might, by definition, have a claim to international protection and assistance. The German Federal Republic must obviously apply quite other criteria in deciding who is a refugee.

For the purposes of this study we shall regard as a refugee anyone who has been uprooted from his home, has crossed a frontier—artificial or traditional—and looks for protection and sustenance to a government or authority other than his former one. By this definition and mindful of the pitfall of statistics it is certain that at least 40,000,000 persons have become refugees since 1945. How many of them continue in their plight in 1960, for how many of them a solution to their problem remains elusive, is a much more difficult issue to decide. A review of the present situation by areas is prob-

ably the only way to arrive at a reasonably accurate appraisal.

THE FAR EAST

In 1953 there were 9,000,000 homeless people in the Republic of Korea but not all of them were refugees from north of the 38th parallel. Many were war-time displaced persons who were slow in returning to their original homes. Time and vast reconstruction programs have had their effect but it is officially reported that there are still 3,000,000 persons who are unsettled refugees in the Republic.

When Vietnam suffered the fate of Korea and was also bifurcated in the interests of coexistence, 900,000 refugees, mostly of Roman Catholic faith, fled south of the 17th parallel. The "Economic Survey for Asia and the Far East" for 1956 reports on this:

The arrival in southern Viet-Nam of about 900,000 refugees had brought crucial problems to a country with a total population of 11 million. By 1956, however, a substantial number of refugees had been resettled and, while many problems were still to be solved in this respect, they were no longer of such a magnitude as to threaten the stability of the country's economy. (The resettlement) was facilitated by favourable factors, such as French and United States aid, the existence of uncultivated land and the industrious nature of the northern Viet-Nameese who were able to adjust to new circumstances. Good use was made of these favourable factors. The refugees were distributed in 325 villages, of which 300 were under the charge of the Commissariat for Refugees. Three categories were established. In the villages of Category A, which number approximately 100 and include more than one-third of the refugees, a programme of activities has been implemented and the financial help to the village has gradually been withdrawn. In this category, it is estimated 60 are already totally self-sufficient. The villages in Category B have a programme of activities but it is still in a transitory stage. Cate-

gory C includes about 50 villages in areas in which security has been recently restored.⁵

The establishment of the separate states of India and Pakistan in 1947 was followed by one of the largest migrations our era has known. It is estimated that 8,500,000 Hindus and Sikhs left Pakistan for India and that 6,500,000 Moslems fled from India into Pakistan. These refugees, like the German expellees, were granted full rights of citizenship in their new countries. This and the fact that the widespread poverty of both countries tends to minimize the difference between a refugee and a native, obscure, at least in part, the full magnitude and nature of this particular problem. It remains true however that over 5,000,000 of these refugees remain landless and homeless and are accordingly persons lacking any permanent solution as yet.

The dual refugee problem

Hong Kong is the focal point of two refugee problems quite different in character but equal in tragedy. Ten-thousand Europeans in China are registered with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner as refugees in need of protection and assistance—neither of which can be extended to them *in situ*. The Shanghai branch of the High Commissioner's Office had to be closed down in May 1956 at the request of the Chinese People's Republic. Most of this group are refugees from the Russian Revolution of 1917 or their children; others are refugees from Nazi persecution. Evicted from their homes, denied the right to work—and often lacking the strength—they are among the most needy and most pitiable refugees in the world.

The problem of saving their lives by

⁵ United Nations Sales No. 1957.II.F.1 (United Nations, Hong Kong and London, 1957), pp. 169, 170.

resettlement has been primarily one of securing exit permits for them from China to Hong Kong, whence they have been moved by the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) to countries of resettlement. After a disheartening period of financial crisis the prospects of a successful operation have materially improved. Even though ICEM has special funds large enough to move 3,400, visas are now available for 7,000. The unresolved problems are, more money for ICEM, more exit permits from China and, given these, some 3,000 more visas.

For reasons that are discussed below, the government in Hong Kong cannot admit indefinite numbers of these refugees without the assurance of their onward movement. There is a real danger that the Chinese People's Republic may be able to score a propaganda victory by showing when the free-world's opportunity to act comes that the five-year concern for these refugees was empty hypocrisy.

Hong Kong has its own intractable refugee problem. Out of a total population in the Colony of 2,500,000 more than one million are officially classified as refugees from mainland China. According to percentage figures, this is the second highest incidence of refugees in a local community in the whole world. They present the Colony with massive problems of housing, health and fire risks, unemployment, and, on occasions, political instability. Despite heroic efforts and quite disproportionate expenditures by the government in Hong Kong the majority of these refugees still live in appalling squalor and overcrowding in hillside shanties or rooftop huts.

It is estimated that 110,000 refugees are living in tin-and-hessian huts on the roofs of buildings. Four tenement huts destroyed in a recent fire in the Kowloon mainland area were housing 111 men, 116 women and

139 children, with 146 others in 20 squatters huts on the roofs.⁶

The situation is complicated by the decision of the government not to distinguish, in need and available services, between the refugees and the native poor of the Colony. It is true that many of the less-poor refugees have exacerbated the lot of the poorer natives by buying their homes and displacing them. The nondiscriminatory decision of government is, therefore, understandable and almost inevitable, but it seriously complicates the issue of international aid in a refugee situation. It should be added that, were it not for border control between the Colony and the mainland, the local refugee problem would be even more intolerable than it is.

Hong Kong has lived up to the highest traditions of the right of asylum but quite obviously has been limited by its absorptive capacity. Here is the first instance in our global survey where frontier control reduces the actual potential of the refugee problem. As we examine Europe we shall see that, even in this age, there are more refugees in intent than there are in fact. This then is the situation in Asia and the Far East. It is a tale of some 21,532,500 persons who have become refugees in a decade. In India about one person in forty-two is a refugee, in Vietnam one in twelve, in Pakistan one in eleven, in Korea one in three, and in Hong Kong nearly two in seven.

THE MIDDLE EAST

The refugee problem in the Middle East is more widely known, though not necessarily appreciated, because it impinges much more sharply on current political issues than does that of the Far East. The latest official count gives a figure of over one million Arab refugees from Palestine who are officially

⁶ *The Times* (London), March 10, 1957.

registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). By definition an Arab refugee from Palestine is a person whose normal residence was Palestine for a minimum of two years preceding the outbreak of the conflict of 1948 and who, as a result of the conflict, has lost both his home and his means of livelihood.

There is a continuing controversy about these figures which need not engage us here. Three facts are clear. The total quoted does not represent the number of Arabs who fled Palestine in 1948. The reported excess of births over deaths among the Arab refugees is 30,000 each year. There are therefore some 250,000 children under eight years of age who were born refugees. There are undoubtedly many hundreds of persons in Jordan registered as refugees who have no title to that status but this figure may well be balanced by others, especially children, who are eligible but not recognized. So long as the Jordanian government persists in its refusal to revise the rolls, this muddle will persist.

The Arab refugees are to be found today, as indeed they have been for over ten years, in Syria, in Lebanon, in Jordan, and in the Gaza Strip in Egypt. In Syria they amount to 2.4 per cent of the local population, in Lebanon to 7.4 and in Jordan 56.3.⁷ It will be seen that in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan the refugees outnumber the local population—the political consequences of this are almost daily evident in world events. In the Gaza Strip—some thirty miles long and five miles wide—no less than 230,000 refugees and 80,000 natives are completely marooned.

The Arab refugees have endured ten years of angry exile. Their situation has

⁷ It should be noted that many persons remain on the refugee rolls even though they have been granted Jordanian citizenship.

been so stagnant that being a refugee has become an institution if not a privilege. The UNRWA ration card is the only form of security they know. Indeed it is oftentimes, notably in Gaza, a form of security superior to that which is available to the nonrefugee Arab. It is well known that the ration card is very tangible currency and security in the Middle East. This particular refugee problem is so charged with political overtones that the underlying human tragedy of so many wasted lives, of so much frustration, bitterness, and hatred is far too often overlooked.

There is another aspect of the Middle East refugee problem that is also frequently ignored. It is necessary to remember that concurrently with the perpetuation of the Arab refugee problem more than 400,000 Jews have been forced to leave their homes in Iraq, Yemen, and North Africa. They have not been counted as refugees because they were readily and immediately received as new immigrants into Israel. Nevertheless they were forced to leave their traditional homes against their will and to abandon, in the process, all that they possessed.

EUROPE

In the decade under review no less than 15,000,000 refugees and displaced persons have crowded into Western Europe. By far the greatest single group of these are the German expellees and refugees. From the German provinces east of the Oder-Neisse line, from the Sudetenland, Poland, and other Eastern European states no less than 18,000,000 Germans were expelled from their homes after the Second World War. Millions died in the horrible process, millions more disappeared but some 13,000,000 survived and arrived as penniless refugees, 4,000,000 in the Soviet zone of Germany and 9,000,000 in the Federal Republic. They constitute in fact 17

per cent of the population of the Federal Republic. In great measure the German authorities have been alone in their efforts to deal with the problem.

Little has been said and less is known in the world-at-large about this massive crime against humanity. The World Council of Churches at its Hamburg conference in 1948 sought to break the conspiracy of silence that shrouded this tragedy, but with only partial success. It may well be that it has been the deliberate policy of guilty men to ignore and forget the enormous consequences of their criminal foolishness. In this case the United States and the United Kingdom must bear a great burden of the guilt. It was the victorious powers that, by Article XII of the Potsdam Agreement, authorized the mass expulsion and expropriation, and it was they who, by default, failed to ensure the fulfillment of their own requirement that it "should be effected in an orderly and humane manner." Small wonder that Albert Schweitzer was moved to write: "This is the worst violation of historic truths and of the rights of man: when the right to their homeland is denied to certain human beings so that they are forced to leave their homesteads."⁸

As though this were not burden enough, no less than 2,900,000 German citizens resident in the Soviet zone, the so-called "German Democratic Republic," have abandoned everything and sought asylum in the West; and the flow is mounting rather than diminishing. Nor is this the end of the tale in Europe. Ideas of expulsion, particularly when it also involves expropriation, are not slow to seize hold. Six-hundred thousand "Volksdeutsche," whose ancestors peopled and cultivated the Danube basin for five centuries, have had to seek asy-

⁸ Quoted in, *After Ten Years: A European Problem—Still No Solution* (Frankfurt am Main: Wirtschaftsdienst Verlag und Druckerei G.M.B.H., 1957), p. 5.

lums in Austria. Three hundred and fifty thousand Bulgarians of Turkish ethnic origin were expelled to Turkey. Four hundred thousand Karelians have similarly found asylum in Finland since the Karelian Peninsula was ceded to the Soviet Union by the 1947 peace treaty. All these groups have one characteristic in common. They have sought asylum from, and thrown themselves upon, the mercy of, their own kind. They are strangers but not among a strange people. Community of language, faith, culture, and social organization provides a cushion that both minimizes the shock of exile and increases the chances of assimilation.

Unhappily this is not true of all refugees in Europe. Nothing tempers the cold wind of exile for the ultimate refugees—those who come within the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner. Leaving home and hearth of their own decision, withal compelled by fear, risking their lives en route, they reject, as they go, any right to the protection of their government and so arrive, defenseless and helpless, in a strange country with a strange language and other customs, the bewildered guests of embarrassed hosts who have no obligations toward them other than those dictated by common humanity. They are indeed "the men who came to dinner."

THE ULTIMATE REFUGEES

There have been slightly more than one million of these ultimate refugees in 1959. Most of them are in Europe although there are small pockets of them in the Middle East and, as we have seen, 15,000 in China. Some of the refugee problems we have examined would have been orderly exchanges of population, if they had been more humanely and more pacifically organized; others could have been planned migra-

tions. Here is one-way traffic from nationality into statelessness.

It was never intended by the authors of the Atlantic Charter that men in our time should have to choose between "Freedom from Want" and "Freedom from Fear." The choice is being made every day and those who make it become refugees. In the main they knock at the doors of those free countries contiguous to the "iron curtain"; thus to Austria, Germany, Greece, and Italy they have come and keep on coming. It would be indefensible to make these countries by reason of accidents of geography alone responsible for this tragic burden of people. This has been recognized, if somewhat narrowly, by the United Nations and, by its action, these refugees, and only these, are the wards of the High Commissioner: his Office is responsible for their protection and for the search for a permanent solution to their problem.

FORTY-MILLION DISPOSSESSED

In our survey from east to west we have noted the creation, since 1945, of more than 40,000,000 refugees. Current events always seem to add to their number. There is evidence that the refugee problem is both dynamic and endemic in our times.

This migratory movement is not yet finished. It is also not restricted to Europe alone. A dispersion zone reaches in a vast half circle around Communist dominated North Asia and East Europe, from Korea over China and Indochina, over the Near East with its refugee distress resulting from the Arab-Jewish conflict, through all of East-Mid-Europe up to Finland that has succeeded in solving its refugee problem

in an exemplary way. Who can say how many people in this dispersion zone—who were forced to flee or were deported or resettled—have fallen into dire poverty or have perished in it.⁹

It is not without its significance that whereas the General Assembly of the United Nations has declared a World Refugee Year, the Food and Agriculture Organization is contemplating a Freedom from Hunger Campaign. The latter agency has recognized in advance the long-term nature of its task. The United Nations has been singularly obtuse in thinking that the refugee problem could be solved by "crash programs" and time-limited agencies. Even now there are too many governments and too many people who imagine that World Refugee Year is the panacea to all these ills.

The numbers involved in this tragedy and the problems arising are too many and too complex for quick solutions; thus a long-term task is inevitable. Nevertheless if, in a year of special endeavor, we cannot solve the refugee problem, we can solve the problems of more refugees than is possible in the disquieting indifference of an ordinary year. There will inevitably be a depressing aftermath—the tragedy of the disappointed refugee who is even more disillusioned than before. That will be the long-term task.

Curiously enough, it was Lenin, in exile in Switzerland, who said, "A refugee is a man who votes with his feet." There is a bigger pedestrian poll today than ever before. They vote for freedom. We ignore their vote at our peril.

⁹ Eugen Lemberg, "How Could It Happen?" in *After Ten Years*, *ibid.*, p. 11.

National Efforts in the Field of Social Development

By GEORGE F. DAVIDSON

ABSTRACT: First, a working definition, or description, of social development is attempted in order to distinguish it from economic or community development. Next, reference is made to factors which have created the tremendous postwar upsurge of interest in social development, particularly in the United Nations and its related agencies. This leads to consideration of problems faced by national governments, particularly in newly independent, underdeveloped countries, as they attempt to meet their responsibilities—often written into their constitutions—in the field of social development. Each country faces the difficult problem of priorities. Some, like India, frankly recognize the necessity of giving priority to economic and industrial development. Others, like Pakistan and the Philippines, attempt, not always successfully, to strike a balance between economic and social development. In still others, certain kinds of social development programs—for example, in health or education—may actually be a precondition of successful economic development. Seldom can less-developed countries give high priority in their social development plans to social security or insurance programs. The article concludes that each nation must resolve the problem of priorities for itself: international or bilateral advice, technical assistance or even financial aid cannot substitute for national effort in the field of social development.

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THE word "development" shines like a freshly minted coin in the currency of international discussion. Like all currency and coinage, it appears in several denominations—economic development, community development, and social development. Much is also said and written these days in international meeting places concerning "balanced" or "integrated" economic and social development. More and more the conviction is growing that economic development and social development are really not separate coins at all but opposite sides of the same coin. For the purposes of this paper, it will perhaps be useful at the outset if an attempt is made to examine at least one of the faces of this coin and to indicate what is meant by the use of the expression "social development."

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT DEFINED

Social development connotes, first and foremost, movement and progress—a dynamic process of evolution and growth—directed towards the achievement of desirable social goals. In its broadest sense, it may be described as including every action, governmental or voluntary, which contributes to building up the structure, both infrastructure and superstructure, of social policies and programs which alone can assure the maintenance and improvement of family and community levels of living and lead to social progress.

Broken down into its component parts, social development embraces everything that is done in the field of health—both preventive and curative—education, labor standards and employment practices, housing, nutrition, child and family welfare, and protection from economic insecurity, whether through provision of help "in kind" or through income maintenance payments of various kinds provided on a taxation or insurance basis. In each of these fields, as

the structure of our society becomes increasingly complex, and this applies to countries in all stages of development, a variety of institutional facilities and community services is required. These facilities and services may take the form of physical institutions, such as schools, hospitals, universities, clinics, child welfare institutions, and housing projects or agencies, such as departments of government, employment exchanges, family and child welfare agencies, and community centers. The social benefits derived from these programs may vary in form from teaching, health care, vocational training to the protection of wage levels and working conditions as provided by standard-setting legislation. They may also take the more tangible form of actual care and maintenance in an institution, or cash income payments provided through social insurance or social security laws. These as well as many other components form the concept of social development which national governments, international agencies, and community groups at all levels of society are endeavoring to promote and strengthen in the interests of individual family and community betterment.

THE UPSURGE OF INTEREST

The postwar years have witnessed an unprecedented upsurge of interest and activity in the field of social development. Laying aside the instruments of war, governments, old and new alike, have turned their attention either to the rebuilding of standards of economic and social well-being which had been gravely undermined or even shattered by the war, or, in the case of newly independent states, to the creation of a new, ambitious and much-improved living standard for their people, impatiently waiting to taste the benefits of their new-found freedom. The most authoritative and detailed accounts of these many national initiatives in the direction

of social progress are to be found in the two International Surveys of Programmes of Social Development published by the United Nations Bureau of Social Affairs and covering generally the period 1945 to the present time.

Perhaps one of the most significant indications of the importance attached to social progress by states and peoples in the modern world is found in the number of national governments which have actually included the concept of social action or social progress, and the state's responsibility for promoting it, in their respective constitutional instruments. Constitutional provisions are not, of course, self-implementing; indeed, it is a well-known fact that some of the most flowery and far-reaching constitutional provisions in the social field are honored more in the breach than in the observance. Nevertheless, it is important to note that more than fifty states in the postwar years have made formal provision for the inclusion within their constitutional instruments of sections outlining, frequently in fairly specific terms, the national government's responsibility for achieving social well-being for its people. This is a most impressive record of progress compared to the number of states taking similar action in any earlier comparable period. Significant is the increasingly widespread acceptance by the modern state, as one of its natural and proper functions, that it should actively develop, promote, and implement policies designed to improve living standards for the masses of the people. This is indeed a far cry from the "laissez faire" concept of the role of government which was prevalent almost universally up to the turn of the century and which was still widely held to be the proper function of government even as recently as the decades between the wars.

It is interesting to speculate as to the reasons for this dramatic upsurge of

interest on the part of governments in the strengthening of social standards within their respective national communities. It has been noted on various occasions that, paradoxical though it may seem, interest in social progress and reform rises to new heights in periods of war. As a result, the years following a major conflict witness, not infrequently, a major forward movement in the social field. This phenomenon has occurred on at least two occasions in the present century. Certainly the decade following the close of World War II has produced an unprecedented wave of comprehensive social plans and programs in both the developed and the less-developed countries. This trend has been accentuated by the emergence in the postwar years of a world-wide United Nations Organization created in the belief, expressed implicitly in its structure and in its Charter, that the deep-seated roots of world unrest are just as likely to be economic and social as political or military in character.

International agencies

The United Nations is, of course, only one of many international organizations created in the postwar years to reflect the concern of governments and peoples everywhere with social problems and to provide a focal point for constructive national and international action. The four major specialized agencies, the International Labour Organisation, the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; concentrate most of their effort and attention on problems of social development. Other examples are furnished by the United Nations Children's Fund, and the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees and its predecessor organizations. In part—and certainly in their origins—each of these organizations was created

in response to a clearly felt need, worldwide in its extent, for some stimulus to greater action in the field of labor standards, health, food production and nutrition, education, child welfare, or refugees. Once created in response to these felt needs, each of these organizations has itself, by its activities, contributed much to the awakening of still greater interest in the problems of and opportunities for social development arising in its particular field. These international agencies, by their leadership, stimulus, and support, provide substantial reinforcement to the efforts which are being made everywhere by national governments to develop and improve their social policies and programs. International assistance thereby helps the national governments achieve their ultimate goal: the improvement of the social and living standards of their people.

It is, of course, axiomatic that international leadership and action, however well conceived, can only be effective in most of these social fields as a reinforcement and support of efforts made at the national level. International effort can never replace national effort; indeed, experience is showing with increasing regularity that only as clear-headed and conscientious effort in the development of social policies and programs is made at the national level does international leadership, guidance, and assistance become meaningful. Let us examine, therefore, some of the main problems faced at the national level as governments and peoples endeavor by their own domestic initiative and effort to advance their standards of social well-being.

THE PROBLEM OF PRIORITIES

The issues present themselves in most dramatic and uncompromising fashion in the case of the underdeveloped countries, many of whose peoples are still seething

in the ferment of a new-found freedom, recently and hardly won and precariously maintained. The problems faced by a newly independent people, struggling to emerge overnight in all the complex paraphernalia of a twentieth-century state, are understandably overwhelming. So much has to be started from the very beginning. Low levels of productivity condemn the masses of the population to a poverty that is almost endemic in its effect and character. The debilitating effects of poverty are compounded by low health standards and widespread disease and epidemics. Without a healthier, better-fed, more vigorous working force, the infant nation's productivity and economic strength will always remain low. Even if it becomes possible through improving health standards to develop a strong, healthy, alert, and vigorous population, there is still the problem of converting an ignorant, illiterate, and often primitive populace into an intelligent, well-trained, modern working force capable of working, producing, and living with meaning and purpose in a modern, industrial world.

The social economists term this struggle in the underdeveloped nations the vicious circle of poverty, disease, and ignorance. Educators may prefer to designate ignorance as the "original sin," giving rise to the other two; medical and health workers would undoubtedly give disease the place of honor at the head of the list. It really matters very little which of these social blights comes first and which two follow after. What struggling nations desperately need to know is: How to break the vicious circle? Where to start? What problem deserves priority of attention? Should social reform, crying out for attention, receive first priority? If so, where to begin? With health? With education? Nutrition? Housing? Or should economic growth and productivity receive prior

emphasis, leaving social progress to a later stage when at least a marginal economic surplus exists which can be converted into social gains?

These questions illustrate the terrible problem of priorities faced by all nations, but more particularly by the less-developed countries as they endeavor to surmount the problems of social development in their respective jurisdictions. The stark fact is that, for the most part, social gains can come only from economic surplus, making possible some social redistribution of the nation's wealth through services or other benefits in cash or kind. In the case of nations whose populations are, almost without exception, living at the poverty level or below, the possibility of taxing surplus wealth to provide social benefits are almost nonexistent. For this reason, in many of the less-developed countries, the hard decision has been taken to give priority to projects concerned primarily with economic development, leaving to a later date the hope that, when economic improvement has made itself manifest, some portion of the nation's newly created and acquired wealth can be converted into social gains through carefully selected social development projects.

INDIA

In India, for example, the government has resolved, even more than in most countries, to proceed on lines of strict austerity and to give a clear priority to economic and industrial development projects, in the conviction that this is, in fact, the surest and quickest way to achieve a real and lasting improvement in the standard of living of its people. Since India's development plan requires that most additions to the nation's annual output go into industrial expansion and not into the production of more consumer goods, it has been necessary to limit severely the new services pro-

vided in the social field to specially vulnerable groups or those in need of special assistance. In Nehru's own words, "this generation of Indians is sentenced to hard labour."

Consistent with this attitude and policy, the first five-year plan for India, covering the period 1951 to 1956, devoted almost one third of its total outlay to irrigation and river control projects, one quarter to the expansion and modernization of transportation and communications, one fifth to agriculture and community development, and one tenth to industrial development, including cottage and decentralized industries. Only after these requirements had been taken care of did the plan include provision of a modest share—something less than one fifth of total projected expenditures under the plan—for social development in all its forms, including health, education, housing, rehabilitation of refugees, aid to the unemployed and other groups in special need, and so on.

Chester Bowles, in his vivid account entitled "An Ambassador Reports," gives a striking illustration of India's policy in action. He relates how, in 1952, the Indian government cut out nearly \$100 million in food subsidies, designed to hold down food prices, in order to speed up the building of a number of great river valley developments. Queried about this in Parliament, the government spokesman stated simply: "We must take some bread from the people today so that tomorrow there will be electric power, expanding industry and an end to India's age old poverty."

Social programs

Despite its openly avowed policy of giving priority to economic over social development, the Indian government has none the less embarked upon a number of basic and fundamental social development projects which, in their dimensions, stagger the imagination. In the health

field, for example, India's first five-year plan laid out a carefully conceived program involving a concerted effort to improve community water supplies and sanitation; massive malaria control and other preventive health measures; special health programs for the rural population and, in particular, mothers and children; and an intensified program for the education and training of medical and other health personnel. The second five-year plan continued to stress the development of adequate numbers of professional and technical personnel, the improvement of environmental sanitation, the control of communicable diseases, and the expansion of institutional facilities of all kinds required in the health field.

One example will suffice to depict the magnitude of the problems faced, and the heroic scale on which solutions were being sought. At the beginning of the first five-year plan, malaria was taking the lives of well over a million persons annually: well over 100 million of the Indian population were malaria sufferers. The debilitating effect of this on the health and productivity of the working population is literally incalculable. The first five-year plan set as its objective the reduction of the number of malaria sufferers from 100 million to one million or less. The program of spraying with DDT, begun with the help of United States funds under the first five-year plan, was continued under the second plan, with the result that malaria is now in the process of being brought under control for the first time in the history of the Indian subcontinent. And this has been undertaken during a period in which the government of India has avowedly been devoting its major efforts to projects in the economic, rather than the social field!

One other example, taken from the field of education, will serve to indicate the scale on which these social develop-

ment projects in the less-developed parts of the world have to be undertaken if trained men and women are to be made available to meet the requirements of accelerated economic and industrial growth. Literacy, like health, is one of the keys to success in any effort to achieve major economic and industrial progress. Indeed, as Professor Hla Myint has stated, in a paper presented to the Ninth International Conference of Social Work, "basic expenditure on health and education emerges as the key to the problem. It is, in fact, a *pre-condition* to economic development."

OTHER COUNTRIES

Recognizing this, the government of the Philippines, in its five-year plan of social development (1958-1963), proposed to allocate 30 per cent of its national budget to education. The government of Pakistan, in formulating its five-year plan for economic and social development (1955-1960), recorded its conviction that "of all the social services that go to build up the people, education is the most important"; and in conformity with this principle, it set out to provide increased facilities for technical training and education and to add one million additional children to its primary and secondary schools. As for India, which had in 1951 some 26 million children in primary, secondary, technical, and vocational schools, the first five-year plan's objective was to increase this number to 36 million; while outside the schools, India has set as its goal the wiping out of illiteracy among 250 million of its people over a period stretching out to 1972. As Chester Bowles has pointed out, the Soviet Union under a dictatorship taught 100 million of its people to read and write within the decade 1925 to 1935: if India succeeds in her much vaster undertaking in a comparatively shorter period of time,

it will represent one of the historic and unforgettable victories for free and democratic government in Asia and indeed in the entire world.

Not all countries, of course, have weighted their development planning as heavily on the side of economic and industrial growth as has India. Other countries have striven from the outset to achieve more of a balance or proportion between the amounts of national wealth devoted to the furtherance of economic development and investments for social purposes. For example, the government of the Philippines, in its three-year program of Economic and Social Development, has prescribed as a basic principle that the yearly increases in national income shall go partly to increase capital formation and partly to increase the consumption standards of the people. Pakistan likewise, in its five-year plan for Economic and Social Development already mentioned, has set out "to develop the resources of the country as rapidly as possible so as to promote the welfare of the people, provide adequate standards, social services, secure social justice and equality of opportunity, and the widest and most equitable distribution of income and property."

Competition for resources

While one of the objectives of the Pakistan plan is to make steady progress in providing social services—housing, education, health, and social welfare—the tragic finding of actual experience with the plan has been that resources for these purposes have been sharply limited because of the competing need for investments in productive sectors of industry and agriculture on which the possibility of further social gains depends. In fact, the close of the five-year period for which the plan was made finds even its relatively modest social goals in large part unfulfilled.

The illustrations given from the experience of three Asian countries—India, Pakistan, and the Philippines—are broadly typical of the experience of most underdeveloped countries, in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East, as they endeavor to provide some help from their meager resources for programs of social development. Time and again national governments find that laudable social goals which they have set for themselves, and which they have frequently enshrined as an obligation of the state in their constitutions, cannot be achieved without a dangerous diversion of resources sorely needed in building up the economic strength of the state itself. This has led, in many instances, to the over-simplified conclusion that all social development programs are unproductive and a net burden on the economy of the state, and that all economic development projects, by contrast, create and add to national wealth. The fallacy of this is now becoming increasingly apparent as nations learn that splendid hydroelectric projects, or cement plants, or giant factories, or mechanized equipment do not all automatically or speedily create a flow of new wealth throughout the national economy. Some of these economic development projects have proven to be strangely unproductive, particularly when there has been failure to develop, along with physical plant and capital assets, a trained and healthy labor force that will make it possible to operate and utilize these modern physical assets for the interest of the total community.

COMBINED OBJECTIVES

More and more, in the light of experience with economic and social development in the postwar years, individual nations are beginning to concentrate their efforts on types of projects which have combined economic and social objectives. Increasingly, efforts are being

made to avoid the arbitrary grouping of projects into "economic" and "social" classifications. As the "United Nations Report on a Co-ordinated Policy regarding Family Levels of Living" points out, such a classification "tends to assume quite unjustifiably that social problems can be solved only by social measures and economic problems only by economic measures." Attention is now being concentrated on projects with a social purpose which in themselves contribute to the possibilities of higher productivity; and this involves, of course, a choice between a wide variety of social and economic projects—a choice in favor of land reform and accelerated food production, for example, or large-scale health measures such as malaria eradication, or educational projects such as vocational training—all of which have a fundamental social purpose, but also produce significant economic results as well.

SOCIAL INSURANCE PLANS

As a corollary to this, it follows, of course, that certain types of social expenditure are given a correspondingly low priority, precisely because in themselves they make relatively little contribution to productivity. Many, if not most of our typically western social security or social insurance measures fall in this category. Income maintenance programs, involving the redistribution of income through insurance, means-test or similar programs have great social significance in the highly industrialized western countries where wages and productivity are relatively high, and where taxation of income and wealth of the majority can be resorted to in order to protect the living standards of a minority who fall below the danger line. But in countries such as India, where three quarters of the people already live in poverty, with most of them close to the hunger line,

western-type social insurance or security measures can have little meaning, because they are simply not workable. This is why the United Nations Group of Experts on Family Levels of Living stressed that systems of generalized insurance belong to a relatively advanced stage of development and gave as an order of priority for underdeveloped countries, first of all the organization of social services, secondly benefits in kind, and finally cash benefits. While there are always dangers inherent in any attempt to generalize, this is probably a reasonable rule of thumb for most countries to follow, especially the less-developed ones, in their efforts to develop higher levels of social well-being for their people.

NATIONAL EFFORT AND DECISION

What, then, are the lessons to be drawn from the varied experiences of nations both new and old as they embark upon efforts to promote their national social development? Probably the only safe conclusion to be drawn is that each nation must develop its own pattern and set its own pace for social development in the light of its particular circumstances. In some countries the basic infrastructure of facilities and services in fields such as health and education may be sufficiently advanced to justify the expectation that economic development projects can be successfully undertaken. These projects will yield in time returns on the human and material investment made, which can later be converted into social gains for the people. In other countries, the first and fundamental attack may have to be directed to the development—through intensified health and education programs—of the human resources themselves before there can be any real hope of substantial success in promoting economic development. In still a third type of society—already

fairly well advanced in terms of economic and social development—the approach to further progress may be in the direction of developing a comprehensive network of social welfare and social insurance measures, geared to the needs of an industrial wage-earning economy in which income maintenance emerges as a major socioeconomic problem.

In each of these situations, international agencies or more fortunate nations stand ready and willing to provide technical assistance, expert advice and, in many instances, significant, if not sub-

stantial, financial help. But while this help from other sources may be both invaluable and indispensable, it does not, and can never provide, the foundation on which the national structure of social development is erected. The design, the foundation, and the main outlines of such a structure must reflect the cultural patterns, the value judgments, and the aspirations of the nation itself. In the final analysis, there can be no substitute for national effort, national sacrifice, and national determination in promoting and in achieving national social development.

Intergovernmental Channels: Activities in the Social Field*

By MARTHA BRANSCOMBE

ABSTRACT: While the principle of intergovernmental co-operation in the field of social welfare was well established prior to World War II, the current widespread activity and proliferation of channels have developed in direct response to the postwar social upheavals and the rising tide of newly independent nations. Present intergovernmental co-operation is conducted through a multifarious network of international organs. There are those linked to the United Nations as well as a more diffuse group of intergovernmental organs with an independent existence. The Economic and Social Council, an organ of the United Nations, which bears the main responsibility for United Nations social policy is also the co-ordinator of the specialized agencies' social welfare programs. In addition to the complex structure of intergovernmental organizations, their efforts encompass all facets of the social field. In such an enormous undertaking the major problem is the co-ordination of these activities and the channels through which they move.—Ed.

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*The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the United Nations.

IT is no longer news that "our world of today is more than ever before one world." Nevertheless, it remains notable in the history of man that the vast social upheavals through which we are passing have brought about wider recognition and increasing knowledge of the social conditions and needs of the world's population and an unprecedented expansion in the conception of the social responsibility of the international society as regards such needs.

The principle of intergovernmental co-operation in the social field was well established by the end of the First World War, but the greatest increases in co-operative activities and in the channels and resources for this purpose have come during the past decade. Not only has there been a vast extension in the range of social matters in which governments have recognized a common interest, but changes have occurred in the kind of action considered appropriate for international bodies. This is an important factor in the vitality of intergovernmental co-operation in the social field.

Too often the facts and the significance of the advances in the collective efforts of people and governments to achieve social goals continue to go unnoticed or to be inadequately recognized. Most often they are overshadowed by the more spectacular activities concerning the maintenance of international peace and establishment of a system of collective security. Frequently also they are minimized or obscured by the assumption that international co-operation for social welfare is inseparable from the political realm and therefore it will not increase to any large degree until fundamental political agreement is reached. It will not be contested that the success or failure of intergovernmental undertakings for these purposes condition progress toward a better way of life for all peoples. But it is also notable that

the Charter of the United Nations recognizes that peace and security require conditions of economic and social stability.

Whatever may be the merits on either side of these debatable issues, the most critical appraisers of the experience to date seem in general agreement that regardless of important limitations the greatest successes of intergovernmental collaboration have been those directed towards social welfare. Nevertheless it is still extremely difficult to evaluate precisely the distinctive contributions of intergovernmental co-operation to observable national social advancements, or to forecast the inherent possibilities of this approach to the basic social goals of improving the conditions of all peoples suffering from poverty, disease, ignorance, or injustice. These uncertainties, however, cannot blur the fact that the consequences of intergovernmental co-operation are today affecting in varying degrees the way the everyday life of hundreds of millions of people is carried on at "the grass roots of the world."

Since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, all intergovernmental efforts in this field have been carried on in a new environment through a network of permanent mechanisms that both express the increased interdependence of nations and their general accord in promoting co-operative programs in the social field. As a consequence, the activities in this field have reached an unprecedented scale and the system of intergovernmental organization has become extremely complex.

Although there are many basic similarities, the variations among the intergovernmental bodies operating today are so numerous that it is impossible in this limited space to describe them in detail. It may be useful, however, to review briefly a few of the major developments in the structure through which intergovernmental co-operation is carried out,

and to examine some of the more significant activities being undertaken and the interrelationship of these programs. Finally, reference to some of the current trends may serve as indicators of the potentialities for future advancement toward the humanitarian ideal of combining common interests and efforts to improve the life of people everywhere.

EARLIER DEVELOPMENTS

It may broaden perspective on more recent developments to recall that it was not until the nineteenth century, and particularly after 1850, that co-operation in nonpolitical and technical fields emerged as a new type of organized intergovernmental effort. Activities in such fields were initiated largely as a consequence of the needs and problems arising from a rapidly growing industrial society and were stimulated by the awakening of a new social consciousness. By the early part of the twentieth century, intergovernmental agencies had been created and new forms of international activity had been started in such diverse technical fields as science, art, communications and transit, health, morals, economics, and finance.

Although the League of Nations was created primarily to promote international political co-operation, it was entrusted under the Covenant and the peace treaties with certain responsibilities in the social field which laid the foundations for later departures from the traditional notions of intergovernmental co-operation. The League's activities were carried out through a number of auxiliary agencies and semi-autonomous organizations established to supplement the central machinery. Significant among these bodies were the semiautonomous World Health Organization, the High Commissioner for Refugees, the committees on Intellectual Co-operation, Traffic in Women and Children, Child Welfare, Social Questions,

Nutrition and the several bodies dealing with regulation and control of narcotic drugs. The International Labour Organisation which was actually created under Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles was an integral part of the "League System," though it maintained an independent status, thus establishing a precedent for the present specialized agencies. The titles of these bodies are generally indicative of the technical fields in which activities were undertaken.

As regards the nature of its activities, the League's work was carried out during a period when intergovernmental co-operation took the form mainly of conferences and various types of legal instruments designed to deal with problems transcending national boundaries, the protection of particular groups, or matters primarily of national jurisdiction which were of common concern to a number of countries. Consequently, while the League's social program included other important activities such as studies, information services, publication of technical journals and reports, its efforts were primarily concentrated on abstract and legalistic approaches to questions of a protective or regulatory nature.

In spite of its limited responsibilities, the League's social activities were gradually expanded,¹ including to some extent the provision of technical services directed to individual countries. Although its activities in the social field were overshadowed by its political concerns, the

¹ A special committee, headed by S. P. Bruce, former Prime Minister of Australia, was appointed by the Council in 1938 to make recommendations regarding the reorganization of the League's activities in the economic and social fields. The Bruce Committee Report, entitled "The Development of International Cooperation in Economic and Social Affairs," was published in the Special Supplement to the Monthly Summary of the League of Nations, Geneva (August 1939).

clearest indication of the far-reaching impact of its work lies in the fact that these activities were subsequently continued in greatly expanded form by the United Nations and the specialized agencies.

During the Second World War and the period following cessation of hostilities, the concept of international social action was notably extended. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) assumed responsibility for the operation of emergency services and assistance on an unprecedented scale. It went far beyond the activities of the League or any previous intergovernmental or nongovernmental organization in supplying equipment and technical advice to war-devastated countries for the restoration of their social welfare institutions. When UNRRA terminated its operations, certain of its services were also transferred to the United Nations and the specialized agencies and formed the basis for the first United Nations experiments in technical assistance to governments.

CURRENT INTERGOVERNMENTAL CO-OPERATION

The developments cited indicate that far-reaching changes in earlier concepts of the role of intergovernmental bodies in the social field had gradually taken place by the time the San Francisco Conference convened in 1945. The great extension since 1945 has resulted largely from the broad formulation of international social responsibility enunciated in the Charter of the United Nations and in the constitutions of the specialized agencies that had already been formed or were in the planning stages when the Conference convened. Today, the formidable task of implementing the expanded concepts of international social policy and action is carried out through an intricate network of intergovernmental channels. Structurally,

these consist of the social welfare system of the United Nations including the specialized agencies and a number of other intergovernmental organizations which have no organic relationship with the United Nations.

It will be possible only to sketch briefly the United Nations system and to mention among the numerous intergovernmental organizations a few which will illustrate the nature and variety of channels through which intergovernmental co-operation in the social field is navigating.

THE UNITED NATIONS SOCIAL WELFARE SYSTEM

One of the primary purposes of the United Nations as set forth in Article 1 of the Charter is "to achieve international co-operation in solving problems of an economic, cultural, social, or humanitarian character . . ." The mandate to attain this purpose lies in Article 55 which empowers the United Nations to promote "higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development; solutions of international economic, social, health and related problems; and international cultural and educational co-operation," together with respect for human rights and fundamental freedom.

The responsibility for the discharge of the functions implicit in this mandate is vested in the General Assembly and under its authority is entrusted to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). With its array of subsidiary units, ECOSOC is in fact the hub of the United Nations social welfare system. In addition, this social welfare system includes a number of special bodies of the United Nations which have together with the specialized agencies wide responsibilities in the social field that are brought into relationship with the United Nations as provided for by the Charter.

The Economic and Social Council

Among the multiplicity of its functions, ECOSOC has, broadly speaking, a dual role in the social field. On the one hand, it has the direct responsibility for initiating and carrying out the social program of the United Nations itself, and on the other, for co-ordinating the activities of the specialized agencies in the social field.²

In performing its responsibilities, ECOSOC is assisted by functional and regional economic commissions and standing committees. The functional commissions cover various technical fields; they include the Social and Population Commissions, the Commissions on Statistics, the Status of Women, Narcotic Drugs, and Human Rights. More recently the terms of reference of three of ECOSOC's four regional commissions were broadened to include promotion of social development and particularly, consideration of the social aspects of economic development. This extension of the functions of the regional commissions, which has significant implications for future activities in the social field, was initiated in 1958, when the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) was first created; in 1959, the functions of the economic commissions for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) and for Latin America (ECLA) were similarly expanded.

Special bodies

Besides ECOSOC, the United Nations has created a number of special bodies or organs within its framework which function independently, but report to ECOSOC or through it to the Assembly. The major ones undertaking social programs perform primarily operational functions, and include: the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the

² Articles 57, 63, 64 of the Charter.

Technical Assistance Board, the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (ACC), Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, the Permanent Central Opium Board, and the Special Fund. From time to time special bodies are established on a temporary basis to deal with emergencies or particular problems, such as the United Nations Relief and Work Agency for the Palestinian Refugees in the Middle East (UNRWA).

The specialized agencies

In contrast to the League of Nations, the United Nations in its Charter recognized the principle of establishing by intergovernmental agreement functional or specialized agencies having broad responsibilities in various technical fields outside the framework of the United Nations itself. Provision was made, however, for such agencies to be brought into relationship with the United Nations by agreements negotiated with each agency, and responsibility for overall co-ordination of this system was given to the United Nations.

The specialized agencies which constitute an important part of the United Nations social welfare system are: the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the World Health Organization (WHO). The major areas of responsibility in the social field vested in these agencies are evident from their respective titles.

Each of the specialized agencies has its own constitution, membership, organizational structure, budget, and program, and each functions independently. Hence they differ in many significant respects, although they have many common characteristics. Among their similarities are the embodiment within their constitutions of social welfare objectives

and responsibilities resembling those of the United Nations; the general pattern of organization; and the performance of multiple functions within their respective technical fields of a research, informational, educational, and advisory nature aimed at establishing and improving national programs and standards, including provision for direct technical services and assistance to governments desiring them.

ECOSOC endeavors not only to avoid overlapping or duplication among the specialized agencies that might result from the broad statements of responsibility in their constitutions, but also to promote their close working relationships. Furthermore, in developing the social program of the United Nations itself, ECOSOC undertakes only those activities in the social field relevant to the formulation of over-all international social policy and those not encompassed by the specialized agencies. In addition to its own co-ordination machinery, ECOSOC is assisted in co-ordinating the programs of technical co-operation by the Technical Assistance Board consisting of representatives of the United Nations and the specialized agencies. Various arrangements are also made directly between and among the component members of the United Nations system for bilateral and multilateral co-operation in planning and operation of programs of common interest. Nevertheless, the similarities and the differences among these autonomous agencies, coupled with those of ECOSOC and its subsidiary bodies which also have some of the characteristics of a specialized agency emphasize the importance and at the same time the difficulties inherent in the task of co-ordination within the United Nations system itself.

OTHER INTERGOVERNMENTAL BODIES

Besides the United Nations system, there are today over thirty other inter-

governmental bodies directly or indirectly concerned with activities in the social field.³ A large number of these existed before the United Nations was created and from time to time new bodies are established with no organic relationship to the United Nations system. Nevertheless, many of these organizations co-operate in various ways with the United Nations and the specialized agencies, and in some instances there are formal arrangements for close relationships, such as those between the WHO and the Pan American Sanitary Bureau, whereby the latter became the regional office for WHO in the Americas. On the other hand, as between and among these various intergovernmental organizations, there are with few exceptions limited or no arrangements for systematic collaboration.

These autonomous bodies vary widely in their objectives, membership, the nature and scope of their activities in the social field, as well as in the patterns of organization and methods of operation. The geographical areas served by these organizations may be constitutionally limited or not depending largely upon the objectives and membership, but generally, their activities are not operative on a world-wide basis. Nevertheless, many of them have features in common and some resemble in certain respects the United Nations and the specialized agencies.

For purposes of illustration, these bodies might perhaps be broadly classified into two groups: first those of a specialized nature performing functions related exclusively or primarily to the social field; and secondly, those having broader objectives covering multiple fields which include certain responsibilities

³ *Yearbook of International Organizations, 1958-59*. Published by the Union of International Associations in collaboration with the United Nations (7th ed.; Brussels, Palais d'Egmont. 1958).

ties in the social field or closely related activities.

Such broad classification obviously is not definitive of the activities of these bodies, but a listing of a few in each group will suggest the range of social matters being dealt with by separate intergovernmental bodies. Among those that might be included in the first group are the Inter-Governmental Committee for European Migration, the Inter-African Labour Institute, the Inter-American Conference on Social Security, the International Bureau of Education, and the International Relief Union.

As regards the second group, the most notable examples are the regional bodies, such as the Organization of American States, the Council of Europe, the League of Arab States, the Caribbean Commission, the Colombo Plan Council for Technical Co-operation in South and Southeast Asia, the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara, and the South Pacific Commission. The social activities of these bodies constitute one aspect of their comprehensive programs which in some cases include larger problems of interstate policy. However significant the differences may be, certain of the social welfare objectives and activities of many of these regional bodies are identical and generally aimed at raising the levels of living. A number of these organizations have been created since 1945, and although their membership is not always based upon geographical contiguity, they reflect a strong tendency toward regionalism.

One of the best examples of a regional system of co-operation and one of the oldest in origin is the Organization of American States. Its broad social welfare objectives are carried out primarily through two of its technical councils and a number of specialized organizations. The Inter-American Economic and Social Council and the Inter-American

Cultural Council act as the co-ordinating bodies for all official inter-American activities in the social field and at the same time undertake their own programs to promote social welfare including technical assistance to member states. Among its specialized agencies concerned with social activities are the Pan American Sanitary Bureau (PASB), the American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood, and the Inter-American Indian Institute.

CO-ORDINATION OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

This brief sketch will not merely suffice to indicate the extent and complexity of the channels for intergovernmental co-operation in the social field but will also make obvious that there exists no systematic arrangement for an over-all review of the programs and policies of this whole network of organizations, nor machinery to bring about the concerted effort and teamwork required to fulfill their various purposes more effectively. However, the differences in the objectives and other characteristics of many of the bodies outside of the United Nations reflect the interest of member governments in a pluralistic approach to international co-operation which would make it difficult to bring about a unified system. Furthermore, there are formidable obstacles to achieving such co-ordination without giving greater power to a central authority than most governments today consider sound or acceptable.

As regards the United Nations system alone, reference has been made to certain of the difficulties even though the responsibility and machinery for co-ordination have received continuous attention. In this connection, a recent study which includes an analysis of this problem points out that "It is generally acknowledged that ECOSOC has had

very partial success in its co-ordinating function. This situation is in large measure due to the limits of its authority."⁴ This same study concludes, however, that it would be highly advantageous if those organizations concerned with social and essentially scientific and technical matters "were made less dependent on the associated governments for their composition and direction, and thus became more truly representative of the nascent international community."⁵ Regardless of the wisdom of this proposition, this problem is of such significance for current international co-operation in the social field that intensive efforts should continue to be directed toward improvements having immediate practical effects, as well as towards longer range solutions.

DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL CO-OPERATION

The actual growth in international social programs during the past fifteen years attests a new sense of the need for positive international action to explore common interests and cope with common problems arising within a world that is rapidly becoming more interdependent. In this respect, the most significant recent developments in intergovernmental action are related to the rapid social and economic changes associated with the widespread impact of modern technology and the extensive political changes affecting a large part of the world's population.

As the urgent problems and needs for emergency relief and rehabilitation following in the wake of the Second World War subsided, the attention of the con-

temporary world was claimed by the mounting expectations and demands for a better life that were reverberating from the newly independent countries and the economically less-developed areas in which the larger part of the world's population eke out their lives under conditions of survival elsewhere described. Moreover, these are the areas of most rapid population growth. This challenge to the world community became a paramount force in shaping international social policy and the inspiration for new and more dynamic approaches to human advancement.

Obviously, the tremendous efforts required to cope with the social needs and problems of improving the levels of living are primarily the responsibility of the individual countries, and intergovernmental action cannot replace national responsibility. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the call for intergovernmental social action is becoming more insistent and the opportunities for such action are increasing.

Developed in response to the prevailing common interest of their member states, the social programs of many intergovernmental organizations are today closely related, in terms of their particular responsibilities, to the preoccupation of most of the world with social and economic development. Consequently, a labyrinth of co-operative enterprises under various intergovernmental auspices spreads over the face of the earth, touching to some degree almost every facet of social well-being, though clearly the current activities and resources do not match the dimensions of the task.

CURRENT TREND IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL PROGRAMS

The marked trend in this decade towards greater government responsibility for the promotion of social welfare and

⁴ Robert M. MacIver, *The Nations and the United Nations*. Prepared for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1959), p. 122.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 130-131.

the consequential growth of new organizational structures for dealing with these matters is observable in countries throughout the world. This is closely associated in some respects with the general trend towards government responsibility for comprehensive national planning and programming for economic and social development that is evident in varying degrees in the major regions of the world. These trends have both increased the opportunities for international social action and are significantly influencing current trends in the programs of intergovernmental organizations.

Illustrations of certain of the trends in the program of the United Nations itself⁶ resulting from an expanding social policy and shifts of emphasis may be indicative of some of the general trends in other intergovernmental programs.⁷ While these are identifiable in

⁶ The United Nations program in the social field as distinguished from those of other components of its social welfare system currently encompasses activities in the following technical areas: community development; social aspects of housing, building and environmental planning; population; social services including family and child welfare, youth welfare, social assistance and related economic measures not covered under social security as dealt with by ILO, planning, organization and administration of social services, training of social welfare personnel, rehabilitation of the handicapped exclusive of medical, vocational and placement aspects, and services for groups requiring special care such as the aged, and social aspects of migration; social defense including treatment and prevention of crime and delinquency and prostitution; social statistics including census. Human rights and status of women are also encompassed within the United Nations program but because they involve additional factors, they are not specifically dealt with in this article.

⁷ In accordance with the General Assembly Resolution 1094 (XI) and subsequent action by ECOSOC including Resolution 694 D (XXVI), an appraisal of the over-all development, the future scope, and trends of the whole program of the United Nations and the specialized agencies in the economic, social, and

the general aspects of the programs of all the United Nations system and will be seen in certain of the interrelationships, there are, of course, other important trends too numerous to elaborate which are distinctly related to the respective functional fields included in the United Nations program and those of health, nutrition, education, home economics, labor, and other related areas of social welfare encompassed by the programs of the specialized agencies, as well as of other intergovernmental organizations.

Changes in emphasis

Since 1950, the United Nations has progressively evolved a broad framework of international social policy which gives overriding priority to assisting governments, particularly in the economically less-advanced countries, in their own efforts to improve the levels of living of their peoples. In line with this emphasis, the program of the United Nations has increasingly stressed activities, in the areas where it is responsible, related to questions of broad social policy, community development, the strengthening of national and local planning, organization and administration of social programs particularly for family and child welfare, and the training of personnel at all educational levels required for social programs.

human rights fields is now in process. A report covering the work of the United Nations was submitted by the Secretary-General to ECOSOC at its twenty-eighth session in 1959 (E/3260/Add.1), and separate appraisals have been prepared by the specialized agencies concerned. A special committee was appointed by ECOSOC to collate the separate appraisals and prepare a consolidated report showing the extent to which the programs responded to basic needs and the interrelations of the activities of the participating organizations in meeting these needs. Unfortunately, as this article is written, the findings are not available, but will be reported to ECOSOC at its summer session in 1960.

In addition, programs based upon newer concepts of international action have begun to take shape involving coordinated efforts by the United Nations system aimed at long-range programs to promote rural community development; to improve the methods and promote programs in the field of low-cost housing and related community facilities. Similarly, through interagency collaboration, explorations are underway at the international level to ascertain the most effective programs and measures for meeting the social problems arising from rapid urbanization.

Another recent trend of far-reaching import is the increased recognition of the social aspects of economic development, which lays emphasis upon the social measures required to accelerate effective economic growth and, at the same time, to cope with the social problems that arise as a consequence of economic development and sometimes impede economic change. These considerations have focused attention upon the prerequisites of development and the problems of achieving a satisfactory balance and integration of national economic and social development programs.

These activities are carried out with the assistance of the Secretariat of the United Nations and through a network of regional commissions and offices, and at the national level with the assistance of resident representatives of technical assistance, country officers, and other field personnel. While many of the forms of action used have traditionally characterized the work of intergovernmental organizations, the shift in emphasis to social development brought with it a parallel shift to the use largely of practical methods of operation. At an earlier period, as previously indicated, the activities of intergovernmental organizations were pri-

marily of a legal character, and while legal instruments, such as conventions and regulations, continue to be used for setting international standards or for devising controls for such matters as narcotic drugs, there has generally been a strong tendency for the international organizations to apply methods more suitable for practical assistance to countries. In this connection, the programs of technical co-operation represent the outstanding form of international action developed since the Second World War, and they have become the major instrument for carrying out the United Nations activities in the social as well as other fields.

Surveys and statistical aids

The idea that social programming should be accompanied by social research is not new, and accordingly, the statistical, research, and related activities of the United Nations have increasingly been redirected to provide the essential information and tools for the formulation and implementation of development programs. Thus the statistical work is aimed not merely at establishment of international statistical standards for data most universally in demand, but more particularly at helping to build up national statistical services essential for planning and program development. Important in this respect is the regular publication of statistical yearbooks, such as the United Nations Statistical Yearbook, the Demographic Yearbook, and a Monthly Statistical Bulletin covering a variety of economic and social subjects needed for national and international planning. A "compendium of social statistics" is to be published in 1961 which may become a regular publication every four years, which indicates the increasing developments in this field.

Social surveys, research, and reports

are undertaken as a basis for the formulation of international social policy, to provide guidance for technical assistance programs and to help governments in the formulation of national policies and plans and in program implementation. Among the most important of these are the comprehensive surveys of world social conditions and of programs of social development which are prepared at four-year intervals in co-operation with the specialized agencies. Furthermore, such surveys bring to light new problems calling for international consideration. For example, the second survey on world social conditions revealed the problem of rapid urbanization as a universal phenomenon, and as a result extensive studies of this problem were undertaken.

These social surveys are supplemented by studies designed to assist governments in appraising the current levels of living and measuring the changes taking place; by the studies now in process which are intended to help new countries struggling to decide what proportion of their budgets should be invested in health, education, and other social welfare activities as compared with the amounts to be invested in industrial, agricultural, and other development programs; and by a series of studies relating to the social adjustments required to bring about a greater degree of industrial development. They are also supplemented by the work of expert groups convened to study and advise on questions of social policy, such as a co-ordinated policy for improving family levels of living, or on various methods of dealing with social questions based on the experience of different countries.

In addition to the diffusion and exchange of information through publications, clearing-house functions, conferences, expert committees, and seminars, various forms of technical assistance for the use of such information may be

given directly to individual governments or through regional projects.

Although the United Nations gives highest priority to assisting newly developing countries, this is not its only objective, nor are the more highly industrialized countries excluded. On the contrary, all of the activities in the social field, including some aspects of technical assistance, have continued to be universal. Moreover, those activities of highest priority involve consideration of fundamental questions of social policy, social needs and problems, scientific and technical matters of common interest to most countries regardless of the stage of development. A permanent intergovernmental mechanism is thus provided to explore these matters and to resolve other common problems associated with new day-by-day relationships among governments, as well as to facilitate mutual exchanges essential to understanding the "fast-moving current of change" that links all human needs and problems and for vital participation in the global flow of human affairs.

Response to human needs

Whatever may be the limitations and shortcomings of the responsibilities, structures, interrelationships, and programs of intergovernmental organizations undertaking activities in the social field at this moment in time, the rapid development of these bodies and the expanding conception of the nature and scope of their social activities during the past decade have come about in response to the growing awareness of the magnitude and significance of unmet human needs and the widening recognition that the whole human community shares a common interest and responsibility for helping to meet them. Moreover, while it is clear that no miracle can be expected and that there are countless obstacles to be surmounted, the

opportunities for intergovernmental co-operation are increasing. The compelling challenge to governments and peoples is to perceive the meaning of the explosive pace of change resulting from new knowledge and technology lest the human situation become subordinate and to prove that mankind can advance at the required pace toward social progress

and development through intelligent foresight in charting the course of common efforts and wise insight into human motivation and common human values. The time may already have arrived when international co-operation in this field may be equally as crucial for peace and security as any other instrumentality yet devised.

Bilateral Channels: Activities in the Social Field

By CHARLES I. SCHOTTLAND

ABSTRACT: Since World War II, "social" programs have expanded rapidly throughout the world and there has been increasing recognition that in the economic development of less-advanced nations, social development must keep pace if nations are to avoid social dislocations frequently associated with industrial and urban expansion. Bilateral programs have not given adequate attention to the social aspects of economic development. The United States has made its largest contribution in the social field in the area of technical assistance to "community development," a movement with broad political, social, and economic implications which is spreading throughout the world and is aimed at improving village life. The International Co-operation Administration (ICA) has also engaged in training of personnel and direct service in the social field but has instructed that social programs must contribute to economic development. Other countries have likewise engaged in bilateral programs in the social field, but, as in the United States program, they have minimized activities in the social field as compared to economic development programs. Increased attention to social factors can minimize the social problems associated with rapid economic development and industrialization and this is urged for future United States programs since the United States has the largest bilateral program in the world.

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ONE of the most distinctive developments in governments throughout the world since World War II has been the growth of public social services and related social programs. In the decade 1945 to 1955, forty-five countries adopted new constitutions or constitutional amendments establishing basic responsibilities for governments in social welfare matters. Such programs as social insurance have become so large and important that in some countries the benefits paid out exceed all other non-military governmental expenditures combined—expenditures often supported by taxes ranging from 5 to 45 per cent of payroll.¹ Probably no other period in history has been marked by such worldwide interest in social action directed towards raising the levels of living as the one immediately following World War II. Social security, social assistance, and other social service programs were newly established in many countries and existing programs were expanded.²

In recognition of the rapid growth of such programs, the United Nations appointed A Group of Experts to report on "The Development of National Social Service Programmes." This committee, composed of experts from nine countries, reported that "in this period of rapid change which differs only in degree from country to country, the social implications should be clearly recognized. It is commonly accepted that the effective development of a country requires a balanced approach from both the economic and social aspects . . ."³

¹ ICA ICATO Circular A. July 24, 1959. In Bolivia, private employers allocated 60 per cent of payroll for Social Security. *Time*, March 2, 1959. p. 25.

² *International Survey of Programmes of Social Development*. (United Nations: New York, 1959), p. 3.

³ Report by A Group of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. *The Development of National Social Service Programmes*. (March 9, 1959), p. 8.

This report, which was vigorously debated by the Social Commission of the United Nations, met with general approbation by the various national representatives, approbation which reflected the growing recognition of the importance of "social" factors in the life of the people of their respective countries and the growth in their own governmental social services.

In view of these developments it is disappointing to note how little attention has been given to the "social" field and related social services in the extensive bilateral programs of material aid and technical assistance of many countries. This article will indicate some of the bilateral activities in the social field and venture some suggestions for the United States program.

The different programs that can be classified as "social" cover a wide range and variety of activities including programs related to health, education, housing, agriculture, labor conditions, social security, social services, community development, and many others. They have in common mainly their emphasis on programs which promote human welfare.⁴ Because of the wide range of services, our discussion will be merely indicative of the "social" programs rather than complete.

THE BACKGROUND

Bilateral programs are not new. Governments have frequently, in the past, extended assistance to other nations in connection with natural disasters, famine, epidemics, and other catastrophic events. Also, since the turn of the century, the foreign "advisor" has been an integral part of the developing history of several nations, particularly in South Asia and the Far and Middle East. The current descendants of these ancestral predecessors, namely, present bilateral programs, have been frequently de-

⁴ *International Survey, op. cit.*, p. 3.

scribed and need not be detailed here.⁵

But bilateral programs today are based on factors which were absent in past efforts of one nation to help another. The cold war has impelled nations, both free nations and Iron Curtain nations, to use bilateral programs to buy friends and influence governments. Added to this, the world has witnessed in the thirteen years since World War II a transition of 750 million people in twenty-one nations from a colonial to an independent status. This political upheaval has been occurring at a time when the population explosion has resulted in doubling the world's population in a single generation.⁶ This population, in addition to its growth in numbers, has been changing from a rural to an urban population and the economy in which the people live has been changing from an agricultural to an industrial economy, from a barter economy to a money wage economy.

These changes have been dramatic, sudden, and frequently have been accompanied by increased want in many areas of the world. Changing from an agricultural to an industrial economy, with such change frequently accelerated by foreign aid, has brought in its train a variety of social problems—slums, delinquency, family disorganization, unemployment, migration—the whole panorama of social problems familiar to the industrialized nations.

How have bilateral programs recognized these social problems and what have they done to assist in their solution? Has the emphasis on material aid and economic assistance excluded effort in the social field? The answer to these questions is not entirely clear. Certainly there has been a growing awareness of such social problems by

nations having bilateral programs. Just as certainly this awareness has not resulted in the kind of major activity in the social field demanded by the situation.

THE UNITED STATES PROGRAM

In President Truman's inaugural address on January 20, 1949, the President emphasized the need for raising the living standards in underdeveloped countries through aid and technical assistance. To provide such assistance, a variety of programs under different administrative mechanisms has been in operation since Congress established the program ten years ago. The history and present organization is beyond the scope of this discussion. Suffice it to say that over one hundred billion dollars have been spent for material aid and technical assistance by the current foreign aid programs and their predecessors.

Under the general co-ordination of the Department of State, three agencies administer the United States Mutual Security Program. The Department of Defense administers military aid, the Development Loan Fund extends long-term loans for economic development, and the International Co-operation Administration (ICA) carries on the economic and technical assistance programs. About two thirds of the funds allocated to ICA have been used in four general areas:⁷

1. Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing. ICA is today aiding fifty-five countries to improve diets and food supplies, establish farm credit agencies, agricultural extension services, farm organizations and farm youth clubs, and introduce better farming production and marketing methods.

2. Education. More than three hundred universities, colleges, and technical schools in forty-one countries are being aided in

⁷ Department of State Publication 6803, Economic Co-operation Series 51, Released April 1959.

⁵ For a comprehensive picture of United States and other bilateral programs see *The Annals*, Vol. 323, May, 1959.

⁶ *America*, March 28, 1959, p. 736.

their development through eighty ICA contracts with American universities. ICA has helped to train hundreds of thousands of school teachers and in some countries up to 80 per cent of all teachers.

3. Industry. The governments of less-developed nations have frequently looked to industrial development as the answer to their economic problems. ICA has aided in industrial development both in the public and private fields and has brought foreign personnel to the United States for observation and training.

4. Health and Sanitation. ICA has co-operated in the training of public health workers, including physicians, sanitary engineers, and nurses, in forty countries.

The primary aim of the United States program has been economic development. Of some 6,000 technical assistance personnel overseas in fifty-eight countries in March, 1958, the vast majority have been engaged, directly or indirectly, in economic development programs. About twelve persons were in the social services, but several hundred were in the broader "social fields."

The lack of greater attention to the social field stems partly from basic legislation and partly from the fact that the responsible officials have either not understood the importance of balancing social and economic developments or else have deliberately decided to concentrate on economic development in the hope that the social dislocations and problems inherent in such rapid development would not be as serious as past experience indicates they are.

The main activities of the United States in bilateral programs in the social field are administered by the International Co-operation Administration pursuant to the 1954 Mutual Security law which authorizes the President to furnish assistance through bilateral "technical cooperation programs." The bill provided that "such activities shall be limited to economic, engineering, medical, educational, labor, agricultural, for-

estry, fishery, mineral and fiscal surveys, demonstration, training, and similar projects that serve the purpose of promoting the development of economic resources, productive capacities, and trade of economically underdeveloped areas, and training in public administration . . ."⁸ Although attempts were made to include "social services" or some similar language in the list of activities, this was not done and social services and other social programs must be related to "promoting economic resources, productive capacities . . . and training in public administration." Although such programs are definitely related in this way, they have been organized only on a small scale.

Some "social" programs of ICA have been placed administratively in ICA's Community Development Division. This Division has primary responsibility for ICA's participation in community development programs and also has the functional responsibility for the social services.

Community development

The largest social program of ICA is "community development." Community development is a term which has come into international usage to "denote the processes by which the efforts of the people themselves are united with those of governmental authorities, to improve the economic, social and cultural conditions of communities, to integrate these communities into the life of the nation, and to enable them to contribute fully to national progress."⁹ Although community development takes many forms depending upon the particular country, the idea of building strong local communities able to help themselves, build

⁸ Mutual Security Act, 1954. Title III, Section 302.

⁹ *International Survey of Programmes of Social Development* (United Nations, 1959), p. 156.

their own institutions, establish a link with their national government, and take advantage of available technical services has spread rapidly throughout the world.

It is sometimes difficult for Americans reared in urban, industrial surroundings to realize that 80 per cent of the people in underdeveloped countries live in villages which are outside of the commercial economies and for the most part are not tied to transportation and communications systems. For example, in the Caspian area of Iran, which is a flat fertile plain lending itself to the easy development of roads, only about eight out of one-hundred villages can be reached by jeep.¹⁰

Community development has attempted to terminate this isolation and bring together the local indigenous as well as national and foreign technical assistance resources to improve village life. The dramatic development of such programs in South Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Far East—with many countries having national ministries concerned with community development—has been stimulated by technical assistance from bilateral and multilateral agencies. The United States' bilateral program of technical assistance in this area has been significant. Instructions sent to United States ICA Operations Missions have emphasized the importance of community development, known in some countries under different names, such as Village Development or Community Education. Guidelines for United States participation and assistance were sent to United States Operations Missions in sixty-one countries on October 27, 1956.¹¹ These guidelines were based on the experience gained in twenty-three

countries where ICA specialists were assisting in furthering community development activities. The guidelines also reflected discussions held in Bangkok in March, 1956, with sixty-five representatives from twenty-two United States Operations Missions.

These guidelines have accelerated United States assistance in Community Development and along with later guides and materials have stressed:

(1) The aims of community development as set forth above.

(2) The importance of assimilating ICA activities with the plans of the host countries without utilizing programs preconceived by United States technicians.

(3) Maximum use of existing governmental agencies.

(4) Within ICA rural programs, the establishment of a community development advisor to co-operate with other United States specialists in such fields as education, agriculture, health, industry, and the social services and to relate ICA programs to host village programs. Such a community development advisor serves as the point of contact with national governments and is liaison with other bilateral, multilateral, and private organizations in the field.

States aided

The results and accomplishments of community development have been extensive and important and United States assistance has been helpful. For example, in India, community development activities are being carried out in 272,756 villages encompassing a population of 150,000,000 people. Over 34,000 workers have been trained for this program. Some of the physical achievements are impressive. Twenty-two thousand new schools have been started, 65,000 miles of road constructed, 53,000 new "co-operatives" were launched, and over 5,500,000 acres brought under irrigation or reclaimed. The Ford Foundation has contributed

approximately \$10,000,000 chiefly for the establishment of training centers.

In the Philippines, the program launched by President Magsaysay in 1955 emphasized self-help financial grants and in 1958 almost 6,000 self-help projects were under way. United States funds are being used to train community development workers and technicians of various kinds and to support self-help projects. In 1958 the Philippine contribution was about 60 per cent as great as that of the United States but is expected to exceed the United States contributions in 1960.

In Pakistan, the community development program began in July 1953. The United States has furnished technicians, supplies, equipment, and advisors.

In addition to the programs in India, the Philippines, and Pakistan, the United States has assisted similar programs in Chile, Korea, Laos, Thailand, Iran, Jordan, Nepal, Ghana, Libya, Egypt, Brazil, Panama, and British Guiana. Also, many ICA activities in other countries have contributed to community development programs.

Several United States universities have developed curricula to train foreign personnel for community development. Perhaps the largest programs are represented by training facilities at Cornell University, Michigan State University, and the University of Kentucky, but a number of other universities have contributed also. An excellent program of interdisciplinary training has been planned by the University of California at Berkeley. In addition ICA has developed a variety of field observations for foreign personnel including field trips to Puerto Rico and Jamaica. The United States Departments of Agriculture and of Health, Education, and Welfare have provided technical consultation to such foreign personnel.

Although much more remains to be done in community development insofar

as United States activities are concerned, there is little question that United States participation has enriched and stimulated the community development programs of many countries. Also United States participation in the community development activities of the United Nations, Organization of American States, and other multilateral bodies has assisted in promoting international programs in this field.

Surplus commodities

With famine stalking many areas of the world, the distribution of United States surplus commodities has been significant. The Mutual Security Program has financed the purchase and export of some six billion dollars worth of surplus foods. In addition, agricultural products, other than surpluses, have been distributed throughout the world.

Since 1950, surplus foodstuffs have also been distributed through American voluntary agencies. Thirty-two private groups have been operating in twenty-four countries and are now expanding into fourteen more. The cost of shipping and distributing the foodstuffs is shared by the United States government, recipient governments, and the voluntary agencies. In 1954, such foodstuffs were made available to intergovernmental agencies.

Social services

Although United States technical assistance programs in the social services have been limited and inadequate in relation either to the needs or to total expenditures, there is evidence of increasing interest in this area. Voluntary agencies, church groups, officials of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and representatives of the less-developed countries themselves have stressed the importance of such social services to the countries assisted.

¹⁰ *ICA Work in Community Development*. (ICA, Washington, D. C., April 1959), p. 2.

¹¹ *The Community Development Guidelines*, ICA, Sent to ICA Operations Missions, October 27, 1956.

The Community Development Division has issued guidelines and instructions,¹² assigned social service personnel to various missions, assisted in training foreign personnel, provided short-term consultation, and attempted to relate the social services to other ICA technical programs and to community development. It has also acted as liaison for ICA with the United Nations, Organization of American States, and voluntary organizations with respect to programs in the social service field.

The Community Development Division has been assisted and reinforced by the Social Security Administration of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Under an agreement entered into in April 1954 and since revised, the Social Security Administration assists in recruiting social service specialists, training of foreign personnel, handling and arranging field observations by foreign visitors, developing literature and materials for United States personnel in the field as well as for foreign governments, and, in general, bringing to the ICA the experience and knowledge of the social services in this country.

ICA instructions have emphasized that technical assistance in the social services must be tied to the increase in standards of living, economic advancement, increase of food production, and such activities as "uneconomical migration" to the cities. This emphasis has undoubtedly hindered the most effective use of United States personnel since many of the social services in child welfare, delinquency, and family disorganization do not appear to be inexperienced to be directly related to economic development. However, ICA and its predecessor agencies have recognized "a

¹² Among the more significant are: ICATO Circular A. *Training for Social Welfare Personnel*. July 24, 1959; Chapter 3100 of the ICA Manual "Social Services," effective November 15, 1957.

relationship between the social and economic aspects of economic development" and priority has been given to those programs "most essential to sound economic development."

Social service activities of ICA have been most significant in two areas—(1) Training and (2) Direct service of United States technical assistance personnel.

Training

Co-operation between the United States and other countries in the training of social welfare personnel has a long history. Antedating World War II, with the United States Children's Bureau promoting such training in Latin America, it was accelerated in 1941 as a measure of national defense.

Since that time, training schools for social workers have developed all over the world and more than 450 have been established. There are sixty-five in the United States.

Training programs of ICA encompass the training of foreign personnel in the United States and the training of personnel in their own countries. With reference to training in this country, the Social Security Administration has developed a comprehensive program utilized by ICA and other agencies. Training usually consists of (a) nine months of academic study in a professional school of social work with field training in selected American social service agencies and three months observation in varied communities; or (b) six months observation or internship in selected agencies; or (c) training within the Social Security Administration; or (d) a combination of the above programs of shorter duration which are developed for key officials. Arrangements are also made for participation in seminars, institutes, and conferences of various kinds. During the fiscal year

1959, the Social Security Administration planned training programs or conducted training sessions for 987 persons from 72 countries. Six hundred fourteen of these came through ICA—many of them with primary interests in other fields¹³ and the remainder through the United Nations, World Health Organization, and other agencies. Those trained have included top government policy advisors in the social services of their respective countries, social work educators and teachers, family and child welfare workers, community organization specialists, social workers for industry, housing projects, and schools, social insurance specialists, and research specialists in social welfare.

Perhaps the most significant training project of ICA was the contract with the Council on Social Work Education¹⁴ for the development of social work education in India. This contract grew out of a series of requests made by a number of individual schools of social work in India to the Indian government for United States technical assistance in the various special fields of social work education. The ICA withheld approval of these requests because it felt that service to a single school did not justify ICA expenditures. Finally, the requests were combined into one over-all project which was accepted by the government of India and ICA.

The original contract was for a three-year period which ended June 30, 1959 and has been renewed for a two and a

¹³ Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Social Security Administration, International Service. *Annual Summary*, 1959, p. 5.

¹⁴ The Council was organized in 1949. Its participants include the United States and Canadian schools of social work and various governmental and voluntary agencies and the National Association of Social Workers. It promotes standards of social work education, develops curriculum materials, provides consultation to schools, engages in recruitment programs, and in general is the leadership body in United States social work education.

half-year extension. During the first three years, consultation was provided to six Indian schools of social work, five Indian educators undertook a year of study in the United States, and books and other educational supplies were provided to the Indian schools. Under the new contract, consultation will continue to four Indian schools, four Indian faculty members will come to the United States for a year of study, and additional educational materials will be provided.¹⁵

Direct service activities

Social workers and a variety of other technicians give direct service to governments in the social service and related fields although these activities have decreased in recent years. Indicative of such direct services has been the assignment of:

An ICA child welfare specialist to El Salvador.

A consultant to Israel "to assist in establishing and improving organizations and procedures for the administration of the National Insurance Law of Israel."

A worker in relief and refugee programs in Tunisia.

A social work consultant for community development in Panama.

A community organization worker in Chile.

A medical social worker in Peru to advise on establishing a medical social work unit in a hospital.

Short-term consultants such as a community organization advisor on housing for three months work in Costa Rica; a community development advisor in Panama; and a consultant to the school of social work in Guatemala.

Exchanges

A variety of exchange programs and visits have proved a valuable part of

¹⁵ Letter from President of Council on Social Work Education to members. No. 20, July 25, 1959. See also Dr. Witte's article in this volume, p. 123.

the bilateral programs in the social field. As part of the Department of State's International Education Exchange Service, travel grants were made available in 1959 by the Department of State for the study of social welfare developments in six Latin-American countries. An exchange of social security specialists was arranged with the Soviet Union during 1958.

OTHER BILATERAL PROGRAMS

Most of the industrialized countries of the world, and even some of the less-developed ones, have been engaged in technical assistance programs as part of the growing desire of countries to help each other either from humanitarian or political motives or a combination of both. For the most part, these programs have been confined to economic aid or technical assistance for economic development, and little assistance has been rendered in the social field.

The industrialized countries

An exception is Great Britain which has developed a comprehensive bilateral program to stimulate economic and colonial development.¹⁶ This program has included considerable activity in the social field. It was undertaken primarily for two reasons: (1) The growing demand of Great Britain's colonial population—about 60 million—for improved social services, and (2) the need to expand production of food and raw materials throughout the British Empire. The program is based on a "partnership" concept between Great Britain and the respective local officials, and the plans are developed jointly.

Great Britain's program was put into effect by a series of Colonial Development and Welfare acts. The first act was passed in 1929. The Colonial Office

¹⁶ W. R. Sharp, *International Technical Assistance*. (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1952), p. 14.

provides staff experts, information, and advice to colonial authorities.

Activities in the social field are numerous and varied. Research institutes have been established such as one in Uganda (April 1950) for the study of East African social and economic problems and the planning and co-ordination of research in anthropology, education, government, labor, social services, and related fields. A variety of scholarships for training of foreign social workers, community development specialists, and others in the social field have been available, and many such persons have been trained in Great Britain in connection with a huge training program for all fields in which as many as twelve thousand students were in various universities. Considerable technical assistance has been given to Middle East countries. Since many of the colonies or former colonies are leaders in the new community development programs—such as India, Pakistan, Ghana, Nigeria—Great Britain has made a significant contribution in this area in training and in the development of techniques, philosophy, and literature of community development.

The Dominions have also developed bilateral programs. Australia has an extensive program of economic aid, primarily to its overseas territories in Oceania. However, it has sent considerable equipment to India. Its technical assistance to its territories has included assistance in housing, sanitation, education, labor conditions, and village or community development.

For its size, Canada has a large program of economic assistance to less-developed areas and although emphasizing the economic aspects, its technical assistance personnel has been involved in a variety of social programs. Since the inception of the different technical co-operation schemes, some two-hundred trainees have come to Canada for training

in health and welfare work. The majority have come under the Colombo plan. A number of Canadians have served as health and welfare experts in the Middle East and Asia under the auspices of multilateral organizations.

Smaller countries have also organized assistance to their neighbors. Israel, itself the recipient of technical assistance, has provided specialists particularly to Africa.¹⁷ Israeli specialists have been sent to Ghana to advise on trade union organization, co-operatives, and resettlement. Similar specialists have been sent to other areas such as Burma. Exchange programs have been increasing. But Israel, in common with other countries, has emphasized the economic aspects of technical assistance and has done little to export its social achievements such as social security, the excellent social work programs, and the new social services.

In June 1952, the Norwegian Storting appropriated funds to establish a "Foundation for Assistance to Underdeveloped Countries" and Norway has extended various types of economic aid. Technical assistance and equipment have been sent to India to assist in developing India's fishing industry and limited technical assistance has been offered in health and maternity programs. However, little has been done in the social field although Norway has much to offer in technical know-how in housing, co-operatives, programs for the aged, and the social insurances.

Sweden, likewise, has done little to export its knowledge and achievements in the social field. Its bilateral programs have generally been limited to such projects as the one in Pakistan, initiated in 1955 for equipping and staffing a technical school in Karachi to train for such occupations as carpenters and

¹⁷ Arnold Rivkin, "Israel and the Afro-Asian World." *Foreign Affairs*, (April 1954), p. 3.

tailors. A similar institute was established in Addis Ababa.

France has a current program also emphasizing economic assistance but including aid and specialist assistance in housing, hospitals, refugees, and relief particularly in its African territories.

Belgium has done considerable work in the Congo in organizing schools, hospitals, and a variety of social services.

Germany has been increasing its bilateral programs. By the end of 1956, over 300 students from underdeveloped countries were studying in West Germany through scholarships awarded by the German government, and in the period 1954–1956, 111 experts were sent to less-developed countries, including some who represented the social field in areas of housing and health programs.

The less-developed countries

The less-developed countries have frequently helped each other through technical assistance. For example in 1957, Ghana sent a team of professional community development workers to the Western Region of Nigeria to advise on community development programs.¹⁸

The Soviet sphere

Little information is available about the bilateral programs of the Iron Curtain countries in the social field. The Soviet Union is developing an extensive program of economic assistance.¹⁹ Its technical assistance activities are patterned after those of the United States.²⁰ In the social field it would appear that its efforts have been very limited. Exchange visits and study groups have

¹⁸ ICA, *Community Development Review*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (June 1959).

¹⁹ Waldemark Nielse and Zoran S. Hodjera, "Sino-Soviet Bloc Assistance—Another Bilateral Approach." *The Annals*, May 1959. pp. 40–49.

²⁰ Michael T. Florinsky, "Russian-American Rivalry in Foreign Aid." *Current History* (September 1957), p. 153.

been encouraged in education, health, medical care, social security, and other social fields, and many scholarships for study in the Soviet Union have included study in various "social" areas. Czechoslovakia has been active in inviting officials of less-developed countries for observance and study of its social security program. China has begun technical assistance programs primarily in the economic field such as assisting in the organization of a textile factory in Burma and other such programs in Cambodia, Ceylon, and Nepal.

The foregoing discussion on bilateral programs is incomplete but nevertheless indicates the limited extent of social programs in the expanding bilateral activities.

MULTILATERAL AGENCIES

Another article in this issue will deal with multilateral agencies.²¹ However, note should be taken of the increasing difficulty of separating bilateral and multilateral programs. For example, there has been a growing tendency for the United States to deal with technical assistance on a co-operative basis through multilateral and regional arrangements. Regional arrangements in Africa, the Caribbean, and South Pacific, aimed at the advancement and economic development of nations in the region, have been the channel for utilizing resources of the bilateral programs. This has been true particularly of the Colombo Plan and the Organization of American States.

Organization of American States

The Organization of the American States (OAS) has developed an extensive program in the social field with the support of its member nations and with the United States, which furnishes two thirds of the funds, making available

personnel for work in member countries. The OAS social program is well developed.²² "Social Welfare and Community Development Programs" are a section under the OAS "Division of Labor and Social Affairs." OAS official policy indicates that "there must be simultaneous and coordinated economic and social development."

Colombo Plan

Of the many regional arrangements for technical assistance and economic development the Colombo Plan is the best known. Actually it is not an organization itself. It developed as a result of a meeting of Britain's Commonwealth Ministers in Ceylon in January, 1950. This meeting laid the groundwork for bilateral programs to raise living standards in South and Southeast Asia through the Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in Southeast Asia.

The small secretariat of the Colombo Plan in Ceylon has as its principal function the expediting of bilateral negotiations. When a country desires a foreign specialist, the request is routed through the Colombo secretariat to the government having such a specialist available.

Although emphasizing economic development, considerable attention has been given, both by the countries assisted and those providing assistance, to the social field. This has been particularly true with reference to training. For every expert sent to Colombo Plan countries, seven persons have been trained, whereas the United Nations ratio has been 0.9 trainees to one expert and the United States ratio about 1.3 trainees to one expert.²³ Many of the trainees have been trained in housing, health, medical care, community development, and re-

²² See Martha Branscombe. Article herein.

²³ Rowland Egger, "Financing Technical Assistance." *The Annals*, May 1959, p. 85.

lated programs. Also, plans of Colombo nations have emphasized the close relationship between social and economic development.

CONCLUSION AND COMMENTS

The "social" aspects of bilateral programs have not received the attention which multilateral agencies and less-developed countries themselves have considered appropriate. The wealthy nations extending technical assistance and material aid are still too complacent about want prevailing in the world and the fact that the situation is not being improved. Thus, the per cent of the world's population which is undernourished has risen from 38.6 per cent before the war to 59.5 per cent at the present time.²⁴ The problem of hunger is tied to related social problems of slums, delinquency, migration, disease, and family disorganization.

Eventually, the programs of economic development should alleviate the problem of hunger but economic growth may well accentuate social conflicts.²⁵ Perhaps one of history's most severe indictments of bilateral and multilateral programs alike will be that rapid economic development of the less-developed nations caused social stagnation and accentuated and developed serious social problems.

The less-developed nations themselves are beginning to understand this. They are not satisfied with slow progress in the social field, and foreign trainees and visitors to the United States have emphasized this frequently. As one foreign official put it, "Aiding a farmer to produce more while industrial development causes his children to leave home and go to the city is not very helpful."

The United States in particular has a

²⁴ *America*, April 26, 1959, p. 141.

²⁵ Oscar Gass, "The United States and the Poorest Peoples." *Commentary* (February 1959), p. 103.

unique opportunity to make important contributions to the social field. Its bilateral programs are large and significant and have been a major factor in the economic progress of many nations. This progress has been responsible for some of these countries choosing the democratic rather than the communist way and, therefore, has been in our own national interest. But our humanitarian interests in bilateral programs demand assistance which enables people to use their capacities to the fullest and to achieve a happier and sounder life. Overemphasis on economic objectives can thwart this goal. Economic development cannot be isolated from social development and the social consequences flowing from economic advancement.

For a relatively insignificant expenditure, many of the social problems arising in the developing economies of the countries receiving technical assistance can be avoided. These technical assistance programs are regarded all over the world as a test of United States sincerity in foreign affairs.²⁶ It does not help our position if slums and delinquency follow industrialization, or unplanned migration disrupts families. Suggested for consideration as an accelerated program for the United States in the social field are the following steps:

First, a clear acknowledgment by ICA and other appropriate United States agencies, similar to the statement of the Organization of American States, that "there must be simultaneous and coordinated economic and social development."²⁷ Such clear-cut recognition of the significance of social development is

²⁶ *America*, February 16, 1957, p. 543.

²⁷ This is official United States policy also in spite of limited programs. See statement by Christopher H. Phillips, United States representative to the United Nations Economic and Social Council, July 14, 1959 that "Neither economic nor social development can be mutually exclusive."

²¹ See Martha Branscombe. Article herein.

particularly important today since there has been in many instances a slowing down or stagnation of social programs in many less-developed countries in the past five or six years.²⁸

Second, the creation of a Social Affairs Division or other appropriate unit in ICA to bring to bear on our technical assistance programs the best skills, knowledge, and thinking in the social field. It is believed that this emphasis is consistent with the present law and legislative objectives.

Third, the placement in each major United States Overseas Mission of a person expert in the social services and social insurances.²⁹

Fourth, acceleration of training programs in the social field—both in the United States for foreign officials as well as the development of training facilities in beneficiary countries.

Fifth, a closer working relationship between ICA, the universities, and other

federal and voluntary agencies in the social field, particularly the Social Security Administration, thus enabling ICA to obtain the advantage of specialist assistance in recruiting, training, and policy formulation.

Sixth, increasing co-operation and relationships with intergovernmental, multilateral, and regional agencies in the social field. In many countries a dozen or more separate assistance programs are in operation. The United States program, usually the largest, can take the lead in bringing about needed co-ordination through established channels.

These suggestions could, if adopted, have an important impact upon the people of the less-developed countries. After all, the real issues of the cold war will be determined by people. And the people of the less-developed countries will develop attitudes based on their personal situations and problems. If economic assistance complicates or increases their personal problems, its purpose, both political and humanitarian, will not be achieved. If a parallel development of social and economic programs can achieve a rise in the standard of living without the social disruptions evident in some areas, the assistance of the United States will be hailed as a great contribution to human progress.

Voluntary Agencies and Foundations in International Aid

By LEWIS M. HOSKINS

ABSTRACT: American voluntary agencies perform on behalf of their constituencies—the American public—extensive overseas operations in many countries throughout the world. They bring medical, educational, agricultural, relief, and refugee services to disadvantaged people wherever they have an opportunity to share their concerns and competence. They co-ordinate their activities and co-operate with governmental agencies through informal arrangements such as councils and more formal agreements such as subcontracts. Their voluntary and independent characteristics permit a maximum of experimentation and close contact with the people with whom they work and share. In so doing they help translate American humanitarian ideals in practical ways. They also bring to communities in the United States firsthand insight of the aspirations and problems of other peoples. This relationship helps the needed communication and understanding in an interdependent world. Foundations have grown in number and scope to supplement the work of the traditional voluntary agencies. Some carry on their own programs; others prefer to work through existing organizations.

²⁸ *International Survey of Programmes of Social Development*. (United Nations, New York, 1959), p. 3.

²⁹ For a discussion of the contributions of American social workers to such programs as community development see: Charles I. Schottland, "Community Development—A Challenge to Social Workers," *Community Organization 1958*, published for the National Conference on Social Welfare by the Columbia University Press, pp. 3-17.

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THE publication of *The Ugly American*¹ has accelerated the debate in responsible governmental and community circles on how to represent the best of American ideals and motivation abroad where even our most altruistic actions are misunderstood and suspected. Sincere attempts to help others less fortunate do not produce the kind of friendships which we desire and which the world needs. Is the representative of the United States who is living and serving abroad inadequate to his task? If so, why? How can we help remedy the situation?

This issue has received earnest consideration by a segment of the American community that has a long record of work overseas; namely, the voluntary agencies. While no specific attack has been made on the quality of the persons sent abroad by the religious and other voluntary groups that render foreign service, their own motivation has made them self-critical and well aware of the role played by Americans abroad. These agencies are constantly seeking to improve their programs and the quality of their representatives. In the selection of personnel they lay special emphasis on motivation, and it must be admitted that few, if any, have funds to attract workers by financial incentives. But religious or idealistic motivation must be supplemented by adequate training and firm organizational support. Relations with the people whom they seek to serve are facilitated by relatively good communication: language, simple living, congenial contact with counterpart indigenous groups, absence of ulterior or political motive and the like.

¹ William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, *The Ugly American* (New York: Norton, 1958). In leading magazines and newspapers and on the floor of Congress earnest discussion has intensified on the issues raised by the authors. This has been essentially salutary in increasing public concern for the maintenance of high standards.

Who are these "voluntary agencies"? Possibly in no country in the world is there a greater and healthier development of free associations of citizens to achieve social improvements than in the United States. This is particularly true of the groups organized to meet relief and welfare needs of people overseas. Our own governmental and community leaders have come to appreciate these unofficial efforts as a significant supplement to official programs. Working as they do without reference to race, creed, caste, geography, or political involvement, these agencies elicit the support of a large portion of our country's citizens. It has been estimated that the membership and supporters of the agencies operating overseas include at least 100,000,000 people. It is impossible to estimate the number of individuals whom these serve, but certainly the beneficiaries must total several hundred million. A true "people to people" relationship is established through material assistance and personal contact, the recipients of which have through the years expressed their appreciation by tokens and letters to donors and above all by helping the people of the United States to understand world affairs.

THE CHARACTER OF A VOLUNTARY AGENCY

In this country a voluntary agency is a nonprofit organization established and governed by a group of private citizens for a stated philanthropic purpose. It is supported by voluntary contributions. Many agencies are designed to meet welfare needs at home. We are here concerned only with those devoted to overseas assistance. In the field, American agencies come into contact and co-operate with similar agencies from other countries; these too are beyond the scope of this examination. Many United States organizations are religiously motivated; some aim to serve

their own counterparts abroad, while others carry on their efforts on a non-sectarian line. America's religious denominations have a long history of missionary service overseas. Originally sent with a primary concern for evangelization, they early began teaching, healing, and helping the people in many ways. In time the medical, educational, and agricultural missions were flourishing all over the world. It is this phase of their work that concerns us here.

Many United States agencies are secular in origin; some represent nationality groups; others a mixture of constituencies. All stem from a vital aspect of the American cultural tradition in which helping one's neighbor was an essential ingredient of the frontier and of an expanding nation. Most Americans come from another land and have old world traditions and associations which make them sympathetic to less-fortunate peoples elsewhere and hospitable to refugees seeking new opportunities. The American people as a whole are not traditionally bureaucratic. They respect action on individual initiative and prefer to help others to help themselves. Belief in the worth of individuals is an integral part of their confidence in the democratic ideal.

Three other efforts, not discussed here, properly belong in a broad review of American nonofficial aid programs. The first is the American Red Cross which has a Congressional Charter. It carries out extensive relief in this country and abroad where it co-operates with the international League of Red Cross Societies. Another is the increasingly significant role of the American universities in supplying specific training as well as technical assistance abroad.²

RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED NATIONS

A third area of great significance must be omitted here because of lack of space.

² *The Annals*, Vol. 323 (May 1959).

American voluntary agencies have developed fruitful relationships with a number of intergovernmental agencies such as United Nations Relief and Reconstruction Agency (UNRRA), International Refugee Organization (IRO), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), and United Nations Works Relief Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNWRA). Of special note was the experience of American groups working with the UNHCR for European refugees stimulated by a grant from an American Foundation. The "crash" program for Hungarian refugees was in part possible because of this pattern of co-operation.

The major expansion in American programs abroad has occurred since World War I and more particularly during and after World War II, when compassion for the suffering brought on by war precipitated the formation of a host of American organizations. Herbert Hoover's huge food relief in Belgium and the other European countries was supplemented by that of numerous private groups that distributed food, clothing, and medical supplies throughout Europe, even in the former enemy countries.³ Many agencies focused on the children, whose innocent suffering elicited sympathy both because of their immediate plight and because hostile attitudes were being engendered. With the outbreak of the Second World War, American philanthropy again responded with instinctive generosity. The burgeoning of organizations and the complications of governmental and intergovernmental relationships during the period of neutrality brought the United States government into the picture as never before.

³ See Herbert Hoover's new book: *An American Epic: The Relief of Belgium and Northern France 1914-30*, (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1959).

Regulation and control seemed imperative at home and in the field.

WAR RELIEF CONTROL BOARD

It was then that Secretary of State Cordell Hull recommended to President Franklin D. Roosevelt (March 3, 1941) that an authority be created to protect the public from exploitation and to make sure that funds and supplies were used for the purposes for which they were collected. President Roosevelt responded by appointing a special committee⁴ to study problems involved in foreign war relief and to make recommendations for supervision. By the time the United States became involved in the war, some problems were acute, and widespread satisfaction was expressed by responsible agencies at the appointment (July 25, 1942) of the President's War Relief Control Board composed mainly of the former committee. The Board was empowered to license and regulate solicitation for war-relief charities, domestic and foreign, by agencies other than the American Red Cross and the churches. Its efforts helped to reduce overhead, maintain standards, and minimize confusion arising in the public mind from overlapping appeals.⁵

Faithful to America's democratic and civilian tradition the War Relief Board was terminated on May 14, 1946, immediately after the cessation of hostilities. But just then the liberation of war-torn countries brought opportunity for full-scale work by American groups. The religious and European nationality groups rapidly increased their efforts. There was a great outpouring of gifts through organizations and individual

⁴ Joseph E. Davies was chairman with Charles P. Taft and Frederick P. Kappel members.

⁵ This story is well told by Arthur C. Ringland in "The Organization of Voluntary Foreign Aid, 1939-53," Department of State Bulletin, Washington, March 15, 1954.

contributions of food packages.⁶ Governments, military authorities and private agencies co-operated closely in setting up a mammoth operation for food relief, rehabilitation, and the reorganization of local welfare services. Shortly afterwards, similar opportunities challenged American agencies in the Orient. In all this the need for continued governmental oversight remained. The War Relief Board was replaced in 1946 by the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid. This was made up of distinguished private citizens and was serviced by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs of the Department of State.⁷

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON VOLUNTARY FOREIGN AID

Over sixty voluntary agencies accepted the Advisory Committee's invitation to register and submit quarterly reports. Both the executive and legislative departments of the government recognized the need for a close relationship between the official and voluntary postwar relief efforts. The Congress, at a time when it was making provision for food, medical supplies, clothing, feed, fertilizers, pesticides, and seed, authorized up to five million dollars to defray the cost of ocean transport for supplies privately donated which were deemed essential to supplement the official program. The government freight has continued to date, including shipments of agricultural surpluses donated to the voluntary agencies under Public Law 480, Title III. The role of the Advisory Committee has also continued, although it is now administratively attached to the International Co-operation Administration.

⁶ At this time CARE (Co-operative Agencies for Remittances to Europe) was organized by various voluntary organizations.

⁷ Ringland, *op. cit.*

FOUNDATIONS

A recent and characteristically American phenomenon in world-wide philanthropy is the development of foundation activities abroad. Of the many hundred foundations or trust funds in the United States, the majority limit their charitable activities to programs in our country, but there is an increasing interest among some larger foundations in programs relating to America's long-range interest in peace and human welfare among peoples across the seas. Tax laws in this country have encouraged the development of these foundations. Though often set up by an individual family, the scope of their programs and objectives equals the span of American concern for human welfare. Often the individual wealth and initiative available to foundations are dedicated to encouraging research and the development of potential leaders here and in other countries. Self-help activities abroad also exert a special appeal and often receive assistance. Annual reports of the stewardship of funds of the larger foundations are published by their Boards of Directors, usually composed of well-known citizens. Many of these directors feel keenly their responsibility and the opportunity to use these relatively free funds as venture capital to stimulate progress toward new frontiers in education, science, medicine, and welfare. "Pump priming" and "multipliers" are favorite phrases among foundation executives. They select, according to these criteria, among the thousands of suggested projects the few which they feel most merit their assistance.

Some of the larger foundations have developed distinctive programs with full-time staff.⁸ More provide subventions

⁸ Well-known examples of larger operating foundations include the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the Carnegie Corporation, the Dan-

to existing educational or voluntary organizations to increase programs already under way or to inaugurate new ones. For example, they have enormously supplemented the resources and effectiveness of the American voluntary organizations. This has been accomplished without appreciably weakening the independent policy and operation of the agencies. In a few cases only have voluntary agencies permitted themselves to be warped or overextended through foundation subsidies. The normal withdrawal of such support after a period of years has occasionally embarrassed an agency whose constituency is unable to continue the program at the higher level of activity. The elaborate applications required by most foundations have had a salutary effect on program planning by the voluntary agencies. Some observers have expressed their regret at the tendency of large foundations to be overcautious in their granting policy. On the whole, the increasing role of foundations in areas formerly dominated by the voluntary agencies has been both stimulating and creative, and the manifold service endeavors of foundations merit special review.

SCOPE OF VOLUNTARY ACTIVITY

At present the 55 voluntary agencies, supported on a nation-wide basis primarily by contributions of their own constituencies, operate relief, welfare, and self-help activities in 103 countries and areas in all parts of the world.⁹

forth Foundation, and others. The Near East Foundation, despite its name is more properly a voluntary agency and not a fund-dispensing foundation in the usual sense.

⁹ A list of agencies registered with the Advisory Committee of Voluntary Foreign Aid can be secured by writing its executive director, International Co-operation Administration, Washington 25, D. C. For general information on voluntary agencies write Director, American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, 20 West 40th Street, New York.

They distribute food and clothing, medical supplies and equipment; they operate hospitals and mobile clinics, schools and training programs; and they carry out agricultural extension work and community development. In order that their efforts will not have proved transient, they strive in their assistance to develop local leadership in true self-help manner. Every year the American voluntary agencies generate an average of over a quarter of a billion dollars for overseas programs. This represents cash expenditures as well as the money value of supplies distributed. To operate and supervise these foreign service programs the agencies normally maintain an American staff of about 800 workers abroad. In addition they employ thousands of indigenous personnel. Beyond that they enjoy the services of many volunteers, often members of counterpart organizations located in the foreign countries in which they work. They operate in these areas usually by specific invitation and with the co-operation of host governments. Home offices provide supervisory and planning personnel, while policy is usually determined by a Board of Directors composed of private citizens with broad background experience. Careful records are kept and reports made to constituent groups and to the general public. This is indispensable to assure future support.

REFUGEES

A specialized area of service in which many American voluntary agencies are vitally involved is that of refugee assistance: relief and welfare services, movement, and resettlement. In this "century of the uprooted" when millions have been made homeless through circumstances beyond their control or remedy, American voluntary agencies have responded with characteristic warmth and understanding. They are uniquely equipped to

supplement the basic services that must be supplied by governments—such as documents, funds for transportation, and so on. The agencies have trained staff abroad; at the same time they have members across America ready to prepare a welcome for newcomers.¹⁰ In the past decade voluntary agencies have helped over 600,000 persons displaced by wars' aftermath, natural calamities, or political oppression to become established, mostly in the United States. This essentially human response to human need is a work of rescue that has not only saved the lives of individuals and families but has also been of service to the economies of overpopulated and devastated countries. In addition there has been an incalculable contribution to American leadership and economic life through the importation of talent and purchasing power. Voluntary agencies carry on a persistent year-round effort to facilitate the resettlement of refugees from Europe and Asia in the New World or Australia. During recent months they have exerted special efforts to make the current "World Refugee Year" a success. Although always co-operating closely with governmental and intergovernmental efforts, their service is personalized in warm and human ways which are difficult or impossible for official efforts alone.

MATERIAL AIDS

It is evident that in war's aftermath huge shipments of various goods are required to bring the level of life back towards normal. It is not always appreciated that such assistance may be re-

¹⁰ Particularly noteworthy are agencies representing America's three major faiths: National Catholic Welfare Conference, Church World Service, Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society/Jewish Joint Distribution Committee. There are other smaller agencies that conduct significant refugee programs in over-all co-operation with these.

quired for many years in areas of poverty and bare subsistence. The government has recognized our responsibility and opportunity to share our bounty. "Democracy begins somewhere above 1700 calories per day." Since 1947 a sizeable portion of our agricultural surpluses has been distributed abroad through the American voluntary agencies. The law not only releases the surpluses, but provides subsidies for moving them from the United States to foreign countries whose governments assure customs free entry and other facilities through agreements with the United States government or the voluntary agencies. Supervision is through the Advisory Committee referred to above with close consultation of officials in the Department of Agriculture and the Food and Agriculture Office of the International Co-operation Administration. Overseas distribution must be supervised by American representatives of the voluntary agencies, although it is usually carried out through indigenous counterpart agencies.¹¹ Care is taken to see that the supplies actually reach needy individuals and that the local economy is not adversely affected. It seems likely that world consumption will be increased because of increased aspirations. In the end this will benefit Americans as producers rather than depress our workers.¹²

¹¹ A manual to guide voluntary agency representatives handling surpluses abroad has been prepared by the Surplus Commodities Policy Committee of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies (March 1959). The historical development of the use of surpluses and the present legal requirements are detailed therein. It is a good illustration of co-operative effort among agencies and between agencies and the government.

¹² An especially imaginative program of material aids is the Brethren's "Heifer Project" under whose auspices thousands of heifers, goats, and poultry have been shipped to needy areas to rejuvenate animal husbandry and raise standards of food consumption.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Although "community development" and "technical assistance" are terms recently in vogue, the concepts they represent are not new to American voluntary agencies. To villages of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, trained technicians from the United States have gone for years to bring know-how, experience, and encouragement to the local people. Education and training programs have been at the heart of most of these efforts. Goals of a co-operative community spirit have been traditional. The current phrase to describe these programs is "self-help." National governments have recently recognized their responsibilities more fully and, like India, have set up "Five Year Plans" in which community development for thousands of villages is an integral part. Supplementing official programs are the smaller, pilot and experimental efforts of voluntary agencies. These are closely co-ordinated with the plans of the government involved. There is also co-operation in various areas with the extensive programs of the United Nations agencies.¹³

¹³ In a report by a group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Twelfth Session of the Social Commission entitled "The Scope and Development of National Social Service Programmes" (February 1959) stress is placed on a rounded approach to economic and social problems both in industrialized and in underdeveloped nations. Properly they emphasize the importance of social services in areas of rapid economic change to insure maximum social stability and the preservation of such values as family life. Members of the United Nations Secretariat, in commenting on their report, pointed out the significant role nongovernmental organizations could play in this field. See "Scope and Development of National Social Service Programmes," reported by the Secretary-General, March 1959. For a description of voluntary activities in technical assistance the reader is referred to Edwin A. Bock, *Fifty Years of Technical Assistance* (Chicago:

The technique of exchange or foreign study is important to the development of local leadership. Many voluntary agencies have experimented with this field, supplementing official programs.¹⁴

CO-ORDINATION

These varied examples illustrate the scope of the major efforts of voluntary agencies in their humanitarian endeavors abroad. But organizational variety and versatility as well as resourcefulness have produced over the years many other imaginative projects designed to meet specific human needs in practical ways. The experience gained by individual agencies is shared in their joint discussions. In the United States the chief agency for co-ordination and maintenance of standards is the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, 20 West 40th Street, New York City. About forty member agencies participate in its various subcommittees, such as the Migration and Refugee Problems Committee or the Committee on Korea. Policy guidance is provided by an executive committee of officers and representatives of the member agencies. The experience gained by the individual groups is pooled, then shared, when appropriate, with government and international agencies and policy-making officials.

Public Administration Clearing House, 1954); American Council of Voluntary Agencies, *The Role of Voluntary Agencies in Technical Assistance* (New York, 1953); W. N. Collison, editor, *Directory of American Voluntary and Non-profit Agencies Interested in Technical Assistance*, American Council of Voluntary Agencies (2nd ed., New York: Technical Assistance Information Clearing House, 1958). Also see *The Annals*, *supra*, note 2.

¹⁴ The 4-H Farm Youth Exchange, Brethren's hospitality on American farms for Polish farmers, the international School Affiliation Service of the Quakers, the aid to foreign students studying in American colleges and universities given by the Institute of International Education are examples of voluntary exchange programs.

In recent years field co-ordination has been expedited by co-operative inter-agency groups such as the Council of Relief Agencies Licensed to Operate in Germany (CRALOG); Licensed Agencies for Relief in Asia (LARA); and the Advisory Council for Relief Efforts in Egypt. In addition there have been informal councils in the capitals of some foreign nations where American agencies are working—Rome, Delhi, Seoul, Vienna, and so on. These devices help to assure adequate co-ordination among agencies and between the agencies and the government programs. They can also facilitate relations with host governments and specialized agencies of the United Nations.

RELATIONS WITH GOVERNMENTS

Both joint and individual relations exist between the various voluntary agencies and their own governments. All share a general belief in the importance of their independence and freedom of action. Some insist more strongly than others on complete separation from official programs. Some gladly support and co-operate to the extent of accepting government contracts and funds for overseas refugee or technical assistance programs. Others refrain from forming any formal ties. A letter recently issued by the American Council to field staff dealing with government surpluses and accompanying a manual on distribution procedures probably reflects the opinions of most agencies:

... freedom of action [is] the highest and crowning prerogative of the voluntary agency. . . . The voluntary agency must be able to act with discretion; it is expected to use wise judgment in all its actions and to have proper discernment in its own conduct. In order to function most effectively, it needs the freedom to act on its own judgment and responsibility. Moreover, because it is designed as a channel through which people may serve people, the choice

of those it will serve must be determined primarily by need, not by the political objectives of any government or the selfishness of any individual. This independent spirit is at the very heart of voluntarism. At the same time, it is in the best interests of all responsible people that the voluntary agency be registered with government. This is a protection for the legitimate agency and tends to eliminate those which are not qualified to serve according to their declared intent. The voluntary agency has a special kind of function in rendering services which government and other private sources are not able to provide. The ideal is a partnership concept in which the work of the voluntary agency and other private sources complement the work of government in the service of mankind.¹⁵

As early as 1950 the administrators of the Point Four program in Washington were considering the use of private voluntary agencies. The acting administrator, Capus M. Waynick, recommended in October 1950 that the government (a) arrange for release of staff of private groups as employees or consultants on United States technical co-operation projects, (b) assist and advise private groups in conducting their programs, (c) enlist participation of private agencies to increase public understanding of the Point Four program at home and abroad, and (d) contract specific projects or functions to be carried out by private groups or award grants for support of approved activities. In April 1951 a memorandum directed attention to voluntary agency experience, personnel, and acceptance in the countries in which they had programs. Their rich resources of dedicated personnel were recognized.

The government followed three prin-

¹⁵ "Letter to a Colleague," American Council of Voluntary Agencies, New York, March 1959. (Accompanying "Manual on U. S. Government Agricultural Commodities" of same date.)

ciples in making early contracts with agencies: (1) Their program should be nonsectarian, (2) they should have the confidence and respect of the host government and the people, (3) they should have sound administrative experience. Before 1952 supplemental principles were added: (1) the host government should desire and request the services of an American voluntary agency, (2) the agency should do no proselytizing, (3) the agency should demonstrate its capacity to relate to local mores and social customs, (4) the agency should encourage self-improvement of the people in training indigenous leaders wherever possible, (5) the agency should relate its activities to the total Point Four program when under contract. These are the general policies still followed by the government in its partnership with voluntary agencies.

One agency so cherished its unqualified independence that it withdrew from an eminently satisfactory relationship with the United States government when officials felt it necessary under Congressional prodding to require security checks of all agency personnel. The loss of government funds forced some retrenchment. It was necessary to seek replacement of income from the general public so that its technical assistance project could continue in India without incident or controversy.¹⁶ Other agencies have withdrawn from efforts to formulate contracts with the International Co-operation Administration because of delays, red tape, and indirect restraints on freedom. On the whole, however, amicable relationships have been worked out despite inherent differences of organization and philosophy between the private and public sectors.

Despite the size and significance of the total efforts of American voluntary

¹⁶ The American Friends Service Committee, Philadelphia.

agencies, they are small in comparison with governmental and intergovernmental programs. Their role is pioneering, experimenting, and filling in gaps which the larger, official agencies may overlook. Among the special contributions which the voluntary agencies seek to make in international welfare programs are the following:

SPECIAL FUNCTIONS

1. They provide a channel for the direct expression of personal concern of people in more-privileged areas for the welfare of people in less-favored nations. Representatives of some private agencies live in remote villages, working directly with the local people, helping them find answers to some of their problems such as food production, disease, indebtedness. This can create a sense of brotherhood and a basis for international understanding in the Americans as well as in those with whom they work. The recipients of this aid can come to realize that these services are provided out of sympathy and not for personal or national ambition. It is worth noticing that while Communist nations may provide competent technicians in their official aid programs throughout the world, they have been unable to supply truly voluntary representatives. The Americans returning from overseas assignments provide sources of insight and widening vision for their home communities. People develop ways of participating in voluntary and official aid programs abroad as they become personally involved in the destinies of people in foreign parts.¹⁷

¹⁷ An example of a spontaneous response to human need was the Hiroshima Maidens project inaugurated by Norman Cousins of the *Saturday Review*. Various church groups offered hospitality. Doctors and hospitals furnished medical services. With a note of penance implicit, this project brought rich overtones of goodwill and international understanding.

2. In the less-developed countries there has rarely been real self-government. Governments have usually been authoritative, operating from the top down. There is no clear channel for the people's voice to pass upward to top government officials, even if the people had an inclination to speak. Since many projects for the improvement of agriculture and health involve radical changes in the social values and customs of a people, government officials coming into the village as innovators may meet resistance because there is a fear that cherished values will be destroyed. Government reforms, however sound, may appear at first to work hardships on the people or on portions of them. In such situations, a nongovernmental organization may play a very useful role. It can serve as a channel of communication between the people and the government, interpreting the one to the other and helping each side to modify its attitudes and actions when it fully understands the other side. Furthermore, it can support and encourage villagers to bring their problems to the attention of the government in appropriate ways. Experience has proved that some easing of communications is possible even though the nongovernmental agency is an outside group, if there is no ulterior motive, no personal stake in the matter.

3. All countries need honest, able leadership. Even more important than technical training in administration and government is integrity and the ability to resist the graft and bribery that are customary in many parts of the world. Many voluntary agencies are tackling this difficult task through intensive training programs for leadership at various levels. Some are developing multipurpose village workers who go out from a training center to serve in several villages. Agencies continually seek to inject a moral dimension and sense

of responsibility into their practical projects.¹⁸

4. Closely related to better leadership is a new spirit of confidence and expectation. One agency¹⁹ states that it "seeks to develop local groups or hosts in whom the technical knowledge brought in by the outside workers can live and grow and continue beyond the period of foreign influence. These self-help, competent, and confident local groups are our major objective . . ." Another agency reported that a village elder remarked with satisfaction on a new project his village was undertaking. "You see, my friend, we now have the courage to do some of the things we never dreamed we could do before." From little changes of attitude great progress may result.

5. Besides facilitating communication between local people and their governmental representatives the nongovernmental organization can frequently show villagers how to secure facilities and services of their own government which they heretofore had never tapped.

6. Voluntary agencies can attempt to meet needs which official bodies cannot or are not yet willing to meet. They can get programs under way quickly and flexibly since they are not limited by legal or political complications.

7. Nongovernmental organizations, because of their experience on over-all policies, are in a position to criticize their own or other governments that tend to violate good principles of social welfare or human values generally.

¹⁸ The Unitarian Service Committee has stressed medical and social work, exchanges, and training. The Near East Foundation experiments in village education and local-teacher training. Others have tried internships and on-the-job training. For an example of village-worker training see *Social and Technical Assistance in India: an Interim Report*, American Friends Service Committee, Philadelphia, 1956.

¹⁹ International Voluntary Service.

Some American agencies have expressed profound regret that the original high principles of President Truman's Point Four have been de-emphasized in favor of stress on technical assistance as a weapon against communism. They tend to feel that a positive program based purely on compassionate concern and humanitarian principles best serves the national and the international interest.

8. As suggested earlier, voluntary agencies are uniquely fitted for experiment. They are able to take calculated risks, trying schemes which may fail or prove sound for larger and for official programs to adopt.

9. Economic progress in less-developed areas of the world is complicated and must be carried out in ways appropriate to complex local circumstances. Anthropologists are helping official and private workers to learn the relationship of popular attitudes to what westerners regard as "progress." Social stability is often precarious and changes may prove upsetting. The voluntary agencies are especially concerned to comprehend subtle, spiritual factors. Can we avoid importing crass materialism that squeezes out rich spiritual values as we try to bring higher standards of living?

EVALUATION

The voluntary agencies are conscious of their inadequacies and shortcomings. They constantly review and evaluate their own programs, seeking ways to improve their operations. They do this self-evaluation because of their sense of responsibility to their constituents and their obligation to do the best possible job. They realize that they have not always been able to reach down to the lowest level of people in areas where they work, and that it is the moderately well-off individuals who may seem to profit most from their assistance, crushing down the very poorest to an even

lower state. They realize that too often their efforts atrophy or die when they withdraw: local leadership has not been adequately trained to carry on, local circumstances have not been adequately prepared for continued growth. They are concerned that their material assistance may be divisive or become a dole if there is not sufficient effort on the part of the people to raise their production levels commensurate with their new

demands. And they realize that they do not portray to their own satisfaction the image of America with its diversity, its freedom, its moral and spiritual values. Nevertheless, by reflection and examination, the agencies constantly seek to raise the level and quality of their performance, so as better to represent the best of America in the overseas activities made possible by the generosity of Americans.

UNICEF in Central America

By ALICE C. SHAFFER

ABSTRACT: Central America has been one of the pioneer areas for the United Nations Children's Fund assisted programs. When the United Nations Children's Fund, under a broadened mandate from the United Nations, shifted the emphasis of its aid from emergency to long term and from war-torn countries to those economically less developed, Central American governments immediately requested its assistance to strengthen and extend services to children and mothers. As one of the first areas in the world to aim at the eradication of malaria and to have engaged in an intensive campaign against malnutrition on a regional basis, the Central American experiences in these fields have become known, watched, and studied by people from many countries. Against this background, international and bilateral organizations are working together with governments as they broaden the scope and the extent of their programs. Ten years of co-operative action have highlighted the need for training of personnel, both professional and auxiliary. This period has also made clear the value of more integrated programs with wider collaboration both within the ministries of government and between the international organizations.

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THE United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), through its Executive Board, has allocated \$7,244,500 for programs in the Central America area during the past ten years, at the request of the governments of British Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama.

UNICEF, established by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1946 to help child victims of aggression, took over that aspect of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency's function when the agency was liquidated.

As recovery took place in Europe, there was an increasing demand that UNICEF turn to the needs of children in other parts of the world, particularly in the economically less-developed countries. Accordingly, in October 1953, UNICEF was continued indefinitely by the United Nations General Assembly as an integral part of the United Nations. At that time the name of the organization was changed from the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund to its present name, but retained the symbol UNICEF.

It was recognized that in many parts of the world, apart from the devastations of war, the health and life expectancy of children were threatened by conditions which, as one Latin-American described it, were due to "chronic emergencies."

In line with the directive of the United Nations General Assembly, that UNICEF should shift the emphasis of its aid from emergency programs to those of long-term benefit to children, the door to other than war-torn countries was opened and governments soon sought UNICEF's co-operation in various programs.

As early as 1948, when the Ninth Pan American Child Congress met in Venezuela, it requested the American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood "to explore the ways in which

the experience of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, the Food and Agriculture Organization and the Pan American Sanitary Bureau may serve to encourage intensified effort to raise the standards of child nutrition in all the American Republics, and to extend and improve child feeding programs adequately related to health and social services for mothers and children and the education of parents in the principles of child feeding and child care."

TEN YEARS OF ACTION

In the course of the first field visits to British Honduras, Central America, and Panama, in order to study the needs of children and explore ways in which UNICEF might assist governments, they called attention to the malnutrition existing in the area, and the fact that children were the principal victims. Without exception, British Honduras, the five Central American countries, and Panama requested UNICEF to assist in school feeding programs.

Likewise, these governments at the same time asked for UNICEF aid in malaria control programs. By November 1949 the UNICEF Executive Board had before it the governments' requests for child feeding and malaria control, and the first allocations for these programs were approved by the Board at that session.

Ten years have passed since these programs were inaugurated and it is significant to note that to date the two major UNICEF-assisted programs in Central America continue to be the fight against malaria and malnutrition.

It should be made quite clear, however, that these programs have not remained static. A brief comment on the present concept and goals may serve to illustrate the extent to which development has taken place over a ten-year period.

For example, malaria control programs have now been converted into full-scale eradication campaigns to eliminate the local transmission of the disease. This, as will be seen later, is very different from programs designed to control malaria.

In the field of the nutrition programs, the focus from the beginning has been toward assisting governments in their efforts to find effective ways to meet their local dietary deficiencies and to improve nutrition generally. There has been a gradual intensification by governments of education in nutrition, the development of local sources of animal and vegetable protein, increased efforts to extend the feeding programs to the more vulnerable group of preschool-age children, pregnant women, and nursing mothers, and the training of personnel at all levels. A most recent development is UNICEF's assistance to a children's nutrition program, where education is fostered through school gardens.

Under its charter, UNICEF was to help children, which was of course considered to include help to pregnant women and nursing mothers.

General public health

But health services benefiting children and mothers had to be considered also in relation to the general public health organization. In the case of providing insecticides for insect-borne diseases it is not always technically possible to separate benefits to children from those to all ages in the community; for some diseases it is necessary to heal adults as well as children in order to prevent reinfection. While children and mothers have been the principal recipients in programs assisted by UNICEF, they are not the sole beneficiaries of such international aid.

Health programs to fight diseases affecting children, such as mass campaigns against tuberculosis, venereal disease,

trachoma, and yaws, have been approved by the Executive Board as appropriate for UNICEF aid. Similarly, environmental sanitation has also been approved. Its direct bearing on the morbidity and mortality of children, the Executive Board recognized, makes it basic to all maternal and child health work.

During the ten-year period in which UNICEF has assisted the governments of Central America and Panama, aid to maternal and child health services has been extended to British Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Panama, with assistance in environmental sanitation having been given to Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. Mass campaigns against tuberculosis have been carried out in British Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica.

Most of the Central American governments, with technical advice from the World Health Organization (WHO), are developing a long-term national public health plan to be implemented progressively. The timing will depend on the availability of trained professional and auxiliary personnel, adequate budgetary provision to cover the expanding services, and the gradual reorganization of the public health structure. Adequate supervision and co-ordination of work at all levels necessitates such a reorganization.

In the light of these developments some governments have requested UNICEF to extend aid to those aspects which relate more specifically to the basic maternal and child welfare services.

For example, such a program recommendation for Honduras was presented to the UNICEF Executive Board at its meeting held in September 1959; an allocation of \$97,000 for this project was approved. Under this two-year program UNICEF will provide equipment and drugs for a district health

center, five main centers, and six subcenters; well-drilling rig, piping, pumps, and transport for environmental sanitation work; stipends for six and one-half months' training of seventy-five health auxiliaries, seventy-five sanitary inspectors; and transport to assist in the expansion and strengthening of the basic maternal and child welfare services during the first two years of the government's National Health Plan.

BASIC CRITERIA AND RELATIONSHIPS

UNICEF assistance to governments usually raises a number of questions in view of the work concurrently administered by the United Nations' specialized agencies and the bilateral aid programs.

In order to clarify how UNICEF operates it may be helpful at this point to recall a few basic points:

1) UNICEF is the only United Nations organization concerned exclusively with children.

2) UNICEF may assist governments through the provision of essential imported supplies and equipment, as well as by contributing to the local costs of training, in the form of stipends for instructors and trainees.

3) UNICEF-aided programs must have the technical approval of the appropriate United Nations Specialized Agency before a government request and recommendation is presented to the UNICEF Executive Board for the approval of an allocation.

4) UNICEF assistance involves a co-operative venture in which the funds it contributes find their counterpart in local funds, facilities, services, supplies, personnel, or other resources made available by the beneficiary country for the purpose of the project. This system has become known as the "matching principle" and any assistance given by UNICEF is in a sense doubled and in many cases more than doubled.

5) For every assisting program, a comprehensive Plan of Operations is prepared defining the scope of the program, its basic objectives, both immediate and long term, and the timing of action to be taken. The phasing of the program is outlined in detail and the commitments of the government and each participating agency are specifically enumerated.

6) UNICEF co-operates jointly with the World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization in two policy-making committees. The two committees recommend general principles to be followed in the organizations' respective spheres of competence: for example, the Food and Agriculture Organization-UNICEF Joint Policy Committee recommends policy governing the assistance tendered to governments for the improvement of the nutrition of mothers and children.

7) The UNICEF Executive Board has approved a procedure for formalizing and strengthening the closer contacts which have gradually grown up in recent years between the UNICEF Secretariat and the Bureau of Social Affairs. On the one hand this makes it possible for the Bureau to keep UNICEF informed of social data and trends; on the other hand UNICEF may be able to assist governments in such projects as community development. The Bureau has a special responsibility in these projects and UNICEF is interested in providing aid for basic maternal and child welfare services.

8) Some of the government programs receiving UNICEF assistance are given technical guidance by experts provided through the United Nations Technical Assistance Board. There are, therefore, periodic reviews between these agencies in the field, insofar as there are common program interests and needs. Regular contacts with these experts are

maintained both in connection with program planning and development.

Policy and procedures do not alone relate to governments and various United Nations Organizations. It is necessary that they take into consideration several regional organizations serving the area, such as the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the Institute of Nutrition for Central America and Panama (INCAP), the Central American Institute for Technological and Industrial Investigations (ICAITI), the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), and the Organization of Central American States (ODECA).

9) There are over fifty international nongovernmental organizations with the status of observers in relation to UNICEF's world-wide activities. Many of these organizations seek direct ways to aid the ongoing UNICEF-assisted programs. At the same time, while voluntary organizations within these countries may have similar desires, they are not always affiliated with an international group and very often they are attempting to build up their own organization's resources, both human and material. The majority of civic organizations have had limited experience in dealing with these types of programs, whether on a local, national, or international basis. To avoid loss and assure effective use of this potential call for creative thinking and action by all concerned, because many well-conceived programs may fail if they are not properly staffed and supported. Public funds are not always adequate to provide sufficient paid personnel; and in the rural areas this problem is even more acute. Also some of the nongovernmental agencies may have members who, with good orientation, could assist trained personnel as volunteers. The services in which all are interested could thereby be extended.

All of the organizations in this large network have an important role to play: They can assist governments in their battle to break the circle of poverty, disease, and ignorance. In addition to the possibilities and limitations which arise out of each agency's basic function, organization, and methods of operation, there is another set of conditions which must be taken into account in planning, implementing, and evaluating joint programs. To illustrate the other factors an agency must consider in its program planning, the child-malnutrition problem will be briefly examined.

FACTORS AFFECTING PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

When the Central American countries asked for assistance to cope with the malnutrition of their children, feeding programs were developed principally through the schools. At that time, they offered the best opportunity and, in some countries, almost the only opportunity to reach regularly some groups of children, especially those in rural areas. It is recognized, nevertheless, that in some Central American countries where less than 50 per cent of the school-age children are in school, the percentage of children benefiting from a school feeding program is extremely limited, even if all schools were reached, leaving aside the more vulnerable group of infants and preschool children. In view of the lack of health centers, particularly in the rural areas, it is presently still very difficult in most of these countries to reach any considerable number of preschool-age children.

The Central American governments, recognizing the general nutritional deficiency, established the Institute of Nutrition for Central America and Panama in 1949. Over the years the studies this organization has made have

shown that the Central American diet is deficient in high quality protein and Vitamin A. As investigations pointed to the more serious nutritional conditions of infants and children of pre-school age, every effort was made by governments to give priority to these categories.

The development of the UNICEF-assisted feeding programs in Central America has inevitably differed somewhat from country to country. While basic imported supplies, such as powdered skim milk, utilized in the program were the same, the individual objectives, needs, and conditions of the countries, as well as the available personnel had to be taken into consideration at each step of development. The relevant factors included among others: the general economy, transport and communications, public health services, general educational level, social organization, concentration of population, the organization of government administrative services, the racial, cultural, and language background of the people, the co-operation between public and private agencies, a country's recognition of its own needs and the extent to which it is trying to meet them, available personnel, and attitudes towards international agencies and their ability to be of practical assistance.

PRACTICAL APPROACHES

During one of the early discussions in a Ministry of Foreign Relations, international aid, as it existed in the past, was described to the UNICEF representative. He was told how seldom it was implemented within the country in such a way that it touched the fathers, mothers, and children directly. The government representative then suggested, "If the United Nations through its various agencies can do something practical which will indicate

to parents that the United Nations cares about their children, perhaps this is one of the most important messages it has to give to our people at this time."

If, in spite of all the efforts of governments and international agencies, programs do not reach the parents and children, especially in the more remote rural areas, perhaps this is due, in part, to the methods being used. One of the more interesting experiences in connection with the nutrition education-school garden programs in Guatemala is to see the response of the village people in seventy-two communities where the school gardens have been started and where mothers' clubs have been organized as a central point in which education in nutrition can be shared. Likewise, men and women of the community have been carefully selected and given a simple training in order to help them to encourage their families, friends, neighbors, and the community-at-large to participate in these related activities. It leaves no doubt that too often there is a very real underestimation of the potential of village folk, both with reference to their interest in their own problems and their desire and ability to help themselves.

Recognizing the interrelated interests and responsibilities of the Ministry of Public Health, Ministry of Agriculture, and Ministry of Education in such programs, the international agencies—the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Bureau of Social Affairs and UNICEF—are planning with governments integrated programs of this type, and it is expected that this development will be a general one in the future.

UNICEF, together with the FAO, has helped five Central American countries in developing milk drying plants as a means of government self-help

toward the continuance of nutrition programs initiated with international assistance and the importation of surplus supplies. The effect on milk production has been striking, once the plant is in operation. Appropriate approaches are being sought in relation to the related problems of production, marketing, consumption, and the health aspects involved.

INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION

In spite of the seeming complexity of international co-operation in practical programs for the welfare of children, there has gradually evolved a working pattern which has made possible the fullest collaboration between the governments and all interested agencies.

The programs are government programs: it is the government which requests and invites the United Nations' agencies and sometimes bilateral organizations, as well, to participate in a given project in accordance with their possible fields of assistance, whether technical or material.

MALARIA ERADICATION

The Central American governments, in concentrating upon the eradication of malaria, are given technical guidance by experts of the Pan American Health Organization which serves as the Regional Office for WHO in the Americas. For these programs UNICEF has contributed a large share of the supplies including insecticides, transport, sprayers, and some laboratory equipment. In some countries the administration of this program is carried on by the co-operative service of public health of the International Co-operation Administration (ICA). Close co-ordination and the sharing of information between the government and all participating agencies is required and equally important is the acceptance by all of the basic theory of eradication and the scientific

techniques required in order to achieve the goal.

In a report on Malaria Eradication prepared by the Director-General of the World Health Organization at the request of the UNICEF Executive Board, an appraisal of present programs was given as a basis for a review by UNICEF of its financial support for these programs. In explaining the theory of eradication, the report states that "the eradication of malaria depends on the elimination of local transmission of the disease by methods directed against the anophaline vectors. As a result of such elimination of transmission, the human reservoir of malaria parasites gradually empties itself, since the infection is self-limiting in time. The latter process can be speeded up by attack on the malaria parasite through the action of specific drugs. The consequent reduction of the reservoir of infection makes possible the final eradication of malaria. In some exceptional conditions where the insecticide alone is unable to interrupt transmission, there might be need for a simultaneous attack on the vector and on the parasite."

The female mosquitoes after each blood-meal and before the subsequent egg-laying rest on the walls and other internal surfaces of houses or shelters in which they feed. The method used, therefore, to interrupt the transmission of malaria is the systematic application of residual insecticides until human dwellings are totally covered, and if necessary the process is extended to animal dwellings.

During the early malaria control program in Central America the plan envisaged the spraying of all houses in the malarious area with DDT every six months. At the beginning of the eradication program six of the countries in this area changed over to the use of dieldrin once a year; however, in view

of the resistance which the mosquitoes built up to the dieldrin, it was necessary to revise the plans in five countries, again using DDT.

As DDT is sprayed twice a year, this has meant a considerable increase in cost to the governments concerned and to the participating agencies, including UNICEF.

The development of resistance to dieldrin has in some cases delayed matters. There is no doubt, however, in the opinion of WHO, as to the feasibility of achieving eradication eventually.

UNICEF originally committed itself to assist governments in their malaria eradication programs for four years, that is, the time the attack phase was expected to last. In view of the development of resistance in Central America, it is now clear that in many cases this attack phase will have to be extended. At its session in September 1959 the UNICEF Executive Board agreed to extend assistance beyond the original four years with the rider that the commitment will never be for more than one year at a time after which the matter will be again considered.

It is virtually impossible to show progress towards eradication without detailed epidemiological knowledge of the country. Moreover, from one single remaining focus of malaria the disease may spread all over again. The evaluation services of the malaria programs are therefore of paramount importance. Encouraged and supervised by trained program staff, thousands of voluntary collaborators—school teachers, shopkeepers, policemen, missionaries—throughout countries take blood-slides from any and all recent or actual fever cases. The slides are examined centrally and the results, apart from enabling those sick of malaria to be treated with antimalaria drugs, enable a detailed map to be drawn up of the epidemiological situation of the coun-

try. Over the months the pins begin to concentrate more and more in isolated spots, leaving ever wider areas clear of pins and of malaria. But the disease will not be eradicated until all pins have been removed and have remained so for at least three years.

TRENDS FOR THE FUTURE

Turning to future program possibilities, mention should be made of two additional fields of action under consideration by the UNICEF Administration and the Executive Board: assistance to primary education and assistance to social services for children with particular reference to institutions, day-care centers, and other methods of care to children outside their own homes.

At the meeting of the UNICEF Executive Board in March 1958 the United States Delegation, noting that UNICEF's aid up to that time had been directed almost exclusively toward improving the health of mothers and children, raised the question as to whether it might not be appropriate to consider ways in which UNICEF programs could be extended more directly in the area of social services.

One year later, in response to this request, a recommendation was submitted to the Executive Board, for its approval, which outlined the ways such social services could be assisted by UNICEF. This was approved unanimously by the thirty members of the Board. In view of this new field, a number of Central American countries, already in the process of strengthening their social services with the technical guidance of the United Nations Bureau of Social Affairs, expect at a later date to request UNICEF aid in this field. This new focus will undoubtedly effect a greater understanding of children's total needs. UNICEF, in partnership with the other United Nations organi-

zations, looks forward to making a contribution that will help children to have a better intellectual and emotional growth as well as improved health and nutrition. These new programs are only in their beginning stages, but in Central America, governments are already aware of and interested in this possible development. In the years to come, UNICEF aid will indeed be broadened, taking into account the whole needs of a child and the general improvement of family and community levels of living.

CONCLUSIONS

In a geographic area, in which the total population in 1960 is estimated at 12,000,000, with 5,136,000 under 14 years of age, it would appear that international aid will continue to be needed, not only along the basic lines developed during the past ten years, but in new fields of action as well.

In view of the matching principle and the obligations it represents, it is logical to suppose that a single ministry may reach its saturation point in relation to international aid, even though there is need for further assistance. The more integrated approach, which calls for several ministries to participate, should have a wholesome effect on the pro-

grams as such and make it possible for their extension.

Anticipating the eradication of malaria, large sums of money now going into these campaigns, both from the budgets of the governments and from international agencies, should eventually be freed for use in other programs.

With the rapid increase of population, greater emphasis will have to be placed on increased food production even to maintain the present inadequate level of nutrition. In a number of countries, half the children of school age are not attending school in spite of compulsory education laws. A large percentage of the children who do attend have the benefit of only three or four grades of primary schooling.

Lack of essential social services, inadequate and insufficient housing, and child labor, affect very seriously the life of children in Central America.

So far the general pattern of assistance, as it has gradually evolved, has been initially to aid governments in programs which had the most urgent character. The governments have turned to longer term planning which, insofar as the UNICEF aid is concerned, puts increasing emphasis on ways to assist in the training of personnel in various fields of service and at different levels.

Social Development in the United Kingdom African Territories

By WILFRED H. CHINN

ABSTRACT: Social development in British African territories has consciously been undertaken by governments only since the end of World War II. Initially it took the form of remedial methods to deal with social problems accentuated by the war. The work of government social welfare departments and voluntary agencies assisted by international aid could not, however, be confined to the provision of remedial services. The underlying social ills had to be attacked as well. Social welfare workers were among the pioneers in community-development work in several territories in Africa; their work originally begun in the towns now reaches more and more into the outlying areas. This is particularly true in the case of Ghana, Uganda, and Tanganyika. In most African territories, social welfare and community development are administered through a single Ministry of Social Development so that remedial and constructive measures are correlated.

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THE report of the Ashridge Conference on Social Development in British Overseas Territories, which was convened by the Colonial Office in 1954, defined social development as "... nothing less than the whole process of change and advancement in a territory considered in terms of the well-being of society and the individual." The report went on to say that social development is not just the sum total of development activities carried out by those agencies usually grouped under the heading "Social Services," but that it covers and informs the economic, social, political, and cultural fields.

PHILOSOPHIC CONCEPT

Social development in this sense is a concept which, in a democratic society, can only grow in conditions which allow free expression of individual aspirations and which provide scope for social action in associations of various kinds. For the older democratic countries these conditions are axiomatic; their social and political institutions are based on the abilities of their peoples to adapt thought and action to changing conditions. But adaptation and adjustment to change are not made automatically through political institutions. Political institutions give expression and force to the ideas and philosophy inspired by individuals and groups and formalize practical voluntary experiments in social development. In other words "the well-being of the individual and society" depends primarily on the efforts which the individual himself is prepared to make, the scope of his activities in his community, and the influence brought to bear on public opinion and governments.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

However, these efforts also need encouragement and stimulation. This is

particularly true in Africa where economic development and social change have been recent and rapid. Development during what might be called the Colonial period was dependent on and furthered the interests of outside commercial enterprise. Until comparatively recently only a small section of any overseas community was directly affected by these trading contacts with the outside world. The establishment of industrial plants, mining concerns, and plantation farming changed the situation. Europeans settled in the healthier areas, towns were built, and labor was required to work for wages in districts far from the tribal home.

Government had to provide services for the growing towns; regulations had to be made to govern conditions of labor, health services provided, and education extended to meet ever increasing demands for a growing variety of skills. All this was expensive, and ways and means had to be found to raise money from a people unused to a money economy. This meant increased production of cash crops from peasant farmers, and agricultural departments were set up to help and advise the farmers. Taxes had to be collected, and new forms of political organizations were introduced to replace or modify the former policy of indirect rule. And so the original concept of Colonial development began to change. Although still mainly economic in character, development was directed to the improvement of conditions in the territories: to strengthening the economy and expanding the social services.

EFFECT ON TRADITIONAL SOCIETY

These changes seriously affected traditional ways of life; tribal laws and customs everywhere show signs of breaking down and in certain areas this process is well advanced. It is, however, important to realize that change

is inevitable; it can and should be directed, but any attempt to prevent it—to return to what is often nostalgically thought of as a happy state of nature—is doomed to failure.

This aspect of change might be considered as the result of a clash of cultures which could be directed and controlled through educational methods and the growth of political responsibility. But in recent years new and much more revolutionary processes have been at work in British territories—namely, rapid economic development and the policy of hastening the advance of overseas territories towards full self-government within the Commonwealth.

EFFECT OF ECONOMIC EXPANSION

The recent origin of this economic growth is not generally realized. Africa is now experiencing an industrial revolution, telescoped into about one tenth of the time occupied by the European industrial revolution. At the same time its people are having to absorb an entirely new culture and have no natural background of tradition and custom suitable for a form of civilization based on western technology. In the west there was not only more time to adjust to changing conditions but the adjustment was made within a social and political setting which allowed for adaptation and the development of a sense of personal and public responsibility. Even so, the western countries made quite a sad mess of many aspects of industrialization. Some of the mistakes made are being repeated in Africa where their effect is even more devastating to the social structure.

FUNCTION OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

It is therefore necessary to think of social development in a functional sense by which certain measures and skills can be made available to communities and individuals in order to

achieve not only desirable social ends but to help to adapt traditional law and custom to the new and as yet not clearly discernable form of society resulting from the rapid change.

At this stage, there is a need for a distinctive social development organization whose activities might be grouped under three heads:

(1) to prepare the ground for and to supplement the work of the technical departments of government, and through group activities and communal effort to concentrate attention on the human aspects of development;

(2) provide constructive measures to build a sense of community and as far as possible to prevent disruption and its consequent social problems;

(3) provide remedial measures to deal with problems as they arise and initiate services to help those individuals who are unable or unwilling to fit into the changing pattern of society, or who fall by the wayside.

These three aspects of social development receive their practical application under the headings of Community Development and Social Welfare.

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

The term community development was adopted at the Cambridge Summer Conference on African Administration in 1948 to describe a method of approach to local administration which aimed at developing the initiative of the individual and the community in schemes for promoting their own betterment. It has been defined as "a movement designed to promote better living for the whole community with the active participation and on the initiative of the community." The principles of community development were, of course, not new in 1948 when the term was first used. What is new is the concept of community development as a movement, the principles and methods

of which are universal in their application. Even so, community development is often used to describe differing methods of approach and there is not as yet, and by the nature of the subject there may never be, a precise definition applicable in all circumstances. There is also considerable divergence in methods used to stimulate initiative in the community from what may be called the "authoritarian" approach through an outside agency to complete reliance on the wishes of the people—their "felt needs." All these methods may use the principles of community development but, as T. R. Batten points out, they may not all equally apply to every situation and in every community.

Different communities have different needs and the same community has different needs at different times. It is in finding and meeting these needs that agency aims and methods should be related, and it is by success in doing so rather than by adhering to fixed principles or dogma that community agencies must justify what they do.¹

The differences in method and application can be seen in British African territories, but recent trends place the emphasis more on the word "community" than on the word "development"; development of communities rather than for or even by communities.

In helping people to adapt themselves to a changing form of society it is essential to find effective ways of stimulating, helping, and teaching them to adopt new methods and to learn new skills; to help them to adapt their way of life to changes they accept or have imposed upon them; and to ensure that the sense of community is not destroyed.

An additional and extremely impor-

¹ T. R. Batten, *Communities and their Development: an introductory study with special reference to the tropics* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957).

tant aspect of community development is the part it can play in building new communities. It was first used in the rural areas where the bulk of the African people live. Not enough attention either in research or experimentation has been given to the constructive side of social development in towns, mining areas, and plantations. In nearly all cases these conglomerations of people are of forced growth and recent origin.² They present a problem of creating communities out of often widely differing ethnic and religious groups. Community development can help to foster means by which the individual in a new and strange environment can discover a sense of belonging, new loyalties can be created, and a forceful public opinion developed.

It is thus through the application of community development methods that the first two requirements of a social development program can be met. It was suggested that these were to prepare the people to accept and use intelligently the services available to them and to ensure that development took fully into account the human aspect; and to build a sense of community and mitigate the social ills arising from economic development.

SOCIAL WELFARE

The third requirement was to provide measures to deal with social problems as they arise: problems such as delinquency, destitution, the care of children, the handicapped, and the aged.

There is a close relationship between social welfare and community development. Social welfare is not only concerned with remedial action but it also has an important constructive contribution to make by applying group work methods in both urban and rural areas. Community associations and centers,

² Gutkind and Southall, *Townsmen in the Making*.

boys' and girls' clubs and associations generally, the organization of sports and athletics, all of which come under the general head of welfare, are essential elements in social development.

PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Broadly speaking, the main principles of social development are:

(1) the need to relate social development policy to the particular circumstances of the particular territory;

(2) interdepartmental co-operation, so devised as to provide a unified approach to the policy;

(3) community development as a component of social development to be integrated at all levels with the wider political and economic plans for the territory, and in particular with the development of local government. In addition, it is essential that the people themselves should be associated with the planning and execution of community development programs at every possible stage and at all levels.³

In the social welfare field statutory provision has been made in all African territories for the treatment of juvenile delinquency, the establishment of probation services, and measures are in hand for legislation to deal with the problem of children deprived of a normal home life. It is the policy of all African governments to make full use of voluntary social welfare organizations.

In many countries public social services originated in the efforts of charitable individuals and voluntary societies, but in Africa there is not time to await the gradual evolution of public services through voluntary action which has been typical in western societies. Governments often have to initiate services to deal with social problems

³ *Community Development, A Handbook* (Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1958).

and to safeguard the individual well in advance of public opinion as expressed in voluntary effort. But as public social services increase, opportunities for voluntary action are presented, and it is considered of the utmost importance that voluntary societies should be encouraged; they are the pioneers of social progress through their freedom both to enter new fields and, most important in Africa, to adapt the traditional social services to modern needs.

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN PRACTICE

During the past ten years a great deal has been said and written on the theory and practice of social development and particularly the place of community development in programs of social development. As is inevitable on a subject of such magnitude and importance, a variety of viewpoints have emerged. Recently, however, there has been some evidence that opinions on fundamentals are drawing closer together. It is, for example, now agreed by most authorities that community development, which tended to have a materialistic bias through concentration on small self-help economic projects, also has a cultural, social, and spiritual significance, and provides a useful stepping stone to democratic self-government as it is understood in the western world.

IMPORTANCE OF FAMILY UNIT

It has now been realized that all these things can only be successfully achieved through the improvement and strengthening of the most fundamental unit of society—the family. This sounds fairly obvious, but the place of the family in African society is not quite so easy to understand, and its significance and influence in the social structure is very different from that of the conventional western type family. The traditional African family is part

of a larger structure. Each member has clearly defined rights and duties, determined by tribal law and custom. In many places this traditional family pattern is breaking up, particularly in urban areas, and it is clear that unless a new and acceptable form of family life emerges, there can be little hope for social development. A conference was recently convened by the United Kingdom Colonial Office to consider "The Place of the Family in Social Development"—the report of which will be available shortly. The conference was quite clear in its conclusions that the family must be the unit through which social development should operate, and that means must be found to preserve, strengthen, and adapt the rights and duties common to the African extended family in and to the changing conditions of today. In other words, social development must be "family centered." The family should be both the recipient of social development services and the unit through which social development operates in the wider community.

In practical terms this means a shift of emphasis from concentration on individual members of a family group—for example, child welfare, women's clubs, community projects involving the man—to a co-ordinated approach reaching the whole family and leading to its complete involvement in community affairs. The techniques of this approach have yet to be worked out but there is no doubt that greater emphasis will need to be placed on home economics.

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

Examples of social development in practice in British African territories are bound to be selective. As was indicated above, there is no common pattern of administration although there are certain commonly accepted principles.

The following examples from actual programs of social development have been selected to illustrate the scope and variety of the schemes in operation.

An encouraging feature of social development in Africa is the increasing interest and assistance given by international agencies and by the International Co-operation Administration of the United States. UNICEF is contributing generously to the Women's Club movement in East Africa. The Home Economics Division of the Food and Agriculture Organization gives valuable advice and assistance.

One of the first projects of the newly created United Nations Economic Commission for Africa was to convene a conference on Community Development, and the Commission has also recently strengthened its Social Service Section.

UGANDA

Social development in Uganda is the responsibility of the Minister of Social Development who includes in his portfolio community development, social welfare and the probation service, and the Division of African Housing. The staff of the Ministry of Social Development consists of a Permanent Secretary who is the principal adviser to the Minister, and two Deputy Secretaries who are responsible for the Social Development and Housing divisions respectively. The Deputy Secretary for Social Development has on his staff a Principal Welfare Officer responsible for urban social welfare and the probation service, and an adviser on women's work. The country is divided into four provinces and sixteen administrative districts. At district level there is an establishment of two community development officers, a man and a woman, and a staff of male and female assistants.

Emphasis is placed on the devolution

of responsibility, and local development plans are formulated and executed by the district team which includes in its membership the officers of the technical departments of government working in the districts, including the community development officer. The district team holds frequent meetings, approves local community development schemes, and technical assistance for the schemes is always forthcoming from the professional officers.

Since high priority is given to leadership training, each district in Uganda has a rural training center controlled by the community development officer and available on request to other professional officers of the district team.

The community development program is a very wide one. It includes literacy classes for adults and the establishment of a literature and library service, training in citizenship, the stimulation and supervision of village self-help schemes, the organization of men's and women's clubs, and assisting the technical departments in their extension work. Urban social welfare and the operation of the probation system is under the direction of the Principal Welfare Officer. Apart from the Probation and After-care services, which cover the greater part of the Protectorate, urban social welfare is undertaken mainly by voluntary organizations most of which are aided by grants from the government. This aid often takes the form of providing staff and facilities for training leaders. Co-ordination of voluntary effort is achieved through the Uganda National Council of Social Service—a body which represents every Protectorate-wide voluntary organization. Government has made institutional provision for young offenders. Welfare committees serviced by social welfare staff have been set up in the major towns. These commit-

tees are composed of members elected by voluntary agencies and government officers nominated by the ministries concerned.

WOMEN'S GROUPS

Uganda was a pioneer in realizing that social progress depended very largely on the attitude of the women. Women in the rural areas were encouraged to form groups where they could share common interests, learn new skills, and discuss what needed to be done to improve their homes. Groups formed throughout one district and were soon organized as clubs, each with its own elected officers. There are now nearly 900 established women's clubs which have graduated from programs mainly concerned with literacy, sewing, and cooking to courses in home economics. Thus, a more complete process of education has begun and action is directed to a greater extent towards raising standards of living, including the improvement of the material amenities of the home. Cultural activities and "fun and games" are not neglected, and music and drama are a feature of most clubs. Men's clubs, which both supplement and co-operate with the work of the women's groups, have also been formed. Closely linked with the instruction given in the clubs are schemes for home improvement, organized by groups of ten families who work in turn on each others' homes and compounds in order to improve the physical amenities of the home, to make simple furniture, and undertake services to ensure a clean and sanitary compound. This type of collective home improvement is very popular and thousands of homes have improved beyond all expectations as the result of teaching in the clubs and voluntary effort. The continued suc-

cess of the club movement depends on trained leadership and this is supplied through courses of three months' duration held at the rural training centers for women voluntary leaders. The more advanced leaders are sent to a central training establishment for further training.

SELF-HELP SCHEMES

Village self-help schemes usually develop from group work based on literacy classes or are inspired by the leadership training courses held for both men and women at the rural training centers. At the local level, it is usual for a group of people to discuss with a member of the community development staff what they feel needs to be done to improve village life, and with the community development officer's assistance, they then assess their ability to meet the needs. An agreed scheme is submitted to the district team, and if approved, help is given in the form of the more expensive materials or skilled labor from community development funds administered locally. Some very large improvement schemes have been undertaken but in the main, the schemes are small, affecting the immediate community. The main purpose of these projects is to develop self-reliant communities and not to do public works cheaply.

An important feature of the work of the Ministry is co-operation with professional and technical departments of government in their extension work. Teaching aids are provided for health work and for agricultural extension services. Community development staff urge their groups to seek the advice of the technical officers and to put into practice the lessons taught by their officers. In addition community development officers co-operate with technical officers in production drives, health campaigns, pest control and so forth.

KENYA

In Kenya social welfare and kindred work is divided between two ministries, and the municipalities of Nairobi, Mombassa, and Nakuru have their own welfare departments. The Ministry of Community Development is responsible, in addition to community development and informal adult education, for the probation service and institutions for the training of young offenders. The Ministry of Health and Local Government is responsible for European welfare services, public assistance, the care of destitute children and the handicapped, and for liaison with voluntary welfare organizations.

The organization and practice of community development is similar to that of Uganda—the important differences being apparent in their local government structures. Community development officers, both men and women, are appointed to the districts, some of whose salaries are provided from United States International Co-operation Administration funds.

WOMEN'S CLUBS

One of the most interesting features of community development in Kenya is, as in Uganda, the establishment of women's clubs. Started in 1951, the clubs attracted members mainly through interest in sewing. They used voluntary helpers, but as trained leaders became available the practice of planned programs was introduced. The clubs multiplied so rapidly that in 1955 the movement known as Maendeleo ya Wanawake (Progress of Women) had enough affiliated members to receive official recognition as a registered society. There are now some 800 clubs with a paid-up membership of 40,000 and an additional 18,000 women who attend meetings without having paid membership fees. The clubs are open to all women over

the age of sixteen, and a recent development has been the formation of Junior Maendeleo groups, supervised by senior members of the registered clubs.

In all areas where there are active clubs, the general standard of cleanliness, both in the home and in the person has risen considerably, the improved health and cleanliness of the children of club members being particularly noticeable. The community spirit engendered by active participation in group activities has shown itself in the practical and valuable assistance given by club members in many of the areas affected by the Mau Mau emergency.

The movement has aroused interest in the men as well as the women of Kenya and in many areas the chiefs and headmen have voted monies towards club buildings and training centers, have given land for buildings and games' pitches, and paid their own local leaders.

YOUTH CLUBS

A recent and significant development in Kenya is the growth of clubs for boys and youths who are unemployed or underemployed. The problem of the landless and semieducated boy is a serious one in many territories. Kenya is tackling the problem through community development techniques, whereby young people organize groups for the purpose of learning crafts and better agriculture and at the same time develop a sense of community and public service. They are encouraged by the adult members of the community who often make gifts of land, money, and materials for club premises and agricultural training.

EAST AFRICA

The three East African territories, Uganda, Kenya, and Tanganyika, are concentrating on similar group activities for men, women, and young people.

The intention of all these groups is to extend into new forms of society those communal services which were an essential part of traditional societies and to introduce new ideas and skills designed to prepare the people to play their part in building the new society.

WEST AFRICA

In West Africa, Ghana provides an example of a nationally organized and centrally directed department dealing with most aspects of social development, both at the policy-making level and in the field. In this respect it has a more advanced and comprehensive form of social development administration than other African countries. It was a pioneer in developing community development techniques suitable for West African conditions and its influence on neighboring territories has been great. Ghana is an independent country so cannot be quoted here as a representative of social development in United Kingdom African territories. A description of the history and methods of social development in Ghana can be found in a book written by the Director of the Department of Community Development and Social Welfare.⁴

EASTERN NIGERIA

Mr. I. C. Jackson has described Social Development in Eastern Nigeria in his book *Advance in Africa*.⁵ This shows the different emphasis placed on community development in a country with established village communities and townships and where the social structure and status of women are different from that in East Africa. Community development took the form of projects communally undertaken, mainly to improve

⁴ Peter du Sautoy, *Community Development in Ghana* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958).

⁵ I. C. Jackson, *Advance in Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1956).

economic standards. It originated in the pioneer efforts of Mr. E. R. Chadwick who worked in the Udi Division and whose methods paved the way for the modern conception of community development. The story has been vividly presented in the film "Daybreak in Udi."

Reference has been made above to training programs for people actively engaged in social development work, whether as Community Development officers, social workers, or local leaders.

Training has been found essential at all levels and has been given considerable support by co-operating international and national agencies. There is also need for much more social research, the evaluation of existing programs, and the encouragement of nongovernmental organizations in experimental schemes.

Social development has many tasks ahead. At the present time it is perhaps the most important aspect of development in Africa, and it requires all the understanding and help it can get.

Pakistan: Co-operative Ventures in Social Welfare*

By VICTOR D. CARLSON

ABSTRACT: The creation of the state of Pakistan, following in the wake of the bloody partition, the mass migrations, as well as the resultant concentration of people, culminated in a situation where the human needs could only be fulfilled through organized and planned social welfare. Industrialization was the apparent need for a largely agricultural country. But the Muslim population with its inbred tradition of social justice and equality reinforced the stress on social welfare. There emerged, therefore, a policy that demanded a balance between economic and social planning. Social work begun by volunteers was shaped by government efforts. International assistance was requested and personnel was secured to institute the needy training of local persons. Among the varied projects which developed, perhaps the most noteworthy was the emergence of the Village-Aid Programs and the Urban Community Development Programs. The simultaneous activity of the government and the voluntary agencies facilitated rapid and dramatic progress in the planning and organization of welfare services.—Ed.

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* The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the position of the United Nations.

PAKISTAN, twelve years old, is, legally, a young country. Culturally, it is very old, dating back 3,000 years B.C. to the early civilizations of the Indus Valley in the West and to the ancient and varying cultures of the riverine country leading to the mouths of the Ganges in the East.

The nation came into being in June, 1947, when Lord Cyril Radcliffe, as Chairman of the Boundary Commission, painfully drew lines across a map to divide the great territory of India into two areas. Ironically, the division, based, roughly, on geographical location of Muslim majorities, resulted in Pakistan's becoming two separate units, twelve hundred miles apart.

Although the large country of India separates the two units, both West Pakistan and East Pakistan are bound together by the shared struggle for equality and freedom, based on a common religion, Islam.

Under the Islamic constitution adopted in 1956, the two provinces were given equal rights and powers in a central government, with Karachi as its capital. It is now planned to move the capital north to the vicinity of Rawalpindi.

PARTITION DISRUPTS POPULATION

For decades, prior to the division and simultaneous freedom from British rule, the Muslims, a minority group, had struggled against the majority Hindus and the Sikhs. The best efforts of such great leaders as Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Mahatma Gandhi, and Pandit Nehru to find a solution to this communal strife, short of partition, came to naught.

The leaders had planned for a peaceful partition, and Quaid-i-Azam, as Jinnah was fondly called, appealed to the Muslim people for an orderly resettlement. But, the passions and hatreds, so long smoldering, could not be suppressed. The heartbreaking, terrible

chaos of partition is now history, but the scars remain. Hindus left houses, shops, and farms and fled to Indian territory, while Muslims, fourteen millions of them, sacrificed their belongings in India to flee to Pakistani territory. About fifty-thousand persons poured into the new country every day, once the mass migration started. Massacres cost a million lives, and probably thrice that were maimed.

The people of Pakistan promptly rallied to establish mass feeding programs and to set up temporary, make-shift housing. With meagre resources, government officials and volunteers worked together to start the machinery of resettlement and rehabilitation.

Pakistan now finds itself a nation of 84 million people, sixth largest in the world. The first and only census, taken in 1951, showed 75,700,000 and the rate of increase is estimated by the Pakistan Planning Commission at 1.4 per cent. Sixty per cent live in East Pakistan, which is less than a third as large as the West Province. Hence, the density of population there is appalling, that is, 777 per square mile. This density is even more vivid when related to cultivable land—11,666 persons per square mile. Overall, the small area of Pakistan—365,000 square miles—makes it the country of fifth highest density, with 225 persons per square mile, although great stretches of West Pakistan, purely desert, are scantily populated, given over to nomadic camel and sheep grazing peoples.

The economy of Pakistan is traditionally and essentially agricultural. Ninety per cent of the people live in villages and depend upon agriculture for their livelihood. The average per capita income, though difficult to establish accurately, is Rs. 249, or roughly \$50 per year, one of the lowest in the world. Large estates prevail in West Pakistan, hence most agriculturists own

no land. They work for Zamindars—large landowners—with the common problems of low yield per acre, and land lying fallow because taxes are based on produce, not land. Enactment of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act of 1951 modified the situation in East Pakistan, as the government has proceeded to acquire land from the Zamindars, for compensation, and to redistribute it in smaller lots. And, in early 1959, the new governmental regime in Karachi, adopted a land-redistribution plan for West Pakistan, which is presently being executed. It is believed that these land reforms will remove some major obstacles to the greatly needed increase in food production.

MOVE TOWARD INDUSTRIALIZATION

The portions of undivided India which became Pakistan contained practically no industry; rather, they were known as the "bread basket" of India. The national efforts toward industrial development are dramatic, textile mills, sugar factories, cement factories, hydro-electric plants are being set up with government funds, private enterprise, and foreign capital. The accompanying urbanization, as the villagers move to the cities and the cities continue to overflow with unsettled refugees, creates acute social problems.

Most of the persons coming to Pakistan in 1947–1949 were agriculturists and craftsmen, while the Hindus and the Sikhs who crossed over to India were, in great part, townsmen who had engaged in business or in the professions of law, medicine, teaching, and governmental services.

Thus, there was a void of technical skills which could not be quickly filled. Many services such as schools, health clinics, dispensaries, hospitals, and welfare institutions were badly crippled in

their operations, or entirely abandoned.

The great increase in population converging on the towns and the cities strained, almost to the breaking point, the essential community services, such as water supplies, electricity, and sewage disposal.

Cities like Karachi, Dacca, Khulna, and others grew tremendously. Housing or developed plots were provided to about half a million persons, but many thousands remain improperly housed to this day.

The early social programs were, thus, necessarily those of mass approach, and little specialized attention could be given to individual needs.

PATTERNS OF SOCIAL WELFARE

There were, however, certain normal patterns of social welfare in prepartitioned India, which had carried over into the new country.

In terms of services, the care of orphaned children was probably the oldest field. Charity schools and orphanages were established as early as the eighteenth century. While the extensive reliance on large and archaic orphanages is now decried in Pakistan, it must be realized that the 1951 census showed nearly two million fatherless children who required some plan of care. Considerably later came the development of some services for the physically handicapped, such as the deaf and dumb and the blind.

Charitable hospital facilities were part of an early welfare movement.

Individual philanthropy had been a distinct tradition. The giving of alms and the care and feeding of the destitute had been considered acts of religious merit. During times of famine, free kitchens were set up and religious buildings used to shelter the homeless.

The greatest resource for the needy, of course, had been the extended family,

where the aged, the disabled, the chronically ill, and others were looked after by the family. Community councils also sometimes took responsibility for persons in need, and the government provided relief work and gratuitous relief in times of disaster. There had not, however, been, nor is there now, any organized method of regularly providing social assistance to needy persons.

Training for social work was relatively new in the subcontinent. The first graduate school of social work was established in 1936—the Sir Dorabji Tata School, in Bombay. The handful of graduates of the Tata School who migrated to Pakistan were influential in gaining recognition of the need for social work training in Pakistan.

IDEALISM AND MODERN CONCEPTS

It was evident from the beginning of its existence as a separate nation, that Pakistan was committed to base its conscious social welfare development on traditional idealism affected by some modern concepts. As a secular state based upon Islam, a religion characterized by concern for social justice and equality, it was appropriately recognized that economic development to be effective required parallel social planning. In order to accomplish the ideal of a welfare state, drastic reforms were necessary to assure that the benefits of a meagre economy were made increasingly available to the common man. To this end, internal and external resources in kind, monies, and manpower had to be mobilized, organized, co-ordinated and used to best advantage. Pakistan's social welfare movement has evolved around these efforts of its leaders to achieve a balance in economic and social development. It is to be noted that there have been drastic fluctuations between progress and regression with respect to these idealistic goals. As in

most new countries, greed and lack of scruples of some of the leaders have, at periods, deterred the advance.

The heroic and unselfish work of volunteers during the emergency of partition resulted in the formation of organizations such as the All-Pakistan Womens Association, Anjumans, Medical Relief Societies, and Maternal and Child Welfare Societies. There was, concurrently, a growing recognition on the part of various departments of government, especially health, education, interior, labor, and refugee rehabilitation, that some professional guidance would be helpful in planning for welfare services. Material aid in the form of relief in kind or individual care seemed of secondary importance to the mobilization and training of national personnel for planning and executing mass welfare programs.

INTERNATIONAL AID REQUESTED

In 1951, the first request was made by the government to the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration for an international adviser. Miss Elmina Lucke of the United States, whom many in Pakistan know well and remember affectionately, arrived early in 1952. With her advice, the government decided that the best progress could be made in combatting social problems facing the country by training social workers who could assist with leadership responsibilities. It proposed, therefore, to set up short-term training courses and requested additional advisory and teaching help from the United Nations. Technical experts from Sweden, Australia, the United States, and Egypt were provided, bringing into the advisory and teaching team a variety of backgrounds and experiences. Their counterparts, or national team members, were drawn from appropriate ministries having to do with some

aspect of welfare services. This team of international and national persons conducted a number of courses, in both West and East Pakistan, in an effort to create a nucleus of understanding personnel who could aid the government departments and voluntary agencies in co-ordinated planning for improved social services.

In devising the type of training most needed in Pakistan, the advisors had first to become acquainted with the factors that would affect training and programming. This was not easy, as the classic approach of survey, analysis, planning, and then implementation was considered impossible in the emergency.

The little band of international and national teachers had scarcely an office roof over their heads, let alone a classroom. For Karachi, the new capital, had until recently been a small, clean, sleepy fishing town and harbor on the Arabian Sea at the edge of the Sind desert, of no more than 200,000 souls, including the surrounding villages. Suddenly, it had become a teeming mass of nearly two million. Space in a government building, reference books, typewriters, or even desks and chairs were in scant supply for the new movement. So a colorful shamiana (tent) was erected in a hot, dusty compound where students gathered for classes and learned their practice by "field work" in the nearby, crowded refugee camps. Teaching staff garnered from allied fields, supervisors, international advisors, and students worked and learned together. These hectic and trying early efforts produced, under stress, some excellent workers. Their efforts resulted in the setting up of what was called the Government of Pakistan-United Nations Social Welfare Project.

When Miss Lucke left Pakistan, she was succeeded as general advisor for a brief period by Dr. Karl de Jongh of the Netherlands. Late in 1955, I ar-

rived in Pakistan to serve as General Social Welfare advisor and Team Leader and had the privilege of working within the country for almost four years. As the need for special advisory skills evidenced itself, the government continued to request and receive the services of international advisors and placed them where they were most needed to help develop schools of social work, to advise on urban community development projects, and to counsel on social work in medical institutions. A total of sixteen different United Nations experts from six different countries have served Pakistan in these areas.

NATIONAL WELFARE STRUCTURE EMERGES

The period 1955-1959, was one of great activity in the government and among the voluntary agencies.

National and Provincial Councils of Social Welfare were created by the government early in 1956 to make grants-in-aid to, and confer with, voluntary agencies. Their interpretive activities, along with those of the All Pakistan Womens Association and other agencies, finally led, in 1958, to the creation of a Central Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. For the first time, the term "Social Welfare" was included as a ministerial subject in the central government. In addition to welfare services, the new ministry includes Rural-village agricultural and industrial development—and Urban Community Development and health and labor welfare.

This significant step was the culmination of a rapid series of experimental ministerial changes all within a few months of 1958, affecting the social welfare programs. There is now evidence of real stability.

The period also saw the creation and advancement of National Voluntary Welfare agencies.

As in the history of the development of welfare services in all countries, Pakistan had dedicated leaders: at most international conferences concerned with some phase of welfare—be it children, prevention of crime and treatment of offenders, labor welfare, women's rights, or the handicapped—Pakistan had been ably represented. It was, then, almost inevitable that a national conference of social work was inaugurated in November 1955, with three affiliated branches in West Pakistan, East Pakistan and the Karachi federal area, to hold annual forums for discussion and planning. They have served to help define the areas and priorities of "welfare services" as well as to bring into a more understanding and active relationship the allied fields of education, labor, health, and religious institutions.

Later came the Pakistan Child Welfare Council to focus the country's attention on its children and their needs.

The organizational developments placed the government and the voluntary agencies in a better position to deal with the continuing problems of poverty, ill health, lack of sanitation, poor dietary habits, inadequate educational facilities, insufficient housing; and also to deal with the problems of adjustment resulting largely from population movement and modification of the traditional agrarian pattern.

Dozens of small voluntary institutions were in existence. Many had been founded by philanthropists of other than Islamic background. When they left the country, many of them were temporarily deserted or converted into shelters for refugees. But the traditions of charity and concern for welfare, inculcated into the religion and culture of the Muslims, made the restoration of these institutions only a question of time. The co-ordinated help from, and shared experience of, available interna-

tional resources served to hasten the process.

RELiance ON COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

The country has relied heavily on community-development programs. The Village-Aid program has steadily expanded until today some 16,000 villages are being served. Its primary emphasis has been on increasing agricultural production and income for villagers, but direct social improvements have also received attention.

The Urban Community Development Program, which now serves large cities in East and West Pakistan, came into being, through the leadership of the early social work trainees, to deal with the urgent problems of urbanization. From the beginning, it has been primarily concerned with the social aspects of community improvement. Emphasis has been on the development of initiative and leadership of people within a community; on encouraging a recognition of community needs; and on stimulating self-help efforts to meet them.

Although the projects are still few and the benefiting population proportionately small, they have served many purposes. On an experimental and demonstration basis, techniques appropriate to community development in Pakistan have been studied and tested. The projects have provided a laboratory for the initial training of Pakistani social workers. They have become the proving grounds for theories and practical methods of arousing the communities' awareness of their own potentials for meeting their basic needs. Many voluntary workers and leaders have been developed under the guidance of the community development organizers. They form a nucleus of leaders for a further

increase in the numbers of voluntary groups to work with government organizers in other localities. More emphasis is now being placed by the program on vocational content, through craft production and cottage industries.

Recently, the value of these efforts, has been recognized by United Nations Children's Fund which, this year, will commence helping with transport, sewing machines, carpentry tools for boys clubs, and equipment for leadership training in centers for women.

The National and Provincial Councils of Social Welfare, created by the government in 1956, have provided grants-in-aid to many voluntary agencies which meet specified criteria. Emphasis has been placed on developing competent leadership and trained staff in the agencies so that existing social services are improved.

A small program of demonstrating social work techniques in medical institutions has continued to make gains although specialization is still not possible in Pakistan because of the paucity of trained personnel and funds.

TRAINING EMPHASIZED

The country has continued its early emphasis on training. Out of the experimentation in the early, short-term courses has come the opening of two graduate professional schools of social work offering a two-year curriculum: The University of Punjab Government School of Social Work in Lahore, West Pakistan, started four years ago, and the new College of Social Welfare, also a research center, to be affiliated with the University of Dacca in East Pakistan.

In the process of developing the social work programs, many international agencies have played a part.

Obviously, their contribution has been relatively minor, compared with the work of the people of Pakistan,

themselves. Nevertheless, the aid has been meaningful.

While the United Nations has sent most of the international advisors requested by the government, many other agencies have contributed.

The Asia Foundation has provided some support for the schools of social work, including payment of salaries for national and international faculty members, student stipends, transport, and improved office facilities. It has aided Pakistanis to travel between the two provinces and Karachi to attend conferences and welfare seminars and to attend various International Conferences of Social Work.

It has also encouraged programs in the social sciences and humanities, stimulated social research, and supplied text books.

AGENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES ASSIST

The agencies of the United States government have been helpful. Through the Washington State College affiliation with the University of Punjab, the International Co-operation Administration has for three years provided an international professor to the Department of Social Work and has contributed library furnishings, books, and other equipment. The United States Educational Fund—Fullbright program—has provided an exchange social work instructor to the same institution.

The Ford Foundation, which is concerned with assisting Pakistan in the establishment of a broad range of new training institutions for advance of individual capacity and opportunity, has included, through its Harvard University contract, international sociological advisors to the Pakistan Planning Commission.¹

¹ See George F. Gant: "The Ford Foundation Program in Pakistan," *The Annals*, Vol. 323, May 1959.

Two international voluntary groups which have aided greatly with short-term training for welfare workers have been the Society of Friends through its Center in Dacca; and the World Assembly of Youth, which has operated the Training for Leadership Centre called Aloka, in Ceylon.

Leaders and workers in the YMCA, YWCA, Red Cross, Girl Guides, and Boy Scouts, from the internationally affiliated national agencies, have contributed to teaching at all levels within Pakistan. And other agencies such as United Nations Children's Fund, World Health Organization, International Labour Organisation, United Nations Economic and Social Council, Food and Agriculture Organization, Co-operative Agencies for Remittances to Everywhere (CARE), Church World Services, Catholic Relief Services, Worlds Veterans Service, the International Child Welfare Union and the International Conference of Social Work have given important supporting services in welfare and allied fields.

FELLOWSHIPS ABROAD PROVIDED

The provision of fellowships and scholarships for training Pakistanis abroad has developed concurrently with the establishment of local training facilities. The United Nations, the United States programs, the Asia Foundation, and the Ford Foundation have all contributed much in this area. In addition, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, acting under the Colombo Plan have given opportunities in their countries for training and observation in Medical Social Work, Treatment of Juvenile Delinquency, Urban Community Development, Probation, and other areas. The governments of Sweden, the Netherlands, and Yugoslavia have offered scholarships.

Some 100 persons from Pakistan have now had full two-year graduate

training in social work either abroad or from the University of Punjab in Pakistan. In addition, 250 to 300 persons have had part-time training in the social services.

Many of those trained in social work have been staff members of various departments and ministries of the central and provincial governments who have returned to their posts better qualified to carry out the welfare aspects of their work, for example, railway labor services, refugee rehabilitation, health, village-aid, and education.

Proper utilization of trained persons has become the key question of the moment. A few of the trainees are not now engaged in work for which the training has qualified them. Others are in marginal situations. The schools, the government, and the voluntary agencies will need to determine what posts should be staffed by fully trained workers and what posts by lesser trained people. Real efforts will be necessary to see that they are placed accordingly.

INDIGENOUS TRAINING MATERIALS NEEDED

There will also need to be continuing activity at the two schools of social work and elsewhere to develop indigenous training materials, such as, among other things, field work process recordings to be contributed by the teaching staff, other practitioners, and students in the field. Only through the development and use of good local teaching materials can training be fully appropriate and effective. There is always the danger that western patterns will be adopted rather than adapted which could prove fatal to social work as a profession and to effective programs of service.

Special attention will also be necessary to the continuous re-evaluation and revision of the curricula of the

schools appropriate to the changing needs of urban and rural community development, labor welfare services, modernization of institutional care, the development of services for children, and other services.

A third element of significance is that of student selection. It is important for Pakistan that the early graduates of their schools be persons of good personal attributes, who, after training, can serve as the leaders, planners, teachers, supervisors, and interpreters of social needs, and who can devise better methods for dealing with them.

The professional workers will never replace the volunteers. But volunteers will also need some training in understanding human behavior and how to deal effectively with people. As more teaching staff becomes available they can be used in the expansion of short-term training courses for volunteers and for persons working in related fields of social welfare.

RURAL SERVICES IMPORTANT

As in most countries, the initial development of social services in Pakistan has been concentrated in and near the cities, where rapid industrialization gives rise to social distress. But the continued deprivation of the rural population, still some 90 per cent of the total, cannot be justified. This is being given cognizance by national and

international departments and agencies. The vitality, both economic and moral, of the country will need to come from the rural population.

After several years of trial and error in rural-welfare planning especially through Village-aid, it is recognized that the break-through of the hard crust of superstition, age-old methods, and customs must come with improved understanding of human nature, group work methods, and community organization.

RAPID AND DRAMATIC PROGRESS

In conclusion, it appears that Pakistan has made rapid and dramatic progress in its planning and organization for welfare services. As has been the experience in many countries, the impact of national emergency or shock has given impetus to existing human concern. A common religion, upon which the new country was based, professing equality and humane treatment for all provided the mandate for universal social welfare. Many adverse factors have yet to be overcome before desperately needed welfare services can reach the millions in need. Economic, political, and cultural barriers to rapid advances in education, health, and related amenities will require years of effort to overcome. But the zeal, dedication and practicality of the present leadership augur well for continued progress.

New Resources for Rehabilitation and Health

By HOWARD A. RUSK AND DONALD V. WILSON

ABSTRACT: During the past few years many new resources have been created to improve the health and welfare of all the people of the world. These new resources include international governmental organizations such as the World Health Organization, United Nations, International Labour Organisation, and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). International voluntary organizations, multilateral and bilateral, are setting new standards. Increased educational opportunities and the development of professional associations are other important new resources. The realization by most of the people of the world that better health, rehabilitation, and welfare services are possible and the demand for such services are also to be regarded as new resources. Most important is the changing attitudes of individuals and communities toward physical handicaps and illness. These new attitudes are the primary new resource for future work in the health and welfare field.

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A SWEDISH physical therapist, a young doctor from England, and a Danish prosthetics technician are working on the same team at the Hospital das Clinicas in Sao Paulo, Brazil to develop a comprehensive rehabilitation program. Their services are made possible by the United Nations and the World Health Organization. They had the help of an expert from Canada provided by the International Labour Organisation and a consultant in services for the blind from the United States. In the same city the Association for the Aid of Crippled Children is developing its program with the assistance of an experienced administrator of crippled children's services from the United States. These programs serve not only the disabled people of Sao Paulo and Brazil, but also serve as a demonstration and pilot project and set an example for nearby countries.

On the other side of the world, in Bombay, India, a similar project has been underway for several years, resulting in the establishment of the All India Institute for Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation. An experienced administrator from the United States was provided by the United Nations; the occupational therapist comes from Belgium; the physical therapist is a young Englishman; and the expert in employment of the handicapped is a Norwegian with extensive international experience.

In both Brazil and India, as well as in many other places, professional persons of several nationalities are working together with local persons under the auspices of international organizations. The primary goal in such projects is to provide more adequate services for the handicapped. An important by-product is to enable individuals of diverse nationalities to learn to work together.

Such projects have common characteristics: the advice and information are

provided by professional persons from other countries; the success, however, depends on the support and understanding to be found in the local community and the ability of local professional personnel to secure the education and training necessary to carry them forward.

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

The expanded programs of a large number of international organizations, both voluntary and governmental, are a new resource available today to all countries of the world who wish to create and improve health and rehabilitation services for the handicapped. International co-operation in this broad field is not new but what is new is the increased utilization of international assistance.

The mere existence of international rehabilitation programs helps to create a world-wide moral standard which recognizes the importance of the individual even though he is severely handicapped. In the local community, both professional and lay leaders now have a strong ally in such international agencies when they wish to take action to make a better life possible for the crippled children and adults in their community. The experiences of persons in other countries with similar interests and community problems are readily available to them through these international agencies.

UNITED NATIONS AND SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

Many international governmental organizations are engaged to some degree in rehabilitation programs: the United Nations; World Health Organization (WHO); International Labour Organisation (ILO); and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).

The co-ordinated program of the United Nations for the rehabilitation of the physically handicapped has evolved

over a period of years. The United Nations and several of the specialized agencies recognized very early the urgent need to do something about the problem of physical disability and rehabilitation. These problems were among the first to be given special attention by the Economic and Social Council when the activities of the United Nations in the field of social welfare were initiated. At its first session in 1946, the General Assembly of the United Nations, on the recommendation of the Council, established the Advisory Social Welfare Services and specifically included the handicapped as an area in which expert advice, demonstration, and technical equipment should be made available to the various governments.

The present program of the United Nations was authorized by a resolution adopted in 1950 by the Economic and Social Council which provides for co-operative efforts on the part of the United Nations and other governmental and voluntary international organizations. The Secretary-General of the United Nations was requested "to plan jointly with the specialized agencies and in consultation with the interested nongovernmental organizations, a well-co-ordinated programme for the rehabilitation of physically handicapped persons."

A recent survey of the rehabilitation program of the United Nations indicates that some form of aid had, over a two-year period, been provided to more than fifty countries. A substantial number of fellowships were provided to enable persons engaged in work for the disabled to study rehabilitation programs in countries other than their own. Experts were provided as consultants to national governments to plan future programs. Much of the work was done in co-operation with international voluntary organizations.

The best practical results of the co-ordinated program for rehabilitation have been obtained within the United Nations technical assistance program. Many of the technical assistance projects in rehabilitation have been undertaken jointly by the United Nations, the ILO and WHO with, in certain cases, nongovernmental organizations co-operating. Joint projects have been, or are being, carried out in a number of countries: in Asia—Burma, India, and Indonesia—the Middle East—Egypt—Europe—Yugoslavia—and Latin America—Brazil and Guatemala. Joint short-term and advisory missions have, in addition, visited Austria, Italy, Spain, Bolivia, Mexico, Paraguay, and Chile. In other cases advisory missions or projects carried out by one agency have been reinforced through subsequent action undertaken by other agencies, for example, in Ceylon, Greece, Philippines, and Turkey.

A number of seminars, study groups, and conferences have been organized jointly by the United Nations and the specialized agencies. The United Nations and the specialized agencies have also supported meetings held by some nongovernmental organizations by providing directing staff, contributing experts to present papers on specific topics, or granting fellowships to participants coming from other countries.

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

The desire to improve the health standards of all peoples of the world, and the widespread awareness that such improvement is possible, are relatively new developments. No longer are poor health, high infant death rates, and disease accepted as inevitable. The people of the world now know that better health is possible for them and their children, and they demand improvement. Particularly in countries which

have become independent in recent years we find a desire and determination to improve health programs.

The best known "new resource" to improve the health of all people is the World Health Organization (WHO), established in 1946. The membership of the Organization now includes practically all nations. "The attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health" is the objective of WHO as stated in its constitution. In the preamble health is defined as "a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity."

In carrying out these objectives WHO has, therefore, given the highest priority to programs that prevent sickness. Such priorities are essential since the total annual budget of WHO is less than fourteen million dollars, or less than what is spent for health and medical programs in many of the larger cities of the world. The program for the eradication of malaria is probably the best known example of the work WHO performs in the prevention of disease.

Although WHO gives priority to the preventive aspects of medicine, the phases of definitive treatment and rehabilitation are not ignored entirely. Many diseases and injuries which result in disability are preventable, but of course preventive programs do not eliminate entirely the need for curative treatment and rehabilitation. Early treatment, when disease and injuries do occur, is an effective means of preventing permanent disability. Accidents in the street, in the house, and at work continue to increase and result in permanent disability unless prompt and good medical care followed by rehabilitation are provided. Although vaccine is now available to prevent poliomyelitis, thousands of children and adults each year will continue to become per-

manently disabled unless medical care is provided during the infectious period and is followed by a rehabilitation program.

CHILDREN'S FUND

The programs of the WHO have been supplemented and extended by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) which has made large contributions for programs to prevent and treat physical disability.

UNICEF has extended aid to tens of millions of children in more than one hundred nations and territories of the world. Mass programs against tuberculosis, yaws, trachoma, and malaria have been conducted. Maternal and child health centers, particularly in remote areas, have been created. UNICEF has also provided supplies and equipment to aid the development of services for handicapped children. Grants made during the past year will aid such programs in Poland, Thailand, Japan, and Pakistan.

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION

An important phase of rehabilitation is to provide vocational opportunities for the handicapped, an area in which the International Labour Organisation (ILO) has provided world-wide leadership. In 1955 the General Conference of the ILO unanimously adopted a recommendation (Number 99) concerning vocational rehabilitation of the disabled. It provides that the disabled should not as a result of their disability be discriminated against in respect to their rehabilitation or subsequent employment. Principles and methods applicable to the vocational guidance, training, and placement of the disabled are set forth.

It is significant that this recommendation was drafted by a group representing labor, employers, and governments of more than sixty countries and that it was adopted unanimously. There

were, however, decided differences of opinion as to how the employment of the disabled should be encouraged. In some countries, but not in North America, a fixed percentage or quota of all employees must be classified as disabled. After considerable debate it was agreed that the ILO recommendation should provide that "wherever appropriate in the national circumstances, and consistent with national policy, the employment of disabled persons should be promoted by the engagement by employers of a percentage of disabled persons under such arrangements as will avoid the displacement of non-disabled workers." The reserving of certain designated occupations for the disabled and arranging that seriously disabled persons be given preference in certain occupations were also approved.

In several countries, such as Poland, the employment of the disabled has been increased by the creation of co-operatives by and for disabled persons. Such employment was endorsed by the ILO recommendation when "appropriate in the national circumstances and consistent with national policy."

The development of co-operatives for the disabled in Poland is an interesting example of how the problem can be met when there are large numbers of handicapped persons in the community and no employment opportunities. In Warsaw at the end of the war, and actually before the fighting ended, a group of disabled persons started to produce soap, dental powder, and similar items for the troops. This group eventually organized as a co-operative and other disabled groups established additional co-operatives. In 1949 the Union of Co-operatives for Invalids was created. On the tenth anniversary of the Union there was a total of 363 co-operatives in Poland employing over fifty thousand handicapped persons. Some employees are not classified as

handicapped but more than 80 per cent are disabled. A variety of goods are produced including shoes, clothing, and books. The object of such a program is to provide work for the handicapped. Only in recent years has much thought been given to other phases of rehabilitation; it is to be expected that medical restoration and educational and vocational training programs will be developed.

Sheltered employment has been developed in many countries to provide work opportunities for the handicapped. Such services aim to rehabilitate the individual by providing needed medical, social, and vocational services to enable him to work in the open market. For the seriously handicapped sheltered employment frequently becomes the permanent job rather than a step to a "regular" job. These programs must be subsidized by the community in some way: by adjustment of taxes as is done in the United States for philanthropies; by charitable contributions; or by special arrangements made by industry or private individuals.

When there are a large number of handicapped in the community and few employment opportunities, sheltered work for the disabled is most important. In countries where unemployment is not a serious problem more effort is expended to provide medical rehabilitation, vocational training, and placement in regular industry. The problems of sheltered employment for the handicapped were considered at a seminar on this subject held at The Hague, Netherlands, in 1959 under the auspices of the International Society for the Welfare of Cripples.

Many important rehabilitation programs begin as efforts to provide employment for the handicapped. Subsequently, medical, social, and other services are added. Conversely, many rehabilitation services begin with a

medical program. How the service begins, by providing either medical care or employment, is not so important as how it expands to provide all the services needed for the individual's complete rehabilitation.

HEALTH FOR PEACE

Research, with the resulting growth in knowledge about prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation, has increased greatly in recent years but has not been utilized to the maximum. More research and, equally important, wider dissemination of the results of previous research are needed. Many of the major medical advances in the past were not the work of any one country but a combination of effort.

The proposed International Health and Medical Research Act, which has been approved by the Senate of the United States, will make possible an important increase in health and rehabilitation research throughout the world. The proposed law, known popularly as the "Health for Peace Bill," will create within the National Institutes of Health of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare a new National Institute of International Medical Research, with an annual appropriation of \$50,000,000.

These funds will be used to encourage and support research and the exchange of information on research, the training of research personnel, and the improvement of research facilities throughout the world. Grants to support such activities, including basic research and research in rehabilitation, would be authorized. Such grants could be made to foreign and American universities and research organizations and to voluntary and inter-governmental agencies such as the World Health Organization.

A National Advisory Council for

International Medical Research, composed of voluntary—nongovernmental—leaders, would establish policies, make recommendations, and approve grants and loans. Existing agencies specializing in heart, cancer, arthritis, metabolic and neurological diseases, blindness, and vocational rehabilitation would evaluate for the Advisory Council specific projects within their particular areas of competence.

The proposed program would not replace support by the United States of the current multilateral programs of international health organizations, such as the World Health Organization and United Nations Children's Fund, or any of the bilateral activities conducted through the International Co-operation Administration. Nor would it supplant the research programs being conducted in the United States through the National Institutes of Health. These programs would be enhanced and would provide additional means for uniting science throughout the world in an expanded global attack on disease and disability. An emphasis on the international implications of research, in health and rehabilitation, is the important factor to be added to existing programs by the proposed legislation.

VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS

A large number of international voluntary organizations include services to handicapped children and adults in their total program. More than thirty such organizations are members of the World Conference of Organizations Interested in the Handicapped. The varieties of interest in services for the handicapped are indicated by the names of some of the organizations that are members: World Association of Girl Guides and Girl Scouts; International Confederation of Free Trade Unions; International Conference of Social

Work; World Veterans Federation; World Council for the Welfare of the Blind; and the World Federation for the Deaf.

In addition to these multilateral international organizations, there are many international bilateral agencies with programs for the handicapped. For many years the American Foundation for Overseas Blind has maintained an extensive program in many countries for the blind. The World Rehabilitation Fund is another example of an agency of the United States assisting programs for the handicapped on an international basis. A large number of fellowships have been provided by the Fund to enable rehabilitation personnel to study in countries other than their own, and rehabilitation programs and organizations have been assisted by the Fund.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF PERSONNEL

Competent personnel is the greatest existing need in health and rehabilitation programs. Improvement in both quality and quantity of professionally trained persons is urgent. Education and training cannot, however, be separated from the total program, for such training is largely wasted unless, upon completion, the individual has a place to work and the equipment and supplies required to work effectively.

Two types of programs are needed: to create and expand educational programs within a particular country and to make it possible for more professional persons to secure professional education and experience in another country.

Educational facilities to train doctors have developed quite well in all countries in comparison to other professions. For example, all countries have medical schools and a basic medical education is available at least to the best-qualified

young people. Advanced medical study, required in rehabilitation programs, is often not available, and the doctor who wishes to specialize must go out of his home country to secure that advanced study. Many doctors go to North America or Europe for graduate work in orthopedic surgery, physical medicine, neurology, and pediatrics. As these specialties develop within a country, there is, of course, less need for formal study abroad, but more need for the experienced doctor to keep abreast of new developments. Travel, observation, and participation in advanced seminars and world congresses supplement the doctor's efforts to keep up to date through reading, films, and consultation with experts who visit his country.

THE PROFESSIONS

A mere listing of all the professions participating in rehabilitation programs indicates to some extent the nature of the program. In the medical phase alone we find the doctor, nurse, medical social worker, occupational and physical therapist, speech specialist, and prosthetic technician.

The development of professional groups throughout the world is undoubtedly an outstanding phenomenon of current times. The traditional professions of law, theology, military, and medicine are being challenged and supplemented by newer groups.

In addition to the advances made in professional education, the professional associations are also important. The membership qualifications of these associations are a great force to bring about an improvement in the quality of services to the individual client.

The development of training facilities for social workers has been outstanding and currently there is less need for study opportunities abroad. The proper role of the social worker in

rehabilitation requires further investigation. The best-defined role is within the medical phase of rehabilitation in which the specialties of medical and psychiatric social work have developed. The role of the social worker in rehabilitation outside the hospital and institution is not so clearly defined. The social worker undoubtedly has a great deal more to contribute than is currently the case in agencies, both voluntary and governmental, engaged in organization of community resources for rehabilitation programs. In the vocational phase, the social worker is frequently called upon to provide services in vocational guidance, counseling, and placement.

EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS

Many rehabilitation services, particularly for children and youths, are undertaken originally as schools for blind, deaf, or crippled. The primary purpose of such a program is education but in time medical services are added. Usually social service is provided at a later date, mainly as a means to maintain relations with the families of the children. As children become older, vocational training and job placement become a part of the school program.

In some countries programs for handicapped children are undertaken under the sponsorship of educational authorities. Subsequently medical, social, and vocational services are added to the program so that rehabilitation is possible in one "school." Whether the school program should be expanded to include medical care or whether a health agency should provide it is a question constantly debated.

Rehabilitation programs can begin in medical agencies, such as hospitals, or in social welfare institutions, in schools, or as a service to provide work for the handicapped. All four types of agencies—medical, social, educational,

and vocational—administer rehabilitation services. It is not important where the service begins or who is responsible for administration. What is important is that each individual receives all the services that can be utilized to bring about his maximum rehabilitation.

SOCIAL ASPECTS

Medical care alone is not sufficient to meet the needs of individuals who become ill or disabled. We now understand more clearly than ever that curative treatment is only one phase of the total service required.

The individual who is sick or disabled presents many problems which cannot be solved without the co-operation of many professional disciplines. The importance of rehabilitation as a part of medical care has been emphasized by designating it as the "third phase of medicine."

Within the field of medicine the importance of rehabilitation has been recognized. Preventive medicine is now given equal place with definitive treatment and is an accepted phase of medical programs. The medical phase of rehabilitation—the third phase of medicine—is now well understood. Integration with other aspects of rehabilitation—social, educational, and vocational—needs further consideration.

AN EXAMPLE

Indonesia presents a striking example of how patience and hard work, combined with aid from international agencies, can overcome centuries of false beliefs and superstitions about crippled children and adults. The Surakarta Rehabilitation Center was established at Solo, a city in central Java, following the Indonesian war for independence. In 1946 the area of hostilities in midwest Java circled the city, making it a beleaguered terminus for countless disabled evacuees. Their spe-

cial surgical and after-care programs required the establishment of a special medical and rehabilitation service.

To solve the problem of providing artificial limbs to the large number of war amputees, a young surgeon worked co-operatively with an engineer. They began in a small garage which was a part of the general hospital. Although materials and experience were limited they were able to manufacture artificial limbs by using scraps of domestic wood and leather, valve springs from damaged motor cars, and aluminum from wrecked planes.

After a year or two of experience some financial help was provided by the Ministry of Health. The number of war amputees coming to the center from all parts of the country increased rapidly, however, and further expansion was necessary. It was realized that the provision of an artificial limb would not by itself be sufficient to restore the amputees to productive life. A simple vocational training program was undertaken by utilizing nearby unused buildings.

Subsequently, at the request of the Indonesian government an expert was provided by the United Nations. An over-all plan for developing nation-wide rehabilitation programs was drawn up which served as the basis for aid in various forms provided by a large number of international organizations, both voluntary and governmental.

The program for the war disabled was the stimulus for creating a separate service for crippled children under the auspices of the Indonesian Society for the Care of Crippled Children. It was realized that the work in adult rehabilitation was already taxing the rehabilitation center, and steps were taken to alert the entire community to the problem of children crippled by congenital defects, war injuries, cerebral palsy, and polio. Women volunteers played the

major role in bringing about an understanding of existing problems and in expanding services.

A new crippled children's center was established in Solo in 1954 with dormitory facilities for fifty-two children between the ages of three and thirteen. A nursery and primary school were included as well as facilities for physical therapy.

The work of the Indonesian Society for Crippled Children did not end, however, with the creation of a single center. Subsequently branches of the Society were established in other cities throughout Java and additional rehabilitation services were created. International contacts were maintained while services were being established, and in 1954 the Indonesian Society became a member organization of the International Society for the Welfare of Cripples.

Rehabilitation experts from several nations served for a time in Solo—from England, Australia, the United States, and the Philippines. In the fall of 1957 a Seminar on Rehabilitation of the Physically Handicapped for Participants from Asia and the Far East was held in Solo and brought together individuals from the following nations: Burma, Ceylon, Republic of China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Laos, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.

The experiences of the Solo Center have been exported to other countries in many different ways: through visitors to Solo; films and publications; and trips abroad by various members of the staff of the Center.

CHANGING ATTITUDES

The most important "new resource" throughout the world is the changing attitude toward the possibility of rehabilitation for crippled children and

adults. In many communities of the world having a handicapped child was, and in many places still is, a mark of disgrace.

The crippled have been handicapped as much by the attitude of society as by their physical limitations. The tendency to set apart the person who is physically different because of a conspicuous physical defect is being replaced by a realization that the crippled individual is first a person and only secondarily a handicapped one. He must, therefore, be treated as a whole person with physical, mental, social, and emotional needs. The recognition of this fact has led to the development of the concept of an integrated pattern of medical, social, educational, and vocational services which has been the most important advance in reducing the problem of disability in recent years. Physical capacity, or incapacity, is a relative matter; no one remains physically perfect, few are totally disabled.

This change of attitude usually comes

about in the community when voluntary agencies establish a service for the handicapped. Members of the family of a crippled child or adult must accept him as a person with special problems who can, with proper help, serve as a contributing member of society.

Most important of all is the attitude of the individual toward his disability. He reflects to a great degree the attitudes met in his community and family, but if he is fortunate he will evolve a personal philosophy that, although he is handicapped by deformity, old age, or chronic illness, he has an obligation to make his maximum contribution to society.

International activities in rehabilitation mean far more when the countless millions of hopeless, helpless people throughout the world return to lives of dignity and productivity. With dynamic leadership international rehabilitation programs contribute another step toward the international understanding that is essential to world peace.

Mutual Aid in Low-cost Housing

By ERNEST WEISSMANN

ABSTRACT: The United Nations—long active in facilitating international co-operation in the housing field—will carry out, from 1961 to 1965, a world-wide program whose central theme is the mobilization of individual and group efforts for the improvement of housing for lower-income groups. According to estimates for the world made around 1950, as many as 150 million families in the industrially less-advanced areas required more adequate homes and better physical surroundings. In the industrially advanced countries, there was a housing deficit of roughly 30 million units. At the mid-point of this century, characterized by the greatest technological advances in man's history, there was indeed no country without a housing problem. While marked strides had been made in health, education, and nutrition, no comparable advance could be reported in housing. With very few exceptions the supply of housing for most families is in fact deteriorating, especially in the less-developed countries. Practical experiences clearly indicate that self-help and mutual aid combined with economic co-operation could contribute towards alleviating the extreme shortage of housing for many income groups and the utter lack of adequate community facilities in most parts of the world.

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THE current explosive growth of cities is creating grave economic and social imbalances and physical decay. The expected growth of the world's population will necessarily cause a progressive concentration of people in cities, and industrialization will have to provide the means of livelihood for them. Provision of housing and essential community services and facilities, in the right place and at the right time, will play a crucial role in this development. This problem is, however, difficult to resolve because of the serious gap between the cost of house construction—economic rent—and the ability of low income families to pay for it—social rent. Three major approaches may help to bridge this gap. A temporary adjustment of housing standards to conform more closely with the economic potential of a country is one way. Another is the steady improvement of the building industry, leading to a substantial reduction of the cost of housing. A third promising means has been the mobilization of the future householder's own contribution in labor through self-help and mutual aid or through appropriate co-operative and other nonprofit arrangements for savings, actual and potential.

HOUSING AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENT

Technological progress in the sphere of construction, transport, and utilities has been multiplying in recent decades, but it has not been applied at a significant rate in metropolitan areas. Grave economic and social imbalances are direct consequences of this gap, and its outward physical symptoms are bad housing and poor community services, choked-up city traffic with excessive travel time to work; and filth, squalor, and disease. Gang activity, juvenile delinquency, crime, and vice are among the more conspicuous aspects of the physical decay and disorganization of

urban economies. While these conditions affect an ever growing number of people already established in cities, they mostly involve newcomers, many of whom belong to the lower income group. These newcomers usually become slum dwellers and squatters and therefore fail to be accepted by their new community and its institutions.

Economic development programs have tended to intensify rural-urban migration when sufficient attention was not paid to corresponding agricultural development. In these cases, living conditions in the villages continued to deteriorate, a growing number of rural people drifted into towns, and large numbers of urban inhabitants as well as the rural people generally remained untouched by their country's economic progress. In some instances, methods known as community development were combined with agricultural extension to increase the food production and thereby remedy this situation. In other instances cottage and small-scale industries established simultaneously have been able to produce needed consumer goods which otherwise would not have been manufactured for many years. Thus, the resources of the people have been mobilized to contribute substantially to general development; and their more extensive participation has been effective in the setting of goals and in determining the direction and pace of development at the local level.

The current trend in urbanization is uncertain, for in all parts of the world more people already live in cities and industrial centers than can be supported by employment in industries. The levels of living of the migrant population are therefore shrinking, not only in terms of physical surroundings and social environment, but also from the point of view of family income. In town and country, economic and social measures are therefore being tested

which are aimed at discouraging the transplantation of rural poverty into the urban environment, and attempts are being made to guide internal migration so that it facilitates rather than impedes development. To achieve this, development plans on a regional scale are conceived to strengthen the economic base of existing cities and to create alternative centers of attraction for internal migration by decentralizing new industry.¹

Economic limitations

In the context of such broad development policies, co-ordinated planning of housing and essential community services and facilities can play a crucial role. The problem is difficult to solve because there exists a serious gap between the cost of acceptable housing accommodations—the “economic rent”—and the amount that families are able and willing to pay for them—the “social rent.” Progressive concentration of people in the urban and industrial areas; the scarcity of resources available for housing; rising cost of building; and a growing shortage of suitable urban land are responsible for this negative trend. While the share of the family budget spent for housing varies considerably,² the fact is that lower income families in most countries find it more and more difficult to obtain adequate accommodation without jeopardizing other essential needs.³

“Housing” constitutes the physical

¹ *United Nations Seminar on Regional Planning* (Tokyo, 1958), (United Nations, New York, 1958), Document No. ST/TAA/SER.C/35.

² Under 5 per cent in Eastern Europe and countries with general rent control; 10 per cent in some Asian countries; 15 to 20 per cent in Western European countries and 25 per cent in the United States of America.

³ United Nations: Report of the Social Commission on its Twelfth Session (New York, 1959), Document No. E/3265 and E/CN.5/343.

environment in which the society's basic unit, the family, must develop; its improvement represents a concrete and visible expression of a rise in the general level of living. Housing, from the family's perspective, however, is not “shelter” alone but comprises a number of services, facilities, and utilities which link the individual and the family to the group and the community.

Attempts by governments of the developing countries to provide better housing and the means of livelihood for the millions of people added every year to the world's population⁴ are often thwarted by the very limited resources available. These circumstances suggest the need for economy, and imagination to meet enormous requirements with small outlays. Action by central and local authorities in a significant number of countries is therefore closely co-ordinated with their economic possibilities: resources to be made available for housing are being assessed in the light of their potential contribution not solely to social betterment, but also to employment and labor productivity, to over-all economic growth, and to a more balanced economic and social development. At the same time, new resources which have not been fully utilized are being sought for housing programs.

Promising remedies

Governments find it necessary to subsidize housing for a rapidly growing number of families, but in view of the considerable outlay of public funds involved they find it also necessary to take a second look at housing standards established by law or custom. As a matter of principle, housing standards

⁴ According to various estimates the current yearly addition amounts to some 50 million persons. By 1975 it will reach the yearly figure of 77 million and at the end of the century 126 million.

must grow out of the social setting and the economic potential of a given area. They should normally aim at establishing guiding principles and required levels of performance with respect to health, safety, and convenience, rather than at fixing specific sizes, construction methods, or materials to be used. A periodic review of such standards is necessary, however, so that they can be raised as soon as this becomes possible. When resources are scarce, emphasis should be laid on adequate utilities and community facilities and services—including transport between residence and place of work—rather than on providing well-equipped houses in an otherwise poor environment. Such a temporary adjustment in which permissible levels conform more closely with the current economic situation of a country is one way used to bridge the gap between the economic and the social rent.

Another avenue being explored by governments is the improvement of the productivity of the building industry which may lead to a substantial reduction of cost and enable more families to pay for their own housing. The development of a highly productive industry is important not only for housing and community improvement but also for investment programs in industry, agriculture, transportation, and power in the developing countries. A review of economic development programs will show that the building industry alone absorbs a larger share of investment funds than any other field.⁵

Finally, a more general mobilization of the future householder's own contribution in labor, cash, or potential savings is a highly promising way of dealing at least in part with the housing problem.⁶ In most countries the mere

⁵ For structures of different types including, for example, housing, harbors and dams, and hydroelectric schemes.

⁶ Finland, Israel, the People's Republic of China, Iceland, and Chile exemplify such poli-

establishment of adequate savings and credit and loan facilities has created a sufficient incentive for mobilizing additional financial resources for housing. In a number of countries with strong inflationary trends a new device has been utilized to increase the volume of private savings by means of an "index clause" which provides, in addition to the normal interest rate, an allowance for any rise in prices as reflected in the fluctuations of a specified index, such as cost of construction or of some basic building material.⁷

MOBILIZATION OF THE PEOPLE'S RESOURCES

To help alleviate this situation, the United Nations will sponsor, from 1961 to 1965, a world-wide program of international action, the central theme of which will be the mobilization of individual and group efforts for the improvement of housing conditions. It is hoped that a concerted effort of the people directly concerned and their governments, with the use of science and technology, can perhaps break through the apparently insurmountable problems of planning, organization, financing, execution, and management created by the current housing crisis.

No government has sufficient resources to provide all the housing and community facilities needed, but the people concerned can contribute their own share. They can contribute labor and skills, their individual savings, and the materials they can produce from local sources. In this way, effective group effort and assistance from public

cies. See *International Survey of Programmes of Social Development* (United Nations, Sales Publications No. 1959, IV, 2), Chap. IV, "Housing," p. 38.

⁷ In many countries the custom still exists of levying contributions in labor for various types of public and communal works in lieu of taxes. In some cases they are convertible into cash payments.

authority can be combined for practical action. It must however be stressed that housing programs involving co-operatives, self-help, and mutual aid will make a substantial contribution to national development only if methods are found which will diminish the now common reliance on exceptional people and exceptional circumstances.

All societies have traditionally used self-help and mutual aid for the building of homes and community facilities. Organized versions of these methods are now being applied with equal enthusiasm in villages and small towns throughout the world as part of community development projects: in Scandinavian cities under the "egnahem"—own home—program; in schemes for squatters' resettlement and slum clearance organized by many municipalities; in the new industrial communities of the Soviet Union under the leadership of labor unions; and in North America by enthusiasts of the do-it-yourself movement. The motivating force may vary, but the general principle is the same. The people concerned contribute their own labor to reduce the necessary capital outlay for the construction of their homes and the facilities needed in their communities. Or alternatively, construction labor needed which may be in short supply is being mobilized in this way.⁸

In Africa, Asia, and Latin America self-help and mutual aid have often been a means for improving the physical environment and health conditions in response to a growing social awareness and eagerness among the people to learn and to improve living conditions. A variety of techniques were

⁸ For a description of some of these schemes see *Housing and Town and Country Planning*: Bulletin No. 6, "Housing in the Tropics" (United Nations, New York, Sales Publication No. 1952, IV, 2); and *International Survey of Programmes of Social Development*, *op. cit.*, Chap. IX.

used to bring the people from "darkness to light." In Nigeria, Haiti, and India, pilot projects were designed to experiment with various approaches before they were applied more generally. The cultural missions in Mexico used as their main vehicle a suitable system of education. Village reconstruction projects in Egypt were using the fundamental education method. The "labor week" in Jammu and Kashmir was designed to encourage in young people a sense of the dignity of labor and their capacity to work together. In addition the community centers in many African and Caribbean areas have demonstrated in a practical way what rural families can do for themselves.

Rural programs

In Ceylon, Indonesia, Jamaica, and the Philippines, self-help schemes have been developed in connection with broad rural resettlement programs, and in Puerto Rico self-help and mutual aid have been applied also in urban resettlement and slum clearance projects. These latter included the transfer of families from slums or squatters' camps to new, well laid-out communities, with a grant of land supplied with basic utilities. In Greece a technique was developed whereby thousands of homes were built cheaply and quickly, despite the postwar shortage of building materials and skilled labor. The original "material-in-aid" plan in that country gradually evolved into a program whereby entire villages were organized for the purpose of housebuilding and whole families participated in building their own homes.

Millions of people have been made homeless due to wartime and postwar economic, social, and political dislocations. Self-help and mutual aid have made possible the resettlement of some of these people in new communities. The new satellite town at Faridabad in

India, for instance, proved that forty-thousand ordinary people could erect homes for themselves, largely with their own labor. In about two years a whole new town was built and the cash outlay per house was at the same time drastically reduced. As many as five-hundred dwellings a month were produced without using elaborate mechanized devices. Due to the steady influx of immigrants into Israel some one hundred thousand people were at one time sheltered in tent colonies, shacks, and abandoned army camps. As a solution to the restiveness of the people compelled to live under extremely bad conditions and to the waste of potentially productive labor, the work village or "maabarot" plan was developed. Under this scheme the immigrants worked in teams building their own permanent homes. In most cases they have also built the factory in which they have eventually been employed.

A self-help program of great promise has been developed in Ghana. There, home ownership has such appeal for people that many of them invest their savings in concrete blocks in the hope of building a house for their families. The government therefore started in 1956 a Roof Loan Scheme under which families who have built their houses up to the roof level are provided, on credit, with roofing materials and doors and windows.⁹ The program is administered through Village Housing Societies which select the applicants from their members on the basis of need and trustworthiness and undertake responsibility for the collection of payments on loans. The loans are interest-free and repayable in four years. The scheme has gained wide acceptance and the revolv-

⁹ A similar scheme was introduced earlier in Burma which involved light roofing for rural dwellings and other structures mainly built with bamboo and belonging to individual families or the community.

ing fund established by the government for its financing is now being increased. At the same time the scheme is also being gradually introduced into urban areas.

The rehabilitation of areas stricken by disasters such as earthquakes, floods, or hurricanes has offered other opportunities for effective co-operation. The National Reconstruction Board in Lebanon which was established in 1956 following an earthquake is a good example. Its operations were financed by a special tax on imported items, an entertainment tax and a postal tax. Some 300 villages affected by earthquake were rebuilt. Along with contractor-built houses, the Board also experimented with self-help. Because of the lack of confidence in this method, participants were initially offered wages for work on their own homes, but the Board was able to cut down the number of houses built in this way. Instead, families willing to rebuild their homes on the old sites were provided with materials purchased in bulk and distributed at a greatly reduced cost to the consumer. To facilitate the operation a system of "regional" depots was established together with smaller local stores for one or more villages depending on their size. The Board provided supervision and skilled labor, and a team composed of an engineer, two supervisors, and two foremen was made responsible for the work in a group of villages. The success of the scheme which involved repair of 13,000 homes in the first year and rebuilding of an additional 9,000 houses in a period of two years can be ascribed to a good preparation of the materials supply line and good planning of operations.

Urban housing schemes

Many experiments with self-help and mutual aid in a number of cities are beginning to yield basic information on

their applicability to urban conditions.¹⁰ The urban housing scheme known as "egnahem" is a particularly novel program conducted in Stockholm, Sweden, by a special municipal department. The city supplies the building components, provides technical advice, and negotiates contracts for skilled labor—such as plumbing. The neighborhood is planned as an urban residential unit with all needed facilities and services. House construction is financed by a single government loan at 3.5 per cent for forty years. This scheme has combined co-operative efforts at saving through industrial prefabrication of structural and other elements of the house with self-help labor of the householder, his family, and their friends.

In the city and region of Gorki in the Soviet Union another approach was taken. Participants were paid full wages by the enterprise concerned, with the government subsidizing any difference that there might be between wages in the factory and the wages earned by the householder as a temporary construction worker. Industrial communities in the Gorki Region have pledged to build by the use of self-help some 700,000 square meters of "net" dwelling area between 1957 and 1960.¹¹ This amounts to 60 per cent of the state plan for that area. The impact of this initiative is evident from the fact that representatives from forty-two territories, regions, and cities of the Soviet Union and from many central organizations joined in a conference to study the self-help experience of Gorki. These housing projects are financed through a fund formed in each enterprise by deductions of 1 to 6 per

¹⁰ For information on housing co-operatives see *Housing, Building and Planning*, No. 10, "Housing through Non-Profit Organizations" (United Nations, New York, Sales Publication No. 1956, IV, 7).

¹¹ Not counting walls, halls, kitchens and bathrooms or closet or storage areas.

cent of anticipated productivity and savings due to lower production costs. Higher deductions, from 20 to 50 per cent, are obtained from production in excess of that anticipated. Large enterprises use the "assembly line method" in house building under the supervision of qualified technical personnel. Local building materials are used as far as possible, including industrial waste products.

In a number of cities, from Morocco and Tunisia to the Belgian Congo, Indonesia and Poland, self-help and mutual aid have been applied with varied success; but projects combining the contribution of the people's own labor with the technical skills and equipment provided by public or private construction enterprises, in other words self-help combined with contractor-built cores of houses, have proved to be most productive. In France and Sweden, savings in cash through contributed labor have been estimated at about 10 per cent, and savings in the cost of building materials through bulk purchase accounted for another reduction of 20 to 30 per cent. In less-developed countries, where construction is generally simpler and therefore relies more readily on unskilled labor, savings amounting to as much as 60 per cent have been reported in certain cases.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF SELF-HELP AND MUTUAL AID

Undoubtedly programs such as those described above can make a significant contribution toward improving housing and community services for the lower income families, particularly if they are executed as part of a national housing policy and if they are supported by appropriate planning. But it must be recognized that such projects require large supplies of resources to be invested in land, materials, equipment, and in organization and technical ad-

vice. There is much practical experience already available in many countries on self-help and mutual aid in rural areas. This will enable the United Nations, its specialized agencies, and international professional organizations¹²—in conjunction with agricultural extension and community development—to undertake demonstration projects as guides for national policies and programs for the improvement of rural housing. The application of self-help and mutual aid in urban slums and squatters' colonies, however, needs further study. Well-planned pilot projects established within the framework of broader plans for slum clearance, urban renewal, and metropolitan and regional development may provide opportunity for such exploration.

While self-help, mutual aid, and co-operatives can clearly make a highly significant contribution to rural and urban housing, it must be recognized that they will be truly effective only if certain basic principles are observed:

(1) Unskilled labor can be economically used only for work that does not require specific skills; it is uneconomical from the national viewpoint to acquire the necessary skills if they are to be used only once.

(2) In order to utilize the latent potential of capital formation inherent in self-help, mutual aid, and co-operation, sufficient initial capital, technical personnel, administrative ability, and organizing skill must also be available.

(3) Housing and community improvement programs using self-help and mutual aid must as a matter of national policy always be made part of general

housing programs, rural or urban; they must also be part of a general improvement of rural life or broad programs for urban development.

(4) Self-help housing projects must not become the "poorer" sections of a community—its "ghetto"; provision of adequate facilities and services must be achieved through suitable community planning on a broad scale.

(5) The householder's labor should be combined with an economically justifiable application of machines to ensure an adequate measure of productivity making the effort worth while beyond the mere fact of employing the underemployed for the sake of having them occupied.

(6) The use of unskilled labor through self-help and mutual aid has definite limitations. It therefore cannot be a substitute for a highly productive building industry which ultimately must be enabled to deal with the increasing problem of urban development and reconstruction to accommodate the expected population growth, to eliminate substandard housing, and to do justice to the continuing rise in legitimate expectations of any people.

Finally, there is a need to take full advantage of new technology in order to rejuvenate the existing cities, to prepare them to receive the growing millions of new urban dwellers, and to create alternative foci of attraction by judicious development of transport and location of industry. Faster transit and new modes of transportation, for example; abandonment, if necessary, of the dream of individual homes in their present form and ownership pattern; and creation of contemporary counterparts in taller buildings and less ground coverage—all of which might return nature, beauty, efficiency, and sanity to our cities. In our times, it is the city that must progress, or the nations will perish.

¹² Such as the International Federation for Housing and Planning, the East Asia Regional Organization for Housing and Planning, the Inter-American Planning Society, International Union of Local Authorities and the International Union of Architects.

A Mass Attack on a Basic Problem: A Child Nutrition Project in Latin America

By ELISABETH SHIRLEY ENOCHS

ABSTRACT: In 1958 and 1959, the Inter-American Children's Institute of Montevideo, Uruguay, and the Unitarian Service Committee of the United States cosponsored four Symposia on Child Nutrition in Latin America with the co-operation of Specialized Organizations of the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and the International Co-operation Administration. Each sponsor appointed a team of experts, contributed by universities and governmental agencies, to conduct the symposia. The Williams-Waterman Fund helped to provide travel grants for three participants from each South American country. Different professions—medicine, agriculture, social work, education, anthropology, and so on—were represented. The multidisciplinary approach—new to the Latin Americans—proved effective in dealing with a multifaceted problem which has top priority in Latin America because of its serious effects on the general population, particularly children, and because it is recognized as a deterrent to economic development and productivity.

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WHEN the VIII Pan American Child Congress met in Washington in 1942—in war time—the founder and director of the National Institute of Nutrition in Argentina, Dr. Pedro Escudero, presented a paper in which he stated that “Latin America has been living a tragedy of hunger since the days of the Conquest.”

Since the war, progress has been made in studying the problem, particularly in the Central American countries where an Institute of Nutrition was established in 1946 by the five Central American Republics with the help of the W. K. Kellogg Foundation and the Pan American Sanitary Bureau, under whose auspices it now functions.

In 1950, when the Inter-American Economic and Social Council held its first Extraordinary Session to establish the Technical Co-operation Program of the Organization of American States, it listed nutrition as one of the major problems requiring attention.

Not until 1958, however, was a mass attack launched on this basic problem through what might be termed community organization on an international scale. The purpose of this article is to describe what has been recognized as a unique experiment in the mobilization of international and national agencies and representatives of many different professions for a war on hunger.

BACKGROUND

It is particularly fitting that this project should have resulted from the meeting, in Panama, July 22, 1956, of the Presidents of all the American Republics, since this meeting was part of a commemorative celebration of the First Pan American Conference called by Simon Bolivar in 1826. President Eisenhower attended this meeting and proposed that each President designate a representative to form a committee

which would have the task of strengthening inter-American relations and improving the welfare of the American peoples. Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower, the President's brother, was designated as his representative and chaired the Committee of Presidential Representatives (CPR) which held several meetings in Washington and drew up a number of recommendations.

In preparation for the first of these meetings, the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, Dr. José A. Mora, addressed a message to each of the Inter-American Specialized Organizations asking them to report upon the major problems in their respective spheres of operations in order to provide the CPR with a comprehensive picture of conditions in the Western Hemisphere.

The Inter-American System includes three organizations directly concerned with one or more phases of the nutrition problem, namely, the Pan American Sanitary Bureau (PASB), the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences, and the Inter-American Children's Institute. All three have special competence in one or more of the technical aspects of the problem. All have co-operative relationships with the specialized agencies of the United Nations. The PASB is the regional office of the World Health Organization. The Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences and the Children's Institute have worked co-operatively with the Food and Agriculture Organization. Co-operating relationships exist also with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). Other inter-American agencies, such as the Inter-American Indian Institute, have studied specific phases of the problem, such as food superstitions and taboos. However, the combined resources of these agencies had never been used for a comprehensive and co-ordinated attack on a prob-

lem of mutual concern to all of them, such as the problem of nutrition.

Malnutrition

The report sent to the Secretary-General by the Inter-American Children's Institute listed malnutrition as the problem with top priority in the field of child welfare. The report from the Pan American Sanitary Bureau placed it second only to the world-wide problem of malaria. “While a variety of nutritional problems . . . adversely affect the health of the population in some areas of Latin America,” said the PASB, “the greatest single problem is recognized to be malnutrition due to lack of suitable protein.” The report stated that consumption of animal and milk protein in Latin America is much less—25 grams per capita per day of animal protein and 65 grams per capita per day of total protein—than in Canada and the United States—61 grams of animal and 90 of total protein. The PASB agreed with the Children's Institute that the problem affects the population as a whole. It asserted that its effect is particularly severe in childhood and is directly responsible for a portion of the high infant and early childhood mortality in many Latin-American countries, and is found in all Latin-American countries with the exception of Argentina and Uruguay. In fact, the PASB report indicated, it has now been established that the condition described by Latin-American pediatricians as “*Síndrome Pluricarenal de la Infancia*”—multiple deficiency syndrome of childhood—is identical with Kwashiorkor, the protein-deficiency disease found by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) consultants to be so widespread in Africa. It has come as a shock to many people in Europe and in America to learn that

malnutrition among children is so widespread in Latin America and as severe as that found in many famine areas of Africa and the Far East.

The Committee of Presidential Representatives agreed that malnutrition in vast areas of Latin America affects economic development and is highly detrimental to the general welfare of the population. In Recommendation Number 17 the Committee urged the Organization of American States (OAS) to bring about a co-ordinated approach to activities in this field through the appropriate organizations; to support the work of the international organizations concerned with it; and, through its expanded technical co-operation program, to help individual governments requesting assistance in matters pertaining to food and nutrition.

It was while the problem was being dealt with at this high level that the Unitarian Service Committee, which had been actively promoting co-operative projects in the fields of health and social welfare, decided to explore the possibility of carrying out a project in Latin America. Mr. Wilmer Froistad, a social worker—community organization specialist—came to Washington as the representative of the Committee to consult with a member of the staff of the International Service, Office of the Commissioner of Social Security, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, who had had long association with the other American Republics. The consultations resulted in a decision to join forces with the Inter-American Children's Institute in conducting a series of symposia on child nutrition in South America. It was agreed not to involve the Central American countries where the Institute of Nutrition of Central America and Panama (INCAP) is actively engaged in nutrition work. The choice was a logical one. Here was a problem with which the whole conti-

nent was concerned. Here was an inter-American organization—the Inter-American Children's Institute—with contacts in every American country through which a project might be developed. And here was a group in the United States—the Unitarian Service Committee—willing to help and to mobilize resources which were not available to the Institute.

PREPARATIONS

In its report to the Secretary-General of the OAS, the Pan American Sanitary Bureau recognized that international and national programs in the field of nutrition need the co-operation of agencies in the field of agriculture as well as in the field of health. "At the international level," they said, "this means co-operation with the FAO and with UNICEF, as well as with the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences and the Inter-American Children's Institute."

As for the latter agency, it has always recognized the interdisciplinary approach to problems affecting child life, and its structure provides for research and advisory services in the fields of health, education, legislation, and the social services.

From the beginning, therefore, it was evident that the approach must be interdisciplinary and that other agencies would naturally be interested in co-operating. From the moment the project was presented to them, the Pan American Sanitary Bureau, the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences, the FAO, and the International Co-operation Administration (ICA) offered their co-operation in both planning and execution. The Inter-American Statistical Institute and the Inter-American Commission of Women also indicated their interest in participating, the former by sending its Vice-President

to one of the symposia and the latter by sending a special message and report.

The regional office of FAO for the Western Hemisphere is located in Santiago, Chile, and as the nutrition adviser, a Frenchman, Dr. Henri Teulon, had just been assigned and was "making contact" with his region, he offered to assist in the planning and to help the Inter-American Children's Institute in the selection of three experts from each of the South American countries who would participate in the meetings on travel grants made available by the Institute.

In correspondence between the Unitarian Service Committee (USC) and Institute headquarters in Montevideo it was agreed that each of the sponsoring agencies would supply a team of experts representing different professional fields to conduct the symposia. The Medical School of the University of Cali in Colombia offered its facilities for the first of the two meetings planned, and the Bolivian Pediatric Society agreed to be host to the second meeting in La Paz with co-operation from the Bolivian Social Security Institute.

Advance planning had to be carried on through conferences between USC representatives and staff of those agencies having offices in the United States or who providentially happened to visit New York or Washington during the preparatory period, and through correspondence with the Institute headquarters in Montevideo and the FAO Regional Office in Santiago, Chile. This triangular arrangement presented many difficulties, as did the short period actually available for preparations. The meeting in Cali had to be held during the week of February 17, 1958, during a vacation period. All participants agreed that more time for advance planning would have been desirable.

Symposium members

The Director-General of the Inter-American Children's Institute, Dr. Victor Escardó y Anaya, appointed as Team Leader the head of the Institute's Technical Department, Dr. Maria Luisa Saldún de Rodriguez, who is also Associate Professor of Pediatrics at the Medical School of the University of Montevideo. Each leader selected the members of his or her team.

The Unitarian Service Committee appointed as Team Leader Dr. Samuel Z. Levine, Professor of Pediatrics, from the New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center. Executive responsibility during the preparatory period was carried by Mr. Wilmer Froistad of the USC, who also served as a team member representing the field of social work.

The personal interest of Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower, President of the Johns Hopkins University, enabled the USC to secure the participation of Dr. Ernest L. Stebbins, Director of the School of Hygiene and Public Health of that University. The University of California contributed the services of Dr. Ruth L. Huenemann, Associate Professor of Public Health Nutrition, and a co-operative arrangement between the Social Security Administration and the Pan American Union enabled the writer to participate as a representative of the field of social welfare.

A distinguished anthropologist, Dr. Isabel Kelly, was made available by the International Co-operation Administration.

Members of the team designated by the Institute included Dr. Arturo Baeza Goñi, Professor of Pediatrics of the University of Chile; Dr. Carlos Collazos Chiriboga, Director of the National Nutrition Institute of Peru; and Dr. Walter Santos, Executive Director of the Co-ordinating Council on Food Supply of Brazil. The Inter-American

Institute of Agricultural Sciences contributed the services of Dr. Jorge Ramsay, an Agricultural Extension agent, and Mrs. Ines de Ramsay, who is both an extension agent and a home economist. The representative of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau was Dr. Carlos Perez, Assistant Director of the Institute of Nutrition of Central America and Panama. FAO made an invaluable contribution in the person of Dr. Henri Teulon, and the International Co-operation Administration contributed the services of biochemists, health educators, home economists, and public health nurses from the missions in the various countries in which these symposia were held.

As mentioned earlier, each country was invited to send three experts—representing different professional fields—to attend the symposia. Through the interest of Dr. Henry Sebrell, the Williams-Waterman Fund made a financial contribution to the project which helped to defray international travel costs for these participants whose maintenance while in Colombia or Bolivia was paid by the Medical School of the University of Cali and the Bolivian Pediatric Society, respectively. A few governments sent extra trainees at their own expense.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE SYMPOSIA

The first symposium opened in Cali, Colombia on February 17. Participating countries were Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, represented by pediatricians, nutritionists, and social workers.

It was symptomatic of some of the basic relationships then existing between Latin America and the United States that the first meeting of the two teams to plan the opening session was held in an atmosphere of tension. As soon as it became evident that the group of experts from the "Colossus of the

North" was not going to "throw its weight around," the tension disappeared. When the meeting in Cali adjourned Dr. Saldún de Rodríguez reported to the Institute in Montevideo that "she had never imagined that it would be possible to work in such an atmosphere of complete companionship."

Discussions covered nutritional needs of pregnant and lactating women; problems of the weaning period; nutritional requirements during the preschool period; minimum requirements of the school-age child and the adolescent; the feeding of children in hospitals and child-caring institutions; problems involved in increasing the production of essential foods; improvement of community food habits in the South American countries; social welfare programs contributing to improvement of family nutrition; and the responsibility of departments of public health and of public school systems to improve nutrition.

The interdisciplinary character of the meetings was a new experience for participants and proved successful in focusing on the need for more co-operation among professional groups as well as the national and international agencies concerned with this multifaceted problem.

There were difficult moments, of course. Technical experts do not always agree about technical matters. National pride expresses itself in various ways. Some experts credited the distribution of dry skim milk by the United Children's Fund (UNICEF), Co-operative for American Remittances to Everywhere (CARE), and other agencies through which surplus foods are made available to other countries under U. S. Public Law 480, with saving the lives of thousands of children. Others expressed the feeling that these children are receiving crumbs from the rich man's table. Occasionally someone would say: "We cannot forever have two Americas, a rich America and a poor America."

There was much discussion of community development techniques through which people in local communities can help to improve and increase their own food supply. The need for more team work between different groups of experts was stressed over and over again. The Director of a national nutrition institute pointed out that many people are confused because they get conflicting advice from experts in different fields. He told of mothers receiving one type of advice from the maternal and child health center, while her school-age children come home with different advice and the home economist comes in with instructions and demonstrations that differ from any of the others. One symposium was fascinated when a home economist told how women in a remote rural area had been taught to can corn in coca cola bottles only to have an anthropologist say that a study in that same area had shown that over the centuries people had been conserving food less laboriously in ways that retained a higher nutritional value.

While pediatricians were discussing some of the causes of infants' diarrhea, social workers suggested that one reason why infants developed it is the extreme poverty and lack of fuel in many homes. If the mothers boil the milk, or the water used to mix powdered milk, as they are instructed in the Mother and Child Health Center, they have no fuel left to cook for the rest of the family. Too often these families do not possess a single spoon. Older children coming home from school dip their hands into the powdered milk because they prefer to eat it rather than drink it. Home economists had called attention to the latter practice, indicating that it is all right for children to eat powdered milk since it is one way of providing them with the protein and calcium they need. The anthropologists discussed food taboos and superstitions and everybody

agreed on the importance of education at all levels and through all professions.

The need for economic development as a basis for more general social welfare was recognized but some of the experts pointed out that national plans for economic development often focus on production for export without consideration of certain basic human needs. Nutrition experts, for instance, felt that they should have a voice in national councils dealing with food production to provide for consideration of national nutrition needs.

Attention was paid to emergency and short-range programs as well as to long-range planning for work in such fields as environmental sanitation. The lack of such sanitation is one cause of intestinal parasites, and the consequent anemia contributes to poor nutrition of people in many areas.

Interest aroused

Although only two symposia were planned for 1958, four were actually held. The interest engendered was so great that the governments of Argentina and Brazil spontaneously decided to organize national meetings to be attended by experts from every province and state in those two countries in order to take advantage of the participation of the two teams. This extension had not been foreseen and since the USC team included faculty members from some of our well-known universities whose presidents had generously given them leave in the middle of the academic year, not all of them were able to remain through the two extra meetings.

En route from Colombia to Bolivia, stops were made in Peru and Chile where special programs were arranged by local authorities to enable the team members to report on the first symposium. The impact of the symposia was thus greatly extended.

The interest aroused was not confined

to professional circles. The Presidents of Bolivia and Brazil asked to meet the visiting teams and receive direct reports of the meetings in which various officials of cabinet rank participated.

Each symposium lasted a full week. One of the few complaints was the lack of time for field visits. But the discussions painted a vivid picture of the seriousness of the nutrition problem in the countries visited. Stories were told of parents who sell their children in order to have fewer mouths to feed, or who drug them to keep them from crying of hunger. Reports from hospitals revealed that near-starvation of children is responsible for a host of other problems, and school teachers emphasized the effect of undernourishment on the school attendance and student performance. Social workers described heroic measures to improve the economic status of families. Nurses, health educators and home economists stressed the need for educational programs couched in terms that people of various cultural levels can readily accept.

While it was agreed that the symposia would adopt no resolutions, they did arrive at certain findings or conclusions which, after review by the Institute, have been widely circulated in both Spanish and English. A major conclusion was that the problem of nutrition, particularly child nutrition, is so great that it must be dramatized and that each American country must be urged to consider its solution a goal of honor.

EVALUATION OF RESULTS

A meeting was held at the headquarters of the Institute in Montevideo to evaluate results. There was complete agreement with Dr. Levine's statement that these symposia had introduced to Latin America a new method of dealing with a basic problem of concern to different professional groups.

Dr. Stebbins described the experiment as "unique in that a very considerable number of national and international agencies participated in discussion of one of the most important problems in Latin America." He described the experience to be most encouraging for the future possibilities of international co-operation, and stated that it was one of the most interesting and valuable international co-operative ventures that he had had the privilege to participate in. The Latin-American experts repeatedly stressed the fact that the project had been carried out, and the discussions conducted, "on a plane of complete equality." There was a consensus that no small part of the success of the project was due to the fact that the Unitarian Service Committee did not go to Latin America with a project of its own but offered its co-operation to an agency that had identified a serious problem but lacked means of dealing with it without assistance. There was enthusiastic agreement that two more symposia should be held in 1959. These were successfully conducted in Quito, Ecuador, and Asuncion, Paraguay, in February and March of that year with some of the same team members.

In each country visited, the symposia received an extraordinary amount of publicity through press, radio, and television. The Inter-American Children's Institute has published comprehensive reports in its quarterly bulletin. Journals of pediatric societies are still commenting on the meetings and proposing new steps to deal with the problem.

When the New York Times on January 30, 1959, carried a report on President Eisenhower's message to Congress urging a "Food for Peace" policy, participants in the symposia were impressed by the statement that there was a plan "to dramatize food as an instrument for building a durable peace."

Several Latin-American countries have now applied to the Interdepartmental Committee on Nutrition for National Defense—established early in 1955 by the United States Departments of Defense; State; Agriculture; and Health, Education, and Welfare, plus the International Co-operation Administration and, later, the Atomic Energy Commission—for co-operation and technical assistance in conducting national nutrition surveys. Dr. Arnold Schaefer, Executive Secretary of the Committee, has suggested that these requests may not be completely unrelated to the symposia since the requesting authorities in the countries concerned include many persons who participated directly in the meetings.

It is noteworthy that these symposia gave members of a newly emerging profession in Latin America—the profession of social work—their first opportunity to participate on a plane of equality with representatives of other professions in meetings of this international character.

New light was thrown on some of the social aspects of economic development. Many of the Latin-American participants declared that "this multi-disciplinary approach has opened a new world for us," and agreed with Dr. Stebbins "that it set a pattern that might be followed, with certain modifications, for future international programs on various subjects."

In the broader area of inter-American relationships there is no question but that these symposia contributed greatly to intercountry co-operation and also to mutual respect and understanding. As mentioned above, the first meeting opened in an atmosphere of tension. In a final meeting one of the Latin-American participants enthusiastically described these symposia as a "miracle of love."

Developing Professional Leadership for Social Programs

By ERNEST F. WITTE

ABSTRACT: The insistent demand in less-advanced areas of the world for improved living standards is dependent upon effecting social changes in the habits and living patterns of the people in these areas. Such changes can only be brought about in an orderly way through the development of competent, informed, indigenous leaders. Among the personnel so urgently needed to initiate and carry on programs of social change are social workers to function at all levels of activity within these countries. As this need has become recognized, a growing world-wide effort to provide such leadership, carried on by many international and national, governmental and voluntary agencies, has emerged. These organizations have developed a great variety of methods to help less-developed countries acquire a nucleus of trained social workers to initiate and carry forward social welfare programs which will ultimately result in better, more secure, and more satisfying lives for the majority of their people. The need for social work personnel is great, and the time available for preparing them is limited. There is much to be learned from past and current experience on how to do this job most effectively.

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THE progress of much of the world toward better living standards, greater self-sufficiency, and a more rewarding life is greatly handicapped by a shortage of technically qualified personnel to provide the needed professional leadership, especially in the less-developed nations of the world. *The Ugly American*¹ helped to dramatize for the United States the importance of the change agent sent abroad to help bring about social and other changes. One of the principal ingredients of success in achieving social change is training of indigenous personnel to carry on the program.

The social change involved in every kind of development program calls for social welfare personnel. Change in any lasting sense depends upon the persons who constitute the society and the degree to which their resistance to change has been overcome by their acceptance of the need for it. It depends as well on the provisions made to ameliorate the ill effects for some persons and groups which are bound to accompany any fundamental social change. In these aspects of development programs the major contribution of social workers may be expected, since their professional focus is on the effective social functioning of people.

WORLD NEED FOR TRAINED WELFARE PERSONNEL

As Louis Miniclier has pointed out in an International Co-operation Administration circular on this subject:

A United Nations survey shows that between 1945 and 1955, forty-five countries adopted new constitutions or constitutional amendments, creating basic responsibilities for governments in the matter of social welfare. One result has been the creation, even in the less-developed countries, of

ministries or other public agencies charged with the planning and administration of social welfare programs.

Since programs are not self-administering, schools of social work have sprung up all over the globe to train staff needed for these new agencies. The philosophy and ideology permeating such training are of vital importance since social workers come in direct contact with a greater cross-section of the population than almost any other type of professional worker.

The training of social workers is considered today as an integral part of a country's effort to promote political stability, increase economic productivity, and provide for the national defense. It is no longer solely intended to improve the professional know-how of persons working in traditional humanitarian fields. Social workers are found today not only in ministries of health and welfare but in ministries of agriculture, justice, education, national defense, and many other public agencies. They are employed as counselors in factories and on farms; in schools and in courts; in prisons and reformatories; in hospitals, health centers and dispensaries; in housing agencies and a variety of other institutions.²

A further clarifying comment on the nature of the problem is set forth in a United Nations report:

The experts have repeatedly stressed that 'the effective development of a country requires a balanced approach from both the economic and social aspects' . . . and, accordingly, that 'the planning of any development policy should give due consideration to the human resources on which such development depends and in whose interest it should operate'. . . . Policies dealing with the social aspects of over-all development should be designed to both 'prevent individual maladjustment and social disruption' which might result from economic change,

² ICA Manual Order 3100, ICATO circular A-353, May 28, 1958, entitled *Training for Social Welfare Personnel*. For a list of the schools referred to by Mr. Miniclier see International Association of Schools of Social Work, *Directory of Members and Constitution* (New York, January 1957).

¹ Eugene Burdick and William J. Lederer, *The Ugly American* (New York: Norton, 1958).

and 'ensure that economic development contributes to the welfare of the population'. . . .³

With wide attention increasingly focused upon the need to improve living conditions in the less well-developed areas of the world, a remarkable world effort to train needed social work personnel has been initiated. Many of these efforts, under many different auspices, have been improvised and hasty; in others more careful and longer time plans have been devised. It is generally agreed that professional education in a school of social work provides the best preparation for many of the functions in developing social programs. This article will not describe in detail the characteristics of social work education, as the subject has been covered in a series of studies published by the United Nations.⁴ Instead, an attempt will be

³ United Nations Economic and Social Council, Social Commission Twelfth Session, *Scope and Development of National Social Service Programmes*, Report by the Secretary-General 30 March 1959, p. 7. A recent comment by Dr. Branko Kesic, Professor of Hygiene and Social Medicine, School of Public Health in Zagreb, as quoted in *The New York Times*, October 18, 1959, bears on this aspect of development. He pointed out that industrialization had certain side effects that he had noted in Yugoslavia and which the nation had an obligation to deal with. He said these included: alcoholism, mental disorders, deficient nutrition, and juvenile delinquency. For a thoughtful, concise and cogent report on the contributions of social service to programs of economic and social development, attention is called to: United Nations Economic and Social Council, *The Development of National Social Service Programmes*, Report by a Group of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, New York, March 9, 1959, especially Chapter II and Summary of Conclusions.

⁴ United Nations, Department of Social Affairs, *Training for Social Work, An International Survey* (1950); Bureau of Social Affairs, *Training for Social Work, Second International Survey* (1955); Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Training for Social Work, Third International Survey* (1958).

made to describe efforts and methods less well-known and designed to increase the supply of professional and technical leadership at all levels to deal with the growing complex of problems involved. The examples cited were selected primarily because they illustrate significant principles or aspects of a complex and difficult task.

MAGNITUDE OF THE NEED

Unfortunately, there has been no study or careful estimate of the over-all personnel needed to provide perspective on the scope of the problem. There are estimates in some countries and for some programs which, if compiled, might be helpful. In India, for example, the first five-year plan required the training of some 84,000 persons in all categories of positions for its community development program,⁵ including: project executive officers, block development officers, village-level workers, social education organizers, doctors, nurses, veterinary personnel, stockmen, teachers, agricultural graduates, co-operative inspectors, compounders, sanitary inspectors, lady health visitors, midwives, overseers, arts and crafts supervisors, mechanics, engineers, and others. In the second five-year plan the number of trained personnel needed for the community development program in India was reported as likely to exceed 350,000 persons. Community development, it should be noted, is only one program of many in India's efforts to improve the economic and social well-being of her people.

A recent report on the Colombo Plan indicates that some "10,000 Asians have been trained [as part of the Plan] in everything from farming to medicine to

⁵ Gibson, Masters, Witte, *Report on Community Development Programs in India, Iran, Egypt and Gold Coast* (Washington, D. C.: International Co-operation Administration, December 1955), p. 22.

engineering and social work. . . . The United States has trained another 6,000 Asians under its own separate programs."⁶

These examples help to convey the size and complexity of the problem involved. Further evidence is abundantly available from the documents of the United Nations, many of them based upon official reports of member nations. One such recent report notes that

. . . The implementation of comprehensive plans requires appropriate administrative organization and qualified personnel. The training requirements implicit in designing programmes to prevent or resolve social problems arising in connexion with the economic development of less developed countries are urgent. Problems relating to the training of social welfare personnel are therefore given continuing priority in the programme of the United Nations.⁷

The degree of success achieved in dealing with the shortage will determine in large part the progress that can be made in effecting social change in the countries concerned.

METHODS EMPLOYED TO TRAIN PERSONNEL

Methods utilized and agencies engaged in efforts to increase and raise the standard of professional and technical

⁶ New York *World-Telegram and Sun*, October 28, 1959, p. 2.

⁷ United Nations Economic and Social Council, *Appraisal of the Future Scope and Trend of the United Nations Programme in the Social Field for the Period 1959-1964*, Report by the Secretary-General 29 April 1959, p. 28. For other representative reports calling attention to this shortage see: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Report on a Co-ordinated Policy regarding Family Levels of Living* (New York, 1957), pp. 49-51. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Assistance to the Needy in Less-Developed Areas* (New York, 1956), pp. 146-147. "United Nations Programme for Family and Child Welfare," *International Social Service Review*, No. 1 (January 1956), pp. 1-17.

leadership in the welfare field are too numerous to review here.⁸ Some of the methods, such as exchange programs, provision of technical aid, and the establishment of special educational institutions,⁹ are better known than are institutes, conferences, seminars, demonstrations, short-time advisory services, planned observation tours, and educational materials and supplies.¹⁰ Some of these devices may serve a single country, but frequently are made to serve more than one by being organized on a regional basis. Methods employed will vary with the general objectives, and whether these are designed to show immediate or more long-range results.¹¹ Unfortunately, political, social, and economic expediency introduces pressures on these programs, both in the countries providing the aid and in those receiving it, and irrespective of auspices. Training programs ill conceived through a need to show quick results may be disastrous to their objectives and economically wasteful by

⁸ The most comprehensive listing of such organizations may be found in *The Yearbook of International Organizations* (7th ed.; Brussels: Union of International Associations, 1958).

⁹ For an excellent example of help extended a less-developed nation to establish and strengthen key educational institutions see: George F. Gant, *The Ford Foundation Program in Pakistan*, reprint by The Ford Foundation from *The Annals*, Vol. 323 (May 1959).

¹⁰ For a good discussion of the use of these methods see: United Nations Department of Social Affairs, *International Advisory Social Welfare Services* (New York, 1949).

¹¹ For an interesting summary of various training programs and the personnel for which training was provided in community development in specified countries see: Jean Ogden, *Conference Summary Community Development Africa*, March 17-20, 1958, Tripoli, Libya (Washington, D. C.: International Co-operation Administration), Chap. V, "Training for Community Development." Particular attention is called to the training for voluntary village leadership in Ghana which is included in this report.

duplicating institutions already in existence instead of modifying them to serve the new needs.¹²

SOCIAL WORK EDUCATION FOR KOREA

An example of fundamental, long-range effort to develop technical leadership and knowledge is the assistance given to Korea by the American-Korean Foundation and the Unitarian Service Committee, with additional financial help from the United States Department of State. It illustrates the time involved, the complications frequently encountered, and the need to co-ordinate the efforts of a number of organizations.

Following the devastating events in Korea, the task of reconstruction was initiated by the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, whose program was started in late 1952.¹² The need for social as well as economic reconstruction was acute, and it was clear that Korean personnel must be equipped to give the continuing leadership required. In 1954 the American-Korean Foundation and the Unitarian Service Committee sent a social work educator from the United States to Seoul to assess the need with Korean educators and to recommend the best way to assure a supply of social welfare personnel.

As his proposals were modified and carried out, three Koreans were brought to the United States by the American-Korean Foundation and the Unitarian Service Committee, and enrolled in a graduate school of social work for the basic two-year course. Funds were made available to the Seoul National University by the Unitarian Service Committee to help establish a Department of Social Work, but when the three Koreans returned to Seoul for that

¹² For a brief summary of its program and accomplishments see: United Nations, *Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization* 16 June 1957-15 June 1958, pp. 27-28.

purpose upon completion of their studies, they learned that the University lacked the additional funds required and the needed legislative authorization to establish the Department.

Further consultation by representatives of the Unitarian Service Committee with the Ministry of Education and the University led to a plan to develop a program for social work education within the Department of Sociology. The number of undergraduates to be admitted was limited to ten students in any one year. This plan was also voided by the failure of the applicants for undergraduate study to meet the standards for admission to the University. Again consultation was provided by the Unitarian Service Committee and arrangements were made for it to underwrite the cost of a beginning graduate program of social work education, utilizing the part-time services of the three Koreans who had completed their professional education in the United States.

By March 1959 the program had become well established. Necessary legislation had been passed providing for an independent Department of Social Work, with earmarked funds to become available in 1960. The funds provided by the Unitarian Service Committee to help keep the program going until 1960 had been more than matched by the University from its meager budget. The representative of the Committee reports that the sacrifices made by the University officials left no doubt that they were really supporting the program and that previous opposition from some quarters had disappeared. The question of the availability of suitable students seemed answered when some 117 applications were received for the ten students to be admitted. The applicants had good academic rating, and the first class selected showed real promise. There have already been substantial indications that employment

opportunities will be available to these graduates when they complete their education, so that they can make their contribution readily in bringing about social change and progress.¹³

This Korean example illustrates a number of problems which appear to be fairly common in the effort to develop qualified personnel. Among these are the chronic lack of adequate resources and the need to find alternative ways of moving forward, that is, of being prepared to start with less than the situation seems to demand; the difficulty of breaking traditions in order to introduce the new; the slow pace in developing the resources required to get the program started; the persistence required if the obstacles facing change are to be overcome; the help which the outside change agent contributes—which may be required over long periods—in moving the program ahead.

PRINCIPLES OF CO-OPERATION

There is growing recognition of the need for a balanced social and economic program of development in less-developed countries supported by appropriate education of all the people concerned. Technical consultants can make substantial contributions toward achieving such a balanced development or impede it according to their understanding and action.¹⁴

In this connection one of the most interesting attempts to develop leadership personnel is the work of the Near East Foundation in the training of women for work in the villages of Iran. This undertaking is extremely important because of its potential, long-range, social significance and because it

¹³ Unitarian Service Committee, "Report on Program in Korea," October 24, 1959 (mimeographed).

¹⁴ For further discussion of this subject see: Council on Social Work Education, *Interprofessional Training Goals for Technical Assistance Personnel Abroad* (New York, 1959).

illustrates the broad personnel base on which social progress must ultimately rest. It was recognized that unless and until some change could be effected in the traditional status of the village women, little real progress could be made to improve the health or living standards of village families.

It was not until 1951 that a home economist from the United States was placed on the Foundation staff in Iran. She initiated, after much exploration, a pilot demonstration project for women in a geographic area where the Foundation had been working since 1946. Her first efforts were directed toward winning the confidence of village men, in order that they might permit the women to participate in any of the planned activities. Considerable time and effort went into the task of recruiting young Iranian women who were willing to learn and to teach literacy, sewing, and, as opportunity offered, something on child care to the village women.

Three years after the demonstration started there had been developed an adult out-of-school program for women which included literacy, the raising of dooryard gardens, raising and cooking vegetables, drying food for future use, sewing, health education, and the care of children.

In 1953 officials of the Near East Foundation had discussed with their Iranian consultant when he thought it would be possible to establish a demonstration boarding school for Iranian girls, as had previously been done for boys. It was agreed that circumstances appeared to favor such a development at the time.

School for girls

Accordingly, a boarding school to train girls to carry on these and other services was established by the Foundation in 1954, called Galeh Nou. The first such school in Iran, it eventually

provided special training programs for teachers, for village-level community-development workers, and for home economists. Planning for the school and its operation was carried on in close co-operation with the Ministries of Education, Interior, and Agriculture.

In 1958 the Near East Foundation turned over operation of the school to the Ministry of Education, maintaining only an advisory relationship to it. The Ministry has more recently asked the Foundation to establish a number of additional schools with funds provided by the Ministry. This arrangement has several distinct advantages including: (a) greater flexibility as to admission standards, employment qualifications of teachers, curriculum requirements, and so on; (b) avoidance by the Ministry of direct political responsibility, should the undertaking not succeed, but permitting credit to be taken if it does; and (c) removing the operation during its formative period from pressures for conformity with the past.

The Iranian woman selected to head the Galeh Nou School was subsequently made the national director of the home economics extension service of the Ministry of Agriculture.

Village-level activity

From the beginning, the Near East Foundation has insisted on keeping this training program close to the culture of the village. Girls selected for training have not been required to have more than a sixth-grade education, even though there has been pressure to raise this requirement to the ninth grade. There are few village girls having a ninth-grade education; those who do are not so apt to want to work in the village; and finally, the Foundation believes that the training program it has developed is not beyond the ability of the sixth-grade graduate at this stage

of development. Only one girl in five is enrolled in a village school, in part because many parents do not want girls to study with male teachers after they have completed the second grade. The Foundation has resisted the temptation and pressures to establish more elaborate and fancier buildings and equipment at the school because this might widen the gulf between the girls trained as change agents and the villagers. In the same way it has continued to insist on a fairly generic and fundamental curriculum for all trainees, of fairly short duration—twelve months for teachers, nine months for community development workers, and six months for home economists—with provision for refresher courses from time to time and for competent supervision of their work in the field.

Operative principles

Although they may seem obvious, certain aspects of this training effort merit special mention: the close partnership which the outside agent—the Near East Foundation—established with government officials responsible for the work at all stages and levels of activity; the care exercised in the selection of Iranian personnel and their on-the-job supervision for the assumption of responsibility and continuing leadership; the early involvement and steady increase in the financial participation of the host government; the willingness of the outside agent to relinquish control to the indigenous authority when this seemed appropriate; the continued participation in the substantial developmental period after relinquishment of control, through the retention of an advisory function. These factors seem so basic in any enterprise of this nature as to be considered "principles."

One of three pioneers in Iranian women's work, Mrs. Ezzat Agheoli, national director of the home economics

extension service in the Ministry of Agriculture, is quoted in a Near East Foundation field agent's report (July 1959) as having learned from her work on this project these three things:

- (1) Do not start programs too high or too big, start where the people are.
- (2) You must live in a village and be considered one of them to be an effective worker for village people.
- (3) Start a program with available personnel and give them job training if qualified personnel is not available.

It is impossible in so brief a report to convey any idea of the problems confronted in initiating and carrying forward a project of this type. Great patience, a sense of objectivity, and dedication are all important in the personnel responsible if the frustrations, the delays, and the slow progress are not to overwhelm the effort to develop the indigenous leadership which any fundamental social change requires.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR IN-SERVICE TRAINING

The direct use of technical assistance to strengthen welfare manpower resources of a country through in-service training is illustrated by a United Nations undertaking in Pakistan.¹⁵ It

¹⁵ See also: Morris E. Opler, *Social Aspects of Technical Assistance in Operation* (Paris: UNESCO, 1954). This report of a conference jointly sponsored by the United Nations and UNESCO presents the various phases of the technical assistance program. The report (p. 38) notes: "Of the many criteria for selecting technical assistance projects, the educational possibilities seemed to the conferees to be one of the most important. . . ." United Nations Technical Assistance Programme, *Social Welfare Project* Prepared for the Government of Pakistan by Elmina R. Lucke, 1955. United Nations Technical Assistance Programme, *Social Work Education in Pakistan* Prepared for the government of Pakistan by Arthur S. Livingston 17 July 1958. American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, *The Role of Voluntary Agencies in Technical Assistance* (New York, May 1953). This volume

illustrates also utilization of the cultural heritage of a country to buttress the effort to train the personnel and create the instruments needed for social change.

Despite generally favorable circumstances, obstacles were encountered, many of them common in ventures of this nature. An exceedingly serious one in this project had to do with its timing, which required the social welfare team to establish a training program before it had made even a beginning inventory of the knowledge and understanding that would be required for social work practice in Pakistan.¹⁶

While this is disturbing and perhaps more costly to the country than a more orderly procedure, few countries offer ideal circumstances. Progress, if there is to be any, may be made by getting a start of some kind, even though much of what is done may later have to be modified. The opportunities for learning from mistakes are likely to be more valuable, particularly in less-developed countries, than withholding action pending a more nearly ideal set of circumstances. This is not to say, of course, that as much careful advanced planning ought not to be done as the complex factors to be dealt with will permit.

Many details of planning the technical assistance program may be factors of importance in the final outcome achieved. Some of these are brought out in another United Nations technical project providing help to the government of Thailand, indicating that it would have been more effective had one advisor been provided for a longer period, instead of the two who were requested for a period of less than a year.

discusses the role of voluntary agencies in providing technical assistance.

¹⁶ Based upon information provided by individuals participating in the program and the United Nations Secretariat.

The timing was poor in that the advisors arrived when the second term of the school year was under way and had to leave as the first term of the succeeding academic year was ending. Most unfortunate of all was the fact that the Administrative Officer of the Social Work Training Institute was out of the country during most of the period the advisors were there. During most of the period no interpreter was available to the advisors.¹⁷

TEACHING MATERIALS

A major handicap to the development of welfare personnel, particularly in the less well-developed countries, is the lack of indigenous teaching materials. Heavy reliance is placed on the literature of the country with which the outside consultant is most familiar, and personnel in the countries being helped generally have to fall back upon its use, even though it may not be in their language. In the early stages, the shortage of indigenous teaching materials seems almost inevitable, but it need not and should not remain so for any extended period. Every encouragement, including funds if needed, should be given to the development of teaching materials based upon work in the country itself. Furthermore, efforts should be made to help the country reproduce the more fundamental reference works of the profession in the language most familiar to the personnel of the host country.

Recent activities in Europe under the auspices of the International Association of Schools of Social Work have demonstrated the value of regional co-operation in the production of teaching materials. Initially, the project was directed toward selection from participating countries of a limited number of case records for use in regional seminars. Their usefulness led to organiza-

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

tion of a pool of European teaching records, and various national committees have been organized to increase the supply and quality of such indigenous teaching records.

The Unitarian Service Committee is currently assisting the two schools of social work in Athens, Greece, by financing the translation into Greek of basic concepts of social work as discussed in a recent seminar given in Greece. This will be the first professional social work literature to come out of a Greek experience. Also in process is the trial translation into Greek of two books, *The Art of Interviewing* by Annette Garrett and *Social Group Work Principles and Practice* by Wilson and Ryland.¹⁸

SOCIAL WORK EDUCATIONAL HELP FOR INDIA

Methods to develop personnel are often determined by the particular circumstances of a given area, as illustrated by the variations in programs to help India and Korea develop indigenous educational resources for training social workers. Korea had no educational institutions offering training in social work, whereas India had a number of well-developed schools of social work already functioning. Following an assessment of their needs made with them over an extended period of time by the social work attaché of the United States Embassy,¹⁹ the Technical Co-operation Mission in India, in co-

¹⁸ Unitarian Service Committee, "Proposal for the Continuation of Program of Assistance in Social Welfare in Greece 1959 and 1960," September 1958 (mimeographed). Attention is called to a recent publication prepared by the Committee on International Education of the Council on Social Work Education as an aid to other countries, entitled *Selected Bibliography of North American Social Welfare Literature* (New York, October 1958).

¹⁹ She later became a member of the staff of the United States Technical Co-operation Mission to India.

operation with the Ministry of Education and the schools concerned, enlisted the Council on Social Work Education to provide the consultation requested by the Indian schools.

The Council selected educational consultants from United States and Canadian sources who: (a) had special knowledge of the educational area required by the Indian schools to which they were going; (b) were especially aware that the consultant's contribution needed to be adapted by the Indian school to the economic, cultural, and social circumstances, needs, and objectives of Indian education; and (c) were secure enough in their knowledge of social work education to be objectively flexible and to realize the two-way learning relationship essential to the success of their assignment.

Experience has demonstrated that, where help is extended in the form of consultation, two-years time of a given consultant appears to be the minimum required, at least in the initial period, if any substantial and lasting contribution is to be made. The consultant must become sufficiently acquainted with indigenous conditions to develop the required confidence of his counterparts, to help institute changes, and to be available for assistance and advice until those with whom he is working are comfortable in their knowledge and acceptance of him. Returns from the original investment will often be greatly enhanced by providing the technical help over a longer period than two years.

PROGRAM CAUTIONS

It cannot be stressed too often that the major time of an educational consultant sent to help a less-developed country should be spent in strengthening indigenous teaching personnel and in aiding the development of indigenous teaching materials and institutions.

Unless care is exercised, there is a tendency to use the consultant to teach regular or special classes, disregarding the long-run benefits that can be achieved when he concentrates on improving the permanent program. In this connection it may be noted that every technician who goes abroad is or ought to be primarily a teacher. Too often he is so involved in getting specific things accomplished that he neglects his primary task of teaching counterpart personnel the *why* as well as the *how* of what is to be done.

One of the pitfalls to guard against in using the nationals and/or the institutions of one country to help train the personnel of another is imposition of the social programs and services with which the nationals of the helping country are most familiar. This is a most difficult problem to deal with even at the conscious level. The same problem often requires a great readjustment of students returning home after training in other countries. Upon their return, they may find the lack of resources more noticeable and frustrating; or be unable to utilize their new knowledge within the framework of the existing culture, structure, and program; or feel a notable lack of enthusiasm on the part of their colleagues to accept the newly acquired knowledge.

Avoidance of another pitfall is illustrated by a volunteer program of help named "Operation Brotherhood," in which eighty-five Filipino doctors, nurses, social workers, nutritionists, and agriculturists are working in eight areas throughout Laos. The purpose of the project "... is to start a series of small pilot projects that, with our training and encouragement, the people can develop and sustain themselves. ... We are not in Laos to give away gifts."²⁰

²⁰ *The New York Times*, November 22, 1959.

This statement of the project director emphasizes the need for a sincere desire for help on the part of the receiving country. In some instances, technical assistance has been tolerated or even forced on the receiving nation as a condition for getting funds or goods, or sometimes to develop or retain the good will of the helping country.²¹ The climate created by the host government for change has a marked bearing upon the potential contribution by outside technicians, and the importance of economic aspects is sometimes overemphasized to the detriment of other factors.²²

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION ADMINISTRATION

A unique development of the International Co-operation Administration (ICA) of the United States in its substantial help to less-developed nations for the training of personnel has been its financing of contracts with United States educational institutions, both public and private, under which they agree to provide technical help within a defined area.

Although social work has no official home within the structure of ICA—a curious phenomenon in view of the fact that the ultimate aim of its whole program is to improve the welfare of people—the Community Development Division, whose work has much in common with social work, has utilized social workers as appropriate in community

²¹ An interesting commentary on this aspect of unilateral assistance has been made recently by Henry Cabot Lodge who is reported in *The New York Times* for January 12, 1960, p. 6: "... They look for help to the United Nations and other international agencies and do not want help that they suspect is offered for selfish motives ... He added that this underscored the importance of pressing a 'vigorous multilateral program which cannot be suspected of any ulterior motives.'"

²² See also: *Report on Community Development Programs in India, Iran, Egypt and Gold Coast*, op. cit., espec. pp. 9-10.

development and in the training of welfare personnel.²³ We may hope for a greater use of social workers in developing the training facilities and the competent training staff for preparing personnel to effect social change and improve living conditions. Such change is absolutely essential to a rise in living standards for the general population, a rise which does not automatically result as the national output is increased by economic development.²⁴

The ICA has utilized many methods of help to other countries, including study observation tours, student exchange programs,²⁵ supplying of advisors and consultants, the organiza-

²³ In this connection see: ICA Manual Order May 28, 1958, "Training for Social Welfare Personnel," op. cit. This is an excellent statement setting forth the role which social work might be expected to undertake in relation to the technical assistance and providing information on United States facilities for training in this professional field. A good reference on facilities in the United States for training of social workers from other countries is United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, *Training Programs in Social Welfare for International Social Workers*, International Technical Co-operation Series No. 5 (Washington, D. C., 1959). The most comprehensive listing of resources available to students everywhere for study in other countries may be found in UNESCO, *Study Abroad*, Vol. XI, 1959-60 (Paris, 1959).

²⁴ *Interprofessional Training Goals for Technical Assistance Personnel Abroad*, op. cit.

²⁵ In the first quarter of 1959-60 there were some 1,620 foreign nationals in the United States for study in various fields of welfare, most of whom were under the sponsorship of the International Co-operation Administration, the United Nations, and the World Health Organization. There were, of course, many other foreign students under voluntary and private auspices. See Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Social Security Administration, International Service "Quarterly Report July 1 to September 30, 1959," mimeographed. For a more detailed statement of U. S. training programs see Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, *Training Programs in Social Welfare for International Social Workers*, op. cit.

tion of seminars, institutes, and short courses, the supplying of educational materials and equipment, and financial help in supporting needed institutions for the training of welfare and related personnel.²⁶

During the period 1941 through 1959, the Social Security Administration of the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare recruited for overseas service in Technical Co-operation Administration programs some 84 welfare experts for service in 28 different countries.²⁷ Of these, some 43 had as all or part of their assignment the provision of help on social work education. Figures are not available on the number of experts sent abroad in various welfare programs through other organizations, including those holding contracts from ICA. They must total a substantial number and many of them have been engaged in the training of personnel.

UNITED NATIONS TRAINING SEMINAR

Seminars, workshops, and institutes, many of them organized on a regional basis, appear to be useful training devices and may serve a variety of purposes, including: sharing of experiences of program officials at many levels from different areas, stimulation of interest in existing or new programs, and development of improved technical competence. Their common purpose is to improve the effectiveness of the personnel responsible for welfare planning and

²⁶ For more comprehensive information on the activities of the Community Development Division of the United States International Co-operation Administration see various issues of *Community Development Review*, a quarterly publication of the Community Development Division, Office of Public Services, International Co-operation Administration.

²⁷ Not including experts assigned to social insurance programs or staff members of the Department who may have made survey trips abroad. The above figures were supplied by the Department upon request.

services in the participating countries.

One example, the first of its kind in Asia, was the Far East Seminar on Training for Community Development and Social Work, held in Lahore, West Pakistan, December 9-20, 1957, under the auspices of the Technical Assistance Administration of the United Nations.²⁸ Wide use was made of specialist personnel from the host country, Pakistan, and participating countries in staffing the seminar.

It is difficult to determine the net value of such a seminar. The report on this one discusses its accomplishments briefly and states among other things:

... The greatest value of any international seminar or training course lies in its impact on the improvement in the home countries of participants following stimulation and inspiration received at the seminar

Both groups realized that their common objective is to accelerate change in the attitudes of people and to contribute to the process of making people more resourceful, more independent in their thinking and more concerned with the welfare of their fellow men and their communities. Their recommendations and suggestions were quite realistic and related to conditions in the region. There was a feeling that the participants learned a lot from the seminar and a strongly expressed desire to improve training upon return home.

²⁸ United Nations Technical Assistance Programme, *United Nations Asia and the Far East Seminar on Training for Community Development and Social Work*, June 30, 1959. For more information on this subject see the following excellent publications: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Study Kit on Training for Community Development*, 1957; and Jean Ogden, *Conference Summary Community Development Africa*, March 17-20, 1958, Tripoli, Libya, *op. cit.*, especially Chap. V, "Training for Community Development." For an excellent example of training material prepared by the United Nations see *Study Kit on Training for Community Development*, *supra*.

This feeling was expressed even by the delegations of countries which at the present lead in the community development programme and social work in Asia.²⁹

It is perhaps significant that the better understanding of urban community development resulting from the seminar held in Lahore was mentioned in a later report made to the government of Pakistan by a United Nations advisor.³⁰

The United Nations recognized early that competent personnel was a major factor in the efforts of less-developed countries to improve the welfare of their nationals. Accordingly, it has taken the leadership not only in sending welfare experts to requesting countries but in encouraging its more-developed member states to do likewise. It recognizes that efforts so far have been inadequate to meet the known need, but during the period 1947 through 1958 the United Nations provided 543 welfare experts to 61 countries and 2,028 fellowships to individuals for study outside their own country.³¹

Extensive use has been made of programs which permit personnel from one country to visit, observe and/or study in another. Educational exchange programs are used to develop and raise the standards of welfare personnel at all levels and are sponsored by governments, voluntary bodies, and the United Nations. Countries where few or no persons have heretofore been equipped by professional education are now likely to have a nucleus of personnel qualified to take leadership in developing the welfare services so urgently required, not only to contribute to needed social

²⁹ United Nations Technical Assistance Programme, *United Nations Asia and the Far East Seminar on Training for Community Development and Social Work*, *op. cit.*

³⁰ Based upon information provided by the United Nations Secretariat.

³¹ Information provided by the United Nations.

progress but to mitigate the human hardships entailed in the economic changes which are being induced.³²

EVALUATION

That much is being done by a variety of governmental and voluntary international and national organizations, utilizing many different methods, to meet the acute need for more qualified social welfare manpower is clear. Less clear, however, is the degree of progress being made. Such an assessment requires more knowledge about the extent of the need, more evaluation of the results of past efforts, and a careful analysis of the methods employed. Review of many United Nations and United States reports on a variety of projects indicates that great value would come from a careful study of such documents and use of the information thus gained to chart future programs of technical assistance for training welfare personnel. Certainly there is widespread interest in a more planful effort to meet the welfare personnel needs of the less well-advanced areas of the world. Fortunately, United Nations personnel is aware increasingly of the need for more penetrating evaluation of the help extended to its members in their efforts to improve the living conditions of their people.³³ Its current studies of methods used to train needed manpower should contribute much to a more informed approach.

Needed also is much more integration

³² For an earlier report on the need for, uses of, and resources for the international exchange of social welfare personnel for training, see United Nations Department of Social Affairs, *International Exchange of Social Welfare Personnel* (1949).

³³ See United Nations Economic and Social Council, *Programme Appraisal, 1959-1964, Work of the United Nations in the Economic, Social, Human Rights and Related Fields*, 29 May 1959, especially Chapters X, XI, XII, XIII, and XIV.

of the training programs for personnel in all the economic and social programs of development and assistance, since changes in the activities and living situations of people are implicit in them, whether the major focus of the program be on agricultural economics, public health, education, public administration, or social welfare.³⁴ Although

³⁴ For further discussion of this and related problems see United Nations Social Commission, *Report of the Twelfth Session* (27 April-15 May 1959), Economic and Social Council Official Records: Twenty-Eighth Session Supplement No. 11, espec. p. 7—paragraphs 40, 41, 42; p. 10—paragraphs 63, 65; p. 11—paragraphs 69, 70, 71.

the complexity, size, and scope of the social as well as economic problems with which the world is confronted preclude any tidy and orderly integrated approach to their resolution, more effort toward integration in training is needed if the required manpower is to be trained purposefully with a reasonable degree of effectiveness and efficiency and to include the common goal of social change. All the evidence indicates the importance of providing the social work personnel required in the less-developed areas of the world where the scope of the need is exceeded only by the pressure of its immediacy.

Foundations of International Aid

By JANE M. HOEY

ABSTRACT: The newly developing countries desire not only political independence but also economic progress for their people—a progress which they can see, and are now aware of, in the rest of the world. The role of the developed countries is to extend aid to the needy. Moral foundations underlie the donor's contributions, but they are more than that, they are the means for acquiring support for international aid in the donor's country. The United States must assume the leadership among the free nations in granting aid; she must accept this role because of her economic achievements and technological advantages. Donators of such aid should take cognizance of the complementary character and interrelatedness of economic and social development. For economic development, however much it is sought, is not an end in itself, rather the aim is the well-being and happiness of the individual. Such a goal necessitates economic aid accompanied by social aid. Social welfare can also be a vehicle to achieve peace, inasmuch as people-to-people relationships generate brotherly love—the only lasting foundation for peace.—Ed.

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THE people in the newly developing countries are aroused and no longer willing to accept their low status and levels of living. Most of the adult population, even in countries without mass media of communication, know now, by word of mouth, that millions of people in more prosperous nations have high standards of living, while in their own countries they cannot get even enough food and other basic essentials of life, and land ownership and wealth are concentrated in a small percentage of the population.

Nationalist feelings are strong and political independence in many instances has been relatively easy to secure. Now, however, governments face great pressure from their people to raise their levels of living. They see economic progress being made under dictatorship in some countries. They do not want the control and suppression of people that this involves but they have had no experience in democratic processes. They cannot be expected to see the advantages of a democracy unless these are pointed out and demonstrated. International aid from the free nations for economic and social development would provide an opportunity to do this.

MORAL LEADERSHIP

Strong moral leadership is required to unite the free nations and to obtain their agreement to expand international aid and to extend it to these countries for a longer period of time. The spiritual and social foundations of such assistance also need to be emphasized.

To secure the funds required, the people and leaders of the Western world must be convinced that sharing resources with the economically deprived is a moral, ethical, and social responsibility, especially of prosperous nations, business corporations, groups, and indi-

viduals. Sacrifice to meet this great emergency will be necessary.

Religious motivation can bring favorable response from large numbers of people in the free nations for support of public foreign aid and programs of international voluntary agencies. It can also help recipients to reject philosophies contrary to theirs and to resist efforts to restrain and repress them. International and national religious leaders in the West should be asked to unite in support of increased foreign aid and to interpret, at home and abroad, the spiritual basis of democracy, respect for the dignity and human rights of every person.

The United States is a logical choice of the free nations to assume the responsibility of moral leadership. The established reputation of Americans for idealism, generosity based chiefly on religious motivation, and their unwavering faith in democracy has qualified the United States in the past for moral world leadership.

Today Americans are challenged to prove that they have the moral courage and strength to continue this leadership. Questions have been raised because of a general attitude of complacency, frequently associated with prosperity, and evidence, widely publicized, of the disintegration of family life, disregard of ethical standards in some large business organizations, and continued denial of certain human rights in some areas. Europeans, likewise prosperous, and with similar problems, are also faced with the necessity of testing their moral fiber in this crisis situation. The free nations, with United States leadership, can make clear their desire to relieve human suffering and their belief in social justice, by joint determination of the amount and character of international aid required by the less-developed countries and by their assumption of this responsibility

on an equitable basis. At the same time they need to demonstrate increasingly their respect for human rights at home and in the administration of international aid.

There is no question of the ability of the industrialized free nations to meet this obligation. In "The Challenge of the Sixties" Barbara Ward wrote, "Of the fundamental fact there is no longer any doubt. The free nations are immensely, unprecedentedly rich. The momentous question is: What do we do with our wealth?" She suggests that "For the West, the decade that lies ahead will compel a choice between constructive use of wealth and a complacency that may prove fatal."¹

OBJECTIVES

People are the focus of international aid. Its primary purpose is to give constructive help to the needy in less-developed countries so that they may become self-sustaining, able to defend themselves against aggression and tyranny, and have an opportunity for cultural, social, and spiritual development. Increased production through industrialization, soil conservation, better methods of farming, and the like are obviously necessary to make available food and other goods required by expanding populations. But these are means of assisting people and are not ends in themselves. Confusion and misunderstandings have arisen as to the self-interest of donor nations when international aid has been used to achieve goals other than the improvement in human well-being.

If people are to be the beneficiaries of aid, the interrelatedness and complementary character of economic and social development should be recognized in practice as well as theory, and joint planning and action should be under-

taken. That this has not happened to any extent in international aid programs was clearly pointed out, with regret, by Christopher H. Phillips, United States Representative to the last session of the United Nations Economic and Social Council in a discussion of the World Social Situation.²

"Social development is frequently treated as a separate entity, entirely distinct from economic development.

"... We tend, I fear, to attach greater importance to economic progress, on the basis that somehow social adjustments and improvements will automatically follow.

"... The ultimate objective of economic development is not bigger and better factories and power plants, per se, nor the achievement of ever higher production statistics. Rather the basic goal is higher levels of living, increased and more secure incomes, better education and better health for all the peoples of the world—in sum, the well-being and happiness of the individual."

Mr. Phillips also added the encouraging statement that "The United States feels strongly, however, that the time has come for us to recognize the interdependence of social and economic policies and planning."

To fulfill this function would require a team of experts from economic and social fields, in the United Nations, in national governments providing and receiving international aid, and in local communities of recipient countries where programs in these fields are planned and in operation. Experts in the social field should logically represent the "helping professions"—social work, health, and education. Their responsibility would be to focus attention on human needs, to suggest programs for meeting these, and ways of preventing increase of social problems caused by rapid industrialization and unplanned urbanization.

¹ *New York Times Magazine*, December 27, 1959.

² United States Information Service News Release, July 14, 1959.

Social workers, especially those with training and experience in public welfare, group work, and community organization, could make significant contributions to such teams if they were given the opportunity to participate. Their training is aimed at making them sensitive to, and understanding of, total human needs, human motivation, and concern about human rights. It also increases awareness of the economic and social forces that adversely affect people and emphasizes the importance of co-operating with citizen groups in social action programs.

PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE RELATIONSHIP

To build firm foundations of international aid, a people-to-people relationship between donor and recipient countries is most important and should receive continuing encouragement. Cultural exchange programs and international conferences focused on human problems have not only brought new knowledge to participants but have provided an opportunity to make new friends and learn about the cultures of other countries.

Out of a people-to-people relationship can grow mutual respect and friendship based on brotherly love. This is a goal to which international aid programs could make a notable contribution. It is an important means of promoting world peace.

The question is constantly asked in underdeveloped countries: "Do Americans and Europeans really care about us, as people? Or are they only interested in stopping the spread of communism and preserving their way of life?" It is time that this question was answered by the United States and other governments of the free nations and by individuals and groups with friends in these countries.

One effective answer would be a clear statement by the United States and

other free nations of their belief in and respect for human rights and of the efforts they have made and will continue to make to help people in all nations secure and protect such rights. It is also necessary to demonstrate, in their own countries, that real progress is being made to remove obstacles to the exercise of these rights by all their people.

To be successful any assistance program should be based on understanding of the nature of man, his human needs and human rights. This was undoubtedly one reason for the United Nations in 1948 adopting a "Declaration of Human Rights to make men and women everywhere aware of the rights to which they are entitled and that each may respect the rights of others." This statement was intended as a guide to nations and organizations and the staff of the United Nations and its specialized agencies in their administration of services to people.

Most of the rights included in the Declaration are not new. They are based on the teachings of Christ, and religious leaders have been promoting their recognition for at least 2,000 years. Yet, denial of certain human rights occurs daily in many communities in every country. Currently racial tensions are high in many parts of the world including the West.

Twelve years have elapsed since the publication of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. A reinterpretation of some of the principles in terms of the current situation might be helpful.

HUMAN NEEDS AND HUMAN RIGHTS⁸

(1) Basic human needs and human rights are universal and unchangeable.

⁸ The following statements are based on the author's personal beliefs but may, in general, also represent the convictions of social workers.

They are not altered by race, color or nationality, by personal characteristics or wealth, by heredity or by environment.

(2) The nature of man determines his human needs. They are the same for every person. In addition to the necessities of life, such as food, clothing, housing, and medical care, these include opportunities for intellectual, cultural, social, and spiritual development and also the need for protection, love, and respect from family and society.

(3) Human rights come from the Creator of mankind. They do not originate in the State. Governments have an obligation to secure and protect them.

(4) As children of God, the Father of mankind, all men are brothers and deserve mutual love and respect. This is the core of religion and inspires the self-discipline necessary to establish this relationship with all people. Love of humanity also stimulates acceptance of the concept of the brotherhood of man and brotherly love.

(5) The right to life requires having tangible means by which to live, such as earnings from employment or continuing income from other sources, to secure the essentials of life for the needy and those whose employment ceases or is interrupted for any reason.

(6) Every person has a right to live under a government established and maintained by the will of the citizens, and one that assures:

- a. Respect for the dignity and human rights of every person;
- b. Freedom, especially religious and political, and of choice as to a way of life and location of residence;
- c. Free enlistment of people in co-operative enterprises for economic, cultural, spiritual, and social development.

RESPONSIBILITIES

Since every right has corresponding responsibilities, it is assumed that every individual, able to do so, will be self-sustaining, will support his family, and that both parents will give care and training to their children. These obligations will also include contributions through taxes and voluntary payments for protection of families against destitution, illness, and other hazards of life and for the provision of health, education, and social welfare services and facilities.

Governments have responsibility for developing the most effective means of assuring continuing income to workers and their dependents when they are unemployed, sick, retired, or die and leave family dependents. Many of the free nations have, through a combination of social insurance and public assistance, guaranteed that no person need go without the necessities of life.⁴

REVIEW OF PROGRAM

If people in the less-developed countries are to receive maximum benefits from international aid, then it is important to review the programs, methods of work, and policies, at regular intervals, and adjust them to meet current needs. All programs should be focused on improving conditions and standards of living for people, and methods of

⁴ While great progress has been made in recent years in the United States in this direction, there is still a major hazard of life for all people, sickness, that is not covered by social insurance, and public assistance is not yet available to any needy person. Also, some minority groups are still denied political rights in certain sections of the country and are discriminated against in employment, education, and housing in a number of areas.

The people in the underdeveloped countries would be encouraged by a demonstration in the United States that human needs were met and human rights respected for all citizens.

work should be in line with this objective.

Efforts should be made to prevent an increase in social problems. Numerous illustrations can be cited to show what happens when industries are located in urban areas with no planning, for example, in respect to the housing of workers' families. Large numbers of men leave their homes and families in distant rural areas to seek employment in cities wholly unprepared to employ, feed, or house most of them. Disruption of family life and support is inevitable in most cases. An increase in alcoholism, divorce, delinquency, and other social problems usually follows.

Qualifications of personnel employed in the administration of international aid should also be evaluated from time to time. In addition to technical and professional education and experience and personal qualifications, an inquiry should be made of every new and old employee in the program as to his attitude toward people of different cultures, races, and religions. Persons with prejudices toward any group are unsuitable for employment in a foreign aid program.

The United States could set an example for other countries by developing interprofessional training for its employees in technical assistance and foreign service.

These programs require professionals and not amateurs. They require every bit of technical knowledge the Western world has collected, they require the rational approach, the efficient use of resources, both material and human, and the careful evaluation of what works and what does not work in the interest of greater productivity in the years ahead. . . . Professionals, trained exclusively in the Western sense of practitioners, are no match for the challenge awaiting them in the programs overseas unless they are reoriented to different goals, different techniques, and an ability to get along with people whose language

and culture they do not at first understand. They need to perceive themselves as change-agents, not because they are interested in change for its own sake, but because changes are already occurring and in need of direction toward humanitarian ends. Nor is one training period sufficient. The task calls for continuous learning of new skills, the development of greater empathy, and a profounder knowledge on which to base day-by-day decisions.⁵

It is recognized that social workers as well as other professional and technical personnel require additional training in order to orient themselves to cultures, languages, and customs unfamiliar to them. But they have knowledge and skill in motivating people, in being "change agents," that is not now being used to any extent since so few are employed in the technical assistance program and none in foreign service.

Persons should be selected for the administration of international aid who are concerned with improvement in human well-being and able to focus their policies, programs, and methods on this paramount objective.

OUTLOOK

The outlook for the future is encouraging if recognition is given in United States practice to co-ordinated and integrated planning for economic and social development. To do this an increase would be necessary in the numbers of persons employed from the "helping professions" including social work. They should be included as members of teams at all levels in the administration of international aid. An enlargement of service programs, utilizing community development techniques, would be a most effective way of training people in democracy.

Goals for the future include assump-

⁵ Council on Social Work Education, *Interprofessional Training Goals for Technical Assistance Personnel Abroad* (New York, 1959), p. 63.

tion by the United States of leadership in uniting the free nations to provide the material aid and technical assistance required by the less-developed countries for as long as it is needed. Also, it is hoped that assurance can be given to the people of these countries that Americans and other people in the

Western world offer them such aid on the basis of friendship and brotherly love. Like a gift from person-to-person, aid from nation-to-nation is most appreciated when the motivations of donors are known to be affection and unselfish concern for the well-being and happiness of the recipients.

Social Development and Foreign Policy

By WALTER M. KOTSCHNIG *

ABSTRACT: The contemporary realization of the importance of international progress in the economic and social fields, and particularly the development of the less-developed countries, has added a new dimension to foreign policy and resulted in vast foreign aid programs. Chief factors in this development are the unprecedented acceleration in population growth occurring primarily in the less-developed countries least able to sustain it, the "revolution of rising expectations," and Communist penetration. In addition to an increase in financial and technical assistance to the less-developed countries, the free world, building on strength, must emphasize that the purpose of economic development is a social objective and that the methods used to promote development cannot be divorced from the overriding social objective without destroying the objective itself. Development planning should aim at balanced economic and social growth and stress economic programs with an early social impact in terms of improved levels of living, and social programs designed to further economic growth.

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* The views set forth in this article are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of State.

OVER the last generation a new dimension has been added to American foreign policy. It stems from a new realization of the importance of international economic and social matters, a new interest in their bearing on the strengthening of free world societies and institutions, and the establishment of firm foundations on which to build a lasting peace. The preoccupation with economic and social aspects of international relations has led to the development of vast foreign aid programs carried forward bilaterally by such agencies as the International Co-operation Administration and multilaterally through the United Nations, specialized agencies, and other inter-governmental bodies. It has brought into the ranks of those who conduct our foreign relations and represent us abroad a new breed of men and women—economists and social workers, educators and doctors, productivity experts and engineers; and not a few diplomats in overalls—county agents from Kentucky and South Dakota working in remote villages in India or Iran, in Thailand and in Peru; or technicians helping to develop dams, develop airports, or build new industries.

Each year, all these new activities, these new aspects of our foreign policy, are brought under close public scrutiny as Congress debates our foreign aid programs, and our participation in the United Nations and the specialized agencies such as the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, and the International Labour Organisation. There is much talk of so-called "give-away programs," of "boon-doggies" and unnecessary frills. And there is frequently an inclination to urge a contraction of activities which to many appear to be only remotely, if at all, related to the vital interests

of the American people, and their desire to go their own way in peace.

Such negative attitudes, rejected year after year by large majorities in Congress, are not responsive to the needs of an enlightened foreign policy, for the simple reason that they are not responsive to the aspirations and interests of the peoples whose friendship and co-operation we are seeking. Pacts and alliances and the build-up of military strength are necessary and will continue to be essential to deter aggression and immediate threats to the peace. But these traditional instruments of foreign policy do not go to the roots of the problems which beset the world today. They help to maintain a precarious peace; they do not, by themselves, build a secure and lasting peace. They are not enough in an age of high-tension ideological and revolutionary turmoil in large parts of the world.

STRAINS AND STRESSES

Other contributions to this volume have enlarged on the basic needs and some of the tidal forces which explain the strains and stresses within the contemporary world. Briefly stated they can be summarized under four headings.

(1) There is first of all the unprecedented acceleration in population growth. In 1830 mankind reached a world total of approximately one billion individuals. It took just another century to reach a second billion. It is taking a little over thirty years to reach the third billion. The world's population at present is close to 2.9 billion. Forecasts by the United Nations demographers indicate that, with continued medical progress, the world total will pass the fourth, fifth, and possibly the sixth billion mark by the end of the century. In other words, we can anticipate the doubling of the present world population within the brief span of forty years. Most of this growth is

taking place in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America. In those regions it is not due to an increase in the birth rate, which has remained relatively stable, and in some cases is even slightly declining, but to a spectacular fall in death rates.

One example will illustrate the point. In 1946, a vigorous public health campaign was launched in Ceylon with the co-operation of the World Health Organization. The program was largely designed to control malaria through the residual spraying of DDT. The death rate responded immediately, and declined in one year from 19.8 deaths per 1,000 population in 1946 to 14.0 in 1947. Since then Ceylon's death rate has continued its remarkable downward trend, falling to 10.1 in 1957. The expectation of life at birth at present is approximately 50 per cent higher than it was only twelve years ago. As a result of the rapid decline in the death rate, the annual rate of natural increase in the Ceylonese population rose from 1.9 in 1946 to 2.6 in 1957.

Similar rates of increases could be quoted for other countries, in some of which the population appears to be increasing by 3 or more per cent per year compared with percentage increases of well below 2 or even 1.5 per cent in the more highly developed countries of Europe and North America. This calls for a final set of figures: in 1950, about 66 per cent of the world's people lived in the less-developed countries; this percentage may rise to 70 per cent in 1975 and more than 75 per cent by the year 2000.

(2) These less-developed countries with the highest increases in population are the very countries least able to sustain such growth. In thirty-eight of the underdeveloped countries with a total of 1,360,000,000 people, the gross national product per head was, according to recent figures, less than \$100. It

was less than \$200 per head in another twenty-seven countries and territories with a total population of 140,000,000. This is another way of saying that these people are living at bare subsistence levels.

World production of food has, in recent years, exceeded the growth of population. However, the actual level of per capita production has increased more slowly and remains much lower in the economically less-developed regions. Thus, the four regions of Latin America, the Far East, and Africa, with about two thirds of the world population, accounted in 1954-1958 for only about one third of the agricultural production of the world—excluding mainland China. The rate of annual increase in agricultural production is presently slowing down in many parts of the Far East, and in Africa is now estimated to have fallen behind population growth.¹ These are the regions of the world where the specter of malnutrition and the threat of famine conditions are ever present.

(3) The time of fatalistic acceptance of such conditions on the part of the people is largely passed. It has been swept away by the famous "revolution of rising expectations" of which so much has been said in recent years. It is a revolution born of the poverty and misery of the masses, and their growing realization that in this scientific age they need not be poor and miserable. Under the impact of their contacts with more highly developed countries and the growing effectiveness of mass media of information and propaganda, fatalism has given way to restiveness, and resignation to expectation.

The situation is particularly acute in those countries which have only re-

¹ See Food and Agriculture Organization, *The State of Food and Agriculture, 1959*, p. 15.

cently gained their independence or are about to emerge as independent states. Close to nine hundred million people have found national independence in the last forty years, most of them since the end of the Second World War. The process which began in the Middle East and in Asia is presently repeating itself at an accelerated rate in Africa. Many of the newly independent countries which have modeled their Constitutions in the image of the great Constitutional documents of the West, are exposed to serious dangers from within and from without. They lack administrative experience, their political institutions tend to be unstable, and in the underdeveloped state in which they find themselves their economic situation is precarious. Under these conditions governments are vulnerable to subversion and their countries are among the chief targets of attempts at Communist penetration.

(4) Benefiting from all this ferment, the Communist leaders of Soviet Russia and of Communist China are making a determined attempt to bring the underdeveloped countries into their fold. Communist propaganda uses every means at its disposal to convince the peoples of the underdeveloped countries that their salvation is to be found along the road of Communism. Every effort is made to emphasize the achievements of Communism in the development of heavy industries, power, and transportation, which are indeed impressive. The present rate of annual increase in gross national product in the Soviet Union is above 6 per cent compared with less than 4 per cent in the United States. Communist attempts at penetration build on the fascination of governments and peoples in the underdeveloped countries with heavy industry as the basis of all development. They use the lack of capital in the underdeveloped countries, and the little margin they

have for savings, to deride private investment, particularly investment from abroad. They give free rein to their imagination in depicting Western economies as built on exploitation, while taking great care to leave the underdeveloped countries ignorant of the terrific price paid in human lives and human liberty for the economic achievements of the Communist world. In recent years this propaganda has been buttressed by Soviet and Chinese experts, scholarships, supplies, grants, and low-interest loans.

CRUCIAL CHOICES

Taken together, these four points bring into sharp focus the explosive conditions prevailing throughout large parts of the world. Barbara Ward in "The Interplay of East and West" summarized the situation succinctly when she stated that "the choice now is to modernize or perish." Indeed, the choice lies between economic and social development at a rate higher than the world has ever known before, or violent revolution, disintegration of democratic government, substandard levels of living and famine, and wars of despair. The governments in the underdeveloped countries know this, and their peoples dimly perceive it.

But there is yet another crucial choice to be made, namely between economic and social development in the image of modern Russia or Communist China, and development in the spirit of the free world and as part of it. On the one hand, it is to choose the complete control of the State over the individual and all his activities, the collectivization of agriculture, the forced development of heavy industries, and the regimentation of labor. The alternative is to choose self-help, individual initiative, private as well as public financing, and balanced economic and social development with due regard to

the interest and needs of the consumer.

Much has recently been said about "competitive coexistence." It is a useful concept provided it is not taken to mean that the danger of armed conflict has been eliminated or that some of the most crucial political issues can be shelved, such as the problem of Berlin, of German unification, or aggressive moves on the part of Communist regimes in Asia and the Far East. Unless a measure of effective, that is, internationally controlled disarmament can be achieved, which of course would be highly desirable, the military guards of the free world cannot be lowered.

With these reservations "competitive coexistence" may well become the keynote in international relations during the next few decades. In this competition the less-developed countries will play a major role. The outcome of the future will, to an alarming degree, depend on their choice between totalitarianism and the way of life of the free. And that choice, in turn, will depend to a considerable extent on the ability of the free world and, above all, of the United States, to demonstrate that free world objectives and methods will serve the hard-pressed countries of the less-developed regions better than the blandishments of Communism.

BUILDING ON STRENGTH

It stands to reason that in this competition the free world must build on strength, its own strength. There are those who hold that free world financial aid to the less-developed countries must be substantially increased. This point is well taken and it is to be hoped that during the years to come much more substantial support will be forthcoming from the highly developed countries, particularly some of the major European states which, thanks to their own efforts, and with earlier Marshall aid,

are presently experiencing a high and welcome level of prosperity.

Yet, however important reliance on the financial resources and the productive capacity of the highly developed free countries of the West and East is by itself, it is not enough. In sheer volume Communist aid to some of the most "sensitive" countries of the world is exceeding that offered by free world countries. The rate of growth of gross national product in the Soviet Union, as pointed out earlier, and in mainland China—even after discounting the blatantly false propaganda claims of the Communist Chinese regime—is presently higher than in the United States or in the major countries of Western Europe and in Japan. Soviet engineers and technicians, flushed with victory in their battle for industrialization of some of the more backward areas of their own country, are in an advantageous position to adjust to conditions of life and work in less-developed countries similarly situated.

Fortunately, there is another element essential to economic and social growth, namely, freedom, and here free world strength is beyond contest, unless the totalitarian regimes are willing to give up the very objectives and methods which they have imposed upon their own people and are trying to impose upon the rest of the world. Freedom—not freedom as a vague abstract notion, but freedom from oppression and want in a democratic society—is one contribution which the Soviet leaders have failed to make to the welfare of their own people, and which for that very reason they cannot make to the welfare of the less-developed countries.

Not enough has been made of the unique strength of that freedom. There has been a tendency, even in this country, to assume that the ultimate objectives of economic development are steel mills per se, bigger and better dams per

se, bigger and better space satellites. It is essential that this technological and economic approach be made meaningful by the recognition that the purpose of all economic development is the well-being of the individual, the satisfaction of his wants, his growth in dignity and freedom. The accent must be placed on the well-being of the individual not of the anonymous "masses," a term much used by Communist planners. The very term "the masses" is a denial of the dignity of the individual and his ability to develop according to his gifts and aspirations.

Thus, in word and deed it must be made clear that the very purpose of economic development is a social objective. The very acceptance of this principle means social progress, for it rejects utterly any form of subservience of man to man, of the individual to the all-powerful State. It means the end of slavery, political, economic, or otherwise.

From this first principle springs a further basic thought: methods used in economic and social development cannot be divorced from the overriding social objective without destroying the objective itself. It means that neither sound economic development nor real social progress can be achieved by the imposition of a particular way of life, by herding people into regimented units, collective farms or communes, by depriving them, even temporarily, of their liberties, or by disregarding their human dignity. These methods are not only destructive of personality, but even the social results are not worth the sacrifices involved. They do not meet the people's need for an early improvement in their levels of living. Real wages in the Soviet Union, not to speak of Communist China, remain far below those paid in the free economies of the West. In spite of remarkable technical developments, longer hours of

work are required of the Soviet worker before he can earn enough to buy the basic necessities. This is a rather startling fact after forty years of Soviet Communism, even when one takes into account the late start of the Soviet Union in large-scale industrialization, and the ravages of the Second World War. There continues to prevail a painful shortage of consumer goods, a severely limited choice for the individual as to how to use his limited purchasing power. And there are continuing restrictions on mobility, and limitations on other prerogatives of the individual. What is more, there is no indication that "the State will wither away," to use the famous dictum of Karl Marx; that there will ever be real social fulfillment and true freedom for the individual.

THE NEED FOR PLANNING

The social approach to free world assistance in the development of the underdeveloped countries calls for careful planning. There are some in this country to whom the word "planning" is a dirty word. It smacks of Socialism and Communism. Yet, private companies plan and could not survive otherwise. Similarly, over-all development has to be planned, to husband scarce resources and to give purpose and perspective to economic and social development.

There are fundamental differences between "planning" as here understood and totalitarian planning. Viewed in free world perspective, the less-developed countries with their vast human resources must be encouraged to stress "human investment," the human element in the development process, the importance of human qualities and attitudes, intangible most of them, which encourage economic growth and efficiency. These include organizational capacity, initiative and self-reliance,

energy and hard work, honesty, confidence in the future, skills and knowledge, inventiveness, ambition and drive, and several others. Many of these qualities, essential to growth, fall into the category of "variables" which plague the mathematical economist. They call for value judgments which cannot be quantified and fed into the computing machine, however useful such computers may be in the planning of certain aspects of economic and social development.

To bring such qualities as initiative, self-reliance, and the will to improvement to the fore, and to achieve voluntary commitment in the less-developed countries, individually and as peoples, to the development effort, it is essential that they be given a share in its planning. Considering the complexities, national planning has to be largely left to the expert, subject to final approval by parliaments or other representative bodies. However, broad participation in planning can be achieved on the local level, which gives special significance to the various community-development programs which are dealt with elsewhere in this volume.

By contrast, the totalitarian approach, rather than taking into account the human element in planning, the more intangible variables, tries to minimize or even eliminate them. In order to have its econometric conclusions come true, this approach bends human nature, it regiments the individual, it deprives him of his liberties, it tells him where to go and what to do. In one word, it tends to turn the individual himself into a machine, to reduce him to the stature of a robot. Whole generations are sacrificed to future targets. Totalitarian planning of this type loses sight of the central purpose of economic development, which is the freeing of the individual, not only from poverty and disease, but from ruthless encroach-

ments on his basic rights by bureaucrats and the ever present State.

The recognition of individual advance and social development as the ultimate objective of all economic development, has a direct bearing on the establishment of concrete development plans which, while flexible and always open to needed adjustments, can give direction and perspective to national development efforts. It is not suggested that "social" programs should be given priority over "economic" programs. The two are interrelated.

BALANCED ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

There has been much discussion in the United Nations, and particularly in its Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, of "balanced economic and social development," aimed at a better understanding of the relative importance of economic and social programs in the over-all development of the less-developed countries, their relationships and "complementarity," the allocation of scarce resources for social as contrasted with economic purposes, and the co-ordination of programs to achieve maximum results in both fields.

In the light of these discussions and of acquired experience, it has become possible to advance certain tentative conclusions. There is growing agreement that priority should be given to economic programs with an early social impact, and to social programs designed to advance economic development.

Within the economic category, early emphasis should be placed on the development of labor-intensive enterprises, such as the development of power and transportation facilities, on food production and the encouragement, in the private and the public sector, of industries designed to meet basic consumer needs. This emphasis on achieving high levels of employment and on the early

satisfaction of consumer needs and the raising of levels of living creates incentives to hard work and strengthens the commitment of the people to local and national development efforts. Needless to say, there is a danger point beyond which it would be unwise to stress the early satisfaction of consumer needs lest, due to insufficient savings, capital resources should not grow sufficiently to permit investments necessary to the acceleration of economic growth²—such growth to include the establishment of capital industries at a reasonable rate.

Inversely, social programs need to be developed which have an immediate or early impact on economic development. This includes programs of education and of health, the development of improved labor relations and organization, and the establishment of minimum wages where possible. The elaboration and application of such programs may involve very difficult choices. It may mean, for instance, that in terms of short-range planning, limited resources have initially to be concentrated deliberately on primary education for only part of the children of school age, in order to preserve resources for secondary and higher education, particularly of the vocational and technical types necessary to meet pressing requirements for trained personnel. Similarly, in the area of health, efforts may have to be concentrated on certain regions within a country, where improved health conditions are most likely to increase production and create new capital. Such temporary imbalances, while difficult to defend on purely moral grounds, may

² While every effort has to be made to encourage domestic savings, such savings in the less-developed countries cannot be expected for some time to meet essential investment needs. To assure a sufficiently rapid growth of development, financial aid from abroad has to be provided in the form of private investment and public aid through loans and grants.

be necessary in order to provide manpower where it can make the maximum contribution and create new resources for a comprehensive development of the entire country. They can be defended on the ground that they will advance rather than retard social development.

At a recent Working Party on Economic Development and Planning in Bangkok, the Philippine Representative addressed herself in some detail to shifts in emphasis within social programs to accelerate economic development, and discussed recent shifts of emphasis in broad social programs which had taken place in the Philippines. Like the advertisements of reducing medicines, she used the "before" and "after" methods. In the field of education, for instance, emphasis in the Philippines used to be on literacy, while it had now shifted to vocational training, including the field of agriculture. The accent on training for government jobs had been replaced by a recognition of the need for skilled labor and management personnel. In the field of health the earlier emphasis on the building of expensive hospitals had yielded to health campaigns for control of malaria, particularly in newly opened parts of the Philippines, and of tuberculosis, particularly in the industrial labor force. Accent was now placed on rural health centers and on nutrition. In the field of labor, where the emphasis had in the past been on direct benefits and on the setting of standards, greater emphasis was now placed on apprenticeship, on unionism and collective bargaining, and on labor-management relations. In the field of social welfare, a preoccupation with public assistance had yielded to a new emphasis on self-help. The accent on family welfare services had yielded place to efforts to foster community-wide services, frequently in the form of co-operatives. A drive for community development

had outgrown an earlier emphasis on casework.

Needless to say, the observations made here are not to be taken as an attempt to produce the blueprint of a master plan. In keeping with the various stages of development reached by the less-developed countries, and in line with their traditions and special needs, each country has to establish its own plans and guide posts. What counts is the recognition that those who are responsible, in the more highly developed free countries, for the development of foreign policy will do well to give full weight to the importance of those types of assistance most likely to further social development in the less-developed regions of the world in the form of higher levels of living shared in by the largest possible number of people.

"SOCIAL WORK, LTD."

In a democracy, foreign policy is a concern of all the people. Each group in the population—engineers, agronomists, economists, doctors, educators, social workers—have their own contribution to make to the formulation and attainment of foreign policy objectives. In an age when the raising of levels of living has become a major objective of both domestic and foreign policy, all of those working in the social field have an exceptionally important role to play.

If the word "social" is taken in its widest sense, it is evident that in some social areas, such as the improvement of health and nutrition, remarkable progress has been achieved through national and international efforts in the less-developed countries. Much has been done, also, by such agencies as the International Labour Organisation to create a greater awareness of the need for better labor conditions or, through the United Nations Children's Fund, for improved care for mothers

and children. Community-development programs in Asia and in Africa owe much to foreign assistance, including a number of dedicated social workers from the West. Progress in education, while remarkable in some places, has on the whole been slow, too slow in view of existing needs.

At best there is no cause for complacency. The number of teachers or social workers serving in foreign lands either under bilateral aid programs or under international auspices, such as the United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, is surprisingly small. Even more striking is the fact that social work experts play a very minor role in the policy-making bodies of most of the less-developed countries or among those who are responsible for bilateral and international aid programs. The situation in this respect is so unsatisfactory that the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, at its 28th Session in the summer of 1959, felt compelled to request "the Secretary General, in cooperation with the specialized agencies concerned, to give special attention to the inclusion of social experts at appropriate stages, especially the initial stage, in the planning and implementation of economic development projects in order to insure adequate consideration of the social implications."

Without attempting an analysis in depth, it might be suggested that one of the major reasons for this situation is inherent in the aspirations and attitudes of many of those who have made the promotion of social welfare their life work. There is no lack of interest in foreign relations or of willingness to serve. But there is frequently an excessive preoccupation with methodology, requiring ever more advanced forms of specialist training and an over-emphasis on degrees and "professional" standards.

This preoccupation and emphasis is undoubtedly important, but unless it is balanced by training in the broad issues of economic and social development which confront two thirds of the people of the world, it tends to isolate the social work expert from the broad stream of historical change. It may even result in a form of parochialism which may prevent the great social work profession in such a country as the United States from making the contribution it should to social development throughout the world.

The "Ltd." has to be taken out of

"social work," to permit the free world countries, and chief among them the United States, to provide to the less-developed countries expert assistance which will lift social planning and activities to the high policy level, and to train social workers, in and for these countries, whose specialization will be given meaning by their grasp of the problems of balanced economic and social development. The new perspective thus gained will give new direction and strength to social development in the world as a major objective of enlightened foreign policy.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

FRANZ M. JOSEPH (Ed.). *As Others See Us: The United States Through Foreign Eyes*. Pp. viii, 360. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1959. \$6.00.

The short and not so sweet tenure of American world power is slipping away without giving Americans a chance to enjoy the sensations of undeserved superiority. This is at least one distinction that differentiates us from the Greeks, Romans, Spaniards, and Englishmen whose days in the sun lasted so much longer and were generally so much more profitable. Few Americans tread land abroad as masters; even our soldiers and airmen huddle on their bases, fenced off from a world largely out of bounds. Despite all the talk of ugliness, most of our official civilians are engaged in earnestly trying to help a variety of querulous people spend American money for their own benefit. Meanwhile, in the United States, the effort to achieve an intelligently hardheaded view of American problems in a changing world is bogging down in swamps of worry over what these querulous people think of us, our foreign policy, our national and individual behavior, our culture, our characters, our mortal souls. Instead of understanding the simple proposition that no-

body likes the powerful—and the Russians have acquired this status, and the Chinese are fast approaching—we are supposed to be bothered by the spite we earn regardless of how often we shine our shoes, pare our nails, wipe our noses, use the right kind of soap, and spend so much money.

These perverse sounding remarks are inspired by this book *As Others See Us*, a collection of essays by foreign authors including no Chinese, Japanese, or Russian authors, but many others, ranging from well-known and knowing skywriters like Denis Brogan and Raymond Aron and the urbane A. D. Gorwala of India to much less well-known and less knowing generalizers such as: Julian Marias of Spain who writes, "When the American and Spaniard meet there is usually comprehension and frequently a lively congeniality," and Peter von Zahn of Germany stating that, "(The Occupation and the Nuremberg trials) strengthened the German in his conviction that the American's conceptions about right and wrong were simple, sometimes primitive, that he did not know political compromise, the nuance, the shades; but that he attempted, with the greatest determination and complete disregard for precedents, to make his views prevail." Yugoslavia is represented by a diplomat's wife who manages to sound exactly like

Ninotchka in the early scenes of that play: "My views, feelings, and judgments arising from my experience in the United States have never been entirely personal. . . ." The Egyptian author, who "obtained permission of his government to write this essay," informs us that "recent international happenings have shown U. S. policy to be guided by forced alliances and by gain and expediency rather than by right and justice."

Seldom do these authors have anything fresh to say about America—most of their remarks are friendly, superficial, and only occasionally shrewd. Only a few seemed to realize that it was not their portraits of America but of themselves that are significant, and most of these profit from being unintentionally drawn. And, only a few deliberately saw the essay as a means of communicating about themselves. From these, notably the Ghanaian K. A. B. Jones-Quartey and most perceptive of all, the Italian journalist, Luigi Barzini Jr., we do get memorable vignettes of encounters with America. In general, however, one looks in vain through these essays for evidence that there is some higher and more perceptive grace in any of their motes than in any of our beams, or that in the protected sanctuary of greater weakness of the lesser power or the ex-power there is some secret source of greater wisdom from which it would help to drink deeply.

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WILBUR SCHRAMM (Ed.). *One Day in the World's Press: Fourteen Great Newspapers on a Day of Crisis, November 2, 1956*. Pp. 138. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959. \$6.95.

This can be called, in a special sense of the word, a textbook. It gives the text, in English and, by a most ingenious use of typography and make-up, the appearance and texture of fourteen newspapers ranging from *Pravda* to *La Prensa*, from Cairo to Frankfurt. In all but a few cases, the entire issue is reproduced. The day chosen is the one on which the banner headline

of *The New York Times* began with "British and French Fleets Close on Suez" and *Pravda* said "Hands off Egypt," but in Stockholm, the readers of *Dagens Nyheter* found "Fleets sail toward Suez" in a secondary position, the banner reading "700,000 Russians Invade Hungary."

It is odd to find in this book, devoted in essence to the reproduction of the actual, a sort of heroic figure. "Why," asks the editor, "were these events and their meaning so much clearer to *Dagens Nyheter* . . . than to most of the other papers . . . ?" He suggests a number of reasons, including differences in time to press, and then: "Or was it that *Dagens Nyheter*, unlike most of the other papers, had not been shell-shocked by Suez and was simply making more effort to cover Hungary?"

"Clearer" and "shell-shocked" are "loaded" words here. It would be equally just to ask why the meaning of Suez did not become clear to the editors in Stockholm, why they could not take their fascinated eyes off Hungary in the tenth day of rioting and revolution there to observe the overwhelming totally new circumstance—the display of force by Britain and France. One might attribute this to the fact that the paper had a special correspondent in Budapest but relied on the news agencies for direct reports from the Mediterranean. And add that the subhead on the news story from Budapest ends with "and our newspaper urges the Hungarian people to rise against the invading Russians" which may be taken as merely an index to the editorial page, but has also overtones of the tendentious news headlines of *Pravda*.

Apart from this single lapse from objectivity, the book is admirable. It is about the size of a tabloid, but the reproduction in size of the large newspapers involves no loss except in a few photographs. Once the reader has considered the handling of the major events, he will discover many fascinating secondary points of interest: that *Pravda* actually publishes those fatuous letters from workers which appear in comic excerpts in our press; that a whole page of *Jen-Min Jin-Pao*, the Peking newspaper, is given over to a trans-

lation of an ancient Chinese classic although "the materialistic point of view lacks thoroughness" and to a report by the Institute of Philosophy on the nature of class contradiction; that *La Prensa* is as devoted to sport as any North American newspaper; and that however the press reflects the political and cultural character of its own country, one universal remains—the trivia in each of the newspapers.

The information given about the communications, radio, television, film, and books, as well as newspapers, in each country is invaluable, and the questions and summations are admirable.

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ALEC NOVE. *Communist Economic Strategy: Soviet Growth and Capabilities*. Pp. xi, 82. Washington, D. C.: National Planning Association, 1959. \$2.25.

Behind its clumsy title, this well-written monograph contains a magnificent review of Russia's current economic situation. The author is one of those literate and perceptive analysts whose balanced and sophisticated judgments have most advanced our understanding of the Soviet Union. His essay can be unreservedly recommended as a thoughtful, up-to-date introduction to its subject, complete with cautions and hardheaded policy judgments.

This study of Soviet economic strength is one of several National Planning Association monographs that analyze "the economics of competitive coexistence." The separate studies investigate specific aspects of the efforts of members of the Soviet bloc, led by the Soviet Union, to win friends and influence people, especially among the uncommitted nations of the underdeveloped world, and to advance Soviet objectives through economic channels. Nove's discussion centers on the Soviet Union, with attention where appropriate to the Eastern European members of the bloc and to China, together with a series of reflections on their trade and aid relationships with the outside world.

After a short introduction and brief dis-

cussion of political forces at work in the Soviet Union, Nove presents a compact survey of the human and material resources the Soviet Union is bringing to bear on its economic challenge of the West. Next he considers the significance of important trends in the effectiveness with which Soviet economic activity is organized. In chapter four he turns to the record and prospects for Soviet economic growth and considers its possible impact on the outside world. Finally, there are four pages of conclusions, nine pages of useful statistical material, and five pages of Notes. The whole is sensibly organized and judiciously presented.

Among the many suggestive observations that mark Nove's conclusions, perhaps three can be singled out and paraphrased here. It is suggested that the Soviet example of rapid growth may prove to have a most powerful influence in Asia and Africa, quite apart from the presence or absence of a Soviet bloc trade and aid program. It is also made clear that, since the trade and aid program so far has involved only a very small fraction of overall Soviet economic activity and since substantial continued growth in the Soviet gross national product can supply easy increments for trade and aid, the Soviets' capability for a massive drive is clearly always going to be present.

The most intriguing conclusion emerging from this study is that the Soviet leadership's focus on internal domestic objectives has so far placed a narrow limit on their willingness to make heavy outward commitments. The self-imposed restraints of economic autarchy have only been relaxed here and there, not wholeheartedly abandoned. It appears to this reviewer that the Soviet Union is likely to get involved in really large trade and aid activities with underdeveloped areas only if Kremlin attitudes are substantially altered. Yet this very change in attitudes might mean, paradoxically, that we would have less need to feel concern over the dangers a Soviet drive would pose for the independence of other nations.

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RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF. *The Soviet Image of Future War*. Pp. xii, 137. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1959. \$3.25.

Dr. Raymond L. Garthoff is among the few top students of Soviet military strategy in the West. His two previous books, *Soviet Military Doctrine* and *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*, are classics on Soviet strategy. He is presently with the Department of Defense.

Soviet strategists in recent years have rejected the view, accepted so unquestioningly prior to Stalin's death, that the traditional "principles of war"—security of the rear, trading space for time, the devices of attrition, and so forth—are by themselves sufficient operational precepts for victory in the nuclear age. Since 1953, Soviet strategists have realized that modern military technology is no respecter of ideologies and that, unless the Soviet Union is able to achieve a position of technological-military superiority, the Soviet homeland will be in great danger in the event of war. This book has many implications for defense policy, for it casts considerable light on issues which have provoked one of the most searching debates on military policy yet witnessed in the Western world. The debate has centered largely on whether United States-Western military posture is adequate to meet the full range of Communist military threats.

The problem is primarily one of estimating Soviet intentions and capabilities. While national security policy should be based more on the latter, every effort should be made to analyze Soviet intentions. It is in this light that Dr. Garthoff's book is particularly useful. At issue in the Western military debate has been the question of whether the United States has not overemphasized its capacity for waging general war to the detriment of its limited war capability, although limited conflicts represent the more probable future threats. Dr. Garthoff's study supports those who contend that limited war is much more in keeping with classic Soviet strategic doctrine than strategies for general war. "The Soviets tend in their published writings to discount or deny the possibility of local

and limited wars, particularly limited nuclear war. But there are good reasons to doubt that such statements foreshadow future Soviet behavior. . . . In seeking to maneuver the U.S. into positions of choice between massive but mutual devastation, or no effective response at all, they strive to deprive us of confidence that we have the alternative of limited nuclear reaction. . . . Limited wars, indeed, represent the classic form of Communist limited military action, for limited objectives, and at limited risk. . . ." (p. 15).

Perhaps the author's most interesting point concerns the importance of surprise attack in Soviet strategy.

While Dr. Garthoff concedes that surprise is now recognized by Soviet military thinkers as a critical factor in modern war, he concludes that the revolution in Soviet strategy on this issue is not complete. Dr. Garthoff does not completely reject the thesis advanced by Herbert S. Dinstein in his study, *War and the Soviet Union*, that the Soviets have fully incorporated the concept of the complete pre-emptive strike into their strategic doctrine. But his analysis clearly supports the view shared by not a few Western military experts that a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the centers of Western power is the least likely of Soviet threats. "Every tenet of Soviet military doctrine is opposed to the conclusion that such a venture would lead to quick victory" (p. 83). More probably the new Soviet missile-nuclear capabilities will be used to underwrite an increasingly bolder strategy of limited challenges designed to demonstrate to America's Allies that American power is no longer adequate to provide for their security. The Soviets will launch a pre-emptive strike against the United States only if "the United States were ever to let its whole military strength so decline that the Soviets believed they could win at acceptable cost . . ." (p. 85).

This excellent study should be read by everyone concerned with the formulation of Western defense policies. Its message for Western policy-makers is clear. No single strategy will be sufficient to deal with the military tasks confronting the United States and its Allies. The West

must have a flexible military posture adequate to cope with the full spectrum of conflict.

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LESTER B. PEARSON. *Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age*. Pp. vi, 114. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959. \$2.75.

This little book comprises the author's four Clayton Lectures, delivered at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1958, and the Nobel Peace Prize Lecture of 1957. They present the views of an articulate and wise public official with long diplomatic experience in the service of the Canadian government. Since Mr. Pearson's intelligence and authority have always been bywords at the numerous international conferences at which he has participated, students of diplomacy and international relations are bound to find his views interesting, and the reading of them is pleasant and not very time-consuming.

They should not, however, expect anything particularly novel. This reviewer has seen or heard elsewhere practically every idea expressed in this book. Words of wisdom and experience are, after all, not usually arresting for their originality. But it is useful to have them repeated conveniently, especially if they are well stated, and there are always new students to whom a book such as this will have freshness along with its other virtues.

In the first chapter, entitled "Diplomacy New and Old," the author discusses the effects on diplomacy of the acceleration of communications and the transformations of political society in many parts of the world. Nuclear weapons have made the consequences of failure far more disastrous than formerly but have not, he thinks, affected the conduct of diplomacy as such. Communications have reduced the decision-making functions of the professional diplomat, but the observing and reportorial functions remain. The glare of modern publicity has made a profound change in his environment, yet the qualifications that

made a good ambassador two or three centuries ago would also serve well today.

In the very brief second chapter, "On Coalition Diplomacy," the author becomes less general and concerns himself primarily with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). He feels that the NATO Council should have more decision-making authority in both the foreign and defense policies of the member states. The third chapter, on "Negotiation and Diplomacy," reiterates some well-known but significant truths about negotiations, such as the importance of knowing one's own objectives and of having agreements recorded accurately in writing. The fourth chapter, "Power and Diplomacy," comes to grips with some of the special problems posed by nuclear weapons, in which the author shows himself quite up to date. He is aware, for example, as many of his colleagues are not, that under some circumstances, which are not at all hard to imagine even between the two super-powers, the aggressor could hope to launch a surprise attack so overwhelming to the victim's retaliatory power that it could escape any serious counterblow.

The final chapter, "The Four Faces of Peace," discusses the relevance to peace of international trade, power, national policies, and human emotions and motivations. It is a suitable summation for a man whose forte is in seeing things clearly and seeing them as a whole. One may miss the exhilarating shock of a new thought, but there is much to be said for a book where every thought expressed is worthy of respect and, almost invariably, concurrence.

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LLOYD A. FREE. *Six Allies and a Neutral: A Study of the International Outlooks of Political Leaders in the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan and India*. Pp. xiii, 210. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959. \$5.00.

This study emerges from a project of the Institute of International Research at Princeton developed in co-operation with local opinion research organizations in the

several countries surveyed. Cross sections of parliamentarians were systematically interviewed, and these inquiries were supplemented between 1955 and 1958 by intensive interviews, conducted directly by the Institute "in governmental, official, parliamentary and elite circles in all of the countries concerned except the United States . . ." (vii). The aim was to uncover the "reality worlds" of these individuals and provide "a picture of the psychological dynamics influencing not only the foreign policy as such, but the international posture of seven major nations at a given point in history" (ix).

India's internal divisions and antagonisms and her quest for social democracy are her primary concerns. Her convictions against war and her interests as a militarily weak state lead her to a policy of nonalignment in the cold war between communism and the West. She supports the principles and objectives of the United Nations and aspires to moral leadership in the search for world peace.

Japan's redundant population and sparse resources make her dependent upon the outside world for stable trade. International peace is vital to her; communism and the cold war, a threat. Should a nuclear war break out she is fearful of becoming a battlefield and feels constrained to be as neutral as possible. Most of the Liberal-Democrats desire, for the present, to preserve the ties that bind Japan to the United States but prefer greater freedom of action in the partnership. The goal of the Socialists is complete independence.

Pragmatic, and "power-oriented," the Conservatives of Great Britain would maintain, as far as possible, Britain's military strength and prestige. Confronted with the threat of international communism, they would supplement the United Kingdom's power with that of the Commonwealth and the United States and rely upon a policy of containment and deterrence. The Labourites consider the domestic well-being of the British people their primary concern, and would chiefly rely upon the United Nations to preserve peace.

France, with neither the military power nor the resources to play a great role in world affairs, is reluctant to take a lesser

part. She insists that she should be formally recognized as a member of the Big Four on a basis of juridical equality with the United States, Great Britain, and Russia.

Italian leaders have no "great power" aspirations for Italy. They have had to concentrate on vast problems of internal rehabilitation and reconstruction. Unable to face the Soviet menace alone they follow American leadership in foreign policy though at times it has been irksome. They regard the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as the main pillar of their policy. The secondary pillar is the unification of Europe with Italy an integral part.

The Germans likewise have no desire to achieve great power status. Their chief aspiration is for reunification of their divided country. Most of the Christian Democrats believe that to reach this goal they should have a close relationship with the United States and the NATO alliance. The Socialists reject the Adenauer policies of deterrence, containment, and collective defense and advocate progressive disarmament, accommodation between communism and the West, and peaceful coexistence. American legislators express strong aspirations for peace and freedom and fear that both are threatened by communism. Although emphasizing mutual understanding and accommodation in the relationships of nations of the free world toward one another, they tend to follow the power approach when dealing with the Communist bloc.

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NORMAN HARPER and DAVID SISSONS. *Australia and the United Nations*. Pp. xiii, 423. New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1959. \$3.00.

At the San Francisco Conference of 1945 on the United Nations Charter, Dr. H. V. Evatt, chief of the Australian delegation, became prominent for his enthusiastic support of the United Nations and his aggressive championship of the rights

of the "Middle Powers." He agitated for some reduction of big power influence in the new organization and the liberalization and broadening of its economic and social functions. Australia failed in limiting the veto in the Security Council. But she was responsible for enlarging the powers of the General Assembly, making full employment a United Nations goal, and increasing the obligations of the colonial powers toward their colonies and the United Nations—to name only the more important successes. On the other hand, Australia jealously guarded preservation of national sovereignty and protection of national interests against encroachments by international agencies. Even the enthusiastic Dr. Evatt doubted the United Nations' ability to guarantee Australia's security, and he, as well as succeeding Australian governments, preferred to rely for that upon the Commonwealth, the United States, and regional organizations.

The Australian public did not share Dr. Evatt's enthusiasm. The feeling of the majority was, at best, cautious optimism about the future of the United Nations.

Once the United Nations began functioning, Australian interest waned. It never played any sizable role in Australia's security nor has it basically affected Australia's foreign policy. On trusteeship questions Australian governments sided with the colonial powers more than with the colonial peoples. In the economic sphere Australia acted according to selfish considerations, and her participation in the International Labor Organization was not impressive, largely due to her federal structure and constitutional system which make ratification of international agreements in this field difficult.

Australia contributed to the general trend of nations transacting more and more international business outside of the United Nations. This further weakened public interest in the organization. Only occasionally, during such events as the Korean conflict or the Suez crisis, was any appreciable—usually hopeful—attention paid to the work of the United Nations. There is, consequently, a conviction among interested Australian circles that under present world conditions any substantial revision

of the Charter is impossible and that only an improvement of technical and procedural weaknesses might be possible.

In essence, this is the story of this book, which provides sufficient details to substantiate it. The authors set Australia's relations with the organization into the context of Australian policies and attitudes generally. This makes the book, written with scholarly care and discrimination, interesting and valuable.

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HENRY BLUMENTHAL. *A Reappraisal of Franco-American Relations 1830-1871*. Pp. xiv, 225. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959. \$6.00.

This analysis of diplomatic relationships between France and the United States in the middle third of the nineteenth century is based on impressively thorough research in French and American archives and on the published materials. Its general thesis is the falseness of the popular impression of abiding Franco-American friendship since the American Revolution; indeed, Professor Blumenthal's volume is a kind of catalogue of frictions and even of crises between France and the United States. Relations between the two countries were in fact marked by frequent distrust and hostility, particularly after Louis Napoleon established the Second Empire in December, 1851.

In his study, Professor Blumenthal adopted a topical approach, which has a number of disadvantages. This organization of his material not only led to a considerable amount of duplication, but it also blurred the significance of the February Revolution and the coup d'état in 1851. The chapter on incidents between 1800 and 1860 was also transformed by this approach into a rag-bag collection of miscellaneous conflicts or frictions.

The volume suffers also from an overemphasis upon developments within each of the two countries and between France and the United States and by some neglect of the general European diplomatic scene. The Crimean War, for example, receives less attention than it deserves.

Indeed, there is no description or analysis of Napoleon III's policies with regard to Europe and the rest of the world; such an analysis would have thrown much illumination upon Franco-American relations during the Civil War. Moreover, the various internal problems and upheavals which occurred in France during these years are not given the attention and explanation they deserve; they did, after all, profoundly affect Franco-American relations.

The style is reasonably clear, with the exception of one or two gross slips, such as one intervention which did not "come off." In addition, the book has a marked nationalistic tone, rather remarkable for a study which deals with the diplomacy of another century.

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RAYMOND W. BIXLER. *The Open Door on the Old Barbary Coast*. Pp. 204. New York: Pageant Press, 1959. \$3.50.

This short but quite penetrating book recalls the wartime appearance of Louis B. Wright's *The First Americans in North Africa* (1945). That volume, issued at a critical time, described America's earliest involvements on the African continent. Even before the days of Jefferson's determined resistance to the Barbary corsairs, North Africa has been of sporadic interest to Americans. Bixler's book is a history of United States economic and political relations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries with the countries along the Mediterranean's African coastline.

The author has shown real diligence in consulting primary sources, including the consular and diplomatic archives of the United States Department of State, as well as foreign correspondence and documentation concerning American involvement in North Africa. His book is both descriptive and analytical. The lay reader might wish for a bit more color and evidence of literary style in such a book as this. As with so many similar works, Bixler's book is written primarily for the specialist. De-

spite its lack of stylistic finesse, one can have little quarrel with the conceptualization of the book, with its informativeness, or with its thoroughness.

Bixler points out how, too often in our national history, North Africa has, like other diplomatically marginal areas, been ignored or rated as of little importance to United States foreign policy. This neglect has tended to color the attitude of colonial peoples and to facilitate the penetration of Africa by the Soviet Union. This phenomenon occurred in Egypt, where a combination of diplomatic bungling and misunderstanding severely damaged the American power position during and after the Suez crisis.

This book makes the point that an era of revolution has arrived in an awakened, socially sensitive Africa. Now that the old imperialism of the nineteenth century is passing, it behooves us to show special care in the development of alternative policies to suit the future. To quote Bixler: "Zealous new national states are coming into being. As they become members of the United Nations, they will join the Afro-Asian bloc and participate in the struggle between East and West." In an age when the Mediterranean has become a vital link in America's world-wide defense posture we need more books which help define, historically and for today, the role which a democracy should play in regional strategy.

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AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY

JAMES ROOSEVELT and SIDNEY SHALETT. *Affectionately, F. D. R.: A Son's Story of a Lonely Man*. Pp. xii, 394. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1959. \$5.75.

This is, as Congressman Roosevelt says, a testament of love to Franklin Delano Roosevelt—not as President of the United States but as father of a numerous and rambunctious brood of children and as consort to Eleanor, his "dearest Babs," to

whom the British in wartime gave the not inappropriate code name of "Rover." It is a "document of love" also to Granny, his mother, that austere dowager of Hyde Park under whose benign rule Roosevelt and his family lived for nearly sixty years. Granny was generous to a fault and spoiled the children by showering them with gifts and surreptitious supplemental cash. But she was equally generous with Franklin and Eleanor, to whom Granny's gifts of hospitality at Hyde Park, a town house in New York, and the now legendary summer mansion at Campobello were but a few items on a large list of benefactions. For it was his mother, Sara Delano Roosevelt, who during most of Roosevelt's life controlled the family fortune.

What effect all this had upon the character and conduct of the Roosevelt family, one can only surmise. That it was an important factor in the education of Eleanor Roosevelt there can be no doubt. It is hard now to believe that this gallant woman lived for many years as a timid, shy, and complacent girl under the shadow of her gracious, generous, but domineering mother-in-law.

Important as Granny is, the center of this fascinating chronicle is James Roosevelt's father, Franklin Roosevelt. It is, in fact, a book about three fathers—the robust, part-time playmate, part-time politician of the prepoly days before August 10, 1921; the affectionate, indomitable, and infectiously cheerful "Pa" of the long recovery period until the gubernatorial campaign of 1928; and the final lonely father, still called "Pa," of the Presidential years.

It may be that "no man can be a hero to his valet" and that "one must not inquire into the mystery that surrounds a King or a President" lest charisma be dissolved by familiarity. But none of these clichés would seem to apply to Roosevelt. The more one learns of the intimate details of his life, both before and after the polio attack, the more does his stature grow. The more, too, does Franklin Roosevelt, the man, the politician, and the President, seem to stand apart from Franklin Roosevelt, the son, husband, father, and friend. He was not only "hail fellow well met,"

equally at home with Louis Howe and Gus Gennerich, Winston Churchill, and the British Royal family, but always, too, fairly alone and aloof.

This book is a massive refutation of Jim Farley's statement that "Franklin finds it hard to relax with people who aren't his social equals." This remark, attributed to Mrs. Roosevelt, was no doubt inspired by her husband's early cruises on Vincent Astor's "Nourmahal" with a covey of millionaires, mostly Republican in politics and patrician in parentage and tradition. Flatly denying having made the statement, Mrs. Roosevelt went on to say, "I couldn't even have thought to say such a thing because it was not true. If I were going to say anything at all on the subject, it would have been that I never understood how Franklin could have gone on those cruises and relaxed with those people." That he could do so in the midst of the bitter battles of the early New Deal is part of the Roosevelt mystique that not even his children could quite fathom. For, as Congressman Roosevelt says, "Nowhere in the world really was there anyone for him with whom he could unlock his mind and his thoughts. Politics, domestic economy, war strategy, postwar planning: he could talk over with dozens of persons. Of what was inside him, of what really drove him, Father talked to no one." It is this quality that justified the subtitle of this book—*A Son's Story of a Lonely Man*.

James Roosevelt and his collaborator, Sidney Shalett, both obviously write under the influence of the "FDR myth." The Father and the President is clearly a hero to them as he was to millions of others around the world. And not all of the intriguing and fascinating tales of his personal follies and foibles, of the *sturm und drang* of a turbulent and often incorrigible family, of his often ambiguous posture toward personal and political associates and public policies, seem to dim in any degree the love of those who knew him best or the luster of his name among the great Presidents of this country.

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THE BASIC BOOK ON

PARTIES AND POLITICS IN AMERICA

By CLINTON ROSSITER, *Cornell University*

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HERBERT HOOVER. *An American Epic*, Volume I, *The Relief of Belgium and Northern France, 1914-1930*. Pp. xxiii, 477. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1959. \$6.50.

In 1914 a man who had made a worldwide reputation as mining engineer and reorganizer-manager was called upon to undertake a herculean task—the feeding of ten million people in German-occupied Belgium and Northern France. This was a redirection of his major life efforts at the age of forty, a redirection that opened the way for a second meteoric career, culminating in the Presidency of the United States.

Herbert Hoover has now undertaken a detailed, authoritatively documented history of relief during both World Wars and in the postwar periods. The present volume covers only relief in Belgium and Northern France from 1915 to 1919, though the story is continued to the final "closing of the books" in 1927 and "re-unions" of the directing commissions in 1938 and 1958. Two more volumes are promised.

In preparation for this history, "the number of documents, books, articles, diaries, records, and reports that had to be examined . . . exceeded 3,500,000." Mr. Hoover himself inspected about 400,000 items, his "homework over the years." This is an impressive piece of writing and editing, but the story itself is far more impressive.

Beginning with nothing—no organization, no money, no precedent, only the ideals of humanity and the determination that the job had to be done—Mr. Hoover and his American Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB) had to overcome opposition in military circles, on both sides, and caution and suspicion at the diplomatic level. They had to organize, at community and national levels in Belgium and France, orderly distribution of food and other supplies. Money had to be raised—a total of nearly a billion dollars, in the form of subsidies from governments of the United States, France, and Great Britain and as charitable contributions by people in several countries. They had to arrange for the purchase, shipment, and distribution of

over five million tons of commodities, chiefly foodstuffs.

The CRB organization and its performance were remarkable in many respects. Almost all of the American members and the leading Belgian members served as volunteers, for periods of a few months to four and a half years, almost all of the Americans even paying their own traveling expenses. Most of the Americans were engineers. Goods worth \$1,400,000,000 were distributed at a total expense of about \$4,000,000—an expense ratio less than one-third of one per cent. The war began in August 1914; Mr. Hoover accepted the chairmanship of the Commission in mid-October; relief supplies began to arrive in November.

The story is primarily one of high-level diplomacy against great odds. Through quoted documents, correspondence, and memoranda, and through direct comments by Mr. Hoover, one feels the awful pressure of the race against starvation and the frustration attending negotiations with military commanders and ministries. The reader gains insight into the personalities of well-known wartime leaders—Ambassadors Walter Hines Page and James W. Gerard, Hugh Gibson, Lord Grey, Lord Percy, General von Bissing, and many others whose names are not so familiar.

Occasionally the author permits himself a pithy comment on a personage or a situation. One such sentence reflects a great deal of Mr. Hoover and of his appraisal of the diplomatic maneuvering: "Stupidity is an essential concomitant of war."

HOWARD M. TEAF, JR.

Professor of Economics
Haverford College

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN. *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin*. Edited by Leonard W. Labaree and Whitfield J. Bell, Jr. Vol. I: Jan. 6, 1706 to Dec. 31, 1734. Pp. lxxxviii, 400. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1959. \$7.50.

This attractive, scholarly volume is the first of a new and comprehensive edition of *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin*. Sponsored by the American Philosophical Society and Yale University, the project

was formally announced on the anniversary of Franklin's birthday, January 17, 1954. In order to make the edition as comprehensive as possible, the editors promptly started a world-wide search for Franklin papers which brought to light literally thousands of new or hitherto unavailable papers. At the time the present volume went to press, 27,800 Franklin papers belonging to 375 owners had been located and photostated for inclusion in this edition which will have three times as many Franklin papers as the latest previous edition (1906) of his writings by Smyth.

This initial volume serves a twofold purpose, first as an introduction to the edition in general, and second, the printing with editorial notes of all Franklin papers of the period from 1722 to December 31, 1734. The long, scholarly Introduction reflects the results of the latest research on virtually every aspect of Franklin's papers—Franklin's literary heritage, genealogies, earlier editions, editorial policies on questions of selection ("any paper whose contents are in any sense the product of his mind"), arrangement (chronological sequence), form and method of presentation. In addition, there are a number of other noteworthy features of the volume that are especially germane to the edition as a whole, such as the fine frontispiece in color of the portrait of Franklin painted in 1778 by the great court portraitist J. S. Duplessis. Pieces like this of the Passy period help to create that larger atmosphere of Franklin's life not yet present in the early Boston-Philadelphia years.

Nevertheless the papers of this early period hold a surprisingly high place in the canon of Franklin's writings. It is doubtful whether any of the succeeding volumes will have as great an appeal to the average reader. Here are the satirical "Silence Dogood" secretly published in the *New England Courant*; the "Busy Body" papers; the "Plan for Conduct"; "Articles of Belief and Acts of Religion," a sort of personal liturgy; "Proposals and Queries To Be Asked the Junto"; "Agreements of the Directors of the Library Company;" Papers on Conversation, Cold, Reading of History, and Literary Style; "Providence

of God in the Government of the World;" the "Epitaph;" and the first two *Poor Richard's Almanacks*.

The photoduplication (28 pages) of the first impression of *Poor Richard's Almanack* for 1733 is a bold departure from the conventional and an effective stroke to introduce the reader realistically not only to Franklin's most popular publication, but also to Franklin as printer, publisher, and businessman. More than ten thousand of the *Almanacks* were sold annually, from 1733 to 1756, the year in which the more acceptable maxims and other features of the *Almanacks* were gathered into one final *Poor Richard*, known as the *Way to Wealth*. More than any of his writings *Poor Richard's Almanack* created an image of Franklin in the popular mind before even the first part of the Autobiography was written.

In the facsimile reproduction of the "Epitaph" (1728), there is more than just another well-chosen illustration. By implication the editors draw attention to Franklin's remarkable penmanship which, like his mental powers, retained its clarity and edge to the end.

"The Plan of Conduct" (p. 99) adopted toward the end of his long voyage in 1726 is an interesting example of several self-imposed disciplines Franklin adopted as a young man. Writing about it in his Autobiography, he described the plan: "more remarkable as being form'd when I was so young, and being pretty faithfully adhered to quite thro' to old age." While Franklin speaks of it as included in the *Journal* of the voyage, it does not appear there. Indeed, no original has been found. The near loss of this important document gives emphasis to the total loss of the large body of Franklin papers entrusted to his friend Galloway before leaving for France in 1775.

Like the content, paper, printing, and binding of the volume are in keeping with the standards established by Benjamin Franklin himself, still America's ranking printer and publisher. The 12-point type for the text was especially designed and cut for this edition. A working Index for each volume is welcome in anticipation of the more detailed Index promised for the

entire work after the last volume appears some fifteen years hence.

In every respect this initial volume of *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin* has in it the promise of a superb addition to the great project of American historiography inaugurated by the American Historical Association, and now in full stride, for the publication of the papers of the great men of the nation.

WILLIAM E. LINGELBACH

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American Philosophical Society

DAVID B. TRUMAN. *The Congressional Party: A Case Study*. Pp. xii, 336. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959. \$7.50.

For better or worse Congress is one of the great institutions in the world and the subject of many intriguing volumes. Allen Drury, through the novel *Advise and Consent*, has given us a stirring, if fictionalized, account of how the Senate works. Journalist William S. White in descriptive prose has taken us behind the *Citadel*. Many political scientists and members of Congress have likewise turned their hand to provide insights about the United States national legislature. Professor David Truman, one of political science's best scholars, has resorted to roll call votes to study the relationship between political parties and the legislature. In a general way he is trying to find out the influence of the political party and the President's program on voting behavior of majority and minority members.

At the outset, the layman who is unsophisticated in statistics and with such terms as "high cohesion" and "cleavages" and "multi-nuclear types" will find many pages difficult to follow. He will hardly be able to judge the efficacy of the author's methodology nor his conclusions. Nevertheless, if he will discipline himself to read the prose and the summaries, he will learn a considerable amount about the leadership systems in Congress and the degree of cohesion on notes between "elective" leaders such as the floor leader and whips and the "seniority" leaders who are the

standing committee chairmen and ranking minority members. Truman brings in the voting behavior of state delegations and some fine insights about Presidential leadership.

The scholar is likely to be as fascinated with the method of analyzing vote clusters as with the substantive observations and conclusions. Although the book concentrates on the clusters of voting blocs in the Eighty-first Congress (1949-51), it makes some generalizations which, to this reviewer, are valid for most Congresses. At the same time, Truman is cautious about applying his conclusions to all Congresses. Each Congress is different as each set of leaders is different. For example, this reviewer, using impressions and interviews, came to quite different conclusions about Senate policy committees in 1955 than did Truman through statistical analysis of their behavior in 1949. This is what makes Congress an exciting subject!

For the reader who believes the congressman ignores party when voting there is a challenge in this book. Truman's analysis finds "Congressional parties" a reality, and he has provided additional documentation of the interdependence between the President and the elective party leaders in Congress. Although a majority of the American voters seem unworried about a President and Congress of opposite party faith, the author believes that this results in limiting the significance of the Congressional parties and their leaders.

HUGH A. BONE

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HAROLD M. HYMAN. *To Try Men's Souls: Loyalty Tests in American History*. Pp. ix, 414. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959. \$6.00.

In this episodic history of loyalty testing in America, Professor Hyman presents a most stimulating account of efforts to uncover the disloyal from the days of the early colonies to the present. Emphasizing the record of oaths of allegiance in the Revolution and the Civil War and of the amateur and extralegal "spycatching" operations of World War I, he amasses im-

pressive evidence documenting his contention that loyalty testing has proved generally ineffective and in support of his concluding plea that, "Until the past history of the inutility of loyalty tests . . . is recognized, American unity and American rights will suffer." The book offers both revealing insights into the antecedents of present-day loyalty-security measures and valuable contributions to the understanding of the times which the author treats.

The chapters on the colonial and Revolutionary periods, in which Hyman convincingly argues that loyalty tests "played a primary role in structuring the Revolution," provide a rich background for the analysis of current controversy over the merits of loyalty measures. Both critics and defenders of today's loyalty programs will find that many of their arguments were stated long ago—by a Lafayette counseling General Washington not to equate nonjurancy with disloyalty or a Tom Paine urging the use of stern loyalty tests to determine "who are in real allegiance with the United Independent States, and who are not."

In his discussion of the complex of laws, edicts, and local understandings concerning loyalty during the Civil War and Reconstruction, Professor Hyman enlarges on a field explored in his earlier book, *Era of the Oath: Northern Loyalty Tests During the Civil War and Reconstruction* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1954). He depicts, with considerable writing skill, the meaning of loyalty tests in the daily lives of millions of citizens in both the North and the South. Of particular interest is his account of the antidisloyalty campaign of Republican Representative John Fox Potter and his investigating committee established in mid-1861, and of Potter's tactics, which bear a striking resemblance to those of his fellow Wisconsin legislator some ninety years later.

Hyman presents only a sketchy, though provocative, treatment of loyalty measures since World War I. With regard to legislative loyalty testing in the 1950's, he observes that modern techniques of mass communication have added "to its exploitative potentialities, but not, unfortunately, to its efficiency or objectivity."

Hyman is far from happy with the recent record of loyalty testing in the hands of the executive but concludes that, "Executive, national management of loyalty testing emerges from history as the proper pattern" and "is far more correctable than congressional control."

No one genuinely concerned over the loyalty-security issue should pass this book by.

WILLIAM D. CARMICHAEL

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JAMES MORTON SMITH (Ed.). *Seventeenth-Century America: Essays in Colonial History*. Pp. xv, 238. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1959. \$5.00.

This interesting collection of essays on the English colonies in the seventeenth century is the fruit of a symposium in honor of the 350th anniversary of the founding of Jamestown sponsored by the Williamsburg Institute. Its program was, as the editor puts it, "to examine some of the more important manifestations of the American colonial experience." The volume makes no claim to be a comprehensive history of seventeenth-century English colonization, but a certain unity has been achieved by the editor's Introduction and Oscar Handlin's essay on the significance of the century. The other essays center on four chief aspects, relations with the Indians, the social structure, church and state, and the character of the transplanting of the peoples as seen through the eyes of contemporary historians. Information on these subjects has in some of the essays been assembled more from the scholarly monographs of other writers than from direct contact with the primary sources, and the impress of the symposium discussions is apparent from the many points of view expressed.

Wilcomb E. Washburn, in his "The Moral and Legal Justifications for Dispossessing the Indians," states that the European powers made little or no attempt to justify such dispossessing, being inter-

ested chiefly in safeguarding their own claims against their European rivals. While this may be true in general, there was at least one English king who did make a conspicuous public attempt to justify pre-empting Indian lands. James I, recognizing the occupational right of the Indians in the northern coast region, stated in his charter to the New England Council in 1620 that because of a "wonderful Plague" which had depopulated the area he believed God "in his goodness" had determined that the country should be "possessed and enjoyed" by Englishmen going there. Winthrop later made a similar statement, after a smallpox epidemic, that God had silenced the Indian claims in the area.

Nancy Oestreich Lurie deals with the impact of the white man's culture on that of the Indians. Mildred Campbell's interesting essay on social origins of the immigrants points out two basic aspects of seventeenth-century philosophy affecting everyone; the general acceptance of the idea of grades of society and the belief that differences in status were "not unalterable." The reviewer is reminded of an almost unbelievable example of the latter in the life story of William Phips of Boston, a rough, uncultured ship carpenter and sea captain who was knighted by James II for discovering a sunken treasure ship in the waters off the Bahamas and then was made the first royal governor of Massachusetts under the new charter. In contrast, Bernard Bailyn found status in Virginia more fixed, for by the end of the century a colonial aristocracy had emerged whose members were distinguished from other people by their wealth, importance, and political influence. There are interesting essays on new patterns of church and state in the colonies by William H. Seiler, Emil Oberholzer, and Philip Haffenden, and Richard Dunn's analysis of histories of English colonization indicates that the colonial authors better understood the significance of the transplanting than did authors in England.

The question might be raised as to whether it is possible to evaluate the influence of the new world on the emerging cultural patterns without taking into ac-

count the promoters of colonizing projects, the trading companies and the feudal proprietors, along with the people they sent over and whose government they controlled. Also the development of a more centralized national control in the royal provinces and over the colonial empire as a whole, supported by increasing numbers of colonists, was certainly a major aspect of the colonial experience. The Restoration experiment with a "dominion" in New England, with the intention if successful of following it with regional groupings elsewhere, was something far more than a doctrinaire gesture, with the emphasis on national control of defense as well as trade and on greater uniformity in province laws and their conformity with the national ones.

Taken as a whole this collection of essays, while covering subjects long well known and understood, presents new and heretofore undiscovered aspects of social patterns in a transplanted English society and of characteristics indelibly impressed on a people ultimately forming a new nation.

VIOLA F. BARNES

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OSKAR MORGENSTERN. *The Question of National Defense*. Pp. xii, 306. New York: Random House, 1959. \$3.95.

Professor Morgenstern has made a major addition to the growing literature on strategic problems. He explains in his Preface that he does not intend to be original, but to find the truth. Therefore, he warns, the reader may feel his conclusions to be obvious. Indeed much of what Professor Morgenstern says is familiar, but the whole has a clarity, consistency, and logic which make the book an original and significant contribution.

The argument of the book rests on the principle that "in order to preserve a nuclear stalemate under conditions of nuclear plenty it is necessary for both sides to possess invulnerable retaliatory forces." If retaliatory forces are vulnerable and can only strike if they get warning and respond quickly, an unstable international situation exists. But if each side knows

that the other side, because its retaliatory force is relatively invulnerable, is under no pressure to strike quickly, worry about error is largely eliminated. This is particularly important when weapons systems are based on ballistic missiles which cannot be recalled as aircraft can.

Fixed sites for missile bases do not meet the requirement for such a retaliatory invulnerable force, the book argues, because in the race between hardening such sites and developing weapons which can destroy them, the defender always loses. Furthermore, it is against American interest to attract ever larger nuclear weapons to our own territory. Since our Allies have similar objections to sites on their territory, the United States needs mobile missile launching platforms in places under the surface of the water. This is Morgenstern's "Oceanic System." He recognized that bases in space would meet the same requirements, but he excludes them from consideration because he thinks they are too far off in time to warrant consideration in his recommendations for what should be done in the immediate future. The "Oceanic System" is not restricted to submarines which can launch missiles from underwater; it includes nuclear powered seaplanes. He advocates seaplanes because they could be serviced from mobile submarine bases rather than from fixed sites on land. Jet aircraft, Morgenstern feels, should be put on permanent air alert as a stop gap until superior systems become available. In addition, Morgenstern advocates improved limited war forces and insists that we should arm them with nuclear weapons of low caliber if that be to our military advantage.

Morgenstern makes very serious criticisms of American defense policy; his own recommendations are carefully considered and deserving of serious attention.

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JAY LUYAAS. *The Military Legacy of the Civil War: The European Inheritance*. Pp. xi, 252. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959. \$5.95.

This reviewer found unusual interest in this book, since from her study of foreigners in the Union and Confederacy she encountered many old acquaintances, such as Colonel Wolsey, Colonel Freemantle of the Coldstream Guards, Colonel Fletcher of the Scots Fusilier Guards, the Prince de Joinville and the Bourbon Princes, Heros von Borcke, the picturesque Prussian with Stuart's Cavalry, and Scheibert, official observer for Prussia, to name just a few.

The author followed a simple and logical organization. In his first chapter he states his problem: to determine the military influence of our Civil War on subsequent warfare and on European military theorists. To find the answer, the author then devotes a chapter to each of the British, German, and French observers, official and unofficial. Next he explores the military writings of French, English, and German military men since the close of the Civil War. Here the author has done a prodigious amount of research. So important did he regard the writings of G. F. R. Henderson that Luyaaas devotes an entire chapter to "The Henderson Legacy." When World War I revealed that our war with its use of trenches and railroads was a forerunner of modern warfare, there followed a revival of interest in that war and reappraisal of the war leaders. Writers like Captain Lepoitier saw that it resembled World War I in that sea-power was the decisive factor. In England the Civil War continued to be studied at the staff college. With new standards from the recent war Jackson shared the stage with Lee, praised for his use of trenches, Sherman for his remarkable strategy and mobility, and Grant for his policy of attrition, understood finally.

Luyaaas concludes that our Civil War never exerted a direct influence upon military doctrines in Europe. Each of the major armies found some part of the American experience of special significance as the British, considering creation of a volunteer force, found the volunteer army. Available information was ignored in favor of a study of recent European wars; yet England could have profited in her Boer

War from our cavalry lessons, and the Allies from the use of trenches. The lesson to be drawn from rifled artillery had to await universal introduction of rifled artillery in about 1870. American developments in technology were noted but not tactical lessons.

The reviewer must deplore the omission of a Bibliography. Attention must also be called to careless proofreading (p. 103), where obviously some lines have been omitted. On page 56 occurs an error of fact: Borcke is presented as serving from May, 1862, to the "following" June whereas he was wounded June 19, 1863.

ELLA LONN

Professor of History, Emeritus
Goucher College

FREDRICK B. PIKE (Ed.). *Freedom and Reform in Latin America*. Pp. ix, 308. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959. \$6.00.

A curious creation indeed would be a *divertimento* in six movements, one each contributed by Corelli, Moussorgsky, Beethoven, Wagner, Stravinsky, and Berg. The editors of symposia should not lightly assume that ten area experts representing almost as many disciplines will produce a more grateful pastiche than our beastly *divertimento*, especially when it is plain that the authors are not in agreement as to the subject on which they are writing. The editor's introduction makes it clear that he considers freedom and reform as mutually opposed—or at least opposable—tendencies. Dr. Pike states, "For Latin Americans, the query as it emerges today is, can we reform in the midst of the freedom we prize? . . . It is not accidental that in the United States the liveliest concern over the disappearance of freedom has come in an age of reform. . . ." Some of his authors are either unaware of this point of view or tacitly in disagreement with it. Professor Charles C. Cumberland, for example, takes the usual view that freedom and reform are handmaidens, basing his entire essay on that premise. Yet another author, Professor Richard N. Adams, restricts his definition of freedom

to religious and political matters, offers a sophisticated statement of the relationship between freedom and reform, and then concludes with an inferentially negative definition of freedom by saying, ". . . one could hardly extend them [aboriginal cultures] more freedom than they have now." Had this collection been organized as a philosophical debate on the social ethics of the political dynamics of Latin America, it would have gained enormously and served as a most unusual contribution. But such frank confrontation never occurs. The result is a bad symposium, although the book is a collection of good articles.

The several authors are among the most able to be found in their respective fields: W. Rex Crawford writes on the concept of freedom as such in Latin America; C. S. Cumberland relates politics and cultural homogeneity to derive a fresh hypothesis of more than passing research interest; F. A. Hermens addresses himself to the constitutional aspects of the matter, while W. S. Stokes contributes a piquing portion of his recently published book, *Latin American Politics*. P. A. Cebollero presents a quite detailed survey of attempts at educational reform, W. C. Gordon discusses economic well-being and social progress, and R. H. Fitzgibbon, A. Karasz, and Alceu Amoroso Lima consider the special cases of Uruguay, Bolivia, and Brazil respectively. The editor himself contributes a broadly impressionistic piece on the sources of revolution in Latin America. These essays are, by and large, fresh and informative. Poor co-ordination, unhappily, does not permit them to gain depth and perspective through their mutual association, so the articles must stand or fall one by one.

So far as symposia on Latin America are concerned, the honors will continue to go to the *American Political Science Review's* now classical "Pathology of Democracy in Latin America," March, 1950, in which Professors Crawford and Fitzgibbon also participated to greater advantage than here.

K. H. SILVERT

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Tulane University

EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY

BRIAN CHAPMAN. *The Profession of Government: The Public Service in Europe*. Pp. 352. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959. \$6.50.

C. H. SISSON. *The Spirit of British Administration and Some European Comparisons*. Pp. 159. London: Faber & Faber, 1959. 21 s. net.

Brian Chapman is Senior Lecturer in Government at the University of Manchester. He has lived often in France and Italy and, among British political scientists, is a leading student of continental government. C. H. Sisson is an assistant secretary in the Ministry of Labour and National Service who, after twenty years in Whitehall, profited by a Simon Senior Research Fellowship to observe administration in France, Germany, Austria, Sweden, and Spain. They have produced complementary books, different in organization, but both illuminated by urbanity, perspicacity, wit, shrewd insight, and appreciation of ways in which "they order this matter better in France."

Mr. Chapman deliberately eschews systematic comparisons with the British system. Mr. Sisson's essays are suffused with the calm assurance that matters are ordered pretty sensibly in Britain, yet he tantalizes the reader by a manner that suggests that he is posing in his tweediest suit, clutching his oldest briar pipe, for a portrait of the typical Briton, like Commander Whitehead and his Schweppesmanship.

Mr. Chapman's book is a magisterial treatise that traverses the experience, literature, official documents, and reports of eleven countries, from Denmark and Sweden to Spain and Portugal. He characterizes his volume as an "attempt to write a textbook for a subject that does not yet exist," for the good reason that there are few writers with sufficient scope to encompass it. He first outlines the historic roots, from Roman times, of the public service in Europe; he discusses its composition, extent, recruitment, and training; the conditions of service—rights, duties, security of tenure, discipline, and promo-

tion. The central concerns of his treatise are the controls of the public servant and the interplay between him, the politicians, and the public. His is a beautiful book.

Mr. Sisson's records of his observations and reflections are less tightly-knit, provocative essays, from which the temptation is to quote at large. Like Chapman, and like Fritz Morstein Marx in *The Administrative State*, Sisson knows that only the strong interplay of opposing parties can provide the political leadership and control that enables the civil servant to play his proper role: "without the dialogue between the two sides of the House, the administration could not show even as much life as it does." Without it, too, the higher civil service, as a professional elite, will dominate the government.

Both authors are thoroughly British in their view of juridical controls, as exercised by continental councils of state. Chapman gives the postwar French national school of administration higher marks than Sisson, who thinks the apprentice year closer than the academic year to the "Anglo-Saxon conception of an institution designed to train people to perform tricks rather than one designed to inculcate learning." In a sideswipe, Sisson dismisses "the fantasy of some American case-studies," footnoted to Stein's famous volume, "as a sort of administrative science-fiction."

Climb steadily to the top of Mount Blanc with Chapman as expert guide to the most extended view of the public service in Europe. Sit over pipes and ale with Sisson on your descent to chuckle over wise saws.

CHARLES S. ASCHER
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EDGAR S. FURNESS, JR. *France, Troubled Ally: De Gaulle's Heritage and Prospects*. Pp. 512. New York: Harper & Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1959. \$5.75.

One of General de Gaulle's accomplishments is that he has succeeded in focusing world attention on his determination to restore France to the status of a truly great power. Professor Furness, a politi-

cal scientist at Princeton, correctly believes that the prospects of the Fifth French Republic are inseparable from the conditions which led to the destruction of the Fourth Republic. He devotes, therefore, the major portion of his book to an analysis of France's domestic and foreign policies from 1944 to 1958.

The author attributes the final bankruptcy of the Fourth Republic to the system of "immobilisme" which, "reflecting contradictory aspirations of the French people, . . . concentrated on 'resolving' conflicts by tactical means without taking strategic or long-range action." In spite of large infusions of foreign aid, protectionist policies, increased production, and high taxes, since 1945 no French government had been able to balance the budget or to satisfy the desire of the great mass of the French people for higher living standards. The Fourth Republic lost the loyalty of many Frenchmen because they were dissatisfied with the system of inequitable taxes, deplorable housing conditions, and inadequate educational opportunities. Crucially important, moreover, was the growing discontent of the French army which felt betrayed by the politicians and let down by the existing political system.

While the author's comments about France's domestic affairs are informative and enlightening, his analysis of foreign political questions is penetrating and thought provoking as he traces the many shifts in French policy since the end of World War II. Prominent among them was the original desire to dismember Germany, which gave way to the acceptance of Germany as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Common Market. Confronted with the East-West conflict, France moved from the original position of intending to rely for its security on the prewar system of alliances—including the Soviet Union—to the support of the Western defense system and the European unification movement. The author analyzes, furthermore, the new relationship between France and its overseas territories, the costly war in Indochina, the Suez fiasco, and the Algerian dilemma.

Although aware of the tremendous complexities of the Algerian problem, Professor Furness regards De Gaulle's inability to end the war as his "most evident failure." As far as French possessions in Africa are concerned, he expresses the realistic view that, although their "loss would be a calamity for France, . . . a policy whose only political alternatives for Africa are maintenance of its connection with France or complete alienation from the West would face diplomatic bankruptcy." This warning is meant for the United States as well as France.

After the Second World War the United States was so anxious to restore France to a dynamic role in world affairs that it encouraged France to think of itself as a great power. The author criticizes the United States for having persistently underestimated the limitations of France's power. Indeed, he is concerned lest Washington continue to do so. This reviewer agrees with the author's conclusion that a power unable to cope with internal weaknesses should resign itself to a limited role in world affairs. Expecting De Gaulle to run into domestic opposition to policies beyond the resources of France, Furness believes that "in the end De Gaulle will not succeed in restoring France to its past grandeur." He suggests that France would do well to recognize its decline as a world power and to chart a new course, taking cognizance of the fact that, fundamentally, it is a continental European power. These critical and controversial observations merit widespread discussion.

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JOHN T. MARCUS. *Neutralism and Nationalism in France: A Case Study*. Pp. 207. New York: Bookman Associates, 1958. \$4.50.

Sir Eyre Crowe's famous memorandum concerning British foreign policy in 1907 argued that coalitions of jealous rivals against the eminence and wealth of Britain were only obviated by Britain's manifest concern for the ultimate interest of every nation, its independence. This concern permitted Britain to protect herself from

the threat of a power aspiring to general dominance by forming an alliance of those states seeking protection from the same threat.

In attempting to contain the expansionist designs of the Soviet Union, American policy-makers looked with some assurance to receive the support of other nations. It has not always been forthcoming. Some states and some parties within states have opted for various forms of neutrality in the Cold War. This neutralism, principally as manifested in France, is the subject of Marcus' book. It is "primarily a mood, an attitude of values, and only secondarily a policy, or set of policies" (p. 107). But its significance was demonstrated in the defeat of the European Defense Community.

This was a considerable achievement for the "mood" and views originally expressed by some left-wing politicians and notably intellectuals, including the *Mouvement Républicain Populaire* (MRP) senator and philosopher, Étienne Gilson. The neutralism of the earlier period from 1949 to 1951 was often pro-American in some respects, but it was argued that since the United States could not provide any tolerable security for France, neutrality would be in the interests of France and ultimately of the United States. If France were not an American ally, the Soviet Union was unlikely to attack her, and she could concentrate on domestic reconstruction and reform. American leadership in resisting the North Korean aggression and in urging the rearming of Western Europe and Germany provoked a more anti-American temper and a more forceful neutralism. Moreover, the disintegration of De Gaulle's *Rassemblement du Peuple Français* (RPF) as a political movement—many of his supporters found Pinay's rightist government congenial—restored the purity of a *mystique* to De Gaulle's movement and permitted his followers to work with others on political issues, for example, on Vietnam and the European Defense Community. Thus, neutralism was temporarily effective because it marked the convergence of "the social ideology of the left and the nationalism of the right" (p. 20). A somewhat similar convergence provides some of the

support for De Gaulle today. In a brief chapter Marcus notes the play of leftist neutralism and nationalism in Bevanism and among the German Socialists.

The volume is distinguished by judiciousness, careful analysis, and wide research.

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WILLIAM A. JENKS. *Vienna and the Young Hitler*. Pp. viii, 252. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960. \$5.00.

Adolf Hitler called the time he spent in Vienna "the hardest, but also the most thorough school of my life." A number of books have already been published by the companions of his early years, which have shed some light on the darkness in which Hitler wished to preserve his youth. Professor Jenks does not attempt to add to the biographical information thus far assembled. Rather it is his intention to "re-create the Vienna in which Hitler spent six aimless but important years." Like most students of the Führer, he has gathered the impression from reading *Mein Kampf* that practically all the future dictator's ideas were conceived or stimulated during his sojourn in the Hapsburg capital. His book is, therefore, a background study designed to explain the convulsed and ideological processes which crystallized in the doctrine of national socialism after 1919.

An introductory chapter presents a view of the Vienna of 1906, with its magnificent opera, its courts and parades, under which seethed the turmoil of its racial mixtures and nationalistic tensions. Mr. Jenks concludes: "If Vienna did . . . not inspire Hitler's hatred for 'inferior races' . . . it at least fixed and intensified his unholy complexes."

The book gives a graphic description, drawn from authentic material, of the welfare institutions to which Hitler was obliged to appeal for his actual survival in Vienna. Apparently some were models of cleanliness, where food and shelter might be secured for a token fee. Even so, Hitler was not always able to pay the small amount that was asked, and con-

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sequently spent many a night in the Prater. Such experiences did not turn him into a park-bench philosopher. On the contrary, the self-induced hardships of these early years increased the venom of a mind that was born poisoned.

The most fruitful parts of Mr. Jenks' study are those devoted to the two crucial figures who influenced the political thought of young Hitler: Karl Lueger and Georg von Schönerer. Lueger in particular attracted Hitler's attention, not only because he was a master demagogue and a crafty politician but also because his "rehabilitation of Vienna" showed the political possibilities inherent in an anticapitalistic program. Schönerer, on the other hand, confirmed Hitler's belief that the Hapsburg empire was doomed and that from its ruin a pan-Germanic empire would rise. The chapter in which Mr. Jenks deals with the Austrian Social-democrats is also enlightening. It explains the contradictions in which this party became involved in its hopeless effort to steer a course between the internationalism of Marxian doctrine and the claims of oppressed ethnical groups such as the Czechs and the Southern Slavs. Hitler's contempt, both for the Social-democrats and the Slavic races, was based on the impressions he received in imperial Vienna. It is, of course, important to note that he remained entirely ignorant of the European West.

The pages devoted to the culture of prewar Vienna are less conclusive. Hitler found Viennese culture decadent and "Jew-ridden," and there is a grain of truth in his observations. However, there is no proof that he was in any position to appreciate the Viennese mind. We have no evidence that he ever read a page by Hofmannsthal, Rilke, Schnitzler, or Freud, nor that he ever listened to the music of Mahler or Bruckner. Hitler's taste was for the bombastic and the chaotic; it was natural that he liked Wagner.

This picture of prewar Vienna will, without doubt, help a future biographer to draw the early years of Hitler with firmer strokes. There remain, however, two questions on which Mr. Jenks has not touched—deliberately, I would judge. One is the origin of the pseudoscientific information

that Hitler absorbed prior to 1914 and which he displayed in *Mein Kampf* as an ideological screen for the burning resentment which inspired most of his assertions. The other problem concerns his psychological make-up. Very little progress has been made in this direction since Heiden's work on the subject. Admittedly the task is a formidable one, but only a psychological study of Hitler could fully explain why the lessons he learned in Vienna became the inflammable material that set a continent on fire. Mr. Jenks' book will facilitate research of this kind; it is fully documented and reveals a familiarity with the intricate Austrian problem that comes only from long and sympathetic investigation.

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L. G. JOHNSON. *The Social Evolution of Industrial Britain: A Study in the Growth of our Industrial Society*. Pp. viii, 178. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1959. 25s net.

Although this volume covers much of the same ground as standard works on British social history written by Clapham and the Webbs, it emphasizes, to a greater extent than in previous publications, the loyalties, habits, and aims of the British people. It is less concerned with the expansion of manufacturing techniques and industrial skills. The search for intellectual maturity, through formal and informal education, and the conflict of ideas because of the advancement of knowledge are outlined in great detail.

Tracing the transformation of the British economy from farm-centered to manufacturing-centered, the author, who is a senior lecturer in economics in the University of Leeds, discusses the new skills developed by Britons, the social implications of industrial progress, and the rise of organized labor. Finally, he indicates the significance for social evolution of important economic, political, and intellectual developments of the last fifty years. Moreover, some of the tasks of creative adjustment now facing Great Britain are emphasized. Completion of these tasks,

in a modern technological period, must be assured if that nation is to sustain its evolution as a democratic industrial society.

To the reviewer, one of the most baffling aspects of the book is the stress of the labor movement with little or no reference to management's role in British progress. Although the part the Productivity Teams played in Britain's recovery after the war receives some attention, it appears that the author does not envisage these Teams as making the significant contribution to productivity and to management education which the reviewer feels was the final result. Johnson writes that the years immediately following the Second World War represented a period when, for the first time in British experience, "serious attempts were made by the government and the Press to instruct the general public in matters directly concerned with the nation's economic prosperity." More attention in this area might be devoted to the rise of the statistician as a key figure in British governmental and business circles.

The book ends on the note that, at least as far as inventiveness is concerned, "there seems to be no limit to the expansion of the British economy. The community's most difficult problem is that of human relations within industry." Wage policies have assumed ever greater importance in British affairs. Johnson believes that his country will be asked, eventually, to decide whether the system of collective bargaining should retain its current form. Perhaps, instead, in order to achieve effective co-operation among the government, unions, and nationalized industries, the system should be altered. The hope is expressed that, in spite of drastic change, "the British people will derive inspiration from the knowledge that, during the earlier phases of industrial growth, they manifested a creative capacity for the development of democratic institutions and that they will not permit their community-sense to be weakened by their efforts to live becomingly in the future."

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ABDURAKHMAN AVTORKHANOV. *Stalin and the Soviet Communist Party: A Study in the Technology of Power.* Pp. 379. New York: Frederick A. Praeger for the Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1959. \$6.00.

Mr. Avtorkhanov was born in the Caucasus in 1908, apparently of Muslim origin. His first name, translated from the Arabic, means "servant of the Merciful (God)." In the volume under review, he has attempted the ambitious task of studying in detail the means by which a fellow Caucasian, Stalin, succeeded in dominating the Communist party of Soviet Russia. The narrative—a mixture of personal reminiscence and historical chronicle—concentrates mainly upon the decade 1928–1938. It is successful not only in making the drama, intrigues, and the squalor of the inner-party power struggles at the topmost levels come to life but also in its skillful sketches of some of the more prominent Soviet figures of that time: Stalin himself, Bukharin, Tomsky, Madame Krupskaya, and Pokrovsky. Events subsequent to 1938, including the Khrushchev regime with its revelations of the Stalin system, are also analyzed, but the earlier period is really the heart of the study.

The author—now a leading figure in the Munich Institute for the Study of the Soviet Union—was a member of the Institute of Red Professors in Russia and later worked in the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the party's Central Committee. He suffered for his sympathy toward Bukharin's views and so-called "right deviationism" and spent several years in prison after 1937, the year of the Great Purge.

Mr. Avtorkhanov is shrewd indeed in his estimation of Stalin and his methods. Unlike many of Stalin's foes, he recognizes just how formidable the Georgian Bolshevik was. The discussion of Stalin's position in the party subsequent to the titanic struggle with and victory over Trotsky, but before the triumph over Bukharin and the "Rights," is masterly in its analysis of Stalin's grasp of "unlimited tactical flexibility"—otherwise known as "Leninist dialectics." Mr. Avtorkhanov concludes

that "Stalin will go down in history not only as a tyrant and Grand Inquisitor but also as a phenomenal tactician, strategist, and master of the science of power. The essence of Stalinism, as practiced by himself and his pupil Khrushchev, is the technology of power."

Stalin and the Soviet Communist Party makes a fascinating and significant contribution to our understanding of the mentality of the Stalinist period of Russian history. Much of the historical value of Mr. Avtorkhanov's book will rest, however, upon the extent to which we can lend credence to the author's "Tacitan" historical approach. For example, a rumor is repeated which pictures Lenin's widow, Madame Krupskaya, as wailing in the home of either Rykov or Bukharin that "This Asiatic monster [Stalin] will end by throwing me into the Lubyanka. . . ." It is possible to visualize such a scene. At another point, the author, in discussing Lenin's demise, goes beyond even Trotsky in practically accusing Stalin of poisoning the ailing Lenin. In this reviewer's opinion, accusations of this kind need more than even the strongest circumstantial evidence to convince the historian of their truth.

DAVID HECHT

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TAMAS ACZEL and TIBOR MERAY. *The Revolt of the Mind: A Case History of Intellectual Resistance Behind the Iron Curtain.* Pp. xiv, 449. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. \$5.00.

Aczel, one of the most celebrated young Hungarian Communist novelists and winner of both the Stalin and Kossuth Prizes, joined the Communist movement during World War II; he played an active role in the events leading up to the Hungarian Revolt, fled Hungary after its collapse, and is now living in London. Meray, an equally outstanding Hungarian journalist, novelist, and Kossuth Prize winner, was also forced to flee Hungary following the events described in this book. Incidentally, he is the author of the recently published account of Imre Nagy and the Hungarian

Revolution, *Thirteen Days that Shook the Kremlin.*

With convincing candor, which is quite impressive at times, the authors describe how they swam with the Communist current for several years, accepting the falsehoods with which Matyas Rákosi tried to justify his domestic as well as the Kremlin's foreign policy while slavishly copying the Soviet Union's economic program, although it completely unsuited Hungary and brought the country to the brink of bankruptcy. Aczel and Meray describe vividly the organized mass arrests and trials with predetermined capital sentences and how this unleashed terror induced them to doubt the dictator's claims. They eventually realized that the members of the ruling clique "lived in an air-tight, isolated world, in a glittering glass sphere into which no sound from the outside could penetrate. They lived according to their own rules, and they answered their own questions in the way they wanted to answer them. Life was an endless succession of victories, and they were the conquerors. . ." (p. 309).

The authors end their story on the eve of the October, 1956, events. Their last chapter is a valuable "Who's Who" of the most important personalities covered in their book. All in all, theirs is an eminently readable, and factually dependable, introduction to the operation of the police state in the European Soviet orbit.

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JOSEF KOVAGO. *You Are All Alone.* Pp. 295. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. \$6.00.

The title of this book may refer either to the author, who was the mayor of Budapest between 1945 and 1947 and again during the revolution of 1956, or to his country. Its real value is in the description of a nation's suffering under Communist rule. The author recounts his own day-to-day experiences, imprisonment in 1950 by the tyrannical Rákosi regime and

release shortly before the 1956 Revolution when the policy of de-Stalinization ushered in a period of thaw resulting in a rising spirit of criticism. The book does not represent a penetrating insight into the Communist mystery, and no attempt is made to discuss the ideological character and the genesis of the Revolution. Nowhere does one get a clear picture of how much the Revolution was anti-Communist, anti-Russian, and prodemocratic; there is no discussion of the elements and groups of Hungarian society that led the Revolution. In fairness to the author, however, his book was not intended to be more than a personal account of the crucial events of these years.

What the author does, and does well, is to present his personal experiences accurately and as dispassionately as possible. It might be noted, however, that the prominence given to some leaders of the Revolution and the superficial treatment accorded to others leave an erroneous impression of the relative importance of the roles that individual persons played in the Revolution. Yet the author is essentially kind to his political rivals. He refers to Anna Kethly, the Social Democrat leader, who might have been his political adversary in a free election, with the utmost respect. But Imre Nagy, about whom he has very little to say, is praised faintly as "the patriot Communist who became disgusted with Communist and Soviet terror." Kovago fully acknowledges that Nagy's government received "a unique mandate from the people" and "a vote of confidence which was virtually unanimous" (pp. 249 and 251).

The Revolution tested Kovago's political integrity and convictions, and he apparently survived unscathed. He was steadfast in his demand for the revival of the political parties, free elections, and the withdrawal of Hungary from the Warsaw Pact. As to whether the position he took was politically astute and realistic, future historians will be in a better position to judge. As he saw it in 1956 the only alternative to Communist Hungary was a free and neutral Hungary, and he was convinced that the people of Hungary had rejected both the Tito and Gomulka

types of national communism. He urged his anti-Communist friends to take over the leadership of the Revolution to avoid being "swept by the storm" (p. 172).

One does not obtain a clear picture of what Kovago expected from the West during the Revolution and whether or not the disappointment over western failure to help or the gratitude over western sympathy dominated his feelings. When Vice-President Nixon explained the "moral dilemma" that faced the United States: that is, if the United States "gave special help to the Hungarian refugees, then more and more people would leave Hungary," which would mean "a very serious loss" to that country, but if the United States did not "give the refugees their support," then it would find itself in "an impossible moral position" (p. 280), Kovago could only say that he "never saw the facts in this light." It would seem, therefore, that the author himself is at a loss to know just what course the United States government should have taken. All in all, Mr. Kovago's book is well written and informative, and it helps the reader to understand Hungary's tragedy.

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ALBERT N. TARULIS. *Soviet Policy Toward the Baltic States, 1918-1940*. Pp. viii, 276. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959. \$5.50.

Here is another one of those books that is so dully written that one can only say the author would have been wise to present a straightforward and unadorned calendar of events, rather than to try to string his thoughts together in a narrative, as he has done here. What we have is a calendar of events anyway, and the strung together paragraphs only obscure a clear-cut view of events that a sober calendar would have furnished. The impact of a calendar would have been the more powerful, also, as then we should have been able to see in stark and bitter outline the inevitable *descensus Averni* which is the theme of Mr. Tarulis' story in this volume.

The book had to be written, that we recognize and concede, if only to record

in one place the steps by which the Soviet Union took over and began to absorb the three Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In the year 1918, within the space of ten months, from February 16 to November 18, the three achieved independence. In the summer of 1940, in the space of three days, August 3, 5, and 6, the three lost that independence and became the 14th, 15th, and 16th republics, respectively, of the Soviet Union. In the book under review we have the record, compiled in detail and largely based on primary sources, of just how the drama implicit in this took place. Unfortunately, in this portrayal, there is no drama, just a record of cynical and low-minded political maneuvering and ultimately a forcing of three once independent states into the Soviet orbit without resistance.

The Baltic has always been some Power's lake: for instance, Denmark's and Sweden's, and there was a time the British would have contemplated its acquisition; at one moment in the period 1930-32, there was hope that it might even become the lake of the mid-zone states, with Sweden as a benign patron. Signs pointing in this direction were, among others, the conference of the Agricultural Countries which was held in Warsaw in 1930, and again the celebrations in Tallinn and Tartu in 1932 of the 300th anniversary of the Estonian University of Tartu. We have tangible evidence of what was then happening in the file of that excellent organ of the small Baltic nations, *Baltic Countries*, published in Poland. But since Peter the Great, there has never been a moment's relaxation of the Russian will to make the Baltic a Russian lake, and it is the realization of this that we see in Tarulis' book.

It is clear that if the Baltic peoples had been one, they might have been able to learn to live with a giant, as Poland, with her unique culture, has been able to do. But with three different peoples, varying greatly in historical experience among themselves and with a population ratio of one to thirty with the Soviet Union, there was never any hope. The sad record is here, fully set down.

Scholars reading this book will certainly

miss a Bibliography. And desirable also would be an informative "who's who," so that men such as the United States Minister to Latvia (p. 169) could be properly identified and so that one could recognize in the man, Kreve, who played so great a role in the final handing over of Lithuania to the Soviet Union the professor, Kreve, who had been a great spiritual force in Lithuanian life and who reached the end of his career at the University of Pennsylvania.

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STANLEY W. PAGE. *The Formation of the Baltic States: A Study of the Effects of Great Power Politics upon the Emergence of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia*. (Harvard Historical Monographs XXXIX.) Pp. ix, 193. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959. \$4.50.

Professor Page's book is concerned with one of the most exciting and complex episodes of the political history of World War I. In a way, it may be viewed as a case study of the double conflict between national aspirations and big powers' politics and between the latter's mutually exclusive political goals. This pattern had been in existence in several areas during the closing days of World War I and reappeared in several instances some twenty-five years later.

The Baltic States became a pawn in the power politics of the big powers. It was only at the beginning of 1917 when Germany faced the necessity of contemplating a negotiated peace that some of her political leaders took cognizance of a national movement in Lithuania which demanded independence. Even though this policy was calculated as a matter of temporary expediency the military leaders of Germany combatted it by other designs which equaled outright annexation. Latvia and Estonia remained part of Russia and their national aspirations continued on the whole to be ignored even by her provisional government. Then, the October Revolution and the Brest-Litovsk Treaty threw the whole area into a maelstrom of chaotic

events in which nationalism, imperialism, and Bolshevism crossed swords in a drama of manifold conflicts. Self-determination became the slogan of the day, whether carried on the banners of the advancing German annexationists or on the lips of the Bolshevik interventionists. The Allies who accepted the principle of self-determination as one of the guiding lights of their peace aims ironically were most reluctant to implement it toward the Baltic States.

The chaos reached its peak when after the armistice the ill-fated Iron Division of General von der Goltz was supposed to hold its position on behalf of the Allies. More out of chaotic circumstances than as a result of a planned policy emerged the independent Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, and the only elements that shone in the darkness of power politics were the national sentiments and goals of their people.

Professor Page succeeded in collecting pertinent information from many scattered sources and in presenting an integrated picture of an extremely complex story. It is a pity, indeed, as he himself recognizes, that lack of language knowledge of the Baltic nations prevented him from tapping an important part of historical materials. Nor did he make use of the archives of the Imperial German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the microfilms of which are deposited in the National Archives, Washington, D. C. and which would have thrown an additional light on the somber scene of the German politics in the Baltics. Nevertheless, his volume deserves careful study for its informative value and clarity of presentation.

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FRIEZ RÖRIG. *Wirtschaftskräfte im Mittelalter: Abhandlungen zur Stadt- und Hansegeschichte*. Pp. xi, 707. Köln and Graz: Böhlau Verlag, 1959. No price.

This book is a posthumous collection of essays written over a period of some thirty years by our generation's most outstanding historian of the German Hansa and the cities of northern Germany. A complete

list of Rörig's publications covers dozens of pages. From these papers the editor has selected a score which deal primarily with the history of the Hansa, the Hansa towns, and medieval cities in Germany. The first half of the book contains a set of articles which already had appeared during the lifetime of their author, at that time under the title *Hansische Beiträge zur deutschen Wirtschaftsgeschichte*.

Whereas the first half of the book contains essays which deal with strictly circumscribed problems of medieval economic, and especially commercial and urban history, the papers in the second part deal with somewhat more general questions. One paper, for example, is entitled "Medieval World Economy: Flowering and End of an Economic Epoch." Another is entitled "The Sea and the European Middle Ages;" and a third "The City in German History." Though many of the illustrations in these articles are taken from the history of the Hansa, and, in particular that of Lübeck, their scope is much wider and their historical depth greater than the earlier papers which explicitly deal with the history of Lübeck or the political and commercial struggles of the Hansa in the Baltic Sea.

The significance of these chapters is threefold. First, they contain some interesting and well-presented aspects of European economic history. For example, in one essay on "The Origin of Magdeburg and the Earlier History of Commerce," Rörig presents a penetrating analysis of the gradual expansion of commerce in the ninth and tenth centuries into the area between Rhine and Elbe, and in the essay "Symbolism of the Reich in Gotland," he describes the manner in which the expansion of German commercial interests in the Baltic gradually brought this area into the network of European trade in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

Secondly, Rörig's essays are important because several provide a synthesis in the field of urban and commercial history; they form a capstone to the more monographic and specialized presentations in the first part. This is true, in particular, of the last two papers on the role of sea trade in European economic history and

the economic function of the cities of Germany in their historical development. A third essay, "The Origin of the Hansa and the Baltic," is primarily historical in conception. It had not been published before, but was intended as a first chapter in a larger book on the history of the Hansa, in general.

Thirdly, Rörig's essays, notably the crucial essay on medieval world economy, contain a lengthy exposition of and argument for a particular thesis on the role of medieval cities and medieval trade, in general. Among European economic historians two extreme positions had become elaborated, one represented by Bücher and Sombart, and the other by Pirenne, H. Bechtel, and Rörig. Whereas the former thought of the economy of the typical medieval town as limited in scope, extent, and variety of customers, the second group emphasized the essential international interdependence of urban economies. Whereas Bücher saw a historical development from a "town economy" to a "national economy," Rörig replies: "The real economy of medieval towns was at the same time always a world economy; only when national economies began to develop, the world economy had come, for the time being, to an end" (p. 391).

Much of the content of the essays collected in this book is an elaboration of this thesis. It is not possible to enter here into the dispute between Bücher and Sombart, on the one hand, and Rörig, Pirenne, and those siding with them, on the other. In part, this dispute is clouded by semantic problems. For example, such concepts as "town economy" or "world economy" are employed with different meanings. Moreover, whereas Bücher has in mind primarily the typical small town of the German plains, with some 1,500 to 2,000 inhabitants, Rörig is inclined to think of the great emporia like Venice, Florence, Bruges, or Lübeck. But the conflict goes deeper than this, and though it cannot be said to be fully resolved—especially since the quantitative relations of medieval commerce are as yet too little explored—Rörig presents in the book under review a mass of ammunition for the "modernizers," as they have sometimes been called.

Surely in view of his arguments the Bücher-Sombart thesis cannot be maintained in its primary intransigent form.

In the course of developing his thesis of the oecumenical network of medieval trade, especially as it was carried on from and through the commercial centers in Northern Germany, Rörig presents a mass of valuable, challenging data and insights. His book is a pleasure to read, and anyone interested in the Hansa or medieval commerce will find it an indispensable companion. And last but not least, some of the essays contained in this work, such as the long essay on "The Market of Lübeck: A Topographical-Statistical Investigation of an Aspect of German Social and Economic History," are rare masterpieces of social-historical analysis which will long remain models for historians and students of society.

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MOSES HADAS. *Hellenistic Culture: Fusion and Diffusion*. Pp. vi, 324. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. \$6.00.

The author has previously published the following important books: *A History of Greek Literature*, *A History of Latin Literature*, and *Ancilla to Classical Reading*. He is Jay Professor of Greek and chairman of the Department of Greek and Latin at Columbia University. In the present work he clearly indicates how Greek civilization after the career of Alexander the Great became strongly affected by Oriental civilizations, while at the same time it exerted a powerful influence in Syria, Mesopotamia, and northwestern India. This is naturally a most fascinating subject, and we are grateful to the writer for his scholarly treatment. He maintains with much justice that western civilization is greatly indebted to the process which he has described. The Christian church in particular drew heavily upon the culture of the Hellenistic world in which it originated and developed. It should be noted especially that the influence of Hebrew literature, chiefly the Old Testament, seems to have expedited the spread of Christianity in the eastern half of the Roman Empire.

Professor Hadas makes this significant statement on p. 264: "For the shaping of European civilization the emergence of unified conceptions of law and authority is the most meaningful consequence of interaction between east and west in the hellenistic age." In his opinion Virgil borrowed from the Jews the widely accepted idea that the Romans were an elect people. He was probably correct in making this remarkable conclusion.

There are altogether twenty chapters, which present somewhat scattered bits of information, leaving the reader in a state of mind in which he is still anxious to view the whole aspect in a more closely knit scene. The Books of the Maccabees, for example, receive more than the proper share of attention, chiefly because the author had published a great deal on this portion of Hebrew-Aramaic literature. We might also wonder why Mr. Hadas expresses this strange thought: "In Greek tragedy there are no villains: Clytemnestra and Aegisthus may not have sufficient justification for compassing the death of Agamemnon, but they have some" (p. 56). No doubt all villains have some justification for their peculiar actions, and yet we hesitate to magnify the extenuating circumstances. In general it may be said that the ancient Greeks were a bit lacking in personal virtue and have received more credit for sound ethics than they deserved.

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ASIA

SIR MORTIMER WHEELER, C.I.E. *Early India and Pakistan to Ashoka*. Pp. 241. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. No price.

While Sir Mortimer Wheeler was the Director General of Archaeology in India, he initiated, on a scientific basis, a regular survey and excavation of prehistoric sites in India and utilized in it the most up-to-date scientific method evolved in Europe and America. It is, therefore, suitable that he should have presented to the learned

world the state of knowledge of prehistoric India in the form of this nicely printed and well-illustrated handbook. A comparison of it with Stuart Piggott's *Prehistoric India*, published in 1949, would give a fair measure of the progress and precision of knowledge achieved during the last ten years.

The author begins with a discussion of the chronology of the three types of wares which are of special importance in any study of Indian prehistory during the first millennium B.C. The "Painted Grey Ware," associated with the Bronze Age, is the earliest ceramic specimen yet found that belongs to a date posterior to the Indus Civilization. The beginning of this "earliest reputable pottery known to us from a number of town-sites, mentioned as already established before the Mahabharata war," is attributed by the author to the eighth century B.C., though Indian archaeologists, who excavated Hastinapura, would prefer to take it back to 1100 B.C. The initial date of the "Northern Black Polished Ware," which immediately succeeded the "Painted Grey Ware," is placed somewhere in the fifth century B.C. The third, the "Rouletted Ware," is placed, on more sure grounds, approximately at the beginning of the Christian era. With an initial gap of five hundred years—more or less—after the end of the Indus Civilization about 1500 B.C., the three types of wares mentioned above bring us through successive stages to the historic period.

The book also deals with the beginnings of the prehistoric age and gives a good account of the Stone Ages and the Indus Civilization, but its special feature is a clear exposition of the prehistoric culture of the period that immediately followed, and particularly its extension to the Ganges Valley and Central India of which very little has so far appeared in the form of a popular handbook. Sir Mortimer Wheeler writes in an easy and lucid style, and his book will surely be read with interest and profit by anyone who wants to possess general but authentic information about prehistoric India. The only blemish in the book is its last chapter dealing with the great Maurya Emperor Asoka, and the author would have been well advised to

omit it altogether. Its relevancy with the preceding chapters is not quite apparent, and the treatment of the subject is open to serious criticism.

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A. DOAK BARNETT. *Communist China and Asia: Challenge to American Policy*. Pp. xi, 575. New York: Harper & Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1960. \$6.95.

Officials, scholars, newspapermen, and debaters will find this book a blessing. Accurate and up to date, it summarizes the accomplishments of the Peking regime within China, outlines Peking's strategic capacities, describes Communist China's foreign policies segment by segment, and concludes with a discussion of Nationalist China and of American foreign policy.

The author is an outstanding China expert. Reared in China, he has the additional advantage of recent service in Hong Kong with the American Universities Field Service. He has also written many of the background studies which go into this book. He knows the country so well and so deeply that he is able to marshal immense numbers of facts without becoming complicated or tedious.

The present work does not have the "fact-crammed" impact of Rostow's 1954 book, *The Prospects for Communist China*. This book is never too detailed. There are few tables of figures, no tables of organization, and very little reference to materials not available in the English language. The approach is always gentlemanly and never pedantic. Sometimes this reviewer has wished that Barnett had been more specific in things which he obviously knew but did not include. The Council on Foreign Relations has an admirable reputation for keeping problems at an understandable, reasonable level; this book continues that tradition.

No other recent book has the sheer geographic and functional sweep of this one. The author portrays Chinese Communist behavior under medium-heavy magnifica-

tion. He does not go into the passionate detail of Robert North's *Moscow and Chinese Communists* or the fact-laden heaviness of Peter S. H. Tang's more recent *Communist China Today*. He desires to keep the subject understandable; this he accomplishes.

In his policy conclusions Mr. Barnett cogently summarizes four major alternatives of the United States in dealing with mainland China—accommodation, limited pressure, complete countermeasures, and a "two-Chinas" approach. He shows that the limited pressure has not been very successful, that accommodation is useless, that real countermeasures would not be accepted in this country or anywhere else, except Formosa, and that the "two-Chinas" policy would meet violent resistance from both the Chinese regimes, Nationalist and Communist. He concludes that the problem is indeed perplexing and that China should be considered in the light of a broader, more inclusive Asia policy.

One may add that the book is handsomely printed, the Bibliographical Note an excellent survey, and the Notes full. The publisher has not keyed the Notes to the text in their running heads, but they are serviceable nonetheless.

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PEDRO CARRASCO. *Land and Polity in Tibet*. Pp. vii, 547. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1959. \$5.75.

Dr. Carrasco has combed the literature on Tibet, principally in Western languages, to produce a useful composite of data contained in the works of explorers, other travelers, officials, diplomats, and other direct observers of the Tibetan scene. This course was prescribed for Dr. Carrasco because of the inadequacy of existing documentary materials and also because the area is generally closed to firsthand field research. He candidly offers his work "as a provisional analysis, giving only tentative answers to a wide variety of questions" (p. iii) until such time as a work of definitive scholarship can be undertaken. Accepted with these reservations, Dr. Car-

rasco's work incorporates a typological guide to the subject and a body of useful substantive conclusions on the relations between the system of land tenure and the political-social organization of Tibet in the "modern" as distinguished from the "contemporary" period—that is, "before the disruption effected by modern civilization" (p. 229).

The basic conclusion of the study is: "There is no class of private landowners not engaged in government, and there is no group of officials that does not also have a privileged economic position. That is, there is no separation between economic power and political power. The same people who control the land also control the state; in fact, they are the state; and the state, that is, its personnel as a group, owns the land" (p. 216). It is equally clear, however, that the system operates differently in detail in the different parts of the country, that landlord-tenant relations are not identical, and that there are variations in the status of regional chiefs, lamas, landlords, peasants, traders, and other social elements. Particular attention, however, is paid to those parts of the country then under the rule of the Dalai Lama, although with respect to the status of the latter Dr. Carrasco asserts: "Since the Dalai Lama is the successor to the rule of the once unified Tibetan nation, he is in the position both religiously and politically to claim some sort of sovereignty over all Tibetan areas" (p. 79). But considering that "in Lhasan Tibet, the upper class clearly rules and owns the land as a body," the corporate or collective rule of the upper class "also finds its political expression in the absolute power of the Dalai Lama, his personal ownership of all the land, and the subordination of all the people as his subjects." But from the traditional seclusion of the Dalai Lama and the fact that only the thirteenth of the Dalai Lamas of the period in question "ever exercised his theoretical power," Dr. Carrasco concludes that "the absolute power of the Dalai Lama . . . is simply a fiction of Tibetan political theory" (p. 217). Certainly these conclusions are not unrelated to the policies and actions of the Chinese Communist regime since the

establishment of its authority in Tibet after 1951.

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DAVID J. STEINBERG and others. *Cambodia: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture*. Pp. 350. Revised for 1959 by Herbert H. Vreeland. New Haven, Conn.: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1959. \$7.00.

Cambodia is the fifth in the Human Relations Area Files (HRAF) series of publications which is designed to provide insight into the total functioning of contemporary societies. In view of the paucity of English-language publications on any facet of present-day Cambodia, this volume is a truly welcome addition to the series.

In keeping with the spirit of the series, *Cambodia* endeavors to provide comprehensive coverage of Cambodian life. The contents of its twenty-two chapters may be summarized into the following categories: religion, economics, government and politics, foreign policy, education, health and welfare, family, values and attitudes, and patterns of living. Of these areas economics and politics receive the greatest amount of consideration, while the least attention is devoted to values, attitudes, and patterns of living.

The book has many merits, particularly with regard to its description of the difficulties attendant upon economic and social reform; but certain shortcomings stand out. Among the most notable of these are the absence of evaluative material and the gross generalizations which the writers often permit themselves to make on the basis of meager facts.

For example, in chapter 8 (pp. 96-97) it is implied that Cambodia's policy of neutrality makes it possible for Communists to use the country as a base for propaganda and infiltration, both within Cambodia and into Thailand and South Vietnam. Except for noting that Prince Sihanouk has stated his concern about Communist activity, no evidence is given

to support this conclusion. Nor is it mentioned that Prince Sihanouk also expressed his concern, on the same occasion, about similar Western activity in Cambodia.

It is unfortunate that an unbalanced concern with issues in the cold war, often confused, beclouds what otherwise one would expect to be careful evaluation. No evidence is offered, for example, to support the assertion that the neutral attitude of the Cambodian government lowers its resistance to communism (p. 113). Nor is any evidence adduced to demonstrate that the Chinese in Cambodia will necessarily serve the aims of Peking (*ibid.*).

The authors betray a lack of understanding of Cambodian politics. To say that "the framers [of the Cambodian Constitution] were satisfied with merely adapting the French constitution" (p. 262), shows a serious lack of appreciation of the shrewdness and foresight of Prince Sihanouk. While it may be true that the Constitution is in part derived from the draft constitution which was rejected by the French electorate in 1946, it would be more pertinent to note that, in setting up a system of parliamentary democracy combined with a measure of autocracy, Prince Sihanouk, then King, liberalized the regime but also provided for a check on the diversity, bred by democracy, which he felt would hinder political and economic progress. As far as Cambodia is concerned, he has been proven correct.

A glance at the Bibliography leads one to question whether all the important material on Cambodia has been consulted by the authors. Conspicuously absent in the Bibliography are the important historical writings of Aymonier, Leclere, Groslier, and Briggs.

These inadequacies, as well as the inconsistencies, often in a single chapter, in the factual material presented, while in part due to poor editing, are perhaps also the inevitable by-products of the particular method used in the compilation of material. This book and the others in the HRAF series have grown out of a request of the Army's office of psychological warfare for information. The original collation of materials on Cambodia was carried

out in 1955 under the editorship of Mitchell G. Zadrozny of the University of Chicago. This monograph was then combined with certain classified information and rewritten by another team as a handbook for the Army's use. In the meantime, HRAF decided to make the original monograph available to the general public. Perhaps it was inevitable that when still another group of persons rewrote the original synthesis in 1957 and revised it in 1959 a certain unevenness of quality and disjointedness in organization would result.

In their statement of purpose, the authors say that they seek to describe the presence and impact of forces for change and to emphasize the constants of attitude and behavior in Cambodia. The flaws in editing, some of which have been noted, detract from the success which they might have achieved in this undertaking. However, many of the guidelines for future research on Cambodia have been laid down in this book.

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The Indonesian Town: Studies in Urban Sociology. (Selected Studies on Indonesia, Vol. IV.) Pp. xxxiv, 379. The Hague: W. van Hoeve for the Royal Tropical Institute under a grant from The Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research, 1959. Distributed by the Institute of Pacific Relations. \$6.00.

This is another volume in the series of English translations of Selected Studies on Indonesia by Dutch scholars, selected and edited by a Committee of the Royal Tropical Institute of Amsterdam. In the Foreword, the editors remark that while the Dutch knowledge of the Indonesia rural scene is widely recognized, relatively few people outside The Netherlands are aware of the Dutch research in urban sociology. This work was executed mainly between the wars as Netherlands East Indies officials became increasingly aware of "bad Kampongs."

The book has four Parts. Part I consists of four chapters and a conclusion

from the *Explanatory Memorandum* on the Town Planning Ordinance for Municipalities in Java (Batavia, 1938), written by architect-planner, Thomas Karsten. Part II presents in five chapters and a summary a Netherlands East Indies Central Bureau of Statistics Report, *An Investigation of the Living Conditions of Municipal Coolies in Batavia in 1957*. Part III contains three chapters by W. Brand, "Differential Mortality in the Town of Bandung," and Part IV comprises two chapters by H. J. van Mook comparing Kuta Gede before and after the reorganization.

These studies document the editors' statement that the painstakingly detailed Dutch scholarship which we have come to respect was applied to the urban as well as to the rural scene in Indonesia. The book would also lead to the conclusion that Dutch social scientists and officials came no closer to providing a satisfactory theory of underdevelopment when they studied urban problems than they did in describing village society.

The first chapter of Part I presents some interesting figures of urban growth from 1905 to 1930. These figures show that considerable growth took place in this period but that it was largely confined to large and middle-sized cities. Chapter Two provides evidence that urban conditions had become highly unsatisfactory by the 1930's. Karsten is rather critical of the efforts made to deal with them. He stresses, as causes of urban squalor and congestion, lack of knowledge; inadequate, inefficient, and western-oriented planning; the welter of land laws; and the uninhibited and ill-conceived acquisition of land by westerners. In Chapter Three, he shows that sociological dualism and pluralism existed in cities as well as in the country, leading to social conflict. The final chapter calls for better planned urban development and improved technical training to that end.

Part II provides a wealth of statistics on budgets of Batavia (Djakarta) coolies. One interesting fact is that the number of children increases with income, indicating either the presence of family planning or very high infant mortality rates among the very poor. The average number of

children per married couple was not particularly high, 2.6, but only some 11 per cent of these went to school.

Part III shows that Europeans were as healthy in Bandung as in Amsterdam, infant mortality being somewhat lower. The Chinese were less healthy than the Europeans, however, and Indonesians had still higher mortality rates than the Chinese.

Part IV derives particular interest from having been written by the last of the Dutch Governors-General in Indonesia and providing clues to this high-ranking official's attitudes. Through the screen of minutely detailed description, one can sense the enthusiasm which van Mook felt for his job and his optimism regarding the potential for Indonesian evolution within a framework of Dutch guidance. It was this latter attitude which eventually made enemies for him in both camps during the Indonesian Revolution.

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J. E. KIDDER, JR. *Japan Before Buddhism*. (Ancient Peoples and Places, Vol. 10.) Pp. 282. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. \$5.50.

This detailed, well-referenced, attractively illustrated book is by far the best survey of Japanese prehistory in a Western language. To find a comparable work one must look back half a century to N. G. Munro's *Prehistoric Japan* (1911). Munro's excellence was in attempting to interpret the past coherently, not merely to survey the existing finds. Most of his successors, failing to revise his concepts or ask really new questions, let Japanese prehistory appear to fall in the doldrums. In welcome contrast, Kidder's new survey draws on a vastly larger store of data, heeds current Japanese thinking, and incorporates fresh concepts to give insight into the past. He summarizes very briefly (pp. 86-89) the few positive results from race-preoccupied attempts to sort out prehistoric "Ainu" sites from "Japanese" sites; race played a negligible role in the successive transformations of culture and society, and Kidder properly emphasizes

diffusion and social contact, instead, as the forces that brought Japan abreast of continental Far Eastern civilization.

The culture directly ancestral to historic Japanese civilization cannot be traced earlier than the Bronze-Iron Age, the third of four main cultural divisions described in the four central chapters of the book. The earliest periods, Paleolithic and Mesolithic (pp. 27-33), first discovered barely a decade ago, are known from stone implements that suggest a sparse population of hunters and gatherers existing with minor changes for several thousand years. The same sort of primitive life was led by people of the following period, the Neolithic, even though they had new skills, as evidenced by the myriad varieties of pottery produced in the Jomon style during their span of several millennia (pp. 60-68). Following Japanese precedent, Kidder reviews the abundant Neolithic materials in five subperiods. These had by no means run their course when rice agriculture began about 250 B.C. in Western Japan, but continued in the north. However, rice growing by newcomers, presumably from the continent, began a new era of population increase and cultural enrichment in historic Japanese civilization. In the first phase of this era, bronze and iron were used by settled villagers making pottery in the Yayoi style. Social stratification became a feature of this Bronze-Iron Age and was intensified when great earth tombs were built in the succeeding Proto-historic period, from the fourth to eighth century A.D. Kidder, reviewing the historic sequence of Yamato emperors (p. 209), shows that the earliest must have lived near the first century B.C., that is, during the Bronze-Iron Age when Yayoi culture prevailed.

Kidder's account, in the main, follows majority opinion among Japanese prehistorians. Points that call for criticism, in fact, often are not Kidder's, but his too faithful reflection of the inconsistencies and blind spots that persist in Japanese interpretation. While questions of interpretation are by no means inconsequential, the very fact that they rise to mind shows the extent to which Kidder has given coherence and order to the hitherto disor-

ganized and complex details of Japanese archaeology.

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ALTEMUR KILIÇ. *Turkey and the World*. Pp. 224. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1959. \$4.50.

This is an excellent review and exposition of the foreign relations of the Republic of Turkey, with sufficient background on earlier years, and particular attention to the present. The author, with due attention to the facts, admittedly sets forth the Turkish viewpoint, including the reasons why Turkey, although a small country, regards itself as both a Western power and a political, military, and cultural bridge between West and East. The penultimate chapter, on Turkey in the Middle East, is of special value not only because it reveals Turkish opinion but also because Kiliç is one of the Turkish officials who understands Americans quite well, and because the Foreign Office in Ankara often has, or could have, anticipated American policy formation. The final chapter on Turkey and the World, which is unlisted in the Table of Contents, should be read by all persons interested in Turkey even if they do not have time to complete the rest of the book.

The international relations philosophy of the author, and presumably of his government, is barely if at all distinguishable from that of the late John Foster Dulles. While Kiliç's partiality to the current regime makes him more critical of its predecessor, his characterization of the former President İnönü as "cautious" would find few dissenters.

Unfortunately, the book is written by a journalist for the type of reader who is satisfied by newspaper coverage of events and problems. Although the author quotes widely, the impedimenta of scholarship are conspicuously absent. Counting memoirs as primary, the Bibliography lists mainly secondary sources. This is the more regrettable as Mr. Kiliç has the intellectual capacity and the necessary access to official sources to have written a book equally interesting if designed also for reference

use, with documentation and citations. Even in the spelling of proper nouns, standard rendition in the official, latinized alphabet has been ignored, and transliterations lack uniformity. The publisher has let pass numerous typographical errors.

The author, press attaché of the Embassy of Turkey in Washington from 1955 to 1959, last year, at the age of thirty-five, became Director-General of Press, Radio, and Tourism, a position little short of Cabinet rank and significance in the government of Turkey. Son of the most renowned raconteur in the entourage of the great Atatürk, he tells his story well. He deserves continuing success and an increasing audience as Turkey's spokesman.

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ZIYA GÖKALP. *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp*. Translated and edited by Niyazi Berkes. Pp. 336. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. \$5.00.

Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924), Turkey's first professor of sociology (1915), was the most quoted theoretician during the demise of Ottoman power and the birth of modern Turkey. Thanks to Professor Berkes, who provides not only the translation but also an illuminating introductory article, his principal writings are now available to readers of English almost as soon as the works of the fourteenth century Arab social historian, Ibn Khaldūn. Gökalp, who, unlike the Berber of Tunis, never traveled abroad, except as a British exile to Malta in 1920 to 1921, distilled the best of European sociology, in the retort of Turkish history and experience, to produce an elixir of reform ideology.

Turkey's salvation, he thought, lay in westernization, nationalism, and Islam. Distinguishing between civilization and culture—material things and techniques versus matters of the spirit—he taught and preached that Turks, proud of their folk culture and inspired by the faith, could so effectively adopt the West's methods of production, commerce, and government that Turkey—as a nation, not an imperial

state—might merit and achieve membership in the Society of Nations. While his most mature writings recognized weaknesses of theocracy and religious establishment, he never abandoned his conviction that enlightened practice of Islam was essential to Turkish behavior. That Atatürk found it necessary to abolish the Kalifat to avoid domestic and foreign political complications does not invalidate the Gökalp viewpoint: in fact, revival of religious activity, especially since 1950, may increase the pertinence of Gökalp's passages on this subject.

That this leader of thought died before his ideas could be tested adds interest to his works: he could not alter his ideas opportunistically. His philosophy for a nationalist program is almost required reading for students of Turkish affairs, and of the role of ideas in action, particularly in nascent nationalism.

Berkes has brought to his task both a wealth of research and academic experience in his own country and the advantages of American graduate education. The translation into English is excellent for not only its literary quality but also its competent rendition in current sociological terminology without excessive employment of parochial lingo. More biographic data on Gökalp would have been appropriate. The book, printed in England, is superbly edited and produced, despite hazards of trilingualism; it is worthy of Gökalp's inspired life and Berkes' painstaking, excelsior interpretation.

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SOCIOLOGY

KURT H. WOLFF (Ed.). *Georg Simmel, 1858-1918: A Collection of Essays, with Translations and a Bibliography*. Pp. xv, 396. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1959. \$7.50.

Current interest in Simmel's work, as well as his place in the history of sociology, is well served by this book. It

contains the most substantial analysis in English of the reasons for Simmel's continuing importance to sociology since the appearance of Spykman's *Social Theory of Georg Simmel*. I especially recommend F. H. Tenbruck's chapter on "Formal Sociology," Donald N. Levine's "Structure of Simmel's Social Thought," and Heinz Maus' article on "Simmel in German Sociology" for presenting a definitive evaluation of Simmel's contribution.

Tenbruck presents a brilliant analysis of Simmel's concept of "forms-of-sociation" which successfully resolves criticisms directed against it and clarifies Simmel's intention. The other two authors present a detailed analysis of Simmel's influence on ideas in the past, as well as on contemporary theoretical writing. In addition to these articles the book contains comment on Simmel's contribution to the "Sociology of Power" by E. V. Walter. H. D. Duncan and M. Lipman discuss Simmel's "Image of Society" and "Conception of the Individual," respectively.

The value of the book is greatly enhanced by new translations of some of Simmel's works. These include a translation by Howard Becker of the Table of Contents of Simmel's *Philosophy of Money* which I hope will prompt someone to make the book available in English. One also welcomes the translation of the first fifty pages of Simmel's *Soziologie* which deals with the problem of sociology and Simmel's answer to the Kantian question: "How is Society Possible?"

The Appendix contains a detailed Bibliography of writings about Georg Simmel and of Simmel's own works that are available in German and in English.

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MARGARET CLARK. *Health in the Mexican-American Culture: A Community Study*. Pp. xii, 253. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959. \$5.00.

This is a problem-oriented study of a Mexican-American neighborhood of less than five hundred residents in San Jose, California. It is an abridged and some-

what popularized version of a doctoral dissertation in anthropology. The treatment almost never transcends routine description and assertion. Yet it tells a true story straightforwardly, and even if none of the facts are surprising, they still deserve to be recorded. Readers unfamiliar with Mexican Americans may enjoy the book because it is liberally salted with human interest anecdotes. Those who know something about the minority will be glad for an addition to the small stock of words on an important but ignored part of the American population.

The author is a humane social scientist who desires to protect a weak minority that is the object of misunderstanding and discrimination. Her conceptual perspective chiefly derives from the idea of conflict between cultures. Although much of the book is composed of standard background information about the community, rather little of it is brought to bear directly on the problem of health.

The conclusions and recommendations ask for understanding, patience, and adaptability on the part of medical and public health personnel. These recommendations are unexceptionable, but they are predicated on the assumption that medical practitioners can adapt more readily than their Mexican-American patients. It would be well indeed if physicians and public health nurses were better grounded in the social sciences and better informed about the social and cultural backgrounds of their patients, whoever they may be. But it is unrealistic to expect individuals of categorically superior status working in positions of authority and responsibility, the Anglian physicians, to be compliant and adaptive toward categorically vulnerable and dependent individuals, the Mexican patients. It is hoped that a few key points, for example, the importance of the extended family in decision making, will be taken into account by medical practitioners who deal with Mexicans.

The author and others concerned with such problems are more likely to influence medical practice among minorities if they turn their recommendations around. That is, they should instruct the minority how to adjust to and make the most of the

realities—often strange and cold—of medical care in the United States. For populations, such as Mexico's, that are likely to persist as minorities for some time, the best long-term approach is to accelerate the higher education, medical and otherwise, of members of their community.

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PAUL ZUCKER. *Town and Square: From the Agora to the Village Green*. Pp. xxiii, 287. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. \$15.00.

Dr. Zucker has a long career as historian and critic of architecture in Germany and the United States. He received the Brunner Award of the American Institute of Architects in 1953 for this book, now issued sumptuously with 96 beautiful pages of illustrations, 55 line cuts, and tender loving care. The author claims as his fresh *parti pris* the view historically and aesthetically of "space as a three-dimensional void," rather than as "three-dimensional mass, . . . volume," finding "its most outspoken and characteristic form in the square, the plaza, the focal point in the organization of the town."

Dr. Zucker allows his publisher to claim that "this book is the first publication in English which gives a general survey of . . . the function of the square in the life of the community and . . . of its conception in purely aesthetic terms." Such a book would be of great interest to the urbanist. Dr. Zucker, in his first five pages, starts bravely to deal with "the psychological function of the square: . . . a gathering place for the people, humanizing them by mutual contact . . . freeing them from the tension of rushing through the web of traffic."

But, in good Germanic tradition, he adopts a "structural" classification of "archetypes" that are "spatially, and not functionally defined." Squares, forsooth, change their functions across the ages. With this basic model, Dr. Zucker has written a systematic and rather pedestrian account of the European town and square in antiquity, in the Middle Ages, the

Renaissance, to the nineteenth century—with brief excursions to Asia and the Americas. From the Far East he brings back Lao-tse's pregnant statement that "the true reality of a room is not its walls but the emptiness they contain." From Latin America, he brings the perplexity whether the gridiron town plan with a central square reflects native traditions or the Conquistadores' Laws of the Indies. Indeed, he concludes that "founded cities always adhered to the gridiron scheme through all centuries and in all regions: . . . there must exist an inner urge for order," which, "in the conception of Thomas Aquinas . . . mirrors the heavenly order of the other world."

Dr. Zucker's side glances at the social and cultural meaning of the square are tantalizingly few. The climate of France and Italy led to "a form of public life—and life in public—which made street and square the natural locale for community activities and representation." Spain, with similar climate, never developed a public life. And in England and Holland not only the climate but "the strong emphasis on domestic life . . . mostly prevented any desire for public spatial expression."

The student of cities not concerned with technical architectural analysis will enjoy greatly the beautiful and evocative illustrations that Dr. Zucker has brought together. But for vivid and imaginative depiction of "the function of the square in the life of the community" he will turn to *The Heart of the City*, edited by Tyrwhitt, Sert, and Rogers for the International Congresses for Modern Architecture (1952), mentioned in Zucker's Bibliography; and even more to the perceptive and human pages on "Cities and Squares" in G. E. Kidder-Smith's *Italy Builds* (1955), not noted by Zucker.

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G. FRANKLIN EDWARDS. *The Negro Professional Class*. Pp. 224. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959. \$4.00.

G. Franklin Edwards in *The Negro Professional Class* has analyzed occupa-

tional mobility among Negroes in a selected group of professions in the District of Columbia. Despite the fact that Washington offers certain special inducements for the development of Negro professional and other white collar workers—Howard University, Freedmen's Hospital, a concentration of federal agencies, a long tradition of professional associations, and good public school education available to Negroes—the findings in Edwards' study offer insights and interpretations which have applicability to most American cities.

Starting with the observation that there has been a conspicuous absence of large-sized business enterprises among Negroes, the author notes that the professional occupations were and are the ones "in the Negro community which could be identified with the American middle class." Edwards has selected four professions for study. They included (1) male college teachers, (2) physicians and surgeons, (3) dentists, and (4) lawyers. A sample of 300 persons forms the basis for conclusions.

Many of Dr. Edwards' findings will not surprise those who are familiar with the general literature on occupational mobility in the United States and know its Negro communities. Most professional Negroes in the District of Columbia come from families in which the fathers were white collar workers. There are, however, two striking differences between Negroes and whites in this regard since among the latter there is a much heavier concentration of fathers in the proprietary group and among Negro professionals there is a greater concentration of fathers in semiskilled or service work. "It is observed that the respondents of the present study come from families in which the occupational level of their fathers was superior to their [the parents'] . . . contemporaries." And this is not a single generation phenomenon: "over a period of time those [Negro] persons entering the professions come from increasingly higher occupational origins."

With a low incidence of business employment, among both Negro professionals and their sons, and this has progressively declined over three generations, "the concentration of . . . [Negro professionals]

resembles the occupational orientation of other minority groups and provides an insight into the areas in the occupational structure where minorities may earn a decent living and secure status."

Dr. Edwards' book reflects and documents the observable fact that medicine is probably the profession which has the highest prestige in Negro society. It also suggests that the improved status of Negroes and growing national concern for civil rights have contributed greatly to the rise in the number and quality of Negro lawyers. This reviewer was delighted to note that the role of the late Charles Houston in the development of the legal profession among Negroes is delineated.

Although restricted in scope, *The Negro Professional Class* is a significant contribution to the literature on occupational mobility and the Negro in America.

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MAXWELL R. BROOKS. *The Negro Press Re-examined: Political Content of Leading Negro Newspapers*. Pp. 125. Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1959. \$2.75.

Given the history of race relations in the United States, one might expect to learn from this small volume that the Negro press is generally radical in its weekly view of America as a civilization. That such is not the case is the major conclusion of Professor Brooks' empirical study of five Negro newspapers with a combined circulation of approximately 800,000 copies, namely the *Afro-American*, the *Amsterdam News*, the *Chicago Defender*, the *Journal and Guide* of Norfolk, and the *Pittsburgh Courier*.

To determine the extent to which the Negro press is radical, the author used one of the techniques of content analysis developed by H. D. Laswell. A sample of editions was selected randomly from the entire output in 1948, a concept of the "American Creed" was operationalized in terms of twenty favorable and twenty-two unfavorable symbols, and a count of positive, negative, and neutral frequencies was

accumulated. The careful analysis yielded some five thousand symbols in various editorials, personal columns, and news items. Unfortunately, the author failed to include a single example of an article from which he had selected and scored some of the symbols, thereby limiting the possibility of any independent comparison based on a set of recent editions.

The overwhelming drift of editorial and personal comment in 1948 was favorable to the "American Creed," particularly in relation to the ideal patterns concerning civil liberties, equality, the franchise, democracy, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution. At the same time, the five newspapers were "uncompromising" in their rejection of social practices which perpetuate the status of second-class citizenship. Thus, "their criticism is directed against barriers that tend to restrict the Negro's participation in the social order, rather than against the nature of the social order itself."

The book provides the social scientist with a good example of the research advantage which can be gained from a rigorous application of content analysis. However, quantification alone is not altogether satisfying to the reader who wants to understand the several ways in which an issue is articulated in the Negro press. Even a small amount of case material would have added immeasurably to the value of the book.

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OSCAR HANDLIN. *The Newcomers: Negroes and Puerto Ricans in a Changing Metropolis*. Pp. xiii, 171. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959. \$4.00.

Under the aegis of the New York Metropolitan Region Study, Oscar Handlin has apparently directed his writing toward the "educated layman," and toward the "practitioner." Human relations specialists and others who are biased positively toward "minority groups" will probably find *The Newcomers* an excellent resource. Persons who are active in programs for the amelioration of social problems associated with

"Negroes and Puerto Ricans in a Changing Metropolis" will find a readable summary of population trends, an insightful analysis of the problems of Negroes and Puerto Ricans in New York City, and predilections which imply that future inter-ethnic-racial relationships in Metropolitan New York are fraught with considerable potential tension.

From another point of view, however, Handlin's treatment of "Patterns of Adjustment" is rich in analysis but poor in citations which support his statements. I could find no direct reference to Clyde Kiser, Louise Kennedy, or Ira Reid, all of whom made studies of native-born or foreign-born Negro migrants. The discussion of "Forms of Social Action" is even less well supported. Here the task is to assess the organizational pattern which has developed so that Negroes and Puerto Ricans may "act freely and as equals" within the region. It is a difficult task, but I believe that the literature is more informative than Handlin indicates.

Some of this criticism is vitiated if *The Newcomers* is considered as an extension of the author's earlier works. The sweeping statements about high population density, immigrant slums, and immigrant social organization as an adjustment process gain considerable credence from the scholarly *Boston's Immigrants* and the poetic *The Uprooted*.

However, his neglect of materials from other disciplines and his concentration on New York dull the edge of Handlin's possible justifiable criticism of Hawley and Grodzins for their lack of historical depth about metropolitan expansion and suburbanism. A more explicit recognition that knowledge may be generalized and that the adjustment processes and the adaptive social organization for in-migrants have been studied before, for example, Killian's Ph.D. study of the "hillbillies" in Chicago and Ostafin's study of the Polish in Detroit and upper Michigan as well as the better known students of Park, Burgess, and Thomas would have given greater depth to the book. Parenthetical remarks about the similarity between the New York Negro in 1950 and the Boston Irish in 1850 do not seem sufficient "to break down the pa-

rochial boundaries between the various social sciences."

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GUNNAR MYRDAL. *Value in Social Theory: A Selection of Essays on Methodology*. Edited by Paul Streeten. Pp. xlvii, 269. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. \$5.00.

More than half of this work is a reprint of parts of *An American Dilemma*, written with the assistance of Richard Sterner and Arnold M. Rose. Of the rest, only Streeten's thoughtful Introduction and a Myrdal article previously published in German had not been available in English. Streeten offers as a "justification for collecting these scattered reflections . . . that the reader interested in the relation between values and analysis of facts in social theory might not look for its treatment in the sources on which this volume draws." Thus we may see in one volume Myrdal's greatest weakness.

This review reacts to the book and not to the prestige of an unusual, intelligent, and decent person who commands high position in the political and economic councils of his own country and in those of the United Nations. Too often Myrdal's virtues in public affairs and his advocacy of constructive programs lead writers to overlook his naïveté and prejudice in psychological, sociological, and methodological matters and his failure to understand the efforts of social scientists.

Myrdal concerns himself here with conflicts among the objective, the practical, and the idealistic. He appears to have wondered a lot about the relations between curiosity concerning society and desire to change society. Like many practical men of large affairs, he found himself annoyed by the pettifoggery, the impracticality, and the objectivity of those devoted more exclusively to curiosity about society. He has also listened to condensed and biased summaries of theory and evidence—in the

manner of so-called "practical men"—for lack of time to dig deeply and to see accurately at first hand.

Built into social science and "common to all social sciences in the entire Western world" Myrdal sees an attachment to a "do-nothing (*laissez-faire*) bias" and to a "naturalistic and, therefore, fatalistic philosophy." He contends that social scientists exhibit "a systematic tendency to ignore practically all possibilities of modifying—by conscious effort—the social effects of the natural forces." He objects to the findings of social scientists that culture characteristically resists social change, that culture controls to a degree the nature of law, and that the midwives of social change are frequently crises and catastrophes. He regards such views as conservative and as perversions of scientific ideals which are inherent in social science. He therefore asserts that a "disinterested social science" is . . . pure nonsense. It never existed, and never will exist. We can make our thinking strictly rational in spite of this, but only by facing the valuations, not by evading them." Thus we should turn away from a dependence on observation and from an ideal of objectivity. We should develop a social philosophy with political action objectives.

Myrdal's position is actually far more conservative than that of those he attacks as conservative. He would lead us back to a position in which the thinker about society is more clearly an instrument of political interest groups.

Despite the hidden value premises common among social scientists, they respect the few novel facts that do "beat their way" into consideration. Such facts are novel in that they were theretofore unanticipated and unexplained. These facts provide us with what leverage we possess with which to modify or destroy the "strictly rational" theories and plans of action inherited from another day and put forward by special interest groups.

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FRANCIS P. WEISENBURGER. *Ordeal of Faith: The Crisis of Church-Going America, 1865-1900*. Pp. 380. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. \$6.00.

Organized religion in America was subjected to many stresses and strains between the end of the Civil War and the turn of the century. Biblical criticism, Darwinism, widespread acceptance of the scientific method, urban growth, and the decay of the Puritan ethic were some of the threats to religious orthodoxy. *Ordeal of Faith* recounts, in a simple, factual manner, many of the events that were part of this conflict. Dr. Weisenburger, long Professor of History at the Ohio State University, has brought together in barely 300 pages of text a wide assortment of interesting historical detail.

The scope of the book is broad. The author begins by discussing the roots of anticlerical individualism in America and suggests reasons for a decline in church loyalties from 1865 to 1900. Each issue is then treated separately: the impact of evolution, of higher criticism, of interest in comparative religion, of the new sociology and the social gospel, of rationalism and of pragmatism, and of developing psychological emphases. The ideas of a host of familiar and less familiar religious leaders are examined, ranging from George D. Herron and Walter Rauschenbusch to John A. Barrows and Laurens P. Hickok.

Most attention is focused upon Protestantism. Each of the major denominations is given separate coverage. Perhaps too much effort is made to cover "left-wing" and bizarre groups as well, beginning with Unitarianism and Ethical Culture and including Swedenborgianism, Spiritualism, Theosophy, and Christian Science. Some of the most significant material is included in the discussion of Roman Catholicism. Dr. Weisenburger points to many controversies that raged within the American hierarchy still unknown to many both within and without the Church of Rome. The four-page chapter on Judaism might better have been omitted altogether.

Ordeal of Faith is commendable as a conscientious effort to summarize briefly the major religious trends of the thirty-

five years under study. Its very conciseness, however, is costly. Superficial treatment is accorded many subjects that demand more complete and profound analysis. An even more serious weakness is that the author seems to have done an insufficient amount of original research. He has depended too much upon secondary sources instead of delving into the masses of primary material, notably periodicals, that are available.

In spite of these shortcomings, *Ordeal of Faith* is a useful reference book. It provides teachers and students interesting bits of information that can aid in understanding the period examined. For the laymen, Dr. Weisenburger has written a satisfactory introduction to main events that helped shape the current religious scene.

RALPH LORD ROY

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The World's Metropolitan Areas. International Urban Research, Institute of International Studies. Pp. vii, 115. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959. \$3.00.

The main, and an important, contribution of this little book may be stated in the language employed in its first chapter. It lies in "the delimitation of metropolitan areas throughout the world according to an approximately standardized method, and the provision of a table listing these areas, their principal cities, and their populations as of two recent dates" (p. 4). This purpose has been accomplished. The volume thus makes available, for the first time, reasonably comparable data on the total population of the world's great clumpings of peoples into an objectively defined ecological unit—the metropolitan area.

Consideration was given to the use of the "urbanized area" as defined in the United States Census as the unit of observation. Although the concept was regarded as theoretically preferable, the "metropolitan area" concept was used because of its greater feasibility and practicability.

For purposes of international comparability the metropolitan area is defined as

follows: "An area with 100,000 or more inhabitants, containing at least one city (or continuous urban area) with 50,000 or more inhabitants and those administrative divisions contiguous to the city (or to the continuous urban area) which meet certain requirements as to metropolitan character."

It is to be noted that this definition differs from that of "Standard Metropolitan Area" as employed in the United States in several respects. The variations are described in detail and presented together with their rationale which is composed largely of considerations of feasibility and practicability. The procedures employed are carefully described. The text of this volume comprises 35 pages, the Table with the basic data 27 pages, and the Appendix giving component areas of the metropolitan areas and sources of the data, 50 pages.

The study entailed investigation of 202 countries and territories. Of these, 105 had at least one metropolitan area before 1954. Of the total of 1,046 metropolitan areas for the years before 1954, Davis and his colleagues were able to delineate the boundaries of 720 or 69 per cent. Of the 326 cases where only the population of the central city could be shown, 266 were in Communist countries, and 230 of these were in the Soviet Union and China.

Both the geographical and statistical results of this investigation are necessarily subject to error. The authors are quite aware of this. They provide an evaluation of their own work with which the reviewer is entirely in agreement. "Although the results are necessarily tentative, they at least afford one more tool in comparative research on urbanization, internal migration, economic location, and population redistribution."

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H. WARREN DUNHAM. *Sociological Theory & Mental Disorder*. Pp. xii, 298. Detroit, Mich.: Wayne University Press, 1959. \$5.50.

H. Warren Dunham is well known to social scientists as the coauthor, with R. E. L. Faris, of the notable study of the ecology of the functional psychoses in Chicago, published in 1939 under the title *Mental Disorders in Urban Areas*. The present volume consists largely of reprints of Dunham's individual papers on subjects related to mental illness, including an early presentation of the Chicago data, originally published as a paper in the *American Sociological Review* in 1937. In addition to reprinted journal articles, however, this collection contains a special Introduction and three hitherto unpublished papers. One of these is a statistical study, "Trends in Mental Disease for the United States and Selected States, 1910-1950," which generally supports Goldhamer and Marshall's thesis that, at least in recent years in the United States, the psychoses have not increased in frequency with the march of civilization. A second is an analysis of the paranoid schizophrenic as a social type. And a third is an evaluation of psychoanalysis as "ideology or science."

The contributions range from the descriptive ecological studies for which the author is justly famous to considerations of methodology, analyses of mental illness as social type, and philosophical reflections on the state of knowledge in social psychiatry.

Of major interest are Dunham's mature reflections on the state of social psychiatry today as a research area, some twenty years after his pioneering studies in Chicago established the existence of sociological differentials in the incidence of mental disorders. The existence of such differentials has been repeatedly confirmed, most recently by Hollingshead and Redlich in their careful investigation of social class and mental illness in New Haven. But, although the ecological studies seemed at first to be an avenue which would lead directly to etiological knowledge, this avenue has so far led only into a jungle of speculations: the drift hypothesis, the social isolation hypothesis, the migration theory, conflicting claims about the nature and effects of various family patterns, and so on.

To add to these already formidable com-

plexities, Dunham observes, the increasingly promising biochemical investigations raise the possibility that an unknown proportion of schizophrenia is organic rather than functional in its etiology. Thus Dunham suggests the possibility that only "pseudo" schizophrenia can be explained sociologically, that the "real" disease is biologically based. Although this may appear to represent something of a retreat from earlier enthusiasms, it would seem actually to be an inevitable withdrawal from an indefensible position. The prospect of a sufficient sociological explanation, not merely of sociological differentials in incidence, but of the etiology of the individual case as well, is remote, to say the least, and the quest for it imposes an unnecessary burden on the pursuit of whatever etiological factors—social, cultural, psychological, or biochemical—may be responsible for statistically significant differences in incidence. Dunham's implied caution to sociological investigators to eschew exclusively sociological theories is an augury of a less narrowly sociological orientation on the part of social scientists interested in the causes of mental illness.

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JACK GREENBERG. *Race Relations and American Law*. Pp. viii, 481. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. \$10.00.

Despite the continuing furor over the details of race relations and the accommodations which must be and are being made in patterns of segregation, the law has become rather clear. Legislatures continue to pass new statutes, and the decisions pour from the judicial spigots; but the main legal guidelines have been established. What remains is the particular application of known principles in specific factual situations which result from activities of members of the white citizenry desperately trying to find acceptable loopholes. Each new variation on the basic

theme of attempted evasion of the constitutional mandate finds, sooner or later, challenge from members of nonwhite groups and some religious organizations. The time thus had come for someone to draw the diverse threads of legal doctrine together into a cohesive whole. This is what Jack Greenberg has done in *Race Relations and American Law*.

Granting the obvious preferences of the author—he is Assistant Counsel to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Legal Defense Fund—the book is remarkably free from emotion and polemic. Mr. Greenberg succeeds in the task he undertook: describing and discussing race relations and American law "essentially as they exist today and in a manner that will remain useful in the future." In relatively brief but nevertheless complete form he has set out a useful statement of the law relating to public accommodations and services, travel, elections, earning a living, education, housing and real property, criminal law, domestic relations law, and the armed forces. The material is so presented that anyone, of whatever persuasion, can find considerable enlightenment and help in threading his way through the legal mazes involved in those subjects.

Of a more controversial and debatable nature are Mr. Greenberg's first two chapters, dealing with the capacity of law to change patterns of racial relations and a legal overview and his thesis that, William Graham Sumner to the contrary notwithstanding, "stateways" can change "folkways." But here again are discussions which will enable any reader to profit and to learn, if not to agree.

Lawyers will find this book of most use, but any person who deals with race relations will find it invaluable, although perhaps somewhat difficult. By legal standards, Mr. Greenberg writes with clarity and a welcome simplicity; but the matters he discusses are complex, and his exposition will demand the close attention of the reader.

Several Appendices, collecting legislative and judicial materials, enhance the value of the volume for reference purposes, as

do a good Bibliography and a Table of cases.

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EDUCATION

OSCAR HANDLIN. *John Dewey's Challenge to Education: Historical Perspectives on the Cultural Contest*. Pp. 59. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. \$2.50.

Any book, however thin, that helps to correct the appalling distortions that continue to prevail concerning John Dewey's educational philosophy is to be welcomed, and especially at a time when attacks upon it have become more virulent than ever before. Professor Handlin serves this purpose, for he demonstrates how Dewey entered the American scene at a time when education was much in need of criticism and improvement. Between 1870 and 1910, the years to which the book pays primary attention, rapid changes were occurring that rendered much of the typical program, especially on the high school level, obsolete. Vocational courses, education for citizenship, and so-called "cultural" training in the refinements of society—all of these were largely separated from the actualities of a young nation growing swiftly toward maturity.

Dewey's great purpose was to bring the schools back into the mainstream. The experimental school which he and his wife developed at the University of Chicago in the 1890's dramatized not only how it was possible to do so, but how, when it was done, the experience of learning could be exciting and rewarding to children. Handlin makes the important observation, not often enough recognized, that Dewey, though a trained philosopher, developed many of his seminal ideas in the laboratories of his own school and in the communities where he was an active citizen.

To appreciate the public service performed by this lecture, the second of an annual series presented by the John Dewey Society, is not, however, a sufficient reason

to approve of it on more critical grounds. Although the author has unearthed a number of interesting historical details that may hitherto have been missed, the central thesis is threadbare—namely, that the schools of the period in many ways fell short of their responsibilities. The subtitle of his lecture—"historical perspectives on the cultural context"—is scarcely borne out: one finds too little either in the way of perspectives or of context to tell us anything freshly insightful about the weaknesses as well as strengths of the American culture, a culture of which Dewey's democratic philosophy has been and remains one of the most sensitive barometers.

It is a little surprising, moreover, that a historian of Professor Handlin's stature should resort to such journalistic oversimplifications as the following: "The culture communicated by the schools had thus become entirely detached from experience" and "The realm of the classroom in the 1890's was totally set off from the experience of the child who inhabited it." Granting the shortcomings of the educational system of that period, the words "entirely" and "totally" are almost if not just as false as they would be today when, despite Dewey's towering influence, we are unfortunately still able to make comparable judgments about education.

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CHARLES V. KIDD. *American Universities and Federal Research*. Pp. xii, 272. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1959. \$6.00.

The post-World War II federal research explosion has had shattering and bewildering impact upon government, industry, and academic institutions. Washington has witnessed the disconcertingly fast growth of new agencies and new programs, the availability of additional billions of dollars, and the rise of a new breed of bureaucrats: scientist-administrators. Concomitantly there have arisen new problems of budgeting, new devices for co-ordination, new mechanisms for advice and liaison with the scientific community, and inter-

minable committees for review and evaluation. In fact, it would seem that not science, but committee reports and recommendations about science have become the endless frontier.

On campuses, and especially in graduate schools, new problems of contract and grant relationships have had to be faced. Searching questions have been asked regarding the basic mission of the university, the public responsibilities of institutions of higher learning, and the relative priority of administrative, academic, and fiscal considerations in the newly developing complex of relationships among business office, dean's office, departments, and the individual scholar and scientist. Policies have had to be quickly formulated regarding indirect costs, payment of summer and academic-year salaries, and the fixing of responsibilities for accepting and administering government grants and contracts.

With increasing recognition of the pursuit of scientific knowledge as an essential requirement for national survival and well-being, intricate interrelationships have been established between university science and the federal government. Dr. Kidd's volume is a penetrating and comprehensive analysis of these indissoluble relationships.

Dr. Kidd defines his central thesis as follows: "Large scale federal financing of research has set in motion irreversible forces that are affecting the nature of universities, altering their capacity to teach, changing their financial status, modifying the character of parts of the federal administrative structure, establishing new political relations, and changing the way research itself is organized." He systematically reviews the research goals and activities of the federal agencies and relates them to the basic missions of the university. He courageously identifies the many difficulties created by the differences in perspectives and objectives of government officials, on the one hand, and academic administrators and faculty, on the other.

In general, little exception can be taken to Dr. Kidd's personal recommendations and conclusions. Unfortunately, he tends, at several points, to equate "non-federal" with "private," thus overlooking the sig-

nificant role of public agencies at the state and local levels. Also, his timidity and pessimism regarding federal support of the social sciences and humanities seem scarcely warranted in the light of encouraging developments in the past year or so.

Dr. Kidd's concern for the preservation of the essential role of the university is admirable. "The university at its best," he writes, "is a key institution through which the right of man to know and to seek knowledge freely is safeguarded. It is through remaining free to criticize our culture, our economy and our political system that universities can best serve the nation as a world power." Dr. Paul E. Klopsteg's wise Foreword reiterates this theme. Especially noteworthy is Dr. Klopsteg's insistence that we not overlook the important position of the undergraduate liberal arts college in the educational process.

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CHARLES FRANKEL, (Ed.). *Issues in University Education: Essays by Ten American Scholars*. Pp. xiv, 175. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. \$3.95.

It is a matter of educational history that American universities are grounded upon colleges of liberal arts or make instruction in this area their prime reason for being. This dedication is shared to a large degree by denominational colleges and, except for certain teachers' colleges and schools of technology, other private or state controlled institutions of higher learning. By definition, the liberal arts cannot but be associated with that process which, ideally, sets the mind at liberty or, through an inherent emancipative action, breeds the man or woman, catholic and humanist, whose concern is mankind; properly, whose country is the world.

A continuing theme of *Issues in University Education* points to the general abrogation of this unique sanction in American agencies of higher education. For, says the editor Frankel—at least on the undergraduate level—"The American college has one primary meaning. It is

the great social escalator of contemporary American society. . . . Young Americans come to college to learn how to behave and how to dress; they come to college to meet—and marry—the right people; they come so that they can leave labeled 'college graduate'" (p. 157).

Even so, the ten specialists who offer this unusually good symposium devoted to a clarification of higher education's contemporary problems see expressive values in the American people's drive to mass education. As an indigenous development, this must be evaluated in terms of the American culture—as opposed to the application of preconceived standards from abroad. Not least in this evaluation is the fact that the United States chose higher education. Belief in the efficacy of a college education is marvelous.

The volume is one outgrowth of a series of international conferences sponsored first by the Hazen Foundation and later by the Department of State. Although the contributions range from higher education philosophy to town and gown relationships, and from the "Making of the Scholar" to the "Democratization of Educational Opportunity," the result is far from the frequent overlapping or pied points of view sometimes characteristic of such undertakings. Yet, unfortunately, no Index has been provided.

Furthermore, one may ask why anthropology was not called to aid; or why the present challenge to American ideology—and that of the free world—was not dealt with more decisively. Professors Ulich and Franklin come closest although their remarks on pages 44-45 and 76-77 only cite the problem. Chapter VII, "In Loco Parentis," offers a weird close-up of educational babysitting that prompts recourse to Abraham Flexner's famous dictum: "To my thinking, for us Americans, education ought at this moment to emphasize scholarship and the capacity for severe intellectual effort, for nothing else needs emphasizing." The prospect of an advanced enrollment within the next decade along with Robert Oppenheimer's comment that knowledge doubles every ten years places Flexner's thrust squarely in the plexus.

Jacksonianism in American higher education remains unresolved.

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JOHN A. GARRATY and WALTER ADAMS. *From Main Street to the Left Bank: Students and Scholars Abroad*. Pp. x, 216. East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1959. \$4.00.

Beginning with John and Ruth Useem's study of *The Western Educated Man in India*, a substantial technical literature has accumulated over the last few years on educational and cultural exchange. This literature is largely the product of three major research and publishing ventures: the eight volumes on universities and world affairs published by the American Council on Education; the five volumes on cross-cultural education sponsored by the Social Science Research Council and published by the University of Minnesota Press; and now the projected ten-volume study—the volume under review is the second of this series—which the Institute of Research Overseas at Michigan State University is conducting on the international programs of American universities.

After nine months of observation in Europe and 400 interviews, Professors Garraty and Adams set out in their book to describe the activities of a large sampling of American students and professors in Western Europe and to estimate their effectiveness. There are separate chapters on the motivations for foreign study, differences between European and American educational systems, orientation activities, organized programs, cross-cultural relationships, professor exchanges, and the impact of the European university and the American student on each other.

Since the first six chapters of the book are largely descriptive, they can be skimmed or skipped by the readers familiar with educational exchange activities. This is not true, however, of the latter part of the book which contains many valuable insights and significant findings. Some of the findings confirm what is al-

ready well known from other studies or what has long been apparent to persons engaged in the operation of exchange programs—in fact, much of the book is based upon interviews with program administrators—but many of the authors' conclusions are quite novel or develop basic principles which have been only dimly perceived by others.

Some of the points made by the authors which seem to this reviewer to be especially well founded and which if more widely appreciated would greatly benefit current educational exchange programs are the following: the main impact of educational exchange will almost always be upon the visiting scholars and not upon the host culture, and this should be kept in mind in planning and evaluating programs; from the American standpoint, large-scale programs of educational exchange would be justified, if for no other reason than the urgent need of Americans to know a great deal more about other peoples and their culture; educational exchanges to be worthy of the name and the large expenditures involved should have at the center a hard core of intellectual effort; from an academic standpoint, although perhaps not from all others, the benefits of educational exchanges increase and the difficulties decrease as the student gains in intellectual maturity and the ability to work independently; and at the professor level it would be better to cultivate and promote exchanges developing naturally among scholars, and for which candidates are already available, than to plan on the basis of political or other considerations more ambitious programs that are less related to academic needs and opportunities and require an extensive and perhaps in the end an only partially successful recruitment campaign.

The authors should be complimented on the evident zest with which the study was conducted and on their lively reporting style.

FRANCIS A. YOUNG

Executive Secretary
Committee on International
Exchange of Persons
Conference Board of Associated
Research Councils

JAMES BRYANT CONANT. *The Child, the Parent, and the State*. Pp. vi, 211. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959. \$3.50.

In these addresses directed to the interested citizen, Dr. Conant explores the broader aspects of his constructive study of *The American High School Today*, published in 1958. His sober analysis of changes in secondary school organization needed to meet the Russian challenge to our scientific achievement provides a welcome contrast to the strident outpourings of those who attribute our deficiencies mainly to progressivist and adjustment to life conceptions of the educational process.

American educational ideas and practices, Dr. Conant makes clear, are inextricably related to complex social factors—to our tradition of decentralized control, to our predominantly industrial economy, to our national tendency to prize practical effectiveness, to our impelling belief in equality of opportunity. Despite its defects, which are in part the obverse side of its virtues, he regards the American high school as a distinctive achievement. Far from advocating a return to the European system, he points out that the trend of world thought is in the direction of the American concern for the educational needs of all the youth, not alone, or primarily, for the academically talented of the upper classes. In concluding, Dr. Conant expresses the conviction that the American high school will be recognized in due time as "one of the finest products of democracy . . . as a continuing insurance for the preservation of the vitality of a society of free men."

In *The American High School Today*, Dr. Conant presents detailed recommendations for pedagogical improvement. Here he reiterates his belief that no radical change is needed in the basic pattern, that is, the comprehensive high school which provides a common core of studies for all and offers electives to meet the abilities and goals of various groups of students. For the common core he suggests as a minimum: 4 years of English, 3 years of social studies, 1 year each of mathematics and natural science. For the academically talented he would require,

besides the core of English and social studies, a sequence of 4 years of mathematics, 4 years of sustained study of a single foreign language, and intensive work in physics.

The difficulties of introducing the program would not come primarily from the educators or school administrators—although some of them no doubt differ with Dr. Conant on the merits of the particular curriculum he proposes. The real difficulties arise from economic factors, from parents' ambitions for their children, and from community attitudes generally. The chief problem is connected with the decentralized character of our school system which has led to the multiplication of relatively small schools. Only 4,000 out of the 21,000 high schools have a sufficiently large student body to permit economic organization of special classes or can maintain a teaching staff and provide facilities necessary for a high standard of work in the sciences and in foreign languages. If the work in our smaller schools could be raised to the level of our best schools, the quality of our secondary school achievement would be enormously improved. A prerequisite for any needed educational reform is an extensive movement of consolidation. This vast task in reorganization would require federal direction and support, modification of taxation policies, and not least, a radical change in public attitudes from local and regional loyalties to a national outlook.

Half of the book is comprised of documents, extensive notes, and concise factual material. The approach throughout is practical: no attempt is made to discuss educational theory; for example, the cultivation of intellectual attitudes or the development of the personality as a whole. Dr. Conant's presentation may not appeal to humanists, perhaps, either of the elitist brahmin persuasion or of the liberal progressive party. But it offers an excellent introduction to the complexities of the American educational problem and is of great value for the educator as well as for the layman to whom it is addressed.

I. B. BERKSON

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OLIVER C. CARMICHAEL. *Universities: Commonwealth and American*. Pp. xx, 390. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. \$6.00.

The universities Dr. Carmichael has studied are appropriately considered together. They have common roots in the institutions for higher education early established in England and in Scotland. Except for a few in Africa and Canada, they have a common language of instruction. Sharing certain basic ideas and ideals regarding higher education, they have developed in many respects along similar lines.

The book is more than a record of impressions gained from visits to more than fifty universities in the English-speaking world and from wide knowledge of universities in America. It contains a great store of precise and illuminating information about the history of these institutions, about numbers of students, about kinds of degrees, and about educational programs.

The chief value of the book is not, however, in the information it contains about these matters, but rather in its analysis of current problems in the institutions of higher education in Commonwealth countries and in the United States. The concluding chapter on "Problems and Prospects of Higher Education" is an impressive analysis of common problems and major issues: the expanding demand for higher education and the consequent problem of handling increasing numbers of students; the proliferation of courses and educational programs to meet the variety of needs of students and the consequent need for a clarification of the objectives of institutions of higher education; the pressure of society to develop our human resources to the full and the consequent need of more adequate provision for the gifted student; the importance of education for women and the need to develop not only equal treatment, but improved curricula for them. The second of these points deserves special attention. As Dr. Carmichael makes clear, "the clarification of objectives and realistic revision of our curricula and methods are long overdue."

Dr. Carmichael cannot be accused of exhibiting prejudices in favor of the prac-

tices of higher education in America. Indeed, while paying tribute to "American zeal for higher education," he confesses that "a paramount need in American higher education is an emphasis upon quality." But if he does not overpraise American education, he does perhaps deal too gently with some of its gravest faults: the corrupting influence of athletics in American higher education, and of the fraternity system, for example, and of the evils of academic bookkeeping under the American course-credit system.

Perhaps these are some of the things Dr. Carmichael has in mind when he indicates in his conclusion "that drastic reforms will be required to achieve maximum results by way of educational and scientific advances." It is to be hoped that American readers will not only be reassured to discover that our basic problems are not unique but spurred to the drastic reforms this book calls for.

CLARENCE FAUST

President
Fund for the Advancement of
Education

RICHARD N. SWIFT. *World Affairs and the College Curriculum*. Pp. xi, 194. Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1959. \$3.50.

This is one of a series of eight studies on the role of American universities in world affairs, prepared for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace as the outcome of a long-range inquiry conducted under the general direction of Howard E. Wilson. Mr. Swift, Associate Professor of Government at New York University, has closely examined the undergraduate curricula at more than seventy institutions from the standpoint of their effectiveness in preparing students—as citizens or potential statesmen—to cope with the awesome problems of maintaining man's cultural heritage and ultimate values in a world which, as he puts it, is "superbly equipped for mass suicide." His audit is not reassuring.

Typically, the college curriculum is parochial, traditionalist, and compartmental. Parochialism denies to most students

even rudimentary acquaintance with non-Western cultures. It permits a great many to escape with a liberal education no more universal than the limits of American or Anglo-American history, literature, and social problems. Mr. Swift also joins his voice to the hue and cry over the linguistic illiteracy characteristic of the American college graduate.

Traditionalism in the curriculum has tended to block awareness of the progress of knowledge and appreciation of fresh insights, especially in the study of human behavior. Students do not come to grips with implications for contemporary society in many branches of learning. The outdated intellectual perspective they often acquire distorts their assessment of current realities.

The compartmental or departmental division of the curriculum may interfere with what Mr. Swift conceives as an adequate approach to education in world affairs. It accents specialization at the cost of a broad grasp of the interrelatedness of modern life. The author is particularly impatient with those who haggle over whether political science has a proprietary claim to the field of international relations. World affairs, he insists, are properly the concern of every department, at least in developing the student's general education. Even for undergraduates majoring in world affairs, Mr. Swift prefers a far-ranging combination of subjects, rather than concentration in a single discipline.

The author has a confidence, which to this reviewer seems exaggerated, that the introduction of new courses, the revision of old ones, and the reorientation of curricular requirements will make quite a difference in the influence of the colleges on their students' fitness for world responsibility. He hopes that proposals of a 1953 Modern Languages Association Interdisciplinary Seminar, for instance, might revolutionize the teaching of language so that students would grasp much more intimately than they usually have the cultural traditions of the country whose language they study. American history courses should give emphasis to the context of world events in which the United States functions. More colleges

should route all their students through something like Columbia University's renowned Contemporary Civilization sequence or basic courses in the analysis of problems of international relations and American foreign policy. Above all, non-Western studies should be encouraged.

The most telling conclusion is that to learn about world affairs students "need an atmosphere where they can begin to see the wholeness of knowledge" whether or not they intend to become specialists. Mr. Swift persuasively maintains that "effective teaching in world affairs occurs where the curriculum and the faculty spirit are truly liberal; where faculty members teach students and not just subject matter; where they try to develop minds and not merely drill automatons; where world affairs permeates the curriculum and appears to some extent in all required courses; and where the college deliberately helps the student relate all his studies to world affairs. In short, if a college or university regards itself as veritably a community of scholars, it can undoubtedly create an effective undergraduate program in world affairs."

PHILIP E. JACOB

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STANLEY M. ELKINS. *Slavery: A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life*. Pp. viii, 247. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959. \$4.50.

The author has aptly stated that his study "does not pretend to be a history" of slavery in any sense but an analysis of certain factors neglected in previous studies of the institution.

In the development of this novel approach, the writer analyzes some interesting angles. In comparing the institution of slavery in North America and Latin America, he concludes that, under the beneficent influence of the crown and church, the institution was less rigid in legal character and hence in its practical operations in Latin America. Thus in the latter region the "Sambo" type, the existence of which is attributed to the submerging of personality, did not appear as

it did in North America. The slavery system in the United States and the concentration camps in Germany are represented as analogous in portraying "the infantilizing tendencies of absolute power."

The British crusade against bondage is compared with that in the United States. The English, operating through institutions national in character, had created a mind favorable to abolition; whereas in America there were no national churches, universities, or business organizations to facilitate a calm, intellectual climate for discussion of gradual means of abolishing slavery. Instead, at a time when economic conditions in the South were ripe for defense of its institution, abolitionists, dedicated to the "guilt and sin" formula, accentuated that defense.

On two points, in particular, the reviewer disagrees with the author. Neither Phillips nor Stampff is definitive on slavery, and both have merits and defects, respectively. To disparage the former and praise lavishly the latter, as the author does, is to overlook the fact that Stampff's approach and bias are as truly subject to criticism as are Phillips'. The other point is in respect to slave insurrections. Since no such phenomena of consequence occurred after 1831, the author concludes that all fears of such were absurd and designed largely to cement antiabolition feeling. Doubtless, such fears were exaggerated, yet when abolition literature was being sent into the South some years after the Nat Turner Insurrection, scores of people, from the North and South, declared that literature to be of an inflammatory and insurrectionary character. Many of these people were probably as honest in their convictions as Duff Green, whose contrary views are given as proof of the author's view. Perhaps, therefore, the eternal vigilance of future years is not as simply explained as suggested in this study.

HENRY H. SIMMS

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MABEL NEWCOMER. *A Century of Higher Education for American Women*. Pp. xii, 266. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. \$5.00.

The author does not attempt to present a detailed historical development of the higher education of American women but highlights significant trends in a pertinent discourse. The real value of this book on a subject that already has extensive documentation is that it gives an excellent perspective on what women of this country have chosen to study, what they have done with their education, and what particular contributions college women have made to society. With the marked changes in what women have been doing with their lives in the past few decades, the author not only raises questions as to how a college education can best assist women to meet the varied demands of multiple responsibilities, but is courageous enough to make sound recommendations on controversial issues relating to their education. A scholarly author with a long and distinguished career teaching social sciences and in government service, Newcomer is well qualified to write on this subject.

The writer discusses objectively the educational aims of the women's colleges and of the women students themselves, comparing and contrasting curriculum, student activities, and motivations in these colleges with coeducational programs. She has given well-documented and carefully evaluated analyses about women after college who have jobs as scholars, artists, homemakers, and civic workers. The author's concern is not whether women will ever use their college education, for there is ample proof that they do, but whether women will acquire the education they need before they marry, and then when the youngest child has entered school be able to establish themselves in some profession without too long a period of training. While the proportion of American women of college age who enter higher education is increasing, approximately 52 per cent do not complete their first degrees, and the proportion continuing with master's and doctoral programs is declining. If the present trend continues, it is to be expected that "women will contribute a decreasing share to the advancement of knowledge in this country." The chief problem, Newcomer believes, is the lack of motivation.

Women themselves are not convinced that higher education is as important for them as for men.

The author contends that educational systems have taken little cognizance of the fact that girls mature earlier than boys and because of early marriage more imaginative programs should be developed to assist them in the completion of undergraduate courses. She makes exceedingly important suggestions to meet this problem. This is a book which should be read by all concerned with women's education.

ALTHEA K. HOTTEL

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University of Pennsylvania

POLITICAL THEORY

PITIRIM A. SOROKIN and WALTER A. LUNDEN. *Power and Morality: Who Shall Guard the Guardians*. Pp. 204. Boston, Mass.: Porter Sargeant Publisher (An Extending Horizons Book), 1959. \$3.50.

Moved by the frightening specter of a divided world in possession of weapons whose potential for annihilation can scarcely be contained, the authors review with great industry the causes of the corruption of power. Then they proceed to disengage it from the instruments of destruction and place it at the service of an emerging order of values which will unite and lead mankind into a new era of creative civilization.

Of the 193 pages of the text, 110 are devoted to a historical and statistical disclosure that authority corrupts through the possession of coercive forces, that individuals and groups invested with power over fellow men have been more ruthless, immoral, and destructive than those without such power, that those who have wielded political power have a worse historical record than those who have exercised nonpolitical power. Further, the incidence of insanity has had a higher ratio among political rulers than the nonpolitical, and the latter higher than individuals who exercise no power whatsoever upon their fellow men. A hierarchical ratio of criminality and insanity is found, with historical

reference, in descending scale from despotic, political rulers to democratic and republican rulers, to captains of finance, industry, labor leaders, and so on. The underlying argument is that moral integrity and sanity are in inverse proportion to the possession of power further aggravated by instruments of coercive force and destruction.

After this bleak, pessimistic picture of human nature in the exercise of power, the authors hopefully envision for mankind a bright new horizon. First, there must be total disarmament by all and the complete elimination of any military resources by a process of scientific and moral persuasion. The coercive power of each state must be reduced and restricted solely to the policing of civil order. This will allow the growth and promotion of the new integral order of values and institutions while the sensate form of culture, which has been dominant in the Western world during the last five centuries, is disintegrating.

The presently emerging integral culture order is an intermediary between the medieval ideational culture which did not take adequate account of sensory phenomenon and the ancient and modern sensate culture which exaggerated it. The ultimate principle of the integral culture proclaims that the true reality-value is an "infinite manifold" in which the supersensory, rational, and sensory forms are inseparable from one another and promises a unification of religion, philosophy, science, ethics, and fine arts into an integrated system of supreme values of truth, goodness, and beauty. This conception of the authors is not unlike the Toynbean latitudinarian and comprehensive integration of values. To ensure the triumph of the new integral order, government, the authors contend, must be entrusted to scientists, sages, and saints who will be guided by universal and perennial moral principles in order to serve only the good and not the evil purpose.

The serious, high-minded intention of the authors is unquestionably clear and admirable, but the premises of their arguments and the means they propose do serious violence to the realities of human

nature. The imbalance of excessive scientism in the first and greater part of the book, in which a most discouraging picture of men in the exercise of power is delineated, contrasts stridently with the idyllic innocence ultimately achieved in the new order. The human capacity for evil will not be eradicated or rendered impotent by the complete removal of the instruments of force and destruction. There will always remain instruments of violence about us. A more realistic admission of perverse and obstinate wills and intellects which will ever remain impervious to the idealism the authors envision as well as to the intellectual and moral discipline they propose might have allowed, on the one hand, the ever-present necessity for coercive power and, on the other, seriously modified the Platonic view of the infallibility of the wise and good in government. The authors have made a strong and admirable case for the potential of human goodness, and the present reviewer prayerfully joins them in the triumph of virtue. But in the vision of a complete triumph on earth of truth, goodness, and beauty over their contraries the authors have overextended their horizons.

JOSEPH COSTANZO

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HORACE M. KALLEN. *A Study of Liberty*. Pp. xv, 151. Yellow Springs, Ohio: Antioch Press, 1959. \$3.00.

Written by a philosopher with a scholarly vocabulary, this study of the basic impulses to freedom is arduous for the average reader of the literature of liberty. As a somewhat more than average reader I had to consult the dictionary with unembarrassed frequency. Despite the difficulties of a scholar's language, the book is rewarding in its insights and its frequent eloquence.

The main thesis enshrines liberty as the driving force of progress in "man's perennial war of liberation," treating reason and science as its major instruments. Life is a constant "becoming"; there are no absolute rules, creeds, or goals. Liberty as "experience, idea and ideal" is examined under two main headings, "Freedom as the

Human Condition" and "the Actual and Ideal in Pursuit of Liberty," with such diverse topics as "Liberty as the Price of Security," "the Conscious Self as Value System," "Freedom as the Making and Working of Ideals," and "Living, Actual and Hypostatic."

A fair quotation of the underlying thesis reads: "The upshot of all the foregoing observations would be that pursuit of liberty and struggle for self-preservation are alternative expressions for the human condition. . . . By first intention, liberty in sum signalizes those altering interorganic relations whereby an organism stays a live organism as it carries on, its give-and-take being the on-going transaction of the self's inner concords and conflicts with the like relations between the diverse and diversifying surroundings outside."

Dr. Kallen illustrates his thesis with both historical and contemporary conflicts, but his major search is in the realm of ideas. None of the great mass movements for liberation is cited, as might be expected in a study of liberty. The nature of the force and its relevance to the individual and to his social relations are the philosopher's own world, in this case warmed and heightened by evident but restrained passion for freedom against all its adversaries.

ROGER N. BALDWIN

Chairman
International League for the Rights
of Man

KENNETH N. WALTZ. *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. Pp. viii, 263. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. \$5.50.

This closely reasoned book finds three "images" of war in the writings of social philosophers. The first group sees wars resulting from "the nature and behavior of man . . . from selfishness, from misdirected aggressive impulses, from stupidity. . . . The elimination of war must come through uplifting and enlightening men or securing their psychic-social readjustment." The second group sees war as the result of the internal structure of certain states. A state "plagued by internal strife [arises] by the contradictions which Marx thought inherent in capitalism" may

. . . seek the war that will bring internal peace. Though the interest of the people is in peace, their governors make war." The third group blames our anarchic system of states. "With no system of law enforceable among them . . . conflict, sometimes leading to war, is bound to occur." The ultimate solution must be world government, but this will be unsuccessful unless it deals with the psychic and political forces analyzed in the first two "images."

Like all good books, this one provokes further thought. It deals with the political and social philosophers. Yet some soldiers have thought about war. Other professionals are more likely to have read them than the social philosophers. Clausewitz's works are not analyzed; the only other professionals mentioned are Skoblov, Tirpitz, and Eisenhower. To adopt Dr. Waltz's terminology, the professionals' image of war has often had a demonstrable influence on policy. To take another possible image, where do politicians get their ideas about war? From military or political thinkers or from distorted versions of both? *Geopolitik* is not mentioned; misinterpreted Rousseau, Clausewitz, Marx, and Darwin have also influenced policy. This superb study deals with one set of images about war; others must still be examined.

As always, it is possible to question details. Norman Angell is correctly described as the leading modern "publicist for the classical economists' conviction that war is an uneconomic venture." But Jean de Bloch is not mentioned, though Merle Curti thinks that he "inaugurated a new and more positive [and publicly more influential] phase of pacifism," and quotes another authority as saying that *The Future of War* . . . [is] exceeded in importance only by the work of Grotius."

THEODORE ROPP

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LEO STRAUSS. *What Is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies*. Pp. 315. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959. \$6.00.

This book is a collection of learned lectures and essays by a scholar who holds

the chair of political philosophy at the University of Chicago. It is a volume by an expert who adheres throughout to his professional subject matter.

There is a considerable diversity of material in the work. There are a number of chapters devoted to broad and general themes, such as "What Is Political Philosophy?" "Political Philosophy and History," "On Classical Political Philosophy," and "On a Forgotten Kind of Writing." The latter is a suggestive essay on how really to understand many political philosophers of the past.

Then there are excellent chapters on important phases of the political thought of leading political philosophers of modern and contemporary times, such as "The Basis of Hobbes's Political Philosophy," "Locke's Doctrine of Natural Law," and the political and social philosophy of the recent German publicist and philosopher, Kurt Riezler.

More esoteric are the chapters on "Restatement of Xenophon's *Hiero*," "How Fārābī Read Plato's *Laws*," and "Maimonides' Statement on Political Science." The volume concludes with some sixteen reviews of important books on political philosophy and the history of political theory, chiefly drawn from the period between 1939 and 1951. Some of the best are those of R. H. S. Crossman's *Plato Today*, which attempts to interpret Plato in terms of present political situations; of C. E. Vaughan's classic *Studies in the History of Political Philosophy*; of C. H. McIlwain's *Constitutionalism, Ancient and Modern*; of John Dewey's rather archaic and discredited, even in revised form, *German Philosophy and Politics*; of Leonardo Olschki's *Machiavelli the Scientist*; and Yves R. Simon's *Philosophy of Democratic Governments*.

Perhaps the most interesting chapter is Chapter IX which can be regarded as a somewhat original contribution to the sociology of knowledge and the art of interpreting some political philosophers. Professor Strauss contends that political philosophy seeks the truth, while political society rests on commonly accepted values and myths known as public opinions or convictions. The latter may fail to coin-

cide with philosophical truth or the findings of social science. Hence, there is often a clash between political and social truths and the accepted principles of society. Truth may upset public convictions and lead to disastrous social tensions. Conscientious and conservative political philosophers may, therefore, feel compelled to write with their tongues in their cheek, so to speak: "Philosophers or scientists who hold this view about the relation of philosophy or science and society are driven to employ a peculiar manner of writing which would enable them to reveal what they regard as the truth to the few, without endangering the unqualified commitment of the many to the opinions on which society rests."

Professor Strauss suggests that a more lucid and intelligible history of political philosophy might be provided by applying this hypothesis to the writings of the great political philosophers of the past. He deals with certain criticisms of his hypothesis by Professor George H. Sabine and Yvon Belaval, especially as related to the thinking and writing of Spinoza, Leibnitz, and Kant.

It would be interesting to see how Professor Strauss would deal with George Orwell's mechanism or device of "double-thinking," which seems to be the key to much of the political thought and practice of our day. It surely serves to support the politicians and to deceive the public—and it may amuse the political philosophers when it does not alarm them as they view the disastrous consequences.

All in all this is a learned book of, by, and for scholars. It will not excite the rabble, but it will instruct the elect.

HARRY ELMER BARNES

Malibu, California

PAUL WEISS. *Our Public Life*. Pp. 256. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1959. \$4.50.

Dr. Weiss deals with social theory. He expressly sets his book in the tradition of Aristotle, Hobbes, and Hegel, "the three great philosophical theorists of the Western World." He has many references to Plato, but Locke and Rousseau are mentioned only twice and Marx once. The

author does not discuss the social sciences or their contribution to the understanding of man in society. Dr. Weiss obviously considers the social sciences irrelevant to his argument, for he deals with ideal models rather than with actual societies. Only twice does he violate his own self-denying ordinance to mention an actual social situation—the mid-twentieth century controversy in the United States over civil rights and the League of Nations. "I asked myself," he says of his book, "not only how it is that men come to be part of public groups, but what ought to occur, if they are to move out of inferior into better states of affairs, from conventional traditionalized societies to state, to cultures, and then to civilization." The terms "state," "culture," and "civilization" must be understood in terms of specific definitions given by the author in this adventure in speculation. Dr. Weiss says: "... we live not in that Civilization [characterized by peace and prosperity and which can be achieved only through world government] but in a fragmentary realization of this—in a unit of civilization or *Culture*."

The author makes an exhaustive, and exhausting, dialectical analysis of man's "native" rights—"essential demands." "The answer here given to the vexatious problem of unalienable rights . . . agrees that native rights are absolutely unalienable, but only as constituent elements in a single constructed unalienable right. . . ." Dr. Weiss begins his discussion of law with "social" law, William Graham Sumner's folkways and mores though Sumner is not mentioned. The author advances to "positive" law and then to "natural" law. Putting aside the discussion through the centuries of the concept of natural law, Dr. Weiss uses a definition that fits into the development of his argument. "Natural Law" is compounded of our understanding of "the social good, of values that now prevail, of laws of nature that connect the one with the other, and of the fact that the social good makes the operation of some laws more desirable than the operation of others." "Natural Law stands in between positive law and a more comprehensive law, a Law of Civilization. . . ." Natural law "needs a society or state, but no

society or state could exist with it alone." The Law of Civilization "is pertinent to men regardless of what society they occupy or what their states demand. That more comprehensive law demands the achievement of perpetual peace and prosperity for mankind."

This essay contributes two new concepts to social theory, "native rights" and the "Law of Civilization." Its chief distinction is an ordered analysis at the level of the ideal "of a sequence of more and more comprehensive ways [a series of enlarging concentric circles] in which men could exist together" if they would succeed in achieving the good life and be able to look "beyond Civilization" to the ultimate "Absolute Good."

RALPH H. GABRIEL

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American University

ECONOMICS

SIMON KUZNETS. *Six Lectures on Economic Growth*. Pp. 122. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959. \$3.50.

The six lectures that comprise this volume were presented by Professor Kuznets at the Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinamericanos (CEMLA) in Mexico City during July, 1958. The lectures cover, in an admirably clear and concise manner, the following areas: The meaning and measurement of economic growth and the high rates of modern economic growth; the necessary conditions for growth and the time patterns of growth; findings on industrial structure and the labor force and national product; capital formation with particular attention to long-term problems; the problems and trends in foreign trade ratios; and the tasks of theory.

The materials frequently wander into the realm of analytical postulation, but the author states in his Preface that the "... lectures deal briefly with findings and hypotheses that warrant more detailed evidence and more rigorously formulated analysis. But I preferred to cover a wider scope rather than encumber the discussion with detailed data or with mathematical

formulae, more appropriate to publications designed for reference."

The language is generally clear. A straightforward definition of growth is presented—a sustained increase in the output of goods. It is refreshing to find such a clear-cut statement of what is growth, instead of being couched in a number of ifs, ands, and conditions. Two characteristics of this sustained growth, one found in all cases—rise in per capita product—and one found in almost all cases—a sustained and substantial increase in population—are set forth as features of economic growth. In spite of the author's lament that the supply of empirical data relating to rates of growth is meager, he does well in presenting several very useful tabulations depicting growth factors in a number of countries.

Particular attention is given to the role of innovations in facilitating economic growth. Likewise, he notes a close association between the nature of the industrial structure of the labor force and national income. One of the more elucidating lectures is concerned with capital formation. The reader is given a clear definition of 'capital, something that is missing in so many treatments of capital formation in development.

As a series of lectures, the discussions are at times brief and a little disjointed. But the whole is tied together extremely well in the last lecture that discusses the role of theory. The first task of theory is to formulate a model, and the second is to "... analyze and formulate the effects of different initial structures of nation-states upon the patterns of economic growth that ensued, and upon characteristics of the mature economies in which modern development has been maintained. The emphasis here is on the differences in the patterns of modern economic growth and in the resulting structures, rather than upon their common characteristics."

In terms of what the author proposed—a series of lectures outlining the subject—he accomplishes his objective well. Quantitative aspects of economic growth are intermingled with analytical propositions in good balance. Data from a wide range

of countries are used to support the assertions. The experience of developed areas is used as a backdrop for discussing the problems of developing nations.

REUBEN E. SLESINGER

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Depreciation and Taxes. Symposium conducted by the Tax Institute, Nov. 20–21, 1958. Pp. viii, 248. Princeton, N. J.: Tax Institute, 1959. \$6.00.

This is another of the annual symposia "conducted by the Tax Institute to focus attention on a major problem of taxation by affording an opportunity for discussion by informed participants representing different points of view."

In this case the principal participants were tax accountants, attorneys, university and business economists, business managers, and tax administrators, including present and former high officials of the United States Internal Revenue Service.

The four half-day sessions were devoted to: 1) Fundamentals of Depreciation Policy; 2) Depreciation and Changing Price Level; 3) Specific Aspects of Tax Policy and Management Decisions; and 4) Considerations in Depreciation Reform.

There is no doubt that depreciation is one of the most important and difficult problems of business management and tax administration. Following are some of the more important aspects of this problem which were discussed: "The deficiency of historical cost accruals by reason of inflation is the main problem of tax depreciation today," said one participant. Apparently all present agreed that inflation affects usual depreciation policies disastrously, but some considered failure to make proper allowance for technological obsolescence as more important in dynamic modern industry.

Minor attention was given to the new depreciation methods of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the last in first out concept (LIFO), and wartime and other accelerated depreciation methods. Also discussed were the interrelations of depreciation policies and: 1) capital gains; 2) capitalization versus expensing; 3) treatment

of salvage; 4) incentive taxation; and 5) other phases of fiscal and business policies.

The Director of the Canadian Tax Foundation summarized briefly the reformed depreciation policies of Canada, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and West Germany, barely mentioning Japan. The net effect in all of these countries has been to increase depreciation allowances very substantially, obviously as an incentive to increase industrial production and general economic prosperity.

Several of the participants were very critical of accountants and business managers and of their respective organizations for not being more courageous in taking the lead in reforming depreciation policies and practices. The chief difficulties were shown very emphatically to be the widespread web of long-standing, conflicting special interests, both economic and political.

As would be expected, most of the discussions were from the point of view of management and its representatives. It was admitted, however, that, in the long run, realistic depreciation accounting and practice, which conforms with the economic facts, would be to the best interest of business, government, and the public generally, even though it might be to the short-run disadvantage of some special interests and politicians.

These valuable symposia on basic problems might be more effective, "and not just talk," if they and the reviews thereof were published twelve or even six months earlier.

ROY G. BLAKEY

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The American Economic Impact on Canada. (Publication Number 12, Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center.) Pp. xviii, 176. New York: Cambridge University Press for the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center, 1959. \$4.50.

The Commonwealth-Studies Center was established at Duke University in 1955 with financial assistance from the Carnegie Corporation to encourage research in Com-

monwealth affairs. One part of its program is the Summer Seminar and Research Group which annually brings together a group of scholars from various Commonwealth countries to pursue their studies in contact with each other and with members of the faculty and graduates of Duke University. The group of visitors which assembled in the summer of 1958 presented seven papers on the economic impact of the United States on Canada, and these studies have been embodied in this volume for public circulation because of the widespread interest in the general topic. The volume is Number 12 in the publications of the Center and the second one on Canada, an earlier one having dealt with problems of Canadian federal development.

Although collectively the essays in this volume are broad enough to touch on the whole field of Canadian-American problems which "have as long a history as the Canadian economy itself" (p. 100), the range of special interest is narrower both in time and topic. The emphasis is on the present and, among many possible areas of special concern, three are selected in which the rays of Canadian discontent have in recent years been brought to focus sufficiently to generate what might appropriately be called a slow burn. These are the nature and significance of American policy relating respectively to foreign investments, agriculture, and labor organization. Canadians devoted a good deal of energy in the 1950's to discussing and exploring the apparently rapid absorption of the Canadian nonagricultural economy by American capital and management, the presumably destructive impact of the agricultural policy of the United States on the Canadian farmer, and the alleged domination of Canadian labor unionism by gargantuan labor organizations with head offices in the neighboring republic. The Commonwealth-Studies Center could scarcely have chosen a more timely group of topics for investigation in the summer seminar of 1958.

The papers in this volume examine excellently Canadian complaints in the light of the best available knowledge. It is difficult to assess dynamic processes in mid-course, but the effort in these studies

is well directed. As might be anticipated, none of the situations turns out to be wholly black or white. American investment presents opportunities for great mutual advantage but is not without potential danger. American agricultural policy does not bear full responsibility for the difficulties of the Canadian farmer but creates hazards in special areas. International unions are "the dominant force in Canadian organized labor" (p. 130), but, in fact, limitations on the autonomy of Canadian unionism are relatively slight. The merits of the individual studies lie, of course, not in summary conclusions such as these but in the careful elaboration of the many relevant circumstances. A paper dealing with the American economic impact on Quebec does not appear to fit readily into the main approach of the book but contains a striking number of homespun truths about a province and a people who are far from living the homespun lives commonly attributed to them.

An Appendix provides some two dozen useful statistical series of particular relevance.

V. C. FOWKE

Professor of Economics
University of Saskatchewan

FRANK A. HANNA. *State Income Differentials, 1919-1954*. Pp. xix, 268. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1959. \$7.50.

This is the final report of a five-year study of Differences in State Per Capita Incomes, which Professor Hanna has lead on the Duke University campus and which was supported jointly by Duke and by the Rockefeller Foundation. The volume is a mine of statistical information for ready reference. It is difficult to find any single result which might be labeled spectacular, but numerous hypotheses are examined and few obvious ones forgotten. It is not a book that he who runs may read, although the initial chapter summarizes some of the principal results for the impatient.

Hanna's personal income figures show a secular leveling of state per capita incomes. That is to say, the percentile range

separating average per capita incomes in New York and Arkansas has tended to contract over the period of the study. The contraction of the income range is marked during periods of prosperity and reversed in periods of depression. Low income states seem differentially sensitive to nation-wide economic changes; Hanna calls this an "accordion effect." Except for the disturbing effects of random fluctuations in farm income, it is possible to compute each state's per capita income figure for any year from the figure for the previous year, the national per capita income change during the given year, and Hanna's indexes of sensitivity and of differential secular trend.

At the same time, differences in state per capita incomes have persisted, and the rank order of the forty-eight states has changed but slightly. To explain the persistence of the differentials, Hanna considers differences in occupational distributions, wage rates, the importance of property incomes, and so on. All of these have their effects, but neither singly nor in additive combination do they explain the entire difference in state per capita incomes. The unexplained residual is apparently due to the existence of positive correlation and covariance among these several factors.

A number of demographic features are also considered in the same way as these economic features have been, notably the age composition and the labor force participation rate. Urbanization is however rejected as an explanatory variable. Hanna finds that cities of given size differ so drastically among themselves that "city size" is an inferior proxy or surrogate for the other economic and demographic variables he has isolated.

Emphasis throughout is on the forty-eight states as such. Little reference is made to metropolitan areas or to regional groups such as "New England" or "the cotton South." Neither is great attention paid to racial composition on the demographic side—the proportion of nonwhites in state populations. These features seem somewhat anomalous in the product of a leading economic statistician in a leading

southern university, while not detracting from the value of the book as a whole.

M. BRONFENBRENNER

Professor of Economics
University of Minnesota

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
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
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The articles appearing in THE ANNALS are indexed in the *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*.

Formulation of American Foreign Policy

By ROBERT R. BOWIE

FOREWORD

The papers in this volume, with the exception of the article by Charlotte and George Dyer, are the addresses presented at the annual meeting of this Academy, held in Philadelphia on April 8 and 9, 1960.

Upon looking at the title of this volume, some members of the Academy may ask, "Why are most of the Academy meetings devoted to foreign affairs? Why can we not leave the elucidation of American foreign policy and related questions to organizations and journals which specialize in foreign affairs, and turn our attention to other important issues, like 1) the future of the capitalistic system, 2) the decay of American cities, 3) the reorganization of our state and federal governments, 4) the care of the aging, 5) the repression of crime, 6) the disintegration of the family, 7) the decline in economic competition and the inflationary effects of administered prices, 8) social medicine, 9) the progressive abandonment of railroads and waterways and our consequent enslavement to the internal combustion engine, and 10) the denial of higher education to talented but poor youths?"

These topics are all good ones, and hence are covered in the regular volumes of *THE ANNALS*, but the officers of the Academy have learned from years of experience that the members and delegates who attend our meetings are less interested in our domestic problems than they are in the troubles of peoples beyond the seas. The poverty of the fellaheen is more absorbing than the rescripts of the Federal Reserve Board. This interest in far-away conditions is not mere exoticism; it bears closely on our modern role as leader of the Western world and our responsibilities to undeveloped and wavering nations. Consequently our officers have shown no hesitation in selecting topics which attract a sustained interest and which also have a solid substantive content. (Comments from our members on this point are sincerely solicited.)

In the Foreword of the 1959 volume, I made the statement that the attendance at that meeting had been the largest in my experience with the Academy. I am gratified to say that this attendance was sustained at the 1960 conference. Approximately 800 attended, including delegates from 341 embassies, missions to the United Nations, United States governmental agencies, universities, and civic and scientific organizations of this country and many foreign countries.

The program was carried out as planned, except that Senator Joseph S. Clark was detained by the crucial civil rights vote of 8 April, and the ambassador of the Union of South Africa to the United States, His Excellency Wentzel C. du Plessis, withdrew from making a public statement because of the adverse American public opinion brought about by the current racial convulsions in his country. Senator Clark's paper was read by a member of his staff, and is published in the pages following; Ambassador du Plessis expressed his regret that the submittal of a paper was precluded by the turn of events.

JAMES C. CHARLESWORTH

ABSTRACT: American foreign relations are determined through a series of complex policy-making decisions. In the analysis preliminary to a policy decision the external environment, the broad objectives of our foreign policy, and the means available for its implementation must be evaluated, interrelated, and appraised. This analysis is but one of the stages leading to the final conduct of foreign affairs. Enlisting the support and resources for a specific policy and the operation or execution of that policy are two further distinguishable stages. Though in the normal order they would follow the policy decision, they too must be predicted and appraised in the original analysis and thus also affect the outcome of the actual policy. To cope with the difficult task of formulating foreign policy, several government organizations were created after World War II: The Department of Defense, the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State. This policy-making machinery has greatly enhanced United States capacity for coping with the complex process of foreign affairs, but its operation can and should be further improved.—Ed.

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ANY treatment of the formulation of American foreign policy in a limited space must inevitably be highly selective. This article will focus on the complexity of policy-making, especially under modern conditions, and comment briefly on certain of the institutions and procedures now involved in making American foreign policy.

ELEMENTS OF POLICY-MAKING

The foreign policy of a state is what it actually does in its relations with other states. That end product, however, is shaped by various factors. There is the initial task of deciding what to do and how to do it. The analysis and judgment required for this purpose are considered below. Then there is the job of marshaling the necessary support and resources to carry out the selected course. The proposed policy may require appropriations, legislation, or other action by Congress. It may depend on Allied approval or co-operation. Finally, there is the stage of executing the policy, often abroad. In its own way, each of these phases has a part in shaping the eventual policy. The proposals as initially framed will take into account the anticipated response of Congress, public opinion, or Allied nations, but they may have to be modified in the course of obtaining the requisite support and co-operation. Similarly, practical problems in the field may change the ultimate emphasis or impact of the policy. A complete discussion of the making of policy would have to consider the influence of each of these stages on the actual conduct of foreign relations. Since all factors cannot be covered in this article, it will concentrate mainly on the first stage of the process: the decision on what policy to adopt and how to carry it out.

Inherent complexity

Before commenting on American procedures, it is well to remind ourselves of the reasons which make the formulation of foreign policy such a difficult and complex task. The fundamental one is that it must deal primarily with external conditions which will prevail in an uncertain future, and over which, at best, any one nation has limited control or influence. The basic task of any nation is to decide how to use its resources and influence to modify and shape this environment. The process of analysis—of deciding what to do and how to do it—involves at least three difficult factors which influence and act upon each other.

The first of these is the appraisal of the present external situation, and the likely course of its development: this is the environment in which foreign policy must be conducted. In large part, this estimation involves both the effort to predict the interests, purposes, and actions of other states and the impact on them and on each other of their differing motivations and actions.

The second factor relates to the objectives which should guide our policy. In its broadest sense the aim of our foreign policy is to create and maintain external conditions congenial to our way of life and values. To provide a basis for action, however, this general purpose must be made more specific in terms of security, economic activities, and so on. Also, relative priorities must be established among these interests.

Finally, there is the choice of means. There are many instruments which a nation can conceivably use to influence the outside world: military force, political activities, economic measures, propaganda, and various other ways. It must decide which of these are most suitable for attaining a specific purpose

and how they can best be used; resources are seldom large enough to allow the use of all possible means in an indiscriminate way.

The analysis is more difficult than this listing would imply. These factors cannot be treated separately; they are all interrelated and influence each other. It is not feasible to study them one at a time. For example, consider the question of appraising the external situation. To be useful the assessment must be objective, but it cannot be passive. The policy-maker is not looking at conditions as a bystander, but as one of the actors. His purpose is not merely to anticipate history but to assess how future forces and events may affect the interests and purposes of his own nation. Consequently, in assessing the environment he must start with some conceptions of national interests and purposes in order to consider how they may be threatened or impeded. Similarly, the appraisal must seek to determine the ways in which the situation is subject to influence both by national actions and by the actions of friendly or hostile powers.

The effort to determine the basic direction of policy involves a comparable analysis. The broadest aims of policy, like security and prosperity, may be treated as given. But practical objectives must be chosen in the light of external conditions and the means available to the nation. The policy-maker must be concerned both with what is necessary and what is feasible. The situation is similar with respect to means. In deciding what instruments to create and utilize, the policy-maker must take into account both what objectives he wishes to accomplish and what methods he deems most likely to be effective in influencing the external environment.

Thus, his task is to solve an equation with three variables, which affect each

other. Moreover, none of these factors are neat or precise: they all involve large elements of prediction, appraisal, judgment, and choice. Anyone who has been charged with trying to cope with such analysis cannot fail to be impressed with the uncertainty inherent in the process. In evaluating future policies, the decisions regarding conditions, purposes, and means pose many baffling dilemmas and alternatives. As historians and columnists have discovered, second-guessing on foreign policy is much easier and less risky than its initial formulation. Time and events remove most of the uncertainties and foreclose many of the alternatives which the policy-maker had to face and choose between.

The contemporary world

Thus the making of foreign policy is inherently difficult in any period. The conditions of the modern world, however, add greatly to the complexity. The reasons are varied.

In the first place, there are far more actors on the international stage. Until World War I, and even later, international affairs were largely dominated by a small number of European nations. The Western Hemisphere, including the United States, played only a small role. Asia and Africa were still within the European empires or, like China, too disorganized to be significant. Despite differences, European statesmen were familiar with the history and thinking processes of the nations playing important roles. Today all that is changed. Now over ninety countries are conducting their own foreign affairs, and another score will begin to do so within a relatively short time. These countries differ widely in culture, history, and attitudes. In living conditions and experience the newer nations are separated by a wide gulf from the developed countries of Europe and North

America. Many of them have weak governments that are facing staggering problems. With very limited background, they must decide how to relate themselves to the outside world and must determine their interests and priorities. The very number of actors, and especially of new actors, adds enormously to the task of conducting foreign policy for every nation.

An added complication is that the relations between nations are far more intimate today than ever before. Further, the domestic affairs of most countries are now closely entwined with international affairs. Each nation must be concerned in some degree with the internal life of other countries. The progress of growth and change within the newer nations is bound to have profound effects in international relations. Inevitably, other nations have a deep interest in the social, economic, and political evolution of these newer nations. But the same fact is also true among the developed countries. The prospects for Europe largely depend on the likely evolution of the political and social order in Germany, or France, or Britain. The events in Algeria, or the possible successor to Adenauer or De Gaulle, can directly affect a wide range of other countries.

The third complicating factor is the Sino-Soviet threat. The existence of expansionist powers has often been a feature of international life, but the Communist powers have developed to a high degree the techniques of pressure, infiltration, and subversion. They show unusual skill in exploiting conditions of instability.

Finally, our times are marked by a pace of change unparalleled in history. The international environment is not only complicated but is changing with tremendous rapidity. This is the hallmark of our era. Under the pressure

of nationalism and the urge for better living conditions, newer countries are actively seeking to modernize their economies as rapidly as possible. They are undergoing social revolution which will undoubtedly transform the structure of their social order and the attitudes of their people over a relatively short period. Meanwhile, the efforts of Western Europe to transcend ancient rivalries and to draw together in regional groupings seems likely to have a major impact on international relations. The Soviet Union too is not immune to the force of change; one obvious question is how social evolution may affect its external purposes and policies. Last, but not least, is the revolution occurring in the whole field of military technology, in the form of nuclear weapons, missiles, and now space. The result is to raise wholly novel questions about the role of force in international affairs.

Under the impact of all these forces, international life has become an intricate web of relationships constantly undergoing extreme and rapid change. As a consequence, the effort to appraise this unfolding situation, to disentangle the various forces and to foresee how they will interact, to determine what our interests are, what our goals should be in a world of flux, is far harder than in the past. Our knowledge is very limited about many of these areas of change. Very little is really known about the whole process of accelerated social and economic change or about the effects it may have on institutions and attitudes. Even those best qualified are only beginning to grasp the significance of the revolution in military force and strategy. No one can be very confident about foreseeing the prospects of change in the Soviet Union. These are all new phenomena, facing the policy-maker with even more uncertainty than usual.

UNITED STATES POLICY MACHINERY

In assessing our foreign policy machinery one should keep in mind how little time our country has had to master its present role. We emerged from World War II ill-equipped for the task. The nation and its leaders misjudged the kind of world which lay ahead and labored under serious illusions about our position and our interests, and the dangers menacing them. Our nation has had to develop an understanding of foreign affairs and the techniques for conducting them in a far shorter period than most great powers. The fifteen years it has had to evolve a framework for policy-making have been times of unprecedented change and turmoil. In many ways what has been achieved in so short a time is remarkable. Yet most would agree that the machinery still needs to be strengthened and improved if the United States is to meet the challenge of the period ahead.

Our present machinery for making foreign policy dates mainly from 1947. By that time Soviet conduct in occupied Germany, in Eastern Europe, and in the Conferences of Foreign Ministers had dashed the earlier hopes for postwar co-operation. The experience of that period had also shown the serious inadequacy of our instruments for policy formulation. To remedy the defects and fill the gaps, new agencies were created and old ones remodeled. The Defense Department was established to unify—but not to merge—the three military services under the direction of the Secretary of Defense. The Central Intelligence Agency was formed to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national security. And the National Security Council was organized to advise the President on the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies, relat-

ing to National Security, and to facilitate co-operation among the interested Departments. At the same time, General Marshall set up the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department to undertake longer-range analysis.

In the intervening years, these various agencies, and certain related ones, have been modified or strengthened in the light of experience, without changing the basic conceptions underlying their foundation. In particular the National Security Council is now assisted by a Planning Board and by an Operations Co-ordinating Board (OCB). On the Planning Board are Assistant Secretaries or officials of similar rank from each of the departments primarily interested in national security affairs. This group prepares, for the consideration of the National Security Council, policy papers designed to pose basic issues of policy and to analyze alternatives for dealing with them. All the members of this group may agree upon the substance of the papers or, if they disagree, the points of disagreement will be indicated, and alternative proposals will be submitted to the Council. In its deliberations the Council also has available the National Intelligence Estimates which indicate the consensus of the several agencies regarding the situation in the area or region under discussion. The Operations Co-ordinating Board was created in 1953 to improve the execution of the policy decisions. It is composed of senior officials from the operating agencies engaged in foreign affairs. This Board, assisted by working parties, develops detailed plans for the various countries and regions. These are intended to co-ordinate the activities of different American operating agencies and to ensure that they reinforce each other. This Board submits regular reports to the National Security Council regard-

ing the progress and problems in each area.

Operation of machinery

How well does this machinery work in practice? Speaking generally, it has certainly improved our policy-making and facilitated the performance of the novel tasks involved in our postwar role. Most observers would probably agree on that point. The present system has, however, been criticized from various points of view. It is obviously not feasible here to review or appraise its operation in any detail. There is only space to comment briefly on certain of the issues which have prompted discussion.

One common criticism is that the policy papers of the National Security Council are too general. Sometimes this defect is attributed to the tendency of committees to seek the least common denominator as a basis for agreement. This view tends to misconceive the nature of the Council. The National Security Council does not reach any decisions. It is solely an advisory group for the President. It discusses issues before him and makes recommendations, but the only one who can decide is the President. The members of the Council may espouse divergent views without resolving the issue. Thus the President has the chance to hear frank expressions of opinion by his principal advisers before deciding on policy issues.

It is true, however, that the National Security Council papers are often quite general. They seldom prescribe the specific means for handling crises which may arise in some area over the next two years. That is not the purpose of the Council. Its function is to consider the general direction or basic strategy of our policy. It enables the responsible officers—the Secretaries of State, De-

fense, and the Treasury, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence—to discuss the critical issues and to examine the alternatives for dealing with them. On the basis of such discussion and analysis the President can then determine the guidelines to govern the departments in their operations overseas. Then, as has been said, the Operations Co-ordinating Board offers a forum for working out more detailed plans.

The machinery does not, of course, always produce the right solutions. Entrenched preconceptions may impede or prevent realistic appraisal of some situations. Thus, repugnance of the Soviet regime made it hard for some to credit promptly the evidence of rapid Soviet economic and scientific progress. Similarly, some have been slow to comprehend the full scope of the Soviet threat, partly at least because its techniques and objectives are so alien to our own. And some did not grasp the force and significance of the new nationalisms as quickly as should have been done. But it is very doubtful whether any machinery can safeguard entirely against such intellectual lags in a period of radical change.

Political-military co-ordination

A valid criticism is that the existing mechanism has not been fully effective in integrating the political and military aspects of policy. The urgent need for better co-ordination in this field was one of the major reasons underlying the creation of the National Security Council in 1947. The initial concept was valid but too simple. In essence, the notion was that foreign policy, military capability, and economic resources must be kept in step. Thus the National Security Council was expected to keep in balance political com-

mitments, military means, and economic requirements. This, of course, is necessary and useful. But in reality today the relation between these factors is much more complex, much more subtle, than that concept suggests. For instance, foreign policy requires many other instruments which compete with the military for resources. Again, collective defense depends on stationing of forces overseas, allocating military assistance, and many other things which require the integration of political, military, economic, and psychological factors. Indeed, deterrence itself, which is the underlying premise of our entire defense policy, is a very complex concept; in deciding on strategies, weapons, and forces within this context it is essential to take account of the political and psychological, as well as the military factors. Finally, in the field of arms control, all these factors must be combined in preparing or analyzing any proposals. The requisite integration cannot be achieved merely by discussion at the level of the Planning Board, or the National Security Council. To get proper results the staffs of the various departments will have to work together intimately at much lower levels in order to mesh thinking and analysis. These officials do consult with each other to some extent but not nearly enough has been done along this line. Top officers in the Pentagon have sometimes been reluctant to see too much co-operation of this kind and the State Department has not been active enough in this field. One handicap, of course, is the shortage of people on both sides able to carry on integrated analysis of this kind. The military services have probably done better in training such people, as in the war colleges. While Foreign Service officers attend these courses, there is still a serious lack of officials with the necessary competence for this kind of work.

Allocation of resources

The present machinery is also deficient in another regard. It tends to be too much divorced from the budget procedures. The basic decisions on national strategy inevitably involve allocation of resources at least in broad terms. The Budget Bureau has insisted on its prerogatives in this area; the National Security Council and the Planning Board have either stayed out of this field or been kept out. The National Security Council should obviously not attempt to make the budget. It could not. But it could exercise more influence on the broad allocation of resources between types of military forces, between military and economic purposes, and so on. Under present procedures, however, these kinds of decisions tend to be made in the framework of the budget procedure.

In the case of decisions regarding the size and type of military forces, which are closely related to the National Security Council functions, another obstacle arises from the Pentagon procedures. The form of the military budget, based on the three services, makes it almost impossible to determine how various budget levels or allocations would affect military capabilities for specific tasks relevant to foreign policy. The result is to impede or block efforts to relate military means to political requirements.

Long-term planning

The Policy Planning Staff was established in 1947 in order to broaden the perspective of the thinking and policy-making in the Department both by transcending the regional approach and also by seeking to look a little further ahead in time. One of the common criticisms is that the Policy Planning Staff has too often become involved in current actions. While this criticism

is partly valid, much of it reflects a misconception of what is useful and possible. There is in the concept of long-term thinking and planning a basic dilemma. It is perfectly possible to put a group of people into an ivory tower to think about the future and write learned and interesting papers. The objection is that it is probably fruitless. Their efforts may result in a magnificent library, but will have little effect on the shaping of policy. The purpose of a policy planning staff, however, is not merely to produce literature. It is presumably to produce results which will affect the determination of policy for different situations. Foreign policy for better or worse is made in current decisions. The decisions made this week or this month relating to the Middle East, or disarmament, or economic assistance often determine the course of policy over a period of years. Unless insights and thinking on long-term factors can be brought to bear on such decisions as they are made they will have little effect. On the other hand, if this planning group becomes too immersed in current activities, it will be unable to contribute views that differ from those produced by others engaged in similar activities. The staff must try to devote its time not only to long-range analysis but also to selected decisions likely to have future significance. There is a constant tendency to draw this staff into operations to a degree beyond the requirement described. This must always be resisted. But many critics who could legitimately object to that tendency ignore the question of how to mesh the thinking with action.

What kind of a contribution should such a staff try to make? Some have suggested that it should be mainly engaged in contingency planning of the sort that many military staffs do. To my mind this is misguided. It would

not be fruitful for such a staff to spend its time trying to develop drawers full of solutions for possible crises that might arise in the next period of years. In the first place, it is very doubtful whether the way such crises are likely to arise can be foreseen concretely enough to make the planning of much help. In addition, the potential number would be too vast to manage.

The purpose of the staff, it seems to me, should be quite different. Its major concern should be to identify the long-range or basic forces at work in the world and determine the implications for the premises of American policy and for the analysis of our interests and purposes.

There are many instruments of policy which tend to be neglected because their effects are slow, or long-term, or not immediate. The tendency of officials charged with day-to-day operations is to look for means which have immediate impact. Therefore, another function of such a planning staff is to direct attention to instruments of policy, or kinds of actions, that may not seem profitable in the short run, but which may be quite vital in shaping the long-run environment.

Furthermore, the staff should constantly criticize existing policies whenever they appear outmoded or no longer suitable to changed conditions. In a world such as has been described, this function is vitally important.

CONCLUSION

This discussion can be concluded with three comments.

First, we can and should constantly seek to improve the methods and machinery for making policy. Improvement is likely to come from a wide range of small actions rather than from any panaceas.

Second, machinery, while important,

is no substitute for able individuals and informed leadership.

Third, the best possible policy will not succeed in giving us an orderly world in our time. We must not let

crises, instabilities, and failures discourage or frustrate us. If we do, we will fruitlessly waste energy which should be devoted to playing a constructive role.

* * *

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: In the light of what Professor Sohn said about the need for understanding abroad, I would like to have you explain what part foreign information, conventionally known as propaganda, plays in foreign policy.

very important element in the whole series of instruments.

Q: In this turbulent world of social, political, and economic change in which the United States is destined to play a leading part, is there a "grand design," an "American grand design," to affect the shape of things to come? If there is not such a "grand design," are there indications that such a "grand design" will be evolved some time in the future, or is it not desirable, or is it not possible in planning and thinking about world affairs on a universal scale? Should we consider that this is strictly the province of the totalitarians?

A: I understand the question to mean the use of propaganda as an instrument of foreign policy. Well, as you know, this is the business of the United States Information Agency, and a rather large-scale activity. I do not know what the current budget is, but it runs into quite a substantial sum of money going into broadcasting, into facilitating the publication of books and other materials, and into implementing various forms of exchanges. All of this is designed to try to do what I think Professor Sohn was suggesting, namely, to relate the purposes and aspirations of other countries to the foreign policy of the United States; to make them realize the ways in which our purposes and theirs coincide; and to try to convey the fact that what they need and what they seek are things which we recognize and wish to support. This is certainly an important instrument in the conduct of foreign policy today. Of course, people differ on how effectively it is being used, partly at least because it is so hard to evaluate the impact of effort to influence attitudes. Doubtless there are ways in which it could be made more effective, but I think it is certainly recognized as one

A: That is a big subject, but I will try to comment. Let me say, first, that to understand the course of American foreign policy you have to think of it a little bit in historical terms. It seems to me that in 1945 we entered a world quite unprepared for what we had to face. We were unprepared because we misjudged what the world was like: we did not understand at all the nature of the Soviet Union's purposes; we were not prepared for the decline and fall of the empires as rapidly as it occurred; we really had not visualized the meaning of nuclear weapons, and so on. Second, I do not think we understood the process of international politics very well. We were rather naive on that. Third, I really do not think we understood our role in the world. Now

that was quite a large series of handicaps with which to start, and it seems to me that you have to visualize the last fifteen years as a process of learning, a process of growing to understand better each of these factors. If you look at it in these terms, there is reason, I think, to feel that we, as a nation, and our leaders, have learned a great deal about each of these topics. I think we understand much better what the world is like. I think we understand much better the demands of our role. However, the way a nation like ours, or any democratic nation, learns is to be confronted with hard facts which tends to mean a series of reactions to crises. I do not think we are at the end of the process. But there are signs we are now beginning to recognize as a nation that a reactive policy, a policy of trying merely to contain communism, is simply inadequate and that our policy must have a positive dimension, a purpose of its own which, I think, is what you are talking about. You speak of it as a "grand design." Maybe that is a little more elegant than how I would refer to it, still it seems to me we must have a conception of the kind of world which we want to live in, the kind of world which will be congenial or compatible with our values and our way of life. This means a distinctively positive approach to the job to be done. I think myself this is coming to be realized as an absolutely essential component of an adequate foreign policy. Now this is not a substitute for the negative element; we still have to recognize the fact that we are in a contest with the Soviet Union.

They are going to use whatever means are available to them, and we have got to be able to counter this as best we can. Therefore, I do not think it is an "either" "or," one or the other, proposition. It seems to me that adequate policy must contain both elements, both the recognition of struggle and the recognition of the necessity for positive purposes of our own for building a kind of world which will fit our needs and the needs of other countries which want to live their own lives not dominated by an alien philosophy. It is going to take a little while to put it into concrete terms, but I think it is happening. Fields like trade relations with other parts of the world, the question of economic assistance to other parts of the world, are beginning to be seen by us not as just negative reactions but also as positive purposes of our own. But, it does take a while for the thinking of leaders and of the electorate to see it in these terms. If you look back over the past fifteen years and how far we have come in that time, then I think you can take hope that in the decade of the 60's we really will add to and round out an adequate program on the positive side. Unless we do, I do not believe that we will be able to carry through in a period of relaxation all the necessary measures, which are going to be slow and costly in time and energy and resources, with the persistence and patience needed to make them work. So I think it absolutely vital for the free nations to develop the bases for making common cause for the purpose of creating a kind of world which is congenial with their values.

Creating a Favorable World Opinion of American Foreign Policy

By LOUIS B. SOHN

ABSTRACT: The United States has for a long time treated its foreign relations as a series of crises and has concentrated too much on counteracting Soviet moves. The United States must instead try to develop a positive, independent policy, the aim of which should be to create a world order in which all nations would be able to live in peace, freedom, and justice. Such a policy cannot be improvised; it must be as thoroughly prepared as that which resulted in the creation of the United Nations. A large research effort, comparable perhaps to the Manhattan Project in the field of nuclear energy, would be necessary. To the extent that the United States should be able to formulate a foreign policy which would be favorable to the survival of the American people and to the survival of the human race, it would not have to worry about creating a favorable world opinion. An effective plan for world peace would create such a wave of enthusiasm around the world that even the Soviet Union would not find it advisable to be opposed.

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THE basic condition for the creation of a more favorable world opinion concerning American foreign policy is for the United States to have a foreign policy in the first place. The second requirement is that the American policy be a policy which would appeal not only to Americans but also to the largest possible number of other nations. Finally, proper means must be devised to persuade other nations that we have an effective foreign policy and that this policy is a good one from their point of view.

FOREIGN POLICY CRITICS

Many books have been written since the Second World War condemning American foreign policy.¹ Some authors have even alleged that the United States does not really have a consistent foreign policy, and that it does not know how to formulate one. Many be-

¹ See, for example, C. Bowles, *Ideas, People and Peace* (New York, 1958); T. I. Cook and M. Moos, *Power through Purpose: The Realism of Idealism as a Basis for Foreign Policy* (Baltimore, 1954); T. K. Finletter, *Foreign Policy: The Next Phase* (New York, 1958); L. J. Halle, *Civilization and Foreign Policy* (New York, 1955); J. H. Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (New York, 1959); E. Hughes, *America the Vindictive* (New York, 1959); G. F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* (Chicago, 1951), and *Realities of American Foreign Policy* (Princeton, 1954); H. A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York, 1957); C. O. Lerche, Jr., *Foreign Policy of the American People* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1958); J. J. McCloy, *The Challenge to American Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953); J. H. Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest* (New York, 1951); R. E. Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations* (Chicago, 1953), and *Limited War* (Chicago, 1957); H. L. Roberts, *Russia and America: Dangers and Prospects* (New York, 1956); F. Tannenbaum, *The American Tradition in Foreign Policy* (Norman, Okla., 1955); J. P. Warburg, *The West in Crisis* (Garden City, New York, 1959).

lieve that our foreign policy is merely negative and passive, and that, in particular, it is so preoccupied with finding an adequate response to each Soviet or Communist Chinese step that no effort is made to establish an independent policy. Others complain that American foreign policy is inflexible, that it is based on the utopian idea of forcing the Communist powers into an unconditional surrender and on the conviction that anything short of such a surrender must be dismissed as appeasement. The view has also been expressed that the American people do not believe in either the traditional or the new means for conducting foreign policy; that they do not trust diplomats, have no confidence in international law, and are afraid that the United Nations is going to deprive them of sovereignty.

Some of these criticisms are, of course, exaggerated. There can be no doubt, for instance, that in the 1950's the United States accomplished its primary aim—to stop the territorial expansion of the Soviet bloc. But any impartial observer would agree with the statements made in a recent study by the Council on Foreign Relations that “the tendency of the United States up to now has been to treat foreign relations as a series of crises, of moves and countermoves in the cold war,” and that “the United States has failed to cast its policies adequately for the long term.”²

LONG-RANGE OBJECTIVES

The first step in our search for a generally acceptable American foreign policy must be, therefore, to discover

² Council on Foreign Relations, *Basic Aims of United States Foreign Policy* (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Foreign Policy, Study No. 7; Washington, 1959), p. 8. This is one of fifteen excellent studies prepared for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1959-1960.

its long-range objectives. It has been suggested that they may be traced back to the preamble to the United States Constitution which proclaims as its goals “to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity”; and that, in modern terms, this means that the object of our foreign policy should be “to promote and secure conditions in the world under which a nation, with such purposes as ours, can live and prosper” and to create “some form of world order compatible with our values and interests.”³

If we should accept this approach, it need not lead us to a constant emphasis on United States interests and United States security. In fact, such an emphasis would be rather undesirable, if we should want other nations to endorse our policy. While it may often be true that what is good for the United States is good for the world, our foreign policy will have a much greater appeal to the nations of the world if it is presented in the alternative form that what is good for the world is good for the United States. While this might sound simple in theory, it is not so easy in practice. Too frequently we have been engaged in two inconsistent selling jobs in situations in which we have presented different interpretations of the same idea at home and abroad. One might recall, for instance, the crucial negotiations for the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). While our Secretary of State was traveling abroad trying to persuade

the Scandinavian nations to join an organization which would increase their security, other spokesmen for our government were busily explaining to the Senate that there would be no real legal commitment to come to the aid of an attacked nation.⁴ More recently, practically every appropriation for foreign economic assistance has been defended in Congress as a contribution to our defense against communism, while we have insisted abroad that we have no intention of interfering in domestic affairs of the assisted nations.

Realism and idealism

This emphasis on our national self-interest, narrowly understood, has led to a misunderstanding about the role played in United States foreign policy by realism and idealism. Some critics of that policy maintain that the United States does not pay enough attention to the realities of power politics, and that it sacrifices political advantages because of moral or idealistic scruples. A recent study has pointed out, however, that whenever “the United States has tried to act without moral conviction, or in ways that went counter to its basic beliefs, it has found itself inhibited and has ultimately had to re-chart its course.”⁵ Whether the issue involved was domination of the Philippines, assistance to French colonialism in Indochina, or support to dictatorial regimes in Latin-American countries, the policies contrary to the basic American ideal of democracy have usually been abandoned. In other situations, the United States has accepted deep commitments and onerous responsibilities which were not necessarily dictated

⁴ See, for example, the debate in the Senate on February 14, 1949. 95 Congressional Record (1949), pp. 1188-93.

³ Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research of the Johns Hopkins University, *Developments in Military Technology and Their Impact on United States Strategy and Foreign Policy* (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Foreign Policy, Study No. 8; Washington, 1959), p. 13.

⁵ Rockefeller Brothers Fund, *The Mid-Century Challenge to U. S. Foreign Policy*, Special Studies Project, Report No. 5 (Garden City, New York, 1959), p. 6.

by self-interest. Both lines of action have contributed to a positive image of America in other countries.

Words and deeds

Another closely connected problem is the relationship between words and deeds. On frequent occasions, big words have not been accompanied by action, thus leading to a "let-down" of hopes and expectations. New policies have sometimes been announced which seemed to imply our willingness to accomplish a change in an undesirable situation, but when a chance arose to fulfil our promise, we hid behind some qualifications which were allegedly embodied in our policy statement. There was, for instance, a tragic link between the so-called "liberation" policy and the purely verbal condemnation of the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt.

Nevertheless, there is room in foreign policy for general declarations of moral principles and for their slow transformation into rules of international law. But such declarations should not be unilateral; they should embody the consensus of as many nations as would be willing to subscribe to them and should be adopted, if possible, by appropriate organs of the United Nations or of other international organizations. Despite some misgivings in certain United States circles, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, approved unanimously by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948, has had an important impact on developments in many nations.*

MAIN GOAL: PRESERVATION OF PEACE

Coming back to a definition of American objectives in more positive terms,

* United Nations Secretariat, *The Impact of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1953), pp. 12-49, and *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Standard of Achievement* (1958), pp. 16-30.

there are many aspects which could be discussed. Even if the Soviet Union should disappear tomorrow, there would be still the problem of China, the growth of political and economic nationalism in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the interrelated questions of race conflict and colonialism, and the problems of economic development and international trade. But the crucial problem is the preservation of peace. If all humanity should be destroyed in a nuclear war, all other values would lose their meaning. The basic objective of American foreign policy must be, therefore, to find a satisfactory solution to the problem of peace and war and to have it accepted by other nations. As in other areas, this policy should not be limited to a monotonous rejection of Soviet proposals, nor should it consist of a series of unrelated, half-baked suggestions which do not even have the approval of the legislative branch of our own government. It is difficult to rally support in this country and abroad for a policy which is presented to the general public in bits and pieces which do not appear to fit into any previously announced larger scheme. The seriousness of each proposal has to be judged also by the amount of consultations which preceded it, both with the leaders of Congress and with our allies. If a new proposal is accompanied by disparaging remarks in Congress and by shouts of dismay in allied capitals, one cannot expect that other nations will embrace it with enthusiasm.

To illustrate, I would like to discuss two concrete cases: the establishment of the United Nations and the recent disarmament proposals made by Secretary Herter and Mr. Eaton.

Planning the United Nations

In the midst of a great conflict, when all the resources of the nation had to be geared to winning the war, the Sec-

retary of State had the foresight to direct the preparation of comprehensive plans for an effective world order to be established after the war. A group of dedicated persons was assigned to this task, and a wide network of consultations was established with private groups working in this area. Many ideas were considered, some of which were quite radical; and through constant discussion a cohesive plan was hammered out. After consultations with Congressional leaders and other influential citizens, the plans were revised and presented unofficially to our closest allies. Further revisions followed and the general outlines were presented to other nations for their comment.⁷ At the Moscow Conference at the end of 1943, an agreement was reached with the Soviet Union on a few basic principles,⁸ and a way was opened for the preparation of a detailed draft. A technical conference of experts from the United States, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and later China, was held at Dumbarton Oaks and a set of proposals was agreed upon. These proposals were immediately published and widely discussed. A few points unresolved by the experts were settled at the summit meeting at Yalta. The support of the Latin-American Republics was obtained at a special conference at Chapultepec, and finally a conference was held at San Francisco of all the nations concerned. The United States delegation to the Conference included a group of important Senators and Congressmen, and some fifty national organizations were consulted daily about the developments at the Conference. A

⁷ For a history of this patient effort, see Department of State, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945* (Washington, D. C., 1950); R. B. Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter* (Washington, D. C., 1958).

⁸ 9 Department of State Bull. (1943), pp. 308-9.

concerted effort was made to explain the crucial issues to the general public, and wholehearted support by most of the influential newspapers was enlisted. Consequently, no strong opposition was encountered in the Senate and the Charter of the United Nations was approved by a Senate vote of 89 to 2.⁹ Only four months after its signature the Charter came into force, and a new era thus began.

Disarmament proposals

Compare with that our recent disarmament proposals. Except for a brief effort in 1946 which culminated in the Baruch plan, we have shown very little imagination in the area for a long time. Over the years we have insisted on discussing minute issues, each of them in isolation from others; for a while, we even refused to discuss the reduction of conventional armaments together with the nuclear ones despite the fact that it was in our interest to have conventional armaments reduced simultaneously with the nuclear ones. In the last five years, we have made so many separate proposals, some of them quite contradictory, that not even a specialist in the Department of State can tell what our over-all plan is, and how these pieces fit together. In addition, nobody seems to know which of these proposals were seriously discussed by the various branches of our government before their presentation, which have received the approval of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and which have the support of our allies.

Since September 1959, when the Soviet proposals for total disarmament galvanized us into action, a new approach to the problem of disarmament seems to have developed in our government. It was first indicated by some questions asked by Mr. Lodge at the

⁹ 91 Congressional Record (1945), p. 8190.

United Nations;¹⁰ it was spelled out by Secretary Herter in his speech before the National Press Club;¹¹ and was implemented by Mr. Eaton in his introductory statement at the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva.¹² For the first time, we seem to have recognized the fact that disarmament is not an end in itself, and that the security of the United States in a disarmed world would require the strengthening of various international institutions—the establishment of a strong international police force, the development of better methods for solving international disputes, and the creation of new rules of international law which would protect nations against injuries to their vital interests by means short of war, such as subversive activities, economic boycotts, dumping, and so on. After preaching for many years about the need for the rule of law in international affairs, we have finally outlined some concrete steps in that direction.

Publicity fiasco

Has this important action received proper recognition at home and abroad? Has it made clear to other nations that we are more peace-loving than the Russians and that we really want to establish the rule of law in the world? There can be no doubt that the answer is "no."

Why did it happen that way? In the first place, the new ideas were buried in long statements dealing with technical details of our new disarmament proposals. Secondly, these disarmament proposals seemed to put stress not on the great principles of an effective peace plan, but on a variety of studies which must be conducted before these principles can be elabo-

rated. In reading our proposals, most people—including the newsmen—never advanced beyond the complicated first paragraphs, and as a result there was practically no reaction to the exciting new idea of a comprehensive peace plan; and even the newspapers which noticed it paid little attention to the idea. Thirdly, there was no indication of the seriousness of our proposals, as measured by prior consultations with Congress and our allies. Fourthly, there was no further action, no attempt to stimulate a debate in the Senate on the subject, no television address bringing the matter more directly before the American people, no Presidential endorsement, no indication that the matter will be brought up at the next summit meeting, no concerted action by our diplomatic missions abroad to bring the new ideas to the attention of foreign governments and foreign newspapers. A great opportunity has thus been missed to create a favorable climate abroad for our foreign policy in an area where other nations are instinctively receptive to our proposals.

New approach

The remedy would seem to be to duplicate the original United Nations approach. There we developed a great idea which was shepherded carefully to a successful conclusion. Now we have a new idea which is a logical sequel to the other one. By a determined effort over perhaps a three-year period we might be able to advance from the present tentative concept to a generally acceptable plan. To the extent that studies are needed, we can conduct them ourselves and present the results to the other nations, as we have done at Dumbarton Oaks. If we can do the job well, and I do not doubt that we can, we should have no difficulty in creating such a wave of enthusiasm around the world that even the Soviet Union would

not find it advisable to be opposed. If, however, the Soviet Union should reject a proposal recognized by all as the only safe way towards peace, then we would accomplish at least the other aim of our foreign policy—to show to the peoples of the world who is the true lover of peace. We have really nothing to lose, and we can gain a tremendous amount. In any case, the risk of exploring the road to peace is much smaller than the risk of a continuing arms race and the prospect that nuclear weapons may soon come into the hands of persons who will have less inhibitions in using them than the present possessors.

NEEDED: A NEW MANHATTAN PROJECT

In conclusion, it seems clear that before the United States can create a more favorable world opinion for its foreign policy, it must reformulate this policy in positive and concrete terms, both in the general area of peace-planning and with respect to the more specialized problems of our relationship to the Soviet bloc, Western Europe, the Commonwealth, Asia, Africa, and, last but not least, Latin America. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is now engaged in this task and it has enlisted the support of all the important centers around the country; the studies already published have developed a number of important new ideas which deserve wide public discussion. But the main burden of formulating the policy, of explaining it to the country and of selling it abroad rests on the executive branch of the government, and in particular on the President. If he should lead courageously, the nation would follow, and other countries would also rally behind us. This cannot be improvised, however. A tremendous effort will be necessary to enable the next President to establish a meaningful foreign policy.

As a minimum this effort should be similar in scope, size, and importance to the great research program which culminated in the establishment of the United Nations. Perhaps we should set our sights even higher and start a research effort comparable to the Manhattan Project in the field of nuclear energy.

Suggestions have been made recently for a separate National Peace Agency¹³ and for an Arms Control Research Institute.¹⁴ But these projects are still too limited in scope, both with respect to their subject-matter and the resources to be drawn upon. It might be desirable to establish in addition a truly international research project in this field, in which men from many nations would join in an objective study of the problem of peace. Such a project might be under the direction of an international peace commission, composed of fifty private individuals—ten lawyers, ten political scientists, ten specialists in arms technology, ten economists and ten persons with experience in the work of the United Nations—with a staff of full-time research associates and part-time consultants. The commission should be empowered to prepare detailed proposals not only for disarmament, but also for an international police force, settlement of international disputes and peaceful change, and development of underdeveloped countries. It should be required to finish its work in three years. If the plan proposed by this commission is deemed by most nations to be impartial and adequate, it would create such a wave of enthusiasm around the world that no nation would dare to be opposed.

If such a world-wide project is deemed too ambitious, it might be tried on a smaller scale, for example, within

¹³ 106 Congressional Record 4559 (8 March 1960).

¹⁴ 106 *idem* 4452 (7 March 1960).

¹⁰ 41 Department of State Bull. (1959), p. 614, at 620.

¹¹ 42 *idem* (1960), p. 354, at 357.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 513, at 515.

the framework of the Atlantic Community. At least, a commission with similar composition and object might be established in the United States, to guide our own study of the problem. It should be entitled to call upon the best men in the country and its research studies should be given the highest priority. To finance the commission's projects, one tenth of 1 per cent of the amount spent on armaments should be sufficient. Planning for peace is less expensive than planning for war, but the peace planners still require much more than has been spent on their work during the last fifteen years.

With patience and perseverance, our commission should be able to formulate interrelated statements of our goals and to outline the concrete steps which we should take to reach these goals. If the President accepts these statements and uses all the power of his office to

ensure the support of the Congress and of the people of the United States, then the moment will come to present this new formulation to other nations for approval. If we do this job right, there can be but little doubt that our new foreign policy will be of the kind that will appeal to other nations and will receive their support.

The United States has no ambition to rule the world in an authoritarian manner; its goal is instead to create a world order in which all nations will be able to live in peace, freedom, and justice. Should we find a way to accomplish that goal, we can fully expect that all the nations of the world will accept it without any hesitation. If we succeed in developing a foreign policy which will be favorable to our own survival and to the survival of the human race, we will not have to worry about creating a favorable world opinion.

* * *

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: Is there not a certain basic flaw in your proposal, namely, that you are actually describing what the Soviet Union does effectively carry out and proposing it for a society which is open? Therefore, is not this proposal, in all its approaches, against the things we positively desire and rather value? Now here is the fundamental question: Are you not proposing something which is not available to a divergent free society?

A: I agree with you that the Soviet Union has a very definite plan for a world order dominated by Communists. The question is what is going to be our reply to it: is our reply to it going to be to do nothing; or is our reply going to be something that everybody knows is entirely ineffective; or shall we try to

find a solution for the problem of peace and war in the world that would be run on a democratic basis rather than on the Communist basis? I think those are the clear alternatives before us. Are we going to have a Communist-dominated world, or a world in which a democratic system would prevail at least on the international level even if there would be some Communist system in some member nations. I think this is something that the nations of the West can devise, and with some imagination, it can be done. I am encouraged, for instance, that in Europe when it came to the several functional problems of the economic life in which until very recently an extreme nationalism persisted, even France and Germany were able to unite in a European

Economic Community, which constitutes a great encroachment on what used to be called economic sovereignty. They have done it as a matter of survival in the world and for more efficient division of their resources. I think we need to do the same in the world at large, and it can be done by the same method, namely, trying to devise some functional way of dealing with problems of peace and war by a specialized organization like the United Nations, perhaps revised to some extent, and with the necessary powers for the purpose. It seems to me that we can devise one, or, at least, propose one and have before the nations of the world an alternative to a Communist-dominated world.

Q: I would like to ask about this large-scale research program of an international scope that you propose for hammering out a genuine proposal for a world under law. You did not feel that the persons engaged in this should be solely government representatives with which I heartily agree. What is your idea, Professor Sohn, of the kind of personnel who should be engaged in this; how should they be recruited; and what should the scope of the research be?

A: The question is to what extent there should be an international group trying to work out a peace plan, and how it should be composed. It seems to me that this group should be, as I mentioned, primarily a private group. I have no objection to public officials taking part in such a group, provided they are, at that point, no longer public officials. I think what I am against is having in that group delegates instructed by their governments and simply transferring to a new forum all the

present difficulties we have in our current forum. I have something more in mind, like the international staff of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the international staff of the United Nations where people try to think in terms of a group of nations rather than in terms of instructions given them by their governments. Now as far as membership of the group is concerned, it should be composed of political scientists, economists, lawyers, and other ordinary scientists. We have discovered over the last few years that the problem of peace enforcement or disarmament enforcement is a very complicated technical problem. It requires tremendous amount of studies, it requires devising new technical instruments for detecting, for instance, tests. Just to try to give you an idea of it, at this point, there is a project going on in our government trying to devise a new machinery for testing, and this by itself would cost in the neighborhood of one hundred million dollars. Very interestingly at this point, this is provided by the Department of Defense budget, rather than the budget for peace planning that normally would be under the State Department. In general, I think a properly equipped group, not organization, is needed. I think Professor Bowie is right. If you make a big organization with all its bureaucracy you are going to run into trouble. This could be avoided if the group could be limited to say fifty or one hundred men coming from all the principal nations of the West which are willing to co-operate with the project. The purpose would be to put them together and enable them to think through problems that have arisen. Professor Bowie, I think, said in the very beginning, how complicated it is for us simply to adjust to the facts of present life to get all the necessary data, economic, political, social, geographical, historical that

would come into such an appraisal, and those various devices of government and law that are necessary to control the big problems ahead of us. I think a group of that type working together in the kind of atmosphere that you have at Princeton in the Institute for Advanced Study or at the new Behavioral Science Institute in California could after a while probably arrive at certain things that would be of extreme use in trying to plan what you can do. But I would repeat again that I think as far as the United States is concerned, probably a much bigger effort is necessary, an effort much of the scale that was undertaken when we were trying to draft the Charter of the United Nations. The problem I would think is even bigger than was involved in the drafting of the Charter of the United Nations, and as far as I can tell we devote to it about one hundredth of the effort that we have devoted to the United Nations. The minimum required is to devote as much effort to the problem of how to solve the present issues of foreign policy, in such a way that it would be acceptable not only to us but also to all our Allies, as was devoted in the period 1942 to 1945 to preparing for the United Nations.

Q: How can we reconcile our position, for example, domestically, where the chief executive of the nation takes a rather equivocal position on the burning question of race in America while Henry Cabot Lodge takes rather a good position in the United Nations? This is on the executive side. On the legislative side, hypothesizing for a moment, could we envision, for example, the next President of the United States taking a trip to Africa and, in line with the lesson we learned since Woodrow Wilson, taking the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Ful-

bright of Arkansas, along with him? The question is simply, how do we reconcile this problem of our equivocal position in the executive branch right now and our ability to address ourselves openly, forcefully, frankly, and honestly to the world of color which is going through so much turmoil and struggle right now?

A: Not being connected with the government either previously or at present, it probably would be easier for me to answer. I think the basic problem here is that, of course, our picture abroad depends very much on what we do at home, and the better we do at home the better we will do abroad. I think that the matter is as simple as that. Of course, this involves, on the other hand, the old complicated issue, how do you solve those problems domestically, and that I think is not the problem for our forum today. It is quite clear, as I mentioned before, that we have been having some difficulties abroad because of the fact that we were saying different things elsewhere and different things at home—the NATO example I gave you. I think the same applies also to the question of color. As long as our principal Allies are nations which are connected in the minds of Asians and Africans with big empires, it is very difficult for us to take a consistent stand when issues of color arise. Sometimes we support France on problems of Algeria, sometimes we abstain, sometimes we hesitantly vote against. In the question of South Africa, we have the same dilemmas, although I think we have resolved it to our satisfaction at this point—we are persistently voting against South Africa, forgetting about the complications it might cause domestically in the United States. I think Mr. Lodge explained it very well when he said you have to distinguish between nations in the world who are trying to

do something about the color problem like the United States and nations in the world who are strongly opposed to solving the color problem except by *apartheid*. I think we have to take a stand on that issue and we should make clear that we are willing to help those European nations which are trying to solve the problems of color in an effective manner, or are trying to find a solution for it, or, at least, show willingness to find a solution for it. On the other hand, we should become more and more opposed to those nations which do maintain the color line without hesitation and try to enforce it in a ruthless manner. I think this is a very good line to take, and I am glad we have taken it.

Are American Foreign Service Officers Adequate?

By HAROLD B. HOSKINS

ABSTRACT: The Foreign Service Institute was organized in 1946 to train Foreign Service officers so that they will be able to carry out foreign policy more effectively. One of the recognized deficiencies in the Foreign Service, the insufficient knowledge of foreign languages, has received much attention at the Institute. Because of the accelerated language program, the language competency of the officers has increased very considerably. In addition, the testing for language ability is now formalized and all persons who come through the Institute are given an examination. Officers receive training at various times in their career. The structure of the Institute's training program is in the form of a pyramid: Training is given at the base to all officers entering the Service; at the mid-point to about one third of the mid-career officers; and at the top to a few senior officers. The success of the training program and the future of the Institute depend largely on the support of the various agencies of the government, the President, the Congress, and the general public. Great strides have indeed been made in the training wing of the State Department. Continued efforts by the Institute as well as greater external support will increase the professional capacity needed to carry out our foreign policy.—Ed.

Harold B. Hoskins, Washington, D. C., is Director of the Foreign Service Institute of the Department of State. He has been a staff member of several diplomatic legations in the Middle East and has served with the Department in various capacities in Washington. A graduate of Princeton University, Mr. Hoskins previously was a business executive in the textile industry.

MY part in this symposium is a relatively simple one when I compare it with the task of those members who have undertaken to discuss the complications inherent in the formulation of foreign policy and the creation of a positive climate in the rest of the world for the interpretation and the understanding of our foreign policy. I hope it is so specific that I can make clear the facts with which we are dealing.

As a missionary's son, I am always very glad to discuss the Foreign Service Institute, the training arm of the State Department, because it is one of the weapons, one of the best, in my opinion, for making foreign policy effective. The type of training and organization we are building is designed to prepare a better Foreign Service Institute for whoever is in the White House. Our job, we believe, is a bipartisan or nonpartisan one, that I hope can appeal, particularly in a political year such as this one, to a great many people on both sides of the aisle.

ADEQUACIES OF TRAINING

In considering the responsibilities of the Foreign Service and the adequacies of training, it must be remembered that the training must be good because we have a very thin front line of Foreign Service officers. There are approximately 4,000 spread all over the world and in Washington. Many of them are of recent vintage, because American world responsibilities date primarily or to a very considerable degree since World War I. Fortunately, better language programs are one of the elements in the training now given at the universities. Months ago, I went to Vassar to assist in the inauguration of a new language building called Chicago Hall, interestingly enough, which is going to be devoted entirely to the teaching of languages. I might mention that

the German cultural attaché who was there told the following story. When he was in Munich last summer, he saw a small group of American girls standing over in the corner; he watched this affair and then went over to speak to them. He thought the joke was rather amusing. When he went over looking at them rather poignantly, he said, "Vaaasarr?" There was a moment of silence, and then the little girl said, "Nein, Smith College."

It is indeed important that we are getting more people trained in languages. As I previously stated, our objective in the Institute is primarily to train officers and achieve a better Foreign Service for whoever may be in the White House. An adequate training is, in my opinion, one of the means by which we can make our foreign policy effective. It is a relatively simpler proposition when compared to the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. So it is important, I believe, that the American public and the Congress should know more about our training and what we are doing. Primarily, we have increased our training program. We did a very considerable amount of training, I might add, before *The Ugly American* came on to the scene. At this point, I might ask, what is the answer to this "ugly American problem" about better representation abroad and the adequacy of our people abroad? As far as the government civilian representation is concerned, which is my segment, I believe that a Foreign Service Institute can do and can help do a better job of training our officers whether from the State Department, the Department of Commerce, Agriculture, the Central Intelligence Agency, International Co-operation Administration, or the United States Information Agency. But I would like to stress the fact that, for instance, under our authority which originates in

the Foreign Service Act of 1946, we are training people today from twenty-five different agencies in the government. Primarily, of course, we are training Foreign Service officers, but we are also training people from the military services and from the civilian services.

Foreign language program

The Foreign Service Institute, which was organized during 1946, was hurt during the McCarthy period; it was at a low ebb financially and in prestige particularly between 1950 and 1954. Furthermore, the United States was handicapped in its operations during World War II and since then by a recognized weakness, the insufficient knowledge of foreign languages. I do not mean to imply that the knowledge of a foreign language is the only thing that is required of a Foreign Service officer or anyone else to make him effective. But, like the alphabet and multiplication table, we are increasingly of the opinion that a foreign language, at least one and preferably two, helps our people understand the problems they are dealing with. In June 1954, the Secretary's Committee on Personnel, which is better known as the Wriston Committee, in their report urged a reorganization and an expansion of our training program. This has, I would say, in great part been accomplished, despite attacks from some people in the Congress. Some of those attacks have been justified and others have not. Our clientele today in the Foreign Service Institute is being trained primarily to meet the needs, as I said, of the Foreign Service and the government of the United States in relation to foreign affairs. Can we make this small group of people more effective and more adequate in their handling of our foreign policy? I mentioned the fact that we are now training people from twenty-five government agencies whereas a few years ago we

were training people from three or four. That is not in itself the whole story, but it shows the direction in which our work has gone.

We also, I am glad to say, are training an increasing number of wives and dependents on the basis of the space available and pending full authority to do a complete job. Nevertheless, we are doing it, and we have already trained several hundred wives of Foreign Service officers, military attachés, and people who have gone abroad in the past year.

A PYRAMID STRUCTURE

Our structure is rather simple, but for the next generation it may be very important indeed. A pyramid is used for our training, and we train everyone at the base. Everyone who comes into the Foreign Service today gets three to seven months of basic training before he goes into his job. We train about 35 per cent of our officers at mid-career—in other words, those who have been in the Service about seven to twelve years. We now have a very small number—this is only the second year of the senior officer course—of the highest ranking officers in the Service who are destined, so far as can be analyzed, to go into the highest posts in the Service. We also teach language. We are teaching twenty-six languages full-time at the Foreign Service Institute, and forty-nine languages abroad—part-time for the most part—at 170 posts. Therefore, we feel that we are progressing in this problem to a greater degree than in the past.

We have little difficulties, however, every once in a while because under the regulations, for instance, a man and wife cannot both be career Foreign Service officers and serve at the same post together. Recently, I talked to one of the young groups of our Foreign Service officers, and said I was glad

to see that 8 per cent of those coming into the Foreign Service today were women. And, I said, even if they do not stay for their whole career, we are glad to have them because there are certain things that women can do that men cannot do in the Foreign Service. They can go into harems in the Middle East, they can talk to women's groups in a more effective way, perhaps, than men. But I said, remember, that you cannot have a husband and wife both as career Foreign Service officers at the same time. Unfortunately, three months later when I again talked to them, I found that one of the boys in the class had married one of the girls in the class. So we lost a Foreign Service officer before we even started, but we did not lose her entirely, because we are going to have the benefit, we hope, of two for the price of one when they go abroad to their post.

I shall not dwell on statistics, but we have trained, and more are *en train*, close to 1,000 Foreign Service officers, grade 8 (FSO-8). FSO-8's are approximately equivalent to second lieutenants in the military. These officers have been trained in both languages and in the career—the metier of the Foreign Service. We have had eighteen classes of mid-career officers who have come in, had their brains stretched, we hope, with suggestions and ideas from the academic world as well as from the Department and other agencies of the government. We now are running our second senior officer course which is organized on a nine-month basis along the same lines as the National War College and other military service colleges.

Formalized testing

Another important point is that since the first of July 1958 we are testing for language skill. It used to be that a man or a woman in the

Service said, well I think I can speak French fairly well or German or whatever the language might be. We now have a rather formalized system of testing which we think is fair. We are improving our system. We now take the responsibility of testing every Foreign Service officer who comes through our Institute in the same manner as a medical examination is given before he goes abroad.

THE INSTITUTE'S PROSPECTS

What is the future of this training? I would like to stress the fact that we are receiving strong and growing support within the State Department, within the executive branch, from the President himself, who came over to talk to the first graduation of the senior officers' course last June. We had nineteen officers in this course, eleven from the State Department, seven from other agencies in the government, including four from the Defense Department. I regret that there is not more understanding in the Congress and the general public about what is being accomplished in the Foreign Service Institute. We are very eager to make a better Foreign Service with the best means at our disposal.

In our foreign language program, for instance, we have a system developed by the military during the war, a guided imitation system of learning languages that we think allows us to teach the Foreign Service officer to speak, not just to read, a language more rapidly than would otherwise be the case. Of course, there is no substitute for time, and we do not think that you can teach Arabic or Chinese or Hindi in a few months. To teach those languages twenty-seven months may be necessary, but we believe that we can teach French, German, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese from three to six months. I realize there exists a difference of

opinion here. Those in the academic world, especially, may think this achievement impossible. The fact is that we stress the speaking ability more than the reading ability of a language, and we have been rather successful so that we now have in the Foreign Service a speaking ability in over fifty languages and dialects.

As far as the Academy of Diplomacy is concerned, we recognize it as one of our problems, a very difficult one. We have studied it at considerable length. I might add that the opinion of the State Department at the present time is still against an undergraduate academy.

A small budget

I would like to stress finally the cost of the Foreign Service Institute because that is always a factor. The problems that arise in connection with the Bureau of the Budget and the National Security Council are similar to those encountered by the Foreign Service Institute, and even the State Department as a whole. We certainly need private educational institutions for research and for the preparation of more teachers. We also need commercial schools such as Berlitz, Vox, and others which I think in many instances do a very good job in fulfilling the needs of people who travel abroad. But the government, including the Foreign Service, is in need of

certain special requirements which cannot be procured at the present time outside of the government. At the same time, I would like to emphasize that our budget is relatively very small. Our budget for administration and teaching is less than two million dollars. We certainly have no objection to the needs of the military services for thirty-four billion or whatever it will require, but I would like to point out that, as a private citizen and a taxpayer myself, I do not think there is any waste in our relatively small training operation. The financial rewards of the Foreign Service are certainly not enormous, but you no longer need a private income to survive—except possibly in three or four major posts. Of course, there are dangers and complications in this sort of life, living abroad most of the time. But, I suggest, there is considerable amount of psychic income in this job of helping to do a better foreign policy job abroad. The Foreign Service has been criticized so often that I am glad as a noncareer Foreign Service officer to stress the wide scope of the training job that is already being done. I think this is one reason why an increasing number of our ablest younger people are coming into the Foreign Service. They are a fine group—both men and women—patriotic, able, and worthy of the public's support, and I hope it will be forthcoming.

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: I gleaned from recent newspaper criticism that the Foreign Service Institute is doing an excellent training job, but the trouble seems to be the co-ordination of the assignment of the people trained by the State Department. Would you kindly comment on that?

A: We are doing a training job, and we are working more closely with the assignment problem, but frankly the assignment problem apparently was a very difficult one for the State Department to mesh completely or very rapidly as a result of the "Wristonization." The "Wristonization," as you know,

brought several thousand people into the Service who had not been there before, and the problem of assigning them to the posts where their languages could be used was something that was not possible to do effectively and completely, right away. Furthermore, you have, I think, one other academic question which has never been resolved. Some of us believe that a man or a woman in the Foreign Service should know something about French, or German, or Spanish, or Russian even if he is not immediately assigned to that country because he is ultimately likely to use it elsewhere. Now a day or two ago you saw the joking reference to the fact that there was a Foreign Service officer who had been trained in Chinese who was in London. Unfortunately, it was not made clear that the reason why that gentleman was there was to act as an interpreter with the Chinese in Poland, a very good reason for having him there, but that did not come out in the published hearings. I would like, therefore, to point out one other thing in connection with this language problem which I did not point out before—just one figure I hope you will keep in mind. Two years ago an investigation showed that about 50 per cent of the Foreign Service did not know any language other than English. That has been reduced from 50 per cent to 15 per cent. Fifteen per cent today of our Foreign Service officers do not have a working knowledge of any foreign language; even this figure is being reduced rapidly.

graduate work. Shortly before he arrived at his post, his position was abolished. His criticism was that there were far too many people available to do the job that needed to be done; that the Foreign Service officers, in general, were doing work which could be done much better by the staff officers; that there was a tendency of the Foreign Service officers to usurp or, because of oversupply, to take on duties which were normally done by the staff officers. I would like, therefore, to ask you, what is your appraisal of the morale of the young Foreign Service officers who have been in the Service for a period of two or three years? To what extent is there a turnover or what is the rate of turnover among these younger officers? And to what extent is this young man's limited observations of the oversupply of Foreign Service officers and the tendency to usurp or to do jobs that the staff might better do, an accurate picture throughout the Service?

A: I think the answer to your question is that these conditions that your friend outlined did exist in certain places and under certain conditions. I do not think it is a general situation, but I think it does apply in certain situations. I believe also that as the expansion has taken place in the Foreign Service and in the number of posts abroad, a shortage has been created of officers capable of performing other than these clerical jobs. The need for them has grown, so that today, I would say, the morale of the younger officers in the Service is good. I think again it varies with the individual, but, by and large, Foreign Service officers today are being given a training which makes them realize that three months after they get into the Service, in their first posts abroad, they are not going to be dealing with Mr. Khrushchev on

Q: One of my very good students of a few years ago passed a foreign service examination successfully in his junior year. He was subsequently appointed to the Foreign Service and after eleven months resigned or at least came back completely disillusioned and frustrated. He is now back resuming

the problems of Berlin. They have got to realize that they start lower down the level and work up to it gradually. I think you have to have patience, you have to have an ideal toward which you are working, and I believe that you have to go into it with a zeal, a missionary zeal, that determines that you are going to work this thing out even if it takes a number of years. That quality is what I see in these younger people coming in. I find an outstanding good group now entering. We had applications to take the examination for the Foreign Service from over 10,000 people in December, and they came from every state in the Union. Now those are points which are

not always clearly brought out. I think there are complications, and I do not mean to deny that there are unhappy individual situations, but, by and large, I would say the situation is much better. Also, I would like to point out the fact that there is a realization as I have said that even if people are coming in and going out, they have a knowledge of our problem and the complexity of foreign affairs which they did not have before. Now that applies to women as much as to the men. There is no excessive turnover, as far as I know, in personnel, and there is, as I have already indicated, a realization on the part of these younger officers that it is a long, slow process to the top.

America and the Future of the Maghreb

By EL-MEHDI BEN ABOUD

ABSTRACT: In the world today nations are interrelated to a greater and greater extent. There is a trend towards more uniform political, technical, and economic progress. The Arab Maghreb does not escape this trend. The prosperity desired by the peoples of North Africa is in large part dependent on the formation of the Maghreb. The foundations for such a regional group rest on various physical similarities, on necessity, and on a common will and purpose. Unity will be an effective instrument to strengthen the area. The development of economic well-being is also dependent on peace in the environment and international co-operation. But there is neither peace in this area nor the possibility for unified action among independent nations. The revolution in Algeria persists. Peace must first be achieved, for only then will the Maghreb come into real existence and reconstruction begin.—Ed.

His Excellency, El-Mehdi Ben Aboud, M.D., Washington, D. C., has been Ambassador to the United States from Morocco since September 1956, when the Embassy of Morocco was first opened. In April 1960, he was also appointed by his government to be Ambassador to Cuba, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. After receiving his medical degree at the Medical Faculty of the University of Paris, His Excellency was the official representative of the Independence Movement of Morocco (Istiqlal) in the United States. Upon his return to Morocco, he practiced medicine until he was appointed Ambassador to the United States. He was also the first Moroccan to address the United Nations in official capacity as representative to the Conference for the Establishment of the Statute for the Atomic Energy Agency.

THE theme of this paper, "America and the Future of the Maghreb," is of the highest interest to all of us. But a discussion of this subject imposes a difficult task. It is not within man's realm to know or foresee the future. What is within his reach is to believe in theory and practice, in a code of morals and human law, to listen to his conscience, and then to expect success or failure on the basis of compliance with or transgression of this set of principles. In the world today, there are many philosophies, many creeds or commandments, many constitutions, many charters, many codes of international law, all of them reflecting the light of human conscience. Their purpose is to bring peace and avoid violence. Their implementation seems to be in conformity with the spiritual nature of man and the apparent laws of social stability. Their disregard leads to conflicts such as the events of violence in Africa. If we really believe in the teachings of our long-standing culture, we can say that the future of international relations, based on the principles of universality and unity of man, is necessarily a future of peace and prosperity among co-operating nations. If, on the contrary, these moral obligations remain unfulfilled and the old rapports of slaves and masters are not broken, there is certainly no doubt that the ultimate course of future events will include a series of conflicts and perhaps chaos.

That is all one can say about the future. The American University of Beyrouth, to take just one of two examples, has guaranteed to the United States the friendliest of relationships with the peoples of the Middle East. The partition of Palestine in favor of a political movement called *zionism* has created a feeling that injustices were visited upon the Palestinian Arab, injustices which have ruined the old relationships in that neutral area.

The United States' reluctance to rec-

ognize the French Protectorate over Morocco, keeping an American legation accredited to the King of Morocco, has won the hearts of our people over to friendliness with the American people. The Franco-American negotiations, at the time of the Protectorate regime, to establish air and naval bases in Morocco that were concluded without consulting the local government were not well received and were not recognized by Moroccans. The recent agreement between Morocco and the United States to evacuate these military installations was a new demonstration of the American sense of justice, of friendship, and of respect towards small nations. In short, to prophesy the future is a hazardous adventure.

A HISTORICAL TREND

In spite of the hazards, however, man's desire to know the future relationships and respective roles of nations in world affairs is a highly significant feature of our times. It derives from several observations.

There is today a deep awareness that the world is one: our planet is shrinking to a greater and greater extent. The unity of men stems, according to our belief, from the eternal unity of mind. Therefore, the principles of universality of values are bound sooner or later to be implemented either through violence or by peaceful means. Freedom, knowledge, security, prosperity, and so on must be opportunities equally shared, with no political or economic obstacles or strings attached. To define precisely the rewards and sanctions contained in an immanent code of justice written in the hearts of men is the duty of every individual anxious to observe the laws of the world order.

Nations are interrelated through the process of mutual influence. This interrelationship works in favor of the development and/or the transfer of civilizations. Imitations and contributions

are usual processes of social life. If a nation like Algeria is held down by obstructive measures and by force of arms, this regressive attitude disturbs the normal course of history. As a result, to swim against the stream is impossible in the long run. But the future prospects sink as long as such an attempt is continued. On the other hand, nations are interdependent. They work together without great awareness of it, mainly in the field of economic activity. As in a given country a carpenter is in need of a mason, tailor, or a peasant; likewise, physical geographic conditions create a similar need in international affairs. This observation should encourage men to replace the old system of domination—the unhealthy exploitation of the majority by the minority—by a new order of co-operation. Nations should complement each other. The United Nations, in this respect, is a window of hope opened on the future.

A third observation reflects the trend of contemporary history. There is a tendency toward the standardization of patterns of living and toward an equal distribution of the political, technical, and economic fruits of material progress. This does not mean a homogenization of humanity currently separated by a diversity of cultures. Rather, it reveals a general quest for political independence, regional groupings, active industrialization, modernization of agriculture, generalization of social security, and so forth. In brief, each nation's struggle for freedom and prosperity.

This phase of history may be considered as an imperative, if transitory, period and it is oriented in the right direction.

THE ARAB MAGHREB

The Arab Maghreb does not escape this trend of history. On the contrary, it is a significant example illustrating the orientation of historical events.

The goal of national independence is the development of men as individual entities. Past history has brought an irrefutable proof that this goal is impossible to attain without national freedom. Present history shows that even with national independence, prosperity is not an easy task without peace in the neighborhood, that is in Algeria, and without international understanding. Besides, the moral conscience of the peoples of Morocco and Tunisia reminds them that they are duty-bound to consider Algerian independence as a categorical imperative without which moral existence is unjustifiable in the near or distant future. Furthermore, colonialism entered North Africa through Algeria. The consolidation of Moroccan and Tunisian independence is not possible if history does not reverse itself. Finally, political or economic strength can grow on firm ground only if it is cemented, assisted, and guaranteed by a unified Arab Maghreb. The large quantity of natural resources that are needed requires not only unified efforts among the various parts of the Arab Maghreb but judicious co-operation in the international domain.

Foundations

The foundations of the Arab Maghreb and the urgent demand for its formation rest on the following historical and geopolitical factors:

(1) The similarities in geographic conditions, ethnographic traits, cultural and psychological complexions have denominators common to each country; moreover, each country's level of progress is equal and each is in the same phase or period of history.

(2) The common will to build a future together is a binding factor.

(3) The empire of necessity makes unity the only shelter against neocolonialism and hidden interference in internal affairs. Otherwise, the temptation to divide and rule will grow stronger and stronger.

(4) The law of action and reaction between nations imposes unity as a means to accelerate progress. As an instrument applied by regional groupings or regroupings, unity can strengthen the moral and material health of the area.

(5) The colonization of North Africa and the war in Algeria with all its complications show that the loss or the recovery of freedom is simultaneous in neighboring areas and that unity will guarantee the future against the perpetuation of weakness and decay inherent in the artificial balkanization of areas.

The Arab Maghreb, then, is a projected regrouping to form a new regional entity which would fulfill the aspirations of the peoples of North Africa in accordance with the demands of intellectual freedom as well as the law of historical and economic necessity. It would also conform to the trend of history. Aspirations for political regional regroupings for regional common markets or for the formation of great federations are not an exclusive privilege of one area of the world. American, Italian, German, and Soviet territorial unifications are or should always be kept in mind as large and early examples of the historical trend toward beneficial and important group formation. It is observed as well in the Middle East and Africa.

Obstructions

Such a unification is obstructed only by the vestiges of colonial domination. This colonial domination was imposed and maintained by:

- (1) a military occupation and economic domination;
- (2) a policy of depersonalization;
- (3) and a sort of expropriation of the minds by a war launched against local language and cultures. When colonialism leaves by the front door, it attempts to return by the windows, which are:

- (a) interference, through a huge apparatus, in internal affairs of the liberated country;
- (b) economic pressures of all sorts—local and international;
- (c) support of some subversive forces;
- (d) and the perpetuation of the policy of divide and rule. For the Arab Maghreb, the war in Algeria can be explained, among other factors, by the colonial desire to keep a foothold in Africa.

It is clear then that as long as there is such a state of affairs, the law of action and reaction will maintain North Africa in a triple difficulty. The retardation of Algerian independence hurts international relations, and this in turn has a deep impact on North African affairs as well as on the position of the United States. The accelerated progress we plan to pursue cannot follow the rapid rate of development necessary. Many nations observed the beneficial effect of the rapid European economic recovery. A rapid North African economic reconstruction will benefit even more of the nations of Africa, who are in such urgent need of prosperity and peace. Conversely, to antagonize Algerian independence will retard this work of unification and reconstruction and result in the development of an atmosphere of generalized revolt.

Objectives

The Arab Maghreb is African by geography, Oriental by culture, and both Mediterranean and Atlantic by neighborhood. Two main deductions can be derived from the characteristics of the Arab Maghreb. Its policy must always evidence good neighborliness and rapprochement between nations. Furthermore, the development of events in that area will have a direct impact on countries in the vicinity.

The problems of the Arab Maghreb occur in the climate of a post revolu-

tionary period. They are, therefore, numerous and are of equal importance. Underlying these problems are certain primary objectives:

(1) A search for peace, prerequisite to an effective political unity and to the economic reconstruction of the Maghreb.

(2) The institution of a real democracy without obstacles from outside. Real democracy is in the interest of all.

(3) The normalization of international relations, readjusting the old situations to fit in the frame of new situations and requirements of sovereignty and economic emancipation.

REVOLUTION: PAST AND PRESENT

America's own history places her in a good position to study and understand the recent course of events in young nations. Although history does not repeat itself, there are some broad lines of similarity.

The national movement starts with an intellectual revolution and continues with an armed revolution. After independence, priority is given to internal over external affairs. Territorial unification and integrity occupy also a central place in political affairs. Then, many problems of equal importance and sense of urgency are raised simultaneously. At this time, also, foreign intrigues and local impatience lead to complications, and it is under conditions such as these that the aftermath of a revolution takes place. But the task of reconstruction presents itself as an imperative and only after a certain lapse of time can an increasing role in world affairs be played.

We should bear in mind that roughly the same rhythm of history develops in

our times. However, we must add the following corrections and amendments:

(1) In the Arab Maghreb, the armed revolution persists in Algeria. Peace is, therefore, still an element which is absent from the North African scene. Only after Algeria is liberated and reorganized by an Algerian government will the Maghreb come into real existence.

(2) Political colonialism should disappear and not be replaced by economic neo-colonialism.

(3) Big powers must understand the views of small nations or new federations who are presently in a position of self-defense.

(4) Territorial integrity is a legitimate claim and a guarantee against international frictions.

(5) Continued co-operation, consultations, and contacts are already inscribed in the normal course of events and are regular practice among the African states.

(6) A deep reconversion of ideas must occur in order that the European powers and the new nations can make an adequate readjustment to the new order of our times.

Mistakes can certainly be avoided. Co-operation has today a clear and concrete meaning in the field of economic and cultural understanding. Obstacles in the road have no *raison d'être*. The war in Algeria is really absurd, although every nation in the United Nations feels that it has its share of responsibility in the conflict.

It is comforting sometimes to open the window of hope on the future and speak about the coming phases of history. But the burning problems of the present remind us of the acute pressure to find a quick solution to the major difficulties.

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: Mr. Ambassador, what would you consider to be the state of relations or rapport, if you will, between the western part of the Arab world and Mr. Nasser's United Arab Republic?

A: This is an up-to-date question. When we say the Arab Maghreb we automatically link it to the Arab Orient or Middle East, since Maghreb means the west. If you speak about Mr. Nasser, he is the Chief of State, and I cannot answer, but if you mean by pronouncing his name, how events in the Middle East will affect future rapport with the Middle Eastern countries, I can answer this question, and will answer it in this line. The Arab Maghreb and the Arab Middle East are one and the same people, with the same background in history and culture. The territorial location from the Atlantic Sea to the Persian Gulf—this is a sentence very dear to the Arabs—is one continuous piece of land with only a little fissure called the Suez Canal. Today we are also in the same level of technical progress, we have the same amount of needs, and hopes, and aspirations. Therefore there is an adequate similarity between every part of the Arab world and we consider the Arab world as one. Our future relations have already been announced by our adherence to the Arab league. We are members of the Arab league. We also have a common culture, which is the identity card of every grouping on the earth. This Arab culture has to be understood and used—the term linguistically is to be used in comparison with the term say Latin culture or Germanic culture. It does not mean that the blood is Arab or Latin or Germanic, but it means that the way of thinking, the influence, and the education are received in the framework of the Arab culture. We belong to this. A third observation is that today there is a trend of regroupings or groupings as we just said, and it is always hopeful to encourage human beings to unity instead of division. If there are common grounds and common denominators to meet together and unite, I believe that unity is one of the

best attributes of every absolute ideal that man can dream of. If there is any encouragement to division, you have to reflect why there is an encouragement to division since division is already repulsive to the heart and mind of men. Therefore, the Arab world and Maghreb have all common reasons and all common grounds to unite. The form, the concrete form, of this unity belongs to the future which no one can prophesy, but when Americans say that we are united as Americans, under the same flag, with the same language, with the same culture, and the same background, there is an aesthetic sense, an aesthetic feeling of happiness inside the heart of every man who feels he is fulfilling his duty towards his fellow man, and especially the nearest ones among these fellow men. It is also with the same pleasure and also the same sense of duty that Arabs want to unite and I believe that unity is also in the trend of history. Even though they do not want to unite, the law of necessity will orient them to unity and then God will open their eyes for a moral observation and a moral understanding of the value of that unity.

Q: I would like to ask His Excellency, how much the exploitation of the oil in the Algerian Sahara is complicating the question of Algerian independence? How steps might be taken in view of France's long desire and hope to make itself self-sufficient in petroleum, and what steps could be made to adjust this situation?

A: This question is even more up-to-date. It is a very difficult question, it requires experts to study, but we can make the following observation: There is a huge amount—I have referred to this in my notes—of natural resources in North Africa and mainly in Algeria.

Oil in Algeria is flourishing and it is also of a good quality. The question has an apparent shape of material economy but if you really open this question you find that it strikes the heart of the world idealism. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries presented a doctrine called "The Colonial Pact Policy." The major European powers agreed to have colonies to divide the territories of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia between them to exploit them in the following way: To take the raw materials from the colony, transport it in the metropolitan land, transform it into manufactured goods, and then resell it as manufactured goods to the colony. So the colony was an area for an open market, a source of cheap or free of charge raw material, a source of cheap or free of charge labor or forced labor, and also a strategic area in the economic competition between colonial powers. Today, oil was found and exploited in an era of crisis. Those, in Europe, who need the use of this oil have legitimate claims, but they will have no legitimate claims if they take a country like Algeria, attempt to perpetuate the law of colonial domination in it, because there is some oil. France should understand that she has to live and let live. If she does so, no complication will arise in the solution of the present conflict in Algeria. The amount of natural resources in North Africa and Algeria is so great that it needs Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and, I hope, Libya, to unite in order to be able to exploit all at once oil, gas, phosphate and some other raw materials like manganese, lead, zinc, cobalt, and so on and provide for the transformation of these raw materials through local industries into manufactured goods. But the vestiges, the rest of the colonial pact philosophy, are still laboring in the minds of some European powers today. That is why they put obstacles in the way and try to present

them as a justification for a military occupation. For example, the oil in Algeria, they say, should be a link of co-operation and harmony between nations and will also justify the progress that we are speaking about. There exists a great amount of natural resources, and there is a conflict. The conflict is for freedom. The amount of natural resources can strengthen this freedom and at the same time provide the necessary amount of oil for the use of European powers. I believe without the European market, this oil will be useless; it is too much for the use of North Africa. So the problem has to be put in the right way—are we ready to understand that in Algeria with its wealth, we can co-operate in freedom or exploit in slavery? This is the real problem.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, most consideration of problems of Africa tends to divide the continent into the Arabic part and the Sub-Sahara part. I wonder whether you care to comment on the relations between these two and to make my question more up-to-date, would you care to speculate on the future and the possibility of a stronger Pan-African agreement among the Arabs and emergent nations of the Sub-Sahara?

A: This is a question anticipating the African conference in Addis Ababa in two months from now. The Sahara desert used to be presented as a separation between Africa north, and Africa south, of the Sahara. Today—I was in Liberia twice last year and I heard this—the Sahara is the bridge linking North Africa to Africa, south of the Sahara. And it is a true assertion, to answer the first part of your question, historically speaking, that because of the deeply religious moral education, the peoples of Africa used to exchange visits between North and South. If you go to Khartoum or to Guinea, you will

find vestiges of Moroccan society, you will find some people who originally came from Morocco, you will find the culture the same, and you will find families now having certain desires to go back to see either their former town or their former family. Commerce used to be very frequent between North and South Africa, but mainly with the neighboring countries which is quite normal in geography.

The second part of the question is about the future. In other words, what do the Africans on the one side, the Arabs on the other side, and the bridge between the two which is North Africa, want? Here we enter the doorway of human freedom, human choice. We have said that today if we really want to read between the lines, we will find that a trend of history is the unification of areas. These areas will unify themselves in the following way: First, beginning with original groupings, North Africa will form the Maghreb; Ghana, Guinea, and Liberia for the last two years have been talking about a form of federation; Sudan and Senegal are already federated in the Mali federation. This is a concrete, obvious, objective observation. It is based on the awareness that the world is progressively being unified. Theoretically speaking we are already one. If there is war in the United States there will be war all over the world; if there is war in the Suez Canal there will be war all over the world; if there is war in Berlin, for instance, there will be war all over the world. There is an awareness now that the world is shrinking and that there is a moral obligation to follow the laws of nature. I believe that Bacon said something to the effect that "to dominate nature you have to follow its laws." This idea is to be applied today. The Arabs are already six nations in Africa: Libya, the Sudan, United

Arab Republic, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. In Algeria, there are about eighteen million Muslims speaking Arabic and therefore the Arabs as representatives of a culture feel that they are brothers of the other Africans and that the Middle East as compared to the huge continent of Africa is relatively small. They will have all the reasons to orient their minds towards unification with Africa, and vice-a-versa, Africa will have all the reasons, moral reasons, to unite or come closer to the Middle East because these original groupings, if we really think in term of man and man, began under the definition given by the will of God. Thus, this unity of humanity is being developed progressively first through general groupings, some happened already as the Federation of the United States, some will happen, some are in the process of happening right now. This will again cause some continents to unify, either economically, under an economic organization like the Common Market in Europe, for instance, or under the political loose groupings like the Arab League or under an organization like the Secretariat of Independent African States. The central idea is clear: the brotherhood of man is more and more imperative, it has to be implemented on earth, it may take centuries and centuries, or less than that. Yet we see today and read in the trend of history that the Arabs will have no difficulty to unite with other Africans and that the union of the Arab states and the union of African states instead of being conflicting and antagonizing will appear in the near future. They are already appearing right now as harmonized elements to give to the world an illustration that the meaning of history is not an illusion and that human beings want to unite, want to live in peace. It is only ignorance that brings confusion.

Our Role in the Quickening Pace Towards Independence in Africa

By JOSEPH C. SATTERTHWAITE

ABSTRACT: Our belief in the self-determination, self-government, and independence of peoples has persisted throughout American history. The rapid political and social changes that are occurring in the countries of tropical Africa have drawn our sympathy and, in a more active way, have drawn our support through material and technical assistance granted to them directly or through the organization of the United Nations. It is of fairly recent date that the United States has officially co-operated in this area, an area that was previously a sphere in which European interests were predominant. While we have begun to offer assistance to the African states, we are hopeful, at the same time, that the long-established ties with the European countries can continue in another form, advantageous to both. The needs, we recognize, of the African states are of such magnitude that they cannot be fulfilled by any one country. We have, therefore, co-operated in efforts to promote economic development initiated by the United Nations and its specialized agencies. We are being called upon more and more to share our material benefits with the less-developed parts of the world. The African states form one of these areas, indeed a very important one, and we are ready to play our role in responding to their needs.—Ed.

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IT is my intention to discuss briefly why and how we, as Americans, are involved in the nationalist ferment in Africa and what the future may hold for our relations with the independent states. Major attention has already been given to the northern and southern areas of the continent. The northern area is the focus for another paper in this volume. And the position of the United States toward recent developments in the Union of South Africa has been made known both in Washington and at the recent meeting of the Security Council. My remarks are accordingly directed in general to the great belt of tropical Africa where at present social and political changes are moving at a rapid pace.

OUR MORAL AND HISTORIC ROLE

I think it may be held that since the American Revolution, the American people have been involved in the movement of any peoples anywhere in the world toward self-determination, self-government, and independence. The founders of our nation and our great statesmen have fully realized and articulated this fact, knowing that the principles on which our independence was based would have effect far beyond their time and beyond our shores. Abraham Lincoln called for the blessings of liberty for all mankind believing that neither his country nor the world could long survive half free and half slave. In the rush of modern events, I think we sometimes forget the strong and enduring currents which our example set in motion. We do not, of course, have a monopoly on these ideals for they have been given impetus by the great liberal societies of Europe and have been jointly enunciated in such historic documents as the Atlantic Charter.

The events of the twentieth century

have brought to the surface a new wave of change which has carried hundreds of millions of people to independence in Asia, in the Arab world, and now in tropical Africa. Here "freedom" in various languages is the catchword. The old slogans and declarations of our independence struggle have been revived with undiminished force and meaning. These phenomena stir a spontaneous response and welcome in the American people because they spring from the same soil in which our own past is rooted.

America also has ties with Africa of a more tangible kind. About one tenth of our population has its origin in tropical Africa. We have, therefore, a special interest in events in Africa, an interest, however, which is by no means confined to those of our population who had their origin on that continent and who have contributed so much to our culture and its expression. I might also observe that our own problems of assimilating Americans of African descent into our free society, an issue involved in our Civil War, should make us view with some humility the present problems of the European populations which now control the "multiracial" states in Africa.

Again on the very tangible side, we helped to establish over one-hundred years ago the free state of Liberia as a home for freed slaves and as an example of the principle of self-government which remained unique in tropical Africa until the twentieth century. Its name, "Liberia," proclaims its status, and its capital, Monrovia, commemorates the President under whose administration it was founded. Our government has always had close and friendly relations with Liberia, and American investment and free enterprise continue to have an important influence on the development of its economy.

Our governmental and cultural rela-

tionships with Africa by no means exhaust our long-term historic association. American missionaries in large numbers have had an important influence quite apart from their evangelical mission. Their mission schools have provided primary and secondary education to promising students who had nowhere else to turn. These men and women now form part of the leadership group who will have to cope at various levels with the independence which their people have achieved or may achieve. Some few of them have gone on to universities in the parent country or in the United States. I think it significant that from this number have emerged such leaders as Prime Minister Nkrumah of Ghana, Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika, and Dr. Asikiwe of Nigeria. Viewed especially in the light of present conditions, the educational service performed over a long period of years by American and other Christian missionaries in Africa will have an abiding beneficial influence on the new societies now being formed.

American private enterprise, private foundations, and education have had a significant influence in Africa. The preponderance of investment has been in the industrialized Union of South Africa, in Liberia, and the Rhodesias, but it is increasing in those newly independent countries which have established a friendly climate for foreign capital. The foundations are conducting research and consultative and educational programs in many countries which have achieved or are on the way to achieving independence. The metropolitan and local governments generally have welcomed these efforts, and their work and training will be of great assistance not only to new governments when they emerge, but also to the United States government and private enterprise in planning future aid and investment programs.

OUR PROPER CONTEMPORARY ROLE

Now I would like to turn to our proper contemporary role in Africa. I shall confine my remarks largely to the role of government. I use the word "proper" advisedly because we are admonished by some to "keep hands off" and urged by others to champion the growing nationalist movement in Africa. We are charged on the one hand with interference, on the other with irresponsible indifference. We likewise face the accusation that our sympathies are entirely with African aspirations and that we are prepared to abandon European and other minority groups who have made their permanent home in Africa. We do not, of course, subscribe to the belief that any race or individual in Africa is expendable. Each can play an important role in the future development of Africa. Between these extremes we must pursue a course best calculated to serve the long-term interests of the peoples of the United States, of Africa, and of the free world in general. I say "proper," also, because we did not play a major role in Africa during the last century, whereas our European allies have major interests of long standing on that continent. The drama now unfolding is one, therefore, in which the Africans and Europeans play the major parts. Our course, in view of our varied and sometimes conflicting interests, is often difficult to chart. However, we shall not go astray if we continue to be guided by our firm belief in the evolution of peoples to self-government and independence by peaceful means, our traditional willingness to offer moral and material assistance to peoples striving to maintain stable representative governments, and our readiness as a member of the United Nations to help defend duly constituted governments and their peoples against aggression.

In tropical Africa the evolution to-

wards independence has been and continues to be remarkable for the speed and nonviolence of the transition. This has required statesmanship, tolerance, and goodwill of a high order on all sides—by the Africans who are imbued with ardent nationalism and are impatient of delay, and by the European powers who are faced with major political, economic, and psychological decisions and adjustments. Our proper role as a government is to play the role of a friend contributing to orderly transition while hoping that new, strong, and voluntary ties will be established between the new countries and the former administering states. Certainly both stand to gain from such a relationship.

I do not mean to indicate from the foregoing that the United States has no official presence in African countries while these changes are going on or until they become independent. On the contrary, we have one or more Foreign Service establishments in most of the political subdivisions of the continent, twenty-nine United States Information Service establishments, as well as International Co-operation Administration representatives, and programs in Overseas Territories. We have embassies in eleven independent countries. Significant, if modest, educational exchanges are taking place, and the President's Cultural Presentation Program is bringing American artists, musicians, and athletes before African audiences. In 1958 and 1959, Prime Minister Nkrumah and President Touré of Ghana and Guinea, respectively, paid visits to the United States at the invitation of President Eisenhower. Such visits express the profound interest and respect of the American people and government for these new nations and their leaders as they embark on the difficult course of liberty.

I should like to comment here on the frequently expressed doubts or fears as

to whether the people of Africa are yet ready to run their own affairs, whether they have sufficient experience with self-government to assume its responsibilities, whether they will not fall victims of governments of the extreme right or left. I believe history has shown that "readiness" is almost an academic question. Peoples tend to acquire independence, whether they are ready or not, according to a timetable more or less of their own making. The degree of experience with self-government varies with the type of tutelage received from the mother country. In tropical Africa, for example, we are witnessing the imaginative evolution of the French community. Its members have moved in a short period of time from typical colonial status towards self-government or independence. Nigeria, a British colony, has benefited in an exemplary manner from education and civic training and guidance provided by Great Britain in preparation for independence in October 1960. We have the dramatic instance of the Belgian Congo where six months ago neither the people of that area nor the Belgian government would have predicted the independence which will come on June 30 of this year. Yet the colonial government with outstanding statesmanship has negotiated with Congolese leaders for the transfer of power under the optimum conditions time will allow.

Turning to the character the new governments will have, I believe, on the basis of past and present experience, we have reason to be optimistic. Elections, both in still dependent and in independent areas, have been generally peaceful, impressive, and marked by a very large turnout of voters. The new governments are responsive to the will of the people and have the support of the majority of the populace. In some cases there is not the same respect for the minority opposition that is custom-

ary in Western democracies. However, we cannot expect Africa to follow entirely Western patterns in developing democracy. Ancient African local governmental processes accept as binding the consensus of the majority. And in African societies where the tribal and chieftain system prevailed those who opposed this consensus had to be silent or leave the group; a system which we might consider autocratic. What we can hope for with considerable confidence is the steady growth of democratic principles based on respect for human rights, justice, and law. We must expect a certain instability and trial and error. These are, after all, the normal problems of democracies which we experienced in full measure during the first decades of our independence. What would be most helpful at this time, it seems to me, is continuing evidence of America's understanding, confidence, and willingness to assist during the years of growth and adjustment ahead.

AMERICA'S ECONOMIC INVOLVEMENT

Both African and outside observers agree that for a long time to come the principal assistance required by the emerging states of tropical Africa is, first, education and training—using those terms in their broadest sense—and second, development assistance, which includes private investment and public financing. President Sekou Touré of Guinea when he was in the United States made the pointed observation that to Africans the world is divided into two parts: not free and communist, but developed and undeveloped, and that they would seek development assistance from wherever they could receive it, without regard to political considerations.

It is perfectly clear that Africa's needs are great, so great that they cannot be provided by any one country. The metropolitan powers have, during

the period of dependence, provided major economic assistance both for development and in the form of administrative expenditures. In general, it seems that substantial assistance from the metropolitan powers will continue during and after the transition period to independence. The value of this type of support for last year is estimated at over \$500,000,000. But independence shifts certain burdens and the metropolitan powers are unlikely to continue to provide all the costs of an administration which they have relinquished.

The United States has but lately become involved in providing a share of the educational, technical, and development assistance so urgently needed in tropical Africa. Interest of American private investment in West Africa is strong and, given a continued receptive climate, should increase. The government, the private foundations, and our universities are making a significant beginning by provision of educational and training assistance for the future leadership. There are now over 1,700 African students in the United States. But by contrast, there are some 10,000 in the United Kingdom, a similar number in France, and an undetermined number in Communist-bloc countries. Next year our government hopes to finance 500 educational exchanges, 400 of them to bring Africans to this country, 100 for American teachers, professors and specialists to work on the African continent.

Now, these are good beginnings but they are not good enough. The facts are that countries are approaching political independence without sufficiently trained leadership and technical and managerial skills and without firmly established economic and social institutions and systems which provide the foundations for secure, confident, African-governed nations. Present United

States foreign assistance programs are not adequate in scope or size to be responsive to the dramatic changes taking place. As the most materially favored nation in the free world community, we must accept a larger responsibility in meeting this challenge. The executive branch has, therefore, proposed to the Congress a special program for tropical Africa with an initial appropriation of \$20,000,000 under the Special Assistance category. We have a fresh situation; we are attempting to meet it in a fresh manner. President Eisenhower in presenting this proposal to Congress said: "It is my belief that this initial effort must be increased significantly in the immediate years ahead and complement similar efforts on the part of other free world nations so that the capacity of the new and other developing nations in Africa to manage and direct their development can be strengthened and increased rapidly and effectively."

The essential character of the special program for tropical Africa lies in its intensive concentration on key education and training problems and on regional activities. It would not replace our bilateral technical co-operation under the International Co-operation Administration, but it would be closely related to it. It is not intended that it should become a competitor to or substitute for assistance from other free world sources. It is our hope, rather, that it may serve to encourage an increase in assistance from other free world countries and international and national organizations.

Development Advisory Group

I mentioned earlier that no single country could possibly provide the economic and technical assistance required by Africa in the coming years—a continent of over 220,000,000 people, over three times the area of the United States, and undeveloped in the mid-

twentieth-century sense of the term. Recognizing this, and also the fact that a number of our allies are providing bilateral assistance to a number of undeveloped countries, Under-Secretary of State Douglas Dillon suggested to the European countries in January that the principal capital exporting countries meet to discuss various aspects of co-operation in their assistance efforts. The suggestion was accepted and last month the group held its first meeting in Washington. Known as the Development Advisory Group the members are: Belgium, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Commission of the European Economic Community.

At this meeting primary attention was directed towards methods and means of improving the flow of bilateral aid. Members reported on their experience and problems in extending, financing, and promoting economic development in the less-developed areas. They heard reports from the International Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Significantly, I think, the Group agreed that its efforts should not involve discussion of amounts of financing for particular regions, countries, or projects. In other words, it is not another operating agency but a facilitating, ways and means body. This should allay the fears expressed by some undeveloped countries that the capital exporting states plan to "gang up" on them, make decisions affecting them without consultation, and keep them in a position of suppliers of raw materials to the industrialized economies. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The Group plans to continue its activities through meetings at regular intervals, the next to be in about three months in Bonn, Germany.

A somewhat detailed discussion of the Development Advisory Group has

been given because it could be a very important step towards reconciling our own and other free world countries' sometimes disparate approach to the joint problems of furnishing economic aid. It is a step away from "going it alone" and towards co-operative efforts. As one commentator expressed it, "the Conference well might become a beacon of hope in a vast economic wasteland." As one of the largest underdeveloped areas of the world Africa could be a principal beneficiary of its work.

In considering the whole area of economic, technical, and educational assistance, we are too often inclined to act, I think, as though all motivation rests with us, "us" meaning the developed countries. This is not a healthy or natural situation. Important initiatives are also required of the countries and territories to be assisted. We may take the area under discussion this afternoon as an example. As states in tropical Africa move toward independence, we need to know with some preciseness their own estimate of their needs. It is not sufficient to say, "we need everything." We cannot plan or budget on that basis, and "shotgun" aid is likely to have a worse effect than none. New states must put their own economic and fiscal houses in order so that aid can be efficiently channeled. There must be an understanding of the processes through which assistance funds are appropriated in democratic countries. Our Congress has an inescapable accountability to the taxpayer for the use of his money, and I would hope that recipient countries would understand this and not regard certain strictures on the use of grant or loan funds or technical assistance as evidence of "political strings" on the part of the United States. While we must cut the red tape that sometimes binds our aid programs, some controls over them are a mark

of responsibility. In the field of free enterprise, new governments must create conditions that will make capital investment and development attractive or it will go elsewhere.

THE REGIONAL APPROACH

Particularly in Africa there would seem to be advantages in a regional approach to assistance. The boundaries of the present political divisions of the continent were in many instances arbitrarily drawn and often prevent the undertaking of economically or socially viable projects.

It is encouraging that African leaders are aware of this problem and are giving some consideration to area planning from the development point of view. We can, I think, do much to encourage such regional and co-operative approaches to the many common developmental problems which confront all the African countries. For example, in planning the special program for tropical Africa which I mentioned earlier, we are proposing to use a portion of the funds requested to support and sponsor multi-country conferences, workshops, and seminars as training programs in themselves and as a means of stimulating co-operative approaches to special development problems, such as the tsetse fly which closes large parts of the continent to livestock raising. In the field of education we will propose a training grant program which will permit Africans from several countries to attend various African schools and colleges.

I would make one further remark on the subject of economic assistance. Aimless benevolence is not the objective of our foreign assistance programs. Our objective is to strengthen the economies of underdeveloped states and enrich the lives of their people so that democracy will be satisfying and meaningful to them. We believe that such objectives

are in our mutual interest. To accomplish them efficiently, there must be responsive initiatives from the co-operating countries.

We must recognize, of course, that the whole question of regionalism in Africa is a complex and difficult subject with far-reaching political overtones. While I believe that closer associations of African countries will develop, it will be a long process and it is a matter which the peoples themselves will have to effect.

In this connection it is pertinent to quote from the speech made by Secretary of State Herter earlier this week in Chicago at the 38th Annual Convention of the National Association of Broadcasters. Referring to efforts which the United States is making to build closer relations with the new African nations and the concern which we have for their welfare and security as they assume the responsibilities of independence, he said: "It is our hope that they can devise regional arrangements to insure the peaceful settlement of disputes and to avoid a wasteful and dangerous arms race. This would indeed be a forward step toward insuring peaceful change."

COMMUNISM AND AFRICA

It is not the purpose of this discussion to study communist influence and involvement in Africa but I believe I should mention it if for no other reason than to avoid misunderstanding. The forces of international communism are fully aware of the opportunities present to exploit the nationalist movement in Africa for their own political ends. They have been doing so at an increasing rate, covertly through their usual methods and overtly through rather massive economic and technical assistance in chosen areas. I think it is testimony to the stability and good sense of the African people that commu-

nism has not gained a significant foothold on the continent. The policy of "positive neutrality" enunciated by some African leaders sometimes leads us to the view, erroneously I think, that the new African states are "soft" on communism. There is more evidence, I believe, that Africans who have but recently freed themselves of foreign control will not, except by force, permit themselves to come under a new domination alien to them in every sense of the word.

I would not be honest if I did not admit that we are concerned over the impressive assistance offers that the Communist bloc have made in Africa in the last year or so. If these programs were only what they seem on the surface, aid to the economy and technology of underdeveloped societies, there would be little cause for concern. It is not reasonable to assume that new governments in dire need of the assistance of technically developed peoples would refuse to accept such aid. The legitimate concern, it seems to me, stems from the fact that communism uses all means to attain the political objective of communization and control. Economic "co-operation" is only one means, but it could be an effective one when applied to peoples who lack an established political and economic order of their own. However, there are many indications that the African peoples and leaders will be vigilant and uncompromising in rejection of all political subversion masquerading as friendship and assistance.

Our own expanding programs of cultural, technical, and economic collaboration with Africa stem from the traditional character of our society which has demonstrated time and again our conviction that to help others help themselves is the path of enlightened self-interest. Our motives are, and must remain, positive and not negative—for a better way of life for

Africans, not against a communist initiative here and there. We have no desire to see Africa become a "cold war" battleground. Such a development would be as distasteful and unproductive for Africans as for the rest of the free world. We believe that the maturing "African personality," while unique, has already cast its lot with free men.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND AFRICA

No discussion of America's relationship to Africa would be complete without mention of the United Nations. Additional contact with Africa comes about through our participation in the United Nations and its specialized agencies. For example, as members of the Trusteeship Council we have had a voice in the future of the trust territories in Africa, although all seven of them are or were administered by various European powers. I think it is fine testimony to their administration and to the effectiveness of the United Nations system that three of these trust territories, Cameroun, Togo, and Somalia, have been or will be granted independence in 1960, and that one other, British Cameroons, may determine its future status within the year. The British Cameroons elected to postpone the decision in a plebiscite held under United Nations auspices last fall. The United Nations has so far been unsuccessful, I regret to say, in its efforts to have Southwest Africa put under trusteeship or under some other form of international supervision. It remains under mandate to the Union of South Africa where it was placed by the now defunct League of Nations.

The United States is a strong supporter of the United Nations technical assistance programs and of the specialized agencies working in the fields of health, agriculture, and education. We are also the largest contributor of funds to these agencies and to the United

Nations Expanded Technical Assistance Program. I think it is sometimes forgotten that the United States assessment represents about a third of the total budgets of the various specialized agencies, and its voluntary contributions amount to 40 per cent of the total funds available to the Expanded Technical Assistance Program and to the United Nations Special Fund. By formula we agree to maintain this ratio as other countries increase their contributions. In other words, the amount of our assistance is tied to the confidence which other members indicate by their support of the specialized agencies and United Nations technical assistance.

In this connection, we have noted the strong preference which some leaders of independent African nations have expressed for assistance through the United Nations rather than through bilateral assistance. Some of them may fear that bilateral assistance will involve excessive dependence upon other nations, or that such assistance would entail conditions which might detract from their sovereignty. While there are certain conditions attached to virtually all forms of aid, multilateral as well as bilateral, we believe the record of the United States and other free nations in supplying economic aid and technical assistance clearly demonstrates that such aid will not be used to impair the freedom or independence of any nation. At the same time, there are sometimes definite advantages connected with aid through the United Nations, and we believe that both United Nations sources and other sources will be needed. As I have noted, our government is the heaviest investor in the United Nations' programs. As more African countries attain independence, I foresee their sharing to an increasing extent in the benefits of these programs. I also believe that the dynamic develop-

ments on the continent increase both the obligation and the opportunity for the United Nations to expand its work. The Economic Commission for Africa, established with headquarters in Addis Ababa in 1958, should give new impetus to the planning of effective programs to meet the social, economic, and technical needs of the African people. The United States has observer status on this Commission and is following its progress with keen interest.

Through the United Nations our government also becomes involved in Africa's political and social problems; and, conversely, the increasing representation of African states in the world organization is having a growing impact. The one-nation one-vote system in the General Assembly means that Africa may, before very long, be able to influence strongly the resolutions of that body which tend to reflect world opinion. In the past we have frequently found ourselves at variance with the African states on issues which, we think, they tend to view from a local or continental vantage point. It is understandable that these new countries should, at the outset, be primarily concerned with African problems and attempt to avoid entanglement in wider issues which, they may feel, they had no part in creating. But it is our hope and expectation that time and experience and the full acceptance of African

countries into world councils will bring us closer together on positions which the United Nations can take to advance peace, security, and international amity.

CONCLUSION

The question posed in that part of this symposium dealing with Africa is whether America is involved in the nationalist ferment in Africa. I believe it is now evident that the United States and the American people do have a significant involvement in African affairs and, inevitably, in the nationalist ferment now taking place on that continent. In the past, this involvement has been important but limited and sporadic. However, with a dramatic new era dawning over Africa, we are called upon to play a new and, I think, a more positive role in responding to the needs of these countries and in sharing with them our human and material resources. We shall not play it alone but in concert with others and with the United Nations. The United States has strong historic, cultural, economic, and linguistic ties with tropical Africa. They are invaluable assets with which to develop new bonds with the peoples of Africa who are looking to the United States to see what response to their needs and problems will be forthcoming. I am sure we shall not be found wanting.

* * *

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: Some of us in the University Extension Association feel that most of the efforts toward educating the adults in world affairs in the past ten years have been considerably less than effective. Secondly, we feel that part of the reason for this is that the universities have not played so large a role in educating

American adults about world affairs as they should have. Africa especially has been one of the neglected areas in this adult curriculum. What might we as academics, as scholars, as people interested in world affairs do to offer the American public some greater education, not simply awareness, not simply propa-

ganda, but genuine education about Africa and its problems and the relation of those problems to our own national welfare?

A: As Ambassador Ben Aboud would have said, that is a very timely question and very difficult perhaps for me to answer since my main responsibility is to deal with African affairs rather than American. But that does not mean that we in the State Department do not have a very keen interest indeed in the problem which you have posed. I think that it is answering itself to a large degree. When I had the responsibility of recruiting an African research division in 1946, we had the greatest difficulty in finding any scholars who had taken a doctorate or even a master's in an African subject. I am glad to say that the two or three we did find have since distinguished themselves in African affairs, and as I am sure you know there are about 200 Ph.D.'s who have taken their doctorates in African studies. That in itself is not the answer to educate the American people, but naturally the universities are the seat of learning, for us the highest seat, and little by little, more and more the great universities and some of the smaller are specializing and bringing in experts on African affairs, and of course that is the most important way. But there are other media and you only have to see the number of interesting and really vital programs on Africa which the nation's three great television chains have produced and the number of special articles in our magazines, I think, to realize that the American people are taking an interest and are thereby getting an education in the problems of Africa.

Q: I recently visited the Republic of Guinea as a private citizen, and found

that the country is full of Russians and East Germans. The Soviet Union has given very large financial assistance to Guinea and not only are they accepting it but they are contemplating the establishment of a technical school founded by Russians and presumably administered by Russians. I also found in the interior of the Republic of Guinea that those people who have some slight education are strictly communistic in their viewpoint. By communistic I do not mean communism as we now interpret it among us intelligently, but they are pro-Russian in their viewpoint. They welcome Russians, the East Germans, technical people, who are visiting them and who are teaching them in the ways that the Russians usually adopt in undeveloped countries. I want to ask how the United States proposes to, let us say, counter such advances by the Russians and the East Germans?

A: I think you will find there the situation which I mentioned in my speech. I mentioned President Sekou Touré by name stating of course they would accept aid from any place they could get it. It is perfectly true there are a great number of East Germans and Polish, Hungarian, and especially Czech technicians and a number of Soviet technicians there and in very important areas, and they are throughout the country. I think it is equally true that the few Americans who do travel out in the country are also very cordially received. There is one feature, of course, about the government of Guinea which may apply to some other areas of Africa. It does have a form of a politburo government but this, it seems to me, is deceptive since it fits in precisely with their own African tribal system. Also there is quite a degree of democracy even in Guinea itself. While there have been no national elections, the members

of the party, the governing group, have all come up through elections in the local communities. Now, as to what we are doing, this has been a most frustrating experience. At a very early date we did send in some assistance in the form of rice and flour which was most welcome, and when President Touré was here we made an offer to give 150 scholarships and to furnish an English teaching program. We hope this will be implemented in the very near future, but we have run into great difficulties which only illustrate the problems for these new countries. Our Congress, I think understandably, puts a great many limitations on the use of our funds and how they are accounted for and this leads to rather difficult negotiations which often are not understood by these new governments. I am confident we have found a way now of implementing those two programs and we hope that we can increase our assistance in effective ways. We are convinced though the Communist technicians are there in great numbers that certainly the President himself and the members of the government do not consider themselves as being under Soviet or East-bloc pressure, that they do dominate the situation. It is therefore all the more important that we get more assistance on our side of a kind that can be really effective in helping them with the very great needs they have. I think as an engineer you probably failed to mention one other significant fact—one of the largest private investments in all of Africa is to be found in this country and is progressing satisfactorily. I refer to the great aluminum project which is 48 per cent American owned, and while this country may have some real difficulties it certainly at no time has had the impression that the Guinean government would not co-operate with it fully. The company is moving ahead with its great project and we hope that the next project, or one of

the two or three next projects, will also go forward, one of which you no doubt know about, the Konkouré Dam.

Q: I wonder if you would like to comment upon the role that arms shipments might play at the present time in stirring up cold-war tensions in Africa, and also what the feasibility might be of controlling these shipments?

A: I am very glad that a member of the government is bold enough to get upon his feet and ask a question of that kind, but I should point out that he is a servant of Congress and not of the executive branch, which makes it easier for him, perhaps. As you will recall, the question of arms control, raised by the questioner, was mentioned by the Secretary of State last Monday. Our hope naturally is that there will not be an arms race but let me say that so far there has not been. The only shipment of arms of any significance, and this is completely insignificant in terms of the West, were the few thousand arms which the Czechs sent in to the security forces of Guinea when these forces were left with no arms at all. My personal feeling is, and I think it may reflect the attitude of the government—it is a problem now being studied very vigorously—that perhaps the surest way to assure an arms race would be for the Western powers to tell the new governments that they could not have arms. They themselves, and I speak particularly of the states of Western Africa, have only very small forces at the moment. Ghana and Nigeria have the names of some famous regiments and war experience, but certainly considering the size of these countries and the important security problems they have, the forces which they have, though they may be called armies, are essentially

nal security forces and could not be effective offensively. Liberia, old friend, has an extremely small force which certainly has no alternative possibilities. Nevertheless they have to and will insist on getting and, needless to say, if the Western powers refuse them these arms they will be a very approachable and readily available source, which would be un-

fortunate. I am confident that in their meetings these African powers themselves will find a solution to this problem. We all know that modern armaments are so fantastically expensive that if they got involved in a race of this kind they would not have the means left in their limited economies to improve the standards of living which is their most important consideration.

An American Policy Toward Communist China

By JOSEPH S. CLARK

ABSTRACT: Security—the containment of Communist China—is one of the basic ingredients of the official United States policy in east and southeast Asia. At the same time we are attempting, with near-success, to conclude a nuclear test ban treaty that will eventually, it is hoped, become one part of a more general disarmament agreement. But is there any hope for a lasting disarmament agreement that excludes Communist China? Moreover, can a nuclear test ban treaty be effective whose control system requires inspection sites on the China mainland and yet denies the possibility to Communist China to participate in its formulation? Furthermore, how advanced is Communist China in the scientific realm? Is it not probable that she too will join the nuclear club in the foreseeable future? When the answers to these questions are faced squarely, they will of necessity indicate the unrealistic nature of the policy we are taking towards Communist China. Hopefully, before even this door is closed, we will begin to explore those contacts with Communist China which are now available to the United States to discover whether or not there is a basis on which a disarmament agreement that includes the Chinese Communists can be concluded.—Ed.

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BEFORE President Eisenhower leaves office next January, the present United States policy of refusing to deal with Communist China will have run its course. In all likelihood the State Department will be urgently seeking ways to open direct communications with Peking at the highest levels of government. Mao Tse-tung's active co-operation and participation in a joint undertaking with the United States will probably be sought. Such communications and negotiations will not only be consonant with our national security interest but essential to it. Another major aggressive move by the Chinese is the only eventuality which would delay this drastic change in policy.

A year ago, six months ago, such predictions would have been shrugged off as ludicrous, possibly subversive. Today they are accepted as inevitable by those who have been following closely developments at the nuclear test ban talks in Geneva. As the test ban negotiations near agreement between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, our so-called "China policy" becomes as obsolete as George Washington's stand against "entangling alliances."

A political lag between established policies and the needs and events of the day is always dangerous. When there is a clear challenge in a field affecting national safety and survival and there are literally no government policies to meet that challenge, it is frightening. This presentation suggests that the urgent need to obtain Chinese participation in nuclear test ban and disarmament control measures requires rethinking of our attitude toward Communist China. Let us ask ourselves a few questions.

What is our current China policy? Why will a nuclear test ban agreement require a new United States attitude toward Peking in the immediate future?

What new approaches to the Chinese should be attempted to obtain their co-operation in disarmament matters?

OUR CHINA POLICY TODAY

Since the death of Secretary Dulles and the retirement of Walter S. Robertson, his principal adviser on Sino-American relations, J. Graham Parsons, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, has been speaking for the Administration on China. Mr. Parsons, a firm adherent to the Dulles-Robertson views, restated recently the main objectives of the Administration's policy of containment of Communist China in a major address on "The American Role in Pacific-Asian Affairs."

Our first task . . . is to assist the survival of [the free countries of east and southeast Asia]. That is why there is emphasis on military aspects in our aid programs and posture in the area. Security is the basic essential. First, as a necessary deterrent to the Communist attacks, we maintain bases and sea power in the region. . . . Also to promote security we render assistance to local forces through our military assistance program. . . . In addition we have concluded bilateral mutual defense treaties with some of these countries, including Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and the Republic of China. Finally, . . . we have joined with seven other countries to form the Southeast Asia Treaty organization.

* * *

As our second major objective, we seek to promote self-sustaining economies to enable the free countries to achieve the rate of progress they desire without sacrificing human values as do the Communists.

There can be no quarrel with any of these statements standing by themselves. The trouble is, they ignore the principal problem which confronts us. The methods of implementing these objectives are well known to all Ameri-

cans. They include (1) nonrecognition of the Chinese Communist regime; (2) opposition to the admission of the Peking government to the United Nations; (3) a negative attitude toward person-to-person contacts between United States citizens and the people of Communist China; (4) no trade with the China mainland; (5) support of Chiang Kai-shek as the only "legitimate" representative of China; and (6) maintenance of strong naval and air forces based on Formosa to hold the offshore islands and deter Chinese Communist aggression anywhere in Southeast Asia.

Two inclusions in and one omission from Mr. Parsons' statement should be noticed.

The two most-discussed aspects of this policy, nonrecognition and opposition to United Nations admission, miss the real point. The critical questions are elsewhere. No political leader of stature in the United States today favors the recognition or seating of Communist China unless, first, satisfactory agreements can be reached with Peking on some of our major outstanding differences. Yet a review of the United Nations votes in the last few sessions on the perennial question of seating Mao's government shows that the margin of votes in opposition to seating has steadily dwindled. The admission of Communist China may well be voted in one of the next few sessions in spite of continued United States opposition.

Omitted entirely from Mr. Parsons' address is any mention of the problem termed "the most important one facing the world today" by President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev—disarmament. This omission is most startling in view of the imminence of an East-West nuclear test ban agreement calling for Chinese participation.

A NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

With the United States-United Kingdom acceptance, following Mr. Macmillan's recent mission to Washington, of the Russian proposal for a limited moratorium on low intensity underground nuclear explosions, conditioned upon Soviet agreement on a number of unresolved issues, including a joint detection research program, a test ban agreement in the foreseeable future became for the first time a real possibility.

The progress of the three-power talks which started in October of 1958 has been so slow and sporadic that the wide area of agreement which has already been reached has not received adequate public consideration.

After a year and a half of negotiations and some 200 meetings the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have agreed on the following points:

1. Purpose and Duration of Agreement. There shall be a treaty whose purpose it will be to ban all aerial nuclear weapons tests within monitorable distance from the earth's surface, all underwater tests, and all underground tests, if the explosions underground are of a magnitude to register 4.75 on seismic instruments at agreed locations. The agreement shall run for an unlimited time period, but violation of key provisions will be cause for abrogation.

2. Duties and Obligations. The United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have already agreed that Article I of the treaty will include a section obligating them "to refrain from causing, encouraging or in any way participating in the carrying out of" nuclear explosions in other countries.

They have also agreed to assign aircraft and weather or exploration ves-

sels to routine checking duty, to provide aircraft for special air-sampling tests, and to give inspectors access to sites of possible explosions whenever the treaty authorizes inspections.

3. Control Conference. The negotiators have agreed that there will be a conference consisting of representatives of each of the three signatory countries and representatives of other countries which accede to the terms of the treaty. The conference will be convened in Vienna once a year or at any time at the request of a majority of the parties to the agreement. At such conference each country will have one vote and most actions will be taken by simple majority decision. The purpose of the conference will be to assess the operation of the control system and make recommendations for any needed treaty amendments. The conference will also have budgetary authority for the control system.

4. Control Commission. It has been agreed that a Control Commission will be established to supervise the detection and identification system. The Commission will consist of representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and four or six other countries to be elected by the conference for staggered two-year terms. Under the latest Russian proposal the Commission would be made up of three Communist, one neutral, and three Western members. The United States has indicated that this is unacceptable because it would place too much pressure on the single neutral member. Our latest proposal is for three Western, two Communist, and two neutral members. Not surprisingly the Soviets have rejected this proposal, and there now appears to be increasing sentiment for a nine-member Commission with three members from the West, three from the Communist bloc, and three from neutral countries.

The Commission will be a permanent one set up to meet in Vienna on twenty-four-hour notice given by any party to the agreement. Voting will be by simple majority rule, unless otherwise specifically provided.

5. Control Posts. The control system will consist of 180 control posts. Each post will be fully instrumented to detect sizable explosions of all types, and manned by 30 technicians, only ten of whom would be nationals of the country where the post was located. The number and general location of the posts were agreed upon by a panel of experts of the three nuclear powers which met in Geneva in the summer of 1958.

Twenty-four of the inspection posts will be located in North America, six in Europe, thirty-seven in Asia, sixteen in South America, sixteen in Africa, four in Australia, seven in Antarctica, and sixty on islands. In addition there will be ten detection ships and planes with roving assignments, and laboratories and a headquarters control structure in Vienna.

Unilateral ban

6. Moratorium on Small Underground Tests. The Western powers will agree to a limited moratorium on small underground nuclear tests, although this will not be written into the treaty and will therefore not directly face the hurdle of Senate ratification. The President has made it clear that he will recommend to his successor continuation of this unilateral ban conditioned on satisfactory Russian performance in a joint detection research project to be undertaken by the three nuclear powers and Soviet acceptance of some of the important issues not yet resolved. Senators Kennedy, Humphrey, Symington, Johnson, and the Vice-President have all indicated assent to this arrangement within the last few days, and indicated

that they would be inclined to continue in effect the President's declared ban on small tests in the event of Russian good faith in compliance with the treaty. Governor Stevenson's backing for this approach can be assumed from his many pleas for a mutual test ban, first voiced in 1956 and reiterated many times since then. Tass has already indicated that an unwritten United States guarantee against low threshold underground tests will satisfy the Soviet Union.

A section providing for nuclear explosions of a peaceful nature has almost been agreed upon in Geneva but is not yet fully settled.

Unresolved issues

The following points, however, have not yet been resolved: the number of times inspection teams will be permitted to investigate on-site evidence of explosions; the identity of the other nations to be represented on the Control Commission in addition to the three signatory powers and the creation and staffing of control posts in countries not parties to the original agreement between the three nuclear powers.

There is evidence that the most important of the unresolved questions—the number of on-site inspections—will be on the agenda at the forthcoming summit conference in May. Settlement of this key question would remove the final major obstacle to agreement.

When the ink is dry on the test ban agreement the question of the participation of nonnuclear countries will come forward. By common consent this large and knotty problem has been postponed until agreement has been reached among the negotiators for the three original members of the nuclear club. The wisdom of this understanding and the desirability of signing a treaty which defers this problem appear highly questionable.

French participation in the test ban

control system is already necessary. The plutonium explosions in the Sahara on February 13 and April 1 are uncomfortable reminders that nuclear know-how cannot be contained within national borders. Although the co-operation of the Fifth Republic cannot be taken for granted, ultimate French co-operation will surely be achieved. The United States and the United Kingdom favor France as the third western country on the Control Commission. France is already participating in the general disarmament talks now in process in Geneva. De Gaulle's joint statement with Khrushchev on April 2 acknowledged that "disarmament is the most important and the most urgent problem of our age," and yesterday in London President de Gaulle told Parliament that France will forego further testing and co-operate in general disarmament measures if adequate controls over nuclear weapons production and tests are established.

Red China's participation

In the light of the preceding points, China's participation in the control system becomes essential.

Almost half of the thirty-seven control posts to be located in Asia would be located on the China mainland to provide adequate inspection and control. If the Soviets agree to United States-United Kingdom preliminary draft provisions, a start on the establishment of control posts in countries such as China which are "adjacent or contiguous" to the territory of the signatory powers will be required within two years of the signing of the treaty. The completion of all 180 control posts will be required within four years of the signing of the treaty. A failure to comply with either requirement will be cause for abrogation of the treaty. Thus, our Far Eastern policy planners will be confronted with the necessity

of obtaining China's initial participation in the control system within two years of the completion of the nuclear test ban agreement.

There is general agreement that this co-operation and participation will have to be effected. Secretary of State Christian Herter told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 21, 1960, that Communist China's participation is "inevitable" if a disarmament agreement between East and West is to be effective. President Eisenhower indicated a concurrence in this view at his March 16 press conference when he stated that the Chinese "will have to be taken into account" when disarmament agreements "come into the realm of practical negotiation and enforcement." All Western disarmament experts who have voiced opinions on the question share these views.

GENERAL DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT

It must be remembered that a nuclear test ban is just the first step in any general disarmament program designed to end the present arms race. If agreement is eventually reached at the ten-nation East-West general disarmament talks now in process in Geneva, a broad array of disarmament measures and international controls requiring the co-operation of all major powers, including China, will be required. Many of the main features of the Western proposal outlined by our chief delegate, Mr. Frederick M. Eaton, at the ten-nation talks would necessitate the presence of inspection teams on the China mainland.

The Western proposals put forward up to the present time include the following: Observers at the launching of missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons; supervision of the reduction of armed forces to agreed levels; inspection of facilities designed to manufacture fissionable materials; aerial and

mobile ground inspection teams to guard against surprise attacks; and, ultimately, co-operation in setting up an "international organization to preserve world peace" in the event that nations do not lay down their arms and submit to controls.

One proposal advanced by Mr. Eaton bearing on the co-operation of countries such as China which are not taking part in the present talks is as follows:

A disarmament conference with other States having significant military capabilities, [should be] called to consider their accession to the disarmament agreement, including their acceptance of appropriate reductions or limitations of their respective force levels and armaments.

Are these proposals and others being made by the United States and our allies at Geneva just attempts to counter the propaganda success of Khrushchev's total disarmament proposals at the United Nations last September? Does not history "prove" that all disarmament efforts are futile? Is not the best mankind can hope for in the foreseeable future a continuation and acceleration of the nuclear arms race in which we will strive to maintain a rough balance?

I submit that the answer to all these questions is a resounding "no!" I submit that those leaders in our public life today who are most concerned with the future are the ones most conscious of the need—indeed the dire necessity—of making the present test ban and general disarmament talks succeed and of taking actions to strengthen the authority of the United Nations to maintain the peace and to resolve peacefully and equitably the disputes between nations.

Plainly the establishment of the 180 control posts, including those on the China mainland, would be an essential first step of inestimable value to all further disarmament controls which must

follow if World War III is to be averted.

Something of the difficulty involved in obtaining Peking's co-operation in international disarmament agreements was indicated earlier this year by Communist China's Foreign Minister Chen Yi. Chen is reported to have stated that "any international disarmament agreement which is arrived at without formal participation of the Chinese People's Republic, or signature of its delegates, cannot, of course, have any binding effect on China." Last October after Khrushchev's visit to the United States, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai gave notice that China "must have the right to participate in any important international issue which concerns her own interest or the interest of world peace."

Time is clearly of the essence if the effort to effectuate an international accord banning nuclear weapons tests is to be successful. The nuclear club, whose membership increased to four in 1960, may double or triple by 1970, according to a recent forecast by the National Planning Association (NPA). By 1970 NPA asserts "most countries with appreciable military strength will have in their arsenals nuclear weapons—strategic, tactical, or both."

Even those who view with equanimity the resumption of tests by the United States in order to "perfect small tactical weapons and fission-free thermonuclear explosives" have no assurances to offer when reminded of published reports that the Chinese will explode their first atomic device in 1962.

SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA

United States knowledge of scientific developments in China is hopelessly inadequate. We must rely entirely upon second-hand reports and the accounts of journalists from other nations permitted entry by the Peking regime for

all knowledge concerning China's great "leap forward" in science and in other fields.

When Chiang retreated from the mainland in the fall of 1949 the Communists were left virtually without physicists or technicians of any sort in the fifth year of the atomic age. It is now common knowledge that Communist China obtained its first nuclear reactor in June of 1958. The installation, which is of medium size, is located near Peking and is said to have the capacity to produce enough plutonium in a three-year period to permit an atomic explosion. The center of the Chinese nuclear program is reported to be at Urumchi, the capital of Sinkiang province, 1500 miles west northwest of Peking. There, it is said, the Chinese are operating a factory to refine uranium ores from Tibet and Sinkiang for shipment to Soviet central Asia for processing into a rich uranium. Another large reactor is being built, according to reports reaching Hong Kong, in Northern Manchuria where the natural resources necessary for large-scale production of plutonium are abundant. Other reactors are reported to be in various stages of construction at Sian, on the Yellow River in central China, and at Chungking on the Yangtze River.

There is little to indicate that the Soviet Union is anxious to have its Communist partner join the nuclear club. True, in 1955, the Soviets signed an agreement with the Chinese on scientific and technical co-operation, but it is now established that the Russians have refused recent Chinese requests for advanced reactors and other nuclear materials necessary to speed the Chinese nuclear development program.

Extraordinarily enough, the Chinese atomic bomb and related delivery system programs have received invaluable aid from the United States. The Chi-

com rocket research program is headed by Dr. Chien Hsueh-shen, Chairman of the All-China Automation Society. Dr. Hsueh-shen was a professor at the California Institute of Technology and headed an American delegation of scientists that examined the German rocket program after World War II. He returned to Communist China from the United States in 1955, after the rescinding of a court order forbidding him to leave this country following arrest in a deportation proceeding brought by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Because of the virtual nonexistence of direct reliable news sources on the China mainland, it is almost impossible to assess the priorities being given to various programs by Mao's regime. Clearly immense stress is being placed on basic public works, heavy industry development, and new means of transportation—China's traditional bottleneck. New methods of cultivation and agricultural research, described in some detail by Morton H. Fried in the March 19 issue of the *Saturday Review*, indicate great strides in the field of agriculture. Scientists and scholars in all fields of human learning from Western countries would clearly have much to impart and much to learn from developments during the last ten years, but no such exchange program is being considered.

The peculiarly intensive xenophobia exhibited by Communist China in its adventures in Korea, in Vietnam, in Tibet, along the Indian border, and more recently in Nepal, and in all monitored propaganda broadcasts from Peking clearly indicate one thing. China will not be content to lag behind the United States or other countries of the West or of the Communist bloc in any sphere of human endeavor—including nuclear capability and general weaponry.

Will public opinion in the United States be as rudely jolted when news of an atomic explosion on Communist China's soil emanates from Urumchi, Sian, Peking, or Chungking as it was when our newspapers contained the first word of Sputnik? It seems inevitable. Because once again, our government has done virtually nothing to prepare for the inevitable. The plain writing on the wall is being disregarded.

The State Department has advised my office that in the ninety-seven meetings held in Warsaw between our Ambassador, Jacob D. Beam, and Chicom Ambassador Wong Ping Nan since August 1, 1955—the most recent meeting was on March 22 and the next meeting is scheduled for May—China's participation in a nuclear test ban control system or in general disarmament accords has never been discussed.

POLICY CONCLUSIONS

If the first Chinese atomic explosion can be expected within the next two years and during that same time period Peking's participation in a nuclear test ban control system will be required to prevent a breakdown of the treaty soon to be signed at Geneva, certain United States policy changes are clearly indicated.

First, our one available line of communications with the Chinese Communists through our Ambassadors to Warsaw should be utilized to indicate at that level, or preferably at higher governmental levels on both sides, our own bona fide intention to achieve a universal, controlled nuclear test ban agreement and ultimate general disarmament and to sound out Chinese intentions in the entire arms control field.

Second, we should initiate "informed, private discussions," as suggested in the studies prepared last fall by Conlon Associates for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "between the United

States and our European allies, Japan, and some of the leading 'neutrals,' particularly India, Burma and Indonesia, to solicit ideas and some cooperative thinking about the problem of China;" and, I would add, in particular, about the problem of Chinese participation in test ban and general disarmament control systems.

Third, China's place in the test ban control system might well be placed on the agenda of the summit meeting in May. Soviet views should be elicited on a problem we both know will be confronting us in the immediate future, and in which United States long-range interests may be the same as the Soviets', as Harrison Salisbury has suggested in his new book, *To Moscow—And Beyond*.

None of these approaches or any others designed to gain Chinese co-operation in test ban and other disarmament control measures may work. If so, Napoleon Bonaparte's musing may well be a prophecy: "China—a sleeping giant—when he wakes he shall shake the world." If so, the sooner we

establish that dismal fact the better, because the military effort we will have to make to keep the arms race in balance in the next forty years as well as the risks of failure will be stupendous. We might as well get at the task free of any illusions about achieving disarmament or developing the rule of law in the world society. But if Peking's understanding of the ultimate folly of nuclear warfare is increasing as Chinese scientists have grown in numbers and in learning and China's physical plant and rudimentary comforts have increased, we should know that too. Let us spare no effort or talent to prevent Communist China from shaking our world—or that of our children.

* * *

(Senator Clark could not attend this symposium because he was detained in Washington for the civil rights vote in the Senate. His assistant Benjamin Reed read his speech but did not participate in the Question and Answer period.—Ed.)

American Alliances with Asian Countries

By AZIZ AHMED

ABSTRACT: Geopolitical considerations necessitate alliances with Pakistan. Pakistan borders on Russia and China, lies astride the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, and constitutes a bridge, geographically and otherwise, between the Middle East and Southeast Asia. The alliances rest on a firm foundation of common objectives and values that are shared by Pakistan and the United States. The charge that alliances and grant of military aid have generated tension in the areas concerned lacks foundation. To wit, tension in the Middle East has not subsided despite Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact; relations between India and Pakistan have lately improved vastly despite continuance of alliances and military aid. The basic cause of Indo-Pakistan tension is the continuance of the Kashmir dispute. Recent developments on India's northern borders underline the urgency of Indo-Pakistan co-operation to meet a common danger. Pakistan has offered to join with India in defense of the subcontinent. This can be possible only if the Kashmir dispute is settled. Economic progress of new Asian countries is not possible without the assurance of continued security. And alliances provide this assurance. They constitute a shield behind which the standard of living of the peoples of Asian allies can be raised.

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A CRITICAL appreciation of American foreign policy and objectives would be valuable at any time; it is particularly necessary at the present time. The particular subject with which this article deals assumes special significance against the background of recent developments in Asia, and since Pakistan is, if I may so describe it, the most allied of America's Asian allies in that it is signatory to more mutual assistance arrangements with which the United States is associated than any other Asian country, it is perhaps appropriate that a representative of my country should attempt to examine the various facets of this subject.

STRATEGIC FACTORS IN ALLIANCES

It may be useful at the outset to state a few basic facts about Pakistan which have a bearing on the question why American alliances with Asian countries should have included Pakistan. Although Pakistan is a small country, compared to, say, India, it is not without considerable importance to the security of the free world. In terms of population—85 million—it is the fifth largest country in the world. In area, it is equal to the combined areas of France, Italy, Belgium, and Holland. Strategically, it occupies a position of unusual interest. It lies astride the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent; each of its two parts abuts upon a separate geographical region. West Pakistan borders on the Middle East; East Pakistan borders on Southeast Asia. Together, the two parts of Pakistan constitute, in more than a merely geographical sense, a bridge between the Middle East and Southeast Asia. West Pakistan, furthermore, has a common border with China and is very close to the Soviet Union's southern frontier. Pakistan thus occupies a position of special significance to the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. West Pakistan stands guard at

the entrance to the mountain passes through which all recorded land invasions of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent have taken place. In effect, Pakistan constitutes virtually the protective shield of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent on its northwestern border and forms a gateway to south Asia. Its strength and stability must therefore be a matter of some interest and concern to all well-wishers of peace and stability in that region.

It was in view of such considerations and the international situation at that time, that, some six years ago, the United States offered to enter into a mutual defense assistance agreement with Pakistan. We too felt that the development of the international situation, at that time, warranted a decision to either accept a firm alliance with the United States or a position of uncertain neutrality. We decided to sign an agreement with the United States and cast our lot unequivocally on the side of the free world, principally, because we share the same values.

PAKISTAN AND DEFENSE PACTS

Politically, it was not a simple decision. There were influential elements in our country which advocated that Pakistan steer a neutral course in her international relations. We rejected such a policy because it was shortsighted. We chose instead, by subscribing to that agreement, to share with America the responsibility, insofar as it lay within our limited power, of strengthening the fabric of world peace. It was a decisive moment. Our course was finally set. And since then we have neither faltered nor deviated from that course.

In accordance with this policy and because of our evident interest, by virtue of our geographical situation, in the security and peaceful development both of the Middle East and Southeast Asia, we later joined the Baghdad Pact and

the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Again, last year in March, it was in pursuance of this same policy that we signed a Bilateral Agreement of Co-operation with the United States who simultaneously signed similar agreements with Turkey and Iran. The purpose of these agreements is to help reinforce the defensive potential of the Baghdad Pact, now called the Central Treaty Organization.

All these alliances are of a purely defensive character. They are fully in accord with the peaceful principles of the United Nations Charter. They are not aimed against any country whatever. In spite of this obvious fact, our membership in these alliances has made us the target of the hostility of certain nations, although those nations too subscribe to the Charter. In recent years, this hostility has found expression in a variety of anti-Pakistan moves, as, for instance, in the Soviet Union's exercise in the Security Council of the veto to block progress towards a settlement of the Kashmir dispute as well as her open incitement of Afghanistan to lay claim to Pakistan territory. Nevertheless, we have throughout stood firmly by our allies. The fact that we signed the Bilateral Agreement of Co-operation with the United States last year, despite the existent hostility, was proof of our intention not to be deflected from our policy, however great the pressure might be.

It is perhaps natural under the circumstances that, in return, we should expect steadfastness from our allies as well. Our people are, therefore, dismayed when, for instance, they hear influential opinion in this country advocate "massive aid" to neutralist India, not to Pakistan or to any of America's other Asian allies. In fact a considerable body of opinion in America now not only condones but openly approves of and even advocates a policy of neu-

trality for Asian countries situated along the communist perimeter. Public opinion not only in Pakistan but throughout United States' Asian allies is perplexed that influential and knowledgeable elements in this country should be advocating a policy which would seem to put a premium on neutrality.

Latterly, there has been a welcome shift in this attitude to some extent. So far as Pakistan is concerned, there is a growing consensus that not India alone but both India and Pakistan constitute the "critical area" in Asia and that both need concentration of economic aid. But the reason for giving this aid is not because Pakistan needs to be strengthened as an ally. The general thesis of these advocates of "flexibility" still seems to be that the supreme objective of American policy should be to woo in every manner the uncommitted world, and the unfortunate impression exists that American allies are taken for granted.

MISCONCEPTIONS OF MILITARY AID

In line with this thinking is the criticism one meets in certain quarters of the wisdom or value of these alliances. It is contended that these alliances and the grant of military aid to their Asian members have created tension in the area. The Baghdad Pact, it is claimed, was responsible for creating tension and division in the Arab world; Pakistan's membership in the Baghdad Pact and SEATO led to the worsening of American relations with India and to the creation of tension between Pakistan and India, and, farther east, Thailand's membership in SEATO caused tension between that country and Cambodia.

Even the value of these alliances to the free world is sometimes openly questioned. There is a disposition to question the ability of Asian allies, no matter how well equipped, to contribute to the defense of the free world. There

is a disposition even to discount the importance these regions have in the context of free-world interests and security. Some of these critics go so far as to suggest that under certain circumstances it might be preferable to shed America's Asian allies and encourage them to follow a policy of neutrality.

Advocating such a course, a distinguished journalist contributing to the *Washington Post* and *Times Herald* last December, for instance, considered Iran "a secondary theatre in the power politics of the globe" and went on to forecast that with the discovery of oil in French Africa and in Libya the oil of the Middle East was no longer a matter of life and death for Europe and that this discovery would be bound to affect European concern about the Middle East. Another critic of these alliances, writing in the January issue of *Foreign Affairs*, expresses a similar view. He considers it doubtful whether the United States needs as military allies any of the Asian states that have joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. "Any great war in which we became involved," he writes, "would be fought principally in other theaters than South and Southeast Asia and for purposes to which the nations there would probably make only peripheral contributions, given the lightning speed of nuclear operations."

It is difficult to contend with a philosophy which is in the nature of a counsel of despair, which already appears half reconciled to the possible loss to the free world of the Middle East and, by implication, of South and Southeast Asia also. The view that any great war involving the United States would be fought principally in theaters other than South and Southeast Asia would seem to ignore the fact that new centers of power and, with it, of likely major conflict zones, are rising in the East.

Another argument sometimes advanced is that it is futile to give military aid to Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, the Central Treaty Organization's Asian members—which constitute what is known as the Northern Tier—because none of them could withstand a Soviet attack or contribute materially to the defense of the region. This would be true of some of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization members also; yet no one would suggest on that ground that steps should not be taken to strengthen the North Atlantic Treaty Organization defense posture. Indeed it would seem to be an argument for placing more, not less, military and economic strength in the Northern Tier. It is precisely the weaker points along the free-world defenses that would need special attention.

THE SINGLE COUNTRY VERSUS REGIONAL APPROACH

I turn now to the main criticism against these alliances, namely, that they have caused tension in the regions concerned. In this connection it is the American alliance with Pakistan that is often singled out for adverse notice. The argument runs something like this: It is suggested that it is a matter of supreme importance for the future of Asia that the Indian democratic experiment should succeed. For that purpose it is necessary that the West give India massive aid so that she may attain, with a speed broadly comparable to that of Communist China's, a self-sustaining, prosperous economy. If that was achieved, the success of India's democratic institutions would have been demonstrated and, in consequence, free institutions everywhere in Asia would survive. In contrast with the recognized imperative need to help India massively, the United States has, it is contended, by giving military aid to Pakistan helped create tension between India

and Pakistan and thereby compelled India to divert her resources from desperately needed economic development to strengthening her military establishment. Some of these critics also cite, with evident approval, the Indian claim that Pakistan's membership in these alliances has encouraged her to be intransigent in the Kashmir dispute, compelling her to match Pakistan's intransigence with her own. Let us briefly examine these contentions.

Consider first the premises. While it may be true that a failure in India's democratic experiment may have a far-reaching effect on the future of free institutions elsewhere in Asia, it would, I venture to suggest, be an oversimplification to conclude that free institutions everywhere in Asia would survive if only the Indian democratic experiment succeeded. What is in fact needed is that not only India but all underdeveloped countries should receive the maximum assistance possible in raising the living standards of their peoples. It would be unrealistic to imagine that the mere spectacle of a successful, prosperous democracy in India would prevent other countries in Asia, battling ineffectively with their own problems of poverty, ignorance, and disease, from turning in despair to totalitarian methods for a solution. One can see the lack of wisdom in even entertaining such a hope by looking at the Western Hemisphere. Here, the United States is the example of the most prosperous democracy in the world. There could be no greater monument to individual freedom and private enterprise. And yet this has not prevented the emergence of totalitarianism in parts of nearby Latin America.

THE KASHMIR DISPUTE

Nor would it be correct to say that American military aid to Pakistan created tension between India and Paki-

stan. There was tension between these two countries long before Pakistan started receiving military aid from the United States; it has existed since the very birth of the two nations. It did not originate with the supply of American arms to Pakistan. It arises primarily because of the dispute over Kashmir. On the Pakistan side, it is fed by bitter indignation that India, having pledged herself in the Security Council to allow the people of Kashmir to decide whether their state should join India or Pakistan by means of a free plebiscite, should nevertheless continue, on one ground or another, to deny them that right. On the Indian side, this tension arises perhaps from a fear that since India continues to bar Pakistan from obtaining redress through peaceful means, either through the machinery of the United Nations or the International Court of Justice, Pakistan might one day in desperation attempt to seize Kashmir which India intends to retain, if necessary, by force. It is only on some such assumption that one can understand India's past objections to the grant of military aid to Pakistan, for India knows fully that there is no likelihood whatsoever of Pakistan launching an aggressive venture against her. Under the terms of the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement Pakistan is committed to use assistance received under that agreement exclusively for purposes of self-defense. India, further, has the assurance from the United States, repeatedly given at the highest level, that should Pakistan decide, despite that commitment, to use American military assistance in an aggressive war against India, the United States would take action both inside and outside the United Nations to thwart that aggression.

Obviously, therefore, if tension between India and Pakistan is to be removed, we should have to remove its

root cause. It cannot be removed by dissolving American alliances with Pakistan or by denying military aid to that country. It can be removed only by helping to bring about a just solution of the Kashmir dispute.

It is only by a Machiavellian disregard of logic or historical fact that it can be maintained that the grant of military aid to Pakistan has made Pakistan intransigent on the Kashmir issue. Both before and after the receipt of military aid, Pakistan has accepted every proposal put forward by United Nations mediators for a solution of this dispute. India has rejected every one of these proposals. As an alternative, Pakistan has repeatedly proposed that the issues in dispute be submitted to international arbitration. India has been rejecting even this offer. It is under the circumstances scarcely permissible to charge that a solution of the Kashmir dispute is being balked by Pakistan's "intransigence."

INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS BETTER

That American alliances with Asian countries are not the basic or even the major cause of regional tensions is proved further by developments that have taken place in those regions during the last two years. Iraq is no longer a member of the Central Treaty Organization; yet one sees little evidence of relaxation of tension in the Arab world, as a result. Pakistan continues to be a member of both the Central Treaty Organization and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and a recipient of military aid, yet during recent months Indo-Pakistan tension has greatly abated and the relations between India and Pakistan are today better perhaps than they have ever been in the past.

The reason for this latter trend is that recent developments along the subcontinent's northern borders are happily compelling both India and Pakistan to

take a more realistic view of their relations. We consider that it is in Pakistan's interest to have in India a strong and stable neighbor. Perhaps India also is beginning to realize, in light of her geographical location, that it is in her interest that Pakistan too should be strong and stable.

JOINT DEFENSE OFFER

President Ayub has shown both courage and statesmanship by offering to join with India in arrangements for the defense of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. Only thus, in his judgment, can the subcontinent be properly defended; acting separately, neither India nor Pakistan can adequately defend it against what is clearly a developing common threat.

While India has not found herself in a position to accept President Ayub's offer, she is at least beginning to realize that the danger to her security comes not, as she previously imagined, from Pakistan but from another source. Largely for this same reason, despite continued American military alliance with Pakistan, American-Indian relations have also greatly improved.

Similarly, farther east, it is difficult to see why Thailand's membership in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization should be the cause of tension between her and Cambodia, because Cambodia is herself eligible for military aid from the United States and, under a Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Protocol, enjoys the same protection as do the members of the pact.

KEY TO ASIAN STABILITY

The key to peace and stability in Asia does not lie in the dissolution of free-world ties with Asian countries. Rather it lies in the resolution of the basic causes of tension. More particularly, it is to be found in a reconciliation between India and Pakistan on the

Kashmir issue. For so long as Indian and Pakistan troops continue to stand facing each other along the cease-fire line in Kashmir and along the Indo-Pakistan border, instead of facing outwards, for that length of time Indo-Pakistan tension will remain, and the two countries not able to co-operate in the vital field of defense will leave the security of the entire region in jeopardy. Mr. Chester Bowles put his finger unerringly on this crucial issue when, speaking at a conference in Washington in May last year, he said:

Nothing is more important for the future stability of South Asia than that such a reconciliation succeed. If the mutual fears and animosities between India and Pakistan continue unabated, . . . the effectiveness of American and other outside aid to either country will be dissipated in mutually wasteful armament expenditures. Working together . . . India and Pakistan combined can constitute the central source of military and political stability in Asia and provide a new gravitational influence for economic and social betterment on the whole Asian continent.

ALLIANCES ESSENTIAL

A word about the value of these alliances. If these alliances were in fact of such little consequence as some critics aver, it would perhaps be reasonable to expect that countries opposed to them would not continue to denounce them so violently or work so sedulously for their undoing. Consider, for instance, the intense pressure to which Iran has been subjected by the Soviet Union for being a member of what is after all only a purely defensive alliance. Similarly, one cannot help ponder the fact that the Chinese should not attempt to seize a small island like Formosa but should quietly bite off a sizeable portion of Ladakh and take forcible possession

of Longju, despite the nonaggression treaty and friendship which bound them to India. Was it perhaps because India, although a far bigger and stronger country than Formosa, was militarily alone?

There is a tendency perhaps to over-stress the purely military aspect of these alliances. It is often forgotten that the object of these alliances is not only to enable America's Asian allies to stand up to military pressure but to create conditions under which these countries can undertake the urgent task of building up their economies in an atmosphere of security and freedom. The withdrawal of British and French power from Asia left a power vacuum in the area. It also synchronized with the emergence of an insidious international threat to the area, a threat that could take the form not merely of an armed attack from without but of subversion from within. The new states needed to build up their political stability and economic strength. For this purpose they needed above all, and still need, an assurance of continued security. Without this they could not undertake any long-range economic and social development. These alliances provide that vital assurance. They are primarily an instrument for deterring attack; they constitute a protective shield for the Asian allies, behind which their economic development plans can go forward and the standard of living of their peoples can be raised.

A time may come when such alliances no longer would be necessary. Any premature termination of these alliances could however cause a serious loss of confidence among Asians in American policies and assurances, impair American prestige among her allies as well as neutrals, and imperil the stability of Asia.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: Mr. Ambassador, what effect, do you think, President Eisenhower's goodwill trip had on Southeast Asia?

A: I think it has had a very good effect. For one thing, apart from the fact that the President has the secret, given to few people, of making friends, radiating friendship, and goodwill, which in itself is a very great gain, this visit gave him firsthand knowledge of what was happening in that part of the world. Those of you who saw his State of the Union Message and subsequently read about what has allegedly been decided by his administration can already see

the results of that visit. These reflect the urgency that he has felt of backing the economic development, of not only all the undeveloped countries, but in particular of Pakistan and India as well as Taiwan.

Q: Mr. Ambassador, would you comment on Pakistan's view of the United States' attitude towards Mainland China, such as Senator Clark's paper suggested?

A: I will give the answer in one sentence. We have diplomatic relations with China.

New Trends in United States Economic Foreign Policy

By EDWIN M. MARTIN

ABSTRACT: United States economic foreign policy has two major functions: to protect and advance public and private economic interests and to promote American political interests abroad. A complex decision-making process is necessary to formulate economic foreign policy. To decide any specific issue, the government must consider the multitude of varied interests involved. The final policy decision will necessarily be a compromise, rarely satisfying all the interested parties. Recent developments in two areas of economic foreign policy—foreign trade and foreign aid programs—have required, in order to continue the policy objectives in these fields, the formulation and execution of new measures. One important change is the deficit in the United States balance of payments. Measures have been taken by the government to counteract this deficit. The rapid rate by which countries are becoming independent poses a new problem for foreign aid programs. The government will continue its share of technical and material assistance to these countries and, in addition, will co-operatively seek to augment the assistance offered by the other industrialized countries.—Ed.

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ALTHOUGH I chose this title myself there is, of course, no such thing as "economic foreign policy." There is only "United States foreign policy." It has economic aspects, though always intermingled with other considerations, and, of course, economic tools are often used to execute policy. But though the phrase is in this sense an abstraction, and it is important that this be understood, it is a useful one and I shall continue to use it.

While it is a commonplace that the art of government is the art of compromise, in my experience, which has covered both domestic as well as foreign governmental activities, I think I have found no area of policy in which the necessity for compromise is so incessant or the conflicting interests so many as in the field of economic foreign policy.

ECONOMIC INTERESTS

In dealing with what we may call the economic aspects of foreign policy, our objective is the apparently simple one of promoting the economic interests of the United States and its citizens. But when we turn to address a specific problem, we find ourselves faced with numerous conflicting pressures, all reflections of the legitimate interests of an important segment of the United States economy. To determine what is "the United States economic interest" becomes a major exercise in politics and economics. An acceptable compromise answer must be found before one can turn to the "foreign policy" issue of how to secure a favorable reception of the United States position by other governments.

For example, when reaching a decision as to whether or not to establish oil import quotas one must take into account not only the views of United States oil companies who are primarily engaged in producing oil in the United

States but also of other companies who are largely dependent on imported oil. One must consider the effect such an action will have on consumers of petroleum products. One will certainly also hear from competing fuel interests like the coal industry and the gas industry. Beyond the multitude of facts presented by these various people in an effort to describe the current impact of a proposed course of action on their livelihood, one must also view the long-term national interest in a natural resource so important to our national life and security.

Having done all this, one then must consider the impact of alternative decisions on our foreign relations, an impact which can in no sense be avoided. If we establish quotas, what will be the direct effect on the economic position of foreign producers of oil who have been shipping to the United States market? Further, what effect will the economic impact have on their political stability and on their attitude toward the United States and on United States leadership in the wider political arena which is so important in the world today? But one cannot stop here. Apart from the possibility of direct retaliation, a decision of this kind will be taken in other countries as indicative of whether the United States is moving toward a protectionist or liberal trading attitude and provide, justifiably or not, precedents and encouragement to one group or the other, with important effects on other United States trading interests.

In some sense, this case is perhaps unusually complicated by the multitude of conflicting interests whose pressures converge on the decision-making center, but I cannot think of any decisions, of any consequence, in which some of these elements are not involved. Often the pressures reach the State Department directly from the interests affected; often the issues are sufficiently related

to national interest that other departments of the government and legislators from the Congress are properly concerned and must have a fair opportunity to make clear in what way the national purposes for which they are responsible will be affected by alternate courses of action. I am sometimes surprised that any decisions at all get made, but an astonishing number of them do in fact, even though sometimes the parties at interest are impatient at the time it takes, and some of them miserably unhappy with the outcome.

POLITICAL INTERESTS

In the other major area of economic foreign policy, that of economic actions designed primarily to assist in promoting political objectives, there is a similar range of considerations forcing compromise decisions. To a large extent this element of our foreign policy is performed through various economic and technical assistance programs. Such programs must often in the short-run be more or less specifically related to our political problems and objectives, country by country. This is a delicate task requiring great diplomatic skill and restraint. Their most important political impact is long-run and indirect, acting through their success in accomplishing their economic purposes of creating sound economic institutions, an understanding of how to make an economy function effectively, and of raising living standards. Countries do not become worth-while friends through purchase any more than do people. We must hope that by our assistance we are making it more possible for each of the less-developed countries to choose freely its own path of political and economic development and that the society which results may be proud to be a friend of the United States, but in any case will wish to and be able to reject the external controls and the internal slavery

implicit in dependence on Soviet leadership and assistance.

In addition to the reconciliation of political aims with economic goals, aid programs call for other types of compromise. First and foremost is the need to adjust the programs we try to pursue to the available resources that the United States people feel capable of sparing for these purposes. In a very real sense the most limited resource is not the taxpayers' money but people who are not only experts in their field and willing to live under unusual and difficult conditions but have the kind of creative imagination and personal touch necessary to apply their knowledge, gained in a highly mechanized, complex, and relatively rich society, to the problems and condition of less fortunate and often newly independent and proud people with great ambitions and hopes but limited material resources.

It is also essential to encompass in our programs not only what our experts think is desirable but also what the recipient countries would like to do, in the light of their own backgrounds, their own understanding of the world, and their resultant aspirations. In other words, to consider what path these countries prefer to take toward the goal of economic well-being and political sufficiency which they all seek. I assure you this is never easy.

Even in the aid field there are also legitimate domestic economic interests which must be given due attention. In the interest of our own business community but also in the interest of our economic and political objectives in the recipient countries, we are anxious that our public aid and lending activities do not inhibit but promote the opportunities for private business enterprise, whether local or foreign. Nor does it make much sense to use United States public funds to develop capabilities to produce items for sale in world markets

which will increase the problems of disposing of commodities which we produce in surplus.

With this brief introduction to the kinds of compromise necessary to formulate United States economic foreign policy, I should like to describe briefly what we are doing in two major areas where recent developments in the world have called for new measures to enable us to succeed in carrying out old policies.

FOREIGN TRADE PATTERNS

In the trade field the last two or three years have seen the end of the period of postwar economic reconstruction and thereby the achievement of the objectives of the Marshall Plan. European countries, Japan and, to a major extent, the Soviet Union have repaired their war damage and restored their disrupted trade patterns. As a result, the United States is no longer the sole source of supply for quick deliveries of many types of manufactured goods and raw materials which in large part it was in the immediate postwar era. The other industrial nations can now meet a large share of their own needs, are able to compete vigorously and effectively with us in third country markets, and by vigorous selling and inspired designing have made the most of their competitive advantages, invading the United States market in an unprecedented way.

The end of the old era and the beginning of a new, yet unnamed period in world economic history has been most dramatically signaled by the change in the balance of payments position of the United States on the one hand and the rest of the world on the other. Between 1955 and 1959, we lost 10 per cent of our gold stores; over the same period other free world countries increased their gold and dollar holdings by 40 per cent. Italy, for example, now

has the third largest gold and dollar reserve in the Western world but her \$3 billion plus is roughly doubled by West Germany.

Protected somewhat by the effects of the Suez crisis in 1957 the United States balance of payments in 1958 and 1959 showed a deficit averaging over \$3.5 billion. During the past ten years, we have acquired a number of large international payments obligations to cover the cost of our military forces stationed abroad in the interest of free world security, to pay for the rapidly increasing volume of United States private investment all over the world, to meet tourist expenditures satisfying the wanderlust and curiosity of the average American, and to pay for that portion of our foreign aid which is spent abroad.

But the changed world trading picture which I have described has whittled away the surplus of exports over imports we formerly had and still need to balance these obligations. While we are a rich country, with very large gold reserves remaining, deficits of the magnitude of 1958 and 1959 cannot be accepted as a regular charge for the indefinite future. The stability and soundness of the dollar must continue, not only in the interests of the United States world economic and political position but also in the interests of the many countries for whom it is the principal reserve currency and whose economic health is therefore dependent on the dollar's health.

The basic decision has been taken that a vigorous effort should be undertaken to move us toward a "reasonable equilibrium" in our balance of payments over the coming years, and that the one path through which a major improvement of the sort required is possible is in expansion of our exports. Thus the liberal United States trade policy of the past twenty-five years, under which we have prospered greatly, still seems to us

the appropriate guideline for actions to deal with these new developments. Restrictions on imports would only invite retaliation, start a downward trend in the volume of world trade, and thus have a retarding effect on economic growth and prosperity of the Western world, so important to us both politically and economically.

We are attacking our problem in this spirit on five major fronts.

Anti-inflationary measures

First and of prime importance has been the Administration's drive to curb inflation and hold the price level steady. Its success in securing a balanced budget this year, with a prospective surplus next year, represents a major contribution by the government to this goal. Ultimate success, of course, depends on actions by others as well. If we can achieve our purpose, the competitive position of United States exports will be improved. For while we are holding prices relatively steady, inflationary pressures have developed in the economies of some of our principal competitors, pressures which will tend to reduce or eliminate such price advantages as they may now have.

Discriminatory practices

Secondly, we have over the past eighteen months pressed a vigorous campaign to secure the abandonment of those discriminations against imports from the dollar area which we tolerated so long as dollars were a scarce currency but which few countries can still justify on this basis. It is not, of course, easy for countries, which have so long been starved for dollars, to adjust their thinking to the new situation in which they find themselves. Moreover, it was inevitable that industries should be built up behind the quota restrictions which are now reluctant to expose themselves to United States competition. However,

it is hard to deny the justice of our case. There is also in most of these countries a real appreciation for the help which we gave and the understanding which we showed during their lean postwar years. As a result all major countries have made substantial reductions in their discrimination against the dollar area and in most cases those remaining are confined to a hard core of agricultural products. It is clearly as difficult abroad as here to find solutions for agricultural problems within the limits of general applicable principles.

Increase sales abroad

With the prices for United States exports more competitive and with new markets opened by the removal of dollar discriminations, it has seemed worth while to institute a major program for promoting increased United States sales abroad. The President announced such a program about two weeks ago. It is most important to underline that the major effort must be made by American business, for only the manufacturer can really sell his product. There are ways, however, in which the government can assist. We are trying to do all we can by providing better service to American business concerns abroad, more information here about opportunities in other countries, and better credit insurance arrangements on export sales. But our main reliance must be on the traditional energy, ingenuity, and skill for which the American private enterprise system is so famous. This is another great opportunity to demonstrate its superiority.

Tariff reductions

Having made substantial progress in eliminating quota discrimination, the Administration is now addressing itself to reducing tariffs against United States goods. When it appeared possible that the Common Market and the Outer

Seven might try to solve their differences by arrangements which, while mutually satisfactory, discriminated against trade from non-European areas, we reversed our previous position and asked to be included in a new group which would grapple with the differences between the Six and the Seven. From this inside position we will be better able, not only to protect ourselves against agreements which will be adverse to our interests, but also to press the Six and the Seven to accompany the preferential position, which the members are giving each other under each arrangement, with lower tariffs to the outside world. We wish to ensure that they will not become closed trading areas but will contribute to a general expansion of world trade.

It is with this end in view that we have welcomed the Hallstein proposal that an acceleration towards a common external tariff among the Common Market countries be accompanied by a 20 per cent reduction in the tariff scale.

It is also to enable us to negotiate for reductions in their tariffs that we asked for and secured from the Congress the most extensive authority yet granted for negotiating on tariffs in the meetings of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This coming fall and winter will see a series of such negotiations in which we will use our bargaining power to secure tariff concessions from other countries and organizations like the Common Market which will facilitate the expansion of our exports. It must be clear, however, that we can only succeed in securing concessions desired by United States exporters if we are willing to open up some opportunities to others.

Low-cost imports

Lastly, we have addressed ourselves more formally than heretofore to the problems created for United States in-

dustries by the increasing volume of imports into the United States from such low-cost areas as Japan and Hong Kong. Some temporary relief has been found in voluntary arrangements to restrict exports of particular items whose price and volume tended to swamp our industries. In addition we are pressing our European allies, now that they are in a sound financial position, to open their doors wider to imports from these areas, thus sharing the advantages and disadvantages of these low-cost imports rather than having them sent primarily, as they now are, to the United States and Canada.

But these are temporary arrangements and not satisfactory solutions to the long-run problems of the very low-cost producers. As time goes on, we shall find more and more of the now less-developed countries with a desire to earn more of their way and a need to repay the large volume of loans now being made to them. We can hardly expect that they will be able to do so solely by the export of raw materials and tropical foodstuffs which are not competitive with our own industries. A middle way must be found which will give them a market for the industrial products which their economic development will permit them to produce without enabling them to seriously disrupt important parts of the industrialized countries' economies. The United States proposed, therefore, at the GATT meeting in Tokyo last fall that a special group be established to recommend possible solutions. It is now at work. The problem is inherently complex, politically and economically, and I cannot predict that a solution is in sight. But a vigorous and rational attack on it has been launched.

These efforts combined with other special factors have permitted us to start 1960 with a substantial increase in our exports over 1959 levels, with-

out a corresponding rise in imports. This is an excellent beginning and seems to prove that the problem is not insoluble and that the means to combat it have been well chosen. But a few swallows do not make a spring. There are still no grounds for relaxation and much hard work and thought will still be required before we reach the necessary "reasonable equilibrium" in our balance of payments.

FOREIGN AID PATTERNS

The second major area of new developments in our foreign policy is the increased intensity and complexity of the problems to which our foreign aid effort must address itself. This results from two factors. First is the ability of the Soviet bloc, as a result of their considerably improved economic position, to which I have referred earlier, to undertake fairly substantial aid commitments. Any pleasure that we might have at the willingness of the Soviet Union to share the burden of providing badly needed development capital to the less-developed countries of the world is seriously diluted by the Soviet Union's utilization of the position which such assistance gives her to promote the adoption of Communist ideology and Communist methods.

The existence of this alternative source of aid also presents a tempting opportunity to the recipient countries to manipulate their demands between the West and the Soviet bloc in an effort to secure more funds from both. This is an opportunity of which advantage will only be taken by countries which are either inexperienced and uninformed about the political elements of Soviet economic assistance or are completely confident that they can defeat Soviet attempts at political infiltration. It is vital to the future of such countries that they understand the dangers of overconfidence in this regard.

In order that the less-developed countries be able to make a free choice and improve their chances of staying free, they must be offered by the West a sound but attractive package of technical and economic assistance designed to enable them to make real and noticeable progress toward higher living standards for their peoples. Our policy must be conceived to provide such an adequate alternative rather than merely to match Soviet offers. It must also recognize that assistance is in the United States interest whether or not there is Soviet competition. The legitimate ambitions of the less-developed countries must be given an opportunity to find fruition in a reasonable rate of economic development. This cannot take place without the kind of economic assistance from both public and private external sources that we benefited from in the early portion of the last century.

Newly independent countries

Our foreign aid program is also faced with new problems because 1960 will apparently give birth to at least eight new countries, perhaps more, in contrast with an average of two a year over the last ten years. These countries add new demands to the other urgent ones with which we have already been dealing. With independence their peoples expect a major upsurge in economic well-being which, if disappointed too seriously, might become a cause of political instability and economic deterioration, developments no one in the West can desire. Many of them start with great difficulty in finding the trained personnel to plan a development program, not to mention the problem of its execution and later of the efficient functioning of the more complicated economy which results.

We are doing what we can to meet these new needs, but we are also ex-

pecting that added resources will become available as a result of the new found prosperity of our European allies and Japan. Currently, we are providing around \$2 billion a year and they are contributing approximately \$1 billion in various forms of direct public assistance. Their share has been increasing each year for the past several years and there seems every reason to hope that it can continue to grow. The added urgency of the need, to which reference has been made, will not only render a reduction in the United States contribution impossible but will also require a more nearly adequate execution of the responsibilities of the industrialized countries.

It is important not to minimize the problem they have in expanding their present aid levels. Several of them have very large gold and dollar reserves but it is not simple to convert these assets into aid for less-developed countries that will provide projects of a long-term character, which is the main requirement. One can raise taxes, sell government bonds in the market, reduce expenditures on other programs, or sell bonds to the central bank. None of these is easy and some of them are fiscally risky for the countries which are most prosperous. Certainly we have found that securing the funds for an adequate program of public assistance is not easy and cannot be done without sacrifice.

Our friends have only recently achieved their present state of prosperity, and they are relatively inexperienced in the problems of developing an adequate foreign aid program. In order to help them to learn from our mistakes and difficulties, as well as to permit a better co-ordination of the activities of the increasing number of agencies engaged in making assistance available, there has been organized a Development Assistance Group. It had its first meeting

early in March and made real progress toward these objectives. This is an official level organization, engaged essentially in the technical problems of economic assistance and not concerned in any way with dividing spheres of influence, discussing individual country programs, or individual projects. It deals only with principles, broad policies, general means, and methods. It is as interested in expanding aid through the United Nations and other multilateral channels as well as bilaterally. But I think by means of this organization we can make real progress to improve the quantity and quality of assistance made available.

In granting effective assistance, it is necessary also to have the help and advice of the less-developed areas. It is particularly important, for example, that they be able to exercise a co-ordinating role to ensure that the several types of aid received from various sources are integrated into a sensible plan and a well-designed set of priorities. They are in the best position to control the flows of assistance.

It is equally important that they resist the temptation to secure quickly large amounts of credits to finance capital equipment for development projects from commercial sources on short-terms—three to five years—only to find that they have seriously overburdened their payment capacity and face bankruptcy. It has happened. It is in their interest as well as ours that they exercise restraint and finance their development programs by loans and other forms of assistance which create a burden reasonably related to the growth of their capacity to liquidate their debts. If we in the industrialized countries are tempted to inflate our exports by pressing short-term credit on them, the less-developed countries must warn us that we are placing them in an unsound position and insist on the more gener-

ous repayment terms their situation requires.

There are, of course, many other subjects with which economic foreign policy must deal. I have discussed two broad areas in which new problems have compelled us to seek new lines of action and new arrangements. The flexibility which we have managed to achieve in these situations is something to be proud of and reflects the maturity which has

been acquired over the past two decades by the American people in the field of foreign policy. If we can maintain this spirit in our approach to world problems, we need have no fear about our ability to support the responsibilities of our leading position and continue successfully the fight to maintain the ideals for which this country stands, and thus make clear to others the benefits of our way of life.

* * *

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: I have been very much interested in the administration of the tariff. All during the year, I have been very much in favor of low tariff, that is a tariff for revenue only which would not protect the big industries and would serve the general consumer, that is, serve the mass of the people. I would like to know how the administration of the tariff could work out in regard to the public opinion and the general interest of the people. I want some ideas on how a high tariff would work and also how a low tariff would work?

A: I must confess that I am not sure which point of the question to address myself to. It seems to me that we are dealing in this field, as in most others of human endeavor, with an imperfect world, and one in which, as I indicated in my speech, compromises are the only way one gets ahead. In general, we feel that the United States interests will be best served by continuing ourselves and encouraging others to lower tariffs. On the other hand, if one does this overnight, one disrupts the existing patterns of economic activity in a way which is not to the net advantage of ourselves or others. Consequently, what we have been doing for the last twenty-five years represents gradual but very substantial progress in lowering our

tariff. Other countries have to a lesser extent done the same. I hope we can continue to do this. It is to our advantage, it seems to me, to make exchange of goods between the United States and other countries as free as possible. But beyond that—getting into more specific questions on more specific items and commodities—there is just no time to do that here.

Q: My first question is: after the vanishing, so to say, of the "dollar gap" and the creation of the new economic organization for economic co-operation, as you mentioned in your speech, how much will the United States back the one or the other group, namely, the Common Market or the group of the Seven, the Free Trade area? It is clear, as Dr. Hallstein has emphasized, that the Six are against discrimination towards the dollar. The other group did not make it clear so far. So what is the American attitude? Which group will be picked by the United States? The second question is how much the United States is admitting difficulties because the eastern part of Europe, the predominantly agricultural part, is under Soviet domination and is hampering the economic and political unity of Europe?

A: First, you were wondering whether the Seven had made any offer similar to what Mr. Hallstein made. They did announce after a meeting in Vienna a few weeks ago that they were prepared to make an immediate 20 per cent reduction in their external tariffs to correspond to their internal 20 per cent reduction. In theory this is more than the Six have offered. Unfortunately, however, this is contingent on the Six doing the same. If the Six were to reduce now their external tariffs, the countries that have low tariffs would be moving away from a common external tariff instead of toward it. So that the Six regard this as a movement to block the development of the Common Market and to prevent it from accomplishing its purposes. I doubt if the Vienna proposal will be accepted, but they have made a generous offer. As to whether the United States is backing the one or the other, I think it has been clear for quite sometime that we have felt that the Six was not only economically but politically of great importance to the Western world, primarily because it would provide a means, through economic intergration, of making West Germany fully tied to the Western world and fully a part of it. At the present time, West Germany is a very co-operative member of Western society, but times do change. It had seemed to us that it was important to develop an organization which, beyond pieces of paper, would tie them closely to the West. Furthermore, it seems important too in a group of countries each of which has certain advantages and disadvantages in terms of future strength, to get them together. As a group they would be a much stronger unit. In Europe, such a strong unit on the side of the West could have an attractive force beyond the present line between East and West. It would also create a stronger defensive force. For all of these political rea-

sons, we have felt that it was of great importance that the project of the Six succeed, and we have backed it fully. At the same time, we have recognized the problem of the Seven who are now in the European Free Trade Area, the Outer Seven, so to speak. We have seen that they have problems, that their arrangement met some of these problems, and have indicated that we have no objections to their going ahead. If there are issues before the GATT of whether they met its criteria or not, we have said that we would consider these problems sympathetically. We have not tried to choose, although we have made clear that politically we would not want anything the Seven has done to block or interfere with the success of the Six. If this became the issue, which we hope it will not, we would have to back the Six.

Now your second question. I have the impression that while in the early postwar years, this division of Europe between the largely industrialized parts and the largely agricultural parts was a handicap and a problem, particularly with respect to Germany, this is no longer in this sense the case. There has been an adjustment made which has helped balance out the picture. There is still, of course, a very substantial flow of agricultural products back and forth across the two lines, and in parts of the Western world other than Europe, there seems to be a reasonable surplus of agricultural commodities which they can import, and we have no trouble meeting their needs. I would think that at the present time this agricultural-industrial split is not a significant problem. There are other economic problems that would be largely solved and relieved and Europe would have greater prosperity if there were not the present division. But on the whole it is more of a political problem than an economic problem at the moment.

A Hard Look at America's Unfavorable Balance of Payments

By HERBERT STEIN

ABSTRACT: The theory, so widely held by economists in the postwar era, of the "dollar gap" or dollar shortage has been invalidated. The evidence is clear. The dollar is not always subject to scarcity but to excess supply as well. There is need for no better verification than the deficit in the United States balance of payments. The immediate reaction to this deficit was twofold: there were those fearful lest the deficit continue, and those afraid that the measures taken to counteract the deficit would be harmful to our international economic policy. The fury has abated. The deficit has declined, inflationary movements have been quelled, and the anti-deficit measures taken in the international economic sphere have not been widespread. But it is too early to be complaisant. The deficit, though somewhat reduced, continues; moreover the problem of how to eliminate or reduce the deficit to a reasonable size remains. What measures should be taken to ensure the least cost to our economic posture, both domestic and international? More aware of the close interrelationship between our economy and others, we must now seriously consider a balance of payments mechanism. We must be prepared with a flexible mechanism should the contingency of an imbalance in our balance of payments occur.—Ed.

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AMERICAN officials are fond of quoting the remark made by Dr. Ludwig Erhard that the American dollar is the sun around which the world economy revolves. The moral of this paper is to observe, with Galileo "Nevertheless it moves." The dollar-centric view of the world economy is unrealistic and therefore dangerous. The dollar is a currency like other currencies, subject to the same laws of behavior and requiring similar care if its strength is to be preserved.

The furor over the deficit in the United States balance of payments has largely abated. I use the word "furor" in a relative sense. Relative to the degrees of excitement normally stirred up in this country by questions of international trade and finance, the balance of payments situation created a furor in the fall of 1959. Today worry about the problem is much less keen and widespread.

REASONS FOR THE FUROR

There were two main reasons for the furor, and these reasons by and large influenced two different groups of people. On the one hand were those who worried because the deficit might continue and even grow. To them the most important point was to stop the deficit. On the other hand were those who feared that the deficit would be stopped in the wrong way. To them the important point was to preserve our foreign aid programs and our policy of minimizing barriers to international trade and capital movements.

For the first group, those who feared the continuation of the deficit most of all, the chief facts visible in the fall of 1959 were these: We had had a deficit of \$3.4 billion in 1958 in our balance of payments. In the second quarter of 1959 the deficit had increased to \$4.8 billion at an annual rate. I use the

term deficit throughout to mean the sum of our gold exports and the increase in our short-term dollar liabilities to the rest of the world. This rate of deficit was large relative to our \$19 billion of gold. People could proceed, and they did, to count on their fingers the years until our gold would be exhausted or at least our ratio of liabilities to gold would reach a frightening size.

The reasonableness of projecting the 1958 and 1959 deficits into the future seemed to be confirmed by events on the domestic economic scene. We had a large budget deficit in the fiscal year 1958-59. The anti-inflationary tight money policy was under strong political attack. The steel industry and the steel workers union were locked in a struggle that might determine the future strength of wage-push inflation. In these circumstances it was easy to visualize the United States careening along on an inflationary course that the rest of the industrial world had already abandoned, with grave consequences for our balance of payments.

For the second group, who feared the deficit less than our reaction to it, the problem only became acute with the announcement, last October, that foreign economic assistance would be provided by our Development Loan Fund only to finance purchases in the United States. This was regarded by many as a major sacrifice of principle on the altar of the balance of payments. Debate was understood to be continuing in the Administration over the extension of this tied loan or grant policy to other parts of our foreign economic assistance program. Suggestions were being heard that foreign economic and military aid should both be reduced in order to balance our payments. Although Congress was not in session, legislation to curtail imports was accumulating for consideration in 1960, and the balance of pay-

ments deficit seemed to give added impetus to such legislation.

WHY THE FUROR HAS ABATED

In the past six months both groups have become more confident. The deficit declined from an annual rate of \$4.8 billion in the second quarter to \$4.1 billion in the third quarter and shrunk to \$2.0 billion in the fourth quarter. For the year as a whole the deficit turned out to be \$3.7 billion, as compared with earlier estimates that it would exceed \$4.0 billion. The best available estimate for 1961 is a deficit of \$2.9 billion.

Opinion about the inevitability of inflation has also changed drastically. It is now about as common to say that the age of inflation is over as it was a year ago to say that it would continue forever. The budget has been brought into balance and a surplus is in sight for next year. The steel settlement at least left alive the possibility that the rate of money wage increases would settle down to the rate of growth of productivity. A spontaneous decline of interest rates has taken some of the "steam" out of the political opposition to anti-inflationary monetary policy.

Meanwhile the conduct of United States foreign economic policy has been reassuring. The tied-loan step of the Development Loan Fund was not followed up by other agencies but was explained as a tactical move designed primarily to induce other industrialized countries to supply more capital to the underdeveloped world. The Administration's requests for military and economic assistance funds seem not to have been influenced by balance of payments considerations. The recent United States initiative in foreign economic policy has been Mr. Dillon's proposal to strengthen co-operation among Western Europe, Canada, and the United States. While it is probably hoped that this will have a favorable effect on our

balance of payments, it is certainly not an economically isolationist reaction to the problem. Proposals for legislation on trade have remained dormant in the Congress.

THE PROBLEM REMAINS

I think it is clear that last fall's excitement about the deficit and our likely reaction to it went too far. But I think that this spring's relaxation of concern has also gone too far. The sharp reduction of the deficit between the third and fourth quarters of 1959 was due in large measure to one nonrecurrent factor—advance repayments on some government loans. The forecasted decline in the deficit from \$3.7 billion in 1959 to \$2.9 billion in 1960 also would be due in large part to the passing of certain temporary items. This decline cannot be projected beyond 1960.

How large a deficit we can run without worrying about it is impossible to say. So much depends upon the expectations and confidence of those, at home and abroad, who hold dollars. Presumably we could run an average deficit larger than zero for a considerable period. But note that if the estimate for this year is correct we shall have a total deficit of \$10 billion for the three years 1958, 1959, and 1960. Seven years of zero deficits would be required to reduce the average deficit for the period beginning in 1958 to \$1 billion a year. I think it is fair to say that there are no signs of a spontaneous decline in the deficit to zero or to \$1 billion a year in the next few years.

The time has not yet come for declaring the age of inflation over, even though the certainty with which some people asserted the permanence of inflation was unjustified. After all, the evidence from which we would deduce the end of the inflation is still scantier than that recently used to demonstrate its permanence.

Neither can we yet be confident that the structure of American foreign economic policy is safe against the reaction to the balance of payments deficit. Congress has been distracted by other things. We have not yet had the debate over the foreign aid appropriations, and when that happens we will certainly hear more about the deficit. Also, there is still a considerable tendency in the country to view the balance of payments problem as a problem of protecting American industry against "unfair" foreign competition. Perhaps more important, while the existing posture of American foreign economic policy may withstand the balance of payments problem, that problem may yet obstruct new moves that would be desirable in trade and aid policy.

So we must continue to think and talk about the United States balance of payments. But we can now think and talk about it differently than we would have done two years or even six months ago. I believe that we have learned something from recent discussion of the balance of payments. At least, some points have been so obvious in the discussion that they should have been learned. I should like to comment briefly on some of the lessons gained from our recent experience and discussion before turning to the problems that remain unsolved.

LESSONS OF THE RECENT EXPERIENCE

Economists have had yet another lesson about the hazards of economic forecasting. Weighty tomes about the persistent dollar shortage were continuing to appear after the dollar shortage had vanished. We must either speed up the publication process or be more cautious in the future. Particularly, we shall have to be careful about making intellectual commitments to the idea of persistent dollar scarcity.

Why such a large number of econo-

mists were wrong about the dollar shortage is a question that will be debated for a long time. I would venture the opinion that in this case, as in several others, economists have erroneously interpreted as real, and therefore rather intractable, phenomena that were basically monetary phenomena and would yield to sound monetary policy.

A second lesson, this one not confined to economists, has to do with the nature of our relations with the economies of the other industrialized nations. The change that has occurred is clear if we compare the rationales of the Marshall Plan and the Dillon Plan. The Marshall Plan was a declaration of America's political interest in the European economy. The Dillon Plan is much more a declaration of America's economic interest in the European economy. In the Marshall Plan days and subsequently our economic relations with Europe were slack. Because of the excess demand for dollars our economy was largely insulated from the consequences of relative price levels, interest rates, and capital movements. Today the gearing between our economy and that of the rest of the industrial world is much tighter and runs in both directions.

As a direct consequence, we are much more aware of the relations between our own domestic economic policy and our international economic policy. For about twenty-five years prior to 1958, American economic thinking, in the universities, in the government, and in the country generally, was divided into two isolated compartments—one domestic and one international. This division is illustrated by the Employment Act of 1946, ideologically the most significant economic legislation of this generation. The Act sets forth a number of basic objectives and conditions that should govern our economic policy, but the Act does not refer to any goal for our

international economic position. The Act would probably be written differently in this respect, as in some others, if it were written today. We are, I think, only at the beginning of a recognition of the great variety of domestic economic policies in which we must hereinafter pay attention to effects on our international position.

CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR OF THE UNITED STATES BALANCE

We have, I hope, learned something about the cyclical behavior of the United States balance of payments. For many years the standard view was that the international balance of the rest of the world was highly vulnerable to a United States recession. In the old cliché, when the United States sneezes Europe gets pneumonia. It was believed that even a minor American recession—as judged by domestic expectations—would so depress our imports as to cause serious trouble for the rest of the world. This theory was somewhat shaken by experience during the 1954 recession, which Europe weathered rather well. But the real "eye opener" came in 1958 when it was the United States rather than Europe that suffered the balance of payments problem. The European recession slowed down our exports of capital goods and industrial raw materials, but our recession did not interfere much with our imports from Europe, which are largely consumers' goods. Our own raw material imports did decline, but these came largely from underdeveloped countries with small foreign exchange reserves. They had to reduce their imports from us when we reduced our imports from them.

It may not always be true that when Europe sneezes the United States will get "the shakes," but we should be prepared for the possibility. We should not be alarmed by the deficits we may

run during recessions but we should try to put ourselves in a position, during favorable cyclical phases, to withstand recession deficits.

The world should also have learned something in the last two years about the way the United States behaves in a recession. We heard a great deal in 1958 and early 1959 about the worries of the Zurich bankers over the large deficit in the United States budget. They apparently regarded this as a grave omen of fiscal irresponsibility, inflation, and weakness in the dollar. Their fears seemed to be contagious and even to feed back to the United States. But they should have known, and should have learned by now, that the United States budget will show a large deficit in recessions, in conditions when the deficit is not inflationary, and that it will quickly snap into balance when the recession is over. No deductions about the long-run trend of American financial policy should be drawn from our recession deficits.

Everyone who thought seriously about the balance of payments problem during the recent excitement must have encountered certain taboos. One is obviously related to the exchange rate of the dollar. It was not good form to talk about the exchange rate while we had a large deficit, because talk on this subject might disturb confidence and cause a run on the dollar. A similar, although weaker, taboo applied to discussion of the law which requires that a large proportion of our gold be held as reserve against liabilities of the Federal Reserve System. This requirement makes this part of the gold unavailable to meet foreign drains. Many people wished that in quieter times we had discussed these matters and arrived at conscious national decisions about them. But 1959 did not seem the year for that. There is, in my opinion, a lesson here. Let us be sure that we do have

a candid discussion of these matters when the atmosphere is once more calm.

WHAT THE PROBLEM IS

I shall refer to only one more lesson of our recent experience and discussion. This lesson has to do with what the balance of payments problem is and is not. The problem is not simply to bring our foreign payments and receipts into equality or into a sustainable relation. There are a great many ways to do this, and if we do nothing at all the deficit will come to an end anyway—certainly when the gold runs out. The problem is to eliminate or reduce the deficit in the best way, in the way that costs least in terms of national and individual objectives.

If we have a deficit of \$3 billion and want to eliminate it, we must sacrifice \$3 billion worth of something. We must give up some combination of foreign economic assistance, military expenditures abroad, private overseas investment, foreign travel and other services, private merchandise imports, and domestic use of goods and services that could be exported. We can choose the proportions in which we relinquish these various things. It is a mistake to think that solution of the deficit problem requires, as a matter of economic necessity, that we give up any particular item on this list. All that is required is that we give up enough in total. To decide what to yield is the task of statesmanship. To execute this decision is the task of economic policy.

There was a tendency in the early days of the balance of payments debate to fix upon our foreign economic aid and military expenditures as the things to sacrifice. But this was never an economically necessary choice, and in broader terms, in my opinion, it would be an unwise choice. The decision to spend X billion dollars a year on such programs has little political sex appeal

and no strong pressure groups for its support. The decision is made each year after most intense and unsympathetic scrutiny. More than in most other parts of the federal budget, it can be said that the decision to make these expenditures reflects a deliberate evaluation of serious national interest. Considering the nature of these decisions, it is absurd to say that they must be reversed because an economy capable of producing \$500 billion of goods and services cannot generate some combination of increased exports and reduced imports that will add up to approximately \$3 billion.

UNSOLVED QUESTIONS

Looking ahead to the future of the American balance of payments, it seems to me that there are three main unsolved questions. I call these questions unsolved quite literally, not as a polite way of saying that only I know the answers but quite candidly that I do not know the answers. The questions are:

1. Have we a satisfactory adjustment mechanism for keeping United States foreign receipts and payments in sustainable balance?

2. What change, if any, in the structure of United States exports and imports will be needed in the future? In my opinion, the essential question here is what will America produce best in a world where capital, technological know-how, and managerial capacity move across international boundaries with great ease and fluidity? This will be a better, more prosperous, and more stable world. The adjustment to it will create some problems for us, because the special productive abilities in which we have had the greatest advantage will be more widely diffused. How well we make the adjustment will affect the efficiency of our own economy, but will not control our ability to solve the balance of payments problem.

3. How can we generate the increase in world liquidity that will be required by the growth of the world's economy? How long can we rely upon gold as the basis of international means of payments, a reliance long since abandoned in domestic economies? Looked at from the other direction, will we be ready to entrust to an international central bank the essential functions now exercised by national central banks? What implications would such a development have for independent conduct of other domestic economic policies?

Except to recognize them as problems, space does not permit me to say more about the second and third of these questions. I shall confine my remaining remarks to the first question, which in the perspective of, let us say, the next ten to twenty years may be the most important.

It may be that we shall solve the current balance of payments problem through a combination of ad hoc measures. The list by now is familiar. Foreign nations should eliminate their discriminations against the dollar. Other industrialized countries should increase their capital exports to the underdeveloped world. We should stop inflation at home. We should make American producers more keenly aware of the opportunities and problems in meeting foreign competition.

Some such package of measures may suffice, and they may suffice for quite a long time. They may serve as a once-for-all adjustment to a once-for-all adjustment in foreign productivity and economic stability that has been taking place. But these measures do not constitute a balancing mechanism. They are not measures that can be applied flexibly, reversibly, and to the extent necessary to meet pressures on the balance of payments, the strength and timing of which cannot be foreseen. Once we have stabilized our price level we

cannot stabilize it further. Once dollar discriminations have been abolished they cannot be abolished again. And so on. These are all things that should be done. In fact, they should be done whether or not we have a balance of payments problem. This is why it has been so easy to agree on them. It is also why they cannot by themselves constitute a satisfactory balancing mechanism. We need something that can be done only if and to the extent that is required by the balance of payments.

WHAT A BALANCING MECHANISM IS

What I mean by a balancing mechanism can best be shown by listing the kinds of mechanism that economists have traditionally discussed. There are four principal means, aside from direct controls, by which it has been thought that a country's international payments could or would be kept in balance in the face of the varied and unpredictable forces that play upon those payments:

1. Prices and money incomes would decline in a country having a balance of payments deficit, partly as a direct result of a decline of exports relative to imports and partly as an indirect result of loss of monetary reserves. The decline of prices and money incomes would increase the deficit country's ability to export and reduce its ability and willingness to import.

2. Real incomes would decline in the deficit country, for similar reasons and with similar results.

3. Interest rates would rise in the deficit country, mainly because of the loss of monetary reserves, and capital would flow in from abroad.

4. The exchange rate of the deficit country would decline.

The common characteristics of these means for maintaining balance is that they can be used as much as necessary—*à l'outrance*—to achieve the result. For example, there is no assignable

limit to the possible decline of the exchange rate and therefore no assignable limit to the balance of payments pressure with which it can cope. In this it differs from, say, lectures by the Secretary of Commerce to exporters, which do have a visible limit of effectiveness.

These four methods of maintaining balance do more than illustrate what a balancing mechanism means. They constitute, I believe, a complete list of the possible elements of a balancing mechanism that have been conceived in more than a century of thought on the subject by economists. Again I exclude direct controls from consideration. I also exclude possible multilateral arrangements under which surplus countries would commit themselves to hold any amount of the currency of deficit countries. In such an arrangement deficit would cease to have its usual meaning of the accumulation of foreign liabilities that could be withdrawn in gold. However, it is inconceivable to me that any country would undertake such a commitment without assurance that deficit countries would employ some of the foregoing measures to limit their deficits. Otherwise the surplus countries give a blank check.

HAVE WE FORSWORN ALL REMEDIES?

To list these four means for maintaining balance is to see how alien they are to our avowed policies. We will not deflate, we will not allow employment and real output to fall if we can avoid it, we will not allow interest rates to rise beyond the point that is consistent with price stability and full employment at home, and we will not devalue. Unless someone has a secret weapon, this seems to leave us without a balancing mechanism.

In fact, we have more room for maneuver than this. The price level that counts is the relation between our price level and foreign price levels. While we

will not deflate, other countries may inflate, and surplus countries have some tendency to do so. We will all have stable price levels, but some will be more stable than others. On our side, the full employment and maximum production we maintain are not always quite full and maximum. Foreign competition can still cause unemployment and idle capacity that provoke a domestic reaction to meet the competition. Moreover, the level of interest rates that is consistent with high employment and price stability is not uniquely given, but depends upon certain variables that can be manipulated, notably the budget surplus. Perhaps we can, if necessary, use high interest rates in defense of the balance of payments, although at some sacrifice of economic growth.

Nevertheless, it seems an unsatisfactory strategy to try to work out a balance of payments policy in the gaps left by our failure, or the failure of other countries, to achieve price stability, high employment, and rapid growth. I make no predictions. The ebbs and flows of international economic forces may be sufficiently offsetting, our reserves sufficiently large, even this limited room for maneuver adequate, to keep us out of trouble. But no one can say with confidence that this will be true.

WHAT IS SPECIAL ABOUT THE DOLLAR?

Our recent and current deficits show us that the dollar is a currency like any other, not designated by Providence always to be scarce but liable sometimes to be in excess supply. We are therefore subject to the classic dilemma of the balance of payments—namely that a domestic policy of general price stability, high employment, and growth will not always be consistent with a fixed exchange rate. This dilemma does not only exist in theory; it has been en-

countered in fact by every nation in the world, except us, in the past twenty years.

The charter of the International Monetary Fund recognizes this problem and incorporates a way to deal with it. It is expected that members of the Fund will pursue antiinflationary policies in order to avoid balance of payments deficits. But no country is expected to put its domestic economy through the deflationary wringer in order to keep its international payments in balance. For a country pursuing sound and prudent internal policies, devaluation of the currency is a permitted remedy for persistent balance of payments difficulties.

But we have not thought that this problem or this remedy applied to us. There are obvious reasons for this. For so many years the dollar was the scarce currency and our reserves were so large. Moreover, there is a real difficulty in the way of devaluation for the United States dollar. The United States, as is frequently said, is the world's banker. Dollars are held as reserves by most foreign central banks as means by which they will meet temporary deficits in their own accounts. This imposes a responsibility upon us. But surely we are entitled to ask whether we must continue to bear this responsibility if it requires subordination of our own domestic economic objectives.

a persistent balance of payments deficit. This is not because I have any fondness for this solution and it is not my point to urge such a solution. My main point is that we need to be prepared with a better thought out and accepted philosophy of ways to deal with a balance of payments problem than we now have.

One may fairly ask why it is necessary now to consider remedies for a contingency that is not now present and may never occur. Why raise such confidence-disturbing questions now rather than wait for the problem to arise if it ever does? The answer is that the problem *may* come, and if it does we will wish we had considered these questions earlier. I would hate to see us twisting and squirming with inferior solutions—cutting our political and economic commitments abroad, imposing restrictions on trade, travel, and foreign investment, trying to hold down the domestic economy—because we are intellectually, psychologically, and institutionally unprepared to do better.

I do not like to end on such a somber note. Our position is both strong and improving. If we are reasonably sensible about inflation there is a good likelihood that our position will remain strong. That is why this is a fitting time to talk about more remote and less comfortable possibilities.

* * *

THE NEED TO BE PREPARED

I suppose it must be obvious that my own thinking leans toward inclusion of devaluation among the instruments by which the United States might adjust to

(Dr. Stein unfortunately was ill at the meeting and could not participate in the Question and Answer period.—Ed.)

Should We Reassess Our Foreign Aid Program?

By PAUL G. HOFFMAN

ABSTRACT: One and a quarter billion people in the underdeveloped countries are in the midst of the "revolution of rising expectations," perhaps the most important revolution ever known. The industrialized countries have recognized the existence of a need for improved living standards in these countries and have granted substantial bilateral assistance as well as assistance through the channels of the United Nations agencies. But the many national and international programs have not markedly affected the living standards of these people. To speed economic growth in the less-developed countries, we must reassess our assistance programs. Only by increased efforts and concerted action among the industrialized countries, in conjunction with the underdeveloped countries, can a notable improvement in per capita incomes of these people be achieved. The industrialized countries must realize that their own prosperity depends on a growing and expanding world economy, that it is, therefore, in their interest to help the less-developed countries achieve a more rapid economic growth. It must be recognized that investment in the underdeveloped countries is essentially trade, and, conversely, increased trade is development aid. The United States, for its part, will have to augment its aid program. We can afford to do more, especially when we know that our increased efforts will be creating a more prosperous world.—Ed.

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FIRST, I will give a quick answer to the question, should we reassess our foreign aid program? It is an emphatic yes! To do so, I suggest, we need to know the dimensions, complexities, and nature of the problem of speeding the development of the less-developed countries. We must review the contribution external aid has made up till now and, learning from our past experience, seek the ways and means to improve its effectiveness.

We are in the midst of one of the most significant events of our time: the revolt of two thirds of the world's people against continued acceptance of poverty, illiteracy, and chronic ill-health. The yearnings of these people for a better living, if channeled correctly, can bring us a better and more prosperous world or, if their yearnings are ignored, a world of mounting tensions and explosive unrest.

Included in the revolt against poverty are, of course, the people of Communist China. It is not because of any indifference to the plight of the 650 million Chinese that they have not been included in United Nations programs, but rather because Communist China does not belong to the United Nations. Our principal concern in the matter of economic development is with the one and a quarter billion people who live in some sixty member nations of the United Nations or in some forty territories and communities associated with the United Nations.

AWARENESS OF THE NEED

The "revolution of rising expectations," as it has been aptly called, is of recent origin. Through countless centuries most of the forebears of these underprivileged people, who are now so determined to improve their lot, endured patiently the evils of poverty and ignorance. In all probability there was

always some smouldering unrest, but it did not burst into flames until the advent of World War II. Because most of the billion and a quarter people with whom we are concerned lived in colonies, they attributed to their colonial status the blame for their unhappy lot. Therefore their flaming unrest first took the form of a demand for independence. No less than twenty-two nations have won independence for their 800 million people in the short period of the 1940's and 1950's. Several other nations comprising many tens of millions of people will become independent this year. And there is explosive unrest in many of the remaining dependent countries. Unfortunately, independence of and by itself does not assure economic progress. Political revolt is only the beginning of a wider and deeper revolt against the indignity of poverty.

Another significant development of recent origin is a growing awareness that the richer nations in their own enlightened self-interest should assist the poorer nations in speeding their economic development. President Eisenhower was voicing this concern when he said in a television interview with Prime Minister Macmillan:

I believe that in a sense the problem of the underdeveloped nations is more important for Western civilization than this problem of the Soviet-Western differences, and quarrels. And there are about two billion people today living without sufficient food, shelter, clothing and health facilities.

This recognition that something should be done for the people in the less-developed countries—in the interests of all—first found expression in the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance of the United Nations and in President Truman's Point Four program, both of which came into being in 1949. Prior to this time, responsi-

bility for assistance was left to the churches and other humanitarian groups which, of course, have long been concerned with the plight of the desperately poor and underprivileged in other lands.

Bilateral assistance

In the 1950's assistance to the underdeveloped countries increased substantially. The United States embarked upon a huge program of bilateral technical assistance through the International Co-operation Administration and bilateral lending through the Export-Import Bank and the Development Loan Fund. The United States also contributed to the programs of the United Nations, the Colombo Plan and the Organization of American States. Great Britain, France, the German Federal Republic, the Soviet Union and other countries also established bilateral programs for giving technical and other financial assistance.

United Nations Agencies

Then there were the United Nations agencies. First, those concerned with economic development through capital investment—the International Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the International Finance Corporation. Second, the group operating in the pre-investment field, whose function is to lay the foundation for investment by assisting in the making of resource surveys, the establishment of training institutes, and making available to the less-developed countries knowledge of new techniques in agriculture and industry. There is the United Nations itself, and its related agencies organized to give assistance in specific fields—education and science, food, agriculture, health, labor, civil aviation, atomic energy, and so on. And the United Nations Special Fund, which I will discuss later.

Low income

In spite of these multitudinous national and international programs in the 1950's, the results in terms of improved living standards were not very impressive. Before I give the figures, let me stress that they are not precise. Figures on per capita income in these countries are substantially understated as compared with those figures from the advanced countries. One of several reasons for this is that much home-grown product in the less-developed countries is not included in the national statistics. The figures do, however, provide a useful index of progress within those countries, and they have value for certain purposes of comparison. Even when allowing for their understatement, they show incomes in the underdeveloped countries to be appallingly and distressingly low.

The statistical income per person in the 100 countries and territories in the year 1950 averaged approximately \$90. It probably reached slightly over \$100 per person in 1959. Gross income grew at the rate of 3 per cent a year, but because there were 200 million more mouths to feed in these countries in 1959 than there were in 1950, the net increase in income per person was only about 1 per cent, that is, about \$1 a year. This is too slow—dangerously so.

THE PROPOSAL

We are now starting the crucial decade of the 1960's. Economic growth in the less-developed countries clearly should be speeded. The first task of each nation is to set its own goal and determine and execute its own program for achieving this goal. But in addition I propose:

That we—all of us together—fix as our goal to double in the 1960's, as compared with the 1950's, the annual per capita rate of economic growth in 100

countries and territories containing a billion and a quarter of the world's people. If we achieve this goal it will mean increasing the per capita economic growth rate of the less-developed countries from an average of one per cent a year in the 1950's to an average of two per cent in the 1960's. To do this it will be necessary for the less-developed countries to sustain an annual rate of economic growth of four per cent. This will mean a total increase of about 40 per cent and a per capita increase of nearly 25 per cent in ten years. It will mean increasing annual per capita income from the estimated present figure of around \$100 to around \$125 in 1970. This means increasing per capita income over the decade of the 1960's by about 25 per cent per person or an average of about \$2.50 per person per year.

Attainable goal

In my opinion this is a modest and practicable goal, entirely possible of attainment. Per capita income growth of 2 per cent a year is just about what was achieved in the United States of America from 1870 to 1929. It is, in my view, the very minimum we should seek to bring about in the less-developed countries today if explosive pressures building up in the world are to be released into constructive channels.

This goal may seem too modest, but this must be kept in mind: the average figures for proposed income increases, covering as they do one and one quarter billion people in 100 different country situations, conceal the exciting possibility that ten, fifteen, or more key countries will achieve a real breakthrough toward self-propelling, self-generating economies with enormous increases in living standards. And nothing is needed more today than examples of countries that—under free institutions—have achieved this goal. I may be over-optimistic, but it is my personal view that at least twenty countries can achieve self-sustaining economies in the

1960's. Think what an inspiration this would be to the remaining eighty.

Theoretically, the achievement of this 2 per cent per annum increase in personal income should be readily attainable, because the underlying reason for underdevelopment is underutilization of natural and human resources. Each day at the United Nations brings new evidence of the massive need for much more knowledge of the physical resources of these low-income countries. Not enough is known about mineral resources, river flows, soil content, industrial potentialities, or markets.

As for the human resources in the less-developed nations, they have been shamefully neglected. Only a very small percentage of the people who live in these countries have ever had the opportunity to acquire an education, most cannot even read or write and only a few have ever held positions of responsibility. There is an immense need for training of all kinds, from on-the-job training of artisans to the more complex sciences of technological institutes. And let no one say that the people of the less-developed countries cannot be trained to be good mechanics, good farmers, good engineers, good doctors, good administrators. May I recall a myth that was current in the United States not too long ago that the Russians were so lacking in mechanical aptitudes that they could not even run a tractor—and then came the Sputniks.

Yes, theoretically the goal I have proposed should be easily reached; but to achieve it, it will be necessary to place our priorities in the right order and to make our thinking and action accord with the facts. This means that there must be a sharp increase in technical assistance and particularly in preinvestment work in the underdeveloped countries, that a greater flow of private capital must be attracted,

and that public investment in basic facilities and services must be increased substantially. It also means that we must make a new approach to the task, based upon the fact of interdependence between the industrially advanced and the underdeveloped countries.

NEW APPROACH NECESSARY

Here, in summary form, is how I think we must approach the problem:

In the first place, all must recognize that today no single country, rich or poor, can achieve maximum economic growth except in an expanding world economy. All countries, whether their incomes are high, middle, or low, must in their own self-interest accept proportionate responsibility for the achievement of a rapidly expanding world economy and rising levels of international trade. The first responsibility of each country is to speed its own development. Its second responsibility is to assist other nations in accordance with its means.

Next, it must be recognized frankly that we in the industrialized countries promote economic development in the low-income countries because it is in our own interest to do so. At the same time, the leaders of the underdeveloped countries, for their part, must accept their own responsibilities for a maximum effort. Both must recognize that they are working together to accomplish a common purpose that will benefit all.

Economic assistance is not charity, and it must not be considered as such. If it is considered as charity, many nations will contribute nothing because the view is widely held, and I share it, that governments should not use tax money for philanthropic purposes. At best, support for charity would be spasmodic and lacking in the necessary continuity. Further, if economic assistance is considered charity, the effect

on the recipient nations is devastating: it saps the self-reliance of both the leaders and their people in the low-income countries. It tends to create the impression that solving their problems is someone else's business. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Paternalism in international relations, like paternalism in industry, generates resentment and results in half-hearted effort. External aid can only help those determined to help themselves, people who are willing to make real sacrifices and devote their maximum energies.

The third factor in the new approach is that economic assistance should be divorced from international politics. Helping to promote greater prosperity in expanding freedom is an objective worthy to be pursued for its own sake. We must not defeat the effort with political strings, nor try to buy goodwill with it, nor use it to try to make momentary gains in a cold war. Economic assistance is a task in which all nations should be urged to participate—in concert. Conflicting aims and competing programs can only lead to confusion and waste.

The fourth element of this new approach is that greatly expanded use should be made of the services of the United Nations and its specialized agencies operating in the developmental field. The needs of the developing nations for preinvestment and investment assistance are so great that the field should, of course, be open for any country, or organization, or group to help in any way of its own choice. But the advantages—political, economic, and technical—which repose in the United Nations and its related agencies should be more widely recognized.

Representatives of countries receiving assistance repeatedly declare their general preference for help through the United Nations because from this source it is much more acceptable

politically. Further, United Nations assistance is a completely co-operative endeavor, with a voice given to countries whatever their size or wealth and with all countries contributing to the costs. On the other hand, the United Nations can be "tough" with the underdeveloped countries and apply sound criteria for assistance. It cannot be accused of seeking any political or commercial advantage. Better results can be obtained through United Nations machinery at substantial monetary savings. And in the United Nations and its thirteen specialized agencies reposes the richest experience that can be found anywhere in virtually every field of development activity. The United Nations draws on the whole world for its technicians.

This brings me to the fifth point in the new approach I propose. It is that we recognize in a practical way the urgent need to speed and expand programs of technical assistance, especially work such as that of the United Nations Special Fund in surveying natural resources and training people in the skills they must have to make effective use of their rivers, forests, fields, and mineral wealth. Our aim is to raise income in the underdeveloped countries, and to do this by raising their production and productivity. This requires investment. But investment, public as well as private, will not venture into the dark. On the other hand, it is attracted by possibilities for its fruitful use.

The United Nations Special Fund

The United Nations Special Fund was organized a year ago precisely to carry United Nations assistance a new step forward by intensifying this essential preinvestment work. It is not a lending institution, but can be of immense service to lending institutions. Its resources are wholly devoted to the financing of

resource surveys, vocational and advanced technical training, and operational research. It concentrates on relatively large projects which will open doors to fruitful investment. During its first year the United Nations Special Fund approved projects to speed economic progress in fifty of the underdeveloped countries and territories in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. They involve expenditures of \$75 million. But as the Special Fund requires maximum self-help on the part of the recipients, the latter will contribute \$44 million to these projects, and the seventy-four governments which finance the program will contribute the remaining \$31 million.

Over half of the Special Fund projects thus far approved are intensive surveys to determine and demonstrate the feasibility of bringing large areas of land into agricultural production, for instance by irrigation, of harnessing rivers to produce electricity, of exploiting mineral deposits, and developing large-scale fishing industries. The second broad category of projects supported by the United Nations Special Fund will help those countries train their people in a variety of crafts from carpentry to mechanics, instruct them in management techniques, develop agricultural extension service, and teach engineering. Other of these United Nations projects will assist a number of countries in applied research, notably in finding new commercial uses for local materials and products. Finally, there is an interregional project to assist governments of a score of countries in Africa, the Middle East, and southwest Asia to control the Desert Locust, which periodically swarms across vast areas devouring all vegetation in its path.

All of the forty-four Special Fund projects approved in 1959 will be ex-

ecuted by the United Nations itself or one of its specialized agencies, using their experience and extending greatly the services they can perform in their particular fields. In its effort to facilitate capital investments, to introduce technological innovations, and improve technical skills, the Special Fund applies sound business criteria. It only helps countries to help themselves. It shares rather than bears the costs. It insists that a project it approves fall within the framework of a consistent economic policy. It only assists projects which are to result in sustained follow-up action. The Fund's assistance to training and research institutions is limited to support for not longer than five years, diminishing in each of the last three years. The whole emphasis is on obtaining significant increases in strategic areas of production and productivity. It assists only schemes which will contribute substantially and quickly to development.

Sound business practice requires that the United Nations program of technical assistance and the work of its Special Fund be expanded quickly in the coming year or two, and be somewhat increased in the following years. There is no doubt whatever in my mind that these millions of dollars in pre-investment work can attract billions of dollars of highly productive investment in this crucial decade.

TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Finally, I come to the question of investment as an essential part of the attack on the problem of economic development. The first point to note is that by far the larger part of the responsibility for supplying the capital needed to speed development must come from the poorer countries themselves. Even though their incomes are

pitifully low, a substantial percentage of them must go into savings to finance the major parts of their development programs which can be financed with local currencies. These countries must also earn by their exports the larger part of the foreign exchange required to finance their imports from the developed countries. This, of course, implies not only a tremendous effort on their part but also requires that the industrialized countries maintain a steady and preferably rapid pace of economic growth, and that they, and the developing countries as well, keep the channels of world trade open. Development aid is in essence trade—the supply of goods and services—just as increased trade is development aid.

I believe that the less-developed areas can raise their merchandise exports substantially in an expanding world economy in the 1960's. Over that ten-year period I estimate they should be able to earn around \$378 billion through the sale of their goods in world markets. On the other hand, if they are to double the annual rate of their per capita income growth in that period of 1961-1970, they will need to import from the outside approximately \$440 billion, which leaves a deficit of some \$62 billion. To this deficit of \$62 billion we have to add approximately \$8 billion to cover foreign exchange needed for transportation, communications, to service debt, and so on, for a total of \$70 billion.

At the present time approximately \$4 billion of capital flows annually for economic development from all outside sources into these countries. Over the ten-year period this would amount to \$40 billion, leaving a deficit of \$30 billion. \$10 billion of this deficit could be covered by increased private investment and bankable loans and increased exports. This leaves approxi-

mately \$20 billion which will have to be financed through what are popularly called soft loans but which, in my opinion, should really be called long-range investments. Ideally, this \$20 billion of investments should be furnished through multinational institutions such as the proposed International Development Association. However, this institution is starting with only a billion dollars of capital which, of course, falls far short of what is needed. Perhaps its capital can be expanded to a point where over the ten-year period it will meet half the needs for so-called "soft loans." The other half will have to come from individual countries or from regional associations. The United States will, in all probability, have to provide for half of this investment, approximately \$10 billion.

Can we afford it? The United States alone is planning to spend \$400 billion for defence in this same ten-year period and no one asks—or should ask—can we afford it? We cannot afford to refuse this investment in the future of these 100 countries because in a very real sense it is an investment in our own future.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: My question is to what extent would it be practical and sensible to divert funds from the military expenditure to the kind of program you have described?

A: I am sure Mr. Martin would join me in saying that neither one of us are military experts, and therefore, I would not have any way to appraise the military program. I think these should be considered separately. In other words are the military expendi-

THE BREAK-THROUGH

The stakes we are playing for are breathtaking. They are to turn rising tensions into constructive channels, to establish and sustain the dynamic environment from which steady increases in national income and human well-being will spring. The people in the underdeveloped countries must do their part to bring about the better life they seek, and we in the industrialized countries must do our part. Working thus together in a common program in the common interest, we can create a steady expanding world economy in which all of us will find increasing satisfaction and opportunity. The achievement, as I have suggested, of self-propelling economies by ten—perhaps twenty—of the less-developed countries by 1970 would have a tremendous stimulating impact upon the rest of the less-developed nations. In the 1970's many more would stage a break-through, and before the year 2000, the poverty, illiteracy, and chronic ill-health which have been the lot of most of the world's people since the beginning of time would be a memory.

tures needed? If they are, then we can afford them. Is the assistance to less-developed countries needed? Is it good business as well as good morals? If it is, we can afford it.

Q: How much from your experience, sir, as administrator of the Marshall Plan—watching all the time the activities of the United States giving economic help—do you have the impression that the help is going to the nation

and not to the government only, especially to dictatorial governments which are using force and slave labor?

A: I am not quite sure that I understand the question. If the question relates to the United States program of aid, then as an international civil servant, it would be inappropriate for me to comment on the United States program. I can tell you that as far as the program of the United Nations is concerned, in the economic field we

clearly would be out of line if we tried to pass critical judgment. We do have a perfect right to pass this judgment: Has the program a chance for success? Will it help the people? In other words, our goal is to try and engage in projects that will directly or indirectly bring about an improvement in the standard of living of people. You have a perfect right to inquire as to whether conditions make the outcome possible, and that is a judgment we do exercise.

COMMENTS

HONORABLE EDWIN M. MARTIN

I would like to comment on our giving assistance to countries which have dictatorial governments. For us this is a very difficult question that you have raised and it will always be one. It is impossible for one country or the United Nations to go into another country without the permission of the government. We cannot deal man to man, person to person, and consequently anything we do if it is good will be credited to the government in power. We cannot avoid this. If it is bad, then they take it too. But we have felt that we have had to take in some cases, much as we dislike it, the onus

of co-operating with the government which might be unpopular with certain parts of the people in order to be able to make assistance available which will help all the people. And that over time, if we are helping the people generally to improve their standard of living and their literacy, they will be in a better position to secure the kind of government we want and that they would really like to have, so that one has to take, I think, some short-term disadvantages in the hopes that there will be long-term benefits. But, they are disadvantages, and this is a real problem.

Implications of the Race Between Economics and Population in Latin America

By PRESTON E. JAMES

ABSTRACT: Hunger is the price today of the race between economics and population in Latin America. Thus, the primary problem is to achieve an adequate food supply at prices which the poor people can afford. The changes in economics and population must be seen in the perspective of the industrial revolution and the democratic revolution. The industrial revolution has provided the means to achieve a better life and the democratic revolution has provided the desire for and awareness of a better life. But the industrial revolution has also brought in its wake increased poverty. The industrial revolution, for example, tremendously advanced the public health services, but as the death rate declined population increased and more mouths needed to be fed. The industrial revolution by modernizing agricultural production increased the food supply but it also released people from the land who could earn higher wages in the cities. As the demand for and the price of food increased, less and less people could afford to buy the food. Thus, the hunger problem, and the need for tremendously increased agricultural productivity arose. Co-operative efforts among many disciplines are needed to devise balanced development programs—programs that will stimulate economic growth in Latin America but will obviate increased hardships.—Ed.

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THE existence of a race between economics and population in Latin America is only a part of a larger and more complex process of change. There can be some concern that our economic planners and the formulators of our foreign policy may not grasp the nature and significance of this process of change soon enough, and that the policy-forming sector of the so-called "general public" may lack the background of understanding necessary for the formulation of wise policy. It is essential to see these current changes from the twin perspectives of history and geography—to understand that we live in a revolutionary age which had its beginnings only a short time ago as human history is measured, and that the twin revolutions of our time have been spreading from their center of origin, creating in each of the world's major culture areas a unique set of reactions. The race between economics and population in Latin America must be seen as a part of a world-wide process of recent origin.

Furthermore, the time has long since passed when the United States could hope to avoid involvement in these processes of change in foreign areas. Whether we like it or not, and whether we are prepared for it or not, the United States is, in fact, deeply involved in changes now taking place all over the world. No longer is it safe to neglect the continued study of any part of the world, however remote. If the third world war is to be a war of ideas rather than of hardware, it is precisely in the field of foreign-area study, and in the formulation of wise foreign policy that the war will be won or lost.

THE GREAT REVOLUTIONS

The great revolutions of our time are called the "industrial revolution" and the "democratic revolution." Both had their origins around the shores of the

North Sea in Europe, and both have spread independently and irregularly from that area. Before the middle of the eighteenth century there had been no such fundamental changes in the way of living since the rise of the early civilizations many thousands of years before Christ. The replacement of human and animal muscles by controlled inanimate power has profoundly altered the economic life; and the replacement of the law of status by the law of contract has given rise to a wholly new concept of the relations of man to man. But these revolutions have themselves changed in content as they have swept into new territory. As they now sweep over Latin America they are producing processes of change that are related to world-wide events but that are, at the same time, unprecedented and unique.

Population change is one of the first effects of the arrival of the industrial revolution. As never before, people are concentrated in cities. Because illiteracy and ill-health can most effectively be reduced where people live close together, the last decade has witnessed a marked rise all over Latin America in the percentage of people who can read and write, and a spectacular decline in the death rate. Since the population picture of Latin America has so recently been presented by the American Academy of Political and Social Science, there is no need to describe it here.¹ The facts are clear: that the population of Latin America as a whole is growing faster than that of any other large part of the earth, but that there are great differences within Latin America in the present density and in the rate of growth; that the most important currents of population movement are from rural areas to urban areas; and that a major cause of the

¹ Kingsley Davis (Editor), "A Crowding Hemisphere: Population Change in the Americas," *THE ANNALS*, Vol. 316 (1958).

rapid rise of the rate of population growth is the sudden decline of the death rate. Furthermore, these demographic changes are bringing about profound changes in the kind of life that people demand. The democratic revolution, now just beginning its sweep over Latin America, means that people are demanding an end to inequality before the law, an end to the existence of privileged classes—such as landowners, army officers, or foreigners—and an end to the system of second-class citizenship.

But in Latin America, these ideas are not exactly what they might seem on the basis of our own experience with them. Equality has a very definite meaning in Anglo-America—that John Doe is just as good a man as the President of the United States, and that every one, no matter what his economic or social status, has an equal right to look and act like "The man of distinction." In Latin America the concept of equality has a subtle difference of meaning. There it means the equal right to be different.² Equality among sovereign states means the equal right of each state to determine its own destiny. There is a certain massive inevitability to the development of deep-seated conflict when a colossus such as the United States becomes inescapably involved in the economic development of countries in which one cherished tradition is the equal right to be different.

UNBALANCED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The involvement of the United States in the economic development of Latin America is not new. Private investors have long sought speculative profits from Latin-American enterprise, and in the process a considerable amount of economic development took place. In

² John Gillin, "Ethos Components in Modern Latin American Culture," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 57 (1955), pp. 488-500.

most instances, however, this kind of development was not an integral part of any over-all national plan of development. In one case, when Percival Farquhar envisioned a national railroad plan for southern and southeastern Brazil before World War I, the program was never put into operation. The arrival of financial aid for economic development from the United States since World War II, on the other hand, has been on a greatly expanded scale. Much has come in the form of private investment, and much has come from government loans and technical assistance funds.

But the resulting economic development has in most countries been carried on piecemeal, with little or no attempt to relate actual development programs to such over-all economic studies as exist. Since national economies are very complex mechanisms, made up of a bewildering array of closely integrated parts, a change in any one small part detonates a chain of reactions that spreads throughout the mechanism and produces unexpected and often disastrous results.

Consider what happens, for example, when funds are devoted to the improvement of public health. Every one favors spending funds for the attack on disease and pestilence. No one drew any conclusions from the example of British experience in Egypt, or of Dutch experience in Java—places where the improvement of public health produced a population explosion that greatly increased the volume of poverty. The United States did the same thing in Puerto Rico. With the discovery of the new insecticides and antibiotics the way was technically open to provide for a vast improvement of health. The results in the modern period have already been presented: more than any other single fact, programs of health improvement and disease control have created

the population explosion which, in turn, has created the race between population and economic development we are discussing.

What possible excuse is there in the modern world for instituting a program of health improvement without at the same time facing the problem of how to provide for more food? If more babies survive the first year of life—as they now do all over Latin America as a result of the programs of health education and the medical clinics—unless the food supply is also improved the net result can be nothing but a larger volume of suffering and poverty. Nor is the development of manufacturing industry alone an adequate answer to this problem. For when the people who crowd into the cities to seek urban employment receive such wages as they have never before dreamed of, their first want is more food. If the food supply remains inadequate, the price of food goes up, and the net result is greater hunger than existed before.

IMPROVEMENT OF AGRICULTURE

How is the food supply to be increased without increasing the cost per unit? In seeking the answer to this question we begin to throw light on some of the most difficult problems of our technical assistance programs. To increase the domestic production of food in Latin America requires an attack on certain traditional ways of living, certain long-cherished values, certain vested interests, that are entangled in the complex web of Latin American culture. Improving the supply of food is not something that can be handled quite adequately by the agronomists, because much more than agronomy is involved. Involved also is an attack on the inherited system of land tenure, on the existence of a privileged land-owning aristocracy. Here we have gone far

beyond the competence of agronomists, or even of land economists.

Programs for the improvement of agriculture usually neglect these social and political repercussions. But, in addition, such programs in many parts of Latin America are formulated and put into operation without benefit of precise knowledge concerning the nature of the resource base or of the present status of economic use. To gain such knowledge requires a land classification and use survey. I am not referring to the kind of general appraisal an economist might make based on over-all statistical data, nor the kind of chemical appraisal a soil specialist might make from soil samples only vaguely located on the map. I am referring to the kind of large-scale survey on maps that geographers have been advocating and developing for the past forty years. First the engineers must prepare accurate base maps—a need rapidly being filled for Latin America by the operations of the Inter-American Geodetic Survey. Up-to-date vertical air photographs are then required. Then categories of soil, slope, and drainage are formulated to describe the variations in the potential utility or productivity of the land. On maps of the same scale the existing use of the land is plotted. Such surveys bring together precise information regarding the critical differences from place to place in the quality of the resource base and the present pattern of use. On the basis of such information a rational plan for the improvement of agriculture can be formulated.

Offhand would any one disapprove of the expenditure of funds for such a survey to provide a basis for land redistribution or for a more rational agriculture? Yet the fact is that such surveys are almost everywhere resisted. There are too many interested parties who do not want the quality of the land to become public knowledge, who plan

to profit from the prevailing ignorance about land quality, and perhaps too many others who have never had the value of such a survey demonstrated. Years ago in our own country John Wesley Powell was attacked in the Congress for his efforts to map the irrigable areas of our arid and semiarid West; and when the Depression came along in the 1930's, one of the first activities of the Michigan state government to be eliminated, in the interests of economy, was the Michigan Land Economic Survey.

In Latin America we have clear examples of what happens when a survey is made, and what happens when no survey is made. Mexico carried out its land reform program in the 1930's without benefit of surveys—with results in rural poverty that can still be observed. When Bolivia redistributed its land, it turned to Mexico for advice. As a result no survey was made. On the other hand Puerto Rico completed a detailed land classification survey, and its efforts to improve the rural land use and to redistribute the land once held by the large sugar cane planters have been highly successful. In Puerto Rico it is possible to demonstrate how such a survey is carried out, how much it costs, and what you can do with the results.³

THE PLACE OF THE PIONEER

The nineteenth-century solution to the problem of increasing the food supply was to expand the agricultural area by moving out onto new lands. This was the solution that was applied to our own food problem in the late nineteenth century, when pioneer farmers moved onto the previously unoccupied prairie lands of the middle west. A similar movement resulted in the settlement and economic development of the Argentine

Humid Pampa in the period between 1880 and 1914. In the 1920's Isaiah Bowman directed a research project the purpose of which was to identify and describe the potential pioneer zones of the world from which an increase of the world's food supply might be derived.

But by 1920 this solution of the food problem was already out of date. In the period since World War II the food supply of the United States has been increased through the use of new kinds of machinery, through the use of improved breeds of animals or better kinds of plants, through the use of new kinds of soil conditioners and fertilizers, and the application of new techniques of land use. Yet the use of these new devices and methods has required fewer farmers than ever before. Between 1910 and 1914 it took 135 man hours of work to produce 100 bushels of corn; but between 1950 and 1953 it required only 34 man hours. In the period from 1935 to 1939 a farm worker in the United States could produce enough food to feed himself and ten others; by 1955 he could produce enough to feed himself and nineteen others. Farmers are leaving the farms because there is no need for their services wherever agriculture has become a large-scale enterprise. The day of the small pioneer farmer, cultivating his own land with his own muscles or domestic animals, is gone.

In Brazil, as in many other Latin American countries, the policy-makers are still thinking in terms of pioneer expansion. The idea is to start a great wave of new farm settlers onto the thinly populated woodland savannas of the interior. On patches of newly cleared forest, a thousand miles in the interior, yields of rice and corn are high; and the price of these foods in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro are so high that it pays to ship the product to market by airplane. But if the need is

³ Clarence F. Jones and Rafael Picó, *Symposium on the Geography of Puerto Rico* (Río Piedras, Puerto Rico, 1955).

to supply larger quantities of food to the cities at lower prices, then the pioneer zones are not the answer. Modern agricultural methods applied to worn out and abandoned land near the cities could contribute to the solution of the food problem. In fact, the advantage of reclaiming worn out land rather than clearing new land is being demonstrated in São Paulo state—even while the politicians continue to call for a "westward movement."

Even in São Paulo, however, the application of modern agricultural methods results in a decrease of the farm people and hastens the already rapid movement from the thinly peopled interior into the cities. The fact which must be faced is that the solution of the food problem in Latin America—the provision of more adequate supplies of food without increasing the price of food—will inevitably result in an acceleration of the migration of workers into the cities.

URBAN EMPLOYMENT

It is at this point that a variety of new kinds of jobs must be provided in the cities. To provide such jobs without increasing the food supply, as we have already seen, only has the result of increasing the price of food. Yet to carry out a program of agricultural improvement without providing jobs for those who will be displaced is another way to invite disaster. Urban employment includes jobs in manufacturing industries, in mining, and in a great variety of service occupations. According to the economists for every person employed in a basic industry, there will be two or three employed in service occupations. An investigation of the structure of employment in Latin American cities, as compared with that of Anglo-American cities, would probably show that there was a much higher proportion in service occupations and a smaller

proportion in basic manufacturing industries. The need for a considerable increase of manufacturing industry is clear.

The development of manufacturing industries in Latin America, however, faces certain obstacles. At this stage of the industrial revolution with a middle class still poorly developed, Latin America is still composed, as it has been traditionally, of two economic classes—a small group of very wealthy people and a large group of very poor people. Where backlanders have moved into the cities but are not provided with adequate food supply and where inflation of prices has gone ahead faster than wages, the result is to increase the number of poor people. Meanwhile the urban poor have learned to hope for a better living and to demand it: before, as rural poor, they were apathetic, hopeless. The continued existence of only two economic classes, therefore, is becoming more and more of a political hazard. The lack of middle-income people is a major handicap for industrial development.

This handicap operates as follows. In Anglo-America when a manufacturer invests capital in new machinery for the purpose of increasing production, he can find more customers by lowering the price of his product. According to Anglo-American economic theory each drop in the price picks up an additional group of purchasers. Manufacturers, therefore, have adopted the principle of high volume of sales, low profit per sale. The benefits of the industrial revolution, as a result, have been shared widely among the people, and there is widespread popular support for the system.

In Latin America when a manufacturer invests capital in new machinery for the purpose of increasing production, he does not find more customers by lowering the price. He would have

to lower the price a long way to reach the poorer classes of people—people who would be happy to purchase his products but cannot possibly do so. Therefore, the manufacturer raises his prices, realizing that if his product is wanted the wealthy people will buy it almost regardless of price. Manufactured products are easily sold to a relatively few customers. The principle adopted is that of a low volume of sales, high profit per sale. As a further result, a relatively small proportion of the total population shares in the benefits of the industrial revolution, and no strong popular support for the system is generated.

The suggestion has been made, but never widely adopted, that a new theory of wages ought to be formulated. As long as wages are considered solely as a production cost, the manufacturer must continue to keep them as low as possible. But if some proportion of wages were considered as an investment in market expansion, this might lead to a more effective attack on one of the major handicaps to industrial development. Long-term thinking of this sort is not at all common in countries where returns on invested money sometimes run as high as 50 per cent per year.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Out of these considerations there emerge certain simple and perhaps rather obvious recommendations. But the fact that they are simple and obvious does not mean that they have been widely adopted by the economic planners and the formulators of foreign policy. Rather the contrary. In facing problems of economic development, each specialist seems to like to be alone: the agronomist resents the suggestion that a land survey is needed; the engineer cannot see far beyond his slide rule; the economist is suspicious

of any one who works with maps instead of statistics; and the population experts seldom think it necessary to establish the distribution of population with precision. The political and social scientists still have a lot to learn about interdisciplinary co-operation—and the time left to learn about Latin America is getting very short.

So far as programs of economic development in Latin America are concerned there is no excuse in the second half of the twentieth century for attacking parts of an economy piecemeal. The approach must be toward a balanced economic development, in which a number of formerly separate programs are linked. The very complex nature of a national economy requires examination from every possible point of view, and requires that development programs be a joint effort of a variety of specialists. How leaders can be found who can keep the specialists in line is one of the major challenges to the social scientists and the administrators of public affairs.

Second, there is no excuse for attacking problems of economic development blindly. Land should not be redistributed without accurate maps of land quality to guide the redistribution. Roads should not be planned solely from the point of view of the engineers, but should also make use of the maps made available in a basic population and resource survey. The survey is much less costly than the errors that result from lack of exact knowledge.

Third, there is no excuse for offering such out-of-date solutions as that of pioneer expansion into new lands, unless some special and unusual conditions make pioneering a proper solution. There are many Latin Americans who still want to take care of the increasing numbers of people by creating more subsistence farmers. But according to another point of view every person is a

potential worker and a potential customer, and the individual is too valuable to permit him to live in isolation, separated from the economic system of buying and selling—as so many people still live in Latin America. The new agriculture, with its vast increase of production per worker, is needed in Latin America, but to introduce it will require more than the services of agricultural specialists, for the changes that are bound to follow will affect all parts of the culture.

Fourth, there is no excuse for failing to appreciate the new spirit abroad in Latin America. The democratic revolution means rising expectations for a better life, and a new definition of human dignity here on earth. Where the Latin American demands the equal right to be different, our deep involvement in his economic, social, and political problems must not be marked by an effort on our part to force him into our own mold. Long ago the Cuban patriot, José Martí, said, "*nuestro vino es agrio, pero es nuestra vino*," our wine is bitter, but it is our wine. Anglo-Americans should learn as soon as possible not to be amazed and chagrined to find that the Latin Americans do not want our way of living.

Fifth, we need to know that because

of this basic desire to be different, each country in Latin America, each subdivision of the larger countries, constitute a unique and separate problem. No general policy of economic development will fit every case, and the effort to enforce or administer a general policy may have very bad results. Each country must be faced as a separate problem not only because of the differences of each land base, each endowment of resources, but also because of deep seated differences in the attitudes and traditions of the people. In dealing with Latin America there is no short cut for knowing about these differences and what they mean.

Finally, let us appreciate what has been accomplished in Puerto Rico. During the last decade that island has been transformed from a horrible example of colonialism to a shining demonstration of how a free people can attack what might seem to be insuperable problems. If the third world war turns out, in fact, to be a war of ideas, the idea of Puerto Rico may loom larger and larger in our thinking, until we come to see solutions achieved in Puerto Rico as vastly more important than all the Sputniks that are spinning through space and all the astronauts poised to follow them.

* * *

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: You began your talk by saying that we have not learned the lessons of Egypt, Indonesia, and Puerto Rico, where public health programs instituted in these countries led to overpopulation. This sounded as though Puerto Rico was a bad example and yet you ended your speech by holding up Puerto Rico as a good example. This seemed to me a paradox. Could you comment on this?

A: The paradox was dissolved between 1948 and 1950 when the relation

of the United States to Puerto Rico was revised and when the present government of Puerto Rico came in. The United States and Puerto Rico up to 1940 was as good an example of the bad effects of so-called "colonialism" as you could find. But since that time we have actually found solutions through the interplay of free institutions. I think the development of Puerto Rico is one of the greatest things that has been going on in the so-called "cold war."

Our Reaction to Communist Infiltration in Latin America

By ARTHUR P. WHITAKER

ABSTRACT: The United States plays a difficult role in Latin America. Our activities are curtailed by the commitment since 1936 to the dictum of nonintervention, yet we must attempt to counter the influence of communism in Latin America. The present status of Castro's regime in Cuba highlights this dilemma. Although, at this time, Castro's government is not directly aligned with the Communist bloc, there are indications of increasing proclivities in that direction. A "hands-off" policy must continue to be employed by our State Department in Cuba as well as in other troubled areas to create a favorable climate of opinion towards our long-term interests. Although the actual membership in the Communist parties of Latin-American countries has decreased, both the Soviet Union and Communist China are attempting to penetrate the leading intellectual and labor groups through the means of propaganda and the well-known tactic of the "popular front." Our reaction to the Communist infiltration in Latin America must not lead to hasty measures. The United States must in the future attempt to combat Communist actions in Latin America by helping establish political democracy through fostering economic development and social reforms in its various governments.—Ed.

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A DISCUSSION of "Our Reaction to Communist Infiltration in Latin America" logically begins with an understanding of what it is we are reacting to. First, how widespread and intense is Communist infiltration in Latin America?

Cuba, from all indications, is the principal danger spot today, but we cannot be sure of the degree of the danger even there. Fidel Castro, the Cuban *caudillo*, has denied repeatedly that he is a Communist, and this may be true. If he often gives the opposite impression during his hours-long radio rantings, perhaps the explanation is simply that, as James Reston recently said, Castro needs more sleep. He was not brought to power by Communists but instead the support of all classes and perhaps most of the well-to-do, educated, and democratic elements in Cuba. And there is no proof of communism in the main features of his regime since he came to power: land reform, expropriation, trade agreements with Iron-Curtain countries, nationalism, and anti-Americanism.

COMMUNISM IN CUBA

All these things could be and, in some cases, have been products of the indigenous social revolution, the revolution of rising expectations that is mounting in Latin America as in other parts of the world. Even trafficking with Iron-Curtain countries is not necessarily sinister, as we have admitted in other Latin-American cases. These include four democratic regimes: Uruguay, which made the first trade agreement with the Soviet Union several years ago; Argentina and Brazil, which in addition to trade agreements have obtained Soviet loans; and Mexico, which Soviet emissary Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan visited late last year without causing a sensation remotely approach-

ing the one provoked by his visit early this year to Cuba.

The differentiation is quite justified, for Cuba is the only government suspected of being pro-Communist. However immune to Communist contagion Fidel Castro himself may be, no such immunity has been demonstrated by his two chief aides: his brother Raul, who commands Cuba's armed forces, and the ex-Argentine Che Guevara, who as president of the Cuban National Bank commands the country's financial forces. Again, Castro's Cuba has recently seceded from the left-wing, but strongly democratic and anti-Communist Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ORIT), and is trying to form a rival Latin-American federation of labor, which is expected to replace the Latin American Labor Confederation (CTAL) as a Communist front.¹ Communists have already been admitted to Cuba's own labor organization.

Most disturbing of all is the direct evidence given by three prominent Cuban military men, all former supporters of the Castro regime, who have independently defected from it within the past nine months in protest against its increasingly pro-Communist character: on July 1, 1959, Major Pedro Diaz Lanz, Chief of the Cuban Air Force; on October 21, 1959, Major Hubert Matos, Chief of the armed forces in one of Cuba's principal provinces; and on March 17, 1960, Lieutenant Commander F. G. Pons, Cuban naval attaché in Washington and

¹ *Noticiario Obrero Interamericano* (Mexico City), Nos. 33-34, February-March 1960, p. 1. This is the organ of ORIT. The CTAL, or Latin American Labor Confederation, founded in 1938, has always been dominated by the Mexican Vicente Lombardo Toledano, who has been described by some as a Communist and by others as only a fellow traveler.

member of the Inter-American Defense Board. In resigning his post, Commander Pons charged that the Castro regime is "a mask behind which hides international Communism" and that Fidel and Raul Castro are only puppets in the hands of the Communist mastermind, Che Guevara.²

THREAT IN REST OF LATIN AMERICA

What of the rest of Latin America? In all of it, signs multiply of increasing Communist efforts, sometimes successful, to permeate intellectual and labor circles, the two main target areas. For example, in Venezuela's principal university, the University of Caracas, the Communist party made great gains in the student elections of March 1960. Either alone or in alliance with the Democratic Action party, it gained control of six of the university's seven "faculties" or schools. And, as is well known, university students play an important political role in Latin America.

The striking point about this case is that Venezuela's present government is ably led by a popularly elected president, Romulo Betancourt, who has given it a decidedly left-wing orientation. However, he is democratic and anti-Communist, welcomes foreign capital, co-operates with the United States, and, significantly, has recently been openly critical of the Castro regime. All of this the Communists and Castro sympathizers cannot endure. They want to displace Betancourt, and they made a good beginning in the very recent University of Caracas elections.

Another example is the report from Santiago, Chile, early in March 1960 that no less a person than the Rector (President) of the University of Chile, Juan Gomez Millas, was about to leave for a visit to Peking as the guest of the government of the Chinese People's Republic. Gomez Millas was reported

² *New York Times*, March 18, 1960.

as explaining that the purpose of his visit was to observe teaching methods and the application of educational principles in Communist China. This may be all there is to it; Gomez Millas is an able scholar and his interest in the new Chinese regime's educational system is understandable. But the timing of his visit was unfortunate, to say the least.

Activities of Communist China

Communist China as well as the Soviet Union now gives active support to the growing Communist drive in Latin America. The rise of Chinese communism from an agrarian base has made it particularly relevant to the case of Latin America, where the population is still very largely rural and the need for agrarian reform is great.

Its relevance was pointed out nearly a decade ago in an exposé of Communist machinations in Latin America by a former Communist, Eudocio Ravines of Peru. Appropriately titled *The Yenan Way*, this exposé told how the Chinese experience was already being capitalized on in Latin America by stressing the rural rather than the urban "way" to the spread of communism.

The "Yenan way" is still being followed, and many observers think the latest illustration is provided by Fidel Castro's special variety of agrarian reform in Cuba, which has made him a hero to the country's peasants. But Communist China as well as the Soviet Union employs additional ways or approaches, such as cultural and radio channels and the air waves—Radio Peking regularly broadcasts to Latin America. The language barrier of Chinese is not much greater than that of Russian, and it is overcome in the same way, by using Spanish and Portuguese.

The results achieved by this Chinese propaganda, with one important excep-

tion, are not easy to estimate. By being kept persistently aware of the new Chinese Communist presence across the Pacific as well as the older Soviet presence across the Atlantic, the Latin Americans are given a sense of increasing encirclement by communism. Its propagators expect the growth of this sense to contribute to ultimate Latin-American acceptance of the doctrine that the triumph of communism is inevitable.

STRENGTH OF COMMUNISM

We, of course, do not believe that the triumph of communism is inevitable, but we should all recognize that it may make substantial gains, in Latin America as elsewhere unless we play our role correctly. We ought to give prayerful consideration to such questions as: How strong is communism in Latin America today? What are its potentialities for growth? And what should we do about it?

Estimates of its strength vary widely. For understandable reasons, it is given a very high rating by dictator Rafael Leonidas Trujillo of the Dominican Republic. He takes the gloomy view that the movement has got out of hand and that, while "community action [against it] may be partially effective in some cases, . . . in others the point of no return has been reached."³ The Panama Canal and our Guantanamo naval base in Cuba, he predicts, will be the next trouble spots. This prophecy was fulfilled before it was made.

Estimates of a private report

On the other hand, in a report prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by a private research organization, the Corporation for Economic and Industrial Research, of Arlington,

³ *New York Times*, April 6, 1960.

Virginia, and published late in February 1960,⁴ the present Communist threat in Latin America is described as being "generally of small dimensions." I have never been an alarmist on this subject. I have always deplored, and still deplore, the proneness of many of our people to blame all our postwar troubles in Latin America on "Communist agitators," as our troubles there in the 1930's and early 1940's were blamed on "Nazi-fascist agitators." Nevertheless, this report's conclusion seems to me altogether too optimistic.

The report unquestionably has important merits. It brings together a great deal of significant data and contains some acute observations. The difficulty, according to my analysis, arises from the report's use of the wrong measuring rods in arriving at its overall estimate of the present and potential communist threat in Latin America. As a result, it underestimates the danger. Too much weight appears to have been given by it to such facts as these: that the Soviet bloc accounts for only 2 per cent of the total foreign trade of Latin America; that it has extended only \$241 million in credits by way of economic aid to Latin America, with only three countries, Argentina, Brazil, and Cuba, as recipients; and that there are not more than 230,000 card-carrying Communists in Latin America's total population of about 190 million, as compared with more than twice as many Communists, 600,000, in a much smaller population in 1947.

All this documentation, and more to the same effect, is true, but it is largely irrelevant to the chief Soviet-Communist

⁴ *Soviet Bloc Latin American Activities and Their Implications for United States Foreign Policy* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), Report No. 7 on United States-Latin-American Relations by the Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.

nist objective. Whatever the case may be ten or twenty years hence, the promotion of trade, of aid, and of Communist party membership in Latin America are not now ends in themselves. At most, they are useful instruments, and even as instruments they are not by any means indispensable to Moscow's and Peking's major purpose.

SOVIET UNION'S MAJOR PURPOSE

The purpose, as the report in question states, is to bring about the "political neutralization" of Latin America and the disruption of the Organization of American States by promoting anti-Americanism in Latin America and enhancing the prestige of the Communist bloc. A mistake is made in assuming that this can be accomplished only, or mainly, through such direct channels as trade, aid, and cultural exchange between the Soviet Union and Latin America.

In reality some of the most important of all possible instruments for achieving these purposes lie completely outside these channels and have no relevance to direct relations between Moscow and Peking, on the one hand, and Latin America, on the other. For example, the lead that the Soviet Union has gained over the United States in the space race has vastly enhanced Moscow's prestige, to the detriment of ours, among educated Latin Americans. For another, all Latin Americans, illiterate as well as literate, have been greatly impressed by the extraordinarily rapid economic development achieved under the Communist system, first by the Soviet Union and now by Communist China. Much as most Latin Americans dislike most features of communism, they have been particularly susceptible to the impact of this achievement because it represents success in an aspira-

tion which they have long shared but in which, under the capitalist system, they find themselves still frustrated after more than a century and quarter of political independence. Our own past mistakes have helped spread communism's image of itself south of the border.

Consequently, it is a waste of time to measure the Communist nations' influence in Latin America in terms of direct trade, aid, and even cultural relations. Not only are such instruments not essential to their purpose; they might even profit without them. Indeed, if I were a Communist and a political adviser to the Kremlin on Latin-American affairs, I think I would tell Krushchev that the intensification of Soviet relations with Latin America through any direct channel should be avoided at all costs. For in proportion to the increase of such contacts, the Soviet Union loses its unique, inestimable advantage over the United States in their rivalry over Latin America, namely, the advantage of remoteness.

The value of this advantage is suggested by several of our homely Anglo-Saxon sayings, ranging from "Familiarity breeds contempt" to "The grass is always greener in the next pasture" and "They all look good when they're far away." This may help explain why, although the Latin Americans retain a lively resentment over our interference in Guatemala in 1954, and our interventions in Nicaragua and other Caribbean countries in the first quarter of this century, not to mention the Mexican War of 1846, some of them seem already to have forgotten what the Soviet Union did to Hungary in 1956. Present Communist strategy, it has been suggested, is aimed at taking advantage of what memory of Hungary remains by provoking the United States into making Cuba an American Hungary.

Statements to the public

Naturally, such objectives are not publicly avowed by Communist spokesmen. A fair sample of what they do talk about when they are on display is provided by Mikoyan's speeches in the course of his visit to Mexico in November 1959. Speaking to a group of manufacturers in Mexico City on November 24, he congratulated Mexico on achieving a higher rate of industrial development (7 per cent per year) than the United States (2 to 3 per cent), and continued:⁶

We, the Soviet people, the communists, have delivered a challenge. We have stated that we are catching up with and overtaking the United States in industrial production—a bold challenge. Once they laughed at us. . . . But when they saw that we had built rockets, satellites, atomic power stations, the first civilian atomic ship . . . several special sessions were held in the U. S. Congress . . . and the question of the USSR rate of development was discussed. . . . In this matter we possess many advantages over capitalism. . . . In the United States . . . the main stimulus is profit . . . even in the best years the capacity for producing 20-25 million tons [of steel] remains inactive. . . . It is improbable that this would happen with us.

Four days later, at a luncheon given by two high Mexican officials, he spoke in a less irenic vein:

It goes without saying [said Mikoyan] that the rate of development of underdeveloped countries would increase—and that would be just—if the colonial powers which robbed these countries returned to them what they had robbed, even without interest. . . . Although many of the countries which had rid themselves of the

⁶ This quotation and the following one are taken from monitored broadcast texts obtained from a reliable source, as rebroadcast from Moscow.

colonial yoke have become independent states, economically they still depend on capitalist monopolies. In six Arab countries U. S. and British oil monopolies make monstrous profits. . . . During the past nine years these Arab countries have lost over 6.5 billion dollars worth of oil profits. . . . We ask for an annual interest of 2.5 per cent for our loans. . . . We are not looking for profits. . . . Apart from this, we give the underdeveloped countries, free of charge, licenses for the production of machinery and other articles based on our blueprints.

No specific mention of Latin America was made in this passage, but the reference was clearly implied, and Fidel Castro seems to have been echoing Mikoyan when he charged that, despite the sugar subsidy, Cuba has been systematically plundered by the United States throughout this century under the guise of investments. Yet throughout his speaking tour Mikoyan systematically coupled such thinly veiled incitements to "Yankeeophobia" with the portrayal of the Soviet Union as the champion of peaceful coexistence.

Soviet agents

It would be a mistake to discount the effect of even such guardedly hostile propaganda on Latin-American minds rendered receptive by years of real or fancied neglect and exploitation by the United States. And what the anti-Americanist Mikoyans of Soviet diplomacy only hint at, a substantial corps of trained Communist agents in Latin America make so explicit as to place no strain on the least lively imagination. Those agents operate in a variety of ways, the most public of which are the more than 300 Communist newspapers and magazines published in Latin America and numerous Soviet cultural and social societies in Latin America, which increased from forty in 1957 to eighty-four in 1958.

It would also be a mistake to think of these Communist agents as novices. Communism became rooted in Latin America in the 1920's. In Cuba, for example, its organization dates from 1925, and about the same time it had centers in Mexico City and Montevideo that served as a kind of regional headquarters for Middle and South America. Because of World War II and certain actions of the United States, the Communists built up their Latin-American membership rapidly during the 1940's until it reached an all-time peak of between 500,000 and 600,000 members in 1947.

Rise of the popular front

Since 1947 the cold war and the outlawing of communism by most of the Latin-American governments have cut that figure in half. But there are still enough Communists to foment trouble nearly everywhere, and, in any case, present Soviet policy does not favor building up Communist party membership. The aim now is to maintain small, disciplined cadres, to operate covertly, especially through non-Communist labor unions, and to extend Communist activities into the once largely neglected rural areas. The present sound policy line is to support nationalism, which, of course, means anti-imperialism, which, of course, as the Communists and many others define it, means anti-Americanism in the sense of hostility to the United States.

In pursuit of this policy the present tactic is to join forces with all nationalist groups that will co-operate, whether of the right, center, or left. In other words, there has been a return to the Communist device of the popular front of the 1930's, but with two differences. At that time the popular fronts were formed against Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. If the Communists can arrange it, the Latin-

American popular fronts of the 1960's will be directed against the United States. Moreover, this will be a more concerted operation, and Moscow will orchestrate it. Until 1957 the stronger Communist groups in Latin America competed in a kind of imperialist struggle for control of the weaker ones. In that year each country was made independent of the rest, and all were placed under direct orders from Moscow.⁶

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

How should we meet this Communist threat? Let us take Cuba as a test case, for it illustrates the problem in its most difficult form. If there were much less Communist influence in Castro's regime, the problem would not arise at all. If there were much more, and it could be proved, the solution could be sought in the Anti-Communist Declaration of Caracas (1954), which would lead the way to multilateral enforcement measures ranging from diplomatic sanctions through economic sanctions to the use of armed force, as provided by the Hemisphere Defense Treaty, or Rio Pact, of 1947.

But this solution is not feasible now, since it requires a two-thirds vote of the American states, which we could not secure in the present state of Latin-American opinion. So we must look for a solution elsewhere. Our search should take account of both the handicaps and the advantages under which we operate in relation to the Castro regime.

Our handicaps

Let us begin with the handicaps. The first is public opinion at home and

⁶ William S. Stokes, "Democracy, Freedom, and Reform in Latin America," in Frederick B. Pike, (Editor), *Freedom and Reform in Latin America* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), p. 140.

abroad, which is divided into two schools of thought. One school that has strength in the United States holds that Castro is a Soviet tool. The other, that is prevalent abroad, even in the free world, holds that this is not proved and that Castro may be only an extreme nationalist demagogue. However much we deplore the latter view, we must respect it, for otherwise we may arouse indignation in the United Nations as well as the Organization of American States (OAS). Castro already has close ties with the Arab bloc through Nasser's United Arab Republic, which is co-sponsoring the conference of underdeveloped nations to be held in Havana later this year.

The second handicap is our inability to control the shipment of arms to Cuba. If Castro is a Soviet agent, one of his most likely courses of action will be to create confusion in neighboring countries by undercover promotion of guerrilla warfare. To do this he must obtain arms from abroad, and so far we have not been able to prevent this, even from free-world countries such as Belgium.

Finally, and most important of all, the United States is deterred by the absolute rule of nonintervention, to which it has been committed since 1936 under a succession of inter-American pacts and by a similar rule of the United Nations Charter. This is not a policy that we can change, but a binding, permanent international obligation. The South African racial discrimination case has just shown that these nonintervention rules can be almost worthless when the majority chooses to ignore them, but, in the Cuban case, the United States would not have the majority on its side if it decided to act now. As the *New York Times*' principal correspondent in Latin America wrote in January 1960, "Fear of United States intervention is so

deeply ingrained in Latin America . . . that Latin Americans prefer to take chances with Dr. Castro rather than see Washington apply economic or other sanctions against him."⁷

Our advantages

But will Latin-American opposition to remedial action through the OAS prevail indefinitely if the Cuban situation continues to deteriorate? This brings us to the advantages that offset our handicaps in dealing with Cuba. There have been many signs of growing opposition to Castro in other Latin-American countries and a few indications that some support has developed among them for the idea of imposing multilateral sanctions on his regime through the OAS.

The idea was publicly endorsed in January 1960 by President Kubitschek of Brazil. Although Brazil is much the biggest Latin-American country, no such action is likely to be taken any time soon, for two reasons. First, it would require an amendment of the OAS Charter, which prohibits multilateral as well as unilateral intervention, except when multilateral enforcement measures are authorized in the special and limited security situation covered by the Rio Defense Pact of 1947. In the second place, this absolute rule of nonintervention has long been sacrosanct to most Latin Americans. In 1945 they killed at birth a similar Uruguayan proposal for multilateral sanctions against the Argentine military dictatorship headed by Juan Peron. Nevertheless, Kubitschek's pronouncement may herald a widespread change in favor of enforcement action, especially since Brazil itself had previously been a strong supporter of nonintervention.

⁷ *New York Times*, January 31, 1960, reported by Tad Szulc, dated Rio de Janeiro, January 30.

Whatever form it may take, disapproval of Castro's excesses has grown apace in Latin America, where at its birth a year ago his regime was enthusiastically welcomed by almost everyone except Dictator Trujillo of the neighboring Dominican Republic. Not only have half of the other Latin-American governments flatly rejected invitations to Castro's projected conference of underdeveloped countries, but some of their leaders are in open and general opposition to his regime and are described as forming a kind of anti-Castro club. In addition to President Kubitschek of Brazil and Governor Muñoz Marín of Puerto Rico,⁸ they include noted left-wingers such as former President José Figueres of Costa Rica and President Betancourt of Venezuela, himself a former associate of Communists but now one of their most effective foes. Signs of growing "anti-Castroism" have also appeared in recent months in Mexico, Argentina, and Chile.

Finally, substantial opposition to Castro appears to be developing in Cuba itself. The opposition still has far to go before it becomes formidable; at the present time, according to one well-informed observer, Castro's support has only been cut from 90 per cent to 70 per cent of the Cuban people. But that is a marked change for so short a period, and Castro's measures may accelerate the process, especially if, as seems likely, they cause hardship among the masses, who are now the hard core of his following.

At any rate, Castro has already alienated many Cubans, both civilian and military, who as recently as a year ago were enthusiastic supporters of his revolution. There are persistent re-

⁸ Puerto Rico is, of course, an "associated commonwealth" of the United States, not an independent state, but it is nevertheless Latin American in language and culture.

ports that the Roman Catholic bishops in Cuba are preparing a public remonstrance against his encouragement of communism; but these reports have also been persistently denied, so that we shall have to wait and see.

The most important conclusion that emerges from this brief survey of the situation in Cuba, and in the rest of Latin America regarding Cuba, is that on both fronts Latin-American attitudes have been, and still are, changing rapidly and to Castro's disadvantage. This consideration should weigh heavily in our determination of the course the United States should follow in dealing with this outstanding problem of Communist penetration in Latin America.

This does not mean that we can sit with folded arms in the calm assurance that a fairy godmother will solve the problem for us. For all we know, Castro's stock may reverse its recent trend and start ascending, both at home and abroad. And a number of other disagreeable things may happen to complicate the problem still further, such as Castro's open or at least unmistakable commitment to communism. But it does mean that, along with the handicaps we are laboring under, there are certain factors in the situation that favor us; and our course should be plotted with a view to making the most of our advantages at the same time that we refrain from doing anything that is likely to add to our handicaps.

POSSIBLE FUTURE ACTION

How do we go about doing this? For the long run, I agree with our leading authority on the Communists in Latin America, Robert J. Alexander,⁹ that the best way to combat them is for the United States to help those

⁹ Robert J. Alexander, *Communism in Latin America* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1957), pp. 399-408.

Latin-American elements that are working for political democracy along with economic development and social reform. I favor such a course not only for its negative, anti-Communist effect but also for its positive merits: it is the kind of course we ought to follow even if there were no Communists for us to combat.

Admittedly, this general principle leaves many troublesome questions unanswered. But at least it establishes some clear guidelines of policy that are different from, and better than, those that we have followed at various times in the past, including the recent past.

Admittedly, also, the principle is not compatible with the rule of nonintervention as broadly interpreted in Latin America, and our departure from the rule will no doubt offend those elements in Latin America whom it does not benefit. But in its present broad sense the rule is unrealistic and unworkable and serves mainly to multiply the Latin Americans' complaints against us. Our very observance of it has this effect. For example, many of them have roundly abused us for not intervening to rid them of dictators. Given the existence of this impossible rule, there is some ground for this complaint. For our wealth and power are so much greater than theirs, and our relations with them so close, that every act on our part, whether of omission or commission, constitutes in some degree an intervention in their affairs.

I am not proposing that we treat the rule of nonintervention as a scrap of paper. On the contrary, I hold that, having accepted it as a solemn obligation, we must observe it to the extent that good faith requires and common sense permits. But we should interpret it narrowly and, in the grey area of doubtful interpretation, orient our departure from it in accordance with the general principle stated above. And we

should also encourage the Kubitscheks of Latin America to work for an amendment of the rule of nonintervention that will bring it into closer accord with the facts of inter-American life.

These general prescriptions for the long run will not be of much assistance in dealing with immediate problems such as Communist infiltration in Latin America. This problem is now brought to a focus in Cuba. What should we do about the problem of Cuba?

Only broad courses of action can be considered here. Two such courses are open to us. One is the difficult course of punitive action against the Castro regime; the other, adherence to our government's present "hands-off" policy of patience and forbearance.

Punitive measures

I have recently heard a sample of the punitive course described in some detail. It included the following steps: (1) calling a consultative meeting of the OAS with a view to taking enforcement measures against the Castro regime under the Rio Defense Treaty, as authorized by the Anti-Communist Declaration of Caracas, 1954; (2) an official declaration by the United States government branding the Castro regime as a Communist dictatorship and a threat to the peace of the Americas; (3) the expulsion of Cuba from the OAS; (4) an embargo by the United States on trade with Cuba; and (5) a general inter-American quarantine of Cuba.

In my opinion most of Latin America is nowhere near to being ready for such drastic action at this time, and it would be disastrous for the United States to take it, either alone or with what little co-operation it might be able to extract from Latin America. I believe that dictator Trujillo's Dominican Republic and the authoritarian regime in Nicaragua are probably the only Latin-

American governments that would co-operate willingly.

To follow such a course now would be to repeat and compound our blunder in the somewhat similar case of Guatemala in 1954, which is still a source of resentment against us in Latin America. On that occasion we justified our intervention—it was not direct armed intervention—on the ground that the Guatemalan government was Communist-infected; but most Latin Americans, of all shades of opinion, right and center as well as left, were convinced that we were really acting in defense of the United Fruit Company, which they regard as a typical Yankee "capitalist monopoly." Today, in Cuba, one of the conspicuous American sufferers at the hands of the Castro regime is this same United Fruit Company. And as for the proposal of an embargo against Cuba, Castro may be a Communist but is that any reason why we should burn down the Cuban barn? Castro would be about the last of its inmates to suffer.

Other punitive measures of a milder kind have been suggested, such as cutting the Cuban sugar quota and freezing Cuban funds. They may be used later, in different circumstances, but, as of now, they are open to the same objections. In the present state of Latin-American opinion, they would give a great impulse to anti-Americanism, while wiping out the nascent "anti-Castroism" and turning Castro into a Latin-American David in courageous combat with the Yankee Goliath. They would also do great and perhaps lasting injury to the Cuban economy and so to its people.

"Hands-off" policy

I need hardly say that my own decided preference is for continuing our

present "hands-off" policy. It is not a heroic policy, but would it be any more heroic for us to step on little Castro? In any case, we are not concerned with heroism but with the course that will reward us best in the long run and still let us live with our consciences.

It seems to me that the "hands-off" policy, as it has developed so far, offers the best hope of meeting this difficult double requirement. This is the kind of policy recommended at the beginning of our relations with the new states of Latin America by one of our great Secretaries of State, John Quincy Adams. In 1827, after ten years of rich experience in relations with Latin America, first in that post and then as President of the United States, Adams declared that "to preserve those relations in amity, which is the unquestionable interest of all parties, will require on the part of the United States, an observing and persevering system of kindness, moderation and forbearance."

Such a "system" is no less requisite today. We have been following it faithfully in the difficult case of Cuba and, I think, with good results. I believe it has weakened Castro at home and abroad and has increased our international stature.

How long we shall have to palliate and endure, and what will come next, I would not venture to say. But I am confident that we have already found the best way of dealing with this particular case of Communist infiltration. I am also confident that the worst way to deal with it, and the best way to promote communism in Latin America at large, would be to embark on a course that might end in making of Cuba an American Hungary and of the land reformer Castro a martyr to anti-communism.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: I wonder if you would care to comment on the possible effects in Cuba and in other Latin-American states of President Eisenhower's blast the other day against Castro?

A: I wonder if you mean the one that was just published in the paper this morning? All I know about it is what I read in the paper, and the paper I could get this morning was the *Philadelphia Inquirer* which did not give as complete details as I would have liked to have. I should think that letter would cause a good deal of unhappiness in Mr. Castro's own circles in Cuba. I must say that for the rest, the other circles in Latin America, as well. I am not suggesting for a moment Mr. Castro is all by himself, but I think that this sort of thing is very good. I think it was a temperate letter. I think it was strongly and well stated, and while I certainly do not want to see the head of our government engage in name-calling with any other country, it seems to me that this was a very legitimate and probably a very useful statement. I do not think that one can take Castro's type of declarations forever. This particular reply, I think, was a very useful one and a permissible reply, partly because it did not in fact come directly from President Eisenhower. It came in the form of a communication which will be delivered by the Ambassador in Chile to the students in Chile, and it was not as if Mr. Eisenhower himself had got up and denounced Castro. I repeat, I think that it was a proper statement. I think that on the whole it will have a good effect; of course it can have some on the other side too.

Q: In considering the role of Communist infiltration in Latin America, is

it not necessary to consider the three following points: First, that all of Latin America is undergoing a thoroughgoing and tremendous social revolution. Second, that the attitude of the United States towards dictators in the past has been a distinct handicap in the answers which we Americans like to give to pro-Communist infiltrators in Latin America. And thirdly, that the achievement of a policy which would satisfy the perfectly legitimate nationalist aims of the leaders not only in Cuba but throughout Latin America would do more than anything else to assure the Latin Americans of the traditional warmth and friendliness of the American people towards the democratic elements in Latin America. In other words, that the best way of meeting the Communist attacks is by modernizing the type of economic, social, and political relationships which have given the Latin Americans perhaps this inferiority complex that has permitted them to become victims of Communist infiltration.

A: Answering the first point, I quite agree that we should recognize the existence of the fact that a social ferment, a social revolution is going on in Latin America. In fact, I mentioned that by name at the beginning of my paper, and I thought I had stressed the point very strongly. Apparently, I did not stress it as strongly as I should have. On the second point, I think the answer is yes. I think that although we are doing very well these days, recently we have not done what we should have in the matter of dictators. I would say yes. On the third point, I quite agree that we must recognize and make full allowance for the spirit of nationalism rising in Latin America. That is another point that I mentioned in my pa-

per and could not develop, in the time at my disposal, as I would have liked to do. I think it is quite true. I think though when you speak of modernizing our economic and social relations you open up a very wide vista with many, many difficult problems. I would like to say only one thing in conclusion, and

that is that I think that our respect for the rule, the absolute rule, of nonintervention is one of the best ways to show our respect for Latin-American nationalism. But we have to leave the positive work of nonintervention under the protection of the Latin Americans themselves.

Toward Better Understanding Between United States and Latin America

By ROY R. RUBOTTOM, JR.

ABSTRACT: The long-standing relations between the United States and Latin America rest on a firm foundation. Yet, certain misunderstandings have arisen which seem to cloud the relations in the Western hemisphere. Nonintervention in the internal affairs of another state is the fundamental principle that has guided the relations in the hemisphere. Since World War II, this doctrine has been supported by the principle of collective security agreed upon at Rio de Janeiro in 1947 and enforced by the Organization of American States. The misconceptions which exist relate to various subjects in military, political, and economic affairs. In military relations misunderstandings arise over the extent of the United States military assistance to the Latin-American countries and over the United States export-of-arms policy. In the political sphere, the United States is condemned for its continued support of the doctrine of nonintervention with respect to dictatorial governments in Latin America. The contentious subjects in economic affairs relate to United States development assistance programs and to commerce in primary products. It is indeed necessary to clear up these misunderstandings so that the channels can be open to continued constructive relations between the twenty-one republics.—Ed.

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IN the relations between the United States and Latin America certain problems exist which contribute to misunderstanding. These are the problems that I wish to analyze and discuss in this article.

Having returned from South America with the President one month ago, I can report that he received an overwhelmingly friendly reception everywhere he went. Much of this was due to his own personal magnetism and was recognition of the acknowledged leader of the victorious forces of World War II, but he was also enthusiastically received in his role as President of our country. Allowing for misunderstandings, some of them serious and deep, which do exist in Latin America's attitude toward the United States, I still think that there is a great reservoir of good will toward this country growing out of respect for the principles on which our relations have been founded and their day-to-day practice. I am convinced that the true basis of any unfriendliness toward the United States finds its roots in misunderstandings. Some of them are general throughout the area, while others are limited to one country or group of countries. We have made extraordinary efforts to overcome these misunderstandings, insofar as responsibility devolves upon us, but obviously a similar effort must come from the other side if understanding is to be achieved. Fortunately, the tradition in this hemisphere has been that men of good will on both sides have sought mutually agreeable solutions to their common problems. We should be realistic, however, and recognize the brutal fact that there are those in the Americas whose single purpose is to create ill will and thwart all efforts to reach understanding.

In this crucible of democracy, we have long since learned that, after the give and take of unfettered public dis-

cussion, workable compromise is possible to devise. This does not require sacrificing principle. In fact, we could not hope to settle our differences or to achieve agreement with parties who insisted that we sacrifice the principles on which we have built our own country and its relations with other nations, including our friends in Latin America. In fact, I know nothing better to suggest as a cure for misunderstanding in Latin America than frank talk and unceasing joint search for the truth.

Some criticism directed at United States policies toward Latin America is so broad and sweeping as to convey to the reader or listener that the governments and peoples of the Americas are incapable of setting their own guidelines, formulating their own policies, and evolving their own destinies. The implication is that the United States is somehow responsible for all the problems that arise in Latin America. On both counts, this kind of reasoning should be rejected. There are increasing signs of the social, political, and economic maturity in this vast region—indeed, some countries are world powers by almost any definition—but even the weakest or the most underdeveloped country would reject the thesis that they were not capable of self-determination. By the same token, the United States could never assume the responsibilities which properly are those of the individual countries themselves; we tried to do this once and earned the displeasure of the entire hemisphere, not to mention that of the countries in which we intervened, in the process.

NONINTERVENTION AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

It is necessary to analyze the doctrine of nonintervention. Prior to the 6th Inter-American Conference at Montevideo in 1933, the governments of Latin America had been deeply concerned with

what they conceived to be the unwarranted interference of the United States in the internal affairs of some of their countries. They were even more concerned over our apparent unwillingness to subscribe fully to the principle of nonintervention. At the Montevideo meeting, we accepted this doctrine in principle. Following the abrogation of the Platt Amendment in 1934, our full agreement with this principle was made known in the treaty embodying nonintervention in specific terms in 1936 at Buenos Aires. Nothing that we had done previously in the realm of inter-American affairs had a more dramatic or favorable impact on our foreign relations than our acceptance of and faithful adherence to the nonintervention doctrine, now one of the most jealously guarded principles of the inter-American system.

Nonintervention is only one of the fundamental rules, if I may use the term, for international conduct in the western hemisphere. No less important for its material contribution to peace is the principle of collective security, which came to full fruition with the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed at Rio in 1947, following the initial steps taken during World War II toward establishing its form and substance. Specifying that an act of aggression against one nation will be considered an attack on all, the collective security agreement provides the machinery for action against a state that does not hold itself bound by the nonintervention agreement. Since 1948, the Rio Treaty has been invoked ten times. On six of these occasions the Council of the Organization of American States, through its Organ of Consultation, succeeded in bringing about a peaceful settlement, while the other four were solved by withdrawal of the charge of aggression or some other means.

Quite apart from binding the twenty-one republics to a solemn commitment not to intervene or resort to force of arms as a means of resolving differences, as well as providing a course of action in case of violation, the linked principles of nonintervention and collective security have given birth to a salutary psychological attitude in the general conduct of inter-American relationships. Each nation of our hemisphere, no matter how small or inadequately armed, now feels protected by the strength of the many allies that would come to its support in case of aggression. Each nation now has the foreknowledge that correct conduct in a serious dispute will be ascertained and approved by impartial investigation. Mutual trust based on confidence has alleviated much of the suspicion that was common in hemispheric relationships; equally noteworthy is the growing awareness of the interdependence of the twenty-one American republics.

Yet the hemisphere now hears a voice which is strangely out of tune. The Premier of Cuba has publicly stated that his government would not feel bound by the Rio pact. Surely he must know that Cuba has nothing to fear from any country in the Americas, all of which have watched with sympathetic interest the unfolding drama of that beautiful island-republic since it successfully fought for its independence only sixty-two years ago. No distortion of history can possibly erase the facts, to which there are living witnesses both in Cuba and the United States, of that glorious effort. Nor shall we forget that it was the privilege of the United States to provide a sanctuary for the beloved hero and patriot of Cuba, José Martí, after he had been forced to flee the island prior to the independence struggle.

Can it be that the present Cuban government is unmindful of the real

threat to their revolution, indeed the threat to freedom and to the cause of just and honest nationalism all over the hemisphere, which is represented by international communism? Would not the freedom-loving peoples in the satellite countries of Eastern Europe have appreciated a kind of Rio Treaty when they were overrun at the end of World War II?

MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS

Many misconceptions exist, both at home and abroad, concerning our military relations with Latin-American countries. In this important aspect of our total foreign relations in the area, the United States collaborates in many ways with Latin American countries. Our representatives deliberate as juridical equals on the Inter-American Defense Board to determine the means and methods of collective security. Our military missions serve in Latin-American countries at the request of the host government. In the various bilateral military assistance programs of our Mutual Security Act, the United States provides materiel and training to a number of countries.

During the last year, there has developed outside the executive branch some sentiment in favor of providing military assistance to Latin-American countries through multilateral channels and of terminating, or drastically curtailing, our present bilateral programs. For example, a recent study prepared by a university for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommends the establishment of a small auxiliary force of about a hundred men, contributed by various countries, to maintain security against threats arising from within the hemisphere. While this proposal is under study at the present time, I would be less than frank not to underline the political and military complexity of establishing a force that would be truly effective and acceptable to all twenty-

one republics in the inter-American community. Discussion of proposals for an international police force might be included under one of the items approved for the agenda of the 11th Inter-American Conference scheduled to open in Quito, March 1, 1961, but no early agreement is foreseen under even the most favorable circumstances. Obviously, such an agreement would require consultations within the individual countries, and it would take a long time to obtain the prescribed two-thirds support of the twenty-one republics, if it could be procured at all.

Some misunderstanding of the mutual defense assistance program also has appeared, both in Latin America and the United States. In this program the United States provides a relatively small amount of materiel and training to a few countries for regional defense needs. Far from serving as the main support of the entire military establishment in any country, as sometimes alleged, in no country does this assistance constitute more than 16 per cent of the total personnel strength of the local armed forces—and from this the ~~total~~ ranges downward to a ~~few~~ two per cent.

This small defense program neither supports nor endorses the additional forces that the individual countries may wish to maintain. The size and character of their total military establishments are within the prerogative of sovereign countries to decide for themselves, and it would be improper for the United States to go beyond a mere statement of belief that most countries probably could reduce their military expenditures without jeopardizing their security requirements. Naturally, the United States would welcome any opportunity to discuss the always difficult and complex subject of Latin-American arms limitations. A conference to discuss this question was proposed by the

Presidents of Chile and Peru, and President Lleras of Colombia has now joined them in this proposal in a statement made during his recent visit in Washington. To the extent that it is compatible with our own national interests, this country is prepared to bring its own programs and policies into harmony with any arms limitation arrangements that may be developed individually or collectively by our neighbors in this hemisphere.

CARIBBEAN ARMS POLICY

I wish to take this opportunity to make clear our policy on the export of arms and implements of war to the Caribbean area. The basic position of the United States is the observance of nonintervention and loyalty to the efforts of the American community as represented in the Organization of American States to maintain within this hemisphere a climate of peace and tranquility within which all American peoples can progress towards the full enjoyment of the benefits of representative democracy and economic progress. There has, however, arisen in various parts of the Caribbean area an atmosphere of violence and tension. Arms obtained in the United States have been utilized, against the desires of the United States government and people, in civil strife and in efforts to intervene by force in the internal affairs of other countries of the area. Accordingly, in March 1958, the United States adopted a policy of closely scrutinizing all applications for export of arms and implements of war to the Caribbean area and, in fact, of denying licenses for shipments from this country to the government of Cuba.

Since that time, there has been no lessening of tensions. The United States has not been able to return to its traditional policy of licensing the export of arms with the assurance that they would

be employed solely for legitimate purposes of defense. Instead, it was obliged to extend impartially to the entire Caribbean region its policy of careful scrutiny of all arms-export applications, denying those likely to result in additional tensions in the area.

This policy was made known to allied and friendly governments, who consult with the United States but who, of course, fully retain the right to make their own decisions in each instance. It should be amply clear that this policy is not directed against any particular country so much as it is directed toward the general aim of maintaining peace in the area.

FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY

It is sometimes said that the doctrine of nonintervention has slowed down the march toward individual freedom and representative democracy in this hemisphere, that nations refusing to apply principles of basic human rights within their borders should not enjoy the "protection" of the nonintervention agreement. This position, in my opinion, is wrong. We have found, after long experience, that nonintervention provides individual nations the opportunity to evolve their own destiny and establish an atmosphere of freedom and human dignity.

Our common devotion to freedom with justice, and indeed to a broad application of democratic principles, should not be construed as an avenue of interference into the affairs of another nation where these same principles may not be in full application. This was a difficult question facing the Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers in Santiago last August, and the decision was clearly stated that the principles of nonintervention are inviolable. Each nation must find its own political destiny without outside interference. This ban on intervention is

just as applicable to forces from outside the Americas as it is within. In his report to the nation, President Eisenhower stated his views this way: "If a tyrannical form of government were imposed from outside or with outside support by force, threat or subversion, we certainly would deem this to be a violation of the principle of nonintervention and would expect the Organization of American States acting under pertinent solemn commitments to take appropriate collective action."

CHILEAN STUDENT LETTER

During his recent tour to Latin America, President Eisenhower received a letter from an organization of university students in Chile. This letter seemed to be sincere and moderate, even thoughtful, but it also demonstrated much of the misunderstanding that exists in the mentality of many students of Latin America. Our Ambassador in Chile delivered the reply on behalf of the President to the student letter on April 8, 1960, and I wish to discuss some of the misunderstandings answered in that correspondence.

One of the phrases that impressed President Eisenhower as an indication of the depths of misunderstanding was the assertion that the United States looks "benevolently" on dictators in the Americas. Our democratic way of life has been so instilled in the makeup of our institutions that we cannot fail to be repelled by the tyrannical abuse of power by governmental leaders. We pointed out that we shall continue to favor the reduction and elimination of antidemocratic governmental practices if the solution is genuinely constructive, in accordance with international obligations, and represents the consensus of the inter-American community. It would only be foolhardy to become so obsessed with the destruction of un-

democratic regimes as to embark upon actions leading to chaos, anarchy, or their replacement by a new but even more dangerous form of tyranny. We hope the point is well noted by the students when they read in the reply that "democracy, unlike communism or any other form of tyranny, cannot be imposed from without by any nations or groups of nations. . . . What all of us can and should strive for is to improve and strengthen the admittedly imperfect democracies in which we live in order that they may serve as examples for others. This moral pressure by example strikes a responsive chord in the hearts of the people."

TRADE AND COMMERCE

That the United States should participate more fully in the economic development of Latin America is a point often made by our critics. The student letter advanced this idea and then added that "economic integration" would permit Latin American countries to "industrialize their economies and accelerate their development." Never in history has a country participated in the economic development of other regions so wholeheartedly as the United States has. The results have been mutually worth while and future prospects are still brighter. Our government has repeatedly and forcefully given its support to the concept of common markets in Latin America that stimulates trade expansion both within the area and with other regions of the world. Improvement of the knowledge and skills of the population has been a major effort of our technical co-operation and educational programs, affording these benefits to thousands of Latin Americans, under the sponsorship of both government and private enterprise.

The letter also points out that our government-owned Export-Import Bank

author does not discuss the social sciences or their contribution to the understanding of man in society. Dr. Weiss obviously considers the social sciences irrelevant to his argument, for he deals with ideal models rather than with actual societies. Only twice does he violate his own self-denying ordinance to mention an actual social situation—the mid-twentieth century controversy in the United States over civil rights and the League of Nations. "I asked myself," he says of his book, "not only how it is that men come to be part of public groups, but what ought to occur, if they are to move out of inferior into better states of affairs, from conventional traditionalized societies to state, to cultures, and then to civilization." The terms "state," "culture," and "civilization" must be understood in terms of specific definitions given by the author in this adventure in speculation. Dr. Weiss says: "... we live not in that Civilization [characterized by peace and prosperity and which can be achieved only through world government] but in a fragmentary realization of this—in a unit of civilization or *Culture*."

The author makes an exhaustive, and exhausting, dialectical analysis of man's "native" rights—"essential demands." "The answer here given to the vexatious problem of unalienable rights . . . agrees that native rights are absolutely unalienable, but only as constituent elements in a single constructed unalienable right. . . ." Dr. Weiss begins his discussion of law with "social" law, William Graham Sumner's folkways and mores though Sumner is not mentioned. The author advances to "positive" law and then to "natural" law. Putting aside the discussion through the centuries of the concept of natural law, Dr. Weiss uses a definition that fits into the development of his argument. "Natural Law" is compounded of our understanding of "the social good, of values that now prevail, of laws of nature that connect the one with the other, and of the fact that the social good makes the operation of some laws more desirable than the operation of others." "Natural Law stands in between positive law and a more comprehensive law, a Law of Civilization. . . ." Natural law "needs a society or state, but no

geration, and in most cases patently untrue, to accuse them of being interested solely in exploiting your countries."

RAW MATERIALS PRICES

The pricing of raw materials is a subject that is often interpreted to the disadvantage of the United States. In this case, the student letter took a quotation out of context from a report and arrived at the opposite conclusion. The full report shows how the development of low-cost resources benefits raw-material-producing countries as well as the countries which buy part of these raw materials. In fact, foreign producers and foreign countries have benefited substantially from policies of the United States government designed, not to obtain raw materials at the lowest price possible, but to give a fair return to suppliers in the United States and abroad.

The Ambassador's reply states: "Our appreciation that violent fluctuations of raw material prices can cause great difficulties for countries which are heavily dependent on the exports of one or two commodities has caused the United States to cooperate with primary producing countries, not only in Latin America, but elsewhere, and in many different ways, in efforts to overcome these difficulties. But the problem is deep-seated and requires basic solution of such matters as rates of economic growth, the need for diversification of production, and the balance of supply and demand. During the time that such fundamental adjustments are being worked out, it may be possible in certain cases to reduce the severity of price fluctuations by arrangements of various kinds among interested countries. In most cases it is possible for countries experiencing temporary balance-of-payments difficulties

as a result of commodity price declines to obtain external financial assistance calculated to tide them over."

The letter points out, that, far from obtaining raw materials at lowest possible prices, prices are supported for certain agricultural products and minerals. Foreign suppliers often obtain prices for commodities sold in the United States which exceed world market prices, at considerable cost to the United States consumer. With respect to imported raw materials which are not produced domestically, we customarily levy low duties or none at all and impose few internal taxes. This stimulates our consumption of these products and so redounds to the benefit of the exporting country.

These are a few of the general areas of misunderstanding. If one would care to dwell upon the effects of disparities, something might be said about the differing heritage of language and cultural patterns, the divergencies in psychological attitudes toward the problems of economics and politics, and the paradoxical comparisons of sociological

and ethnological structures. It is my belief that in the face of present day realities, these dissimilarities are less important than the principles and practices that we hold in common with the people of Latin America. Individuals do differ, and so do nations. What matters far more is their capacity to work together toward their common aims for the mutual good of all.

We must all maintain a balanced perspective toward Latin America. The problems there are great but even greater is the challenge and opportunity. In the ebb and flow of hemispheric developments, progress far outweighs regression. Our relationships with Latin America today are on a sound basis, and there is a constructive trend which should continue unabated into the future. We are jointly committed with our sister republics in what President Lleras Camargo of Colombia two days ago described as a "glorious, responsible and arduous task . . . of proving that a part . . . of the world knows how to live in a society of nations ruled by law and moving towards perfection."

The Problem of German Reunification

By HANS J. MORGENTHAU

ABSTRACT: The unification of Germany is at present impossible because of the irreconcilable interests of the United States and the Soviet Union. The Berlin issue, as it was raised by Khrushchev in November 1958, is the symbolic manifestation of the real issue which has separated the United States and the Soviet Union since the beginning of the cold war, that is, the permanence and legitimacy of the territorial status quo in Europe. The substance of the Berlin issue, by virtue of its symbolic character, is not negotiable, while the modalities of the Western presence in Berlin are. The Western presence in the former capital of a unified Germany symbolizes the provisional character of the division of Germany; by negotiating about its right to be in Berlin, the West would put into question the right itself and, with it, the provisional character of the division of Germany. The Western position is endangered by the Russian advantage of being able to satisfy the German national aspirations whenever it wishes by uniting Germany and restoring its eastern provinces to German rule. It is therefore imperative for the West to reconcile itself to the continuing division of Germany, while at the same time convincing the Germans that their hope to see their country united on tolerable terms lies in co-operation with the West.

GERMAN reunification is like the weather. Everybody talks about it, but nobody does anything about it. The analogy does not end there. For nobody does anything about the weather because nobody can do anything about it; and to a very great degree, especially in so far as the Western world is concerned, we do not do anything about German unification because we are unable to do anything about it. There is, then, a great gap between the verbal professions of interest in German unification and the actual unwillingness and inability to do anything about it. The reasons for this hopeless situation—hopeless in terms of German unification—lie deep in the very nature of the German problem as it presents itself not only to the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe but to the Western world as well.

THE GERMAN PROBLEM

In order to do justice to the German problem and the policies of the nations regarding it, it is necessary to take into account certain objective facts. First of all, even the truncated West Germany of today has already become the third most powerful nation on earth. This is one fact. Furthermore, and this fact goes back into history at least to the first unification of Germany in 1870, the other nations of Europe have regarded and still regard today a powerful, independent Germany as a threat to their interests, if not to their existence. And thirdly, the other nations of Europe have tried to counter this threat of a powerful, independent Germany, and this goes back even to the seventeenth century, by dividing Germany.

The present attitude of both the Soviet Union and the United States toward Germany was established immediately after the Second World War and has remained constant to this very day because of the objective interests

which both powers must pursue with regard to Germany. Considering the actual and potential power of Germany, neither side has been willing to contemplate all of Germany joining the other side as an ally or a satellite. Of this unwillingness, the division of Germany has been the logical result. In other words, what has happened in Korea and Vietnam has also happened with regard to Germany. Since neither side could accept the falling of the whole country into the orbit of the other side and since neither side had enough power to draw all of the country to its side, the division of these countries was a natural consequence of the actual balance of power, of the military and political stalemate between East and West.

THE FUTILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS

The negotiations which have been carried on over the unification of Germany between East and West in innumerable conferences since 1947 all ended in complete failure. They were bound to end so because they were not real negotiations at all. Either side could have had no doubt but that what it proposed was unacceptable to the other side or was acceptable only on the condition of unconditional surrender. The West has consistently proposed free elections for all of Germany which would decide not only the domestic regime but also the political orientation of a united Germany. Of course, the result of such elections has always been a foregone conclusion. If the East Germans could freely elect their government, Communists would not stay in power for twenty-four hours. If they could elect a foreign political orientation for themselves, they would not remain in the Soviet orbit for twenty-four hours. This we know, and this the Soviet Union knows, and for this reason the Soviet Union could never accept free elections in East Ger-

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many, short of being forced to relinquish its foothold in East Germany and start the liquidation of its empire.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has consistently suggested the equal representation of East and West Germany in a common government or in a common commission which would make preparations for unification. In other words, the Soviet Union always insisted upon the minimum demand that the Communist domination of East Germany and the existence of two Germanies be accepted by the West as accomplished facts. Beyond this, the Soviet Union has tried to induce West Germany to accept into its midst a Communist "Trojan horse" which could undermine its government and social structure. This Soviet proposition has been and still is as unacceptable to the West as the Western proposition has been and still is to the Soviet Union. So the so-called "negotiations" over the unification of Germany have ended, as they were bound to end, in a complete and unmitigated stalemate. There is no doubt that both sides will continue to talk about unification as they talk about the weather, but there is also very little doubt that neither side in the foreseeable future is willing and able to do anything about it.

THE BERLIN ISSUE

It is in the context of this hopeless and entirely negative situation that one must consider the current issue of Berlin. For the issue of Berlin has not been created by Mr. Khrushchev for his own amusement. The issue is intimately connected not only with the issue of Germany but more particularly with the long-range objectives of Soviet foreign policy. In order to understand more clearly the significance of the Berlin issue as it was raised by Mr. Khrushchev in November 1958, one

has to go back to the objectives of Stalinist foreign policy.

The major objective of Stalin in Europe was the stabilization of the status quo. During the Second World War, he conceived of the postwar world and, more particularly, Europe being divided between the United States and the Soviet Union into two gigantic spheres of influence, with both superpowers governing the rest of the world in unison and the Soviet Union advancing whenever the opportunity arose. Stalin made numerous proposals, either directly or indirectly through neutral diplomats, for an arrangement with the United States by which at least Europe would be divided into two spheres of influence with the military line of demarcation of 1945 constituting the boundary of the two empires. The United States has consistently refused even to consider such an arrangement. The United States has always regarded the line of military demarcation of 1945 as a provisional line which after a final settlement would run much farther to the east than it runs now. Here again, of course, the division of Germany is the outward manifestation of this stalemate over the territorial settlement of the Second World War, which one side regards as provisional and the other side wants to have recognized as definitive.

Khrushchev has revived this Stalinist objective by raising the issue of Berlin in an acute and threatening form. He has created the Berlin issue as a symbolic manifestation of the over-all German issue, and here lies its significance. For as long as part of Berlin—that is to say, the capital of a once united Germany, the potential capital of a reunited Germany—is occupied by the Western powers, that occupation symbolizes the provisional character of the division of Germany. If the Western

powers were to leave Berlin, making it first a so-called "free city" and then allowing it to become a truly "free" city in the Communist sense—that is to say, a Communist city—they would relinquish that symbolic foothold in the former capital of a united Germany, symbolizing the potential unity of all Germany.

Furthermore, from the Russian point of view, as long as the Western powers are in Berlin by right and not merely by sufferance of the Soviet Union, a point to which I intend to return in a minute, the division of Germany is only provisional. For the status quo of Berlin implies paradoxically enough an instability in the status quo of all of Germany. As long as the Western powers are in Berlin, the division of Germany is only provisional. Once the Western powers have weakened their foothold in Berlin, in that measure the division of Germany is on the way to becoming permanent. And this is exactly what Khrushchev is aiming at. Through the instrumentality of the Berlin issue, he tries to force the West to recognize what it has refused to recognize for the last fifteen years, that is, the definitive division of Europe, with the Russian army standing 100 miles east of the Rhine and staying there for an indefinite future. So the issue that Khrushchev has raised is by no means limited to whether there ought to be eleven or eight or six or five or four thousand Western troops in Berlin, or whether they ought to be in Berlin by virtue of this kind of arrangement or another kind of arrangement. The issue Mr. Khrushchev has raised is the fundamental issue of who shall rule what, and whether what is ruled now by the Soviet Union shall be ruled by it in perpetuity, recognized in its legitimacy by the West. In order to make the over-all status quo in Europe more secure for the Soviet

Union, he has called into question the status quo of Berlin.

Thus the issue of Berlin in its true dimensions by far transcends the legal modalities of the Western presence in Berlin. The Western presence in Berlin and its modalities are a mere symbolic manifestation of the underlying issue from which the cold war between the Soviet Union and the United States arose in the first place and which divides the Soviet Union and the United States today, that is, the legitimacy of the status quo. That issue will continue to divide them as long as both sides defend their interests as they see them.

IS BERLIN NEGOTIABLE?

It has been said that the issue of Berlin is not negotiable. Mr. Adenauer has said it in the name of Germany, and Mr. Acheson has said it as a citizen of the United States, but speaking also for a considerable body of American opinion. They have said that the Berlin issue cannot be negotiated, and I must say that in so far as the substance of the issue is concerned, I agree with them. For if you live in your house and your neighbor tells you to get out, you cannot reply "let's negotiate about it." Either you stick to your right to stay in your house and that is that, or your very willingness to negotiate implies that you are not quite sure that you have the right to be where you are. You cannot insist on your right and make it the subject of debate at the same time.

Mr. Khrushchev is a much more subtle man than Mr. Stalin was, and by trying to change the legal foundation of the Western presence in Berlin, he really tries to undermine the legal right of the West to be in Berlin. At present, the West is in Berlin not by leave of the Soviet Union, not by virtue of a contract with the Soviet Union,

but by the right of the conqueror. Now Mr. Khrushchev says, on the face of it in a most reasonable manner—statesmen that try to separate you from what belongs to you appear often very reasonable—"The Second World War has ended fifteen years ago. Isn't it time to liquidate the war? Oughtn't we to have peace now?" What could be more sensible than this? And so he says, "Let's change the legal foundation for the Western presence in Berlin. Let's give up the right of the conqueror and you, the United States, Great Britain, and France, make a treaty with the Soviet Union, and we will allow you to stay in, and to have access to, Berlin."

However, there is a great deal of difference between being in Berlin on the basis of conquest and being in Berlin because the Soviet Union allows you to be there. For what the Soviet Union allows you today it can deny you tomorrow, and international treaties have a way of being left by the wayside when the situation under which they have been concluded changes. The Soviet Union has shown itself particularly adept, as have other nations, at making treaty stipulations conform to changing circumstances. This innocent-looking change in the legal right of the West to be in Berlin would really put the West at the mercy of the Soviet Union with regard to that right.

However, to say that you cannot negotiate about the substance of your right to be in Berlin does not mean that you cannot negotiate about the modalities of your presence. Certainly you can manipulate that right, you may debate the decorations of the house, the roof, the paint, the driveway. You can agree to building a different fence, say, a United Nations fence, if your neighbor does not like the fence you have. Or we can diminish our troops in a moderate way, or we can stop hostile propaganda. We can pledge

ourselves not to have atomic weapons in Berlin, which we would not want to have there anyway, and so forth. But you cannot sit down and negotiate about your right to be where you are without by implication casting doubt on that right.

If this is the nub of the Berlin issue, then the struggle over Berlin is really a struggle for Germany, and we should realize its significance. And those in our midst and more particularly in Great Britain who say that the Berlin issue is not worth bothering about and is not worth fighting for, if they face the issue squarely, are really saying that Germany is not worth bothering about and Germany is not worth fighting for. And this is exactly what Mr. Khrushchev wants us to believe. For once we have retreated in Berlin, we have not only started to give up Berlin, but we have started to give up much more.

THE SOVIET ADVANTAGE

This leads me to a point which is again part of the objective conditions with which all policy must come to terms, regardless of what it aims at and what measures it proposes. That is the basic fact that with regard to the unification of Germany and to the future allegiance of Germany the Soviet Union has an enormous advantage over the West. For the Soviet Union can unify Germany tomorrow if it wants to, simply by throwing the East German government overboard. And when it comes to the eastern provinces of Germany, it can restore all or a part of them to Germany overnight by dividing Poland again between Germany and the Soviet Union. After all, we should not forget that in the last two hundred years Poland has been divided four times between Germany and Russia. It has been divided not because of the whims of some statesmen, but because

of objective conditions of interest and power which made it advisable for both sides to come to an understanding on the prostrate body of Poland. In the game for the allegiance of Germany, these are the trumps of the Soviet Union which the West cannot match.

What has kept West Germany thus far on the Western side is its mistrust of the ultimate objectives of the Soviet Union and its confidence in the objectives and power of the West. In the measure that this mistrust and this confidence should diminish West Germany will be tempted to try to obtain from the Soviet Union what it wants, that is, unification and the restoration of the former eastern frontiers. The only hope the West has to prevent this from happening is to keep West Germany from becoming disillusioned with the West and to make it crystal-clear that the West will not accede to Soviet Union demands either with regard to Berlin or with regard to any other issue in which Germany has an interest. For if West Germany should believe, rightly or wrongly, that it cannot rely upon the West for support in the pursuit of its national objectives, it will naturally turn elsewhere, and the natural direction in which it will turn is the Soviet Union.

Mr. Khrushchev, who is a subtle but also a blunt man, has taken this possibility into account. He has said to one of his Western visitors that one of these days he will make a bargain with West Germany, and the West will then be left emptyhanded. This is a real danger. It is not yet an acute danger, but it is a real danger because it is inherent in the objective conditions of interest and power. Hence, the West must be on guard lest it is not lured into policies which will give both the Soviet Union and West Germany an incentive for bringing to pass what would be a real catastrophe for the interests and the

power position of the West. It is obvious that the prospects for German unification are dim as long as both sides keep their positions. There is no chance for the unification of Germany under Western auspices as long as the power and interests of the Soviet Union are what they are today. It is also obvious, it seems to me, that the prospects for German unification under Russian auspices will be greatly improved if the West should weaken in its resistance to changing the status quo in Berlin in order to stabilize, for the time being, the status quo in all of Germany.

WESTERN OPPORTUNITY

So far I have spoken primarily of American and Soviet policies. Ten years ago it would have been sufficient to do that, and I could have stopped here. But today it is, of course, necessary to speak of German policies as well. For, as I pointed out before, Germany has already become one of the great powers—economically and politically strong and in the process of becoming militarily strong again. Here lies another factor which strengthens the hand of the Soviet Union. For nobody fears the military power of Germany more than the countries of Eastern Europe, such as Czechoslovakia and Poland, who remember what happened to them fifteen and twenty years ago when Germany was very powerful indeed. And the support of the nations of Eastern Europe for the German policies of the Soviet Union is primarily motivated by that fear. Here is another problem and, I think, another opportunity for the West.

It is interesting to note that President de Gaulle alone of all the Western statesmen has seen this opportunity by declaring himself in favor of the Oder-Neisse line as the permanent eastern frontier of Germany. If all nations

would make such a declaration, in other words, if all nations would make it appear a hopeless undertaking for any German government ever to recover the regions east of the Oder-Neisse line, the present community of interests between the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe would be thereby weakened, if not destroyed, in so far as their policies toward Germany are concerned. And, I think, the nations of the West would also greatly contribute to the stabilization of order in all of Europe and to the promotion of freedom in eastern Europe.

These considerations have, of course, but an indirect and negative bearing upon my topic, the unification of Germany. They deal with policies and conditions which would make the continuing division of Germany bearable for all concerned. For unification cannot be brought about in the foreseeable future by diplomatic negotiations. Given the continuation of the present balance of military power, it cannot be brought about by force. It can only come about by the Soviet Union, which, as I said, occupies the key position in this situation, realizing that it is more to its advantage to relinquish East Germany than to keep it indefinitely.

WHAT PRICE LIBERATION?

The last question I want to raise then is how can one create an interest in the Soviet Union to yield East Germany? Two proposals have been made to create such an interest; one has been the neutralization of Germany—which was widely debated in the late forties—the other, more recently discussed, has been disengagement. Neutralization might have been possible perhaps ten or twelve years ago when Germany was both impotent and antimilitaristic. But a great power which is aware of its power and which is rapidly regaining its military strength, primarily

under Western instigation and auspices, cannot be neutralized from the outside. It can be neutral if it wants to be neutral, but no other power or group of powers will be able to impose neutrality upon it against its will. Thus nobody, I suppose, seriously thinks of the neutralization of Germany today.

The idea of disengagement, on the other hand, implies a retreat of the armed forces which face each other in the center of Europe at the line of demarcation of 1945, so that a zone free of the armed forces of both West and East would be created, comprising at least all of Germany and some adjacent territories to the east and west. I have always had difficulties in seeing the virtue of this proposal in strictly military terms. For obviously the danger of war does not arise from armed forces opposing each other in physical proximity in Europe. It arises rather from intercontinental ballistic missiles poised in readiness on both sides. This danger would not be affected by disengagement. This anticipated benefit of disengagement, if I understand it correctly, is really political. It is intended to create an incentive for the Soviet Union, by paying it a price, to loosen its military grip on Eastern Europe.

In the abstract, this is indeed a sensible proposition. But as a practical matter, it has become obvious from Mr. Khrushchev's words and deeds that he does not intend to strike a bargain for such a price. Being aware of the inner weakness of the Russian empire, on the one hand, and, on the other, being much more committed than Stalin ever was to the dynamic expansion of Communism, he intends to stabilize, not to dismantle, that empire. The Russian government cannot afford, in view both of this weakness and this dynamism, to retreat from any forward position, such as East Germany, without endangering its empire altogether. For

once it starts retreating there will be no way of knowing where the retreat will stop. Once the East Germans have regained their freedom, will not the Poles and Hungarians try to regain theirs? Furthermore, a political movement which claims to bring salvation to all mankind and looks forward to burying the non-Communist world cannot afford to retreat, it cannot afford to stop advancing. At the very least, it must stay where it is and must try to advance; for by retreating, it denies its very claim of being the "wave of the future," the ideal organization of society in whose image sooner or later the whole world will be organized. Thus it is impossible to visualize at present a price sufficient to induce the Soviet Union to forsake East Germany and thereby create the essential precondition for German unification.

This is obviously, in terms of German

unification, a hopeless outlook. But it is not necessarily a hopeless outlook in terms of the objective interests of all concerned. We and everybody else can live with a divided Germany, provided we can convince the West Germans that they also must live for the time being with a divided Germany. Knowing that Germany can at present not be united, we must nevertheless keep up their hope that one day it will. And we must convince them that their hope to see their country united on tolerable terms lies in co-operation with the West. This task requires a great measure of statesmanship, of subtlety, of courage, and of caution, and it carries within itself a formidable danger. That danger poses the real problem for Western policy: how to prevent the West Germans from becoming desperate about unification and making a bargain with the Soviet Union.

* * *

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: I have two questions for Dr. Morgenthau. First, is the Soviet policy with regard to the reunification of Germany, in your view, motivated by the security considerations of the Soviet Union—that means by the fear of a reunited and eventually remilitarized Germany—or by the desire of the Kremlin to preserve or to keep its wartime conquests in Europe, or by the eventual ambitions to extend the Soviet and Communist domination westward over all of Germany and all of Europe? My second question is, would it not render the position of the Western powers in the forthcoming summit conference stronger, if they would switch from the defensive to an offensive? That is, to put the question of the liquidation of World War II in the right perspective and to raise both problems

that constitute the legacy of World War II, namely, the problem of Germany and the problem of the restoration of independence or freedom of the nine sovereign states that are now in Soviet bondage, by applying the principle of self-determination to the solution of both problems. By applying the principle that even Khrushchev in Afghanistan advocated for the tribes of Pukhtuns and also for the peoples and tribes of Africa.

A: If I still remember your first question, I think the Soviet Union is primarily motivated by the desire to keep what it has annexed and to annex more when the occasion arises. It is not primarily motivated by security considerations. I must disagree here respectfully with Mr. Warburg's inter-

pretation that there is an incompatibility between NATO and the unification of Germany, that is to say, that the dismantlement of NATO is a precondition for the unification of Germany. I believe that even if NATO had never existed, the Soviet Union would not agree to the unification of Germany on any terms acceptable to the West. As far as your second question is concerned, I would give a qualified positive answer to it. I think our policy has been much too negative all along. We always react to Russian moves rather than let the

Russians react to ours for a change. I found in the fall of 1956, and still find today, our inactivity in the face of the Hungarian revolution almost inexcusable. But on the other hand, there is, of course, a great difference between making verbal declarations and pursuing a policy. We have had enough of verbal declarations about liberation and so forth; everybody knew, almost everybody knew, that no action could follow those words. So I think it is wise to bring verbal declarations and actions somewhat in tune and not to promise more than one is able to achieve.

COMMENTS

JAMES P. WARBURG

I first want to make clear that I did not say that the choice was between reunification and NATO; I said that the choice was between a German military participation in NATO or German reunification—that is not the same thing. In the second place, I think it is all very well to say that we should take the offensive, but I have yet to hear from you, sir, or from anyone else, what the offensive should be. Now what I suggest is that we say to the Russians, "We opt for reunification at the price of the neutralization not only of the two German states, but as much as possible of the whole area in between us." I am not prepared to say that the Russians will accept this; I do say that we should make this proposal because if it is accepted you will settle the cold war as far as Europe is concerned. If it is turned down then it is perfectly clear where the fault lies and instead of reiterating the same demand that we want the Russians to give up their Germany under free elections in order that it may become a part of the anti-Communist alliance—this is what we have been saying when we demand that a

reunited Germany shall have the right to enter NATO—I think we should at last face this decision we have got to make. It is much too late, we should have done it a long time ago. But I still think we ought to set ourselves right with the world by making this proposal, which is sensible. I will go one step further and say that I am not at all sure that the Russians would reject it. Mr. Khrushchev, if he knows nothing else, is keenly aware of what the Russian self-interest is, and I suspect that he knows that ultimately the Soviet coercive position in Eastern Europe is untenable. If he could have a bridge built for him and receive something in exchange for it, he might very well consider this. Because unless he does it soon, these people are really going to be alienated from Russia in the long run; whereas, some of them might voluntarily associate themselves with the Soviet bloc economically, if they are not pushed too far. In any case, you can never find out whether the Russians will or will not enter a serious negotiation until you try, and we have never tried.

How Useful Is NATO?

By JAMES P. WARBURG

ABSTRACT: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was originally conceived as an alliance between the United States, Canada, and Western Europe for the purpose of guaranteeing their mutual defense. The assurance the alliance provided for the defense of Western Europe was beneficial and necessary in the face of the mounting Soviet threat. More and more the "shield" that NATO forces were to provide has become nothing more than a "tripwire," because the NATO military forces in Europe, according to the calculated estimates, are and have been since the inception of NATO inadequate to restrain a Soviet westward movement. Apart from the military co-operation provided for in the alliance, there were provisions for political and economic co-operation. These were left aside from the beginning, mainly because there were other organizations better suited to deal with them effectively. For these reasons, it seems that NATO has become an outmoded instrument for the pursuit of free-world interests. Perhaps, NATO could be used as a bargaining counter for an eventual peace settlement in Europe, but it may already be too late to use NATO for even this purpose.—Ed.

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THE mere assignment of the question "How useful is NATO?" to a participant in this annual symposium seems to me interesting. It implies that NATO is no longer quite so much of a sacred fetish as it has been in the past.

Very likely, the new mood of skepticism which prompts the raising of this question arises out of four more or less recent developments in the European scene. I have in mind the resurgent nationalism of France under President de Gaulle—a nationalism which repudiates military or political integration and insists that France will co-operate as an equal with its friends but will not in any way dilute its sovereignty. I have in mind further the fact that, because of the Algerian war, French participation in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has become little more than nominal and that, as a consequence, West Germany has become the central bastion of NATO defense. Third, I would suppose that the recent outbreak of anti-Semitism in Germany and the Bonn government's flirtation with Franco Spain have somewhat shaken confidence in that country's fitness to serve as a bulwark of Western democracy. And, finally, the unfortunate split between the so-called "Inner Six and Outer Seven"—between the Common Market countries and the Free Trade Area—has given rise to misgivings about the solidarity of Western Europe.

I do not wish to minimize any of these developments. Each is, indeed, a serious threat to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I would suggest, however, that these developments have arisen very largely out of the past and that, to some extent, they were made inevitable by decisions reached long ago.

At the end of World War II, the ideal of Europeanism had supplanted the spirit of nationalism which had caused so many wars. Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe reduced this ideal

to the dream of at least a united Western Europe. At the same time, fear of further Soviet encroachment strengthened the West European desire to draw together. The United States and Britain encouraged this drive toward unification.

But then two things happened:

The British, having encouraged European integration, decided to abstain from participation in it.

The United States, having taken a firm stand against German rearmament, reversed its position.

The resurgence of French nationalism is the direct result of French fear of being left in a West European union dominated by West Germany.

The resurgence of German nationalism is the direct result of the predictable failure of Allied denazification and re-education capped by the American demand for West German rearmament.

What has happened to Western Europe is, I think, very largely attributable to the panic generated in the West by the Communist rape of Czechoslovakia in February 1948. Fear of a Soviet military invasion of Western Europe led within thirty days to the signature of the Brussels Pact by Great Britain, France, Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg. A year later, still greater apprehension aroused by the Soviet blockade of West Berlin led to the North Atlantic Treaty, in which the Brussels powers were joined by Norway, Denmark, Italy, Portugal, Iceland, Canada, and the United States. In 1952, Turkey and Greece became additional signatories.

A DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE

In order that the rather negative opinion which I am about to express concerning the present value of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization may not seem capricious or based upon

hindsight, I shall take the liberty of briefly tracing its historical evolution.

Exactly ten years before the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, during the anxious days of the so-called "Peace of Munich," I ventured to suggest in a speech before the Economic Club of New York that the only way to prevent Hitler from starting a second world war would be for the United States to declare at once that it would consider any attack upon Western Europe as an attack upon itself. It is scarcely necessary to state that, at that time, the suggestion of an Atlantic Treaty fell upon barren ground. The predominant isolationist sentiment was eloquently expressed by two other speakers, one of whom—a Democratic United States Senator—asserted that there would be no war in Europe and that in any case it would not affect the United States; while the other—later to become a Republican Secretary of State—said that "only hysteria would suggest that any of the dynamic have-not powers, Germany, Italy and Japan, would ever dream of attacking the United States."

I mention this little episode only to show that I have never been prejudiced against linking the defense of the United States to the defense of Western Europe, even when this idea was far from popular.

Ten years later, in May 1949, I was invited to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with regard to the North Atlantic Treaty then under consideration. My basic attitude remained the same; namely, that the United States should make it unequivocally clear—this time to the Soviet Union—that an attack upon Western Europe would be considered by the United States as an attack upon itself. Although I did not share the prevalent fear of a physical invasion of Western Europe by the Soviet Union, I recognized that the fear existed and that, if

nothing were done to allay it, anxiety might well paralyze the West European recovery which had begun under the Marshall Plan. This would again make Western Europe vulnerable to what seemed to me the real danger; namely, the danger of political subversion and penetration. Accordingly, I testified in favor of the proposed treaty.

However—and this is a big however—I took the position that the United States should *not* commit itself in advance to fighting an aggressor according to any preannounced strategic plan—least of all to a plan under which it would commit itself to defend Western Europe at the line of the Iron Curtain which ran through the heart of a partitioned Germany. My stated reasons were these:

1. That it is always wise in war to retain freedom of action as to strategy and tactics.
2. That, given our overhasty demobilization, it would scarcely be possible to build up land power in Central Europe capable of holding off 175 combat-ready Soviet divisions.
3. That any attempt to build such power would divert Western Europe from recovery to rearmament and thus make it once more vulnerable to political penetration.
4. That the fulfillment of a commitment to defend Western Europe at its frontiers would necessitate the permanent stationing in Germany of a powerful United States garrison, far in excess of the equivalent of two divisions then doing occupation duty.
5. That any undertaking by the United States to defend West Germany would inevitably lead to the demand that the West Germans contribute to their own defense—in other words, to the rearming of West Germany—and that such a demand would both undermine the morale of Western Europe and cement Moscow's hold upon Eastern Europe.¹

The Senators referred to the fact that Secretary of State Acheson had assured

¹ See Congressional Record on May 10, 1949.

them that Europe would not be diverted from recovery to rearmament; that no additional American troops would be sent to Europe; and that, in no circumstances, would the United States ever acquiesce in the remilitarization of Germany.

When it was pointed out that, if such were the administration's intention, any undertaking to defend Western Europe at its frontiers would be a cruel hoax upon the countries of Western Europe, the Foreign Relations Committee went on record to the effect that the North Atlantic Treaty would not be permitted to involve any such commitment.²

Yet, within weeks, the Truman administration did quietly take precisely this commitment. It did shortly send four additional American divisions to Germany. And, within a year, it demanded the rearming of West Germany.

Now, it is widely believed that this extraordinary reversal came about as the result of the Korean War. This is demonstrably untrue. Even before the treaty was signed, Maurice Duverger had written in *Le Monde*: "If one speaks of defending Western Europe against possible external aggression, it must be recognized that these words imply the restoration of the German army." In May 1949, *Le Monde* said: "The rearming of Germany is contained in the Atlantic Pact like the yolk in the egg." By the end of 1949, German rearmament was being discreetly discussed in Britain and in the United States although officially denied in both countries. I, myself, heard Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein advocate "rearming Jerry" in November 1949. On May 7, 1950, John J. McCloy, returning to the United States at the end of his term as High Commissioner in Germany, publicly expressed the opinion that German troops were

necessary to the defense of Europe.³ This was a month before the Korean outbreak.

The Korean War merely provided an excuse for publicly announcing a decision which had been previously reached as the inevitable consequence of undertaking to defend Western Europe in central Germany.

NATO'S MILITARY VALUE

It is not necessary to review the four years of pushing and hauling which followed upon Secretary Acheson's formal demand, in September 1950, for a German participation in NATO, at the end of which period the French rejected their own Pleven Plan for a European Defense Community and paradoxically agreed to the creation of a national German army.

Nor is it necessary to review the long series of meetings of the Atlantic Council at which minimum force goals were set which were never to be even approximately realized. It is sufficient to note that, at the Lisbon Conference of 1952, 80 divisions were set as the minimum required to restrain a Soviet invasion. At that time, NATO could muster about 18 divisions, half of them supplied by the United States, Great Britain, and Canada. Since then, the only substantial addition to NATO's European front has been supplied by Germany which now has furnished 7 not yet fully trained divisions. Meanwhile, Britain has reduced her forces and France has withdrawn practically all her NATO contingents to North Africa.

In 1954, when it had become obvious that Western Europe itself was unwilling or unable to make a serious effort to provide for its own defense, the

³ See E. S. Furniss Jr., *France, Troubled Ally* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), pp. 50 and 62.

NATO Council decided that, if the NATO forces could be equipped with so-called "tactical nuclear weapons," 30 divisions, equipped with these weapons, would suffice for the central European front. This revised plan was based upon the theory that the resulting increase in fire-power would offset the deficiency in manpower—a theory which apparently failed to take into account that Soviet forces might be similarly equipped.

In spite of the reduction in manpower requirements, General Norstad is even at this late date complaining that he is short of the 30 divisions promised to him as a minimum.

On the other hand, by trying to save manpower, NATO has, as the saying goes, "painted itself into a corner" by rendering itself incapable of fighting anything other than the nuclear war which it was supposed to prevent.

The original concept was that the NATO ground and tactical air forces would provide the shield, while the United States Strategic Air Force provided the sword. The shield was expected to restrain an invasion long enough to gain time for negotiation, or for an appeal to the United Nations, before the sword would have to be unsheathed.

This concept is now invalidated. The shield has become little more than a tripwire assuring immediate United States involvement. The sword has been blunted by reason of the fact that the United States can no longer destroy Russia without itself suffering destruction.

As for the costly string of Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases erected in Britain, Spain, North Africa, and Turkey, these have served chiefly to arouse Soviet apprehension and to spur on Soviet efforts to develop countervailing long-range striking power. Without doubt, Soviet missile launchers are now

"zeroed in" on all of these establishments.

To summarize up to this point:

The original basic idea of NATO was soundly conceived as a declaration of American and Canadian solidarity with the West European nations which had pledged each other mutual assistance under the Brussels Pact of 1948. As such, the NATO Treaty gave Western Europe a needed reassurance and served, perhaps, as a useful warning to the Soviet Union.

The mistake, I think, was to stretch the treaty commitment into an undertaking to defend Western Europe at a line running through the middle of a partitioned Germany. This so-called "forward strategy" necessarily involved rearming West Germany and thereby disunited the West while solidifying the Eastern bloc. No other single factor has so effectively cemented the Warsaw Pact alliance as the fear of a rearmed Germany.

Moreover, it became evident that this forward strategy demanded a far greater effort and sacrifice than the West European countries were able or willing to undertake.

Since I, for one, have never believed that the Russians intended a military attack upon Western Europe unless they could first thoroughly undermine it politically and outflank it in Asia and the Middle East, it was my view that the Marshall Plan fulfilled the first essential in West European defense. Rearmament, if undertaken on a scale large enough to implement the forward-strategy commitment, would have arrested West European recovery, undone the work of the Marshall Plan, and rendered Western Europe once more politically vulnerable. Fortunately, from my point of view, this did not happen. But the fact that it did not happen—that rearmament was never undertaken on a scale commensurate with the com-

² See front page of the *New York Times* of May 11, 1949.

mitment—made NATO more of a provocation than a military barrier to aggression.

A POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty provided for close economic as well as military co-operation among the signatories. The fact is, however, that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has concerned itself almost exclusively with military affairs. The economic co-operation which has occurred within Western Europe and between Western Europe and the United States has been achieved first through the Organization for European Economic Co-operation set up under the Marshall Plan, and then, so far as the Inner Six are concerned, under the auspices of the European Coal and Steel Community, Euratom, and the Common Market. As a vehicle for economic co-operation among the signatories, NATO has achieved next to nothing.

There have, to be sure, been sporadic efforts to endow NATO with more of a politico-economic aspect. It has, for example, been suggested that NATO should become the instrument through which its members would supply economic aid to the so-called "underdeveloped countries."

It is difficult for me to think of a worse method of handling this crucially important problem. The emerging nations which require economic assistance are for the most part former colonial possessions of Great Britain, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. These four nations are leading members of NATO. In addition, Portugal, an unregenerate colonial power, is a NATO member. To make NATO the channel through which the industrialized countries would direct their economic aid programs would, in the eyes of most of the recipients, color the whole effort with the psychological overtones of co-

lonialism. On the other hand, neither Switzerland nor Sweden, both highly industrialized nations, is a member of NATO, not to mention Japan which is probably one of the most important potential contributors to any plan of world-wide economic development.

Clearly, acting as the instrument for aid to economic development is one function to which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization does *not* lend itself.

What about NATO's usefulness as an instrument of promoting European unity?

If we mean by this all-European unity, it is obvious that NATO is scarcely the most likely organization in which the divided European trading community might be reunited. If we mean only West European unity, it is difficult to see how an organization which does not include Switzerland, Sweden, Austria, and Spain and which does include Greece and Turkey can furnish the ideal nucleus. The Organization for European Economic Co-operation would seem far more suitable, particularly in view of the unfortunate cleavage between the Inner Six and the Outer Seven which has recently arisen.

Finally, what about NATO as the instrument through which its member nations might co-ordinate and concert their policy in other parts of the world? Here the trouble lies not so much in the nature of NATO as in the divergent interests and policies of its members. How could NATO or any other organization hope to co-ordinate French policy with United States policy in North Africa or United States policy in China with that of Britain? NATO has not even been able to co-ordinate American, British, French, and German policy toward Russia with respect to the future of Germany.

To say this is not to say that co-ordination of policy among the Western powers is not to be desired. Of course

it is, just as the unification of Europe or even of Western Europe is to be desired. But to agree upon desirable objectives is one thing; to say that NATO is the most desirable instrument for attaining these objectives is another thing altogether.

A BARGAINING COUNTER

This brings me to the conclusion that NATO has probably outlived its usefulness, except possibly in one respect—namely, as a bargaining counter in negotiating with the Soviet Union toward an eventual all-European peace settlement.

Germany is the key to an all-European settlement. If the Western powers seriously wish to end the state of tension in Europe, they must at long last face a choice which has all along been inescapable. They must decide whether they want a German military participation in NATO or the reunification of Germany. They cannot have both.

If the Western powers decide that they cannot or will not forego a West German military contribution to NATO, then they must accept as more or less permanent the partition of Germany and the continued existence of a divided Europe. This will involve recognition of the German Democratic Republic and the renunciation of any idea of "liberating" Eastern Europe. This choice will also mean that the Western powers cannot reasonably expect West Berlin to remain as a Western-controlled island of freedom in the heart of the communist-controlled German Democratic Republic. The most they can hope for is that all of Berlin might be united as a free city under United Nations guardianship, with the United Nations possibly exercising its authority through a resurrected four-power *Kommandatura*. Even if Soviet agreement to such an arrangement could be

obtained—as it might be in the context of a Western recognition of the European status quo—it is difficult to see how, in the long run, the inhabitants of the free city could avoid becoming economically dependent upon the surrounding communist territory, thus eventually losing their freedom.

If, on the other hand, the Western powers were to decide that they want German reunification—and, eventually, all-European reunification—more than they want a West German military contribution to NATO, then the situation would arise in which NATO would become a bargaining counter.

Obviously, Germany cannot be reunited in freedom, so long as Soviet coercive power remains in the East German republic. It is equally obvious that the Soviet Union will not withdraw its coercive forces from East Germany without a countervailing Western withdrawal. In 1956, when the Soviet Union was in trouble in Hungary and Poland, I suggested that the Western powers might—as a start toward mutual retirement from Europe—offer to withdraw American, British, and French forces to the west bank of the Rhine in exchange for a Soviet withdrawal to the east bank of the Oder and Neisse rivers. This proposal gained some support in Washington but was strongly objected to by West German Chancellor Adenauer.

Since then, the Polish government has come forward with the Rapacki Plan, under which foreign troops would be withdrawn not only from the two German states but from Poland and Czechoslovakia as well. Mr. Hugh Gaitskell, leader of the British Labour Party, advanced a similar proposal which included Hungary in the neutralized zone.

The essence of all these proposals, including the rather vague suggestions put forward in 1957 by former United States Ambassador to Moscow, George

F. Kennan, is that the states in the neutralized zone be debarred from entering into military alliance with either NATO or the Warsaw bloc. This debarment would not stand in the way of their entering into whatever non-military association they might wish.

So far as German reunification is concerned, beyond troop withdrawal, it would be necessary to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union in which both sides undertook to permit the two German states to find their own way toward eventual reunification without any outside interference whatever. Pending such reunification, the status quo in Berlin might be preserved—possibly with some modifications—or else the United Nations might be asked to take over until the city could once more become the capital of a reunited Germany.

Now, as a practical matter, I see very little hope that, so long as Konrad Adenauer remains in power, the West will be able to reach any such decision. Dr. Adenauer has staked his political life upon his ability to make the people of West Germany continue to believe in a myth—the myth that they can both remain military allies of the West and achieve the reunification of their partitioned country. In this effort Chancellor Adenauer had the full support of the Truman administration and, until the incapacitation of Secretary Dulles, the equally strong support of its successor.

Prime Minister Macmillan and President Eisenhower are now clearly aware that the Adenauer-Acheson-Dulles policy has run the West into a dead-end street. I suspect that Mr. Dulles recognized this himself shortly before his tragic death. On the other hand, President de Gaulle, who doubtless likewise realizes the futility of the Western policy, is for reasons of his own supporting the German Chancellor's intransigence. Thus, the chances are that, in the forth-

coming negotiations, the Western powers will not be able to come to a clear choice between two mutually exclusive objectives.

If this is a correct forecast, the result will strongly favor the Soviet side because it, quite clearly, knows precisely what it wants; namely, the maintenance of the German and European status quo with the sole exception of the status quo as to West Berlin.

It is probably clear from what I have said that, in my opinion, NATO should be used as a bargaining counter in seeking to achieve the objective of removing Soviet coercive power from all of Europe outside of the Soviet Union's own frontiers. I must add that the pursuit of this objective begins to make real sense only in connection with a serious effort to achieve general disarmament.

The other choice—to accept as permanent the partition of Germany and of Europe for the sake of keeping West Germany in NATO—seems to me wholly undesirable.

The only way to defend Western Europe is to make peace in all of Europe. If war should come, NATO cannot defend Western Europe with or without a German participation. But a partitioned and rearmed Germany will always remain a threat to peace.

CONCLUSION

As a military alliance, NATO is obsolete, not only because it was conceived in terms of preventing the sort of war which can never again occur, but because all military alliances are becoming meaningless by reason of the obsolescence of war. The world's need is for a greatly strengthened world organization capable of enforcing universal disarmament—not for old-fashioned coalitions, alliance, and counteralliances.

As a political organization, NATO is

both too large and too small. It is too large for the creation of a consensus among homogeneous peoples. It is too small because it does not embrace all the peoples among whom a consensus might be attainable. In a world two-thirds nonwhite, NATO is a white man's club which does not even include some of the best of the white peoples. In a world two-thirds impoverished, hungry, and seeking change, NATO is essentially an association of those relatively fortunate nations which seek to preserve the status quo.

As a bargaining counter to be used in pursuit of a durable European peace settlement, NATO is an asset, but an asset the value of which is rapidly depreciating through disuse.

Given the apparent unwillingness of our government to join the British in overriding the stubborn intransigence of Chancellor Adenauer and the probability that this intransigence will continue

to be supported by President de Gaulle, it seems to me unlikely that NATO will be used as a bargaining counter in the forthcoming talks at the summit. In that case, it seems probable that the ultimate decision will be left until next year, when a new administration will be in office. Whether NATO will then still have any value as a bargaining counter depends upon intervening developments impossible to predict.

The one thing which seems to me clear beyond doubt or argument is that United States policy with respect to NATO, Germany, and a European peace settlement has—like our policy with respect to China—remained static throughout a decade in which conditions have radically changed. Whatever may have been the merit of our European and Far Eastern policies when they were initiated ten years ago, they are now not only inadequate but almost wholly irrelevant.

* * *

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: Wise men learn by reason. Would it not be wise on the part of the United States to cut through the Gordian-like knot of the problems we have been talking about, by proceeding in the direction of total disarmament that Mr. Khrushchev said the Soviet Union desires and that the highest authorities, including President Eisenhower, say that we desire? Would not that condition do more to unify Germany, free Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Bulgaria from the grip of the Russians, and provide the means to implement what Paul Hoffman said we needed to do in the world?

A: I said that the suggestion of an attempt to reach a German settlement, which I put forward, only made sense

in the context of a serious attempt to reach general disarmament. Of course this should be the objective. I think the questioner does not fully understand the Soviet proposal. What we have reached so far apparently is a condition in which the Soviet Union says, "We want you to agree that we all want universal general disarmament," and then there is some vague language about how it would be enforced. What we have said, and I do not approve of it myself, is that we want to move step by step without ever saying what our ultimate goal is. I do not think that first steps are worth while unless they are first steps towards something. Our government, I think, should make it unequivocally clear that it is our aim to achieve total universal disarmament.

down to the level of lightly armed internal security forces; and to have this disarmament enforced by a supranational enforcement agency—there is no other way to enforce it—endowed with the exclusive right to maintain and if necessary to use force to prevent illegal rearmament. So far, this has not been our declared aim. Secretary Herter made a very forthright speech on February 18 in which he almost said this, but not quite. There is more than a semantic difference between talking about international and supranational enforcement. International implies enforcement by international agreement between sovereign nation-states. This has been tried again and again and it never works; you can use it to enforce action against a small aggressor but not against a big one. I suspect that the Russians are very far from being willing to create the supranational agency under which alone you can really have universal disarmament. I agree with the questioner that this should be the context in which we try to do all these things, but it is not a question of which is chicken and which is egg. You cannot say you have to get disarmament before you can relax tensions; you cannot say you have to relax tensions before you can get disarmament. What you need is two simultaneous efforts.

Q: Is there not a certain danger in overrealism? Does not this overrealism lead to a new defeat, to new concessions? By overrealism I mean an acceptance of the status quo. I think, at this time, when there is a nuclear stalemate, moral values are a very dynamic force in all negotiations, and if we really abide by moral values we can expect much better results.

A: I would say that you are simply saying the same things I have been say-

ing. You are against accepting the status quo, which is the present condition in Eastern Europe and Eastern Germany. So am I. I do not think you alter it by simply digging your feet in and by staying in the same trenches in which you have stood for ten years. I think you must come forward with a constructive proposal. Now if you do not like mine, give me a better one.

Q: Is not your structure somewhat based upon glittering and unproven generalities? For instance, you referred to the revival of anti-Semitism in Germany, which is an assertion that has not yet been proven. In another part you mentioned that NATO has cemented the Eastern Alliance. This does not seem to me the case, since the cement became looser after NATO's establishment, just about 1956, specifically with respect to Poland and Hungary.

A: Well, these are two quite separate questions. I only referred to the recrudescence of swastika painting as one of things which probably make people a little skeptical, at the present time, about the solidarity of Europe. If you want my brief analysis of what this means, I do not think it is anti-Semitism at all. I think that this swastika painting is an expression of unregenerate German nationalism, and it happens to take this form because this is the symbol for this whole business. I am not surprised at this because there are high Nazis in the government, countenanced by us incidentally. I do not know how many of you know that the man who performs the same functions, and has for ten years, for Dr. Adenauer that Sherman Adams, until he got in trouble with Mr. Goldfine, performed for President Eisenhower, is a gentleman called Hans

Globke, who is co-author of the Nuremberg racial laws. I have also seen the German textbooks and the history books. The entire twelve-year period in most of these books is covered in about a page or a page and a half. Thus, it is not surprising, at all, that if you ask a German teen-ager who Hitler was, he does not know anything about concentration camps. Hitler was the man who built the *Autobahn*. So the only thing that surprises me is that this has not happened sooner. I do not think it is anti-Semitism; I think it is simply using the anti-Semitic symbol to express a resurgent Nazism. Now as to the second question: as I see it, and this is debatable, the revolt in East Germany in 1953 and in Hungary and

Poland in 1956 was not caused by and had nothing to do with NATO. This had to do with a relaxation of tensions after the death of Stalin, and, oddly enough—this is historically often the case—when a tyrannical regime begins to relax tension this is when your revolution takes place. You would think it would take place when the pressure on the people was greatest, but that is not the case. It usually takes place when the pressure is relaxed. Therefore I do not think this had anything to do with NATO. I do think that the formation of NATO and the rearming of Germany tied the Poles closer to Russia, and probably the Czechs and Hungarians as well, than they otherwise would have been.

Estimating National Power and Intentions

By CHARLOTTE AND GEORGE DYER

ADDENDUM

The article beginning on the next page is pertinent to the general subject of the conference on "Whither American Foreign Policy?", but the paper was not presented orally at the meeting. It is published here in the hope that it may help to stimulate a discussion on increased coverage and mechanization in gathering and analyzing the information necessary if sound decisions are to be made in foreign relations.

JAMES C. CHARLESWORTH
Special Editor

ABSTRACT: The rational formulation of American foreign policy is rendered extremely difficult by the great number of factors which must be taken into account by the decision-makers. These are beyond the capacity of any human brain, or even team of brains, to assimilate, evaluate, and reduce to forms upon which sound policy can be based. A weighted framework or model is needed, and some mechanical support for human thinking which would rationalize initial foreign policy estimation electrically. Such a device will also permit gaming. As a preliminary blueprint for this proposed device, *The World Analyst* classification system is used to divide national power into ten "factors": geographic, demographic, political, foreign affairs, economic, industry, transportation and communication, scientific, armed forces and biographic. To evaluate individual elements of national strength and weakness, these are cross-categorized on game boards in five panels: immediate national power, potentials for national power, destruction of such elements, aggressions between nations other than the United States, and acts of aggression towards the United States. Using a model of this sort a trial balance can be obtained between nations, and policy can be tested in advance.

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IN common with many other aspects of life in the United States, but earlier than some, American foreign policy has reflected the chaos associated with the 180-degree change from an economy of scarcity to the "affluent society." One hundred and fifty years ago, for example, the President and the Department of State suffered from an outright lack of information upon which to base crucial decisions.¹ Now to a great extent the reverse is true, and in most areas of consideration our agencies concerned with international relations are literally flooded with an embarrassing wealth of information.² Why such riches should be embarrassing rather than enlightening is well described by Roger Hilsman in a recent study.³ His "operators," though often clinging naively to the idea that their foreign policy decisions would be better if they had "all the facts," are really aware that if they did have all the facts the result would be only acute indigestion.

There are at least two underlying reasons why ulcers are the lot of decision-makers immersed in this sector of the economy of abundance. It is not just that there are too many "facts" about foreign nations available for any single human mind—or any staff collection of human minds—to assimilate. Also no over-all framework for the comparison of national "capabilities and vulnerabilities" has been established⁴—to say

nothing at the moment about "intentions"—nor have there been any mechanical means devised by which the most important elements of such a comparison might be rationalized and presented in digestible form to the human mind that must, ultimately, make policy decisions. The purpose of this article is to present a proposal for such a framework and its supporting mechanization.

Objections

Any proposal so sweeping and novel in its claims must immediately face two types of objections. The first is one advanced, notably in the Hilsman book, that "all" those facts which might conceivably have a bearing on a given foreign policy decision approach infinity as a limit. This is essentially a counsel of despair, and in justice to Hilsman it must be said that he recognizes the all-important role of selection. The present writers, while admitting that even the current price of horseshoe nails might have some bearing on the outcome of a battle or a contest for world empire, believe that a sound system of selection and emphasis can reduce the margin for error to manageable if not negligible proportions.

The second argument is the old one to the effect that "you can't add oranges and apples." This is the conceptual single track which has led previous thinkers into the intellectual cul-de-sac of trying to reduce the entire complex of national power to some over-all common denominator, such as dollars. To change the metaphor, it is on this Procrustean bed that the "facts" had to be stretched or chopped beyond any final

works as George B. Cressey's *The Basis of Soviet Strength* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1945); and even in such fine efforts as Harold and Margaret Sprout's *Foundations of National Power* (2nd ed.; New York: Van Nostrand, 1951).

utility. The solution offered in this article bypasses the need for a rational common denominator by providing an electronic one, and conceptualizes a model of the "perfectly" strong society against which all others may be compared in all important details; hence, in terms of relative power, each may then be compared to any other.

NATIONAL POWER ANALYSIS

The central ideas for this proposal are so few and so essentially uncomplicated that it might be well to state them briefly in advance of a more elaborate exposition. One is that a system for organizing information on international relations can be devised which will comprehend data on so large a proportion of the essential elements of national strength and weakness that by means of it a trial balance between nations can be run at any time within an acceptable margin for error. Such a system is considered to be the one developed by the writers and known as *The World Analyst*.⁵

The second idea is that such a system can be expressed electronically to (1) illustrate visually the essential elements of national power so that a total relative value, in whole or for any major part, will be instantly apparent; (2) estimate with a high degree of probability the most likely of a number of possible future "courses of action," whether advantageous to us or not, by the governments or peoples of foreign nations; (3) warn in good time of other countries' dangerous hostile policies—or even "intentions"; and (4) test by means of "gaming" any new policy or plan proposed for our conduct of foreign affairs, and thus predict experimentally

⁵ *The World Analyst: A System for Analyzing and Classifying Source Materials on International and National Affairs* (4th ed.; New Hope, Pa.: The Dyer Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies, 1958).

the efficacy of such a policy without having to risk empirical procedures.

Let us consider each of the ideas listed above. By what means would it be possible to organize this vast quantity of information in such a manner that the decision-maker could instantly strike a trial balance, and comprehend at a glance the relative strengths and weaknesses of two nations?

It must be understood initially that all events are interrelated; none stands alone. For example, the political and economic progress of any nation throughout the year might be compared to the movements of a huge ball which is slowly pushed over a flat surface, impelled by countless pressures from many directions, each exerting a different weight. These pressures may be further likened to the various elements in each of the *World Analyst* ten factors, discussed below, which are used to assess the "strengths, weaknesses, and probable course of action" of a nation. The resultant of such pressures may push the metaphorical ball to the east or west, to the north or south, towards prosperity or depression, towards alliances with other nations or war, or hold it virtually static over long periods of time.

Each time any one of these factors is changed, by increasing or decreasing its momentum and point of impact, the whole speed and direction of the movement of the "ball" may be changed. Each factor is interrelated with every other, and may affect the others in a variety of ways. For example, if a large steel plant is built on the Delaware River, not only is steel output affected, but labor, housing, roads, water, sewage, schools, entertainment, railroads, and so forth—the list is unending—are in turn affected. Each one of these categories in turn affects others, and a chain reaction is begun.

If it were possible to show at any

¹ S. F. Bemis, *John Quincy Adams* (New York: Knopf, 1949), Chap. XII.

² This began early with the Department of State; see Dyer and Dyer, "The Beginnings of a United States Strategic Intelligence System in Latin America" in *Military Affairs*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (1950), pp. 65–83; amplified in "A Century of Strategic Intelligence Reporting," *Geographical Review*, Vol. 44, No. 1 (1954), pp. 49–69.

³ *Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956), especially p. 61 ff.

⁴ The inadequacies of previous attempts are suggested by such incomplete and unbalanced

given moment how all other subordinate factors as well as the nation as a whole are influenced when a major change is inaugurated in one or more factors, it should help national leaders to make sounder decisions. It would be enormously helpful if such decisions could be based on an accumulation of facts, instantly recorded and visibly presented in summary, rather than on intuitive opinions derived from labored study of extensive compilations difficult to retain and balance correctly.

Also if it were possible to show the decision-maker graphically, simply, and in advance the probable results of a proposed course of action, instead of requiring him to read many "appreciations" and reports and to remember the vast number of figures and data required, he might well achieve a better understanding of the whole situation. It might even permit him to formulate policies more rapidly as well as more correctly.

TEN FACTORS

To accomplish the desirable results suggested above a weighted outline of the factors which affect national power in any and all nations must be established, and each nation must then be compared to this model. *The World Analyst* constitutes such a theoretical model—a simple and carefully weighted outline for the analysis of national power and intentions. The outline is divided into ten major "factors" which in turn are divided again into many subheadings of various importance.

These factors include the following fields: Geography, Sociology, Politics, Foreign Affairs, Economics, Industry, Transportation, Science, Armed Forces, History.

For the sake of clarity as well as to conserve space, the illustration of this system's application to game theory will be limited to the principal head-

ings of one of the factors developed in, and here reproduced from, *The World Analyst*, with only one heading expanded. The letters and numbers to the left of the words are simply to facilitate the filing and retrieval of material either manually^a or by computer (see Table 1). However at this writing there are no numerical weighted values attached to the headings. Theoretical numerical values will have to be assigned to these headings and subheadings by an operations research team of selected experts.

ASSIGNMENT OF VALUES

It is self-evident that, within the context of power politics, not all of these headings are likely to be equally important. For example, the size of the labor force (.D121) and the armed forces (.D122) is vastly more important perhaps than the refugee (.D152) problem. However, under certain circumstances—as between Israel and the United Arab Republic—the refugee problem could also have considerable affect on the power relationships. The team of specialists, as stated above, would have to assign a theoretical relative numerical value to each of the factors. The assigning of such numbers would be a difficult but not an impossible task and would require the services of individuals who have a wide experience in each of the disciplines most nearly represented by the factors. It is highly probable that some of the initial values assigned would be altered over a period of time, after the device had been tested with known policies for international action, the outcomes of

^a If a manual system is used, and the file folders are arranged in the suggested order, a complete report outline for a nation "in depth" is possible by simply evaluating and synthesizing the materials found in the folders. Related information will be found grouped in adjacent file sections, and the report may be written in that order.

which have been reported and assessed in the past. But there is no reason why a relatively workable and accurate theoretical value could not be assigned to each factor after a preliminary period of trial and error.

After these theoretical values have been assigned, their total in each component, that is, political, economic, demographic, and so on, will represent the total power possible in this field for the model nation.

When comparing the power of any two nations, each element within each component of each nation will be given the theoretical value assigned to that subheading, or a percentage of it.

Steel production

For example, to determine the number of points to be allocated for steel production, the theoretical number assigned for steel production in the *The World Analyst* would be considered to be equal to the greatest present production of the largest steel producing nation in the world, as well as its possible potential in one year. This number would be credited to that nation. In this case the total number of points would be assigned to the United States, the greatest steel producer at the present time. All other nations would have assigned to them a percentage of this total, based on their relative position in the steel-producing scale. Thus in 1958 if the United States had 200 points representing steel, then the Soviet Union would only have 142 points, as its steel production in that year was reported at about 71 per cent of the United States total.

Conversely, with regard to the population factor, China with its probable 600 million people would have the full number of points assigned to population, while the United States, with about 175 million, would only be given 29 per cent of that number. However, in

TABLE 1—D DEMOGRAPHIC (SOCIOLOGICAL) FACTOR *

- .D0 Race, Ethnic Groups and Their History
 - .D1 Population
 - .D2 Language and Dialects
 - .D3 Temperament of People
 - .D4 Education
 - .D5 Health, Sanitation and Welfare
 - .D6 Recreation and Amusements
 - .D7 Institutions and National Culture
 - .D8 Religion and Philosophy
 - .D9 Sociological Factors Affecting Stability and Defense
- EXPANSION OF THE POPULATION (.D1) FACTOR ABOVE
- .D1 Population
 - .D11 Census, General
 - .D12 Age-Sex Distribution
 - .D121 Labor Force, Statistics Only
 - .D122 Armed Force, Potential, Statistics Only
 - .D13 Mortality and Fertility
 - .D14 Natural Increase and Projections
 - .D15 Migration
 - .D151 Immigration
 - .D152 Refugees
 - .D153 Emigration
 - .D154 Internal Migration
 - .D16 Spatial Distribution of Population
 - .D17 Minorities
 - .D171 Location, Size, Ratio to the Rest of Population
 - .D172 Socio-economic Characteristics of Minorities
 - .D173 Degree of Assimilation, including Ties with Mother Country by Minorities (See also .F)
 - .D174 Political Influence and Organization of Minorities
 - .D175 Aspirations of Minorities

* Charlotte L. Dyer and George B. Dyer, *The World Analyst: A System for Analyzing and Classifying Source Materials on International and National Affairs*, (4 ed.; New Hope, Pa.: The Dyer Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies, 1958) pp. 69-70.

the matter of education and technological training, the tables would be reversed, and the United States might have the optimum, and China a much lower percentage.

The factor of sea and land transportation, for example, is revealing. Where the importance of air or sea transportation looms large, those nations

having highly developed systems would show an advantage, but where foot transportation was required, the nations accustomed to this mode of travel might reveal superiority on their own home territory.

It may be argued that some factors in the sociological component, such as religion, will be difficult to evaluate. Also it may be objected that some factors cannot be compared with others, such as steel with religion. With the old system of trying to reduce all values to a common denominator such as dollars, this was true. However, with this new system, the difficulty is overcome.

Sociologists are among the leaders in the quantification of elements within their areas of competence. Thus, the initial assignment of points to the various subheadings found in the sociological factor should not be too difficult for specialists in this discipline. At least it should not be any more difficult for them than for economists to assign values to the elements in the economic factor, and rather less than for political scientists, perhaps.

Religion evaluated

The method of comparing the religious element between two nations in the sociological factor will be accomplished in the same manner as steel production is compared in the economic factor. If for example the sociologists decided that religion is so important that it should be assigned 250 points of the total amount of points assigned for the sociological factor, then the nation whose life is most affected by religion will be given this total amount. Portugal, being a theocratic state, might very well receive this amount. It would be possible to assign the same value to one or more nations, just as in any of the elements, provided that the nation was equally affected by religion; for

example, Tibet, before it was overrun by China. Other nations would be assigned a percentage of this number depending on how much their life was controlled and affected by religion. The initial assignment of these values for some ninety nations would be arduous, and would have to be done by persons who are very familiar with the nation in question. However, except in the case of a major revolution, this element would change very slowly, and would not have to be reviewed as often as, for example, some of the elements in the economic component.

The troublesome question of total number of points to be allotted to each factor will have to be decided arbitrarily for no one factor in its entirety is more important than another. In order that a country function it has to have some form of political structure, some form of economic organization, and so forth. If it lacks a whole component, such as armed forces, or scientific, it is seriously weakened, and this weakness must be reflected in the evaluation. So it is suggested that each of the 10 components be initially given the same number of points, for example, 10,000. Then each group of experts, within their discipline, will allocate these points among the elements of "their factor."

COMPARATIVE POWER VALUE

It is important to note that steel production and religion do not have to be compared. Each of the ten factors will be compared and contrasted with its opposite number in the other nation; sociology with sociology, economics with economics, and so forth. The decision-maker then has to compare and weigh only ten items against each other, instead of thousands. For example, in 1939 France's army was rated as one of the best in the world. It never occurred to anyone that it could be over-

run by the Germans in six weeks. Had *The World Analyst* system been in use it would have been apparent that discontent within France was so great that the sociological factor was weakened to the point of danger as compared to the German, which was excessively strong.

Results will not be 100 per cent accurate, but the resulting estimate by the means proposed in this article will be at least much more accurate than any other method that has been devised. Previously the most varied types of information—"oranges and apples"—have not been fitted into an over-all weighted pattern which can be measured against a theoretical model. By measuring each nation against this theoretical model, they can in turn be compared to each other. Thus the economic power of one nation may be measured against the economic power of another. The morale, homogeneity, or customs, and so forth, of one nation may be seen in relation to another's and a comparative power value derived.

ELECTRICAL DEVICE

After the assignment of numerical values the above system will be translated into a visual form which will indicate at a glance the following classes of information:

- (1) Relative over-all power of any two nations or groups of nations;
- (2) Potential reserve of a nation;
- (3) Degree of conversion of this reserve into present power;
- (4) Destruction by percentage of any factors in a nation and its effect on other components;
- (5) Acts of aggression against the United States by a nation;
- (6) Acts of aggression between any other two nations which might affect the United States.⁷

⁷ A second article is in preparation which will give further details of the electrical game testing board described below, how it is wired and how it will be "played."

It is proposed that the foregoing be accomplished by substituting electric light, measured in lumens, for the numerical weights assigned to headings and subheadings of *The World Analyst* system; by using, in other words, the physical phenomena by which light intensity or electrical flow through differing resistances varies like water pressure fluctuating in a pipe; and by a combination of these types of translation from calculated numerical programs into electrical impulses, producing a device which provides a warning system, a check list for the collection of needed data, and a method for better evaluation of a given situation.

Color banks

In order to do this, it is proposed that game testing boards electrically wired be provided. Each nation under consideration should be represented by its own game board.⁸ This board will consist, in a spatial-visual organization, of five vertical columns of different colors on which are arranged five banks of white lights arranged as follows:

- (1) Green column lights when added together would give a number in lumens which will represent the amount of assets the nation has at the beginning of the time under consideration, as well as a number of bulbs measured in lumens equal to the probable potential which the nation could develop during a given time span. The number of lumens are derived from the addition of the theoretical values assigned to the various headings in *The World Analyst*.

⁸ It will not be necessary to have ninety or more boards to represent the nations of the world. Being electronically controlled, a relatively few boards will suffice as they can be used first for the nations of Europe or Asia. After these results have been considered, the nations of South America or any other section of the world can be fed into them.

- (2) Yellow column lights would equal the probable potential mentioned in 1 above.
- (3) Red column lights represent actual destruction in a nation—that is, loss from acts of God, fire, war, strike, and so forth. Here, too, the number of red column lights and their lumens exactly balance the green column lights.
- (4) Blue column lights represent acts of aggression between two or more nations not including the United States, but which in the long run might involve the United States. The number and intensity of the blue column lights would be representative of the power of the nations involved.
- (5) Purple column lights represent possible acts of aggression of any kind toward the United States, not only to include conventional war, but economic warfare, political warfare, or alliances between other nations directed against the United States, and so on. The total number and intensity of the purple column lights should balance exactly the number and intensity of the green column lights, but would not be connected with them in any way.

These five banks of lights are crossed horizontally at exactly the same place by each of the ten factor headings, as well as any subheadings which are thought to be sufficiently important to include (see Table 2).

GAMING AND TESTING

At the beginning of play the green "power" lights would be on. The green "potential" would be off. The yellow "potential" on. The red, blue, and purple, all off.

It would not matter whether the boards were being operated to test a proposed policy—gaming—or whether the actual power differential between

nations were being measured; in either case its operations would be the same.

The green, red, and yellow boards will be connected in such a fashion that if any yellow-backed light were turned off, indicating a "potential" had been made a reality, an equal amount of light would come on in the green section. If any red lights were lit indicating some sort of destruction due for example to war, acts of God, major strikes, and so on, the green lights would automatically be dimmed in the various sections affected by this loss. The various sections would all be interconnected to show how a loss, for example, in rail transportation would affect the steel industry, food industry, and so forth.

The purple lights, representing acts of aggression against the United States, would not be connected with any other bank of lights, but would be turned on or off as such acts were attempted. If the acts turned out to be futile and harmless, they would only be shown on this board. But if they were actually harmful in any way, these results would show on both the red and green boards as indicated.

The blue board, representing acts of aggression between two nations other than the United States, would also show activity as it occurred. This board's activity might or might not be transferred to the red and green boards as indicated.

In gaming, a time scale will have to be applied to the operation of the boards. Thus, every minute of play might represent a certain number of days or weeks of actual time. When the boards are being operated for actual comparison, each event will be recorded as it occurs.

As the play proceeds, the beneficial as well as the harmful results of events or proposed policy will be transferred to the board, by turning on and off the various colored lights. With a photo-

TABLE 2—DEMOGRAPHIC

(Suggested schematic breakdown of a portion of the board*)

GREEN	YELLOW	RED	BLUE	PURPLE
RACE				
---	---	---	---	---
---	---	---	---	---
---	---	---	---	---
POPULATION				
---	---	---	---	---
---	---	---	---	---
---	---	---	---	---
LANGUAGE				
---	---	---	---	---
TEMPERAMENT OF PEOPLE				
---	---	---	---	---
---	---	---	---	---
EDUCATION				
---	---	---	---	---
---	---	---	---	---
HEALTH, SANITATION, AND WELFARE				
---	---	---	---	---
---	---	---	---	---
RECREATION AND AMUSEMENTS				
---	---	---	---	---
INSTITUTIONS AND NATIONAL CULTURE				
---	---	---	---	---
---	---	---	---	---
RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY				
---	---	---	---	---
---	---	---	---	---
TOTAL NUMBER OF LUMENS FOR THE SOCIOLOGICAL FACTOR				

* The various columns would be painted the indicated color.

** The dashes represent light bulbs.

electric cell continually trained on the boards, it will be possible from minute to minute visually to ascertain and translate into numerical values the increase or decrease of any section of the economy, to determine the total relative strength of the nation, and also to measure its power potential.

The blue and purple lights indicate the aggressive action taken by any nation in world events and would act as a cumulative graphic warning system against this type of action. The totaling and recording of such acts, graphically shown on the entire board, would give ample warning of possible serious events.

Accuracy of the results

The accuracy of the results if the game is being used to test a proposed plan will depend on the degree of accuracy of figures fed into it and the sophistication with which the initial values have been assigned. In the case of economic development, this may be forecast with a reasonable degree of precision. In the political field the forecast is much more difficult. It would have been difficult, for example, to forecast the relative displays of popularity shown to Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Khrushchev, respectively, on their recent trips to India. It should be somewhat simpler when the happenings are recorded from day to day, as actual reporting of accomplished incidents will have the advantage of greater exactness in the allocation of values. The employment of the yellow or "power potential" bulbs should be of great utility. Had such a system been in effect before World War II the dangerous power potential and probable intentions of Germany might have been self-evident. When added to that of Italy and Japan, it should have given a warning that no one could have missed,

especially since the gradual shift from potential to reality would have been striking.

Very often, small unrelated facts, which in themselves are unimportant, can, when correlated, assume great importance; for example, the development of German sailplane clubs after World War I—the future fighter pilots—the statements of Hitler's aims made in *Mein Kampf*, and hundreds of other "straws in the wind."

As soon as percentages of the red, green, blue, purple, or yellow bulbs of any nation change radically, then an immediate investigation should be made in an effort to determine the underlying causes, direction of policy, and likely outcome. The mere fact of knowing what to look for is half the battle in finding the facts, and in estimating the results from the facts found.

This type of semiautomatic assessment would prevent to some extent the errors made, as at present, by groups of people sitting around conference tables and trying—essentially through "intuition"—to estimate reality in world affairs. Very often in this situation the strongest willed, or most persuasive, speaker is able to present a relatively unimportant issue as if it were a decisive major one, and so influence the majority to his way of thinking, against the better judgment of the others.

A person able to "see the whole picture" at a glance is better able to arrive at an accurate comparison of the status of competing nations each year, is protected to some extent from special pleading, and thus may well arrive at a far more just estimate of the current world situation.

SUMMARY

If this device for estimating national power and intentions and testing policy through gaming were installed and kept

up to date the following benefits might be expected from such a set of electronic "boards:"

- (1) Give a comparative measure of strengths and weaknesses between nations;
- (2) Provide a visual aid which not only indicates the comparative strengths between nations but graphically shows any major conversion in a nation from one type of economy to another, thus giving warning of the capability and intentions of a nation to wage war;
- (3) Show how an event happening in one field immediately affects related fields;
- (4) Show visually the cumulative increase or decrease in a nation of anti-American feeling;
- (5) Demonstrate graphically, and even predict, the accumulation and loca-

tion of "trouble spots" in the world which might cause concern to the United States;

- (6) Test the efficacy of a proposed policy in order to determine whether it should be put into effect or not;
- (7) Analyze the effective results of any major action taken by our government in peacetime or wartime in the past.

Such an arrangement has been needed to aid our statesmen for many years, and it is believed that if the above theories were developed, a truly valuable system might be developed. Certainly some device of this sort is essential to assist in the conduct of American foreign policy and to bridge the morass of uncounted, badly organized, and unassimilable "facts."

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BERNARD BRODIE. *Strategy in the Missile Age*. (The RAND Corporation.) Pp. vii, 423. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1959. \$6.50.

Strategy in the Missile Age is a critical and disturbing evaluation of current American military practices by one of the nation's most distinguished naval historians. In large measure, the author merely substantiates what many military experts have been writing for years, but his search for meaning in both the past conduct of war and the strategic concepts which determined it has led him to the conclusion that nations have generally failed less in battlefield tactics than in strategy or the search for broad objectives. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, he stresses, was tactically perfect but strategically stupid. Of the great strategists of the past Mr. Brodie prefers Clausewitz and Schlieffen, for they acknowledged the close relationship between war strategy and national policy. Schlieffen, for example, warned that if his plan failed to win an early victory over France, Germany should take immediate steps to achieve a negotiated peace. Such notions of employing war only when it could bring some conceivable gain to the nation were obliterated in World War I by German and Allied leaders alike. For them war became an end in itself.

In this context of rational policy the author analyzes the impact of nuclear weapons. To him the new destructiveness of weapons has revolutionized the strategy of war, for it removes the need of traditional modes of fighting and renders both air superiority and the precise definition of targets almost unnecessary. He discounts the current theory of a "broken-back" war which suggests that after initial bombings on each side the war would resume along conventional lines. When nations in the past improvised successfully after suffering heavy blows, they always had both the time and the incentive to organize such measures—factors that would not be present after a general thermonuclear attack. Never before have weapons placed the advantage so completely in the hands of the nation that strikes first.

Mr. Brodie concludes, as have others, that the only answer to the challenge of nuclear weapons is the re-establishment of traditional concepts of limited war which demand both limited means and limited ends. He finds the great danger in the antithetical arguments that war cannot be limited and that war has been eliminated and, therefore, ceases to be a danger at all. Both concepts result in the neglect of conventional forces. But the author criticizes as well the neglect of diplomacy, pointing out that there is no mathematical

equivalence between military strength and the ability to bargain successfully. Unfortunately he never explains fully the significance of this meaningful observation in terms of precise political settlements of cold war issues. If such matters were beyond the scope of this study, Mr. Brodie makes it clear that the only genuine solution to the dilemma of thousands of missiles accurately pointed to enemy targets lies in the diplomatic alternation of the present world environment.

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FIELD-MARSHAL MONTGOMERY. *An Approach to Sanity: A Study of East-West Relations*. Pp. 94. Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1960. \$2.75.

This slim volume by one of the distinguished military leaders of World War II who is now an important advocate of peace is a good example of what writing on world affairs should be: carefully deliberated ideas expressed with precision and effectiveness in minimum space. Civilian authors of bulky volumes on problems of world peace here face a real challenge from an expert on war.

The core of this book consists of the two Chichele lectures which Field-Marshal Montgomery gave at Oxford University in May, 1959, on "The Conflict Between East and West." The lectures are preceded by reprints of articles on the same theme which the author had contributed to the *Sunday Times* on the tenth anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), April 4, 1959, and on other related topics.

Field-Marshal Montgomery makes his points swiftly and succinctly. In his opinion, the crucial error of the Allies in World War II was to leave all political issues for discussion "till the fighting was over." "Nations," he argues, "go to war for political reasons. When it is clear you are going to win, political decisions become paramount; it is then essential so to direct the operations that you end the war with a political balance favourable to win the peace."

This, he argues, the Allies failed to do—a failure which Montgomery attributes to President Roosevelt. The result was the dangerously unsettled and confused situation in Europe, particularly in Germany, which served the interests and purposes of Stalin. The creation of NATO in 1949 was a check on the Soviet Union. NATO, however, Montgomery contends, suffered from disunity among members, from their failure to transform a military alliance into an economic and psychological coalition, and from their inability to give NATO a global character. NATO, he says, has not seen the global wood for the European trees.

But Montgomery, while recapitulating the lessons of the past, concentrates on plans for the future. He has a horror of war and wants the world to achieve lasting peace. He quotes Robert Southey's poem, "After Blenheim": "And everybody praised the Duke/ Who did this great fight win./ 'But what good came of it, at last?'/ Quoth little Peterkin." He is thoroughly in agreement with Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's policy of seeking relaxation of tensions between the West and the Soviet Union. He is convinced that Khrushchev, whom he visited in 1959, is a very different man from Stalin. Mr. Khrushchev "is without a doubt a brilliant political leader with all the arguments at his finger tips. You would have to get up very early in the morning to get the better of him in discussion."

But how is peace to be achieved? Montgomery rejects the view of those who think the Russians are planning to attack the West the moment a favorable opportunity occurs. "I do not believe this for one moment," he says. "The plain truth is that neither side has any intention of attacking the other."

The achievement of peace, however, requires the West to face several realistic factors. It is illogical to expect Russia to agree that a united Germany armed with nuclear weapons can be integrated into the Western alliance. The reunification of Germany is not a matter of practical politics, for the present time at least. It is illogical to try to solve the German problem without first solving the European

The consequences of, or the anticipated consequences of, the disposal operations of P.L. 480 on foreign competitors created a furor at the inception of on over-all plans for a European settlement. It is illogical to work on the assumption that the East German government does not exist. "It does exist. And for a satellite of Russia the German Democratic Republic is prosperous." The problem of West Berlin should be settled with the assistance of the United Nations. On these points, too, he apparently sees merit in Moscow's proposals. And it is illogical to work on the assumption "that the true Government of China is in Formosa."

This list of "illogical" factors shows that Montgomery's views differ sharply from major United States policies. He gives high praise to the United States for its contribution to Europe's economic and military recovery in the postwar years. But he clearly favors Macmillan's policy of negotiations with the Soviet Union, proceeding, without "appeasement," "little by little, and bit by bit," to create confidence at each step.

If this is done, he believes that there will be a slackening of tension and that the West and Russia, for a generation ahead, can "live and let live." To this reviewer Montgomery's analysis seems realistic and sound—with one exception. That is when he asks whether, given time, "the Russians can become a part of Christendom." He apparently thinks this could happen. But need this question be pressed? Many nations which are not "part of Christendom" have in the past shown a greater capacity to "live and let live" than some avowedly Christian nations.

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THEODORE ROPP. *War in the Modern World*. Pp. xv, 400. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1959. \$10.00.

It requires courage to undertake to survey the history of warfare through the past five centuries in less than 400 pages.

Professor Ropp has done a remarkable job of just that in this unique volume. It is not concerned with individual campaigns or battles so much as it is with trends and the changes that have been brought about by political, social, and economic developments through the centuries. Yet, the two-paragraph description of Napoleon's invasion of Russia and the one-paragraph account of the Battle for Leyte Gulf, in World War II, contain the essence of those events. It is arranged in three parts; from the Renaissance to the defeat of Napoleon, the nineteenth century to World War I, and the major wars of the twentieth century, with stress on Anglo-American ideas of the conduct of sea, land, and air warfare. Almost half of the volume is devoted to the third part.

The scope is limited generally to the important and major European wars of the period and to the major wars of the United States. The author also contains in his narrative "an introduction to the major military classics." Space considerations limit the extent of this introduction, but no one who has studied the works of Clausewitz, Jomini, Mahan, or even Douhet, for example, will seriously question Professor Ropp's evaluation of these men and their work.

An outstanding feature of the volume is the manner in which the Bibliography is presented. It is developed by means of Footnotes to the text so that the reader has the applicable reference before him as he reads. Before the period of World War II the Bibliography is selective. Whenever possible the latest scholarly work on the subject is cited, but other recognized or classical works are included. For World War II the Bibliography is comprehensive, and this reviewer knows of no book of merit on that war that has been omitted. The compilation of the Bibliography alone is a monumental piece of work.

This volume is much more than an introductory textbook to military history; it is a reference work of real worth. Political and social scientists who are unfamiliar with the field of military history should find it useful for discovering a ready answer to some question that might arise in this field. If the specific answer they seek

is not there, they will have an authoritative reference in military literature where it should be discussed in detail or which will steer them to such a discussion.

BERN ANDERSON

Rear Admiral
United States Navy (Ret.)

WALLACE MCCLURE. *World Legal Order: Possible Contributions by the People of the United States*. Pp. xvi, 366. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960. \$7.50.

This volume is sponsored by the World Rule of Law Center, Duke University, School of Law. The author had the advantage of a Thomas Jefferson Fellowship awarded by the Alumni Board of Trustees of the University of Virginia Endowment Fund.

Dr. Wallace McClure, the author, is well known for his scholarly work on *International Executive Agreements* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941). He served for some thirty years with the Department of State.

In an extensive Introduction on "World Law" various kinds of law, local, state, national, and supranational, are discussed. It is stated that "the universal chaos of nation-states insufficiently restrained by law has been made manifest in universal war."

In Part One there is an analysis of the place of the Constitution, statutes, and treaties in the United States. The leading cases are reviewed. The author makes a plea for the dignity and validity of treaties as now constituting, along with international common law, an effective method of dealing with the international relations of the United States.

Part Two is devoted to a discussion of Supranational Common Law and National Constitutional Law. As an introductory thought to this part the now celebrated case of *U. S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation* (1948) is cited, and much importance is attached by the author to the statement of the United States Supreme Court in this case that the Court "found warrant for its conclusions not in the provisions of the Constitution, but in the law

of nations." The case involved a United States arms embargo in the Gran Chaco war between Bolivia and Paraguay. With respect to international law and international customary law the author notes that "it would seem difficult to refute the presumption that a body of law that its courts acknowledge and draw upon as a source of rights and powers is law the rules of which the United States is legally bound to observe."

Part Three on the Legal Structure of the World Community includes an analysis of the United Nations as an "institutional component of legal order"—legislation, adjudication, aggression as a world-law crime, and enforcement of law. The constitutional development of the United Nations is discussed.

In chapter 12 the novel and interesting suggestion is made that "the President himself might head the United States delegation [to the United Nations] and that he should plan to devote more of his time to such meetings than has been true in the past."

A plea is made for more attention to the broad international objectives of the United Nations and less emphasis upon "policies of narrow self interest." The author favors a repeal of, or at least curtailed usage of, reservations which hamper the dignity and usefulness of the International Court of Justice. Threats of nuclear annihilation point to the new needs for a world legal order. The world has already witnessed the beginnings of an international police force in Korea (1950) and in the Suez crisis.

This significant volume contains a Table of Cases Cited, a Table of International Legislation and Constitutions, and a useful ten-page Bibliography.

Dr. McClure sees little hope in isolationism and in too much reliance upon national sovereignty. On the contrary he favors the striving for a world legal order, a stronger system of international law, a stronger world court, and in general the substitution of courts and conferences that is, the law for brute force in the settlement of international disputes. He is to be congratulated for his forthright and scholarly work which should be studied

to be appreciated fully since a brief review can hardly do it justice.

J. EUGENE HARLEY
Professor of Political Science
University of Southern California

Organizing Peace in the Nuclear Age. Report of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace. Pp. xvii, 245. New York: New York University Press, 1959. \$3.75.

This eleventh report of the Research Affiliate of the American Association for the United Nations equals the standards set by its predecessors. Buttressed by a trio of supporting papers, the report first tackles the general theory of international legislation and then proceeds to discuss its practical application in the concrete case of the use of atomic energy. Conclusions of the report are summarized in a series of eighteen propositions. They range from a general adherence to "the ideal of a world system in which law and politics effectively combine their respective contributions," to the creation of world order through the belief that "every independent state" should be a member of the United Nations, to a recommendation that the United States make the International Atomic Energy Agency the "focal point and major instrumentality" of support for the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy in other countries. Eighty-one members of the Commission signed the report, but five participants demurred from the implications of the phrase "every independent state" in the light of their opposition to the inclusion of the People's Republic of China under present circumstances. One additional member queried the view expressed in one of the propositions that enlargement of the Security Council would assure a more realistic and equitable distribution of seats. With all due consideration for the reservations, the report as a whole is a sensible, temperate, and even realistic set of proposals for the improvement of international organization and its role in the reduction of contemporary tensions.

The first of the supporting papers is Quincy Wright's study of the role of law in the organization of peace. In brief,

it is a group of thoughtful suggestions for improving the legislative, adjudicative, executive, and administrative procedures of the United Nations. Its companion essay by Arthur N. Holcombe argues for the expansion of the role of politics in the operation of the international organization. In particular he supports the development of the leadership of the middle powers in the politics of the United Nations. His theme is based on the proposition that the major powers in the Security Council rely too much upon violence or intimidation as an instrument of national policy. Whether the proposed solution—grossly oversimplified in this brief review—would be of much real effect is clearly debatable.

The final and by far the longest of the supporting papers is John G. Stoessinger's careful description of the establishment and the operation of the International Atomic Energy Agency. His analysis leads to the obvious conclusion that the high hopes engendered by President Eisenhower's original "Atoms for Peace" proposal in 1953 have hardly been fulfilled. The erosion of American support, to cite a major problem, has relegated the Agency to a secondary position. Yet he warns that disillusionment must not be permitted to obscure the possibilities for peaceful co-operation in the uses of atomic energy and suggests a number of ways for strengthening the Agency.

Altogether, it is healthy to ponder the conclusions of a group that insists on taking a long-run view of the international scene. It may well be that our one opportunity to enjoy that "long run" lies in the rapidity with which many more of us come to share a similar viewpoint.

HENRY R. WINKLER
Professor of History
Rutgers, The State University

KENNETH W. THOMPSON. *Christian Ethics and the Dilemmas of Foreign Policy.* Pp. viii, 148. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press for the Lilly Endowment Research Program in Christianity and Politics, 1959. \$3.50.

Many writers on Christian ethics and foreign policy confine themselves to the extreme moral problem of war in the nu-

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clear age. Others deal with generalities, offering but a dribble of pious platitudes.

Dr. Kenneth Thompson, a political scientist, a thoughtful writer on problems of international politics, and a member of the editorial board of *Christianity and Crisis*, offers a different approach. Writing from the point of view of "the realistic moralist" he deals carefully with everyday "problems of power, of the gulf between individual and collective morality, and of the relation of national interest to higher aims and purposes" (p. 143). He holds that "one of our supreme tasks in foreign policy is to bring moral purpose and political realities into line and to understand their relationship more deeply and in terms that carry meaning for men in other lands." He states: "I believe that this overarching goal can be subjected to intellectual discipline, can be safeguarded at once from cynical nihilism or hypocritical moralism, and can be measured or played against the living standards of international political behavior. I believe that morality as distinct from moralism can be discovered and analyzed in international affairs as in other social realms" (p. 4).

In the course of his discussion, Dr. Thompson examines the opinions and judgments of a wide range of philosophers, statesmen, diplomats, and historians on the relationship between religious ethics and foreign affairs: In background and thought they range from the Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr to the Catholic Judge Charles de Visscher, former member of the International Court of Justice, and from Churchill and Bismarck to George F. Kennan and Dean Acheson and historians Herbert Butterfield and Geoffrey Barraclough.

But the author goes beyond a lucid analysis of the thinking of others. He takes up such vital problems as armaments, colonialism, diplomacy, and the cold war and subjects them to the probing light of Christian ethics. Whether Dr. Thompson's readers agree or disagree with him on specific conclusions they will be grateful, in the reviewer's opinion, for his presentation of searching thought, moral courage, and readiness to promote a much needed public discussion in this vital field. Appre-

ciation is also due to the Lilly Endowment Research Program in Christianity and Politics at Duke University which sponsored these lectures and made possible their publication for the benefit of a wider audience.

JOHN BROWN MASON

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EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY

HENRY L. MASON. *Toynbee's Approach to World Politics*. (Tulane Studies in Political Science, Vol. V.) Pp. x, 153. New Orleans: Tulane University, 1958. \$2.00.

In an Appendix of some fifteen pages Mr. Mason deals with Toynbee's critics and remarks on "the incredibly unfavorable and hostile reception received by the *Study* on the part of its academic critics." As for him, he wants to preserve his independence with regard to "the rampant anti-Toynbeeanism common in many circles," and in his very last sentence he asks whether it may not be that "while the *Study's* inevitable weaknesses attract the ire of the various disciplines, its merits somehow fall between the several academic chairs?"

In fact he had introduced the critics on practically every one of his preceding 120 pages. Not a statement or a view of Toynbee's does he mention without recalling what others have had to say about it either in support or, mostly, in opposition. This undoubtedly adds to the interest of his book, although it is hardly the way in which the author might have composed a coherent analysis and conveyed a clear and consistent impression of his own view of the man and the work. The less so as his comments on the pronouncements, that he cites as he progresses, are often the reverse of incisive. He admits the truth of a great deal of the adverse criticism, sometimes he rejects it, but even when he admits it he is inclined to extenuate. Very often, moreover, in his rendering of the

strictures, he does not do justice to the point of view of their authors.

It is obvious that he is in sympathy with some of Toynbee's leading ideas. Toynbee's attempt to break away from Western complacency, his impatience with "parochialism," and his soaring imagination inspiring him to large global visions; the importance, too, he attaches to religion, not only in interpreting the past, but as the force which can redeem the present and the future—all that makes Toynbee in Mr. Mason's eyes an attractive and a significant figure.

Now it is not on account of these views that I want to criticize Mr. Mason or his book. The fundamental objection moved against Toynbee's work lies elsewhere. It is that his oft-repeated claim to be proceeding rationally and empirically and scientifically from established facts to proved conclusions is make-believe. All that Mr. Mason has to say about this, after quoting a number of critics who state this allegation in very precise terms, is that "those who accuse him of adopting an empirical cloak for purely spurious reasons hardly provide empirical evidence for their very serious charge." Apparently the charge that he rejects is that of acting in this way deliberately. But the charge that has to be met is that of being constitutionally unable to make the necessary distinctions.

It is significant that Mr. Mason is impressed with Toynbee's own rejoinder to me when I had called him "not a historian but a prophet" (*Journal of the History of Ideas*, 1955). Toynbee suggested that, to me, apparently, narrating events is the true function of the historian. In Mr. Mason's view, too, Toynbee is to be acclaimed as an innovator because his approach goes beyond "the ordinary or traditional historians' primitive fact-finding method." As if the "ordinary" historian could not admit that "examining" history, that to compare and to look for general conclusions, is a legitimate, and indeed a most valuable, part of his job! As if, for instance, we are not fascinated by Burckhardt, by Tocqueville, by Carl Becker, by Huizinga. If Toynbee's generalizations are considered to be "unhistorical," it is because the factual

foundations on which he builds them are so often unsound or faulty. Toynbee, in other words, evaded criticism by a crass misrepresentation of his critics' meaning, and Mason here follows him blindly.

In his "approach to world politics" Toynbee has been charged from many sides with an anti-Western bias which tends to weaken his attitude with regard to the revolutionary forces of our time. Mason gives a number of telling quotations and is palpably a little embarrassed by the problem. Nevertheless, here too, he ends on a defensive note. "Toynbee's analysis seems far from malicious towards the West," a conclusion which he fails to substantiate, "and his solution, an increase in spirituality, is about as un-Communist and un-Fascist as can be imagined." Nevertheless, Toynbee's rejection of democracy causes Mason real uneasiness, but once again he concludes: "This ambiguous and perhaps unfair view of contemporary democracy does not necessarily range Toynbee among the Communists or the Nazis." True, but the apologist is not facing the real issue, for who should dream of describing Toynbee as a Communist or a Fascist? The way in which Mason discusses the evidence of Toynbee's curious animosity against the Jews is exactly similar.

Let me in this connection remark that Romein, the Amsterdam historian, who was at one time one of Toynbee's avowed admirers, is not, as Mr. Mason says, "a Social-Democrat," but a Marxist. The distinction is relevant, and it is worth noting that the insistence on "an increase of spirituality" did not stand in the way of appreciation from this quarter.

One more small point is that Mr. Mason rebukes "that great anti-Toynbeean Trevor-Roper" for asserting that Toynbee called World War II "a supplementary war": Trevor-Roper ought to have looked more carefully at Table I of Vol. IX, p. 255. Well, I have looked at that Table again, carefully, and it bears out Trevor-Roper's statement.

PIETER GEYL
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J. F. C. FULLER. *The Generalship of Alexander the Great*. Pp. 336. New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1960. \$7.50.

This new Alexander book is very uneven. Were it to survive, like so many ancient historical works, merely as a series of fragments, some future scholar might well find it necessary to posit three separate "Fullers" to explain its diversity. One, and probably the one for whom there would be the largest number of fragments, would be labeled a compiler. He would be held to have copied his materials chiefly from Tarn, with excerpts from Droysen, Wilcken, Wheeler, Ferguson, and others, perhaps based on a convenient intermediary source book. The second author would be described as a free-swinging critic of his own day, a man of the stamp of Theopompus, invoking the past to pour scorn on contemporary statecraft. But the third author would be distinguished by his sound judgment on military matters and by his straightforward, no nonsense account of Alexander's campaigns. For General Fuller is all three of these persons.

Admittedly no classical scholar, he has been forced to read his sources through translations, yet his own disciplined imagination enables him to make sense of them, where more learned predecessors often betray their civilian limitations. However, when he expresses general judgments, as he not infrequently does, on the reasons for the decline of the city-state; on the character and intentions of Alexander; and on the lessons Greek history holds for the present generation, then he writes as and like an amateur.

Fuller's Alexander is essentially the Alexander of Tarn, except when he is in the presence of an enemy; for then he forgets about the brotherhood of man and remembers only that he is a soldier. Since Tarn's thesis has been effectively controverted recently (see Badian in *Historia*, 7, 425 ff.), this aspect of Fuller's book need not be discussed here. But Fuller makes a contribution of his own, particularly in four consecutive chapters devoted entirely to Alexander's fighting. The general account comes first (chap. 4),

and it is anything but a eulogy. We see that Alexander, like other famous military men, learned to profit from his mistakes (see pp. 99; 111; 119). This general survey is followed by three chapters of analysis. The discussion of Gaugamela, to cite one example, offers a new interpretation of the operations of the Persian left, that appears to make far better sense than the traditional account of the plundering of the Macedonian camp. But of the battles, by far the most interesting is that with Porus, where the moves and countermoves along the banks of the Hydaspes are clearly described and illustrated by useful diagrams even a layman, like the reviewer, can understand (pp. 189 and 192). A special feature of this book is the chapter devoted to "Alexander's Small Wars" (chap. 8), for this contains practical remarks on the details of drill and tactics, remarks that incidentally illuminate other accounts of warfare in the fourth century.

No student of classical warfare can afford to neglect this book. The thoughtful reader will not be prevented by the occasional bombast from doing justice to the great merits of a study on Alexander written by a professional military man.

TRUESDELL S. BROWN

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University of California
Los Angeles

HANS KOHN. *The Mind of Germany: The Education of a Nation*. Pp. 370. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960. \$5.95.

If any further evidence is needed of the scholarly stature of Hans Kohn, this superb new study provides it. This is intellectual history at its very best. It is a joy to read these sparkling pages written by a master historical craftsman.

Professor Kohn seeks "a tentative reply" to the question upon which much of the fascination of German history rests: How was it possible for a people such as the Germans, who had won enormous prestige in scholarship, music, literature, and philosophy, deliberately to attempt national suicide? The author's answer is that the responsibility for the disaster

must be borne by those Germans who rejected the humanitarian traditions of Western Europe. In this alienation from the West was the great tragedy of German history.

Based on his lifetime study of nationalism in the modern world, Professor Kohn rightly concludes that the sentiment of nationalism led the Germans to an errant path. "Perhaps the Germans have presented the most outstanding example in our times of the moral catastrophe, into which the malady of a self-centered nationalism and the accompanying *trahison des clercs* can lead" (p. x).

In a brilliant opening chapter the author traces the course of modern German history and leads the reader by short, deft strokes to the present. Germany did not succumb to Hitler, he says, because she had become part of modern Western society, but because this modern society had been imposed on premodern social and intellectual foundations which were proudly retained.

In succeeding chapters Professor Kohn examines these foundations by concentrating on key individuals in German intellectual history. He absolves the magnificent Goethe as a cosmopolitan who spurned the cult of the Middle Ages fostered by the romantics. He shows how such romantics as Novalis and the Schlegel brothers placed abnormal stress on "German-ness," with deplorable results later in the century. He describes the integral nationalism of Turnvater Jahn and his intellectual war against the West. He quotes Heinrich Heine as warning against a unified Germany that would terrorize all Europe.

Later chapters show how German liberalism began to wither in 1848, how in 1866, the *annus mirabilis*, liberalism gave way to nationalism, and how the liberal intellectuals finally surrendered to the might of Bismarck's *Eisen-und-Blut* empire. There is an extraordinarily fine chapter on Richard Wagner: "What separated Nietzsche from Wagner, was not only the master's Germanophilism and racialism but also Wagner's character, his lusting for honors, women, and gold" (p. 210).

Professor Kohn sees an astonishing

change of mind in the Germans in the last decade. He is firmly convinced that the new German Federal Republic is safely anchored to the West and that the new German generation is finding inspiration and social solidarity in a return to the principles of human freedom. "Germany's two hegemonial wars in the twentieth century brought the peoples and the civilization of Europe to the brink of catastrophe. Out of this catastrophe one great gain has come, a democratic Germany which is finally taking its due place in modern Western life" (p. 354).

The author is to be commended above all for his calm objectivity. His study throws more light upon the German mind than any other book written on Germany during the last several decades. It is "must" reading for all who would seek to understand the German catastrophe.

LOUIS L. SNYDER

Professor of History
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ERNST FRAENKEL (Ed.). *Amerika im Spiegel des Deutschen Politischen Denkens*. Pp. 333. Köln und Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1959. DM 20.

America's growth from an only potentially important power on the periphery of the political world to its present greatness could not fail to make a deep impression on European statesmen and thinkers. The views expressed by them in the face of this astounding development are interesting in two different ways. In spite of errors of information and judgment they reveal aspects of American life which are less apparent to those immersed in it. At the same time they betray the breadth or narrowness of vision in those who unwittingly portray themselves in depicting America. Not only their personal power of comprehension but also the validity of their principles is put to a searching test. Professor Fraenkel served historians and generally the students of German-American relations well by providing them with a selection of utterances compiled with utmost care and discernment.

It will be hard to discover shortcomings save those which belong to the nature of anthologies. By reprinting a few pages

taken out of the context of a book or essay we are in danger of distorting or obfuscating the perspective intended by the author. In the present case this danger is effectively counteracted by the editor's introductory essay. Here the development of the German attitude toward the United States from the Revolutionary War to the present is competently outlined, and the reader is given a reliable framework within which he can place the documents.

The selection itself, being truly representative, embraces everything: expressions of enthusiastic admiration and outbursts of spite and contempt, evidence of deep and sympathetic understanding as well as testimonies of prejudiced arrogance, Goethe's and Jakob Burckhardt's wisdom but also the folly of Hitler who despised America as a hopelessly decadent country defeated by herself in the Civil War. Prevalent, however, is an endeavor to attain a balanced view and a just appraisal of American democracy.

HELMUT KUHN

Professor of Philosophy
University of Munich

JOSEPH ROTHSCHILD. *The Communist Party of Bulgaria: Origins and Development 1883-1936*. Pp. viii, 354. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. \$7.50.

In 1883 Dimitar Blagoev, then a Bulgarian student at the University of St. Petersburg, organized among his friends the first Social Democratic group in Russia. On returning to Sofia he joined with Yanko Sakazov, who had studied in Germany, England, and France, to organize the socialist movement in Bulgaria. In 1891 twenty men gathered in the woods of Mount Buzluja near Sofia and founded the Bulgarian Social Democratic party. It remained for years largely a group of intelligentsia, and many leaders of other political persuasions spent an apprenticeship in Socialist ranks. "In 1910, for example, with but two exceptions every minister in King Ferdinand's cabinet had only a few years before been a zealous Socialist (p. 3)."

The Bulgarian Socialist party received

its inspiration from Russian, not French and German sources. In 1903, the same year that the Bolshevik-Menshevik division took place in the Russian Social Democratic party, a similar break occurred in the Bulgarian party. The "Narrow" party under Blagoev became the Bulgarian Leninists—dogmatic, doctrinaire, uncompromising as to theory and tactics; the "Broad" party under Sakazov, the Bulgarian Mensheviks—less dogmatic, more willing to adapt themselves to changing conditions and to co-operate with other liberal and reform parties. The Broad group was the strongest, due in part to further splits over doctrinal issues within the Narrow group. Capitalizing on the discontent following the Bulgarian defeat in the Second Balkan War, the Socialists won one-fifth of the vote in the December 1913 Sobranie elections, the Broad party winning 21 seats, the Narrow 16. In May 1919, the Narrow party changed its name to the Bulgarian Communist party, and became not only one of the first, but also one of the staunchest supporters of the Third International. The Russian leaders always looked upon the Bulgarian Communists with favor, partly because the Bulgarians were willing to accept the Moscow party-line, but also because Bulgaria after 1918, like Russia, was a revisionist state, and the Kremlin leaders saw in Greece, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, outposts of French and British imperialism. The Bulgarian Communist demand for a Balkan Federation—with Thrace, Macedonia, Dobrudja, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro established as independent members alongside existing states—won Moscow's approval. Moscow, however, was not able to force this policy upon the Communist parties of Yugoslavia, Greece, and Rumania. This is the basic, if not the only, reason why the attempt to unite the Balkan Communist parties into a Balkan Communist Federation remained stillborn.

Rothschild says little about theory or dogmatic differences but concentrates on tactics and the relationship of the left parties to the issues of the day. This makes the book far more than a party history, and some of the best and most

perceptive sections cover wider aspects of Bulgarian affairs. There is much in the volume on the economic development of the country, on labor legislation and labor organization, an excellent brief discussion of the Stamboliski dictatorship, the Communist-inspired insurrection of September 1923, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization and its policies, the explosion at the Sofia Cathedral in 1925, the Velchev-Georgiev coup in 1934, and so forth. Although the volume ends with the purge in 1936 of Bulgarian Communist party members, engineered by Dimitrov and Kolarov with Comintern support, the copious Footnotes often mention later events and the careers of various leaders after that date.

This is an excellent study, measured in tone, well documented, and a volume to be consulted by anyone working in Bulgarian history, particularly in the post-World War II period.

E. C. HELMREICH

Thomas Brackett Reed Professor of
History and Political Science
Bowdoin College

NEAL WOOD. *Communism and British Intellectuals*. Pp. 256. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. \$4.00.

The British Communist party, as Mr. Wood points out, has followed in origins and leadership the pattern of Socialist development in Britain in that it is predominantly working-class. As a result its influence has been greatest in the trade unions and on matters affecting the short-term interests of their members. In politics its influence has been negligible, and the part played by intellectuals, except a handful of party bureaucrats, has been tangential. The intellectuals who, first in the nineteen-twenties and then in larger numbers in the nineteen-thirties, were attracted by the ideas of communism, were not unemployed and despairing professionals but quite "well-heeled" members, mainly educated at the fee-paying public schools and at Oxford and Cambridge, of an upper middle class which for long had exercised the role of ruling élite. They were, therefore, in the words of Beatrice Webb, "mild-mannered des-

peradoes." When their numbers were greatest they never represented more than a tiny minority of those who, by their intellectual activity, made the important decisions in British society.

This brief but well-documented book fairly and objectively describes the origins and motives of those who were attracted to Communist ideas in the two periods, the uses to which the Communist party put them, and the causes of their disillusionment. Whereas in the nineteen-twenties the Russian Revolution attracted for a short time many already active on the left in British politics, in the nineteen-thirties the conditions of mass unemployment and the growth of fascism politicized a number of literary and scientific personalities who had previously lived ivory-tower lives. The climate had been prepared by the collapse after World War I of traditional ideas on morality, the growth of relativism in philosophy, and the revolution in the natural sciences which undermined established habits of thought.

Disgusted with the society from which they had previously withdrawn, they reacted with almost mystic fervor to the promise of certainty through Marxist action. Brought up in a tradition of liberalism which owed much to the rationalism of the Philosophic Radicals, they found little difficulty in combining the idea of a social system claiming to be based on scientific theory with the crusading ideals of earlier campaigners for humane causes. This spirit reached its zenith with the gallant deaths in Spain of many young writers among the 543 British soldiers who were killed in the Civil War.

Mr. Wood rightly rejects the thesis that all support for communism among intellectuals is the result of neurosis, although this may often cause a predisposition to accept its values. What he fails to do is adequately to analyze the reasons of some, especially scientists, who find it so difficult to break their allegiance in face of the severest disillusionment. Here, surely, the clue is most likely to be found in some disturbance in personality.

While recognizing the inhibiting effect on the growth of the Communist party of Great Britain of a powerful democratic

labor movement, Mr. Wood perhaps underestimates the contribution which it made to the prevention of the growth of Communist influence among intellectuals. Its very defects of pressure to conform and bureaucracy prevent its being as easily moved as those who live mainly in the realm of ideas; while its broad federal structure offers a place for intellectuals whose interest in socialist politics is more than transitory. In practice, it performs the invaluable function of continuing to expose, as they are founded, the swarm of "front" organizations which Communist parties form. No one was ever left in doubt as to the origin of these "proscribed organisations," to which no Labor party member is supposed to belong. This did not prevent people joining them, especially in the late nineteen-thirties and nineteen-forties; but their effectiveness and power to command loyalty were very much reduced.

This sober study of a problem that has aroused interest in many democratic countries, and anxiety in some, is a useful contribution to the growing literature on the power of the Communist idea.

AUSTEN ALBU

Member of Parliament
Great Britain

MORRIS GINSBERG (Ed). *Law and Opinion in England in the 20th Century*. Pp. viii, 407. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959. \$6.50.

This useful, illuminating and, in some sections, brilliant volume illustrates one of the laws of literary natural history: that it is hard for a team to beat a man. The man in this case is Albert Venn Dicey whose *Law and Opinion* furnished the model for this symposium. Dicey had many faults. It might be unjust to describe him as shallow; it would not be unjust to assert that he had a talent for not noticing or accepting awkward facts that ran counter to his excessively symmetrical preconceptions. He was, in the medieval sense of the term, a "realist": nouns like "collectivism" were objective realities for him and did not need or

did not bear analysis. Dicey sought and found simple laws of politics, simple principles of political behavior, and transcribed his conclusions in lucid and deceptively cogent prose. The result was a series of books that may well have done more harm than good, a set of misleading minor classics.

The new "Dicey" is a very different and, in many ways, a superior work. The contributors are not content with disquisitions on vague nouns like "collectivism." Every chapter is significant, full of specific references and often of critical analysis based on an impressive body of knowledge of a type that Dicey never bothered to acquire. Yet Dicey wrote a book, while Professor Ginsberg has had to be content with editing a symposium. All the chapters are worth reading, all are in harmony in that they accept with little or no lamentation the fact of the welfare state, but not all are equally interesting.

American readers still learn a great deal, however, from the chapters that deal with the present state of British parties, especially from Professor Burns' subtle exposition of conservatism, his explanation by example of the Tory party's lack of a dominating ideology. The editors of *The National Review* might see treason of the clerks here, but the student of politics will be enlightened and even, in a way, edified. The account of the Liberals by Mr. R. B. McCallum is as able, but the subject is not so "ondoyant et divers." The account of the Labor party by the late G. D. H. Cole is not only an able piece of exposition but casts possibly unintended light on the present discontents of that party.

Of equal interest are the chapters on the social services. American readers are especially recommended to the section on "Health" by Professor Titmuss. They will learn of the great improvement in the income and status of the family doctor made possible by the beginnings of "socialized medicine" in 1911 and learn that one of the main beneficiaries of the new health service has been the lower middle class or perhaps just the middle class. The general popularity of the service is due to the very wide base of support it has acquired.

The American Medical Association might take note. This is also true of the extension of education. The beneficiaries have been white collar not blue collar families. The "eleven plus" examination is an ordeal, feared by parents as much as children, settling as it does the academic fate of the child and, in most cases, his social and economic destiny for life. The pressure continues after the "eleven plus" examination. I know of one London school of good repute where the parents go to night school to train themselves to help their children with their homework. These chapters were originally lectures, and there are occasionally marks of the genre. But if not a literary masterpiece, this is a most useful guide to the British welfare state, its politics, its law, its successes and failures.

D. W. BROGAN
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THOMAS H. D. MAHONEY, *Edmund Burke and Ireland*. Pp. x, 413. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960. \$7.50.

Burke's "imperial mentality"—to use Professor Mahoney's excellent term—embraced most of the great political problems which confronted England in his day. It gave no special pre-eminence to the problems of his native land, which perhaps stirred him less than did those of India, America, or revolutionary France. Yet in one sense Ireland was outstanding among Burke's causes. It was the first to excite him, and he pursued it the longest. It may also have been the shrewdest test of his conservative philosophy. The wrongs of Ireland were not new and sensational, like the crimes of the Jacobins or even the inequities of East Indian rule. They were long-tolerated realities of a familiar world. Burke spent five years of his boyhood in his uncle's Roman Catholic household in County Cork. The Penal Laws and the harsh restrictions on Irish trade, farming, and industry were among his earliest memories. If a conservative is merely a man who accepts the status quo, he could have made peace with such seasoned injustices; or when he left Ireland at twenty-

one, he could have turned his back upon them.

Burke was a more useful kind of conservative. He would not, like some of his countrymen, demand swift, violent remedies; he believed that deeply rooted evils took time and patience to cure. Neither would he put all the blame upon the English; in his day a small group of Irishmen, the "Protestant Ascendancy," were far more culpable. Separation of Ireland from England he rejected as ruinous to both countries, though more so to Ireland. But he found genuine remedies, of a drastic sort; and in nearly forty years as a British statesman, he watched eagerly for the times when they could be applied.

Professor Mahoney has told the story of Burke's services to Ireland more fully, clearly, and authoritatively than any previous scholar. Using the newly opened Burke and Fitzwilliam papers, he has treated some episodes virtually for the first time: notably Earl Fitzwilliam's ill-fated lord-lieutenancy in 1795 and the Irish mission of Richard Burke, Jr. He has not, naturally, exhausted his enormous subject. Portions even of the Fitzwilliam papers, in particular some at Northampton, he seems to have neglected. Many judgments of Burke's wisdom, and especially of his tactical competence, he could have made less tentative by wider investigations of events in Ireland. But perhaps what Burke once said of reforms can be said of historical narratives: it is not essential to complete them; one should leave something for one's successors to do.

THOMAS W. COPELAND
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SIDNEY POLLARD, *A History of Labour in Sheffield*. Pp. xix, 372. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1959. 35 s. net.

This book by Professor Pollard is a report of a study of the slow development of conditions of labor, of the growth of labor organizations, and of the improvement of the lives of workers in a principal city of England—the city of Sheffield. The period covered is roughly from 1850 to

1940. These ninety years encompass the influences of the "radicalism" of the Chartists and Socialists, the coming of the heavy industries with many foreign workmen, the growth of broad industrial unions, and the influences of the armament race and of the war in the early years of this century.

Also included in this era are the changes in the steel-making processes and the mechanization of industry, both of which affected the number of workers and the types of skills required. Affected in turn were the wage levels and, as a consequence of this, there was improvement in housing, health, sanitation, and the general conditions of life.

Professor Pollard has had the opportunity of working in the University of Sheffield on a Douglas Knoop Research Fellowship in Economic History. He subsequently became a lecturer in the University. His study has taken him into the details of the history of industry, of worker organization, and of municipal activities in such a way to create for the reader a rounded story of this little sample of industrial society.

The reader will be interested in the introduction of the special types of steels such as the Taylor-White tungsten alloy, to name only one. This was developed in America and was used to make such items as high-speed tools. Stainless steel was another invention, first used in making rifle barrels but later a great transforming force in the whole field of steel usage.

But the main interest is in unionization and conditions of work. The coming of trade unions, sometimes locally organized rather than nationally introduced, the growth of industrial unions, and the improvement of urban conditions of life, especially during and since the war period of 1914–19, along with increments in the general level of prosperity have transformed the dingy, undrained town of Sheffield of a century ago into a modern English city. The newer unions were more active in this than were the older ones. "On the whole," says Professor Pollard, "workers in the light trades, of whom many were still acting as employers of labour or independent contractors, were

less militant than the men in heavy industry" in the struggle for organization and for improvement of wages and work benefits. They were also slower to modernize. Technical progress with its decline of manual skills seems to have been more characteristic of heavy industry than of the light crafts in steel and silver. Heavy industries, of course, were more subject to national influence than were light industries.

The research on the human and the industrial sides of life in Sheffield presented here is so thoroughly done that it will not need to be supplemented, when this period and subject-matter are concerned, for a long time to come. Because so much time is spent upon working conditions, health of workers, housing and sanitation, adult education, and other good causes, this is a study in social welfare as well as economic history.

The Bibliography is extensive and detailed; the Index is adequate. If general statements had been given at the beginning or end of chapters to serve as guidelines, the reader could more easily follow the direction of the author's thought. Perhaps, after all, there is some difference between a research paper, as such, and a printed study that is for the use of the general public. But this is immaterial; the book is a scholarly work that will furnish an example of fine research to all who study socio-economic history.

W. HENRY COOKE
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E. H. PHELPS BROWN, *The Growth of British Industrial Relations: A Study from the Standpoint of 1906–1914*. Pp. xxxvii, 414. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1959. \$9.50.

Though the focus of this work is the state of affairs in Britain between 1906 and 1914 when industrial strife seemed so menacing, the author, Professor E. H. Phelps Brown of the London School of Economics, in his own words, "looks backward to ask how that state had come about, and forward, to ask how far it accounts for what goes on today."

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their view, social class weighed more heavily than nationality in education, professional attainment, and in determining their attitude toward the regime. The rest is concerned with such matters as the pattern of family life, industrial organization, and other aspects of internal life and administration. All these are discussed through an elaborate analysis of the statistical material provided by the inquiry, but the result is what one could expect from the special pressures of Soviet policy and from the general trend of the times. In the nineteen-forties and nineteen-fifties social conditions were changing rapidly everywhere and nowhere faster than in the forceful evolution of Russian society.

What the upshot of that evolution might be could hardly have been forecast by that dated and limited inquiry; nor does the authors' rich and, like the rest, well-written concluding chapter depend much on confirmation by that old grain of fact. They both spent a month in the Soviet Union in 1956-57 to get firsthand impressions and found the Soviet system well entrenched and no evidence that its subjects want or need to change it forcibly.

It is changing of itself. As it passes from the stage of sheer "effectiveness" to the more mature stage in which "efficiency" is the main criterion, the dictatorial features are sheared off as no longer necessary or suitable. The challenge it presents to the world springs precisely from that lively dynamism, not from the "unchanging character" of the system. Like the people of any other industrial society, the Soviet citizen is looking for "opportunity" for fair living, and as he is getting it "the crucial change in Soviet society is that now the main outlines of the system seem to enjoy the support of popular consensus." This is a solid political conclusion derived from an elaborate non-political inquiry.

DAVID MITRANY

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WLADYSLAW W. KULSKI. *Peaceful Co-existence: An Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy*. Pp. xxi, 662. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company in co-operation with

the Foundation for Foreign Affairs, 1959. \$12.50.

In the Introduction to his *The Soviet Regime: Communism in Practice* (Syracuse University Press, 1954) now in its third printing, Professor Kulski speaks of his hope that those of the younger generation who are searching for a better world will be warned against believing that a better world is being built in the Soviet Union. In his new book, which, in spite of its cost, may well be even more widely read than its predecessor, he gives another warning, this time to those he refers to as "wishful thinkers" and "well-intentioned people." They should not be influenced either by the new Communist general line or by its principal salesman—a type of party politician, more familiar on the American scene than the Russian—a poor farm boy who made good, who tells jokes, slaps backs, kisses babies, and "beats the drum" for peaceful coexistence and total disarmament.

The Communists, Professor Kulski says, have not had a change of heart. They have merely decided that circumstances make it advisable to use different tactics on a new battleground—the less developed countries—to gain old ends. What keeps the Soviet leaders from using against non-Communist ruled countries the same methods they used in Hungary is not a newly discovered "peace-on-earth-good-will-to-man" spirit but "the actual world wide distribution of power." We must not let this distribution of power shift in favor of the Communists by underestimating the seriousness of their challenge.

The author explains that he has not written either a history or a monograph but has analyzed "basic patterns, objectives, and means of Soviet foreign policy." These analyses are organized topically in fourteen chapters in which he discusses, among other matters, the following: Russian nationalism and its relation to communism; the residue of the Communist faith and the nature of Communist morality, strategy, tactics, and current objectives; doctrine and policy regarding the party, revolution from above, and underdeveloped countries; the Soviet record of violations of the five principles of

coexistence and of their practice of imperialism and colonialism; the Communist international movement especially since 1956.

On the much debated question of whether Soviet foreign policy is more nationalist than Communist, the author suggests that this is another instance of marriage between a creed and a territorial or ethnic unit. In this case the territorial unit, having identified itself with the creed, uses the creed as a weapon of expansion and control of the colonies or protectorates so acquired. The Soviet leaders are first of all Russian patriots, and their alliance with the Chinese Communist leaders is based on a mutuality of interests cemented by "a community of ideological beliefs." The Soviet Union is the senior partner of this alliance, which, the author believes, is not in serious danger of being disturbed by "ideological discrepancies." National communism is a form of resistance to Soviet imperialism as well as a heretical deviation from the general line.

Professor Kulski sees no likelihood of a disintegration or liberalization of the Soviet system or of any long lasting accommodation with or toleration of non-Communist systems. Present Soviet policy is to avoid nuclear war, to defend Soviet conquests at all costs, and to use all means short of a general war to divide and weaken the non-Communist world, and eventually to bury all non-Communist systems.

These brief references to the author's views, as I understand them, relate to only a small number of the topics discussed in this useful and abundantly documented book. They may indicate, however, the bases of selection and emphasis. Another writer might be inclined to place more emphasis on the significance of the scientific-technological revolution in respect to ideologies and social institutions, especially regarding relations between peoples and governments. In a time of such vast and rapid change, the rigidities of a totalitarian dictatorship may in fact be less formidable and enduring than they now appear.

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San Francisco State College

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN (Ed.). *The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union*. Pp. xviii, 457. New York: Random House, 1960. \$6.50.

The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union is a collection of readings on Soviet foreign policy with an Introduction and extensive Notes by its editor, Professor Rubinstein of the University of Pennsylvania. It is the first collection of readings in Soviet foreign policy designed for the college classroom. Jane Degras' *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy* and the Eudin and North collection on Soviet policy in the East and the Eudin and Fisher collection on Soviet policy in the West were designed to assist the research worker rather than the college student.

Professor Rubinstein has chosen his readings on the principle that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is an amalgam of discrete elements. He accepts in part the thesis that Soviet statesmen seek the same objectives as their imperial predecessors: the "natural frontiers" and access to seas. But this is only one strand in Soviet policy as Professor Rubinstein tries to present it. Ideology is also accorded great importance because it is the basis for Soviet forecasts of the future and also because ideology describes the objectives of Soviet policy. Professor Rubinstein is too sophisticated a guide to accept all ideological statements at face value. He knows that some statements are ritualistic, and others are made to mislead, but this does not lead him to the sophomoric error of throwing out the baby with the bath water.

Professor Rubinstein, then, treats Soviet foreign policy as a knotty and complex problem. The college student using this book as his first introduction to the source materials on which any respectable judgment must rest, will find no simple key which will unlock all the doors to understanding. As the student reads materials on ideology, speeches made simultaneously to domestic and foreign audiences, notes of protest against the policies of non-Communist governments, propagandistic attacks on American disarmament policy, and Soviet analyses of the "colonial question," he will learn that the analysis of Soviet

foreign policy is a formidable task. But the skillful introductions to the various sections of the book and the concluding chapter of analyses by outstanding experts demonstrate that it is possible to understand Soviet foreign policies.

But these selections of divergent interpretations and Professor Rubinstein's own judicious introductions, which present the views of others in addition to his own, reveal to the student that there are no easy answers. It is fortunate, indeed that our first book of readings on Soviet foreign policy for the college student is such a good one.

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G. D. EMBREE. *The Soviet Union Between the 19th and 20th Party Congresses, 1952-1956*. Pp. ix, 365. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959. Guilders 22.80.

In the period between 1952 and 1956 there were significant developments in both internal and foreign policies in the Soviet Union. Beginning with the convening of the Nineteenth Party Congress in 1952 and ending with the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, George D. Embree has collected and collated a large amount of information taken from Soviet press and periodical literature. Relying heavily on the translations of Russian literature in *The Current Digest* of the Soviet Press and supplementing these with an extensive canvass of American, British, and German books and articles, the author has put together an impressive amount of information. The book has the semblance of a doctoral dissertation. It contains a Bibliography, Footnotes, long quotations, and documentation. Like most studies in current Soviet history, Embree's book is filled with a recitation of events as reported in *The New York Times*. He retells the story of the accomplishments of the Nineteenth Party Congress of 1952, the events which preceded the death of Stalin, the "Doctor's Plot," the situation confronting the party and the government after Stalin's death, the changes in internal policy, the machinations of Beria

and his purge. There is an eighty-two page chapter in which the new foreign and domestic policies are discussed. Starting with the interregnum in which Malenkov shares power with Khrushchev, Embree develops the story of the new collective leadership and of the economic changes and foreign policies which were the culture for the seed of Khrushchev's power to take hold and sprout in many directions. He goes into considerable detail in discussing Khrushchev's rise to power. Merle Fainsod, Bertram Wolfe, and a few other distinguished scholars have written on this topic in a more trenchant and penetrating manner, but young scholars like George Embree should be encouraged to replot the ground so that they may have the exercise and experience of collection and interpretation of data.

The penultimate chapter is a factual description of the events of 1955 concerning Soviet foreign policy, and the final chapter discusses the Twentieth Party Congress of February 1956. Starting with the decision in 1954 to embark on a program of foreign economic aid to underdeveloped countries, the Soviet Union continued in 1955 to extend its posture before the world in a different manner than during the Stalin era. The realignment of power in the Kremlin in February 1955 with the "resignation" of Malenkov and the appointment of Khrushchev's puppet, Bulganin, as prime minister brought the role of Khrushchev as the spokesman of Soviet foreign policy very much to the front of the stage. The year 1955 ends with Khrushchev and Bulganin "peddling their wares" in South Asia. Embree finishes his book with an account of the party and the economic changes wrought by the Twentieth Congress. He documents the story of the denigration of Stalin, the problem faced by Khrushchev to stave off an attempt to move him aside, and shows how Khrushchev was preparing the maneuver to weaken Malenkov and Molotov.

All these events are well known, but they make interesting repetitive reading. Dr. Embree might consider a sequel study of the following four years, from 1956 to 1960, and attempt to trace through the

last four years the events which consolidated Khrushchev's power. Such another volume would be of considerable value. The large print of this book makes it easy reading from the optical point of view, but next time an attempt should be made to prevent the inordinate number of typographical errors.

WILLIAM B. BALLIS
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SERGE A. ZENKOVSKY. *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia*. (Russian Research Center Studies, 36.) Pp. x, 345. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960. \$6.75.

The twenty million or so Turkic speaking Muslims—Tatars, Uzbeks, Turkmens, Kazakhs, Bashkirs, Azeris, and others—of Russia constitute the largest non-Slavic and non-Orthodox population of the Soviet Union today. In the days of Jingiz Khan and his Golden Horde successors, Turkic nomads established their rule over much of what today is Russia. With the conquest of Kazan by Ivan the Terrible, the trend was reversed, and in the mid-nineteenth century the partly Turkic populated Caucasus region and solidly Turkic Central Asia became the last major territories to be incorporated into the ever expanding tsarist realms.

The advent of liberal, constitutional, and nationalist ideas to Russia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was bound to stir the Tsars' Turkic subjects into new political consciousness. The tsarist collapse of 1917 briefly seemed to present the alluring prospect of national independence; yet it is doubtful whether any of the essential prerequisites of nation-statehood were present. Religious consciousness competed with ethnic loyalty. The culturally more advanced Tatars in the West were scattered over a wide area—from the Crimea to Baku and Kazan—inhabited by Great Russians and other non-Turkic populations. The region of solid Turkic settlement from the Caspian to the Altai mountains was on a far more primitive social and cultural level. In addition, the energies of Turkic political

leaders during the climactic years of the Russian Civil War were consumed with quarrels over basic political ideals, such as that between the centralist Tatars of Kazan and the federalist or separatist Bashkirs of the Southern Ural, and over tactics in the fight against the resurgent Bolsheviks. By 1922 the Red Armies had fully re-established Russian control throughout the area.

Dr. Zenkovsky has provided us with the first detailed study of political developments among Russia's Turks during the crucial period from the 1905 Revolution to the Civil War. The merit of the book, however, lies far more in the choice of subject matter than in its treatment. The author labors under the decisive handicap of being unfamiliar with the languages of the Turkic peoples whose aspirations and activities he examines. He has obtained assistance in securing translations of excerpts of a few original documents—notably the Proceedings of the Muslim Congresses of 1906 and 1917. Otherwise, the bulk of his material is derived from secondary sources in Russian and other European languages. That Turkic names and citations, including references to these key sources, are hopelessly garbled, at times beyond recognition, is only to be expected under the circumstances. What is more surprising is that even the material from western sources suffers from this. For example, the author cited on p. 299, n. 8 is Jean Deny, not "J. Denis"; the nineteenth-century poet Namik Kemal has evidently been confused with Atatürk (see pp. 30, 341); there are no references to the important works bearing on Ottoman Pan-Turkism by E. E. Ramsaur, Bernard Lewis, and others; Nabih Amin Faris (p. 277) is not an "authoritative Moslem thinker" but a Christian.

In fairness to Dr. Zenkovsky it should be stated that the inaccuracies in which the book abounds are the result of carelessness rather than of deliberate distortion. Indeed, in a subject that could easily give rise to charged emotions, partisanship, and wishful thinking, he has maintained a commendable detachment of point of view. Nor has he attempted to fit his data into any explicit theoretical scheme.

The subject still awaits a treatment based on the combination of broad perspective and careful scholarship characteristic of such works as Pipes' *Formation of the Soviet Union* or Kazemzadeh's *Struggle for Transcaucasia*. In the meantime, Zenkovsky's book will serve as a preliminary, though not always reliable, exploration of a fascinating subject.

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EMANUEL POLLACK. *The Kronstadt Rebellion*. Pp. 98. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. \$3.00.

The Kronstadt rebellion in March, 1921, was a dramatic episode in the early years of Bolshevik rule in Russia. The decision of the sailors on this island fortress to demand a relaxation of the harsh political and economic measures of the Soviet government; the efforts of that government, in the person of Kalinin, to win back the loyalty of the sailors by a personal plea; the growing intransigence on both sides; and finally the bloody suppression of the rebellion—such elements of drama make this episode a central issue in the interpretation of early Soviet history. The victorious government claimed that the rebellion was a White Guard counter-revolutionary plot, designed to undo the work of the revolution. Opponents of the Communists have seen it as the last effort of the Russian people to gain the political and economic rights denied them by the Bolshevik dictatorship. Historical scholarship in the West now interprets this episode as a reflection both of the disillusionment with Bolshevik policies shared by many supporters of the revolution, and of the single-minded determination of Lenin and his colleagues to suppress all forms of criticism within the revolutionary movement.

This monograph unfortunately fails to do justice to this important and controversial subject. Scarcely longer than a graduate term paper, it draws on a very limited range of materials and adds nothing to our knowledge or understanding of the

events with which it is concerned. In a brief chapter, supplemented by an Appendix, an effort is made to discuss the changing Soviet interpretations of the Kronstadt rebellion. Here again, however, the treatment is so lacking in detail and subtlety that only the most obvious conclusions are drawn. American scholarship has made great advances in recent years in the study and interpretation of Soviet affairs, but this monograph reflects no familiarity with these advances.

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NICHOLAS V. RIASANOVSKY. *Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825-1855*. Pp. viii, 296. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959. \$5.00.

A study of the theory that guided state policy during the reign of Nicholas I has long been overdue, and Professor Riasanovsky has succeeded admirably in providing such a study and throwing light on it from different angles. His material is grouped under these headings: the Supreme Commander, the Men, the Ideas, Home Affairs, and Foreign Policy. These, in turn, are followed by a general summary, in a final, short chapter, "Official Nationality and History." He has consulted an impressive number of authorities including periodicals and the original works of the chief authors who contributed to formulating the theory, obviously a time-consuming task since we are told that it took him six years. The thoroughness of his investigation precludes criticism of his scholarship. Some might disagree with his treatment of various topics, a hazard to which the vastness and complexity of the subject exposes him. This reviewer is forced to question one of the basic assumptions that underlies his whole work, while admitting that on this point divergent views are possible.

The author endeavors to deal with the events of Nicholas' reign in the general context of European history, for which much can be said. However, he goes further and discusses the cult which he calls nationality as a phase only of the national-

ism that developed throughout Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Surely it is a mistake to equate movements that grew out of such diverse backgrounds and that manifested themselves in such different ways. The distinctive type of feudalism that prevailed in the West, the presence there of a universal church, the tradition of Roman law, the influence of the guilds in the economic life, and the wealth and power of the towns clearly set absolute monarchy of western Europe quite apart from the autocracy of Russia. The latter was not as in the West a compact of the crown and the middle class against the aristocracy, but, on the other hand, a monolithic despotism enforced by terror and reducing all classes to a state of servitude.

Professor Riasanovsky may be right in his claim that Peter the Great and his regime were the models Nicholas took for his government; but it was Ivan the Terrible to whom Russia owed her autocracy and who formulated his theories in unforgettable language.

The reader is still left wondering why this official nationalism had so little hold on the Russian people that despite all the efforts of the state to expand its influence, it was so soon overwhelmed by a powerful movement in a contrary direction. The author does, indeed, speak of this unfortunate "split between governments and society" signs of which were not wanting in the works of the great writers even in Nicholas' day which assumed fateful proportions under his successor. But he seems to imply this came about through the harshness of Nicholas' regime. The causes must surely lie deeper in the forces of Russian history. The oppressive severity of censorship may have been a contributing factor. The widespread corruption in the administration, which even no remedial measures were able to check, undoubtedly aggravated the situation. But, it surely was a revulsion against the centuries-old system of what the Russians call, *opeka*, an all-embracing tutelage exercised by ruling minority over the majority, a system now hopelessly bankrupt, for which, however, it seemed no substitute could be found, since there were no institutions by

which the interests of minority and majority could be harmonized.

STUART R. TOMPKINS

Research Professor, Emeritus
University of Oklahoma

VLADIMIR GSOVSKI and KAZIMIERZ GRZYBOWSKI (Eds.). *Government, Law and Courts in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe*. Volumes 1 & 2. Pp. xxxii, 917; xv, 921-2067. New York: Frederick A. Praeger (Atlantic Books), 1959. \$30.00.

Is Soviet law unique? A team of twenty-eight experts under the skilled guidance of two experienced comparatists concludes that it is, although some branches of the law and some countries of its reception show continuing strong influences of the civil law system of Continental Europe. Thus, "With all its real or merely seeming novelties, the Soviet criminal law is an offshoot of Continental European criminal law," and with regard to the countries of the Soviet orbit, "by and large the old administrative pattern of the bourgeois democratic state has been retained."

The interplay of tradition and Soviet pressure for adoption of Soviet patterns in Eastern Europe is made the basis for this monumental effort to analyze the law of Eastern Europe. What the Socialist influences upon law have been are set forth with precision, but it is noted that in spite of Soviet theory, elements of non-Socialist law remain, and the states of Eastern Europe seem unable to dispense with those elements. Still, this does not in the authors' view prevent the system resulting from the amalgam from being new. In words applied specifically to civil procedure but applicable generally, "It is like a new building erected with old bricks."

Investigators of Soviet legal institutions trained in common law, notably American lawyers familiar only with their own courtrooms, often return from Moscow impressed by Soviet legal novelties. These weighty volumes will correct these impressions, for the forms and many of the substantive rules of Soviet law are identical with those of Western European

legal systems. The real fascination lies in comparison of Soviet and Western European law to determine what socialism has added. Only with knowledge of the starting point can one distinguish new elements introduced to cope with a state-oriented economy and a mass-oriented society.

The authors deserve praise for what they have accomplished in preparing the way for Americans who approach European law for the first time, but only the persistent scholar will open these covers, for they are not light reading, nor could they be. They stand primarily as research sources for those seeking comparative materials, and this function is well performed.

Knowing as this reviewer does the voluminous nature of the material digested, he marvels at the cohesion that has been achieved. The authors obtain this by concentrating on that part of the law relating to the rights of the individual. Yet there are some tangents, as when the authors give a full record of the Soviet assumption of power in the Baltic states. This excursion into international law is valuable for those who know little of it, but it belongs perhaps in a separate study and not with municipal law. Further, numerous pages are devoted to a foreshortened history of Russia and its revolution, but some of these encumber an already long study, valuable as they are, especially with regard to land holding. Finally, the volumes were prepared during the period of speedy post-Stalin reform, and they cannot but reflect the confusion of the era which introduced changes while the book was in press. In spite of these criticisms, the work stands as a monumental study in a fascinating new field of comparative law, the law of comparative communism. As such the volumes belong on the shelves of every library concerned with development of the Soviet idea.

JOHN N. HAZARD

Professor of Public Law
Columbia University

HERSCHEL and EDITH ALT. *Russia's Children: A First Report on Child Welfare*

in the Soviet Union. Pp. 240. New York: Bookman Associates, 1959. \$3.75.

This "first Report on Child Welfare in the Soviet Union" is a fascinating account by two sensitive and astute observers. The Alts found universal friendliness on the part of "guides, chauffeurs, waiters, hostesses on airplanes, by porters and the baggage men. They all knew we were Americans, but this apparently did not restrict their spontaneous expression of warmth and friendship." They report that both their food and housing were good, and they did not overexert themselves. Yet after twenty-one days on Russian soil they wrote it would take some time to recover from the strain of the Russian experience. They felt the strain was due to the "joylessness of living and the depreciation of the individual, and the ever present fear which continuously communicated itself to us."

The state takes primary responsibility for the child's upbringing. It is held that "only as the family is completely in tune with the social order and expresses its purposes can it successfully prepare the child for life in that society." Russian parents seem kindly, protective, and solicitous but, with their long work hours six days a week, cannot give their children much direct supervision. They are helped by "patronage nurses" who visit each family regularly and give help and instruction in child guidance. Unsuitable homes are reported, and if they do not improve, the children are removed and placed in a boarding school.

The state provides well-organized kindergartens for four to seven years until regular school starts. Some good nursery schools are provided by the state and some by the unions. The writers were amazed by the perfect order in the nurseries and the good behavior of even the two-year olds, who were regimented yet treated with warmth and kindness. There are also a good number of nurseries which care for babies that are two months or older only going home on weekends with their families. Here some babies of two months are put into pens together to develop their social feeling early. Despite a highly organized and carefully staffed system, there is

considerable delinquency, "hooliganism," drunkenness in boys of fourteen and fifteen, and emotional and mental illness among children. The fact that these ills have not been eliminated is believed to be due to faulty upbringing in homes. Therefore there is a movement underway to provide boarding schools for all children from seven to seventeen. The ideal Communist personality would be left more and more to the state.

This plan may not receive widespread acceptance. Despite their will to the contrary, the Soviet commissioners have had to make concessions to human feelings and needs in providing incentives through higher wages, personal property such as cars, electric appliances, and private homes, and even some degree of inheritance.

It is impossible in a brief review to give an adequate account of the rich and illuminating details which fill these pages. The book is far more than an account of child welfare in the Soviet Union. It provides a vivid cross section of Russian life including some revealing glimpses and frank criticisms by Soviet citizens not planned for by Intourist! Just as the authors say after their crowded days of intensive study, "We need to know much more," we may say one needs to read much more than can be presented here to gain the full value of this admirable book. It is like opening a window onto the amazing social experiments in Russia today.

KATHERINE WHITESIDE TAYLOR
Supervisor of Parent Education
Baltimore Public Schools

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY

M. MORTON AUERBACH. *The Conservative Illusion*. Pp. xii, 359. New York: Columbia University Press. 1959. \$6.75.

One of the intellectual fantasies of the twentieth century centers about the diverse adventures of a number of American publicists in quest of conservation in an age of cataclysmic change, unrest, and unreason. These publicists possess little

in common save the designation of New Conservatives, and although some of them have occasionally made astute analyses of social conditions, they have on the whole probably received more attention than they merit from friendly and adverse critics alike. Mr. Auerbach's volume represents the most systematic attempt to relate the ideas of the New Conservatives to their context in the intellectual history of conservatism as exemplified by the writings of Plato, the Stoics, St. Augustine, John of Salisbury, and Edmund Burke—the transcendent values of all, according to the author, are harmony and tranquillity. These five theorists represent respectfully the five major forms of historical conservatism: authoritarian, "alienated," radical, "pure," and liberal, all of which have appeared in the twentieth century under new auspices.

After describing the historical forms of conservatism, Mr. Auerbach proceeds to analyze the ideas of the southern agrarians who in some ways represent liberal conservatism; Russell Kirk and reactionary conservatism; adjusted conservatism as propounded by John Halliwell, Herbert Agar in his later writings, Peter Viereck, and Clinton Rossiter; the corporatist conservatism of Peter Drucker; and the radical, neo-Augustinian conservatism of Reinhold Niebuhr. That everyone will not regard all of these writers as representatives of conservatism is no disparagement of Mr. Auerbach's careful analysis of their writings for which a discursive sketch like this is altogether inadequate as a mirror of the inner confusions, contradictions, and frustrations of much of conservative thought which Mr. Auerbach exposes with ruthless vigor.

Perhaps the most significant portion of the book is found in the three final chapters where the author points to the fallacy of the "New Liberalism" in its defense of liberal values in conservative terms, relates conservative ideology to theory and history, and concludes by associating the desire for harmony with the Freudian death wish. Hence, according to the author, "Conservatism does not speak for mankind but only for bewildered individuals and groups which are left be-

hind by historical development." Therefore, "to offer mankind Conservative harmony as its supreme goal, on the assumption that social and moral forces are decisive in history, is to offer an illusion; and to burden man with a superfluous sense of guilt for failing to achieve an illusion is to make a grim joke of a history which has too long borne unnecessary tragedies." In every way Mr. Auerbach has written an important book characterized by good writing, incisive comment, and shrewd analysis.

ROBERT J. HARRIS
Professor of Political Science
Vanderbilt University

DAVID CUSHMAN COYLE. *Ordeal of the Presidency*. Pp. v, 408. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1960. \$6.00.

This book was written with a double purpose. One, doubtless, was to exploit the market for timely entertainment in book form provided by a presidential campaign, promising the usual thrilling contentment. Seekers for such entertainment will not be disappointed. The author, who knows how to write fast-selling literature, has chosen ten of the thirty-three past presidents whose terms were distinguished for the reckless abuse heaped upon them by their more irresponsible and unscrupulous critics. The volume opens with Tom Paine's most outrageous animadversions against George Washington and closes with lurid details from "The Strange Death of Franklin D. Roosevelt" by one Emanuel M. Josephson. In-between is an artful and copious selection from the "mud" thrown at John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, J. Q. Adams, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, Andrew Johnson, Theodore Roosevelt, and Woodrow Wilson. Any casual reader, who enjoys righteous indignation, will enjoy this book.

The second purpose is more subtle. It is not only in the buried past that unrestrained and fantastic vilification has been inflicted upon eminent public men. In our own time, as our author temperately observes, "we have seen the President of the United States called names that his

enemies felt to be richly deserved but his friends took as indecent outrages." It may be useful under such conditions, our author opines, to recall the outrages of former generations. "To aid in such an exercise is the main purpose of the book."

There can be no doubt of the practical utility of this fascinating volume. On the eve of a campaign, which threatens to rouse at least the customary amount of political passion, a reasonable warning against partisan "mud-throwing" is a valuable contribution to the political education of the American people. Some of the author's reflections on the record of the presidents' ordeals will provoke controversy. He quotes with approval John Fiske's dictum: "The statesman's business is to accomplish sundry concrete political purposes, and he measures statements primarily not by their truth, but by their availability as a means toward a practical end." This is obviously an attitude toward truth-telling that freely exposes the statesman to charges of lying. The more stormy the waters through which he is trying to steer the ship of state, the more freely the charge of liar is likely to be shot at him. Happily Mr. Coyle does not attempt to rate his ten presidents on any scale of veracity. Perhaps it will be enough for the curious reader in this campaign if he gains from this book some comfort, when the veracity of his favorite candidate comes under fierce attack.

ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE
Professor of Government, Emeritus
Harvard University

DAVID A. SHANNON. *The Decline of American Communism: A History of the Communist Party of the United States Since 1945*. Pp. xiii, 425. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959. \$7.50.

The failure of the Communist party in the United States during the postwar period has received much scholarly attention. However, it remained for David A. Shannon, Associate Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin, to document fully and interpret that failure.

In doing so, he has rendered a valuable service to all those concerned with the careers of radical movements in this country, and he has produced a study that will endure. Indeed, it is difficult to see how other historians can do much more than elaborate and further document the principal ideas he sets forth.

While Professor Shannon writes primarily as a historian, few readers of this volume will fail to be impressed by his sophisticated use of political and sociological materials. He shows, of course, a decent regard for the relevant facts, but he realizes that they do not speak for themselves. Accordingly, his interpretations are informed by insights into events and sensitivity to human roles that all too rarely shape the treatment of the life histories of political organizations. A good example is found in his exploration of Communist involvement in the Progressive party. Equally illustrative is his interpretation of the internal workings of the Communist party and the motivations and actions of its leaders during a series of institutional crises.

While some students of American communism have attempted to link the party with a native radical tradition and to see some of its actions as manifestations of indigenous protest, Professor Shannon clearly establishes its almost complete dependence on the Soviet party and diagrams its movements as responses to Kremlin demands. He concludes with the observation: "Of all the generalizations about the Communist Party of the United States and its history that might be made from the evidence, the most important and generally valid one is this: the American Communist Party was and is the willing instrument of the Soviet Union." With that statement few knowledgeable observers will fail to concur.

One wishes only that Professor Shannon had dealt more extensively with some of the methodological problems encountered in this study and that he had provided a longer and more inclusive bibliographical essay. However, for his purposes, he had no obligation to do so, and he can hardly be taken to task on these matters. He has said much about the Communist party

in the postwar period, and he has said it well.

WILSON RECORD

Associate Professor of Sociology
Sacramento State College

PAUL T. DAVID, RALPH M. GOLDMAN, and
RICHARD C. BAIN. *The Politics of
National Party Conventions*. Pp. xv.
592. Washington, D. C.: Brookings
Institution, 1960. \$10.00.

After the 1952 campaign a first-rate set of studies appeared covering the convention and pre-convention political operations in both major parties. Those studies have formed the basis for this new work, a comprehensive inquiry into America's "peculiar institution"—the national nominating convention. Devised first in the 1830's as a popular substitute for "King Caucus," the conventions have been extant for a century and a quarter—peculiarly American, peculiarly democratic, peculiarly republican.

The Politics of National Party Conventions is much more than a convention-by-convention recital of maneuvers and stratagems. This volume sets down a practical, documented anatomy of our quadrennial exercises in collective political action. Starting with a relatively brief fifty-page study of the background and adjustments of the convention method over the years, the authors consider the leadership in convention operations, correctly pointing out that a quadrennial mass gathering of this type is peculiarly subject to leadership need. Contrasts are drawn between the pattern of a political party in office, that is, in the White House, and a party out of power. A large number of charts are used to demonstrate what actually happened in a variety of leadership situations.

The authors then move to a consideration of the delegates—how they are divided among the states, how they vote, how they are elected. A particularly interesting chapter deals with the characteristics of the delegates themselves—their age, color, sex and religion, educational and income status, occupations and party experience. Finally, the nature of nominating campaigns and campaigning and the variety of tech-

niques used to translate the campaign into an effective and winning effort on the convention floor in the actual decision-making work of the party congress are discussed.

Somewhat apart from the study of conventions per se the authors offer some views on the relationship of convention action to final election results and some thoughts on the development of the convention process in the future. But this is mainly a book about the convention as it is now. It seems likely that the David-Goldman-Bain effort will remain the standard text and reference volume in this field for some time to come. It is authoritative, and its research is graphically supported in detail.

This volume will be ponderous for the average reader; it is not intended as a popular work. But it is understood that an "abbreviated" book will be made available later in the year for general use. The full volume, however, will be standard reading for all serious students of American politics, in this 1960 election year and for many years to come.

RICHARD M. SCAMMON

Director of Elections Research
Governmental Affairs Institute
Washington, D. C.

J. JOSEPH HUTHMACHER. *Massachusetts
People and Politics, 1919-1933*. Pp. x,
328. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press
of the Harvard University Press, 1959.
\$6.50.

During the past quarter-century a number of studies of political behavior in a particular state have engaged the attention of political scientists. One thinks of California, Iowa, Louisiana, New Mexico, Tennessee, and Texas, in this connection. These are not uniform in method, emphasis, or style, but they are sufficiently alike to improve our understanding of American political action. Neprash's pioneer study of the Brookhart campaigns placed the emphasis on the tactics of an agrarian insurgent. Gosnell's studies employed advanced statistical skills to measure social forces and correlations. Most of the others combined psychological insights, ecological methods, historical documentation, and conventional assumptions about

motives to produce well-rounded analyses.

Huthmacher's Massachusetts study is a socio-psychological study of political forces in the Bay State during the period 1919-1933. It is an account of the transformation of political power from republicanism to democracy. The personal qualities and tactics of party leaders, such as Coolidge, Curley, Fitzgerald, and Gillette, are not ignored, but they are subordinated to other considerations. Just as in national politics during the 1920's and 1930's, Democratic leaders adhered to the traditional strategy of combining the South and West, and had to meet the challenge of the growing power of the urban East, so in Massachusetts the party leaders were obliged to follow a course which would mobilize under the party banner at least two of the major population groups.

Most Americans are well aware that prior to World War I, the dominant social and political groups in Massachusetts were comprised of Yankees, that is, "Old Americans" with English Protestant ancestors, but they probably are not aware of the extension of this group to include British, Scandinavian, and German immigrant stock. Apparently, these allied "Anglo-Saxons" have been rewarded for their support by means of social, economic, and cultural advantages, and not by political jobs.

In his treatment of the Irish Catholics, the author is on familiar ground. Since they were excluded from the society of the Old Stock Republicans, the Irish naturally cast their lot with the Democrats. Because of their heavy concentration in certain cities, especially Boston, they could win local elections but could not seriously threaten the Old Stock in the state. Here is where the third element comes in.

Huthmacher persuasively argues that the "New Immigrants," consisting of diverse racial, nationality, and religious groups, nevertheless constituted an element or force capable of being politically united because of common cultural ideals, problems, and frustrations. These "New Immigrants" were: French Canadians, Poles, Italians, Portuguese, Jews, and relatively minor settlements of Lithuanians, Greeks, Armenians, Syrians, and even Negroes.

Although the Irish were discriminated against by the Old Stock, the New Immigrants were in turn discriminated against by both of the former elements.

The book under review is the story of the attempts of the Old Stock Republicans and the Irish Democrats to effect an alliance with this third force. Sometimes the Old Stock Republicans would be weakened by internal dissension, such as characterized the rivalry between the Lodge and the Crane-Coolidge factions. In the 1920's, despite efforts to divide them, the Irish and the New Immigrants were united by the impact of national issues—prohibition, 100 per cent Americanism, Ku Kluxism, and immigration restriction. It was David I. Walsh who launched the first "revolution" which combined the second and third forces, and even enlisted under the Democratic banner, Yankees, liberals, and labor leaders who had formerly been associated with the Old Stock Republicans.

The hero of the book is Al Smith. As an "Urban New Immigrant" himself, Smith helped the Massachusetts Democrats to weld together the second and third forces. This coalition held firm from 1924 to 1952. It is not part of the author's design to explain how Roosevelt and Truman managed to retain the loyalty of the Democratic coalition in Massachusetts, but his references to their programs and leadership in the nation as a whole account for their success in overcoming Eastern urban reluctance to unite with the South and the West.

Although the author carefully avoids making any predictions for 1960, John F. Kennedy is mentioned only in the Preface, one wonders what the implications are of the new issues, internationalism and communism, which caused the loyalty of Massachusetts to the Democratic party to falter in 1952. Perhaps, as Huthmacher suggests in his reporting of the elections of 1920 and 1932, state leaders who wish to remain in power can do little more than adapt their policies and utterances to pressures originating outside of the state of Massachusetts.

ROY V. PEEL

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ARTHUR MANN. *La Guardia: A Fighter Against His Times, 1882-1933*. Pp. 384. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1959. \$6.00.

Fiorello H. La Guardia is fast becoming a legendary American hero, celebrated in song and story. It is fortunate, therefore, that so competent and perceptive a scholar as Arthur Mann has undertaken to do a political biography of this tribune of the people at a time when the record of his life is still fresh in popular memory.

Among all those public men who made their mark on the national scene in the years that bridged the two World Wars, La Guardia must be accorded high rank. An authentic product of an America in ferment, a symbol of the vitality of the "New Immigration" that began in the 1880's, a creative spirit by inclination and heritage, this New York-born, Arizona-bred, New York University Law School-educated son of an Italian father and a Jewish mother engaged in the good, tough fight for personal fulfillment, public acclaim, and civic righteousness. The story of his career is a colorful drama, reflecting the trials and triumphs of a generation of new Americans seeking place and position in an emergent urban-industrial society. Professor Mann, who has done important research in this field before, catches it all with a brilliance born of keen, analytical power and consummate literary skill.

As the first of two volumes on La Guardia, the book covers the period to the New York Mayoralty campaign of 1933. It draws on the La Guardia Papers in the New York Municipal Archives and on other primary sources, including records here and abroad, numerous interviews, and many published works, among them La Guardia's own autobiography, *The Making of an Insurgent, 1882-1919*. It uses, too, a wide variety of special studies, printed and in manuscript, dealing especially with Progressive politics in the 1920's and La Guardia in Congress. Mann has been indefatigable in his search for significant social and personal determinants of thought and action.

It all adds up to an absorbing and instructive account of a champion of the common man, battling his way to pre-

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ferment as consular agent, union lawyer, Congressman, aldermanic president, and mayoralty hopeful, and, in the process, breaking down the social and political barriers to power. On the hustings and through the columns of the press, especially the Hearst papers, La Guardia espoused an all-embracing program of reform, founded on the philosophy of the welfare state and the pressing needs and hopes of the urban populace. "I would rather be right than regular," he declared in 1924 as he campaigned furiously for Congress on the La Follette platform, and he made that his lifelong credo.

Perhaps the secret of La Guardia's success lies in the fact that he, like Franklin D. Roosevelt, whom he resembled in many ways, had a sense of history, which transformed him from a rough and tumble, if resourceful, politician to a statesman. He mastered the lessons of politics as he matured in responsible leadership. He responded instinctively to the growing demands for expertness in government in an age of specialization. His political life is stirring proof of the creative working of the democratic process in the big city.

SIDNEY I. POMERANTZ

Professor of History
The City College

FREDERIC N. CLEAVELAND. *Science and State Government: A Study of the Scientific Activities of State Government Agencies in Six States*. Pp. xvi, 161. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959. \$3.50.

This book, based on more detailed studies financed by the National Science Foundation, brings together data on what California, Connecticut, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, and Wisconsin are doing to promote scientific research and development. Its importance lies in the fact that it is the first systematic attempt to consider the scientific role of the states. It thus lays a foundation for further analysis and sets a pattern for future study.

Scientific competition with the Soviet Union has made it axiomatic that what

we as a nation do in the field of science is of overwhelming importance to national welfare. But it is often assumed that anything so labeled necessarily contributes to scientific research and development. Too often merely wearing a laboratory technician's smock or having microscopes and other instruments in an office are considered sufficient to qualify activities as research. Unquestionably, the meaning, significance, and relevance of scientific activities must be analyzed critically. The nation's research agenda must be reviewed carefully.

In this regard Dr. Cleaveland's volume is quite restrained. Its criticism of scientific activities in the six states is muted. Largely descriptive in nature, the book follows the presentation in the useful National Science Foundation surveys of *Federal Funds for Science*. In many respects, however, the author's data speak for themselves, and what is said is not encouraging.

The proportion of state research funds devoted to agriculture, for instance, will not make those happy who are concerned about burgeoning metropolitan problems. It is not that agriculture should receive less support, but rather that other areas require more. The general neglect of the social sciences should be disturbing to readers concerned with this field.

Dr. Cleaveland's presentation points to many important questions of public policy and permits the identification of research needed to examine more closely program content and administrative processes related to state scientific activities. The issues associated with the allocation of state research dollars require appraisal. The extent of political programming of research, as in the case of agriculture, needs to be evaluated. And, the basic question of how decisions with respect to the research agenda are made should also be reviewed. One wonders, for example, whether state legislatures are presently so constituted and equipped to make wise choices and sound policies on spending state research funds.

These are but a few of the problems which are implicit in Dr. Cleaveland's

data. Future studies, it is hoped, will undertake to deal with them explicitly.

NORMAN WENGERT

Professor and Chairman, Department
of Political Science
Wayne State University

WILLIAM J. SIFFIN. *The Legislative Council in the American States*. Pp. xiv, 266. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1959. No price.

This is an important book for readers seeking a comprehensive, incisive, and objectively critical study of one of the recent innovations in American state government. It also contains useful data for all teachers of American government—data throwing light not on the legislative council alone but on some of the central problems of federalism in the United States.

The legislative council's span of time, 1933–1960, coincides with what may come to be known as the twilight period of American state government. The night seems hard upon us. It was the hope and belief of many of the leading advocates and promoters of the legislative council that it might tend to revivify and reinvigorate state government, particularly the legislative branch. Professor Siffin's book makes clear why this has not happened and probably will not. By implication at least, it also raises the question of whether any sort of structural reform can suffice to rescue the states from the low estate of mendicant dependency on the federal government.

In interesting narrative the book tells of the beginnings of the legislative council idea, the political battles to gain its acceptance, the plans adopted in such pioneering states as Kansas, Michigan, Illinois, and Kentucky, its interrelations with the earlier legislative reference libraries and bill-drafting bureaus, and its variations under the impact of practical politics.

The author's judgments are temperate and well fortified with documentation. The tabular data are effectively presented, the Bibliography is excellent, and there is a fully adequate Index. Having been an attending delegate in the Moot Constitu-

tional Convention in Cleveland, Ohio, on December 29–31, 1919, when the legislative council was first proposed, the present reviewer has found Professor Siffin's account of that occasion especially interesting.

CHESTER C. MAXEY

President, Emeritus
Whitman College

FREEMAN CLEAVES. *Meade of Gettysburg*. Pp. xi, 383. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960. \$5.00.

General George Gordon Meade is best known to twentieth-century Americans as the commanding officer of the Union forces in the important victory at Gettysburg. Actually, he had a long and commendable military career and has suffered from a lack of attention on the part of historians and biographers. Mr. Cleaves, author of distinguished biographies of William Henry Harrison and George H. Thomas, now undertakes to remedy the neglect of this very solid Union general.

A graduate of West Point, where his record was far from impressive, Meade served at various frontier posts, with the Army Topographical Engineers, and under General Taylor in the Mexican War. Like many other young officers, he resigned from the army to accept civilian employment.

Meade's role at Gettysburg has been well studied and, especially his failure to effect an energetic pursuit of Lee after the battle, often criticized. On the other hand, there has been no adequate attempt, in recent years, to appraise Meade's role at such battles as Second Bull Run, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, and in the Wilderness Campaign. Working carefully through a mass of sources—War Office archives and records, regimental histories, reminiscences of associates and subordinates, a great many manuscript collections, and many newspaper files—Mr. Cleaves has sought to sift the truth and establish a fair evaluation of General Meade's services to the Union cause.

As biography, this leaves much to be desired. A scarcity of personal documents and papers, especially for the early period,

provides an explanation of the author's inability to delineate the man as successfully as he does the officer. The organization, with most of the book devoted to the years of war, also leaves something to be desired. As military history, however, this is excellent. Well researched and carefully documented, written in a clear and forceful style, this book should begin to restore the balance of military appraisal in favor of a highly competent and completely dedicated soldier.

RALPH ADAMS BROWN

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HUDSON STRODE. *Jefferson Davis: Confederate President*. Pp. xvii, 556. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959. \$6.75.

Biographical projects have a way of expanding between original design and finished product. Before Hudson Strode completed initial research on Jefferson Davis, he decided that the Mississippian's career required two volumes rather than one for adequate coverage. The first, subtitled *American Patriot* (1955), brought the narrative through secession. The remaining period proved a bigger task than the author contemplated; and the present book, *Confederate President*, closes on New Year's Day, 1864. Like the first volume, it is historical biography, with perspective limited chiefly to political, military, and diplomatic history. Economic conditions are largely ignored. The author devotes considerable attention to social life in Montgomery and Richmond; and, as in Volume I, he lightens the narrative with family affairs that exhibit the President as a warm and affectionate man.

Using effectively previous studies of Davis and his contemporaries and much printed and manuscript material, including many fugitive letters and journals, Professor Strode has produced a good though hardly a definitive account of the years 1861–1863. The Jefferson Davis that emerges from his pages differs markedly from the man often presented by earlier

writers. The much maligned President becomes a human personality, a lovable character in the eyes of intimate acquaintances who understood the extraordinary problems that faced the chief executive. Ill-health seldom diminished equilibrium and stability, even in periods of mental depression. Davis outwardly ignored the jibes of carping political and military critics who needed a scapegoat for Confederate failures; and he cultivated a selfless and devoted spirit. Despite optimism that continued through the darkest days of the Confederacy's history, Professor Strode concludes that "Jefferson Davis had a very sound sense of reality."

Appraisals of military and political leaders are usually judicious. The great collaboration of Davis and Lee parallels the earlier co-operation of Jefferson and Madison. *Confederate President* reflects the chief executive's unlimited confidence in Stonewall Jackson and Albert Sidney Johnston, whether in victory or defeat; and it presents Bragg and Pendleton more favorably than many previous works evaluated them. Joseph E. Johnston and Beauregard were major military problems; the first remains an unresolved enigma. Faultfinding generals and politicians, among them Wigfall, Stephens, Yancey, Rhett, Hunter, and Foote, made administration difficult, and the wonder grows that the southern Confederacy survived so long. Professor Strode's rehabilitated Jefferson Davis justifies the decision of 1861: delegates to the Montgomery Convention actually chose the ablest Southerner chief executive.

WENDELL HOLMES STEPHENSON

University of Southampton

ALLAN NEVINS. *The War for the Union: The Improvised War 1861–1862*. (Vol. 1.) Pp. x, 435. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959. \$7.50.

Despite the intense interest displayed in the Civil War, many of the opening moves in 1861 have been curiously neglected. Much has been written, of course, about the role of Lincoln, the Fort Sumter crisis, and the first battle of Bull Run, but for some reason the story of the way in which the rival governments

—one a recent creation and the other a captive of an immature political party—geared their states for war is not often told. In many respects, however, the first year was the most critical and instructive of the war. Whole new armies had to be raised, equipped, trained and competent officers developed to lead them. The border states, uncertain in their loyalties, had to be treated gingerly and public opinion mobilized for a powerful war effort. The events of 1861 may not have been as spectacular as those to follow, but they largely determined the structure of the war.

Professor Nevins has written a fascinating account of the first year of the war. Commencing in March, 1861, he shows how North and South each misread the signs and miscalculated the determination of the other. He describes the struggle between Blair and Seward for Lincoln's support before, and the struggle between Lee and his conscience after, the guns fired upon Fort Sumter. He examines the failure of the North to hold key arsenals at Norfolk and Harpers Ferry and to make good use of the enthusiastic army of volunteers that responded to Lincoln's call for troops to uphold the Union. His treatment of the first clash of "the greenhorn armies" at Bull Run which impressed a contemporary observer in Europe as "certainly the greatest joke in the world," the struggle for Kentucky and Missouri, and the political strains and alignments in Washington and the various state capitals provides fresh insight into some of the intricate problems that faced Lincoln's administration during this period of improvisation. And because the army is but the mirror of the state, the author has also provided a comprehensive view of Northern society and institutions at the time of the Civil War.

The War for the Union deserves high rank in the current literature about the Civil War. It is well written, evenly balanced, and obviously the result of extensive research, including some obscure foreign sources. If much of his material is familiar, Professor Nevins has dramatized an original theme—"the impact of the war on national character." Lincoln

emerges as a war leader of great promise who, despite the failures and frustrations of the first year, "was beginning to feel his strength; to ride in the tempest, and direct the storm."

JAY LUVVAAS

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PHILIP I. MITTERLING. *America in the Antarctic to 1840*. Pp. viii, 201. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1959. \$5.00.

For many years the frozen wastes of Antarctica seemed as forbidding a terrain to historians as to actual explorers. Only in the last half century, as exploration and settlement have steadily increased, has interest been gradually aroused. Nevertheless, most of the existing works about the seventh continent have come from the pathfinders themselves or from an array of able witnesses and reporters. The best of these journalistic efforts, such as those of Sullivan or of Kearns and Britton, are reliable surveys of exploration based on honest research in memoirs and secondary sources. Mr. Mitterling's study, however, is one of the first attempts by a professional historian to subject a phase of Antarctic history to closer scrutiny.

Although this book contains a brief analysis of general concepts concerning Antarctica as developed before 1800, the major portion is devoted to an examination of American exploratory enterprise in the first four decades of the nineteenth century. At first, during the years from 1800 to 1820, it was primarily a greedy search for fur that led Yankee sealers to the icy wastes. Then, commercial interest was combined with curiosity and some scientific interest to lead other pioneers such as the legendary Nathaniel Palmer and the enterprising Benjamin Morrell to probe further into the unknown regions. The knowledge which these men brought back finally led Congress in 1838 to underwrite the memorable United States Antarctic Expedition under Lieutenant Charles Wilkes. While the fascinating story of this amazing enterprise constitutes fully the second half of this volume a critical Bibliography provides further guid-

ance for those whose appetite has been whetted.

Mr. Mitterling has endowed his compact work with virtues not possessed by its journalistic predecessors. He has been unsparing in his search for data and has delved into a wide array of hitherto unutilized sources ranging from manuscript collections to United States Government reports. In addition, he has applied critical judgment to some controversial episodes of Antarctic history, such as the dispute over the first discovery. Finally, he has done more than tell a mere adventure story, for he has tried to set his subject into the broader framework not only of American diplomatic history but also of the relationship between government and science in nineteenth-century America. One would hope, therefore, that the author will continue his studies on these themes since with the present study he charts a route into a subject that deserves further exploration.

GERALD D. NASH

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RICHARD C. WADE. *The Urban Frontier: The Rise of Western Cities, 1790-1830*. (Harvard Historical Monographs XLI.) Pp. 362. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press under the direction of the Department of History, 1959. \$6.00.

This volume is a valuable addition to the slowly but surely growing body of historical literature on American cities. Years of careful research and thoughtful analysis of contemporary newspapers, municipal records, travel journals, and older local histories have enabled the author to document what less painstaking scholars have only known in a general way: that the organization and development of new territories necessarily gives rise to urban centers in the midst of a "non-urban" milieu. This is true as much for the Ohio and Mississippi Valleys in the years 1790-1830, as it is for the Atlantic seaboard in Carl Bridenbaugh's period, 1625-1742. Within the broad centrifugal tides of westward migration there are always strong centripetal currents of population forming cities. In-

deed, town sites are located and in some cases developed almost before the eager farmers bring in their first commercial crops. The foundings of Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Lexington, Louisville, and St. Louis all antedate the formation of the state governments which give them "legal" existence and which, incidentally, curb their authority to tax and cope with mounting "urban problems." Whether such pioneer communities survive and grow into cities depends, of course, on a multiplicity of conditions not all of which are subsequently fulfilled.

Having founded his towns, Wade is concerned: first, to trace their rapid rise through the beginning of the steamboat era, and, secondly, to show that by 1830 Western urbanization "had produced two types of society—one rural and one urban." Growth of the five major centers quickens after 1815, though Lexington, due to its landlocked position, does not seem to have recovered from the commercial depression, around 1820. Population of greater Cincinnati, on the other hand, grew from about 6,500 in 1816 to more than 26,000 in 1830; Pittsburgh and environs had reached 22,000; and Louisville about 13,000. The steamboat was clearly the decisive influence, but the successful merchants who dominated urban affairs had also realized that manufactures offered a much greater potential for growth than commerce alone. This broadening economic base, in turn, had fostered social stratification and led to greater ethnic and racial diversity; the "Negro problem" was severe in Cincinnati during the 'twenties.

The fact that economic, social, and cultural differences emerge, however, does not, for this reviewer, justify the conclusion that the West was divided into "two types of society—one rural and one urban." A dispersed population of low density cannot support schools, museums, or theaters in the same degree as a concentrated population, but this does not imply that "rural" people are indifferent to things of the mind or that urbanites are enthusiasts for culture. "Urban" and "rural" are not opposing community types with generically different attributes. In making this doubtful distinction, more-

over, Wade seems to negate his own cogent argument that the urban dimension of life is an integral part of Western community organization and structure. Thus, Henry Clay, Thomas Hart Benton, and William H. Harrison are not represented as "rural agrarian" leaders in national affairs; their private interests and public activities identify them as "urban" spokesmen for the larger Western community. It is unlikely that the urban-rural dichotomy will serve historians any better than it has sociologists.

ERIC E. LAMPARD

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University of Wisconsin

RICHARD WALSH. *Charleston's Sons of Liberty: A Study of the Artisans, 1763-1789*. Pp. xii, 166. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1959. \$4.25.

Here presented is a study of a neglected social class in the American Revolution—the artisans. It helps to complete an analysis of the Revolution along social-class lines which has been examined for the colonial merchant by Schlesinger, the western land speculator by Abernethy, and the Virginia planter by Harrell.

Charleston was wisely chosen. It ranked fourth among the cities of Colonial America, was the largest city in the South, and contained a powerful artisan population. The master mechanics alone formed about 22 percent of its free inhabitants.

A large majority of the artisans were foremost in resisting the colonial policies of Great Britain. Economic self-interest, Walsh discovers, forced them into this course. They opposed the Monetary Act of 1764 and the Stamp Act because both were deflationary in a postwar period of economic depression. No one used more paper, glass, lead, and paint than they did—all taxed under the Townshend Acts. Such duties and the various restrictions on colonial manufacturing made competition with imported British articles extremely difficult.

A mechanic, perhaps Edward Weyman according to Walsh, initiated in Charleston the opposition to the new, oppressive British policy introduced after 1763. In

radicals among the planters, notably Christopher Gadsden, the radical artisans discovered experienced political leadership which they followed only until 1778.

Their break with the radical planters is convincingly explained. They wanted to prohibit the importation of slaves because of the competition of slave labor. They opposed the exemption of rice from the nonexportation agreement, for a complete boycott of British markets would make certain more markets for their own wares in South Carolina. They wanted a more representative government than the planters, even the radical ones, were willing to allow.

An explanation of the causes of the unswerving loyalism of a minority of the artisans is lacking. After the British occupied Charleston some of the radical artisans were constrained to pretend they had returned to their allegiance to the Crown. That they would have been completely ruined otherwise is adequately described.

The table of wages shows that skilled workmen received good wages in the late colonial period: a master carpenter, for instance, about two pounds of the current money a day and an ordinary one, whether Negro or white, about one pound.

ROBERT LEROY HILLDRUP

Professor of History
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OTHER COUNTRIES

ROBERT E. SCOTT. *Mexican Government in Transition*. Pp. 333. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1959. \$5.75.

"The decision-making process and the interaction of interest groups which participate in it" is the focus which Professor Scott selects for his analysis of the Mexican political system. Outlines of this methodological approach have appeared in several articles published lately in scholarly journals, written by members of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council. If this particular study represents a valid application of Committee models, then the entire

Committee design requires a new appraisal. Frankly, the study is disappointing: it ignores the significant issues of Mexican politics, incorrectly identifies the official party as the focus of effective political power, provides us with no case studies, and, most surprisingly in a study of interest groups in the Mexican political process, disregards leading foreign interests, social clubs, novelists, and intellectual circles as well as Masonry and the communications elite.

As the first successful national social revolution of the twentieth century, the still-unfolding Mexican Revolution constitutes an important object-lesson for the entire underdeveloped world. Nonetheless, the study provides no insight here. Mexico's "take-off into sustained growth," to use Professor Rostow's expression, was a painful, valiant, and, at times, bloody struggle to toss off the historical shackles preventing our southern neighbor from establishing a social foundation upon which Mexico could build a modern society. Why American social scientists, nurtured in the nation which many foreigners respect as the father of pragmatism, cannot grasp the fact that revolutionary action, within the context of the image which each underdeveloped nation holds of itself, may constitute rational action remains a mystery.

The author asserts that "effective decision-making takes place in and around the revolutionary party." Organized industrial and communal agricultural labor wish it were true. Party leadership dreams of it, indeed, even speaks of it once a week on its regular television program. But, once again, this time at the party's third National Assembly, held the last week of March, 1960, party membership was restricted to a large extent to the laboring classes and popular masses. Industry and commerce, banking and insurance, top level bureaucrats, university and normal school administrators, and military men—in short, the interests which have really prospered since 1939—are still excluded from official party ranks. Are we to believe, as Professor Scott contends, that a proletarian oriented and staffed party would sponsor two decades

of government favoring its adversaries when "effective decision-making took place in and around the party?"

This reviewer prefers to credit Mexican leadership with more intelligence and consistency and, accordingly, to submit that effective political power centers in the bureaucracy, in which the official party plays a very minor role, and in a pragmatic, liberal, modern elite composed of families and interests dedicated to the Revolution and prospering with it.

FRANK BRANDENBURG

Mexico City

ROBERT LORING ALLEN. *Soviet Influence in Latin America: The Role of Economic Relations*. Pp. x, 108. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press in co-operation with the Woodrow Wilson Department of Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, 1959. No price.

There has been a great deal of talk in recent years about the Soviet "trade offensive" in various parts of the world. All too much of this discussion has been sensationalist. Professor Allen's book is, therefore, most welcome, surveying as it does the facts concerning what has already occurred in this field insofar as Latin America is concerned and giving the reader some basis for judging the probable trends in the foreseeable future.

The first part of the work is devoted to a more or less detailed survey of how much trade has actually occurred between the Soviet bloc and the twenty Latin-American republics since the Soviet Union began its present foreign economic policy in 1953. His conclusion, and the figures he presents corroborate it, is that this trade has been relatively small in volume and value, has been concentrated in half a dozen countries, and has been sporadic. In no year between 1953 and 1958 was trade both ways with the Soviet bloc more than 2 percent of total Latin-American imports and exports.

Later sections of the book deal with the role of foreign trade in the economies of the respective areas, with the objectives of both the Latin-American and the Communist countries in seeking to increase commerce with one another, and with the

question of the complementary nature of the economies of the two regions. He ends with an evaluation of the whole problem and of the future prospects for trade.

Insofar as the Latin Americans are concerned, Allen points out that they are anxious to find new markets for the narrow range of exports upon which they depend for all their foreign exchange. At the same time, they are very anxious to find sources from which to obtain the capital equipment they need for their economic development as well as certain basic fuel needs such as oil and coal. They are particularly desirous of obtaining these products at no cost in foreign exchange.

The Soviet Union and its satellites dangle the possibility of fulfilling these aspirations before the Latin-American countries. They argue that through their bilateral trading devices they can provide the Latin Americans with a number of products they need without the necessity of payment in precious dollars and pounds, since the Soviet bloc works on the basis of barter. The attractiveness of these offers is heightened by the Latin Americans' tendency to exaggerate the extent of Soviet economic development, according to Allen.

However, the author feels that, although there will be an increase in Latin American-Iron Curtain trade in the near future which will be statistically impressive, there are several factors militating against the Soviet Union and its associates becoming a major factor in Latin-American foreign trade. These include the demonstrated unwillingness or inability of the Soviet Union in practice to provide the goods it so blithely hints it can make available; the red tape and bungling of the Soviet foreign trade bureaucracy, the poor quality and unfamiliarity of many of the Soviet goods, and the needs of the Soviets' own development program which will seriously limit the amount of capital equipment which the Soviet bloc will be able to provide. He cites the experiences which Argentina and other Latin-American countries have already had to buttress his argument. Finally, the author holds that the economies of the two areas lack the fundamental

complementarism which is the economic basis for extensive trade.

There are perhaps two elements which Professor Allen does not adequately stress and which may weaken his argument in actual practice. One is the possible political importance to the Soviet Union of the Latin-American countries. Although Allen notes this factor, the reviewer would be inclined to think that he does not stress enough the likelihood that, particularly in view of the growing anti-United States sentiment in Latin America, the Kremlin might well decide that the political gains to be made in the United States own backyard would be well worth the economic cost of unprofitable trade and loan agreements with selected Latin-American republics.

Second is the fact that the Latin Americans will prefer some markets, no matter how insufficient, to none at all. The fact, which Allen mentions but does not weigh heavily enough, is that the Latin Americans are desperately anxious to get rid of their actual or potential surpluses of mineral and agricultural exports, and may well be willing to get rid of them on relatively poor terms rather than not at all.

The new Cuban trade and loan agreements, signed since this book was published, may well indicate whether Professor Allen's conclusions are correct. The accords signed by Mikoyan and Castro are the most significant development yet in Latin American-Soviet economic arrangements. They are being watched very carefully by the rest of Latin America. They will undoubtedly have an important impact not only on trade between the Soviet bloc and Latin America, but on general economic and political trends south of the Rio Grande.

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RICHARD N. ADAMS. *A Community in the Andes: Problems and Progress in Muquiyauyo*. Pp. xiv, 251. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1959. \$4.75.

This is a report of a field study in anthropology undertaken in the town of

Muquiyauyo, department of Huancayo, Peru, during the period August, 1949, to May, 1950. Evidently, this particular town, composed of Indians and mestizos, had acquired a reputation for being unusually progressive as compared with other communities in the region. The study sought to explore the nature of this progressiveness and to describe how it came about. It was hoped that "delineation of these traits, besides providing a general account of the life in a Peruvian mountain community, might help solve problems faced in applied anthropology and provide a test for hypotheses in anthropological theory" (p. xi).

At first, attention was focused primarily on the history of the community as reflected in the town records and in interviews with older residents. Problems faced and solved by the community were traced. The author found it impossible, however, to explain how this particular town, and not another, became progressive. He reasoned that a community is a unique event and, that while certain factors may be selected for emphasis, these same factors may be present elsewhere and the same events might not take place. He, therefore, shifted his objective to focus on two goals. "First, to provide a description of the life of a Central Sierran mestizo and Indian community, since other studies made in this geographical region are not readily available; and second, to show through the recent history of this community how local history is directed through the presence of a few pressing unsolved problems, how each generation makes new attempts to solve these problems and in so doing brings drastic cultural and social change into the community" (p. xii).

The work is divided into three parts. Part I is historical and contains chapters on "The Setting Today;" "Land and Population;" "Political and Administrative Development;" "Developments in the Religious Organization;" "The Change in Social Class Structure;" and "Influences from the Outside."

Part II deals with contemporary life and contains chapters dealing with "The Farmer and His Land;" "Cultivation and Livestock;" "Crafts and Commerce;" "The

Home and Women's Activities;" "Clothing and Costume;" "The Cycle of Life;" "Activities of the Community;" and "Recreation, Indulgence, and Celebrations."

Part III is concerned with culture change in Muquiyauyo.

The author presents the following conclusions concerning the process of change: 1. "Every change that occurred was in itself not too great a change but was an attempt to solve some problem that faced the community at the time" (p. 202); 2. "The problems that demand solution are defined in terms of the culture of the community and the experience of its members" (p. 204); 3. "Not only will the problems be set but the solutions selected will be shaped by the culture and experience of the community members" (p. 206); 4. "Recognition of a problem and the exertion of efforts to solve it do not necessarily bring success" (p. 210); and 5. "In the process of solving one problem, new problems are often created" (p. 210).

Thus, while the original objective was not achieved, the study is useful in providing an analysis of a contemporary community in an area where such information is scarce and in showing the role of historical factors in shaping the present community patterns.

N. L. WHETTEN

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THOMAS M. FRASER, JR. *Rusembilan: A Malay Fishing Village in Southern Thailand*. (Cornell Studies in Anthropology.) Pp. xviii, 281. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1960. \$5.75.

This volume represents the first published study to "encompass the total socio-cultural organization of a Malay community." It is also the first major piece of research carried out among the Malay population left under Siamese rule with the end of British expansion northward up the Malay Peninsula.

This book is, therefore, doubly welcome. As a community study, Dr. Fraser has succeeded in giving a rounded picture of village life that rings true for Malay peasantry generally. Features such as "few

well defined formal roles of authority," and the lack of effectiveness this leads to in organisation beyond the elementary family, seem to be typical of Malay society everywhere.

But because of the wideness of his coverage Dr. Fraser is unable to pursue any point in great detail. This limitation is not, of course, peculiar to the volume under review, but a necessary consequence of choosing the community study for the presentation of research material. It is, however, particularly to be regretted in this case where there is no other source on the people described.

In addition to presenting a general picture of the society and culture of Rusembilan, Dr. Fraser is also concerned with the problems of the place of the Malay community within the Thai nation and the process of change within the community.

With regard to the first of these questions he clearly shows to what extent the Malays still cling to their separateness and keep their contacts with the Thai national majority, especially its official representatives, to a minimum. It would have been interesting to know to what extent irridentism is still active amongst the Patani Malays. The Malay Press in Malaya from time to time publishes stories of Siamese oppression of Malays in Patani—recently the seizure of Malay newspapers, pictures of Malay and other Asian political leaders, and the closure of some Arabic schools. Frequent contact with Malaya exposes the Patani Malays to political ideas in the Federation. In the neighboring state of Kelantan, state and federal elections were won by the Pan-Malayan Islamic party. This success is usually explained by the great influence of the religious school-teachers with the villagers. Dr. Fraser tells of the importance of religious education and explains the greater contemporary emphasis on religion as a reaction to change and Thai pressure. Does religion play a more passive role than in the Malayan East Coast States?

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ROLAND YOUNG and HENRY FOSBROOKE.
Smoke in the Hills: Political Tension in the Morogoro District of Tanganyika.
Pp. xii, 212. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1960. \$5.50.

In general, books about African political systems fall into two broad groups: detailed "functional-structural" studies by field anthropologists and the works of political scientists, which range from the aridly legal to the pompously sociological. Each creates its own feeling of dissatisfaction. It is the great merit of *Smoke in the Hills* that it avoids the worst extremes of either school while attempting to combine the advantages of both. This is an ambitious attempt which does not wholly succeed. Chapters III and IV give the reader the basic anthropological information on the social structure and the lineage system of the Luguru, and were written by Mr. Fosbrooke, now Director of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute in Northern Rhodesia. While the anthropologist will have had his appetite whetted and as a consequence will feel frustrated with a fare of only forty pages, the political scientist, and perhaps the general reader, will regard Mr. Fosbrooke's contribution as a difficult obstacle before he is piloted into the calmer waters of Indirect Rule by Professor Young. But this sort of collaboration is valuable and with a little more integration, and possibly agreement over vocabulary, has a fruitful future before it.

Smoke in the Hills studies the manner in which social and political changes are taking place among the Luguru in the Morogoro District of the Eastern Province of Tanganyika. The Luguru, who were originally a mixture of other tribes, settled in the Uluguru Mountains and the plains below some 300-400 years ago. In course of time, they emerged as a separate tribal entity, and, in common with other tribes of Tanganyika, were faced with the necessity of adjusting themselves to European methods of administration.

In one of the most interesting chapters in the book, Professor Young shows the shortcomings of Cameron's idea of Indirect Rule. The assumption was that some

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kind of traditional authority could be utilized for modern administrative purposes. But what was to be done among the Luguru who, with no identifiable leader, had some 800 lineage heads? Inevitably, certain individuals were selected for administrative posts who in many cases took advantage of the new situation and thereby created fresh tensions within the traditional order.

The change from Indirect Rule to the modern local authority is a slow process, handicapped by a shortage of trained staff and finance. The District Commissioner continues to be the essential, standard-maintaining link between the local unit and the central government. The time when his functions will have been absorbed by the town clerk lies in the distant future. Professor Young has many pertinent observations to make on this vital aspect of developing political institutions.

In 1955 riots broke out among the Luguru as a protest against the administration's introduction of terracing in the mountains. Professor Young's analysis of the political and social factors which contributed to the disturbances is excellent. There is a chapter on urban government in the area, and the new forces generated by nationalist politicians are also scrutinized. The book is illustrated by photographs and has end papers locating the area under discussion.

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A. J. MEYER. *Middle Eastern Capitalism: Nine Essays*. (Harvard Middle Eastern Studies 2.) Pp. viii, 161. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959. \$3.75.

In nine lively essays in this small book A. J. Meyer, Associate Director of the Harvard Center for Middle Eastern Studies and Lecturer in Economics at Harvard University, tackles some of the basic economic problems of the Middle East. Besides that, he deals with the problem of Cyprus, the "Copra Boat" economy, and

with Turkish land reform, which he calls an experiment in moderation. Two chapters deal with the question of what the West can offer: economic doctrine, economic policy, and a point of view.

The difference in the attitudes of Middle Eastern "oil-rich" countries provides an historical analogy, in the author's view, with the economic developments of another age in England and Spain. The former hoisted itself into the position of a world power because of the great natural resource of those days, gold, corresponding in importance to oil today, while Spain lost its world-power status and skirted bankruptcy. Similarly, oil gushers had brought Saudi Arabia close to bankruptcy and triggered the economic development of Iraq. Oil integration is another challenging problem mentioned in this book. It refers to the petroleum companies' efforts to aid the economy of the producing Middle Eastern countries by stimulating local enterprise—supplying a large number of company jobs; promoting the expenditure of wages for locally produced goods; fostering home-building and, generally, turning oil operations into one of the enterprises rather than into "the" Middle Eastern enterprise. The companies have learned from the nationalization of oil in Iran.

The "demonstration effect," popularized by James Duesenberry, engages the author's attention, too. This effect is expected to foster the revolution of expectations in such underdeveloped regions as the Middle East by exposing their people to a psychological shock treatment of showing them the life of the West. By viewing Western movies, for instance, the Middle East is expected to learn about the world in which there are people who have nearly everything, instead of possessing practically nothing. The results of this treatment Meyer says, are less than fortunate because they adversely affect the flow of private savings into investments, one of the great needs of the region.

In some of these countries, the author writes, remarkable skill has been exhibited in converting money into productive values, such as improved soil and dams, but much

more is needed. The United States, lavish elsewhere, has paid scant attention to some Middle East key countries, and too much emphasis has been placed on economically unproductive military expenditures. It would be remunerative for America to put more money into this region—outside oil—about half a billion a year. The multiplying effect of such aid would provide the United States economy with new frontiers of markets. The author also recommends closer contacts between America and the Middle East, more exchange students, and a better understanding on the Americans' part of the people of the Middle East. Language study is good but not enough. "Fluent arrogance is probably worse than uncontaminated arrogance."

In sum, the West and particularly America, should contribute its share in keeping Middle Eastern investment levels high. The most important contribution toward this end in the coming decade may be the maintenance of the high level of oil flow and the resultant high royalties, also emigrant remittances, and better markets for such cash crops as cotton. Surely, this is as safe a program as it is conservative. It is to be assumed that such a program could serve as the foundation upon which more enterprising and bolder programs could be built.

EMIL LENGVEL

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GEORGE LENCZOWSKI. *Oil and State in the Middle East*. Pp. xix, 379. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1960. \$6.75.

In the present age of technology, nationalistic fervor, and demographic restlessness, it is difficult enough merely to keep abreast of the rapidly shifting international scene. It is a real public service, therefore, when from an authoritative source comes a study showing enough of the interplay of deep-moving forces in international relations to be of value in the consideration of foreign policy. Such a study is the one under review. Its author, already distinguished for his contributions on the modern Middle East, has set forth here

the result of several years of intensive study, much of it pursued in the Middle East itself, of the importance of Middle East oil in the economy of Western nations, the relations of oil companies and corporate oil combines with host governments, and the effects of Western technology and industrial enterprise on local economies and local populations. The book thus deals mainly with relationships and problems hardly touched in previous writings on oil in the Middle East.

It is noteworthy that in his treatment of major problems arising in connection with oil exploration, production, and transportation in and from the Middle East countries, the author has paid particular attention to legal issues. These have been both numerous and varied. They have arisen, for example, over the validity of chartered concessions, the inclusiveness of grants, matters of corporate taxation in the field and at home, and the employment of labor—inevitable consequences of the exploitation of the principal natural resource in certain underdeveloped countries by powerful interests from abroad seeking to make a profit. The bearing of such questions on the shaping of attitudes among peoples increasingly imbued with the spirit of nationalism and the outlook for Western oil interests in consequence constitutes much of the theme of the book.

The moral drawn from this theme is illustrated in a final section of the book dealing with "repercussions of the Suez crisis." In this case-study are depicted the hazardous effects on the Middle East oil industry of political developments largely unconnected with oil operations. The moral, more or less applicable to any foreign-operated enterprise in an underdeveloped area, is summarized in the author's observation that "it . . . seems to prove that countries passing through the ferment of nationalist awakening no longer abide solely by consideration of economic self-interest."

Although not addressed to the general public, the book will be of much practical interest to the area specialist and the political scientist, as well as to the business executive with ventures overseas. It should

certainly figure prominently in the reading lists of students of international relations.

HALFORD L. HOSKINS

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Library of Congress

ECONOMICS AND LABOR

MICHAEL HARRINGTON and PAUL JACOBS. (Eds.). *Labor in a Free Society*. Pp. xi, 186. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959. \$3.00.

Last year a Congress which, at the time of its election, was widely heralded as the most liberal since 1936, proceeded to enact union reform legislation strongly opposed by organized labor. The passage of the Landrum-Griffin bill in the face of determined union opposition illustrates the type of problem with which today's labor movement is faced.

The task to which Congress set itself, to legislate a greater degree of democracy in union affairs, forms the central issue of this volume. The papers included here were presented to leading representatives of the labor movement, government, and the academic world at a 1958 symposium organized under the auspices of the Fund for the Republic. Also included is a brief summary of the discussion that took place at that conference.

This is a valuable volume for the casual reader or the experienced student of the labor movement because its well-known contributors are discussing issues that go to the heart of the union's function in today's society.

Perhaps the most stimulating contributions in the volume are those by foreign observers. Hugh Clegg provides insight into the reasons why on the issue of corruption British unions have a better record than their American counterparts. James McClelland traces Australian experience with union democracy and points out how the threat of Communist infiltration has led to greater intervention into the conduct of union elections both by the legislature and the courts.

Sumner Slichter's contribution is painted on a broader canvas. He comments on the chief interests of unions, the effect of increased union membership on union government, wage structure, and the economy as a whole. His general conclusion is that "business unionism" is too limited a goal for today's labor movement.

In a piece of a quite different key, Eric Fromm applies to the worker his views on man and his alienation from society. As Fromm sees it, the average worker is unhappy at his job, manipulated by management and unions, almost solely interested in consumption—keeping up with the Joneses—and readily conforms to fairly rigid social standards. Fromm's answer is called "humanistic communitarianism," a rather utopian ideal of adjustment and creativity which sounds useful, though it might prove a somewhat dull life, but no practical guidelines for attaining it are furnished by its designer.

Some of the papers focus more directly on the problem of democratic procedures in unions and in effect cover the ground which during the intervening two years, has been well explored in the press and the Congress.

Archibald Cox reviews the law before Landrum-Griffin on expulsion from union membership, union elections, and union trusteeship. Arthur Goldberg has a useful contribution pointing out the differences between the tests of democracy in the political sense and democracy as applied to union organizations.

David Cole who has been the arbitrator of many inter-union disputes, argues for a more active role by the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) in enforcing union democracy. He suggests an official investigatory body armed with subpoena powers. However, he does not explore whether such a procedure could prove effective considering the relatively weak ties that bind any national union to the national federation. It seems doubtful that Cole's suggestion could be adopted in the absence of additional far-reaching changes in union structure.

Cole also seems more willing than the other academic contributors to limit the

union member's freedom of expression on basic union issues. He is ready, for example, to deny the right of individual members to disagree with the AFL-CIO "no-raiding" policy. While this proposal for uniformity of opinion may be questioned, Cole has made clear how the traditional values of freedom can conflict with traditional union objectives.

PETER HENLE

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PAUL P. HARBRECHT, S.J. *Pension Funds and Economic Power*. Pp. 328. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1959. \$5.00.

This volume is one of several recently published by The Twentieth Century Fund which analyzes the influence that certain financial institutions appear to be having upon the basic nature of modern-day American capitalism.

The first few chapters attempt to trace the early development of the pension trusts as one of the primary centers of power in a newly emerging social system; to review the role they play in transition whereby the power to control property is passing from the hands of individual workers, for whom the pension trusts exist, to large financial institutions; and to examine their organization, operation, and objectives. These are followed by chapters dealing with considerations of external forces affecting their development and operation, such as the federal government and the courts. Finally the growing size of the pension trust is reviewed, and the extent of its economic power is examined.

The study ends with a socio-economic-legal treatise on the paraproprietal society, in which parallels between former eras in man's economic development—the ruling principle in Roman property organization, the laws of property, the migration of power, and the rights and property of the wage earner as a member of a pension program—and the present period of economic power are drawn together: "... Our society is called paraproprietal, or beyond property, because in it the connection between man and things, which is another way of

saying property, is so attenuated that the fundamental function of property is not dominant, though it still serves a purpose. Certain things began to be called property in Western society because they 'belonged' to a man, pertained to him in a special way, were 'proper' to him. They were, in a sense, the extension of his personality. Thus the fundamental notion of property is intimately connected with the ideas of 'own' and 'ownership.' But there is nothing personal about General Motors or the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company in this sense. 'Mine' and 'thine' have very little meaning when applied to them. Something that is owned by everyone is truly owned by no one. Ownership in connection with the modern institutional organization of wealth has very little of its former meaning" (p. 287).

That the author has been trained as a lawyer and not as an economist is evident throughout this work; but he has brought together some interesting data on a significant new development within the American economy. This development is indeed ripe for penetrating economic analysis.

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WILLIAM H. KNOWLES. *Trade Union Development and Industrial Relations in the British West Indies*. Pp. 214. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959. \$5.00.

The British West Indies are in many respects a model of an underdeveloped area whose political development has raced ahead of economic viability. After centuries of colonial rule based chiefly on the decreasingly profitable estate cultivation of sugar, self-government and limited federation were achieved two years ago. Complete independence can probably be attained but hardly afforded in the face of very serious economic backwardness. A monocultural agriculture, acute shortages of capital and natural resources, excessive population growth, high rates of illiteracy and semiliteracy, severe unemployment and underemployment, inadequate trans-

portation and communication systems, deprecatory attitudes toward manual labor—these constitute the principal factors militating against even modest economic development. Fortunately, there is no serious racial problem.

Against this background Professor Knowles has brought together the results of his intensive studies of British West Indies labor problems and labor movements, chiefly based on interviews of estate owners and managers, union leaders, politicians, and government administrators in 1953-54. In addition to specific analyses of the development of labor organizations in the different territories, he has devoted considerable effort to an explication of the peculiar nature and structure of British West Indies trade unionism and its most significant environmental determinants, to the all-important relationships between trade unions and the labor-based political parties, to the nature and ambitions of union leaders, and to the character of the industrial relations system which remains heavily influenced by traditional and paternalistic estate patterns of labor-management relations.

The study has some technical shortcomings. Most of the interviews took place six and seven years ago, well before the formation of the Federation. It is, therefore, in some respects outdated by the course of events, particularly as regards the attitudes of those interviewed. The author has, however, made an obvious effort to stay abreast of developments by including or inserting the most recent information available to him. Some chapters contain substantial sections of duplicate information, for example on the impact of the outside world on worker attitudes, on obstacles to union organization, and on sources of union leadership. There are some parts which seem like summaries of field notes, and one occasionally notices a peculiar organization of the material, as for instance indicated by the statement that "The possibility of creating jobs through industrialization and the limiting of further population growth by contraceptives will be discussed in the chapter on trade-union policies" (p. 21).

Nevertheless, this remains on the whole

a competent, insightful, and sympathetic treatment of the labor problem in an area that is presently overshadowed by the more violent events in neighboring parts of the Caribbean. Its struggle for a decent standard of living in place of poverty and economic stagnation commands our understanding and assistance. Students of economic development and of labor movements and those who are generally interested in the social and economic problems of this area will benefit considerably from Mr. Knowles' commendable effort.

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MARTIN SEGAL. *Wages in the Metropolis: Their Influence on the Location of Industries in the New York Region*. Pp. xi, 211. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960. \$4.75.

In the period since World War II, a number of empirical studies of wage behavior in local labor market areas have been made. The book under review here differs from the other studies of specific labor markets in that it is not concerned primarily with the broad problem of wage determination but instead it deals with the more specific question: How do wages and other labor market conditions affect the location of industry in the New York region? Consequently, this study will be of interest not only to the labor economist but also to students of industrial location and metropolitan development, as well as to those interested specifically in the economic future of New York.

The book begins with a discussion of the factors that determine which industries in the New York area are particularly sensitive to labor cost considerations and which industries are largely insensitive. The author concludes that only about 1 per cent of the New York work force is presently employed in industries that are under powerful pressure to find lower labor costs elsewhere and that most of these people work in establishments producing low-priced lines of garments. Much of the remainder of the book is devoted to a

careful analysis of the present and prospective status of these "labor-sensitive" industries.

After demonstrating that at the present time New York labor costs in the lower-priced garment lines are relatively high, Mr. Segal asks whether we can expect these interarea differentials to disappear in the near future. His conclusion is that while various factors—the migration of labor, locational shifts in industry, collective bargaining, and minimum wage legislation—tend to bring about some convergence of wages, these forces are not strong enough to bring about any quick alteration in the position of New York as a high-paying region. Consequently, the labor-sensitive industries will continue to be under considerable competitive pressure from firms in other geographical areas.

In addition, there are a number of reasons for thinking that the labor-sensitive sector will come under increasing pressure from industries within the New York region that can pay higher wages and thus make it difficult for the labor-sensitive industries to attract and hold labor. For these reasons, the author is forced to conclude that employment in industries such as the lower-priced garment trades is likely to decline. However, this does not mean that New York is going to become a "decaying" or "stagnant" region. It is also true that employment in the industries for which New York has a special locational appeal seems to be increasing more rapidly than employment in general. Consequently, while the composition of the New York work force may change, there is no reason to expect total employment to fall off.

This brief resume does not do full justice to the argument of the book. Nor does it illustrate the author's skill in collecting and processing data as well as in applying the insights gleaned from other labor market studies to the locational pattern of New York. The only warning that must be given to the reader is that at many points this book will raise—but not answer—broader issues, such as the interrelation between wages and other factors determining location and the implications of this case-study for the general subject

of location theory. However, this book is but one volume in a series on the economic development of New York, and these broader problems may be considered in other contributions to the series as a whole.

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RICHARD E. CAVES. *Trade and Economic Structure: Models and Methods*. Pp. viii, 317. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960. \$6.00.

With the virtually simultaneous publication of this work and a joint book on *The Canadian Economy* with Richard Holton, Professor Caves leaps into the rank of first-class economists in the field of international trade.

This book, which is a revised thesis, is an attempt to sort out and criticize the writing of the last sixty or so years on the factors affecting the character of trade. In a sense, it is a continuation in time of Professor Viner's monumental *Studies in the Theory of International Trade*. But Caves is less interested than Viner in extending the theory himself. He holds to the role of reporter. While most of the material is up to date—to 1958—there are occasional references to earlier neglected items. The main theme throughout the analytical account of the literature on the roles of factors of production, conditions of production, and demand in the determination of the structure of trade is the clash between the neoclassical theory and the Heckscher-Ohlin approach. In the end he awards the palm to the classical theory, perhaps relying too much on the empirical work of MacDougall.

The virtues of the book are manifold. Professor Caves writes well, and not without humor. His analytical powers are keen, and his facility for summarization impressive. The coverage is enormous, as shown by the twenty-page Bibliography. The book is superbly indexed. While the separation of positive static from welfare and dynamic aspects of the discussion provides a certain amount of repetition, the book, like Viner's, is hardly designed for discursive reading but is intended as a

reference. Since the Index is full and clear, the repetition offers no impediment to complete understanding.

There is little to say on the negative side. There are some slips, a few points on which it is possible to differ with his interpretation, and a badly distorted diagram on page 117. At times, too, the analysis becomes overly bookish, focused on small and subtle points rather than the significant and straightforward.

But these are minor blemishes in a major contribution. Professor Caves has put students in his debt with his highly useful *vade mecum* through the undergrowth of international trade theory. It is difficult to know whether we should ask him to continue the task, and in particular to review, as soon as he can read it, the exploding literature on growth and trade, or to regard his critical assignment as complete and ask him to "pitch in" and add to the verdure.

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CARL KAYSER and DONALD F. TURNER. *Antitrust Policy: An Economic and Legal Analysis*. Pp. xxiii, 345. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959. \$7.50.

Apologists for monopoly have generated a fog of rationalization to the effect that: monopoly is inevitable, technologically determined, and socially beneficial; competition is destructive, inefficient, and obsolete; antitrust policy is irrational and futile; abatement of monopoly would involve disastrous sacrifices of efficiency. The effect, as intended, has been to induce public acceptance of, and to paralyze opposition to, monopoly; to destroy faith in competition and hope for its survival.

Kaysen and Turner dissipate this murk with the bright light of realism and common sense. They demonstrate that, in most sectors of the economy, monopoly is neither inevitable, efficient, nor desirable; that competition, given a favorable environment, can allocate resources efficiently and maximize general welfare; that antitrust, while presently defective, can be

transformed into a vital instrument of public policy; that monopoly power can be reduced without sacrifice of economic or technological efficiency. Their goal, then, is to reduce the present degree of monopoly in the economy and to increase the amount and vigor of competition.

The focus of their attack is market power, defined as a structural situation which permits a firm to behave noncompetitively, that is to restrict output and fix prices without losing a substantial share of the market because of the increased output or lower prices of rivals. Evidence of market power would include: 1. Failure of prices to reflect declines of demand or costs or excess capacity; 2. Persistence of abnormally high profits; and 3. Failure of new rivals to enter the market during periods of high profits. Where such market power exists it would be reduced by dissolution, divorcement, and divestiture, exempting only market power based on economies of scale, valid patents, and new processes, products, or marketing techniques. The anticipated result is limitation of market power, the maximum number of producers consistent with efficiency, a planned transition from "tight" to "loose" oligopoly.

Reduction of market power would not obviate the necessity for control of business conduct; remaining imperfections in markets would require continuous supervision to insure fair dealing. Accordingly, the authors would strengthen the antitrust laws governing business conduct, particularly restrictive practices, patents, and price discrimination. They would also modify regulatory and conservation laws, the tax system, government procurement, and international trade policies to promote competition.

Some will say the authors go too far, others not far enough, in limiting market power, but none can deny they are on the right road. Market power is the crux of the monopoly problem; it must be limited if competition is to survive. Kaysen and Turner, in this excellent reconnaissance study, have shown how it can be done.

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SHIRLEY BOSKEY. *Problems and Practices of Development Banks*. Pp. xv, 201. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1959. No price.

The present volume is a companion piece to the initial study by William Diamond, *Development Banks*, published in 1957. Both books are the work of staff members of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); and have come out of the close relations—both financial and advisory—between the IBRD and these national credit institutions which have evolved during recent decades in the search for means to finance and, in general, to promote economic development in retarded countries. Building on the broad discussion in Mr. Diamond's book, Mrs. Boskey makes a detailed presentation of issues in the establishment of a development bank and problems in operating it.

Like the earlier volume, this study does not attempt a critique of concepts and policies of these banks from the standpoint of actual and potential contributions to development. Instead, it is a careful and sensible taxonomy and descriptive account. Occasionally, to be sure, the author goes to a deeper level, notably in asserting (p. 50) that the "combination of banking and developmental criteria in investment decisions is the distinguishing mark of a development bank"; and in that connection, stressing the limitations of loan standards which insist on "bankable" projects at the expense of developmental needs, as well as underlining the danger of "developmental" standards which threaten the solvency of the bank itself. But in subsequent pages the author often slips away from this complex definition. Particularly in the discussion of criteria for loans (pp. 51-55), she simply adopts the usual banker's concept that "profitability" is an adequate measure of "economic efficiency," of "economic importance," and even of "sufficiently high economic priority to warrant financing by the development bank." Much the same must be said of the discus-

sion of policy on interest charges (pp. 75-80), where criteria of bank administration and solvency take a long precedence over developmental considerations. Concepts of this kind express the prudence, the carefully restricted outlook, and the concern with direct results, which are suitable to the commercial banker; but these may not be entirely appropriate to the public or quasi-public institution which has been defined as promoting the long-range development of an entire economy, and must do so through all the lean years before affluence.

These ambiguities in the sections on criteria and investment policy do not minimize the solid worth of this book in other regards: in assembling the types and practices of the actual development banks, and in diligently expounding their operating problems and their administrative practices. In fact this volume provides an excellent body of material for some future study that will evaluate the development banks and their policies.

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B. S. KEIRSTEAD. *Capital, Interest and Profits*. Pp. ix, 180. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959. No price.

Over time, theoretical studies on interest and profits have varied considerably. Each study has had its own particular emphasis on these returns to special types of economic activity. In addition, concepts of capital, saving, and investment have all had special meanings for practically every generation of economists. Professor Keirstead has provided a valuable service in seeking to clarify the issues on these topics and to establish precise theoretical conditions for their functioning. He in turn presents his own contribution to theoretical advance. After systematically examining the nature of capital in society and its various yields, he also presents several illuminating empirical studies on the role of capital formation in economic change.

In the first part of the book, theories of

profits, interest, and returns to stock are developed: many traditional concepts are examined, and some are rejected. A valuable graphical summary of the various interest rate theories is presented in Chapter IV. Incidentally, the graph on page 44 which shows the model of J. B. Clark is incorrectly labeled. Although the theory of capital developed by Keirstead depends upon other factors than used by Keynes in his theory of investment, there are many similarities. Keirstead believes that the liquidity preference theory of interest, the marginal efficiency of capital, and the multiplier are crude and misleading concepts. Likewise, the marginal productivity theory of distribution, especially with respect to interest, is shown as inadequate. He links monetary factors with real economic factors in forging distinctive views on interest. He considers that the rate of interest which allocates monetary savings depends primarily on government policy. Use is made of the theories of expectations and the element of risk and uncertainty. Profit which measures the incentive to invest becomes a reward for a real cost, necessitating payment either in a private enterprise system or in a socialist state. For the private sector, the rate of economic progress, depends on these entrepreneurial expectations of profits. For the public sector, it is blandly asserted the rate of economic progress depends on the ability of public policy to enforce savings and "to use resources effectively."

The second part of the book attempts to provide empirical evidence for the theories developed in the first part. The large screen of analysis used tends to blur the most valuable points emerging from the theories. There are five interesting essays which are unrelated apart from the narrow strands of reference to capital formation in economic development and the business cycle. One of these is a chapter on capital formation in "conventional societies," meaning stagnant, capital-deficient, underdeveloped societies. This unfolds as an historical survey of the ways by which shocks produce progressive economic growth. Another essay deals with the lack of response to capital inflow in the economic development of New-

foundland. Progressive economies can be maintained by favorable entrepreneurial profit expectations or by adequate amounts of forced savings. Capital from abroad by itself may be insufficient to provide the necessary stimulus.

Professor Keirstead's relatively short book contains much information. Relief is given to the logical inquiry by the asides on such unrelated topics as Russian roulette and the social role of the automobile. The consequence is that the same topics escape full critical focus. The book nevertheless represents a worth-while contribution on the important subjects it examines.

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SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION

LUIGI LAURENTI. *Property Values and Race: Studies in Seven Cities*. (Special Research Report to the Commission on Race and Housing.) Pp. xix, 256. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960. \$6.00.

This study, one of a series on the housing problems of minority groups, is an analysis of the effects of urban migrations by nonwhites on real estate prices. Up to now, the issue had been joined by *ad hoc* opinions of realtors and land specialists who insisted that prices invariably collapsed and by experts in race relations who have countered "no" or "not necessarily." Dr. Laurenti joins those who say "not necessarily."

He has arrived at his conclusion by taking a number of neighborhoods infiltrated by nonwhites in varying degrees and patterns, then pairing them with comparable white study-areas and checking the sales prices of both over a period of years. The bulk of his statistical evidence is based on original studies he made in San Francisco and Oakland, California, and in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He then cites and analyzes studies conducted independently by others in Chicago, Kansas City, Detroit, and Portland, Oregon, which arrive at the same conclusions.

Although he has found that "the entry of non-whites into previously all-white neighborhoods was much more often associated with price improvement or stability than with price weakening," he tempers this with a finding that "no single or uniform pattern of non-white influence on property prices could be detected." It depends, he concludes, on any one of ten variables which may raise or lower prices or not affect them at all.

Dr. Laurenti's project, involving as it did the collection of price data from 1943 to 1955, on almost 10,000 individual sales, was an arduous piece of work and is an important contribution to the racial-relations field. It will be cited by civic groups in the numerous cities in which Negroes are moving into white areas.

How much effect his conclusions will have in settling the fears of white owners or in changing the minds of the real estate people is another matter. Price in the real estate market is governed by many intangibles, including bias, the prepossessions of mortgage lenders, and the emotions, controllable and uncontrollable, of home-owners. As the author himself concludes, there are no two cases and no two areas alike. An issue which has sparked mob action and dynamitings in Chicago, Miami, and elsewhere will not be put to rest by a disquisition.

Its main value will be to challenge the pat charge made by experts and pseudo-experts that values are always affected adversely by a minority infiltration. I hope, however, that it will not be cited—as it already has been—as proof absolute that minority in-migrations improve values.

Nor should the implication be drawn from it that market values are the only aspects with which home-owners are concerned. They may make money by selling to Negroes, yet oppose the shift in color compositions of their schools, neighbors, and associations. The problem is far too complex to be based on whether the arrival of a Negro neighbor is financially a boon or a bane. Many more hypotheses remain to be framed, many more fictions challenged, many more programs promulgated before all the facts are revealed and real

headway made toward understanding this sensitive issue in its complete context.

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LEONARD REISSMAN. *Class in American Society*. Pp. xii, 436. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959. \$6.75.

Leonard Reissman has written an excellent new book on the increasingly popular subject of class relations in American society. Although written primarily for graduate and undergraduate students of social stratification, this book's thorough coverage of the literature in a clear and jargon-free style should provide social scientists of allied disciplines to sociology, as well as the layman, with an excellent introduction to the subject.

The book is systematic and analytical. Though he covers the theoretical and substantive literature in an objective and comprehensive manner, Reissman has his own point of view. Thus he stresses that, while status-striving and the manipulation of the psychological nuances of class distinctions are important aspects of American social life, it is the attempt to understand the differential distribution of social, economic, and political power which, in the last analysis, makes the class concept a crucial variable in the study of human relations. Thus, one would hope that this book will be widely read as an antidote to the point of view recently popularized, for instance, in Vance Packard's summary of the sociological literature on status-striving.

While modern Americans are apparently preoccupied with social class and status-striving, this has not always been the case. Reissman traces the development of our traditional view of America as the land of equality and mobility, free of the Old-World devils of feudal caste, nobility, royalty, and servile masses. He convincingly shows how the doctrines of Karl Marx and his emphasis on the class struggle had little appeal for a nation with a frontier psychology; how the Protestant ethic and Horatio Alger myths led Ameri-

cans to stress the possibility of any man succeeding as long as he was willing to work, and had some luck and some brains; and finally how the ideology of individualism, supported to a great extent in fact, lead both social scientists and laymen in America to avoid the issue of class until comparatively recently.

With our peculiar historical background, then, it was not until the late nineteenth-thirties and nineteen-forties that American social scientists began to stress the class concept. While the publication of the *Communist Manifesto*, in 1848, according to Reissman, set the tone of European class analysis and the European intellectual's interest in history as primarily a class struggle, it was not until the American anthropologist, W. Lloyd Warner, began publishing his thorough and detailed studies of the status systems in Newburyport, Massachusetts (Yankee City) in the nineteen-forties that American sociologists engaged in the study of class earnestly.

This book not only outlines why and how our society eventually developed a class system and how the sociological interest in the system arose, it also discusses the important class theories, Marxian, functional, Weberian, and Warnerian; and social mobility, especially within the business and managerial elites; outlines what we know about the structure of national and local class systems; and summarizes the extensive literature on the social psychology of class values, attitudes, and behavior patterns. All in all, the book is comprehensive, clearly written, and interesting.

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REINHARD BENDIX. *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait*. Pp. 480. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1960. \$5.75.

Bendix's exposition of some of Max Weber's early untranslated studies, that initiates this book, introduces the reader at once to Weber's lifelong concern with modern Western individualism and rationality that led him to explore the many facets and ramifications of these puzzling

phenomena in his vast studies in the fields of the sociology of religion and of politics.

This may suggest what is old and what is new in Bendix's undertaking. Old is the content of Weber's major works, most of which are by now available in English. New, substantively, is the presentation of some, but not all, of those not yet translated; new, theoretically, is the systematization of Weber's opus, its interpretation. This interpretation is thoughtful and illuminating. It traces, above all, the logical and conceptual order that pervades Weber's studies; it explores their relation to his biography and to his and our time in only a minor way. There is very little information provided on Weber's antecedents and descendants, on the analyses and repercussions of his work, on the controversies it engendered, on the questions of what has remained of it, what has been superseded, and why. At best, Bendix's book thus is "an intellectual portrait" for those who must acquaint themselves with the content of Weber's studies before they can approach the traditions in which he stood and appreciate the extent to which he transcended them. Not only historically, but systematically, too, the book is frustrating, for it does not pull together the ordering of Weber's work that is presented throughout. One of the intellectual and historical problems of our time that Weber helped raise and even, if I may say so, personified—the relation between participation in history and systematic study of social affairs—is just broached, and only toward the very end, when Bendix expounds Weber's "political judgments and forecasts" (p. 456). Who was Weber the student of history; who, the systematic social scientist turning away from history; who, for that matter, the methodologist?

The book raises many more particular questions—I wish I had space to mention at least some of them. It clarifies and enlightens the thoughts of even the student who thinks he is familiar with Weber. Also, it will lead many readers to Weber himself, though it might prevent others, content with this summary, from turning to him. While I can understand Bendix's desire to see the result of his painstaking

and impressive effort in print, I still wish he had abandoned the project for a while and then finally refashioned it into a truly intellectual portrait of Max Weber.

KURT H. WOLFE

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PAUL K. CONKIN. *Tomorrow a New World: The New Deal Community Program*. Pp. ix, 350. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1959. \$6.00.

This is a book that needed to be written. It is not too clear that it presents a thesis, but it does present a record, a record which this reviewer feared might never be written with care and meticulousness. The compiling and interpreting of this record was not easy, but it has been done excellently. It is a record of the one-hundred communities built during the New Deal era.

The nearest approach to a thesis is that all of these communities and community schemes were rooted in the century-old prescription of "refuge in the land" or "back to the land," for alleviating the growing pains of urban industrialism. The author traces the history of this prescription from Thomas Jefferson's agrarianism to the National Recovery Act of 1933, one section of which provided for relieving urban unemployment by developing subsistence homesteads on the periphery of large industrial centers. Added to this was the idea, and ideal, of bringing the conveniences of urban living to the people on the land.

To this general thesis was added the struggle between bureaucratic and decentralized methods of building and operating these newly established communities and between individualism and collectivism. The author recognizes the oversimplification, and thus the inadequacies, of these dichotomous characterizations of contending forces and personalities represented in the hectic and continuous contention concerning each of these communities and programs. This reviewer, who worked in three of these community programs, probably even more than the author, knows that the presentation of the ideologies of the chief architects of these programs is

not only inadequate but precarious. But one of the merits of his account is that by such treatment, he was able to tread through a confusion of events which has thus far kept anyone else from writing a systematic account of one of the most significant series of experiments of the New Deal era.

Many, probably most, of the readers of this book will be more deeply interested in the ideological struggle waged in the planning and building of the communities than they will in the detailed descriptions of the communities themselves, or in what may appear to them to be the petty, even crank, ideas of many of the would-be contenders in the struggle. But to the extent that they disregard these details, they will fail to know what happens to ideologies when they are subject to the democratic process of the opposition of public opinion and sentiment and are put to the test of placing practical projects on the ground. This is the story which the detailed descriptions of programs and projects tell. It is the chief merit of the book, not only because it accomplished a difficult task, but because it shows, from the record, why even highly desirable changes cannot, in an affluent society, be accomplished by a "great leap forward."

CARL C. TAYLOR

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MAURICE R. STEIN. *The Eclipse of Community: An Interpretation of American Studies*. Pp. 354. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1960. \$6.00.

"A developed literary imagination is a great help in doing, and no less in reporting, a community study," says Maurice Stein, and while he did not intend it, he provided a compliment for his own work.

Professor Stein is a polished and clear-thinking writer. He had something important to say about communities. He organized an impressive array of materials about his subject and presented his thoughts in a very orderly way. His remarks and insights related to the several summaries of community studies made by him are of a high order in the tradition of scholarship.

Professor Stein divides his work into three parts. The first concerns itself with the historical roots of community study in which the works of Park, the Lynds, and Warner are discussed in a thoroughly energetic and analytical way to provide a tentative theory of American communities.

In the second portion of his work, Stein brings us up to date through insightful reviews of the social structure studies which underlie our modern social sciences. "Street-corner society," bohemia, caste and class—the traditional structure studies—are brought into current focus with meaningful discussions of World War II military communities and the popular revelations of the inner workings of suburbia.

The whole work is rather uniquely summarized in its remaining portion by turning the foregoing material before three different professional lenses, anthropological, psychoanalytic, and sociological, to allow the reader to view facets of community concepts in differing but congenial perspectives.

The book is a very useful one for serious students of community in that it brings together many scattered and obscure materials in a vital and fresh way. It provides cues for empirical research by telling us where we are now in regard to community study. It is written without pomposity and in a manner to attract any but the very superficial reader.

Recognizing how difficult it is to give titles to books, I reluctantly say that I had some difficulty with the title of this one, and vowed several times while reading the book that I would try to figure out what the title really meant, but never did. Suffice it to say, the reviewer thought highly of the book itself, and gratefully leaves the title to each reader.

FLOYD HUNTER

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H. WARREN DUNHAM and S. KIRSON WEINBERG. *The Culture of the State Mental Hospital*. Pp. xxiii, 284. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1960. \$5.00.

The state mental hospitals of our nation are undoubtedly among the best places in

the world for studying the problems of bureaucracy. And one of the favorite sports of medical sociologists, who are of course professional antibureaucrats, is hurling brick-bats at the long pilloried state mental hospital system. Dunham and Weinberg, in their study entitled *The Culture of the State Mental Hospital*, indulge themselves in this familiar exercise in ballistics skill. As one who favors the underdog, this reviewer's attention was accordingly divided between indignation at, and compassion for, the generally underpaid, usually ill-trained, and invariably poorly supported staffs of state hospitals for the mentally ill.

The data-collecting phase of the Dunham and Weinberg study was conducted at Columbus (Ohio) State Hospital between April and December 1946. Although the information presented in this work thus dates from the pretranquilizer era, when insulin and metrazol shock therapies were still fashionable, and physical restraints, such as ankle chains and strait jackets, were occasionally employed even in humanely operated institutions, the authors do not hesitate to claim that their study is representative of the current situation. Similarly rash assertions characterize the whole work: thus in the first chapter we are informed that "of all the mentally ill in our society, 97.6 per cent (as of 1947) are being cared for and treated in state hospitals"; and in the last, it is announced that this study has provided "ample evidence" for the statement that "the existing cultural climate of the state mental hospital affects the patient adversely." Period, there is no qualification of this statement and no context of comparison. Nor should any be expected, for the tone of the work is polemical, and the jargon of social science is inter-larded with the argot of unqualified opprobrium applied to the hospital staff, such as "backward," "paranoid," and so forth.

The virtue of the study, as well as its weakness, lies in the straightforward identification of the researchers with the patients rather than the hospital staff. After an initial two-chapter presentation of the history of the Columbus State Hospital and of the "employee culture," the re-

maining nine chapters are devoted to an earnest attempt to portray the desperate efforts of the right-less, honor-less, and power-less patient to retain self-respect and to win eventual release. The book's primary value lies in its recognition that the patient is encumbered in these efforts not only by his illness but also by the reality problems of survival in an institution many of whose staff members are more concerned with patient-control than with therapy. But, despite a sprinkling of statistical tables, liberal quotations from patient interviews, and the propounding of numbered findings, the study impresses this reviewer more as a diatribe than the ethnography it claims to be. State hospital staff members, like head hunters and cannibals, are after all members of the human race. However much as citizens we disapprove of certain of their practices, as scientists we attempt to understand them, even if our ulterior motive is reform. The justification for this dispassionate approach is that it is much easier to eliminate that which we understand than it is that which we merely abhor.

Dr. Dunham and Dr. Weinberg make again the familiar and generally agreed upon, even by state hospital staffs, point that the emotional milieu of the state hospital is oftentimes antitherapeutic. It is unfortunate that they have not turned their creative talents to the analysis of the reasons for the unsavory aspects of the system and the discovery of the practical remedies which might lead it to a state of higher grace. Such a voyage of discovery might reveal that the problem lies less with hospital staffs than with state legislatures and the citizenry at large.

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K. ISHWARAN. *Family Life in the Netherlands*. Pp. xi, 291. The Hague: Uitgeverij Van Keulen, 1959. 19.50 guilders.

There are two extraordinary features of the book under review. First, the author

has reversed the usual direction of a social scientist going into the "field"; he has come west from India to study the family in The Netherlands. Second, while sociologists generally believe that the family in Western countries has shrunk in functions and in influence under the impact of industrialization and urbanization, Ishwaran does not share this belief.

Because he wished to conduct his study in the English language, he confined his study to university students. He had 411 respondents to a 52-item questionnaire. Eighty of these subjects also participated in intensive interviews. On the basis of these procedures the author describes the recent and contemporary family in the segment of Dutch society represented by the students.

In presenting the general cultural background the author asserts that religion is one of the important influences contributing to the stability and integration of the Dutch family. In the rural regions which he studied there is, he asserts, a direct relationship between the size of farm and the occurrence of the extended family. He believes that Dutch women are reared to be more oriented toward a life of marriage and domestic activity than are women in comparable Western countries.

The book is designed, however, not to describe the Dutch family but to determine whether or not it has changed "in its essentials" since the turn of the century, a period during which Dutch society has been undergoing social change. This question requires (a) an explanation of what is meant by "essentials," (b) comparable data with respect to these essentials for at least the end-points of a sixty-year span, and (c) the specification of a procedure in terms of which a decision can be made as to whether the data do or do not support the conclusion that the Dutch family has changed in its essentials.

With respect to the first of these points the author asserts that the "essentials" are institutionalized ways of fulfilling four core functions of the family as distinguished by Kingsley Davis: reproduction, maintenance, socialization, and placement of the individual in the larger social systems. This specification of the meaning of "essentials"

is very satisfactory to the reviewer, but it is distressing then to discover that data are not presented systematically in terms of the core functions.

On the second point it is uncertain just what information the author has on trends. At two points in the book he addresses the question. Once he refers to agencies and governmental bureaus which supplied "indirect material on which we drew substantially" (p. 7). At the other point he says that his information on the "attitudes and practices . . . fifty to a hundred years ago . . . has been gained from sources such as informants, statistics and general literature" (p. 219). There are a few tables reporting trend data with respect to such series as birth rates, divorce rates, and the participation of women in the labor force, but this reader could find no firm evidence on attitudes during the early period.

The absence of a formal procedure leaves the critical reader in doubt. Occasionally conclusions appear without supporting evidence, but the pattern of presentation is for the author to assert that the data do not support the generally held presumption of a change, then to indicate that, of course, the data do show some change, and finally after having specified some of the evidence showing change, to leave the reader with the uncomfortable feeling that it was virtually a matter of individual taste whether the change or the continuity should be emphasized. This reader derives the impression that if Ishwaran has a value-position he wishes the data to sustain, it is that most sociologists are wrong and the Dutch family has not changed in its essentials.

In the reviewer's opinion the task which the author set for himself could have been carried out but not by the ethnographic procedure used. For example, with respect to the function of socialization it would have been possible to show whether or not there has been an increase in the average number of years of schooling and in the average number of hours spent in school per year. An increase in either or both of these series would imply a reduction in the proportion of the socializing function being carried out by the family,

and surely American data support the conclusion that there has been a reduction.

Despite this reviewer's opinion that Ishwaran's method cannot lead to a conclusion about his central question, the book still has numerous virtues. His descriptive observations seem useful and informative. An interesting feature is the presentation of nine accounts of "a day at home." And he is at times felicitous in his diction and conceptualizing as, for example, when he characterizes the relationships between cousins as that of "ascribed friends."

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ORVILLE G. BRIM, JR. *Education for Child Rearing*. Pp. 362. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1959. \$5.00.

It appears that parent education in the United States has passed through two historical stages and entered upon the third. The first, which characterizes all simple, folk societies, is the informal preparation of men and women for their roles as parents. Then, with industrialization, the culture becomes more complex and the informal preparation for parenthood gives way in part to formal preparation. Parent education, extant for more than half a century, is a manifestation of this change. And more recently still, with the coming of age of the social sciences, we have entered upon the third stage, namely, the critical appraisal of parent education from the standpoint of social science.

This book by Brim, undertaken at the behest of the Child Study Association of America and with the support of the Russell Sage Foundation, is the most searching and comprehensive study to date of the field of parent education from the standpoint of social science. The assumptions, objectives, procedures, and results of parent education are scrutinized, the deficiencies set forth, and the elements of a sound approach suggested. All of this is done with care, competence, and unusual clarity. The most significant part of the book is an evaluation of all the studies, the good and the bad, dealing

with the results of parent education programs. The review concludes on the pessimistic note that the results are inconclusive. We do not know how effective parent education is in changing parents or children. We have, then, become self-conscious and critical about the educational process in adulthood, but we have not yet developed sufficiently rational and sophisticated methods to enable us to know with confidence what we are accomplishing. That remains as a challenge for the future.

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IRVING D. HARRIS. *Normal Children and Mothers: Their Emotional Opportunities and Obstacles*. Pp. x, 287. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959. \$6.00.

The major portion of this text is devoted to a discussion and interpretation of the data obtained in an investigation of the concepts of normality and latency, which was undertaken by a diagnostic team from the psychoanalytically oriented staff of the Illinois Institute for Juvenile Research. The Appendixes include abbreviated protocols of the twenty-eight boys and twenty-six girls who, with their mothers, comprised the sample population. These "Varieties of Normality (54 Profiles)" serve as an extension of the basic theme of the book, emphasis upon the richness of the variety of human nature and the wealth of appropriate solutions to normal growth problems.

The eight- and nine-year old children, of diverse socio-economic backgrounds, were selected on the basis of their adjustability at school. Since only one half of the fathers expressed their willingness to participate, the investigators did not pursue their original intent to include both parents in all aspects of the study. The acceptance of this limitation appears regrettable, for it would seem a tenable supposition that research involving twenty-seven children and both parents might have yielded results which were less tautological and potentially more valuable than those of this study, which is primarily one of

dyadic relationships between children and mothers.

As implied, much of the data serves to substantiate earlier expressed concepts of child development, particularly those of Erikson, Havighurst, Bossard, and Boll. The more unique contributions are those of the establishment of "rough" criteria for optimal normality in mothers and children. The criteria for the children were the outcome of the identification of six items which were considered the crucial differentiation among the fairly well, the well, and the very well-adjusted children of both sexes. These items were elicited from the mothers with regard to weaning and sibling rivalry; the responses of the children to two of the Despert Fables; and the children's modes of socialization and discharge of hostility as revealed in the psychiatric interviews.

The criteria for the children are stated as follows: "(1) a psychological readiness (based on previous experience) to open up to the environment outside the family; and (2) an active impulse life which prepares the child for the impulse storms of puberty" (p. 28). The criteria for the mothers are considered to be those of warm dependability, understanding, correction of the emotional climate afforded by their mothers if needed, and feelings of affection for their fathers. Approximately 25 per cent of both groups met these high expectations, while the majority could be considered as occupying various places on a continuum of mental health with the optimal group representing one extreme. The optimal group of children were among those checked four years later at puberty, and their sound adjustment in the school had been maintained.

Despite the reassuring tenor of the entire volume, the most meaningful use of this work would be that of encouraging parents to arrive at answers to questions, almost inevitably aroused in its reading, in individual or group counseling sessions.

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RICHARD H. SHRYOCK. *The University of Pennsylvania Faculty: A Study in Amer-*

ican Higher Education. Pp. 259. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1959. \$5.00.

Since 1954 the University of Pennsylvania has been engaged in one of the best conceived and most thorough self surveys ever undertaken by an American college or university. This volume constitutes one of its products.

Professor Shryock, a distinguished medical historian and 1951 president of the American Association of University Professors (A.A.U.P.), gathered his data by interviewing a random sampling of members of the Arts College faculty of the University, approximately one in four of each rank; by visiting, interviewing, and corresponding with faculty members in American and European universities and by exploring the literature including the other studies of the Pennsylvania Educational Survey. He presents his findings in fluent prose uncluttered by excessive statistics.

These findings cluster about two foci: his conviction that the prime function of "a real university" must be research and his strong advocacy of closer faculty participation in institutional policy-making. He also makes more than a score of pertinent recommendations about how faculty performance and morale might be improved, but these can only be cited as predominantly worthy if not insistent. The 400 words allotted the reviewer must be employed in the discussion of Professor Shryock's two pivotal propositions.

The first of them he states most forthrightly in the following passage: "The policy which a real university should follow, in confronting the respective claims of teaching and of research, can be stated quite simply. Every effort should be made to improve teaching *within the limits set by the primary obligation to research*. By the same token, any program to improve teaching which will inhibit research—for example, staffing a department largely with 'scholar-teachers' rather than with 'scholar-writers'—should be suspect" (p. 38). Professor Shryock reports that this statement represents the opinion of the majority of the faculty members he interviewed, but he does not assess the points of view of

the dissenting minority or of other critics of it. Thus he writes as a partisan rather than as an objective scholar seeking a workable solution to perhaps the most complex, vexing, and efficiency-inhibiting problem facing American colleges and universities.

Though bland, Professor Shryock's partisanship will not help the University of Pennsylvania or any other institution to resolve the emotive conflict between its teaching and research functions. Instead, the undergraduate will continue to be "short-changed" as he has been in most American universities since President William Rainey Harper of the University of Chicago propounded the "dominance-of-research" thesis beginning in 1892. To use a phrase that Henry Seidel Canby employed when writing about this conflict a quarter of a century ago, Professor Shryock, in this reviewer's opinion, had a strategic opportunity to lift the controversy to a higher plane; but he "muffed it."

On his second major theme of faculty participation in academic government, Professor Shryock has written perceptively and wisely. Unlike some other former presidents of the A.A.U.P., he recognizes "the values of competent administration" (p. 257) and also the necessity and even desirability of boards of trustees. His pleas for closer relationships of faculty members, administrators, and trustees in the making of institutional policy should help persuade faculty members at the University of Pennsylvania and elsewhere to think more kindly than some professors do of those legally responsible for the operation of American colleges and universities.

W. H. COWLEY

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GEORGE N. SHUSTER. *Education and Moral Wisdom*. Pp. ix, 146. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. \$3.50.

This is one more of the genre of books presenting papers and speeches of college presidents delivered over an administrative career. Frequently such collections

are dreary polemics. Fortunately this present collection is of considerably greater worth. George N. Shuster is a Roman Catholic who has been president of Hunter College, one of New York's municipal colleges, for almost twenty years. He has maintained the integrity of both roles throughout his tenure, and the wisdom and prudence with which he has done so are reflected in the essays comprising this book.

He thoroughly understands the problems of a municipal college and the commuting students who inhabit it. He does not set any exalted goals for such an institution, nor is he condescending toward it. A college, in his view, should be a friendly, literate, and sometimes amusing place in which a relatively few things are taken very seriously. His job as administrator is to try to create such a place.

Academic freedom was frequently in the news during his presidency, and he discovered that some of the professors at Hunter were actually afraid to work with student political groups. In response to this he emphasized in clear tones that he valued and respected academic freedom but believed that it could be maintained only so long as those who wanted it were ready to pay a price for it. To the faculty, he urged participation in student political groups even if it involved some personal danger to them.

To the freshmen of Hunter College he extended always a warm but calm welcome. He promised them that some would awaken to the joys of scholarship, "free and brave, aware of vistas which are more endless even than landscapes of mountains and seas, cheerfully and humbly aware of one's very finite limitation in relation to the potential infinity of knowledge . . ." but warned that some would break in the quest.

President Shuster makes the most sense to this reviewer in an essay on education and wisdom. The pursuit of wisdom is not carried on through scholarship alone. Scholarship and specialization are valuable, but the wisdom students can acquire must come from the process of young minds meeting old ones in an essentially emotional context.

The problem which Roman Catholic

education has yet to solve is how to help young people change from the acceptance of a dogmatic education of elementary and secondary schools to the acceptance of a higher education which will enable them to question even their most fundamental religious beliefs. Until this is achieved, Roman Catholic education will always be open to the charge which Shuster himself made as a young man: that there were few, if any, genuine scholars among Roman Catholics.

Such brief epitome of some of the better essays clearly cannot do them justice. President Shuster's book is a good one which deserves wide reading.

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W. FRIEDMANN. *Law in a Changing Society*. Pp. xxvi, 522. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959. \$8.50.

In an extraordinarily concise yet comprehensive Preface the author has told fairly what he intends to cover in this book in a way that this reviewer cannot improve. Throughout the book little summaries are found, expressly purporting to be such, which from time to time put the reader in place.

It is my immediate and continuous impression that this book cannot profitably be read cursorily but requires serious and concentrated thinking on every page. The reader is also expected to be familiar with or to look up a vast number of decisions, articles, and references cited in addition to those which are abstracted in the text.

The author takes great pains to state both sides of controversial questions. More than twenty instances were noted in which he has bracketed specific problems with "on the one hand" and "on the other."

Part Six, Conclusions, entitled "The Rule of Law, the Individual and the Welfare State," summarizes the whole book and describes the various tensions between the several groups shown throughout the book to be striving for supremacy in contemporary society.

At the end of the book the author states as his ultimate conclusion that it is con-

ceivable that the almost fantastic progress of the means of transport and communication will at last alert the nations of the world to the anachronisms of national sovereignty. Mr. Friedmann believes that the only serious justification for any hope that the deeply divided and antagonistic nations and power blocs of the world may merge their powers and purposes in a universal organization equipped with more than debating functions, lies in the overwhelming threat of contemporary technological and scientific developments to the security and, indeed, to the survival of mankind. When we consider the destructive capacity of the hydrogen bomb, the development of intercontinental missiles which can cross the oceans in a few minutes at tremendous heights, the early prospect of manned rockets landing on the moon or, in years to come, even on planets, coupled with the capacity to set up service stations in outer space and the availability of all these overwhelmingly destructive devices to the major opposing powers, there appears to be an impelling force towards a far more advanced world order than that represented by the present world organization.

The author submits a persuasive case for his belief that the enormously destructive power of modern weapons will induce the contending blocs to remain at arm's length and to develop for this purpose such legal relations and contacts as are required for the maintenance of a live and let live coexistence.

This is by no means an easy book to read, but careful reading of it will be well rewarded.

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WILLIAM ZELERMYER. *Invasion of Privacy*. Pp. vi, 181. Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1959. \$4.00.

This book attempts to appraise the development of legal doctrine in the field of invasion of privacy. The topic affords an excellent opportunity to analyze legal evolution as a response to a problem made compelling by the technological and social developments of the past century. Unfortunately, Mr. Zelermyer's treatment of the

subject, though advertised as "the most thorough and elaborate study of privacy yet made within the framework of tort law," fails to add much to what has already been said on the subject.

The method employed by the author, Professor of Business Law at Syracuse, is to describe the fact situations and decisions in a large number of cases where privacy is at issue. Cases are classified in terms of jurisdiction, with chapters on New York and Georgia, and type of invasion, for example, printed publications and television. This approach makes it difficult for the author to deal creatively with the central legal issues. Casual comments aside, there is no real analysis of the problems posed by the conflict between public interest in the dissemination of news and the individual's right to be left alone. The writer has chosen instead to assume that there is only one possible position and that the courts can and should clarify the present doctrinal confusion by providing every possible protection against invasions of privacy, even when these are unintentional, informational, concerned with a public personage, or unlikely to have bothered the "reasonable man."

Nor is there an adequate treatment of the theme of legal evolution, suggested early in the book. Dutiful reference is made to the celebrated article, "The Right to Privacy," published in 1890 by Warren and Brandeis (4 *Harvard Law Review* 193), which traced concurrent changes in social needs and legal policies in this area. The evolutionary theme might have provided an excellent framework for relating subsequent legislative and judicial changes to the social conditions which have affected the value placed on privacy. Instead, the crudest possible picture of legal development is drawn. We are told, for instance, that "Regardless of size, shape, or direction, the paths of the law form a unified network, with no beginning and no ending. These paths are followed by human beings, whose tendency is to follow them. Time or tide, fact or fancy, excuse or exigency, constraint or construction may cause pathways to deviate from their original locations, but the basic pattern of the law maintains its enduring form."

Without being unduly harsh, I think it is fair to say that this is an anachronistic view of the law. To deal adequately with what Gregory and Kalven have called the "clearest example of a 'new tort' arising in the past half century," a more sophisticated jurisprudence is surely needed.

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EVERETT KNIGHT. *The Objective Society*. Pp. xv, 137. New York: George Braziller, 1960. \$3.75.

Mr. Knight, an existentialist who is an ardent disciple of Sartre and a defender of Sartre's brand of modified Marxism, writes his indictment of the cult of objectivity by the modern academic intellectual with forceful indignation and, in the process, reveals a good deal of that culture whose conscious cultivation he so bitterly condemns. He objects to a merely sterile and sterilizing scholarship. He is angry at an art appreciation which confuses aesthetics with collectors' accumulation and turns museums into mausoleums. He condemns a scientism which, arrogantly convinced of its sufficiency, denies meaning to man and society and fate. He damns as pure evil the killing and denying of life in the name of a precious cult of culture. He is convinced that the thinker and the scholar do not today fulfill their role, but are ignoring life and playing with thoughts as a means to escape it. Even though Mr. Knight is sometimes extreme, one cannot fail to be sympathetic with his generally just irritations and anger.

Nor would it be wise to deny his thesis that we make and shape our world in experiencing it and acting in it; that beyond such being and immersion there is nothing; and that the only true humanism is compassionate and committed action: acting, we become aware of and give meaning to ourselves as we recognize our fellows. It is exceedingly urgent to insist on the irrelevance, and indeed the positive evil, of a politics of enslavement to a standard of living, rather than of creative making and utilization. Likewise, Mr. Knight shows

clarity and perspective when he indicts that position which urges other peoples' indulgence in the leisure enjoyments, nice or nasty, of a middle-class society with a high standard of living, with nonsensical and insensitive unawareness that for masses of men in underdeveloped countries, who lack an adequate diet and live only in the short run when they manage to survive at all, such counsels of dubious perfection are a gross irrelevance.

Fortunately, Professor Knight is no vulgar activist. He fears above all the generic corruptions of fascism, overt and covert. Yet he provides no criteria whereby we might discriminate among types of activity. Unfairly, he ignores the correct elements in the attitudes and analysis of a long line of modern thinkers, from Bentham to John Dewey, and fails to note the grounds on which one may clearly distinguish between brutal and loving passion, contemplative and creative compassion. Perfectionist analyses may indeed lead to false and irrelevant issues and refinements, to fruitless debater's points, and to men sealed in ivory towers, with pure pointlessness cleansing and recleansing their perennially dirty line, which is unclean, by wild paradox, because forever virginally spotless. Yet, however dangerous the misconception of life achieved by the arrest and abstraction of analytical distinctions, it nevertheless surely remains true that contemplation, while not the sole good, is among valuable and properly valued activities; that disinterested inquiry is not irresponsible withdrawal but instead the means to more effective action; and that in some contexts "a plague on both your houses" is no search to be above or outside the battle, but a positive commitment, an act of war against both the contestants of the moment. In many controversies the intellectual third force is involved in the engagement and is designed neither to avoid responsibility nor to deny the necessity of power as means to create. Rather, it rests on a search for, and constitutes a means to, the necessary leverage to make a better world, where men can enjoy and utilize abundance to express their dignified essence. Thus may they live more abundantly in a world they make in the living.

In this sense, pluralism is no search for an escape. It is the essence of existential personalism.

THOMAS I. COOK

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ALF ROSS. *On Law and Justice*. Pp. xi, 383. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959. \$6.00.

This is an uncommonly good book particularly to be recommended to those suffering from the logical and historical confusions involved in the revival of modern natural law theories. Alf Ross is Professor of Law at the University of Copenhagen. He has been strongly influenced by the Swedish philosopher, Axel Hagerstrom, as well as by contemporary logical empiricism. His intellectual antecedents really go back to the methodological aspects of Bentham's and Austin's thought in refreshing contrast to the murkiness of much of European metaphysical jurisprudence. The distinctive feature of the book is its attempt to offer an analytical and naturalistic interpretation of those features of the legal experience—the existence of norms and the consciousness of their binding character—which give rise to *a priori* notions of law. Professor Ross is very sympathetic to the American realistic school of jurisprudence whose fount is Holmes, but he is critical of the extreme behaviorism into which it debouches in the writings of jurists like Jerome Frank. He strives to synthesize the behavioristic and psychological approach by insisting that an understanding of juristic behavior must be predicated "on the hypothesis that in his spiritual life the judge is governed and motivated by a normative ideology of a known content." The exact significance in this context of "spiritual life" is left rather obscure. In places it seems synonymous with "mental life." Professor Ross fails to explain how changes in the "spiritual life" of a judge are to be recognized independently of their behavioral manifestations. If the reference is to language as ritual, how is the sincerity of the linguistic or ritualistic professions to be attested?

There are many other topics discussed

besides the nature and sources of law in this provocative and wide-ranging book. Professor Ross' discussion of the scientific determination of policy is interesting and reflects the views of Charles Stevenson. But it assumes a purist view of the nature of science and a failure to understand the many ways in which means and ends are interrelated. Despite what he says, many problems of "ought" or "should" are "solved," and not merely "resolved" by an irrational leap. He here seeks to settle matters which *au fond* are matters of empirical inquiry by easy definition in the manner made familiar by Max Weber. Professor Ross shows a surprising unfamiliarity with John Dewey's theory of valuation which, despite some of its difficulties in formulation, seems to be just the specific required for the theoretical deficiencies of this work. At the least Dewey's position should have been considered in some detail because it is precisely directed against the type of view defended by Ross.

The greatest merit of the book is that it raises all the key questions in a fresh and illuminating context.

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EDGAR H. S. CHANDLER. *The Hightower of Refuge: The Inspiring Story of Refugee Relief Throughout the World*. Pp. 264. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. \$6.75.

This volume, richly illustrated by numerous documentary photographs, is not an attempt to make a scientific analysis of the refugee problem. Dr. Chandler, Director of the Refugee Service of the World Council of Churches and President of the Standing Conference of Voluntary Agencies Working for Refugees (Geneva), states as his purpose "simply to tell the story of refugees the world over, and of the church's attempt to help them." In this he has admirably succeeded. His effective and compassionate presentation makes excellent use of field reports from experienced workers, innumerable interviews with dis-

placed refugees, and his own firsthand observation and direct participation in service projects all around the world.

Most of the twenty-two chapters take the reader to refugee units in countries of temporary asylum: Austria, the Philippines, Greece, the Middle East, Korea; to Berlin, Trieste, Hong Kong, Istanbul. In each of these settings we meet refugees as individuals. Skillful sketches bring to life the personal backgrounds of men, women, and children, the tragic events leading to flight and separation, their valiant efforts to cope with most depressing conditions, to gain a chance for a new life and freedom.

The reader is also introduced to many outstanding men and women giving their life's work to refugee service. We learn of their constructive projects to make waiting periods in miserable shelters and camps less wasteful; and of the incessant, patient struggle of staff members of many a voluntary agency devoting great skill, imagination, and diplomacy to achieving the goal of all refugee service: admission one by one to a new homeland, relocation, integration.

A chapter on certain resettlement projects in Latin America highlights the problems arising in receiving countries. A brief historical survey of the development of national and international instrumentalities for migration aid and of the significant role of voluntary agencies in this area is provided in a final chapter.

While the book is focused on the clients, projects, and personnel of the World Council Service to Refugees, it illustrates clearly the complex pattern of interagency cooperation in refugee movement and resettlement, the mutual interdependence and close partnership of voluntary and governmental service.

The book is warmly recommended reading for people with an uneasy conscience who would like to see the 1960 World Refugee Year offer more than a kindly thought to forty million homeless, waiting people.

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
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Special Editor of this Volume

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Professor of Political Science


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THE THEME

This volume¹ is aimed at contributing to a sweeping change in the focus of American agricultural policy. It aspires to a prominent place on the desks of farm editors as well as on reading lists of agricultural policy courses. It hopes to influence the agenda of farm policy conferences and to command the attention of policy-makers in Congress, the Executive, and farm organizations. It transcends—even though it draws upon—recent symposia on the farm problem.² Admirable as these efforts are, they do not try what this volume attempts: to examine farm policy in light of the radically changed situation of the United States in the world. Certain differences of interpretation among authors of articles in this volume only underscore their concurrence with the general scheme.

Until recently our problems seemed essentially domestic. Even severe international crises seemed temporary and did not appear to jeopardize national survival. Now all this is changed. Our fate is conclusively involved with that of other nations. The next few decades seem critical in the race between population and technology. Fortunately we have immense capabilities, if we will only use them, to help underdeveloped countries. Whether the strength that we and our friends can muster will be enough this generation will probably never learn; but it is forced to the attempt by its religious convictions, by its heritage of democratic constitutionalism, and by its interest in survival. The population explosion, the rising demands and turmoil in the world, the spiraling efficiencies in mass destruction all indicate that nothing less than our best effort will do.

To show concretely and in detail how farm interests and farm policy relate to these transcending needs is the task of this book. Agriculture by no means monopolizes this lofty obligation, but a start must be made somewhere, and agriculture is fitting both because of the significance of domestic farm programs for economic foreign policy and also because the miracle of farm science illumines a forbidding future.

This book looks first at foreign economic policy and only later—and then briefly—at domestic farm policy. The order is deliberate. The domestic problem looms so large that it nearly blinds those concerned to everything else. It is not enough merely to catch the eyes of farm spokesmen—they must come to see their immediate problems in relation to the overriding needs of this nation and, indeed, of mankind. We must scrap the threadbare theory that the general welfare will automatically emerge if each group presses as hard as it can for its immediate interests.

Therefore, we open with a discussion of American agriculture as it bears upon trade among nations. How have our farm products entered into world trade; what has been agriculture's influence on trade policy; what would a desirable and consistent trade policy be; and what implications would it have for agriculture?

¹ The author is indebted to T. W. Schultz for his help in crystallizing the goal and in spelling out the organization of this volume.

² William H. Nicholls (Editor), *American Agriculture: Perspectives and Prospects* (New York: Columbia University, The American Assembly, 1955). Iowa State University Center for Agricultural Adjustment, *Problems and Policies of American Agriculture* (Ames, Iowa, 1959). Joint Economic Committee, *Policy for Commercial Agriculture*, 85th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1957). Harold Halcrow (Editor), *Modern Land Policy* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960).

This leads to an evaluation of governmental programs to dispose of farm products abroad and to an exploration of the possibilities—and the dangers and limitations—of using farm surpluses in foreign policy. In turn, this prompts an examination of the export of other kinds of capital—and here we are forced again to recognize what still comes as a surprise and even a shock to many people in this country and abroad: the overwhelming importance to economic growth of increases in human capital.

What kind of effort should this country make to extend farm science to underdeveloped nations and to adapt it to their needs? What changes in attitudes, in educational institutions, in administrative agencies are indicated? What can experienced men say of the tasks that confront us abroad, and how can we improve our domestic recruitment, training, and orientation so that we can fulfill our proper role in world economic development?³

Only after an extensive treatment of such issues do we turn to the domestic farm problem. One article deals with its crucial price and income aspects as these grow out of the chronic overexpansion of agriculture. Another probes relevant Canadian experience. Three papers deal briefly with separate commodities—cotton, wheat, sugar and wool—each of which plagues both domestic and foreign politics. Finally, the malallocation of human resources in agriculture is examined, less in its aspects of human poverty and disadvantage, appalling as these often are, than as a drag upon total productivity. In the coming world struggle we are inevitably shorthanded; we simply cannot afford the loss in annual production attributed to the employment of too many people in agriculture.

All this prepares us for a major and in many ways the most difficult question: How do we get the policies that we need? Fortunately authors here have been able to sharpen issues and to make useful proposals. But this is only the beginning of what should be a tremendous effort of mind and will. The job is to fix the attention of all those who are concerned with farm policy upon the highest objectives of this country—to pre-empt the first and controlling place on the agenda for the loftiest considerations.

After this must come the policy-makers. The entire process of farm policy formation must be informed by an understanding of the salient issues which, imprinted on enough minds in the farm sector, may bring about a major intellectual reorientation. This calls for conscious and sustained effort in the federal agencies, not only in the Office of the President and in the Department of State, but also in the United States Department of Agriculture. It calls for a corresponding determination in Congress, in the farm press, in the colleges of agriculture, and in farm organizations, not only nationally, but down into the last township Farm Bureau and the last local of the Grange and the Farmers Union.

We are, indeed, in search of a national purpose. But it is not enough merely to define it intellectually. It has to be grasped by people who are sweating over their own troubles. In agriculture it must penetrate through the barriers created by the overexpanded farm plant, the threat of falling farm incomes, the mounting costs of farm programs, and the growing public restiveness with the size of the farm budget. All these deepen the obsession in the farm sector with the domestic problem, as would be seen by an analysis of Congressional hearings, of United States Department of Agriculture reports and activities, of the farm press, of farm

³ See George Liska, *The New Statecraft: Foreign Aid in American Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960) reviewed in this volume.

organization publications, and of the talk in farm meetings. Something must be done about the size of the farm plant, and we may be sure that no effort will be spared to find cures. But somehow the minds of those so engaged must still be fastened upon the larger issues before the country—and this must mean much more than merely settling upon foreign policy as a way to alleviate the domestic farm problem.

But a nagging doubt remains about our national purpose. How do we know that an upsurge of economic growth in the underdeveloped countries will herald peace, spread freedom, and add to human happiness? We cannot know this absolutely. We only know that it is our genius to produce more tools, more food, more machines; to make these things and then get them into the hands of people who need them; and to get these people into the habits of using and of continuously demanding and searching for, and expecting, better tools and methods of production. Yet the ultimate meanings of these added instruments lie beyond our grasp. A man's moral stature is not necessarily increased because he stands on a higher pile of goods. But in this time of staggering possibilities we have to rely on what we know how to do. The gap between the healthy and the poor nations grows; so does the clamor for equity. We know that we can help others to get ahead. But we cannot see the end of our efforts and theirs; even the proximate results—and whether they will be good or evil—are completely shrouded.

If there is no proof, there may still be conviction. Some will find it in religious revelation, others in political wisdom. To the latter, we might presume to say a word. Because of the delicate situation in domestic politics—this is an election year!—and more especially because we are not alone in this great task, let us turn to Charles de Gaulle of France whom Walter Lippmann recently declared to possess true genius. "This gift, which is more than leadership as such, is second sight into the nature of history. It brings with it the gift of prophesying what is going to happen. . . ." With it is carried "the ability to convey what his vision brings to him."

On the same day that Lippmann's tribute appeared De Gaulle declared in Washington, D. C.: "There can be no deeply rooted peace in our time without economic development . . ."

"In my opinion, fundamentally, and above and beyond all theories, all doctrines, all systems of government, the great task facing the world is to raise from poverty and start on the path toward economic development these 2,000,000,000 people who lack everything."⁴

CHARLES M. HARDIN

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⁴ *New York Times*, April 24, 1960; for Lippmann, "Salute to De Gaulle," *Chicago Sun-Times*, April 24, 1960.

Trade and Agriculture Policy

By LAWRENCE WITT

ABSTRACT: Through trade agreements and inflation, tariff levels have been reduced to about one fourth the 1931-1934 levels. These advances toward a freer trading position have been hindered by the rapid growth in import quotas. Some sectors of American agriculture have been in the forefront of those seeking import limitations. The use of price supports in implementing American agricultural programs tends to encourage imports and discourage exports. In addition, price supports have stimulated new programs to encourage exports; such as by transferring purchasing power abroad, or by reducing export prices. These programs range from special loans, sales for local currency (Public Law 480), to export subsidies. Such attempts to insulate domestic agricultural prosperity from the world market divert individual attention and reduce the pressures which otherwise might strongly press for an active and liberal trade policy. Similarly these programs have lowered the influence of the foreign protests, by introducing the additional opinions of those benefiting from special sales. The present complex of programs and policies has quieted the voices of many of those strongly proposing freer trade in order to lower costs.

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IMPORTANT sectors of agriculture have a vital interest in a strong export market. A third to a half of the cotton, wheat, tobacco, lard, and rice production traditionally has moved overseas. Historically, foreign markets provided the base for westward agricultural expansion. The foreign exchange earned supported the development of a transportation system, factories and other facilities to undergird American economic development. The export market continues today to be a major outlet for many farm products. Powerful agricultural interests have supported liberal trade policies, such as the Reciprocal Trade Agreements (RTA), so as to protect and expand such markets.

In recent years the operations of agricultural programs have imposed a series of restraints, import quotas, and escape clauses upon trade policies. Some sectors of agriculture have led the way for the whole economy in forcing exceptions, though other groups—bicycle producers, watch makers, and others—have been close behind.

These confusions and inconsistencies are in keeping with America's long history of vacillating trade policy. Before 1857 we had already gone one full circle of liberal trade, high tariffs, and gradual reductions. From 1862 to 1916 the nation moved again irregularly through such a cycle. In 1922 and 1930 tariffs were again raised, the Smoot-Hawley tariff being considered the highest in American history. In reaction to the mistaken idea that tariffs on exported products provided price benefits, agricultural interests compromised on a program of "equality for agriculture." The McNary-Haugen bills were designed to separate the foreign and domestic markets, permitting farm products to be sold at world prices abroad, while fetching a higher price at home.¹

¹ For a fuller review see: Murray Benedict, *Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-*

The depression of the thirties brought a disillusionment with a variety of past policies. Those agricultural groups selling heavily abroad—wheat, cotton, tobacco, pork, and lard—attributed part of their troubles to the virtual disappearance of the American farm exports. They began to recognize that purchases beget sales. Thus agriculture warmly embraced the Hull Reciprocal Trade Agreements program for two reasons. First, it promised to reopen foreign markets closed by the rampant protectionism of the period. Second, it promised to reduce tariffs on imported manufactures and cut the costs of certain agricultural inputs. Even so there were certain reservations, by commodity groups interested in sugar, wool, and to a lesser extent in butter.

At the same time, it was widely recognized that domestic problems made even a complete re-establishment of the foreign market an inadequate measure, and in any case would require some time to accomplish. Even before the RTA came into being, Congress passed the Agricultural Adjustment Act, striving to correct the domestic imbalance between production and consumption. The philosophy and implementation of this Act led to many conflicts and inconsistencies—a problem which is still with us.

PRODUCTION CONTROL PROBLEMS

Under the original Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) and in all of its later amendments, efforts have been made to control production. Successful production control raises the price in the United States market. To the extent that the price is increased, the United States ability to export affected farm commodities is reduced and the ability of competing countries is enhanced. In some cases, the difference

1950 (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1953), pp. 207-238.

between the American and world price was large enough to attract goods to the United States over the Smoot-Hawley wall.

The latter point was recognized as early as 1935, when Section 22 was attached to the original AAA. This became the most significant limitation on competitive agricultural imports. This section directed the President to impose quotas on imports, whenever they were found to be interfering with any program operating under the AAA. Thus, cotton imports were placed under quota in 1939 and wheat imports in 1941.

The reduced ability to export could not be countered so simply. Although of minor significance, export subsidies for Pacific Northwest wheat in 1934 and for cotton in 1939 gave a limited preview of one means of enhancing exportability. Some restoration of foreign purchasing power occurred with world economic recovery and preparations for World War II. The passage of Lend-Lease provided another way of increasing foreign purchasing power. While viewed as a means of providing dollars—primarily for military purchases—during a period of extraordinary demands, the techniques involved foreshadowed the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA) and the Marshall Plan. This experience led into other techniques for bolstering foreign purchasing power, such as those represented by the Agricultural Trade and Development Act (Public Law 480).

One other aspect of the agricultural programs of the thirties needs to be brought out before considering the Reciprocal Trade Agreements. The Jones-Costigan Sugar Act of 1934 makes even more clear the ambivalent position of American agriculture. It imposed import quotas on sugar, with even smaller quotas on refined sugar. In fact, the

Sugar Act of 1937, 1948, and recent extensions essentially divide the market among specified states and territories, the Puerto Rican Commonwealth, and foreign countries. It has become a permanent means of protecting American beet and cane sugar producers. In renewing the Sugar Act next year, great forbearance will be required if the nation is to avoid mixing sugar protectionism and punishment for Fidel Castro.

RECIPROCAL TRADE AGREEMENTS

The Reciprocal Trade Agreements were heralded as a reversal of America's high tariff position, but the implementation of the program belied its high expectations. Only slowly through individual country agreements were tariffs lowered. Under the Reciprocal Trade Agreement, the President was authorized to negotiate and reduce tariffs up to 50 per cent of the 1934 level. During the negotiations the United States reduced tariffs on only as many dollars worth of trade as did the other country. The general interests of United States consumers in lower tariffs, regardless of foreign concessions, was nowhere given recognition in the negotiating procedures. Moreover, extraordinary efforts were made to deal only with commodities which were specific to the trade of the United States and the other country, even to the extent of further subdividing the complex division of commodities in the Smoot-Hawley Act. Thus most widely traded products were almost untouched until 1945.

In the first flush of enthusiasm after the war the President was given additional room for negotiation. This was done by setting the lower limit at 50 per cent of the January 1945 rate, thus assimilating the earlier reductions. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) followed shortly, with simultaneous negotiation with 23 countries and including commodities sup-

plied by several or many countries. Negotiations at Geneva were almost scuttled by action of the United States with respect to wool. Australia and New Zealand insisted that tariff reductions on wool be part of the Agreement. The United States Congress was unwilling to countenance the price reduction this would mean for American wool. Only a Presidential veto of a proposed extra import fee and a support program for wool saved the negotiations.

By 1949 the burden of tariffs had been substantially reduced, from an average ad valorem rate on dutiable imports of 55 per cent in 1931-1934 to 14 per cent in 1948-1949. Measured against all imports, the reduction was from 19 to 6 per cent.² Since that time further small reductions have been made. Such figures show that real progress was made in easing tariff burdens, but they do not give a complete account of the tariff schedule.

Some tariffs have been and still are so high as to exclude imports, and are not included in the figures above. In 1953 there were still nearly 500 tariff rates in the United States schedule which exceeded 50 per cent ad valorem.³

Secondly, price increases, combined with specific tariffs, have drastically reduced the burden of many American tariffs, even without tariff reductions. Specific tariffs are more likely to be applied to farm products, and ad valorem or percentage tariffs to industrial products.

More generally, the full impact of the tariff reductions was not felt until the 1950's. The war so disrupted produc-

tion and trade patterns that finding something to export became the order of the day in many European countries. The United States was being called upon to supply deficiencies for a wide range of products. Few imports were able to take advantage of tariff reductions; only later did actual imports become a source of concern to American producers.

THE RETREAT OF THE FIFTIES

At the beginning of the 1950's, agricultural price support programs were still the order of the day. The government was heavily involved in the purchase and storage of agricultural commodities. Since overseas production was nearly restored, the acute demands for food were reduced. Some countries had developed and expanded their production of farm products and were competing with the United States. With many American prices above world prices, foreign exports moved more easily and imports were knocking on our doors. Hostilities in Korea obscured the trends for several years, but the pattern was clear.

In trade policy the United States continued to assert a liberal program, but gaps were appearing. The United States Congress had not accepted membership in the proposed International Trade Organization; efforts were being made to substitute GATT in its place as a long term commitment. Even GATT itself included many loopholes for nationalistic policies. Astute observers overseas were questioning whether the United States was willing to follow a low-tariff policy. Many argued that when pressures accumulated, a reversion to isolationism and protectionism was inevitable. Despite these doubts, the Mutual Security Administration encouraged European countries to expand production facilities—as in cheese—in order to increase exports to the United

States and thus reduce the prevalent dollar gap.

Even the extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements in 1951 was less clear cut. It included specific provisions for investigation by the Tariff Commission, if the question of injury to domestic producers arose. Section 22 of the AAA also was amended to prohibit the application of any trade agreement or international agreement inconsistent with the requirements of this section. Thus, under the pressures of these conflicts, Congress reversed itself and made any trade agreement subservient to the domestic agricultural program, if the two should conflict.

Action under other legislation brought new restrictions on agricultural imports. During the first half of 1951, a number of farm products were restricted by import licenses issued by the United States Department of Agriculture, under the Second War Powers Act. These included butter, flaxseed, peanuts, rice, rice flour, rice starch, and so on.⁴ Most of the restrictions continued after July 31, 1951 under the Defense Production Act of 1950, with fats, oils, and dairy products being added. Under Section 104 of this Act, import licenses were issued until June 30, 1953, for butter, cheese, casein, flaxseed, linseed oil, non-fat dried milk, various types of peanuts and rice. These provisions reflect the increasing use of quantitative controls as a means of controlling imports—a world-wide characteristic in recent years. While licenses for many products were issued freely, those for cheese were severely limited and for butter almost nonexistent.

Strong protests were lodged against the United States by Denmark, Canada,

the Netherlands, and New Zealand, and other protests followed. These protests, and retaliatory action by the Netherlands in reducing imports of wheat flour, led to a review of the policy.

In July 1953, these licenses were abandoned. But simultaneously and after a review by the Tariff Commission, a system of quotas and fees was instituted under the provisions of Section 22. The severity of the restrictions was loosened, but the effects were the same—the essential separation of the American market from the world market.⁵

Such restrictive devices, however, were just as inadequate for American agriculture as in the earlier periods. Farmers continued to produce substantially in excess of what could be sold at established prices. In 1953 agricultural exports dropped to the lowest level since 1945, and government stocks reached high levels. In the concern engendered by this decline in exports, attention turned again to a technique already being utilized, under Sections 402 and 550 of the 1953 Mutual Security Act. Strongly supported by the Farm Bureau, the Agricultural Trade and Development Act of 1954 (P. L. 480) was passed.

Sale of farm products

Under this legislation the sale of farm products was stimulated in three ways. The first technique was to provide a continuing support for a device used earlier—the gift of food to nations facing temporary food shortages, due to poor crops, natural disasters, and so forth. The second technique was the

⁵ As of January 1959 the following farm products were subject to import controls: sugar, dried figs, alsike clover seed, cotton and cotton waste, wheat and wheat products, tung nuts and oil, rye, rye flour and meal, malted milk compounds, butter substitutes, butter, dried cream, dried buttermilk, dried skim milk and dried whole milk, cheeses, peanuts, peanut oil, flaxseed and linseed.

² See Lawrence Witt, "Trade and Reciprocal Trade Agreements," *Technical Bulletin* 220 (Michigan Agricultural Experiment Station, June 1950).

³ Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (under direction of Harry Hawkins), "International Trade Policy Issues," prepared for and published by the Chamber of Commerce of the United States (February 1953), p. 4.

⁴ These and other restrictions listed later are assembled from mimeographed annual reports of the United States Tariff Commission, entitled "Operation of the Trade Agreements Program."

bartering of food for strategic materials. The third and most important was the authorization of sales for local currency, thus completely bypassing the foreign exchange market.

This legislation was to dominate the export picture, develop new strains with America's Allies, and stimulate farm leaders to think about how foreign development and surplus disposal might be associated. As presently renewed, P. L. 480 provides \$1.5 billion annually to stimulate farm exports. Other programs such as the International Wheat Agreement, Section 32 of P. L. 320—Seventy-fourth Congress—and the Mutual Security Act provide additional financial stimuli.

The effects of these actions are clearly apparent in looking at trends in total trade and in agricultural trade. During the five-year period between 1952–1953 and 1957–1958, total exports, in quantity, increased by 18 per cent while agricultural trade increased by 55 per cent. Thus most of the increase was agricultural. On the import side during the same period total imports rose by 20 per cent and agricultural imports remained constant.⁶ Agriculture is out of step both in policy and with actual market trends.

For the future one wonders whether the seeds of this policy are now growing rankly. Policies within the Common Market with respect to imports from outside the Six will raise the weighted average of the barriers against American imports. African areas are considered within and the United States outside. And because the United States has systematically excluded any major dependence on agricultural products from these areas, its bargaining power

⁶ United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, M-76, *Quantity Indexes of U. S. Agricultural Exports and Imports*, Revised (January 1960), Tables 2 and 6.

may be limited. In any case the Six and the Seven can, if they wish, point to many precedents in recent American agricultural and trade policy, as justification for actions which they may take in limiting exports from outside areas.

SUMMARY

In the past twenty-five years of trade and agricultural policy, several developments are evident. One is that trade policies have been relatively successful in lowering tariff levels, and in keeping them from increasing. The second is that import controls have been inserted into American policy largely by way of agriculture. Trade policy condoned a series of exceptions to the general liberal trade position, in order to attain major trade agreements. In many cases, the effect of lower tariffs is not to increase imports and lower prices, but to transfer purchasing power—formerly derived from import duties—from the United States Treasury to foreign producers able to sell in the United States market. The third is that, despite its weaknesses, agricultural policy has attained some of its objectives, including higher prices and some income transfer to agriculture. In so doing, it has reduced or removed agriculture's incentive for a strong position on foreign trade policy. Under the system developed, improvements in foreign trade usually do not translate directly into improved agricultural prices and welfare.

To say this, however, is not enough. Agricultural policy, by concentrating on support prices as a technique, has created real trade difficulties for farm products. In the process of resolving them, the way was opened for the use of import quotas and licenses on the one hand and for making the export market dependent on government policy and financing on the other.

A series of programs which indirectly

and directly aided exports have helped agriculture retain a role in export markets. Lend-Lease, UNRRA, Army Civilian Supply in occupied countries, the Marshall Plan, Mutual Security operations, and now P. L. 480 each have served to temporarily bolster foreign purchasing power and make imports less vital in the support of export markets.

The inconsistency of farm price raising and import price lowering—through tariff reduction—as techniques to promote farm and general welfare led to

the insulating and contradictory programs described above. The programs to augment foreign purchasing power helped reduce foreign pressures protesting against our restrictions on imports. At the same time import restrictions for farm products undercut and sapped the vigor which the Trade Agreements program attained in the immediate postwar years. Other sectors have taken advantage of this ambivalent position and pushed for similar exclusions or limitations in their own interests.

A Sound Trade Policy and Its Implications for Agriculture

By D. GALE JOHNSON

ABSTRACT: A move toward freer trade, involving reducing tariffs and export subsidies and eliminating import quotas, simplification of customs, and consistent maintenance of these changes, is in the national interest. Our role as a major world leader would be enhanced, and we would be making an important contribution to the development of poorer nations. Such a program would require adjustments in agriculture—major adjustments, in fact—but with appropriate policies American agriculture is capable of making these adjustments.

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IN the world as it is constituted today there are three compelling reasons for the adoption of a truly liberal trade policy by the United States. First, a liberal trade policy would result in an increase in the real value of our national output by permitting a more efficient allocation of our resources. In our competitive struggle with the Communist area of the world, we cannot without great peril to ourselves fail to follow a policy that will allow an increase in our national strength. Second, the consistent following of a freer trade policy will enhance our role politically as the leader of the free nations of the world and will, at the same time, result in an increase in the economic strength of the other major nations. Finally, the maintenance of the largest single market in the world as a relatively free and available market would contribute significantly to the economic development of the poorer nations of the world.

We Americans should remember the role that a large and growing foreign market for our products, primarily agricultural goods, played in the development of our own economy in the period from 1870 through 1920. It was the export of agricultural products that provided the foreign exchange for the import of capital goods, and it was the expanding flow of exports that encouraged foreigners to invest in the United States. It was the ability of the United States to produce large amounts of farm products and to sell these products in the relatively free markets of Europe that was expected to provide the foreign exchange necessary to repay the large investments that were being made, if this should prove to be necessary or desirable. At that period of history, Europe provided the largest market existing in the world; today the United States has the potential for providing a large and stable market for many of the underdeveloped nations of

the world. Our huge national income and the productivity that makes that income possible is the necessary condition for the provision of a large market; our trade policies, however, must be modified if this market is to have the role in the free world that it could and should perform.

A LIBERAL TRADE POLICY

In the space of a few pages it would be most presumptuous of me to claim that I can even adequately outline the elements of a desirable and consistent trade policy. I certainly cannot claim that I can prove to the satisfaction of an honest skeptic that the outline I do present is definitely in the national interest. While I believe that it is in the national interest to adopt a free trade policy, with the exception of certain military items, I believe that many of the gains that are possible from free trade can be achieved by the adoption of a liberal trade policy that does not achieve free trade in the immediate future. But a liberal trade policy must move in the direction of fewer restrictions on trade between nations.

A liberal trade policy should include the following major elements. The degree of protection to domestic producers should be reduced to some maximum specified level, such as 20 to 25 per cent. Whatever protection that is provided should be afforded through tariff duties rather than import quotas or embargoes. The use of export subsidies should be minimized, though as long as tariffs are continued there is a similar reason, equally valid or invalid, to provide limited export subsidies in some export products. The administration of customs should be standardized and simplified so that importers have a high degree of certainty concerning the actual duties that will be levied. All too often tariff schedules are now highly complex and difficult to interpret; schedules

should be clarified and the number of different rates of duties should be reduced to a small number, perhaps four or five.

Above almost all else, whatever trade policy is adopted should be applied with consistency and certainty. Sudden and abrupt changes in tariff duties, quotas, or export subsidies disrupt trade and have serious political implications as well. Furthermore, domestic producers must be convinced that it is not possible for them to solve their problems by obtaining additional restrictions on trade. When Chrysler finds that it is losing auto sales to Ford or General Motors, Chrysler does not expect to be rescued by a special tax levied on the cars produced by its major competitors. Similarly the producers of actual or potentially imported goods should realize that they must compete in terms of cost and efficiency, and that they cannot rely upon being rescued by political pressure.

While there would be a significant gain to the United States by adopting a completely free trade policy, except in the case of actual military items, a large part of the gains in economic efficiency would occur if we adopted a simple tariff schedule of ad valorem rates, with a maximum rate of 25 per cent and with four other rates of 20, 15, 10, and 5 per cent. A strong case can be made for the position that if a domestic producer cannot produce a commodity for, at most, a premium of 25 per cent over the price of the same commodity when purchased abroad, the producer has no claim for protection. If the position of an importer with a tariff rate of 25 per cent is compared to the position of the exporter who must sell into the same markets that the imports come from, the relative advantage of the importer—one might say the relative subsidy of the importer—is greater than 25 per cent. This is true because there are freight, insurance, and other

costs that both the exported and imported products must bear. Thus the true degree of protection, relative to the producer who is an exporter, may be 35 per cent or more. While we may as a nation be willing to accept some inefficiencies in the use of our resources, it does seem appropriate that we place an upper limit on the amount of inefficiency that we are willing to pay for.

As Professor Witt points out in his article, the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act has contributed substantially to a reduction of trade barriers. But the modifications that have been made in that act in recent years indicate that if further major gains are to be made in liberalizing trade a different attack may be required. Consideration should be given to a complete overhaul of our tariff acts to include the small number of tariff rates suggested above and simplification of our customs procedures.

IMPLICATIONS FOR AGRICULTURE

The implications of a more liberal and consistent trade policy to agriculture are quite considerable. With the existing import quotas and export subsidies agriculture is one of the most highly protected major sectors of the economy. The removal of much of this protection would require considerable change in certain sectors of our agriculture. The most important farm products that would be significantly affected are sugar beets, sugar cane, wheat, cotton, flax, and dairy products. The feed grains and fats and oils have been moving into international trade with some degree of subsidy involved in most transactions. With the exception of sugar, dairy products, and flax, the products mentioned above are export products. The protection that these products have received has come through export subsidies of various kinds, with import quotas and tariff

acting to prevent imports from negating the effects of the export subsidies.

It has been the domestic price support policies that has necessitated the use of export subsidies and import restrictions for the farm commodities. In recent years a large fraction—approximately 60 per cent—of all agricultural products exported from the United States have involved one form or another of export subsidy. Some have been direct such as the subsidy programs for cotton and wheat sold under the International Wheat Agreement; others have been somewhat indirect and were made in the form of agreements under various features of Public Law 480. Any immediate removal of the price support programs and the accompanying export subsidies and import restrictions would result in a great deal of economic distress for American farmers.

A move toward a freer trade policy which would involve a reduction in import barriers on several farm products and a reduction of export subsidies on others would require a number of adjustments in American agriculture. In the years immediately ahead, United States farm prices would be lower as exports were reduced from their present levels, as governmental purchases became less important, and as some increase in imports materialized. In the short run, unless special measures were taken as an offset, total farm income would be adversely affected.

FARM INCOMES AND SUBSIDIES

If the above paragraph represents a substantially correct indication of the impact of a freer trade policy on agriculture, does this mean that the national gain from such a policy would come at a very considerable economic cost to agriculture? I believe that the answer is in the negative. There are two reasons for a negative answer.

First, there is little or no evidence that there has been any significant economic gain, as measured by increased real income per farm worker or family, as a result of the price supports, trade restrictions, and export subsidies that have played such an important role in agricultural policy since the end of World War II. Second, while it may be true that farmers have gained little or nothing from the programs, large losses would result from the immediate abandonment of them; however, most of these losses can be prevented by the adoption of appropriate policies during the transition period.

Of these two reasons, the first is undoubtedly the most controversial. How is it possible that the support prices and billions of dollars of direct and indirect farm subsidies have not resulted in higher average incomes to farm families? Note that I do not claim that total farm income has not been increased by the programs; it undoubtedly has. But the position taken is that the average income of farmers has not been increased as a result of the "protection" afforded them. Direct proof of my position is hardly possible, but some analogies and some comparisons indicate the strong possibility that the result of these endeavors has not been to significantly increase the average real income of farm families.

If it were possible to increase average incomes—wages or return to farm operator families—by the means we have used, it would imply that incomes or wages should be higher in those parts of the economy that are protected by import duties than in those sectors of the economy producing for export. Quite the opposite is the case in the United States. A study by Professor Irving Kravis of the University of Pennsylvania, published in 1957, found that the highest wages were paid in export industries and that industries with tariff

protection paid lower wages than the national average. There is no implication that protection through tariffs, price supports, or export subsidies lowers the return to labor, but only that these devices are no cure for low incomes.

Until 1958 the Canadian farmer received relatively nominal price support or other forms of economic protection. There are a number of areas in the United States that are quite comparable to the major agricultural areas of Canada. In major respects the United States and Canadian economies have many elements in common. Both are high-income countries that have experienced significant increases in real income during the past three decades. In both countries there is and has been a large net annual flow of labor from farm to nonfarm employment. If price supports and higher prices resulting from the supports did result in higher average incomes, real farm incomes should have increased more rapidly in the United States than in Canada since, say, the mid-twenties. For example, during the nineteen-twenties the United States farm price of wheat was at most 10 per cent higher than the Canadian price; during the latter part of the nineteen-fifties the United States price has been approximately a third higher. Yet farm incomes have increased as much in the Prairie Provinces, the great Canadian Wheat belt, as in the northern spring wheat area in the United States. Comparisons of income change in Ontario, which is a general farming area, with similar areas in the United States revealed similar income changes.

The comparisons between the United States and Canada revealed two interesting differences. First, land prices increased substantially more in the United States than in Canada. Second, farm output increased somewhat less in Canada than in similar areas in the United

States. These differences imply that a major effect of the United States policy was to increase land prices, which means that new entrants into farming are likely to gain little from the higher prices that may result from price supports. The differences in the changes in output also mean that Canadian farmers were able to keep output expansion at roughly the same rate as demand expansion.

The ability of farmers to respond to changing conditions and to make satisfactory adjustments to these conditions is indicated by the Danish farmer. The Danish farmer has little or no governmental protection—a large share of his output is sold abroad and he buys many of his farm inputs, especially feed, from foreign nations. Despite this—or perhaps because of it—he has one of the highest incomes of Western Europe, even though all other European governments provide a considerable amount of protection for their farmers. Average real income of the Danish population has increased substantially since the end of the war and the Danish farmer has shared fully in that increase.

APPROPRIATE POLICIES

The important question is not whether the American farmer could adjust to the changed conditions that would result from a freer trade policy. Rather the most important question is whether we would design the policies that would facilitate the adjustment. For the last decade American farm policies have tended to give the farmer the wrong signals. These policies have implied that markets existed when they did not and have induced farmers to make decisions that were not in their long-run interest.

Except through the use of large-scale export subsidies, the American farmer cannot become competitive in world markets until our price-support policy

is changed markedly. But the changes in that policy must take time unless there is to be considerable financial and economic distress among our farmers. If a clear and consistent policy were followed, much of the adjustment could be carried out within five years. I can only sketch the nature of the policy changes that would be required. Price supports should be gradually lowered to approximately the world level, though modest export subsidies might be continued in the cases where prices are far out of line, such as wheat. A program for disposal of existing stocks in conjunction with aid to underdeveloped countries should be carried out. All of the governmental programs that have the effect of increasing farm output—irrigation, reclamation, agricultural conservation payments, watershed develop-

ment, importation of foreign farm workers—should be tapered off and stopped. But positive steps are also required. The first is to take all desirable measures to increase the demand for labor in the nonfarm sector of the economy. The more rapidly the demand for nonfarm labor increases, the easier it is for farm workers to shift to nonfarm jobs. The second is to undertake measures to ease the shift from farm to nonfarm employment for the millions of workers who will have to make this change in the next decade. These measures include improving rural schools, extension activities that provide information about nonfarm career opportunities, assistance in finding nonfarm jobs and housing, and a program that will help farm people to adjust to urban conditions.¹

¹ See James G. Maddox, below.

Public Law 480 and Related Programs

By WILLARD W. COCHRANE

ABSTRACT: Surplus agricultural commodities have been moved abroad during the late 1950's under several programs: Public Law 480, The Mutual Security Act, and foreign dollar loans and credits. Shipments under these programs have bulked large in recent years—running close to 40 per cent of total agricultural exports and amounting to about \$1.5 billion. The emphasis in these programs has been on surplus disposal, rather than on the development needs of the recipient countries. Hence, it is not surprising that the potential for using the surplus food and fiber bounty of the United States to support and induce economic development has scarcely been touched. But policy actions are within our grasp for making more effective use of surplus food and fiber products from the United States in the recipient "underdeveloped" countries; food and fiber can be used as capital to finance economic development.

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FOUR different avenues of foreign surplus disposal are employed under Public Law (P.L.) 480. First, and most important in terms of the volume handled, is the sale of surplus agricultural commodities to foreign countries for local currencies. This is the arrangement under Title I of P.L. 480 whereby the United States government accepts the national currency of a foreign country, which usually is not convertible into dollars, in exchange for surplus agricultural commodities. Second, Title II provides for grants of surplus agricultural commodities to friendly nations to meet emergency situations. Third, Title III authorizes the donations of surplus foods for domestic distribution and for distribution to needy persons overseas through non-profit, relief agencies. Fourth, Title III authorizes the barter of surplus agricultural commodities for strategic and other materials produced abroad.

In addition to the foreign disposal of surplus agricultural commodities under P.L. 480, such commodities are made available to foreign countries: (1) in exchange for their local currencies under Public Law 665—the Mutual Security Act—and (2) as the result of the extension of dollar loans and credits by agencies of the United States government, mainly the Export-Import Bank. In sum, numerous devices, some ingenious, some crude, are being employed to move surplus agricultural commodities abroad and to keep the domestic purchase-storage-disposal program from collapsing under its own weight. This is not a new development; the shipment of agricultural commodities abroad under these and other special government programs has formed a large part of the total agricultural exports since World War II.

PROGRAM OBJECTIVES AND OPERATIONS

The objectives of P.L. 480, as stated by Congress, are four in number, (1)

to promote economic stability for American agriculture; (2) to expand international trade in agricultural commodities; (3) to encourage the economic development of friendly countries; and (4) to promote the collective strength of the free world. If we give this formal listing of objectives a free translation, it turns out to be consistent with reality. Certainly the primary objective of P.L. 480 has been to move surplus stocks of agricultural commodities, acquired under price-supporting operations, out of the country to ease the pressure on, and even save, the price-support program. And the secondary objective has clearly been "while we are moving stocks abroad, let us do as much good with them as is possible." The secondary objective has included erasing the specter of famine, combatting undernourishment and hunger, and facilitating economic development. The objectives of the Mutual Security Program have been much the same as regards agricultural commodities: (1) dispose of burdensome surpluses at home and (2) buy as much military preparedness abroad as is possible.

During the period of July 1, 1954 to July 1, 1959, over 150 agreements, or supplements to agreements, were entered into with thirty-eight countries under Title I of P.L. 480.¹ The export-market value of all commodities shipped under these agreements amounted to \$3.7 billion. The countries receiving the greatest amount under Title I have been, in descending order of importance: India, Spain, Yugoslavia, Pakistan, and Turkey.

Exports under P.L. 480 accounted for about 27 per cent of total agricultural exports over the five-year period of op-

¹ For an excellent summary of program operations see *The Tenth Semiannual Report on Activities Carried on Under Public Law 480, 83rd Congress, As Amended, 86th Congress, 1st Session, House Document No. 206, July 30, 1959, and later Semiannual Reports.*

TABLE 1—UNITED STATES AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS UNDER SPECIFIED GOVERNMENT-FINANCED PROGRAMS AND TOTAL AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS, 1956-1959

FISCAL YEARS	PUBLIC LAW 480 (Per Cent)	MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAMS (Per Cent)	CREDIT SALES (Per Cent)	TOTAL SPECIFIED GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS ¹ (Per Cent)	TOTAL AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS	
					(Per Cent)	(Million Dollars)
1956-1957	32.5	8.4	1.5	42.4	100	4,723.8
1957-1958	25.5	5.7	5.1	36.3	100	4,002.3
1958-1959	28.5	5.7	2.5	36.7	100	3,720.4

¹ It should further be recognized that "commercial" sales by the Commodity Credit Corporation at or below market prices are not included under this category.

eration, 1954-1959. And shipments under Title I, or sales for foreign currencies, accounted for well over one half of those P.L. 480 exports. But in some years barter sales have been sizeable—running up to 400 million dollars in 1956-1957.

Operations under P.L. 480 do not, however, complete the total foreign disposal picture. Exports of agricultural commodities resulting from the operations of the Mutual Security Program and from credit sales involving the Export-Import Bank and the Commodity Credit Corporation amounted to about 10 per cent of total agricultural exports over the period 1956-1959. Thus, agricultural exports moving directly under some kind of governmental program stood at 42 per cent of total agricultural exports in 1956-1957, and at 36 per cent in 1957-1958 and in 1958-1959 (see Table 1).

CONSEQUENCES OF THE PROGRAMS

The first, and least controversial consequence of foreign surplus-disposal programs of the United States in agricultural commodities, has been the effect on food consumption for the countries involved. Certainly the diets of many thousands of people living in poverty have been improved, in terms of both quantity and quality, as the result of these disposal programs. These are short-term gains, but they are im-

portant gains to people suffering from chronic undernourishment, and even starvation in some cases. Analysts sitting in their offices in the United States, enjoying rich and varied diets—although perhaps suffering from too great a caloric intake—would be crass indeed to ignore this direct and beneficial consequence to the lives of these people.

But these disposal programs have not greatly facilitated economic development in the countries involved. According to the Tenth Semiannual Report² roughly half of foreign currencies obtained under Title I of P.L. 480, or \$1.8 billion, has been allotted to loans to foreign governments for economic development. But, as of March 31, 1959, less than a third of that amount had been disbursed on projects. Further, we have no way of knowing how many of these paper projects have reached completion and have added to the stock of effective capital, or how many of these projects would have been undertaken anyway out of some kind of internal financing. Until we know more about the operation of surplus-disposal programs for agricultural commodities in the recipient countries, the suspicion must be that the operation of these disposal programs generally has not fostered economic development; this suspicion rests in part upon the project data cited above, but it rests

² *Ibid.*

more importantly on the attitude that has prevailed in Congress and this administration with respect to foreign surplus disposal, namely, "this is an emergency, and if we can find a home for our agricultural surpluses for a brief spell we will be all right."

But there are reports of instances where foreign disposals of food and fiber have been tied to specific development projects—for example, road building, irrigation construction—and productive capital has been formed.³ In part at least, and if we want to, we can use surplus agricultural commodities to finance economic development. The use of food and fiber surpluses to finance economic development may not constitute the most efficient way to support foreign economic development, but it is a way.

Further, surplus food and feed grains from the United States have played a major part in moderating and blunting the price inflation in India in the past several years, and may have saved India from scrapping, or drastically modifying, its second five-year plan of economic development. Certainly surplus agricultural commodities from the United States can be integrated with major plans of economic development in several underdeveloped countries, but as yet this potential remains largely unexploited.

The consequence around which the most controversy and the most confusion abounds is that concerned with the effects of foreign surplus disposal on the producers and production in the recipient countries. One view holds that the surplus-disposal operations of the United States have generally hurt producers in the recipient countries and,

more importantly, have acted to remove the incentive to increase total production in those countries, hence have acted to perpetuate their food-shortage problem. Another view holds that the surplus-disposal operations of the United States have generally been administered in such a manner as not to hurt the producers involved, and, through the beneficial effects on capital formation, have acted to increase agricultural production above what it could have been without the programs. And, of course, there are many combinations of views between those two poles.

Actually, no one really knows, in any general sense, what consequences foreign surplus-disposal programs have had on agricultural production in the recipient countries. And we will probably not know until we have some good, representative studies of the consequences of P.L. 480 operations in the foreign countries involved—studies which are not now underway to the knowledge of this writer. In the meantime we should be wary of general conclusions in this area, based upon summary analyses of brief visits to countries involved and projects by traveling experts. This is a difficult terrain in which to reach definitive conclusions; for example, controversy continues to rage over the effects of government programs on production in the United States.

Foreign competitors

The consequences of, or the anticipated consequences of, the disposal operations of P.L. 480 on foreign competitors created a furor at the inception of the program, but in the past several years the tumult and the shouting has abated. It has subsided because foreign competitors have become convinced that in the administration of Title I at least, the United States has no intention of stealing their regular commercial markets. In the administration of P.L. 480,

³ See, *A Note of the Utilization of Agricultural Surpluses for Economic Development in Japan*, publication of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (Bangkok, 1958).

after the first year or two, the United States has consistently followed the "additional principle"—the principle that sales under Title I are in addition to regular commercial imports. Further, the United States has consulted formally and informally with third-party countries to protect the interest of those countries prior to entering into sales agreements with recipient countries. By these practices the United States, in the administration of Title I, has not encroached upon or damaged regular commercial markets of third countries. This is not to say that all foreign competitors are pleased with P.L. 480, but it is to say that the sophisticated administration of Title I has pulled the fangs of foreign criticism.

There is still criticism of the barter operations under P.L. 480 and competitive dollar sales by the Commodity Credit Corporation, and with good reason. But so long as we have surplus commodities, interest groups, and congressmen, there will be unilateral attempts to export the farm problem.

SHORTCOMINGS OF THE PROGRAMS

The consequences of foreign surplus disposal have been, as we observed in the foregoing discussion, good, bad, and indifferent. But perhaps the most important point to be made with respect to the operations of foreign surplus-disposal programs is their failure to produce, or generate, lasting benefits for the recipient countries involved. The potential of these programs to generate economic development has barely been touched. This failure to use our foreign disposal programs constructively to form capital and to increase worker productivity in the underdeveloped recipient countries stems from the limited conception of the potential role of these programs generally held by Americans. This myopic view has led to a program

structure with severe shortcomings. Those shortcomings are:

(1) The temporary, emergency quality of our foreign surplus-disposal operations. Although everyone likes a bargain, there have, as yet, been few lasting benefits to the recipient countries involved. Current consumption levels have been increased; and this can be important to hungry people. But little else has been achieved. Our foreign disposal programs have not been conceived as vehicles for inducing and financing economic development. They have been conceived by this administration as expedient, temporary, disposal measures, and they are treated in that manner by all concerned.

(2) The great uncertainty created in general by our foreign surplus-disposal operations. We, ourselves, do not know how long we will place primary emphasis on this type of adjustment, what forms the programs will take, the extent of the price concessions, and the nature of the side conditions attached to such sales. Plans of economic development of several years' duration based upon agricultural exports from the United States must be based upon either hope or conjecture, consequently they often are not made. This is the irresponsible aspect of our foreign surplus-disposal policy.

IMPROVEMENT OF PROGRAMS

The question may then be asked, what do we need to do to make these disposal programs acceptable to friendly competing nations and to contribute to economic development in the recipient nations? I would state the basic need as follows: in the disposal of surplus agricultural commodities in foreign countries, the United States must be prepared to make some policy commitments of long-run duration with respect

to program objectives, availability of supplies, means of financing, and so on. The specifics of this general course of action can be stated under the following seven points:

(1) Except in famine situations, surplus agricultural commodities in the United States, when disposed of abroad, are to be used exclusively to finance economic development. Economic development is here interpreted broadly to include education and training of the human agent as well as physical capital formation, but all food and fiber shipments must be related to, or integrated into a plan, or plans, of economic development.⁴

(2) Once "surplus" agricultural commodities from the United States become committed to a development plan, or project, of a foreign country, for whatever duration, one year or ten, they cease to be surplus commodities and the whole operation ceases to be a foreign surplus-disposal operation. At this point, the committed supplies become "development supplies" and become part of the aggregate demand for the farm products of the United States.

(3) Food and fiber supplies committed to development plans and projects would be financed by means acceptable to the recipient countries but with the basic objective of speeding economic development: perhaps by grants, perhaps by loans, perhaps by sales for national currencies. The financing principle to be followed here is one that maximizes economic development, not the pecuniary return to the United States.

⁴ This statement is not intended to constitute a rejection of multilateral commodity agreements; such agreements must play an important role in the expansion of foreign trade in the context of planned, or controlled, agricultural economies.

(4) Recipient countries must in every case provide evidence that these "development supplies" from the United States do not reduce their "normal" acquisitions of food and fiber from other countries. By this and the previous point, criticisms of foreign competitors lose their force.

(5) Since "development food and fiber supplies" could finance only a part of every plan or project, complementary programs to finance the purchase of hard goods, construction materials, and services would be necessary. In some cases, food and fiber supplies might finance up to 70 to 80 per cent of a project—for example, road building under an antiquated state of the arts—but in most cases the percentage would be lower. Hence, the financing of non-agricultural supplies must be a part of the total program.

(6) Competing nations burdened with agricultural surpluses—for example, Canada, Argentina—should be invited to participate in this "food for development" program. And to the extent that competing nations desired to participate, multilateral arrangements could be initiated. This is the way that a formal international program under the sponsorship of the United Nations might come into being.

(7) But until such time as a world program did come into being the Food and Agriculture Organization—or some other United Nations agency, or set of agencies—should be charged with the responsibility, and be provided with the necessary funds, to aid recipient countries formulate and execute plans of economic development. This provision would speed development where administrative experience and technical "know how" are most lacking.

Export of Capital?*

By ROBERT B. SCHWENGER

ABSTRACT: The financing by the United States of agricultural expansion seems, at first sight, to present a policy dilemma; namely that a government with large agricultural surpluses on its hands is being asked to provide capital to increase foreign production of the very commodities in surplus supply. In the practice, the dilemma breaks down because of failure of the assumption that the expansion of agriculture in the underdeveloped countries has been hampered by the lack of physical capital from abroad. In fact, the principal limiting factors have been of a local institutional and social character. Against these obstacles, the advance of the agricultural production needed for development has been actively promoted by the flow of United States capital to these countries.

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* The judgments made and conclusions reached in this article are the exclusive responsibility of the author and do not express United States government policy, but a number of former colleagues in the United States Department of Agriculture have helped generously.

THE special editor has asked for a frank general discussion of the role of United States capital in developing the agriculture of underdeveloped countries in the context of United States policy. This may seem to present a policy dilemma which a government official would have to evade. In fact, however, it is a welcome opportunity to suggest to the readers of this volume that the supposed dilemma is more logical than real.

THE APPARENT POLICY PROBLEM

The apparent dilemma relates primarily to capital available from United States government agencies such as the Export-Import Bank, the International Co-operation Administration, and the Development Loan Fund. It does not apply to international or interregional agencies, such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Finance Corporation, the International Development Association, or the Inter-American Development Bank, even though the United States contributes a large part of their capital. Neither is there any policy dilemma for private capital loans from individual Americans—or American firms—to agricultural enterprises abroad.

The dilemma may be stated, somewhat oversimplified, as follows: It is United States policy to assist economic development in the underdeveloped nations. One of their prime needs, during the current effort to achieve self-sustaining development, is a greatly increased supply of food. The quantities needed will probably exceed the amount that will be available abroad and capable of being physically moved from foreign producers to consumers in the underdeveloped countries—even if the necessary foreign exchange financing could be

found without imperiling development.¹ Therefore, a condition of successful development is the expansion of agricultural production in the underdeveloped countries to meet increased domestic need. This requires capital investment, since the agriculture of these countries has low yields and inefficient techniques. United States capital, therefore, should, pursuant to our policy of aiding development, be available for this type of investment on terms at least comparable to that for United States capital available for investment in the industries of the developing country.

But, it is contended, the United States has surpluses of the needed foods—large and burdensome surpluses of those most needed by underdeveloped countries—and it is United States policy, whether through direct action or through freeing market mechanisms, to reduce the supply of these foods—both in the United States and world markets—in order to bring their natural market prices into reasonable relation to the prices of things agricultural producers must buy. United States food producers and taxpayers are expected to take a dim view of United States government loans to underdeveloped countries for the purpose of producing more wheat and rice and corn.

The alleged dilemma appears even more serious if one turns to the needs of the underdeveloped countries for exports—to earn foreign exchange for increased food and development purchases from abroad. As primarily agricultural countries, most of them must depend on sales of agricultural products for this purpose. At this stage of their

¹ India alone is taking about 4 million tons of food grains annually and, in about five years, is expected to need of the order of 10 to 15 million tons over anticipated Indian production on the basis of present plans. Other large deficit countries will probably include Pakistan and Indonesia.

development, capital invested in agriculture seems to be the necessary means for making their economies viable. But United States agricultural policy, it is argued, can hardly be expected to support such investment if, as is often true, the products are already in world surplus and prices are already depressed.

OTHER LIMITING FACTORS

In the full context of the current world situation, however, this theoretical dilemma is hardly ever realized. Foreign capital is not usually the important factor limiting the expansion of agricultural production in the typical underdeveloped-country situation.

Elsewhere in this issue of *THE ANNALS*, the more important limitations will doubtless be reviewed. A suggestion of their nature can be given by mention of land-tenure arrangements which give no incentive to investment, social stratifications or exploitation patterns, and usurious credit practices—in local currency—which deprive the cultivator of the benefits of investment, transportation, and marketing facilities which create local surpluses even in times of national famine, and, above all, the force of tradition and taboo—often sanctified by religious institutions—opposing change. This type of factor inhibits investment in agricultural improvement even when capital is available. It slows down the useful effects in cases where investment is "imposed" by making new equipment available or setting up pilot operations through government or some outside agency.

In Iraq, until recently, capital was available in abundance, not only for direct investment but also for major irrigation and other quasi-industrial projects needed to benefit farm production. Most of the foreign exchange earnings from sales of oil were reserved for development programs by special legislation, and a government bent on

agricultural development was trying to apply this capital where it would increase production most. It had good technical assistance from abroad. Yet the complex of land ownership, tradition, and other institutional arrangements within which Iraqi agriculture is conducted has conspired to frustrate the effort. Iran is going through a similar effort to expand agricultural production—with capital and technical assistance available. The Shah is actively sponsoring an agrarian reform program. It will be interesting to see whether, with the traditional agricultural institutions of that country, the available capital resources can be applied in order to expand agriculture successfully.

On the other hand, once a farm producer is freed from archaic institutional limitations and is permitted to obtain a fair price in a situation where the need for increased production has created an opportunity for profit, he usually seems to be able to get the needed physical capital for expanding his output without public assistance. In fact, he seems to be able to do so even in cases where the product is in surplus if the opportunity for profit is artificially maintained. From 1957 to 1959, with attractive domestic prices, capital continued to pour into the extension of coffee plantation to the forested hillsides of Parana—at a rate approaching a half-million acres of new trees per year—after world prices had fallen more than a third from their 1954 peak and an enormous world surplus was in sight for at least five years ahead.

THE CAPITAL NEED

For the purposes of this discussion, the capital needs of an underdeveloped country can be usefully considered in the following loose categories:

(1) Direct investment in agriculture. This includes land, labor, materials, livestock, machinery, buildings, wells, and

other investment applied directly to production, by the producer or on his behalf, and not significantly for any nonagricultural purpose. Governments customarily count as direct investment in agriculture the general field of "extension"—that is, investment in the education of the producer to know about and use improved techniques of production—although this might perhaps be considered indirect investment because of the large nonagricultural benefits.

(2) Indirect investment to benefit agriculture—major irrigation and power projects, fertilizer plants, farm-to-market roads, and other supporting investment which will permit the producer to expand his output.

(3) Investment not consciously directed to agriculture—primary investment in the development of industry.

The capital needed for direct investment in agriculture in an underdeveloped country, once the other limitations on investment are sufficiently abated to get producers to use it, is typically of a local or national nature. It does not require much foreign exchange and, therefore, is not in itself dependent on loans from abroad. Moreover, it is small relative to the total capital, foreign and national, required for development. Hence, a government can, if necessary, usually allocate its foreign exchange to provide the small amount needed for direct agricultural investment from its own foreign earnings, without the use of foreign capital received as aid or loans.

The government of India, in its third development plan—beginning in 1961—even though greatly increasing emphasis on agriculture over earlier plans, provides less than 15 per cent of the total planned capital expenditures as direct investment in agriculture. A good part of this consists of extension-type activities—bringing technological knowledge to the villages. The rest is an estimate of what private entrepreneurs will invest—its direction depending primarily on

the relative profitability of different commodities in the Indian market. But, while the plan as a whole calls for somewhat more than one fifth of its capital in foreign exchange, the foreign exchange portion of the direct agricultural capital requirement is very much smaller.

From another point of view—that of net capital requirement for agriculture—it may be noted that, for most underdeveloped countries, a main concern is how to obtain capital from agriculture. In a largely agricultural country it is necessary to acquire national savings for investment in industry very largely by extracting from the agricultural community a surplus of currently produced income. Foreign capital can help, but there must be a substantial surplus of national production over consumption before self-sustaining development can be achieved. In effect, agriculture as a whole must save the direct-investment capital needed for its own expansion as well as some of that needed for industry.

INDIRECT INVESTMENT

The case is different when it comes to dams and irrigation systems, roads, fertilizer plants, warehouses, elevators, and other largely industrial investments which aid agricultural expansion. For many of these, the agriculture-aiding effect is overshadowed by other benefits to development. Moreover, the agricultural advantages are not necessarily pointed to a particular crop.

Many of these indirect investments to help agricultural expansion require very considerable amounts of imported material. The question of foreign capital is both relevant and important. In countries where land has been farmed for centuries, indirect investments—to bring plant food and water to the tired soil—give greatest promise of increasing agricultural production. To get the desired increases in Indian agricultural produc-

tion it is essential to apply much larger amounts of fertilizer. The facilities to produce this fertilizer require heavy capital investment to which the United States has importantly contributed. Where the most significant single need is irrigation, United States capital is available for that. Even in the case of the loan originally contemplated for the Aswan High Dam, the fact that Egypt is a large cotton-exporting country did not prevent approval from the point of view of agricultural policy. The later withdrawal was not due to agricultural considerations.

ALL CAPITAL HELPS

It seems quite probable, however, that, over any period of time, even the third category of capital need—that not consciously directed to agriculture but primarily to industry—tends to expand agricultural production, even though the industry in question produces items of no significance for agriculture—either direct or indirect. The expansion of industry spreads among more and more workers, their families and friends, a degree of the technical sophistication needed to enable agriculture to advance. In the process of growing up in the presence of industry—with opportunity for employment therein and advantage therefrom—there is implanted in the minds of people of a nonindustrial country the “magic” of applied science in place of whatever traditional “magic” has previously helped keep their agriculture primitive. The basic attitudes toward reality that go with understanding how to repair a machine, how to organize effort to gain efficiency by new specializations, or how to adopt a new process or technique will be carried inexorably into agriculture. The habit of making new things work is a powerful agent which time-honored institutions cannot resist indefinitely.

THE UNITED STATES ROLE

Thus, in a significant sense, practically all of the capital made available to underdeveloped countries by United States agencies, viewed as a whole, is a powerful factor in increasing agricultural production, although not necessarily at a rapid rate.

But, apart from that, the United States, in approving the loans requested by developing countries and giving technical assistance to their agriculture—a related matter—puts a high priority on the wishes of the government of the country requesting the funds. The United States is trying to help these countries develop from their present plight of having the bulk of their populations in agriculture—with people crowded on the land, underemployed, and inefficiently used even when they work—to a condition of substantial industrialization with their populations distributed—from an employment point of view—in such a manner that will advance individual opportunity and dignity in both industry and agriculture. Hence, there is emphasis on industrial development—except as needed to meet the growing food needs of the domestic population. For this latter purpose, however, the United States government is at times even more concerned than the local government that there be enough new investment in agriculture.

INVESTMENT IN SURPLUSES

Exports are another matter. It is rarely in the real interest of a developing country to expand the production of an agricultural commodity for export which is already in world surplus. This is true whether or not the United States happens to be an exporter of the product. It is as unfortunate, at this time in world affairs, to put additional capital into the production of coffee as of

wheat—for export. Demand is inelastic, exportable supplies greatly exceed what importing countries will buy—at any price schedule that yields an increase of exchange earnings with an increase of exports. United States reluctance to let its capital contribute to a worsening of this type of situation could hardly be considered a conflict of development policy with agricultural policy. A loan application for such a purpose might be a miscarriage of development policy. In the cases where underdeveloped countries request loans to expand production—for export—of commodities in world surplus, it is well to question whether the special interest of established producer groups² or the failure to work out imaginative plans for diversification and development have not unduly influenced the loan applications.

There will be cases where there is a real difference of opinion regarding a loan to expand agriculture in an underdeveloped country—and it is not impossible that United States agricultural

policy may be a factor in the United States view. It is believed that such cases have not been important. They have been negligible by comparison with the helpful effects toward balanced agricultural development resulting from United States lending and aid taken as a whole. A few cases are hardly evidence that underdeveloped countries have been hampered because United States agricultural policies interfered with United States capital aid.

In the perspective of history, it is not impossible that United States agricultural policies in the past fifteen years—for all their weaknesses—may be judged as one of the great contributions—albeit inadvertent—of the Western industrial world to the achievement of economic development in the previously less-advantaged countries. Certainly the flood of our farm surpluses has breached the levees of established Western commercial policy and is even now forcing new channels for the spread of our abundance. Official imagination is being flexed to envision magnitudes of capital flow adequate to complement the unplanned bounty. The turbulences incidental to such a flood will hardly be recorded as obstacles to development.

² The export products in many cases are grown on lands operated in plantation units, often owned by foreign capital or the local economic elite.

Scientific Manpower for the Less-developed Countries

By F. F. HILL

ABSTRACT: To stimulate agricultural growth through the application of science is a key problem of economic development. Numberless cultivators must be reached by—and must accept—integrated programs which include a range of services and commitments from technical advice to market assurances. Properly to aid cultivators requires enormous numbers of trained men and women who must essentially be local citizens rooted in their country's culture and problems. Even so, the United States can and should make an increased but more selective effort to help. The scope and complexity of the task together with the need to reach cultivators with all essential services recommend concentration in selected areas with long-term programs. The necessary emphasis upon the application of science makes educational institutions obvious instruments of this national policy, but they require long-term commitments with adequate financial help and a large amount of responsible freedom.

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THE majority if not all of the less-developed countries of the world urgently need to increase the quantity and improve the quality of their agricultural output. The urgency may arise, as in India, from the necessity of meeting the food requirements of a large and rapidly increasing population already undernourished or, as in Burma, primarily from the need for increased earnings of foreign exchange to help finance a program of general economic development.

Increasing the quantity and improving the quality of a country's agricultural production is basically a problem in the application of science and technology to the development of its agricultural resources. This involves much more, however, than knowing what existing techniques to apply to obtain increased yields and improved quality or how to develop new techniques to achieve these objectives. Even if appropriate techniques are available, the individual cultivator must first be convinced that they will in fact produce increased yields under his particular conditions. To convince him requires effective education and demonstration at the village level. He must also come to believe that he and his family will benefit sufficiently from the results to make it worth while to assume the production and economic risks involved. If he is a tenant, his decision will be affected in part by the share of the prospective increase in output which will accrue to him. If dealers' margins are excessive, the cultivator's incentive to increase production and improve quality will be reduced accordingly. Farmers in the less-developed countries, no less than in the United States, are sensitive to the possibility of declining prices if national output is substantially increased. Since small cultivators practicing a traditional agriculture make small cash outlays for operating ex-

penses and family living, they are under less compulsion to produce more for the market in the face of falling prices than are farmers in the United States.

But even if cultivators in large numbers in an underdeveloped country are convinced that the application of new techniques "will pay," measured in their terms, there are still important conditions that must be met before widespread adoption of new practices is likely. First, there must be in existence or created an effectively functioning supply line that makes available at the village, when needed, at reasonable cost, such production supplies and equipment as are required to put improved practices into effect. Second, since not every cultivator who might find it profitable to increase production is able to finance from his own resources the cost of the supplies and equipment required for the introduction of improved practices, credit on terms suited to the needs of the cultivator must be available at reasonable cost. Third, there must be a marketing system that moves farm products from the village to the consumer with minimum loss of quantity and quality and that returns to the producer a fair share of the price paid by the consumer.

THE PROBLEM

It is clear that not one but a number of conditions must be met if agricultural production in an underdeveloped country is to be materially increased. Solutions to the many problems involved are not to be had by simply exporting existing American institutional arrangements and technical knowledge to the less-developed countries even though these arrangements and techniques have created in this country a current embarrassment of agricultural riches. Each underdeveloped country must develop its own institutions rooted in its own cultural and institutional background.

Unless it is quite small, it must produce the greater part of the trained manpower required to staff these institutions—scientists, social scientists, administrators, and so on. Some of the trained manpower required can be brought in from the outside. Some can be produced by sending young men and women abroad for training. Foreign specialists and persons trained abroad can, and in the early stages of development frequently do, make contributions far out of proportion to their numbers. Seldom, however, will the number of persons in these two groups begin to meet total requirements. This means that the greater part of the scientific and administrative manpower required to modernize the agriculture of an underdeveloped country of any size must be trained at home. If appropriate educational and training facilities and programs do not exist, and they rarely do, they must be developed.

Agricultural development in such countries largely requires human and institutional development: training professional and administrative personnel for a wide variety of tasks; developing attitudes and points of view that will enable them to work effectively with each other and, when necessary, with the cultivators they are intended to serve; and providing educational and service institutions and institutional relationships that will make it possible for professional and administrative staff to function with maximum effectiveness in contributing toward the country's total agricultural effort. Above all, a shift from a traditional agriculture and way of life toward an agriculture based on modern science and technology involves not only acquiring new knowledge and skills on the part of millions of individual cultivators but far-reaching changes in their outlook and attitudes. Human and institutional change is a slow process usually better meas-

ured in decades and generations than in weeks, months, or even years.

SUGGESTED STRATEGY

It is the writer's belief that the United States can best assist the less-developed countries in improving their agriculture by placing major emphasis upon helping them develop key institutions and services and helping train the manpower required to staff them. Sending United States scientists and other specialized personnel abroad or bringing persons from the less-developed countries to the United States for training should be viewed primarily as a means to this end.

Growth and development of any kind seldom proceed uniformly over time. This is true of agricultural development within a single country as well as among countries. At present there are one or more underdeveloped countries in each major geographical region that have more agricultural development potential during the next decade than do others. These differences derive in part from differences in internal political stability, the aims, policies, and economic programs of current political leadership, variations in natural resources and, importantly, differences in the currently available numbers and quality of trained personnel, and in the vigor of institutions and flexibility of institutional relationships. These differences suggest the desirability of concentrating United States assistance in each major region first on a relatively limited number of key countries from the standpoint of agricultural development. This approach is likely to make the best use of scarce manpower and capital resources, both in the United States and host countries, and to accomplish the most in the shortest time in terms of demonstrable results. Demonstrated progress is of major importance in the

early stages of development in stimulating further progress.

Within each country selected for intensive effort it will usually be desirable, at least at the outset because of shortages of competent personnel and other resources, to concentrate on the development of a limited number of key institutions and training programs and, in the countryside, on a limited number of carefully selected areas. India's program announced last April which proposed a concentrated across-the-board effort to increase the production of food crops in one district in each of her fifteen states is a good illustration of concentrating scarce manpower and material resources in key areas in an effort to stimulate a shift from a traditional toward a modern agriculture.

Although concentration of United States efforts in key countries in each major geographical region and on key institutions and services and in selected production areas is desirable, it is imperative that the program include an attack on all the major bottlenecks limiting increased production. Experience has clearly demonstrated that results are likely to be disappointing if efforts are largely confined to one or two aspects of the total problem. It does little good to convince a cultivator that a particular set of practices will result in substantially increased yields if he believes that the economic risks involved in adopting them are greater than he can afford, or that his share of the increased output will be so small that the effort is not worth while. Furthermore, even if he is willing and eager to adopt improved practices, he will not be able to do so unless the necessary production supplies and equipment are available when he needs them and unless he can finance their purchase either from his own resources or through a loan at reasonable cost on terms suited

to his needs. To repeat then, this means (1) that improved practices must have been tested and demonstrated to the cultivator, (2) that he must be convinced that they will result in increased output on his particular holding and that his share of the increased output will be sufficient to justify his assuming the risks involved, (3) that the supplies and equipment necessary to carry out improved practices must be available at the village at the time the cultivator needs them at prices he feels he can afford to pay, (4) that, if he requires it, credit is available on terms suited to the cultivator's needs at reasonable cost, and (5) that the marketing system is reasonably efficient and returns to the cultivator a fair share of the price paid by the consumer. All these conditions must be met if new and improved production methods are to be adopted.

The emphasis placed upon selecting key countries in each major geographical region for intensive United States assistance and upon key institutions and areas within each key country does not mean that I would limit assistance to these countries, institutions, and areas. Political as well as other considerations make such an approach impractical. However, it is important, it seems to me, to concentrate sufficient resources in selected countries, institutions, and limited areas in an effort to achieve a noticeable increase in agricultural production in the shortest possible length of time; in other words, to develop pace-setting areas. An important consideration in the early stages of any development program is to demonstrate beyond doubt that the methods recommended will in fact result in increased production and higher levels of living. Once this has been done, one can intensify the programs in other areas as rapidly as resources will permit.

METHODS OF ASSISTANCE

The primary objective of all United States assistance, whether in agriculture or other fields, presumably is to help the recipient country reach a point as quickly as possible where such aid is no longer necessary. In agriculture this means that attention should be concentrated on helping host countries develop agricultural colleges, experiment stations, research institutes, extension services, supply services, credit services, and marketing services suited to their particular needs; in other words, to help them develop the basic institutional mechanisms required to bring about changes in agriculture over time including changes in the attitudes and outlook of cultivators. In appropriate instances, both financial and technical assistance might well be given in connection with large-scale intensive demonstration efforts such as the one previously referred to in the case of India.

Since institutions, services, and programs are being developed for the benefit of the host countries, they should, other than in exceptional circumstances, pay local currency costs and provide a part of foreign exchange requirements in proportion to their ability to do so. Project plans and agreements should provide for the gradual replacement of United States personnel by indigenous personnel as it is trained and for the gradual withdrawal of United States financial support with the host country increasing its contribution by stages until it is paying the full cost.

As previously shown, agricultural development is essentially a slow process of human and institutional change—a fact that should influence the planning of aid to agriculture in the less-developed countries. The development of a viable, effective agricultural college, experiment station, extension service, credit service, or marketing service in

an underdeveloped country may take ten years or longer. Personnel requirements and financing should be planned accordingly.

Proposed approach

We need, I think, to experiment with some new approaches in the financing of United States foreign aid programs. If, for example, we decide to establish an agricultural research center or a laboratory for nutritional studies in an African country to be fully staffed and financed by that country in, say, ten years, why not:

(1) Select the university or other United States institution best qualified to do the job and try to persuade it to undertake the assignment under contract. Or encourage the formation of an association of two or more universities or other institutions to accept the job, as the Associated Universities, Incorporated, which operates the Brookhaven National Laboratory for the Atomic Energy Commission.

(2) Formulate a general agreement upon the nature of the job to be done. Leave management decisions, including the determination of salaries and personnel policies, to the contracting institutions. Require the submission of regular operating and financial reports, but limit control to annual inspections and to audits such as those conducted by United States Department of Agriculture experiment station examiners.

(3) Make an outright grant to the contracting university or other institution in two parts, consisting of (a) the estimated capital costs of establishing the institution and (b) estimated operating expenses for a period of ten years.

(4) Tell the contracting institution to proceed with the job.

Because of the wide variety of specialized jobs to be done and the fact

that a primary objective of United States foreign technical assistance is to help the host countries train their own people to replace American staff as quickly as possible, it is neither feasible nor desirable to build up a career technical assistance staff to do the total job. In terms of both flexibility and of obtaining all the kinds of special competence needed, the career staff should be supplemented by borrowing of staff, for varying periods of time, from colleges and universities, the United States Department of Agriculture, and other organizations.

Unless colleges and universities can supplement existing staff—to have at least some manpower beyond the minimum requirements of the classroom—they will not be able to respond to requests for released staff time when the bulge in student enrollments strikes the country's campuses in the early 1960's. One possible approach to this problem might be for the federal gov-

ernment to make five- or ten-year grants to institutions willing to cooperate in foreign aid programs in amounts sufficient to cover the salaries of a specified number of additional staff members, with the understanding that the institution would be willing to negotiate on the question of released time for an equivalent number of staff members for overseas service. Such negotiations would have to be mutually undertaken in a "give and take" spirit respecting the precise number and the particular staff members to be released in a given year. Whether or not this particular approach is feasible, the fact remains that a new dimension has been added to our land-grant colleges and universities, in particular, namely, "overseas extension work." Institutional and financial provisions need to be made in executing this new activity as was ultimately done when extension was added to teaching and research in the United States.

Transfer of Basic Skills of Food Production

By CHARLES E. KELLOGG

ABSTRACT: Potentialities for more food in the underdeveloped countries with better soil and water use range from small to exceedingly large depending, in the first instance, on the kind of soil and what is known about it. The achievement of the potentialities is a very complex and difficult problem. For success in most places, several practices, such as those for water control, fertilization, kind and varieties of crops grown, and plant protection, must be changed at the same time if any of them are to give significant economic returns. Basic handicaps are a very low social status of cultivators in many countries and the lack of specific information requiring sound recommendations. Rarely can programs or practices be transferred from advanced countries of temperate regions to underdeveloped countries of the tropics or subtropics. Only basic principles and the skills to learn can be transferred. Those transferring skills from the advanced to the underdeveloped countries must be able (1) to analyze the problems and to invent effective practices and programs while in the area, (2) to work hard under less than ideal conditions, and (3) to be courteous at all levels of work from the cultivator to the highest officials of sovereign governments.

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THE world food problem demands attention. Although abundant food may not guarantee peace, severe food scarcities will guarantee no-peace. Generally countries must raise most of their own food. The percentage of the world's food requirements supplied through international trade will be small at best.

Since 1945 increased efforts have been made to transfer skills from the advanced to the underdeveloped countries. Yet food production skills have lagged far behind those that preserve life and that lead to increased material wants.

This lag results from several causes, not the least of which is a general failure to recognize the complexities. Most, including the writer, have suggested that the economic, political, and institutional aspects are more complex than the strictly physical and biological problems. Although probably true in most underdeveloped areas, this is a misleading generalization. The record shows that the development of reliable recommendations for soil use and management to realize the potential harvests is extremely difficult, especially in crowded countries. In this article I propose to suggest some of the reasons why the job is so difficult.

THE PROBLEM

The world food problem, in strictly physical terms—in calories per person—has probably been more serious many times in world history than it is at present. However, populations are now increasing, unevenly in relation to supplies. Certainly serious food problems could arise in many countries, partly because of a lack of the basic agricultural resources—responsive soils and water—but much more because the resources available are not used so effectively as they could be.

On the other hand, science has made possible an enormously improved agri-

cultural technology that is being applied to food production in many advanced countries at a continually accelerating rate. Not only has science increased the potentialities of traditionally arable soils; but also it has made economic food production possible from soils that were nonarable—unusable for food crops—by the methods known only a few years ago.

Still many countries face a food crisis. In social and political terms, the problem is far more critical than ever before.

For one thing the expanding economies of many underdeveloped countries have increased the demand for food; and the lack of it is a substantial cause of inflation. But another reason is more important: before world-wide travel and communication most of the people in the underdeveloped lands took food shortages and occasional famines for granted. The full rice bowl has been the symbol of both security and affluence for a long, long time in many countries.

Recently the people in countries short of food have learned that people elsewhere have abundant food. They have heard about America, for example, and some have been here. They are now unwilling to accept either chronic or occasional food shortages as a normal way of living. This new awareness is far more important in highlighting the food problem than any absolute scarcity. With the new burst of nationalism and the burning desires of these people to be recognized as full citizens of the world, they expect to have governments that will do what is necessary.

Yet raising the level of food production is an exceedingly complex process. It deeply involves science and technology as well as improved institutions for farm supplies, credit, land tenure, and food marketing and distribution. The most successful methods are now

products; (2) systems improved through the application of science but without industrial products; and (3) high-level systems that make full use of technology, including machines and chemicals. The differences in production per acre or per man-hour-acre are very different among these levels on the same kind of soil. But in countries where land is scarce and the need for food is great, such transitions are likely to be too slow.

Besides the difficulties of analysis and invention, we need to recall that people from advanced countries are primarily helping officials and technicians in the underdeveloped countries to use the basic principles and the learning skills. Rarely should they attempt direct work with the cultivators by themselves. They are helping to develop a skilled cadre to do the scientific, technical, and educational work, and to continue to meet the needs for the long years ahead.

THE SOCIAL SETTING

Many of the countries who have the greatest need to improve their food supply have only recently acquired their independence. The goals they conceive for themselves are not always the same as people from advanced countries think they should be. But the fact that they are independent sovereign states should not be forgotten for a moment.

In contrast to America and Western Europe, in most underdeveloped countries the cultivators who work in the fields have a low social status. This is an enormous handicap to agricultural improvement through the use of modern technology. Besides the fact that many cultivators are illiterate, communication is made even more difficult because so many people in the government services, perhaps unconsciously, regard them as inferior people. In the underdeveloped countries where food shortages are most severe, generally the

college curricula for agricultural scientists, compared to those for other professional careers, are the poorest and the standards for both admittance and graduation the lowest. According to a summary in the *New York Times* for June 28, 1959, less than 4 per cent of the foreign students coming to the United States study agriculture. Such a hapless lack of balance in educational effort is difficult to overcome while the socially degrading position of the cultivators seems to the young student to extend also to the professional men who serve them.

Although government leaders are trying to correct this situation, progress is slow. Moreover, many of them have this prejudice themselves, despite their efforts to overcome it. Yet experience strongly suggests that there is marked improvement only among those farm people who take a large share of the responsibility themselves. The dignity of the cultivator must be strengthened and respected. He must learn to help himself and to be self-confident of his own ability.

Unhappily, relatively few high government officials in the underdeveloped countries have a primarily rural background. Contrary to what many from advanced countries suppose, I have found these officials to be as able and as responsible as their counterparts elsewhere. But they lack agricultural knowledge, partly because of the low social status of farm people and partly because of the absence of a corps of agricultural scientists.

Perhaps the greatest handicap to agricultural improvement in many underdeveloped countries is the false notion that this improvement is a relatively simple matter. This unhappy idea has even been supported by some American and European advisers. The notion implies, firstly, that improved farming results from emphasizing a few

simple practices; secondly, that "someone" knows what these should be; and thirdly, that it is necessary only to find this "someone" and have him pass the "good word" on to the cultivators. None of these is approximately true for most undeveloped parts of the world.

SOME HANDICAPS TO BE OVERCOME

People in both advanced and underdeveloped countries must be helped to understand two basic ideas as they apply to particular areas and communities: (1) The potentialities for more food with better soil and water use range from small to exceedingly large, depending, in the first instance, on the kind of soil and what is known about it; and (2) the achievement of the potentialities is a very complex and difficult problem including scholarly scientific research and surveys, careful testing of alternatives, and full co-operation with cultivators regarded as equal citizens.

Where the full measure of these complexities is not understood, a tendency to short-cut them is inevitable. Many government leaders want to reach their goals quickly. And to get the votes in a democratic society they do need to show progress! They are attracted by the various agricultural advisory services of advanced countries without realizing that such programs, helpful as they are, are only partly responsible for the agricultural improvements of the past 150 years. A host of other essential public and private efforts also contribute to the result.

Besides public education and similar activities, many private agencies have functions of great importance in the advanced countries. For example, much of the stepped up use of fertilizers in the United States and Europe is due to the trade itself. In these countries, most improvements in farm machinery have been developed by private manufacturers.

Even individuals doing effective advisory work in the advanced countries may not themselves realize how much the results they seem to achieve depend both on basic data and on many other programs and institutions that they have always taken for granted, but that hardly exist in the underdeveloped countries. Thus, unconsciously they ascribe more of the results to advisory work than it has actually achieved, by itself, and promise far more for undeveloped areas than it can accomplish. With such a wrong diagnosis of problems requiring research and invention, the government leaders, the advisers, and the cultivators become frustrated with the results of the program.

Now this does not always happen. Some reliable data do exist in parts of these countries. Some advisers do have the skill to learn. They study the local conditions and experiences of their area of concern; they diagnose the basic problems; and they draw on the results of research and experience from similar areas, perhaps in distant countries where the soils are of the same kinds, and formulate dependable suggestions for transfers of both basic data and agricultural skills. That is, the oversimplification and superficiality that are so common are not universal.

Another kind of handicap results from the critical need for more food as well as from strong desires to progress along all other lines at the same time. Agriculture competes with programs for transport, housing, health, education, and industry, for skilled scientists and technicians, and for such materials as chemicals and steel. Curiously, in countries where food is the outstanding problem one may find the salary scales in the agricultural services lower than those in other less urgently needed services.

Naturally, the people in underdeveloped areas are struggling with the other

problems too—taxes, health, education, and so on. Other services are being changed also. With proper co-ordination these can help food production, rather than compete with it. But unhappily such co-ordination is difficult where the needs of agriculture are imperfectly understood. In crowded countries especially, the agricultural adviser finds few places to start afresh on a clean slate.

THE SUCCESSFUL ADVISER

Anyone undertaking to transfer the basic skills of agriculture from advanced to underdeveloped countries must have a well-disciplined imagination tempered with patience. He must not only use and be proficient in the skills, but he must also be able to teach them to others.

Many of us have seen good examples of people from advanced countries helping those in underdeveloped countries to make substantial progress. Such people vary from one another, of course, and their detailed methods vary with their personalities. But generally they seem to have a few vital characteristics in common:

1. They have unusually high competence in the basic aspects of their fields of learning and enough imagination to invent programs that fit the problem situation, which they are able to diagnose and to understand. Besides being outstanding specialists they have broad points of view that permit them to see how their own specialty must be related to others for successful results.

2. Successful advisers in underdeveloped countries have an enormous capacity for sustained hard work under less than ideal conditions. Hard work is necessary to complete the job. Perhaps even more important, a sense of urgency and the example of hard work spread to others.

3. Such successful advisers have good manners and courtesy, coupled with essential firmness. This gives them the ability to deal directly with top-level people in foreign governments, with the cultivators, and with other large groups of people.

One could not say that any one of these three is more important than the others. A lack of any one is an extreme handicap. A very few people who are barely adequate in America or Europe are successful abroad, but this number is very small indeed. Generally speaking, this kind of work requires men old enough to have gained experience and balance but young enough to be flexible and to work effectively within a new and different environment and with people having somewhat different ends in view.

Some say that a kind of "missionary spirit" is necessary. More important is the desire to learn and to be helpful. The able adviser who works hard at learning and at his task can influence social ends, mainly by his actions and especially by the results of his work, but little through talk alone.

REASONS FOR THE EFFORT

This is indeed a job that needs to be done for positive reasons. Americans have worked hard; and we still do. We have also been very fortunate. We have great resources per capita; we started with a great cultural heritage from classical Greece and Rome and from Western Europe; we have had great opportunities for individuals to succeed; and science and its resulting technology have had a chance to thrive.

We should share our experiences, not with any spirit of opposition or superiority but rather in the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount, with humility and thankfulness for the opportunities for constructive help.

Contributions of Colleges of Agriculture in Making Human Capital Available in Foreign Economic Development

By MERVIN G. SMITH and JOSEPH ACKERMAN

ABSTRACT: The United States agricultural colleges and extension services need to take a key role in our foreign policy. The need is great for trained people in foreign agricultural development. Agricultural colleges are conducting special assistance projects, training foreign students, and furnishing technical personnel. This has been valuable, but it is not enough if we are to be successful in the economic cold war and the world ideological conflict.

In our foreign assistance program much more emphasis is needed on the development process, the problem-solving method, broad planning, and longer-term programs. Consideration should be given to the cultural, psychological, institutional, social, and economic changes which must accompany rapid progress and economic growth. Our agricultural colleges need to strengthen their research and educational programs on managing and facilitating changes or adjustments to the rapid adoption of new technology. This is important: (1) if we are to make headway on our major domestic farm problem, and (2) if we are to develop an outstanding technical assistance program with underdeveloped countries.

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OUR challenge today is to achieve significant improvement in the ability of the masses of people in the world to satisfy their basic wants. The Western nations and the Communist bloc are involved in an ideological conflict about the type of government organization, the place of the individual, and the method of achieving rapid economic progress in underdeveloped countries.

One of the serious limiting factors to progress in such countries is the lack of training and skilled human resources. The situation can be improved if the United States fully uses an important existing resource—its agricultural colleges. Since the underdeveloped countries are agrarian their development programs must stress rapid increase in agricultural productivity.

We must recognize that the people of the less-developed countries are becoming aware of the beneficial role science and technology have played in the Western world. They expect that scientific developments could also improve their living conditions. They want, and intend to secure, the modern advantages of education, research, and technology in order to improve their health, their diets, and in general, to obtain many of the material things we regard as necessities.

After 1945, the first emphasis was on recovery from war damage. Later, assistance was provided to develop the military strength of the free world against Communist threats. With the growing desire of people for progress, increasing thought must be given to economic and technical assistance.

FARM POLICY CONCERN

Before we analyze our foreign technical assistance program and the contribution of the agricultural colleges, we shall consider briefly our own farm pol-

icy and its relation to foreign technical assistance. Our success in the entire foreign assistance program may be influenced greatly by our domestic farm policies. To some extent, we have been trying to solve our domestic farm problem through exports. This has brought unfavorable reaction from foreign countries, some justified and some not.

Our farm problem is the result of unprecedented rapid adoption of new technology in agricultural production. Although we have made many adjustments in the last few years, too many resources still remain in farming, resulting in chronic excess production over consumption and continually depressed farm prices and farm incomes. The solution to this problem lies in facilitating more rapid adjustments of resources in farm production. We should also give separate attention to improvement of foreign trade and other foreign problems, but this is not the basic problem in agriculture. Special foreign trade schemes are not likely to solve the entire farm problem; these often affect adversely the economies of foreign countries, creating unfavorable foreign relations. Such programs arouse suspicion about the United States motives and hinder our efforts to promote economic development.

Agricultural colleges are giving some attention, but need to give more, to the economic and social adjustment problems in farming, in agricultural related industries, and in rural communities in the United States. Research and education on these problems will improve our effectiveness in training personnel for technical advisory work in foreign countries.

FOREIGN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

In considering the part the agricultural colleges and extension services can play in our foreign policy we need first

to make a critical analysis of our total foreign aid program which has consisted of three types of assistance: military, economic, and technical. Technical assistance has constituted only about 4 per cent of the annual foreign aid budget or about 150 million dollars of the total 3 to 4 billion dollars per year. The largest part of our expenditure has been divided between military and economic assistance. Both American and foreign people are confused about the difference between these programs and the objectives and motives behind each. We believe that administratively military assistance should be more definitely separated from the other phases, not only to distinguish between the programs but also to have each phase directed by qualified specialists.

Technical assistance is mainly investment in human resources, such as educational institutions, training programs, and so forth. It is not only the least expensive form of assistance but probably the most effective. It builds strong ties of understanding, confidence, and good will. Economic assistance is mainly an investment in physical resources, such as dams, factories, and so on.

Much of the economic assistance is for so-called "impact" or spectacular projects. How much we should spend for these and how much for institutional or human resources is a difficult question.

To court popular favor, the Communists have emphasized "impact" projects, yet their technicians equal or outnumber ours. In 1959 the United States International Co-operation Administration (ICA), which conducts most of our technical assistance work, had about 3,200 technicians abroad, including about 1,100 in agriculture. In 1958 the Communists were estimated to have abroad about 6,100 technicians

of whom significant numbers were trained in economics and administration—fields in which only a very few of our technicians are trained.

ICA has had much difficulty finding qualified technicians and has often been forced to hire personnel without proper training or experience. Administrators and technicians in technical assistance work should have a broad understanding of the whole development process. Training is required to develop ability to analyze relationships between various segments of an economy and to understand the production and marketing processes, social relationships, and the role of credit and education. Most technicians with training in the natural or physical sciences lack this training, yet they are in charge of most of our development programs.

Economic and social aspects

Not enough attention has been given to the economic, social, and cultural aspects of promoting progress in underdeveloped countries where the attitudes, methods of procedure, and even the social system must often be changed and geared to the promotion of economic development. The speed with which new technology can be adopted will depend on how rapidly the accompanying social and economic changes can be effected. Unless considerably more attention is given to these aspects progress will be too slow and political and social chaos may follow.

To illustrate, when a country wishes to develop a specific area, an economic analysis should be made. Unfortunately, many of our technicians lack experience in such studies. If the analysis suggests a colonization project, some of the items which should be considered in its development would be: selection and movement of farm people to the

area; training of technicians to advise the farmers; development of transportation facilities; development of associated agricultural supply, processing, and marketing industries; development of farmer organizations, perhaps including co-operatives; training of skilled and specialized leaders and labor to work in these organizations and related industries; consideration of social and cultural problems which are likely to arise; and development of governmental and other services in the community.

Applied education

Few persons in foreign technical assistance work have the background or training to handle all these. Our personnel tend to think in terms of the United States in 1960, rather than an economy with an agriculture more like ours 100 or 150 years ago, but with an adverse ratio of population to resources.

In order to achieve economic development democratically, the people must understand their problems and take part in programs to solve them. Few people in underdeveloped countries have sufficient education to study and analyze the problems, or to cope with the much more difficult task of developing solutions to these problems. Literacy is estimated to be less than 25 per cent. Basic to all development, and this needs to be stressed more in technical assistance, is elementary education: reading, writing, and arithmetic. Unless the masses can be educated, assistance programs will be difficult to establish and may be doomed to failure. The people must understand its importance, must be trained for specialized work, and be sufficiently involved to take interest and pride in doing a good job.

Our technical assistance programs have not gone far enough in developing wide participation in the problem-solving process of applied education. In

some countries having four-, five-, or six-year plans, few leaders and even fewer citizens have thoroughly studied the problems and developed an understanding of the procedures for solving them. For this reason, many phases of the plans are never carried out, especially at the local level.

Under the method of the Communists or the dictators, a few people develop the plans and procedures. The implementation of such programs and plans usually requires considerable regimentation rather than voluntary participation. The Communists believe in widespread education to develop the skills of people. They also use economists to develop their programs. However, they have little regard for people as human beings outside of the technical context.

Both administrators and technicians find their new roles in technical foreign assistance difficult. Impatient with the lack of training or incentive of their local counterparts, they have an impulse to move in and do the job themselves. Failure may be the result; success comes only when local people learn to do things for themselves.

An understanding of the people, the way they think and work, is essential to the success of a program. Such understanding comes best from working with the people on tasks of mutual concern. The people must be convinced of our desire for their advancement, and earning their confidence is sometimes a slow process. We cannot buy this confidence and friendship with money, material goods, and military equipment. It can only be gained through understanding and mutual respect. At the same time we should not underestimate the confidence we now have.

Recently one of the authors directed a short seminar on agricultural marketing and co-operatives for Latin America. The delegates, one to six per country,

showed much interest in the breadth of the approach needed to bring about development. Some of them indicated, however, that they would not be able to do much unless more of their leaders acquired an understanding of the problems involved and the many facets that require attention if development is to be achieved. The delegates indicated they might be able to develop a broad study program if the director of the seminar could meet for a few days with their associates and leaders. Not being intimately involved, he might persuade their associates to participate in a seminar and to interest them in studying their problems more intensively and in developing improved action programs.

Congress should put foreign technical assistance on a long-term rather than a year to year basis. Uncertainty regarding continuance of the program is a serious obstacle to technical assistance. Often foreign countries cannot start major long-run projects without assurance of our assistance. Administrators who can offer only one or two years of tenure are handicapped in hiring the best personnel. Effective planning is difficult in the face of an uncertain future. Continuity is disrupted, resulting in a waste of time and funds. In spite of the short-term planning technical aid programs have justified their investment by the improvements in the economies of many countries.

AGRICULTURAL COLLEGES

Technical assistance is a major national policy that our universities and colleges must support with research and education. Our agricultural colleges, including the extension services, can make important contributions in five main areas: (1) carry out specific foreign technical-assistance projects, (2) train United States technicians for work in this field, (3) train foreign students,

(4) do research work in foreign agricultural development and relations, and (5) conduct an educational program in this country to develop a broad understanding of world affairs and especially technical assistance.

College contracts or projects

In 1959 some fifty-three universities and colleges in the United States had contracts for varied types of educational institutional assistance in underdeveloped countries. Of the eighty-nine separate contracts or projects about one third were agricultural. While some projects have been generally productive, they can and should be considerably improved.

Some difficulties have been encountered in the working relationships between the colleges and the ICA. Apparently ICA in Washington has lacked understanding of the philosophy, policy, and operation of the colleges. This has led perhaps to more checking and restrictions in the management of the projects than the colleges would have liked. On the other hand, college administrators and personnel have not had a thorough understanding of the total foreign technical-assistance program and the part that college contracts can play in the program. College projects must be co-ordinated with the larger programs which ICA and other technical-assistance agencies are conducting.

Colleges of agriculture have much to offer in advising foreign countries in developing programs of agricultural education, research, and extension. Administrators and technicians assigned to the programs have often been unfamiliar with the conditions they were to meet. Moreover, project personnel have rarely been properly trained or experienced in the over-all development process. Most of the contracts are for help in developing agricultural colleges, extension serv-

ices, and experiment stations. Not enough attention has been given to the economic, social, cultural, and psychological adjustments required in the development of these institutions. These immensely important projects should be directed by our most competent and experienced educational administrators. Our educational and technical aid must be free from the suspicion that it is a part of a military or economic pressure program.

Training U. S. personnel

If our agricultural colleges are to participate in technical assistance for an extended period, the entire staff of the colleges of agriculture should become acquainted with the foreign contract program. The various departments need to be involved in the planning, training, and assignment of personnel.

The personnel or technicians working under the special college contracts are only a small portion of the number of technicians involved in our total foreign technical-assistance program. At least, some of our colleges of agriculture need to develop plans for doing an adequate job of training technical-assistance personnel. This requires the addition of new courses, obtaining qualified teaching staff, and some reorganization of the colleges. Special training should be offered in the process of economic development and especially in the history, culture, language, economics, and sociology of the foreign countries.

If special financing, outside of the regular state and federal funds for colleges of agriculture, is required the foreign technical assistance budget might provide for it. Both the colleges of agriculture and ICA need to take a critical and objective look at these problems and design programs within our colleges to meet the needs.

Training foreign students

An increasing number of the 47,000 foreign students presently attending universities and colleges in the United States are enrolled in colleges of agriculture. The number in agriculture is likely to increase in the next few years. Besides these regular students some 8,000 foreign nationals are being brought to this country for three months to one year of training—three fourths of them by the ICA. Over one fourth of this number are in agriculture. Nearly all of our land-grant colleges have been taking these students. The courses offered and the quality and orientation of instruction could be greatly improved, and everyone concerned must work to this end. Most foreign students should have training in administration, since many of them will later find themselves in administrative positions in their own countries. Arrangements should be made for research or study dealing with problems of the student's own country. Possibly selected institutions should receive financial help to specialize in the training of these foreign students.

Research

If agricultural colleges are to participate in foreign technical assistance they must conduct research in this area, particularly in the field of economic and social development, and they should receive funds for such programs from our foreign assistance budget and from other sources.

Public education

Our universities need to include courses on economic development in the general curricula. Our agricultural extension service should include foreign policy and agricultural technical assist-

ance in its educational programs for rural people.

Can the land-grant colleges in this country meet the challenges in these broad problem areas? They must assume greater leadership in helping to solve our domestic farm problem. They must also do their share in helping the less-developed countries of the world achieve rapid economic development and growth. The pessimist will forecast

failure, saying that the democratic educational process is too slow, and that the world-wide downfall of democracy is imminent. The optimist will say that we will meet this challenge, that the concern for the human being and his supreme rights and welfare will prevail so strongly that even the Communists and regimented systems will need to give greater consideration to the human being in the future.

Land-Grant Institutions, the Public, and the Public Interest

By ROLAND R. RENNE

ABSTRACT: The land-grant institutions constitute a revolutionary concept in education. Each state, by passage of the Morrill Act of 1862, was given a grant of public land. Later acts appropriated federal funds to pay part of the operating costs of these institutions and established agricultural experiment stations and the Co-operative Agricultural Extension Service to be operated by these institutions. These institutions fulfilled the need for educating the youth of the farming and "industrial classes." From "colleges of agriculture and mechanic arts" these institutions have broadened their curricula and have become for the most part universities. Although curricula have undergone great changes in number and in specialized content there is now a great need for further adaptation to the vast complexities of present-day national and international realities. The urgency for widespread understanding of peoples will require much less specialization at the undergraduate level and much more synthesis of material which will cut across rigid, traditional course lines. Establishment of divisions or centers for international problems and policies should be accelerated. To develop consumer understanding of agricultural programs and problems, the land-grant institutions should consider the development of more educational programs among workers and their families.

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THE land-grant institutions as we know them today represent a co-operative undertaking with joint financial support by the federal and state governments for resident instruction at the college level, agricultural research through a system of experiment stations, and dissemination of agricultural and home economics information through the Co-operative Extension Service. There are sixty-eight such institutions in operation today, one in each of thirty-three states and Puerto Rico, and two in each of seventeen states—Massachusetts and sixteen southern states. Fifty-two of the sixty-eight institutions serve primarily white students and the other sixteen serve primarily negroes.

The federal act establishing such land-grant institutions is known as the Morrill Act of 1862, and the bill passed by Congress was signed by President Abraham Lincoln on July 2, 1862. The Morrill Act provided only for grants of public land to the states for the establishment of such institutions, and the states were permitted to sell parts of this land. Later, federal legislation was passed making federal funds available to cover part of the annual salaries and expenses of operating such institutions. The second Morrill Act of 1890 appropriated \$25,000 to each state for such institutions, and the Nelson Amendment of 1907 added another \$25,000 for each state. The Hatch Act passed in 1887 appropriated funds for agricultural experiment stations to be established in connection with the land-grant institutions created by the Morrill Act of 1862. The Adams Act of 1906 and the Purnell Act of 1925 provided explicitly for research grants at the experiment stations. The Smith-Lever Act of May 8, 1914 established the Co-operative Agricultural Extension Service, and made federal funds available to pay a portion of its costs. The Bankhead-Jones Act of 1935 added additional federal funds

for resident instruction, experiment stations, and extension services.

THE LAND-GRANT INSTITUTIONS

No other institutions of higher learning in the United States participate in the above federal appropriations, except the so-called "land-grant institutions." The above federal acts indicate the partnership of the federal government with state governments in providing resident instruction, agricultural research, and extension services for the people. Other institutions, including separated state universities, schools of mines, and some teachers colleges, participated in the land-grant, but none of these institutions participate in the annual federal appropriations for operating expenses. Consequently, the term "land-grant institution" as we know it today refers to only a part of the institutions that were given federal land grants.

The Morrill Act establishing land-grant institutions provides that these institutions have for their leading objects and purposes, "without excluding other scientific and classical studies, and including military tactics, the teaching of such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts." Many of the land-grant institutions were known in the beginning as "A & M" colleges, or in other words, Colleges of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts. Today only eight of the sixty-eight institutions have, as a part of their official name, the term "A & M" and forty-eight are called "Universities." Only twenty, or approximately 30 per cent, of the sixty-eight are referred to as "Colleges." This change in name from "A & M College" to "State College" to "State University" shows the broadened scope of education provided by the land-grant institutions. Many of these names have been changed from

"College" to "University" in the past five years. The change in name in addition to reflecting the need for broadened educational services also reflects the declining importance of agricultural students in the total enrollment. It is significant that only nineteen of the sixty-eight institutions still use the word "Agricultural" in their official title. All of the institutions, of course, have schools of engineering which grew out of the term "Mechanical Arts." Four of the institutions carry the word "Technology" or "Polytechnic" in their official names, six carry the word "Science" or "Applied Science," one carries the term "Engineering," and one carries the word "Industrial" in its name. These last sentences epitomize the trend of the land-grant colleges toward university status.

A NEW CONCEPT OF HIGHER EDUCATION

The Morrill Act ushered in a whole new concept of higher education. These institutions were designed to serve primarily the sons and daughters of the working classes and the farm people. Evidence that this revolutionary idea met a strongly felt need in the United States and that these institutions have kept pace with the changing needs of the country is displayed in the following statistics. Although the sixty-eight land-grant institutions comprise only 3.4 per cent of the total colleges and universities of the nation, they enroll 18 per cent of the United States college population. They award 40 per cent of the Ph.D. degrees in all fields, 55 per cent of those in biology, all of those in agriculture, 43 per cent in the physical sciences, 53 per cent in engineering, 35 per cent in mathematics, 31 per cent in the social sciences, 28 per cent in business and education, 25 per cent in Eng-

lish, and 23 per cent in literature and foreign languages.¹

From the very beginning, because of the partnership arrangement between the federal government and the state governments in financing land-grant institutions, their campuses were not limited to the boundaries of individual states. Each institution was concerned with the problem of its home state within the federal setting, including national problems, policies, and programs. This was especially true in the case of agricultural education, agricultural research, and agricultural extension, but to a lesser degree in the other fields of study offered. As the position of the United States changed to its present one of world leadership with its technical assistance and other aid programs, the campus of the land-grant institutions has likewise expanded so that now the world is their campus. They are the principal recruiting grounds of the federal government, other friendly nations, foundations, and commercial interests abroad. Their system of co-operative agricultural extension services has been adapted to many parts of the world.

EDUCATION FOR WORLD LEADERSHIP

Education directed towards understanding other peoples is one of the important needs of our nation. Such understanding is prerequisite to effective technical and economic assistance, to expansion of world trade, and to the implementation of United States foreign policy. Adapting the land-grant college idea to underdeveloped nations by working directly with the people and by helping them solve their own prob-

¹ See Russell I. Thrackrey and Jay Richter, "The Land-Grant Colleges and Universities, 1862-1962: An American Institution" in *Higher Education*, United States Office of Education, Vol. 16 (November 1959), pp. 3-8.

lems through education and demonstrations is an important part of this implementation, for which specialization in limited technical fields will not suffice. The undergraduate curricula should be as comprehensive as possible in the humanities, social and natural sciences, without heavy specialization until the graduate level.

This education should provide the American people and particularly their leaders with the concepts, knowledge, and methods for understanding the nature of the existing international situation and the course of its development. To be fully effective this would require making a long overdue reappraisal of the social science curricula at the high school and undergraduate levels, in terms of the current world situation rather than in terms of the outdated view of narrow, highly specialized academic disciplines.² For a sound approach to almost any international problem the specialized academic departments of history, economics, sociology, political science, psychology, and so forth, must be presented, not as isolated fields, but as an organic synthesis. Furthermore, the broader the background of education of the individual the better he is able to comprehend complex international problems.

One of the most difficult problems in the effective preparation of students to cope with the realities of modern complex international relationships and policies is to find a way of adequately understanding "the many-faceted nature of social phenomena which avoids both emaciated generalization and indigestible masses of data."³ The interdisciplinary curricula are too often insufficiently integrated to be realistic in

terms of actual world problems. This situation is aggravated in many of the land-grant institutions by the heavy emphasis on the natural sciences—physical and biological sciences.

A few of the land-grant institutions have recognized the importance of meeting their international obligations more adequately by establishing an institution-wide agency or division on "international programs" or "international services" whose head—a Dean or Director—reports directly to the president. For example, Michigan State University calls its division "International Program" which is under the direction of a Dean. Montana State College refers to its unit as the "International Cooperation Center," which is administered by a Director. The University of Vermont has established a special Bachelor of Science degree in "International Science." These are each attempts to secure more interest from the entire campus by cutting across departmental and specialized division or college lines and thus service its international obligations on a parallel basis with its national and state obligations. It is hoped that most land-grant institutions will establish such campus-wide international centers or divisions promptly.

Even though land-grant institutions have grown rapidly in enrollments and services, many do not give a degree in the liberal arts and social sciences or, if they do, the degree is frequently a Bachelor of Science rather than a Bachelor of Arts. Under these circumstances it is very difficult to obtain strong liberal arts and social science instruction requisite for a broad understanding and appreciation of current international problems and policies. Because of the demands made upon the land-grant institutions to furnish personnel for international programs, they have a very special obligation to provide adequate

² See Theodore Geiger, "Education for the World Responsibilities of the United States" in *Looking Ahead*, National Planning Association, Vol. 8, No. 2 (March 1960).

³ *Ibid.*

training for this personnel. Greater emphasis, at least at the undergraduate level, on well-balanced, integrated, interdisciplinary studies would help to reduce the lag between American responsibility for world leadership and present American performance which, if it continues, may prove fatal to the program of the western nations.

SYNTHESIS VS SPECIALIZATION

Our social, political, economic, and industrial structures have undergone revolutionary changes in the last three quarters of a century, and our educational structure should be adapted to meet these changes. This adaptation cannot occur simply by the addition of more highly specialized courses, but must come through reorganization of our existing courses. Our educational structure has been characterized by a mushrooming and pyramiding of numerous specialized courses and curricula. This proliferation of courses and our multiple-major educational structure offers students a wide choice of professional and academic fields in which to specialize, but only within rigid specialized curricula. There is a great need for a shift from the multiple-major structure to the multiple-level structure, and we should regroup our highly specialized curricula, retaining those more applicable to modern everyday situations, consolidating others, and eliminating those which have become antiquated.

The overemphasis upon numerous highly specialized curricula is pronounced in the field of agriculture, and it is in this field where the land-grant colleges have had practically exclusive control. The large decline in farm population and agricultural enrollment has resulted in many small classes and expensive instruction because of the proliferation of agricultural curricula and courses. For example, in most land-

grant institutions there are numerous agricultural curricula such as general agriculture, agricultural economics, agricultural education, agricultural engineering, agronomy, animal industry, dairy manufacturing, dairy production, horticulture, poultry industry, range management, rural sociology, and soils. In each of these thirteen fields specific four-year tabulations of courses are set up, averaging around two hundred quarter credits or about one hundred and thirty semester credits.

Three or four land-grant institutions have already achieved a consolidation of these narrow, rigid, highly specialized curricula into four or five broader curricula such as agricultural business, agricultural production, agricultural science, agricultural education, and agricultural engineering. Much more needs to be done along these lines if agricultural graduates are to receive the kind of basic education in the sciences and humanities which is needed in today's world. These fewer and broader curricula make it possible for the individual to secure education in the basic principles and theories essential to develop the objective reasoning necessary for effective adaptation to varying situations and requirements in our modern society.

RESPONSIBILITIES TO LABOR

The land-grant institutions have manifested little interest in the industrial classes in spite of the fact that the Morrill Act emphasized that they were to be people's colleges for the education of the youth of the "industrial classes" which included both workers and farm people. There is no program to keep workers and their families abreast of current developments that most concern them. There is no labor extension service, there are few short courses, no demonstration projects, no annual fairs, or any similar services for

labor comparable with those for agriculture. It is true that the federal government has not appropriated funds, in partnership with the states, to develop a labor extension service in a manner comparable to the co-operative agricultural extension service, but within the states the land-grant institutions with very few exceptions have not taken any major responsibilities in the labor field proper.⁴

One of the greatest needs of American agriculture is that its problems, programs, and policies be understood by consumers. Workers' families constitute the largest single block of consumers. The land-grant institutions therefore have a special interest in and obligation to provide adequate information about these problems, programs, and policies to workers and their families. As has been pointed out earlier, these problems,

programs, and policies in the mid-twentieth century have a world-wide import.

Another very great need in American agricultural policy is unity of purpose and method among farm leaders.⁵ This will be difficult to achieve, but the land-grant institutions through concerted, dedicated efforts in education and extension programs ultimately may be able to achieve such unity. Perhaps the most important development in educational services rendered by land-grant institutions in the next decade will be synthesis. Farm problems do not occur in a vacuum nor do labor's problems.

Land-grant institutions have been pioneers in the educational services the country has needed to develop its natural and human resources. The next phase of their pioneering may well be to guide curriculum development and extension in the fields of international understanding and to integrate those domestic policies with international policies when the two are interrelated.

⁴ See Brendon Sexton, "A Responsibility Forgotten: A Relationship Between the Land-Grant Colleges and the Labor Movement" in American Association of Land-Grant Colleges and State Universities *Proceedings* (1955), pp. 89-94.

⁵ See Bushrod Allin, "Agriculture's Public Relations" in *Journal of Farm Economics*, Vol. 40 (May 1958), pp. 187-195.

Potential Contribution of Agriculture to Economic Growth in Less-developed Countries

By SHERMAN E. JOHNSON

ABSTRACT: Substantial betterment of conditions in the less-developed countries is dependent upon both private and public action to achieve rapid increases in output. Improved technology is the key to higher output, but successful adoption requires additional capital and the learning of new technical and management skills. Agriculture can become a leader in economic growth by providing labor-intensive employment for rapid increases in food production. Larger food supplies also will lessen the inflationary pressures resulting from the construction phase of a development program. With the help of technical advisers, combinations of improved technology can be adopted that will greatly increase production per acre with a small investment of capital in relation to the resulting output. The combinations usually include chemical fertilizer, improved seed, pesticides, and better soil and water management. Help also will be needed in obtaining the necessary production supplies, in arranging credit at reasonable rates, in developing storage and marketing facilities, and perhaps even in providing for changes in the tenure system. All of these aids may need to be combined into one program in order to shift rapidly from a primitive agriculture to the beginnings of modern farming.

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THE greatest unsolved problem of our times is the abject poverty of the masses of people in the less-developed countries. Their continuous struggle for food is a primary cause of international instability. Promises of rapid economic improvement have a powerful appeal to people who are living at bare subsistence levels.

Not long ago most of the people in the less-developed countries accepted poverty as their ordained lot, but airplane transport and radio communication have facilitated the spread of information that betterment is possible. They now expect their governments to provide conditions conducive to improvement. Leadership that inspires confidence in government and public institutions that facilitate progress are essential steps in development, but substantial betterment for the masses is dependent upon private as well as public action to achieve rapid increases in output of the entire national economy.

Improved technology is the key to higher output—in agriculture as well as other industries. But successful adoption of new techniques requires additional capital investment in order to establish new industries and to rehabilitate the old. New technical and management skills will need to be learned, and perhaps many of the established institutions that inhibit change will need to be modified. Moreover, the various segments of the total effort must be synchronized in order to prevent unbalanced production.

All of these activities will need to be undertaken within a relatively short period of time because a part of the demands for better living of the rank and file will need to be satisfied without delay if governmental stability is to be maintained. And total output must expand enough to increase per capita output, and not merely keep pace with

the increase in population. To achieve a synchronized program of this type requires competent leadership in both planning and program operation.

AGRICULTURE'S CONTRIBUTION TO GROWTH

Agriculture's contribution to the development of a self-generating economy becomes evident if we consider present conditions in the less-developed countries. Many of these countries are overpopulated, at least in relation to the resources that are now developed. From 50 to 80 per cent of the total population is dependent upon agriculture for a livelihood. Most of the farm villages are relatively untouched by the technical and economic changes of the last 200 years. Consequently, crop yields and livestock production are extremely low in comparison with the more-developed countries.

Annual income per person in the densely populated countries averages as low as \$60 to \$75, compared with more than \$2,000 in the United States. Food absorbs most of this meager income. Consequently, any increases in national income will be translated immediately into additional demands for food. Unless these demands are met with larger food supplies, inflationary pressures will develop that may be very difficult to control by rationing or by any other means. Unrest is easily generated in people who are impatient for specific evidences of betterment.

How can the necessary food be obtained? Domestic food production can be increased by two methods: (1) Adoption of improved production techniques, which will result in higher output per acre, and (2) development of additional land. The first method holds the greatest immediate promise in most areas. Even when additional land is available for development, it usually requires expensive drainage, clearing, or irrigation.

Scarcity of capital in the early stages of development, therefore, will place definite limits on land reclamation, unless it is a part of power development or unless improved production techniques can be readily adopted on the land which is reclaimed.

It may be feasible to supplement domestic production with food imports, but unless food imports are obtained under foreign aid programs, they will absorb scarce foreign exchange which is needed for other segments of the development program. Moreover, imports under special programs usually cannot meet all the needs of a rapidly increasing population.

Some of the less-developed countries produce food products for export. They also produce such so-called "industrial crops" as rubber, cotton, jute, and sisal. The industrial crops as well as such food crops as sugar, coffee, and tea are likely to be produced on large plantations alongside of the small farms producing mainly for family subsistence. The export crops provide foreign exchange; and increases in productivity should facilitate import of additional capital goods needed for growth in all sectors of the economy. We must recognize, however, that expansion of some of these crops may result in relatively saturated markets and declining prices.

Capital formation

We have said that additional capital and the requisite technical and managerial skills are necessary to adoption of the improved technology that is essential for economic development. Some capital and technical aid can be obtained from abroad. But the flow of private foreign investment and skills is inadequate; and although public aid programs can function as catalytic agents, they cannot perform the job alone. Capital formation must take place within the country—for invest-

ment in new industries, for exploitation of undeveloped resources, and for rehabilitation of the existing agricultural and industrial plants.

The new investment must include facilities for technical and management training in order to provide competent personnel to man the new enterprises. In many countries this will include establishment of a complete educational system beginning with the primary grades.

The smaller the margin above subsistence, however, the less opportunity there is for financing such investment by taxation or by other means of involuntary saving.

Here is, indeed, a dilemma. Capital formation within the country is necessary for economic growth. But there appears to be no margin for either voluntary or involuntary savings. Some of these countries, however, do have islands of progress in industry and trade. These isolated operations furnish the nucleus for industrial growth, but they cannot bear the entire burden of capital formation. Members of the small elite class perhaps can be induced to invest in new enterprises instead of hoarding their wealth or spending it on consumption goods. Heavy purchase taxes on goods other than the barest necessities also may siphon a part of the income of this class.

Within the agricultural sector some landlords and operators of the large farms have incomes sufficient to provide capital formation either through voluntary savings or by taxation. Agricultural capital for increasing food production can be built up by employment of unutilized rural labor on work which can be carried out with hand labor and simple tools. Terraces, surface drainage, minor irrigation development, access roads, and local storage facilities are examples of this type of construction. Fortunately, also, in most areas a com-

bination of improved practices can be adopted to increase yields per acre with a relatively low input of capital in relation to the resulting output. On present farms the additional capital will be used largely for current inputs of improved seed, commercial fertilizer, pesticides, and simple farm tools. But if these materials are to be made available to cultivators, they either have to be produced in factories within the country, or imported. This is likely to involve some scarce foreign exchange, either for building of factories or for importing of fertilizer and other supplies. Although some initial capital will be needed to utilize surplus labor effectively in agriculture, the returns are likely to be higher and the waiting period shorter than for most other investments.

In many of the less-developed countries, near-term expansion of food production is not severely limited either by the climate or by the soil and water resources. Present production per acre is so low that it could be doubled, or even trebled, by application of modern technology. The gap between present output and physical potentialities is well illustrated by crop yields in India. The average yield of wheat per acre is about 10 bushels, or approximately half the average yield in the United States. The average yield of rice is about 800 pounds per acre compared with about 3,000 pounds in Japan. The soil and water resources of India respond to new systems of farming. In some pilot areas, effective combinations of aid have enabled cultivators to obtain yield increases of 50 per cent or more. The return on the additional expenditure probably has averaged better than a ratio of 3 to 1.

DEVELOPMENT IN AGRICULTURE

Although the production potentialities of combinations of new technology and management assistance have been

demonstrated in most countries, we must recognize the impediments to general adoption of the new ways of farming. Perhaps the greatest handicaps to be overcome are illiteracy and the village people's lack of knowledge concerning conditions outside their own immediate environment. This lack of knowledge generates suspicion of outsiders. To break with tradition will require gaining the confidence of at least a small group of cultivators in each village who can be made aware of the benefits to them of adopting improved methods. They must then be willing to become innovators of the new system of farming, and help persuade others to follow their leadership.

Even after the "crust" of suspicion has been broken and the desire for improvement has been stimulated, there are still many obstacles to be overcome. An effective technological break-through requires development of farming systems which include a combination of improvements. Single measures such as better seed or use of commercial fertilizer may result in small increases in yields per acre, but when these improvements are combined with better tillage, and when pesticides are used as needed, the combination of practices will have a multiplying effect on yields.

Cultivators will need considerable technical and management assistance if they are to adopt successfully such a combination of improved practices. The seed, fertilizer, and pesticides must be available to the cultivators when they are needed—and in adequate quantities. Some improved tools and equipment also must be available. Most cultivators do not have either financial resources of their own or credit available at reasonable rates to purchase the needed materials and supplies. Consequently, credit arrangements will need to be devised that will provide loans at moderate interest rates and repayments based on

potential increases in output. Furthermore, the cultivators are operating so close to the margin of subsistence that they cannot afford to take the risk of either crop failure or lower prices. It may be necessary, therefore, to provide assurance to cultivators that they will be protected against lower crop yields and lower prices.

In some areas, the land-tenure system may prevent the cultivators from realizing sufficient gain from increased production to make the effort worth while. Perhaps also the physical fragmentation and dispersal of holdings will impede or prevent adoption of improved techniques. When land reform and consolidation of holdings are prerequisites to agricultural development, the process is likely to require courageous public measures to deal with these obstacles.

The guiding principle in furnishing technical and management assistance should be to help in overcoming any obstacle to successful adoption of the new farming program. This will include help in (1) adopting combinations of new technology, (2) obtaining the necessary production supplies, (3) arranging the credit to purchase supplies, (4) developing a market for the product, and (5) perhaps even helping to change established institutions such as the tenure system.

All of these steps may be involved in the transition from primitive agriculture to the beginning of modern farming. There are no panaceas. The assistance program will need to be tailor-made to overcome the obstacles that are encountered in each area.

In the laudable zeal for rapid change it is necessary for both native and foreign technicians to recognize that modern technology cannot be successfully transplanted from one country to another. It must be adapted to the culture and the environment of the people who are involved in the change. In

countries with much underemployment in agriculture, first attention must be centered on ways of utilizing, with a minimum of new capital, the available labor to increase total output. At this stage, labor-saving equipment would involve scarce capital and would displace labor that could not find other employment.

Production per acre can be greatly increased by improved practices that are suitable for use with hand labor and bullock power. Many tools are available that constitute intermediate steps toward a mechanized agriculture. Workers from less densely populated areas need to recognize that farming in many of these countries will remain a labor-intensive and small-scale agriculture, even when much greater efficiency has been achieved.

BALANCED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The end purpose of economic development is to provide a better living for the majority of the people. Economic development in the nonagricultural sectors is likely to begin by building new plants and equipment for new manufacturing enterprises. Such construction will provide more employment and increased income before the output from the new plants becomes available for purchase. A large portion of the higher income will be spent for food. If agricultural development has been undertaken to supply these growing demands for food, inflationary tendencies will be restrained. At the same time, farm people will obtain higher incomes from the larger output. They will then spend more for manufactured goods when these become available, which in turn will provide a wider market for the industrial sector. In both sectors the higher incomes will provide some margin for saving which will be available for new investment. The tax base also will be larger.

Improvements in agriculture, by themselves, may not generate sufficient momentum to raise the entire economy to a higher and self-generating level of production, but agriculture can become the leader in economic growth. The circle of stagnation can be broken by initiating developments in agriculture. Productive labor-intensive employment for rapid expansion of farm production can be provided in the early stages of the "take off" period. In food-deficit countries, this will mean more adequate food supplies, and use of scarce foreign exchange for other imports. In food-surplus countries, more foreign exchange

will be available for development of other sectors of the economy.

Eventually, the nonagricultural sectors of the economy should achieve sufficient momentum to provide employment for many of the underemployed workers in agriculture. By that time, the improvements in agriculture will have gathered sufficient momentum to continue their upward trend, and purchases by farm people for production and for better living will provide a growing market for manufactured products. In this way simultaneous development in agriculture and industry will result in rapid, self-generating economic growth.

growing weather had prevailed, the harvested area would have been more than 35 million acres smaller than it actually was and nearly 60 million acres smaller than it would have been without the conservation reserve.

Rather arbitrary assumptions about prices were made for the hypothetical situation. Cotton and wheat prices were lowered to levels that would permit dollar exports in recent volume without subsidy. Feed grain prices were raised moderately, and the expected volume of dollar exports was reduced below the amount sold abroad, with subsidy, in 1959. Exports under P.L. (Public Law) 480 were not considered part of the commercial market. The price estimates average only 75 per cent of parity, the present legislative price standard. All estimates are necessarily rough approximations. Aggregate normal-weather crop production was about 8 per cent too large in 1959 by these modest criteria. Total livestock production was only slightly too high but would have been excessive if expanded sufficiently to absorb the surplus production of feed grains and wheat.

More labor was employed in agriculture than needed in an ideal situation to produce either the actual or the market-adjusted volume. This was the case in important parts of commercial agriculture—the 44 per cent of all farms that in 1954 marketed 91 per cent of all farm products—but was especially true among the semisubsistence and part-time farmers whose units were much too small for efficient operation. There were 4,640,000 farms in 1959—by the old definition—but their output could have been produced by fewer than 2,000,000 units without adding to the number of larger-than-family farms. The farm labor force, according to estimates by the Department of Commerce, averaged 5,836,000 hired and family workers in 1959; at a very rough guess,

perhaps 3,500,000 would have been sufficient on larger and better organized farms.¹ But many of the apparently superfluous workers had limited skill for nonfarm occupations, were advanced in age, or for other reasons had no more potential earning power outside of agriculture than in it. To assume that an agriculture of fewer than 2,000,000 farms employing 3,500,000 workers is practicable in the next few years would be a misinterpretation of the estimates.

Any substantial reduction of labor in an ideal situation would be in part offset by an increase in machinery and equipment. This might not be large, however; many farms are equipped to handle more acreage than is presently farmed. Incidentally, if the reorganization of farm size, labor force, and use of capital considered here had existed in 1959, the superior management accompanying it would have raised crop and livestock yields and would have reduced still further the crop acreages for the market-adjusted situation.

THE COMMERCIAL FARM PROBLEM

At the end of World War II agriculture had a high production base, and during the 1950's the availability of new technology continued to raise potential production faster than peacetime markets expanded. Farmers have comparatively fixed resources of land and family labor and, unlike producers in much of industry, have no ability as individual firms to influence prices by varying their own production. Their economic incentives are to adopt new methods whether prices are high or low and to expand output without regard for total market outlets. A thrust of new technology often lowers farm prices in free markets by more than produc-

¹ The basic assumption for this estimate is that output per worker throughout agriculture could be at least as high as it was on economic class III farms in 1954.

tion costs per unit are reduced. Then all of the benefits of technology, and more, are passed on to the general public. When this happens in large sectors of agriculture, strong economic pressure is exerted to reduce labor and land resources. Even a large outflow of labor may have little effect on production and prices when technology is advancing and farms are being consolidated, however, and good land does not go out of production. During the extreme economic and weather vicissitudes between 1920 and 1959, cropland² varied less than 5 per cent from its average.

When technology is advancing rapidly, as it did in the 1950's and promises to do for years to come, chronic farm depression results. This was the situation in the 1950's, with one great exception: government programs diverted supplies from the market and prevented as much decline of farm income as otherwise would have occurred. The programs probably did little to hold resources in farming, but they raised surplus stocks and government expenditures for agriculture to unacceptable levels.

The immediate problem posed by the too-high rate of current production and by the 9 billion dollar stockpile of farm surpluses is a daunting one. Demand for total farm output is highly inelastic: if all crops available in 1959 with normal weather had moved into domestic consumption directly or through livestock, the farm price of corn might have fallen below 70 cents per bushel, wheat to 75 to 80 cents per bushel, and hogs to about 10 cents per pound. Disastrous is not too strong a word to describe the income effects of such prices. Larger exports would modify the domestic impact of selling in a free market, but trouble would appear abroad as well as at home. The prices at which

² Acreage harvested, lost through crop failure, or in the conservation or acreage reserve.

Canada, Australia, and other exporters could sell wheat might be reduced by one fourth without much increasing world trade in the commodity or our share of the total. Nations exporting corn, cotton, fats and oils, rice, and tobacco would be affected adversely, and among these would be some economically weak countries heavily dependent on agricultural exports for foreign exchange.

FOREIGN OUTLETS FOR SURPLUSES

Possibilities of using American farm products in aiding underdeveloped countries, as under P.L. 480, are not fully known. In the next few years the United States can supply large quantities of farm products without foregoing other goods and services, for we have large stocks on hand and excess resources in agriculture. In the more distant future, when labor can be engaged in other pursuits, a dollar spent for farm products will need to have as much potential benefit as a dollar spent in other ways to be a justified expenditure for foreign aid. If—as seems possible, but unlikely—large exports of farm products are warranted by this test, then a substantial contribution to solving the domestic farm problem without conflict with other policy will have been made. At least, we should be prepared to deal with the domestic problem in other ways while standing ready to furnish farm products to the extent needed.

Commercial markets abroad offer much less opportunity for depleting American farm surpluses than do exports outside of commercial channels. Dumping is ruled out for obvious reasons. World trade in farm products is greatly influenced by governmental policies, underdeveloped countries are increasingly restive about the price instability that has always plagued their markets, and international commodity

agreements rather than the classic precepts of free trade appear to be the next evolutionary step in regularizing exchange among nations. The United States is turning from old desires to gain domestic agricultural stability through exports to a recognition that international stability must be considered in shaping domestic farm policy.

MANAGING FARM PRODUCTION

The excessive rate of current farm production and the high potential for further increase are strong reasons for making supply control the central instrument of domestic farm policy. The desirability of routing income to agriculture through the market rather than through the federal budget, where farm programs and governmental services not having the market as an alternative compete for support to the disadvantage of both, is an additional reason for supply control.

The effectiveness of present acreage restrictions on controlled crops has been impaired by rising yields per acre, and the diversion of land from controlled to uncontrolled crops has made the restrictions almost wholly futile in curbing total output. The conservation reserve attempts to induce voluntary retirement of cropland by payments to farmers. Since the poorest cropland usually is the first attracted into the reserve, the program would have had to exceed 60 million acres in 1959 to adjust output to commercial markets. The program is resisted where retirement of much poor land depresses local economic activity, and it will become increasingly expensive if it is expanded enough to cut output importantly and to improve prices. A revised and gradually expanded conservation reserve has a useful role in speeding adjustments of both land and labor, but the size and urgency of the present general problem, together

with the special circumstances of wheat and some other commodities, require a direct attack through compulsory controls.

Serious administrative difficulties and the attitudes of farmers probably must restrict a supply control program initially to the most urgent and intractable aspect of the problem—controlling production of feed grains, wheat, cotton, and soybeans without shifting land to the production of other crops. Farmers voluntarily adjust livestock production more readily to the feed grain supply than they adjust total crop production to market outlets, though important differences exist within the livestock category.

Probably the only feasible way to control output of feed grains is to restrict acreage and to require land taken from the production of these grains to be held idle. A considerable potential for increasing per-acre yields exists, and it would be better use of resources and more profitable to farmers to apply controls to actual production than to acreage. But so large a volume of feed grains is fed to livestock on the same farms that direct control of bushels produced does not seem possible. For cotton, soybeans, and most wheat, sales quotas should be used, in addition to idling a portion of the cropland, to prevent the use of nonfarm resources—for example, fertilizer—to produce unwanted yield increases. Sales quotas can be extended to other crops and to livestock products where feasible and acceptable.

In a number of special situations, other types of controlled marketing already exist in the form of marketing agreements and orders or where farmer co-operatives have a degree of market power. These situations will grow in importance but cannot extend, for many years at least, to the large-acreage field crops. Decisions of marketing or proc-

essing firms determine the volume of farm output in some instances of vertical integration, and such situations will also become more important.

As a necessary supplement to production control and desirable on its own merits, a storage program to stabilize annual utilization and prices of controlled crops will be required. Wheat is such an aggravated case of imbalance between production and market outlets that domestic prices probably must be above export prices, and similar pricing may be needed for some other export crops.

Two important objections to production control are possible inefficiencies in use of resources and magnification of government power. The labor of succeeding generations is the principal agricultural resource likely to be in excess but having productive alternative uses. The common thesis that price supports are a prime reason for locking labor in agriculture is not supported by experience. The many inadequate farms on which unskilled people labor unproductively for low economic rewards became established in a free market, and more progress was made in solving the prob-

lem under price supports in the 1950's than at any time prior to the 1940's. Supply control in commercial agriculture is less relevant to labor mobility than the education and skills of farm people and the availability of attractive nonfarm jobs.

How productive agriculture is twenty-five years from now will depend more on technological progress than on any other matter. It is reasonable to suppose that technology will be developed and applied as rapidly in a stable agriculture under supply control as in any other circumstances likely to prevail.

Perhaps no group in America would be more disposed than farmers, other things equal, to reject the government intervention involved in supply control. But other things are not equal, and farmers individually and collectively are torn between their preference for freedom from government interference and their inability to cope with the massive farm problem without government assistance. To be successful, supply control must be supported by the majority of the farmers affected and should enlist their participation in making program decisions.

Cotton

By M. K. HORNE, JR.

ABSTRACT: The United States government functions as the price leader for cotton in international trade, and as an inevitable consequence it plays the role of residual supplier on the world market. This means that United States exports of cotton fluctuate widely from season to season, while other exporting nations enjoy greater market stability. By supporting the world price level and by serving as the stabilizing factor in the world market, this country has provided a little-recognized source of strength to many weaker nations. Foreign cotton consumption passed its prewar peak in 1950-1951 and subsequently has continued to rise at an average rate of 1.5 million bales a year; but foreign production expanded even more rapidly through the season of 1955-1956, so that United States exports were threatening to disappear almost entirely. While this country cannot presently escape the role of residual supplier, it can use its responsibility as price leader with reasonable regard for the problems of foreign producers and of its own citizens as well. Since 1955-1956, an export subsidy has placed restraint on the upward trend of foreign production and has improved the outlook for United States exports. The cotton farmer's opportunity to escape reliance on the export subsidy lies in shifting the emphasis of production costs from labor to constantly improving technology.

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COTTON is a clear case of an agricultural commodity for which the United States government functions as the world price leader. This is true by virtue of some simple arithmetic. During the past five seasons we supplied 32 per cent of the cotton which moved in world trade. Of some forty other cotton-exporting countries there was none which could account for even half so much. The basic decisions governing the general price level at which we export cotton are made by one agency, the federal government. In other words, one decision-maker determines the price for a third of the international trade in cotton. So long as the foreign world depends upon us for this large fraction of its imports, we can, by withholding cotton except at a certain price, draw the whole market up toward the general vicinity of that price. And so long as we hold big stocks, we can, by selling cotton at any price, drop the whole market down toward the vicinity of that price.

This position of price leadership is accentuated by the fact that virtually all our competitors in cotton exports—Mexico, Egypt, and so forth—have neither the local finances nor the supplies of foreign exchange to permit them the luxury of holding their cotton through periods of price weakness. Only the United States can afford this dubious luxury.

Our role as the price leader is far from a comfortable one. Whenever price leadership exists in any commodity, the smaller competitors enjoy quite a trading advantage. When market conditions are tight and sales are easy to make, they can raise their prices up to or above that of the leader. When the market is glutted, they can nearly always continue making sales by cutting their prices slightly below that of the leader.

This is just the situation which has

bedeviled the makers of United States government policy toward cotton. In the season-before-last, for example—August 1, 1957-July 31, 1958—this country obtained 41 per cent of the world trade in cotton. This was because the volume of trade was relatively strong. Last season, on the other hand, was one of recession in the world cotton trade, and we received only 22 per cent of the business.

THE ROLE OF RESIDUAL SUPPLIER

It is charged, quite correctly, that in these circumstances the United States serves merely as the residual supplier of cotton to the world. Other countries, by selling below our price when necessary, can assure themselves of a market for their production year after year. In crudest terms, we take whatever market they leave us.

It is a great oversimplification, of course, to generalize in this manner without regard for differences in quality and merchandising efficiency. The quality of cotton is a thing of vast importance, complexity, and—I must add—controversy; but if space permitted a discussion of this subject we still would find that in a broad sense our country functions as the residual supplier.

There naturally is much criticism of the government for allowing itself to be caught in this weak bargaining position for the world market. Indeed the existing law undertakes to rid us of this position by ordering the Commodity Credit Corporation "to make cotton available at prices not in excess of the level of prices at which cottons of comparable qualities are being offered in substantial quantity by other exporting countries."

The difficulties are apparent. If the United States were a small factor in the world cotton trade, the government could not be the price leader even if it wanted to. But since it actually is

such a large factor, the government does not really have the power to abandon the role of price leadership. If we try to follow the prices of our competitors downward, we may drive them down further. We could find ourselves following downward a price which we ourselves were driving downward.

There seem to be only two routes by which we could escape the burden of price leadership. One would be by continuing to become a smaller and smaller factor in the world cotton trade until at length we no longer held the power to affect the price so decisively. We are much closer to that position now than in decades past. Indeed within recent years we seem to have experienced short periods in which the world received a foretaste of this condition. During 1955 particularly, for a number of months the United States was virtually out of the world market because, seemingly for the first time, other countries were pressing to sell more than enough cotton for the entire immediate export demand. For the first time the sellers of foreign-grown cotton were not competing primarily with the United States but rather with one another—and the world price took a steep plunge.

The other route would be by taking the government out of its role as maker of the general price level for United States cotton. It holds this role by means of support programs which tend to set a floor for prices and of large stock holdings which tend to set a ceiling at the level where these stocks may be released upon the market. In addition the law authorizes export subsidies which cause the export price to differ from the domestic. Currently a payment-in-kind subsidy on exports is in effect.

If the government relinquished this entire function, the United States apparently would no longer serve as the world price leader because there would

be no concentration of the basic price-making power. The whole structure of the world market presumably would be radically changed. It would resemble much more closely the classical concept of many buyers and many sellers, none in a position of special dominance.

The following comments, however, will deal with the situation in which we are today, in which we have been for a long time, and in which we shall be for some indefinite future time: the situation of the price leader.

THE EFFECT UPON FOREIGN PRODUCTION

The foremost cotton-producing countries of the foreign free world read like a roster of the strategically placed nations in the struggle for progress and freedom: India, Egypt, Mexico, Brazil, Pakistan, and so on. Surely we must have careful regard for their economic stability and progress. What is their interest in the United States cotton policy?

Few kind words are ever said for it in international councils, but as a matter of fact, this policy must have served as an enormous boon to the progress of less-developed nations.

The fundamental nature of cotton prices is not too commonly understood. On the demand side, it is fundamental that cotton is an industrial raw material. Seven eighths of the retail value of the typical product is added after the fiber leaves the farm. The notion that the mills can make quick and easy shifts between cotton and rayon belongs to theory, not to fact. Such shifts do occur, but they typically require years of sustained technical and merchandising effort. In the short-run, the quantity of raw cotton consumed does fluctuate quite importantly, but the fluctuations are governed by the requirements of the spinning mills throughout the world. These requirements change as

the mills respond to the up-and-down motion of the textile cycle. On the supply side, the quantity available in any short-run period is seriously affected by changes in the weather all over the world. These short-term fluctuations in both demand and supply are not caused by the price of raw cotton, nor can small price changes bring them into equilibrium. A tendency toward wide short-term fluctuations in prices is inherent.

In today's world, important expansion in cotton production requires long-range plans and substantial investments—even, to a considerable extent, in the underdeveloped countries. More and more, any significant expansion depends on great irrigation projects. Such investments involve great risks. It seems inescapable that United States cotton policy has served effectively to remove most of the price risk involved, as well as maintaining the world price during most of the postwar period at levels which were quite attractive to the foreign producer.

Under these conditions foreign free-world production rose to 12.4 million bales in 1950–1951—approximately equaling its prewar peak—and from that point proceeded to build up rapidly to 17.5 million in 1958–1959. This is indeed a healthy rate of growth, and it takes on greater meaning from the fact that in the decade of the 1950's the main trend of United States production was forced downward by acreage restrictions.

In addition to maintaining the world price, our cotton policy has provided reasonable assurance to every foreign producer that he could market his crop virtually every year, while we ourselves absorbed the impact of fluctuations in our annual volume of exports ranging from 7.5 to 2.2 million bales. Such is the lot of the residual supplier. In absorbing the main shock of changes

in the supply and demand situation, we maintained the only important stock of surplus cotton in the world, even when our carry-over reached 14.5 million bales in August 1955.

If we have regard solely for the interests of the foreign producing nations we evidently should think long indeed before abandoning our role as the great stabilizing factor in the cotton markets of the world. I would judge that few if any forms of "foreign aid" have meant so much to the strength and progress of the weaker nations.

THE EFFECT UPON UNITED STATES EXPORTS

What, on the other hand, is in the direct national interest of the United States?

I would think, first of all, that our policy needs to be based on a deep understanding of the basic economics involved—the real nature and function of supply, of demand, and of price. This is a prime obligation of a country which holds the burden of such over-towering leadership. I refer, most emphatically, to the supply, demand, and price of this particular commodity. We cannot afford the luxury of theoretical generalizations any more than we can afford that of narrow-minded self-interest.

In the present structure of the world market, it is futile for this country to try to free itself from the handicaps of price leadership. In struggling to do so, we would batter and punish other nations far more than we would help ourselves. And we still would find it impossible to export some normal portion of our production each season, as other nations tend to do.

Our real interest calls for a longer view. Though we are obliged to play the part of the residual supplier, we can profitably direct our attention to the size of the residual. We cannot keep

this from fluctuating a great deal between one season and the next, but we surely can take rational measures aimed at protecting or expanding the average size of the residual over a period of years. The residual involved is, in simplest terms, the gap between total consumption and production of cotton in the entire foreign world. If that gap disappears, we have virtually lost our export market. If it expands, our exports are bound to expand.

Many forces determine the long-range trend of foreign consumption and production. Some of them are entirely outside the province of our national policy or of private industrial policy. Others are within the proper reach of our influence. Sales promotion has a significant bearing on the volume of cotton consumption. Techniques of industry-wide promotion which have been pioneered for the past two decades in this country are now being transported to fourteen leading foreign nations by means of Public Law 480 programs, with major contributions coming from industry groups both in this and in the foreign countries involved.

In this context it is most interesting to examine the function of price. While our role as price leader is a handicap within the time span of a single marketing season, it certainly need not be if we can project our thinking over a period of years. Over the years—and only then—the price of cotton does indeed become a major influence upon the quantity consumed and the quantity produced. Whether we like it or not, our government holds the power, through price, to influence very materially the trend of both consumption and production abroad. This great power can be used with reasonable regard for the direct interest of our own producers as well as those in foreign lands.

A basic source of optimism is the

spectacular rate of growth in foreign cotton consumption. In the whole foreign world—Communist included—cotton consumption has increased in every single year since 1943–1944. It has doubled since 1946–1947! It exceeded its prewar peak level in 1950–1951, reaching 24.6 million. From that point it has climbed upward to 36.9 million in 1958–1959, and perhaps to 38.5 million in 1959–1960. An average increase of 1.5 million bales per year!

Surely in this dynamic market situation it is not greedy for the United States producer to hope that he might maintain his export market at the same average level, or even share modestly in the market expansion. The fact is, however, that throughout the postwar period to 1955–1956, the upward trend of foreign production not only equaled but exceeded the tremendous growth in consumption, so that our residual part of this market was trending downward and our export market was headed toward extinction. In the season of 1955–1956 the government embarked on a program of substantial export subsidies. In the ensuing years foreign production has continued an upward trend, but the pace of the increase has been sharply reduced, so that the residual between foreign consumption and production has begun to show an upward tendency and the outlook for United States exports across the years has improved.

A CHANGING PRICE POLICY

In the meantime the farmer is making a real effort to move with reasonable speed toward the point where he can hold a sound place in the world market without reliance on the export subsidy. Much has been achieved in the field of education on the real market significance of the cotton price. The prices received by farmers for cotton have had a pronounced downward trend over the past decade. The old clamor for 90

per cent of parity is seldom heard today. In 1958, with urging from the cotton industry and the cotton farmer, new legislation was adopted which set the support price on a downward course. For the season beginning August 1, 1960, it has been announced that the export subsidy will be reduced from 8 to 6 cents, accompanied by an offsetting reduction of almost as much in the support price to the farmer. More of this could occur in future years. The declining prices received by the farmer are the more significant because they come in an environment of rising prices for the factors of production. Not many American cotton farmers, even in the most efficient bracket, give much evidence of prosperity today. Neither, incidentally, do many cotton farmers in other lands.

In the cost of production, the great

disadvantage of the American cotton farmer is the price of labor. In many other aspects of production, he has a competitive advantage. As progress is made in the use of machines, chemicals, and scientific techniques in replacement of labor, the hopes of this country for a real comparative advantage in cotton production become brighter. The possibilities of such progress, even to the point of sensational break-throughs in several key problem areas, are quite enormous. If, in the next decade, the technology of cotton production remains rather dormant, it is likely that our genuine economic claim upon a large place in the world cotton market will decline. If great technological progress is made, as it can be, the United States farmer probably will achieve a real comparative advantage in the true classical meaning of the term.

Wheat

By R. L. KRISTJANSON *

ABSTRACT: Internal American agricultural policies as they affect wheat have been determined far too independently of the requirements of sound foreign economic policy. Public Law 480, which was passed to dispose of surpluses, particularly wheat surpluses, has not only tended to disrupt normal commercial trade but has also, mainly because of its temporary nature, failed to be as beneficial to underdeveloped countries as it could have been. To establish a sound wheat program, it is necessary to define the quantities of wheat needed by the underdeveloped countries. Since the amount of wheat required annually for other uses of wheat is known, the determination of the underdeveloped countries' needs would establish the magnitude of adequate internal supply control measures. Maximum use of surplus wheat to foster sound economic development programs can be encouraged by changing existing legislation to allow for the collection of more adequate information concerning the quantities of surplus wheat needed in the years ahead, longer-term surplus-utilization agreements, closer coordination between aid in the form of surplus wheat and other financial aid, and the limitation of surplus utilization to countries in genuine need. Only when these changes are made will the wheat program in the United States fit the requirements of sound foreign economic policy.

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* The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of The Canadian Wheat Board.

INTERNAL American agricultural policies as they affect wheat have been determined far too independently of the requirements of sound foreign economic policy.

Past policies of the United States Department of Agriculture have been primarily determined by the attempt to achieve two goals—efficient production of agricultural products and a distribution of income within the United States that was favorable to the agricultural sector of the economy. The techniques used to achieve these goals have been many and varied, but one of the effects of these policies has been production of wheat that consistently and increasingly outstrips the effective demand for that commodity. The magnitude of the resulting surplus is constantly brought to the attention of the American public.

As the surpluses of wheat mounted the hue and cry from the farm bloc was to dispose of these surpluses. The result was twofold—a considerable increase in the amount of money invested in attempting to find industrial uses for the surpluses and secondly, the passage of Public Law 480.

Public Law 480 was a conception that grew out of a domestic agricultural program. Its emphasis was entirely internal, and it was conceived as a temporary program to dispose of excess agricultural commodities—primarily wheat—that had proved such an annoying and embarrassing problem.

The effects of Public Law 480 on other food surplus-producing countries has been, to say the least, extremely disconcerting. Particularly during the first few years after the law was passed the effect on other food-exporting nations was to have them live in constant fear that the American colossus backed, as they saw it, by a treasury with infinite funds would step in and take over commercial markets on which the livelihood of their farmers depended.

For example, the Canadian farmers and their spokesmen were particularly concerned that the United States Department of Agriculture in its zeal to dispose of its surplus problem would barter wheat in Canada's traditional markets in Western Europe. For the Canadian wheat farmer this would mean financial ruin since the Canadian government cannot afford to subsidize to any great extent the production of a crop whose value is so large in relation to the resources of the Canadian economy.

EFFECTS ON RECIPIENT COUNTRIES

Nor was the operation of Public Law 480 entirely satisfactory from the standpoint of recipient countries. Since Public Law 480 was designed as a measure to dispose of surpluses, it has been clouded with a great deal of uncertainty as far as recipient countries were concerned. To use surpluses to their maximum benefit it is essential for the recipient country to know how much, what kinds, and for what period of time surpluses will be available. For example, if India is to use surplus wheat effectively as a partial substitute for capital in her five-year economic development plans, it is essential that the planners know the amount of wheat that will be available for several years in advance. However, since Public Law 480 was considered a temporary surplus disposal scheme by its originators and administrators, Public Law 480 agreements were mostly annual agreements with no certainty of their continuation.¹

In criticizing a program that was devised as a temporary expedient to solve

¹ Special editor's note: The United States and India have announced a sale of 16 million tons of wheat and one million tons of rice, delivery to be over four years' time, for approximately \$1,276,000,000 to be paid in rupees of which 80 per cent will be given to India as long-term loans for economic development. *New York Times*, May 4, 1960.

an embarrassing domestic problem, one may easily lose sight of its highly beneficial effects. Through the fog of bureaucratic terminology, such as Title I, Title II, Title III, soft currencies, and so on, one can nevertheless see that hungry people were able to obtain food which otherwise would have been denied to them. No economist or political scientist will ever measure the importance of this contribution, but it can hardly be denied, however critical one is of Public Law 480, that on humanitarian grounds it has been an extremely desirable program.

Since 1954 valuable experience has been gained in the administration of Public Law 480. Recognition has gradually grown that the barter feature of the program is simply a crude technique of price cutting and will have detrimental effects on American commercial sales, as well as commercial sales of friendly competing nations when this bartering is pursued in normal commercial wheat markets. Valuable knowledge has also been gained about the generation of soft currencies as a result of Title I transactions. It is now generally understood that the sale of surpluses for soft currencies and loaning these currencies to the recipient country does not constitute a double gift, but rather is a single gift of food for which the United States receives in return currencies of very limited value.

PROBLEM OF OVERPRODUCTION

One effect of attacking the wheat problem as a domestic one, and then passing legislation to dispose of the surplus, has been that the domestic program has never really grappled with the problem of overproduction. When Public Law 480 performs the function of providing a "happy dumping ground" for the agricultural program, then really effective supply control measures will not be forthcoming.

The total annual requirements of wheat for all uses with the exception of wheat for noncommercial export requirements are quite stable and are known. The market for wheat in the United States is approximately 600 million bushels a year. The commercial export market for American wheat is approximately 150 million bushels a year.

The need then is for a program that defines the quantities of wheat that are needed for well-planned and well-organized programs of economic development in the underdeveloped countries. When this quantity is determined and projected into the years ahead and to this are added the quantities of wheat that are required for other uses, then and only then will the extent of the supply control measures for wheat production be known. Whether the supply control measures take the form of an expansion of the Soil Bank program including taking whole farms out of production as Professor Earl O. Heady of Iowa State College has suggested, or whether it is a system of supply control based on marketing quotas as Professor Willard Cochrane of the University of Minnesota has suggested, the magnitude of the needed wheat production adjustments will be established.²

² Both proposals have the same serious weakness. They ignore the political repercussions that will result from the implementation of these proposals. If Professor Heady's proposal were enacted into law and whole farms were either leased or bought on a scale large enough to solve the overproduction problem, the effects on small towns and communities in the more rural states would be devastating. Given the agricultural bias in the composition of the United States Congress the law would quickly be changed. Professor Cochrane's proposal has a similar weakness. Marketing quotas limit what a farmer can market—not what he will produce. If the marketing quotas were stringent enough to solve the overproduction problem, surpluses would accumulate on farms instead of in government storage bins. Again, given the composition of the

The amount of wheat that can be utilized effectively by the underdeveloped countries in the years ahead will depend on the type of program that is used to distribute the wheat. The maximum use will not be made of surplus wheat if the program is so administered that the underdeveloped countries receive only such wheat and only at such time as it is politically expedient within the United States to dispose of it.

POLICY CHANGES NEEDED

Some of the requirements for a sound wheat surplus utilization program would seem to be:

(1) The establishment of a division within the Foreign Agricultural Service to determine the needs of the underdeveloped countries for surplus wheat. The role of this division would be not only to determine needs within the framework of practical workable development programs, but also to project these needs for a five- to ten-year period so that agricultural policy-planners within the United States would know how much wheat would be needed for this use in the years ahead. This division would, of course, have to consult and keep in close contact with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and representatives of other wheat surplus-producing nations. A precedent for the types of studies needed has been made by the Ford Foundation in predicting the food needs of India.³

(2) The activation of Title IV of Public Law 480 so as to allow for authorizations of surplus wheat to the underdeveloped areas for periods of five to ten years. As was indicated above,

United States Congress the accumulation of surpluses on farms would not be tolerated.

³ *India's Food Crisis and the Steps to Meet It* (New Delhi: Government of India, 1959).

it is essential to sound economic development planning to know the extent of the surplus wheat available for a time period long enough to provide for sound planning.

(3) The amendment of Public Law 480 to allow for integration with other forms and types of financing economic development projects. The number of international and bilateral financial arrangements seem to be increasing at a steady rate. If surplus wheat is to be used as a partial substitute for capital in development projects its availability must be contingent on the availability of complementary financial aid.

(4) The strict limitation of surplus wheat utilization on the basis of need. Rules should be established whereby countries with a per capita income above a certain level are declared to be commercial markets and hence will not receive wheat through barter or sales for local currencies. By establishing a rule such that no country with a per capita income of \$200.00 or over will receive wheat donations would have the effect of protecting American commercial markets for wheat. It would also protect the commercial markets of other wheat surplus-producing countries and assure that the United States did not create new areas of economic distress in other parts of the world in its attempt to aid underdeveloped countries.

If the changes outlined above were made, Public Law 480 would become a program that would allow for surplus wheat utilization, rather than being a dumping policy for a domestically oriented wheat program. The over-all domestic wheat program could then be fitted into a policy that was internationally oriented and one that was worthy of a country whose economic power is so great that its every move has economic and political repercussions throughout the world.

Sugar and Wool

By EDWARD F. RENSHAW

ABSTRACT: The production of sugar and wool in this country is encouraged by protective devices which illustrate the peculiar vulnerability of the democratic process to a well-organized, dispersed interest. In pursuing their own narrow interest both groups have unintentionally fostered competition from substitutes which could destroy large segments of their respective industries. Spectacular growth in the consumption of synthetic fibers and the development of a variety of artificial sweeteners suggest that even the most cleverly organized monopolies are threatened by technological progress. The consumer who has been taxed by the sugar and wool interests may gain more in the long run than the producers who must adjust to a kind of competition for which the best protection is no protection.

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UNDER the Jones-Costigan Act the domestic market for sugar was divided between United States and foreign producers. The principal instruments for dealing with the sugar problem under the act were:

(1) The determination each year of the quantity of sugar needed to supply the nation's requirements at prices reasonable to consumers and fair to producers; (2) the division of the United States sugar market among the domestic and foreign supplying areas by the use of quotas; (3) the allotment of these quotas among the various processors in each area; (4) the adjustment of production in each area to the established quotas; (5) the levying of a tax on the processing of sugarcane and sugar beets, the proceeds of which to be used to make payments to producers to compensate them for adjusting their production to marketing quotas and to augment their income; and (6) the equitable division of sugar returns among beet and cane processors, growers, and farm workers.¹

In 1936 the Supreme Court ruled that the tax on processors of agricultural commodities was unconstitutional when used as a device to control production. Thus, provision 5 above was supplemented by an authorization to the Secretary of Agriculture to make payments out of the federal treasury from funds appropriated for that purpose. Aside from that change, however, and the to-be-expected continuous quota revisions, the sugar control program of the 1950's is still the program of the 1930's.²

In another context this author has discussed the probable cost of the sugar program to the consumer.³ It is in the neighborhood of one to two dollars

¹ "The United States Sugar Program," *Agriculture Information Bulletin*, No. 111, United States Department of Agriculture (July 1953), p. 8.

² Willard W. Cochrane, *Farm Prices* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), p. 169.

³ "Reclamation and the American Sugar Policy," *The Western Political Quarterly*, Volume 10 (December 1957), p. 860.

per person per year. William Pendleton has written an excellent article in which he describes the history of "American Sugar Policy" as well as the political considerations involved in the restrictive Sugar Act of 1948, since extended.⁴

About 85 per cent of the United States output of sugar beets is grown on western irrigated farms. One of the paradoxes of government interference in the market on behalf of sugar is that an inefficient sector of our economy has inadvertently been used to justify some extremely wasteful investment in reclamation. The complementarity between sugar beet production and public investment in reclamation illustrates the well-known political-economic process by which relatively small gains to vocal and politically astute minority groups can be compounded into an exorbitant total social cost provided the cost to any individual taxpayer is sufficiently small to go unnoticed or to be hidden within a context of policy objectives that the voter automatically assumes are good for the country.⁵

The sugar program is unique in that even the foreign suppliers have a vested interest in its continuation. If the domestic industry is as unable to compete as many advocates of protection claim, the real beneficiaries from the program are foreign producers who are allowed to sell a portion of their crop in the United States at the protected price. In recent years, the price of raw sugar in the United States, less the protective tariff, has averaged two or three cents above the price prevailing in the world market. The windfall accruing to certain foreign countries, in particular Cuba, heavily dependent upon the ex-

⁴ William Pendleton, "American Sugar Policy," *Journal of Farm Economics*, Vol. 33 (1948), pp. 226-242.

⁵ Edward F. Renshaw, *Toward Responsible Government, An Economic Appraisal of Federal Investment in Water Resources* (Chicago: Idylla Press, 1957), pp. 17-24.

port of sugar, is a threatening weapon of diplomacy.

Congress, in recent months, has been under tremendous pressure to grant the President authority to reduce Cuba's sugar quota. Considering both the amount and the way in which capital belonging to United States citizens has been appropriated, some sort of economic retaliation is probably inevitable. The relevant question would appear to be, is a reduction of Cuba's sugar quota an optimal retaliatory instrument? The answer, it seems to me, is no.

A better device would be to freeze, say, two thirds of the two-cent-per-pound premium Cuba obtains from the sale of her quota in our protected market, with the understanding that the money will be used to compensate those individuals who have had their property seized. To keep the program above-board, payments should be based upon an independent appraisal of property values by a neutral nation.

The advantage in this approach, it seems to me, is that it can be defended on moral grounds. The economic benefits accrue to the injured parties rather than to secondary parties hoping to take advantage of an unpleasant political development.

If the more advanced countries of the world agreed among themselves to discriminate by imposing, temporarily, special tariffs against the goods of countries expropriating foreign capital—to insure just compensation in that event—much of the present reticence on the part of private interests to invest capital in politically unstable countries would disappear. Without foreign capital and the technology which comes with it, the road to economic prosperity and political maturity for the so-called “underdeveloped” countries is likely to be much longer and more apt to follow the Soviet pattern.

Considering the far-reaching reper-

cussions of any move that might be interpreted as “retaliatory” on the part of the United States, Congress ought to consider seriously the possibility of establishing a precedent which will promote economic and social stability in the free world as opposed to a reflex reaction which will only benefit a few sugar growers who have already been granted special privilege.

WOOL

Wool is of particular historic interest because of its key role in American tariff policy. According to Blinken:

The wool tariffs have traditionally been at the center of American tariff battles. For all practical intents and purposes, the 1929 Smoot-Hawley tariff debates were waged about Schedule 11, that section of the tariff laws dealing with wool and wool manufactures.⁶

When the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, concluded by the State Department at Geneva, was released in November, 1947, the comparative calm with which it was greeted was marred only by the backwash of the wool tariff controversy. The *New York Times* reported that “there were 3,500 American products listed for tariff reduction in a State Department announcement, November 17, but the western wool growers, members of Congress, and Chamber of Commerce officials had eyes for only one—wool.”⁷

Wool production in this country is at the present time encouraged by means of a fixed tariff and a system of compensatory payments. Under the National Wool Act of 1954:

(1) An annual production of 300 million pounds of shorn wool—about one-third more than we are now producing—is to be encouraged as a measure for our national security and promotion of the general economic welfare. (2) An incentive price is

⁶ Donald M. Blinken, *Wool Tariffs and American Policy* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1948), p. 9.

⁷ *Ibid.*

established to encourage this larger production. (3) The price will be obtained by means of payments to growers to bring their income from wool up to the incentive level, rather than by raising prices in the free market. (4) A portion of the duties collected on imports of wool and wool manufactures is appropriated to finance the payments. (5) Section 708 of the act provides a self-help feature whereby wool growers can work together more effectively in developing and financing advertising and promotion programs to improve the demand for the industry's products and, thereby increase the prices received in the free market.⁸

The wool act is unique in that the burden of maintaining a high-level price support for United States production is shifted in effect onto the foreign producer. The dual protection afforded by the tariff and the compensatory payments has been greater in recent years than the tariff which existed prior to the 1948 Trade Agreements Act.

IMPORT FOR DOMESTIC POLICY

According to Professor Willard Cochrane a combination of circumstances is causing the cartelization of agriculture. “I am convinced that society is eventually and inevitably going to grant monopoly powers to agriculture, via government, to permit and enable the many producers in agriculture to act in concert.”⁹ In *Farm Prices, Myth and Reality*,¹⁰ the main outlines of a monopolistic course of action for agriculture are again set forth; the monopolistic features, however, are cloaked in the

⁸ United States Congress, House of Representatives, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Livestock and Feed Grains, *Extend National Wool Act of 1954* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 17.

⁹ Willard W. Cochrane, “Agricultural Policy—Recent Changes and Future Implications,” *Journal of Farm Economics* (May 1957), pp. 296–297.

¹⁰ Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958.

guise of a “public-utility approach to the price-income problems of agriculture.”¹¹ Cochrane likens his comprehensive supply control program primarily to the sugar program.

While both the sugar and wool¹² programs deserve special consideration as ways of obtaining the price support end without contributing to domestic surpluses, doubt can be raised as to whether they have helped to reduce the income disparity vis-à-vis agriculture and the rest of the economy.

It does not appear that sugar producers enjoyed a more affluent position than other farmers in 1949, the most recent year for which data are available.¹³ Furthermore the data are not inconsistent with the hypothesis that the gains from the sugar program have been capitalized into land values.¹⁴ Admittedly the position of land owners is enhanced by an increase in land prices resulting from the program, but it does not follow that the young farmer just becoming established or the farmer who wants to enlarge his holdings finds himself in more advantageous circumstances by an increase in the ‘cost of doing business.’ Price support programs which act to inflate land values could, in the long run, aggravate more than help farmers make the kind of adjustments that are necessary in order to obtain the benefits from the new and

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

¹² Under the National Wool Act of 1954 there has been a dramatic decline in Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) holdings of wool. Over 180 million pounds of wool were accumulated by the CCC from the 1952, 1953, and 1954 price-support loan programs. At the beginning of the 1955 marketing year existent stocks totaled 150 million pounds. The CCC holdings were progressively liquidated under the incentive program and were no longer a depressing influence on the market by the end of 1957.

¹³ Edward F. Renshaw, “A Note on Farm Price Supports,” *Modern Age*, Vol. 3 (Summer 1959), p. 271.

¹⁴ *Loc. cit.*

better production possibilities afforded by technological progress.

FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Sugar and wool are two of the most perfectly organized monopolies in existence. They are widely dispersed throughout the United States and assured of continuing Congressional support. Neither commodity is significantly dependent upon net treasury outlays to maintain its price supports. In view of these factors it would be unrealistic to advocate a policy of free trade in sugar and wool regardless of the desirability of that objective.

The issue, it seems to me, is whether they should be given such a high level of protection that they become growth industries. After World War II a sizeable expansion in United States sugar production was permitted. The present program seems to be directed toward allocating a fixed historical share of the United States market to domestic producers. If population continues to increase and if synthetic sweeteners do not increase significantly in relative importance, this policy could foster the growth of an inefficient industry.

A prime objective of the National Wool Act was to increase domestic production. Increased domestic production was to be encouraged at a time when the share of the United States market supplied by foreign producers was declining.

The argument advanced for maintaining a fixed share of the market and even increasing the domestic share is couched in terms of national defense. But this argument is fallacious. The United States has never been successful at increasing the production of either sugar or wool in time of war. Past wars have simply made us more dependent than ever upon imports.¹⁵

¹⁵ Cuban sugar is produced virtually in our own back door. The logical way to provide

The most important factor to consider in connection with the defense argument is the changing concept of war itself. Strategists are now speaking in terms of short wars, even minute wars. For a war that is expected to last less than six months, it is the efficiency of the economy prior to the outbreak of hostilities that is important. Even if the war were expected to last longer, it is not certain that our aim should be self-sufficiency; shipping hazards must be balanced against the vulnerability of atomic attack. The destruction of foreign production is not likely to be given so high a priority as the destruction of United States productive capacity. In either event it would seem the height of foolishness to exhaust our own natural resources and to promote the growth of inefficient industry at home, thus weakening our allies, at a time when the cold war is clearly being fought on the economic front. If we lose the latter, we are almost certain to lose a hot war, regardless of our self-sufficiency.

A reasonable kind of protection would be directed toward maintaining a level of support that would insure domestic producers the lower of either (1) a fixed total output or (2) a fixed share of a declining domestic market. If all the so-called "developed" countries were to adopt protective policies of this kind, the world economy could be expected to adapt to a policy of free trade without severe adjustments. It is not unreasonable to believe that economic progress in the free world could be accelerated at little or no cost to vested interests by making the "right to grow" more contingent upon economic efficiency.

for our defense needs with respect to wool would be to stock pile that commodity. See: *Wool Tariffs and American Policy*, op. cit., pp. 57-62.

Lessons from a Comparison of United States and Canadian Farm Policy Approaches

By DAVID L. MACFARLANE

ABSTRACT: Professor Johnson's unpublished paper entitled "Income and Resource Effects of Canadian and United States Farm Policies: A Comparison" demonstrates that the policies followed in Canada until 1958 were quite satisfactory compared to those pursued in the United States. Canadian costs have been far lower regardless of the method of measurement; changes in Canadian farm incomes over thirty or more years have been just as favorable; and Canadian resource adjustments have been by economic standards more desirable than those of the United States. The last point is particularly clear in the case of the wheat economy and in the relatively greater expansion of livestock production. The emphasis in Canadian farm policy has been on production payments, for example, feed freight assistance, prairie farm rehabilitation—a farm development program—prairie farm assistance—a crop insurance scheme—and premiums on high grade hogs. These contrast with parity payments and attempts at restriction of output in the United States. While desirable resource adjustments have been made in Canadian agriculture, returns per farm and per worker are substantially lower than those prevailing in the United States and only half those in nonagricultural occupations. Thus the challenge to farm policy is greater in Canada than in the United States, and political pressures demanding a more aggressive approach to the farm income problem become stronger each year.

David L. MacFarlane, Montreal, Quebec, has been a member of the staff of McGill University since 1947. He came originally from the Canadian prairie region and after graduate studies at the University of Minnesota, the University of Chicago, and Harvard University worked for five years in Kentucky before entering wartime service with the Canadian government. He is a co-author with John D. Black of *The Development of Canadian Agriculture to 1970* (1958) as well as the author of many papers on Canadian farm policy.

MANY analyses of the American farm programs have considered in some detail their implications to the foreign policy of the United States. Professor D. Gale Johnson's book entitled *Trade and Agriculture* is perhaps the most notable of these works. However, little comprehensive work has been devoted to detailing the comparative implications of clearly different farm policies on farm economies which have much in common.

Professor D. Gale Johnson has prepared a paper in which he undertakes such a comparison with respect to Canada and the United States.¹ While it is most unfortunate that Professor Johnson's valuable paper has not been published, the writer has permission to quote from it and generally to employ it as a point of departure for much of the present paper. Johnson's major focus is on the consequences which flow from the pursuit of divergent farm policies in these two countries. He has used many imaginative and yet unsophisticated analytical techniques in handling a most difficult subject. It may be appropriate to commence this paper by quoting several of Johnson's major findings:

On the basis of the evidence brought together in this paper, the Canadian farm policy as it operated until 1958 was a reasonably satisfactory one compared to the policy followed across the border. This conclusion rests upon the following points. . . . First, the relative cost to the government of the Canadian farm programs for price and income support (regardless of how they are measured) has been only a fraction of the cost in the United States; second, the general changes in the income of the farm population has been at least as favorable in Canada as in the United

¹ "Income and Resource Effects of Canadian and United States Farm Policies: A Comparison," University of Chicago Office of Agricultural Economics Research, Paper 5912 (April 6th, 1959).

States; third, the resource adjustments that have occurred are, in several cases, more appropriate than has been true in the United States; and fourth, the current price structure in Canada is much more consistent with the underlying demand and supply conditions than is true in the United States.

The Canadian experience in the major wheat areas indicates that it is possible to adjust resources and farming practices to a substantially lower price of wheat than prevails in the United States without a significant effect on the return to labour. In the Prairie Provinces there has been a much greater emphasis on summer fallow than in the regions across the border; there has also been a significant shift towards livestock and feed grain production as sources of income, shifts that did not occur in comparable areas in the United States.

The Canadian experience tends to cast doubt upon the "inevitability of output outrunning demand" because of the continuing advances of technology. . . . The Canadian experience supports the prediction of traditional theory of the firm and the industry that output grows in response to change and demand and factor supply conditions and does not just increase "willy nilly" in response to purely technological considerations. It is certainly true that technical conditions in production have a great deal to do with relative product prices. And if relative product prices fall because of resource economies output would surely be larger than it would in the absence of the economies, but this is very different than saying that the increased output is caused by changes in techniques.

Finally, the Canadian and the United States experiences taken together indicate that the factor supply adjustments that have occurred, especially in the labor market, have been sufficient to result in some long run improvement in the relative income position of farm workers and a very substantial improvement in the real income position as conventionally measured. The rise in real incomes has not been due to improvement in the relative prices in farm products; if anything relative farm prod-

uct prices have fallen over the past three decades. The improvement has been due to the significant increase in the marginal physical product of labour which, in turn, resulted from technological change, general improvements in resource efficiency and a

substantial reduction in labour employment, both absolutely and relatively to all other outputs. There is no reason to believe that the general improvements in technology and productive efficiency will not continue; consequently further in-

TABLE 1—GOVERNMENTAL COSTS OF PRICE AND INCOME SUPPORT PROGRAMS, CANADA AND UNITED STATES, 1948-1949-1956-1957*

COUNTRY AND PROGRAM	PERIOD	
	1948-1949 1956-1957	1952-1953 1956-1957
(millions of dollars)		
Canada		
Agricultural Prices Support Act	92.8	83.9
Agric. Prod. Co-op Mkting Act	7.4	5.4
Cheese and Cheese Factory Imp. Act	6.5	3.1
Prairie Farm Assistance Act	33.9	9.6
Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Act	32.3	19.8
Hog Premiums	49.1	29.3
Replacement of Maple Sap Buckets	2.3	0.8
Lime	4.2	2.4
Freight Assistance on Western Grains	155.5	88.6
Wheat Grant	65.0	
Apples—Postwar Industry Assistance	5.7	
Other	3.0	0.3
Total	457.7	242.9
United States		
Commodity Credit Programs	5,786	4,263
National Wool Act	125	125
International Wheat Agreement	811	420
Donations of Commodities to other Nations	384	384
Commodities sold for foreign currencies	931	931
Removal of Surplus Commodities	925	669
Sugar Act	159	93
Federal Crop Insurance	75	52
Soil Bank	519	519
Agricultural Conservation Payments	2,006	1,069*
Other ^b	254	191
Total	11,975	8,711

* Estimate of 200 million dollars for last two years.

^a The Canadian data are from Marjorie R. Cameron, *Federal Agricultural Assistance Programs, Canada, 1945-56*, Economic Division, Marketing Service, Canada Department of Agriculture, Ottawa, February, 1957, Table I, and *Current Agricultural Assistance Programs, Canada Department of Agriculture*, June, 1957, Ottawa, July 1957, Table 2.

^b The United States data are from F. D. Stocker, *Governmental Cost in Agriculture*, Agriculture Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture, May, 1956, Table 2, and testimony by Secretary Ezra Taft Benson in *Farm Program*, Hearings before the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, United States Senate, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, January 17-22, 1958, following p. 42.

N.B. The currency units are those of the respective countries.

creases in the real income of the farm workers will depend upon further reductions in the farm labour force.

CANADIAN FARM POLICY

It is appropriate at this point to examine briefly the Canadian farm industry and Canadian farm policy which have drawn more than mild praise from Professor Johnson. Until 1958, Canadian farm policy is clearly characterized by restraint with respect to the use of subsidies from the public treasury and the total absence of direct production controls. Professor Johnson's very useful summary of the types of payments from the federal treasury used in support of the farm industry in Canada and in the United States is reproduced in Table 1. The restraint shown by the Canadian government in supporting agriculture becomes more evident if an adjustment of the data in Table 1 is made, removing the influence of purely emergency programs with which any government would have to deal whether or not it had an agricultural policy. These adjustments include (1) the cost incurred by the outbreak of the foot-and-mouth disease, included in price supports and totaling 70 million dollars; (2) the payment of 65 million dollars to wheat farmers to compensate them for a five-year wheat contract with the United Kingdom that was not concluded by the Canadian government because of either misunderstanding or bad faith; and (3) the cost of butter price support during the period following the legalization of margarine in 1949—production and sale had been illegal for nearly sixty years—amounting to approximately 10 million dollars. This adjustment reduces the eight-year total of farm program cost to 312.7 million dollars or an average of less than 40 million dollars per year. The adjusted costs of federal farm programs distributed over the eight-year period averaged

2 per cent of gross farm income and 3.5 per cent of net farm income.

It is further evident that a very large proportion of government payments to Canadian farmers, after considering the adjustments indicated in the previous paragraph, were primarily intended to be production payments, for example, feed freight assistance, prairie farm rehabilitation—a farm development program—prairie farm assistance—a crop insurance scheme—and premiums on high grade hogs. Thus price support and other programs for the purpose of influencing farm prices have been of negligible importance.

PRICE SUPPORT LEGISLATION

But this policy ended in the fiscal year 1957–1958—the last year in Johnson's table. In that year a new government passed price support legislation which was much more comprehensive, making support mandatory for nine products at a level of at least 80 per cent of the average price of the previous ten years. The following year, the government began to subsidize milk for manufacturing purposes on the basis of 25 cents per hundred gallons. The new supports were carried out, for more than a year, by a purchase program which placed in government hands embarrassingly large supplies of pork, dairy products, and eggs. Losses by the new Agricultural Stabilization Board, largely on the products noted, amounted to about 58 million dollars in fiscal year 1959–1960. These losses as well as the difficulty of trying to sell, dump, or give away surpluses resulted in deficiency payments for hogs and eggs. Ostensibly for the purpose of combating vertical integration, the deficiency payments apply only to one hundred hogs and 4,000 dozen eggs per farm per year. Though this plan was in operation for only a few months at the time of this writing, it is realizing its avowed pur-

pose of restricting production. Both because of its discriminatory aspect and because the major farm organizations advised against deficiency payments, the present program is under vigorous attack. Major Canadian farm organizations have generally been statesman-like and have suggested supports at a level which would provide no incentive to increased production. At the same time, in consideration of the grave difficulties involved in marketing, they have pressed vigorously for direct payments on wheat. Stringent quotas are applied to farm deliveries. These have typically been low because exports have lagged in the face of United States non-commercial wheat exports.

CANADIAN WHEAT FARMERS

One other aspect of Canadian farm policy should be noted. It lies in the role of the Canadian Wheat Board which is a monopoly marketing agency for wheat, oats, and barley. The Board pays an initial delivery price, which operates as a floor price on these grains, and makes further payments as the crops are marketed. The support on "No. 3 Northern," an average grade, has for some years been \$1.32 basis "Ft. William" or generally about \$1.10 to \$1.15 at farm level. The farm price of wheat has averaged \$1.25 to \$1.30 in recent years compared to an average farm price close to \$2.00 in the United States. The general position of the Canadian wheat grower is that he could compete fully with the United States producer, but can scarcely be expected to contend with the United States Treasury.

As Johnson correctly points out, Canadian wheat farmers have made substantial adjustments to the low price of wheat and to the more buoyant prices for livestock and livestock products. He cites that in the 1926–1929 period almost 70 per cent of the cash receipts

of farmers in the Prairie Provinces were from wheat and that by 1953–1957 the proportion had fallen to 44 per cent. In the two-year period 1958 to 1959, it fell further to 37.3 per cent. In contrast to this drastic remaking of Canadian Prairie agriculture Montana and North Dakota show no reduction in dependence upon wheat. Johnson makes the point that total farm output in the United States has expanded somewhat faster than that of Canada. And he could have added that this occurred in the face of a faster rate of growth of Canadian population.

RESOURCE ADJUSTMENTS

Johnson stresses as consequences flowing from Canadian agricultural policy the extent to which farmers have made adjustments in resources used—and they have been very substantial. The most important of these relates to the labor force in Canadian agriculture which has declined from 1,200,000 in 1941 to 748,000 in 1958. This is a somewhat greater reduction than the United States has experienced. Comparative adjustments in other production factors are indicated in the following tabulation which shows percentage change in capital invested in real estate, machinery, and livestock from 1941 to 1958:

PER CENT CHANGE IN AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT, 1941–1958

Resource	Canada	United States
Real Estate	127	231
Machinery	265	389
Livestock	202	168

While many limitations attach to the use of these data they suggest that a smaller increase in the use of machinery and a greater increase in livestock investment have been associated with the very modest Canadian farm programs.

This would be expected in terms of Johnson's analysis since American farm programs have aided crops more than livestock while the generally "free" market in Canada has had the opposite result. The larger comparative increase in real estate values in Canada is probably due to the unduly low levels during the depression period which in the case of Canada extended at least through 1941.

THE LESSONS

What lessons emerge from this comparison of Canadian and American farm policy? First it is necessary to make unmistakably clear the fact that while desirable resource adjustments have proceeded more quickly in Canada, they have not been accompanied by any improvement in income. Apparently most of the benefits of these adjustments were quickly transferred to consumers. Johnson points out that over a thirty to thirty-five year period real returns per worker in the two countries have increased to the same extent. However,

in either absolute terms or compared with returns to workers in other industries earnings of farmers are deplorably low. And in Canada, they are not only about 20 per cent less than in the United States, but farmers in the latter country apparently have considerably higher earnings than nonfarm sources.

Thus the challenge to farm policy remains. With aggressive and expensive programs the United States has failed to meet the generally accepted income criteria of farm policy; without them Canada has also failed. And while the atmosphere for constructive adjustment is more propitious in Canada no resolution of the farm income problem is in sight—and barring substantial redirection of policy Canadian farmers seem assured of at least another decade on the tortuous path through the economic "meat grinder." A redirection may of political necessity come in the form of relatively large direct payments and/or an expansion of production payments. That such benefits would be retained in agriculture is uncertain.

Toward Better Use of Human Resources in Agriculture*

By JAMES G. MADDOX

ABSTRACT: During the last twenty years this country has seen the sharpest decrease in farm population in our history. However, American agriculture is still overstaffed. What can be done to alleviate this oversupply of labor in agriculture? Public action in several areas will be needed. A more rapid growth of the total economy would attract substantial numbers of people out of agriculture. Educational opportunities for rural people in primary and secondary schools should be enlarged and reoriented to provide better training for nonfarm occupations. Farm people should be aided in analyzing and evaluating nonfarm employment opportunities of various types. Likewise, they should be provided with more adequate information pertaining to nonfarm jobs, and a loan program to enable farm boys and girls to obtain specialized training for nonfarm work would be helpful. In many areas of chronic rural poverty the needed redevelopment programs should aim at: creating nonfarm jobs in these areas through industrialization; assisting some people to move out of the areas; and providing liberal credit and farm planning assistance for those who remain in agriculture. The results of public programs of these kinds would be an increase in the efficiency of the national economy and improved incomes for the farm as well as nonfarm population.

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* The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily correspond to the official views of the School of Agriculture of North Carolina State College.

APPROXIMATELY 21.2 million people were living on farms in the United States in the spring of 1959. This was the smallest farm population reported since data first became available in 1910. It was 15.5 per cent below the 25.1 million people who lived on farms in 1950. Since 1940 there has been a net decline of 9.3 million farm people, which must have been the sharpest decrease in any twenty-year period in the history of the country.

Nevertheless, there is evidence that American agriculture is still overstaffed. The federal government is spending large sums to support the prices of several farm products. It also maintains complex programs of acreage control. Yet, surpluses continue to mount; the purchasing power of farm commodity prices declines; and much of the labor employed in farming earns less than many nonfarm workers in fairly comparable types of employment. These considerations alone point to the conclusion that too many people are trying to make a living by farming.

But this is only a part of the picture. The natural rate of population increase is much higher than is necessary to maintain a stable farm population. At the same time, a technological and organizational revolution is sweeping through agriculture and rapidly decreasing the labor required to produce a given output. Fewer farm people would be employed in the future than in the past, even if there were no price and surplus problems. Clearly, if equal returns to comparable kinds of farm and nonfarm labor are to be achieved—a condition which would both increase the efficiency of the national economy and improve the income position of agriculture—many people now employed in farming, as well as those who are coming into the farm labor force each year from the natural rate of population

growth, must shift to other occupations.

OVERSUPPLY OF LABOR

How great is the oversupply of labor in agriculture? How many people would have to leave farming during the next decade in order to bring the earnings of labor in agriculture to a level comparable to those in nonfarm occupations? On the basis of existing knowledge about the way in which the total supply of agricultural products responds to changes in prices and costs and the extent to which capital can economically be substituted for labor, an accurate answer to these questions is virtually impossible. An annual net migration of one to one and one-quarter million people out of agriculture, for the next ten years, could probably take place with relatively little effect on total farm output. A shift of this magnitude would drain off the net natural increase in farm population as well as an additional 900,000 to 1,000,000 farm people per year. Though such a rate of change might have little effect on total farm output, it would result in a significant rise in per capita farm income.

Income comparisons

Comparisons between the average annual returns to farm labor and the yearly wages of employed factory workers or the average per capita net incomes of the farm and nonfarm populations indicate that farm people earn only about one half as much as those employed in nonfarm occupations. There are, however, numerous difficulties in such comparisons. First, there are differences in the age, sex, education, and experience of the farm labor force compared to nonfarm workers. Second, the purchasing power of a given income in urban areas is probably lower than on farms. The magnitude of these differ-

ences is not accurately known. However, per capita farm incomes which are 65 to 70 per cent of per capita nonfarm incomes may result in farm labor receiving about the same real returns as nonfarm labor of equivalent ability.¹ Even so, average per capita net farm income would need to increase substantially above the levels of recent years, if labor of comparable ability is to receive approximately the same return in farming as in nonfarm occupations.

However, there are wide variations in the incomes of farm people. Income data pertaining to national averages are of limited value. The Census of Agriculture shows that about 62 per cent of all farms in the United States in 1954 produced approximately 91 per cent of the total value of agricultural products, while the remaining 38 per cent produced only about 9 per cent of the value of farm output. The former group, which we call "high production farms," had gross sales of \$2,500 or more per farm in 1954. The latter group, designated as "low production farms," had gross sales of less than \$2,500 per farm.

A study covering the period 1947 through 1956 indicates that the average family income, from both farm and nonfarm sources, on high production farms was higher than the average income for nonfarm families from 1947 through 1952 and ranged from 79 to 89 per cent of nonfarm family income from 1953 through 1956. In contrast, the families on low production farms had average incomes from both farm and nonfarm sources which ranged from 42 to 51 per cent of the average incomes of nonfarm families during the decade from 1947 through 1956.²

¹ See "Labor Mobility and Agricultural Adjustment," by D. Gale Johnson, *Agricultural Adjustment Problems in a Growing Economy* (Iowa State College Press, Ames, 1958).

² See "The Current Income Position of Commercial Farms," by Nathan M. Koffsky

Although the earnings of high production farms have probably worsened since 1956, the major problem of low returns to agricultural labor is certainly centered on the low production units—which numbered approximately 1,800,000 farms, not including residential and institutional units, in the United States in 1954. The number has probably decreased since that time, and the migration of young people from such farms has been heavy. Consequently, it is hazardous to guess the number of people who presently reside on low production farms. However, it is likely to be in the range of 5 to 7 million.

Approximately 48 per cent of the low production farms in 1954 were in the ten states of Kentucky, Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Oklahoma. The South is the center of the most serious low-income problem in American agriculture. In this region, farms are small, capital is scarce, the natural rate of population increase is high, there are relatively few nonfarm jobs, and those which are available are most commonly in low-wage occupations. If equality of returns among farm and nonfarm workers of comparable abilities is to be achieved, occupational shifts must be far greater in the South than in any other major region of the country.

POSSIBLE PUBLIC ACTION

Public action will be needed in the years ahead to stimulate the growth of nonfarm jobs and to assist farm people to shift into nonfarm occupations. A rapidly growing economy requires a high degree of geographic and occupa-

and Ernest W. Grove, *Policy for Commercial Agriculture*, Joint Economic Committee (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, November 22, 1957).

tional mobility among members of the labor force. Public policy may need to give attention to this problem in several sectors of the economy, but agriculture is the major sector, at the present time, in which greater occupational mobility would increase national efficiency significantly. The following types of public action are in order:

First, the rate of economic growth in the total economy should be raised.

Second, the abilities of farm people to become productive workers in nonfarm occupations should be enhanced.

Third, farm people should be given more assistance than they now receive in analyzing and evaluating their future prospects in various types of employment.

Fourth, farm people should be supplied with more adequate information respecting nonfarm employment opportunities than they now receive.

Fifth, a specialized loan program to aid selected farmers and maturing farm youths to shift out of agriculture should be inaugurated in those states where low incomes, high rates of population increase, and limited opportunities in agriculture are prevalent.

Sixth, there are numerous "special areas" in which a complex of integrated activities aimed at developing nonfarm jobs and reorganizing existing farm units should be undertaken.

Increase in GNP

The average rate of increase in gross national product for the total economy might well be raised to around 4 or 4.5 per cent annually. There are both many difficulties in and many justifications for such a course of action. It would be important in assuring a sufficient demand for labor in nonfarm occupations to attract substantial numbers of people out of agriculture. To achieve such an objective will require monetary, fiscal, and price stabilization policies which are far afield from the subject of this paper. The remainder of the

discussion, therefore, centers attention on the other areas of public action suggested above.

Enlarged educational opportunities

The second of these—programs to enhance the abilities of farm people to become productive workers in nonfarm occupations—would involve enlarging the educational opportunities of the rural population. It is probably the single most important step that government can take in bringing about a better allocation of labor in the economy. The main lines of emphasis of an expanded educational effort for rural people should be: (1) to provide improvements in the general quality of instruction in elementary and secondary schools in rural areas; (2) to provide a sequence of vocational courses in the existing rural high schools both for youngsters and for adults, which are aimed at fitting farm people for nonfarm jobs; and (3) to provide for an expanded number of specialized vocational schools in rural areas, which are organized and operated for the purpose of preparing rural people for nonfarm types of employment.

The responsibilities for implementing these improvements in rural education should be borne mainly by state and local agencies which administer our system of primary and secondary schools. In order to provide the necessary authority and funds, however, important legislative action will be necessary. Moreover, there is little reason to believe that the task can be accomplished on the scale which is needed without substantial utilization of federal funds. Space is much too limited to permit an adequate exploration of this problem. Pertinent light is thrown on it, however, by the following data for 1955-1956.³

³ *Statistical Summary of Education: 1955-1956*, Office of Education, United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

	EXPENDITURES PER PUPIL IN AVERAGE DAILY ATTENDANCE IN PUBLIC, ELE- MENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS	EXPENDITURES FOR ELEMEN- TARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS AS A PER CENT OF PERSONAL INCOME
United States	\$388	3.57
Kentucky	179	2.56
Tennessee	229	3.59
North Carolina	242	4.07
South Carolina	292	5.44
Georgia	222	3.39
Alabama	206	3.62
Mississippi	171	3.94
Arkansas	197	3.71
Louisiana	358	4.81
Oklahoma	331	4.49
Average for 10 southern states	244	3.91
Average for 38 other states	435	3.53

In most southern states, where the need for education is greatest and where educational expenditures per pupil are lowest, a higher percentage of personal income is devoted to education than in other regions. With only two exceptions—Kentucky and Georgia—the ten southern states listed above made a greater effort in 1955-1956, relative to the incomes of their citizens, to educate their children than was true of most nonsouthern states. For instance, in Mississippi, the state with the lowest expenditure per pupil, 3.94 per cent of personal income was used for elementary and secondary education in 1955-1956, compared with 3.44 per cent in New York, the state with the highest expenditure per pupil.⁴ This contrast epitomizes an important aspect of the educational problem in the United States. If rural education is to be improved significantly in the states where the need is greatest, federal aid will be essential.

⁴ The expenditure per pupil in average daily attendance in public, elementary and secondary schools in New York in 1955-1956 was \$584.

Some changes in rural education, however, are not wholly dependent on a new program of federal aid. There are opportunities to make adjustments in the uses for which present funds have been allocated. For instance, there appears to be little justification for a continuation, at the present scale, of vocational agricultural training in rural high schools. Most future graduates of agricultural high school courses will not enter directly into modern, commercialized farming. The aims and methods of the present system of vocational agricultural training should be shifted to give greater emphasis to training youngsters for nonfarm jobs.

Career counseling

The third suggested area of public action—greater assistance to farm people in analyzing and evaluating alternative employment opportunities—should become the responsibility of the Agricultural Extension Service. Research may often be needed on which to base such educational effort. The important aim would be to teach farm people, particularly young people, how to think through the problem of choosing a career. One would be rash to imply that there is only one solution to the problem for each individual or that an optimum solution can always be achieved. In this respect, however, the problem is similar to numerous others, about which farmers are often given educational assistance by the Extension Service. The need is for a continuing program, in which the focus of emphasis is on teaching farm people how to analyze their future prospects in various types of occupations. The intensity of effort should vary by regions, but there is hardly an agricultural area in the United States in which farm people could not be benefited by an educational effort of this type.

Nonfarm employment

The fourth area of needed public action—providing to farm people more adequate information with respect to nonfarm employment opportunities—appears to call for a revitalization of the United States Employment Service and its affiliated state agencies. As this organization now functions, it does not appear to be serving farm people in an adequate manner. In many areas of the South, where farm incomes are low and farming opportunities are scant, there is a noticeable paucity of information about job opportunities in the urban areas of the North and East. For the Employment Service to serve the best interests of farm people in low-income areas, a specialized program may be necessary. Because there are often local antipathies toward a decrease in the number of farm workers, federalizing the Employment Service's functions should be carefully considered.

Loan programs

The South and a few other scattered areas have such a high ratio of rural population to capital and land resources, such a high natural rate of population increase, such a deficiency of nonfarm job opportunities, and such a plethora of low-income farm people that a special loan program to enable maturing farm boys and girls to obtain apprenticeship training or to attend specialized vocational schools or colleges should be inaugurated. It could be administered by the Farmers Home Administration without involving the establishment of a new agency. Legislative authority and an increase in appropriations would probably be necessary.

Such features as the eligibility requirements of borrowers, the maximum size of loan, the length of the repayment

period, the type of security, and the interest rate should be established by the lending agency. Loans of this type would probably range from \$200 to \$2,500 and would be repayable in monthly installments after the borrower had finished his or her period of training. They would be analogous to loans which many colleges now make to selected students. In most cases, however, they would be made to rural youths who are interested in taking a specialized vocational course which would range from only a few months to perhaps as long as two years. Ten million dollars per year for loans of this type, over a ten-year period, would be of inestimable value to thousands of farm boys and girls.

Redevelopment programs

In various regions of the country, but particularly in the South, there are numerous areas of chronic rural poverty, which are in need of specialized redevelopment programs.⁵ Many of these areas are heavily populated, lacking in natural resources, culturally isolated from the main stream of economic development, and poorly supplied with roads, schools, and other community facilities. Within recent years many young people have migrated out of such areas, but farm enlargement is taking place slowly and industrial growth appears to be centered mainly around the larger cities. As a result, many of the areas of chronic rural poverty are in great need of new capital and new entrepreneurship.

Integrated programs of redevelopment which provide liberal amounts of credit and farm planning assistance to those who remain in agriculture so that they can enlarge and improve their

⁵ For a delineation of such areas see: *Development of Agriculture's Human Resources*, United States Department of Agriculture (April 1955).

farms, which provide vocational training for those whose only opportunities are in nonfarm occupations, and which encourage the growth of industry and service trades in these areas are sorely needed. Opportunities and potentialities vary greatly from area to area. The first major step, therefore, should be to conduct an economic study of each area which would culminate in recommendations for action programs. The financing and co-ordination of such a series of studies will require federal action, though much of the work might be done through contracts with Agricultural Experiment Stations. Subsequently, a series of Special Area Development Authorities may be needed to carry forward the recommended programs of redevelopment.

The six areas of public action which have been suggested in the preceding paragraphs involve a combination of federal and state action. Those which are educational or informational in content should be national in scope and should become continuing functions of government. The educational loan program and the special-area redevelopment activities should be limited mainly to the South and a few other relatively small areas where the low production farm problem is most serious. If this combination of programs were pursued with vigor and imagination for the decade ahead, it would greatly increase the efficiency of the national economy and improve the incomes of the people who leave agriculture, as well as those who remain in farming.

The Executive and Farm Policy

By JOSEPH S. DAVIS

ABSTRACT: The national interest requires a reversal of the costly drift of farm policy in the area involving price supports, production controls, and surplus stocks and disposals. There is a dangerous trend toward continuing rise in surplus stocks, of wheat and corn especially, in spite of heavy exports under subsidy and special programs. Disagreements between the Executive and the Congress have prevented or seriously delayed desirable legislative changes, and fear of the farm vote has hampered more far-reaching proposals. In arriving at decisions on farm policy the Executive operates under handicaps arising from tradition, politics, and entrenched ideas, practices, and vested interests. Needful changes therefore require wide support based on clearer and broader public understanding. There is urgent need for fresh penetrating reappraisals—from the viewpoint of the nation as a whole—of the real farm situation in perspective, of the farm programs and their impacts, and of goals appropriate to changed agricultural conditions. Materials for such reappraisals are abundant, but the task calls for vigorous new efforts within and outside the government. A specially constituted interagency committee might perform this service, but this could advantageously be paralleled by a nongovernmental undertaking reinforced by individual efforts.

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I HAVE been asked to grapple with the question: How can policy-making in the Office of the President and the United States Department of Agriculture be improved in order to produce a farm policy adjusted in accordance with the requirements of sound economic foreign policy?¹ To this baffling question no one can give a thoroughly competent and satisfying answer, if indeed there be one. I am not presumptuous enough to promise one. I shall offer a few leads, but with little confidence that they will prove of value.

SCOPE OF THE DISCUSSION

At the outset, let us limit the topic. In various parts of farm policy the current programs are well established, working reasonably well, and more or less readily modified as conditions change. Several others are open to criticism, and some of these are resistant to fundamental change, but their defects have relatively minor impacts on the economy, the federal budget, and international relations. By contrast, the programs involving price supports, acreage allotments, surplus concentration, and surplus disposal are highly controversial and widely recognized as, for the most part, costly failures in spite of some useful by-products. Yet the President and the Congress have repeatedly been unable to agree on needed modifications, and various compromises have been sadly disappointing. The present mongrel program is neither Presidential nor Congressional. The President's Special Assistant on economic affairs

¹ Such a reconciliation of farm and foreign policies was seriously sought in 1953-1954, by the Commission on Foreign Economic Policy chaired by Clarence B. Randall. Unfortunately the Randall Commission was unable to come to effective agreement in this area. See Commission on Foreign Economic Policy, "Report to the President and the Congress" (January 1954); "Minority Report" (January 1954); and Staff Papers . . . (February 1954).

rightly said late in 1959: "The farm price-support and production-control legislation now on the statute books does *not* represent the Administration's farm policy. . . . Clearly the public will not tolerate indefinitely the heavy cost and the growing stocks which result. . . ."²

In concentrating upon this crucial area, I shall ignore areas of lesser importance which also seem to defy significant improvement. Examples are the highly protectionist tariffs, import quotas, and regulations affecting a great variety of competing agricultural imports. These are not in harmony with our avowed general policy in international trade. Yet I see no prospect that they can be dealt with until the more glaring defects can be at least partially overcome.

ABUNDANCE AND SUPERABUNDANCE

"Sustained abundance" was officially proclaimed, by Secretary of Agriculture Clinton Anderson in 1947, as a prime objective of postwar farm policy. With rapidly advancing technology and long delayed reduction in wartime price supports, this goal was quickly over-attained. Varied and protracted attempts at production control have largely failed, and persisting superabundance now threatens to become permanent. Yet for wheat and corn, in particular, price supports are at levels that generate surpluses faster than they can be disposed of by all sorts of devices, at home and abroad. Losses on surplus disposal, costs of carrying surplus stocks, and other costs involved in the mis-called "stabilization of farm prices and income," impose heavy burdens on the hard-pressed federal Treasury. These constitute a large proportion of the Department of Agriculture

² Don Paarlberg, "In Support of the Administration's Farm Policy," *Journal of Farm Economics*, Vol. 42 (May 1960), pp. 401-412.

budget, which nowadays totals about 40 per cent as much as estimated net farm income from farming.³

Virtually no one endorses or supports this "program" in its present form, and farmers generally evince extreme dissatisfaction with it. Yet it has been highly resistant even to minor improvements and politically invulnerable to drastic revision. The President has exercised his veto repeatedly to prevent its worsening, but the Congress has repeatedly thwarted his efforts to revise it substantially, and the forced compromises—such as the Soil Bank and the latest corn program—have had unhappy consequences. Thus the nation continues in the grip of a badly working, indefensible system. This extremely costly failure reflects on all of us. Somehow the impasse must be broken.

EXECUTIVE POLICY-MAKING

In considering changes in farm policy the Executive labors under several handicaps arising from tradition, politics, inertia, and so on.

The President, rarely well versed in agricultural affairs, typically relies heavily on his Secretary of Agriculture, whose huge agency is traditionally viewed as "The Farmers' Department." All too limited contributions are made by other agencies that are deeply concerned in present-day agricultural policy, notably the Bureau of the Budget and the State and Treasury Departments.

Competition for the "farm vote" has led, as in 1948 and 1952, to pre-election legislation which obstructs needed program changes. Key statements and commitments made to win farmer votes

³ "Economic Report of the President" (January 1960), p. 212, and Bureau of the Budget, "1961 Federal Budget in Brief" (January 1960), p. 26.

in political campaigns exert grave influence on proposals that may seem desirable or undesirable with fuller knowledge—a special handicap for a newly elected President. Political acceptability of possible changes carries heavy weight in policy decisions, and fear of committing "political suicide" hampers courageous moves.

Further obstacles lie in deeply entrenched concepts, formulas, and practices, such as the artificial "parity" idea and the un-American nonrecourse loan, and in the vested interests that have been built up, as in the huge volume of storage for wheat, corn, and cotton surpluses.

It requires extraordinary courage for the President and Secretary of Agriculture to admit failure when a given policy had been urged as a highly promising change and to avoid unwarranted optimism over an improvement in farmers' income, agricultural exports, or surplus stocks, even when this is due to transitory factors or to heavy drafts on the federal Treasury.⁴ Yet this sort of courage is necessary if policy is to be advantageously reoriented. Ways must be found to render it easier for such courage to be displayed.

Despite the unwholesome drift in this phase of our farm policy, some signs of progress can be noted. The President's agricultural messages and Economic Reports have come to display somewhat more realism and candor and have shown less tendency to over-

⁴ Boris C. Swerling, "The Farm Policy Debate: Discussion," *Food Research Institute Studies*, Vol. 1 (Stanford University, February 1960), pp. 100-103.

Secretary Ezra T. Benson referred last April to "outstanding progress in recent years in restoring American agriculture's position in the world market." But his base for comparison was the exceptionally poor export year 1952-1953, and he failed to mention that most of our "dollar sales" abroad are heavily subsidized.

promise. The overambitiously labeled "Food for Peace Program" is important because it provides for serious international consultations in connection with surplus disposals overseas, initially for wheat.⁵ The Rural Development Program has made a beginning in the attack on the special problems of low-income rural areas. Other examples could be cited.

NEED FOR REAPPRAISALS

Hope for significant improvement in the controversial farm program must rest on much clearer and far broader public understanding of the real farm situation. On this basis income taxpayers, housewives, and other nonfarm groups concerned, as well as the press, would be justified in taking strong positions on farm policy issues. Moreover, farmers of many types and levels could be helped to look beyond their immediate personal interests and ask themselves whether the demands, hitherto made in their name, and the special privileges accorded to many of them, are justified by results and fair to the nation.⁶

There is urgent need for penetrating reappraisals—from the viewpoint of the nation as a whole—of the agricultural situation, farm policy objectives, each of the major programs, the defects that call for correction, the political obstacles

to wise policy changes, and the merits and demerits of proposed changes. There is special need for succinct summaries not only of the points on which wide agreement exists but also of the issues on which there is still serious disagreement. Despite enormous efforts made in many quarters and a growing mass of articles, reports, hearings, and studies, we still lack a realistic presentation of farm problems combined with candid critiques of farm programs in operation. And Swerling was right in saying in his discussion of Paarlberg's recent paper: "Little progress has been made toward formulating attainable goals appropriate to present-day farm conditions."⁷

The need for realistic reappraisals is even greater because politics so thoroughly bedevils farm policy. Biennial election campaigns and debates in both Houses of Congress give rise to distortions of facts and loss of perspective, as well as to unwise commitments on the part of newly elected or re-elected representatives and the President. The 1960 political campaign may provide fresh illustrations.

Many attempts to do something of this sort have contributed valuable materials toward the desired product, but none provides the model for a fresh appraisal now. It might best be undertaken both at the government level and as a private project.

There is hardly any other area of national policy in which the informational basis is so nearly adequate. This is due chiefly to the enormous research and multifarious publications of the Department of Agriculture and the state agricultural colleges, experiment stations, and extension services, many independent individuals and groups, and committees of the Congress. Yet there are few areas in which the failure to

⁵ See my paper, "Food for Peace," in *Food Research Institute Studies*, Vol. 1 (May 1960).

⁶ The declining weight of the total farm vote and the diversity of interests among farmers are seldom given enough attention. I strongly suspect that improved analysis would show that common impressions of what farm voters conceive to be in their interests are seriously in error, and that hard-headed farmers would welcome forthright presentations which included hard facts realistically faced. The American Farm Bureau Federation holds this view, and endeavors to act upon it.

⁷ Swerling, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

grapple effectively with obstinate policy issues has been so serious and protracted.

Such analyses and appraisals should greatly facilitate formulations of proposals for policy changes and for marshaling arguments in their support.

HOW APPRAISALS MIGHT BE MADE

I do not consider altogether happy the outcome of several cabinet committees, a few mixed commissions, and several Presidentially appointed committees or commissions. Accordingly I should not propose one of this kind for the task in question.

The National Agricultural Advisory Commission, heavily weighted with farmers, has met with Department of Agriculture officials for two days in each quarter and served some useful purposes. But the Commission has not justified the hopes that were held at its establishment in 1953, and I see no prospect that it could make the urgently needed reappraisal.

Nor can the task be wisely entrusted to the Department of Agriculture. Its permanent technical staff is numerous and competent, but its members are understandably cautious in dealing with matters involving criticisms of Congressional and Administrative actions and pronouncements.⁸ At the policy level there are only a few overworked persons who must necessarily work under the Secretary, who has positions to defend before Congressional committees and farmer organizations. The experience, grasp of subject matter, and ideas of all these need to be drawn upon, and drafts on specific topics could be pre-

⁸ See Possible Methods of Improving the Parity Formula: Report of the Secretary of Agriculture Pursuant to Section 602 of the Agricultural Act of 1956, 85th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Document No. 18, February 1, 1957. This did not go to the heart of this entrenched concept.

pared by some of them, but it would be too much to expect from the Department the kind of definitive appraisals, from a national standpoint, that are most needed.

An effective interagency task force or committee might be able to undertake the job. This could be composed of selected policy-level representatives of the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, State, and Treasury, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Council of Economic Advisers. This group could be charged with preparing, in the perspective of the whole problem, a series of reports in which the national interest would be stressed. Drafts of these could be studied and discussed in the several agencies and then be considered by the National Agricultural Advisory Commission, the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, and the Interagency Committee on Agricultural Surplus Disposal.

Such a task should not be conceived as a "quickie," though pressure should be exerted to insure a fairly steady stream of output. The committee should have a small special staff, besides enlisting aid from the agencies represented and from individual specialists outside of the government. The President would be informed of the progress of the work, be aided in his politico-economic thinking, and have opportunities to bring his own ideas gently to bear on it; but he should resist temptations to dominate it.

In due course, the matured reports could be published, without fanfare, for serious critical review by independent economists. Upon them could be based popularizations of the significant results for wide circulation.

Lack of space precludes elaboration of my suggestion of a parallel undertaking under appropriate auspices outside the government, but I believe this has merit. And there is scope for arti-

cles by individuals designed to contribute to this end result.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The foregoing suggestions are made without any assumption about the outcome of the 1960 elections and regardless of the positions that may be taken and commitments that may be made by the successful candidate for the presidency. These might more or less severely restrict the scope and character of subsequent critical appraisals within the government, for a time at least, but would not obviate the need for them.

Wise revision of the discredited parts of the farm program to bring it into far better accord with economic realities,

budgetary sanity, and our foreign economic policy is a large job that cannot be quickly or easily achieved. It will be more difficult if the new Administration should be firmly committed to actions determined in advance of adequate analysis.

In view of the uncertainties immediately ahead, it seems futile to propose ways in which specific policy formulations should be arrived at. Experience seems to make it clear, however, that these should be much less exclusively drafted within the Department of Agriculture than has hitherto been the rule and that leaders in closely related agencies should have ample opportunity to influence their final character before the President makes the final decision.

Congressional Farm Politics and Economic Foreign Policy

By CHARLES M. HARDIN

ABSTRACT: The primacy of foreign policy centers attention upon Congressional politics with its wonted stress upon local and particular issues. Farm political influence is considerable in Congress where domestic farm policies, often with unfortunate effects upon foreign policy, are strongly rooted. Farm politicians in and out of Congress must help improve the legislative process in order to give the emergent national concern in a sound and effective foreign policy its merited support. While some adaptation of present procedures is possible, the needs of the times require a courageous examination of more sweeping proposals for change.

THE obvious primacy of foreign policy underlines the rising significance in foreign affairs of Congress and especially the House of Representatives. Despite improved organization and staffing to focus more effectively and steadily on world affairs, Congress is still extremely responsive to local interests in shaping and financing both foreign policy and also domestic policies that have a clear and present bearing upon foreign policy. If Congress is to address itself to the great issues of national survival and national purpose in a manner that will vindicate representative government, those interests and groups with the greatest voice in the legislative branch must consciously recognize the problem and commit their strength to its solution. High among the major legislative interests and often foremost among them is agriculture. Hence a grave responsibility rests upon all persons associated with Congressional farm politics, first, to co-ordinate farm policies better with foreign policy and, second, to assume their due responsibility in generally reorienting and, if necessary, reorganizing Congress to play a more adequate role in foreign policy. Granted, the obligation goes beyond agriculture to other groups just as the problem transcends Congress to include related parts of the political process: public opinion, political parties, the President, and the administration generally; but the focus here is upon agricultural politics in Congress.

FARM POLITICS IS CONGRESSIONALLY ORIENTED

Farm politicians in the United States work happily and, on the whole, effectively through Congress. True, executive leadership has sometimes been crucial both in advancing and in frustrating farm policies. Most farm leaders most of the time have been suspicious of the Executive. Their power is mag-

nified in the Congressional constituency by virtue of the equal representation of states in the Senate and of the control of Congressional redistricting by state legislatures which are typically dominated by nonmetropolitan interests. Within Congress their power is enhanced by the seniority rule which elevates to controlling positions, especially to committee chairmanships, many more legislators from rural areas than the proportion of farm population in the country justifies. The usual Presidential constituency, in contrast, is different, larger, and much more nearly centered in the great cities.

Farm price policy illustrates the Congressional bent of rural politicians. The agricultural bloc of 1921 was formed in, and realized its early triumphs essentially through, Congress—just as it met defeat of its price program in Presidential vetoes of McNary-Haugen bills. Executive initiative was vital in the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929, in the Agricultural Adjustment Acts of 1933 and 1938, in the Second Price Control Act of 1942, and in the Agricultural Acts of 1954 and 1958. But Congress took the leadership in 1934 with the Bankhead Cotton and Kerr Tobacco Acts, and in 1940–1942 when farm price supports were raised to 90 per cent of parity and legislatively guaranteed to continue for two calendar years after the formal cessation of hostilities. Congress frustrated the flexible price proposals of the Executive in 1948 and the Brannan Plan in 1949; it tempered the Eisenhower-Benson farm bills in both 1954 and 1958. During farm politics' "modern period"—which began when farm prices fell in 1920—farm policy has repeatedly been stalemated by Executive-Congressional conflicts—1926–1928, 1930–1932, 1948–1953, 1955–1956, and 1959–1960. In the earlier years, however, stalemate meant going, without an effective farm pro-

gram. Since World War II it has meant maintaining a complicated and expensive farm program which the Executive has been determined to change.¹

BEARING OF FARM POLITICS ON FOREIGN POLICY

Farm politics has affected American foreign policy for both good and ill. National benefits beyond exaggeration have issued from agriculture's great and growing productivity which in itself is consequential largely to long-range public policy, beginning even before the Morrill Act of 1862, of applying science to agriculture. A tremendous output of farm produce in critical times has strengthened this nation, its allies, and other countries as well—not least, those nations that our allies and we have defeated in war. Meanwhile, growing agricultural efficiency has continued to release resources for other economic sectors.

Agriculture has had a mixed influence upon foreign trade policy. Many farm products, especially cotton and tobacco, and, to a less extent, wheat and lard, have heavily depended upon export markets. Until recently the cotton South has solidly supported free trade. Since the 1930's the American Farm Bureau Federation, with few qualifications, has favored periodic extensions of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, as has the National Farmers Union (NFU), despite the apparent conflict with the purposes of price-support policies the NFU has endorsed since about 1949. Long an apostle of "the American market for the American farmer," the National Grange has recently relaxed its opposition. On the positive side, in the Foreign Trade Development and Assistance Act, in the Mutual Secu-

rity Act, and related programs, farm politics has effectively pushed the foreign disposal of domestic surpluses but with some intention—partly fulfilled—to help economic development in recipient countries.²

On the other hand, agricultural protectionist interest, expressed especially—though not exclusively—by commodity organizations, have tried with some success to restrict foreign trade. Since the McKinley Tariff of 1890 and the Wilson Tariff of 1894, our tariffs, quotas, and domestic price programs for sugar have repeatedly disturbed Cuban economics and politics—severely after 1929, in 1940, and in 1948, but more mildly in many other years. Wool politics nearly disrupted the 1947 Geneva negotiations which led to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Protection of dairy products under the Defense Production Act of 1951 brought a charge by eight nations that this country had nullified and impaired GATT.³

Domestic price support programs have not only been written essentially without regard for foreign economic repercussions, but since 1935 agricultural price legislation has provided both for subsidized exports of surpluses and also for the protection of domestic programs from the upsetting effects of agricultural imports. Quota restrictions were tightened and made mandatory by the Defense Production Act of 1950, provisions of which were allowed to lapse in 1953 only after executive commitments to administer more vigorously the restrictive provisions of the earlier law—Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1935.⁴

² Willard Cochrane, this volume.

³ Holbert N. Carroll, *The House of Representatives in Foreign Affairs* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1959), p. 51.

⁴ D. Gale Johnson, *Agricultural Price Policy and International Trade* (Princeton University, 1954), pp. 9–10.

Price support programs have often been followed by domestic surpluses which have been subsidized and sold abroad, although not in great amounts—except for wheat under the International Wheat Agreement—until the Agricultural Trade and Assistance Act, and related programs, of the 1950's. As noted elsewhere, efforts have been made to reconcile this program with the trade of friendly nations having competitive farm exports. But the heavy production in the United States together with the export policy continues to harass not only the prospects of friendly exporting countries but also the economic development of countries that this nation is trying to help. Thus *The Second Five Year Plan*⁵ for Pakistan notes that its projected increases for cotton production have been cut 17 per cent because—among other things—of uncertainty about the "disposal policy for cotton surpluses in some . . . countries. . . ."

Finally, agricultural programs are notoriously costly. To find money for these and other heavy spending programs, Congressmen search for possible budgetary economies which they regularly find in foreign policy expenditures.

In 1945–1957, the House of Representatives cut the President's recommendations for Mutual Security appropriations by 10.4 per cent and for the Department of State by 13.6 per cent;⁶ although the Senate typically raised the annual figures on both items, the final slash remained a testimony to the fact that neither the State Department nor the Mutual Security Administration has a group behind it such as farmers, labor, the veterans, or the supporters of rivers and harbors bills or of protection for merchant shipping.

⁵ Government of Pakistan (Karachi, 1960), p. 34.

⁶ Carroll, *op. cit.*, pp. 182, 185.

WHAT MAY BE DONE?

A scholarly survey of the Congressional role in foreign policy warmly commends the efforts of many enlightened Congressmen—including some in the "farm bloc"—and of some Congressional staff workers to improve the present system. "Yet the question remains: is this enough? The evidence presented in the preceding chapters—the procedure of uncoordinated and slipshod control—supports the conclusion that it is not."⁷ The needs can only be hinted at here. The Congressional contribution to foreign policy should be co-ordinated and integrated rather than cut into bits and pieces for division among a score of committees. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the House should have prestige in proportion to the importance of the problems assigned to it. The Congressional approach to the budget must be integrated and co-ordinated with the Executive's. To achieve these ends requires much better party leadership. Even effective bipartisanship in foreign policy, so far as it is desirable, needs a degree of party leadership now virtually unknown.

Only in this way can Congress develop "the sense of corporateness for determining policy, so that the Senate and the House—rather than their committees—are in fact the heart of the process of determining policy."⁸

This is indeed a large undertaking. Whether evolution reinforced by exhortation can achieve an effective approach to the problems of our time—here exemplified, though by no means exhausted, in the effort to integrate farm policy and foreign politics in the national interest—is extremely doubtful.

⁷ Carroll, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

⁸ Roland Young, *The American Congress* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 275.

¹ Charles M. Hardin, "Farm Political Power and the U. S. Governmental Crisis," *Journal of Farm Economics*, Vol. 40, No. 5 (December 1958).

True, there is evidence that Congressmen have more leeway than they think in raising or lowering farm price supports. The fate of Congressmen seeking re-election cannot be shown to hinge on whether they voted for "flexible" or "rigid" price supports.⁹ Rather, their fate is much more dependent on the fortunes of their political party—and in their turn, these fortunes rise and fall with the more general tides of hope and fear in the electorate.

But will more partisanship help? It can be argued that spurts of partisanship in farm politics have sharpened the

⁹ Thomas V. Gilpatrick, "Farm Price Support Policy and the Midwest Farm Vote," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (November 1959); J. Roland Pennock, "Party and Constituency in Postwar Agricultural Price-Support Legislation," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 18 (1956), pp. 167-210; Charles M. Hardin, "Farm Price Policy and the Farm Vote," *Journal of Farm Economics*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (November 1955).

difficulty of securing domestic policy that is compatible with foreign policy in the national interest. In reflecting on this "counter thrust," we must first remember that present methods work very badly. Second, we must think of partisanship not as simply grafted on our present divided and splintered politics but as emergent in a changed—and, I think, eventually a profoundly changed¹⁰—political system. We must work toward national parties that empower, engage, and constrain both citizens and their responsible leaders. An initial step is to follow the advice of President Eisenhower: to end the biennial Congressional elections and to synchronize elections of the entire House of Representatives with the quadrennial choice of the President.

¹⁰ Charles M. Hardin, "Farm Political Power and the U. S. Governmental Crisis," *op. cit.*, and Stephen K. Bailey, "The Condition of Our National Political Parties," Fund for the Republic, Inc. (New York, 1959).

Farm Policy, Foreign Policy, and Farm Opinion

By LAUREN K. SOTH

ABSTRACT: The United States has excess farm production and technical agricultural resources which could be used profitably in overseas development programs. The export of these farm resources would benefit American agriculture and would cost American consumers very little. To accomplish such a shift would take (1) more government intervention in the farm economy and (2) more United States involvement in international programs. How would the American farm "public" respond to proposals for such changes in policy? The largest and most powerful organization, the Farm Bureau, would resist these changes in farm and foreign policies, and although other groups—especially the Farmers Union—would favor action, the combined weight of farm organizations would be opposed. Some recent changes in farm opinion, however, may point to modification of farm organization attitudes in the future.

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IN recasting farm policy to better suit the purposes of the nation's foreign policy, what changes are politically "possible," or feasible, so far as the pressure groups and the opinion-makers in agriculture are concerned?

Anyone who generalizes about "farm opinion" in the United States stands on dangerous ground. There are so many different kinds of agricultural business in this continental country, so many diverse farm economic interests that a national farm opinion does not exist. With that caveat explicitly stated, let me stand this dangerous ground and generalize about farm opinion.

To begin with a sweeping generalization, farm people and farm organizations subscribe to what may be called the "feed the hungry" doctrine. They would like our food surpluses to be used for helping the undernourished of other countries. This stems from natural humanitarian instincts, as well as painful awareness that American agriculture produces more than can be consumed at home without drastic declines in prices.

FOREIGN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

When it is a question of providing foreign countries with technical aid to help their farmers produce more, American farmers are not so unswerving in their support. Some fear that the United States might be building up foreign competition for American farmers. On the whole, however, farmers and farm organizations have supported the Point Four program.

Thus, the general lines of American policy toward the underdeveloped countries of the world find an agreeable response in agricultural circles.

Does this mean that farm organizations would respond enthusiastically to a large expansion of foreign agricultural programs which would call for substantial alterations in domestic farm policy?

Not necessarily. They would respond enthusiastically if they felt the change would increase farm income or at least not worsen it. But if they thought the change would be costly to them, they would oppose it—regardless of the larger welfare of the country as a whole. In this, of course, farmers are not different from other people. They would argue, as their leaders have many times in the past, that if the action proposed is in the national interest, then it should be paid for by the people as a whole.

For example, one way to help the underdeveloped countries would be to provide easier access to the American market for their exports of agricultural products, but United States farm organizations would object strongly to lower tariffs, larger quotas, or other liberalization of United States trade barriers against foreign agricultural products.

Farm organizations are thoroughly in accord with a policy to expand exports of United States farm products for the benefit of people in underdeveloped lands and American agriculture. But there is disagreement about ways and means, and an expansion of government subsidy programs would meet fierce resistance from some farm groups—on ideological grounds. Strange as it seems in connection with such practical people as farmers, ideology may well be the most important factor involved in gaining the support of farm groups for the programs contemplated in this volume. Before discussing this, however, it is necessary to examine the economic impact of these programs on United States agriculture.

IMPACT ON DOMESTIC AGRICULTURE

American agriculture has large excess capacity in relation to present domestic markets. In recent years something like 6 or 8 per cent of output has been stored or disposed of through noncom-

mercial channels. Moreover, new technology and new capital invested in agriculture are advancing output faster than the growth of population and rising nonfarm income per person are increasing the commercial market demand.

Clearly, commercial farmers as a group would be in a better economic position if some way could be found to restrain production. If output could be lowered by 6 or 8 per cent, farmers would receive the same prices in the market without government purchases and disposal operations. If production could be reduced somewhat below this level, farm prices would rise and net incomes of commercial farmers would be higher. The sharply inelastic demand for food—becoming more inelastic as the country gets richer—means that the adjustment in output could be small and still yield substantial returns to farmers.

By the same token, an increase in the quantity of farm products detoured outside commercial markets and made available to people of the lesser developed countries also would produce higher income for farmers.

Let me couch this in another way: the United States has excess agricultural resources which could be used profitably in overseas development programs—to the benefit of American agriculture and with little cost to American consumers. A small decrease in the food supply available to American consumers would mean a substantial rise in prices to the farmer but only a modest increase in retail prices of food. This is because the raw farm products constitute a relatively small proportion—38 per cent in 1959—of the total food bill.

In theory, therefore, the American public could make a given contribution to foreign economic development at less cost through using its excess agricultural resources than in any other way.

The demand for farm products is much more elastic in the underdeveloped countries than it is in the United States. Thus there is a genuine economic gain for all concerned from this international transfer: a gain to American agriculture; a gain to the foreign recipients of aid; a smaller cost to the American taxpayer than if he provided the same amount of aid—at dollar cost—in the form of industrial goods and technology.

There is no doubt that United States agriculture could "spare" a third or more of its overhead production-improvement organization—namely the United States Department of Agriculture technical research and educational services, combined with the state land-grant college experiment stations and extension services—without strain.

Indeed, agriculture would gain from such a shift if the reallocation of its educational services slowed down the accretion of new technology in American agriculture. It probably would not, because (1) private research in technology would expand to offset part of the reduction in public research, and (2) research by American scientists on technology for India, Peru, and Ghana would produce some useful techniques for American farming. But in any event a reduction of public effort devoted to converting basic scientific knowledge into new American farm technology certainly would do no injury to United States commercial agriculture.

This looks like magic—an easy way to help the poor countries and help ourselves at the same time. Why has something so eminently sensible and "economic" not been done long ago? Why does not the United States ship three times as much grain under Public Law (P.L.) 480? Why is not the Point Four technical assistance program three times as large as it is?

FARM OPINIONS

The answer is, of course, that such a massive reallocation of farm production and farm resources would be extremely difficult to arrange politically—both on the foreign scene and on the domestic. This article is not concerned with the difficulties of “putting over” such a policy in the recipient countries or in competing farm export countries. Nor is it concerned with the difficulties of explaining and selling to the American public this abstract idea about a “least-cost method” of helping the poor countries. It is only concerned with whether the idea would be salable to United States farmers and farm organizations.

To compress the problem to a workable size for analysis, one is compelled to erect some boundaries. So I shall be dealing with the attitudes of what the census calls “commercial” farmers—and primarily with attitudes of those engaged in major crop and livestock farming. The subsistence, part-time, and very low-income farmers do not really enter in the equation, because they do not participate in the leading farm organizations and because they are not greatly concerned with the kinds of farm policies here discussed. The “Point Four” technical aid programs America uses to help its own “underdeveloped” farm areas have an important bearing on this country’s relations with the outside world, but that is another issue not directly associated with the one at hand.

To derive a reasoned judgment about this complicated question of political behavior, one must resort mainly to inferences from stated positions and reactions of major farm organizations, along with signs of trends in farm opinion.

The massive changes in foreign and farm policies here proposed would require a considerable expansion of gov-

ernment activity in the farm business. United States agriculture would have to be adjusted in order to suit the requirements of a national policy of assisting underdeveloped economies reach what Walt W. Rostow calls the “take-off point” of sustained economic growth.

This might involve drastic adjustments—in cotton, for example, to open up a larger portion of the United States and Western European markets to Brazilian, Egyptian, Indian, and Mexican cotton. It is unthinkable that the United States would suddenly eliminate price protection and quota protection for American cotton growers without substituting some form of direct subsidy or adjustment payments. In this century governments do not repeal “corn laws,” as the British did in the 1840s, without compensating the victims of an action taken in the national interest.

The changes suggested also imply a high degree of co-operation with other countries, including participation in international organizations, such as a world grain stabilization agency. The international transactions we are discussing could not take place through the private market system. It would be impossible for the United States to supply the underdeveloped countries with, say, 750 million bushels of grain a year for ten years—easily within our capacity—unless Canada, Argentina, Australia, and other exporters were brought into the operation—to say nothing of the leading commercial importers of grain who might be directly affected.

As clues to the American farm reaction to a major policy alteration of this nature, then, we may ask, what is the attitude of farmers and farm groups to more government management of the farm industry, and what is their attitude toward more “internationalization” of the farm business, with the relinquishment of some phases of national sovereignty in this field?

Farm Bureau

When the questions are put in this blunt fashion, they nearly answer themselves. American farm policy leaders are not ready for such violent changes.

The leading farm organization, the Farm Bureau, with a million and a half members, comprising within its own membership a substantial majority of all the commercial farmers of the country, stands staunchly against more government action in agriculture. It wants a reduction of such action instead. In the last dozen years, the Farm Bureau has moved into increasingly doctrinaire opposition to government “controls.” Its faith in “free markets” has remained firm in the face of declining farm income.

Recent statements by Farm Bureau leaders and the resolutions passed at the December 1959 convention show that the organization would be opposed to expansion of foreign aid programs, including the P.L. 480 sales of farm products for “soft” foreign currency.

The Farm Bureau in early 1960 called for a reduction in foreign aid spending as a means of correcting the deficit in the international balance of payments of the United States, showing more concern for the unfavorable balance of payments than the Eisenhower administration itself. In its 1959 resolutions, the Farm Bureau said, “Economic aid in the form of capital investment should be substantially reduced.” The organization said that “Public Law 480 was designed as a temporary measure to help relieve problems caused by unrealistic domestic farm programs.” It said that it is now time “to make a critical review of this (P.L. 480) program. . . . We do not question the need for a more adequate food supply among people in many parts of the world, but we do question the wisdom of American commitments which may jeopardize

commercial trade and our financial stability.”

The Farm Bureau showed alarm that foreign aid might be used to promote socialism: “Every effort should be made to prevent the misuse of U. S. taxpayers’ money representing the fruits of free enterprise to establish, promote and support socialistic schemes.” It resolved that Development Loan Fund loans should be granted only when the recipient country follows policies that “attract private investment.”

Since many of the underdeveloped countries believe they can achieve rapid economic progress only by a high degree of government enterprise, the conditions laid down by the Farm Bureau would be unacceptable. Besides, the newly independent countries resent “conditions” of this kind on loans from the rich, capitalistic United States.

Further indications of the reaction of the Farm Bureau to proposals for a large expansion in foreign agricultural aid, from the 1959 resolutions:

We should avoid the perpetuation of programs which give away our farm products. . . . We are opposed to proposals to establish agencies within the United Nations through which large sums of U. S. money (or a major portion of U. S. surplus agricultural commodities) would be channeled for economic development programs. . . . We believe the United Nations could become a more effective world forum if it did not dissipate its efforts through numerous and elaborate economic and social welfare programs.

The Farm Bureau was generally international in its viewpoint until recent years. It was an early backer of the reciprocal trade agreements, strongly supported the United Nations, the Marshall Plan, and similar policies. It continues to advocate trade agreements and a freer trade policy. But in recent years it has become identified with some poli-

cies of right wing nationalist groups, probably because of its agreement with these groups on domestic policy.

For example, it "vigorously opposes" repeal of the Connally amendment to United States participation in the World Court. This amendment reserves to the United States the right to determine whether any case in which it may be involved before the court is a domestic matter or is subject to jurisdiction by the court. President Eisenhower has asked several times for the repeal of what he calls this "self-judging" amendment.

The Farm Bureau, even in late 1959, was still echoing the demand that the "United States should make sure that the staff of the United Nations is subject to reasonable security controls." It did not say how the United States could subject the staff of this international organization to its own national security controls.

On domestic farm policy, the Farm Bureau wants to "eliminate government regulations" just as soon as possible. It flatly opposes production payments—calling them "unsound and dangerous"—wants to move in the direction of eliminating acreage allotments and quotas, and thinks "the government should refrain from direct participation in the marketing of farm products."

It is evident that the kinds of foreign policy and farm policy changes suggested in this volume would be completely incompatible with the Farm Bureau's policies.

Other organizations

The other general farm organizations would be more agreeable than the Farm Bureau to increased government intervention in agriculture.

The National Farmers Union would support the policy changes suggested, both on the domestic scene and in for-

eign affairs. The Farmers Union advocates making Public Law 480 a long-range program with expanded appropriations. It has favored international agencies to stabilize prices of farm commodities, such as a "world food board." It also has supported economic aid through United Nations agencies. It has recommended production payments for a number of years.

The National Grange falls somewhere between the Farm Bureau and the Farmers Union in its general approach to both domestic and foreign policy. This is a considerable change both for the Grange and the Farm Bureau in the last twenty years. In the 1930's the Grange was quite nationalistic and protectionist on tariff and trade policy. In recent years, however, it has moved more in the direction of free trade and has backed foreign aid programs, but with reservations somewhat like those of the Farm Bureau. It is in domestic farm policy that the Grange has shown more willingness to accept government action than the Farm Bureau.

Even if the Grange were to be counted—along with the Farmers Union—as generally sympathetic to large-scale adjustments in farm and foreign aid programs, which would be stretching the evidence a good deal, one would have to say that organized agriculture as a whole represents a negative influence. This is because of the size and political strength of the Farm Bureau as compared with the other two organizations.

It may be argued that these farm organizations do not truly represent the opinion of farmers. A good deal of evidence could be produced that most farmers do not agree with the "free market" policies of the Farm Bureau. Scientific sample surveys of opinion in Iowa and Wisconsin in recent years have shown farmers to be more favorable to price supports, direct payments,

and acreage controls than the Farm Bureau is.

The most recent Iowa Poll, conducted by the Des Moines Register, showed a much higher percentage of farmers—44 per cent—in favor of price supports based on parity than were in favor of the Farm Bureau plan of price supports based on an average of market prices for three previous years—24 per cent. The Farm Bureau is overwhelmingly dominant in Iowa, with more than 100,000 members.

Votes on marketing quotas in the wheat, tobacco, and cotton areas would indicate that many Farm Bureau members do not shudder at the idea of government regulation of marketing.

However, the farm organizations do speak for farmers, and the Farm Bureau speaks loudest of all. Unless the members demand changes in the policies and the leadership of their organizations, it must be assumed that they are satisfied and that the organizations accurately represent member opinion.

DISSENTING FARM VOICES

Plainly, it would take an overthrow of the present leadership of the Farm Bureau to provide unified farm organization support for major changes in farm policy which would make a bigger contribution to underdeveloped countries. In the early years of the Great Depression, the major farm organizations did co-operate fairly well in setting up the original Agricultural Adjustment Act and in other farm legislation. What indications are there that farmers might force a change in the policies of their organizations now?

A few such indications may be cited. The National Farm Organization, a new group only four years old, has been winning members in the Midwest on a platform of production control, withholding commodities from market, and "collec-

tive bargaining" with the buyers of farm products.

Some commodity organizations, like the National Wheat Growers Association, have advocated production controls, including quotas on the number of bushels a farmer could sell, and multiple pricing. Even the Farm Bureau has had some rumblings. The biggest state Farm Bureau organization, the Illinois Agricultural Association, passed a resolution in 1959 for compulsory acreage retirement. The Illinois delegation was not able to secure acceptance of this resolution in the American Farm Bureau convention, but it indicates some resistance to the national Farm Bureau policies.

The unpopularity of Agriculture Secretary Ezra Benson among farm people certainly is an indication of disaffection with present farm policies. The heavy farm vote on the Democratic side in the Wisconsin primary points in the same direction. The fact that no politician in either party associates himself with Benson policies in the Middle West is significant, and Vice-President Nixon has plainly tried to divorce himself from Benson. By and large, Benson represents the policies of the Farm Bureau.

So it is conceivable that after the 1960 election some change in farm organization policies might occur. The Farm Bureau has not always been as rigid in its position as it is today. In 1920, for example, the Iowa Farm Bureau was agitating for the withholding of farm products from market, as the National Farm Organization does today. Maybe it will become less dogmatic in its opposition to government action in the future.

But as the situation stands right now, the only reasonable conclusion is that the farm pressure groups would be opposed to the kinds of farm and foreign policies proposed in this volume.

Farm Organizations and the National Interest

By ROSS B. TALBOT

ABSTRACT: A world-wide contest for power between the nations of the free world and those within the Communist orbit is the dominant phenomenon within international politics today. This situation is certainly not new, but the pace is accelerating. Within the next decade or so the loyalties of the underdeveloped and uncommitted nations will be molded. Food can be a significant weapon for the United States, both in terms of national interest and national morality. One major difficulty, however, is the inability of American farm organizations to see the central issue of our times and to concentrate their unified efforts upon this objective. They tend to confuse rhetoric with reality and thereby dissipate our national strength through their misunderstanding of the crucial goal. A White House Conference on Farm Policy is proposed as a means for beginning the redirection of American farm policy. The genius of American politics seems to call for a new accommodation in view of the threatened national security and the mounting dissatisfaction with present farm policies.

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THE July 1959 issue of *The National Grange Monthly* declared: "... Russia is bent on an over-the-years goal of taking control of the world, whereupon man, as a mortal being and an individual with rights and privileges, would vanish into generations of darkness." If this grim estimate of the situation is accurate, the people of the United States and our allies in the "free world" have abundant cause for concern. Should the more optimistic view of Harrison Salisbury, and Lauren Soth of the *Des Moines Register*, accurately predict the direction in which United States-Soviet relations are moving we would probably discover that the thaw is only partial—a modest shifting of strategy and techniques away from the present and dominant military emphasis. Whatever the trend, the 1960's will be the decade of decision. One important area of decision must concern farm policy. The present farm policies of the United States are unsatisfactory, domestically and internationally. Solutions to this "farm problem," constantly being advanced, will not be reviewed in this paper. Rather an attempt will be made to suggest, procedurally, a new and dynamic framework in terms of our national interest in which the farm problem might be alleviated, if not solved. It is assumed that this crucial redirection can occur only through fitting domestic farm policy more effectively into an appropriate foreign policy.

Our political system consists of a "polity of pressure groups," according to Walter Lippmann, and his phrase is especially apt for the area of farm policy. National farm legislation is constructed through a complex and usually tendentious intermingling of different power centers—the national farm organizations, key members of certain Congressional committees, the United States Department of Agriculture

(USDA), the President, and other interests. Out of this environment has come a "hodgepodge" of farm laws which are expensive in operation, contradictory in policy directions, and thus inaccurate in terms of diagnosis and prescription. The nature and growth of our political system has, admittedly, made the development of systematic and responsible policies most difficult. Nevertheless, it is assumed that: (1) a rational farm policy can be worked out in terms of our national interest, (2) such a redirection of policy can only result if there is a reconciliation of ideological and personality differences among the major farm organizations, and (3) for reasons already stated, it is clearly mandatory that dramatic attempts be made to provide an intellectual and political atmosphere in which these farm policy and organizational differences can be analyzed and adjusted. Thus it is proposed that the next President of the United States call into session, as soon as possible after his inauguration, a "White House Conference on Farm Policy."

Before outlining the goals and structure of this proposed conference we must ask: Which are the major farm organizations? How did the present intergroup schism come about? Why might a White House Conference on Farm Policy resolve these policy differences and factional feuding? How could such a reconciliation be in the national interest of the United States?

AMERICAN FARM ORGANIZATIONS

The American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF) is clearly the largest and most powerful of all the farm organizations. With an individual membership—one to a family—of some 1.6 million in 1959 it overshadows the National Grange with its 789,031 family members and the National Farmers Union's

543,472 family members.¹ The two different methods of calculating total membership make it difficult to do an exact comparative analysis as to size. However, the Farm Bureau's strength, per state, is apparently exceeded by the Grange in the New England area, the Middle Atlantic states, Ohio, Oregon, and Washington. The Farmers Union has more membership than the AFBF in the Dakotas, Montana, Minnesota, and Oklahoma, although the Farm Bureau has substantial strength in those states too, excepting South Dakota and Montana. The budget for the National offices—Chicago and Washington, D. C.—of the AFBF for the year ending November 30, 1958, was nearly \$1,500,000, which places it much above the other farm groups in terms of organizational wealth.

The National Council of Farmer Cooperatives (NCFC) has a total membership of more than 3.5 million, but it is a confederation; actual power is located in the 126 state and regional co-operatives and the nearly 5,000 local co-operative associations they represent. Thus the NCFC suffers from the weakness of all confederations; the national organization exists at the sufferance of its sovereign masters.

The National Farm Organization (NFO), with most of its membership in Iowa and Missouri, was organized in 1955 as a protest movement against low livestock prices and appeared to have a renewal of organizational energy in 1959. Whether the collective bargaining power approach of the NFO will substantially influence the organizational strategy of other farm groups is unclear.

Then there is an abundance of commodity organizations, such as, the National Association of Wheat Growers,

¹ The last two membership figures are for 1958 and the comparisons, by state, are also based on 1958 data.

the National Corn Growers Association, the National Milk Producers Federation, and the National Cotton Council. An estimated fifty to sixty special commodity groups are more or less active on the national political scene. Recent attempts of some thirty-six of them to co-ordinate their activities through a National Conference of Commodity Organizations (NCCO) have met with only minimal success.

SCHISM AMONG FARM GROUPS

Disagreement among the major farm groups can be viewed in historical, geographical, ideological, and leadership terms. The following discussion will concentrate on the nature of the ideological and the leadership differences among the three general farm organizations. It is primarily through a reconciliation of these differences that the necessary adjustments in farm policy may be accomplished.

The Farm Bureau

To cite Justice Holmes, the AFBF's national leadership is convinced that the United States Constitution embodies Herbert Spencer's *Social Statics*. Their major premise is that the iron laws of supply and demand will, if unfettered by government controls, govern farm yield so that it is produced as efficiently as possible and only in such amounts as the market can sustain. The AFBF is so overwhelmingly concerned about a free market philosophy that it may be losing sight of national and international goals which will have to be sought through the use of several political and economic methods.

Historically, the international policies of the Farm Bureau have been positive and broadly oriented. Their efforts for freer international trade have been in the liberal and internationalist tradition. Public Law 480 was probably conceived in the Chicago office of the AFBF. In

recent years, however, the leadership of the organization has become involved in, if not the leader of, the "New American Right." The dangers of positive government are continually brooded upon and harangued against. The traditional axiom—that government is best which governs least—seems to govern the recent policy statements of the Farm Bureau. Power is, truly, a dangerous weapon but the domestic and foreign policy of the United States may suffer certain defeat if this eighteenth-century axiom is considered to be a principal guideline for policy determination during the remainder of the twentieth century. In this time of trouble and crisis, the nation has a right to demand a high order of statesmanship from one of its most powerful political associations.

The Farmers Union

The National Farmers Union (NFU) is a composite of frustrations touched with humanity. Historically, it is a protest organization with a strong leaning toward liberal—to some extent, socialist—ideologies. Jeffersonians in their adulation of the small family farm as the backbone of American democracy, they cling to a stereotype that is rather rapidly fading away.

The central tenet of Farmers Union ideology—the family farm—is confusing, and perhaps misleading, the NFU in its efforts to bring about major changes in farm policy. The Poage-McGovern bill—often termed the Family Farm Income Act of 1960—is designed to use the instrument of national government to achieve parity of income for farmers. Thus the family farm, it is assumed, would be preserved. But the provisions of the bill seem to present genuine hazards for American foreign policy. The record of the NFU is clearly pro-internationalist. Nevertheless, the enactment of the presently

sponsored legislation might well further aggravate American foreign policy—"The wheat title [in the Poage-McGovern bills] provides 100 percent parity market price for domestic food and export wheat by means of managed marketings."² Can this "managed marketing" method be fitted into a foreign policy which is in the national interest?

The National Grange

Born of agrarian agitation and protest, the Grange has become so much of a social and fraternal organization that it is difficult to analyze its political capacities. Of the major farm organizations, the political base of the Grange seems to be clearly the weakest. Yet the Grange is respected in the nation's capital. The most probable reason for such a situation appears to be the confidence that the politicians have in the good sense of the organization itself. Not that the Grange is always "right," but there is a realization that no ideology, of an economic nature, binds it to a policy position in which the national interest will not be the paramount consideration.

Leadership differences

The nature of the leadership—or personality—differences can only be summarized. What De Tocqueville termed the "... secret propensities which govern the factions of America ..." seems to operate within the leadership of the farm organizations. The Farm Bureau leaders, notable since the advent of Allan Kline and then Charles Shuman to its presidency, have inclined toward the "passion" of aristocracy³—not of

² National Farmers Union, *Farm Legislative Status Report and Farm Economics Situation* (March 22, 1960), p. 7.

³ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (Phillips Bradley, Editor), (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1945), Vol. I, p. 178.

an hereditary, nobility type such as characterized the Old World but an aristocracy based on economic success in the business of farming. The Farmers Union leadership has been moved by the democratic "passion"—the belief in human equality and the willingness to socialize in order to achieve that goal. Since perhaps the mid-1940's, and particularly within the last decade, these differences have sharpened. They will not be reconciled in any simple fashion. To compound this problem is the bureaucratic consideration: after many years of tenure and activity the permanent personnel of an organization is not as amenable to the dissolution of policy differences as either the organizational membership or the nation might deem possible and beneficial.

The Grange leadership is pragmatic and not inclined toward the use of the political weapons of scorn and derision. Whether it has the political power and skill to be the "broker" in this area of ideological disunity is an issue open to debate.

A WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE

Students of the American political system are quite generally convinced that the President of the United States is the major policy-maker. If he is not the innovator, he must be the catalyst. Otherwise no substantial unity and direction in public policy will occur. Consequently, we have proposed that the President issue the call for a White House Conference on Farm Policy. The Conference should be personally inaugurated by the President, and make its final report, including policy proposals, to him directly. The power of his office, the influence of his new electorate, and the magnitude and seriousness of the problem should provide the atmosphere for conciliation and positive action. If the election produces a President and Congress of the same political party, the

recommendations of the White House Conference might well become the basis of legislation. Even a split decision in the November election does not foreordain failure. Both nominees for President will be committed to the pursuit of basic changes in the farm program.

One foundation for such a conference is, at this writing, being laid at the Center for Agricultural and Economic Adjustment (CAEA) at Iowa State University, which is formulating plans for a Farm Policy review meeting in December, 1960. If these plans mature, this could well become a preparatory meeting for a later White House Conference. Those invited to the Iowa State meeting will be a few members of Congress who hold important positions in the legislating of farm policy and their committee staffs, certain officials of the USDA, the legislative representatives and research directors of the major farm organizations, a select group from the land-grant and private universities, and a cross sections of officials from other interested and concerned pressure groups.

The agenda of this proposed CAEA meeting will call for the following presentations—the nature of the present farm problem, a summary of its historical development, and a review of the major areas of farm policy legislation—price and income, soil bank, and surplus disposal programs. During the first part of each session, the "statement of policy" of the major bills of farm legislation will be analyzed in terms of the goals set forth therein as compared with the achievements that have been forthcoming. Following, there will be analyses of alternative methods which might be used to realize more effectively the policy objectives. The last half-day of the meeting will be utilized in the development of an over-all reappraisal of farm policy in terms of varying goals and methods.

Those who would attend the White House Conference should be selected from the very highest echelons of the national public and private organizations; this is particularly important in regard to the representatives of the farm groups. Certainly, the presidents of the three major farm organizations need to participate. Also, there should probably be ranking representatives from the NCFC and the major farm export-import groups—wheat, cotton, tobacco, wool, and sugar. It would seem prudent for the President to invite, too, those members of Congress who are ranking members of the House and Senate Committees which act in the areas of foreign and farm policy. The goal of the selection process will be to find the golden mean—not so large a membership that important decisions will be frustrated; not so small a membership that the centers of influence will be neglected.

Policy studies—such as those emanat-

ing from the Ames meeting—should precede the Conference itself and be made available, at an early moment, to the participants. However, this is not the place to discuss the mechanics of the Conference. Our principal emphasis is upon the energy and dispatch of the incoming President; if he inaugurates, sets the tone for, and sustains a constant interest in, the Conference it might well be of real benefit to the nation. The power, pomp, and prestige of his office will do much toward mitigating the divisive tendencies that are now so apparent between our national farm organizations.

This proposal, if of any considerable value, will not harbor postponement. The next President, barring a serious recession or sensational incidents which might weaken our international position, may well be the chief executive for the next eight years. Never will the warmth and strength of his mandate be more potent than in early 1961.

The Extension Service and Public Policy

By WALLACE E. OGG

ABSTRACT: If the United States is to have a foreign agricultural policy which is consistent with our over-all foreign economic policy it may be necessary to find some simultaneous solutions to our current farm problems. The Co-operative Extension Service is uniquely equipped to meet the challenge of providing a firm educational base for facilitating adjustments needed in American agriculture and also for a consistent foreign agricultural policy. But meeting this challenge will not be easy. The Extension Service and probably the whole land-grant institution would face a major reorientation of the extension educational program. Emphasis and support would have to be shifted from preoccupation with the technology scientific research has made possible to a much broader program of education designed to help society manage social and economic change. Whether extension can rise to this challenge may determine whether the United States can have a consistent foreign agricultural policy.

DOES the Co-operative Extension Service have a role in the task of integrating foreign agricultural policy and domestic farm policy? The answer would seem obvious to anyone familiar with the historic role of the Extension Service in the scientific and technological revolution in agriculture. It is questionable if the integration can be achieved without the effective participation of the Extension Service.

At this time, the Extension Service is not actively participating. It is talking to itself about the responsibility in national conferences, and a few state programs have done a little. For the most part, however, the state programs do not include this responsibility.¹

EDUCATION ON FOREIGN POLICY

Why is the Extension Service not more actively involved in education on foreign policy? One reason is that an adequate program is so complicated that a superficial program might be worse than none at all. Others include tradition, a given audience, and a reluctance to approach this audience and a potentially much expanded one with a new and relatively uncharted educational area.

In the past, life for the Extension Service in most states has been fairly simple and—given the objectives—eminently successful. The goal has been to extend the use and applications of technological research to farm people. Evaluations could simply measure rates of the adoption of practices by farm people.

As indicated by other articles in this

¹ The recent market study tours sponsored jointly by the Foreign Agricultural Service and the Federal Extension Service have sparked considerable interest. Subsequent meetings and radio and television programs have been conducted. A sense of responsibility has been created, and one is aware that most specialists involved are a bit frustrated by the fact that they have not done more.

publication, accepting responsibility for an educational role in the development of foreign agricultural policy should not be taken lightly. The responsibility would include an objective analysis of the dynamic world situation and the broad outlines of the commitments that the United States has made in foreign policy. It would have to include an analysis of the place of foreign agricultural policy as part of our foreign economic policy. Commitments in the latter area include a combination of balanced technical assistance—balanced in the sense of including assistance with both technological innovations and social and economic adjustments to them. Commitments also include the export of capital to developing countries.

As these countries improve their productivity, trade, based on comparative advantage, will be a necessity—to provide market outlets for developing production and sources of commodities that can be purchased and imported more economically than produced at home. In the modern world of planned and controlled trade, this will probably not be nineteenth-century free trade. It will have a good deal of government direction, but the planning will need to be based on the principles of comparative advantage in order for economic development to flourish.

There may be alternatives to this developing outline of policy which should be explored. Certainly there are alternatives within our foreign policy commitments that will need exploration for specific policy implementation.

It already has been clearly indicated that it will not be enough merely "to wrench farm attention away from the home front." A foreign agricultural policy consistent with our over-all foreign policy goals probably is not politically feasible unless it is related to and based upon simultaneous solutions of some of the domestic farm problems. If

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so, this means that nonfarm people also have a stake in domestic farm policy.

A sound program

A sound educational program will have to explore these problems and the alternative choices to deal with them. It will have to explore the complex relationships between foreign agricultural policy and domestic farm policy. This is indeed a large undertaking.

An educational program will have to face frankly such areas of conflict as:

(1) Problems related to the level of output. There are sharp conflicts between efforts to contain our excess agricultural capacity and a consistent trade policy.

(2) The inevitable fact that anticipating a really successful development program in agriculture for economically underdeveloped countries will generate fears of new competition and additional pressure for agricultural adjustment in this country.

(3) Competition for both legislative attention and funds between foreign agricultural policy and domestic farm policy.

A sound educational program should also recognize the complementary relationships between domestic farm policy objectives and foreign agricultural goals of:

(1) An adequate domestic educational program to facilitate needed adjustment in our agriculture. A program of vocational and educational counseling of youth and adults, technical vocational training, and college or university education for capable young farm people who are now bypassed would be only part of a much broader national educational effort for economic growth and national defense.

(2) A domestic reallocation of both labor and capital from farming to other industries and services. This would not only relieve income problems in farming and strengthen the rest of the economy but would also reduce political resistance to foreign agricultural policy.

(3) Reallocation of scarce scientific technologists from research and extension

work in the United States to foreign economic assistance. This would be consistent both with agricultural adjustment in the United States and with foreign economic development.

It is complicated enough to try to communicate the idea that only a simultaneous solution to domestic farm problems and foreign agricultural policy problems is likely to be politically feasible. It is even more difficult to do this in a way appropriate to objective education. And objectivity is imperative.

In an economy conditioned to high-pressure and superlative advertising and selling, the prestige of the Extension Service rests on a firm foundation of objectivity with technical information. This objectivity also must be maintained with education for foreign agricultural policy. Temptation would be strong to become the advocate of a program if only because the need for good policy is urgent. But the temptation must be resisted.²

A further complication lies in the need to expand the audience of the Extension Service. It is not sufficient to educate public opinion in agriculture. True, an effective educational program for the farm audience could make it easier for politicians to treat domestic problems in a perspective centered on foreign policy. But this may not be enough. The conflicts between domestic farm policy and foreign agricultural policy are not the exclusive concern of farm people. Because of the urgency of foreign policy, the nonfarm public could decide to resolve some of these conflicts at the possible expense of the interests of farm people. In this case, it is important that the nonfarm public

² This does not mean that the work of education is ended once people come to the threshold of action. As people decide what they want to do, education assumes a service and counseling role.

understand as fully as possible the areas of conflict and complementary interest so that conflicts are minimized.

Students of co-operative extension education have been saying that the audience of the Extension Service must be expanded to include the nonfarm audience in any case. The public affairs program often is mentioned as a candidate for this expansion. Talking about expansion, however, is much easier than achieving it. Extension education—for farm people—is highly respected by nonfarm people who know about it. But it seldom occurs to them to come to the Extension Service—unless they have a lawn, household, or garden problem.

Notable starts on broad programs in public affairs have been made in a few states, but these are only the beginnings. With so limitless an audience and such definitely limited resources, the plaguing question of where to begin raises its ugly head.

CAN EXTENSION MEET THE CHALLENGE?

Considering its past and present tradition of extending technological information, can the Extension Service rise to the occasion and participate effectively in educating public opinion on the related problems of foreign agricultural policy and domestic farm policy?

The Extension Service already has done a good deal of soul searching on this subject. For a little over fifteen years, the Extension Service has been saying to itself that extending technological information in farming and homemaking is becoming less important—and that public affairs education, including both farm policy and foreign policy, should receive increasing attention. This was mentioned in the Land Grant College Association's report, "Postwar Agricultural Policy," pub-

lished in October 1944.³ It was emphasized in the so-called "Kepner Report" of 1946⁴ and again in the "Joint Committee Report on Extension Programs Policies and Goals," published in 1948.⁵ Recently the Scope reports have re-emphasized these same ideas.⁶

There has been progress. Assisted by the Farm Foundation and encouraged by the Federal Extension Service, almost all states are represented at the Foundation's annual National Policy Conference. Most states make available some printed material on public policy issues. Perhaps half of the states conduct occasional meetings on national policy issues, and four or five states have more intensive programs with one or more full-time specialists in public affairs. Several of these states have conducted extensive programs on international understanding and foreign policy. Even in the most advanced states, however, there has been almost no actual reallocation of resources in public affairs programs.

The new programing has been made possible almost entirely by adding specialists in the field of public affairs.

³ Post War Agricultural Policy, Report of the Committee on Post War Agricultural Policy of the Land-Grant Colleges and Universities (October 1944).

⁴ Kepner Report, Extension Service, United States Department of Agriculture, No. 18 (January 1946).

⁵ Joint Committee Report on Extension Programs Policies and Goals, United States Department of Agriculture and Association of Land-Grant Colleges and Universities (Washington, D. C., August 1948).

⁶ The Cooperative Extension Service Today, Joint Committee on Extension Program Policies and Goals, American Association of Land-Grant Colleges and State Universities and the Federal Extension Service, United States Department of Agriculture (April 1958). A Guide to Extension Programs for the Future, Agricultural Extension Service, North Carolina State College for the various Agricultural Extension Services and the United States Department of Agriculture (July 1959).

Technical production education has been expanded at the same time. The pressure on local county educational programs has been to add to programs rather than to substitute.

All in all, only limited programing in this area and an almost infinitesimal amount of total resources have gone into education to develop informed public opinion and leader education on foreign agricultural policy. But if the job is to be done, the Extension Service probably will have to do it. And, in many ways, the Extension Service is uniquely equipped to do the job.

No other agency for formal or informal adult education has the organizational resources possessed by the Extension Service. In each state, the Extension Service is an arm of a land-grant college or university, with access to an impressive array of the resources of these institutions—including access to almost all of the available knowledge and research on domestic farm problems and foreign agricultural policy. There is access also at these institutions to the kind of educational resources needed for an understanding of the international situation and a program related to and dependent on foreign policy. There is access to both the best knowledge needed in agriculture and the political scientists, sociologists, historians, anthropologists, and others who are experts on the world situation and foreign policy.

The state extension services reach into every rural and urban county in the United States. Each county office has a staff of professional adult educators—in tune with most of the rural leaders in the county and, in many cases, urban leaders as well. The Extension Service has the experience and know-how to organize and conduct effective educational campaigns, using direct teaching, indirect teaching, printed materials, and mass media.

Thus, in part, the Extension Service is well equipped by its organizational and other actual and potential resources to conduct the needed educational program. On the other hand, the strong traditional commitment of resources to technological education, among other factors, inhibits the Extension Service from meeting this new challenge.

WHAT IS REQUIRED?

To the extent that the domestic farm problem is partly one of adjustment to technological progress, the land-grant system and the United States Department of Agriculture may be said to have helped create the problem. Both are deeply concerned at the present time with adjusting their own programs toward more emphasis on facilitating adjustment.

What if the Extension Service were to adopt the broader challenge in the task of integrating domestic farm policy and foreign agricultural policy? If it does, it will probably involve much more than the addition of a new program and a few new specialists. It would involve a completely new orientation. Among the kind of changes, this reorientation would require:

(1) The acceptance of and responsibility for positive leadership on the part of administrators—college and university presidents, deans, directors of extension, and chairmen or heads of departments—who have a contribution to make in

(a) The mobilizing of external support so that the budget for the work can be formal and protected;

(b) The mobilizing of internal support so that an effective program can be developed and implemented;

(c) The organization of necessary administrative, supervisory, service, teaching, research, and extension staff resources; and

(d) The implementation of necessary staff training at the state and local levels.

(2) The development and implementation, with continued administrative leadership, of a program consistent with the nature of the problem and the educational needs of the people to be reached.

(3) The streamlining of traditional programs at both the state and local levels to permit reallocation of resources to the new programs.

(4) Special and determined effort to reach the nonfarm audience.

To reorient the whole program of the Extension Service in this direction will mean accepting the responsibility to go on a new, unfamiliar stage in a new and unscripted role in which the importance of administrative and objective subject-matter leadership cannot be overemphasized. Whether the Extension Service leadership is ready to accept this chal-

lenge remains to be seen. The consequences of the choice may be profound. It may not be possible to have the kind of foreign agricultural policy that the world situation demands from the United States if the Extension Service does not accept this new role.

If the Extension Service elects to continue its traditional job of extending only new farm and home technology and to leave education on adjustment problems and foreign agricultural policy to other institutions and agencies, the Extension Service of necessity probably will fill a declining role in our society. But if it elects to launch out in response to this new challenge, it will have both a new and broader audience and a new reason for existence.

Agricultural Policy, Politics, and the Public Interest

Suggestions for Additional Reading

BY GLADYS L. BAKER AND CHARLES M. HARDIN

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ECONOMICS

DENNIS H. ROBERTSON. *Lectures on Economic Principles*. (Vol. III.) Pp. 164. London: Staples Press, 1959. Distributed by John de Graff, New York. \$3.50.

This is the last of three volumes which reproduce a course of lectures that Sir Dennis Robertson delivered at the University of Cambridge prior to his retirement in 1957. Earlier volumes were reviewed in *THE ANNALS* for September 1958, and January 1959, respectively. The third volume deals with money and business cycles. Appendices reproduce addresses to international groups.

The main interest of this volume to American students of the social sciences is likely to be in its demonstration that Keynesianism in the postwar period has not by any means received unqualified acceptance in its home university. This is not to say that Robertson rejects such elements of the Keynesian doctrine as anti-deflation policy pursued through public finance and monetary channels, planning government construction to use public works as counterdepression measures, and the general run of automatic and discretionary controls of the over-all level of business activity. But he has some very critical comments to make.

"I am definitely of opinion," he says, "that in his later work Keynes, while he continued to contribute to, also marred by distortions and exaggerations of various kinds, a fruitful body of doctrine which had been moulded over several decades by many hands." This view Robertson exemplifies in Keynes' dramatization of the contrast between mass unemployment and full employment, which according to Robertson oversimplified the problem of objectives in the 1930's. Robertson criticizes attaching much importance to an ex-post equality of saving and investment when, as Hawtrey pointed out, a distinction might well be made between intended investment and investment which is no more than an unintentional accumulation of unsold goods. Robertson also argues against the Keynesian view that wage reductions necessarily augment rather than lessen the amount of unemployment. He considers the assumption of an "immutable income-consumption function" to be mistaken and is dubious about the mathematical models of the business cycle which have become fashionable in recent years. He thinks that these may point the way to advances in cycle theory but says that they neglect the part played in investment by innovations and discontinuities. The multiplier, Robertson feels, is an "extremely unreliable instrument for short-run or cyclical prediction."

As with the earlier volumes, these lectures contain a great deal in small compass and should interest American teachers as examples of how teaching is conducted in British universities.

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WILLIAM G. BOWEN. *The Wage-Price Issue: A Theoretical Analysis*. Pp. xv, 447. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1960. \$8.50.

The gist of this interesting study can be stated rather simply. In a period of full employment we are confronted with what Paul Samuelson calls "the biggest unsolved economic problem of our time," namely whether there is a built-in inflationary bias in our institutions of wage and price setting. To this question Professor Bowen does not provide a conclusive answer. Instead, he concentrates on the issue of whether the behavior of any particular social group or institution can properly be regarded as the "cause" of inflation and, consequently, be held responsible for it. The reply is in the negative, as may be expected. Certain behavior patterns of the various agents operating on the labor market must coincide with certain policies of the monetary authorities and a failure of the engineers and managers to provide a sufficiently high rate of increase of productivity in order for the wage spiral to arise. Of all of these necessary conditions, none is sufficient by itself to "cause" an inflationary movement. To single out one of these as "responsible" is inadmissible and betrays bias.

These results can be obtained by a rather simple process of analysis. The author, however, provides us with a goodly quantity of further material. This book is divided into five parts. The first presents what Bowen calls the "dilemma model"—the chain of events which imposes upon society a choice between inflation and unemployment. Part II deals with the process of wage determination, one of the key elements in the dilemma model, while the price-setting aspects of the dilemma model are dealt with in Part III of the study. This section includes a discussion of the

cost-plus pricing process, which is rather fair and a useful summary of the literature with some helpful comments of the author. The next part of the book deals with monetary policy: One of the main issues presented is that of the effectiveness of restrictive monetary policy. Part V, finally, presents the conclusions of the author.

One of the most useful contributions of the book is its successful attack upon a classification of types of inflation which has been *en vogue* in the last few years: demand versus cost inflation, buyers versus sellers inflation, spontaneous versus induced inflation, and so forth. A basic difficulty of these classifications is that no practicable way exists by which we can decide how much of any given price increase can be ascribed to either of the two types. The reason is that in many cases, as a result of monopolistic competition, demand and cost schedules are interdependent. Moreover, the term "inflation" covers a multitude of price movements in divergent directions many of which are again interrelated. Finally, neither demand nor cost inflation could persist without the requisite behavior of the monetary authorities.

This review falls far short of a full description of the contents of this exceedingly useful volume. The book is a highly necessary warning against the pitfalls of thinking in large aggregates, indispensable as the latter are on certain levels of abstraction.

ADOLF STURMTHAL

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F. THOMAS JUSTER. *Consumer Expectations, Plans, and Purchases: A Progress Report*. (Occasional Paper 70.) Pp. xviii, 174. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1959. \$2.50.

Expectations about the future can and do influence the present and prospective spending and saving of consumers, and in the aggregate, consumers' decisions can initiate changes in the general level of economic activity. Hence a knowledge of consumers' current attitudes and expectations might provide the policy-making economist with valuable predictions of the

immediate future. The hope of deriving a trustworthy short-run forecasting tool from information supplied by consumers about their plans has inspired a substantial amount of empirical work and some theoretical study of the nature of expectations over the past ten years. Mr. Juster's careful study of the data on buying plans obtained from the membership of Consumers Union late in 1957 and early in 1958 is directed towards the formulation of a theory of data collection on decision-making among consumers. Without such a theoretical frame of reference, empirical work cannot progress beyond the demonstration of a high correlation between changes in consumers' buying plans and subsequent changes in actual purchases over a brief span of years.

Starting with a contingent action view of consumer behavior, the author carried out an empirical examination of the data from the two surveys to ascertain how buying plans are related to expectations about income, prices, and other constraints on expenditures and what kinds of survey questions provide the most reliable information on purchasing decisions. The statistical analysis shows that "definite" plans to buy durable goods within the next six months are more closely related to general expectations and to the financial circumstances of the consumer than plans over a longer time-horizon. The consumers with improved personal situations or with favorable expectations reported more buying plans for the near future than other consumers. These results imply that buying plans for the six months ahead are probably the most trustworthy indicators of future action.

The buying plans for the short run were, however, closely related to consumers' expectations about their financial situation over a much longer period. Optimism about their economic situation as much as five years in the future may account for relatively more buying plans in large part because new homeowners or prospective home buyers purchase and often own more durable goods than established homeowners and renters. The purchase of a home demands assurance of a favorable financial outlook over a longer period than

the purchase of an automobile or of various types of household equipment. The location of new homes in the recent period of metropolitan expansion has made the automobile a primary necessity, and home buyers' plans to buy automobiles are no different than those of other consumers. Buying plans cannot be used with confidence for forecasting purposes without a greater understanding of the nature of consumers' long-run financial expectations and commitments. This progress report on work that is a part of an extensive investigation of expectation data is quite hopeful. The collection of more adequate survey data can provide the basis for tracing the effects of changes in expectations on buying plans and actual purchases. The best information on expectations can be determined experimentally by comparing how well the answers to different types of questions serve as predictions of actual purchases in every situation that could arise.

DOROTHY S. BRADY

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HERBERT V. PROCHNOW. *The Federal Reserve System*. Pp. xiv, 393. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. \$6.50.

The Federal Reserve System is a collection of essays by authorities in the field of banking and finance, carefully edited by Herbert V. Prochnow. The authors of the separate chapters have been chosen from financial institutions, the universities, and the Federal Reserve System itself. All of them, by virtue of past experience or close contact, have an intimate knowledge of the System and its problems. In a book containing much detail there are bound to be some overlaps and inconsistencies, but in *The Federal Reserve System* these are at a minimum, and the quality of exposition is generally excellent.

The title of this book recalls an earlier publication of the same name, subtitled, "Its Purposes and Functions." There are few students of economics and finance during the last twenty years who are not familiar with that little paper-bound volume published by the Board of Governors

in three editions between 1939 and 1954. There is a significant difference, however, between the earliest edition, bound in gray, with its mechanical charts and cold tabular material, and the latest edition with its two-color pie charts and modern format. Viewed together with the publications of some of the Federal Reserve Banks, it signals a growing realization of the importance of broad professional and public understanding of the role and activities of the Federal Reserve System and the desirability of "popularizing" its problems.

The Federal Reserve banks have continued to expand their coverage of many aspects of System functions, always reaching for broader audiences. The Board of Governors in Washington, concerned with more delicate policy questions and with communication at a different level, has apparently found it more difficult to do so. However, if the Board has seen fit to forego a new edition of *The Federal Reserve System* or of its 1941 *Banking Studies*, Herbert Prochnow's volume is a worthy substitute. It brings descriptive and historical material up to date, and it continues in the direction pointed by its predecessors—toward greater depth of analysis and greater understandability. This volume does not attempt to "popularize" in the sense of providing a simplification; but it does give the reader a sense of reality that is often missing in treatises on central banking or in official pronouncements. This is accomplished not only through the authors' grasp of the facts and their familiarity with the institutions concerned but also through their willingness, at times, to allow their personal convictions to emerge.

This book will be useful for several types of audiences. For the student in college it will provide an excellent summary of the origins of the Federal Reserve System and its functions and some good, factual background for the study of monetary theory. For the informed business man or professional, it provides a wealth of little-known detail in proper perspective. A lucid explanation of Federal Reserve Bank Statements and an excellent summary of all Federal Reserve Regulations, while available elsewhere in different form, are

most welcome. For the general public and for the legislator it cannot, by itself, bring full understanding, but it can provide good "feel" for the complexities and difficulties as well as the opportunities of monetary management. This volume undoubtedly will become one of the "standards" of the literature of central banking.

DAVID C. MELNICOFF
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JAMES WASHINGTON BELL and WALTER EARL SPAHR (Eds.). *A Proper Monetary and Banking System for the United States*. Pp. viii, 239. New York: Ronald Press, 1960. \$6.00.

This book is a study by a group of conservative economists who were selected by a subcommittee of the Executive Committee of the Economists' National Committee on Monetary Policy to describe accurately "the fundamental errors in principle and practice in our monetary and banking structure" and to offer "specific recommendations for improvement . . . in the interest of the public welfare."

A model bill designed to provide us "with a gold (coin) standard and redeemable currency and to correct other defects in the monetary system" appears early in the text, and the last sentence in the book recommends its enactment. However, the co-authors do not go completely back into history, for they do not advocate the re-appearance of the gold clause contract. "All bonds and other securities issued by the government or private enterprise should be payable in dollars. Such an arrangement permits the debtor to pay in any type of dollars which he finds convenient, and the creditor, if dissatisfied, is free, under a gold standard and redeemable currency system, to convert the dollars received into any type of dollar which he may prefer" (p. 45).

From the political angle it is difficult to believe that the model bill can be adopted in the easily foreseeable future. The last nationally known politician to speak boldly in favor of the pre-New Deal gold standard was Harold Stassen. The monetary aspects of the Roosevelt revolution seem nearly unchanged in even minor details as

far as the law is concerned after almost eight years of traditionally 'sound money' party rule, at least in the eyes of the executive branch of government.

There is a chapter on "A Proper Central Banking System" which contains a recommended rewording of the Title of the Federal Reserve Act designed "to state more fully than is now the case the appropriate purposes of the Federal Reserve System." This would add to the usual purposes of elasticity, rediscounting facility, and more effective supervision other purposes, such as: "to protect the integrity and purchasing power of the United States dollar; to promote profitable production and employment; to facilitate consumption and to foster a high standard of living." Bell thinks that, as a result of the Employment Act of 1946, "Efforts are constantly being made to force the Federal Reserve System under the control (of the Act) and to make the banking system an instrumentality of the government" (pp. 225-226).

Pressures toward the monetization of public debt are deplored. They make the proper role of the central bank more difficult. But in view of the wars and economic convulsions of the incredible past fifty years, how could these pressures have been avoided?

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EDWARD S. MASON (Ed.). *The Corporation in Modern Society*. Pp. xv, 335. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959. \$6.75.

This symposium of fourteen essays attempts to analyze the influence of the corporation on American life. The role of the corporation in the social, economic, and political environments is examined from the viewpoints of lawyers, economists, sociologists, and political scientists. The viewpoint of the businessman or the professional manager is missing.

According to the editor, he has tried to the best of his ability to assemble the ideas of a number of knowledgeable contributors to various aspects of the problems raised by the emergence of the large

corporation in modern society. Among the main questions and issues considered are: To whom are corporate managements responsible, and to what purposes? How much power do large corporations have, and how is this power limited? Who are the managers of large corporations? From what groups do they come, and how are they selected? What effect has the separation of ownership and management had on the meaning and justification of private property?

The effects of the separation of ownership from control on methods of corporate financing and the uses of corporate funds are considered. Evaluation is made of the contribution of the corporation to research and development in the United States. Attention by some of the contributors is given to the nature of the corporation's relationships to its labor force, to its owners, and to its vendors and customers. An assessment is made of the corporation as a form of government; and the role of American corporations overseas is discussed. Included are essays about the nature of the corporation in Great Britain and certain aspects of Soviet industrial organization.

Edward S. Mason, in his editorial introduction, provides the reader with a synopsis of the main points of the fourteen contributors. He organizes the principal questions asked about the present and future impact of the corporate system on society as follows: (1) the problem of legitimacy; (2) the problem of power; (3) the managerial revolution; (4) the changing character of private property; (5) the corporation and the state; and (6) the major contributions of the authors of the essays.

Inasmuch as the book is composed of a collection of essays, different points of view about the corporation are presented. Any reader will find himself both agreeing and disagreeing with the divergent ideas expressed. In a Foreword, Adolf A. Berle, Jr. suggests that the American problems of the latter half of the twentieth century will be as much philosophical as economic. For those who agree, this excellent symposium is recommended.

The authors of the essays have provided a basis for present analysis and further

study of the impact of the corporation on American life.

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RALPH L. NELSON. *Merger Movements in American Industry 1895-1956*. Pp. xxi, 177. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1959. \$5.00.

This study began as a Columbia University doctoral thesis and was completed at the National Bureau of Economic Research under the direction of Professor George Stigler. It is one of several studies currently under way there on industrial organization. The book deals only with manufacturing and mining mergers and covers primarily the period, 1895-1920. However throughout, and especially in a final chapter, Dr. Nelson ties in his material with Willard Thorp's classic, *Recent Economic Changes, 1919-1928*, subsequently extended by Dr. Thorp and by the Federal Trade Commission. There have been four previous studies on the great merger period, 1898-1903, but none on the "dark age" of 1904-1919. When Dr. Nelson undertook to analyze that neglected era he found the data in the four earlier studies so difficult to use that he pushed his starting date back to 1895. He reworked the sources used by the earlier four, John Moody, Luther Conant, Myron Watkins, and the Census, of which the chief was *The Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, added new cases or dropped old ones not suitable to his tables, and thoroughly reorganized the findings. These appear in 62 Tables in the text, in 23 Appendix Tables, and also in 6 charts. He devotes an entire chapter and also part of the Appendix to explaining in considerable detail his statistical methods and to justifying the decisions that he had to make where the data were inadequate. This reviewer was impressed by his care and patience and by his ingenuity and good sense in finding new ways of analyzing the data.

There were three great merger movements in modern American economic history, namely those of 1898-1902, 1926-1930, and 1946-56. Each was relatively less important than its predecessor. Dr. Nelson draws a distinction between consolidations, many firms assembled all at once, and acquisitions, a gradual process. Consolidations were more characteristic of the earlier period. He overlooks the fact, it seems, that anti-trust sentiment itself has made consolidations today hazardous. He is also interested in the periods of little merger activity, and he likewise analyzes the movement in terms of industries most affected by mergers. There are indeed very few approaches to his problem that he has overlooked.

For many scholars the most fascinating portion of his study will be his judgment on the four major explanations of the upsurges in mergers, especially of the 1898-1902 one. His data do not sustain Myron Watkins' hypothesis that mergers were devices whereby producers could preserve profits in the face of slackening demand and greater pressure of competition. Nor does he give appreciable credence to the reasoning of Joe Bain that improving transportation brought about national monopolies. He accepts in part only the explanation that by 1900 a large national capital market had developed and was the cause of mergers. The hypothesis that he finds most acceptable is the oldest and simplest of all, namely, that business leaders sought market control and hoped for monopoly profits. In each of these cases his reasoning is skillful and provocative. In an Appendix he draws on H. W. McCrosty's study of the simultaneous British merger movement for further support of his own analysis and conclusions.

In general, Dr. Nelson finds that the peaks and troughs in mergers follow surprisingly closely those of business cycles. Merger upsurges and stock market booms have a close correlation.

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LEO GREBLER. *Housing Issues in Economic Stabilization Policy*. (Occasional Paper 72.) Pp. xi, 129. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1960. \$1.50.

This monograph is the story of the intricate manipulations of the housing and mortgage markets between 1955 and 1958. It is a tale of governmental intervention through selective housing credit controls fraught with the difficulties of reconciling two broad national objectives—the promotion of stable prosperity and the advancement of better housing. The author of this brilliant piece of economic and political analysis is one of the few persons who truly understands what has been going on. He leads the reader through the maze with a scholarly clarity and a lucid style.

The period between 1955 and 1958 was selected for study because the multiplicity, frequency, and scope of the administrative actions affecting the housing sector of the economy exceeded anything previously experienced. This experience best serves the purpose of the author in evaluating governmental housing credit policies in relation to general economic stabilization policies. For the full perspective, one should first read Professor Grebler's companion piece, *The Role of Federal Credit Aids in Residential Construction* (Occasional Paper 39, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1953) which deals with federal credit aids in their impact on new nonfarm residential construction from 1935 to 1951. In combination, these two Papers recount the economic history of postdepression real estate finance and serve, as no other writings in published form, as a textbook description and a scholarly interpretation.

The first phase of the period covered by this study was one of housing expansion in 1953-1954, "a classic response to easy credit." In 1955, the overbuilding of the previous year led to a series of selective credit controls to curb the exuberance in the housing sector though, at the same time, clear restraint of the general business boom was delayed until late in the year. In 1956-1957, only a few months after the housing controls became operative, governmental policies shifted to steps to help

check the decline in the supply of funds available for home building and purchase.

Among the imperfections in governmental controls which are revealed are the time lags in giving effect to policy and the frequency of policy shifts. This undue flexibility created uncertainties in an already uncertain milieu and induced successive expansion and contraction in mortgage lending which accentuated fluctuations in residential construction. However, the exceptional volatility of federally assisted construction was not entirely explained by the existence of Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and Veterans Administration (VA) programs and their administration. The author apparently does not see a fundamental conflict between long-range housing goals and basic economic stabilization policy though short-run compromises may be required. Finally, he judges that stability of residential construction independent of general construction and the general economy is an impractical and undesirable objective.

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Economics and the Policy Maker. Brookings Lectures, 1958-1959. Pp. xiii, 209. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1959. \$2.95.

The eight essays contained in this slim volume are the Brookings Lectures for 1958-59. The lectures were addressed to "professional specialists and public officials" and were "designed to present a review of the uses of economics by policy makers in the conduct of public and private affairs." The lectures I enjoyed most were those by Sidney Alexander, Mark Massel, and Louis Shere although neither these nor the other lectures contain particularly new insights or particularly fresh approaches. But to expect these in a series of semipopular lectures would be unrealistic. The five-page Foreword by Robert D. Calkins summarizes the volume adequately.

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SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION

SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET. *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. Pp. 432. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1960. \$4.95.

Professor Lipset, a sociologist at the University of California in Berkeley, addresses himself to various audiences, ranging from innocent laymen to "hardboiled" practitioners, for whom he provides abundant Footnotes and methodological asides, and to a wide variety of topics as these are exhibited in a wide variety of countries—the United States, Canada, Western Europe, Japan. His quotations extend from Aristotle to Talcott Parsons, from classic treatises to obscure monographs. He deals with the broad sociology of politics; with class structures and other factors as they affect the growth and problems of party systems; with the reasons why people vote—or fail to vote—as they do; with the particular niceties of the American political scene, including the behavior of the American intellectual; and with the politics of "private government" as this is illustrated within the trade-union movement. The result is not an easy book. The component chapters do not always form an integrated whole. Some of Professor Lipset's generalizations are, inevitably, so general that they seem either truisms or else too slippery to grasp. His historical account of American political parties is open to objection.

But if these are faults, they are admirable ones. *Political Man* is a remarkable book, with more ideas in it than are to be found in a dozen orthodox academic treatises. While specialists may quarrel with him on points of detail, few if any living scholars in the social sciences can match him in intellectual energy or in width of allusion. Like many contemporary sociologists, he is interested in consensus, mass culture, anomie, the end of ideology, and so on. But on all these somewhat hackneyed themes of our time he has something fresh to say or to suggest. He manages to avoid being trapped by the conventional originalities, such as today's novelties are tomorrow's banalities, and he

is neither "liberal" nor "conservative," nor yet again clinically detached. Thus, he notes that democracies which have two-party systems depend upon something very close to consensus. Too much vitality is a sign of too much dissension; apathy among voters may be a healthy rather than an alarming symptom. American economic mobility is actually no greater than that of other industrial societies such as Britain and West Germany, though the belief in greater mobility is an important element. American intellectuals have a far higher status than is commonly recognized: again, their belief in their own lowliness is an interesting feature. On these and many other aspects of political man, Professor Lipset speculates brilliantly. His book does far more to indicate the vigor of democratic communities than do any of the spate of current works which are overtly designed to laud the democratic way and purpose.

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ELI GINZBERG (Ed.). *The Nation's Children*, Vol. I: *The Family and Social Change*. Pp. xvii, 252. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960. \$4.50.

ELI GINZBERG (Ed.). *The Nation's Children*, Vol. II: *Development and Education*. Pp. xvi, 242. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960. \$4.50.

ELI GINZBERG (Ed.). *The Nation's Children*, Vol. III: *Problems and Prospects*. Pp. xvi, 242. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960. \$4.50.

These three volumes constitute the working papers for the Golden Anniversary White House Conference for Children and Youth held in Washington, D. C., in the spring of 1960. At the request of the Steering Committee of the Committee on Studies, thirty-four writers in education, religion, medicine, psychology, business, social work, economics, and anthropology contributed thirty-one chapters, to which Eli Ginzberg added editorial introductions. Lists of suggested reading to supplement

each chapter are appended to all three volumes.

The two-fold purpose of the papers, directed to the educated layman rather than to the specialist, was not to present original research but to (1) "help to outline the major developments in the field of children and youth since the 1950 Conference" and (2) "provide a basis for charting directions for the next decade."

The first of these purposes is certainly achieved. The papers devoted to stating major developments are so well done they need little comment. They succeed admirably in revealing the nature of the demographic, industrial, and institutional changes which have transformed our society in this century. Nowhere outside of textbooks has so much pertinent material been brought together and presented so simply and well.

Whether or not the second purpose—provision of a basis for charting directions for the next decade—is achieved will not be determinable until the decade runs its course.

The reported dissension in the Conference with respect to resolutions supporting the Southern student auditors suggests, in the first place, that the direction charted by the Conference was not clear-cut. Furthermore, there will certainly be loud lamentations from opponents of "the welfare state" over Eveline M. Burns' relentlessly logical statement of the case for improved provision for children by the government. These same people may protest also against the increasing burden of voluntary welfare services to children proposed by Elizabeth Wickenden.

Ginzberg was at some pains to reconcile relatively minor differences in figures of average family income used by different authors. He makes no attempt to reconcile more fundamental differences, such as those between the paper by representatives of three major religious faiths and the paper by Norman Cousins. Cousins, with his usual eloquence, attacks precisely the parochialism represented by the religious writers. Cousins urges us to stop thinking in terms of East and West, assuming that each is an entity. He wants us to think in terms of loyalty to the human common-

wealth, which he sees in no way as a threat to loyalty to one's own country. The three religious leaders still think in terms of America's "mission to the world"—a mission which many peoples of the world have come to resent.

At the risk of being invidious, the following statements are presented as among the many useful guidelines for charting future directions: "could we but give to every child in the land the same opportunities for intellectual stimulation now enjoyed by the children of professional, technical, and kindred workers, we could increase our 'talent pool' fivefold" (2, 133); "... the most important single clue to the quality of change in the Negro family and in the Negro community is found in the job picture, particularly for the male" (1, 136); "... farm-reared youth who migrate to cities are relatively unsuccessful..." (3, 36); "A Southern white man who recently returned to the South after eight years in other parts of the world said that the most startling change he noticed was that 'Negroes look you straight in the eye now'" (3, 74). There are many others, stark and challenging.

But knowing trends, amassing facts, summarizing developments are not enough. "... effective development of publicly [and privately] provided goods and services... will depend upon... how much people care about the well-being of children and families..." (3, 179). And, as Nelson Foote points out, no one who has ever agitated for school bonds would ever assume that people do care enough (3, 1-2). In any event, the major developments of the past decade have been ably traced; they can provide a basis for charting future developments. It is now a problem of strategy.

JESSIE BERNARD

Professor of Sociology
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LEE RAINWATER with the assistance of KAROL KANE WEINSTEIN. *And the Poor Get Children: Sex Contraception and Family Planning in the Working Class*. Pp. xiv, 202. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1960. \$3.95.

There is amusing irony in the observation that sex has something to do with contraception and that it can be regarded as a new if not profound insight into the causal system underlying the use, regularity, and effectiveness of contraceptive practice. J. Mayone Stycos pointedly reminds us in the Preface to this volume that sex has been almost totally ignored in fertility research. Although his claims are somewhat exaggerated, the criticism is well taken and provides an appropriate introduction to the work of Rainwater and Weinstein which was sponsored by the Planned Parenthood Federation of America and represents the first of a series of "Social Research Studies in Contemporary Life" edited by Burleigh Gardner.

The study is described as a "pilot investigation of the psychosocial factors involved in family planning and contraceptive practices by working class men and women." The data are from interviews conducted with a quota sample of forty-six married men and 50 married women drawn from the working classes in Chicago and Cincinnati. The analysis and presentation take the form of developing typologies of "upper lower and lower lower class" contraceptive and sexual behavior, replete with numerous verbatim quotations from the interviews, occasional statistical estimates of prevalence, completely inappropriate considering the nature of the sample, and most importantly the deduction of provocative hypotheses and speculations.

A considerable number of these deductions are worth taking seriously such as religious belief seems more to disorganize efforts at contraception than to prevent them completely. The implication that lower class males are less concerned with contraceptive responsibility and are less interested in their wives' sexual sensitivities than middle class males seems worth investigating in connection with contraception. The authors seem to exhibit considerable insight into the culture of the lower classes relevant to contraception. Their account of the value systems of fatalism, wishfulness, and luck seems particularly relevant for understanding contraceptive behavior.

Other factors are also enumerated which

if true in any important statistical sense would be quite pertinent to an explanation of contraceptive behavior. The amount of premarital ignorance about sex, conception, and contraception is one such factor. The woman's apparent concern about fecundity as it relates to her perception of the adult female role is another. The significance of sexual conflict for contraception effectiveness is still another. The authors also include some very neat social psychological analyses of the perceptions of familial roles, self-images, and male and female perceptions of sexuality, all within the context of lower-class culture.

This book should be read by anyone doing research in contraception of the social psychological aspects of fertility because it is rich in suggestions for research. Stycos most appropriately concludes his Preface with the hope that "the present investigation will not be interred in the ever-expanding graveyard of 'exploratory studies' whose tantalizing hypotheses are indefinitely left in limbo." And let the readers remember that this research has no empirical basis whatsoever for estimating the prevalence of any characteristic or evaluating the validity of any proposition.

One general question seems in order, and that is the significance for understanding differential fertility in contemporary American society of research organized around the class dimension when it is clear that class is rapidly diminishing in significance for fertility. At the moment—and this generalization is supported by two recent large-scale studies of fertility—religion is far more important than class in the determination of fertility and contraceptive practice. This in no way, of course, compromises the importance of this work for the interests of the Planned Parenthood Federation.

CHARLES F. WESTOFF

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New York University

WILLIAM H. NICHOLLS. *Southern Tradition and Regional Progress*. Pp. xviii, 202. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960. \$5.00.

The author of this book, an economist, through the use mainly of secondary

sources, has examined the factors in the shaping of Southern attitudes and policies in relationship to economic progress. He emphasizes the persistence of the agrarian idea; the creation of a Black Belt aristocracy with political power out of proportion to its numbers; the lack of an adequate sense of social responsibility in respect to matters intellectual and economic; and a strong tendency to conformity of thought and action, especially in relation to the race question.

The author considers acceleration of urbanization and industrialization essential to increasing progress of the South. City population is regarded as more progressive and tolerant than rural elements. Inequitable representation in state legislatures, a condition not peculiar to the South, should be rectified so that urban sentiment will not be unduly hampered by rural strength. There is suggested an economic program, fostered in part by the states and in part by the federal government, to correct the economic ills of the region, particularly those that retard small and middle class farmers.

Professor Nicholls concludes that the race tradition of the South is its greatest barrier to progress. He is alarmed at the possibility that the integration controversy may result in partial abandonment of the public school system, a step which he feels would lead to deterioration in education and probably would produce adverse effects upon industrial development. This alarm, which many share, and the author's sympathy with integration are, however, factors which seemingly have helped make his appraisal of Southern education, especially since the Civil War, the least satisfactory part of his book. The treatment is flimsy; neither the difficulties encountered nor the relative advances made in the field of education are adequately emphasized, while the persistence of the private school idea, with its alleged relevancy to the integration question, is overemphasized. Whatever may be said in condemnation or praise of segregationists, this reviewer feels that sentiment for private schools is the least significant factor in motivating their stand.

Conformity of thought is represented as one of the main aspects of the Southern

tradition, but, excepting his demonstration of general conformity on the race question, the author leaves the reader somewhat confused as to the extent of this principle (pp. 23, 135-140, 145). Whatever its shortcomings, this book, written avowedly for a purpose, follows closely its central theme and is, on the whole, suggestive and thought provoking.

HENRY H. SIMMS

Professor of History
Ohio State University

MYRON LIEBERMAN. *The Future of Public Education*. Pp. ix, 294. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960. \$5.00.

According to the description on the jacket, this book is "the most provocative book about the subject (the public schools) in years." This is a rather extravagant statement but not without precedent in the long history of publishers. That the author does launch an informed attack on almost every aspect of public education is true. But whether he will succeed in provoking counterattacks remains to be seen. Perhaps his object is merely to provoke thought on the part of his readers. This, in the opinion of the present reviewer, he has accomplished.

In his opening paragraph the author dissociates himself from all contemporary movements, theories, and personalities. In this sense he pursues a policy of "neutrality" among the contending parties. He declares flatly that he is not "an advocate of basic education, progressive education, the three R's, social adjustment, or stricter discipline." At the same time he endeavors to demonstrate that each and all of these approaches fail to go to the root of the problem of raising the level of instruction in our public schools. That root, he contends, is to be found in the broad framework of our educational system and, more particularly, in its "power structure" which is "anachronistic and dysfunctional."

The author predicts a profound revolution in this realm during the coming generation—a revolution which already is long overdue. The foundations of the system under which we now operate, he observes, were laid in our early agrarian society with

its great distances, its primitive means of communication, and its relatively self-contained neighborhoods and communities. It was in this society that our tradition of local control and the untrained teacher was developed. Now we live in a closely integrated society marked by fabulous mobility and close interdependence from border to border. Education consequently has become, not only an essential national concern, but also a vast enterprise on which the welfare of the nation rests.

In this brief review it is possible to mention only the two most basic theses of the book. The first is that the weakness of the public school derives from the system of local and even state control. There is little chance of improvement until the nation as a whole, by means of appropriate instrumentalities, assumes major responsibility for the support and direction of public education. The second thesis pertains to the role of the teaching profession. Only through a powerful organization of teachers can the necessary reforms be achieved. The profession must lead the way and guard jealously its rights and responsibilities. The role of the citizens should be strictly limited to the setting of the great goals and purposes of education. The determination of the means for achieving these goals and purposes is a purely professional task and should be left entirely to the teachers. These are truly provocative theses and should stimulate wide and thoughtful discussion of "the future of public education" in the United States.

GEORGE S. COUNTS

New Hope, Pa.

MARJORIE FISKE. *Book Selection and Censorship: A Study of School and Public Libraries in California*. Pp. ix, 145. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959. \$3.75.

Research for this study was undertaken during the years 1956-58 on a grant from the Fund for the Republic. Focusing on the source of library censorship, self-imposed or originating outside the institution, it sheds light as well on professional attitudes and behavior in the school and in the

community. Impetus for the study came from concern over pressures for the removal or restricted circulation of specific titles and general subject matter on the shelves of public and school libraries in California over a period of several years. The field work centered on twenty-six communities whose libraries serve the majority of the state's population. About 300 persons were interviewed in the course of the study.

The first chapter consists of an analysis of book selection practices, which were frequently found to be at variance with professional theory and established standards. The need for reliable methods of determining community needs and interests as a guide to book selection was noted, as was the absence of systematic efforts at qualitative appraisal and balance of subject matter. In school libraries varying degrees of deference to administrative personnel were observed.

Sources of censorship pressure were examined with the conclusion that individuals apparently acting independently have been more vigorous and persistent than the religious organizations and community groups which are popularly supposed to be sources of criticism of library policy. The most successful means of meeting attacks on library book selection policies at present seems to be affirmation of existing policies and support by the local press. Severe cases of controversy may lead to a habit of self-imposed censorship. However, where the library and its personnel enjoy a favorable status in the community greater freedom of book selection is exercised.

Many avenues worthy of further investigation are opened up by this very tentative survey. The entire study is more valuable as a challenge to further research than it is for its conclusions. The latter are based on such a limited geographical area that they cannot be accepted as typical of the climate of book selection in the United States. The value of the study lies in its examination of several cases of censorship and of the opinions and practices of numerous librarians and school administrators on the subject of actual or possible attacks on their policies.

This volume should be in the office of

every head librarian and school administrator. It should stimulate further research into the character of the library as a public institution. Aspects of the problem particularly deserving of attention are the public image of the library and the status of the librarian, criteria for book selection, the personnel shortage in libraries, factors influencing financial support of libraries, and administrative problems of school libraries.

MARGARET A. KATELEY

Librarian

Scarsdale Public Library

EZRA SOLOMON and ZARKO G. BILBIJA. *Metropolitan Chicago: An Economic Analysis*. Pp. xix, 208. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960. \$7.50.

This study is a cameo of the Chicago metropolitan economy—carefully cut and delicately contrived. Like any cameo it provides a miniaturized and restricted view, in which lies much of its charm and interest. Yet in this case we lose too much of the full profile from concentrating on what might be likened to, say, the lips and chin of a famous beauty.

Lest this criticism be taken too far amiss, let us at once describe what the authors have most admirably succeeded in doing.

Making use of what are in the main readily available data for most of the larger and some of the smaller metropolitan areas, and adjusting data which were not so readily available, they have outlined the salient features of the development of this metropolis. This outline is the most detailed and vivid over the past decade, and this sharper focus is due almost entirely to the very substantial improvement of small-area data during this time. Similarly, the outline is clearest in relation to those magnitudes which are most closely related, as was the authors' intention, to the nationally important accounting of: "employment, output, income, and saving" (pp. 4-5).

The choice of and focus on these particular magnitudes constitute both the strength and the weakness of this work. What the authors have done here is a model of clar-

ity and completeness which is within the grasp of analysts working in perhaps fifty standard metropolitan areas. It makes full use of recent advances in data collection. It is geared to the now-familiar quantities of national accounting and is therefore readily comprehensible to the educated lay reader. It provides an historical perspective, it relates the Chicago economy and its growth to that of the national economy, and within these broad sweeps it provides many valuable insights. To many, including perhaps your reviewer, one could wisely say: "Go thou and do likewise."

Yet for all of these virtues, there remains an unsatisfying sense of lack of fulfillment, which may stem from the somewhat overambitious claims of the authors in relation to their total achievement. Thus, a certain novelty is claimed: "It is only in the past few years that economic analysis as such has been applied to the systematic measurement and interpretation of metropolitan economies as individual entities," and "... the economic aspects of local area analysis have been invariably treated as subsidiary" (by a number of other disciplines and interest groups). The present work still falls short of an economic analysis in the most general sense and is more nearly a sound exercise in statistics; still worse, it displays not much if any more sophistication than some of the preceding literature with which the authors have apparently a "too-rapidly-passing" acquaintance.

It is quite true that economic analysis has much to offer to local area analysis. It is true that consistency with national accounts is desirable. It is true that available statistics permit increasingly detailed study. But both other economists and members of lesser breeds such as urban geographers and planners have discussed with more penetration the primary role of trade relations in the growth of local areas, thus indicating the greater relevance of international trade theory than the theory of national accounts to the problems in hand. A pursuit of these problems leads as well into delicate matters of industrial location and of urban function, in part as measured by nonmanufacturing employment, and in all three realms the problems of data col-

lection and analysis are most serious. At this level of maturity, metropolitan economic analysis is neither simple nor inexpensive.

Metropolitan Chicago should therefore be taken gladly and studied well for what it is, rather than for what it professes to achieve.

BRITTON HARRIS

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CHESTER RAPKIN and WILLIAM G. GRIGSBY.
Residential Renewal in the Urban Core: An Analysis of the Demand for Housing in Center City Philadelphia, 1957-1970 with Reference to the Washington Square East Redevelopment Area. Pp. 131. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960. \$3.75.

Residential Renewal in the Urban Core by Chester Rapkin and William G. Grigsby deals with a question of urgent importance to most large American cities: "Can middle and upper income families be induced to return to the center of the city to live?" It was prepared for the Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority under contract to provide a basis for determining the marketability of proposed apartment towers and of rehabilitated houses in a run-down but historical section of Old Philadelphia.

Fine techniques were developed by the authors for relating the area market problems to the projected metropolitan housing demand, and the derivation of the results was presented with such clarity and supported by such an amplitude of summary tables that the reader has little difficulty in following the entire process, and may add interpretation of his own. Because of this, the report is an important contribution to the field.

As advice to potential investors, the basic purpose for which the study was made, the report is cautious and conservative, stressing possible pitfalls and difficulties but still sufficiently positive to have inspired the developers to proceed with plans to spend \$40,000,000 in the area for residential development. Within this context, the report is a success.

However, the publication and wide dis-

tribution of this report place it in an entirely different frame of reference. The issue shifts from the immediate investment decisions to the long-range effect on the development of American cities. Here the problem, often found in books on this subject, is the intermixture of statistical fact and subjective judgment and the danger of confusion between the two, giving the personal bias of the authors disproportionate significance.

The basic technique used in the study is to project, by highly developed statistical means, the total metropolitan area demand for housing and then to estimate the portion of this that will be satisfied in a specific area. Here a critical element is the changing preferences of the people. The statistical projections flow logically out of statistical trends but the shifts in preference have little basis in documentation, and are not supported by the kind of research which reveals emergent trends not yet generally evident. This is particularly significant because of the assumption of the authors that center city is not a suitable environment in which to rear children.

This issue of whether or not families with children will live in center city is important because it will have a major bearing on whether the new generation will include leaders familiar from childhood with urban life and urban problems. The implication drawn by the authors from their study that "it is not likely that the number of families with youngsters will increase materially in center city" is a point of view not directly derived from the statistics nor supported by research of a scope sufficient to justify it. Because the book is surrounded by excellent statistical material, it assumes an aura of authority that it does not deserve and so contributes to its own fulfillment.

History will determine whether the projections of this book are correct or whether there are dynamic emergent factors not taken into account which will draw people, even including children, to the centers of our urban civilization.

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EDGAR M. HOOVER and RAYMOND VERNON. *Anatomy of a Metropolis: The Changing Distribution of People and Jobs Within the New York Metropolitan Area.* Pp. xvi, 345. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959. \$6.00.

The problem of metropolitan areas has been called the "number one domestic challenge" in the area of government today. We have made relatively little headway with this problem partly because the public, whose support is needed for effective solutions, does not yet understand the need for remedial action and partly because the specific information required by specialists to devise new forms of local co-operation has been largely lacking. *Anatomy of a Metropolis* is the introductory volume in a series on the New York Metropolitan region, which represents the first full-scale scholarly effort to reveal to the public the need for area-wide planning and to provide the specialized information on which such planning must be based.

The series was sponsored by the Regional Plan Association, an early pioneer in metropolitan planning, and conducted by the Harvard Graduate School of Public Administration. Three years of intensive research and planning by a special staff, sparked by Harvard faculty seminars and assisted by a distinguished advisory committee, preceded the publication of this volume.

Anatomy of a Metropolis was written by Raymond Vernon, Director of the Metropolitan Region Study, and Edgar M. Hoover, Professor of Economics at the University of Pittsburgh, aided by specialists who did the spade work. It analyzes the vast shifts in population, employment, and housing that have recently taken place in the twenty-two countries that comprise the New York Metropolitan Region and attempts to project future changes for a quarter of a century.

Its most dramatic finding is that in the next quarter of a century the region's "central core," New York City proper, will experience a decline in jobs, business, and people. This decline in jobs will come because assembly-line plants like automobile or airplane factories must be built along horizontal lines. However, in activities

permitting vertical expansion in skyscrapers or requiring a great diversity of professional or trade services the city will continue to grow. By the same token, population in Manhattan and its traditional "bedroom" boroughs will thin out, while the "grey areas" of slums and blight will spread. At the same time, manufacturing and population will mushroom in suburbia and exurbia.

The New York Metropolitan area contains the greatest aggregate of people, jobs, and wealth in the United States, but the changes described in this volume typify those in metropolitan areas throughout the nation. Indeed, preliminary data from the census of 1960 are confirming the trends foreshadowed in this study, not only in the region it describes but also in the rest of the country. That is why this valuable work, embodying the best thinking of experts in many areas, will serve as a model for metropolitan surveys for a long time to come.

FREDERICK SHAW

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Board of Education of the City
of New York

LOIS MACDONALD with the assistance of MURRAY B. NESBITT, PETER F. FREUND, and SAMUEL N. SEIDMAN. *Leadership Dynamics and the Trade-Union Leader.* Pp. xi, 156. New York: New York University Press, 1959. \$2.50.

Business, voluntary organizations such as the Red Cross and the Boy Scout movement, as well as the civilian and military branches of government, have paid increasing attention—financial and otherwise—to the torrent of research reports emanating from social psychologists and sociologists concerned with the study of small groups, leadership, and bureaucracy. Labor unions, on the other hand, have for the most part ignored this kind of material or have been downright hostile to it.

The authors of this book set themselves the exceedingly difficult task of ordering the findings of these reports to determine whether or not they might not after all have usable implications for the problems which the labor movement faces today.

Chapter I of the book, therefore, sets the stage by describing these problems: the change from organizing and recruiting members to administering contracts; the oligarchic tendencies which seem inevitably to accompany the increasing size and complexity of the labor movement; and the expansion of union activities into the political and other fields. Chapters II and III survey the findings of social psychologists and sociologists respectively; Chapter IV covers the relatively few studies of leadership actually undertaken in unions; and Chapter V summarizes.

The authors' attitude toward the products of the "behavioral scientists" is a sense of exasperation mingled with continued hope. In this they seem to mirror accurately views which are today quite frequent among economists, political scientists, and other representatives of the older social sciences. Militating against the likelihood that the behavioral scientists' material is applicable is its internal lack of agreement and conclusiveness; its preoccupation with method as against content; and the fact that the settings in which findings have been obtained range from the unrealistic, *ad hoc* student groups, to the noncomparable, leadership in the military. Yet the authors—and they are not alone—are loth to write off these findings altogether. These studies are, after all, the only massive body of empirical findings on leadership and administration that even attempt to be additive. How, without making the attempt empirically rather than on an *a priori* basis, can one be sure that leadership even in student groups may not bear similarities to leadership in more serious situations? The authors' judgment is therefore poised in the middle and, being of necessity an *a priori* judgment, it cannot be anything else.

This reviewer wonders whether the authors' condensation of the various fields they have tackled, heroic effort though it was, will be meaningful to all but a few of the outsiders for whom it is intended. From the insider's point of view there will be questions concerning the organization of the material—the subdivisions of the social psychology chapter, for instance, are by research group rather than by underlying

concept, and therefore are confusing to the reader—and there will also be questions on matters of fact. But given the difficulty of the task and barring a great deal more time, it is doubtful that others could have compiled a much better book.

HENRY A. LANDSBERGER

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New York State School of Industrial
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Cornell University

CHARLES H. LANGE. *Cochiti: A New Mexico Pueblo, Past and Present*. Pp. xxiv, 618. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1959. \$10.00.

This study is outstanding in its workmanship and in its comprehensiveness. With scrupulous attention to detail, Dr. Lange has integrated the results of his own field work with almost all published information on Cochiti. He has also ransacked manuscript sources in Santa Fe, Albuquerque, and Philadelphia and examined collections of photographs in Los Angeles, Washington, New York, and Denver. To an extent which few anthropologists have equaled he has combined the skills of the archivist and historian with those of the fieldworker. The product has a satisfying firmness of documentation and a constant dimension of time perspective.

The book begins with a succinct survey of the environmental setting. There follows a more extended account of the prehistory and history of the Pueblo. The economic base and subsistence are next considered. The chapter on political organization encompasses only some thirty-five pages, but the very interesting phenomenon of factionalism is treated in many different contexts in the volume. Indeed no description of Pueblo life can fail to discuss "politics" under the headings of religion and social organization as well as when devoted to government as such.

It has become customary, rightly or wrongly, for anthropologists in writing about Pueblo cultures to give the most extended scope to religion. Lange is no exception. But his chapters and sections on ceremonial organization, cosmology, witchcraft, medicine and secret societies.

ceremonial calendar, and paraphernalia are remarkable for their rich specificity. The reader learns which identified persons danced in what order, exactly how they were costumed, and the like. Lange critically relates his own interviews and observations to reports in the literature.

The chapters on social organization and life cycle contain good material but are somewhat less full-bodied, and the handling is more conventional. The forty-two Appendices contributed by Lange are models of reporting the minutiae of demography, kinship, art and material culture, and so forth in such a way that the specialist can both check generalizations in the body of the text and also utilize the raw data for different kinds of analyses. The Appendix by Gertrude Kurath on choreographies and songs is excellent, though highly technical. The final Appendix by Robin Fox on linguistics is cautious, tentative, but highly sophisticated.

One may regret that Professor Lange has not permitted himself more interpretations and a concluding chapter which was generalizing and perhaps comparative. Perhaps this will follow in another book. In any event one should not cavil at an author for what he has deliberately not decided to do. This is intended as a descriptive study, and it is a fine one. The inevitable limitations of time and of the skills that a single fieldworker can control mean that some topics are neglected—as Lange himself recognizes. This reviewer could wish that the author had given more amplitude to the presentation of his field methods. The work extended from 1946 to 1952 with the subsequent trips in 1957 and 1958—the data from which were not fully incorporated in this volume. But so many visits to a single community must have inspired some reflections on changing contexts through time and with cumulative experience. Finally, it is regrettable that all Cochiti terms as recorded by Lange, Kurath, and Fox were not reduced to the same phonetic alphabet.

These, however, are minor strictures. This is a serious, honest book which adds greatly to our knowledge of the Southwest and which sets high standards of recording,

synthesis, and presentation. It deserves the handsome job of bookmaking which the University of Texas Press has provided.

CLYDE KLUCKHOHN

Professor of Anthropology
Harvard University

EDWIN J. THOMAS, DONNA L. MCLEOD in collaboration with PAULINE BUSHEY and LYDIA F. HYLTON. *In-Service Training and Reduced Workloads: Experiments in a State Department of Welfare*. Pp. 130. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1960. \$2.50.

This monograph is a timely publication. Since it presents the findings of an evaluative study in which social workers and social scientists participated, it illustrates a newly developing method of collaboration between these two professions. It is of interest to those concerned with social welfare in general as it confirms the feasibility of experimental studies in a state department of welfare and provides new data concerning the Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) Program, a program of increasing concern to professional social workers, to legislators, and to the public.

The project evaluates the usefulness of in-service training and reduced workloads for the ADC program in certain counties in Michigan. Two separate experiments were conducted, each covering a time span of one year. In each the "effects of reduced workloads as well as of training were independently assessed" to determine if such aids help to forward the purposes of the 1956 Amendments of the Social Security Act related to non-financial services, that is to "help maintain and strengthen family life." In one experiment a training supervisor, a member of the research group, trained personnel directly responsible for services to ADC recipients while in the second experiment the same training supervisor provided training for a group of supervisors who then transmitted this knowledge to the welfare workers. Within this framework several control groups were established: some workers received the training as well as a reduction in caseload; others received only training; a third group

utilized certain administrative devices designed to save time. There was also a "no change" group. An elaborate plan of objective tests, questionnaires, and an "experimental" interview involving the use of an actress was utilized in evaluating how much the workers changed in knowledge and performance. Comparisons were made among the various control groups.

Most of the verified results are what a professionally trained social worker might have anticipated. For example, the workers changed more in terms of knowledge than in actual performance. In future studies it would be interesting to see if the addition of supervision in application of casework principles with the recipients—the workers only received continued supervision on administrative and eligibility content—might contribute to improved performance. One puzzling finding is that workers trained by the agency supervisors "changed" more than did the supervisors themselves. Although it is suggested that there was some shift in the focus of the training program for the latter group this does not seem a sufficient explanation. A major conclusion that will be supported wholeheartedly by those concerned with the public social services is "if the rehabilitative objectives of the 1956 Amendments of the Social Security Act are to be realized . . . it seems apparent that long, intensive on the job training will have to be given along with much smaller caseloads."

Of particular significance to administrators of public programs is the conclusion that training alone is not so helpful in improving the quality of service as a reduction in caseload which permits the "opportunity for frequent family contact."

The material is presented in a clear, orderly, readable style and while it in essence presents nothing startlingly new, it is probably indicative of a trend in social welfare and in social work, that is, the verification through the application of social science research methods of clinical data long recognized by trained practitioners. The authors present their methods and findings in detail and are modest in their presentation. While one can take minor exception to certain parts of the material—for example, "casework" is never

clearly defined—it is a useful contribution to the goal of improving services in the ADC program. The training program content which is fully outlined in the Appendix could be of great value to those responsible for the training of public welfare personnel. It is to be hoped that the factual verification of the need for both training and reduced caseloads will be of assistance to administrators in providing the skilled services needed by the 2.2 million children and their families presently receiving Aid for Dependent Children.

HELEN PINKUS

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PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

JOHN WILD. *Human Freedom and Social Order: An Essay in Christian Philosophy*. Pp. xi, 250. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press for the Lilly Endowment Program in Christianity and Politics, 1959. \$5.00.

This is an original and challenging book devoted to the problem of the meaning of human existence and freedom from the perspective of a Christian, existential philosophy. In the course of his devastating attack on the rationalism and humanism which stems from classical Greek thought, Professor Wild is led to question the major theses of the realistic philosophy which he himself had advocated so persuasively in his earlier works. Since the publication of his *The Challenge of Existentialism* (1955) he has undergone a thorough conversion to the existentialist mode of thinking and in the present work finds himself completely disillusioned with the claims of traditional, rationalist philosophy that human reason is capable of providing universal, objective knowledge of nature, God, and man. According to the author, an authentic Christian philosophy based on an adequate synthesis of reason and faith has not yet been achieved by either Augustinians or Thomists. This essay is viewed as an attempt to present the outlines and conditions of such a synthesis.

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
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According to Wild, the rediscovery by Husserl and Heidegger of the concept of the *Lebenswelt*, translated as "the world of lived experience," is the most noteworthy philosophical achievement of our time (p. 90). Henceforth the primary function of philosophy is the clarification, through phenomenological analysis, of the structures of this human world and of the philosophic categories necessary for its comprehension. Since the basic assumptions of philosophic analysis are not demonstrated by any available evidence, the philosopher must seek the aid of faith to provide a "guiding image" for his formulations. Reason, in the sense of exact understanding, and faith, as exemplified through what Paul Tillich has called "ultimate concern," are autonomous and independent of each other and, at the same time, dependent on each other. Faith and reason are said to be in a state of "dialectical tension" (p. 87). There is no pre-established harmony between faith and reason, and a special decision is required in each instance to establish which element shall prevail. The Christian philosopher will utilize Christian revelation as his guiding image of faith but will not feel bound to accept any dogmatic or absolute interpretation of his faith. For Wild, no one philosophical conception of the *Lebenswelt* is final because our human truth grows and declines with historic experience. Hence an authentic Christian ethic is not based on the humanistic assumption of a fixed human nature and a prescribed form of self-realization, as classical theology tends to assume. Christian ethic is based on faith in the disciplined expression of freedom and on man's capacity for self-transcendence (p. 180).

Human Freedom and the Social Order merits serious consideration for its fresh examination and appraisal of controversial philosophical and theological problems. In spite of the author's assurance, this reviewer has serious misgivings concerning his uncompromising attack on classical, rationalistic thought and his relativistic evaluation of human reason. Nevertheless, I find myself in sympathy with his ultimate concern that philosophical thought be made

relevant to the imperatives of human existence.

DAVID BIDNEY

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ROBERT O. BYRD. *Quaker Ways in Foreign Policy*. Pp. xxi, 230. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960. \$5.00.

This book shows clearly and adequately that the Society of Friends or Quakers has for three centuries had a fairly consistent foreign policy based on a coherent theory regarding the nature of man and the universe. It also shows how this policy has been expressed and sometimes implemented through petitions, letters, and deputations to governments and through a variety of activities both educational and in the field of practical humanitarian service. It is surprising that such an extensive record as this can be made of a small, decentralized group whose religion is primarily directed, not toward the outer world, but toward the spirit or light within all men and whose social doctrines, especially those which concern peace and human equality, have been so much at variance with prevailing popular opinion.

The book is designed to be descriptive and analytic though some attempt at evaluation is made in an epilogue which is intended to indicate that Quaker doctrines are more practical and expedient than they are generally considered to be. Since Friends have depended on an inner sense or intuition of the intrinsic rightness or wrongness of an action regardless of its apparent results, the author devotes little space to the success or failure of their undertakings though he indicates that a noncompromising application of Christian principles in a non-Christian world sometimes is successful in the long run. The struggle for religious liberty in England and America, during which Quakers endured persecution, was successful because they took an absolute, not a relative, position. William Penn's holy experiment in establishing the commonwealth of Pennsylvania was a success as long as the Quakers were in control. Yet Quakers

have generally been gradualists rather than revolutionaries, not because they were willing to compromise, but because they did not expect their absolute position to be adopted by others except by degrees. When they advocated modifications of foreign policy, it was always in the direction of less reliance on military compulsion and other forms of coercion. This included unwillingness to approve of forcing an extreme position on people not inwardly prepared to accept it. Evil, they felt, must be outgrown rather than violently suppressed.

The peculiarity of the Quaker approach stems primarily, says Dr. Byrd, from a conviction that there is "that of God in every man," a phrase much more used by this author than by Quaker writers in general. Awareness of "that of God within" creates a belief in the infinite worth of every individual and a sense of unity and community with all men and all life.

For the solution of international problems Friends rely on agreement achieved through spiritual power which is not coercive. The search for security is not a primary motive. The Quaker method starts from within, individually and eventually nationally. It works from within outwardly into wider and wider circles.

The first part of the book is theoretical, and the second part historical. The multitude of events described indicates that Friends have not been satisfied with a purely negative peace policy but have continually urged governments to take a positive action in the direction of arbitration and disarmament. Friends have admitted the need of a police force but have disagreed on the morality of an international police army. The main modern Quaker contribution to foreign affairs has been the creation of pilot projects, mainly educational, in an attempt to reduce tensions by increasing international and interracial understanding.

This book is an excellent contribution to the subject. It is the only study which adequately covers Quaker efforts in the first half of the twentieth century. While it raises more questions than it answers, these are questions which concern our most difficult problem of today, that of foreign

relations. If the Quaker doctrine can not be fully realized at present, it may, at least, represent the direction in which men and nations should move.

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CARL J. FRIEDRICH (Ed.). *Community. Nomos II.* Pp. viii, 293. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1959. \$5.00.

This volume of the Yearbook of the American Society of Political and Legal Philosophy is based on the discussions and papers presented at the meeting of that society in 1957. The central problem of the conference was to explore the meanings and implications of the concept of community, mainly from the point of view of historical, philosophical, and legal thought. Of the sixteen papers presented in the publication we observe such titles as, "The Community as the Legal Order," "The Co-Organic Concept of Community," "The Crisis in Community: Challenge to Political Theory," "Community—After the Apocalypse," "The Principal Structures of a Community: A Sociological Analysis," "Community as a Matrix," "Community, Communication, and Communion." Two papers deal with community in terms of publicity and secrecy, one in relation to the role of the Supreme Court. Perhaps the most comprehensive is the initial chapter by Friedrich, "The Concept of Community in the History of Political and Legal Philosophy." Talcott Parsons attempts, as one might expect, to consider the community as an aspect of a social system, emphasizing four structures which he refers to as the locational, the occupational, the jurisdictional, and the communicational. To this reviewer, one of the most stimulating chapters is presented by Benjamin Nelson, "Community—Dreams and Realities." Anyone who feels comfortable about modern society or who finds satisfaction in some of the platitudes erupting from the high priests of political power, whether democratic or authoritarian, could profitably ponder on Nelson's tough-minded realism.

One finds in the volume a variety of interpretations of the concept of community. The volume is not limited to con-

ceptual meanings but is also concerned with basic problems such as the function, character, and abuse of power, totalitarianism in the modern world, and the challenges of nationalism to social theorists. Some of the writers view community in a broad sense, almost the equivalent of a national society; one is concerned with the conventional conception of community as human organization in a local setting.

To read this book is a vigorous intellectual exercise. While its appeal is mainly to philosophers and historians, some of the chapters would be of special interest to behavioral scientists.

NOEL P. GIST

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EMILE DURKHEIM. *Montesquieu and Rousseau: Forerunners of Sociology.* Translated by Ralph Manheim. Pp. xvi, 154. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960. \$3.95.

In the first essay of this book, written in 1892, Durkheim discusses Montesquieu's contributions to the founding of social science under such captions as: Conditions necessary for the establishment of social science, Montesquieu's classification of societies, the extent to which Montesquieu believed that social phenomena are subject to social laws, and Montesquieu's methodology. Durkheim concludes that no earlier writer had perceived so clearly as did Montesquieu the conditions needed for the founding of social science.

According to Durkheim, Montesquieu also "instituted a new field of study," now called comparative law. Durkheim commends Montesquieu's methodological conclusion that laws cannot be understood apart from "morality, trade, religion, etc." or separate from "the form of society." Thus Durkheim claims that Montesquieu foreshadowed the unity of social science. Although Durkheim admits "an element of ambiguity in Montesquieu's concept of law," he believed that Montesquieu laid the groundwork for a science of sociology, although his discussion of this point is incomplete and unclear. His use of the terms social science and sociology is not differentiated, and his inference that Mon-

tesquieu was the father of sociology appears to claim too much.

In the second essay, Durkheim seeks to determine what Rousseau meant by a "state of nature," and why, according to Rousseau, people departed from this state to found societies, why Rousseau believed that this shift was not inevitable, and how it was that he believed that the state of nature and a civil nature are reconcilable. Durkheim points out how Rousseau and Descartes were alike in that each sought "to clear the mind of all mediate judgments." Durkheim accepts Rousseau's belief that the state of nature is satisfactory for man as long as conditions are simple and stable, but no longer so, when conditions change and arouse new wants. Durkheim explains how Rousseau posits "the establishment of a body politic," and how he defines "the social contract." Durkheim contrasts Montesquieu and Rousseau at the point of results in their thinking, —the former emphasizing a normal division of functions and mutual service, while the latter believed the individual to be hostile to the common will.

In the Foreword, Henri Peyre reviews Durkheim's life briefly, and in a statement supplementary to the two essays, George Davy, one of Durkheim's successors at the Sorbonne, compares Durkheim, Montesquieu, and Rousseau, stressing how Durkheim regarded Montesquieu as a precursor and no more of the modern social sciences. Durkheim's two essays are as valuable today as when they were produced in describing some of the basic ideas which led to the founding of sociology. The essays reveal Durkheim at his best in the role of a lucid thinker, effective writer, and a fervent diagnostician of some of the origins of social science.

EMORY S. BOGARDUS

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OVERTON H. TAYLOR. *The Classical Liberalism, Marxism, and the Twentieth Century.* Pp. viii, 122. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960. \$3.50.

This small volume contains four lectures given at the University of Virginia by

Overton H. Taylor, a Harvard economist. It aims at contrasting the basic philosophies in conflict between "classical liberalism," which the author believes characterizes American and Western capitalism and democracy, and Marxian communism of Russia and other Communist areas. The author traces the development of "classical liberalism" which came to fruition in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The emphasis is upon basic freedom for the individual and is in contrast to the "cult" of the New Dealers and Fair Dealers, enthusiasts for the trend towards the welfare state, or "humanitarian big government." The author considers some areas of justifiable government intervention, but he favors a return to a point somewhere between "strict laissez faire," and "the semi-socialist, so-called liberalism of today." An earlier volume of collected writings contains essays written under the influence of the liberalism the author now condemns, as well as essays representing recovery to his present position, but he there described himself as "a perpetually troubled, mind-changing moralist."

Perhaps more stimulating than the defense of a moderate conservatism found in these lectures, is Dr. Taylor's discussion of Marxism and the distinctions between Karl Marx and the modern Communist version. He stresses the need to acquire a deeper understanding of Marx than is usual, as Marx was "a truly great scholar and thinker no matter what or how we think about him." As an economist, he believes that Marx's insights into the dynamic, evolving aspects of capitalism and the business cycle cannot be dismissed. The element of utopianism in Marx, however, was the greatest weakness, and "professed builders of his utopia are now making it a hell." The Communists have also given an emphasis to revolution beyond that of Marx.

In assessing the appeal communism has for some peoples, the author calls attention to the reality of oppressive class governments which existed in areas won over to modern communism and to the fact of rapid industrialization and modernization which they are achieving. The fatal omission is in the field of ethical or moral

progress, and the response of the West must be union upon a single sound moral vision. As for imperialism, the main cause is the chaos of a world of sovereign nations. International government and an effective body of international law must replace this chaos.

DALE PONTIUS

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DOUGLAS V. VERNEY. *The Analysis of Political Systems*. Pp. v, 239. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959. \$6.75.

Within the covers of this small volume, the author has tucked a surprisingly rich conspectus of government and politics as they exist among the nations and peoples of the modern world. His methods are empirical, his categories are clearly defined and entirely relevant to contemporary experience.

The work is divided into three main parts. In the first he examines governmental structure and finds that most present governments fall into one of three systems: presidential, parliamentary, and convention. A few are combinations of two or more, while five may be called *ancien regimes* and nine more are unclassifiable. Most Communist states operate under the convention system. Each of the three basic systems is carefully described and explained. Many of the author's insights in this part challenge commonly held dogmas and stimulate refreshingly a new look at governmental structure.

The second part of the book is concerned with the political process. Here the author discusses theories of general participation and theories of limited participation. In the first group he considers the theory and practice of "classical" democracy, representative and delegate democracy, and interests and pressure groups. These last, he thinks, should be regulated "to assure that in making their contribution to the political process [they] do not lose touch with their members or act contrary to the public interest."

The three chapters which deal with elite theories, with the "iron law of oligarchy," and class war, offer a succinct analysis

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of contemporary governments and societies which should prove quite useful to the student of political science in his consideration of problems of government personnel.

The final chapter, entitled "Government and Political Process," is in the nature of a conclusion based on the earlier analysis. This synthesis sheds considerable light on contemporary problems in political science. There is a separate examination of the applicability of democratic and Communist theories to the development of underdeveloped countries. The author concludes that the achievements of communism are largely economic and Communists seem to be blind to the need for political growth. He feels that as national economies in the underdeveloped countries reach a level acceptable to their residents the political shortcomings of the Communist creed will become increasingly apparent. Then full, genuine popular participation will be demanded, and nothing else will do.

To those who wish to clarify their thinking about certain aspects of political theory and about government and its activities in the modern world, this little book is confidently recommended as well worth reading.

HARVEY WALKER

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

KENNETH W. THOMPSON. *Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics: An American Approach to Foreign Policy*. Pp. ix, 261. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1960. \$5.00.

Mr. Thompson has for many years been one of the ablest exponents of the "realist" school of international politics. In this volume, which is based on a set of lectures, he presents the main and, by now, familiar themes of "realism": the absence of absolutes in world affairs, the permanence of power conflicts, the limited freedom of action of the foreign policy-maker, the differences between individual and collective morality, the difficulty of effective diplomacy in a democracy. As in many of

Hans Morgenthau's works, we find here a sharp criticism of traditional American approaches to world politics: isolationism and collective security, excessive faith in naked power and extravagant legalism, the tendency to moralize too much, and the habit of speaking with too many voices. Indeed, the book sounds like a mass of expiation for the deadly sins of liberal optimism, enlightenment, faith in progress, and "sectarian Christian perfectionism," conducted in a realists' Pantheon, where we find, along with Mr. Thompson, those men whose ideas he praises throughout: Niebuhr, Kennan, E. H. Carr, Morgenthau, Spykman, Lippmann, and Dean Acheson's policy-planners. Together they preach of "the inevitable tragedy of human existence, the irreducible irrationality of human behavior, and the tortuous character of human history."

It is an eloquent sermon, and no one can deny that the demons which Mr. Thompson exorcises deserve to be chased away, and are indeed very difficult to drive permanently out of American foreign policy. However, two serious questions may be asked. First, does the battle still need to be fought so hard? Haven't those evil spirits lost much of their strength, and is it entirely fair to see in every crisis or mistake of recent years a trace of their presence? Secondly, are the principles with which realism proposes to replace the illusions of the past able to provide us with sound guidance? I doubt it on two counts. To help us understand the world around us, realism proposes two tools which are a bit too awkward for good use: history and the concept of the national interest. Now the former supposes a far more thorough discussion of its relevance and interpretation than is provided here, and the second is treated as if it were an easily identifiable and objective reality, which it certainly is not. To help us solve the political and moral dilemmas which both block and require action, realism merely repeats that everything is "fraught with dilemmas" and that problems have to be faced "on their merits," but does not tell us what the merits are. The civilized despair, or the informed sigh, about moral ambivalence is not much better than

the trenchant and crude moralism which it displaces: both are oversimplifications and escapes. To warn us against absolutes is good as long as it is intended only to remind us of the perils of moral absolutism in a divided world. But in a revolutionary period, to talk about the moral content of all national interests comes dangerously close to an invitation to desist from moral judgment altogether. To plead for expediency rather than principle risks making us forget that expediency all too often means bowing to the principles of one's antagonist.

Indeed, the lodestars which Mr. Thompson points out to us: diplomacy, compromises, and the British approach to foreign affairs, re-enforce this reader's suspicion that the realists' conservatism is simply a case of fatigue of liberals who have lost their faith in—or illusions about—man but preserved their hope for—or illusions about—accommodation and restraints. It might be beneficial for present-day liberals to "accept the wise doctrines of . . . the Policy Planning Staff," but it is unfortunate to see realists take almost as a model the policies of a nation—Great Britain—whose twentieth-century diplomacy, inspired by nineteenth-century traditions, could be used as an almost permanent exhibit of egregious errors. Having purged our mind of the poisonous foods it has absorbed in the past, the "realists" leave it hungry for better nourishment which they do not provide.

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WILLIAM T. R. FOX (Ed.). *Theoretical Aspects of International Relations*. Pp. xii, 118. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959. \$3.25.

The distinguishing mark of postwar social science is the quest for organized bodies of theory capable of providing a measure of unity and coherence for the major disciplines. This little volume is a sample of progress in the international relations field. It contains seven essays prepared for an inter-university seminar conducted in 1957 at Columbia University. Its contributors are a former policymaker, Paul H. Nitze, a theologian, Reinhold Nie-

buhr, and economist, Charles P. Kindleberger, and four political scientists, William T. R. Fox, Hans J. Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, and Arnold Wolfers. The authors discuss the elements, the nature and limits, the uses, the actors and the central concepts of a theory of international politics. One contributor evaluates international political theory from the standpoint of economic theory and another in the light of classical political philosophy.

None of the theorists claims a monopoly for his approach to the theory of world politics. Each is content to add to the sum of knowledge of "normative," "scientific," or "rational" theories. Individual authors contribute in their own right, and we are indebted to the Committee on International Relations of Notre Dame University for publishing the cogent and incisive essays under one cover. Each essay was presented to the Columbia Inter-University Seminar composed of the seven authors and fifteen younger theorists from nearby universities and centers. Every author was given an opportunity to revise his paper in the light of the successive seminar discussions which extended in each case over a two- and three-day period. No inquiry into theories of international politics can afford to pass over this important collection of papers that illustrates so graphically the unity and diversity of prevailing approaches. For example, Professors Fox and Wolfers reflect a strong leaning toward the behavioral sciences. Mr. Nitze applies the experienced practitioner's corrective to theories he finds insufficient, and Professor Morgenthau and Dr. Niebuhr illustrate the usefulness of "strong" organizing principles or concepts for the development of theory.

If the reader feels a sense of disappointment on completing this excellent study, he can trace it primarily to "a missing chapter." At no point does the editor or any of his colleagues consider the relationship of the parts to the whole. In economics, we have witnessed a lively discussion on the relation of partial to general theories or concepts of microeconomics to macroeconomics. Professor Kindleberger viewing international theory from the outside invites attention to this problem. I suspect the inherent modesty of each con-

tributor coupled with the present stage of development of international theory explains the absence of such analysis. Perhaps other scholars who use the book may be stimulated to complete this unfinished task. In so doing they will exploit the valuable insights of this significant treatise in an emerging field of study.

KENNETH W. THOMPSON

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RAYMOND H. DAWSON. *The Decision to Aid Russia, 1941: Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics*. Pp. xv, 315. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959. \$6.00.

The enthusiasm with which the British and American governments welcomed Hitler's invasion of Russia, June 22, 1941, is well known. Churchill's pungent remark, "If Hitler invaded Hell I would make at least a favourable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons," has been often quoted, as has Secretary Hull's telephoned message to the President: "We must give Russia all aid to the hilt." Both Churchill and Roosevelt promptly announced their intention to give all possible aid to the Soviet Union in its fight against Nazi Germany. Yet it was not until November 7 that the President signified that the Soviet Union was eligible for aid under the Lend-Lease Act. It is the reason for this long delay that Mr. Dawson has set forth with great detail in his well-written and well-documented monograph.

Starting with the debate over the Lend-Lease Bill, January to March, 1941, he shows that the opposition made repeated attempts to exclude Russia from the benefits of lend-lease. The Administration forces, aware of the possibility of a breach between Russia and Germany, successfully opposed such attempts. When the break came, therefore, the Soviet Union was legally eligible for lend-lease aid, but Roosevelt feared that the extension of such aid would arouse formidable opposition to the new appropriation for lend-lease, which was essential for continued aid to Britain. Aid to Russia, therefore, was temporarily financed by purchase of Russian gold and

other hand-to-mouth expedients, while the President tried to mollify hatred of the Soviets, especially hatred based on religion. His rather amusing attempts to secure proof of religious freedom in the Soviet Union were futile, but the Vatican co-operated in a statement distinguishing between communism and the Russian people. Congressional opposition, clearly less formidable than the President had supposed, collapsed. The new appropriation for lend-lease, with no restrictions on where the President might use it, was signed on October 28, 1941. Ten days later Mr. Roosevelt informed the Lend-Lease Administrator that he had on that day found that the defense of the Soviet Union was "vital to the defense of the United States," and hence that the Soviet Union was eligible for lend-lease aid. Mr. Dawson's book makes a valuable contribution to the history of Soviet-American relations.

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GEORGE LISKA. *The New Statecraft: Foreign Aid in American Foreign Policy*. Pp. xv, 246. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960. \$5.00.

Under the auspices of the University of Chicago's Center for the Study of American Foreign and Military Policy appears another worthy addition to the notable series of recent volumes. George Liska's study of foreign aid is erudite, insightful, and provocative. It is surely one of the very few really important books on his subject.

The most distinctive element of this study is its focus upon the instrumental nature of foreign aid, including economic assistance, as a weapon in the arsenal of the donor for short-term or long-term security goals. Liska has very little squeamishness about American intervention in the internal affairs of recipient powers; even a "noninterventionist" aid policy is seen to have "interventionist" consequences. Liska's only plea is that "a decent measure of control is more likely to flow from an attitude of detachment than from one of involvement;" "intervention" but not "identification" with those governments or

factions that are, directly or indirectly, being aided is "the beginning of wisdom in foreign aid policy."

I may, as Liska warns, be guilty of "mechanistic thinking" in finding this distinction not completely tenable. And there are numerous other points where he seems to rely more on confident assertion, illustrated by specific episodes, than upon really thorough empirical testing of his hypotheses. But usually Liska's judgment seems to me sound and politically sophisticated—considerably more so than The Proposal by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology group whom he evidently regards as his chief antagonists. Furthermore, Liska has evidently read very widely—one of his most interesting chapters draws intriguing parallels between contemporary foreign aid and previous forms of intergovernmental subsidies from the last three centuries. In all, Liska's study is a notable example of how much an imaginative scholar with a fine analytical mind can accomplish by means of library research, without group efforts or field studies, even in the area of current foreign relations.

Unfortunately the form in which the material is presented sometimes detracts from its logical clarity and readability. In particular, the first and last chapters seem structured in a more aggregated than integrated fashion. But the middle chapters are so meaty that they deserve careful perusal by anyone who specializes in contemporary American foreign policy. Hopefully, many such readers will be inspired to attempt some further empirical testing of Liska's richly provocative insights.

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JAMES R. SCHLESINGER. *The Political Economy of National Security: A Study of the Economic Aspects of the Contemporary Power Struggle*. Pp. vii. 292. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960. \$5.00.

Since World War II many American students of diplomacy, modern history, international relations, economics, and poli-

tics have been provided a new focus for their work. That focus is the concept of national security. It is a concept so broad and so vital that it has compelled the re-examination of conventional political and economic ideas and the formulation of some refreshingly new ones.

The Political Economy of National Security takes its place as a most worthy example of this new scholarship. Among its more impressive qualities is its perspective, and yet the breadth of the author's views does not prevent his identification of specific details. Professor Schlesinger sees national security as a most complex phenomenon, and economics is for him but one of several related components of national strength. His selection of facts about productive capacity and economic resources is pertinent, and his objective treatment of them is reassuring to anyone who attempts to establish, say, comparative Russian and American potentials.

He treats accurately and coherently such disparate factors as manpower, taxation, budget allocations, dangers and advantages of autarchy, and both the facts and the concepts of economic growth in Russia and the United States, yet never loses sight of the relation of each factor to national security as a whole. Although the author addresses himself to economics, he sees, as his title clearly implies, that for national security the only economy that matters is political economy. The basic issues are political issues, and his analysis of them is most penetrating. He points out how much the political conditioning of the American mind disqualifies this country for the role it is now called upon to play—our belief, for example, that "stability is the normal course for human relationships," our belief that "wealth is a cure for political ills," our reluctance to "readjust our domestic habits to the demands of national security." He calls for more realism for problems we have been unwilling to face—the necessity of a greater budget allocation for security purposes—as well as for developments we have unduly feared, such as the exaggeration and the meaning of Soviet economic growth. His analysis of the political and economic costs and values of American aid to underdeveloped countries

should give both the skeptic and the sentimentalist much to think about.

A long review of Professor Schlesinger's book could find some statements of fact and some implications of policy to criticize; a short review can only express appreciation for a first-rate work of analysis and for an informative treatment of a very complex problem. The quality and workmanship of this book deserve the gratitude of scholars and the attention, hopefully, of government officials responsible for national policy.

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MURRAY DYER. *The Weapon on the Wall: Rethinking Psychological Warfare*. Pp. xxi, 269. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959. \$6.00.

This book should be read under the shadow of a U-2. It also goes well with a speech by Fidel Castro or Nikita Khrushchev.

It is a straight-talking, straight-thinking consideration of where we stand in the ideological struggle of our time and what we can do about it. Of all the books written on our national propaganda program, this is the freshest and, on many points, the most insightful.

Dyer, who worked for Office of War Information (OWI), the Associated Press, the Columbia Broadcasting System, and the National Broadcasting Company, once taught at the Japanese Naval College, and wrote this book while a member of the Operations Research Office of Johns Hopkins, goes right to the heart of the matter. He says that Americans have never understood how to use the force of fact and idea in the present world. To clear our heads of the military limitations of "psychological warfare," the unsavory connotations of "propaganda," and the neuterness of "information," he suggests a new term: political communication. This is not limited to a shooting war. It is not anything a citizen of a democracy need feel ashamed of doing, and it is conceived of as a fourth arm for attaining national objectives; the others

are diplomatic, economic, and military. Dyer's discussion of what political communication should be in a nation like this is one of the illuminating sections of his book.

Most of his book, though, is concerned with the problems of attaining an adequate program of political communication. The volume was delayed sixteen months while it was passing through government clearance committees, and the reason is not difficult to guess: it stepped on the toes of very large federal agencies. He was telling, with as much frankness as was permitted him, the sickening story of the battle between the agencies over who should do what in psychological warfare.

Dyer feels that even if the program should logically be run by one of the present agencies, the interagency battles of the last fifteen years have now made that impossible. Therefore, it must be administered in the Office of the President. The President himself must take leadership. Chiefly he must lead the government in the belief that, just as state and defense are significant and vital, so is political communication an imperative and key activity. Dyer rightly says that this sort of attention will overcome countless barriers that have stood for years in the way of the program.

He suggests that the President have a co-ordinator in his office to ensure that the whole policy of the nation is expressed. An agency under the control of one of the great federal departments, Dyer argues, could hardly be expected to rise above the politics of its department after the "give-and-take" of determining policy. This suggestion will surely be resisted strongly because of earlier experiences with super-agencies and co-ordinators. His other recommendations are less controversial. Among them are a national college of political communication, to raise the study of this subject "from training to teaching," and a permanent joint congressional committee on political communication, parallel to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

But none of these devices will yield results, he insists, without "national leadership that can light up the premises behind a free people" and "action governed by those premises." Then "active, militant

political communication" will acquire significance.

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ASIA AND AFRICA

GABRIEL A. ALMOND and JAMES S. COLEMAN (Eds.). *The Politics of the Developing Areas*. Pp. xii, 591. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1960. \$10.00.

The study of comparative government has hitherto been confined to the major powers, most of which were located in Europe and America. Thus each state could be viewed as a unique product of social, economic, and ideological forces over a period of centuries. The minor powers could be regarded as variants upon the major themes of the development of forms of government—the transition from feudal monarchy to democracy. The countries of Latin America were potential democracies which had failed to fulfill their ambitions. Asia and Africa contained few independent states, and these were anachronistic survivals often teetering between tyranny and anarchy. The rest of the world was safely under Western tutelage and might, conceivably, begin to take the first steps along the road that would lead to responsible self-government.

The fifteen years since 1945 have changed that concept of the world. There are now some 100 states in existence or about to be created. They cannot be ignored, and it cannot be assumed that their highest ambition is to imitate their favorite Western power.

We need to know the political problems of the developing areas. Yet it is obvious that the traditional approach to comparative government has limitations. No doubt it is possible and necessary to have students of politics who have some knowledge in depth of the language, history, and outlook of the people of Laos or Ghana or Liberia. But there is a danger that each

specialist may be so convinced of the uniqueness of 'his' chosen country that he will be unable to understand the wider issues that concern all or most of these countries. Obviously it would be a vain hope to expect to find an expert who would be equally competent to discuss more than a handful of such states.

Messieurs Almond and Coleman and their collaborators, Lucian Pye, Myron Weiner, Dankwart Rustow, and George Blanksten, have attempted to meet this difficulty in two ways. Firstly they have propounded an analytical framework of concepts and standards of evaluation. Secondly they have invited five area experts to apply this theory to the groups of countries that they know best.

This is a pioneering work and, as such, it is hardly surprising that its quality is somewhat uneven. Each of the discussions of the five areas contains valuable and original insights, especially those dealing with South Asia and the Near East, though this preference may well reflect the bias of this reviewer. But their merit seemed to increase the farther they departed from the theoretical basis set forth by Mr. Almond. For the theory is largely divorced from history. Each state is presented for classification as it stood at the moment of writing. Thus Mr. Coleman groups Ethiopia and Liberia in one category; and, among others, Mauritania, Ghana, Gabon, and the Sudan in a second; Sierra Leone, Uganda, and British Somaliland in a third; and Kenya and the Belgian Congo in a fourth.

Those political scientists who rely heavily upon social anthropology have often criticized writers who rely on history and law for their undue formalism. But Messieurs Almond and Coleman seem to be producing a formalism of their own which is the more rigid for its attempt at logical rigor. Happily most of their contributors have declined to be confined to their procrustean bed.

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RUPERT EMERSON. *From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples*. Pp. x, 466. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960. \$7.75.

"At this uncertain point in history no definitive answer can be given to the question whether the nationalism of Asia and Africa will turn out to be a blind alley, leading nowhere except to ultimate disaster, or the path leading toward internationalism which nineteenth-century liberalism proclaimed nationalism to be" (p. 396). Thus, Professor Emerson, fundamentally in sympathy with the newly emerging nations' desire to make a successful transition from colonial status to self-government, expresses his doubts as to the likelihood of a life without travail for them.

Roaming the world for illustrative material, he cites the pitfalls they face. Who is to speak for the nation? Will the abolition of colonial rule see the triumph of the old tribal chieftains or the westernized intellectuals? At what point should self-determination stop in order to avoid fragmentation? What effects will rising populations, limited land resources, a shortage of capital and skills, pressures for social welfare, unresolved problems of irredenta and so forth, all in a cold war setting, have upon these lands? Professor Emerson does ask most of the pertinent questions.

While his work is not exceptionally novel, it does in intelligent fashion deal with fundamentals, constituting a good synthesis of the problems of postimperialism. The first four and last five chapters seem most rewarding. It is not to be expected that one will agree with all of his views, for example, the minimizing of colonial issues as factors in World War I (p. 23), but, on the whole, he couches his ideas with sufficient qualification to create the impression of judicious evaluation. He can deftly puncture the hypocrisy of the imperialist's rationalizing and as readily highlight the illusions of many anti-imperialists.

For the most part he is sufficiently skeptical not to be oversanguine regarding the prospects for the future. He thinks there will be many more "strong-man" governments, and though favoring financial aid

to underdeveloped areas, cautions against expecting quick or easy progress. A broader discussion of economic problems might have replaced or supplemented the overly extended six chapters on The Anatomy of the Nation.

The book gives evidence of wide-ranging knowledge and displays perceptive analysis, though one or two of his examples may fall into the category of arbitrary selection. In a style that is academic but not dull, he has written a good book—and as with many good books, both beginners and experts will find value in it.

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FRANK N. TRAGER (Ed.). *Marxism in Southeast Asia: A Study of Four Countries*. Pp. 381. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959. \$7.50.

A study of the penetration of Marxism into Southeast Asia is certainly needed, and the authors of this work are to be complimented for undertaking so ambitious a project. Their book is divided into background chapters devoted to the historical development of Marxism in four Southeast Asian nations and two analytical sections contributed by Professor Trager. In the historical part, John Seabury Thompson has contributed a balanced and lucidly written account of the development of Marxist ideas and movements in Burma, while Milton Sacks provides a long-awaited history of Vietnamese Marxism which adds much to our knowledge of the Viet Minh's intellectual roots. Jeanne Mintz' chapter on Indonesia is balanced rather unsteadily between a history of Indonesian communism and a general survey of the political situation in that country, an unevenness which owes much to the difficulty of dealing with an area in which nearly every political movement has been influenced by Marxism. David Wilson faces the opposite problem in handling Thailand where no measurable Marxist influence has been felt; he has met it with a highly stimulating analysis of Thai society in terms of its receptivity to Marxist ideas, an approach which is most welcome since, while we are

beginning to acquire a literature on how Marxist movements have grown in Southeast Asia, few writers have scratched more than the sociological surface in explaining why they have arisen.

Professor Trager's contribution on "The Impact of Marxism" is the keystone of this work; it is therefore unfortunate that it is also the weakest part and that his efforts to generalize for the entire Southeast Asian area result more often in oversimplification than in insight. A major stumbling block for the reader is the author's inconsistency in his use of the term "Marxism"; sometimes it appears as a body of ideas, sometimes as an organized movement; sometimes it seems identical with communism, and at other times it may include the social democrats and even some nationalists. Perhaps the major objection, however, is that Professor Trager divides Southeast Asian politics into categories which are both limited in scope and Western in origin—a compartmentalization which leads him to the curious conclusion that throughout Southeast Asia a three-party system of government is developing which will result in the establishment of a tropical version of Swedish social democracy.

RUTH THOMAS McVEY
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J. H. BRIMMELL. *Communism in Southeast Asia: A Political Analysis*. Pp. ix, 415. New York: Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1959. \$6.75.

Increasingly students of modern Asian affairs have concerned themselves with the variable phenomena associated with Marxism in Asia. Whatever calm there may be in the writing of their texts there is a sense of urgency in the topic. This has been accentuated, if not created, by the successes of the Communists in China, North Korea, North Viet Nam, their clear cut linkage with the Soviet Union and its satellites, and their combined threat to the rest of Free Asia. Obviously, whatever is learned about Communist Marxism in this Asian setting has practical significance for counterpoising policies and programs.

The immensely important concern with Chinese communism—a true descendant of Marx, through Lenin and Stalin—must not be allowed to absorb our exclusive attention. For Marxism, ideologically and otherwise in both its Communist and Socialist garbs, has been, according to Brimmell, if not "the" most dynamic influence in the area, at least one of the most potent influences in Southeast Asia since World War I.

Communism in Southeast Asia has the merit of recognizing both the extent of the canvass to be examined and its roots in an aggressive, missionizing ideology which first came to Asia largely under the inspiration and leadership of Lenin. Brimmell offers a history and analysis of this Leninist version of Marxism up to 1958 as it affected the countries of Southeast Asia, that is from Burma to the Philippines. It is most important for us to note that though the indigenous and emigre followers of Lenin, Stalin, and latterly Mao Tse-tung have tried armed rebellion, infiltration, subversion, and every other device in their arsenal, they have failed except in North Viet Nam to establish their control in any country of the Southeast Asian region. But they continue to try, and, therefore, it is, to say the least, prudent for us to learn about their trials and errors. We may not have too many chances in the future. The time we now have has been bought initially and in significant degree through the awakening, understanding, and effort of indigenous Nationalist Southeast Asian leaders.

Communism in Southeast Asia is useful for all readers concerned with this problem. The general reader will profit from some of the author's swiftly paced political summaries, for example, on the conditions in these lands as colonies which promoted Asian nationalism (pp. 169–175). Specialists in the area will reject or question various data offered by Brimmell, for instance, his treatment of the origins of the Burma Communist party and of the Burma Nationalist organization, the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (pp. 117, 121, 155, 157, 186). Many Americans will be justifiably annoyed by what amounts to a form of British anti-American stereotypy (p.

391 ff.). Despite these criticisms the book is evidently as worth having as it was worth writing.

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WALTER RUBEN (Ed.). *Die Ökonomische und Soziale Entwicklung Indiens: Sowjetische Beiträge zur Indischen Geschichte*. Pp. x, 308. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1959. DM 22.00.

This book contains a collection of eleven papers by various Soviet authors on the social and economic history of India, mostly since the onset of British rule. Only two essays deal with the pre-Muslim and Muslim period. The papers vary greatly in quality, and one or two are extremely poor and seem to have been included mainly for their ideological undertone.

The underlying purpose of all papers is to show that India since the eleventh century has passed through a period of "feudalism," which by the end of the nineteenth century gradually came to be replaced by "capitalism." Moreover, the attempt is made to show that the "lower forms of capitalist enterprise" are gradually losing out to the factory, that is, the cottage industries and small enterprises tend to be replaced by larger firms. In brief, the papers in this book are designed to clarify the Marxian theory of capitalist development, and this framework clearly stands out—including especially Marxian terminology as well as numerous references to often unrelated works of Marx and Lenin.

If we disregard the statements of doctrine and the special Marxian terminology, we have—except for a few papers—a number of quite competent essays on recent economic history of India. The sources used by the Soviet authors are the same as those employed by Western scholars: they are mostly settlement reports, accounts of travelers, parliamentary papers, district gazetteers, and documents of the East India Company. Of course, the data extracted from these sources by the Soviet

scholars are designed to show the nature of feudal, and particularly capitalist, exploitation of the Indian peasants and workers by the landed aristocracy and the industrial and financial bourgeoisie.

This book is an interesting example of Soviet historical writing, at about the end of the Stalinist era. Though it is, on the one hand, infested with a strong doctrinaire bias, it presents, on the other, a host of interesting and well-documented data from Indian economic history and draws attention to some otherwise little explored aspects of the Indian economy mainly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In particular, the discussion of village communities in Maharashtra in the early nineteenth century, the early phases of the *zamindari* system under the East India Company in Bengal, and the problems of tenancy relations in Tamilnad in the interwar period repay study. Anyone who reads German with some ease will find it interesting to browse in this book, in part for the substantive problems discussed there, and in part to examine the way in which orthodox Soviet historiography deals with the economic history of an underdeveloped country of Asia.

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K. P. BHAGAT. *A Decade of Indo-British Relations, 1937–47*. Pp. xv, 521. Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1959. Rs. 25.00.

The last decade of British rule in India was one of great importance in forming and hardening the political conditions that have prevailed in India since 1947. The period encompassed the inauguration of the 1935 Act, the experimental provincial governments (1937–1939), wartime politics, the rapid rise of the Pakistan demand; finally, partition and independence. Professor Bhagat has addressed himself to an analysis of this crucial period.

Unfortunately, the author has not contributed much to a better understanding of the decade. Relying heavily on the admirable series of "Annals" edited by N. N. Mitra, with scattered additions of evidence from a number of other standard

sources, Professor Bhagat has outlined in tiresome detail, and with hundreds of truncated quotations, a week-by-week review of the critical political issues of the times. As a reference, the book is not always reliable; the analysis and interpretation are lacking in insight and objectivity. For one case, the Pakistan issue is not fairly treated, unless one accepts the official Congress stand uncritically.

For some curious reason, the phrase "... it was this dynamic nationalism which was one of the most potent factors that demanded British withdrawal from India ..." (p. 37), or paraphrases of the same thought, reappears in the book over thirty times by my count—repeated three times on page 62 alone! There are several other similarly questionable clichés that, used over and over, tend to round out this 521-page book.

This book represents a serious attempt by an Indian scholar to use careful techniques of documentation and footnoting, no doubt impressed on him in his graduate training in the United States. There is nothing wrong with these techniques, properly used. But content, insight, and relevance surely must come first. Despite the enormous amount of work that appears to have been poured into the preparation of this study, the result cannot be commended.

The Index is generally good, as is the organizational layout of the book. Typographical errors abound.

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FRANK MORAES. *The Revolt in Tibet*. Pp. 223. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960. \$3.95.

This book is one of the best popular descriptions of the Chinese subjection of Tibet during the period from 1950 to 1959. The author, an Indian journalist and scholar who is well known for his books on Mao's China and on Nehru, combines in this well-written book the documentary evidence of treaties and agreements with the personal accounts of participants including that of the Dalai Lama himself.

The book begins with an account of the flight of the Dalai Lama from Lhasa and then deals with the historical background of Sino-Tibetan relations and of India's role in the present tragedy of Tibet. It is interesting because of the critical view taken by an Indian observer of Nehru's actions and policies.

In discussing the Indian responsibility for the seventeen-point agreement which the Tibetans were forced to sign in 1951 and the agreement between India and China of 1954, the author points out the inconsistency of Nehru in claiming that he had to follow the British acceptance of Chinese suzerainty or overlordship over Tibet without insisting on any practical guarantees for Tibetan autonomy. For Nehru there was no difference between sovereignty and suzerainty, and he was most vague about the legal consequences of Chinese control which according to him had existed unchallenged over the last several hundred years. By accepting in the treaty of 1954 the Chinese phrase "the Tibet region of China" Nehru had gone far beyond anything the British had ever recognized and thus, in the author's view, not only accepted what actually was a British "imperialist" concept but had given away, without consulting the Tibetan government, any legal basis for challenging China's breach of the treaty she had signed with Tibet.

One weakness of this most informative book may be found in its organization. The author changes from accounts of present events to descriptions of history and back again. Material on events in Tibet alternates with material on foreign relations. The author is forced into repetitions and cross references that interfere with the continuity of the story.

A more serious shortcoming of the book may well be the author's misreading of the doctrinal past of Chinese communism and of the relationship between Communist China and the Soviet Union. He shares with many others the mistaken view of Mao Tse-tung's doctrinal heterodoxy and of the alleged special role of the peasants in the Chinese Communist revolution, a myth that seems to die hard. From this mistaken view of Communist China's dif-

ference the author is led to the belief in a Soviet fear of Communist China and to the idea that "it is in Soviet Russia's interest that Asia should not be made Communist too quickly. If India has been disillusioned about peaceful coexistence with Communist China, the disillusionment with the faith in the more peaceful approach of Soviet Russia and in the conflicting policies of the two Communist powers may yet have to come.

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SIAO-YU. *Mao Tse-tung and I Were Beggars*. Pp. xviii, 266. Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1959. \$6.00.

Siao-yu (Siao Shu-tung), a Chinese emigré academician now living in Montevideo, was a schoolmate of Mao Tse-tung after the latter entered the First Normal School in Changsha in 1912, and an intimate comradeship was maintained between the two until 1921 when Siao-yu rejected Mao's invitation to attend the founding session of the Chinese Communist party. Both were co-founders of the New People's Study Association, a main nucleus of the eventual Chinese Communist party, in Changsha in 1914; and both were active in the student-worker study program under which progressive Chinese studied in France after 1919. This charming book consists of Siao-yu's autobiographical reminiscences of his friendship with Mao and his reconstruction of the innumerable conversations between them on a large variety of subjects—on politics, morality, personal affairs, and the situation in China just prior to the organization of the Communist party. It may be read for pleasure as a literary achievement in its own right, but its prime importance arises from the fact that it constitutes a significant body of original source material concerning the personal life and ideational development of Mao Tse-tung as a young man between nineteen and twenty-eight. Siao-yu has reconstructed long conversations from memory—"my memory is one of my most precious gifts," he remarks with pride—

after a lapse of more than forty years, and consequently his reporting might be impeached on many matters of detail; yet the story he tells is generally compatible with what little is known of the subject from other scanty sources of information, and the Mao Tse-tung who emerges from these pages becomes an entirely credible Chinese personality.

The title of the volume is derived from a single episode in their long friendship. In the summer of 1917, when Siao was a teacher at Ch'u Yi School in Changsha and Mao was still a student at the normal school, the two decided to travel afoot in Hunan Province as simple beggars—panhandling for meals and lodging, writing poems and inscribing mottoes in return for small-change, and visiting with former schoolmates—in order to learn about the countryside and experience the life of the beggar (pp. 76-164). The comrades discussed their personal problems, and at meals and abed talked about the wide range of topics that might have engaged the interest of any two bright, thoughtful, and perceptive young men. More directly valuable for the purposes of history is Siao's reporting about the affairs of the New People's Study Association and the student-worker movement, as precursors of the Communist party, and about the young progressive or revolutionary leaders of the time. Nearly every important figure in the early history of the Communist party, including several who have survived the years, finds mention or characterization in these pages. Robert C. North's excellent "historical commentary and notes" (pp. 209-253) correlates Siao's reporting about Mao with the material previously supplied by Edgar Snow and Emi Siao, Siao-yu's Communist brother, in their own biographic interpretations of Mao Tse-tung, so that the book comes to incorporate nearly everything we know about Mao's early years.

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PING-TI HO. *Studies on the Population of China, 1368-1953*. Pp. xviii, 341, xxxii.

Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959. \$6.00.

Every few years we have seen some contribution to the study of China's population and its historical development. This book is the broadest in scope available in Western languages. It also contains the most thorough examination of the problems that are involved.

More than one-third of the text describes the records of population in China from the beginning of the Ming dynasty; and a chapter reviews the data on land utilization. A chapter is devoted to interregional migration during this period; and one each to changing patterns of land utilization, "other economic and institutional factors" affecting population, and "catastrophic deterrents." A conclusion draws together many of the earlier points, and Appendixes summarize some of the official data on population growth, changing geographical distribution, food imports, and a remarkable series of natural calamities recorded in Hupei Province. The text is documented copiously, though not always authoritatively on demographic topics.

The author very ably explains the strange implications of these population records when treated as statistical data. The numbers have different meanings at different times and places in Chinese history. He demonstrates that these figures do not represent an aggregate picture of the Chinese population. From this it would seem to follow that the attempt to fix its size and measure its growth is ill-advised. Having convinced us on this point, however, the author proceeds to make the attempt, as has been done many times before. This demographic effort, which is a major part of the book, is its weakest portion.

The more significant part is the discussion of the factors bearing on historic population growth in China, particularly as related to political institutions. The careful reader can find additional material on this point even in the early chapters on the nature of the population records which contain the most thoughtful review of the administration of these records yet available. It seems a pity that these factors could not have been made the main object of the study and that the high level of

effort and skill squandered on assembling aggregate figures were not spent more judiciously on the institutional factors—perhaps in a detailed exploitation of certain local histories. As it is, these subjects are treated rather lightly.

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MINORU SHINODA. *The Founding of the Kamakura Shogunate 1180-1185*. Pp. xii, 385. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960. \$7.50.

Until this present volume appeared, no one book in a Western language was devoted to a detailed treatment of the founding of shogunal power, organized feudalism, in Japan. In fact, but little interest has been manifested by Western writers for the source materials necessary for such a study, one of which is the *Azuma kagami* [Mirror of Eastern Japan], a semiofficial history covering the years 1180-1266. Mr. Shinoda's study, which concentrates on the so-called "Gempei War" (1180-1185), is based on this source. The *Azuma kagami* was compiled by the Kamakura shogunate itself and "proposes to present largely the point of the [sic] view of the founders." Biased it may be, but its study does much to clarify the aims of those who established the new, nonimperial power in eastern Japan. In Part II, which constitutes roughly half of the volume, the author has provided a translation of five of the fifty-two chapters of this principal source. He constantly refers to this translation in the Footnotes of Part I.

Doubtless written at the end of the thirteenth century, the *Azuma kagami* is a chronological record of the shogunate in diary form. Since the Nara period (710-794) "official histories" had regularly been compiled and the *Azuma kagami* was meant to be of this type. It is written in an irregular and unorthodox *kambun*, and would seem to indicate that the warrior class responsible for the compilation was unfamiliar with this sort of writing. Its reliability as a historical source has been questioned, for besides incorporating house records of certain military families and those of religious establishments, it also

relied on the imaginative war romances to complete its account. "However, the reliance is far from excessive and it is more or less limited to details of the military campaigns and battles fought in Western Japan. Moreover, these historical romances as well as the other works drawn on by the editors were themselves primary sources, and hence their use by the editors to supplement shogunate materials—far from diminishing the reliability of the *Azuma kagami* as a historical source—has enhanced its over-all value." A more serious charge is the bias shown for the Hōjō family.

In Part I, Mr. Shinoda not only carefully draws the over-all picture of the crucial years between 1180 and 1185, but he is at pains to sketch the full background of feudal institutions: *shōen*, local lords, the evolutionary character of the founding. His discussion of the Gempei War is detailed; to some it will appear overly so. Mr. Shinoda's book can be used as a detailed complement to Sir George Sansom's fine general treatment of this period in *A History of Japan to 1334* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958).

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KAZUO KAWAI. *Japan's American Interlude*. Pp. vii, 257. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960. \$5.00.

This is an important study of selected controversial aspects of the Japanese reactions to American influence during the Occupation period. Its author was editor of the *Nippon Times* during World War II and the Occupation. He holds a doctorate in political science, and his experience includes eighteen years of teaching at American universities. To these qualifications for knowledge of his subject he adds a lucid literary style and a scholarly concern that accomplishments as well as failures shall be recognized. His book is based primarily upon his own notes and editorials, but he acknowledges aid to focus and perspective obtained from writings enumerated in his Bibliographical Notes.

He begins by examining possible reasons for the unexpected early passivity and the subsequent co-operative spirit exhibited by the Japanese people. His own explanation derives from their "situational ethics" combined with the consideration shown by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) administration. After pointing out that a background for democratization already existed in Japan, he proceeds to deal with the major features of the ambitious reformist program, those relating to the constitution, the Emperor, political reorganization, the location of political power, big business, labor, agriculture, economic recovery, education, and social change. His analyses and observations are fresh and thought-provoking. Without overloading his treatment with references to personalities, incidents, and other data already dealt with in earlier studies, he adds to our knowledge and contributes to our understanding. Political scientists will find especially helpful his ideas on the increasing deference of the bureaucracy to the political parties, the resultant improvement in the power-position of the Diet, the growing influence of younger, locally supported political novitiates as opposed to machine bosses, and the lag in popular appreciation of local self-government. Economists will value his clarification of the prewar attitude of opposition of the great trusts toward militarism, his explanation of the political maneuvering of the labor unions, and his answer to the population problem: more industrialization and more export trade. All readers will find his treatment of the socialistic bent of the university faculties instructive, though to this reviewer he overstates their ivory-tower Marxism and gives too little attention to their desire to see Japan free to develop her own foreign policy. He reserves his severe strictures for the Occupation's inane educational reforms, noting justly that they set up for Japan a uniform system which is being discarded in the United States.

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EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY

CARL LANDAUER in collaboration with ELIZABETH KRIDL VALKENIER and HILDE STEIN LANDAUER. *European Socialism: A History of Ideas and Movements from the Industrial Revolution to Hitler's Seizure of Power* (Volumes 1 & 2). Pp. xviii, 1179; ix, 1193-1894. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960. \$20.00.

Recent books on socialism have been unusually bulky. The work edited in 1952 by D. D. Egbert and S. Persons on *Socialism and American Life* comprised two volumes of almost 1400 pages; only in 1958 G. D. H. Cole concluded a six-volume set of the *History of Socialist Thought*; and now we have C. A. Landauer's almost 2000 pages on European socialism.

It seems as if now, when socialism has lost much of its former vigor and appeal, and has been replaced by communism in eastern Europe and parts of Asia, and suffered apparently permanent setbacks in the countries in which capitalism has been successful, extensive post-mortems on socialist policies and socialist political movements have become the vogue. The particular formula which Landauer has developed appears to perform this function best. At the beginning he concentrates on European socialism, notably in western Europe, and still more specifically the socialist movements in Germany and France. These were the countries in which most of the new ideas, parties, factions, and sects in the socialist camp flourished and grew. Secondly, Landauer devotes the bulk of his account to the events since 1890, that is, since the revival of the socialist movement in the Second International. Whereas before 1890 socialist parties were either outlawed or existed only on the fringes of Europe's political structure, after that date these parties were the organized representatives of mass movements which increasingly became eligible for participation in government. Hence the story of socialism as a movement—in contrast to the history of socialist thought which had its most important development in the first half of

the nineteenth century—enters into its most significant phase after the turn of the twentieth century.

The consequence of this is that Landauer's book, though designed to deal with both ideas and movements, contains much more material on the latter than the former. Thus, in principle it becomes a history of the socialist movement, chiefly in continental Europe, in the period from about 1890 to the outbreak of the second world war. And since Landauer was, for a significant portion of this time, a close observer of and an active participant in the European socialist movement, some of the history described in the book is an account of events which were personally witnessed or closely followed at the time of their occurrence by the author.

Though the two volumes concentrate on events which have been treated before by historians, the work presents a new and refreshing approach. Landauer has remained a social reformer and democratic socialist, and this philosophy permeates the pages of the book. But there is no distortion of viewpoint, and the valuations of the author are apparent more by the selection of facts discussed than any conscious partisanship or bias. Even the discussion of the rise of Nazism and fascism is an orderly account of social and political developments, rather than an emotionally or politically inspired story. The book tries to demonstrate and to instruct rather than to blame or to praise. The outcome is a lively and reliable account of an important piece of recent European history, and since the author conscientiously sticks to the topic he has selected for analysis, special emphasis is placed on events and episodes which were of crucial significance for the development of socialist movements and parties and which, in spite of their intrinsic interest and importance, often found only scanty treatment in general histories. Hence—to select only a few cases—such points as the details of political developments in Bavaria after the end of the first world war, the relations between the German Center party and various rightist elements, or the internal struggles in French left parties and labor unions, events which in the long run were of profound political

importance for Germany and France—are placed in their accurate political-historical perspective. The value of the book is enhanced chiefly in that it does provide, because of its focus and the philosophy of its author, an important supplement to much of the general social and political historiography of Europe in the first half of the twentieth century.

A brief comment should be made on the last chapter of the work, entitled "Socialist Theory in the Twentieth Century." Whereas the remainder of the work is primarily devoted to the discussion of socialist movements, this chapter is limited to an exposition and critical evaluation of ideas. As such it constitutes a concise discussion of post-Marxian economic theory, and it summarizes some of the best German economic writing in the period between 1890 and 1914. The high intellectual level and the profound moral earnestness of this post-Marxian economic and political theory contribute greatly to an explanation of why so many members of the European intelligentsia were attracted to socialism.

The book has a Bibliography of almost thirty pages and two excellent and detailed Indexes which enhance its usefulness as a work of reference.

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PETER G. RICHARDS. *Honourable Members: A Study of the British Back-bencher*. Pp. 285. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. \$5.00.

Parliamentary government in Britain has undergone a profound change during the past hundred years. It is still formally true to say that the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet hold their offices only for so long as they have the support of a majority of the House of Commons, but it would be most misleading not to add that, in the conditions of the modern totally disciplined party system, it is almost inconceivable that this majority should be lost except as the result of a general election. At the general election of 1959 the Conservatives won most of the seat -- there is a Conservative gov-

ernment, supported by a majority which can be expected to vote solidly for the present government no matter what it does. It seems, then, that the function of the majority of members of Parliament is to give the Government automatic support, while that of the minority is to offer criticism which can always be swept aside. "Lobby-fodder," "sheep"—these and similar terms are currently applied to members of the House of Commons, and the use of these terms is not altogether unjustified.

Perhaps the most important fact which emerges from Mr. Richards' very thorough and well-directed inquiry is that, although members of the House of Commons vote like sheep, voting is no longer their real means of self-expression. Of the 365 Conservative members elected in 1959 about fifty hold some office in the Government, and the others vote faithfully, as they are instructed, for all the Government's policies. However, they exercise a real and substantial influence, both as individuals and collectively, on the formation of the Government's policy, both in principles and in detail. The medium of their influence is partly public, through speeches and questions on the floor of the House, partly private, through expressions of opinion in the ever more important private party committees which correspond more or less with the main executive departments, and partly personal, through their constant daily contacts, as individuals, with individual ministers during the long hours which all must spend in the Palace of Westminster. There is reason to call this the best club in London, and once a man has received his first appointment to the lowest rung on the ladder of ministerial office, his chances of promotion depend in part on the impression he makes on his fellow members, not only those of his own party, but those of the Opposition too.

Mr. Richards produces a great quantity of highly significant new information as well as some very welcome statistical tables, though some of these could with advantage have been a little more comprehensive. He presents a clear and well-balanced picture of the contribution of back-bench members of Parliament to the British political process, and he shows how

it is that despite strictly controlled voting, many of them nevertheless have a part to play on behalf of interest groups, regardless of how much these groups may tend to exert their influence directly on the members of the executive departments.

If there is any flaw in the picture which he presents it is that it may perhaps slightly overemphasize the role of the backbenchers in the formation of governmental policy, in legislation, and in administration. This is perhaps just as well, because there is need for a corrective to the current exaggeration of the contrary. This book is a strictly political analysis—its value will be greatest for those who have already some knowledge of the basic theory and practice of British government and parliamentary procedure.

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ARNOLD KRAMISH. *Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union*. Pp. x, 232. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959. \$4.75.

After World War II, the United States and Great Britain issued comprehensive reports on the development of their atomic energy programs and subsequently supplemented them by period progress reports. The author, a member of the research staff of The RAND Corporation, sets out to supply similar information for the Soviet Union. He has screened many thousands of issues of Soviet newspapers and technical journals for this purpose. He has succeeded in giving the general reader a full, revealing, and stimulating account of past Soviet atomic energy research and its future aims.

The author shows that Soviet nuclear research started in earnest in the decade after 1920 and that, by 1940, it was evident "that in theoretical ideas and in knowledge of experimental techniques Soviet scientists were equal to their counterparts in the West" (p. 21). They scored a remarkable number of "firsts": Among other discoveries for which they are justified in claiming priority, they were the first

to observe the flight path of cosmic rays (p. 6), the first to observe a laboratory nuclear reaction caused in bombardment by cosmic particles (p. 7), the first in Europe to use a cyclotron (p. 19), and they were the first, in 1940, to obtain conclusive proof of the spontaneous fission of uranium (p. 28).

Contrary to the United States and Great Britain, the Soviets, in June, 1941, almost completely stopped their atomic research and concentrated instead on problems of immediate urgency. The author suggests a number of reasons for this decision and emphasizes that "there is a good deal of evidence that the Soviet political leaders did not become fully aware of the military aspects of nuclear energy until it was too late for them to transform their large-scale research effort into a development and production program" (p. 36).

In 1943, Soviet scientists resumed their research, and in November, 1947, Molotov could state that the Soviet Union knew the secret of the atom bomb. In 1949 the Soviets exploded their first atomic weapon and in 1953 their first hydrogen device, and they were the first to start work on the H-bomb (p. 127). In 1949 Soviet scientists commenced work on the peaceful use of atomic energy and put the first atomic power plant which delivers electric current into operation (p. 144).

My main impressions, after reading this valuable book, are: first, Soviet espionage seems to have played a smaller part in their advance in nuclear physics than is commonly assumed; second, Soviet scientists would have been capable of developing the atomic bomb during the last war and had they done so, the years after 1945 might have been less peaceful for the West; third, further advances in controlled thermonuclear research are likely and, as the author points out (p. 209), "the Soviet Union stands a very good chance of establishing further thermonuclear guideposts of political and technical significance."

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U. W. KITZINGER. *German Electoral Politics: A Study of the 1957 Campaign*.

Pp. ix, 365. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960. \$7.20.

This study of the 1957 West German Bundestag election is dubbed by its author "as being of the Neanderthal variety" and "sets out to be no more than one observer's very personal impressions corroborated or modified by the observations of colleagues with more detailed knowledge of the campaign in certain areas of the Federal Republic." It seeks, as the author tells us, "to continue the series of Nuffield election studies which has now been carried on for twelve years."

Clearly the author is a modest man, and his accomplishments in the book demonstrate at least that he has learned a lot of German politics in a very few years. In fact, in addition to presenting an excellent analysis of the strategy and tactics of the campaign, not to mention its various detailed facets, Mr. Kitzinger has particularly distinguished himself in a number of chapters, for instance Chapters IV, X, and XIV which deal with the process of selecting candidates, campaign finance, and voting behavior. Here for the first time in English we have a good explanation of the German nominating procedure. True, it is not a thorough analysis of all the contests, but as the author correctly says "a sketch of the patterns that seem to have emerged." Similarly, the very sophisticated discussion in Chapter X, together with a detailed Appendix of campaign expenditures, is a very helpful contribution.

Elsewhere in this very readable and useful volume, the author illuminates other dark corners of German politics to give a complete picture of the 1957 election. For instance in the explanation of party mergers and alliances, of the influence of the churches, trade unions, and other interest groups, and in the analysis of campaign media, the author is clear, precise, and adequate. To be sure, any important election deserves and could include more than one brief volume. Actually an earlier German study of the 1953 election is nearly twice as large as the present one under review. But in *German Electoral Politics* the reader is given a reasonably intensive and inclusive analysis of this crucial Ger-

man election of 1957 which adds luster to the long list of Nuffield College election studies and brings great credit to the author and his few collaborators.

The book includes, in addition to the special Appendix on campaign expenditures mentioned above, three illuminating, detailed studies of local constituencies: one from Lower Saxony, one from Bavaria, and one from the Rhineland. These analyses add depth and local color and detail to the over-all review.

The author concludes his study of the election by pointing out that it was the usual nonvoter who voted in 1957 who "gave the Government its resounding victory" and that "C.D.U.'s absolute majority of votes was won only with the help of the postal voters." Making good use of the rich German electoral data, without exhausting it, and observing electoral phenomena very acutely, Kitzinger has given us a welcome and quite indispensable contribution to an understanding of politics in the Federal Republic.

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DOUGLAS V. VERNEY. *Public Enterprise in Sweden*. Pp. x, 132. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1959. 21s, net.

Sweden's welfare state is not built primarily upon the basis of public ownership. The welfare state comprises a system of social insurances, co-operatives, public aids to housing, collective bargaining, and a redistribution of income via transfer payments and taxes. Still, though Sweden is basically a private enterprise country, public enterprises contribute not a little to her highly developed welfare state.

Unlike Britain, Sweden has not achieved her public enterprises by means of a program of nationalization. There has been little threat to private enterprise, and cordial relations exist between the public and private sectors. The state and private enterprise, for example, may collaborate in building a power station. In the case of electric power the state generates about 40 per cent of the aggregate power produced.

For the most part, public enterprises in Sweden were owned by the state from their inception. There has been little transfer of ownership whereby private enterprise has been taken over by the state. Public ownership has developed through a process of natural growth over a long period of time. Domestic private capital was inadequate to cope with large real ventures like railways and the telegraph. Thus the tradition of civil service operation of enterprises took firm root in Swedish soil. Without this tradition, timber and waterfalls might have been transferred from the Crown's domain to private companies. Instead, the Power Board and the Forest Board became great Civil Service Trading Agencies.

Public enterprise has to be sure been extended piecemeal by the state taking over here and there a considerable number of small individual enterprises which have continued to face private competition. There is state competition in road passenger transport, road haulage, restaurants, ferries, iron works, and even, to a very limited extent, in commercial banking. In other fields state monopolies prevail, as in wine and spirits and tobacco. Indeed the tobacco monopoly was formed to finance the old-age pension scheme adopted in 1913.

Mr. Verney's book is concerned not with the economics of enterprises but with administration. In Britain the prevailing form of organization is the public corporation. In Sweden the main forms are: (a) the great Trading Agencies and (b) the State Companies, often relatively small units.

The British public corporation is a separate legal entity. The Swedish Trading Agencies are not, but are operated as a part of the Civil Service. The Swedish State Companies are more like the British public corporation. They are separate legal entities and acquire property in their own name. Their employees are not civil servants. They are governed by the provisions of the Companies' act which governs private companies. They carry the same corporate prefix, namely AB, attached to their name as private companies, and so are not easily distinguishable from

private companies. But the state is the stockholder and, therefore, the Minister occupies, so to speak, the stockholder's seat.

Mr. Verney's study is a valuable contribution not only to our knowledge of modern Sweden but especially to the problems of administration and control.

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EDMUND BURKE. *The Correspondence of Edmund Burke*. Volume II, July 1768–June 1774. Edited by Lucy S. Sutherland. Pp. xxiii, 566. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960. \$12.00.

This second volume of the definitive edition of Burke's correspondence appears on schedule; the plan of the general editor, Professor Thomas W. Copeland, calls for a volume each year until the series of ten is complete. For the years 1768–1774 we have here 253 letters, including 185 written by Burke himself—all those known to exist—of which 55 are in print for the first time. Of those addressed to Burke the most important are from his political chief, the Marquess of Rockingham. Miss Sutherland's Introduction is wholly admirable, and her extraordinary knowledge provides in her notes a sure guide through the many obscure references in the text.

This correspondence, largely political in nature, provides nothing like a continuous story, for Burke, as Miss Sutherland points out, wrote letters not as a literary exercise nor for pleasure but to serve practical needs. Consequently, most of these letters were written between rather than during parliamentary sessions. Even so, they make clear once again that Burke's contribution to the Rockingham Whigs was not that of a leader determining policy but was rather derived from his qualities of mind, his skill in debate, and his restless energy in prodding some of his sluggish aristocratic associates. "You are in general somewhat Languid, scrupulous and unsystematic," he wrote to the Duke of Richmond in November 1772.

Though always loyal to the lead of his chief, Burke's ideas and his oratory helped

transform a loose connection into a self-contained group within the Whig Opposition. The Rockingham Whigs would have no part in a Whig coalition except as a single party and on their own terms. This position Burke voiced in one of his great pamphlets, *Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents* (1770). And for a time the Whigs remained divided and ineffective. A semblance of unity came with the emergence of Lord North's policy in America. On reception in England of the news of the Boston Tea Party, Burke wrote Rockingham (February 2, 1774), "Your Lordship will find all your friends, though not active, yet all in their posts; in good humour with one another; . . . firmly attached to their principles and to your Lordship. As to others I hope they begin to know to whom it is they owe their present situation."

It is useful to fill out Burke's role in politics. But also, in letters hitherto not in print, we catch heart-warming glimpses of a happy family life, and an extended correspondence reveals Burke's devotion to agriculture and his success as a farmer at Gregories, his country estate. In contrast, we have darker passages concerning his wholehearted acquiescence in the questionable financial ventures of Richard, his brother, and of William, his cousin, by which a common family purse was maintained. These volumes will make readily available what material there is in the Burke papers for the study of his family life and personality.

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F. S. L. LYONS. *The Fall of Parnell, 1890–91*. Pp. xii, 362. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960. \$6.50.

"In the history of modern Ireland the downfall of Charles Stewart Parnell stands out as an event of immense significance. His tragedy—romantic, total, irrevocable—overshadowed his own generation and ever since has kept its hold upon the Irish imagination."

With these words Dr. F. S. L. Lyons, Fellow in History at Trinity College, Dublin, begins the first full-length study of the

tragic last year of Parnell's life. He has retold the familiar story in an objective way, with ample documentation. He has made good use of some of the collections of papers which have only recently become available, notably the Dillon papers and the Gill papers. Documents in the latter collection throw new light on the Boulogne negotiations, late December 1890 to early February, 1891, and on the circumstances under which John Dillon and William O'Brien, while in confinement in Galway jail following their return to English jurisdiction after their sojourns in America and France, reached basic agreement on the strategy to be followed upon their release in late July, 1891.

Dr. Lyons does not neglect the human side of the story. He has many revealing comments on some of the main actors in the drama, especially Parnell himself, William O'Brien, John Dillon, T. M. Healy, Thomas Sexton, Justin McCarthy, John Redmond, Timothy Harrington, and Henry Harrison. Other important participants—Gladstone, Joseph Chamberlain, Sir William Harcourt, John Morley, Cardinal Manning, Archbishops Croke and Walsh, Michael Davitt, and, curiously enough, even Captain O'Shea and Mrs. O'Shea—are often referred to, but they remain shadowy figures in the background. Dr. Lyons handles the whole "O'Shea affair" delicately and adds little to the information that has long been available about this much-discussed subject. He seems to accept the thesis, first advanced in detail by Henry Harrison nearly thirty years ago, that Captain O'Shea "was not a deceived husband but had, on the contrary, connived at the relationship between his wife and Parnell," although he is careful to point out that this still "remains a hypothesis." He is obviously an admirer of Parnell, but while he sees in Parnell's fall a case study of "greatness overthrown by mediocrity" he concludes, nevertheless, that "Parnell was to a great extent responsible for his own ruin."

The main focus of the study is not on personalities but on "the broad issues of national policy which the crisis brought into the open." The split in the home rule movement in Ireland, momentous in

itself, led, in his judgment, to three major consequences: it "deeply and permanently changed" the Irish Parliamentary Party; it subjected "the relations between the church and a section of the laity . . . to a severe, perhaps unprecedented, strain;" and by making the Irish nationalists in Westminster dependent on the Liberal alliance it affected "the whole future of Anglo-Irish relations."

This volume is the first in the Second Series of Studies in Irish History, under the general editorship of Professors T. W. Moody, J. C. Beckett, and T. D. Williams. It maintains the high standards of the volumes in the First Series and is a real credit to Irish historical scholarship.

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ERICH RAEDER. *My Life*. Translated by Henry W. Drexel. Pp. xvii, 430. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1960. \$6.00 (\$4.50 to members of the Naval Institute).

Grand Admiral Raeder has written a factual, sincere, and very readable story that covers his life, and in particular the forty-nine years that he served his fatherland. Few officers are alive that had a more interesting career; and there are few who suffered more as a result of professional defeats and the fickle course of history.

He was an officer in and contributed measurably to the training and efficiency of the first German Navy. He describes those times when, at the turn of the century, the Kaiser, his brother, Admiral Prince Heinrich, and Admiral Von Tirpitz bent all efforts to build and train a fleet that would approach parity with that of Britain. It was Raeder's fortune to serve in this fleet as the brilliant Chief-of-Staff of Admiral Von Hipper at both the battles of Dogger Bank and Jutland.

Raeder, outstanding leader and personnel expert, was chosen to rebuild the post-World War I Navy that fought World War II. This interesting period could be summarized with the observations: Hitler never understood the proper use of sea power, and Goering flatly refused the Navy

an air arm—all leading to Raeder's final acceptance of the conclusion of the now deceased Von Tirpitz, that "The German people never have understood the sea."

In building the new Navy, Raeder recognized that discipline must be based upon "a respect for the dignity of the individual" rather than the code of the old Imperial Navy where established class distinctions were taken for granted. Raeder stressed "the intelligent treatment of all subordinates." It is of interest that he encouraged religion in the fleet, but he soon ran afoul of the super-race myth of the Nazis that was the essence of the so-called "German Religious Movement." Raeder was devoutly religious, a powerful prop that sustained him in his ordeal of trial and imprisonment.

The Admiral had many differences with Hitler and his lieutenants, some of them over the Nazi attacks on the Christian churches and the treatment of the Jews. Many of Raeder's beliefs were anathema to the new regime of "super-men." Also in the areas of strategy and tactics, Hitler and Raeder often disagreed. This led to Raeder's resignation in 1942 as the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Admiral Donitz took over the Naval High Command.

These memoirs should be of absorbing interest to both professional and reserve officers of all Navies. Those in other services and, in particular, students of military history should find in the autobiography of this dedicated old sailor, superb staff officer, and born leader some of the reasons why the Führer lost the war.

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LOUIS LISTER. *Europe's Coal and Steel Community: An Experiment in Economic Union*. Pp. 495. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1960. \$8.00.

This book will inevitably be compared with William Diebold's *The Schuman Plan: A Study in Economic Cooperation 1950-1959*, which was reviewed in these columns in January, 1960. No comparison is intended here except to indicate that the two books cover to a large extent the same

ground. But while Diebold's volume presents a broad, comprehensive investigation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) within the historical and political conditions of the time, Mr. Louis Lister, an expert on the coal and steel industries in this country and a member of the United States delegation to the Community in 1952-1953, has limited the scope of his study to a technical economic examination of the institution. He concentrates on the essential economic developments of it during the first six years.

Launched in 1952, the Coal and Steel Community, comprising Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands, was the first major step of the movement for European integration. Its basic economic aims were to federate the coal and steel industries of the member nations under a supranational authority and "promote greater average productivity and efficiency" in the two sectors "by means of greater regional specialization in the most advantageous districts" of a free trade area. After a brief survey of the historical background of the ECSC idea, of its organization and objectives, and a description of the agency's producing areas and markets, Lister subjects the actual workings of the Community to careful scrutiny in order to ascertain how effective it has been in reaching its goals. He analyzes costs of production and investments, corporate concentrations, restrictive business agreements and price practices in each of the two industries, as well as the external commercial policy, transport rates, and social policy of the member states.

Lister's evaluations of the Coal and Steel Community are noteworthy and may be summarized. He makes clear that, though the Community has succeeded in abolishing customs barriers to the trade in coal and steel among the member nations, it has not achieved complete economic union. The author blames this on the insistence of the members of maintaining intact the traditional forms of national sovereignty and their unwillingness to support a central authority. But then "The coal and steel industries," he argues, "were not the most tractable ones with which to start the experiment of freeing trade and prices be-

cause freight costs in both industries tend to create separate markets, because of the structure of ownership and the long history of concerted practices, because individual governments exercise strong influence over the two industries, and because the coal industry is so labor intensive." And as the national governments "have continued to exercise power even in the fields from which they were supposed to have withdrawn" under the terms of the ECSC Treaty and have been reluctant to sever the coal and steel industries from their economies, this has resulted in the Community remaining "a partial economic union."

However, with regard to promoting greater average efficiency by means of greater regional specialization and trade, Lister notes that, though "Competition through the price mechanism has not been legislated into existence in the steel industry as the means for raising average efficiency through greater regional specialization, . . . Greater economies of scale through concentration may . . . well be one of the results of the early history of the common market so far as the steel industry is concerned." In the coal industry, on the other hand, "Improvements in average efficiency through greater regional specialization . . . depend in present circumstances not on the price mechanism but on administrative decision and coordination. Attainment of the best results for the least amount of capital thus far has depended on exhortations from the High Authority, hoping that each country or mining district will plan its future with the welfare of the Community as a whole in mind."

ARTHUR LEON HORNIKER

Washington, D. C.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY

RICHARD E. NEUSTADT. *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership*. Pp. xii, 224. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960. \$5.95.

This is not an investigation of the presidential power derived from the Constitu-

tion, statutes, and usage but instead a study of the President's status, prestige, and influence that in fact empower him "to execute the office of President." Neustadt wants to know "what he does today looking toward tomorrow from today" that invigorates the executive arm. It is astounding how long such a supremely significant investigation has been delayed, but here at last are the "facts of life" that every young president should know.

Eisenhower, the amateur, assumed that to give an order sufficed and reacted with shocked astonishment when his directions bounced back while Truman, the professional, accepted such failures with resignation. Mere formal power to direct may prove futile. A president who fails to publicize adequately his purpose may experience what Eisenhower did when he failed to clarify any intentions with respect to Little Rock, and Faubus judged he could act in defiance of a federal court order.

Bold strokes of the president that once astonished the public, such as Theodore Roosevelt's intervention to settle the anthracite coal strike in 1902, are routine today prescribed by statutes while usage, quasi common law, now obligates the president to do what the statutes omit. Let him neglect legislative leadership or fail to push his budget before Congress, and his indispensable prestige can plummet. Eisenhower experienced this when he failed to sense the peril in his Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey's bombing of his budget of 1957 with the prediction of a "hair curling" depression.

Instead of standing firmly by his own budget, the president admitted it was too high, thereby virtually inviting Congress to cut it. Eisenhower Republicans in Congress were dumbfounded. Such was the confusion created and the consequent damage to the President's prestige that a year later when a technician of the Bureau of the Budget speaking before a House subcommittee closed his recommendation with the statement that it was "essential to the President's program," the phrase was greeted with hilarious laughter. But from this nadir of presidential prestige, a "new Eisenhower" arose, recovered the initiative,

vigorously defended his budgets, and the laughter stopped.

Public prestige as an essential of presidential power stands out in bold relief in the contrast between the President Truman of early 1948 when his party sought to discard him and the later militant victor of the 1948 election. The president himself must preserve his prestige since no one else can. Franklin Roosevelt habitually did this. Eisenhower belatedly learned the lesson.

WILFRED E. BINKLEY

Professor of Political Science
Ohio Northern University

CARTER GOODRICH. *Government Promotion of American Canals and Railroads 1800-1890*. Pp. x, 382. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960. \$7.50.

This penetrating and scholarly work is a major contribution to an understanding of United States economic development in the nineteenth century; but peripherally it also illuminates certain crucial contemporary problems of economic development. Drawing upon his own well-known research and administrative experience in the international field, as well as on the incisive work of many other students of the early promotion of transportation, Professor Goodrich casts much light on internal improvements in the 1900's. He demonstrates that in the period 1815-1860 public agencies—federal, state, and local governments—contributed about 70 percent of the construction costs of canals and between 25-30 percent of the construction costs of railroads. In the south, the proportion was 55-75 percent; and for three of the four trunk lines, it was about 50 percent.

If the evidence indicates clearly that laissez faire policy was a myth, what policy did prevail and what were the forces determining that policy? Professor Goodrich's work clearly illustrates that public policy was pragmatically aimed at stimulating economic growth through whatever means appeared to be most effective in the particular situation: "The rejection of the federal government as the principal agency of the [internal improvement] program is partly to be explained by constitutional

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CORNELIUS P. COTTER, *Stanford University*

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scruples and the doctrine of states' rights and perhaps even more... by the inability of rival local and regional interests to agree on a common national program."

The aid that government agencies gave to promote internal improvements varied and reflected the spirit of improvement and innovation that permeated much of our early economic development. Most people know of the federal government's largess in granting wide tracts of land to promote the construction of railroads, but the general involvement of cities, counties, and states in the construction of railroads and the variety of techniques used by these units to promote construction—such as stock subscription, mixed enterprise, loan guarantees, and the like—are less widely known.

Starting with a chapter on the federal government's role in internal improvements early in the century, Professor Goodrich details a federal-state-local contrapuntal pattern of government promotion throughout the century. Next, the book deals with the activities of states, counties, and cities in the many efforts to penetrate the Appalachian Barrier and in the widespread commitment to internal improvements on local and sectional levels up to the Civil War. The book then returns to the federal intervention theme, 1850-72, when the rapid and ubiquitous growth of railroads was expedited by monumental federal land-grant subsidies and other assistance. Re-counting the details of the state-local programs from 1861 to 1890, Goodrich develops finally the theme of local-sectional interest.

Without doubt the great value of this work is the very richness of material which makes possible a more meaningful view of United States economic development and government policy in transportation—a view much closer to the realities of the times, realities that have been put into quantitative terms. Moreover, despite the many caveats about applying mechanically the "lessons" of history to contemporary problems, it is clear that at the very least, Professor Goodrich's categories of developmental and exploitative internal improvements help to put any underdeveloped

country's transportation problem in a useful frame.

CHARLES HOFFMANN

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Flushing, N. Y.

CHESTER BOWLES. *The Coming Political Breakthrough*. Pp. xi, 209. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. \$3.75.

The election year of 1960, thinks Chester Bowles, can see a "political breakthrough" for the American people from twelve years of "marking time" to a new national consensus releasing all our energies for an assault on the problems and perils which beset us.

How can this come about? The author, a Member of Congress from Connecticut whose distinguished public career is too well known to need recounting here, bases his optimism on a "theory of political growth." The two parties, operating within the "framework of a broadly accepted code of conduct," alternately enjoy power. Leaders of the minority sense a demand for new answers to old problems; as the "party of hope" they engineer a "breakthrough" to a new consensus, first opposed, then joined, by the "party of memory." Three such breakthroughs have occurred in our history—in 1800, 1860, and 1932, each followed by a period of dominance by the party achieving them.

The new breakthrough will come because of our growing concern over the challenge of the Soviet Union, with its threat of nuclear war. To meet it successfully, says Bowles, we must win the friendship of the other two-thirds of mankind. How? The task is "to demonstrate in practical terms that the American Revolution, as Jefferson once said, 'belongs to all mankind.'" Reaffirming the dimension of moral power is the new realism.

Our program must consist essentially of two goals. The first is to build an adequate defense barrier for the free world against the Soviet power system. The second is to develop free societies behind the barrier and revitalize our own democracy.

The key to the problem, Bowles clearly believes, lies in unleashing and driving the

American economy. Khrushchev, he reminds us, has declared economic war on us, with a confidence based on the Soviet economy's seven-year annual growth rate of 9.5 per cent. Bowles believes we must reach and maintain a rate of 4-5 per cent; not inflation but slow growth rate, caused by restrictive governmental policies, is the real danger. But rising prices and recessions must and can be controlled by bolder and more sophisticated use of compensatory spending by government. Our pressing needs, which if met will improve the quality of our life, are inventoried specifically and convincingly.

Which is the "party of hope"? Not the Republicans, thinks Bowles—a liberal President would be shackled by conservatives in his party. The Democrats can be, if they face courageously the right of Negro citizens to full equality.

One strength of the book is that its ideas are not really new—we have done all that it suggests, discontinuously and imperfectly perhaps, or proved that we could. Surely another is the author's boundless faith in American capacity for achievement once we set our faces to the task.

RALPH K. HUITT

Professor of Political Science
University of Wisconsin

MONROE BERKOWITZ. *Workmen's Compensation: The New Jersey Experience*. Pp. xiii, 298. New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1960. \$6.00.

This is the first in a series of studies projected by the Institute of Management and Labor Relations of Rutgers University designed to analyze and appraise conceptual and operational problems in such fields as social insurance which affect the interests of management and workers in New Jersey. The primary purpose of the present study is an objective examination of the functioning of the workmen's compensation system of that state, but the findings are comprehensively compared with experiences in other jurisdictions throughout the United States.

Following an introductory statement of workmen's compensation problems in general, in which the development of work-

men's compensation legislation and the provisions of the New Jersey statute are set forth, the author proceeds to a critical examination of the trends in such legislation and the New Jersey experience. Detailed attention is given to the adequacy of workmen's compensation payments, permanent partial disabilities, the administration of workmen's compensation claims, the administration of the New Jersey act, the financing of the program in New Jersey through private insurance companies rather than an exclusive state fund, rehabilitation and medical care, second injuries and the employment of the handicapped, heart cases and radiation hazards.

The merits and deficiencies of the New Jersey statute and its administration are examined in detail with admirable objectivity. The author does not confine his attention to a critical review of shortcomings in the New Jersey experience but throughout the study weighs constructively comparative programs of remedial action, drawing generously upon the more liberal and progressive measures in other jurisdictions.

In the final chapter the author discusses "The Future of Workmen's Compensation." Valid criticisms as well as unwarranted exaggerations concerning the operation of workmen's compensation programs are clearly recognized, as is the urgent need for improvement. He is admittedly pessimistic with regard to the probability of effective improvement, except perhaps through incorporation of the workmen's compensation program into an integrated social insurance system at the federal level. The suggestion of such incorporation will, of course, immediately revive the endless controversy over centralization versus decentralization of political control and administration.

This is an unusually valuable study which will richly repay thoughtful reading by all who are interested in and concerned with the workmen's compensation program, not only in New Jersey but throughout the United States.

GORDON S. WATKINS

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Economics, Emeritus
University of California, Riverside

CARL BECK. *Contempt of Congress: A Study of the Prosecutions Initiated by the Committee on Un-American Activities, 1945-1947*. Pp. xii, 263. New Orleans: Hauser Press, 1959. \$4.50.

This is a useful little book. It cannot, however, be regarded as a substantial treatise on the law of contempt procedures or as a definitive study of congressional investigations. It is, rather, a well-organized compendium of committee hearings, congressional actions, and court decisions arising from the business before the Committee on Un-American Activities in the period 1945-1957. The scope of the study, the mass of evidence reviewed, and the brevity of the text (189 pages) preclude extensive investigations or a full analysis of all pertinent issues.

Beginning with two introductory chapters: "I. Development of the Contempt Process" (pp. 1-16) and "II. The Power to Subpoena Documents" (pp. 17-40), the study moves to an examination of hearings conducted by the Committee, emphasizing especially its exercises of contempt procedures, and to a summary analysis of subsequent steps including final disposition in the courts. The author has carefully assembled a mass of data and catalogued it in terms of the constitutional issues involved. He has briefly yet conscientiously traced the history of each case to its final disposition. In Appendix A he presents and identifies all contempt citations for the earlier period, 1787-1943. Appendix B and an Addendum list in chronological order all citations originating with the House Committee on Un-American Activities. In another half-dozen pages, Dr. Beck presents in tabular form selected information on a wide variety of contempt cases. The book also contains a Table of Cases, a Selected Bibliography and a brief Index. The documentation is adequate.

Even though apparently overambitious in scope, the study bears ample evidence of scholarly dedication, of great industry, and of some ingenuity in approach and treatment. Handicapped as he is by textual limitations, Dr. Beck nevertheless finds some space to state his opinions, convictions, and biases. He is impliedly unsym-

pathetic, perhaps thoroughly disgusted, with the activities of the Committee on Un-American Activities, hostile towards its procedures, and critical of both congressional and judicial review of much of the work of the Committee. One may infer that the evidence demonstrates abuses of power by the Committee and an almost complete abdication of basic responsibilities by Congress and, to a lesser degree, by the courts. I am not quite sure where the author stands on interpretations of constitutional issues. The doubts arise because too frequently Dr. Beck's appraisals and criticisms are limited to unargued and undocumented assertions and are otherwise beclouded and enfeebled for want of adequate development. In spite of its limitations, teachers and researchers in this area and period of constitutional interpretation will be indebted to Dr. Beck for this compilation of basic data.

HAROLD M. DORR

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CORWIN D. EDWARDS. *The Price Discrimination Law: A Review of Experience*. Pp. xxii, 698. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1959. \$10.00.

Corwin D. Edwards has produced an exceedingly illuminating and important volume even though he found it impossible to carry out his original plan. It had been hoped and planned to give only a minimum of attention to litigation before the Federal Trade Commission and the courts and to ascertain from field interviews and case studies "what happened after orders under the Robinson-Patman Act were issued" (p. ix). Unfortunately the original plan could not be fulfilled; hence it was revised "to include an analysis of the litigation under the Robinson-Patman Act as well as the changes in business practice that followed this litigation" (p. xiii). No endeavor was made to "analyze the scope and effect of the private law suits" (p. xiv) because information derived from such proceedings was not readily available.

The volume begins with a brief legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act. This section will illuminate little for in-

formed readers but will provide some perspective for the initiated. After brief discussions of the content of the statute and of enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission, the leading provisions and issues are discussed, including brokerage, proportionality in payments and services, quantity and volume discounts, quantity limits, functional discounts, territorial discrimination by price formulas, meeting competition as a defense, cost justification, and miscellaneous matters. Practitioners—public and private—business executives, scholars, and students will find all of these interpretive reviews tremendously useful and revelatory.

In two final chapters Dr. Edwards makes an over-all appraisal of the price discrimination law and suggests the lines along which the law might be revised or rewritten. The author concludes that the law has been only partially successful, partly because it was written too largely in terms of the problems and conditions in the food industries (p. 621) and experience has indicated that "the problem posed by discrimination was more complex than had been envisaged by Congress" (p. 620). On the credit side "there is strong reason to believe that the statute has afforded effective protection against the price-cutting activities of predatory would-be monopolists and that it has substantially reduced the discriminatory advantages in price enjoyed by large buyers" (p. 622). On the opposite side have been the tendencies (1) to reduce the vigor of competition (p. 630), (2) to diminish the flexibility of prices, to make sticky prices stickier, and in general to reduce the responsiveness of the price system (p. 631), and thus (3) to evoke a dual standard in public policy under the Sherman and Robinson-Patman Acts (p. 633).

Suggestions regarding policy are made in the perspective of the above consequences and the belief that "the objective of preserving equal opportunity is an appropriate focus for a law of price discrimination" (p. 641). Space cannot be taken here to review all aspects of the suggestions for amending or rewriting the law. In essence "the focus of public policy should be shifted from efforts to control market be-

havior to efforts to prevent undue concentrations of power" (p. 641). A remodelled statute with this focus admittedly "would bear little resemblance to the Robinson-Patman Act" (p. 646).

But this interpretive sketch, like the author's own summary (see p. 656), suggests far too little concerning the full treatment by Dr. Edwards. *The Price Discrimination Law* should be on the must list for all concerned with the Robinson-Patman Act.

E. T. GRETHNER

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Continuing Legal Education for Professional Competence and Responsibility. (The Report on the Arden House Conference, December 16-19, 1958.) Pp. xviii, 315. Philadelphia: Joint Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the American Law Institute and the American Bar Association, 1959. \$5.00.

This book is an annotated version of the statement of the consensus reached during a four-day conference at Arden House. The conference, called by the American Law Institute and the American Bar Association, of 110 members of the bar, including some judges and law teachers, considered in the main the problem of how through continuing legal education an awareness of professional responsibility could be maintained and increased among the bar. While the conference was called to consider both questions of competence and responsibility, the emphasis during the course of the proceedings shifted to responsibility. It was recognized that "Programs for continuing education thus far have placed a major emphasis on professional competence and have not always given to professional responsibility the attention it should have. In the future these programs must also emphasize the professional responsibilities of the lawyer. They must help the lawyer to fulfill a wide range of professional responsibilities: to the courts, to the administration of justice, to law reform, to the law-making process, to his profession, and to the public." In addition to the annotation of the consensus

statement, the volume contains in Appendices the addresses given at the conference by Judge Learned Hand, John Lord O'Brian, Dean Erwin Griswold, Judge Charles Wyzanski, Jr., and Robert Blakely, and contains also various accounts of some continuing legal education programs now in effect in the United States. The conference was made possible by a grant from The Fund for Adult Education.

In part the volume then is an addition to what has been described by Professor Mathews of the Law School of Ohio State University as a "crescendo of hortatory material" dealing with the need for action or education in the field of legal ethics or professional responsibility. The annotation sets forth a "classification of opportunities and responsibilities which may clarify further consideration." This classification includes responsibilities (1) "in actual practice towards lawyers, judges, the administration of justice and the public"; (2) "in areas adjoining actual practice, such as the administration of justice, selection of judges and the like; reform of law both procedural and substantive; representation of all persons, although poor or unpopular"; (3) "in other areas which have recently become important, for example those concerning the development of administrative and international law, and professional relations with foreign lawyers"; (4) "to take judicial, legislative and government positions and in the conduct of these offices"; (5) "to the profession through active participation in the work of the organized bar"; and (6) "to the public of a general character, such as service on educational and charitable boards, leadership of public opinion and community leadership."

This volume may provide some insights for those interested in the process of communication within a somewhat sprawling profession which possesses considerable monopoly power, although much less perfect than that devised for the practice of the medicine, and for those interested in the reactions of a segment of a profession which has correctly regarded itself as charged, along with some other groups, with special responsibilities for leadership in civil affairs. The volume must be taken

as an expression of faith, a manifesto, and in some mysterious way it will be an effective guide to action. Future action will be reflected in the work of bar associations, law schools, and special professional adult educational groups. It will be reflected also in the conduct of the bar and perhaps the understanding of the public, with respect to such matters as the representation of unpopular causes or persons and the reorganization of the courts for the better administration of justice.

EDWARD H. LEVI

Dean
University of Chicago Law School

ROBERT H. BREMNER. *American Philanthropy*. Pp. vii, 230. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960. \$4.50.

Dr. Bremner, a professor of history at Ohio State University, gives himself no small task in writing this book by accepting a very broad definition of his subject. "The aim of philanthropy in its broadest sense," he says, "is improvement in the quality of human life." He therefore endeavors to present in popular terms, from earliest colonial times to the present, American voluntary activities in the fields of charity, religion, education, medicine, humanitarian reform, social service, war relief, and foreign aid. He is the first to admit that "readers may look in vain for mention of favorite philanthropists," though he does mention many, and that he must limit himself to "a narrative of some of the major trends in American philanthropy." The book has no footnotes, an omission that will distress students in the field but probably delight general readers.

Granted these limitations, *American Philanthropy* is an interestingly written, informing introduction to the changing patterns of American philanthropy and reform movements through three centuries. It is properly critical of indiscriminating efforts, including the society lady who admired bread lines and asked about the costs because "I'd love to have one," but also mentions those so fearful of pauperizing the poor that the only commodity they dared offer was advice. The author places considerable emphasis upon the de-

velopment of social work and "scientific philanthropy" and the later expansion of government services into areas once a primary responsibility of private agencies. The concluding sections of the book, appraising developments during and since the Great Depression, seemed to this reader fuller and better balanced than the early historical chapters. Financial data are scarce and inadequate. A final chapter looks forward to the world responsibilities of American philanthropy.

There is an excellent Bibliography for suggested further reading and a good Index.

F. EMERSON ANDREWS

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LESTER J. CAPPON (Ed.). *The Adams-Jefferson Letters: Complete Correspondence Between Thomas Jefferson and Abigail and John Adams*. Vols. 1 and 2. Pp. li, 638. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture at Williamsburg, Va., 1959. \$12.50.

The correspondence of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, declares Dr. Julian Boyd, dean of editors of the writings of American statesmen, "remains unrivaled, in the United States at least, for its revelation of two writers' minds and characters, its literary distinction, and its historical importance." I would not limit its rank and purview to America. It is almost as if Voltaire and Rousseau had exchanged intimate friendly letters on men and measures, philosophy and politics, throughout their long lifetimes. In the case here noted, each of these two men had been fathers of American independence and presidents of the United States. And in one of the most remarkable personal exits in history, both departed this life on July 4, 1826, almost within the same hour, exactly fifty years after adoption of the Declaration of Independence, which they had combined to draft and sign.

The correspondence of these great men, throughout their half century of United States history, has long since been available in print and admired by their posterity. But it has never been brought together in one convenient publication.

Readers formerly had to pick it out from successive editions of the over-all writings of Jefferson and of John Adams. Most of these editions were published before historical editing had reached its present refinement of perfection in this country, and, in them, selected letters of Adams and Jefferson were usually taken from the writer's retained copies rather than from the actual letters as signed and received. There can be a significant difference in the two documents.

A project to publish the 380 letters—189 from Adams, 164 from Jefferson, 27 from Abigail Adams—by themselves, in one edition, has been on foot since 1948, conceived by Carl Bridenbaugh, former director of the Institute of Early American History and Culture at Williamsburg, Virginia, forwarded by successive editors, Donald Murgidge, and Lyman Butterfield, and supported by a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.

But it fell to the capable Lester J. Cappon, present director of the Institute, to take over and carry through the project. The present volumes may properly be credited to him, and their quality proves that the work could not have been entrusted to a more capable scholar, nor the printing to a more competent press.

SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS

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MAX HALL. *Benjamin Franklin and Polly Baker: The History of a Literary Deception*. Pp. xi, 193. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia, 1960. \$5.00.

This is a lighthearted book about a lighthearted subject—one of Benjamin Franklin's roguish literary escapades. The affair had its beginnings in April 1747, when a leading London newspaper, the *General Advertiser*, printed a dramatic courtroom speech purported to have been delivered "at Connecticut near Boston in New England" by one Polly Baker "who was being prosecuted for the fifth time for bearing a bastard child."

The account reported Polly as admitting the charge but, at the same time, denying indignantly that she was guilty of any real wrongdoing against God or man. Said Polly, "I have brought five fine children into the world at the Risque of my life." She had not, she said, "debauched any woman's husband or enticed any youth," nor had she ever refused "any bonafide proposal of marriage." Declaring dramatically that the man who had originally seduced her was now a magistrate of the court, she inquired "how could her offense have angered heaven" when "God has been pleased to add his Divine skill and admirable workmanship" in the formation of her children's bodies and "crowned it by furnishing them with rational and immortal souls."

The entire story was of course a clever and bawdy literary fraud, apparently contrived by Franklin with the connivance of the paper's editor. But the account swept like a brush fire through the press of Britain, the continent, and America. At least five British newspapers had published the tale within a month. The *Gentleman's Magazine* picked up the tale immediately, embellishing it with the additional information that the guilty magistrate had been so overcome with remorse that he had married Polly on the spot and that she had subsequently borne him fifteen additional children. By July and August, the story was front-page news in the *Boston Weekly Post-Boy*, the *New York Gazette*, and the *Annapolis Maryland Gazette*. Polly's story was in vogue in France during the 1770's, when the Abbe Raynal incorporated it in his *Histoire Philosophique*, and both Diderot and Brissot de Warville thereafter used the tale for their own purposes to propagandize against the Ancien Regime. It was Franklin himself who revealed his authorship in an offhand fashion to Raynal, and subsequent scholars from Jefferson and Voltaire to Carl Van Doren have quite generally accepted this account as correct.

The subject of the present work is hardly profound, but the author has nonetheless turned it into a kind of model of historical scholarship and literary criticism. By his zeal and conscientiousness in collecting the evidence, collating documents, and in

matching conflicting accounts, he has succeeded in producing a *delightfully* written and scholarly book.

ALFRED H. KELLY

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G. M. WALLER. *Samuel Vetch: Colonial Enterpriser*. Pp. x, 311. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1960. \$6.00.

The course of eighteenth-century history is not solely explained by a knowledge of the British colonial system. Workable in theory, perhaps, that system was certainly beset by adventitious factors. The life of Samuel Vetch illustrates the problems which arose in shaping a colonial policy, the general ineptitude of eighteenth-century bureaucracy, and the tangled process by which Americans groped toward colonial maturity. The availability of family manuscript collections in more recent years has permitted an evaluation of the interrelationship of many activities that previously had to be treated as separate political, commercial, or personal occurrences. A biography such as this provides valuable insight into the history of the period. Enlivened by glimpses of family life a biography can be far more readable. The publication of this volume is well justified even though the basic facts of the career were mostly established in studies published before 1900.

The birth and early training of Samuel Vetch in Scotland, family life with his father, a leading clergyman of proscribed Covenants, flight to Holland and education there, service on the continent as an officer in the armies of the Protestant Alliance, the great hopes and dismal collapse of the efforts of Scotland to colonize the Isthmus of Darien in spite of hostile English merchant influence in court, and arrival of the starving refugees in the harbor of New York in August 1699 are all covered in two short chapters. Vetch was a cousin of Robert Livingston. He soon contracted with him for food and supplies for the refugees, established major business contacts with the firm of Delancey and

Wenham, and married Margaret Livingston. For a decade his trading activities from New York and Boston, as close to the edge of the law as was then customary, led directly toward plans for British expansion against French Canada. Vetch's knowledge of the St. Lawrence and the coasts of lower Canada contributed much to his later success as an official.

A few historians previously have recognized the importance of Vetch in connection with the expeditions against Canada, but only now is his full contribution evident. His achievement was remarkable in that he successfully merged a number of colonial plans with those of the Ministry in London, maneuvered for years, bribed where it was customary, combined church, partisan, and Scottish nationalist support, and efficiently led expeditions in the field. He risked his entire personal fortune and died in debtors' prison in London in 1732. But he had personally seen the earlier British victories in Canada in 1710, and his wife lived to the years of the final successful British attacks nearly half a century later.

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BRUCE CATTON. *Grant Moves South*. Pp. x, 564. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960. \$6.50.

One does not have to read very far into this book before realizing that an excellent choice was made in selecting Bruce Catton to complete the multiple volume biography of Ulysses S. Grant which the late Lloyd Lewis began a decade ago with *Captain Sam Grant*. Catton's national reputation as a writer on the War Between the States is enhanced by *Grant Moves South*. For years Grant was overshadowed in American historiography by other military leaders. Moreover, Grant has been blamed for the low public morality and general dishonesty in the national government during his two terms as President. From this nadir of popularity he has only recently emerged. Unfortunately neither Kenneth P. Williams, the author of *Lincoln Finds a General*, nor Lloyd Lewis lived to com-

plete their studies on Grant. In the publication of this volume a notable step has been taken in the evaluation of Grant as a military and political leader.

Grant Moves South covers a period of a little more than two years, June 1861 to July 1863. Physically, Grant never looked like a military hero. His habits of dress and his mannerisms contributed to his nondescript appearance. That Grant successfully emerged as the ablest military leader of the Union and the co-ordinator of all the federal forces is attestation enough of Lincoln's correct evaluation of Grant's ability. At last, the Commander-in-Chief had found his General. Indeed, Lincoln and Grant possessed many similar and admirable traits of character.

Although Catton focuses attention on military strategy and tactics more sharply than other biographers of Grant have done, he never loses sight of the many complex problems which plagued his subject. The general was forced to cope with such matters as contraband commerce, mails, passes, slaves, and supplies. The author's discussions of these problems are full and revealing, as is his entire writing about Grant during the period dealt with in his book.

As Lincoln was growing in stature by meeting his responsibilities as President, Grant likewise was developing by facing his problems on the field of battle. The author concludes that Grant did not arrive at the fullest development of his faculties until the height of the Vicksburg Campaign, July 1863. Henceforward, with Lincoln's support, Grant was confident of his success.

In the avalanche of books on the War Between the States now flowing from the presses, *Grant Moves South* occupies a conspicuous position among the best. All persons interested in biography will welcome this book and will await with anticipation the volumes which will complete the biography of Grant.

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DONALD BRUCE JOHNSON. *The Republican Party and Wendell Willkie*. Pp. ix, 354. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960. \$5.50.

Looking back at the election of 1940 Irving Stone once wrote of Wendell Willkie that he was the only defeated candidate "who, a few weeks after the election, was being patted enthusiastically on the back by his erstwhile opponents and kicked in the rear with equal enthusiasm by his erstwhile friends," and small wonder. The Republicans, the party of McKinley and Hoover, had selected an internationalist, a political innocent, an inept organizer, and horror of horrors, someone who had once voted for Franklin Delano Roosevelt and saw some value in much of the New Deal's social legislation. How he managed to obtain the nomination, yet ultimately lose his party, is the substance of this definitive, exhaustive, and strikingly well-written book.

The basic story is familiar. Confronted by mediocrities, guided by northeastern financial giants and Ogden Reid's New York *Herald-Tribune*, and utilizing a clever publicity program, Wendell Willkie's image was favorably impressed upon millions. He was, in addition, a fresh, candid, articulate personality and the perfect opponent for Roosevelt. After his defeat, he continued as the "loyal opposition," traveling around the world and trying to lead the Republicans into an acceptance of the Administration's support of the British and later, into an acknowledgment that this country had fundamental postwar international obligations it could ignore only at its peril.

In the early months of 1944 he entered the primary in a Wisconsin so thoroughly isolationist that "the record of its representatives on the floor of the House prior to 1944, was one of complete opposition to the principles for which Willkie stood." Why he chose to make his stand there remains something of a mystery. The author believes this decision was determined by his advisors and the hope that "if he could win a majority of the twenty-four delegates from this area . . . he would be off to a flying start. . . ." Unwise as it now seems, he was adjudged a favorite by many seasoned observers. Furthermore, Wisconsin's impossible cross-filing preferential primary law has impaled keener politicians on the cross of enthusiasm generated by the heat of campaigns. Perhaps he should have ignored Wisconsin; yet the

nomination would have never been given him again, for this extraordinarily free man who had so many admirers outside his party had so few within it.

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OTHER COUNTRIES

S. D. CLARK. *Movements of Political Protest in Canada, 1640-1840*. Pp. viii, 518. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959. \$6.50.

In at least one important respect, this study by Professor Clark of the University of Toronto is iconoclastic. It challenges the traditional view that the Canadian people have always shunned the radical experiments of the United States and have invariably sought through an orderly process to adapt their political traditions to changing circumstances. Through a detailed examination of Canadian protest movements from 1640 to 1840, the author proves that Canada has had her full share of radicalism and convincingly argues that "in terms of the kinds of movements which grew up, there was no essential difference between Canada and the United States."

The Canadian movements resembled those in the United States simply because they were inspired by similar influences. On both sides of the boundary vast land masses and ineptness of political administration bred political discontent and offered unlimited opportunities for the growth of radicalism. The ultimate outcome, however, was different. South of the boundary the spirit of the frontier was able to incorporate its principles and programs into the American constitution; whereas north of the boundary the frontier spirit regularly met defeat. The American revolutionary movements succeeded because they came to be identified with the strengthening of the American political community as a whole; the Canadian failed because they came to be associated with disloyalty; "they meant exposing the frontier to forces of American expansion and threatening

thereby the separate political existence of the Canadian community."

In most respects the book is admirable. The various movements are thoroughly and carefully analyzed; the arguments are documented by extensive quotations from original sources; and the prose, while not distinguished, is serviceable. The reviewer, however, is inclined to challenge some of the author's very broad statements. For example, he questions whether the French settlers actually viewed the English attacking forces of 1690 as "something of the character of liberation" (p. 24); whether the Canadian habitant population viewed the British conquest of 1760 "as an act of emancipation" (p. 89); and whether "the American Revolution began as a movement for the political liberation of the population of Nova Scotia and Canada" (p. 50). He likewise views as too unequivocal the assertion that the western American movement of political democracy "forced the American Republic into war with Britain in 1812" (p. 237). British violation of American neutral rights is generally admitted to have also been a factor of some significance. But all of the examples relate to matters about which there are grounds for a difference of opinion.

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EDWIN LIEUWEN. *Arms and Politics in Latin America*. Pp. xiii, 296. New York: Frederick A. Praeger for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1960. \$4.75.

This valuable book goes far toward supplying a long needed systematic discussion of the role of Latin America's military in politics. In fact it goes farther than that, for Professor Lieuwen's study covers more than its title indicates. The book is divided into two parts, Latin America's Armed Forces and Military Aspects of the Latin American Policy of the United States. The first and longer section deals with the position of the military on the domestic scene, under such chapter headings as "The Armed Forces and the Social Revolution," "The Changing Role of the Armed Forces: An Analysis," and "The Latin American

Military Today." The second portion of the work concerns itself with United States policy, in chapters headed "Evolution of Policy, 1898-1959," "Analysis of U. S. Policy," "Critique of U. S. Policy," and "Policy for the Future." Also included are two Appendices, one a specimen of an agreement for a United States military mission with Nicaragua and the other a specimen of a military assistance agreement with Honduras, and an adequate Bibliography.

Although the two parts of the study are related, and the thesis of the second portion would be a great deal less compelling unless prefaced by the first, they are quite distinct in approach and in over-all effectiveness, with the section concerning United States policy the more successful of the two. The disparity arises because in his first section, dealing with the domestic situation in twenty different countries, the author has to cover a mass of complex material in a relatively restricted number of pages. Almost inevitably, a few minor errors of fact slipped past him, but I shall neither count them nor quote any, so that I can demonstrate my scholarship by adding a snide "sic" after them, for the impressive truth is that an amazing amount of complicated material has been presented with a minimum of human mistakes. Instead, I shall merely warn the nonspecialist that Mr. Lieuwen's generalizations, valid as they tend to be in global terms, sometimes oversimplify the complex social, economic, and political factors at work in a specific situation. At the same time, this book suggests just how fruitful further, more specialized analyses of Latin America's military could be.

In dealing with United States policy as regards military affairs in the area, the study grapples with a much more manageable problem, and does so both incisively and well. Mr. Lieuwen's thesis that this country's arms supply and military training programs provide neither additional international force in the struggle against communism nor incentive toward responsible, civilian government in the individual states concerned is well documented. So is his contention that our military and civilian leaders are well aware of this fact.

Taken as a unit, *Arms and Politics in Latin America* is an excellent example of the truism that foreign policy-makers must know a great deal about the domestic conditions of the countries with which they are dealing if they hope to provide meaningful and constructive courses of action for this country. I am pleased to see the Council on Foreign Relations encouraging such studies.

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CARL S. SHOUP and others. *The Fiscal System of Venezuela: A Report*. Pp. xiii, 491. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959. \$8.75.

This book is an outgrowth of a study conducted by a commission composed of economists and tax law experts from the United States and Great Britain. This commission, constituted in 1958 at the request of the government of Venezuela, included Carl S. Shoup, as Director, and John F. Due, Lyle C. Fitch, Sir Donald MacDougall, Oliver S. Oldman, and Stanley S. Surrey. The report is a collaborative effort, with authorship of individual sections undesignated.

The two opening chapters deal with the distribution of income and other general economic considerations relevant to public finance. Nine chapters dealing with specific taxes follow, with heavy emphasis upon income taxes and sales and excise taxes. The five concluding chapters cover such topics as state and municipal finances, governmental accounts and reports, non-tax revenues, and an analysis of the tax system and economic stability as well as an estimate of the costs of education and health. Four Appendices contain additional material on detailed matters. Throughout the report, there is an admixture of factual information, economic analysis, and policy recommendations, both general and very specific indeed.

The report is very competently done. Although it contains a massive array of facts, as well as detailed analyses and recommendations, the net effect is not that of a reference handbook. The book is clear, incisive, and straightforward, and a

continuing analytical framework protects the excursions into detail from discursiveness. Although written with clarity rather than sprightliness, the book should attract the interest of many readers. For those interested specifically in the Venezuelan economy, the report presents a wealth of information and a host of policy recommendations. For those concerned with the methodology of case-studies, this book presents a careful and workmanlike model. Finally, for the perhaps even larger numbers of economists, political scientists, and others interested in growth and development, this report sheds much light. It reveals, factually, an economy largely dependent upon a single commodity, with a highly concentrated income distribution, but with more wealth—largely from oil—than possessed by most underdeveloped economies. Within this context, the estimates in the report regarding capital requirements, sources of savings, and so forth, as well as the tax recommendations, are of keen interest. This book is, in short, a very useful addition to the growing library of case-studies in economic development and national economies.

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ARNOLD WIZNITZER. *Jews in Colonial Brazil*. Pp. x, 227. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960. \$7.00.

Professor Wiznitzer has gathered much detailed information about individual Jewish settlers in colonial Brazil and about cases where they were brought before the Inquisition at Lisbon, and his study throws much new light on some phases of Brazilian colonial history. Many Jews fled to Brazil, and others were deported to the colony as convicted heretics after the King of Portugal attempted to compel all of his Jewish subjects to accept Christianity in 1497. They were active in the establishment of the sugar industry and in trade, and they maintained close relations with another large group of exiles who had taken refuge in Amsterdam. Most of the "New Christians" continued to practice the old religion secretly.

After the Dutch conquest of northern

Brazil, the Jews in that region were able to give up any pretense of being Christians. Their number was augmented by immigrants from Amsterdam, and they played an important role in commerce and finance and obtained most of the contracts for the collection of taxes. Professor Wiznitzer thinks that they comprised about half of the white population of approximately 2900 in 1645. Though the local Dutch Calvinists often attempted to interfere with their religious freedom, the policy of the West India Company, which ruled the colony, was a tolerant one. The Jews often fought more tenaciously against the Portuguese than the Company's own mercenary troops, and nearly all of them fled to Holland when the Dutch were finally defeated. Some later returned to the New World to settle at New Amsterdam or in the West Indies.

Smaller groups of Jews at Rio de Janeiro and São Vicente and São Paulo remained in Brazil. The Jesuits used their influence to protect them from persecution, but, in the century that followed the Dutch wars, many were sent to Lisbon for trial by the Inquisition. In most cases they were given relatively light sentences, but eighteen were executed as heretics between 1644 and 1748. Persecution practically ceased after the Marquis of Pombal stopped all discriminations against New Christians in 1773, and thereafter the Jews were absorbed in the Brazilian Catholic population so that there were few if any who still practiced their religion at the time of independence.

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RELIGION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY

Special Editor of this Volume

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Trends in Church Membership in the United States

By BENSON Y. LANDIS

FOREWORD

Taken together, the articles in this volume are in remarkable agreement on the main outlines, trends, and problems of religion in the United States today. Their viewpoint, by design, is naturalistic; that is, they analyze our religious institutions in much the same way as one might analyze a political party, a corporation, or a school system. None of them is concerned here with the validity or the character of the theological discourse or with the relative merits of one or another denominational view. All of them are concerned, and some of them are a little uneasy, about the organizational form and the quality of religious observance in our society. In general, however, the tone is optimistic, much more optimistic than would have been anticipated several decades ago. Following the substantive articles of this symposium, a final article will examine some of the major themes which are found in these pages and present them as an interwoven whole.

RICHARD D. LAMBERT

ABSTRACT: American religious bodies—excepting the Church of Christ, Scientist—have officers who make public reports of the numbers of their adherents. During recent years the “latest information” available has appeared in the annual *Yearbook of American Churches*. Two hundred and fifty-one bodies reported 109,557,741 members, equal to 63 per cent of the estimated population in 1958, in the *Yearbook* for 1960. The figures from church headquarters are made public at irregular intervals and are not gathered by uniform methods. The *Census of Religious Bodies*, which did gather figures by means of standard forms, has been discontinued. The average size of local congregations has increased 50 per cent since 1926, and church membership advances at a more rapid rate than the population. However, church statistics have many defects, and it is not known what effect the mobility of the population has had on church records and on record-keeping. Roman Catholic and Protestant bodies are reported to have now about the same numerical relation to one another as they had in the early 1900’s, but since 1950 the Roman Catholics have reported the more rapid gains. One study indicates that the more conservative denominations report larger growth than those known as the more liberal. Many professional workers challenge the frequent use of extensive church statistics as evidence of the vitality of the institutions or of religious revival.

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At no time in American history have so many people or a greater proportion of the people been affiliated with religious bodies. Statistics supplied by the current *Yearbook of American Churches* reveal that 109,557,741 persons, or 63 per cent of the total population of the United States, are affiliated in 251 religious bodies. The *Yearbook* is a reference work compiled and published annually by the National Council of Churches, New York. Its reports indicate membership totals mainly for 1958 or for a twelve-month period ending in 1958. Statistics were gathered from the forty-nine states and the District of Columbia. Figures for Hawaii will be included in the next annual edition of the *Yearbook*.

REPORTS FROM ALL FAITHS

Reports come from all faiths and are sent to the *Yearbook* by the statisticians of the religious bodies. With the exception of the Church of Christ, Scientist, all the religious bodies in the United States appoint persons to gather figures from their local congregations or parishes. The Church of Christ, Scientist reports that it has a rule forbidding the compilation of its church membership as well as the reporting of such figures for publication. The latest information about the number of persons affiliated with the Church of Christ, Scientist appeared in the federal *Census of Religious Bodies* for 1936, published by the Bureau of the Census, Washington. According to that compilation the number of persons in the Church of Christ, Scientist was 268,915. It does report the number of branches throughout the world, 3,200, a figure published in the *Yearbook of American Churches* for 1960.

The *Yearbook* reports "the latest information" that is available from the headquarters of the religious bodies.

Many denominations, however, do not publish figures annually. The information published in 1960 includes figures for probably more than half of the local parishes or congregations for the year 1958. A few of the reports are for the year 1936. Others are for recent years prior to 1958. The *Yearbook* lists a few bodies which compile figures and consistently decline to have them published, but these are not believed to be large bodies. These exceptions notwithstanding, the data officially reported to the *Yearbook* does account for all but a relatively small percentage of the persons claimed as members by the religious bodies.

WHAT IS A RELIGIOUS BODY?

The religious bodies for which the *Yearbook* has reported figures during recent years are virtually the same as those listed in the *Census of Religious Bodies*, 1936. Although the term religious body, or denomination, has never been strictly defined, the *Yearbook* lists those bodies which have been generally accepted through the years as separate denominations. These are characterized by more than one local unit, by a program broader than that of a local church, by a denominational literature, and by some method of ordaining or licensing clergy or leaders. There are many informal fellowships or associations that are more or less religiously oriented which are not regarded as denominations. These are not listed. The *Yearbook* also does not list groups commonly regarded in the United States as cults. And a few very small sects are omitted because documentary information is impossible to obtain.

The number of local churches reported by the 251 religious bodies was 309,449. This number refers to local organizations. It does not take into account buildings or houses of worship.

The number of local church buildings has not been compiled in recent years. In the *Census of Religious Bodies*, for 1906, 1916, 1926, and 1936, the number of local churches which reported buildings of their own consistently was about 90 per cent of the total number of churches. According to annual estimates made by the United States Department of Commerce, there has been a marked rise in expenditures for new religious buildings since World War II: from \$251,000,000 in 1948 to \$935,000,000 in 1959.

MEMBERS PER LOCAL CHURCH INCREASING

The average membership of the local church has been increasing for all religious bodies. Since 1926, the number of members per local church has increased about 50 per cent: from 235 in 1926 to 354 in 1958.

Among the 251 religious bodies reporting statistics for 1958 there were 82 with memberships of 50,000 or more. These had over 98 per cent of the total church membership. Thus there were 169 bodies with constituencies equal to only about 2 per cent of the total membership.

Data on age groups, sex, occupations, and attendance are seldom recorded locally and are not reported nationally by the religious bodies. It is also not reported what proportion of the members counted contribute money to their churches, or in what ways members are involved in local church life.

STATISTICS NOT STANDARDIZED

Can comparisons be made between the latest information and earlier statistics? What can be said about trends? Between 1890 and 1958 there were thirty compilations of church membership. Five of these were made by the

Bureau of the Census according to standardized methods. The other compilations were made by the *Christian Herald*, a periodical published in New York, and by the Federal Council of Churches and the National Council of Churches. The National Council has compiled the latest information annually since 1951. The difficulty is that the private compilations were not made by uniform methods. Because of the lack of uniformity and the irregularity with which figures are reported, there currently are no national statistics compiled by standardized methods. Thus no direct comparisons between religious bodies can be made on a national basis.

The federal religious censuses were made by means of standard forms mailed to the pastors and clerks of local congregations. The figures were summarized by denominations and were distributed by states, counties, and cities. The *Census of Religious Bodies* for 1926 is generally regarded as the most adequate book on church statistics ever published in the United States. The 1936 statistics were much less satisfactory. The Bureau of the Census stated that the census for that year was "incomplete." It seems that about 20 per cent of the local churches did not report to the Bureau even after a series of requests. The number of local churches recorded by the census was about 20 per cent lower than the number reported that year to the *Christian Herald*, which had collected figures in various previous years. The 1946 *Census of Religious Bodies* was begun but never completed owing to the refusal of Congress to make an appropriation sufficient for the project. In 1956 no recommendation was made to Congress by the administration concerning the matter, and no member of Congress appears to have been sufficiently interested to raise a question about it, and no official of a religious body appeared

before a congressional committee to request an appropriation for the purpose. Officials of religious bodies have occasionally made representations to the Bureau of the Census regarding the value of these projects.

As the censuses between 1906 and 1926 indicate, there has been a tendency on the part of some religious bodies to report on a more inclusive basis in the later as compared with the earlier years. Thus some of the alleged gains reflect in part changes in the method of reporting. It would appear, however, that there have been no major changes in the basis of reporting since the year 1926.

WHAT DEFINITIONS OF MEMBERSHIP?

Since the year 1926, the following seem to be the bases on which memberships are reported. The Eastern Orthodox Churches include all persons in the nationality or ethnic groups being served. The Jewish congregations regard as constituents all Jews in communities having congregations. The Roman Catholics count all baptized persons, including infants. Most Protestant bodies count only the persons who have attained full membership, and previous estimates have indicated that all but a small percentage of these are over thirteen years of age. The Lutheran bodies and the Protestant Episcopal Church, it should be noted, report all baptized persons rather than only those who have been confirmed and have attained full membership.

Another factor affecting membership statistics is the high mobility of the people during recent decades on local church records and record keeping. This is hardly documented at all. Church affiliation is a formal matter, and when people change their residences their local church affiliations are not automatically changed. Many persons mov-

ing from rural to urban areas have been commonly observed to retain their memberships in the rural churches for considerable periods. The same situation has recently been noted when people move from suburb to suburb, or from city to suburb. It may not be unusual, as a suburban minister recently remarked to the writer of this article, for a church to have 900 members on its rolls but not to have a mailing address for 200 of them.

Finally, about seventy religious bodies, including some that are large, have been reporting their memberships in round numbers which appear to be estimates.

SOME COMPARISONS

Because of the nature and the limitations of the data, a discussion of trends must be done with recognition of the inadequate sources for strict and direct comparisons.

In general, religious affiliations reported have been increasing more rapidly than the population. For example, total church membership as officially reported in the *Yearbook of American Churches* for 1960 has been estimated to include 36 per cent of the population in 1900 and 63 per cent in 1958.

Considering only the statistics of the larger groups, and referring as bases to the federal religious censuses of 1906 and 1926, some comparisons can be made.

In 1906 there were 35,068,058 members of bodies of all faiths, of whom 14,210,755, almost 40 per cent, were Roman Catholics. In 1958 there were recorded in the *Yearbook* 109,557,741 persons of all faiths. Of these, 39,509,508, or 36 per cent were Roman Catholics. Protestants in 1906 numbered 21,040,835 persons, or almost 60 per cent of the total of 35,068,058 persons as members of all faiths. In 1958 Prot-

estant Churches reported 61,504,669 persons, or 56 per cent of the total of 109,557,741 members of all faiths. In 1906 the number of persons neither Catholic nor Protestant was reported to be only about one half of 1 per cent of the total. During the interval the marked gains were registered by the Eastern Orthodox, who reported only 129,606 constituents in 1906, and 2,545,318 in 1958. The Jews, who reported only heads of families in 1906—101,457 persons—reported 5,500,000 persons in 1958, an estimate of the number of all Jews of all ages in communities having Jewish congregations. Both Roman Catholics and Protestants reported smaller proportions of the total religious affiliations in 1958 than in 1906, both being less by approximately 4 percentage points.

Over a shorter period, 1926 to 1958, the following comparisons can be made. Protestants numbered 31,511,701 persons in 1926 and were 27 per cent of the total population of the nation. In 1958 Protestants numbered 61,504,669 and were 35.5 per cent of the population. Roman Catholics numbered 18,605,005 in 1926, 16 per cent of the population; and 39,509,08, or 22.8 per cent of the population, in 1958.

For the period since 1950, we find that the Roman Catholics numbered 27,766,141 in 1950, according to the *Official Catholic Directory*, and 39,509,508 in 1958—a gain of over 42 per cent. Protestants, according to reports in the *Yearbook of American Churches*, numbered 50,021,960 in 1950 and 61,504,669 in 1958—a gain of 23 per cent. Thus the gains of the Roman Catholics have been generally more rapid than those of the Protestants since the year 1950.

TRENDS IN GROWTH

"The more conservative groups have had greater success in enlisting members

than have the more liberal groups,"¹ observes Richard C. Wolf, Associate Professor of Church History in the Oberlin Graduate School of Theology. For seven years Professor Wolf studied changes in American religious life. The article compares the 1906 statistics of church membership which appeared in the *Census of Religious Bodies* with statistics of fifty years later as reported by the religious bodies themselves.

During these fifty years the estimated population increased almost 100 per cent, while the officially reported church membership of all bodies in 1956—100,162,529—represented a gain of about 190 per cent over the 1906 figure of 35,068,058, which is the corrected figure published in the 1916 Census. In 1906, 186 denominations reported; in 1956, 258 reported.

The increases in membership in the large bodies and the large families of bodies have been pronounced. In 1956, eleven denominations and families of denominations, each with over 1,000,000 members, reported 92 per cent of all Christians; in 1906 these eleven bodies and families of denominations had 90 per cent of all Christians. There were sixteen Baptist denominations in 1906, and twenty-six in 1956; fifteen Methodist bodies in 1906, twenty-one in 1956; twenty-four Lutheran bodies in 1906, eighteen in 1956; four Eastern Churches in 1906, eighteen in 1956. Professor Wolf concludes that neither merger nor division seems to have a "definitive role in denominational growth." Nor does he find the growth explained by the type of organization or by the type of program. Considering the eleven large bodies and groups each with 1,000,000 or more members in 1956, and arranging them by rate of growth and by "theological mood," Professor Wolf finds that

¹ Richard C. Wolf, "Religious Trends in the United States," *Christianity Today*, April 27, 1959.

the more conservative bodies report by far the largest gains.

EXAMPLES CITED

Some examples of denominational growth should be cited. In the fifty-year period, the Churches of Christ, the Latter-day Saints, the Lutherans, the Baptists, and the Roman Catholics reported gains much above those of the Presbyterians, Methodists, Disciples of Christ, and the Congregationalists.

The Southern Baptists report a gain far in excess of the American Baptists, formerly the Northern Baptists. The Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod reports a gain above that of the United Lutheran Church. The Presbyterian Church in the United States, often called the Southern Church, reports a gain in excess of that of the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America.

Adventists, Brethren, and Mennonites give figures showing gains far above those of the Friends, Universalists, and Unitarians.

Roman Catholic gains are below all of the following: consistently conservative Lutheran bodies, the Latter-day Saints, the Baptist bodies generally, the Churches of Christ, the Mennonites, and the Adventist bodies.

Professor Wolf concludes in these words: "Admittedly such statistical study cannot say anything precise about the relative impacts which the various denominations have made upon the nation's religious life. Nevertheless the study has value in the degree to which it throws light on some trends which have marked the American religious community, especially the Christian segment of that community, in the first half of the twentieth century."

VARIOUS INTERPRETATIONS

It has been said that the official figures on religious affiliation are of par-

ticular interest to church officials, to the common man, and to the newspapers of the nation. To church officials they appear to be related to the usual rivalry among institutions. It has been observed that the common man ordinarily thinks of religious institutions in terms of size. And the newspapers often publish figures as part of their discussions of an alleged revival of religion.

The figures here cited are viewed differently by many social scientists and by other professional persons, including clergymen and others working in the local churches. Social scientists frequently challenge the use of extensive church figures as evidence of the vitality of institutions. And ministers and specialists in religious education working in congregations often allege that many of the contacts of local church members with their institutions are superficial. There are also informed persons who observe that there has been more activity and more church growth in the suburbs of the nation and in the smaller cities than in rural areas or in the "inner sections" of the larger cities.

Two additional sources on religious affiliation should be noted: a church distribution study and a survey of a sample of the civilian population conducted by the Bureau of the Census. Data from 114 religious bodies for the year 1952 were published in a series of eighty bulletins entitled "Churches and Church Membership in the United States" by the National Council of Churches. These bulletins revealed a total membership of 74,125,462 persons in 182,856 local churches in the 114 religious bodies co-operating. Roman Catholic and Jewish figures were included along with figures for many large Protestant denominations. The large Negro Protestant bodies as well as many others, totaling 137 in number, were not studied because the figures were not obtainable for states, counties, and cities on a com-

parable basis. This study brought out significant differences between the metropolitan and the nonmetropolitan areas. Fifty-seven per cent of the people of the nation lived in metropolitan areas, according to the 1950 Census of Population. In these areas were found 46 per cent of the Protestants included in the study and 75 per cent of the Roman Catholics and all but a small percentage of the Jews. Forty-three per cent of the people lived in the nonmetropolitan areas. These included 54 per cent of the Protestants studied and 25 per cent of the Roman Catholic membership. On a regional basis, comparing denominational strength with population distribution, the Protestants were strongest in the South and weakest in the northeast; the Catholics were strongest in the northeast and weakest in the South.

A RECENT SURVEY

For several decades there has been an interest in the inclusion of a question on religion in the decennial Census of Population. In 1956 the Bureau of the Census began a consultation among many agencies concerning the inclusion of the question "What is your religion?" in the forthcoming population census of 1960. The question was tried in a few localities, and in March 1957 a sample of persons over fourteen years of age in 35,000 households in all parts of the nation were questioned. Officials of the Bureau of the Census indicated that if the question were used in 1960 it would probably be asked only of a sample of 20 per cent of the households enumerated.

Considerable discussion of the proposal ensued in church circles and elsewhere during 1957. Roman Catholic officials and press were, with one exception, in favor of the proposal; Jewish press and agencies, again with one exception, were opposed; Protestant offi-

cials and press were apparently sharply divided.² Religious liberty—the freedom of the individual in relation to the power of the government—was the overriding consideration among those opposed. A journal edited by Roman Catholic laymen, *The Commonweal*, New York, regarded the inclusion of the question as an invasion of privacy. *The Commonweal* seems to have been the lone Catholic dissenting voice.

Asking the question was favored by those who felt that there was some value in learning the religious leanings of the people by localities, states, and regions. It was opposed by some persons with experience in population surveys as of little value for research purposes because the replies would indicate both preference and affiliation with no distinction between them.

After careful study of the discussion, the Director of the Bureau of the Census issued a statement on December 12, 1957 to the effect that the Bureau would not ask a question on religion in the census of 1960. It was recognized at the time that a considerable number of persons would be reluctant to answer and the refusal to answer would be legally punishable. The value of statistics based on the question was not considered great enough to justify overriding such an attitude. Cost factors were also a consideration. In the statement it was also said that the decision did not preclude inclusion of the question in some later census or the publication of information obtained in voluntary surveys.

On February 2, 1958, the results of a voluntary inquiry appeared under the title *Religion Reported by the Civilian Population of the United States; March 1957*. Two out of every three persons fourteen years of age and over reported themselves as Protestants and one out

² Information Service of the National Council of Churches, Vol. 37, No. 6.

of every four as Roman Catholic. More women than men were reported for the major religious groups. Ninety-six per cent of the respondents reported a religion; 3 per cent stated that they had no religion; and 1 per cent made no report on religion. It was found that the more rural the community, the higher the proportion of Protestants;

the more urban the community the higher the percentage of Roman Catholics. About 100,000 persons were included in the sample. Figures were stated to be not comparable with the reports of the religious bodies, because the latter included only formal affiliation, while the survey of the population asked simply about religion.

Historic Waves of Religious Interest in America

By TIMOTHY L. SMITH

ABSTRACT: The current high prestige of religion has provoked a re-examination of earlier periods of spiritual awakening in America, but it has not yet produced any lessening of the traditional emphasis upon mass crusades conducted by professional evangelists. Most significant are four decades in American history—the 1790's, and 1850's, the ten years from 1895 to 1905, and the 1950's—when Christianity made major adjustments of thought and practice to cope with new social conditions. The latter three periods in particular differ from one another sufficiently to raise a question about attempts to generalize on the sociological conditions or the cyclical recurrence of religious revival. The awakening of the 1850's witnessed major attempts to apply Christian principles to the social needs of the growing new cities. That of the progressive era, perhaps similar in spirit but widely different in its forms, dealt with the amoral and revolutionary tendencies of industrial society. And the present groundswell of religious concern arises from a complex of factors whose kinship seems to be mostly one of timing. Industrialization seems to have created the kind of society in which stress along boundaries of social change increases rather than decreases man's need for clarification of the ultimate issues of life.

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GENERAL accounts of American religious history have traditionally emphasized three or four great periods of evangelical revival distinguished by the ministrations of outstanding pulpитеers. The "first great awakening" of the colonial era, in which the names of Jonathan Edwards and George Whitefield stand out, was succeeded by a time of spiritual declension in which rationalism, deism, and unitarianism prevailed.

A "second great awakening" began about 1800. Western campmeetings, revivals in Eastern colleges, and the new tract, Bible, and home mission societies broke the back of Deism, saved the frontier from "barbarism," and set the ship of state on course toward Christian harbors. Most students of the subject have viewed Charles G. Finney's evangelistic campaigns between 1828 and 1835 as the climax of this second awakening. After that, America's preoccupation with industrialization, westward expansion, the Mexican war, and the slavery fight seem to have undermined vital piety.

Dwight L. Moody's career began a third great epoch of revivals after the Civil War. Soon, however, a new kind of religious conviction, based as much on the new science as on the old revelation, replaced evangelical Christianity with the Social Gospel. Despite occasional later bursts of enthusiasm under such preachers as J. Wilbur Chapman and Billy Sunday, thoughtful observers concluded that the day of socially significant revivals had passed. Moral guidance would come instead from the behavioral scientists.

The eruption of what some have called the "fourth great awakening" in the decade now closing, however, revealed an unexpected persistence of piety on both popular and sophisticated levels. It has dramatized the need for a re-examination of previous waves of

religious concern. As yet, however, little has been done to disturb the traditional delineation of the historic cycles of revival or to direct attention away from professional evangelists to the role of what Franklin H. Littell calls "the whole people of God."¹

The aim of this brief essay is to underline important periods of religious interest which came about independently of the leadership of notable "soul winners" and in some cases in spite of them. I believe that from the vantage point of the inner life of the American faiths, Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish, religious ideas and practices have more or less steadily increased their hold upon American life since the 1790's. Overattention to the sensational events which periodically caught the public eye has distorted our view. Far more important were the major readjustments which popular piety made to social realities about once in every fifty years—in the 1790's, the 1850's, at the turn of the twentieth century, and in our own day.

Professional evangelists, after all, have proven an opportunistic breed, more apt to exploit than to create a new religious situation. They represent the bloom rather than the root of religious awakenings; and the fruit is sometimes bitter. William G. McLoughlin and Bernard A. Weisberger have recently made this fact clear to many of us; Burt Lancaster's

¹ See Will Herberg's chapter on "The Contemporary Upswing in Religion," *Protestant, Catholic, Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology* (rev. ed.; New York: 1960), pp. 46-72; William G. McLoughlin, *Modern Revivalism: Charles Grandison Finney to Billy Graham* (New York: 1959); Bernard A. Weisberger, *They Gathered at the River: the Story of the Great Revivalists and Their Impact upon Religion in America* (Boston: 1958); and the manuscript summary of Littell's address delivered at a series of conferences of American church historians in the winter and spring of 1959.

portrayal of Elmer Gantry will reach the rest.

PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION

One of the major problems facing historians seeking to understand recurrent waves of piety in America is the choice of evidence. For example, those who rely upon contemporary newspapers are apt to be misled by their tendency to report only those events which affect matters of immediate public concern or which are intrinsically sensational. News of the awakening which swept through both the Northern and Southern armies during the Civil War, for example, filled space in the public press far out of proportion to actual accomplishments.² Fifty years later, Billy Sunday's pulpits with the devil made excellent news copy; but reporters' accounts afford little insight into the total evangelistic effort of the American churches in the decade of World War I. If, on the other hand, one surveys year by year the literature issued by churchmen themselves, a clearer picture emerges. But there also emerges the risk of bogging down in materials which pay relatively little attention to the social impact of spiritual fervor.

Another central historiographic problem arises from the effort to relate religious innovations to issues of class, status, and power. Historians once traced the western phase of the second great awakening to a spontaneous and perhaps psychopathic flight of the frontiersman from unnatural isolation. Now it appears, from the writings of Sidney E. Mead, Ray Allen Billington, and Clifford S. Griffin, that religious and political conservatives seized control of that movement in order to bridle ramp-

² See Lemuel Moss, *Annals of the United States Christian Commission* (Philadelphia: 1868); and W. W. Bennett, *A Narrative of the Great Revival Which Prevailed in the Southern Army . . .* (Philadelphia: 1877).

ant democracy. Federalism, Calvinism, and Whiggery, best personified in the Reverend Lyman Beecher, were the keel, rudder, and sail of the ship of Zion, we are told; the Holy Spirit provided only the wind.³

Use as opiate

Two unpublished studies of the "prayer meeting" revival of 1857 and 1858 have documented Theodore Parker's charge that businessmen promoted it with the aim of diverting the people's attention from their moral duty to the slave.⁴ Similarly, William McLoughlin stresses the evidence of what he believes was the pressure of business interests upon evangelists Sam Jones and Billy Sunday to reject the "godless social service nonsense" of Christian progressivism and to confine their social message to the questions of prohibition and American nationalism.⁵ All of these support to some degree Karl Marx's comment that the capitalist class used spiritual religion as an opiate, to deaden the people's outrage at injustice and exploitation.

Psychic need

A related question is whether periods of unusual fervor reflect simply one of

³ See Sidney E. Mead, *Nathaniel William Taylor, 1786-1858; a Connecticut Liberal* (Chicago: 1942); Ray Allen Billington, "Anti-Catholic Propaganda and the Home Missionary Movement, 1800-1860," *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. 22 (1935-1936), pp. 366-80; and Clifford S. Griffin, "Religious Benevolence as Social Control, 1815-1860," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. 44 (1957-1958), pp. 423-444.

⁴ See Russell E. Francis, *Pentecost: 1858. A Study in Religious Revivals* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania: 1948); Carl Lloyd Spicer, *The Great Awakening of 1857 and 1858* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University: 1935); and Henry Steele Commager, *Theodore Parker* (Boston: 1936), pp. 269-71.

⁵ See McLoughlin, *Modern Revivalism*, pp. 298-99, 397-99, and *passim*.

several responses to widespread social tension. During all of our great wars, for example, reverence for things divine has increased sharply among all classes and at all levels of sophistication. Not only isolation but the newness of their social surroundings impelled Kentuckians to the emotional outburst of 1800-1802. They were endeavoring to form stable relationships with people they had not known before, amidst every kind of conflict over land, custom, and liberty. A few became frontier philosophers, but many more fell under the power of primitive religious experience. Later on, mass immigration from Europe in the 1840's and 1850's created another kind of ecological frontier, the urban slum, and the spiritual results were analogous.

Much other evidence suggests that localized awakenings were but the crackling sounds of stress within the leading edge of change. Richard Hofstadter has explained how the "psychic crisis" of the 1890's undergirded populism and imperialism and laid the foundations of the progressive movement. It also sustained in the movement for social Christianity a powerful outburst of religious fervor, different from previous ones, to be sure, but nonetheless organically bound up with everyday realities. Another illustration is the growth after 1920 of the small revivalist sects. They occupied the social no-man's land separating the old residents of cities and towns from those newly come from the countryside.

TWO CRUCIAL DECADES

Wesley M. Gewehr long ago described the extension of the colonial "great awakening" to Virginia in the period between 1770 and 1800. Especially in the 1790's it laid the groundwork in thought and feeling and tested the methods of evangelism which Method-

ist, Baptist, and Presbyterian preachers exploited fully in both colleges and campmeetings during the "great Western revival" of the following decades. Not least important was Bishop Francis Asbury's development of the circuit-rider system. Thus, in the period when the popularity of Tom Paine and Tom Jefferson seemed to the pious an omen of national apostasy, Protestantism made the fundamental adjustments of organization and simplifications of doctrine which were necessary to carry the gospel to the rootless and mobile frontiersmen.⁶

Pastoral evangelism

Similarly, Charles C. Cole and I have recently published studies of the mid-nineteenth-century era which depict a basic reorientation of American evangelical faith to the task of Christianizing an increasingly urban culture. True, the fortunes of individual revivalists declined after Charles G. Finney left New York for the wilderness at Oberlin. But the system of voluntary church membership and support, which is the chief factor distinguishing American Christianity from that of Europe, required every pastor to be an evangelist. Albert Barnes in Philadelphia, Edward Norris Kirk at Mount Vernon Church in Boston, and George B. Cheever at the Church of the Pilgrims in New York seemed more memorable than individual Methodist clergymen only from the fact that their terms in a single pulpit covered a lifetime.

By 1850, evangelical religion had attained an eminence which Europeans used to the state-church system found

⁶ Wesley M. Gewehr, *The Great Awakening in Virginia* (Durham, N. C.: 1930); Barton W. Stone, "A Short History of the Life of Barton W. Stone" . . . in Rhodes Thompson, comp., *Voices from Cane Ridge* (St. Louis, Missouri: 1954), pp. 36-52.

almost unbelievable. Leading periodicals published under Congregational, Baptist, New School Presbyterian, and American Lutheran auspices promoted earnest soul-winning as a means to usher in the Kingdom of God and raised questions at the same time about professional evangelists. Revivalist pastors played key roles in the establishment of scores of colleges, including not only Oberlin, Knox, and Illinois, but also Andover, Amherst, and Mt. Holyoke, Gettysburg, Wittenberg, and Western Reserve, Rensselaer, Colgate, and Rochester, and Illinois, Connecticut, and Ohio Wesleyan. They were the chief supporters as well of the interdenominational tract, Bible, and home missionary societies, and of the Evangelical Alliance, America's first venture in ecumenical organization.⁷

Humanitarianism

It is difficult but necessary for modern students to realize that in this epoch pastors who adopted the new revival measures were also devoted to progressive theology and humanitarian reform. Only thus could they have won the support of so many, both in and outside the churches, who wished Christianity to become a dynamic force for the perfection of human society. Particularly important is the fact that Eastern and urban pastors now led the way in activities once more characteristic of the frontier. They were particularly concerned with ways to evangelize the impoverished immigrants in the slums. A major purpose was to make Protestants of Catholics, to be sure. But the attempt required them to recognize that they had an urban civic duty as well.

⁷ See Timothy L. Smith, *Revivalism and Social Reform in Mid-Nineteenth-Century America* (New York: 1957), pp. 37-38, 59-62, 219-24, and *passim*; and Charles C. Cole, Jr., *The Social Ideas of the Northern Evangelists, 1826-1860* (New York: 1954).

THE CHALLENGE OF THE CITY

In September 1856, the New York Sunday School Union allocated to churches of every denomination responsibility to visit homes and organize mission Sunday schools in a destitute area of the metropolis. The plan caught the imagination of key laymen. By the following spring two thousand visitors, working in teams of two for each block, were blanketing the city with weekly visits to every home that had no church affiliation. They provided material relief on an individual basis wherever they found a need. The idea spread rapidly to other communities, notably Philadelphia, Brooklyn, Hartford, and Buffalo. That a year of great revival followed in the winter of 1857-58 should be no surprise. A working laity rapidly developed the necessary attitudes of concern and expectancy. They had experienced the emotional shock of exposure to raw human suffering, and they brought new grist to the mill.

Revival of 1858

Methodist, Baptist, Congregationalist, and New School Presbyterian churches provided most of the lay leadership of the noonday prayer meetings which swept over the cities of America after January 1858. Remarkably enough, however, "Old School" Calvinist pastors found their laymen also swept along in the popular tide. Even Episcopal and Unitarian congregations were deeply affected. At Harvard, Frederick Dan Huntington, leader of the "evangelical" wing of Unitarians, held weekly meetings for prayer and testimony in Appleton Chapel. He announced his conversion to Trinitarianism in 1859.

Succeeding years brought no reaction at all against revivalism. On the contrary, ministers of many denominations united to promote city-wide campaigns and other interchurch activities which

extended the movement to groups previously untouched. Most notable, perhaps, was the work in cities of the Young Men's Christian Association and the American Sunday School Union. A companion organization, the United States Christian Commission, evangelized the Northern armies during the Civil War. Dwight Moody was in fact the heir of this revival movement. In some ways he betrayed it by his determination to exclude from his preaching all reference to social issues.⁸

Eminent divinity

Many observers bore witness to the profound revolution which had taken place in the status of evangelical Protestantism. When Charles G. Finney returned to Boston for union meetings at Park Street Church in 1858, the Reverend Edward E. Hale, Unitarian pastor at the South Church, welcomed him heartily. "He believes, as we believe," Hale wrote, "that the tide of the Spirit is always at high water. And so, in his own side of the church, they criticize him, and his, as much as they dare, as 'Perfectionist.'" Hale went on to declare that the doctrine beneath Finney's language was the one from which the Old Calvinism was to meet its doom. "It is the Quaker doctrine, the Methodist doctrine, the Ultra-Unitarian doctrine, the Transcendental doctrine—that God is, every moment, with every child, in a union so close that nothing can be compared with it." Another Unitarian pastor, James Freeman Clarke, rejoiced meanwhile that under the influence of the revival the churches were rising "out of dogmas into the life of the Spirit," where new manifestations of "liberality of opinion and practical

⁸ See Weisberger, *They Gathered at the River*, pp. 175-219, for a sympathetic but penetrating account of Moody's career; and Smith, *Revivalism and Social Reform*, pp. 63-79, 100-101.

goodness" would add strength to their common bonds.⁹

Travelers from Europe who visited America during the decade were convinced, as Isabella Bird Bishop said, that "the transformation of society into the kingdom of Christ" was to be the great work of the American churches. As compared with the nation's preachers, a writer in *The Atlantic Monthly* declared, "no class has such opportunities for influence, such means of power." The vast sums given by laymen to erect new church buildings, the handsome salaries of urban pastors, the tremendous multiplication of church colleges and periodicals, and the new friendliness toward religion by men in political life were all marks of that decade's flood tide.¹⁰

New Protestantism

What made the era most significant, however, was the completion of the decades-long task of remolding American Protestantism to meet the needs of a new age. Lay participation and control in the spiritual and ecclesiastical work of the churches expanded rapidly at the expense of the traditional predominance of the clergy. The spirit of interdenominational brotherhood swiftly replaced sectarian bigotry, and ethical concerns displaced dogmatic zeal in evangelical preaching and writing. Equally important, the Arminian view that all men could be saved by freely accepting God's gift of grace undermined the Old Orthodoxy so fully that few besides conservative Presbyterians would admit they were Calvinist at all.

⁹ *The Watchman and Reflector*, April 15, 1858, quoted Hale's sermon at length; see also James F. Clarke, "The Revival," *The Monthly Religious Magazine*, Vol. 19 (1858), p. 351.

¹⁰ Isabella (Bird) Bishop, *The Aspect of Religion in the United States* . . . (London: 1859), 188-89; *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 1 (1858), pp. 862-63.

An older generation of historians interpreted all the major movements of the antebellum era—the extension of democracy, the growth of public education, utopianism, the antislavery crusade, and literary transcendentalism—as essentially reactions from traditional piety in favor of secular humanitarianism. The evidence demonstrates, however, that concern for the common man was as central in religion as in politics. Churchmen led the way in establishing academies and common schools, not so much in opposition as in anticipation of laws providing state support for public education. Christian millennialism, as displayed in the writings of Edward Beecher, Charles G. Finney, and Gilbert Haven, reawakened the Puritan dream of a holy community and applied it to the entire nation, contributing at least as much to the American heritage of hope as the secular utopianism of Robert Owen and Frances Wright. On the antislavery front, Theodore Dwight Weld, George B. Cheever, and Orange Scott wielded a gospel sword whose cutting force was greater than Garrison's. And Methodist perfectionism, spilling over rapidly into the Congregationalist, Presbyterian, and Baptist communions, proclaimed a transcendentalist platform which stood foursquare on the Rock of Ages, and thus reached plain men in a way Emerson could not.¹¹

¹¹ See, for citations from the sources, *Revivalism and Social Reform*, pp. 80-94. On education in Illinois, where the legislature was especially negligent of its responsibilities, see Burt E. Powell, *The Movement for Industrial Education and the Establishment of the University, 1840-1870*, *Semi-Centennial History of Illinois*, Vol. 1 (Urbana, Illinois: 1918), 159 ff.; Harry E. Pratt, "Peter Cartwright and the Cause of Education," *Illinois State Historical Society Journal*, Vol. 28 (1935-1936), pp. 271-78; and Society for the Promotion of Collegiate and Theological Education at the West, "Memorandum Book, 1843-46" (manuscript, Houghton Library, Harvard University), pp. 126-234.

THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT

We may now profitably shift our attention to another crucial decade, 1895 to 1905. No professional evangelist towered over these years. Moody's star was setting, and Billy Sunday was still relatively unknown. Yet the religious view of life was a central feature in every part of the movement for reform which we call progressivism.

Broad Christian commitment

In no other decade between the Civil War and the 1950's was the public commitment of the American people to "Christian" standards greater. Consider the attacks on the evils of monopoly, corrupt municipal government and slum housing; the concern for the welfare of the immigrant, the Indian, the Negro, and the indigent native-born; the new solicitude for children displayed in efforts to establish playgrounds, kindergartens, and juvenile courts, to promote progressive schools and visiting nurse's associations, and to secure the passage of laws outlawing child labor and regulating the employment of women; and, finally, the assumption of the "white man's burden" of civilizing and "Christianizing" primitive people beyond the nation's shores. In state legislatures and theological seminaries, in the new organizations devoted to human brotherhood and Christian socialism, and in the fashioning of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, a morality which was older and more Christian than the Gospel of Wealth prevailed. The careers of a trio of women, Ida Tarbell, Jane Addams, and Frances Willard, perhaps illustrate best the way in which old-fashioned principles contended with the amoral tendencies of industrialization.

In any other generation the action of

the Democrats in three times nominating for the presidency a Christian pacifist and evangelical, William Jennings Bryan, would have been incredible. The same is true of what happened in 1912, when the most liberal wing of Republicans bolted their party to seek the reelection of Theodore Roosevelt. Their convention went delirious singing "Onward Christian Soldiers" and, to the tune of an old revival hymn, "Follow, follow, we will follow Roosevelt."¹²

Achievement of peaceful reform

The spiritual crisis of the turn of the century seemed to contemporaries as deep as that of the 1850's. Conscience had won out over interest in the previous one, but only by violence. In the intervening years man's inhumanity to man had taken on new forms. Monopolists in the oil, steel, and meat-packing business defended themselves by brazen appeal to a religion of success. The merciless exactions of tenement-house landlords exceeded only in degree the exploitation of new immigrants by political bosses who were sons of the old. The refusal of English and American-born skilled workmen to identify themselves with the aspirations of the laboring class at large weakened the position of all workingmen. No defense is implied here, either, of the sentimentality, the frequent ignorance of social forces, and the insecurity about their status which thrust middle-class Protestants into the progressive movement.

The gains in retrospect seem small, but they came this time not through violence but by legislation and voluntary action. Religionists can scarcely be ashamed of an era when faith helped

¹² See Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform: Bryan to F. D. R.* (New York: 1954); and Lawrence Cremin, "The Origin of Progressive Education," *The Educational Forum*, Vol. 24, no. 2 (January 1960), pp. 133-40.

set the pattern of peaceful reform which has proven the twentieth century's best answer to the challenge of communism.¹³

Intellectual synthesis

Perhaps the best explanation for the success of the progressive movement is that it allied an intellectual elite whose inspiration came from reform Darwinism with an army of preachers, school-teachers, and social workers whose guiding light was social Christianity. Both groups rejected the reactionary Gospel of Wealth and the social Darwinism which sustained it.¹⁴

Although the first rumblings of fundamentalist reaction on the one hand and of positivist social science on the other indicated some sand in the gearbox, the rank and file clung to the belief that science and education, Christianity and democracy, were reciprocating cylinders in the engine of progress. They justified virtually every kind of "progressive" activity in terms of both William James's psychology and Charles M. Sheldon's Christianity. So appealing was the synthesis to the popular religious mind that, as William G. McLoughlin points out, even professional evangelists found it necessary to pay lip service to reform. Billy Sunday frequently volunteered that he supported "progressive orthodoxy" in religion, "Christian social service" in reform, and Theodore Roosevelt in politics!¹⁵

¹³ See, for example, Marc Karson's discussion of the role of Roman Catholicism in the labor movement in *American Labor Unions and Politics, 1900-1918* (Carbondale, Illinois: 1948), chapter 9.

¹⁴ See, generally, Richard C. Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought* (rev. ed., New York: 1959); Ira Brown, *Lyman Abbott, Christian Evolutionist* (Cambridge: 1953); and Charles Howard Hopkins, *The Rise of the Social Gospel in American Protestantism, 1865-1918* (New Haven: 1940).

¹⁵ McLoughlin, *Modern Revivalism*, pp. 364-99, 402.

Discord and particularism

By 1925, the fragmentation of the progressive synthesis, pathetically symbolized at the Scopes trial, was complete. The irreligion of the jazz age may, however, have been more superficial than real. Surely, the young writers and poets were in rebellion. The social scientists embraced behaviorism, eugenics, and Freud, and eliminated preachers and welfare workers from their councils. Fundamentalist Protestants organized crusades against evolution and joined the Ku Klux Klan.¹⁶ But the result was not so much to destroy as to regroup the forces of religion. Roman Catholics, for example, turned to their church with new fervor, partly from anxiety that Americans seemed intent upon keeping them strangers in the land. The flourishing growth of holiness and pentecostal sects was an omen of the future: the Protestant working class could not give up its faith. And out of the discord over what was true in religion emerged a great concern for preservation of the truth in particular religions.

THE PRESENT RESURGENCE

By comparison with these previous decades of awakening, today's rebirth of the prestige of piety seems unique indeed. Just to identify its obviously new facets is sufficient to nullify superficial generalizations about sociological laws and religious cycles. One is the wholesale return of third-generation descendants of European immigrants to the faith of their grandparents. Will Herberg has explained how the second generation's rejection of the concept of the ethnic community left a void which a broadly inclusive identification with

¹⁶ See Henry F. May, "Shifting Perspectives on the 1920's," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. 43 (December 1956), pp. 405-27.

Catholic or Jewish faith now fills.¹⁷ Another is the amazing assertion of the religious spirit in the Negro's nonviolent "stride toward freedom." The sit-in movement displays a radically different motivation and pattern of behavior than liberal "Negro leaders" of an older generation expected. Conservative Southern whites find it equally mystifying. Hymn-singing and martyrdom bid fair to work the social revolution which agitation and political pressure could not, despite everything which critics of "Christian reform" have said.

New intellectual climate

In the worlds of literature and philosophy, meanwhile, the intellectual crisis which psychoanalysis and the new social science provoked in the 1920's produced quite another breed of religious prophet. Long before evangelical Christians heeded Billy Graham, intellectuals were listening to T. S. Eliot and Reinhold Niebuhr. Writers like William Faulkner and Eugene O'Neill had only questions to offer, not answers, of course. But honest questions serve far better to promote a religious awakening than answers which merely paper over cracks in the wall.

New, also, is the shape of the theological, social, and ideological issues which set the stage for mid-twentieth century piety. The amazing victory of militant neo-orthodoxy over modernism, both in the seminaries and at the centers of administrative power in the great denominations, was won in only fifteen years after 1940. It fundamentally altered the pattern of Protestant thought and life. Only thirty years ago, Reinhold Niebuhr's prophetic call to a theology grounded in the mystery of Biblical revelation and looking to a redemption not within but beyond history, seemed an unintelligible shout in the

¹⁷ Herberg, *Protestant, Catholic, Jew*, pp. 31, 47, 153.

dark. Soon, however, morally concerned intellectuals found the neo-orthodox reconstruction of Christianity a tonic to their souls. It was surprisingly analogous to that which fundamentalist revivalists offered beaten men and women in store-front churches across the land.

Novel social stimuli

Although previous wars had contributed their part to religious awakenings, the staggering dimensions of World War II combined with the creation of atomic weapons to produce a new sort of social crisis. It called for many kinds of religious answer. Not the least of several expressions of militant pacifism, for example, was the renunciation of nationalism and war which Jehovah's Witnesses believed to be the path to the Kingdom of God.

Meanwhile, on a different plane, the new "red scare" played a part. In the popular mind, the conflict between communism and capitalism was clearly reducible to a "spiritual" interpretation. That Christians on this account often ignored the economic facts of international life in their preoccupation with the so-called "battle for the minds of men" does not diminish the significance of this factor in the current wave of religious concern.

Finally, and altogether unpredictably, the divorce of religion from instruction in the public schools, including especially the high schools where the meaning of modern science should have been seriously studied, has succeeded less in clearing the way for secular ideology than in preserving in a compartment isolated from scientific scrutiny the heritage of evangelical faith. The exclusion of the Bible and religious observances, which fundamentalists believed was a threat to traditional piety, has turned out, perhaps more alarmingly, to have restricted the incorporation of the scientific outlook into the American child's

real world. A contest with God, home, and mother, as every politician knows, is a hard one to win.

Basic sources

Of course, influences familiar in past awakenings have contributed to the current one. Undoubtedly the most important of these is the persistence of the old-time religion among the mass of ordinary men. Professor McLoughlin has told this story in terms of the growth of fundamentalism. If one is looking specifically for the background to Billy Graham's success, the point is important. Even Graham's supporters, however, come from a much wider band on the Protestant spectrum. Who can say that theories about the premillennial return of Christ, the substitutionary atonement, and the verbal inerrancy of the scriptures are really their dominant concern?

The truth is that fundamentalism, like previous popular reconstructions of Christian ideology, draws its real strength from the common ideas of sin and forgiveness, love and duty, death and resurrection, which have been handed down from father to son and mother to daughter from generation to generation. In this respect, there is little difference between Protestant and Roman Catholic piety. Not the inerrancy of scriptures, but the sense of divine sovereignty; not the virgin birth, but the need of a new birth; not the Second Coming, but an awareness of immanent judgment are the spiritual forces which repeatedly drive men back to their gods.

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, then, the main factors common to the recurrent cycles of religious interest which this essay describes have been tensions resulting from rapid social change, the determination of large numbers of religious leaders to do some-

thing about them, and the persistence among the mass of ordinary men of the simple ideas of evangelical religion. It seems reasonable to suppose that if the pace of social revolution continues to accelerate in the ratio characteristic of the last one-hundred years, the strain upon individuals will drive them to a continuing exploration of the ultimate issues of life, whether in the name of "religion" or not.

Ironically enough from the standpoint

of the Marxists, industrialization may turn out to unveil more the spiritual than the economic nature of man, precisely because it supplies physical needs so well while taxing spiritual resources to the breaking point. Is it not true that in the last ten years more than any other men have sought for that brotherhood which would bind them together in mutual awe and reverence toward one another, and toward the ultimate concerns of their lives?

Theology and the Present-Day Revival

By SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM

ABSTRACT: The current upsurge of interest in religion in the United States is two-fold: popular and theological. The locus of religious thought has shifted in the twentieth century from Europe to the United States, and the present religious revival is distinguished from earlier ones by the activity of a significant number of first-rate intellectuals contributing to a renewed theology and a fresh philosophy of religion. Neo-orthodoxy among theologians, ecumenicalism among churches, and a religious curiosity on all levels are major aspects of the contemporary situation. The reinvigoration of theology now underway in the United States represents a confluence of many streams of religious thought: an existential idealism begun in Europe; the philosophical and ethical lessons of Plato, Aristotle, and the classic Stoics; a concept of creative dialogue with the world, society, and culture springing from nineteenth-century liberalism; the demythologizing of the Scriptures; an approach to dogmatics which does not dismiss philosophical issues; and an insistence upon an ethic which is Christocentric, theologically oriented, and biblically grounded but also relevant to the situation of the contemporary individual.—Ed.

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WHEN we search for an event which clearly marks the beginning of the "contemporary" period in American Christianity, none serves so well as the Great Depression. In Europe Jacob Burckhardt had shuddered even in 1871 with premonitions of a world governed by *terribles simplificateurs*, "a fixed and supervised stint of misery, glorified by promotions and uniforms, daily begun and ended to the sound of drums."¹ Kierkegaard, and Dostoevsky before him and Nietzsche after him, had similar premonitions. When the armistice came in 1918 to a torn and blanched continent, a number of uncommonly prescient men perceived both the collapse of the political order and a crisis of Western civilization.²

But to the United States of "Only Yesterday" all this was strange and unnecessarily grim. The war had been "Over There," a vivid adventure for most Americans and soon a redolent memory. The failure of the peace became chiefly an excuse for both political and theological isolationism. The influence of the churches fell to its lowest ebb. The liberals took new and more daring theological and biblical positions, to which the fundamentalists responded with horror and righteous wrath; the "Monkey Trial" in Dayton, Tennessee, provided the most spectacular religious news of the postwar decade. Walter Rauschenbusch and Washington Glad-den died in 1918; the temperance movement and pacifism became surrogates for the Social Gospel. For most churches it was the heyday of the lawn social. Fleeing a fictional Elmer Gantry and a very much alive Bruce Barton, the intellectuals abandoned the Church in droves, with H. L. Mencken piping the

tune. By almost every legitimate canon of measurement the great depression came upon religion during the booming but troubled Twenties.

NEO-ORTHODOXY

Yet, in a certain sense, even this era had its "underground men" quietly developing a revulsion for the culture-protestantism in which both liberals and conservatives seemed to be conspiring to rob the Christian message of relevance and prophetic content. H. Richard Niebuhr brought his thought to focus in 1929 with trenchant reflections on *The Social Sources of Denominationalism*. He called attention to the problems of human historicity in a way that confounded the reigning traditions of theological liberalism without giving any facile consolation to its enemies.³ Before Niebuhr's work appeared in print, Douglas Horton had already found Karl Barth's *Das Wort Gottes und Die Theologie* on the Harvard Divinity School's new book shelf, and Horton immediately undertook the translation of Barth into English. In 1957 he looked back on that event—which in a literary sense marks a turning point in American theology:

Only those who are old enough to remember the particular kind of desiccated humanism, almost empty of other-worldly content, which prevailed in many Protestant areas in the early decades of this century, can understand the surprise, the joy, the refreshment which would have been brought by the book to the ordinary and, like myself, somewhat desultory reader of the religious literature of the time.⁴

³ See Hans Frei's two excellent essays on H. R. Niebuhr and his intellectual background in Paul Ramsey (Editor), *Faith and Ethics* (New York, 1957).

⁴ Introduction, Harper Torchbook edition of Horton's translation of Karl Barth, *The Word of God and the Word of Man*.

¹ Quoted in Karl Loewith, *Meaning in History* (Chicago, 1949), p. 24.

² Ludwig Wittgenstein, Oswald Spengler, and Karl Barth each signed the prefaces to epoch-marking books in 1918.

Events and crises

After 1928 and 1929 theological events both literary and personal occur with increasing rapidity, with the harsh noise of the Crash hastening the process. The year 1932 marked the passing of the old order in more ways than one. The acute realism of Reinhold Niebuhr's *Moral Man and Immoral Society* and H. R. Niebuhr's translation of Paul Tillich's *The Religious Situation* ruffled the placid waters of liberal social Christianity and because both works were conceived on the borderlands of secular and religious concern, they reached a new kind of American audience. Speaking more directly to the Church in that year was Walter Lowrie's long-gestated demand that we give heed to the "theology of crisis."⁵ A close acquaintance with Albert Schweitzer's *Quest of the Historical Jesus* (1906) and cognate works was readily apparent in his impassioned analysis; and his emphasis clearly foreshadowed a lifetime's preoccupation with making Kierkegaard known to the English-speaking world. The theological *annus mirabilis* came in 1934 when a half-dozen major works made neo-orthodoxy a self-conscious movement of Christian thought, drawing deeply from traditions that had been spurned for two centuries, invigorated by fresh concern for the biblical message, and determined to speak relevantly to the total human situation. Edwin Lewis issued a *Christian Manifesto*, Walter M. Horton struggled to formulate a *Realistic Theology*, Reinhold Niebuhr published *Reflections on the End of an Era* and turned to *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics*, George W. Richards found *Beyond Fundamentalism and Modernism*, *The Gospel of God* and joined with Elmer G. Homrig-

⁵ Walter Lowrie, *Our Concern with the Theology of Crisis* (Boston, 1932).

hausen to edit a volume of Barth's sermons. Nearly every one of these men, moreover, described or documented a critical turning point in his own life and thinking. Like many other liberals of their generation, they moved, as Richards said—in a statement that also reveals the degree to which this stream of thought had German as its *lingua franca*—"from Schleiermacher, Ritschl, and Troeltsch to Kierkegaard and Barth." Before Reinhold Niebuhr delivered his Gifford Lectures on *The Nature and Destiny of Man* in a world darkened by war, the theologians were also responding to another grisly phenomenon: the atavistic barbarities of Adolf Hitler. But with National Socialism there also came the "Barmen Declaration" and the heroism of a "confessing church" in Germany. In 1936 Sverre Norborg of Norway sent an "unpretentious book . . . across the Atlantic as a greeting from a continent in fatal crisis . . . a greeting from the *Unknown Europe*, hidden from the shrieking headlines of newspapers, living its rich and victorious life, whatever befalls it."

That Unknown Europe [he said] is the living communion of believers throughout all the nations of what seems to be a dying continent. . . . They have not been "re-thinking" Christianity, or been busy remodelling its message. They have *heard* a Word, coming from the Other Side of mere human possibilities.⁶

In the meetings and committees of the ecumenical movement these interchanges were deepened.

Upsurge in America

It would be impossible here to recount in detail or even in outline how during the next few years a new theological

⁶ Sverre Norborg, *What is Christianity* (Minneapolis, 1936), pp. vii-viii.

temper made itself felt in America.⁷ The process was a complex one. Books and men that had been ignored during the Twenties took on new significance; other new thinkers were found for the first time; and still others arrived in person. Paul Tillich's American career began at Union Theological Seminary in 1933-34. Many diverse trends of thought came to a focus: Russian, Berdjaev; Spanish, Unamuno; Swedish, Nygren and Aulén; English, Forsythe and Temple; French, Marcel, Maury, and Maritain; German, Heim and Gogarten; and pre-eminently two Swiss thinkers, Emil Brunner and Karl Barth. The two books which best clarify to even the most unprepared mind the nature of these exciting new theological currents are Barth's commentary on *The Epistle to the Romans* and the work translated by Dr. Horton which was mentioned above. It was the intense, existential message of the young Barth that put its indelible imprint on American neo-orthodoxy. Other "discoveries" followed: Kierkegaard, Pascal, Luther, Calvin, and Augustine; and beneath all came a re-entry into the strange world of the Bible. The biblical world was entered not just to seek the religion or social teachings of Jesus or the prophet Amos, but to apprehend the evangel, the kerygma, the proclamation of the gospel, the good news of God to his covenant people. Gradually men even became aware of how the message of Christian hope was as meaningful to twentieth-century Christians as it had been for those who were nourished by

⁷ For more detail, see my "Continental Influence on American Christian Thought since World War I," *Church History*, Vol. 27 (Sept. 1958). On both liberalism and its critics, see H. S. Smith, *Changing Conceptions of Original Sin* (New York, 1955); John Dillenberger and Claude Welch, *Protestant Christianity* (New York, 1954) and C. F. H. Henry, *Fifty Years of Protestant Theology* (Boston, 1950).

the New Testament Apocalypse under the persecution of Domitian.

New biblical emphasis

Quite aside from various superficial readings "from Luther to Hitler," the "Luther renaissance" and later a "Calvin renaissance" began to change the academic approach to the Scriptures even in the old liberal bastions where biblical research had become merely an ancillary aspect of Near-Eastern and Hellenistic studies. Genesis gradually ceased to be a hornets' nest of the Fundamentalist Controversy and—without the slightest abandonment of historical research and scientific textual criticism—became a foundation stone for a Christian's theological understanding of the world. Thanks to Kierkegaard, the account of Abraham and Isaac on Mount Moriah far from being an immoral vestige of primitivism came to reveal a whole dimension of the religious life. The Gospels were untangled from the synoptic and Johannine problems to allow a concern for the gospel, and St. Paul was restored to the canon as something more than the villain who twisted the pure religion of Jesus into an Hellenistic mystery cult. Yet, again, there was no inclination in either case to repudiate historical methods or findings. Indeed, it must be emphasized at this point that one major feature of neo-orthodox thinking was its complete willingness to join contemporary philosophical discussion, to share the liberal respect for scientific endeavor, and to accept and extend the nineteenth century's massive tradition of religious scholarship. Along these lines the neo-orthodox departure proceeded down to and, with explicitly reduced impact, during the Second World War. It was not a monolithic orthodoxy but a renewal with latent tendencies by no means visible when the war

post-Civil War period it probably achieved little more than surface effects on the basic pattern of American religious growth. Even after World War I when professional mass-manipulation of the Billy Sunday variety suffered a decline, revivalism of a less pretentious sort continued unabated in the small towns, in the urban rescue missions, among countless sects, and in individual congregations of the revivalistic denominations. In general, therefore, it is far more important to perceive the continuing impact of revivalistic Protestantism than to emphasize great oscillations in American religious activity.¹²

Recent popular trends

Having duly emphasized this point, one may cautiously concede that during the Twenties American Protestantism suffered a decline which continued after 1929.¹³ Contributions for missions and benevolences were declining despite the prosperity. Church-going and membership declined as well. During the later 1930's, however, the membership losses sustained by American churches during the darkest days of the Depression were gradually recouped and the rate of expansion prevailing since the Civil War was resumed. Then after the Second World War there did, undeniably, occur a surge of piety, an upswing in religion or a revival of interest in religion as it has been variously termed. Martin E. Marty, who has most trenchantly described *The New Shape of American*

¹² See Timothy L. Smith, *Revivalism and Social Reform* (Nashville, 1957); B. A. Weisberger, *They Gathered at the River* (Boston, 1958); W. G. McLoughlin, *Modern Revivalism* (New York, 1959) and *Billy Sunday Was His Real Name* (Chicago, 1955); and the essays of S. E. Mead and R. S. Michaelsen in H. R. Niebuhr and D. D. Williams (Editors), *The Ministry in Historical Perspectives* (New York, 1956).

¹³ Robert T. Handy, "The American Religious Depression, 1925-35," *Church History*, Vol. 29 (March 1960).

Religion, finds this latest revival beginning in the late 1940's and noticeably ebbing in the late 1950's; but he takes great pains to distinguish it sharply from the older revival tradition that runs from Jonathan Edwards down to Billy Sunday, and he means down. "Since World War II," he says, "we have been witnessing the first great awakening not of mainstream Protestant Christianity as such but of a maturing national religion."¹⁴ Will Herberg asserts substantially the same thing and adds important observations on the relation of these trends to America's immigration heritage. These and still others who have studied the phenomenon concur that this most recent revival has been marked by an extraordinarily large component of pious utilitarianism in which religion has been made ulterior to almost every conceivable human need from nationalism and free enterprise to business success and "praying your fat away." Most would probably agree, moreover, that the postwar American situation—its affluent society, its lonely crowds of gray-flanneled organization men, its vast numbers of upward-mobile status-seekers, rootless and insecure, its trembling awareness of hydrogen bombs, fallout, and the fact that a blow at the enemy would be suicide—all this has created religious needs both shallow and deep.

These needs have led to many manifestations, of course, but pre-eminently to a huge nation-wide quest for peace of mind and confident living which could be expressed, and answered, with all degrees of profundity and realism. In its most debased and popular forms it has led to a veritable new reformation according to which salvation comes simply through religiosity-as-such. The mate-

¹⁴ *The New Shape of American Religion* (New York, 1959), p. 10. See also A. Roy Eckardt, *The Surge of Piety in America* (New York, 1958).

rial principle of this new reformation seems to consist of positive thinking, or justification by faith in faith. Its leading apostle is Norman Vincent Peale, with the wise and perceptive Rabbi Joshua Loth Liebman as its best-selling forerunner, and Dwight D. Eisenhower as its most distinguished exponent.

Curiosity about religion

Closely related to these forms of utilitarian piety has been another which is characterized chiefly by an interest in religion, frequently at a very high intellectual level and often in the university. It may or may not be accompanied by great confidence in religiosity-as-such or the assumption that religious curiosity is certainly good and possibly redemptive. A genuine or even intense curiosity about or fascination with religion is its hallmark, and it may lead a person merely to taste some popular book, to take up the study of some religious topic or course, to become a disciple or fan of some religious poet, or to dedicate himself to a lifetime vocation of religious research. These remarks, let me add, are in no sense pejorative. I share this interest. But it is important to see that such interest has become a significant part of the revival, and that it is qualitatively far removed from older conceptions of religious interest.

All of the foregoing manifestations of revival have been essentially individualistic, even self-centered in their appeal. Christianity, however, has been persistently corporate in its emphasis and expression—from the Feeding of the Five Thousand and the Last Supper on through its permutations in every age. Of Judaism the same must be said. As could be expected, the American permutations of the present day are no exception. Just as Luther's justification by faith in no sense reduced the significance of "the Holy Catholic Church, the

communion of saints," the contemporary justification by faith in faith similarly leans heavily on the lonely crowd's need for community and its preference for a community which, in Milton J. Rosenberg's phrase, offers "the pleasures of sacred gregariousness . . ."¹⁵ The revival, in other words, has not simply led men to the kind of Emersonian individualism which stresses each man's original relation to the universe. It brings people into the churches; and, especially in rapidly growing suburban areas where many of our industrial society's most urgent human tensions are felt, it results in automatic congregational growth. A dedicated pastor of a long-established church in a Massachusetts town told me on one occasion, "The people keep joining the church without my lifting a finger. I don't know what they want because they don't seem to want much of anything. The thing's gotten out of hand and I don't know what I can do." His predicament reveals a major fact of the day.

Mass revivalism

In this context a brief consideration of Billy Graham is in order for almost solely on his broad and manly shoulders has rested the burden of reviving mass revivalism and preventing it from becoming only a cheap and emotional accommodation of vague American yearnings or a sentimental reversion to a not-so-old "old-time religion." Not sufficiently realized, however, is the significance of his solitariness in the field and the drastic contrast of this situation to that in the days of Moody and Sunday from 1870 to 1917 when the country was criss-crossed by roving teams of competing revivalists. So important is the one man, Graham, that

¹⁵ "The Social Sources of the Current Religious Revival," *Pastoral Psychology* (June 1957), p. 34.

positive or negative reactions to his methods provide very useful information to the taxonomist of American religious bodies. Now Graham is ecumenical in a sense, though nondenominational is a better description of his stance. His city-wide campaigns depend on the cooperation of an extremely wide range of churches; in many cases he works through local councils of churches which some of his most fervent admirers refuse to join. But he is not a flaccid accommodationist catering only to vague religious interests and nostalgia. Like all men who have to depend on an organization and who have to sell a standardized product to a mass audience, he nevertheless becomes a victim of the very forces he would oppose. Madison Avenue has put its unmistakable mark on the crusader's tactics and even on his message, which becomes increasingly slick and rounded off. His shortcomings thus illuminate the spirit of the times as much as do his successes.

Revival in Judaism

The present state of American Judaism allows many similar observations, though the qualifications entered in the final section of this paper would also apply to a degree. A Jewish revival and a highly visible return to the synagogues is taking place; and as Nathan Glazer and others have pointed out, it has taken place to a large degree in the new social setting created by the current migration to the suburbs and by the corresponding occupational shift.¹⁶ To these forces must be added the powerful stimuli provided by Nazi persecutions, the rapid growth of Zionism and, still later, the actuality of an Israeli republic. As a result the Ameri-

can Jewish community has become not only remarkably homogeneous in its social composition but more determined to root its Jewishness in some form of its religious tradition. Living in this new situation amidst Christian neighbors who, whether Protestant or Catholic, are on the average much more regular in their religious participation, Jews are returning to increased observance and to providing a Jewish education for their children. Whether Glazer's further view that conformity and "other-direction" sum up and explain this development is very doubtful. He exaggerates its superficiality. But the fact of a revival remains.

Roman Catholicism

Of Roman Catholicism no easy generalizations are possible. Following Will Herberg, one may make two assertions in the present context. The prominence of the Irish among American Roman Catholics and their dominance in the clergy and hierarchy has had much to do with the Church's easy and persistent fusion of religion and nationalism. Nor is it enough to say, merely, that Catholics are in general patriotic; both in neighborly conversation and through national spokesmen they proclaim the great usefulness of the Church in the advancement of national aims in a hostile world, and they often do so in accents that blend indistinguishably with the maturing national religion that Dr. Marty has described. Arthur Mann goes too far in saying that "the idea that religion is handmaiden to democracy has made such headway that American Catholicism, American Protestantism, and American Judaism appear like parallel shoots on a common stock."¹⁷ But the general point is worth making.

A second aspect, not unrelated to the

¹⁶ "Charles Fleischer's Religion of Democracy," *Commentary* (June 1954), p. 557; quoted by Marty, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

foregoing, is the now general Roman Catholic acceptance of its tradition as one of three great faiths of this country—or, in John Courtney Murray's phrase, as one of the four conspiracies, for he rightly sees secularism as an active ingredient in the melting pot.¹⁸ In other words, the Church in a practical way accepts the basic—and, for the foreseeable future, unchangeable—pluralism of American life and the statistical fact that since the ending of immigration, and despite the influx of nearly a million refugees since 1935, the Roman Catholic Church has grown somewhat more slowly than Protestantism.¹⁹ Though with less force than in established state-churches, this acceptance of pluralism conduces in its own way to nominal, superficial religion. Roman Catholicism, however, does not often magnify or even concede the utility of religiosity-as-such. Contrary to what many Protestants would like to think about "Rome's keen sense of expediency," its constant emphasis is on its own uniqueness and on the dangers that by acculturation a genuinely Catholic way of life may cease to exist. If the Christopher movement were cited as an exception, it must be answered that it is an exception and a minor one. If Bishop Fulton J. Sheen were cited as the Roman corollary of Dr. Peale or Rabbi Liebman, it must be insisted that he stands in radical contradistinction to them. He is in command of nearly all the persuasive arts, but with far more success than Billy Graham he seeks to transcend the advocacy of belief in belief with a more substantial, prophetic message. He preaches no minimized Catholicism however popular his apologetics may be. His theology rests on the Thomistic foundations out-

lined in his *God and Intelligence in Modern Philosophy*, published in 1925, and he develops the mystical and existential emphases latent in that tradition. It has been my own observation, moreover, that approximately the same statement would hold even for the most simplified Roman Catholic tract literature, including that which, in C. S. Lewis's phrase, is aimed at the "swing vote." Those ecumenically-minded Roman Catholics who emphasize the evangelical, or, if you will, Protestant, aspects of their church have made far less headway in America than in Europe.²⁰

If some effort were to be made to bear out Arthur Mann's extreme statement quoted above, it would, I suspect, require careful motivational research among Roman Catholics in suburban areas of second and third settlement. I would be surprised if such study did not reveal that the widespread current interest in religion, with all its ramifying roots in genuine human need, was often leading Catholics as well as Protestants and Jews back to affirmative religious participation rather than to apostasy and indifference. In these days fewer Catholics than formerly are tempted to change their names and join Protestant churches for social or business or political reasons. That these and other factors in many cases result in very superficial appropriation of the faith probably every priest would admit. Good Catholics no doubt shudder to hear some of the things their nominal brethren say; but as with Protestant churches and Judaism, the rising number of nominal brethren is a vital aspect of America's revival of religious interest.²¹

²⁰ See George A. Lindbeck, "The Evangelical Possibilities of Roman Catholic Theology," forthcoming in the *Lutheran World*.

²¹ "The churches . . . can be the life of the suburbs; but the suburbs may also be the death of the churches." Jaroslav Pelikan, *The*

¹⁸ "America's Four Conspiracies," in John Cogley (Editor), *Religion in America* (New York, 1958).

¹⁹ For statistics see Herberg, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

¹⁶ *American Judaism* (Chicago, 1957), Chap. 7. See also Marshall Sklare, *Conservative Judaism* (Glencoe, 1955) and Will Herberg, *Protestant-Catholic-Jew* (2nd ed.; New York, 1960).

PRESENT THEOLOGICAL TRENDS

Neo-orthodoxy and the revival of religious interest are unquestionably major aspects of the contemporary situation. The surge of popular piety, however, was to so large degree a response to peculiarly American needs in the post-war world and therefore so singularly tame and conformist that important creative achievements could hardly be expected from it. True to these expectations, the revival has been unaccompanied by the emergence of new institutions or the bursting of traditional structures and practices such as came with the other great revivals in the medieval, reformation, and modern periods or in the long, unbroken series of American Protestant revivals of the nineteenth century. The chief contemporary exceptions may be certain trends towards denominational federation or consolidation and the growth of community churches.²²

In contrast to this state of affairs, the movement of vigorous theological protest and revision which waxed in the 1930's led almost necessarily in the postwar years to new and more constructive movements in Christian thought. The purpose of this final section, therefore, is to review some of the more enduring recent theological developments and in the process say something of a deeper renewal of the church which is making headway beneath the banality and sensationalism of the popular revival already discussed.

No facile generalizations

American theology since the neo-orthodox period defies neat and unified characterization. The most important

Riddle of Roman Catholicism (Nashville, 1959), p. 172, and valuable throughout.

²² See Robert Lee, *The Social Sources of Church Unity* (Nashville, 1960).

fact is that it has been renewed. Twentieth-century Christendom has seen a theological renaissance unparalleled since the age of the Reformation. Americans, moreover, have avidly participated in it, and with a catholicity of interest noticeable in few other countries. As a consequence theologians have come to occupy the place in American life that during the half-century after James and Royce was occupied by secular philosophers or almost secular liberal theologians. American philosophy has been preoccupied chiefly with formal questions and has nearly abandoned the large issues of human existence.²³ Since the deaths of Dewey and Whitehead, it would be difficult to find any American philosophers of public eminence who have addressed themselves to the problems of men. The major fact about the American theological enterprise is its broad concern with the whole gamut of human problems. It is determined to make its efforts responsive to contemporary science and literature and relevant to the decisions men make in this world. At the same time it has taken up with renewed vigor its special role of speaking to the church and articulating its faith.²⁴

Biblical scholarship and theology

As one attempts a more detailed characterization of this enterprise, the new locus and importance of biblical scholarship and exegesis are the inescapable points of departure. The Dead Sea Scrolls, the gnostic materials found in Egypt, and archaeological evidence have

²³ Political scientists, economists, sociologists, and psychologists seem also to be fleeing from normative concerns in great numbers.

²⁴ On recent trends and theologians, see D. D. Williams, *What Present Day Theologians are Thinking* (2nd ed.; New York, 1959); D. W. Soper, *Major Voices in American Theology* (2 Vols.; Philadelphia, 1953-55).

been brought into the field of inquiry, put under analysis, and consecrated to the single purpose of better understanding the Holy Scriptures. Any thing or any auxiliary discipline that can shed light is welcomed. As it happens, the findings of recent decades have tended to vindicate or approach many traditional interpretations. An earlier dating of the Fourth Gospel, for example, has been justified. The Masoretic text of the Old Testament has been shown to be surprisingly accurate. The historical basis of many Old Testament men and events has been vindicated. In other cases, traditional views have been cast into deeper doubt. In general, new discoveries tend to be assimilated into older debates and positions; but there is frequently very little correlation between the conservatism of the scholarly findings and the theological position of the scholar concerned, except among right-wing evangelical groups which tend to applaud scholarship that supports tradition and denounce as liberal or even communistic that which tampers with old texts or requires new interpretations.²⁵ It should be said in this connection that since the publication by Pope VII of the encyclical *Divino Afflante Spiritu* in 1943 Roman Catholics have begun to make an important entry into the whole field of biblical criticism and there is no reason to doubt that in time their contributions will enter the mainstream of the continuing enterprise. They at least may be spared the charge of communism.

Biblical scholarship, however, is increasingly understood not only as a de-

partment of scientific historical studies but also as contributory to biblical theology; scholarship and exegesis are thus inextricably joined in a task involving matters far larger than the dates, authorship, and texts of documents. Exegesis of both the Old and New Testaments is, in turn, closely linked with the task of Christian preaching. The resurgence of interest in biblical study is thus related to the restoration of the preaching office in the Church; and much of the renewed interest of theological students in the Greek and Hebrew languages stems from their theological and homiletical responsibilities. To indicate the further interrelation of things, it should be said that the Luther renaissance and many brilliant studies of Calvin and of Puritanism accentuate this concern. In New Testament studies these trends are also furthered by the method of "form criticism," *Formgeschichte*, with its emphasis on the biblical kerygma, proclamation or message, and on the importance of the oral tradition and the apostolic pericopes, or preaching units, as materials of the synoptic gospels. Very few truly germinal contributions in this field have come from America; but the works of John Knox and Paul Minear in New Testament and William Albright, John Bright and Millar Burrows in Old Testament, to name but a few, witness to the emergence of a creative and fully mature tradition of biblical scholarship. The serious concern and accompanying ferment are of primary importance to any interpretation of contemporary American theology.

Ecclesiology

As if the concept of interrelation had not been sufficiently stressed already, it must be underlined again in discussing the importance that the problem of the church, ecclesiology, has taken in

²⁵ Recent introductions explicate and document these trends: see Bernhard W. Anderson, *Understanding the Old Testament* (New York, 1957); Franklin W. Young and Howard C. Kee, *Understanding the New Testament* (New York, 1958); the introductory essays, *Interpreter's Bible* (12 Vols.; Nashville, 1951-57); and Henry, *Revelation and the Bible*, *op. cit.* (note 9 *supra*).

recent decades. The need to face these issues was highlighted in the ecumenical movement almost from its beginnings. As the Faith and Order Commission first faced its task in 1927 and as through the years its dozens and hundreds of committees and study groups have probed the issues that lay beneath the church's clearly visible divisions, the centrality of ecclesiology became inescapable. Questions about the ministry, the sacraments, and the essence or ontology of the church became burning questions. The contemporary situation in its totality, including the transformation of theology implicit in that change, brought to the fore the very problems which the Enlightenment, pietism, romanticism, and revivalism had slighted, ignored, or derided. Historical studies contributed much that was new by laying bare the great concern of the apostolic and early Church for precisely these matters. Reformation research only confirmed this emphasis by demonstrating the centrality of the eucharistic controversy to the first major divisions of Protestantism. Recognizing how important such issues are, contemporary theologians have turned major efforts toward their illumination. In this process, as was inevitable, biblical study has had a primary place, not only for what it might say of the cult and polity of the apostolic church but because the church is, in the ringing phrase of Ephesians, the body of Christ. To understand itself, the church is driven to deepen its understanding of its Head; Christology and ecclesiology flow into each other.²⁶

Effects on practice

Alongside this specifically theological impulse was another movement, out-

²⁶ Claude Welch, *The Reality of the Church* (New York, 1958), exemplifies this impulse, and cites much of its literature.

wardly more practical, in that it had to do with practice, but with large theological implications, the so-called "liturgical renaissance." Here again biblical, early historical, and Reformation studies made large contributions and, as was inevitable, theological emphases were translated into the worship of the church. The impulse has at least three points of origin: in the Lutheran revival of the nineteenth century and cognate movements among the German Reformed, in the English Oxford movement, and in Roman Catholicism, especially in France, Belgium, and Germany, and notably among the Benedictines.²⁷ The movement seeks most directly to reinvigorate the worship and devotional life of the Church, but only after broadening and deepening the idea of worship, *leiturgia*. The royal priesthood of all believers, therefore, is of vital importance—with large consequences for traditional notions of the laity. The movement also seeks to simplify, purify, and clarify the worship of the church while at the same time claiming every depth and resource that tradition can offer. In its desire for genuinely liturgical preaching it responded to many contemporary theological emphases. Among Roman Catholics it awakened interest in the vernacular mass and lay use of the Bible, thereby underlining the liturgical significance of reformers like Luther and Cranmer. Yet this movement was not restricted to those communions which preserved traditional worship forms. In Presbyterian and other Reformed churches there were efforts to forego the excesses of Puritanism and reclaim

²⁷ See E. B. Koenker, *The Liturgical Renaissance in the Roman Catholic Church* (Chicago, 1954) and Massey Shephard et al., *The Liturgical Renewal of the Church* (New York, 1960); J. D. Benoit, *Liturgical Renewal* (London, 1958); L. J. Binkley, *The Mercersburg Theology* (Lancaster, Pa., 1953).

the less radical attitudes of Calvin and the German Reformed leaders. A great surge of scholarship on the Puritan tradition revised the deprecatory views of many who owned that heritage, awakening a powerful emphasis on expository biblical preaching as a corrective to many revivalistic and sentimental innovations of the nineteenth century, and carrying over as well into architecture and hymnology. Pervading this entire movement of renewal, as must be apparent in even this brief account, is a more serious concern for the meaning of church membership and a desire to realize a deeper understanding of the church as a fellowship, a *laos*—a people or laity—of God, an *ekklesia*—assembly—of God. Accompanying this hope came an impulse considerably broader than the liturgical movement itself to introduce where it had faded the idea of preparation for membership. This approach to the ancient catechumenate, pale though it be, involves the presumption that the Church is custodian of an objective message and has a positive teaching role.²⁸

System in theology

The Church's assumption of a teaching role is but the practical corollary of the intensely intellectual task of the systematic theologian, namely, the rigorously reasoned formulation of dogmatics. By 1930 dogmatics had almost become a swearword in most American religious circles. Successive waves of rationalism, revivalism, romanticism and liberalism had almost entirely eroded the idea of a scientific discipline for studying the faith of the

²⁸ See E. B. Koenker, *Worship in Word and Sacrament* (St. Louis, 1959); Hendrik Kraemer, *A Theology of the Laity* (Philadelphia, 1958). On the changing views about religious education, see H. S. Smith, *Faith and Nurture* (New York, 1941).

Church. Apologetics had flourished mightily since its heyday in the Enlightenment. Post-Kantian idealism inspired a vast literature in the philosophy of religion, and the nineteenth century historical revival virtually made historical theology the Church's handmaiden. But through all these vicissitudes dogmatics languished. During the last two decades, however, some of its ancient dignities and perquisites have been restored both in realms where fundamentalism once ruled with anti-intellectual absolutism and where liberalism more indulgently sought to evoke a message from the religious consciousness itself. This is not to say—as some wishful critics have said—that the churches are being victimized by a new dogmatism. Even if every American systematic theologian, whether confessional or ecumenical, were in full agreement with his colleagues, it would be a half-century before their combined influence could make even a mildly significant penetration at the local or parochial level. There is small danger that American Christianity will be swept by dogmatism! At the present time the chief fact of interest is that theology as a rigorous and more or less systematic pursuit is becoming an increasingly lively enterprise. It continues to work, as it must if it is to flourish, in close union with philosophical, historical, and, above all, biblical disciplines.

Confluence of mainstreams

American theologians reflect their country's varied background. At the same time they manifest the integrative effects of both a more widely opened door to the great tradition and the social forces of church unity operative in the United States. Within this common approach to common problems one may discern at least six diverse trends,

none of which can be justly treated in the brief statements possible here. The first of these trends is deeply indebted to Paul Tillich and reflects his existential idealism. Committed to the ontological concerns of the post-Kantian tradition, above all, Hegel and Schelling, its broad and catholic correlation of human problems and Christian answers is expressed in philosophical rather than exegetical argument. Closely related is a second trend in which is continued the long enterprise of turning Plato, Aristotle and classic Stoicism to Christian purposes, as did Augustine and Aquinas and Richard Hooker in their characteristic ways. This is, of course, the dominant trend in Roman Catholicism, especially in America, and also a persistent feature of Anglican thought. The widely varying uses of Whitehead should also be noted in this connection. A third trend, related to the above two, may be noted, I think, in the renewed interest being shown in Friedrich Schleiermacher, F. D. Maurice, Horace Bushnell, and other great nineteenth-century liberals, though it is by no means always being turned to the development of a new liberalism. Thinkers in this group obviously share much with H. Richard Niebuhr and Tillich, most of all in their determination to keep theology free from what they might call dogmatism and open to creative dialogue with the world, society, and culture. They do not emphasize a radical disjunction between the church and the world; and they inherit a measure of the liberal's optimism about Christendom and the formation of a Christian society. A fourth trend owes much to Rudolf Bultmann and through him to the existential philosophy of Martin Heidegger, but always with the biblical orientation indicated by Bultmann's two greatest works, a commentary on St. John's Gospel and a *Theology of the New*

Testament. During recent decades Bultmann has done more to invigorate biblical theology than any other thinker, and it is appropriate to designate a trend with his name even though many whom he has influenced do not share either the radicalism of his demythologizing or his confidence in Heidegger as the lamplighter of Christian theology. In his emphasis on making the scandal of the gospel relevant to the present era, Bultmann shares a concern with each of the three foregoing trends.

Less accommodating to the ways and wisdom of the world and possibly—perhaps as a result—less influential among American theologians is a fifth trend which is best designated by the massive, Christocentric effort of Karl Barth to disengage dogmatics from all kinds of crippling alliances. This takes its most monumental form in the volumes which Barth significantly named *Church Dogmatics*. Also in this group may be included various Scottish, Swedish, and German theologians as well as the leading thinker of the very conservative Netherlands Free Church, G. C. Berkouwer. In this group dogmatics flourishes in its purest form, being rooted in the Scriptures and guided by the church's creeds and confessions. In the case of Barth it is carried on with the freedom of great genius and has led not at all to a dismissal of philosophical issues. In certain sectors of this group are those who would dismiss Barth as a modernist. These ultraconservative evangelicals, however, are to be distinguished from fundamentalists by their efforts to confront the modern world's problems. Yet they are linked to their past and to each other by extremely formal and objective views of "special" revelation. This "inscripturated Word" nevertheless seems unable to resolve many critical issues that divide them; they agree to disagree, and perhaps for this

reason should be separately grouped in this essay.²⁹

The sixth trend here delineated owes much to an initial impulse given it by Reinhold Niebuhr and is specially marked by its strong ethical interests. It would be discussed in an entire separate section if space permitted. Not being a pure species it could, through different thinkers, be linked to several of the foregoing groups, though perhaps most usually the fifth. Its thought is marked by an insistence that a Christian ethic—or the life of the Christian in this world—can make sense only when it is Christocentric, theologically oriented, and biblically grounded. It is suspicious of abstract or autonomous principles, often including natural law philosophies insofar as they ignore the situation of the individual person. Yet it affirms the goodness of the creation, the significance of law, and the meaningfulness of the Christian's vocation in the institutional life or orders of the creation. Luther is frequently a great resource to such thinkers, and also Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who was put to death by the Nazis in 1945.³⁰

The above groupings are incomplete and stripped of many nuances. Most lamentably not shown here are the ways in which the underlying categories become blended in actuality. Nor do they record the degree to which many theologians are influenced by psychological theory, the liturgical movement, logical positivism, philosophical analysis, studies of language, myth and symbol, and by literary trends. Edgar Brightman and the continuing influence

of idealistic personalism at Boston University and in the Methodist Church are not discussed at all. It will be remarked, too, that little is said of Reinhold Niebuhr who has unquestionably been the most influential thinker in American theology during the last quarter-century. The difficulty here lies in the fact that the influence of his Christian realism is everywhere and that it has shown an amazing consistency and durability ever since it began to take shape between 1930 and 1940. His neo-orthodoxy has been behind and leading into most of the creative developments of the postwar period even when he himself would not always follow these leadings.³¹

Prospects

A comprehensive survey of American theology, if undertaken, would show, I believe, that the country's legendary pluralism is an enriching fact though also a disappearing one. Diversity, however, leads to catholicity as well as homogeneity; and in this fact there is reason for believing that the impressive uniqueness of the American religious experience will in time bear some distinctive fruit. In the United States voluntarism, freedom, church-state separation, and positive, constructive "laicism" have long and abundantly flourished. In almost every faith and communion, whether its roots are in old state-church traditions of Europe, in strong movements of tolerated dissent, or in circumstances of positive persecution—or in all three, as is the case with Roman Catholicism—this situation has conduced to new and exciting developments that will probably be reflected sooner or later not only in practical achievements but on a theological plane.

²⁹ See C. F. H. Henry (Editor), *Contemporary Evangelical Thought* (Great Neck, N. Y., 1957); also Henry's *Evangelical Responsibility in Contemporary Theology* (Grand Rapids, 1957).

³⁰ See John D. Godsey, *The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer* (Philadelphia, 1960) and Joseph Sittler, *The Structure of Christian Ethics* (Baton Rouge, 1958).

³¹ See Charles W. Kegley & Robert Bretall (Editors), *Reinhold Niebuhr*, Library of Living Theology (New York, 1956).

Ironically, though understandably, the most significant manifestation of this possibility was Roman Catholic Americanism.³² In Protestantism, so far, the American contribution has consisted chiefly of a disposition to activism, the Social Gospel, and more recently a sociologically and theologically rooted social ethics. But from the theological ferment of the present day we can

perhaps expect still other developments. In the meantime, this same ferment can be expected to do much toward sublimating the traditional anti-intellectualism of American Christianity. It may further reduce the alienation of the intelligentsia which was so prominent during the past century or more when so many churches seemed to have set themselves athwart the entire movement of modern science, scholarship, and literature. Finally, it may extend that deeper revival of the church which goes on at the level of faithful commitment rather than religious interest.

³² See Walter J. Ong, *American Catholic Crossroads* (New York, 1959); T. T. McGarry, *The Great Crisis in American Catholic History* (Chicago, 1957) and Robert D. Cross, *The Emergence of Liberal Catholicism in the United States* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958).

Church and the Laity Among Protestants

By PAUL M. HARRISON

ABSTRACT: Increasing attention is being paid on the fringes of the major Protestant denominations to the role of laymen in the work of the churches. A theology of the laity is in process of development and represents an effort to distinguish between ecclesiastical and secular vocations of the church's ministry. Despite emphasis, however, on the doctrine of the priesthood of all believers there is a subtle clericalism in the denominations which undermines the role of laymen. This points to a major dilemma in contemporary Protestantism. The rapidly developing institutional bureaucracies of denominations and of local congregations create needs of their own which must be met before the churches can attend to the goals for which they were originally established. In this situation laymen are almost inevitably utilized as subordinates to ministers in the work of the institutional church. Seldom is the ministry aware of the developing conception of clergymen as assistants to laymen who are active ministers in the world. On the frontier of Protestant action there are exciting experiments to seek solutions for this dilemma but the work is usually frustrated by a tendency to institutionalize the experiments and by the apathy of the laymen themselves.

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EVENTS in the current century have disturbed the confidence of Christians. The advance of the Communist and nationalist ideologies, the heroic but retarded response of the churches to fascist barbarities, the collapse of evangelistic work in China, and the difficulties of missionary enterprise in Indonesia, Africa, and India have all had an effect upon the outlook of the leaders of the church. More immediately, the denominations in America are frantically attempting to keep pace with unheralded revolutions in urban, suburban, and rural society. In the age of the affluent society, pitchmen who hawk their wares on late and early television shows stand on the highest rungs of the nation's prestige ladder while the ministers who most effectively compete with them adopt their techniques and subconsciously pervert the meaning of the central symbols of the faith. Samuel Miller, Dean of Harvard Divinity School, notes that the Sermon on the Mount has been distorted to read: Blessed are the prosperous; blessed are those with fulness of spirit and aggressiveness; blessed are the cheerful, the optimistic, and those who think positively.¹ The meek, the humble, the poor, and the peacemakers are unfit companions in a land where ownership and virtue are one.

A SECULAR MINISTRY

It is critical alterations like these which have been responsible for a renewal of interest in what churchmen call the ministry of the laity. The role of the professional clergyman is changing. Many of them realize that if they rigidly maintain their traditional patterns of action they cannot cope with

¹ Samuel H. Miller, "The Practice of Religion in a Technological Culture," in a lecture given at the American Baptist Convention, Rochester, N. Y., June 1960. (Mimeographed), pp. 1-2.

the evolving situations of the revolutionary world. The World Council of Churches recently proclaimed that "one of the greatest tasks of the Church today is to grasp clearly the significance of the lay ministry in the world."²

Recent developments in this country, dramatized by such experimental projects as the East Harlem Protestant Parish, the Judson Memorial Church in Greenwich Village, and the Christian Faith and Life Community in Austin, Texas, emphasize "the development of an effective secular ministry in contemporary society."³ Recognizing that a secularized church in a technological culture is not amenable to the customary practices of the ministry and that the pervasive image of revivalistic evangelism has placed the professional clergyman at a disadvantage, the leaders of these experiments are engaged in developing what they hope will result in a transformation of the layman's role. But these isolated events represent the exception to the lay situation in Protestantism. Less dramatic procedures portray the life of the ordinary churchman in the local congregations.

In contemporary usage the term "laity" describes "the vast body of church members who spend their lives in what is called a secular occupation. . . ." In the early church *laos* meant the whole people of God, and *kleros* signified the whole church and

² "The Laity—The Christian in His Vocation," in *The Christian Hope and the Task of the World* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), Chap. VI, p. 1.

³ For example, see Ross W. Sanderson, *The Church Serves the Changing City* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955), Chap. 8.

⁴ "The Laity," *op. cit.*, p. 1. Louis Rumpff defines the laymen in similar terms of "those who earn their living by secular work or as housewives." See "Laymen, Churchmen in the World," *The Student World*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Third Quarter, 1956), p. 208.

was not confined to the priesthood. The work of the clergy and the laity "can only be defined in relation to the ministry of the church as a whole."⁵ Thus the doctrine of the priesthood of all believers "does not refer to the priestly character of every Christian, as if the Christian fellowship were simply a collection of individual priests who have organized themselves for various purposes. The priesthood of all believers refers to the priestly character of the Church as a whole [I Peter 2: 9-10] from which individuals both clerical and lay derive a common priesthood. . . ." It is on this interpretation of the church and its people that contemporary Protestants base their understanding of the ministry of the laity.

THE SCOPE OF THE SUBJECT

There are so many Protestant laymen in so many churches doing and believing so many different things that almost any generalization can immediately be controverted by mutually contradictory facts. American Protestants report approximately sixty million laymen in 280,000 churches.⁷ Among these people there is the dignified elder of St. John's Episcopal Church in New York City as well as the recent convert to the Two-Seed-in-the-Spirit Predestinarian Baptists of rural Kentucky.

The magnitude of the subject can be suggested in another way. Sociologists have discovered that one fruitful

⁵ Hans-Ruedi Weber, "The Ministry of the Laity in the Missionary Outreach of the Church," *The Student World*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Third Quarter, 1956), p. 224. For a Roman Catholic description of the role and status of layman and priest see George H. Tavad, *The Church, the Layman, and the Modern World* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1959), Chap. 1.

⁶ Charles D. Kean, "Clergy and Laity," *The Student World*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Third Quarter, 1956), p. 240.

⁷ *Yearbook of American Churches for 1959* (New York: National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U. S. A., 1960), p. 267.

method of analyzing social phenomena is to develop a typology of the problem to be investigated. Thus in the sociology of religion typological distinctions have been made between churches, denominations, sects, and cults.⁸ American laymen can be classified according to these four institutional types and generalizations can be made about each. The scope of the issue can be illustrated by developing other categories of laymen. Liston Pope, for example, has subdivided laymen into several types and subtypes on the basis of social class, occupation, education, and political preference.⁹ Other classifications can be developed such as age and sex; residence—rural, urban, suburban; degree of church participation—dormant, marginal, modal, and nuclear;¹⁰ and intensity of belief.¹¹

In order, however, to restrict the compass of this paper, attention will be paid exclusively to generalization about laymen in the major Protestant denominations in America and typological categories will be avoided for lack of space. Three topics will be considered: laymen in relation to religious organization, to the ministry, and to the secular community.

⁸ For example, see Liston Pope, *Millhands and Preachers* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942), pp. 117-140.

⁹ Liston Pope, "Religion and Class Structure," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 256, No. 2 (March 1948), pp. 84-91. See also, Frederick A. Shippey, "Religio-Socio-Economic Characteristics of Urban Church Officers" (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Northwestern University, 1947), pp. 52-93.

¹⁰ These categories were developed by a Jesuit for the study of a southern parish: Joseph H. Fichter, S.J., *Social Relations in the Urban Parish* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

¹¹ Yoshio Fukuyama, "Using Belief to Define Orientations to Religion," in a paper presented at a meeting of The Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, New Haven, 1959. (Mimeographed.)

LAYMEN AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION

According to Roman Catholic theologians the "holy priesthood" refers in a general way, as in Protestantism, to the whole church, but it refers more specifically to the priestly hierarchy. The dogma of the Catholic Church places the hierarchy in a position which is ontologically prior to the existence of the laymen.¹² In the Protestant situation in America only a comparatively small number of churches, largely confined to the Lutheran and Episcopal traditions, are willing to abide by this hierarchical principle. The Reformation was grounded first of all in the doctrine of the absolute sovereignty of God and the finitude of all things under God—including priest and church. Secondly, the Reformers emphasized the doctrine of justification by faith and the priesthood of all believers. Protestants have not been consistent in their support and understanding of these difficult doctrinal foundations. They admit that the believer cannot see God and often fails to confess his sovereignty, the sinner cannot fully experience justification, and the laymen can clearly distinguish himself—and frequently prefers to disassociate himself—from the clergy.

Perhaps because of this situation the doctrine of the priesthood of all believers has never been efficacious on Protestantism.¹³ At the lay experiment in Austin they are "perceiving the subtle clericalism in the Protestant Church and uncovering the meaning of the term 'laity.' They are insisting that the primary ministry in the Church is that of laymen in the world." The fact that many Protestant leaders

admit there is a critical need for a theology of the laity is indicative of some dissatisfaction with the work of the churches. The lay developments in this country and Europe represent an effort to distinguish between Christian ecclesiastical vocations and Christian secular vocations, between the valid ministry of the clergy and the equally legitimate ministry of the laymen. But again, the isolation of these experiments must be emphasized for even among Protestants whenever the question of the authority of the laymen is raised, "the finger of an exclusively priestly voice and authority is immediately raised also."¹⁴ Among the majority of ministers there appears no sympathy for the lay movements except when they represent an effort to assist the institutional ministry. It has been noted that many of the vaunted seminary courses for laymen are faintly disguised efforts to clericalize the laymen.¹⁵

THE ORGANIZATIONAL DILEMMA

The Reformation tradition, and its reaffirmation by the neo-orthodox movement, places contemporary Protestantism in a paradoxical dilemma which has an important effect upon the life of every churchman. The doctrine of the finitude of all things under God explicitly includes the finitude of the visible Church. Therefore, the church in history can never legitimately become an end in itself. But on the other hand, if the missionary and evangelistic obligations of the church are taken seriously the churches must develop efficient organizational forms which lead to the displacement of the

original goals due to the requirements of bureaucratic procedures. The results are paradoxical since the values and goals which the organization was created to preserve and achieve tend to be uprooted by the goals and values of organizational self-perpetuation. Peter Selznick describes this process in terms of organizational imperatives. The bureaucracy creates needs of its own which must be met before the group can attend to the goals for which it was established.¹⁶ These organizational imperatives impinge upon all the activities of laymen in the institutional church. John Casteel observes that "when the layman is in the church he acts as he has been taught to act as a churchman: he does his duty to the institution; he supports it with time, money, and attendance; he listens but keeps his counsel."¹⁷

In every social activity, religious and secular, the lives of Christian laymen, according to Charles Page, "have become bureaucratized. Their interests and activities in the urban world are multi-divided, segmentalized, routinized and ritualized. . . ."

They listen and look, occasionally applaud and commend, frequently ignore and condemn, the offerings of others. They are members of inactive majorities, mass-witnesses of spectacles, spectator-citizens, spectators of sport and entertainment, spectator-worshippers in the urban church. In this last capacity they may even regard their weekly or less frequent attendance as a kind of periodic soul-cleaning routine—a routine one follows in an orderly, rational, and systematic fashion in about the

same manner that one calls upon the dentist or physician¹⁸

In a pluralistic and bureaucratized society Christian laymen maintain membership in a variety of secular and religious activities. This often results in competition for the layman's time, money, and talent. More serious is the potential or existing conflict of role images, values, and goals. The layman thus experiences an ambivalence toward the churches and their demand upon his resources. The congregations become "one more organizational activity. They make the same demands upon the behavior of people as do other organizations in society."¹⁹

ORGANIZATIONAL LITERATURE

Each of the self-perpetuating denominational bureaucracies of Protestantism includes an agency for lay activity. The author was graciously assisted by the executives of several of these groups when they sent a ten-inch stack of pamphlets and charts to augment the writing of this paper. The primary theme of this literature is an appeal to laymen to witness to the call of the gospel through support of the local churches and co-operation with the program of the denominations. For example, the intention of a pocket-size card distributed by the Southern Baptist laymen's organization can be summed up in the following phrases: "loyalty to Christ, to the church, and to the pastor as leader of all its work; cooperation with every agency and organization of the church and denomination; evangelism; increased circulation

¹⁸ Charles H. Page, "Bureaucracy in the Liberal Church," *Review of Religion*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (July 1951), pp. 149-150.

¹⁹ Thomas Bennett, "Discussion of Sam Blizzard's Paper entitled 'The Layman's Understanding of the Ministry,'" in *Conference on Motivation for the Ministry* (Louisville, Ky.: Southern Baptist Seminary, 1959), p. 76.

¹² Hendrik Kraemer, *A Theology of the Laity* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1958), pp. 78-79.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

¹⁵ John L. Casteel, "Laymen, Church, and Seminary," *Journal of the Christian Faith and Life Community*, Austin, Texas, Vol. 6, No. 8 (April 1960), p. 7.

¹⁶ Philip Selznick, *TVA and the Grass Roots* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953), p. 256. See also, Robert Lee, "The Organizational Dilemma in American Protestantism," Sixteenth Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life, August 1960. (Mimeographed), pp. 2-3.

¹⁷ Casteel, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

of denominational publications; tithes; advance in church budgets; patronage of denomination institutions."²⁰

For almost four centuries Protestants have indulged themselves with critical remarks on the subject of the intricacies of the Roman Catholic hierarchy. The Catholic Church is indeed a unique phenomenon in the realm of religious organization. Reporting on a study made by the American Institute of Management, the *Times* notes that "the Roman Catholic Church got an 'A' yesterday for administrative efficiency. Its numerical grade was 88. . . . The Standard Oil Company of New Jersey was at the top of the class with 90 plus. . . ." ²¹ However, the major Protestant denominations have kept pace with the organizational revolution which accompanies our industrial development. The organizational chart of one relatively minor subagency of the Missouri Synod Lutherans—the Lutheran Laymen's League—resembles closely the bureaucratic plan of Standard Oil of New Jersey.²² There are no exceptions to this phenomenon among the large Protestant denominations. The professional staff of another lay organization proudly reported its activities for 1959. "The staff travelled over 225,000 miles, spent over 200 days 'on the road,' participated in 431 Council and Chapter meetings attended by a total of over 28,000 men. . . ." ²³

Working slowly through the ten-inch pile of denominational pamphlets issued for the instruction and stimulation of

laymen one is impressed first of all by the amount of material devoted to various spiritual exercises on how to pray, how to read the Bible, how to make an evangelistic call, and how to be a good Christian layman. One of the early leaders of the Judson Memorial Church is critical of this appeal to the laymen. "There is no compelling sense of urgency about such a presentation of the gospel. Underlying this approach is the modus of salesmanship technique in which the assumption is implicit that the 'product' is not really necessary in its own right to the person, but can perhaps be made to seem so."²⁴ A major part of the remaining material in these pamphlets is an appeal to organizational impulses of the modern churchman. "We would like to have all these men assume their rightful places in every phase of the life of the Church."²⁵ Instruction on how to organize the first meeting of a local lay fellowship is carried to the last detail: "Cooperate with the local church's Lay Development Committee. . . . Select one or two men to act as hosts. . . . Invite the past president of the State or National Association. . . . Check on ventilation and lighting—the room should not be too hot or too cold. . . . Seats should be arranged in a semicircle. This is very important!" ²⁶

LAY ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CHURCH

It is not surprising that "the laity perceives the church as an organization," and that "they perceive the minister as the local functionary of that

²⁴ Robert W. Spike, *In But Not of the World* (New York: Association Press, 1957), p. 74.

²⁵ "A Manual for Officers of a Chapter of United Presbyterian Men" (New York: The National Council of Presbyterian Men), p. 6.

²⁶ "Men's Fellowship Work in the Church" (Philadelphia: American Baptist Convention), p. 5.

organization."²⁷ The contributions the laymen are asked to make "are essentially aimed at maintaining the denomination as an organizational entity."²⁸ In the words of one layman, "the only time the minister calls is when he wants me to do a job. When I'm sick the assistant minister calls." The clergyman knows that his professional future depends upon his ability to fulfill the organization imperatives of the denomination, but the opinion of many laymen is expressed by the words, "I belong to St. Brick's, but they don't pay much attention to me until they want me to help with the Everymember Canvass."²⁹ But this is not necessarily the prevailing opinion among laymen. Whyte discovered that in the Protestant churches of suburbia the need to belong to a group was of key importance. The organizational methods that people learn in their secular pursuits are eagerly transferred to the sphere of the local church.³⁰ In relationship to their laymen the Protestant churches in America are engaged primarily in "picking up the pieces" and maintaining the equilibrium of individuals and social groups. There is a prevailing and increasing emphasis upon the development of personal and group counseling techniques, and the sermons on Sunday extol the virtues of togetherness, fraternal love for the brethren, harmony in group relations, a healthy family life, and protective concern for those in the community who are less fortunately endowed with the talents and material advantages of this life.

The interests of laymen, as well as the nature of the organizational imperatives of a local congregation, are revealed by an analysis of the kinds of

²⁷ Thomas Bennett, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

²⁹ Casteel, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

³⁰ William H. Whyte, Jr., *The Organization Man* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956), Chap. 27.

jobs which laymen accept or reject. In a city church of 500 members in which there were 475 tasks for laymen, Frederick Shippey distributed the tasks among eighteen basic categories. He found that 103 tasks, 22 per cent, were unclaimed by the lay people. The tasks which were fully appropriated were in the following categories: committee work, financial matters, property and buildings, missionary promotion, religious literature, and record keeping. Job categories which attracted the lowest number of participants were as follows: visitation of constituency, group work, office work, and entertainment.³¹

Protestant laymen willingly and even eagerly participate in the organizational process. Their occasional complaints and their constant efforts to avoid the less exciting and routine tasks only proves that they are not yet angels. In their work with laymen, denominational officials and local ministers may succumb to institutional pressures, they may be motivated by self-interest more often than the Christian idealist would prefer, and they may lack imagination or even the strength of their convictions. Nevertheless, for the most part laymen appear satisfied with the church as it is.

LAYMEN AND MINISTERS

The polymorphic role of the Protestant clergy in contemporary America does not place these men in an enviable social situation. The lay membership of these voluntary religious associations look to their ministers for leadership in maintaining, at the same time, the material solvency and the spiritual integrity of their institutions. The minister must be an organizational director of the highest calibre, but because of the requirements of his religious voca-

³¹ Frederick A. Shippey, *Church Work in the City* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1952), p. 181.

²⁰ "Aims and Objectives of the Brotherhood" (Memphis, Tenn.: Baptist Brotherhood Commission, Southern Baptist Convention).

²¹ *The New York Times*, January 23, 1956, p. 27.

²² "Official Manual, Lutheran Laymen's League" (St. Louis, Mo.: Lutheran Laymen's League), p. 1.

²³ "Annual Report, 1959" (New York: The National Council of Presbyterian Men, 1959), p. 4.

tion he must avoid any taint of bureaucratic officiousness. He must, nonetheless, be an efficient bureaucratic official. A booklet published by the Disciples of Christ inadvertently outlines the problem. Christ must run the church, the author says, and if he is not in constant charge of the church, "there will be no church at all. If the administration of the Holy Spirit is not present, the spirit dies within the church and it remains only a hollow shell." But the "spiritual side" of the church must be "augmented by a functional side."

Essentially the plan is this: A congregation selects a minister who serves as "chief of staff" of the church government. The church is then organized into various departments, each department allotted a certain task in the church's work. The congregation selects from its ranks the men and women who are to head these departments. These department heads form a kind of "cabinet" to assist the minister in the over-all management of the church. Finally the minister and his "cabinet" appoint churchmen to various department committees.³²

"A church today which would have an effective program must have dedicated laymen sharing the responsibility of its ministry with a wise and able pastor." To assist the minister we should "encourage him as men rally to his support with time, talent, and money."³³ In describing the relationship of laymen and minister these words characterize one of the principal themes of the denominational pamphlets. The ideal role of the laymen is to act as assistants to the clergy. The laity are presumably doing a job that the minister could do better if he had the time, the money, and the energy. He has the training and the talent.

³² Mark Rutherford, *The Christian Layman and His Church* (St. Louis: Bethany Press, 1958), pp. 27-28.

³³ "Why a Men's Fellowship" (New York: American Baptist Men), pp. 2, 7.

Charles Page emphasizes the relationship of antipathy which exists in every bureaucracy between the professional expert and the clients. These attitudes are not officially sanctioned by the policies of the bureaucracy, in fact, proclamations which emphasize the element of service to the clients are constantly made.³⁴ Antipathy occurs also in the churches where the laymen are being educated by the minister for they are the constant recipients of his specialized training, in pulpit, committee meeting, and classroom.

As the clergyman's tasks and skills become segmentalized and specialized, the social distance between himself and his parishioners increases. . . . His expertness is not simply a monopoly of know-how in matters officially defined as sacred or spiritual . . . but includes intellectual prowess in other fields. He masters the complexities of political issues, of economic analysis, of international affairs, of sociological and psychological investigation, of psychiatry and psychoanalysis. He may even publish learned books in these subjects, and frequently not as an amateur. Most of the members of his congregation, on the other hand, are necessarily amateurs. And . . . they either resent and resist the special claims of the expert or they praise him unduly. . . . The minister of the large congregation who has successfully avoided both antipathy between himself and his clients and the "bureaucratizations of spontaneity" has managed an adaptation of real proportions.³⁵

Although this characterization of the relationship which exists between clergy and laity can be overdrawn it corresponds to the ambivalence laymen feel toward their participation in the work of the church. They love it and hate it. The church is critical of them and fills them with guilt, but it comforts them in their need; the church demands everything from them that they most

³⁴ Page, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 149.

dearly cherish but at the same time they confess that it promises them eternal redemption. So the Protestant laymen have come to terms with their clergymen and with their own ambivalence. They realize that under the pressures of the modern organizational environment the minister has necessarily become the pastoral director of an institution which differs in no significantly visible way from other institutions to which the layman claims membership. They believe that in an invisible way, in a manner which is not entirely explicable, the authority of God still resides in the church and its ministry despite the cultural adjustments which are inevitable.

As the polity of all the churches, whether they are episcopal, presbyterian or congregational by tradition, has been modified in the direction of the political structures of Canada and the United States, so the institutional status and authority of the ministry are being modified in the direction of the democratic type of political, educational and economic executive or managerial authority.³⁶

The Protestant minister is respected and obeyed in his role as pastoral director insofar as he demonstrates a capacity for executive leadership and insofar as he is able to combine this with a spiritual authority derived from the Bible, from the traditional doctrines of the church, and from the dynamic of his own personality. As a source of authority, especially in Protestantism, the power of the minister's personality must never be underestimated.³⁷

³⁶ H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Purpose of the Church and its Ministry* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), p. 90.

³⁷ Kenneth Underwood, *Protestant and Catholic* (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1957, pp. 97-122; Paul M. Harrison, *Authority and Power in the Free Church Tradition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), Chaps. 4-5.

THE POWER OF LAYMEN

Laymen exercise a tremendous power in the Protestant church, not because they possess an authority which is theologically legitimated by such doctrines as the priesthood of all believers, but because the doctrine of the church in the major portion of Protestantism is inadequately defined and the relationship between clergy and laymen has never been explicitly and fully developed. The authority of the clergyman prior to the Reformation resided in the traditional doctrines of the church which substantiated the official authority of the priestly hierarchy. Priestly authority further resided in the authority of the Scriptures, and the Scriptures were in turn interpreted by the hierarchy of the church. The Reformers rejected this procedure because they believed it was a circular validation of power. But in Protestantism the problem of authority has never been so rationally solved. There exists a pluralism of authority, so that even within a single denomination there can be found vast differences of opinion as to the legitimate locus of authority. The possible authorities are: the Bible, the creeds, the local minister, the whole group of the ministry and the agreement they reach, the national denominational council, the state or local council, the local church, and the individuals within the church. In recent years some American denominations have been seriously wracked by debate on the issue of authority.

In this situation it is difficult if not impossible for the local minister to understand "by what criteria he orders his activities and the use of his time." This is, "in sociological jargon, the problem of authority, the problem of defining the basis of legitimation for his various activities."³⁸ If the minis-

³⁸ James M. Gustafson, "An Analysis of the Problem of the Role of the Minister," *The*

ter's authority is improperly defined—within American Protestantism this is clearly the case since the Episcopal Church represents no consistent illustration to the contrary—the local minister is exposed and susceptible “to all the idiosyncracies and ideologies of the particular groups to which he is called to minister.”³⁹ The adjustment he most often makes is to the class ideology of his community. Liston Pope, for example, has shown that despite protestations to the contrary by the industrialists and clergy of the South, ministers were often acting as “moral police for the industrial overlords.”⁴⁰

Without a traditional and official source for the legitimation of his authority, the Protestant minister has been forced to insert into the vacuum left by the displacement of historical dogma the power of his own personality and the persuasiveness of his intellectual skill. This places an inordinate burden upon the local clergyman and upon his integrity as an individual divested of the comfort and support of his professional brethren. In times of social crisis the Protestant minister who opposes the dominant laymen of the community usually stands alone and is eventually forced to conform to the popular prejudices of the community.

MIDDLE CLASS VALUES

Laymen willingly follow the leadership of the clergy in ecclesiastical affairs but distrust or ignore their opinions on issues of crucial secular significance. William Meyer discovered no important difference in the attitude of laymen in their responses to various kinds of ministers. He made a study of two

Journal of Religion, Vol. 24, No. 3 (July 1954), p. 187.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 188.

⁴⁰ Pope, *Millhands and Preachers*, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

churches, one with a “run-of-the-mill minister,” the other with a “dynamic leader” who possessed unusual gifts and was deeply loved and respected by his congregation. In the latter church the dynamic minister was able “to obtain a greater involvement of members in church activities,” but he was not able “to bring about significant attitude changes in most of the congregation. His energy, enthusiasm, drive, and leadership produce responsive reactions in the members and they find themselves more willing to do things. . . . It did not bring action in those areas of community life about which members had deep-seated attitudes. As the pastor himself stated, this was particularly evident in respect to Negro-White relations.”⁴¹

The authority of the Protestant minister in relation to the laymen has been critically tested in the Southern racial crisis. Most ministers who have been firm in their convictions and bold in stating them from the pulpit have been relieved of their posts. Many citations can be offered to support this allegation but suffice it to say that ministers in Little Rock were forced “to admit the staggering conclusion that as clergymen they were largely without influence in the time of trouble. . . . What they were proclaiming as sacred, many of their own church members rejected as impractical and unrealistic.”⁴²

This situation has been summarized: when lay parishioners hold divergent views on an issue, the ministry will be equivocal in its position; when the laymen are partisan on an issue the ministers will be equally committed to the

⁴¹ Howard William Meyers, “A Study of the Effects of Environment Upon the Attitudes and Actions of the Members of Two Churches” (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Yale University, 1959), pp. 215–16.

⁴² Robert R. Brown, *Bigger than Little Rock* (Greenwich, Conn.: The Seabury Press, 1958), p. 82.

lay position.⁴³ Waldo Beach observes that even though the Episcopal Church “is officially inclusive, its witness has been stifled by culturally conditioned laymen.”⁴⁴

According to the denominational literature for laymen the churches must maintain a constructive relationship with the secular community. This literature, however, is more often directed toward the middle-class virtues than toward the transformation of existing political and economic structures which may be the source of social injustices. Lay organizations must “make a contribution to clean entertainment, healthy recreation, social betterment, and good government.” They must “help the church start mission churches which provide worship services and Sunday schools in unchurched areas, make the church more attractive to the community,” and “through . . . discussion of community and world needs, develop an interest that will apply the teachings of Christ to the solution of many problems.”⁴⁵

The majority of Protestant laymen see through the glass darkly when they seek solutions for social problems. They dwell in a middle-class ghetto and remain so effectively isolated from the rest of the world that they readily accept the myth that they alone possess true virtue and protect all significant value. A bank president participating in a small church discussion group asked, “Why shouldn’t the Board of Trustees be made up of prominent community leaders? They’re the ones who

⁴³ Charles Y. Glock and Benjamin B. Ringer, “Church Polity and the Attitudes of Ministers and Parishioners on Social Issues,” *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (April 1956), pp. 148–56.

⁴⁴ Waldo Beach, “The Southern Churches and the Race Question,” *Christianity and Crisis*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (March 3, 1958), p. 18.

⁴⁵ “Why a Men’s Fellowship?” *op. cit.*, p. 10.

are most aware of what’s going on . . . and can help the church do the things that are best for the community.”⁴⁶ Contemporary American Protestantism often substitutes television for the golden harps, tail fins for angelic wings, the three day week end for heavenly rest, and the psychoanalyst’s couch for the suffering of the cross.⁴⁷

LAYMEN AND THE WORLD

In this final section we shall attempt to illustrate and summarize the thinking of those church leaders who stand at the forefront of the ministry of the laity. Efforts are being made to relate the churches in new ways to the problems of the secular community. Laymen are in a unique position for they are related to the secular environment in ways which can rarely be achieved by the professional clergy. “It is the laity, living and working in the world, which daily experiences the deep gulf between what the Church stands for and what the world drives at. They are moulded, mangled, confused or suffocated by the dominant trends of thought.”⁴⁸ Hendrik Kraemer, when he wrote these words, also noted that the laity represents the sector of the church which must bear the burden of the church’s encounter with the world, and must “voice and incarnate . . . Christ’s relevance to the whole range of human life.”⁴⁹

This is the fundamental theme of the new lay movement. An effort is being made to discover ways in which laymen can carry the church into the world without compromising Christian theological and ethical ideals and without removing the laymen from participation

⁴⁶ Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

⁴⁷ See H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Kingdom of God in America* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1959), p. 196.

⁴⁸ Kraemer, *op. cit.*, pp. 113–14.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

in the vocation of their choice. The enormity of the difficulties is apparent to everyone. Few laymen are theologically trained for the task. The Sunday school clichés are useless, the advertising techniques of the religious organizations are believed to be self-defeating, the ancient symbolic phrases of the evangelistic crusades stimulate repugnance more often than they arouse nostalgia, but the greatest problem is the specific relevance of Christian doctrines to secular vocations. Having rejected the monastic ideal as well as distinctions of sanctity between clergy and laymen, Protestants are faced with the problem of discovering the meaning of the doctrine of the priesthood of all believers within the contemporary situation. This involves first of all the necessity of understanding the role of the professional clergy and the function of the institutional church. Those who are on the forefront of the lay movement believe that no longer can the laity be treated as assistants to pastors who are maintaining the institutional programs of the church.

It is not the duty of the laity to help the pastor to carry out his pastoral work: it is the pastor's duty to equip the laity to carry out their work in the world. . . . We must not "missionize" the world into the Church; but the Church in its mission must go out into the world. If the life of the older and younger churches is examined from this point of view, a great deal of the activity of the Church and of its missions will be exposed as wasted effort and church-narcissism.⁵⁰

This raises another problem, for how can the Protestant minister whose basis of authority is already extremely tenuous engage in a serious conversation with the laity in order to discover the legitimate authority of the layman as a Christian missionary to the world? The vested interest of the clergymen mili-

⁵⁰ Hans-Ruedi Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 224.

tates against the efforts of the advocates of a lay priesthood. Words like these are viewed with suspicion by ministers: "It is precisely when the laity are engaged in their 'secular' occupations that they are working in the service of the Church. They are fulltime Christians just as much as the pastor is. The usual distinction between the sacred and the secular disappears completely."⁵¹

The minister distrusts the laymen, not only because they threaten his authority, but because they conform so easily to the pressures and prejudices of the secular environment. It is the trustee more often than the minister who benefits from the profits of economic exploitation, and it is the deacon, seldom the minister, who is chairman of the White Citizens Council.

But if the preacher is rarely involved in these activities, it is equally true that he seldom engages in an extended, serious, and equal conversation with a layman to discover the full meaning of the emotional impact that confronts a man who refuses to participate in the anti-Semitic, anti-Negro, or antilabor charades of his business colleagues. The import and significance of the daily pressures experienced by the laymen would be incomprehensible to the minister who has never once passed the portals of an executive office or a labor hall.

The leaders of the new lay movement believe that the "secular clergy" of Protestantism have much to teach the professional ministers if they are willing to fully associate and communicate with the layman in the midst of his weekly enterprise and become a participating witness to the amenities of the layman's secular career. It is this kind of technique which is used most effectively by ministers of the innercity slum parishes. Before they speak—certainly before they preach—to the Negro or Puerto

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 223.

Rican outcast they join him in his caste society. They may attend a movie with the gang at four in the morning, stand with them while they make the decision to go on a rumble, or sit with them while they try to come out of a heroin spin.

A young Protestant layman who practices law in East Harlem and who lives on the notorious block of East 100th Street between First and Second Avenues wrote a moving account of his experience which can be used to summarize the intention of the contempo-

rary laymen's movement. He concludes that to be a Christian is to possess the extraordinary freedom to share the burdens of the "common, ambiguous, transient, perishing existence of men even to the point of actually taking the place of another man whether he be powerful or weak, in health or in sickness, clothed or naked . . . fed or hungry, at liberty or in prison, young or old, white or colored, rich or poor."⁵²

⁵² William Stringfellow, "Christian Poverty and the Practice of Law," *Harvard Law School Bulletin*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (June 1959).

Church and the Laity Among Catholics

By JOHN J. KANE

ABSTRACT: The relation of the Catholic laity to the Roman Catholic Church is clearly defined by obligations incumbent upon adherents throughout the centuries. The attitudes of the lay Catholics toward their church vary. On one hand, a variety of charitable, professional, and social organizations with a distinctively Catholic orientation flourish. On the other hand, less than half the Catholics in some dioceses attend mass regularly, although regular attendance is required and expected. The Catholic laity belongs, organizationally, at the bottom of the Church hierarchy. This stems historically from the prestige of the priests and monks who preserved the Catholic intellectual heritage during hostile onslaughts throughout the Christian ages. The reluctance of the Church in America to welcome lay participation has historical roots in an early trusteeism which humiliated and embarrassed the young Church in this country. The current growing demands upon the Church and the resulting burden upon facilities and clergy as well as the increase in numbers of educated and able Catholics will lead the laity into fuller participation in the business of their Church.—Ed.

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THE Roman Catholic considers his church a divinely instituted organization founded by Jesus Christ, the Second Person of the Trinity, true Man and true God, in which and through which he can work out his eternal salvation. At the beginning of life, unless he is a convert, he is inducted into the Church via the sacrament of Baptism and at the end of life he is prepared for eternity through Holy Viaticum and Extreme Unction. As a youth he is prepared for and receives the sacraments of Penance, that is, confession in which he tells his sins to a duly authorized priest, repents of them, and firmly resolves to sin no more in order to receive absolution; and Holy Eucharist, the reception of the Body and Blood of Christ. Shortly thereafter he is confirmed in his faith sacramentally, and later may be married in the sacrament of Matrimony, or if a male raised to the priesthood through the sacrament of Holy Orders. Some Catholics, of course, never receive either Matrimony or Holy Orders. Thus the Church through an outward sign instituted by Christ to give Grace provides for the most important rites of passage in most human lives—birth, marriage, and death.

The central fact of Catholicism is the sacrifice of the Mass which Catholics, except for a serious reason, must attend on every Sunday and on holy days of obligation. There is also an annual obligation of receiving Penance and Holy Eucharist during Easter time, a period extending from the first Sunday of Lent until Trinity Sunday. Every Catholic parent must instruct his children in the faith. If possible, such instruction is supplemented by a child's attendance at Catholic schools or Sunday schools. There is a hard core of beliefs which Catholics must accept. They must also accept the moral obligations set forth in the ten commandments and the com-

mandments of the Church.¹ Over the centuries thorough interpretation of these commandments and their application to daily life have been set forth by church authorities aided by theologians and philosophers. Catholicism is a way of life which extends into the minutiae of daily living.

This is not to say that every individual Catholic, even adult Catholics, is fully aware of all teachings of the Church on such matters. Neither would it be accurate to claim that all Catholics rigidly adhere to all obligations of the Church. Some fail through ignorance, some through human frailty. Others lose their faith and leave the Church. Contrary to a belief popular in Catholic circles, some embrace another religion. The number of non-practicing Catholics and of converts to other denominations is simply unknown and tends to be ignored in the estimates of membership in the Roman Catholic Church.

On January 1, 1959, there were 39,505,475 Catholics in continental United States including Hawaii, Alaska, and the personnel of armed forces and various overseas services. The world Catholic population is estimated at 527,643,000.² Unlike some Protestant denominations, the Catholic Church counts membership from the moment of baptism, thus including infants and children. In 1926 Protestants constituted 27 per cent of the total population of continental United States; Roman Catholics, 16 per cent. By 1958 Protestants made up 35.5 per cent of this population, Catholics 22.8 per cent. The rate

¹ The commandments of the Church cover such matters as the obligation to hear Mass on Sundays and on holy days of obligation, to fast and abstain on days appointed, to obey the marriage laws of the Church, to contribute to the support of pastors, and to perform the Easter duty.

² *The National Catholic Almanac* (Paterson, N. J.: St. Anthony's Guild, 1960), p. 354.

of growth was almost identical for both, Protestants having a slight edge.³

PRESTIGE OF THE CHURCH

Crowds thronging Catholic churches on Sundays, the number of edifices and in some cases their magnificence, the Catholic education system extending sometimes from nursery school to the graduate and professional level, the numerous other parallel institutions and societies such as hospitals, orphanages, reformatories, the press, the Knights of Columbus, the Catholic War Veterans, and professional societies seem to attest to the esteem in which Catholics, especially American Catholics, appear to hold their Church. More recently, Catholic Action, the Liturgical Movement, the Christian Family Movement, the Cana Conference, and other developments point in the same direction. But this bright picture has a dark side which often is neither entirely recognized nor appreciated when pointed out.

Sociological surveys of actual religious practice, such as the percentage of Catholics who usually hear Mass on Sunday, reveal that only about 48 per cent attend Sunday Mass in Germany. In large European cities the percentage is even lower—27 per cent in Munich and 26 per cent in Nancy. The practice of Catholicism in some Latin-American countries, beset by a dearth of clergy, is poor. In some large American dioceses the number of Catholics reported by pastors on the basis of baptisms, with due allowances for deaths,

³ *Christian Century*, Vol. 16, p. 1045. In a population survey made in March 1957 sponsored by the United States Bureau of Census of 35,000 households in 330 sample areas across the nation those indicating religious preference fourteen years of age or over, Protestants made up 66.2 per cent, Catholics 27.7 per cent. Dorothy Good, "Questions on Religion in the United States Census," in *Population Index*, Vol. 25 (Princeton: Office of Population Research, 1959), pp. 3-16.

immigrants, in-migrants and out-migrants, is almost 60 per cent below the number that could be expected from such calculations. Similar estimates made on a national scale show the number of Catholics to be about ten million less than should be expected. Studies of regular attendance at Sunday Mass in some United States dioceses reveal that they average between 30 per cent and 46 per cent.⁴

The number of invalid marriages, that is, those contracted outside the Church, in which one or both parties are Catholics is unknown. About three out of every ten valid Catholic marriages, in the United States, is a mixed religious marriage.⁵ Investigations show that such marriages are a source of leakage from Roman Catholicism. Despite Church regulations that Catholic children shall be educated in Catholic schools, in the United States only about 60 per cent of Catholic children in these age brackets do attend Catholic elementary or Catholic high schools. On the college level, only about one third of Catholic students are enrolled in Catholic colleges or universities. This is due only in part to the lack of adequate facilities. Vocations to the priesthood, the brotherhood, and the sisterhood have not kept pace with the demand, and the ratio of laymen to priests has become larger.

SANCTIONS

Sanctions exist within the Roman Catholic Church for the violation of the law of God or church regulations. Sins may be forgiven by the priest in the sacrament of Penance under the conditions noted earlier. Catholics who enter into marriage before a civil magis-

⁴ John G. Milhaven, "Sociological Soundings of U.S. Catholicism," *America*, Vol. 93, No. 5, pp. 124-25.

⁵ John L. Thomas, "Are They Marrying Their Own?" *Catholic World*, Vol. 174, p. 125.

trate in some dioceses or a non-Catholic clergyman anywhere are excommunicated. The marriage is invalid. It should be noted, however, that this does not apply to the marriage of non-Catholics before civil or non-Catholic religious authorities. Such a marriage is considered valid, and in the event of divorce, a Catholic may not marry either of the divorced persons during the lifetime of the other partner. Strictly speaking, Catholic parents may be excommunicated if they fail to send their children to Catholic schools. In actual practice there are two reasons why this is rarely, perhaps never, carried out in the United States. First, Catholic schools are unavailable in certain parts of the country. Second, in very many cases it would be impossible for Catholic institutions to accommodate all Catholic students, particularly on the college and university levels. Excommunication is a very serious penalty in that it denies access to the sacraments. If the individual repents and satisfactorily alters his or her way of life, excommunication can be lifted. Severe sanctions exist for the priest who enters into marriage. The foregoing examples illustrate rather than exhaust the possible sanctions that the Church may employ. Space does not permit a full discussion of this topic.

STRUCTURE OF CATHOLICISM

The Roman Catholic Church is hierarchical in structure. At the apex is the Pope, the Bishop of Rome, whom Catholics believe is in direct succession to St. Peter. Immediately below him are the bishops of the world and under them are the duly ordained priests. Lowest in rank are the laity. Cardinals are members of the Sacred College of Cardinals who advise and assist the Pope in the government of the Church. There are three ranks, cardinal deacon, cardinal priest, and cardinal bishop.

Except that a cardinal bishop must be a bishop these designations bear no relationship to the individual's rank in Holy Orders. Formerly, a primate was a bishop without the rank of patriarch who had jurisdiction over all metropolitans and bishops of a given area or country. He was himself subject only to the Holy See, that is, the Pope. This position is no longer recognized in canon law but the title is retained by some archbishops and, in certain cases, it provides a position of precedence outside of the local hierarchy.

A patriarch is a bishop who has the highest rank after the Pope in the hierarchy of jurisdiction. Today there are seven patriarchs: the Patriarch of the West, the Pope; the Coptic Patriarch of Alexandria; the Melkite, Syrian, and Maronite Patriarchs of Antioch, the Armenian Patriarch of Cilicia, and the Chaldean Patriarch of Babylon. While the power and importance of patriarchs, other than the Patriarch of the West, have declined greatly since the schism of the East, they are still independent of any authority except that of the Pope and his delegates. With the exception of the Coptic Patriarch, appointed by the Holy See, patriarchs are elected by their bishops and their election is confirmed by the Pope.⁶

From the third century onward it is necessary to distinguish another category of the faithful: unordained monks and other religious brothers and nuns. In the strict canonical sense these are not clerics and have no hierarchical rank.⁷ In actual practice, however, monks and nuns are not considered lay persons. Canon law recognizes their precedence over the laity in the first

⁶ *A Catholic Dictionary* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1949), pp. 74, 371, 401.

⁷ Yves M. J. Congar, O.P., *Lay People in the Church*, translated by Donald Attwater (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Co., Ltd., 1957), pp. 3-8.

paragraph of Canon 491.⁸ Unordained brothers, sisters, and monks take vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, wear a prescribed type of dress known as a habit, and follow a religious rule. They may be engaged in the education of youth, in nursing, or in social work, or they may be engaged exclusively in contemplation, like the Carmelite nuns. Secular institutes have more recently been founded. These are composed of men or women who practice the evangelical counsels and take vows without losing their lay status.⁹

ROLES OF PRIESTS

A priest is a sacred minister empowered through Holy Orders to celebrate Mass, administer the sacraments, to preach, and to bless.

The priest is the key person in any Catholic parish, and his role in the functioning of the parochial system is so important that without him the parish would cease to exist. From the sociological point of view, he is the most essential of the four elements in the canonical definition of the parish. The concept of a "religion without a priesthood," or of a religion in which the ministers of God are merely employees, directors, or supervisors of congregations, is completely alien to the religious institution of Catholicism. All parochial activities, strictly so called, directly or indirectly depend upon the priest. They touch upon him in some way even when they do not completely revolve around him.¹⁰

Priests may be divided into two major categories, the regular and the secular clergy. The regular clergy are members of religious orders or congregations and follow a religious role under a supe-

⁸ Msgr. Gerard Philips, *The Role of the Laity in the Church*, translated by John R. Gilbert and James W. Moudry (Chicago: Fides Publishers Association, 1955), p. 10.

⁹ Philips, p. 10.

¹⁰ Joseph H. Fichter, S.J., *Social Relations in the Urban Parish* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 123.

rior. They also take vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience. The secular clergy are immediately under their bishops, take vows of chastity, a vow of obedience to the bishop, but no vow of poverty. On January 1st, 1959, there was a total of 52,689 priests in the United States. Of these, 31,961 were secular clergy, 20,728 were regular clergy.¹¹ While the roles of the regular and the secular clergy generally show some variations, there is a tremendous overlap. Most secular clergy are priests in parishes or occupy administrative offices within the respective dioceses. Regular clergy are more likely to staff high schools and colleges, to preach missions within their own country, or to go to foreign missions. But some of the regular clergy also staff parishes and some of the secular clergy teach in high schools and colleges.

A parish is a definite territorial area in which there is a church, a congregation, and a pastor who has the care of souls. In larger parishes the pastor may have one, two, or as many as four or five assistant priests or curates. But parishes reveal great variations by reason of size, the structure of the congregations and the geographical area in which they are located. These factors modify the roles of the parish priest.

Father Fichter states that the large urban parish is not an organized formal group but rather a social unit which may be identified as a statistical population, a social aggregate, or a category.¹² Within its boundaries there will be found Catholics of diverse occupations, different educational levels, various racial and ethnic backgrounds, and other social characteristics. Because of its size some parishioners may not be known to any of the parish priests. Theoretically, when a Catholic moves

¹¹ *The National Catholic Almanac*, op. cit., p. 435.

¹² Fichter, op. cit., pp. 18-19.

into a new parish, he is supposed to report to the pastor or one of the pastor's assistants. In practice, this does not always occur. The close, personal, intimate, face-to-face relationship that characterizes the small rural parish does not exist for many large urban parishes. An annual census of the parish is not always possible although such efforts are made in some dioceses. In every large city there are certain downtown parishes located in business or interstitial areas with few parishioners but large congregations during the week. These congregations are drawn to morning Mass, noon Mass, or sometimes afternoon Mass, to confessions or to devotions from day-time workers in the area. Transients from nearby hotels may also attend such churches, particularly on Sundays. In these cases, only very few of those in attendance are known to the priests and the priests are strangers to them.

While racial and ethnic parishes are now becoming a largely historical phenomenon, some still exist. The ethnic or nationality parish, Irish, German, Italian, Polish, or other, played an important role in the last century and during the early part of this one. They were established to care for the needs of the immigrants; the church was staffed by priests of the same national origin as the parishioners; sermons were delivered and confessions heard in this tongue and sometimes this language was taught in the parochial schools. They probably slowed acculturation to American ways, but they also provided a cushion against a too rapid Americanization which could result in the "marginal personality." With the practical elimination of immigration, the need for ethnic parishes no longer exists and insofar as they continue, they are a needless duplication of services. Sometimes they are located across the street from each other. In the city of Philadelphia,

for example, in the space of four or five city blocks there were three Catholic churches, Irish, German, and Polish.¹³

The roles of priests in racial and ethnic parishes have been quite different from the roles of priests in the usual American parish. This was especially noticeable in the past and is noticeable at present to a lesser extent.

In Ireland, and for a long time in America, the clergy were almost the only educated persons. . . . Priests read and wrote letters for illiterate Irishmen, gave them medical and psychiatric advice, served as marriage counselors, acted as moderators or chairmen of various Irish movements, protested to authorities about discrimination, religious or national. The priests' functions were not and could not have been purely ecclesiastical. They were active social workers in behalf of their people, they were the leaders and almost the only leaders the illiterate or poorly educated Irish could or would entirely trust.¹⁴

The racial parish still exists and is apt to be so identified by some persons even after it has become integrated. In many sections of the United States, Negro Catholics may make a choice of the parish they will attend. They may become members of the parish within whose boundaries they live or, if they prefer, they may become members of a Negro parish if one exists in their city. In the colored parish a pastor's role, usually a white priest, inevitably involves leadership in interracial work. Despite his race, he may become a spokesman for the Negroes of his city. There are also parishes, such as the Chinese parish, which are both racial and national in composition.

¹³ One exception to the statement about the decline of the ethnic parish is the Puerto Rican parish established in some cities as a result of the heavy immigrants from that island during recent years.

¹⁴ John J. Kane, *Catholic-Protestant Conflicts in America* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1955), pp. 52-53.

The social structure of most parish congregations is mixed, that is, it contains members of different social classes. But since most parishes have definite territorial boundaries, there is a distinct possibility that one social class may tend to predominate. This is obviously true of the parishioners of the downtown church mentioned above. Most American Catholics in the past and to some extent in the present tend to cluster in the middle class and below, or to use a more neutral term, the working class. But certain parishes, especially in the new suburbia, may be largely upper middle class. Such a class structure may influence the tone of parish societies and somewhat modify the roles of the priests. Parents in these parishes are likely to show a keener interest in the parochial school because they have higher educational expectations of their children.

The roles of priests are also influenced by the part of the country in which the parish is located. The high status accorded to Catholic priests in Boston even by persons who are not Catholics can be attained only with difficulty in certain sections of the South where Catholics are sparse. The possibility of Catholic influence in community leadership in such areas depends very largely upon the personality of the priest, his willingness to mingle with non-Catholics, and to join with the community in civic activities.

Father Fichter has distinguished several other roles which the parish priest must play. In his administrative role, the pastor not only "runs the parish" but he is also a "sort of super president and super treasurer of all the official constituted societies of the parish." While he may assign the direction of such organizations to one of his assistants he may intervene at any time, take over any meeting, and change the plans as he decides. The business-man role,

which is particularly that of the pastor, carries an obligation to raise and administer parish funds. He must render accurate reports to his bishop and, while he may have the assistance of lay trustees and the advice of bankers, it is his responsibility to keep the parish solvent. At times this is a difficult and trying task. He may be admired or criticized for it by his parishioners. Some hail his acumen as a business man; others criticize his constant pleas for money. His civic role requires participation in numerous community activities. Luncheon speeches at service organizations, the pronouncement of the invocation or benediction at public dinners, co-operation with mayor's committees on various projects, and sponsorship of programs for reform all become his lot.¹⁶

Aside from the role of pastor or assistant priest in a parish, priests are editors of newspapers and magazines, principals of high schools, presidents of colleges and universities, teachers in both kinds of educational institutions, directors of Catholic social service, superintendents of diocesan schools and directors of various lay activities such as the Cana Conference, the Christian Family Movement, and others.

THE LAITY

The status and role of the laity in the Church are in a state of flux. This can be readily illustrated by two widely circulated anecdotes. Cardinal Aidan Gasquet tells of an inquirer who asked a priest, "What is the position of the layman in the Church?" The priest replied, "To kneel before the altar and to sit beneath the pulpit." The cardinal then added that the layman also had to put his hand into his pocket. Financial support of the Church is certainly an important function of the layman, and it is so stated in the commandments

¹⁶ Fichter, *op. cit.*, pp. 129-132.

of the Church. But it is not his sole function. Another story is told of Pope Pius X who asked some cardinals what was the greatest need of the Church in contemporary times. One cardinal replied that more priests were needed, another that more churches were needed, another more schools. Finally the Pope interrupted them to say that what was most needed was a dedicated laity.

In Jewish and early Christian tradition the word laity referred to a sacred people and there is no distinction between lay people and clerics in the vocabulary of the New Testament. The first use of the word layman as opposed to priest occurs in a Roman document, a letter to the community at Corinth written by Clement of Alexandria.¹⁶ Between the end of the eleventh century and beginning of the thirteenth century, Father Yves M. J. Congar believes, deep changes occurred in the clerical-lay relationship, and these changes have persisted until the present time. In 1092, confirming the foundations of the Canons of Raitenbach, Pope Urban II said, "From the beginning the Church has offered two kinds of life to her children: one to help the insufficiency of the weak, another to perfect the goodness of the strong."¹⁷ The implication seems to be that the lay state is a concession to human weakness. The dictionary of Catholic theology does not mention the word layman, and of 2,414 canons in the Code of Canon Law, only forty-four are devoted to the chapter on the laity, "De Laicis."¹⁸

A number of historical circumstances have contributed to the lower status of the laity in Catholicism. It was monks and priests who preserved the intellec-

tual heritage during the barbarian invasions. During some periods of Western history, literacy itself was almost the exclusive prerogative of the cleric, and the right to the "benefit of clergy," a provision in civil law, was determined by ability to read. Monsignor Philips points out that attempts to suppress all hierarchical authority during the Reformation were countered by the Church with a vindication of papal and episcopal authority. Many catechisms, especially in their original form, were drawn up with this anti-Protestant motive.¹⁹

The history of the Catholic Church in the United States is still haunted by the ghosts of trusteeism, a controversy which occupied the American Church from 1815 to the end of the Civil War. The first Catholics in the original thirteen colonies built churches and then sought priests to staff them. They administered the temporal matters, selected their pastors, determined their salaries, and eventually in the 1820's tried to nominate the Bishop of Philadelphia. Rome, in a most temperate letter, refused this request. Two factions were formed at St. Mary's Church in Philadelphia. Violence occurred at their meeting and militia had to be summoned to put down the riot. Trusteeism was not confined to Philadelphia, and it proved an embarrassing, humiliating experience for the young American Church. While trusteeism no longer exists, the fear it engendered of entrusting to the laity their rightful share of work in the Church still persists.²⁰

Historically the American Catholic laity, with the exception of English Catholics who arrived prior to the Revolution, were usually of the laboring class, illiterate or poorly educated, as

¹⁶ Congar, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-2.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹⁸ Msgr. Gerard Philips, *The Role of the Laity in the Church*, translated by John R. Gilbert and James W. Moudry (Chicago: The Fides Association, 1955), p. 10.

¹⁹ Philips, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

²⁰ Rt. Reverend Monsignor Carl J. Ryan, "Ghosts of Trusteeism," *Homiletic and Pastoral Review*, Vol. 57, p. 705.

incapable as they were unwilling to assume their proper leadership. Out of sheer necessity priests spoke as authorities in areas rather far removed from ecclesiastical matters. To some extent they still do and this is at least in part due to a lack of lay initiative.

CLERICAL-LAY RELATIONSHIPS

The whole question of clerical-lay relationships is a delicate matter, too far reaching and complex to be dealt with adequately in the space of an article. As a matter of fact, several books have been published on the subject and it is a favorite topic in Catholic periodicals.

Three extreme attitudes in clerical-lay relationships are clericalism, anti-clericalism, and laicism, none of which is presently found in the United States, although they are not absent in Europe and in Latin America. Clericalism occurs when the clergy unduly extends ecclesiastical authority and influence beyond its rightful sphere.²¹ Anti-clericalism opposes the Church's rightful concern about social, economic, and political affairs, even when these affect the religious welfare of its members, as in the case of Communist political activity. Laicism is the opposite of clericalism; it is the undue extension of secular authority and influence into ecclesiastical matters. So far as the Roman Catholic Church is concerned, laicism is of less importance than anti-clericalism today. The proper spheres of Church and lay authority are more easily defined theoretically than practically. Those who would attack the Church readily cry "clericalism," while some churchmen, such as the one cited above, who consider it to be the function of the laity to kneel before the altar and to sit beneath the pulpit, may prematurely shout "anti-clericalism." Michael De La Bedoyere has defined the

²¹ *A Catholic Dictionary*, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

"clericalist layman" as one who believes "only the priest can do real Christian work, and he wants to help him." He considers the work of the lay apostolate as a pale reflection of the priestly apostolate, a view sometimes shared by priests. He claims that the promising Catholic child is identified as the "pious" child and the "sacristy" child. The laymen who are always at the beck and call of priests and will not move a finger without consulting them are taken as a model of Catholic reliability and obedience.²²

He adds that there are many laity who have no feeling of oneness with the priest nor care to experience any. He says they feel the occasional need of the priest to save their souls or sign a form but their sense of loyalty depends upon a common minority cause and the physical contact which worshiping in the same building involves.²³

Some Protestant spokesmen have noted what they consider the inferior position of the laity in the Church and point particularly to the lay teacher's position in Catholic educational institutions.²⁴ Certainly in the past the lower status of the laity has been obvious. It has by no means disappeared although at times it has been exaggerated by statements of disgruntled laymen who project experiences at the hands of an excessively authoritarian pastor or priest onto the entire clergy. But, as pointed out above, the present relationships are in the state of change and of necessity they will change. Catholic laymen today have considerably more formal education than in the

²² Michael De La Bedoyere, *The Layman in the Church* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1955), p. 6.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

²⁴ Martin E. Marty, "Dialogue Within the Catholic Church," in Philip Scharper (Editor), *American Catholicism, A Protestant-Jewish View* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1959), p. 23.

past and many of them wish to have a more active part in the apostolate.

Two milestones since 1930 clearly indicate the changing status of clerical-lay relationships. One is the call to Catholic Action by the popes and bishops, the other is the development of the Liturgical Movement. Catholic Action under the ecclesiastical authority of bishops attempts to replace the priest by laymen insofar as this is canonically possible. It is essential today because it is impossible or unfeasible for priests to do the necessary work of evangelization and teaching in some places where these are most needed.²⁵ The Liturgical Movement generally means a more active participation by the laity in the Church services, particularly the Mass. The *Missa Recitata* in which the congregation makes the responses to the priest at Mass and recites aloud certain parts of the Mass, oddly enough, has been resisted by some lay people. Other laymen, however, press vigorously for Mass to be said and sacraments to be administered in the vernacular. Neither Catholic Action nor the Liturgical Movement should be considered something new; they are, rather, revivals of past practices.

The increased birth rate following World War II and the consequent demand for more Catholic schools and teachers to staff them mean an increasing use of lay persons as teachers and professors. The lay teacher has ceased to be, as he was once considered, a necessary evil. Today he is a desperately needed asset and in the future without his services the Catholic education cannot continue even at its present level and certainly cannot be expanded to meet future needs.

Toynbee has pointed out that a pro-

²⁵ De La Bedoyere, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

letariat is not formed because people are placed in a subordinate position but rather when they are compelled to live in a society of which they do not consider themselves active members with rights. "Lay people will always be a subordinate order in the Church; but they are on the way to recovery of a fuller consciousness of being organic, active members thereof, by right and in fact."²⁶

THE FUTURE OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

The future of Roman Catholicism behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains is uncertain. Thoroughly accurate information cannot be obtained, but, from what is known, its future seems precarious. But it should be recalled that such a situation is scarcely novel and that the Church has survived crises from her beginning. The words of her divine Founder that He will be with her till the end of time and that the gates of hell shall not prevail against her are a major source of reassurance. In some parts of Europe and Latin America the practice of the faith is less fervent than could be desired, particularly among the working classes. In other sections of the world—among which the United States is included—the Church is thriving. More active participation by the American laity and the development of various movements cited seem to indicate a fervor and vigor for the future that may exceed that of the past. On the purely sociological level, the truly great asset of the Roman Catholic Church is her ability to adapt to changing times without altering the repository of faith and morals. That such adaptations will have to be made is obvious; that they will be made seems certain.

²⁶ Congar, *op. cit.*, p. xxiii.

Church and the Laity Among Jews

By MARSHALL SKLARE

ABSTRACT: Judaism is an ethnic church with all born Jews who have not converted to another religion having equal religious rights whatever the extent of their commitment to Judaism. A distinctive religious configuration in the Jewish community results from this fact as well as from the lack of separation in Jewish tradition between the obligations of laity and clergy. While membership in the household of Israel and in its religion is a hereditary right and obligation, membership in a particular congregation is an act of conscious affiliation. Congregations have become increasingly influential in the Jewish community as they have ceased to limit their concerns to religious worship and study by adults of Jewish sacred texts. Contemporary congregational programs include a wide variety of activities with special emphasis on religious education for children. One manifestation of the expansion of the synagogue is its greater utilization in the fund-raising drives for general Jewish causes. The impact of congregational affiliation and activity upon the congregant, especially upon the level of religiosity and ritual observance, is yet to be measured. It is apparent that both in Reform, in Conservatism, and in Orthodoxy the attitudes and life patterns of the laity depart markedly from ideal norms.

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SEVERAL characteristics of the Jewish religion in terms of church and laity require analysis in order to establish a framework for a discussion of the contemporary American synagogue. Of prime importance is the ethnic stress of the Jewish religion, resulting in the fact that Judaism represents a type of ethnic church. Membership in the Jewish religion overlaps with membership in the Jewish community. The fact of birth entitles the individual to membership in the religious community. Furthermore, the definition of Jewish religious law—he is Jewish whose mother is Jewish—is reinforced by both Jewish and Gentile public opinion. In the United States only a small segment of ultra-Reform Jews and a group of Jewish converts to Christianity have seriously suggested splitting the atom of ethnicity-religion in Judaism.

The results of this articulation of religion and ethnicity include the fact that there can be no strong division in Judaism such as exists in other religions between the "saved" and the "damned," between those who have "confessed" and those who have not done so, between those who have accepted the "truth" and those who live in error. All Jews may claim equal membership in the Jewish "church."

Nevertheless, several important distinctions are encountered in Judaism. One is the distinction between the learned and the ignorant. The students of the vast corpus of Jewish religious law are to be distinguished from those who remain in ignorance of all but its most simple stipulations and to whom its intricacies will remain unknown. The other distinction is between the pious and the nonobservant, between those who carry out ritualistic and moralistic requirements and those who neglect them.

The contrast between the learned and the ignorant has been obscured on the

contemporary scene. The rise in secular learning, the changing character of Jewish scholarship, and the impact of non-Jewish religious traditions have severely attenuated this long standing distinction. The division between the observant and the nonobservant continues, though not in accordance with the rigid categories of yesterday. The contemporary distinction is generally between degrees of observance rather than between those whose observance is perfect and those whose observance is only partial.

To the Jewish layman the present-day rubrics of Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform are not always designations indicating denominational affiliation. Rather they may measure the degree of observance of the commandments—*mitzvot*—of the Jewish sacred system. The individual may continue to observe *kashruth*—the laws relating to food—in the home but neglect them on the outside. Consequently he may no longer describe himself as an Orthodox Jew but rather as a Conservative Jew. Another comes to neglect *kashruth* both outside as well as inside the home; he no longer describes himself as a Conservative Jew but rather he feels that he is a Reform Jew.

While all three groups—Reform, Conservative, and Orthodox—are in the midst of elaborating an institutional structure which appears to be denominational in character, the articulation of religion and ethnicity in Judaism limits the impact of such elaborations.¹ The

¹ Federations exist for each of the three groups: the Union of American Hebrew Congregations for the Reform group; the United Synagogue of America for the Conservative group; and the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America for the Orthodox group. The Reform federation is the oldest and the best organized of the three. The Conservative federation was relatively inactive until the 1940's, becoming an important agency after that period. The Union of Orthodox

fundamental distinction continues to be between Jews and Gentiles rather than between the three wings of American Judaism.

LAITY AND CLERGY

It has been emphasized that the ethnic stress in Judaism results in both believer and nonbeliever holding equal membership in the Jewish church. We may now explore the distinction between laity and clergy. As elaborated in Judaism this distinction contrasts sharply with the dichotomy which is characteristic of many other religions. According to Jewish tradition, identical behavior is expected of the layman and the rabbi. Spiritual exercises and religious observances are equally incumbent upon all males. Furthermore, the areas where rabbinical intervention is required are few in number. All *rites de passage* can be celebrated, all holidays observed, all religious services held, all *mitzvot* performed without rabbinical supervision. The traditional agenda of the rabbi does not include serving as a priest—a conductor of public worship; a preacher; a cleric—an official empowered by the state to perform certain ceremonies; a rector—an administrator of a religious institution or parish; or a pastor.² No “call” is ordinarily heard by the fledgling rabbi.

The rabbinical office derives from a Jewish Congregations is a loosely organized group. The synagogues affiliated with the Young Israel movement, however, have achieved a measure of co-ordination, and the Yeshiva University Synagogue Council also has become a force in the Orthodox group. The Synagogue Council of America, an overall agency, is composed of both rabbinical and lay representatives from each of the three groups. It has confined its efforts to representing the common interests of Reform, Conservatism, and Orthodoxy before interreligious, governmental, and Christian agencies.

² It should be noted that the rabbi traditionally was a communal rather than a congregational functionary.

distinction suggested earlier, the gulf between the learned and the ignorant. All scholars are entitled to respect; the greatest masters of Jewish learning are qualified to serve as conservators and interpreters of the tradition. More exactly, the rabbinical degree entitles the holder to serve as the head of an academy of Jewish learning and as the president of a tribunal. He is thus a teacher and an adjudicator; he possesses a doctor of laws degree and a license to teach. Since the cultivation of learning is incumbent upon all, it is expected that some of the scholarly will pursue learning as an avocation and hence will not exercise rabbinical prerogatives. In contemporary Orthodox schools of higher learning—*yeshivot*—it is still not assumed that all advanced students are aspirants for the office of rabbi. Reform and Conservative schools, however, are largely seminaries, that is, training institutions for religious professionals.

These changes serve as clues to the departure from traditional norms and hence to a growing distinctiveness between the functions of the layman and the rabbi. The addition of pastoral, priestly, clerical, and several other roles serves to transform the rabbi into a clergyman and the nonprofessional into a layman. The distinctiveness of the roles is hardened not only by general societal trends toward specialization but also by the sharp limitations of Jewish knowledge evidenced by lay persons; such limitations preclude their sharing in functions formerly reserved for nonprofessionals.

The institutionalization of differences in religious obligations between laity and clergy has not yet been achieved. Nevertheless in practice a wide distance between the level of religious observance of the rabbi and that of the layman is evident. This occurs in Reform, Conservatism, and Orthodoxy. In all three

the difference in level of observance of *mitzvot* between clergyman and layman tends to be substantial. There is a tendency to accept the difference as an appropriate one and to castigate as insincere the rabbi who is only as observant as the layman.

CONGREGATIONAL AFFILIATION

While membership in the household of Israel and in its religion is a hereditary right and obligation, membership in a congregation is an act of conscious affiliation. Such membership is characteristic of American Jewish life; in the European lands from which the ancestors of most American Jews came the individual did not affiliate with a congregation in the sense customary in the United States.

The typical American Jewish congregation is formed by local residents who join together to hold religious services and to establish a school for their children. They raise the funds necessary to build an edifice and to hire a professional staff. Generally the synagogue is organized in the form of a corporate body which holds periodic membership meetings at which the affairs of the institution are discussed, officers and board members elected, and contractual obligations with the rabbi and other professionals reviewed.

Membership in the congregation is open to all. There is generally no test of the applicant's religious attitudes or of the intensity of his religious observance. In many Reform or Conservative congregations the applicant is commonly sponsored by a member of the congregation or by one of the professional staff. Individuals who are financially irresponsible or who have an abhorrent moral reputation may thus be screened. There are a few Orthodox congregations which inquire into the applicant's level of observance; they restrict their roster to

those whose behavior is in conformity with certain selected religious norms.

Motivations for affiliation are extremely varied, but the desire to give a Jewish education to one's children plays a leading role. Jewish religious schools are increasingly becoming institutions sponsored by individual congregations rather than independent entities. This is particularly the case in suburban areas. Some congregations make membership mandatory for enrollment while others adjust their tuition fees to provide a financial incentive for membership.

The desire to attend religious services on the High Holidays—*Rosh Hashanah* and *Yom Kippur*—is another leading motivation for congregational affiliation. Daily services, Sabbath services, and festival services are open to all, but on the High Holidays tickets are distributed only to members. In some instances tickets are sold to the public and members are afforded a reduction in fee. Most High Holiday services are conducted by congregations. The number of “mushroom synagogues” opened by private entrepreneurs each fall is decreasing and the phenomenon is rarely encountered in middle-class areas or prestigious neighborhoods. Congregations will frequently hold overflow services for the High Holidays, thus increasing the number of available seats in much the same manner as was formerly done by the mushroom synagogues.

The desire of a considerable segment of the Jewish population for elementary Jewish education and for seats at High Holiday services, when combined with present institutional arrangements, assures many congregations of a sizeable membership roster and long-term fiscal stability. However, those who are motivated solely by the desire to have their children confirmed—*Bar Mitzvah*, *Bas Mitzvah*, or Confirmation—are poor

prospects for long-term membership. They delay joining until the child is of elementary school age and may resign soon after the performance of the ceremony.

Membership dues provide the bulk of the income of most Reform and Conservative congregations. Where the practice is to allow each family two seats for the High Holidays, dues may average about \$175 per year. New or expanding congregations will add building assessments. School fees may be additional.

Some Orthodox congregations are large institutions organized along the same lines as Reform and Conservative synagogues. Others place no emphasis on developing a membership roster; they derive the major portion of their income from High Holiday seats, from the auctioning and sale of synagogue honors, from individual solicitations, and from periodic appeals to worshipers. There are also instances of Orthodox synagogues which are not organized as corporate bodies. One example is the prayer houses of Chassidic groups. Here we encounter an instance in the Jewish community of sectarian rather than denominational behavior, for the adherent becomes a follower of a dynastic religious leader endowed with charismatic qualities rather than a voting member of a corporate body. The followers of the Chassidic leader, *rebbe*, elect no officers or board. The *rebbe*, and those designated by him, constitute the leadership.

CONGREGATIONAL PROGRAMS

The traditional program of the synagogue was confined largely to religious worship and the use of its quarters for groups devoted to the study of various sacred texts. One important departure from this program, the development of elementary Jewish schools, has already been noted. Previously, *melamdin*,

elementary-level teachers, formed their own schools, conducting classes in their place of residence or sometimes giving instruction in the homes of pupils. This system was still in use in immigrant areas; however, the *talmud torah*, or communal school, soon became popular. This was followed by the congregational school, presently the regnant form of elementary Jewish education.

The provision for religious services remains an important area of congregational functioning. Their frequency, duration, and character vary markedly according to whether the congregation is Reform, Conservative, or Orthodox. There is also some variation within each of the three groups. Orthodox congregations generally hold services three times each day. The daily prayers, however, can be recited at home as well as at synagogue. Reform congregations, on the other hand, generally hold services only on the Sabbath.

Levels of attendance differ widely, but in most cases it is only on the High Holidays that the majority of the congregation attends any one service. Then the crowds strain the facilities and attendance is high regardless of the day of the week on which the Holidays fall. While a core of faithful daily or weekly worshipers is commonly encountered in all three groups, the typical member attends only a handful of services during the year in addition to those held on the High Holidays. An invitation to attend the confirmation of the child of a friend, the desire to recite the memorial prayer for a member of one's own family, interest in the subject of the sermon, the desire to hear a celebrated guest speaker, all may play a part at one time or another in motivating the occasional worshiper.

The ten-man quorum necessary for holding a public service is present in most Orthodox and in many Conservative congregations daily. Recruiting the

tenth man has become a subject for humor. No ingenuity is required for Sabbath and festival services; a quorum is assured. Attendance at a Sabbath or festival service in large congregations may be considerable, but satisfaction is rarely expressed about the ratio between the number of members and the number of worshipers. At periodic intervals many Reform and Conservative congregations make strenuous efforts to raise the level of attendance.

On the subject of affiliated organizations, we find that they constitute a bulwark of support for the congregation. They compensate, in one sense, for the limited participation of the membership in public prayer. The sisterhood is the strongest such affiliate. Sisterhoods are found in all medium- and large-sized Reform and Conservative congregations, and in some Orthodox congregations. The Reform groups are joined together in the National Federation of Temple Sisterhoods, the Conservative group in the National Women's League of the United Synagogue. The sisterhood is commonly in competition with Jewish women's associations which are not synagogue based. Conservative sisterhood members will frequently belong to Hadassah, Reform members to the National Council of Jewish Women.

The prosperity of the sisterhood is indicative of the increasing importance of women in the functioning of American Jewish congregations. Women did not take part in the study circles of the traditional synagogue, and while they could attend the religious services they came as auditors rather than as full participants. At contemporary Reform religious services, however, the proportion of women is frequently higher than men and their participation in the service is extensive. The trend in Conservative congregations is more attenuated but still very noticeable. The election of women to congregational boards

is now commonplace. It came about initially because of the importance of the sisterhood in the total program of the synagogue. Women sometimes serve as officers in Reform congregations.

The men's club is less successful than the sisterhood, but is nonetheless an important organization in Reform and Conservative congregations. Programs are less elaborate and frequently less serious in content than those of the sisterhood. Fund-raising is more casual. Men's clubs are also in competition with secular Jewish associations, most frequently with the B'nai B'rith.

While all adult females are invited to join the sisterhood and all adult males the men's club, several age-graded and specialized clubs are found in the well-organized congregation.³ One of the most successful is the "couples club" composed of younger married persons. Another is the parent-teacher organization. Some congregations have "golden-age clubs" meeting on their premises, and some have organizations or hold entertainments for younger unmarried adults.

Programs of youth activity are sponsored in most Conservative and Reform congregations. Since only a small proportion of young people continue their Jewish education during the high school years, such groups serve as the only tie with the institution. Parents value the organizations for the recreational opportunities which they afford as well as for their indirect influence in discouraging dating across ethnic-religious lines. The National Federation of Temple Youth has chapters in most Reform congregations. Its opposite number in the Conservative movement is the United Synagogue Youth.

³ For an attempt to establish a congregation without affiliated organizations see Arnold Jacob Wolf, "Experimental Synagogue in Suburbia," *Reconstructionist*, Vol. 26, No. 7 (May 13, 1960), pp. 15-19.

A recent development is the growth of summer camping for children and youth. Camping previously was in private hands or under the sponsorship of secular Jewish organizations. During the past decade both the Reform and Conservative movements have developed a network of camps throughout the nation. Much less vigorous has been the development of adult retreats.

The recreational programs of individual congregations vary widely. Some, particularly in the East, maintain swimming pools and gymnasiums. Models for such developments were the settlement houses and the Jewish centers founded at the turn of the century in immigrant neighborhoods or in areas of second settlement. Many congregations now sponsor day camps during the summer months and nursery school programs during the school year.

ADULT STUDY

The final aspect of the congregational program which requires review is the traditional one of serving as a center for the study by adults of Jewish sacred texts. This type of activity has been continued in many Orthodox synagogues although in attenuated form. For several decades many Reform and Conservative groups shifted their educational emphasis to public forums featuring nationally known speakers on general topics of current interest. The older tradition lived on more as a historical memory than as current practice, while the limitations of such lecture series became obvious over a period of years. Concurrently the gap between the ever increasing educational level of the congregation, a substantial proportion of whom had attended college, and the low level of their Jewish education was apparent.

In recent years public forums geared to attracting the widest possible audiences have been de-emphasized.

Courses dealing with textual study have sometimes been reinstituted in modernized versions, but current study programs are more likely to include Hebrew language courses, instruction in how to conduct various ceremonies in the home, instruction in the ritual of the synagogue, survey courses of various periods of Jewish history, and courses which deal with contemporary Jewish problems. While guest speakers are utilized, their topics are more closely geared to Jewish concerns. It is generally conceded that adult study is a frontier area with activity lagging behind the interest manifested in the congregation's recreational and associational program.

PHILANTHROPY

In the traditional synagogue funds were raised or donated for a wide variety of philanthropic purposes. With the growth of Jewish federations and welfare funds in the early decades of the century, fund-raising for local, national, and international Jewish needs became centralized; the larger fund-raising organizations made little use of the synagogue for their campaigns. Such organizations did not wish to limit their solicitation to synagogue members. They found, furthermore, that even affiliated persons gave in modest amounts when approached through the synagogue. One important reason for this result was that the focus of the activity of the individual was becoming more occupational than congregational. In a community of independent businessmen and free professionals, many of whom had had close interpersonal contacts or a thorough knowledge of each other's affairs, an occupationally based campaign was feasible. This type of solicitation has been highly effective and is still the fundamental mode of organization for large campaigns.

There is, however, a trend toward returning to the older tradition of the

utilization of the synagogue as an avenue for fund-raising efforts. The rise in synagogue affiliation makes a larger public available than formerly through congregational channels. The development of varied congregational programs has given the average member a stronger tie with the institution. The ability of the synagogue to evoke sizeable contributions for its own purposes and for "denominational" bodies has given the institution new stature in the eyes of fund-raising executives. All of this has resulted in greater utilization of the synagogue for solicitation for general Jewish causes. Congregations in the larger communities are asked to sponsor fund-raising dinners and commonly do so for selected campaigns. While a sizeable proportion of the largest donations announced at such dinners do not represent "plus giving," the donor having already been contacted through the trade division of the campaign, some additional money is raised through these affairs.

At the dinners for local, national, or international Jewish needs the sights are high. Most congregations also sponsor a variety of funds established for the receipt of small donations. These are given to mark a variety of occasions—a birth or a birthday, an engagement or a marriage, the recovery from an illness, the death of a relative or a friend.

THE IMPACT OF THE SYNAGOGUE

Because there are no studies which provide data on the changes which take place as a result of joining a congregation, it is difficult to give a valid account of the impact of the synagogue upon its membership. And because the impetus for joining is frequently the desire to provide a Jewish education for one's children with the attendant willingness to modify the Jewish atmosphere of the home to conform somewhat more closely

with that of the religious school, it would be difficult to trace any changes which occur in the life pattern solely to the results of congregational affiliation.

Given Judaism's ethnic church character and the fact that all Jews are equal members in the household of Israel, were there even less secularism in the Jewish community than obtains at present we would expect few dramatic instances of religious transformation which motivate or follow upon congregational affiliation and involvement. Instances where a type of conversion experience has taken place are occasionally described in the press, but these generally have little connection with belonging to a congregation.⁴ The usual correlate of synagogue affiliation—even for the more seriously involved person—is the shift of the individual to a network of new interpersonal associations, to give him a somewhat richer insight into spiritual problems and Jewish values, and to confront him more directly with the problem of his observance of *mitzvot*. Whatever changes in life pattern occur can frequently be traced not so much to a conversion experience but to co-optation into the leadership and committee structure of the congregation.

The operation of the modern congregation demands a variety of professional specialists. The newest is the executive director, an official who specializes in the administrative, fiscal, promotional, and building-maintenance problems of the congregation. But even with the addition of this manager the structure of the synagogue provides a variety of positions for the congregation member.

⁴ For a Conservative example see Morton Gerla, "Two Who Returned," *United Synagogue Review*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Winter 1959), pp. 12-13. For a Chassidic example see Zalman M. Schachter, "How to Become a Hasid," *Jewish Heritage*, Spring 1960, pp. 33-40. See also Arthur A. Cohen, "Why I Choose to be a Jew," *Harper's Magazine*, Vol. 218, No. 1307 (April 1959), pp. 61-66.

Whether or not actual power is in the process of shifting from volunteer to professional, the tradition of lay control is well established. The table of organization calls for a sizeable number of committees, with some turnover in their personnel inevitable. Opportunities for workers thus are numerous. And there exists the possibility that the individuals will assimilate some of the ideal norms of the institution in whose behalf they labor. This process, however, occurs only in a limited number of cases. The available research points to the existence of a wide disparity between the norms preached from the pulpit and those established in creed and code, and the actual beliefs and pattern of life of the laity.⁵

In Orthodoxy the model of required observance is clear but the model is less clear in Reform and Conservatism. The desire for a code of normative beliefs and practices has been articulated in the Reform movement. It has been claimed that unless religious standards are unambiguous and certain essentials required of every Reform Jew, the impact of the movement will necessarily be limited. Those who have had reservations about the promulgation of a code of normative beliefs and practices have questioned whether the very concept of a code, and any implication of sanctions, is not antagonistic to the central ideals of Reform Judaism. The diversity of practice among Reform Jews

⁵ For a significant report on Orthodoxy see Howard W. Polsky, "A Study of Orthodoxy in Milwaukee: Social Characteristics, Beliefs and Observances," in Marshall Sklare (Editor), *The Jews: Social Patterns of an American Group* (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1958), pp. 325-35. For the Conservative group see United Synagogue of America, *National Survey on Synagogue Leadership* (New York: United Synagogue, 1953). For an optimistic report on Reform see National Federation of Temple Brotherhoods, *Current Reform Jewish Practice* (New York: National Federation of Temple Brotherhoods, n. d.).

has prompted critics to ask whether a code might not multiply strife and defection rather than increase normative adherence. The critics have prevailed and "guides" rather than "codes" have been promulgated. The guides have been issued by individual rabbis rather than by authoritative Reform bodies.

The approach of the Conservative movement has been similar to that of the Reform. Although standards are less ambiguous, no substantial attempt has been made either to promulgate a code, to interfere with the freedom of the individual, or to penalize the non-conformist. One approach of the Conservative movement has been to stress standards of congregational rather than individual practice. Thus no inquiry is made into the observance of *kashruth* by synagogue members but the "Standards for Synagogue Practice" of the United Synagogue states that:

Recognizing *kashruth* as another basic tenet of Judaism, congregations will take all steps necessary to insure proper observance of *kashruth* at all functions on the premises of the synagogue and at functions away from the synagogue which are held under their auspices.

Another approach of the Conservative movement has been to inaugurate campaigns aimed at increasing adherence to particular religious observances rather than calling for a generalized reawakening to all religious norms. Program materials and congregational aids are generally issued, but results have not been objectively measured. The most notable campaign has concerned observance of the Sabbath, a crucial aspect of the Jewish sacred system and one where the distance between religious norms and the life pattern of the laity has been exceedingly wide. The campaign publicity not only stressed the man-God relationship but also emphasized the social utility of Sabbath observance for,

in this case, its contribution to improved mental health.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The successful institutional adaptation of the synagogue has been made on a variety of levels. The role of the rabbi has been redefined—new roles have been added and the older ones of judge and teacher have either lapsed or been reformulated. The synagogue member has become a layman. Modest demands are made upon him for religious observance and manifold opportunities are provided for participation in synagogue affairs. Religious education and recreation for the young are stressed as well as attractive leisure-time activities for the mature. The modern synagogue is conducted in a way which is in accord with the advancing class and status level of the Jewish community. Increasingly less emphasis is given to adherence to a deviant culture in addition to loyalty to religion. To the individual the existence and prosperity of the neighborhood congregation point to the promise of Jewish survival at a time when the acculturation process is sufficiently advanced to make it difficult to take survival for granted.

The institutional growth of the synagogue movement since World War II has been exceedingly impressive. There has been some growth also in the Jewish community center movement. The centers are almost exclusively devoted to

providing for the leisure-time activities of members of the Jewish community. They have group workers rather than rabbis for leaders, and they offer little systematic instruction for the young. Although the center movement has expanded, the synagogue movement has expanded far more rapidly and seems to be more appealing within the Jewish community.

The prosperity of the synagogue is also impressive when congregational gains are compared with those made by Jewish organizations. Some associations—Zionist groups, for example—have declined. Other mass organizations, like the B'nai B'rith, have maintained their membership or made small gains. But the rate of growth even of the successful agencies does not compare with the gains made by Reform, Conservatism, and, to a considerably lesser extent, Orthodoxy.

There is, then, a strong predilection among members of the Jewish group for synagogue affiliation in spite of considerable secularization and of consequent wide departures in attitudes and life patterns from religious norms. Such a predilection presents a challenge of considerable proportions for a religious institution: its very success may serve to mask its failure. Furthermore, increasing involvement with the synagogue in comparison with Jewish ethnic associations presents the synagogue with grave responsibilities for determining the future character of Jewish life in America.

Financing the Local Church

By WILLIAM H. LEACH

ABSTRACT: The social heritage of the Christian church derives from Judaism, and methods of financing today's local churches can be traced from the pre-Christian era. Many leaders insist that the Jewish tithe of the Old Testament should be the basis of church support today. The process of local church finance in the earliest days is described in this paper and compared with the new, complex methods which are practiced by contemporary churches. Churches have grown—in numbers and wealth—with the changing society. There is a great difference between the "collections" of two generations ago and the budgeting and accounting principles of the successful churches of today. With some of the larger churches operating on annual budgets of three quarters of a million dollars, and with sixty to eighty persons on their payrolls, a serious consideration of business methods in church finance is clearly warranted.

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THE Christian Church descends directly from Judaism; its founders were Jews, and any concept for financing the local groups of worshipers would naturally be influenced by the Judaic cultural heritage. The early Christian churches, unlike the Jewish communities, were independent organizations; they lacked any state affiliation, and they could not depend upon a state, governor, or king to collect taxes or contributions from the people to pay the costs of operating local Christian societies.

THE TITHE

The religious institutions in the Jewish nations of Israel and Judah were supported by levies made upon the people for the upkeep of the temple, the priesthood, the Levites, and other employees of the religious institution. The term for the levy used in our English translations of the Bible is "tithe" which means "tenth." There are many supporting instances in the Old Testament to show the principle of the tithe. The following from the book of Deuteronomy is a good example:

Ye shall tithe all the yield of your seed, which comes forth from the field year by year. . . . And if the way is too long for you, so that you are not able to bring the tithe . . . then you shall turn it into money, and bind up the money in your hand, and go to the place which the Lord your God chooses.¹

At the end of every three years you shall bring forth all of the tithe of your produce in the same year, and lay it up within your towns; and the Levite, because he has no portion or inheritance with you, and the sojourner, the fatherless, and the widow, who are within your towns shall come and eat and be filled.²

During the history of these Jewish nations, however, the principle of the

tithe was not continuously observed. There were periods during which it was largely ignored. The Old Testament books of Ezra and Nehemiah relate some of the difficulties in collecting the tithes to rebuild the temple. In the book of Malachi we find the prophet accusing his people of robbing God by not paying their tithes for the religious institution.

From the days of your fathers you have turned aside from my statutes and have not kept them. Return to me and I will return to you, says the Lord of hosts. But you say, "How shall we return?" Will man rob God? . . . Bring the full tithes in the storehouse, that there may be food in my house; and thereby put me to the test, says the Lord of hosts, if I will not open the windows of heaven for you and pour down for you an overflowing blessing.³

The tithe, as expressed in these selections, seems to have little significance in contemporary Judaism.⁴

While the term "tithe" appears but a few times in the New Testament there is evidence that the followers of the Christ gave generously from their means. It should be remembered that these early Christian churches were, above all else, Christian fellowships. Those who had resources contributed to the aid of their less fortunate friends. At one time there was a common treasury; some gave their entire possessions. The first lay officers, the deacons, were given the responsibility to feed the hungry, the widowed, and the poor.

The Apostle Paul, who possessed a

³ Malachi 3: 7, 10.

⁴ Interesting discussions of this and other closely related subjects are found in three recently published books: Richard Byfield and James P. Shaw, *Your Money and Your Church* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1959); Hiley H. Ward, *Creative Giving* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1959); Thomas K. Thompson, *Stewardship and Contemporary Theology* (New York: Association Press, 1959).

¹ Deuteronomy 14: 22-25.

² Deuteronomy 14: 28, 29.

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 their chicken suppers and earned, with much consecration in toil, the dollars which contributed to the support of the minister and paid for other activities of the church.
 But the real day of church stewardship was still to come.

CHRISTIAN STEWARDSHIP

The modern concept of local church support is based on a simple statement of Christian stewardship. The constitution of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America defines Christian Stewardship as follows:⁷

Christian stewardship is the practice of systematic and proportionate giving of time, abilities, and material possessions, based on the conviction that these are a trust from God, to be used in his service for the benefit of all mankind, in grateful acknowledgement of Christ's redeeming love.

This is a very broad statement which is not concerned with the methods used to implement the principle. Some, undoubtedly, would have preferred to have the tithe recommended as a principle of giving. Tithing still is a most effective way of financing churches. Many people who tithe insist that they receive spiritual benefits from the practice. It may still be a potent factor. Christian stewardship, however, involves more than the tithe.

The financial obligations of today's local church fall in three areas:

First, there is the cost of suitable real estate and the expense of proper buildings for the program of the church. Money for this purpose is usually designated as "cap-

tal funds." Second, there is the amount of money needed for the local church program. This amount includes the salaries paid to the ministers and other employees, the cost of church building maintenance and insurance. Third, there is the amount of money to be raised for the extension of the church program in new areas at home and abroad. This must include the teaching ministry of the gospel; the healing ministry of doctors and nurses; and the social ministry of feeding the hungry and extending aid in times of emergency.

FINANCING CHURCH BUILDINGS

The number of church buildings erected during the past fifteen years has been tremendous. Year after year the total amount spent for new church construction has increased. In 1959 it approximated one billion dollars.⁸ There are indications that it will be just as high in 1960. The need for these buildings has resulted from vast population movements, the increased birth rate among American families, a new religious interest, and a new concept of the type of building adequate for the modern church program.

The modern church has a multicelled program. Hence it requires a multicelled structure. The simplest church today requires a physical plant which has facilities for worship, education, fellowship, administration, storage, heat and ventilation, and parking. Today many of the denominations are reluctant to encourage a church to build unless it has at least five acres of land. One acre of parking surface, for example, accommodates only one hundred automobiles.

Before 1900 the average congregation, in planning new building, placed more than three fourths of the total building

in the worship unit. The sanctuary was the church. Today, educational and social needs require more space than worship does. The result is that the total cost will be about equally divided between the sanctuary and the other units.

There is, first of all, the expense of purchasing satisfactory real estate. That varies, of course, among communities, but the areas will be few where suitable land can be purchased for less than one thousand dollars per acre, and it may cost ten times that figure. For a congregation of five hundred people, the cost for real estate, plus the building necessary for a well-balanced program, with architectural fees and landscaping, can hardly be less than four hundred thousand dollars. The cost, in most instances, will be greater. Since churches of this size may be running on operating budgets of twenty to fifty thousand dollars, it is easy to see that the financing of a new building is something quite apart from the annual church budget. It requires a different technique.

New buildings are financed by capital fund campaigns conducted by local leaders or supervised by professional fund raisers. These funds are augmented by contributions from the denomination, memorial gifts from members and others, and loans from banks or other lending agencies.

The professional fund raiser has found a fertile field in the current era of church building. Some of the denominations have established their own bureaus to help the churches in their campaigns. There are, of course, many reliable firms and individuals who direct campaigns on a fee basis. Most of the campaigns solicit pledges to be paid weekly over a period of years. Three years is a popular pledge span at the present time. Professional leadership, commercial or denominational, usually produces more pledges in fund campaigns than local, volunteer leadership.

FINANCIAL RESOURCES

With the inflationary costs of today, very few congregations are able to secure sufficient funds for a complete, new building in one financial campaign. The campaign must be supplemented. Occasionally, but not often, churches have had sufficient foresight to amass substantial building funds prior to the need for the building. Perhaps every congregation should follow the example of industry and set aside a definite amount each year for replacing the house of worship. It is unusual at present to find this plan in practice among churches.

Memorial contributions often are available after the completion of the campaign. Any effort to solicit such funds should be delayed until the overall canvass has been completed. A duly appointed committee can compose a list of memorials which would be acceptable to the church. Memorial gifts may furnish organs, windows, chancels, chapels, and even rooms and pews. The total cost of building is thereby reduced. Even with this additional income, many churches are unable to authorize the construction of the complete structure.

There are two alternatives to building a complete, new structure. One alternative is to build the church by units. New architecture styles with ground level, expansive buildings can readily be adapted to this scheme. The second alternative is to negotiate a loan with some lending institution and to undertake a mortgage. There has been a recent revival of an old practice for permitting church members to lend the money. The members who make the loans accept debenture notes based on Sunday offerings of the church. This can be a very simple matter if the notes are not offered for public sale; or it can develop into a full-fledged issue of mortgage bonds cleared by the state securities commission or agency.

⁷ Constitution of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America (New York: National Council of Churches, n. d.).

⁸ The F. W. Dodge Corporation reports that the amount spent on church building construction in 1959 reached \$799,500,000. Other sources give higher estimates.

Any loan, whether protected as a mortgage or based on church income, must be paid in regular monthly, quarterly, semi-annual, or annual payments. From the time that the loan is granted, the local church budget must provide for repaying it in an orderly way.⁹

THE ANNUAL CHURCH BUDGET

In church finance, the decade of 1900-1910 marks the division between the pioneer church and the modern church in America. Two innovations were introduced which revolutionized church incomes. The first was the "every member canvass," which is a plan by which every family in the parish or congregation is reached for a pledge toward the support of the church. The second was the improvement in printing processes which allowed weekly contribution envelopes to be printed, numbered serially, and dated chronologically, in one operation. This made it possible to give to each individual a package of fifty-two envelopes, each carrying the name of the local church, in which to pay his pledge. Weekly payments revolutionized church finance, increased the giving by congregations many times over, simplified accounting procedures, and made it possible to project a yearly financial program.

Envelope manufacturers have co-operated in making giving easy. Envelopes of many sizes and varieties are offered; there are single pocket envelopes, duplex envelopes, and triplex envelopes; some are printed in colors for variety. One manufacturer even prints brief homilies on the back of his church envelopes.

This growth in income made possible

⁹ An excellent study of budgeting and the every member canvass is found in Richard Byfield and James P. Shaw, *Your Money and Your Church* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1959).

the multiplication of service units in the church program. In the same era, 1900-1910, graded Sunday school lessons were introduced; church offices began to make their appearances; and, for the first time in American history, the minister, as the head of the church, found himself responsible for directing an organization in addition to conducting services.

During the ensuing decades many variations of the every member canvass have developed. Denominational leaders originally emphasized the biblical method. Jesus sent out his disciples in pairs, and church solicitors went out two by two. Subsequent variations have placed less stress on biblical authority and more on thoroughness and results. Some churches substituted "loyalty Sundays" for the canvass; others solicited on a group rather than household basis. In church building campaigns, an effort currently is made to have the solicitor represent the same income bracket as the persons solicited. Many churches have experimented with direct mail canvasses. Regardless of methods used, however, the two basic principles remain. Every member and affiliate must be given the opportunity to make a pledge, and weekly contributions must be stressed. The point has been made many times that two dollars per Sunday is greater than one hundred dollars per year.

The church budget usually is made before the solicitation of pledges takes place. A frequent procedure is to have the prepared budget in the hands of the prospective contributors before they are solicited. A pledge, then, is a vote of approval for the budget.

The preparation of a church budget may be a very simple or complex affair depending upon the size of the church, its program, its financial resources, and its responsibilities. The budget is a detailed estimate of the amount of money

the church will need to operate during the forthcoming year. In the pioneer days, budgets were not made. A pioneer budget would have listed few expenses: the minister, the custodian, insurance, taxes, a few public utilities, building maintenance, and perhaps a subscription to missionary work.

The local church budgets of today, exclusive of building funds, range in the Protestant churches from four or five thousand dollars to three quarters of a million dollars. Every church that makes a budget starts with two general classifications, local church expenses and benevolences. The first is self-explanatory. It includes subclassifications such as salaries and pensions, music, church school, building maintenance, publicity, debt retirement, and so on. The second classification, benevolences, includes contributions for the various missionary and denominational programs, denominational activities, interdenominational activities, and social service.

After the classifications have been subdivided, the expenditures of the past year are compared with the estimated needs of the next year. What employees should have wage increases? Will heating costs increase? What painting and decorating is advisable? The trustees, or the group handling this study, will require information and estimates from each department of the church program. The committee must consider the departmental requests along with other requirements and decide how much of each request can be accepted and referred to the congregation.

Members of the finance committee usually are volunteer workers, and, in larger churches, they give much time and effort in trying to reconcile figures and to produce a budget within the financial resources of their church. When the budget has finally been composed, it may be given to the canvassing committee which will have charge of or-

ganizing the campaign for the solicitation of pledges.

There is a growing effort to develop a means of soliciting and collecting the necessary funds without the tiring work of personal visitation. Some churches have successfully made their canvasses without a formal budget. In a pre-budget canvass, members are asked to give to the church as the Lord has prospered them. The resulting increased pledges, in many instances, have been astounding. The proponents of this plan argue that the average person will give more generously when he is asked to thank God for the good things of life, than when he is asked to pay for salaries, public utilities, and debt reduction. But the plan is still—in the view of this writer—just one more idea to vary the every member canvass.

There have been some experiments in trying to secure church support through assessments on the members or a definite membership fee. These have not, as a rule, been successful. The rule earlier mentioned, which was laid down by the Apostle Paul, is to stress the importance of personal stewardship as the most effective method of fund raising for the church.¹⁰

ACCOUNTING

After the canvass has been conducted and the pledges secured, the remaining aspect of church finance has to do with the efficient collection of pledges, the proper recording of amounts paid, the acceptance and payment of the financial obligations. During the ages, religious services have included, as a vital part

¹⁰ Detailed studies of church budgeting and accounting can be found in William H. Leach, *Handbook of Church Management* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1958); John C. Brauer, *Efficient Church Management* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960); David R. Holt, II, *Handbook of Church Finance* (New York: Macmillan, 1960).

of the worship service, the receiving and blessing of gifts from the members. The "offertory," in the early church, was the opportunity for each of the congregation to receive the elements of holy communion. The meaning of the term has been changed in the contemporary church. The offering is the opportunity for the congregants to present their gifts to God. A typical prayer of dedication is as follows:

O God, of whose bounty we have all received; accept this offering of thy people; and so follow it with thy blessing that it may promote peace and good will among men, and advance the kingdom of our Lord Jesus Christ. Amen.

The theology of the offering is well expressed in the words of a hymn written in 1864 by Bishop W. Walsham How:

We give Thee by Thine own,
What-e'er the gift may be:
All that we have is thine alone,
A trust alone from Thee.

A great proportion of pledges are left at the altar of the church by those who have made pledges. Giving in that manner has the aspect of an act of worship.

Tabulations are necessary. The gifts must be counted to ascertain that the enclosures correspond with figures marked on the envelope. The accounting is the responsibility of the church treasurer or financial secretary. In a church which has a professional staff, one of these officers supervises the count and the actual work is done by one of the office secretaries. Most churches use patented forms which are obtainable from religious supply houses. Weekly sums are listed, usually for quarterly periods. Contributions are recorded in three areas: local expense, benevolence, and church building. Experience shows the efficacy of statements sent either

monthly or quarterly to each church member. When the contributor uses weekly offering envelopes, which are dated for each Sunday, he automatically makes a weekly report of his contributions. Sending a quarterly statement to him will either commend him for his faithfulness or remind him to meet his obligation for any amounts which are still due.

The financial secretary must have a system for keeping a record of individual Sunday contributions. He must also keep a receipts journal in which he records the totals from the Sunday offerings along with amounts mailed into the church office, income from interest, rents, dividends, and any other revenue items. He must keep a disbursing journal in which expenditures are entered. The wise church accountant will use a system which enables him to keep a current daily check on the total disbursements for each classification of the budget.

HOW MANY TREASURERS?

It has been shown that there are three main financial requirements of the local church—the local church expenses, benevolences, and new church construction. Traditionally, the churches have had two treasurers—one for the local church account, a second for benevolence funds. With the increase in staffed church offices, the two accounts can usually be handled through the same desk. The building fund, however, presents a complex problem. The pledges for the capital fund should be segregated from the other funds of the church and should be entrusted to a different treasurer. When the time comes that the church is able to take over the financial obligations of the new building, the building committee may ask to be discharged and the building fund can be integrated into the local church budget.

One interesting concomitant of the growth in size and wealth of local congregations is the addition of the office of church business administrator. This office usually is a full-time position held by an individual who has had business experience. The church business administrator is responsible for all office procedures, for raising all except capital funds, and for accounting.

Some final admonitions might be added.

Every congregation should require an annual audit of its books, and this audit should be made by some unrelated agency. All officers and employees who handle church funds should be bonded, not only for security reasons, but also to assure contributors that the Lord's business is conducted in an orderly way.

Ecological Changes and the Church

By TRUMAN B. DOUGLASS

ABSTRACT: The Church, as a human institution, is affected by every social and cultural change which occurs in its environment. Of all human institutions, however, the Church is probably the most conservative. The current awakening of religious interest throughout the United States presents the Church with many opportunities and confronts it with potential dangers. The danger exists that emphasis upon quantitative growth will obscure the need for qualitative excellence. A well-educated laity will embarrass the church whose educational standards for the clergy fall below those for business and the professions. Although the churches speak boldly for liberal reform, they lag behind government, the armed services, sports, and industry in implementing liberal programs. It is not certain that the Church speaks relevantly to an urban-dominated culture. It is certain that the churches have overlooked many opportunities in the innercity areas. Although denominational ties have lost much meaning among laymen, many denominations aggressively perpetuate their separate existences. Unions between differently organized denominations, rather than reunions within splintered denominations, indicate real accomplishment in social adjustment.—Ed.

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AN adequate review of ecological changes as they affect the Church would include consideration of nearly all the major sociological changes that have occurred in American life in recent years. These changes constitute important aspects of the environment with which the Church interacts. There is scarcely any feature of human society which does not influence the estate of the churches. Economic conditions, population shifts, family life, class structure, race relations, education, leisure, changes in the distribution of age groups, the condition of the general culture, the definition and redefinition of social goals—all have their consequences for the Church.

Because the Church is in many respects a conservative institution, these ecological changes frequently present themselves to the Church in the form of problems and dilemmas for those who shape its policies, plans, and program.

There are, of course, churchmen who adopt what is essentially a transcendentalist view of the Church. They would claim that in its essential characteristics the Church is untouched by outward change. They feel that the lines of the Doxology which read, "As it was in the beginning, is now and ever shall be," apply equally to the teachings of the Christian Gospel and to the primary features of the Church. If, however, one believes, as does this writer, that in addition to its divinely given attributes the Church bears the marks of a human institution, then every change occurring in society and its culture has implications for and effects upon the Church.

QUANTITATIVE CHANGES

Some conspicuous quantitative changes have had major effects upon the life and activity of the churches. The population upsurge and increased mobility constitute such obvious features of

twentieth-century American society that the Church, even in its most conservative expressions, has not been able to ignore them.

A quarter of a century ago the Protestant churches were persuaded that the period of church extension—of establishing new churches—was virtually ended in the United States. This conviction was articulated at a congress of home mission boards held in Washington, D. C. under the sponsorship of the Home Missions Council of North America. At this meeting the conviction was expressed that the settlement of the country had been completed, that the population had reached a point of stability, that the nation was adequately provided with churches, and that, therefore, the home mission boards could turn their energies and resources to other tasks.

These prognostications were completely negated by subsequent events—primarily by the population explosion, the wartime and postwar migrations of the American people, the continuing suburban trend, and the creation of multitudes of new communities. As a consequence, the intimation that the churches would refrain from major efforts in the field of church expansion has proved to be far from correct. For a number of years the churches have been organizing new congregations at the rate of approximately 10,000 per year. The value of new construction of religious buildings rose from \$117,000,000 in 1923, to \$863,000,000 in 1958 and will closely approach a billion dollars in 1960.

Thoughtful church leaders are beginning to realize that these expansionist phenomena have their dangers. There is danger that the denominations will be more interested in reaping a statistical harvest than in making certain that the religious needs of communities are well served. Churches are likely to give more

attention to quantitative growth than to the improvement of the qualitative excellence of their programs. There is danger that in the vast reshuffling of our population, and in the attendant concentration of the churches upon numerical increase, individuals will be lost to view. A mobile population requires more mobile forms of pastoral care than the Protestant churches have yet devised. It is more impressive for the minister's record to add ten new members to the rolls of his church than to make certain that ten old members who have moved to new places are established in churches in their new homes. There is danger that with all the building and rebuilding of church edifices, churches will be known for the comfort and modernity of their structures rather than for the Gospel they preach and for the quality of Christian life exhibited by the congregation.

THE RELIGIOUS REVIVAL

Church members now constitute 63 per cent of the population of the United States. This compares with 16 per cent in 1850 and 22 per cent in 1900. There is much debate about the accuracy of these figures. One variable which is not taken adequately into account in comparing the statistics reported by the churches is the changing conception of a church "member." For example, in the case of the Episcopal Church, in 1916 only 1 per cent of its members were children under 13, as compared with 26 per cent in 1926. Efforts have been made to standardize the statistics by calculating the percentage of people aged 13 and over who are recorded as church members, since denominations vary greatly in their practice of enrolling children. When this correction is made the figures do not show, as is frequently assumed, a steady rise in the proportion of church members in the total population since the beginning of

the century. They show, rather, a decline from 1916 to 1940—55 per cent in 1916 and 50.7 per cent in 1940—and a notable rise thereafter. "In other words the American revival dates not from 1900 or before, but from 1940 or shortly after."¹ The growth since 1940 has been impressive—from 50.7 per cent to 63 per cent of the population in 1958. Today the membership of religious bodies in the United States exceeds 110,000,000.

There is a question whether this increased popularity represents a success or an embarrassment for the churches. It has produced, according to Martin E. Marty,²

... the erosion of particularity, the smoothing of the edges of witness, the loss of religious content. Particularity is challenged by a blurry, generalized religion; distinctive witness is confronted by amiable syncretism; theological content is often replaced by sentiments about religion. There are intimations that many churches represent a kind of American Shinto and that their popularity is gained by their identification with the "American way." They have tended to become simply one aspect of the general culture rather than being in tension with it and exercising a critical function toward it.

CLASS AND RACE

The effects upon the churches of changes in the class structure of American society are largely indeterminate.

Evidence is abundant that a revolution is occurring in the racial and class composition of our nation. One relevant set of facts pertains to the composition of the labor force. The number of farmers, for example, declined from 16.5 per cent of the labor force in 1910 to 7.3 per cent in 1950. The proportion of farm laborers declined from 14.5

¹ Michael Argyle, *Religious Behavior* (Glen-coe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958), pp. 28-29.

² Martin E. Marty, *The New Shape of American Religion* (New York: Harper, 1958).

per cent in 1910 to 4.3 per cent in 1950. During the same forty year span, professional persons increased from 4.4 per cent of the labor force to 8.5 per cent, and the proportion of clerks, salespeople, and those in similar occupations increased from 10.2 per cent to 18.9 per cent.³ White-collar workers increased in number from 5,115,000 in 1900 to 21,600,000 in 1950. They now constitute 36.6 per cent of the labor force as compared with 17.6 per cent in 1900.⁴ There has been a parallel change in the distribution of income. In 1929, 65 per cent of the population had incomes under \$3,000 per year. In 1951 this portion was reduced to 46 per cent. The proportion receiving incomes between \$3,000 and \$7,500 rose from 29 per cent in 1929 to 47 per cent in 1951.⁵

Little is known of the effects of these changes upon the Church. No significant amount of research has been done in this field. It seems evident, however, that some of the widely held presuppositions regarding the relationship between social class and the churches have not been substantiated. For example, it might have been expected that with the virtual disappearance of an American proletariat, the so-called pentecostal sects—churches which allegedly drew their membership primarily from the economically disadvantaged groups—would have ceased to flourish. This has not been the case. The Assemblies of God increased their membership from 6,700 in 1916 to 148,000 in 1936; they continued this growth and reached a membership of more than 505,000 in 1958. The Pilgrim Holiness Church had 5,300 members in 1916, 20,100 in 1936, and 32,600 in 1958. The Pentecostal

Holiness Church had 5,600 members in 1916, 20,100 in 1936, and 32,600 in 1958.⁶

Conversely, the churches which might have been expected to benefit from the number of what Vance Packard calls "the strivers for upward mobility"—namely, such denominations as the Episcopal, Congregational, and Presbyterian Churches—have exhibited no gains which are disproportionate to those made by other denominations which presumably offer fewer social advantages.

At least three factors seem to have contributed to the failure of church members to behave according to anticipated formulas. First, church affiliations seem to be more stable than other social affiliations and do not seem to be affected—at least not immediately—by a change of status. Second, some of the Pentecostal sects have steadily grown more respectable, have changed their character to conform to the changed class status of their membership, and have taken on more of the ways of the conventional "old-line" churches. For example, the General Conference of the Seventh Day Baptist denomination has joined the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America. Third, the evangelizing zeal of the Pentecostal groups has not waned as their members have acquired economic advantage and social status—nor has the zeal of such denominations as the Episcopal, Congregational, and Presbyterian notably increased, it would seem, as changes in the class structure of the nation have presented them with the sociological bases of larger opportunity.

One of the anomalies in this area of class-race relationships is the fact that the denominations which have been

³ Joseph A. Kahl, *The American Class Structure* (New York: Rinehart, 1957), p. 57.

⁴ United States Census Bureau, *News Release*, August 31, 1958.

⁵ Figures from *Business Week*, October 1952, with income in terms of 1951 dollars.

⁶ Figures from *Census of Religious Bodies 1906-36* and *Yearbook of American Churches 1960* (New York: National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., 1960).

known as churches of the proletariat have made slower progress toward the integration of Negroes into their membership than have some of the longer established and presumably more socially conservative bodies. In 1950 a survey of Presbyterian, United States of America churches disclosed that out of 2,706 reporting congregations, 832 were integrated. A 1958 study of Congregational Christian churches in metropolitan areas found that 12 per cent included Negro members and that 49 per cent were willing to accept Negroes as members. The Protestant Council of New York City asserts on the basis of a recent study that half the churches in that city have an interracial membership. Liston Pope estimates that about 10 per cent of the total number of Protestant churches in the nation are interracial.⁷ This figure is five times as large as the corresponding figure for ten years ago. There is no evidence that the Pentecostal sects have shown any similar disposition toward integration. This is probably due, in the first place, to their tendency to make a radical separation between faith and social ethics and, in the second place, to the fact that many of these sects have their greatest strength in the South.

The most intensive study yet made of the attitudes and practices of a single denomination respecting racial integration covered the Congregational Christian churches in standard metropolitan areas. Questionnaires were sent to all the churches of that denomination in such areas. When congregations showed themselves willing to participate in the study, interviews were held with the minister and at least one lay official. Of the 1,500 churches of the denomination located in standard metropolitan areas, 1,054 took part in the study.

Two significant and encouraging facts

⁷ Liston Pope, *The Kingdom Beyond Caste* (New York: Friendship Press, 1957).

were disclosed. First, some modest gains in racial inclusiveness were revealed. The survey showed that 26.6 per cent of the churches in metropolitan communities included in their membership representatives of at least one minority group. A less thorough study made twelve years previously revealed that only 17 per cent of these churches could be classified as inclusive.

Second, in the opinion of ministers and lay leaders, well over half the congregations studied—63.4 per cent of them—would support their pastors in implementing a policy of racial inclusiveness.

There were some disheartening findings. Nearly half the local churches that were studied had no definite policy for receiving members of racial minorities. Approximately 70 per cent said they had never confronted a situation that required decision in that area of policy. Since the study was limited to highly urbanized communities where the size of racial minorities has rapidly increased in recent years, it is evident that the churches are not aggressively pressing toward a policy of racial inclusiveness.

In the opinion of a large number of lay officers of churches, the pastors would have more support for programs of desegregation in the community than in their own churches. Dr. Herman Long, the director of the study, considered this the most negative finding.

A majority—51.4 per cent—of the lay respondents from the Midwest believed that there are exceptions to the denomination's announced policy of unconditional hospitality to members of all racial groups. It is alarming that what has been considered the southern pattern may also be the midwestern pattern.

A general result of the study was to indicate that in a period of history when events in the realm of human relations

move with lethal swiftness the churches proceed with glacial slowness. The extent of integration in the churches compares unfavorably with accomplishments in other areas such as employment in federal and state governments, the armed services, professional sports, labor unions, institutions of higher education, and so on.⁸

CITY AND SUBURB

The city and the suburb are obverse sides of a primary problem-area for the work of the churches. Nearly every denomination has acknowledged publicly that from the standpoint of institutional strength it is losing ground in the inner city. Most denominations also acknowledge that with the whole nation coming under the influence of a predominantly urban culture, the failure of the Church to find its place in the city raises questions concerning the relevance of its message and program to modern society.

Curiously, some denominations are troubled almost as much by their successes in the suburbs as by their failures in the inner city. This seems strange, for in a number of instances denominational programs of suburban expansion were undertaken as a deliberate plan for compensating losses of institutions and members in the central metropolitan areas.

Meanwhile, the "exploding metropolis" continues to explode. The 168 standard metropolitan areas have steadily increased their share of the country's population. In July 1958 these areas included 59 per cent of the total population of the United States. Within these areas, the suburbs continue to

grow at a faster rate than the central cities. Between April 1950 and July 1958, about 12.4 million people were added to the population of communities adjacent to our larger cities, giving an average annual increase of 3.7 per cent annually. This is almost three times the rate of growth within these cities and more than double the rate for the country as a whole. While, for example, there has been no appreciable population change in New York City, Jersey City, and Newark, the adjacent communities have increased at the rate of 3.9 per cent a year. A gain of 1.6 million persons has occurred in the New York-Northeastern New Jersey standard metropolitan area. This gain is exceeded only by the increase in the Los Angeles area.⁹

The embarrassment of the Church concerning its suburban prosperity has been mentioned. The Church does not minimize its responsibility for providing religious ministries to the millions of people who have moved to the burgeoning suburbs, nor does it ignore the fact that many of these people occupy positions of strategic influence in American society. The Church is ill at ease over its success because of the relative simplicity of its adaptation to a suburban environment. Church leaders are beginning to recognize that the task of establishing a successful church in a new, rapidly growing suburb is scarcely more difficult than the problem of establishing a filling station on a new superhighway. The Church is disturbed at finding itself too readily at home in a one-class community. It is haunted by the consciousness of its essential nature as an inclusive fellowship in which distinctions of "Greek and barbarian, wise and simple, bond and free" are transcended.

⁸ Herman H. Long, *Fellowship For Whom? A Study of Racial Inclusiveness in Congregational Christian Churches* (New York: Department of Race Relations, the Board of Home Missions, 1958).

⁹ Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, *Statistical Bulletin* (New York: Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., October 1959).

On the other hand, the problems of the Protestant churches in the central city are not simply functions of population increase or decrease. There appears to be something in the urban community and its culture which is alien, if not hostile, to the Church. For example, during a period when 200,000 people were moving into New York City in the area below Fourteenth Street, seventeen Protestant churches moved out.¹⁰

One probable cause of the Church's alienation from the city is the fact that a large proportion of ministers come from rural and small-town communities. A recent study of the sources of the Protestant ministry revealed that in a sampling of 1,709 ministerial students only 36 per cent came from cities of more than 25,000 population. Because of their rural and small-town origins, many ministers bring to their work in a city church a distaste for city ways. Facing the life of the city, the average Protestant minister's dominant emotion seems to be not the "love that casteth out fear," but the fear that excludes love. He is terrified by the vast agglomeration of human beings, by the city's monstrous vitality, myriad forms, restless energies, and by the impudent way in which it deals with the proprieties which a polite, middle-class Protestantism identifies with a "Christian culture." The minister is likely to be disabled from dealing with city people by his moralistic approach to their problems. He looks with disapproval upon an institution of such importance as the neighborhood tavern. He is appalled by the extravagance, late hours, and alcoholic excesses of city people and judges these "sins" far more harshly than small-town snooping, gossip, philistin-

¹⁰ Ross W. Sanderson, *The Church Serves the Changing City* (New York: Harper, 1955), p. 238.

ism, and cruelty toward the nonconformist.¹¹

OTHER CULTURAL CHANGES

Other changes in the culture are presenting the Church with problems and with opportunities only partially realized.

There is, for example, the growth of leisure. More and more the attention of the individual American and the family is centered on the use of the hours and days away from productive work. Approximately 15 per cent of total consumer expenditures are annually spent on leisure-time activities. With the arrival of the five-day week, and with the prospect of the four-day or even three-day week, the Church must reconsider its program in the light of a three-day or four-day "sabbath." The inviolability of the hour of eleven o'clock on Sunday morning and the universally observed time for corporate worship is brought into question. One church in New York City has had some success in its experiment with holding its weekly service of congregational worship on Friday evening in the summer time. Many churches are developing programs of adult education—often in the form of small groups engaged in the study of theology and biblical subjects—as ways of providing constructive leisure-time activities.

Another major cultural change is what Peter Drucker calls the educational revolution. Education today, instead of removing people from the productive enterprise into a leisure class as it often did in the past, has become almost a prerequisite to effective participation in the productive process. This fact constitutes an authentic revolution.

¹¹ Truman B. Douglass, "The Job the Protestants Shirk," *Harper's Magazine* (November 1958).

What does this revolution mean for churches that have set mediocre standards for the education of their ministry? What does it mean for churches whose outlook has been essentially anti-intellectual. The presence in their congregations of large numbers of persons who have been trained in the principles of critical thought constitutes a new situation which the churches have only begun to face.

DENOMINATIONAL IRRELEVANCE

Finally, a general observation that must be made about the changed situation of the churches is that the denominational system which characterizes religious affairs in America is becoming increasingly irrelevant to the actualities of our society and culture. While this irrelevance is becoming more clearly visible, the denominations, with their enlarged memberships and increased financial prosperity, become more self-assertive and tend to dominate the religious scene.

All churches in the United States, including the Roman Catholic Church and the "undenominational" association of Community Churches, are also sects. As the sectarian system becomes stronger and its constituent denominations become increasingly powerful, it also becomes less and less pertinent to the realities of American life. The so-called religious revival of the last decade has to be appraised in the light of the increasing irrelevancy of the fundamental structure of the Church in this nation.

The irrelevancy has been produced by some of the social and cultural facts that have been considered in this article.

One of these facts is the mobility of the American people. No church, not even the largest, is ubiquitous. When people are moving to the extent that

the American people have been moving since 1945, many of them settle in places where no church of their traditional denominational affiliation is present. In consequence, many of them change their denominational associations. They discover that this can be done without impairing—often, indeed, enriching—their religious experience. Many pastors of urban churches annually receive by transfer from congregations of other denominations three or four times as many members as they receive by transfer from congregations of their own denomination. It is evident that for many persons denominational loyalty ranks low among the considerations which influence their choice of a local church. Convenience of access, good Sunday School facilities for the children, the general excellence of the church's reputation and program, even availability of parking space may be more important factors than the continuance of an existing denominational affiliation.

A recent survey which included interviews with 4,100 members of Congregational Christian churches in all parts of the country, revealed that only one member out of three was originally a Congregationalist.¹² The churches studied derived over one half of their present membership from four other denominations: Methodist—18 per cent; Presbyterian—15 per cent; Baptist—11 per cent; and Lutheran—8 per cent. Two per cent of the members included in this study originally were Roman Catholics.

On the point of the historic theological and ecclesiological controversies which produced the separated denominations, the indifference of the laity is monumental. It has increasingly come to be recognized by both clergy and

¹² Yoshio Fukuyama (Research for doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago).

laity that many of the persons who avoid the Church do so not because of the "offense of the Cross," but because they are repelled by the offense of competing denominations.

DENOMINATIONAL DILEMMA

Can anyone seriously believe that these separated clans and tribes of the Christian family have any relevance to the real problems that humanity confronts in our time, or that their prosperity or lack of it provides any standard for judging the advance of the Christian movement? The statistical records of the denominations are not only notorious examples of the do-it-yourself craft of "how to lie with statistics," but are virtually meaningless as measurements of Christian accomplishment. One reads the recruiting literature of almost any denomination and tries vainly to find some resemblance to the criteria of the New Testament. The motivations to which appeal is made are not essentially different from the apologetic for the Junior Chamber of Commerce or the Neighborhood Improvement Association. They say, in effect:

Join us because we are a great organization with so many million members and so many thousand congregations. We have a noble tradition; we were brought to this country by passengers on the Mayflower. We have spawned the following well-known personalities. In this nuclear age, when the whole world is a neighborhood, we have missions from northern Greenland to Tierra del Fuego. Furthermore, through the influence of our great personalities and our spiritual teaching we are one of the chief bastions for the defense of the American way of life.

When a denomination is asked what is the relationship of this type of publicity to Christ's summons to "leave all and follow me," or to "do the things I command you," the answer is, "None whatever." This discontinuity is widely recognized. The response of intelligent persons to the typical forms of denominational propaganda is worse than incredulity; it amounts to boredom.

Thus the movement toward the overcoming of denominational disunity is generated not only by religious considerations but also by sociological factors. At the present moment it is being somewhat retarded by the economic prosperity of the denominations and by the illusions of omniscience which this prosperity produces. While there are some four hundred state and local councils of churches representing the cooperative tendencies of Protestantism, the denominations are reluctant to assign to them any real responsibilities except statistically unproductive functions such as work with agricultural migrants, share-croppers, and American Indians.

The dilemma of denominationalism gives a significance far greater than their quantitative dimensions to the movements toward actual unions of denominations—particularly those movements which aim at a reconciliation of fundamental differences of polity such as the differences between the episcopal, presbyterian, and congregational systems. Such unions are far more important than the reunion of separated branches of the same denominational family. One such union—the union between the Evangelical and Reformed and the Congregational Christian Churches—has already been accomplished in this country. Others are under consideration.

Religion and Education

By ROLFE LANIER HUNT

ABSTRACT: Sunday schools, vacation church schools, summer camps and conferences, released time, and church-related elementary and secondary day schools are the principal programs for religious instruction in the United States today. A trend toward more nonpublic schools on the elementary and secondary levels can be observed. An opposite trend can be observed in higher education. Organized attempts are being made to co-ordinate efforts in religious education made in the home and by mass communications media with the efforts of the churches and the major faiths. In a broad sense, no institution which permits or encourages the discussion of ultimate values is without a religious aspect. The public schools, therefore, are brought within the pale of the discussion of religion and education. An intelligent appraisal of the needs of the United States for religious education, narrowly or broadly understood, requires answers to questions which have not yet been researched.

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EDUCATION becomes religious, in a formal sense, when instruction is given in the tenets of one of the organized faiths. It is commonly expected that the beliefs taught will be represented as the true faith and that the students will accept them as such.

The most popular form of religious education in the United States is the Sunday school. The 39,564,925 pupils enrolled in the Sunday schools of the United States in 1958 amounted to 22.7 per cent of the total population. The comparable figure for 1926 was 17.9 per cent. While the total population was increasing 53 per cent during the years 1926-1959, Sunday school enrollments gained 90 per cent. During the same period, church memberships gained 105 per cent in the United States.

The total enrollment includes 35,850,699 persons reported as Protestant, and 3,714,226 reported as non-Protestant. The enrollment of Protestant children is distributed among the different age groups as shown in Table 1.

In considering the impact of the Sunday school, it is useful to note the proportion of each age group in the total population enrolled in the Sunday school. For this purpose, comparative figures are available for 1958.

TABLE 1—SUNDAY SCHOOL ENROLLMENT BY AGE-GROUP PERCENTAGES¹

SUNDAY SCHOOL DIVISION	AGE GROUP	PERCENTAGE OF ALL SUNDAY SCHOOL PUPILS
Cradle Roll	Under 2 years	7.2
Children's Division	3-12	38.0
Youth Division	12-23	19.5
Adult Division	24 and over	35.3

¹ Data for Tables 1 and 2 and in accompanying text were gathered by Helen Spaulding, Bureau of Research and Survey, National Council of Churches in the U.S.A., August 1960.

A total of 278,857 Sunday or Sabbath schools had the services of 3,674,730 adults—over 2 per cent of the total adult population of the United States—as teachers and officers.

The Board of Education of the Methodist Church distributed 6,975,991 copies of curriculum materials for the July-September quarter of 1958. In the first eight months of the year, they sold 40,000 filmstrips and records for the church-school curriculum.

In theory, the Sunday schools represent a major educational effort of the Protestant and other churches using them, yet it should be realized that the Sunday school is only part of the educational program in these churches. Most pastors conceive of the pulpit ministry as an effort in education. They intend their congregants to learn through sermons as well as to worship through participation in such other portions of the service as Bible-readings, affirmation of faith, hymn-singing, and the like. Returns from a questionnaire sent to 450 Methodist churches indicate that 65 per cent have Bible study for the whole congregation separate from the formal Sunday school, and 47 per cent of these projects are scheduled during the week rather than on Sunday. Methodist Men enroll more than twelve thousand clubs with regular meetings, and the Women's Society of Christian Service is one of the church's most effective educational arms. These agencies and efforts can be matched by reports of similar activities in many other denominations.

The denominations co-operate in many aspects of the work of the Sunday schools—in the preparation of outlines for curricula of the different age groups, in the training of teachers and administrators, and so on. Thus, fifty-five committees across the country have reviewed and evaluated more than 2,500 pieces of audio-visual material available for use in church school, and their clas-

TABLE 2—1958 SUNDAY SCHOOL ENROLLMENTS RELATED TO TOTAL UNITED STATES POPULATION AGE GROUPS¹

AGE GROUPS	PROTESTANT SUNDAY SCHOOL PUPILS	UNITED STATES POPULATION	PER CENT PROTESTANT SUNDAY SCHOOL PUPILS IN AGE GROUP
Cradle Roll	2,581,000	11,668,000	22.1
Children's Division	13,623,000	32,604,000	41.8
Youth Division	6,991,000	30,327,000	23.1
Adult Division	12,655,000	99,465,000	12.7

sified judgments are recorded in an *Audio-Visual Resource Guide* published by the National Council of Churches, with continuing reviews reported monthly in the *International Journal of Religious Education*.

SUMMERTIME EDUCATION

To utilize the free time of children during the summer, many churches operate "vacation church schools" and "vacation Bible schools." In 1958, a total of 108,124 vacation church schools in the United States enrolled a total of 7,598,940 pupils under the instruction of 1,158,585 teachers and officers. The enrollment of pupils represented a 2.1 per cent gain over that of the preceding year.

In the year 1958, a total of 7,063 summer camps and conferences sponsored by Protestants enrolled 801,871 campers and delegates supervised by 91,744 leaders and teachers. The reported number of campers and delegates represented an increase of 23.5 per cent over the preceding year. More than half the children who attend camps in the United States attend church-sponsored camps.

The following table shows the percentages of participants and leaders in summer programs as they are distributed according to age. The figures are derived from statistics supplied by eight denominations which reported a total of 230,602 campers and five denominations which reported a total of 32,180 leaders.

Many educational leaders report that vacation church schools and summer camps, affording large blocks of time for directed and sustained effort, are better opportunities for teaching and learning than the Sunday schools.

RELEASED TIME

The programs of religious instruction operated by churches for pupils who ask to be excused from public schools in order to attend are usually described as programs on "released time." A vari-

TABLE 3—ESTIMATED AGE-GROUP PERCENTAGES IN CHURCH CAMPS²

AGE GROUP	PER CENT OF CAMPS AND CONFERENCES	PER CENT OF CAMPER AND DELEGATES	PER CENT OF LEADERS
Children under 12 years	20.2	20.4	19.6
Camps for Junior High School pupils, 12-14 years old	35.3	36.6	40.2
Camps and Conferences for youth 15-23 years	26.6	32.3	35.2
Conferences for adults	12.8	5.9	2.4
Family camps and conferences	5.6	4.8	2.6

² *Ibid.*

ant is the "dismissed time" program in which all students are dismissed and those who choose to attend religious instruction can do so. Figures on these classes and their enrollments are hard to secure. State departments of education seldom require reports of this nature, and denominations thus far have asked for few reports on the matter from their local churches. Estimates of enrollment range from two and a half to five million children. Some programs of released time include only pupils in one grade; other programs are broader. A few programs extend into high school and may or may not be scheduled for credit.

The Church of Jesus Christ Latter-Day Saints, often called Mormon, was a pioneer in released time. Its system of seminaries, built on church-owned properties adjacent to the public high schools they serve, began in 1912, a year before Gary, Indiana, attracted nation-wide attention by introduction of week-day religious classes conducted during school hours. The system today includes 126 released-time seminaries, and approximately four hundred non-released-time seminaries giving religious instruction before or after school. This writer's visits to a representative sample of them found them to compare favorably in buildings, equipment, and qualifications of teachers with the schools to which they were attached. In these situations, the public school typically allows one-half unit of credit for the first year's study of the Old Testament and another one-half unit for the second year's study of the New Testament. Third and fourth years devoted to Church History and Doctrine usually are done without high school credit. The seminary teachers are recruited from among the regular subject teachers in the high school who have had at least two years of teaching experience. They are given extra training

and pay and have responsibilities in counselling and guidance.

After an initial delay, the Roman Catholic Church has come to make extensive use of released time programs. In some cities parochial school pupils are dismissed in order to free the buildings and teachers for pupils coming from the public schools. In other places, the Confraternity of Christian Doctrine, an adjunct of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, recruits lay teachers. With this system, they often prefer simultaneous release of all pupils from the public school.

To make use of full-time trained and professional teachers of religion, Protestants sometimes prefer the plan of "staggered time." This permits the trained teacher to work all day long with one class after another. This is done by the teacher in the Mormon seminary.

Programs of released time are maintained by practically all religious groups to some extent. Christian Scientists and Jews operate such schools in New York City, for example. The majority of the denominations in the National Council of the Churches of Christ promote a co-operative approach to the released time program. They encourage their local churches to collaborate in providing personnel and facilities and to use a common curriculum. The recommended curriculum, by action of the National Council of Churches Committee on Weekday Religious Education, will be directed toward interpretation of the child's experience in the public school in the perspective of "the revelation of God within the totality of man's experience."³

Disputes over the legality of programs of released time have been quieted by the decision of the United States Su-

³ "Relation of Religion to Public Education," *International Journal of Religious Education*, April 1960, p. 32.

preme Court in the *Zorach* case of 1952. That decision allows released time programs provided they make no use of the school machinery.

STAFFS AND SCHOOLS

The number of professionally employed "directors of religious education" is growing in the churches emphasizing Sunday and other church schools. Paul H. Vieth reported 1,003 persons so engaged in 1926. In 1958 it is reported that 11,258 persons were so engaged. Under the leadership of the pastor, these persons devote full-time professional skills to parish work in religious education.

The United States Office of Education estimates that in the 1959-1960 school year full-time non-public schools


TABLE 4—NONPUBLIC HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES AS PERCENTAGES OF ALL HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES IN THE UNITED STATES⁴

SCHOOL YEAR ENDING	PER CENT OF ALL HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
1920	11.6
1930	9.2
1940	6.4
1950	11.4
1956	11.5

enrolled 5,400,000 pupils in kindergarten through eighth grade out of a total of 33,380,000 pupils enrolled in those grades. The Office of Education estimates an enrollment of 1,100,000 out of a total enrollment of 9,590,000 for ninth through twelfth grades. It should be noted that the term nonpublic includes church-related schools and also

TABLE 5—ENROLLMENT IN PUBLIC AND NONPUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS⁵

Total public and nonpublic school enrollment is estimated at 42.7 million for the 1959-60 school year. Of this total, 36.2 million are enrolled in public schools and 6.5 million are enrolled in nonpublic schools. Since the school year 1939-40 enrollments in nonpublic schools have increased from 9.4 to 15.2 per cent of total enrollment.



⁴ Adapted from *Health, Education, and Welfare Trends* (1960 Edition; Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 60.

⁵ *Health, Education, and Welfare Trends* (1960 Edition; Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 56.

schools under private auspices which may be either profit-making or non-profit.

The Office of Education predicts a gain of 200,000 pupils for nonpublic schools in 1960-1961 as part of a total gain of 1,000,000 pupils in kindergarten through eighth grade, and a gain of 100,000 pupils as part of a total gain of 700,000 pupils in grades eight through twelve.⁶

Table 4 shows the percentages of high school graduates who were produced by nonpublic schools.

The nonpublic enrollment for 1920 was divided between 16,000 boys and

20,000 girls, and in 1956, 73,000 boys and 90,000 girls were reported. In the years 1940 and 1942, boys exceeded girls by 2,000 in enrollment of 7,800 and 8,100 respectively. In the public high schools, 1956 graduates included 607,000 boys and 646,000 girls. It is estimated that in 1958, 64.9 per cent of the persons seventeen years of age graduated from high school in the United States.

Tables 5 and 6 show the Office of Education long-term report of trends in enrollment for public and nonpublic elementary and secondary schools.

Tables 5 and 6 make no distinctions

TABLE 6—MILLIONS OF PUPILS ENROLLED IN PUBLIC AND NONPUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS⁷

SCHOOL YEAR ENDING	TOTAL ENROLLMENT	IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS			IN PRIVATE SCHOOLS			PER CENT NONPUBLIC IS OF:		
		ALL GRADES	KINDER-GARTEN -8	GRADES 9-12	ALL GRADES	KINDER-GARTEN -8	GRADES 9-12	TOTAL ENROLLMENT	KINDER-GARTEN -8	9-12
1900	17.0	15.6	15.0	0.6	1.4	1.2	0.1	8.2	7.6	20.9
1910	19.6	17.9	17.0	1.0	1.7	1.6	0.2	8.8	8.5	14.3
1920	23.5	21.7	19.5	2.2	1.8	1.5	0.3	7.5	7.1	10.4
1930	28.6	25.9	21.4	4.4	2.7	2.3	0.4	9.4	9.8	7.9
1932	29.3	26.5	21.3	5.2	2.8	2.4	0.4	9.7	10.1	7.6
1934	29.4	26.6	20.9	5.7	2.8	2.4	0.4	9.4	10.2	6.2
1936	29.2	26.5	20.5	6.0	2.7	2.3	0.5	9.2	10.0	6.4
1938	28.9	26.1	19.9	6.3	2.7	2.3	0.5	9.5	10.2	7.1
1940	28.3	25.6	19.0	6.6	2.7	2.2	0.5	9.4	10.3	6.8
1942	27.4	24.7	18.3	6.4	2.7	2.2	0.5	9.7	10.5	7.4
1944	26.0	23.4	17.8	5.6	2.5	2.1	0.4	9.8	10.5	7.4
1946	26.3	23.5	17.8	5.7	2.9	2.3	0.6	10.8	11.3	9.2
1948	27.2	24.1	18.4	5.7	3.1	2.5	0.6	11.4	11.8	10.0
1950	28.7	25.2	19.5	5.8	3.4	2.7	0.7	11.9	12.3	10.8
1952	30.6	26.7	20.8	5.9	3.8	3.2	0.7	12.6	13.2	10.3
1954	33.4	29.0	22.7	6.3	4.4	3.6	0.8	13.2	13.8	10.9
1956	36.1	31.3	24.4	6.9	4.8	3.9	.9	13.2	13.8	11.0
1958(p)	39.4	33.8	25.9	7.9	5.5	4.5	1.0	14.0	14.8	11.2
1960(p)	42.7	36.2	28.1	8.1	6.5	5.4	1.1	15.2	16.1	11.9

⁶ Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Press Release HEW-N53, July 7, 1960.

⁷ *Ibid.* The statistics include, in addition to enrollments in regular public and nonpublic elementary and secondary schools, enrollments

in residential schools for exceptional children, model and practice schools in teacher training institutions, subcollegiate departments of college, federal schools for Indians, and federal schools in federally affected areas.

TABLE 7—ENROLLMENT IN CHURCH-RELATED ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES

DENOMINATIONAL CONTROL	ENROLL BY TYPE OF SCHOOL*		
	KINDERGARTEN	ELEMEN. ^a	SECOND. ^b
10 PRINCIPAL SCHOOL SYSTEMS			
Roman Catholic	n.r.	3,400,000	690,000
Missouri Synod Lutheran	1,724	130,124	7,022
Seventh-day Adventist	—	42,069	13,380
Protestant Episcopal ^c	3,252	12,028	17,900
Joint Synod of Wisconsin	—	21,901	—
Christian Reformed ^d	—	31,874	6,664
Nat'l Assn. of Christ. Schools	7	8,960	7,492
Mennonite (including Amish)	88	—	5,870
Friends	221	4,978	4,940
Jewish ^f	4,133	21,259	4,326
OTHER DENOMINATIONS WITH SCHOOLS			
American Baptist Convention	—	—	968
American Luth. Church	1,236	2,765	—
Augustana Luth. Church	—	259	—
Council of Liberal Churches	—	—	126 ^g
Evangelical Luth. Church	—	1,151 ^h	692 ⁱ
Evangelical Mission Covenant	—	—	944
Latter-Day Saints	—	—	324
Los Angeles Baptist City Mission Society	—	2,949	—
Methodist Church, The	4,018 ^j	244	5,003
Moravian Church	—	—	574
National Evangelical Lutheran	21	38	—
New England Assn. of Christian Schools	91	218	173
Norwegian Synod Luth.	—	379	—
Presbyterian U. S.	n.r.	1,130	970
Presbyterian U. S. A.	n.r.	—	—
Reformed Church in America	—	—	62
Slovak Evangelical Luth.	—	147	—
Southern Baptist Convention	7,400 ^k	2,000	3,606
United Lutheran Church	—	625	—
Wesleyan Meth. Church	—	—	72

* Total reported Protestant enrollment: Kindergartens 18,058; Elementary 263,839; Secondary 76,842.

^a Includes schools with kindergartens but no schools with grades above grade 8.

^b Includes all schools with one or more grades 9-12, including schools with elementary grades also.

^c Includes all schools with one or more grades 9-12, including schools with elementary grades also. Does not include junior colleges or other institutions on college level that offer precollege level courses.

^d Enrollment figures for this denomination were for 85 nursery-kindergartens, 112 elementary schools, and 84 secondary schools.

^e The schools sponsored by this denomination comprise the National Union of Christian Schools.

^f Included with figures for secondary schools.

^g Does not include 550 for which level of instruction was not known.

^h One school only reporting enrollment.

ⁱ Eight schools only reporting enrollment.

^j Two schools only reporting enrollment.

^k Includes 1,992 pupils in nursery schools.

^l Includes an estimated 600 pupils in nursery grades.

TABLE 8—DISTRIBUTION OF CATHOLIC STUDENTS IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

EDUCATIONAL LEVEL	NUMBER OF SCHOOLS	NUMBER OF STUDENTS
ELEMENTARY SCHOOL		
Parochial and Institutional	9,897	4,195,781
Private	475	90,115
Protective Institutions	...	11,875
Public	...	2,466,386
SECONDARY SCHOOL		
Diocesan and Parochial	1,567	520,128
Private	866	324,171
Public	...	835,015
SEMINARY		
Diocesan	96	12,763
Religious of Scholasticate	429	19,618
Other	...	7,515
COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	265	302,908

between kinds of nonpublic schools. Reliable data on church-related elementary and secondary schools are notoriously hard to collect. The best summary available seems to be the one done by Bertha Blair. Her findings are shown in Table 7.⁸

According to a survey made in September 1959 of 3,349 Protestant full-time elementary day schools in North America, some 47.39 per cent were Lutheran, 38.34 per cent in the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod. The same survey reported 173,474 students in Lutheran elementary schools, and 121,949 students in elementary schools of other Protestant denominations. In

⁸ Bertha Blair, "Church-Related Elementary and Secondary Schools in Continental United States," Bureau of Research and Survey Information Service (New York: National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U. S. A., January 3, 1959).

January 1960, the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod reported 8,019 students in seventeen high schools under their auspices.⁹

The 1960 *Official Catholic Directory* reports 8,786,270 students under Catholic instructions. The distribution among educational institutions of all Catholics who are enrolled as students is shown in Table 8.¹⁰

Technically, the term "parochial school" describes a school operated by a parish and under the control of the parish priest. A school sponsored by the bishop for a diocese, or a school operated by a religious order such as the Society of Jesus, is not accurately classified as a parochial school. Nevertheless, the term is widely used to describe all church-related schools.

A survey in 1958 of Jewish education in the United States showed that 553,600 Jewish children were attending Jewish schools, an increase of over 130 per cent during the last 10 years.¹¹ An estimated 40-45 per cent of Jewish children of elementary school age attend such instruction. The Conservative groups account for 39 per cent, Reform for 28 per cent, and Orthodox for 21 per cent of the schools, with Yiddish and multiple-oriented schools accounting for the rest. Nearly all of the schools are under direct control of local congregations. Almost all of the whole-day schools are sponsored by the Orthodox, one half of the weekday afternoon schools are sponsored by the Conservative group, and the Reform group supports many Sunday schools.

⁹ These figures are supplied in a letter from William A. Kramer, Associate Secretary of Schools, Board of Parish Education, Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, St. Louis 2, Missouri, May 23, 1960.

¹⁰ *Official Catholic Directory* (1960 Edition; New York: P. J. Kenedy and Sons, 1960).

¹¹ Bernard D. Weinryb, "Intergroup Content in Jewish Religious Textbooks," *Religious Education* (March-April 1960), p. 112.

TABLE 9—ENROLLMENT BY TYPE OF JEWISH SCHOOL¹²

TYPE OF SCHOOL	NUMBER ENROLLED	PER CENT OF ALL ENROLLED
Full time day schools	42,651	7.8
Weekday afternoon schools	261,287	47.2
One-day Sunday schools	249,662	45.0
	553,600	100.

The objectives of Jewish education as formulated in the different curricula include knowledge—Bible, history, customs, Hebrew, Yiddish; practices and participation; beliefs and attitudes—understanding of Judaism, heritage; and a sense of belonging and identification.¹³

An estimated 80 per cent of all Jewish children in the United States receive some Jewish schooling at some time during school age.¹⁴ A majority attend three or four years, a sufficient time for effective preparation for Bar Mitzvah or confirmation. Some 60 million dollars per year is reported spent on Jewish education in the United States.¹⁴

A poll of 1,560 Jewish community leaders revealed that 75 per cent were opposed to the Jewish day school. The 25 per cent who supported the day school were chiefly Orthodox and Conservative constituents.¹⁵ The majority opposed the day school because they felt that common school provided their children a better preparation for life in the religiously pluralistic adult society of the United States.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Alexander M. Dushkin and Uriah A. Redelheim, *Jewish Education in the United States* (New York: American Association for Jewish Education, 1959), cited in Bureau of Research Education, and Survey, *Information Service* (New York, National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., June 25, 1960), p. 6.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

HIGHER EDUCATION

Enrollments in public four-year colleges and universities from 1949-1950 to 1959-1960 rose at the rate of 83.8 per cent, as contrasted with a rate of 31.8 per cent in private institutions including church colleges. Enrollments in public junior colleges increased at a rate of 128.3 per cent during the decade; enrollments in private junior colleges increased 24.7 per cent.¹⁶

Private institutions traditionally have enrolled the majority of students in higher educational institutions in the United States. Public institutions have been gaining, however, and they currently enroll nearly 60 per cent of the students. Church leaders have had to exert great effort in order to maintain the relative status of the church schools. Thus the Protestant Episcopal Church has more than doubled its contributions to its six four-year colleges and to its religious ministry to students and faculties in other colleges and universities. Within the decade, the Southern Baptist Convention increased two and a half times its support of its thirty-one senior and twenty-one junior colleges. In the American Baptist Convention, 2,287 churches in thirty-eight states pledged \$4,539,000 in the first half of a campaign for \$7,500,000 for their colleges and student work.

The Southern Presbyterian Church, officially known as the Presbyterian Church in the United States, has doubled its annual contributions to operating expenses, adding more than 30 million dollars to their assets in the decade. The Presbyterian Church in the United States of America—now becoming by

¹⁶ Annual Report on the Progress of Education in the United States to the 23rd International Conference on Public Education, Geneva, Switzerland, cited in United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of Education, Press Release HEW N-53, July 7, 1960.

merger the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America—has multiplied by four times its national appropriations to its colleges and student programs. It has especially emphasized raising salaries of faculties in a campaign in which national funds are matched by local funds. This church has a large scholarship program and it maintains over 120 student centers in colleges and universities other than its own.

The Methodist Church has just completed a quadrennial emphasis on higher education. It supports 118 colleges and universities, 162 Wesley Foundations at state and independent colleges and universities, and 245 other units of the Methodist Student Movement. They report increases in national funds from \$3,953,486 in 1956 to \$6,814,302 in 1959 for the colleges and universities, and from \$777,984 in 1956 to \$1,844,656 in 1959 for the student program. In addition thirty-three annual conferences during the quadrennium engaged in campaigns for capital funds for higher educational institutions. Their goals amounted to \$41,651,638, with \$35,306,031 achieved in cash and pledges and success expected in meeting the full goal. During the quadrennium, endowments of Methodist Church colleges were increased by more than one fourth to an amount of \$418,023,548. The valuation of the physical plants also was increased by one fourth to \$592,070,020. The Disciples of Christ, the Congregational-Christian, the Evangelical Lutheran, the Church of the Brethren, the Church of God, and many other denominations are making parallel efforts. One congregation of the Seventh-Day Baptist Church gives an average of ten dollars per member annually to support a college. New church colleges are being established, for example, a university in Alaska and two colleges in North Carolina by Methodists,

a university in Florida by Presbyterians, and so on. Roman Catholics have the announced aim of taking care of all their students in their own colleges. Jewish groups have established Brandeis and Yeshiva Universities.

The American Association of Theological Schools in the United States and Canada is the accrediting body for Protestant schools of theology. The Association reports that in the 1958-1959 school year eighty-two fully-accredited schools of theology enrolled 18,631 students, and forty associate schools enrolled 3,140 students. The eighty fully-accredited schools which reported that year had full- and part-time faculties numbering 1,725 members; the property assets of sixty-seven schools totaled \$138,383,944; and eighty-one such schools had current budgets totaling \$24,686,495.¹⁷

Some data on Roman Catholic theological enrollments has already been given. Seminaries are also operated by the Conservative, Orthodox, and Reformed branches of Judaism in the United States. New York, Chicago, and Cincinnati are notable as Jewish theological centers.

THE HOME AND OTHER AGENCIES

The home teaches religion. Common experience shows that the religious example which most influences the child is the example of his parents. There is a dearth of objective data on the basis of which trends in religious practices and teachings in the home can be evaluated. Churches are making fuller efforts to assist parents in teaching religion to children in the home. For example, in one year the Methodist Church Board of Education distributed 2,242,500 leaf-

¹⁷ These figures are supplied in a letter from Jesse H. Ziegler, Associate Director, American Association of Theological Schools in the United States and Canada, Dayton 2, Ohio, March 14, 1960.

lets and pamphlets on family life and publishes *The Christian Home*, circulating 200,000 copies monthly, relating current issues of family living to the Christian faith. Similar papers are published by other denominations. Boards of education of the Protestant Episcopal Church and the Presbyterian Church in the United States have recently published new curriculum materials which involve co-ordinated efforts by parents in the home and teachers in the Sunday school.

The brevity of this article makes it necessary to omit much of interest in assessing religion and education in the United States. The National Association of Evangelicals, for example, brings together many churches with educational programs. Methodist churches sponsor 13,221 troops of the Boy Scouts of America, Roman Catholics sponsor 12,686 troops, Baptists 7,291, Presbyterians 7,190, Lutherans 5,639, and five other denominations sponsor more than 1,000 such local units each. Religious bodies sponsor 50.1 per cent of the 129,097 Boy Scout units which enroll over 3.5 million youth in the nation.

All of the churches have programs of teacher training for church-school teachers. For example, over 250,000 persons were enrolled in study courses sponsored by the Methodist Church for the improvement and personal enrichment of teachers in the church school. Other boards, such as those on temperance or world peace, carry on other educational programs. The denominational boards of social action associated with the Division of Christian Life and Work of the National Council of Churches, for example, are currently sponsoring study groups in hundreds of churches on the theme "Christian Responsibility for Freedom."

Television and radio programs could be the subject of a separate article. National networks and many local sta-

tions give public service time in addition to purchased time to series of religious programs. Experiments are made in collaboration between stations and churches. "The Rainy Season," for example, posed problems of older adults on television. It was heard and used as material by eighty-seven discussion groups in churches of one denomination. Network and local television and radio programs are aimed at specific audiences, some at children, some at youth, some at adults.

The Religious Education Association, a professional association of religious educators from all the faith groups, encourages the exchange of experiences. It publishes *Religious Education* as one means of circulating research reports.

THE PLACE OF VALUES

The definition of religious education accepted at the beginning of this report directed attention to the educational effort of organized religious groups. By another definition, religion is simply loyalty to ultimate values.

Schools are established by those who think they have something to teach, and educators seek to transform the world as it is into the world as they believe it ought to be. This is also the concern of religion. Both education and religion provide some continuity with the past and some vision for the future. The facts with which the school deals are not simple, for every fact is expressed within some conceptual framework, within some interpretive scheme. The selection of facts to be taught is governed by some set of ultimate values which guide choice. In school, youths look for answers to questions about the origin, destiny, and meaning of life. These are religious questions. In the United States we say that every individual has a right to an education. And this is an expression of a religious conviction about the nature of the universe

and man's place in it. Within the wider definition of religion, public education is perhaps the greatest religious force in American life today.

Private schools derive their orientation from the values of the group supporting them. That group most often is a self-conscious segment of society such as an economic, social, or religious group. The church school is based upon the governing convictions of its sponsoring religious body. Parochial schools operated by different churches should not be completely equated, for the schools reflect the views of the parent churches which may differ widely in values and beliefs.

Public schools derive their values from the needs and interests of the society as a whole or of its majority groups. Because the public schools are operated by the people through the state, there is always a tendency to make the state itself an object of deification, to accept the state as constituting the highest value. Yet political theory in the United States still emphasizes that the government exists to serve the people.

In the United States, the public schools are expected to inspire the young with the ideals of American democracy as embodied in our traditions and in our documents such as the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights. These concepts derive from a theistic view of man and of society. Man is seen as a creature endowed by his Creator with inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. Men and nations live under a Divine Providence and a Supreme Judge. Schools are intrinsically religious when religion is conceived as relevant to every human activity and whenever the educative process becomes the occasion for asking

the most profound questions, entertaining the highest hopes and expectations, and making the basic decisions.

Questions of how the public schools should deal with matters of religious concern inevitably arise. More lawsuits are pending on such issues than are pending in the more publicized field of racial desegregation of public schools. It is appropriate to note that in a society in which most children attend public schools, memberships in Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant religious organizations have increased to unprecedented proportions.

Proposals for use of tax funds for the education of children in the church-related schools are being seriously advanced and considered. Precedents can be gleaned from the social welfare field, from government programs of aid to higher education, and from other areas for urging tax-supported aid on elementary and secondary levels of education. It would be helpful in future deliberations if some answers were available to questions such as these:

What differences exist between the students produced by the public schools and those produced by the church-related schools as operated in the United States?

What differences exist between the students produced in American schools and the students produced by schools in which an established religion is taught in countries whose practices are offered as precedents for us?

What are the differences in people who have had religious education in varying amounts and those who have not?


How can religious learning be fitted into a developmental sequence and provide a basis for a curriculum, perhaps assigned to co-operative educational arrangements as suggested by released time, division of responsibility between church and state?

Answers to such questions would probably cost twenty million dollars and twenty years of effort—but would they not be worth the price?

Religion and Politics

By LUKE EBERSOLE

ABSTRACT: The controversy over mixing religion and politics has not kept religion apart from government. Religious groups participate in a wide variety of political activities. But religious groups in the United States are not organized as political parties or political machines. There is a relation between religious affiliation and party affiliation. The correlation, however, does not usually indicate a "religious" vote. In part, the relation reflects socio-economic status. For Catholics and Jews it is very much a result of awareness of minority status. As minority awareness declines, trends in voting change. There is no pattern of voting for or against candidates because of their religion. The importance of religion in a presidential election cannot be assessed on the basis of other elections. The election of a Catholic president would not change the nature of our government, but it would have an effect on American politics.



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IN the controversy over mixing religion and politics, a distinction frequently is not made between religious political action and the joining of church and state. Without regard for its historical meaning, the principle of separation of church and state is often used as the chief basis for criticism of political activity by religious groups.

The legal basis for separation of church and state in the United States is contained in the provision of the First Amendment that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." In the years since its ratification there has been considerable contention over its specific application, but there is rather general agreement that its authors meant to prohibit the federal government from regulating and supporting religion.¹ On the whole, the "wall of separation" has been well maintained.

The framers of the Constitution were equally concerned about the control that religion might exercise over government. The coin of disestablishment had two sides. At the same time that it granted freedom to religion from regulation by the state, it foreclosed a major means for religious domination of the state. There could be no state church or churches.

But separation of church and state as set forth in the First Amendment does not cover the whole range of relations between religion and government. Other than to disestablish the church or churches, it does not define the legal place of religion in government. Religious political movements, religious political parties, organized religious pressure groups, and church lobbying are

outside the purview of any Constitutional provision.²

PRESSURE AND LOBBYING

In practice, religion has not held itself aloof from government. Organized efforts to sway government in the name of religion have long been part of the political process. A survey of a few past movements and organizations shows how varied the political interests of religious groups have been. Since 1844 the Christian Amendment Movement has been attempting to have religious language written into the preamble of the Constitution. One of the purposes of the Know-Nothing Party was to prevent the election of any but staunch Protestants to public office. Churchmen played prominent roles on both sides of the political struggle over slavery. Immediately following its appearance in 1874 the Woman's Christian Temperance Union launched a prohibition campaign. The Knights of Columbus has attempted to use the machinery of government to achieve its ends. The Lord's Day Alliance was formed in 1888 to represent Protestant denominations in their efforts to secure the enactment of legislation to preserve Sunday rest and worship. In the present century the most conspicuous political activity of the churches was the drive for national prohibition under the direction of the powerful Anti-Saloon League. The Methodist Board of Temperance moved to Washington in 1916 in time to aid in the prohibition campaign. The National Council for Prevention of War, working closely with church groups, started its campaign in Washington in 1921. Between the First and Second

² The only other specific reference to religion is contained in Article 6: "... no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States."

World Wars many religious groups were active in the peace movement and opposed governmental action that might lead toward war.

Some of these older groups still continue their efforts to influence government in Washington. In addition, new organizations have appeared. A number of religious groups have formed agencies which have the assigned function of providing their constituents with information about government and also of representing their respective denominational or interdenominational church bodies before the federal government. The Catholic Church has had offices in Washington for more than four decades. Most of the Protestant agencies have maintained offices in Washington since the end of the Second World War. Among the groups with Washington offices are the Friends Committee on National Legislation, the Legislative Committee of the Congregational Christian Council for Social Action, the Council for Christian Social Progress of the Northern Baptist Convention, several Methodist organizations, the National Lutheran Council, the National Council of the Churches of Christ in America, the American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs, the National Catholic Welfare Conference, the National Conference of Catholic Charities, the Christian Science Committee on Publications, and Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State. This list might be expanded to include other national organizations and also groups that operate on the state and local levels.

The activities of such organizations vary greatly in the degree to which they are political. Some church agencies in Washington function only to channel information concerning legislation and governmental action to the church public. Others have become experts in the art of influencing government. They

take their place among the lobbyists in informing, advising, and persuading legislators and administrators. The efforts of many national and local groups consist chiefly of sporadic campaigns of propaganda and pressure. By passing resolutions, appointing delegations, calling mass meetings, and sending letters and telegrams, religious groups across the country pressure and protest, approve and disapprove governmental action.

There are many critics of the participation by religious groups in the affairs of government. Church political action agencies are often charged with taking positions that are not representative of their constituents. In many cases the charge is true, as it is true of other organizations that attempt to speak for large and heterogeneous groups. In their study of the Protestant Episcopal Church to find the relationship between parishioners' attitudes and official church policy on social issues, Glock and Ringer reported that on all but one issue on which the church has a committed policy the parishioners are divergent. The single area in which there is agreement is the United Nations. They also found that on most social issues the policy of the church is more liberal than the attitudes of parishioners.³ In a letter prefacing the final report of the National Lay Committee of the National Council of Churches, the chairman wrote: "Clergy and laity active in organized Protestantism seemed to have lost the capacity to understand each other. We, as lay people, were alarmed and unhappy as the National Council assumed the right to speak increasingly on subjects in which

³ Charles Glock and B. B. Ringer, "Church Policy and the Attitudes of Ministers and Parishioners on Social Issues," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 21 (April 1956), pp. 148-156.

⁴ *U. S. News and World Report*, Vol. 40 (February 3, 1956), p. 47.

¹ Since 1925 the First Amendment has been interpreted to mean that the states also shall not regulate or support religion.

it was difficult to see ethical or spiritual content for that inarticulate and voiceless body called "34 million Protestants."

Some of the opposition, of course, follows from the premise that, no matter what the issues, organized religion has no place in government. Indeed, there are some critics who seem to believe that all pressure groups should be removed from government. They would prefer to have the National Association of Manufacturers, the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, the Farm Bureau, and other interest groups, along with religious groups, cease political activity and leave government to function in a pressureless vacuum.

No matter how religious groups resolve the issue of their proper place in government, it appears that their present organized pressure and lobbying efforts are not contrary to the intent of the Constitution. No church organization is in a position to dominate government in the United States. The political forces of religion are dispersed, not centralized. They often display disagreement, not consensus. Moreover, the attempts of religious groups to influence government are usually based on utilitarian and broadly ethical considerations, rather than on strictly sectarian and theological grounds. The churches in this country are not political rivals of the state. Religious groups are doing nothing more than participating in the democratic process of discussion, pressure, and consent by which government policy is formed.

NO RELIGIOUS PARTIES

Unlike religious groups in several European countries, religious groups in the United States have not formed political parties. Only once has a party with avowedly religious purposes achieved even a modicum of political power. The

Native American Party, which became the Supreme Order of the Star-Spangled Banner or Know-Nothing Party, was committed to the election of Protestants. The program of the movement derived not from what it was for but from what it was against. In a predominantly Protestant country, the erection of Catholic churches, schools, and convents gave rise to a deeply rooted set of suspicions, fears, and hates. The Know-Nothing Party was the political embodiment of religious hostility. It fought against every form of Catholic influence in the United States. A few years after the peak of its strength in the middle of the last century, the Know-Nothing Party was dead. But Know-Nothingism has been felt many times in American politics in the small waves of Anti-Catholic and Anti-Jewish feeling that have moved across the nation.

Not only are there no religious political parties in America today; there are no politico-ecclesiastical machines comparable to the Anti-Saloon League in its day. Founded in 1895, the League grew into an organization supported by as many as 60,000 agencies and spending as much as \$2,500,000 a year. Although temperance societies in and outside of the churches co-operated, it was the churches that gave the organization its strength. The League had a simple and unchanging platform. It would settle for nothing less than destruction of the entire traffic in liquor. It was geared for quick and effective action toward this end. Control was centralized. Funds were bountifully supplied. League henchmen were located throughout the land. Most important, the League could employ the one sure method of exerting political pressure; it could control votes. At the height of its strength the Anti-Saloon League achieved unprecedented political power.⁵

⁵ See Peter H. Odegard, *Pressure Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928).

It cannot be alleged that there now exists a political machine prepared to deliver a bloc of Protestant votes, nor that there is a political machine able to deliver the Jewish vote. But the charge is made that the Catholic Church has a political apparatus that can control the Catholic vote throughout the United States. The case against this belief is stated by Elmo Roper.⁶

I think I can . . . dispel . . . the myth of a captive, precommitted Catholic vote. . . . Catholic voters are just as free, just as unfettered, just as intelligent, and just as divided in their voting preferences as any other group. . . .

One can only hope that both our politicians and our people will one day acknowledge what seems an obvious truth: that Catholics are many things. For example, they are not only Irish—they are Italians, they are Germans, they are Frenchmen, and they are Poles. Catholics are liberals—and they are conservatives. Catholics belong to labor unions—and Catholics are unhappy about labor unions. Catholics are Republican—and they are Democratic.

Most students of political behavior concur in the judgment that the Catholic Church does not constitute a political organization capable of delivering the vote of its members. Catholic laymen, like other laymen, are responsive to many political cues other than those that might be provided by church officials. Moreover, Catholic officials have demonstrated little inclination to present a united front in support of particular candidates for public office. Like the leaders of other churches, Catholic leaders are politically divided.

DO THEY VOTE RELIGION?

Despite the absence of religious political parties and of politico-ecclesiastical

⁶ *Saturday Review*, Vol. 42 (October 31, 1959), p. 22.

machines ready to deliver blocs of votes, is there a relation between religion and voting? Is there any indication that religion enters into the choice that the American registers at the polls? This is a complex matter involving many often contradictory factors. We shall consider only a few.

It is necessary to make a distinction between voting when local measures are at stake and voting in national elections. The greatest evidence of religious bloc voting or of occasional ecclesiastically encouraged voting is to be found below the level of national politics. It is apparent that at times local actions produce a religious vote. In 1948 in Massachusetts, Catholics voted in vast numbers because of a referendum measure to allow state health officials to disseminate birth-control information. In California in 1958, there was an outpouring of Catholics because of a referendum issue which would have made parochial schools subject to taxation.⁷ In local liquor referendums, organizations led by Protestant ministers sometimes arouse the "church vote." But in view of the difference in drinking habits among Protestants and within each denomination, such voting can hardly be called Protestant, or even Baptist or Methodist.

Turning to the broader question of the religious composition of political parties, there is some indication of a relation between religious affiliation and party affiliation. It is an elementary political assumption that although Protestants, Jews, and Catholics are both Republicans and Democrats, Protestants tend to be more Republican than Democratic, and Catholics and Jews tend to be more Democratic than Republican. The evidence, however, is not unmixed,

⁷ Peter H. Odegard, *Religion and Politics* (New York: Oceana Publications, 1960), pp. 123, 124.

and the relation between religion and party is probably not as consistent as is widely believed.

On the basis of a small-scale study of the 1948 election and a nationwide study of the 1952 election, the University of Michigan Survey Research Center provides some evidence concerning the voting behavior of Catholics and Protestants.⁸ In 1948 the Catholics contacted during this survey expressed a strong Democratic preference. Forty-nine per cent voted Democratic; 15 per cent of the nonvoters had a Democratic preference. This produced a total Democratic preference of 64 per cent. Twenty-five per cent of the Catholics surveyed voted Republican; 2 per cent of the nonvoters had a Republican preference. This produced a total Republican preference of 27 per cent. In 1952 the total Democratic preference among Catholics was 53 per cent, of which 43 per cent were voters and 10 per cent were nonvoters. The total Republican preference was 47 per cent, of which 41 per cent were voters and 5 per cent were nonvoters.

Protestants questioned by the 1948 study seem to have had a Democratic preference which did not show up in their vote. The total Democratic preference among Protestants was 53 per cent, of which 25 per cent were voters and 28 per cent were nonvoters. Thirty-four per cent of the Protestants had a Republican preference, of which 28 per cent were voters and 6 per cent were nonvoters. In 1952 the total Democratic preference among Protestants was 39 per cent—26 per cent voters and 13 per cent nonvoters. The total Republican preference among Protestants was 57 per cent—45 per cent voters and 12 per cent nonvoters.

In general, these findings conform to

⁸ Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1954), p. 71.

the assumed relationship between religion and party, but they show that the relationship is varied and sometimes tenuous. In a Democratic year, Catholics voted Democratic two to one. In a Republican year, Catholics divided their vote almost evenly, giving the Democrats a slight edge. Protestants, in a Democratic year, had a Democratic preference which they did not vote. In a Republican year they voted Republican not quite two to one.

In several studies of particular communities, Catholic-Protestant differences stand out more definitely. In Erie County, Ohio, in 1940, 60 per cent of the Protestants said they intended to vote Republican, whereas only 23 per cent of the Catholics indicated a Republican preference.⁹ In Elmira, New York, in 1948, Catholics voted Republican only half as much as Protestants.¹⁰

In the case of American Jews, the relation between religion and party affiliation has been marked. For many years Jewish immigrants gave their political loyalty to the Republican Party. But since the 1930's the Jewish vote has shifted to the Democrats. In 1936, Ward 24 in Chicago, which probably had a higher proportion of Jews than any ward in the nation, voted 96 per cent for Roosevelt. National surveys show that in 1940 and 1944 more than 90 out of 100 Jews voted Democratic. Since 1948 the Jewish Democratic vote has diminished but the decline has not been great.¹¹

⁹ Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1944), pp. 21, 22.

¹⁰ Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 64.

¹¹ Jewish voting trends have been analyzed by Lawrence H. Fuchs in *The Political Behavior of American Jews* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956), and in "American Jews and the Presidential Vote," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 49 (June 1955), pp. 385-401.

ECONOMIC STATUS

Does the correlation between religion and party, whether great or small, consistent or fluctuating, actually represent a religious vote? So far as Protestants are concerned the answer is in the negative. Protestants are much too diverse in their political attitudes and behavior to be treated as one group. After an analysis of politico-economic attitudes in eight major religious groups, Wesley and Beverly Allensmith concluded as follows:¹²

Differences can be shown between major Protestant denominational groups which are as great as differences between such groups and non-Protestant groups. Thus differences between Congregationalists (taken as a group) and Catholics (as a group) are in general no greater than differences between Congregationalists and Baptists.

The source of Protestant political differentiation is not religious but economic. Among Protestants there is a close correlation between socio-economic status and political behavior.

With considerable justification, many political observers have also applied a socio-economic interpretation to the party identification of American Catholics. In *The Future of American Politics*, Samuel Lubell wrote:¹³

Because they came to this country late, these immigrants and their children were concentrated in the lower economic rungs. . . . Catholicism . . . coincided largely with discrimination and sweated labor, with immigrant minorities who were looked upon as inferior beings—in short, the lower class.

On the other hand, the Erie County and Elmira studies showed that when

¹² Wesley and Beverly Allensmith, "Religious Affiliation and Politico-Economic Attitude: A Study of Eight Major U. S. Religious Groups," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 12 (Fall 1948), pp. 388, 389.

¹³ Samuel Lubell, *The Future of American Politics* (New York: Harper, 1951), p. 39.

Catholics and Protestants on various socio-economic levels were compared, Catholics voted more Democratic than Protestants on all levels.¹⁴ Catholics of high economic status voted more Democratic than Protestants of low economic status. In addition, liberalism or conservatism on economic issues was not the determining influence in party alliance. Catholics who agreed with the Republican position on economic issues were no more Republican than liberal Protestants. On each level of liberalism or conservatism, Catholics were more Democratic than Protestants.¹⁵ In Philadelphia, Glantz found no difference between Catholics and Protestants at the top level of stratification, but in the middle and lower classes there was twice as much Republicanism among Protestants as among Catholics.¹⁶ Thus while the economic status of Catholics has an important bearing on their party affiliation, it does not offer a full explanation.

For the Jewish group taken as a whole, the economic class theory of politics is not relevant. The economic position of American Jews has been improving rapidly. Yet while this improvement was taking place, the Jewish vote shifted from Republican to strongly Democratic. Within the group, economic differences have had little effect on voting in national elections. Political attitudes, too, appear to be unrelated to economic status. Only a relatively small proportion of Jews are manual workers, but they tend to share certain of the attitudes held by groups having a large proportion of workers.¹⁷

¹⁴ Lazarsfeld *et al.*, p. 22, and Berelson *et al.*, p. 65.

¹⁵ Berelson *et al.*, p. 66.

¹⁶ Oscar Glantz, "Protestant and Catholic Voting Behavior in a Metropolitan Area," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 23 (Spring 1959), pp. 73-82.

¹⁷ Wesley and Beverly Allensmith, p. 381.

MINORITY STATUS AWARENESS

What we see in the party affiliations of Catholics and Jews is not in a true sense "voting their religion." Religious issues are rarely involved. Whatever political consensus exists, and it is sometimes small, is not so much a result of religious cohesion as it is a result of awareness of minority status. Berelson, in Elmira, found the following:¹⁸

The more closely the members identified with their minority group, the stronger their Democratic vote. Regardless of the particular measure, those minority members who feel close to their own group (or who feel hostile to the out-group) are more likely to express the group's political preference (i.e., vote Democratic) than their fellows.

Religious intolerance, ethnic discrimination, low economic position, urban concentration, and residential segregation have all contributed in varying degrees to Catholic and Jewish minority feelings. In cities with large Catholic populations the Democratic party early became an agency of Catholic social participation, protest, and power. Once established, party allegiance tended to be transmitted within the group and from generation to generation.

One of the reasons why Jews first associated themselves with the Republicans was that Catholics were Democrats. But in the campaign of 1928 and during the 1930's, the Democratic Party came to be defined as the party of the city, of social protest, and of hope for minorities. Increasingly Jews found identification with the Democratic Party to be more compatible with their own status. When in the late 1930's and early 1940's Franklin D. Roosevelt became the symbol of opposition to Hitlerism and Jewish persecution, the Jewish sense of affinity with the Democratic Party was

intensified. For a period the Jewish transfer to the Democratic Party was almost complete.

The need for Catholics and Jews to hold to a minority-group political identification has greatly decreased in the last generation. Occupational and economic mobility, political and educational achievement, cultural assimilation, and increased religious tolerance have removed much of the reason for minority protest. Indeed, when the Michigan Survey Research Center attempted to measure the degree to which the relationship between religion and party is psychologically meaningful, it was discovered that most voters, including minority group members, do not think of their religious group as preferring a particular party.¹⁹

But even though the stimulus for minority political sentiment has weakened, minority-group patterns of voting persist. Without consciously voting as Catholics or Jews, people tend to vote like others who have had similar experiences and like the people with whom they associate most intimately. For urban Catholics and Jews these people are often members of their own religious group.

There is evidence, however, that the changing status of ethnic and religious minorities is causing political change. The Elmira researchers saw a decline in the Catholic Democratic vote. They also found more Republican voting among younger Catholics than among older Catholics. "The succession of generations seems to be softening the religious difference."²⁰ While Jewish defection from the Democratic ranks is small, there are signs that in some communities Jewish voting is beginning to

¹⁹ The investigators recognized that their results may have been influenced by the reluctance publicly to associate religion with politics. See Campbell *et al.*, pp. 206-15.

²⁰ Berelson *et al.*, pp. 69, 70.

move toward a pattern more influenced by economic status. For both Catholics and Jews it may be expected that as minority feelings diminish, occupation and economic and social class will gain in importance as determinants of their political behavior.

CANDIDATE'S RELIGION

Hitherto we have dealt with the party preferences of religious groups, irrespective of who the candidate may be. We are still left with the question of whether the religious affiliation of the candidate himself is a factor in the vote for or against him.

The argument that the religion of a candidate can help to attract support was used by the supporters of Senator John F. Kennedy in his bid for the Democratic vice-presidential nomination in 1956. According to their analysis, the Democratic Party was losing Catholic votes. They held that in 1952 Democratic Catholic candidates for Congressman, Senator, and Governor ran ahead of the Democratic presidential candidate. They argued, too, that a Catholic vice-presidential candidate would not hurt the party ticket. Thus, they took the position that Catholics would vote for a candidate because of his Catholicism, but that non-Catholics would not vote against him as a Catholic.

The claims of the Kennedy supporters were refuted by a group of social scientists in a study released by Ralph M. Goldman and John H. Romani.²¹ They showed that in 1952 there was no significant difference between the vote for Catholic and non-Catholic candidates. Catholic Congressional candidates ran ahead of the party ticket, but so also did non-Catholic Congressional candidates. Through an analysis of election results in states in which religion was claimed to be a factor, the study showed

²¹ *U. S. News and World Report*, Vol. 41 (August 17, 1956), pp. 44-46, 132-35.

that a large Catholic population did not give an advantage to a candidate who was a Catholic. At the same time, a large non-Catholic population did not put a Catholic candidate at a disadvantage. In every state the situation was the same. A pattern of religious voting could not be established. A study of this type cannot be interpreted to mean that Catholics never give special support to a Catholic candidate. But it does help to refute the assertion that Catholic candidates receive general and predictable Catholic support.

There can be no doubt that religious affiliation has been a factor in the making or breaking of many political careers. Catholics and Jews have held almost every type of public office. But the willingness of party leaders to accept them as candidates, as well as their own realistic aspirations, have frequently been governed by the rules of political "availability." For Catholics and Jews, availability has been influenced by religion. The same is true of Protestants in predominantly Catholic or Jewish areas.

RELIGION AND THE PRESIDENCY

The 1960 election has again raised the issue of voting for or against a presidential candidate because of his religion. Notwithstanding objections and disclaimers, religion was an issue from the beginning. In accepting the Democratic nomination, Mr. Kennedy made an effort to remove religion from the campaign when he expressed the hope that no American would waste his franchise by voting either for him or against him because of his religious affiliation. Earlier, however, Mr. Kennedy had recognized that religion was part of 1960 presidential politics. He warned Democratic leaders that if he did not receive the nomination, it would be taken to be on account of his religion, and the Democratic Party would suffer. The

¹⁸ Berelson *et al.*, pp. 71, 72.

implication was that rejection of a Catholic candidate would result in loss of Catholic Democratic support. At the same time a number of prominent Catholic political leaders and religious leaders were fearful that Mr. Kennedy's candidacy might meet with enough opposition to change the comfortable climate in which Catholics in public life have functioned.

Evaluation of the importance of religion in a presidential election is singularly difficult because there is little in the 1960 election that can be compared with the past. The campaign of 1928 was hard fought and even vicious. Religious prejudice was fully exploited. In some Democratic strongholds the Catholicism of the candidate outweighed party loyalty. Even so, in retrospect it appears that religion may not have been as decisive in the defeat of Al Smith as was originally supposed. Religion aside, 1928 was a year of battle between country and city, native born and foreign born, privileged and underprivileged, drys and wets. After a study of 173 counties in eight Northern states distributed across the country, Ogburn and Talbot concluded that prohibition sentiment was decidedly more important than anti-Catholicism in the Democratic defeat.²² Whatever the effect of the religious controversy in 1928, that campaign does not answer many questions about the present. The pattern of politics has changed, as have also attitudes on religion.

Studies of voting in local and state elections have limited relevance in assessing the influence of religion on a presidential vote. In local and state elections the religion of a candidate may not be known by many voters. In a presidential election the voter can

hardly fail to know. By common consent the presidency has been regarded as a public office requiring a unique set of political qualifications. Catholics and Jews have been mayors, senators, and governors, but no Jew has been a candidate for the presidency and only twice have Catholics been candidates. Voting to fill offices that have many times been held by members of all major religious groups cannot be compared with an election in which there is a Catholic candidate for the presidency.

Moreover, victory or defeat for Mr. Kennedy is not the test of the place of religion in presidential politics. Win or lose, many questions will remain to be answered. Did the Democratic candidate receive stronger Catholic support than usual? If so, in what areas? Did he lose votes among non-Catholics? If so, in what areas? In areas with large Catholic populations, what issues other than religion might account for strong or weak support? What issues other than religion might account for strong or weak support in areas with small Catholic populations? These and others are questions answers to which will need to wait for a careful analysis of the 1960 election.

CONSEQUENCES OF 1960

As this article is being written, the results of the election are not known. Nevertheless, a few observations about its possible consequences may be allowed. The election of a Catholic as president almost certainly would modify the pattern of politics. The sequel probably would be a strengthening of Catholic Democratic loyalty. It is likely that some Catholics would rally to the Democratic Party as the party that was again willing to disregard traditional religious qualifications for a presidential candidate. But such a gain for the Democrats could be temporary.

The net effect might be a loss of Catholic support inasmuch as the election of a Catholic president would further diminish the need for a minority-group political orientation. In the long run, any decline in out-group feeling would be expected to cause Catholic voting to be determined by more nearly the same factors as Protestant voting.

If Mr. Kennedy is defeated, the result will be different. No matter what the real reasons, defeat would be interpreted by many Catholics as a rejection of one of their own. There would be lingering frustration and consequent awareness of minority status until the last political door is opened. In this mood some intensification of Democratic allegiance might be anticipated.

It is not to be expected that the election of a Catholic as president would alter the structure of government. The fears of direct ecclesiastical control of a president grow out of a failure to understand the nature both of American Catholicism and of American government. That on some matters a Catholic president would hold attitudes influenced by his religion is to be assumed. Presidents who have been farmers, businessmen, educators, generals, and Protestants have not divested themselves of all prior attitudes upon entering the White House. The real question is whether the issues on which a Catholic president might feel bound by his religion are public issues, whether they are national issues, and whether they are clearly contrary to democratic tradi-

tion and practice. There are relatively few social issues on which Catholicism has an official position. Divorce, birth control, censorship, and state support of parochial schools are among the issues on which there is an official policy. Of these the major matter of national relevance is support of education. It is not inevitable that on this or any other policy a Catholic president would share or feel compelled to support the position of his church. Moreover, a president does not rule from a protected position of private preference. He governs in a public role delimited by traditions and precedents, pressures and counter pressures, Congressional co-operation and resistance, and political support and political punishment.

For those who are apprehensive about a Catholic in the White House, the contest would not end with the election. The actions of a president who is a Catholic would be vigilantly scrutinized. Every suspected move would become the subject of private and public discussion and would be filed for future political reference.

It is reasonable to assume that a Catholic in the presidency would be equally aware of public watchfulness. The presidency is the ultimate symbol of political acceptance, and it does not seem probable that a president who is a Catholic would wilfully and knowingly do anything to reverse the confidence of the electorate that the duties of his office can be fulfilled without partiality to any religious group.

²² William F. Ogburn and Nell Snow Talbot, "A Measurement of the Factors in the Presidential Election of 1928," *Social Forces*, Vol. 8 (December 1929), pp. 175-83.

Religion Among Ethnic and Racial Minorities

By J. OSCAR LEE

ABSTRACT: Churches of racial and ethnic minorities have developed and exist to serve the religious and social needs of these groups. This function has been shaped and reinforced by practices of racial and ethnic discrimination in American society. The goals and programs of racial and ethnic churches are affected by such factors as the movement toward desegregation and integration, the aspiration to full participation in community life, mobility, urbanization, and changes in socio-economic status. Although ethnic churches for persons of European background have virtually disappeared in America, churches of other ethnic and racial minority groups—Negro, Puerto Rican, Spanish-speaking people of the Southwest, American Indian, Chinese American, and Japanese American—continue to exist as significant institutions. Both the Protestant and the Roman Catholic churches recognize that discrimination and segregation contradict their basic beliefs and teachings. There has been a movement toward desegregation and integration within the life of the churches themselves. Because the pattern of ethnic and racial segregation in the churches is related to the pattern of ethnic and racial segregation in society, the churches have had to concern themselves with the elimination of policies and practices of discrimination and segregation in all areas of community life.

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DURING the past two decades the problem of race relations in the United States has moved into the forefront of the social problems confronting the nation. In spite of the numerous crises it has provoked, one of the most far-reaching social developments in the nation during the last ten years is the progress which has been achieved in eliminating the pattern of compulsory racial segregation. Moreover, we have been made aware by the mobility and urbanization of the Negro population that Negro-white relations are no longer a problem of the South alone. Increased awareness of the situation of Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, American Indians, and other ethnic and racial minority groups has caused the nation to recognize other dimensions of the problem. A third aspect of the problem which is gaining recognition is the international overtones of racial relationships in the United States vis-à-vis a world in which the achievement of human rights for all people is an increasingly important concern.

One cannot deal with religion among ethnic and racial minorities without seeing it in the context of the churches' concern about race relations. The churches have been especially preoccupied with this problem in the past twenty years. This interest has included: an examination of the pattern of racial segregation in American society; a determination of the religious and ethical implications of racial segregation; and movement to eliminate racial segregation from the life and work of the churches. One result of this process is that an increasing number of Christians agree that racial segregation must be rejected since it is a violation of the spirit and the teaching of the Christian gospel. In fact, many religious leaders consider the elimination of segregation from religious institutions as probably the most cru-

cial and urgent problem which the churches face today.

The problems of ethnic and racial minority groups are a concern of most of the churches in the nation. Mobility and urbanization, however, and other socio-economic changes which have affected the lives of people belonging to these ethnic and racial minority groups have special meaning for the churches of which they are members. They are important factors in determining the goals, functions, and programs of these churches. The changes in goals, functions, and programs which many of the churches have faced in the past twenty years are not only in response to demands for adjustments to new ways of life, but also may be indicative of changes in attitudes about the role of religion in meeting the needs of persons and groups.

The limitations of space and the specifications set forth for this article make it necessary to confine it to a consideration of the churches as religious institutions and how they have been affected by social changes.

THE NEGRO CHURCHES

The largest nonwhite minority group in the United States is the Negro-American group. In 1950, the United States Census indicated that there were 15,482,000 nonwhites in the United States and that Negroes constituted more than 95 per cent of this group. Negroes are mainly found in separate Negro denominations. These denominations are the National Baptist Convention, United States of America, Incorporated; the National Baptist Convention of America; the African Methodist Episcopal Church; the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, and the Christian Methodist Episcopal Church. While accurate membership figures for these denominations are not available,

it is estimated that the five Negro denominations have approximately ten million members.¹ Comparisons of this estimate with estimates made in previous years would seem to indicate that these denominations are growing in membership. There are approximately 600,000 Negro members in the predominately white Protestant denominations of which about 366,000 are in the Methodist Church.² According to the *National Catholic Almanac* for 1960, there were, as of January 1959, about 595,155 Roman Catholic Negroes in the United States. This is an increase of 20,000 over the preceding year.³

These figures indicate that a high proportion of the Negro population are members of churches belonging to the five Negro denominations. But they reflect more than this. They point to the central place that the churches have occupied and continue to occupy in the life of the Negro community. In a very real sense, it is the Negro's own institution in that it is organized, led, developed, owned, and controlled by Negroes.

Center of opportunity

Blocked as the Negro is by the pattern of racial segregation from full participation in the total life of the community, the Negro church affords him the opportunity for full participation in an organized group. Charles Johnson has aptly described the role of the Negro church.⁴

¹ *Yearbook of the American Churches, 1960* (New York: The National Council of Churches, 1960), pp. 253, 257.

² "Proceedings of the General Conference of the Methodist Church, 1960," *Daily Christian Advocate*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (April 29, 1960), p. 105.

³ *National Catholic Almanac, 1960* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1960), p. 473.

⁴ Charles S. Johnson, *A Preface to Racial Understanding* (New York: Friendship Press, 1936), pp. 153-54.

It has provided a substitute for political organization and has furnished a channel for social as well as religious expression; it has been the center for face to face relations, for communication, for recreation and for physical as well as psychological escape from their troubles. It has been welcomed by Negroes even in areas where physical separation in worship was not demanded.

Even though Negro communities have developed many types of organizations to serve various social, political, and civic purposes, the Negro church still occupies a central place. It is to the churches that these organizations turn when they need to communicate with the entire Negro community or desire mass support for a program or project. The Negro churches are not only composed of the masses of the people, but the churches are also an important medium through which these masses shape and express their aspirations. Moreover, the Negro minister has the historic role of leader in the community. In the days after slavery, he was the principal if not only leader in many communities. While this has changed as teachers, medical doctors, lawyers, and other professional and business people assume a share of the leadership burden, the Negro minister still occupies an important place of leadership. He still has direct contact with the masses of the people who are members of his congregation and who look to him for counsel and guidance on many problems.

Negro churches play an important role in the shaping and the expression of the aspirations of the masses of Negro people, and these aspirations are important in shaping the goals, functions, and programs of the churches which must attempt to meet the felt needs which confront people in a period of rapid social change.

Mobility and urbanization

The mobility and the urbanization of the Negro have been mentioned. These are probably the two most important factors affecting Negro life in the last twenty years. This movement of Negroes to urban areas first gained momentum during World War I and continued in the period between 1920 and 1930. In the depression years there was very little movement. During World War II it gained considerably greater momentum. According to data published by the United States Bureau of the Census in 1900, 77 per cent of the Negro population lived in rural areas and 23 per cent in urban areas. By 1950 this had changed radically; 37 per cent lived in rural areas and 63 per cent in urban areas. Also, much of this movement has been from the southern to the northern, midwestern, and western areas of the country. Indicative of this trend is the fact that the Negro population in the thirty largest cities of the North, Midwest, and West more than doubled in the decade 1940 to 1950. This trend appears to have continued in the decade 1950 to 1960.

The movement from rural to urban areas and from South to North has worked far-reaching changes in the status of Negroes. Eli Ginsberg points out in *The Negro Potential* that between 1940 and 1955 the number of Negroes in nonfarm civilian employment increased from about 3 million to about 5.5 million, a proportionately larger expansion than for the labor force as a whole. Although most of the nonfarm employment available to Negroes is unskilled or semiskilled, a higher income has become available to Negro families in urban areas than was available in the rural South. Ginsberg states that in 1954 the median money income of Negro farm families in the rural South was \$742 annually. For Negro families in

urban areas it was \$2,876. The higher income was reflected in better living conditions, better health, and increased education. The status of Negroes has been affected and the economic opportunities for Negroes have been altered by social and political efforts in the past two decades to eliminate racial discrimination and segregation from public schools, higher education, employment, public transportation, and public accommodations. These changes have generally been accompanied by a clarification of the goals which Negroes seek. The racial church has, in many cases, been the only available channel through which the Negro could find social expression and could exercise leadership on the basis of character and ability.

In the movement from rural areas to urban areas, Negroes encounter a different group of social problems. Major problems are racial discrimination in housing and the slum conditions in city areas where most Negroes are forced to live. These are often accompanied by poor housing, poor schools, and poor community facilities and services. Another set of problems revolve around unemployment and underemployment. The rate of unemployment among Negroes continues higher than the national average. Involved in this is the fact that many of the better types of jobs are unavailable to Negroes and in the South many of the ordinary semiskilled and unskilled jobs in industry are unavailable. Also, there is increased recognition that major attention must be given to encouraging Negro youth to acquire skills. Still another set of problems centers around racial segregation and discrimination. These include the disenfranchisement of Negroes in the rural South; discrimination in the use of public accommodations and facilities; frequent instances of personal violence against Negroes; and a growing resolution to work for the elimination of dis-

criminary practices based upon race as soon as possible.

The changes and problems suggested above are relevant because the Negro church is confronted with them as it plays a role in the adjustment of Negroes to urban life. In this connection, these problems have affected the goals, functions, and programs of the Negro churches.

Mobility and urbanization have affected the rural Negro church. In 1947, Dr. Harry Richardson made the following observation:⁵

Indeed, in sharp contrast to the increases reported were the cases of losses in membership, many of them so great as to reduce the size of some churches, and in a few cases, to close the churches completely. All the cases of extreme loss were due to migration or emigration from rural areas to urban centers. . . .

This movement has been accompanied by the growth of many existing urban churches and the establishment of many new ones. On the whole these urban churches are larger than the rural ones. Urban churches as a rule possess sufficient financial resources to employ full-time leadership which enables them to conduct a continuous program. This contrasts with the general pattern in the rural churches. The program of most of these churches is confined to conducting worship or preaching services one, two, or three Sundays a month, under the leadership of a pastor who lives in another community and who travels to the church for this particular purpose. Possibly this is a reason for the suggestion that the urban Negro church penetrates the community more than the rural one does and that its program is more practical in its community outreach.

⁵ Harry V. Richardson, *Dark Glory* (New York: Friendship Press, 1947), p. 54.

Social relevance

Another important development seems to be an increasing interest in the integration of religious values into life. In the book, *Religion of Negro Protestants*, Ruby Johnston says:⁶

Religious ideas are significant in action. The religious ideas and actions of the Negro reflect the 'interests' of the collectivity. There is a close relation between the common value attitudes of the group and religious ideas.

There appears to be substantial agreement among many Negroes that in addition to worship and religious education the church should be active in promoting the social advancement of the race. There is an expectation among an increasing number of Negroes that the churches should be active in the improvement of the community, cooperate with community welfare and civic organizations, and engage in social action to correct injustice, particularly in race relations. Possibly the classic example of the realization of this expectation is the Montgomery, Alabama bus boycott which was led by ministers with the full and active support of their churches. This movement drew the admiration and support of Negroes nationally. These expectations have affected the programs of many churches which are including such activities as education in social and community problems, recreation, social service, and social action. Changes in the status of Negroes as well as the social problems which they confront in urban areas are factors in stimulating these expectations and this development.

Contrast of old and new

This is not to imply that the religious beliefs which are traditional in the Ne-

⁶ Ruby Johnston, *The Religion of Negro Protestants* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), p. 33.

gro church have disappeared. There are still a substantial number of Negro church members who hold to religious concepts which emphasize personal salvation, pietistic individual living, and a better life after death. Also, there are many people who find escape in emotional expression. However, despite this, the emphasis on social concern and action may mean that such factors as the pressure of urban problems, increased education, and a better understanding of methods of group action are effective in changing the traditional attitudes of Negroes about the role of religion. Ruby Johnston in the book cited above presents an interesting discussion on the decline of traditional religion and emotionalism among Negroes.⁷ While shouting and the use of the verbal expression "amen" continue to be practiced in many churches, the tendency appears to be that a smaller number of people, usually the older ones, engage in them.

Store-front churches

Emotional expression as a factor in the religious experience of the Negro raises the question of store-front churches and the movements of "personal saviors." Dissatisfaction about emotional expressions works two ways, and it is at least one index to class stratification in the churches. There are those people, usually members of the growing Negro middle class, who resent emotional expression in the church. Some of these people become members of churches with more restrained services. These churches usually emphasize a rational and action-oriented approach to religion under the leadership of a well-trained minister. At the other end of the spectrum are those who are dissatisfied with the restraint on emotional expression or who feel that the church does not provide the warmth of fellowship or who

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-15.

may have a doctrinal difference. These people withdraw to organize a church of their own. Many of these groups start as store-front churches.

Leadership appears to be a key factor in the destiny of these churches. Some are started for no other reason than that a person with some leadership capabilities decides to organize a church. The ministers of many of these churches have practical leadership capabilities but little academic or professional training. Some of these churches have a short span of existence because they are led by people who aim to exploit the members; others are quite permanent and still others grow into larger, established congregations. This is testimony to the practical leadership capabilities of some of the ministers who serve these small congregations. The people, usually of limited educational background and opportunity, who are members of these churches seem to find security by participating in a small group which emphasizes what is called the "old time religion." Some of these store-front churches may be affiliated with one of the five Negro denominational groups mentioned above, but the large group of them are identified as Holiness Pentecostal, Faith Healing, or Spiritualist.

Personal saviors

Many of the movements of the "personal saviors" are national in scope. Some of the better known examples are the United House of Prayer for All People, the Father Divine Peace Movement, and, more lately, the movement of Mr. Elijah Mohammad which calls itself "Muslim." It is difficult to summarize these movements because they vary greatly in purpose, organization, content of belief, and practices. Estimates of the number of people who belong to these various cult movements vary according to the source. While there are no reliable figures, it is apparent that

the vast majority of Negroes do not belong to them. One has to be careful in making generalizations about these movements, but their centers of strength appear to be large urban centers. They are centered around strong leaders who have a unique appeal to masses of people. They seem to relieve and to release the psychological tensions of people who are extremely frustrated by the problems of urban life. Both their appeals and their activities are dramatic enough to attract considerable publicity. These movements appear to be closely knit organizations and to exercise a considerable degree of control over the personal lives of their adherents. It seems safe to say, however, that while these movements may serve the need of their adherents, they do not have a great influence in the Negro community as a whole.

CHURCHES OF ETHNIC GROUPS

The great immigration from European countries prior to World War I made its impact upon the churches. The immigrants brought the religion of their home countries with them. In these immigrant churches the language of the homeland was spoken and some of the customs as well as traditions were maintained. As the children of these immigrant families grew older, they wished to be thought of as Americans; they spoke English and exhibited little desire to master the language of their parents. This made it necessary for the churches to hold some services in English. In effect, the churches became bilingual, but even this was temporary. The stoppage of the tide of European immigration, the depletion of the first generation by death, and the opposition of the second and third generations to the use of a foreign language have produced a gradual disappearance of the bilingual feature in many of these

churches. In some cases these churches have had to close because the second and third generations have moved to other neighborhoods. In the cases in which these churches have made successful transitions, they have had to forego their preoccupation with European customs, traditions, and language in order to serve the current needs of their congregations. It is the judgment of many competent observers that when such a church fails to do this, its future is not promising.

This is only a part of the story of ethnic groups in the United States. Puerto Ricans, Spanish-speaking people of the Southwest, American Indians, Chinese Americans and Japanese Americans have churches with distinctive characteristics.

Spanish-speaking people

The Spanish-speaking population in the United States is a large one. This brief statement will deal with two groups, the Puerto Rican and the Spanish-speaking people of the Southwest. The latter group is defined to include naturalized immigrants from Mexico, native-born persons with parents or grandparents born in Mexico, alien Mexicans in the United States either on a temporary or permanent basis and Spanish Colonials largely concentrated in New Mexico and southern Colorado.⁸ This definition is indicative of the difficulty of defining precisely the Spanish-speaking population of the Southwest. However, the bulk of this population is either Mexican by birth or the native-born descendants of persons born in Mexico.

The Migration Division of the Department of Labor of the Common-

⁸ Bureau of Research and Survey, *Spanish-Speaking Americans* (Unpublished manuscript by Blair, Lively, and Trimble; New York: National Council of Churches, 1959), p. 14.

wealth of Puerto Rico estimated that the population of Puerto Rico as of July 1, 1958 was 2,317,000 and that as of December 31, 1958 there were 849,000 Puerto Ricans living on the mainland of which 77 per cent were living in New York City.⁹ The 1950 United States Census reported that there were 2,448,977 white persons of Spanish surname in five Southwestern states and persons in other states born in Mexico or with one or more parents born in Mexico. Of this number 1,998,415 were native born and 450,562 were Mexican born. It is also reported that 1,519,812 of the Spanish surname population in 5 Southwestern states or 66 per cent were urban dwellers. The five Southwestern states are Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas.

There are substantial differences between the Puerto Rican population and the Spanish-speaking population of the Southwest. For instance, one of these differences is that Puerto Ricans are citizens of the United States and movement within the country constitutes migration. On the other hand, the people of Mexican origin are immigrants from another country. There are some similarities. Many of the people of Mexican origin came from an agrarian society and some of the Puerto Ricans came from a similar type of society. Both groups came from societies in which the characteristics of Spanish culture and the traditions of the Roman Catholic Church are predominant. The majority of both groups have settled in urban areas. They speak Spanish and those who have not mastered English experience difficulty in communication. Both groups experience a lack of full acceptance in American society because of their ethnic background. Even though some people of Puerto Rican and Mexican background, because of education

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

and skill, have gained a degree of acceptance, these groups are victimized by socio-economic disabilities.

These factors are reflected in the churches. The Spanish-speaking people of the Southwest come from a Catholic background. Catholicism was taken for granted in Mexico. There was little knowledge that other religious forms existed, and this was true of Protestantism, also. Religion was deeply interwoven into the life of the community. Thus those people coming into the country were predominantly of Roman Catholic background. Several competent observers have indicated that they were nominal Roman Catholics. It has also been pointed out that only a small proportion of those in this country are active members of the Roman Catholic Church. Possibly one of the reasons for this is that religion is not so fully integrated into community life in an urban-industrial society and is therefore unable to meet the needs of the people as it had done in an agrarian society.

Mexicans

Mexican Americans in the United States are attracted to Protestant churches, but the total number is small. Some attend English-language Protestant churches. It is reported, however, that few local Protestant churches in the border areas exhibit active interest in attracting Mexican Americans. The fear of not being accepted as well as difficulties of language may deter many Mexican Americans from joining these churches. Also, there are churches which serve Mexican Americans. A study of eighty-one Mexican churches in 1959 indicated that fifty-one claim less than one hundred members each. Sixty-three of these churches reported under one hundred in average attendance. Twenty-five of the churches reported using some English in the services and fifty-three used no English. The denominational

distribution of these churches was as follows: Disciples—three; United Presbyterian, United States of America—twenty-one; Methodist—twenty-two; Congregational—three; American Lutheran—six; Church of God—two; Episcopal—five; American Baptist—nineteen.¹⁰ These figures indicate that the Protestant churches serving Mexican Americans are small in size and that the total number of members involved is small.

Puerto Ricans

The fact that Puerto Rico is predominantly Roman Catholic in religious background is well known. It is reported that probably 80 per cent of the island population would say they were Catholic if pressed with the question of religious orientation. However, most recent observers note that perhaps 20 per cent or less actually practice the public and obvious manifestations of the Roman Catholic faith.¹¹ It is estimated that at least 10 per cent of the population of the island could be characterized as Protestant. Protestantism has been on the island for about fifty years. Protestant denominations are working in 522 areas of service on the island; 413 of these areas are identified as rural.¹²

Puerto Ricans bring their religious traditions to the mainland with them, but some observers believe that a larger proportion of Puerto Ricans in New York City than on the island do not

have an active relationship with the Roman Catholic Church.¹³ However, many Roman Catholic parishes serve the religious and social needs of Puerto Ricans. But the report *Midcentury Pioneers and Protestants* says:

In summary, it would seem fair to say that few Protestant churches established in communities into which Puerto Ricans are moving have made an attempt to welcome the Protestant Puerto Ricans. Few churches have reached out to help the newcomers in their adjustment process. Even fewer have attempted to evangelize the Puerto Ricans.¹⁴

The few English-language Protestant churches that do serve Puerto Ricans offer activities designed to integrate them into the congregation, such as released time religious classes, Scout troops, athletic leagues, forums, and other types of leisure-time and recreational activities. Some churches conduct worship services in Spanish at various times and a few churches have Spanish-speaking staff members.

The report mentioned above established the existence of 181 non-Roman Catholic Spanish-speaking churches in New York City in 1953. Some information was gathered about 169 of these churches. Ninety-two of the 169 churches were identified as Pentecostal; thirty-eight were conducted by Protestant denominations; thirty-four were independent; and five were connected with New York City Mission Society. Ninety-six of the 169 churches which returned completed questionnaires reported 9,965 church members of which 8,239 were said to be active. The average total number of members per church was about 103 and the total average attendance at the main Sunday Worship Service was about 102. Seventy-one of the ninety-six churches reported memberships of less than one hundred each and forty of the seventy-one had member-

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

ships under fifty. It should be pointed out that three of these churches had more than three hundred members and three others had more than five hundred members. However, seventy-nine of these churches are completely self-supporting and forty-five have full-time pastors. The number of these churches appears to be growing. Seventy-one of the ninety-six churches were organized between 1940 and the first six months of 1953.¹⁵ Most of these churches are small, but they are self-reliant and active institutions.

The case of the Mexican Americans and the Puerto Ricans seems to indicate that neither Roman Catholics nor Protestants have developed an effective strategy for working with these groups. Yet it must, in fairness, be said that there is awareness of the need for such a strategy, and interested church groups are grappling with the problem.

American Indians

Both Roman Catholic and Protestant churches have conducted missionary activities among American Indians for a long period of time. In 1951, thirty-six Protestant denominations were doing mission work among these people. While there are no reliable statistics, it is estimated that there are between 65,000 and 70,000 Protestants and about 95,000 Roman Catholics among American Indians. In addition to meeting the spiritual needs of these people, this work has concerned itself with their social, material, and economic problems. These missionary programs have been concerned with education, family life, land problems, economic development, health, and work with American Indians to achieve responsible participation in community life on and off the reservation. This has required a great deal of adaptability because American Indians vary from those who occupy

prominent places of leadership in American society to those who lead a very primitive tribal existence.

Of the 400,000 persons counted as Indians in the United States about 300,000 live on or near reservations. Much of this land has a low productive potential and with the increasing Indian population, it is unable to support the people who live on it. This suggests an important recent development among American Indians. Indians are leaving the reservations, some for work as agricultural migrants and others for jobs in urban centers. The movement of Indians to urban centers has become more pronounced since World War II. This movement flows into cities such as Minneapolis, Minnesota, Rapid City, South Dakota, Chicago, Illinois, Salt Lake City, Utah, and Los Angeles, California. Migration to urban centers confronts Indians who have lived in rural areas with the problems which are connected with adjustment to urban life. Problems such as employment, housing, and the use of community services and facilities are often compounded by the strangeness of the city and in some places by discrimination against American Indians.

The churches, both Roman Catholic and Protestant in many cities, have recognized the need to help American Indians adjust to and become a part of church and community life in urban centers. The result is that they have established programs to work with other interested community agencies to accomplish this.

Chinese

The United States Census of 1950 reported 117,629 Chinese in the United States. The estimated total for 1958 is 135,000. Rose Hum Lee says:¹⁶

¹⁶ Rose Hum Lee, *The Chinese in the United States of America* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960), p. 278.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 10-22.

¹⁰ Bureau of Research and Survey, *Missionary Opportunity Among Spanish-Americans, Report on Local Church Questionnaires* (Mimeographed; New York: National Council of Churches, September 1959), pp. 1, 6, 9.

¹¹ *Midcentury Pioneers and Protestants—A Survey Report of the Puerto Rican Migration to the U. S. Mainland and, in particular, A Study of the Protestant Expression Among Puerto Ricans in New York City* (Mimeographed; New York: Protestant Council of the City of New York, March 1954), p. 3.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 2.

The Chinese brought with them no organized religious system per se, but they imported a complex blend of traits selected from two ethical systems—Confucianism and Taoism—as well as some religious practices identified with Buddhism.¹⁶

The Protestant home missionary movement started work among Chinese about 1853. The Roman Catholics started work in San Francisco about 1900. San Francisco today is the largest center of Catholic activities among Chinese. Roman Catholic missions were organized in Philadelphia in 1939, Chicago in 1941, and New York in 1949. By 1952 there were sixty-two Protestant Chinese Churches and missions and six Catholic Churches and missions. It is estimated that there were about 6,000 members in the Protestant Chinese Churches and about 3,000 in the Catholic Chinese Churches. This, of course, does not represent an accurate picture of the number of Chinese Christians because many Chinese attend churches which are predominantly white or interracial in membership.

In addition to religious services, the Roman Catholic centers conduct a social program to meet the needs of Chinese people—English classes for adults, parochial schools for children which sometimes supplement their courses with studies in Chinese culture.

A study of the sixty-two Protestant Chinese Churches in 1952 shows some of the characteristics of these churches.¹⁷ Forty-three are denominational, five are interdenominational, and fourteen are independent. Twelve are self-supporting groups; twenty-six receive some aid from denominational mission boards; fifteen depend entirely upon, or receive the major part of their support from mission boards; and seven are small

¹⁷ Horace R. Cayton and Anne O. Lively, *The Chinese in the United States and the Chinese Christian Churches* (New York: Bureau of Research and Survey, The National Council of Churches, April 1955), pp. 48-68.

groups with limited programs. The average Chinese Church has 155 members with the range running from less than fifty members to over one thousand. The average budget is about \$5,260. The data on membership indicates that some of these churches are growing in size and that there is a higher proportion of young people among Chinese church members than among non-Chinese church members.

The history of Protestant mission work among Chinese reveals continuing interest in the adjustment of Chinese to American life and in combating discrimination against Chinese. This interest continues. In addition to normal programs which are carried on by churches, the Chinese church appears to emphasize work with young people and pastoral counseling. Many of them maintain classes for those who wish to learn English as well as classes in Chinese language and culture. In this connection it might be mentioned that there is a trend toward the increased use of English in these churches. Possibly this might be due to the increasing influence of American-born Chinese.

INTEGRATION IN THE CHURCHES

The previous discussion has considered the churches among racial and ethnic minorities. In a sense, this is testimony to the fact that these groups are separated in varying degrees from the main body of the churches. The concern about the elimination of segregation from religious institutions has been mentioned. The positive goal is the inclusion of persons in the congregation and the activities of the church or church-related institution on the basis of religious commitment without regard to race or ethnic origin. The churches are taking positive steps in this direction. Space does not permit more than mere mention of some of the highlights of this development.

The Roman Catholic Church has been clear and forthright in its policy that racial segregation is contrary to the teachings of the Church. On this basis it has moved forthrightly to eliminate it from the local parishes, parochial schools, and church organizations where it exists. Hundreds of Catholic parishes have members of all races in their membership. Catholic organizations, such as the Catholic Interracial Councils, the National Federation of Catholic College Students, and the National Catholic Welfare Conference have made major contributions toward improving race relations both within the Church and in the community.

The National Council of Churches and most of the major Protestant denominations have adopted statements either renouncing the practice of segregation in the churches or affirming a ministry which is inclusive of all people regardless of race or ethnic origin who desire to participate in a particular church or church-related institution.

These statements have provided the basis for the achievement of integration of national and regional church organizations. Significant integration has taken place in councils of churches. Racial minorities are integrated in the organization of the National Council of Churches. This is true also in state and city councils of churches, even in states where segregation is enforced by law. Several of the predominantly white denominations have moved to eliminate racial segregation from their national and regional organizations. Several are currently grappling with the problem. The Negro denominations face the problem of integrating white people into their organizations. A number of denominations with predominately white membership are carrying on various types of programs aimed at the elimination of segregation in local churches and church-related institutions. While many

Protestant church-related institutions have always been open without regard to race, there are numerous instances of others which have in recent years adopted and pursued policies of inclusive service to all people. However, it is widely acknowledged that much more progress must be made.

The local church has presented a difficult problem, but even here there is movement. While there are no reliable figures on the total number of Protestant churches which have members of more than one race, recent studies by denominations indicate they are increasing in number. While the figures of the denominational studies are not comparable, they would seem to indicate that possibly 10 per cent of the Protestant churches have members of more than one race and that most of these churches are located in urban communities where people of two or more races live together. To be sure, the percentage is small, but it involves hundreds of churches, and it is significant because movement among Protestant churches appears to be in the direction of integration.

CONCLUSION

It seems clear that a major function of the churches of ethnic and racial minorities is to serve the religious and social needs of their people. This function is shaped and reinforced by ethnic and racial discrimination, which is a dominant factor influencing every aspect of the lives of people belonging to these minority groups. Their aspirations are an influential factor in shaping the goals toward which these churches work. The church programs are determined to a large extent by the problems and needs which confront ethnic and racial minority peoples. These churches are dynamic in that they are affected by social changes such as mobility and urbanization as well as the increasing and imperative demand for full participation

in community life on the basis of ability without regard to ethnic or racial background. There is evidence that this in turn has affected the expectations of people about the role or roles of the churches in meeting the needs of people who face the necessity of adjusting to these changes.

The very existence of churches which serve people belonging to a particular ethnic or racial minority group is, in a sense, a testimony to the pervasiveness of racial segregation in our society. It is clear that segregation based on ethnic or racial background is a major problem confronting the churches. At the same time, many people in the churches recognize that this is a basic contradiction

of Christian principles and teaching. In recognition of this, there is a movement to eliminate segregation and to achieve inclusive practices in all areas of church life. While the churches face the responsibility of taking increasing initiative in accomplishing this, it must be recognized that desegregation and integration of the churches is related to desegregation and integration of the total community. For instance, many churches find that racial segregation in housing makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to achieve integration in fact in the churches. Therefore, the churches face the challenge to work for the elimination of segregation from every aspect of American society.

Sects and Cults

By MARTIN E. MARTY

ABSTRACT: Sects and cults constitute a third Christian force, in addition to Protestantism and Roman Catholicism, in contemporary America. Sects are particularist groups with a basically negative orientation. Cults tend to be positively oriented and to be organized around a charismatic leader. Any discussion of the various religious groups in the United States must take into account the differences in context, rather than the differences in content, between them. Religious context largely determines whether or not religious groups are in the mainstream of historical development. The principal distinction between sects or cults and denominations is that sects or cults are established to achieve the spatial and psychic context of isolation. The denominations currently adapt to middle-class beliefs and values. The sects and cults are uneroded, unexposed, intransigent, and withdrawn. They provide a haven from social interpenetration and complexity. They do not wish to be assimilated into the mainstream of religious thought and practice. The sects and cults, in almost every particular, provide a counter current in the mid-twentieth century religious revival.—Ed.

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THE conventional tripartite division of American religion into Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Jewish has been widely criticized for its neatness and its limitations. The Eastern Orthodox churches obviously do not fit into any of the divisions. There are millions of Americans who either adhere to a great world religion other than Christianity or Judasim or profess a secular religion of humanism or ultimate devotion to democratic processes. This six-fold division still does not do justice to the inclusiveness of organized religion in America. A large and growing cluster of denominations and forces, most of them of Christian orientation, do not find recognition within Protestantism nor do they wish to be numbered with classic reformed churches.

THIRD FORCE

This cluster, which we here refer to without derogation as sects and cults, has assumed sufficient proportions for the president of a large interdenominational seminary to call national attention to them as being a "third force" in Christianity in America. The first two forces, of course, are Protestantism and Roman Catholicism. President Henry Pitney Van Dusen—in the interest of a theology centered on witness to the Holy Spirit—is surprisingly positive in his regard for this force. He finds it primarily in the "Spirit-centered" churches, that is, the Pentecostal and Holiness bodies.

The current growth and fluidity of pattern among these sects and cults runs counter to many of the major trends in the revival of religion which has followed the Second World War. These groups have made it necessary to alter the conventional ways of thinking about churches as institutions in order to understand the appeal and classification of religious feeling to which the sect is a response. Traditional cate-

gories still are useful but they fail to account adequately for the context in which sects and cults appear today.

THE MAINSTREAM

The first and most obvious observation about the sects and cults is that they do not conform. A survey of the twelve major histories of American religion or American Protestantism—from Robert Baird in 1844 to Jerald C. Brauer in 1953—confirms suspicions garnered from less disciplined reading: historians and sociologists as well as laymen have evolved certain ways of classifying American religious groups according to whether or not they belong to the mainstream of the nation's experience. The categories do not always follow the lines one would expect. "Stream" is not a static category, and groups once in the mainstream at another time may be out of it. "Mainstream" is Ralph Henry Gabriel's term, but it is matched by Leonard Bacon's distinction between groups only "incidentally connected" with the history of American Christianity and others which are organically connected. William Warren Sweet, the dean of modern historians in this field, speaks of "indigenous" and of "typically American" churches. Andrew Drummond spoke of "Americanized" and "definitely American" churches. Each lacks precision in defining the mainstream, but all twelve remarkably agree on what belongs in it.

Statistical data, for example, do not explain the place of denominations in the mainstream. Many mainstream groups are no larger than the Pentecostals, but the Pentecostals do not belong. Never in American religious history has size, that most American form of measurement, explained the national significance of a religion. Roman Catholicism, Lutheranism, and continental Reformed groups were of relatively immense size before they came to

be accepted in the mainstream. Similarly, attempts on the basis of polity to distinguish denominations that belong from sects and cults which do not belong have been unsatisfactory. Episcopalianism has been considered by many historians, particularly in the past, to have a nondemocratic polity. Methodism also has been seen in this light. But both were considered to be as much a part of the American scene as were the Baptist and Congregational bodies.

Class distinctions provide some explanation, just as they have in classic writing on sects. But while membership in denominations might vary along classic economic and social lines from Episcopalian to Unitarian affiliation among the wealthy and influential classes to Methodist and Baptist affiliation among the lower classes, lower class identification did not by any means exclude a body from the mainstream, certainly not since the age of Jackson. The churches which historically served the disinherited and uninfluential elements in society might still be in the mainstream. Theological generalizations, references to the substance and the content of the faith, provide almost no help in forming a generalization, although a century ago the evangelical bodies were squarely in the mainstream and the bodies which were not evangelical—Roman Catholic, Universal, Shaker, socialist—were insecure.

CONTEXT, NOT CONTENT

The approach which this article takes to the position of sects and cults in the present scene is that factors other than those which classically have determined ecclesiastical institutional life are operative in America. Internal conditions, matters of content, are of secondary importance. The degree of religious comprehension in the lives of adherents, the claims made on their devotion, the tenacity with which they hold the

church's tenets, the theological acumen, the richness of worship, all factors that are important in generalizing about most of historical Western Christendom, are secondary in American life. Instead, certain external conditions, matters of context, are of primary importance.

In this light, new distinctions emerge which help in the present task of understanding sects. There have been historic transformations. Until the modern period of realized pluralism, national origin was significant; to be of Anglo-Saxon provenance was of great help. Thus, a review of American churches in 1836 by Reed and Matheson provides the clue:

Blot out Britain and America from the map of the world, and you destroy all those great institutions which almost exclusively promise the world's renovation; but unite Britain and America in energetic and resolved cooperation for the world's salvation; and the world is saved.

Conversely, less than a century ago historian Daniel Dorchester could speak of Germans and Irish immigrants as having . . . low habits and ideas, retaining supreme allegiance to a foreign pontiff, or controlled by radical, rationalistic, materialistic, or communistic theories. . . . Can religion and morality endure the severe strain and the virtue and intelligence of the people be preserved?

Needless to say, these ethnic distinctions have largely disappeared.

Other almost mystic accidents of national history contribute to uncritical historical generalizations on the location of denominations. Historic identification with the religion of New England guaranteed a place to bodies like the Congregationalists which saw their relative size diminish but their symbolism on greeting card covers offer a guarantee of security. Identification with the struggles of religious liberty and voluntarism stood Baptists, Quakers, and some others in good stead. Participa-

tion in the major movements of national religious life—expansion through the frontiers, the involvement in successive great awakenings or revivals of religion—enhanced denominational claims.

The result of the foregoing for the discussion of sects is this: Americans tend to classify denominations in relation to their typical or mainstream status by a set of subtle contextual norms. Most of them revolve around the dialogue of American churches with their environment. The more exposed a group has been or becomes, the more its claims are eroded by its place in a pluralist society, the more it has been seen in harmony with main themes of national history, that much more does it belong. The more isolated, intransigent, withdrawn, the less exposed and eroded a group has been, no matter what its size and influence, the less it has come to be regarded as a normative religious expression for America. The largest remaining body of unexposed believers belong to what is known as sects and cults, and they can best be accounted for and located by this approach.

PARTICULARISM

Why are sects and cults of third-force Christianity and its fringes growing so rapidly today? What is their reason for existence? What part will they play in the future? These questions raise theological and sociologically perplexing problems. The widespread observation that ideologies are being diffused and even buried today—as argued by Daniel Boorstin and Daniel Bell—in politics, philosophy, and religion, is countered by the spurts of energy and growth of religious groups who make much of their different and, sometimes, completely esoteric systems of belief. The tendencies to homogenize religious beliefs and groups, so ably chronicled

by Will Herberg, William Lee Miller, Stanley Rowland, G. Roy Eckardt, and others, seem relevant until one encounters the growing sects and cults. The temptation of Americans to cancel the varieties of religious experience and institutional options with apathy—probably as a reaction against bewildering evidences of pluralism and competition of claims—is evident and can be documented. People are identified with religious institutions, but they lack apparent conviction or passion. Yet the sects and cults refuse to participate in this oversimplification of a pluralist heritage. They noisily assert their particularities even at the sacrifice of participation in inclusive American religious institutional *Gestalten*.

These basically religious considerations disturb those who try to classify nonmainstream sects and cults, but sociological factors further complicate the picture. Social historians depict the affluent society as one in which the masses have attained the historic status and have acquired the historic values of the middle classes. America has become, in its prosperity, a panmiddle class society. Its religions, no matter what their historic origins, tend to take on appropriate characteristics. The obvious examples would be the lavish institutional outlays of the large urban Southern Baptist churches in which a plush setting and the current technological devices serve groups which derive their historic warrant for existence from their disinherited positions. Yet the sects and cults are not dependent on middle class inclusiveness, and even where they succeed amidst relative prosperity, they do so without vital contact with the culture. Since World War II, the normative growth of American denominations has come about through their easy and uncritical identification with suburban value systems. Yet the sects and cults are not dependent on the

situations which make mere belonging to religious organization so attractive.

Thus, paradoxically, the sects and cults show most remarkable growth in a period during which most documented social and theological factors and events seem to contradict their claims. This necessitates revision not only of historical observation but also of sociological classification. So significant an exception to the rule, while it may prove the rule, may also enlarge the definition of the rule. The late twentieth century conceptions of mainstream American denominations must be related to non-typical sects and cults.

SECT AND DENOMINATION

"Sect," in this context, is obviously not a translation of "denomination." One guide in the perplexing problem of locating sects today has been that "sect" has become a less satisfactory term for denoting what should be called, neutrally, "denominations." When the obsolete terminology appears it tends to be used by organized antiorganized-religion fronts or is used thoughtlessly. When *Life* magazine in 1957 referred to the Congregational Christian and Evangelical and Reformed bodies as sects, reaction was instant and significant. In our classification, the term is used without any sense of patronization or derogation. It is used in relation to groups which would readily accept some term to set themselves off from the typical or mainstream denominations which desire to be part of the nation's *mores* and its *ethos*. This does not mean that the sects in question want to be thought of as partial; ordinarily they do assert catholicity or wholeness; their witness is seen to be the hope of a rejecting world. But asserting this witness necessarily involves separation from other witnesses, and this separation is at the basis of the term "sect."

DRAMATIC GROWTH

It is not important or possible here to shed new light on the quest for statistical precision in discussing the non-mainstream groups. Statistics are, at best, relative; they are notoriously slippery when provided by religious groups. The quest is further complicated by the dynamism of sect growth and change—the process of fission seems to be part of the essence of sect life—and by the fact that many sect and cult statistical summaries are kept secret. Finally, for strategic reasons, sects may feel called upon to exaggerate their size at moments when growth enhances a claim or to exaggerate their diminutiveness at moments when smallness seems to substantiate the theological and ethical correctness of a group's concerns. Suffice it here to say that the smaller sect-type bodies are, for the most part, experiencing dramatic growth against the pattern of middle class church identification. And economic support for the isolated groups is disproportionately higher than is that of the more prosperous, settled churches. Yet the marked and perhaps nervously exaggerated growth of Dr. Van Dusen's third force is not a necessary factor in the need to account for its presence: the mere fact of survival would occasion this quest.

SECTS AND CULTS

The thesis here is that negatively-oriented sects gain their current attractiveness from their attempt and relative success at isolating people from competing value systems; and that positively-oriented cults, usually gathered around charismatic persons or clans, succeed to the extent that they provide surrogates for interpersonal relations or attachment to significant persons in an apparently depersonalizing society. To the first group would belong sects like

the historic Adventist bodies, some of the Churches of God, the primitive bodies, the Jehovah's Witnesses, the Pentecostals, the Assemblies of God, and other eschatological groups; to the second would belong the cults which offer substance in place of meaning. Among them would be the Peace Mission Movement of Father Divine; the "I Am" Movement, in some respects, the Oxford Group Movement; Unity School of Christianity; Theosophy; New Thought; and others.

The sects with an essentially negative orientation to the world were originally and in a different society organized around charismatic leaders, but they are not dependent on charisma for survival. A philosophy of history and an anti-world context are basic for them. The cults with an essentially positive orientation to the world and to material or substantial values need the presence of the charismatic leader, and they often flounder in the absence of charisma. Since the latter group, apart from fanatic devotion to the person of the founder, takes on characteristics of mainstream American religion in its substantial offers to a prosperous society, it is not necessary to account for them as an exception, and they will receive further consideration only when they illustrate the quest for surrogates for personality. It is the sect, then, that concerns us, and the cult concerns us only as it partakes of the character of the sect.

THE SECT PHENOMENON

"Sect" is etymologically closely related to what we are here calling "cult." That is, it does not derive from the Latin *secare*, *sectum*, to cut, as is commonly thought, but from the positive *sequi*, to follow. It should refer to "a group having in common a leader or a distinctive doctrine . . . a following," according to Webster's *New Interna-*

tional Dictionary. But origins do not explain present significance, and history and sociology displace etymology. The dictionary continues, "In religion, the believers in a particular creed, or upholders of a particular practice; . . . a party dissenting from an established church. . . ." This definition is of some use if we recall that establishment can belong as much to *ethos* and *mores* as it can to legal sanction.

The amiable neutrality of this definition has been displaced by attempts to establish "sect" as a distinct and distinctive category from "church" or even "denomination." The decisive and still most creative work in this respect, whatever its present-day limitations, has been done by Ernst Troeltsch and Max Weber. They describe the sect as essentially a society established by contract as opposed to the institutional and "natural" or organic ecclesiastical body. As they point out, success is one of the hazards of sectarian life, and many historic sects, in this sense, tend to take on the character of churches as they establish themselves in society. This is true of Baptist and Congregational bodies in the Old World which came to predominance in the mainstream of the New. Weber and Troeltsch account for this in part by the quieting of religious fervor in the second generation, although a variety of political factors also play their part in post-Revolutionary developments. Troeltsch and Weber leave us in their debt for their attempt at isolating the meaning and historic purposes of sects. H. Richard Niebuhr produced the classic American work, *The Social Sources of Denominationalism*, written at a time when economic and social considerations played a much larger part than they currently do in theological setting. He stressed genesis and entry. One is born into the church, a "natural social grouping," but he must join the sect. The church is the auto-

matic way for the individual to be located in religious society; the sect is the outlet for self-determination against the grain of religious or secular society. There are limitations to Niebuhr's distinction. People constantly are joining churches, and members of sects bear children into the sect. This led Niebuhr to point out that in the decisive sense a sect lasts only one generation. The deficiencies of Niebuhr's helpful work are apparent in the prolonged image of certain sects across the centuries and in the resuscitation and revivification of certain undying sectarian impulses whether they be of the classically negative sectarian or normatively positive cultic varieties. The Montanists illustrate the negative and the Gnostics illustrate the positive aspects of the tendency to recur. Ellsworth Faris, in *The Nature of Human Nature*, pointed beyond these definitions, but he did not fully develop the perceptive notion that the contemporary significance of such groups is their isolation in a modern world. A fourth useful and illuminating approach was Howard Becker's designation of the "ecclesia" as a compulsory group and the sect as a voluntary group. A denomination, according to Becker, is a sect in its later generations, and cult is personal, quasi-mystical religion. Joachim Wach made original contributions to the study of sects, particularly in the development of the idea that sects originate during times of change or collapse in old orders. Finally, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, in his sociological study of religion, made a point that in content there was no essential difference between church and sect. This leads us to pursue the contextual question for the illumination of sect and cult bring to settled denominationalism. Rather than concentrate on many of the enduring features—charisms, emotions, positive and negative aspects, and so on—it is profitable in this limited context to stress

one factor that accounts for sect importance today.

To isolate this factor it is necessary to develop a construct by which our whole society can be viewed.

SECTARIAN ISOLATION

One fruitful approach is the distinction between a society which can be described in diagrammatic terms and one dialogically defined. Or, to borrow the acute observation of the Jesuit scholar Walter J. Ong: spatial metaphors are largely obsolete for depicting current forms of community and communication; interpersonal metaphors are decisive. The importance of the sect in what Faris calls its isolation will emerge against this setting.

All the spatial pictures—ward, ghetto, sector, valley, and, in its static sense, parish—are obsolete or becoming obsolete as approaches to the nurture of religion in a free society. Only a coercive society can depend upon spatial images and the realities to which they point for nurture of ideology. The sect can be seen as a quasi-voluntaristic reaction against the erosion of spatial settings. What accounts for the change? When "inner direction" and "tradition direction" were real possibilities, the diagrammatic way of looking at the human community was feasible. People lived in physical and psychical independence of one another. Truth could be sustained and perpetuated by reference to the whole, local, undisturbed community.

Almost every documented feature of what it means to live in the modern world militates against perpetuation of the spatial relation. Population growth has removed both actual and psychic distance between peoples who hold to different ultimate or even proximate value systems. The extreme mobility of modern life brings people into new contact both in their geographical, hori-

zontal movements and in vertical class adjustments. Men have long known nomadism, but nomads of today move not as clans but as individuals; they do not carry community religious patterns with them. Transportation advances, the juxtaposition of ideologies, and, most of all, the interruption of all spatial illusions and realities by instantaneous, efficient, and total means of mass communication render the diagrammatic approach impossible as a permanent strategy. That this interruption has obvious assets is clear. Few modern men would ignore or undo these factors of modernity. At the same time, much restlessness, rootlessness, and anxiety have come to light in recent years.

Religious groups in America, particularly the mainstream groups, provide little buffer against the jostling which the interpersonal world has brought. Denominations which adapt and conform to the value systems of a middle-class society become the captives of it; their distinctiveness erodes and their particularity is muffled. This means that anyone who seeks refuge from easy identification with a casually this-worldly religiousness must move in one of two directions.

One possibility is for him to accept a religious constellation which in part affirms the world and tells him that not all the stimuli he receives from his environment are harmful to his religious development. This amounts to agreeing that his milieu is, after all, God's workshop. And that dialogue with the environment can be a revelatory and redemptive experience. Many of the most noted Christian theologians are seeking to prove the truth, or Biblical warrant, of this position. Nurture, however, remains complicated in such a setting; theology must be transferable and almost, we might say, portable. It

is easy in such a conjunction of religion and world to see rapid dissipation of religious energies and relapse into unsatisfying identification with the restless contemporaneity which the individual sought to escape.

The sectarian possibility is for the individual to seek a group whose philosophy of history contradicts the existing values so dramatically that the group sustains itself at least through a generation. The comfort, the appeal, and the sanction of the sect, in this instance, are that it provides surrogates for insularity through apparent psychic if not always possible physical distance from worldliness and competing systems. The sect provides the illusion and sometimes the reality of a buttress against encroaching and eroding forces which contradict personal beliefs. The sect organizes itself, if not in physical spatial contradistinction from other groups, at least in psychological distinction and distance.

Thus, modern sects remain segregated in varying degrees with little contact beyond their own organization. This is unlike almost all other social groupings today where a mass society creates an apparent availability of prosperity to all. The sects sometimes actually are nomadic, preserving community by moving. A Milwaukee fundamentalist group followed its pastor to the southwest. Some sects achieve isolation by walling themselves in. An extreme apocalyptic cult in Arizona did this. Ordinarily, mass media of communication are criticized and motion pictures, picture magazines, and television barred by a sect because of their dialogical interruption of temporarily sustained barriers. The consciousness that the group's philosophy of history runs counter to all that the world and established religious groups offer helps cultivate the feeling of isolation.

AUTHENTIC SIMPLIFICATION

One of the obvious appeals of the sect in the modern world is comparable to the appeal of monasticism. Despite the fact that both set high standards and that the calling makes demands of discipline, rigor, or Puritan zeal which would be unattractive to the hedonistic escapist, both sectarianism and monasticism provide authentic simplifications of an overly complex society. In this sense, sectarianism is a form of escape from complication. For some sects this may eventuate in a prideful relation to those outside; for others it develops an authentic humility and spirit of service which motivates missionary activity and seeks to serve those who do not and will not conceivably become part of the nurtured system of values. One thinks here of the historic peace churches insofar as they retain characteristics of the sect type. The cult in our usage differs in that it depends upon some withdrawal and isolation in order to offer not less but more in the middle of the world. Through esoteric and mystic approaches, substance is proffered instead of sacrifice being solicited. The cult offers some escape through attachment to the charismatic person at a time when a dialogical, interpersonal society tends to level and plane personality.

No attempt has been made here to account for the authentic religious vision in sects or even in cults. This is not because the vision is to be downgraded, but because it falls beyond the scope of social analysis. One authentic appeal of the sect is that it provides authority and usually a coherent system of beliefs and hopes, an attraction that cannot be denied in a time of confusion. But this appeal becomes important here only for the way in which it is sustained and nurtured: in prolongation of relative isolation.

THREE CONTEXTS

In the period before Christendom emerged as the entity which expressed interpenetration and interpermeation of church and world, symbolically until 313 A. D., the sect provided Christian distance from a pagan world, as in Montanism. In the period of Christendom, symbolically until the later eighteenth century, the sect provided Christian distance from establishment and complaisance, as in Waldensianism and Albigensianism. In the period of post-Christendom, the sect provides religious distance from religion. It displaces all philosophies of history and all leaderships but one. It is not difficult for the sect, as it relates to the Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit, to claim primitive warrant for what it is doing. Most sects do this. It can point to an authentic prototype in early Christian discipline. The theological question as to whether or not the sect is adequate in the post-Christendom constellation is basic to the choice people in a Christian culture make between church and sect.

Will the pressures of life in a society where the spatial metaphor seems doomed by the factors essential to modernity also doom the sects? If the factors themselves dissipate, sectarian impulses may be prolonged. If the ideologies of the sects prevail, the impulse will be transformed, perhaps into churchliness. If a sect could attain coercive powers in a community, it could nurture life based on the diagrammatic assumption. None of these three possibilities seems worthy of serious speculation to anyone outside the sects. Yet the sectarian impulse, having survived in the West in at least three basic concatenations of circumstance, would, no doubt, erupt in surprising and durable new ways. There seems

to be a need in the hearts of many religious people for the preservation of distance from the world. In the present situation, the failure of communication between the sects and the churches doubtless contributes to the detriment of both. Yet the sects, with a calculation that goes beyond the rational to the profoundly instinctive, recognize that authentic communication means the beginning of the end of the diagrammatic or spatial construct they have succeeded in establishing or preserving in the contemporary world. Actual communication, in other words, could mean the death of the sect. The contribution of the sect to the larger society is, therefore, made best through the sympathetic observer who carries with him a picture of the advantages

of particularity and assertiveness back to the world of dialogical complexity. It is, no doubt, through the publicists of the third force that its force might be felt on Christians and other religious people who easily accommodate themselves to an existing culture. On this level of interaction the sects and cults become socially important to those they do not directly attract and serve. It is on this level, the level of the sect in the culture of a world where spatial and psychic barriers have been removed for most people, that the discussion of sect and cult could move beyond Weber, Troeltsch, Niebuhr, and Wach. The resulting discussions of nurture and discipline could be meaningful in the study of education, politics, and the arts and sciences in a democratic society.

The Ecumenical Movement

By ROSWELL P. BARNES *

ABSTRACT: The ecumenical movement is primarily the result of an internal dynamic arising from religious convictions, but it is also in part a response to social forces and historical developments. It is more inclusive than the major Protestant denominations in the American tradition and broader than the organizations which promote co-operation among the churches. The churches are not seeking to establish a monolithic church structure under centralized authority and control. The councils, in which they achieve order and at the same time maintain their freedom, may be suggestive to other institutions which desire to keep freedom and order in balance in modern mass society. Distinctions must be drawn between unity and uniformity, between agreement and mutual understanding. The community of interest among Christians rests primarily on common presuppositions derived from their faith. Intensive study of differences in doctrine and church polity improves mutual understanding and enlarges the areas of agreement. Participation in the ecumenical movement is changing the perspective of American churches with regard to national and world problems. Extensive association in international consultations and specialized agencies dealing with international affairs, in the missionary enterprise, and in interchurch aid and disaster relief corrects provincialism.

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* The opinions expressed in this article are the responsibility of the author, and do not express the views of the World Council of Churches or of United States Conference for the World Council of Churches.

WHEN we consider the ecumenical movement in American society, we must constantly remember that we are concerned not with a national phenomenon but with an expression of a world phenomenon in a national situation. To speak of the American ecumenical movement would involve a contradiction in terms, for what is ecumenical is of the whole inhabited earth. In Christian terms, it is the whole Church in all its historical manifestations in the whole world.

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization speaks of itself as ecumenical with etymological and factual justification. It is composed of, and concerned with, peoples—nations, races, cultures—of nearly all parts of the world. Ecumenical shirts and neckties have been advertised in New York papers; they are decorated with drawings of a wide variety of human types.

In general usage, however, the ecumenical movement is the trend toward unity among the Christians of the world. It has been associated popularly in America and elsewhere with the gravitation of Protestant and Eastern Orthodox churches toward a close community among themselves, notably during the last few decades. Since the Reformation and until recently, the trend had been toward division, magnifying the special tenets of faith emphasized by particular denominations. The ecumenical movement reverses that trend and focuses attention on the basic aspects of faith held in common.

But Protestants and Eastern Orthodox Christians do not limit the scope of the ecumenical idea or the movement to themselves. They recognize that in principle, and at some points in actuality, the Roman Catholic Church on the one hand and certain Christian groups of recent origin on the other hand are encompassed within an accurate use of the term *ecumenical*.

A distinction must be made between the ecumenical movement and its principal expression in councils of churches. The movement is much broader than its organized manifestations. It is a matter of spirit, purpose, and behavior. The World Council of Churches, which is its most obvious expression and instrument as it is popularly understood, is composed of 178 national church bodies in more than fifty countries. But it does not include in its membership the Roman Catholic Church, nor the Southern Baptist Convention, the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, nor the Pentecostals, nor numerous other smaller groups in this country.

However, there are Roman Catholics, Southern Baptists, Missouri Synod Lutherans, and Pentecostals who are committed to the cause of Christian unity and who co-operate with the churches in the World Council in the effort to bring it about. Most Roman Catholics maintain that the only possible unity would be that which would result from a return of all Christians to their Church. Some work and pray for unity as God may will, implying that a "return to Rome" is not necessarily the only way.

So wherever we find in this country a spirit and effort to further Christian unity in the whole world, in the nation, and in the local community, we find a manifestation of the ecumenical movement. The National Council of Churches of Christ in the United States of America and the 873 state and local councils of churches are committed to this purpose. When we consider the ecumenical movement, we have in mind the councils but much more.

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PRESSURES

Basically, Christian unity is a given fact derived from a common belief in Jesus Christ as God and Savior. It is, therefore, not created by men, but gratefully acknowledged and manifested.

It is furthered and developed by men as they progressively respond in obedience to what they believe to be God's will. Christ prayed for his followers of all time "that they all may be one." The ecumenical movement is essentially an expression of conviction, a matter of faith derived from biblical and theological authority.

But there are external contributing factors, some expediential, some inherent in historical developments. This is not to say that they are without theological sanction, for God works in and through history.

One of the important factors of expediency has been the need, recognized by missionaries in non-Christian cultures, to reduce competing and seemingly contradictory interpretations of Christianity which have made other people wonder whether there is really a Christian faith or only a variety of sects having their roots in some vague and remote common origin. The varying denominational emphases have made some sense in the West, which has understood their origins and their common basic faith, but they have made little sense in many parts of the world.

The need for making a common impact in the world, for aggregating and strategically deploying all resources, has been and still is an inducement to magnify common beliefs and to co-operate. The International Missionary Council has been serving this need for half a century. That Council will probably be integrated with the World Council of Churches in 1961.

In some lands of the younger Christian churches, and even more in the United States, the mobility of the population—including church members—is conducive to unity. Many Protestants join a church of a denomination other than the one with which they have been affiliated if there is none of their own in a community into which they move. Even if they can find one of their own

at a distance, they may join another because of convenience, the church program, the minister, its being the church of their children's friends, or other considerations.

Consequently, many a Protestant church has more members who came to it from churches of other denominations than who were always in its own denomination. It is inclined to try to make Christians raised in various traditions feel at home. Consequently it may not emphasize its peculiar traditions and beliefs.

Certain aspects of societal evolution have encouraged Christian unity. The world-wide alignments of interests and influences, consolidating ideological, military, racial groupings, have encouraged Christians to come together. The emergence of mass societies having mass media of communication and requiring large constellations of like concerns has made it almost necessary for church groups to co-operate.

In the United States, if it were not for the broadly representative National Council of Churches, there would be competition among the churches in radio and television broadcasting of religious programs. Government agencies would be seriously handicapped if they could not get information and advice on matters of concern to the churches from a few representative centers. Otherwise they would find it necessary to go to all the larger churches separately. From the point of view of the churches, co-operation has been desirable if not necessary to achieve satisfactory relations with the government.

FREEDOM AND ORDER

Circumstances have made it highly expedient for the churches to co-ordinate their interests and efforts for the purpose of achieving effective influence in the life of the nation. In the never-ending tension between freedom and

order in the institutions of religion as well as in those of political life, the nature of modern society encourages emphasis on the side of order.

From the time of the Reformation until recently, freedom had been magnified. A church could easily pursue its own course and a nation could live in isolation. But with the emergence of mass society and the alignment of political powers in the world community, isolation has become difficult and irresponsible in both religion and political life.

At the same time, there is a resistance to the trend toward order, because the order which had prevailed before the reformation swing to freedom had been maintained by centralized authoritarian control by an ecclesiastical hierarchy. And in countries where order has been achieved by a reformation church or an Eastern Orthodox church being "established" by the state with special privileges, freedom has frequently—though not always—been impaired. Our national tradition has been founded on a repudiation of order achieved by monopoly of any type.

Thus, while the churches have recognized the need for more order among themselves they have at the same time persistently cherished the notion of freedom. The ecumenical movement has sought to achieve unity without uniformity, and to maintain diversity without anarchy. In other words, it has resolved to keep freedom and order in balance.

The councils which the churches have set up serve this purpose. By voluntary association in the councils the churches achieve order and maintain freedom at the same time. They preserve their respective sovereignties without mutual hostility. They further co-operation without uniformity. They aggregate their resources for an effective impact

in mass society at the world, national, state and local territorial levels.

Achievements

The churches in the National Council have achieved a large measure of order in foreign missions, home missions, the allocation of time among themselves on radio and television. They have co-ordinated overseas relief and reconstruction, service to refugees, and church extension. They are gaining in concerted impact on social problems such as juvenile delinquency, interracial tension, and political corruption. They provide certain services through the councils which they could not provide at all or as well separately; for example, the production of the Revised Standard Version of the Bible, the nomination of chaplains to prisons, and the provision of worship materials for use in services on ships of the United States lines.

Thus in organizational structure, procedures, and methods of operation, the voluntary co-ordination of the churches is demonstrating how to keep freedom and order in balance in a democratic mass society. Many millions of church members, who are also citizens, are habituated to, and disciplined in, a pattern of relationships which in many respects can be applied to governmental and other community affairs.

In the early history of our country, the organization and group processes and disciplines of the covenant fellowship of the local church had a pronounced influence on community life. The national constitutional structures and procedures of the churches were reflected in the forms of government set up for the new nation.

Today the councils of churches, as institutional manifestations and instruments of the ecumenical movement, are demonstrating in the religious life of the nation a solution to one of the most

urgent and difficult problems of our society—maintaining a balance between freedom and order consistent with democratic principles.

Social responsibility

A basic contribution of the churches to the nation's life is still, as it was in the beginning, the cultivation of the disciplines which make the freedom of democracy responsible and safe. But in the contemporary intricately interdependent society, mass impacts, highly organized power groups, and the expanded role of government are conducive to large combinations under centralized controls. Individuals and small groups do not seem to count; their creativity, initiative, and discipline seem less important. There is danger that freedom and order get out of balance, the latter outweighing the former.

The churches have escaped the danger. Again, as at the beginning of our national history, they may influence the temper and the institutional patterns of our public life.

FACTORS OF RESISTANCE

A few individuals and groups—most of them never having had experience in the councils—fear that the ecumenical movement, by moving toward order, is moving toward centralized control and the impairment of the freedom of those who participate in it. They see large groups of people at council meetings and assume that some one must be trying to build a "super-church." This is a basis for opposition to the movement in some quarters.

Also, there is an inherent encouragement to denominational particularism in the movement. Association with others often accentuates emphasis on one's own particular tradition and doctrine. However, just as internationalism may be contributory to sound nationalism rather than to cosmopolitan-

ism, sound ecumenicalism may likewise be conducive to sound denominationalism rather than to a vague lowest-common-denominator religion. The Statue of Liberty has a strong emotional appeal to me when I pass it after a long stay abroad, but it does not lessen my sympathetic concern for the peoples with whom I have been associated. So the ecumenical movement does not dilute one's faith; it enriches it. But some who are not in it are not aware of this fact and therefore magnify their separateness in extreme isolationism.

Another factor in the opposition is a concept of the nature of Christianity and of the role of the church. There are some who regard religion as an extremely individualistic matter divorced from the problems of society. For them, the role of the church is to prepare souls for eternity by its rites and sacraments and to have nothing to do with public affairs. Inconsistently, however, these same people often insist that the church in a Communist-dominated country should challenge the ideology of the state and its political, economic, and social policies. The churches in the ecumenical movement are concerned with social problems.

Just as there are some isolationist nationalists who still live in the intellectual world of the nineteenth century, there also remain church groups of a similar mentality and social philosophy. They tend to associate themselves with sympathetic social and political groups in a determined effort to resist the march of history.

THE EXTENT OF THE MOVEMENT

Despite these and other separatist factors—some derived from misconceptions and others from variant beliefs—Christian solidarity is developing on all fronts in America. To estimate the extent of the ecumenical movement, it may be helpful to think of it in terms

of three concentric circles representing three steps of progression from the settled, organized core to the experimental frontier at the periphery, even though the lines are not definite or fixed.

Core groups

Within the first circle are the Protestants. They have much in common in tradition, theology, the concept of the church and the function of the church in society. They have been frustrated and disturbed in conscience by the competitiveness of their divisions and have had most experience in developing a pattern of co-operation. They have provided most of the initiative, leadership, and resources for the councils of churches in America.

The Protestant churches have largely eliminated their earlier stultifying fragmentation. There was a time when they could be characterized as "a congeries of contentious and contending sects." That certainly does not apply today. The Protestant churches as a whole can present a co-ordinated aggregate impact when they feel the need to do so.

Beyond co-ordination, Protestant denominations have been establishing more structural unity among themselves. There have been numerous mergers between denominations of the same "family," or general tradition and theological position. The Methodists formed one church composed of the former northern and southern churches and the Methodist Protestant Church. There has recently been one large Lutheran merger and another has been authorized. In the Presbyterian family, the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America represents a merger of two denominations. Earlier, the Evangelical and United Brethren churches united. Well over seventeen million members have been involved in these unions.

Notable merger

But mergers have not been limited to denominations within a family. One of the most significant has been that of the Congregational Christian and the Evangelical and Reformed denominations, each of which represented earlier mergers. Those two denominations had different traditions and forms of government—the former had a decentralized congregational polity, emphasizing the autonomy of the local covenant fellowship; the latter had a presbyterian form of government, vesting more authority in a group of churches.

Through the Faith and Order movement, one aspect of the ecumenical movement, the churches are constantly attempting to work toward agreements on theological positions regarding the nature of the church and its doctrinal formulations of the Christian faith. On the basis of such agreements the churches could unite or at least manage some semblance of unity by, for example, recognizing each other's ministries.

National Council complex

The second concentric circle in the ecumenical movement in the United States includes Eastern Orthodox and other ancient Oriental churches along with the Protestant denominations. This grouping represents a wider variety of traditions, doctrines, and forms of ecclesiastical organization than is found among Protestants alone. There is more basic agreement among all Eastern Orthodox churches on matters of theology and forms of church government than there is among Protestant churches.

This wider circle marks the range of membership in the National Council of Churches and most of the state and local councils. Most of the program

activities of the councils reflect the desire for co-operation. However, they are giving increasing attention to faith and order studies. Theological discussion is lively and usually creative. At the present stage, progress is more marked in mutual understanding than in agreement on basic issues.

Need for knowledge

The distinction between understanding and agreement is of the utmost importance in analyzing the ecumenical movement. After a long history of isolation from one another, the first step in the development of Christian community is an understanding by each church of what the others believe and why they believe it. Without such knowledge, each may attribute to the others beliefs which the others do not hold.

Misunderstandings are conducive to estrangement, tension, and antagonism. As they are eliminated, or even reduced, the spirit of trust and fellowship develops. Some disagreements have been based on misinformation or misinterpretation; and even though other disagreements persist, they become less a source of irritation and more a cause of concern. Then the effort to achieve agreement becomes more intense and at the same time more relaxed. Contentiousness is eased by understanding and the discipline of close association in a common purpose.

It is possible, however, that the objective of co-operation may become so absorbing that the only agreement diligently sought may be that of achieving a united front for the sake of effective action in society and that little attention may be given to developing more basic unity. For this reason it is sometimes charged that a council of churches retards progress toward significant unity because the council is based on the assumption of the indefinite continuation

of the sovereignty and autonomy of the present separate denominations.

Current ecumenical frontiers

The third concentric circle marks the widest extent of the ecumenical movement. No one can measure its dimension, because its limit is determined by the spirit and purpose of people. It includes those people who may not be related to any of the councils or other organized expressions of Christian unity but who are committed to it in principle and exert influence toward the development of understanding and brotherliness among Christian groups. Many Roman Catholics share this spirit and purpose, as well as many members of Protestant churches which keep themselves separated from councils of churches.

One of the most important features of the movement within this widest circle is the improvement of communication between churches which have little close association and between individual leaders and members of such churches. Roman Catholic and Protestant theologians are meeting for joint discussions. Protestants, Eastern Orthodox, and Roman Catholics are studying each others' publications and exchanging comments. Serious dialogue is much more frequent than formerly.

It should be noted that this widest limit of the ecumenical movement does not reach beyond the bounds of trinitarian Christian faith. It does not encompass or seek to encompass all who believe in God in some way. It should therefore be clearly distinguished from religious syncretism.

Being strict about its basis of trinitarian faith and concerned about the theological and traditional differences which divide the churches, the movement is separated clearly from ethical humanism. At the same time, as the churches find greater depth and confidence in their faith through the ecumenical movement, they are becoming more

menical experience, they often become more co-operative with groups of other religious faiths, or with secular groups, in social welfare and civic improvement projects.

UNITY VERSUS UNIFORMITY

No simple and satisfactory answer can be given to the question, "What are the prospects for pan-Christian union?" If by "union" is meant one monolithic institution embracing all Christians under one ecclesiastical authority, the answer is fairly easy. It is certainly not possible in the foreseeable future, and probably not desirable ever. The World Council of Churches has disavowed it as an objective. It might be a reasonable theoretical objective of the Roman Catholic Church, but not of Protestants who believe in freedom.

Pan-Christian "unity" may be quite a different matter. In a sense, it exists now; for all Christians are one in certain essentials of faith. There is general agreement that this given unity should be more visibly manifested than it is at present. How it should be manifested is a matter of major discussion in ecumenical circles. The nature of the unity we seek is not defined; but for most persons in the ecumenical movement it lies somewhere between the present situation and one monolithic church. For some, the visible organizational expression of unity in a council of churches would be sufficient if all churches were included; for most, it would not be sufficient.

This author would state the confident personal judgment that the prospects are good for rapid progress during the next several decades in pan-Christian mutual understanding, trust, harmony, and organized co-operation in the pursuit of common social objectives such as peace, justice, and social welfare. Christian unity is a matter of both spirit and form. As it is achieved in

spirit, the possible and desirable forms will become apparent.

ECUMENICAL PERSPECTIVE

As the ecumenical movement progresses among the churches in the United States, their influence becomes more co-ordinated. The Protestant churches represent the predominant religious tradition and force in American life. Most of the major Protestant churches, along with the principal Eastern Orthodox churches, are associated together as members in the National Council of Churches. Thus they have the means to achieve mutual understanding, to define their common purposes, and to aggregate their resources in the pursuit of their agreed objectives. At many points churches which are not actually members of the National Council co-operate with the member churches in their programs.

The 50 state councils of churches, 42 with paid staff, and the 823 local councils, 226 with paid staff, also serve the churches in their respective territorial areas. They are all autonomous, being responsible to the church units which constitute them. Their constituencies are generally affiliated with the denominations which comprise the National Council, though there are variations. In many respects, their policies coincide with those of the National Council. There are also 68 councils of religious education which help to co-ordinate the work of the churches at some points.

Thus it can be seen that the visual impression of separate church buildings with different denominational names and various forms of worship and government does not provide an accurate concept of the organizational expression of religious life in this country. For voluntary co-ordination has achieved unity in many aspects of the impact of the churches upon the community.

The ecumenical movement has resulted not only in the development of new structures and procedures and the improvement of mutual understanding among our churches but also in a broader perspective of analysis and judgment. As a world-wide movement, it brings the churches of the nation into close association with those from varied settings facing a multitude of problems.

We Americans find fresh insight into the problems of our society when we compare notes with colleagues who face analogous problems in other situations—race, alcoholism, juvenile delinquency, mass communications, the urbanization of agrarian cultures, the power alignments of free-world and Communist interests, the functions of national agencies and of international agencies in Africa.

REFLECTIONS AT ST. ANDREWS

Let me be concrete. This article is being written between sessions of consultations related to a meeting of the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches being held in the ancient university at St. Andrews, Scotland, in August 1960. I talk with clergy and lay people in small scheduled groups, at meals, in the lounges, or walking on the campus, for minutes or for hours at a time. Many have been colleagues for ten or twenty years, some longer. A few are almost strangers.

Among the topics of serious conversation have been the present position of moderates and left- and right-wing radicals in several countries in Africa; the present situation with regard to apartheid in South Africa; the "teddy boys" of London and the youth gangs of New York; disturbances over race in England and the United States; the dynamics of present-day nationalism in Greece and Japan and its effects upon the churches; cultural trends in Spain; and the behavior, more than the results, of

the recent Democratic and Republican conventions in the United States. In all these conversations competent people fresh from the scenes of the problems are being questioned.

American national image

As seen from the inside, events often have quite a different meaning from what they seem to have as seen from the outside, but each view may correct the other. We Americans seldom stop to think how our conventions lend themselves to reporting by pictures, television, radio, and newspapers overseas. They are the most dramatic episodes in our national political process. They are interesting to other people. They make more sense to us than to outsiders; they are hard to explain to non-Americans. And the greatest distortions of American political life arise from the inevitable tendency for others to generalize from the spectacular incident. The more thoughtful and orderly aspects of an election year, being less newsworthy, less obvious, are not called to people's attention in other countries in such a way as to correct the impression gained from the conventions. Even so, it is good for us to see ourselves as others see us.

Ecumenical association corrects our own analysis of our own problems, our appraisals of situations in other countries, and our judgment as to our relations with other nations. Obviously, this observation applies especially to religious affairs and the particular concerns of the churches, which occupy most of our time at such ecumenical gatherings.

There are nearly 500 people involved in these exchanges of views at St. Andrews, including wives and husbands of some official participants, staff, and interpreters for the few who do not speak English. Among this number are more than 100 from all sections of the United States, most of them in positions of

national or community leadership. Some of us are here for four weeks. And this is typical of many similar occasions.

Extended effects

The accumulated experience of a large number of leaders in such associations is gradually having an effect on the world outlook and the political and social philosophy of the people in the churches and consequently on their influence in the nation.

The churches have also set up special organizations to deal with international problems. The Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, sponsored by the World Council of Churches and the International Missionary Council, relates the churches of many nations to one another for mutual advice and support and represents their common interests to the United Nations and other intergovernmental agencies. Its members are predominantly Christian laymen of experience and standing in dealing with world problems in public affairs. Its staff has special competence in its field of operations.

This world body helps to co-ordinate the interests and activities of more than twenty related national commissions, and more than 300 correspondents around the world. In the United States its primary channel of communication with the churches is the Department of International Affairs of the National Council of Churches. Some denominations and some local councils of churches have similar groups. Through the National Council's department, its member churches keep in touch with developments in American foreign policy and make overtures to the government when authorized to do so by the central governing body of the Council.

Understanding of the problems of the world is deepened both by normal ecumenical associations such as those at St. Andrews and by agencies dealing

specifically with international affairs. But there is something special about such associations. There are many world travelers who talk with people of many lands. There are many organizations which deal with world affairs. What is different about ecumenical associations and work?

Areas of agreement

Within the ecumenical movement people discuss and collaborate on the basis of a fundamental common faith. Although they do not agree on all theological interpretations of that faith, they do agree on many essential presuppositions. They have the same supreme loyalty to God in Christ. They have the same general understanding of the meaning of history under the sovereignty and redemption of God. They all regard nations as subject to the laws of God. They recognize all peoples as bound together in mutual responsibility. Therefore they are committed to seek peace, justice, and freedom for all within God's creation and concern. They share standards of moral integrity.

This is not a complete list or analysis of agreements, but it is sufficient to indicate why ecumenical association and collaboration are different from others and how they help to hold the world together.

American actions

In two other ways American churches are closely associated with other peoples. The missionary enterprise has aroused widespread interest in their circumstances and aspirations. Mission study groups in most churches acquire considerable insight and information. Missionaries from our country and leaders from the younger churches promote mutual sympathetic understanding.

Also, during the last several decades, but especially since World War II, American churches, along with those of

her nations, have participated in a vast program of relief, reconstruction, interchurch aid, and service to refugees, co-ordinated by the World Council of Churches. Some 75 million pounds of clothing have been collected here and distributed overseas. About 180,000 refugees have been resettled in this country by our Protestant and Eastern Orthodox agencies. The churches in the National Council are contributing about two and one-half million dollars a year through their co-operative program in Church World Service. Medical supplies and cattle, sheep, chickens and

a great variety of other material items are sent all over the world. This massive demonstration of concern for the welfare of other people has built up sympathy for their needs of all kinds.

We conclude, therefore, that in the ecumenical movement the American churches are making a more effective witness to their faith, providing a better ministry to a confused generation, and exerting a more helpful and relevant influence in the nation as it faces the hazards of unprecedented power and responsibility in an unstable and apprehensive world.

Current Trends in Religion—A Summary

By RICHARD D. LAMBERT

ABSTRACT: The decline in support for religion among the populace and the intelligentsia which marked the opening decades of the twentieth century has been reversed during the years since World War II. On the one hand, swelling church memberships have been accompanied by a bland popular piety. On the other hand, intellectuals have undertaken a challenging new era of revisionist theology. The supply of clergymen has not kept pace either with the increasing memberships or with the expanding functions of the churches. One result is the enhanced importance of the laity. The financial needs of the churches have induced them to approach ever more closely the methods and structures of business. The divisions between the various denominations on doctrinal and ethnic points have lost much of their relevance, and efforts at merger and unification have been productive. The splintering and growth of sects and cults continues.

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THE purpose of the present article is to present in capsule form the main arguments and viewpoints which emerge from the fuller treatments in the earlier articles.

First, how many people are involved in church activity in our country? Table 1 presents data from the decennial census on the number of people who return clergyman as their occupation. It also contains a set of comparisons of the number of church members and the total population per clergyman and the proportion that clergymen represent in the economically active section of the population.

It will be noted that there was in 1950 one clergyman for every 507 church members and for every 881 persons in the population at large. The number of clergymen has not increased as fast as church membership, nor has it increased as fast as the general population or that portion of the population which is economically active. The increasing number of lay church members per clergyman is both a result of the increasing size of congregations concomitant with the urbanization of America and of the decline in recruitment for the ministry in the face of competition from other professions.

Table 2 contains the estimated changes in the number of people who are members of religious bodies for the same decennial census years.

TABLE 1—CLERGYMEN IN UNITED STATES, 1910-1950

CENSUS YEAR	NUMBER IN THOUSANDS	CHURCH MEMBERS PER CLERGYMAN	TOTAL POPULATION PER CLERGYMAN	CLERGYMEN PER 1,000 ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE
1910	118	326	779	3.2
1920	127	380	832	3.0
1930	149	394	824	3.1
1940	141	457	934	2.7
1950	171	507	881	2.9

TABLE 2—TOTAL MEMBERSHIP IN UNITED STATES RELIGIOUS BODIES, 1910-1950

CENSUS YEAR	NUMBER IN THOUSANDS ¹	PER CENT TOTAL POPULATION MEMBERS	PER CENT POPULATION AGED 13 AND OVER MEMBERS ²
1910	38,497*	41.2	55.0
1920	48,251*	45.6	54.1
1930	58,754*	47.8	53.4
1940	64,502	48.9	50.7
1950	86,830	57.6	63.7

¹ Source: "Membership of Religious Bodies: 1890-1957," *Historical Statistics of the United States* (Washington, D. C.: United States Bureau of the Census, 1960), p. 228.

² Source: Michael Argyle, *Religious Behavior* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958), p. 28.

* Estimated for these years by straight line interpolation between religious census years.

Landis, in his article for this issue, reports that there were 251 distinct religious bodies in 1958 with a total membership of 109,557,741 members equivalent to 63 per cent of the population. It will be seen from column two that the percentage of the population of the United States which was claimed by the religious bodies as members had increased steadily since 1910. Religious figures are notoriously inaccurate as a result, at least in part, of the differences in the definition of church membership over time and among denominations. But one disturbing factor is removed from the calculations in column three. By restricting the comparison to those who are over thirteen years of age both among church members and in the population, we correct both for the aging of the United States population and for the varying practices in reporting children as members. We note from this comparison that church affiliation declined mildly from 1910 to 1940 and then took a spectacular jump after 1950 which gives every indication of continuing to the present time. The correction

for age makes the mid-century religious revival even more spectacular.

AUTHENTICITY

The fact of this revival has been amply documented and discussed. What is surprising is the almost unanimous suspicion with which it is greeted. Ahlstrom reflects the attitudes of the vast literature on the subject when he frowns upon the "pious utilitarianism," the peace of mind cults, the contentless faith in faith, the bland conformity in the upsurge of popular piety. But Ahlstrom describes another aspect of the revival which he considers more durable and more valid, namely, the increasing religious trend of the intelligentsia. This reverses the ecclesiastical malaise of the nineteen twenties and thirties when intellectuals tended to consider religion one of the least worthy forms of irrationality and to believe that man's relationship to the universe was a scientific, as distinct from a theological, problem. During the nineteen forties and fifties theologians have vigorously re-entered as scientific specialization has tended to withdraw science from the broader stage. The two streams of popular piety and intellectual resurgence are antipathetic, an antagonism reflected in the almost uniform disdain which intellectuals among the clergy heap upon the instrumental, circumscribed piety which they observe as so characteristic of the American public today. This expression of clerical disapproval of popular religion is, in a way, the price paid by the clergy for freeing itself from the onus of the Scopes trial and the Babbitt image. More importantly, though, it reflects a conflict between the desire of our religious "middlemen" to attend to their relationship with God and the demands of the public that they attend to their relationships with their clientele.

THE CLERGY AND THE LAITY

The relationship between the clergy and the laity is full of contradictions and imprecision. Differences in the sanctification of the clergy and the power of the clergy over the lives of the laity lie at the heart of the classic institutional contrasts among denominations and religions. Kane begins his article on "Church and Laity Among Catholics" by saying, "The Roman Catholic considers his Church a divinely instituted organization founded by Jesus Christ." Later he indicated that "A priest is a sacred minister empowered through Holy Orders to celebrate Mass, administer the sacraments, to preach, and to bless." Harrison points out in his article "Church and Laity Among Protestants" that "only a comparatively small number of churches, largely confined to the Lutheran and Episcopal traditions, are willing to abide by this hierarchical principle." And elsewhere, quoting from Charles Kean, he writes, "The priesthood of all believers refers to the priestly character of the Church as a whole from which individuals both clerical and lay derive a common priesthood." Sklare, in his article on "Church and Laity Among Jews," notes that "According to Jewish tradition identical behavior is expected of the layman and the rabbi. . . the rabbinical office derives from a distinction—the gulf between the learned and the ignorant." In practice, however, the three great traditions are moving closer together. Among Catholics, while the priest remains the key figure in the parish, the role and status of the laity in religious affairs have been rapidly increasing. Among Protestants, "Whenever the authority of the layman is raised, 'the finger of an exclusively priestly voice and authority is immediately raised also.'" Among the Jews there is "a growing distinctiveness between the

functions of the layman and the rabbi. The addition of pastoral, priestly, clerical, and several other roles serves to transform the rabbi into a clergyman and the nonprofessional into a layman."

All three groups, then, have a new balance of power in clerical-lay relationships. This new balance is, in part, a result of the disappearance of the monopoly of education by the clergy. But, to a greater extent, it arises from what Harrison, quoting Philip Selznick, calls the "organizational imperatives" of religious life in America which are common to Catholics, Protestants, and Jews alike. The very size of the enterprise, the repetitiveness of the activities, the large number of functionaries involved at all levels of the religious endeavor impel religious organizations to take on a bureaucratic form, and the needs of this form of organization become primary ends in themselves, often taking precedence over the stated goals which the organization is dedicated to serve. This is a phenomenon by no means limited to religion, but its growth is made easier by the fact that the religious enterprise does not measure its success by objective standards. In business monetary success provides a ready scoreboard by which organizational efficiency can be measured. There is no way in which a religious bureaucracy can measure in quantity or quality the piety it has generated among its followers. It is not surprising that several authors have remarked upon measures borrowed by churches from the field of business. Many churches have adopted the concrete measures of success such as the sumptuousness of the buildings as an indicator. And they count the number of their adherents in the manner of a Trendex rating. The numerology of membership, like its prototype, pays little attention to the attitudes among the audience so long as the audience is captured regularly.

FINANCIAL PROPORTIONS

The magnitude of the endeavor contributes to the impression that religion is big business in America. For new church construction alone, Americans spend close to a billion dollars annually. To this sum must be added salaries and maintenance for the church physical plant, the cost of seminaries and other educational institutions and hospitals, funds for missionary projects, and the unaccounted ancillary enterprises such as the production of Bibles, vestments, periodicals and tracts, rosaries and religious medals, and the like. The sum becomes staggering. Leach reports that for a congregation of five hundred people the cost of real estate and architectural and landscaping fees alone will be at least four hundred thousand dollars. In addition to this there will be an annual operating budget ranging from twenty to fifty thousand dollars.

Unlike other institutions of comparable size, however, churches in America have few ways of guaranteeing a regular income. Their product, if such a term may be used, operates in the worst buyers market imaginable. Churches cannot enforce the payment of dues as a labor union can. They do not enjoy the coercion available to the state in its taxing power. Although tax exemption may lighten the costs to some extent, nothing is thereby added to income. The traditional way of financing the church—real estate ownership—today provides some income, but most churches in America are making payments on the mortgage rather than collecting rent. Since church income depends, then, upon voluntary contributions—which, at best, fluctuate widely—it is not surprising that religious institutions seek to employ all the pressures they can command to regularize and maximize their income. They must do so under an em-

barrassing ethic which treats monetary affairs as slightly defiling for spiritual preceptors. And they must be cautious lest too gross an assault on the clientele will defeat its purposes. As a result of the continual hunger for funds, local churches must devote a considerable portion of their energies to promotional activities. Consequently, as Harrison remarks, the church appears to many of its members to reach them only in financial drives. This impression is deepened by the increasing use of the professional fund raiser whose techniques have a depressing sameness whether he is speaking in the name of an American Legion post, a church, or a political party.

Two tendencies are noticable in the pursuit of funds. One is, as Leach remarks, a "growing effort to find some new scheme which can produce the money necessary without the tiring work of personal visitations." The second is the attempt to regularize the flow of income with annual budgets, prorated pledges, and weekly envelopes for all members styled along the lines of installment buying. In view of all this, the cost accountant can be seen to achieve the same dominance he is coming to enjoy in so many other areas of American life.

THE NEED TO EXPAND

The constant need of the local church for funds to carry on its present activities is at war with the built-in institutional imperative to expand both its membership and its functions. The competition over membership figures is notorious. To some extent the comparative figures reflect different conceptions of what makes a member. The Roman Catholic Church and some Episcopal and Lutheran bodies consider all baptized children as bona fide members whether they become active in church affairs as adults or not. Those religious

bodies whose definition is primarily ethnic, such as the Jews and the Eastern Orthodox, enumerate all members of their ethnic or cultural group who reside in a community where there is a congregation. Most Protestant groups count only those who have, by their own volition and maturity, accepted full membership in the church. The attention given to the size of membership and to its constant expansion derives to some extent from the evangelical mission of the church. A correlative to that seems to be that the validity of the message and the effectiveness of the clergy somehow depend upon the number of adherents, particularly new adherents. There are some groups for which this is not true, particularly the ethnic churches, where proselytizing is at a minimum. Here the emphasis is upon drawing the ethnically-defined clientele into fuller participation and upon preventing its assimilation into other denominations. It is also true that some churches, particularly in suburban areas, are disturbed by the large numbers of uncommitted persons who fill the pews but remain outside the organizational reach of the church. The way Jewish temples have adapted themselves to this circumstance is interesting. They realize a part of their income through the sale of seats for the few annual rituals at which participation is almost compulsory.

All religious groups extend their organizational boundaries by encouraging the formation of satellite lay organizations which are church based but primarily fraternal, educational, or recreational in their interests. The combination of these three interests with the doctrinal message is the most characteristic organizational form in American religion. The dilemma this poses for the church is mentioned by Harrison, who quotes Thomas Bennett, "The congregations become one more organizational activity. They make the same demands

upon the behavior of people as do other organizations in society." It is true that the selection of fellow members is made upon the basis of common religious allegiance, but the superimposition of religious instruction usually takes a distant second place to other organizational functions. Some of these satellite groups, at the same time, become agencies for initiating and policing fund drives. In this way they remove the debasing activities connected with the pursuit of money from the immediate purview of the inner sanctum.

EDUCATION IN RELIGION

The most important of these secondary organizations and the ones most closely related to the churches' principal purpose are the educational institutions. Hunt tells us that about 42 per cent of the United States population between the ages of three and eleven is enrolled in Protestant Sunday Schools. About four million Catholics and 350,000 Protestants are enrolled in full-time, church-related elementary and secondary schools. Almost half the Jewish children of elementary school age receive instruction in Jewish schools. Some 80 per cent receive "some Jewish schooling at some time during school age," usually for three or four years. The number of people of all denominations who receive some formal religious instruction attests to the demand for such services from the American public, but the proper relationship between religious and secular education has been a vexed one throughout American history. The question has been "settled" many times only to become unsettled again. The current resolution whereby religion is something to be added to a hard core secular education, whether by released time or an occasional school period or the ritual of morning prayer or any other device, is subject to constant negotiation. The infusion of religion

throughout the curriculum is practiced only in the church-related schools and even there the insertion of religious doctrine into a subject like trigonometry is most difficult. No one argues for a return to the days when religious instruction was the sole function of organized educational institutions. Nor does anyone argue that churches do not have a right to utilize the organized educational process through which all of our young must pass for the propagation of religious ideas. The argument is over who shall pay the bill. The current debate wears the linguistic garb of an ideological dispute over the separation of church and state. Sometimes the relative primacy of the parent as against the state is drawn into the argument. Its essence, however, is graphically demonstrated by such an uncivil exchange as that between Cardinal Spellman and Mrs. Roosevelt over the provision of funds. We are back, then, in the area most essential to church survival. The California electorate recently defeated a threat to withdraw tax exemption from Catholic schools. There is constant Catholic pressure for support of such ancillary services as school buses, lunches, and medical care. These are cases in point which illustrate that behind the debate lies the fear that one side or the other will gain an advantage in the interdenominational wars for membership.

CHURCH JURISDICTION

Where the jurisdiction of any set of social institutions overlaps with other social institutions, there is a jousting for supremacy. This may involve business and government, family and the educational system, or it may involve the church in relation to all of these. The least formal of the disputes is the sovereignty of the church over the family, and the denominations differ widely upon the extent to which family affairs

are considered within their domain. The variation ranges from rather detailed family canon among the Catholics to celebration of minimal rites of passage and the provision for mediation in cases of family discord among some Protestant groups. The interlocking of education and religion has already been discussed. In the areas where religion and business impinge upon each other, church efforts have been generally confined to a rising tide of books and pamphlets aimed at raising the ethical level of business transactions.

Under the aegis of the social gospel, many of the clergy have felt impelled to promote policies which they interpret as the embodiment of the ethical principles in their religious code. This call carries the cloth into many a reformist battle where the immediate relevance of religious doctrines has not been altogether clear to the laity. Their ventures into secular policy can, for the most part, be identified with the liberal viewpoint. Racial equalitarianism remains almost the only surviving issue for liberalism today. As Lee points out, this, more than any other issue, tears at the cleric in numerous ways. The position of his denomination and his personal position as well frequently are at sharp variance with the sentiments of his congregation, which are strongly felt and anti-integration. The members of his congregation are armed with powerful sanctions. They may withhold financial support, boycott the church, or request a new pastor if he strays too far beyond the parochial culture of his parishioners. The churches are uneasy in the face of this issue. The uneasiness reflects not only genuine ambivalence among the clergy but also an awareness of the pressures which the laity can potentially use against the clergy. Generally, the effective limits to the adventures of the clergy in public policy are those cultural limitations which charac-

terize the laity and those views from which the laity will not be parted. Few clergymen pursue a course beyond those limits. A surprisingly large portion of clergymen, in view of the limitations, have taken positions on integration which are far in advance of their congregations.

AREAS OF CONTROVERSY

The most controversial institutional overlap of the churches with secular affairs is in the field of politics. As Ebersole points out, until recently the impact of religion on politics was primarily a matter of pressure brought to bear in specific issues about which the Protestant clergy felt strongly. The outstanding examples of such issues are prohibition and the abolition of slavery. Perhaps Washington felt more beleaguered in the heydays of the Women's Christian Temperance Union and the Anti-Saloon League, but many church groups retain well-staffed lobbies in the capital today with a view to exerting pressure over specific issues. In the nineteenth century, Catholicism was important as a primary target on the national political scene for the nativist parties such as the Know-Nothings and the American Protective Association. On the local scenes, the ethnic vote, much of it Catholic, contributed to the success and durability of the political machines in the metropolitan areas of the northeast and spawned a tradition of ethnic and religious distribution of appointive posts. Since the short-lived party of Bishop Hughes in 1841 which swung the balance between the Whigs and Democrats in New York, there has never been an avowedly Catholic party. Nonetheless, the expression "the church" in politics refers to the influence of the Catholic hierarchy upon the political opinions of their laity. This takes several forms in operation. The most conspicuous are the church pronouncements on legisla-

tion which the church considered directly related to dogma. The issues which generate the most conflict with other denominations concern the prohibition of information, particularly birth control information, and the censorship of entertainment considered immoral by an official of the church. As in the Holyoke incident of 1940 and the bitter political campaigns in Massachusetts of 1942 and 1948, these matters strike Protestants as unjust interferences by the church into politics and as a denial of civil liberties. Ironically, the Catholics in Massachusetts were working to prevent the repeal of a birth-control law, a law which had been passed in 1869 at the urging of the Protestant clergy. Catholicism has entered politics less directly in the second type of issue wherein the strength and interests of the church are involved. Such issues, in the main, relate to public support for Catholic education and vary in scope from local school board fights to the United States Congress where dispute was generated by the Barden Amendment to the Federal Aid to Education Bill (HR4643). A third type of issue concerns unofficial Church support for a variety of political views such as opposition to right-to-work laws or support of strong anti-communist legislation. The Church stand on these issues often is indistinguishable from the stand of a broad section of the general public. On such issues the Church is at its least organized and is probably among the least effective of the interested political pressure groups.

All of the issues mentioned above come to focus in the current debates over the Catholic vote and the submission expected of Catholic office-holders to Church discipline. Most politicians operate upon the assumption that Catholic voters will tend to choose a Catholic candidate over a non-Catholic candidate. The current drift of opinion seems

to indicate that the Catholicism of a candidate is always significant for Protestants in the more fundamentalist bodies. It gains significance for others if there is an issue related to religion in the campaign. By and large, Catholicism does not currently seem to be an insurmountable handicap, and possibly, on balance, it could become an asset.

SURVIVAL

One of the most enduring generalizations about religion in general is that it is the most resistant to change of all institutions. It is for this reason that most major religious changes throughout history have come about through conquest or revolutionary upheaval. Significantly, though, Kane remarks that "The truly great asset of the Roman Catholic Church is her ability to adapt to changing times without altering the repository of faith and morals." We can be sure that the adherents of other denominations would claim as much for them. This juxtaposition of conservatism and flexibility shows up in the attempts of various churches to adapt to the rapidly changing culture and environment of America today. Among the most far-reaching changes is the decline in importance of such older centers of loyalty as geographic locale and ethnic affiliation which were the rocks upon which the churches were built in America. The rigid boundaries formed by these differences nurtured denominational separateness and provided the churches with clienteles already defined. The more recent great mobility of the American people and the blurring of ethnic lines has produced what Marty refers to as the loss of the diagrammatic effect or the spatial metaphor for defining community and communication. Marty suggests that the growth of sects is a "reaction against the erosion of spatial settings." The sect provides the

comfort of conservatism because its doctrines are immune to the evidence of the worldly setting. And it substitutes for "physical spatial contradistinction from other groups . . . various substitutes in psychological distinction and distance." The cult, Marty argues, does not seek separateness for it is internally bound by a sort of hierarchical togetherness in which the interpersonal relations are more important than the doctrine.

The majority of church groups have sought neither the answer of the sect nor of the cult. Rather, clinging to the old spatial orientations, they have fled the cities for the suburbs in pursuit of their clientele. They have tried to adjust to the cafeteria-like religious services and the denomination-blurring homogenization of the suburban church. Douglass notes the churches' embarrassment in having adjusted so easily. He observes guilt over their abandonment of the urban proletariat, now racially and ethnically separate. He sees the decline in the relevance and meaning of what he calls the "separated clans and tribes of the Christian family."

Only the urban-based churches of ethnic groups which feel themselves under assault retain the old tradition. Among the Jews, for instance, the vignette of our times is the chic, suburban, middle-class Jewish mother who tries to raise her children in a ritualistic tradition she earlier discarded in the name of intellectual enlightenment. The flourishing of the Hasidic community is a more extreme case. Lee, quoting Charles Johnson, points out that the Negro church has provided a substitute for political organization and has furnished a channel for social as well as religious expression. It has been the center for face to face relations, for communication, for recreation, and for physical as well as psychological escape from troubles. It has been welcomed by Negroes even in areas where physical separation in wor-

ship was not demanded. Other ethnic and racial groups such as the Puerto Ricans, Spanish-speaking peoples of the Southwest, American Indians, Chinese-Americans, and Japanese-Americans still retain in their church affiliation some of the functions which the immigrant churches of the great Atlantic migration performed.

For other groups, however, a man's ethnic affiliation is no longer so important a fact in his life. Time has blurred the old highly fragmented sectarian and denominational differences into what Will Herberg calls the "triple melting pot," three great communities with religious labels reading Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish. It is one thing, however, to indicate the declining relevance of minor sectarian splits for the laity. It is another thing to demonstrate it for the clergy. Self-contained formal organizations resist vigorously all tampering with their boundaries, whether these organizations be the branches of the military service, companies, educational institutions, or churches.

The ecumenical movement, in an attempt to reunite the fragmented denominations in the face of strong institutional resistances, proposes as a solution a loose confederation which permits the retention of denominational sovereignty in internal affairs while supporting a uniform foreign policy. Barnes makes the point that advocates of this movement take great pains to reassure wary denominations that they will not be submerged in the over-arching bureaucracy. The ecumenical drive has had some notable successes among Protestant groups, but it has made little progress in wooing Catholic support. It does not extend to the Jews.

The future of denominationalism is difficult to assess. We can be reasonably sure that a church will survive. At no time in history has there not been between men and their gods other men

who spoke more intimately, more knowingly, and perhaps more effectively in the sacred discourse. From time to time a people has tried to sweep away these middlemen as they would sweep cobwebs from before their eyes, but others always have taken the places. Today, the sweeping aside takes the form of secularization and homogenization in the

churches themselves. As old doctrinal cleavages, so irrelevant in American thought today, fade in importance, it is probable that new doctrinal and procedural distinctions more suited to the current divisions within our society either will establish new denominations or will be quietly adopted by the old ones.

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SOCIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

PAUL M. HARRISON. *Authority and Power in the Free Church Tradition: A Social Case Study of the American Baptist Convention*. Pp. xix, 248. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1959. \$5.00.

In this valuable contribution to the sociology of religion, the American Baptist Convention, a major American denominational organization, is studied by one of its own members, who is not only sociologically oriented but also sufficiently sophisticated in the methodology to analyze functionally the consequences of large-scale organization, mechanization, and bureaucratization in a religious institution. The author's empirical research involved the use of unstructured and focused interviews and schedules and an examination of Baptist histories and sundry other written materials, reports, correspondence, and directives. In providing a comprehensive analysis of the structure and function of his church polity, comprising approximately a million and a half members and 6,400 churches, the fourth largest Baptist group in the United States, the author employs the theoretical background for understanding social systems developed by Talcott Parsons, Robert K. Merton, and Marion J. Levy, Jr.; he also utilizes the interpretation of ecclesiastical authority and power provided by Robert Michels and Max Weber, with supplementation from Lasswell and Kap-

lan's views in their study, *Power and Society*. Incidentally, while adopting Weber's typology of authority, Harrison, following an observation of Carl J. Friedrich, introduces two modifications into the Weberian "ideal-typical" conceptualization of the bases of "legitimacy," by suggesting two subcategories of authority—"rational-pragmatic" and "quasi-charismatic."

The primary problem which this analysis confronts is the discrepancy between the polity of the American Baptists and their doctrine of the church. The latter for over a century has stressed the freedom of the individual in religious matters and that of the local congregation to manage its affairs without church councils or associations and regardless of denominational officials who legally cannot possess power. Yet despite the absence of a hierarchy, the Baptists have developed an "impressive denominational organization" which in power and complexity recalls the bureaucratic structures in government and business. Despite the desire of the Baptists to curtail the influence of ecclesiastical personnel, which was a major consideration in the formation of the Convention, its officials have secured more power over local church activities than recognized as legitimate by ideologists of the Baptist movement. This has led to the suggestion that the polity system be altered to recognize the power of the denominational leaders, but this alteration would entail a change in the doctrine of the church.

After defining the problem of authority in a congregational church dedicated to the affirmation of "the freedom of man under the freedom of God," Harrison scrutinizes the history of the Baptist denomination first in Europe and then in the United States, and the forces and pressures from which the Convention emerged in 1907 in order to introduce greater efficiency into the missionary and promotional enterprises of American Baptists which had grown greatly during the nineteenth century. He then proceeds to analyze the contrast between the formal system of authority and the informal system of power, with special interest in the pragmatic power of the professional executives, their policy-making scope, their conservative leadership patterns, and their operation as organization men.

Because the Baptists have rejected, in principle, presbyterial and episcopal politics, this Free Church movement has been bedeviled by the quest for some primary locus of authority; this has been sought variously in the individual soul, the local congregation, the Bible, or particular theological tenets. For the official ideology maintains "the freedom of the individual in all matters of faith and practice" and the autonomy of the local Church apart from councils, associations, or denominational officials. It emerges from the author's analysis that although Baptists have energetically affirmed that the social system can operate *sans* established lines of authority, leaders have inevitably arisen within the group whose acquired power in the discharge of their responsibilities may even exceed that obtained by leaders in the hierarchical denominational organization. The growth of the Convention has produced the inversion in roles, for although it was designed to serve the autonomous free churches, the extension of its power and of its "bureaucratic" functionalities has in various ways seriously compromised the autonomy of the constituent churches and displaced the role of the individual church. "The preservation of the Convention's organization and program has now become an ultimate purpose of the denomination."

Pragmatically the author devotes his

final chapter to a postscript for Baptists, drawing the consequences of the location of authority in a congregational church order in which all ecclesiastical order must be penultimate. He affirms the necessity of an "associational discipline" for the Baptists who, because of their failure to produce a "pure democracy," must seek alternatives to some form of associational polity which will provide a countervailing power to the apparently inevitable tendency toward centralization and rationalization.

Transcending the limits of the denominational structure in question, this study raises more general problems, such as the relation of authority and power, particularly in the free church tradition. Apart from its careful analysis of the Convention, this work also challenges certain accepted formulations of Baptist ideology, for instance, that it is primarily a quest for congregational autonomy, stressing that the primacy belongs to the principle of the sovereignty of God, whereas individual freedom and congregational autonomy are only means. This raises the interesting general question of whether the later formulation of a religious ideology does not regularly distort original positions and syncretize doctrines which are not fully compatible, for example, individual freedom and congregational autonomy. It may be hoped that similar studies may be undertaken of the phenomena of rationalization, bureaucratization, intragroup tension, and doctrinal ambiguity in comparable congregational structures, such as the other Baptist organizations, Congregationalism, Unitarianism, the Disciples of Christ, the Society of Friends, and Judaism.

The author has provided a select Bibliography, sundry tables and charts, and a full Index.

EPHRAIM FISCHOFF

Lynchburg, Virginia

GEORGE B. DE HUSZAR (Ed.). *The Intellectuals: A Controversial Portrait*. Pp. viii, 543. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960. \$7.50.

In his introduction to this anthology, De Huszar tells us that the "modern intellectual is seen to have emerged around the time of the French Revolution" and asks

our indulgence for the exclusion, among others, of classic pieces by Plato, Ibn Khaldun, Petrarch, Leonardo da Vinci, Montaigne, Cervantes, and Francis Bacon. The reader may console himself: almost everybody else is here and accounted for. By way of doing penance the editor has assembled excerpts from the writings of no fewer than sixty-six scholars, from Aron to Znaniecki, whose contributions are classified according to the following scheme: Emergence of Modern Intellectuals, Nature of Intellectuals, Types of Intellectuals, Role of Intellectuals, Intellectuals and Modern Ideologies, and Intellectuals in Various Countries. The result of this prodigious enterprise is predictable. *The Intellectuals* is judiciously edited and is characterized by considerable scope and attention to representativeness, but it is subject to the customary querulous complaints about "unevenness" and "fragmentation."

The over-all impression created by this volume is that the contemporary intellectuals are dreadfully unhappy about the state of the universe, themselves, and each other. The fearfully articulate new conservatives warn shrilly that through default or active connivance the liberal intellectual is preparing the ground for the total triumph of the welfare state, the collapse of traditional values, and the ultimate demise of freedom. The prose and the accompanying calls to duty suggest nothing so much as reading backwards the *Nation*, circa 1937. But the all-powerful vanguard, having bypassed Marx, exhausted Freud, and recently rediscovered the mass society, scarcely appears very reassured about its diabolical powers. Quite to the contrary the man of ideas stationed a little left of center seems primarily preoccupied with his formal right to dissent. His twin concerns are a vigilant defense of civil liberty and his alienation from the mass society; the product of his ruminations often takes the form of invocations not to "conform."


This posture of defensiveness appears strange when one considers that, despite the rhetoric of defeat which one hears on all sides, the liberals have won most of their recent major battles.

The basic insights of Marx, Freud,

Dewey, and Mencken—among the most germinal influences of our time—have ceased to shock, and the heresies of yesterday have become quite respectable. Who is not now prepared to concede that the state must cushion the effects of poverty, that ideology is related to social structure, that women have the right to pursue careers, that alcoholism is a disease, that mothers are fallible, that proof is lacking for doctrines of racial superiority, and that God did not really create the world in precisely seven days?

The widespread emergence of enlightenment is still another indication of the permanent paradox confronting the man of ideas in America—each new victory contains its own potentialities for malaise. The intellectual is by tradition an angry man who stands at the periphery and says nay. But anger thrives best in defeat, and too often now the intellectual finds himself the possessor of a free floating militancy in search of a substantive issue. He finds it a dreary fact of life that in most of the public controversies in which he engages the nature of the dispute is instrumental rather than moral so that the man who wishes to leave a useful imprint on history is obliged to deal with means rather than goals and with techniques rather than superior intentions. This is not the sort of task for which the intellectual is best equipped. He tends to be uncomfortable in affirmation, at best devoid of passion as he pursues "positive" objectives.

All of this suggests why the victorious intellectual adopts the essentially procedural slogan of "nonconformity" as his rallying cry for a kind of peevish holding operation, a program of preparedness in the event of future intellectual warfare. To the extent that the doctrine of nonconformity has a substantive message it consists of the view that majorities are inherently bad and asserts its disenchantment with the mass society with its complexity, its bureaucratization, its aesthetic uniformities, and modes of social control. But since it is rather unlikely that we shall escape from this universe, the cult of "nonconformity" is essentially frivolous; it offers us poetic despair at a time when we are in real need of serious analyses. A philoso-



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phy whose major proposition is "You ought not to conform . . ." is at best elliptical and tends to be wholly vacuous.

Mr. Mort Sahl, a formidable dissenter himself, has perhaps best summarized the dilemma of his intellectual confreres. "I wish I had a cause," he recently said, "because I've got a lot of enthusiasm."

MARVIN BRESSLER

Associate Professor of Sociology
New York University

W. D. BORRIE and others. *The Cultural Integration of Immigrants: A Survey Based upon the Papers and Proceedings of the UNESCO Conference Held in Havana, April 1956*. Pp. 297. Paris: UNESCO, 1960. Distributed by the Columbia University Press, 1960. \$3.00.

This volume and the conference on which it was based dealt with the imposing problems of cultural integration encountered by the immigrants of the postwar period. The massive displacements of population in the past fifteen years have created imposing difficulties for the migrants themselves and for the countries which received them. This little volume presents a stimulating analysis of the problem based upon a thorough survey of the literature of the past two decades. It should be read with interest not only by students but by all those concerned with shaping public policy in the immediate future.

The very title reflects the degree to which the contributors to the volume have mastered the new insights and concepts of this period. They have discarded the conception of assimilation that so long dominated the thinking in this field and that demanded that a newcomer reshape himself at once to the existing patterns of the host society. Instead Professor Borrie and his collaborators treat integration as a two-way process in which the immigrants and the culture they find upon arrival exert a reciprocal influence upon each other. Their treatment reflects a much sounder apprehension of the problem and of the possible solutions to it than was common before 1945.

The heart of the volume is a long, thoughtful summary by W. D. Borrie. An incisive theoretical analysis is based upon

a good account of the postwar migrations and leads to stimulating discussions of the role of the state, of voluntary organizations, and of mass media and education. Professor Borrie's conclusions with regard to the general economic, social, and cultural aspects of the problem are thoughtful and sound.

Of the large number of papers submitted by the delegates to the conference, only four have been published. Three are case studies of intracontinental European immigration by J. Zubrzycki, of the Brazilian situation by Neiva and Diegues, and of the developments in Israel by Julius Isaac. The fourth published essay is an account of group settlement by C. A. Price. The whole forms a useful and thought-provoking volume.

OSCAR HANDLIN

Professor of History
Harvard University

JOHN H. ROHRER and MUNRO EDMONSON (Eds.). *The Eighth Generation: Cultures and Personalities of New Orleans Negroes*. Pp. xi, 346. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. \$6.00.

The Eighth Generation is a superior research study carried out by an interracial, interdisciplinary staff which included psychologists, psychiatrists, a sociologist, an anthropologist, a linguist, psychiatric social workers, interviewers, and graduate students. The difficulties of collaboration on the part of specialists from several fields seem to have been successfully overcome in this follow-up study almost twenty years later of Allison Davis' and John Dollard's *Children of Bondage*. The present research team had the advantage of numerous studies of the Negro community and Negro personality made during the past two decades, but their project represents a considerable advance theoretically and methodologically over previous investigations.

Rohrer and Edmonson, and their associates, attempted to locate 107 of the 277 former New Orleans teenagers studied by Davis and Dollard in the late 1930's. Forty-seven of the ninety people found were interviewed, and twenty of these were selected for intensive testing and interviewing. While acknowledging some mid-

dle-class bias in their small sample of a universe of 200,000, the authors think that "the status context" of these persons reflects fairly well that of the city as a whole.

Social stratification is traced from the Creole social structure of 1800, called by the authors a biracial society of three culture-castes—or semicastes—and three classes, through the two-caste system, slave and free, with three classes within each of two free color-castes, which they outline for the 1850's, to the biracial society of three classes seen by them in the 1950's. Social organizations within the Negro community of New Orleans are succinctly delineated.

Throughout the volume the concept of social class is handled with sophistication. Davis' and Dollard's conclusion concerning the primacy of class over color is accepted as valid "for many individuals," but the present writers view the class interpretation at times as being forced. Myrdal's conclusion that class factors are not the only intervening variables is endorsed, and the position is taken that race can have no generic meaning for Negroes. These researchers were unable to substantiate Kardiner's and Ovesey's hypothesis that self-hate is present in all Negroes. This viewpoint is questioned mainly because no experience was found reaching an entire population which was sufficiently general to produce a similar reaction in all individuals. Rohrer's and Edmonson's data led them to conclude that there may be four or five types of family systems among American Negroes.

The twenty subjects fall into five major groups: four culture groups—the Middle Class, the Matriarchy, the (male) Gang, and the (isolated) Family—and a residual group of the culturally marginal. A vague cultural determinancy is avoided by relating cultural influences to the intrapsychic functioning of each individual.

The values, self-conceptions, and antagonisms which are associated with the several primary role identifications are set forth in general terms and are spelled out in case histories. The analyses of the matriarchy and the gang are among the most valuable contributions of the book. Also of great importance is the authors'

treatment of the variety of meanings and the variety of psychic consequences of being Negro. The point of view and the conclusions of this study are well summarized in the following passage: "The interrelationships between primary role identification, ego identity, and the techniques used for maintaining ego integrity are not a matter of simple cause and effect nor of independent and dependent variables. Each of them influences and is influenced by the others. . . ."

To those who lack psychoanalytic orientation, some of the interpretations of the individual's "psychodynamic functioning" may seem rather strained, but all who read this book will be impressed with its insights and with the cogency of its conclusions.

An investigation of dialect and society proved to be rather inconclusive. It was found that the Negro community of New Orleans is not clearly segmented if it is assumed that some shared linguistic usages should be associated with the segmentation of a society.

GEORGE E. SIMPSON

Chairman, Department of Sociology
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Oberlin College

NATHANIEL WEYL. *The Negro in American Civilization*. Pp. xi, 360. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1960. \$6.00.

Nathaniel Weyl originally intended to "trace the Negro's changing status under the American Constitution." His discussion of the changing formal definitions of the relationship of Negroes to the American social system is probably the best part of the book.

Weyl goes on to conclude that racial integration in the public schools has caused a decline in their intellectual quality and that Negro migration is causally related to a significant rise in crime, delinquency, and immorality. He infers a causal correlation between the increasing proportion of urban Negroes and Puerto Ricans and the seeming decline in the social and economic significance of the city as a metropolitan center. Most of these conclusions are inadequately documented.

The author has few "positive" recommendations. He seems to favor integrated equality with respect to political rights and public services, but segregated equality in education and housing. He views the Supreme Court desegregation rulings as unfortunate examples of judicial legislation that must now be supported primarily because of the fundamental significance of the judicial process. His "solution" is both a strategy and a principle: there should be greater provision for individual differences through homogeneous grouping of children of different intellectual capacities into different public schools. This is counter to the "racial blending" advocated in New York City. Since he seems to conclude that most Negroes are by heredity intellectually inferior to most whites, Weyl's intellectually homogeneous public schools would tend to be racially homogeneous as well, and the integration campaign would simultaneously be short-circuited. He could not anticipate the new direction of the present nonviolent demonstration campaign.

We may view *The Negro in American Civilization* as a statement in a classically Marxian class struggle. Weyl is analogous to the middle classes which are forced to take sides during the social and ideological conflict. His school proposal is a formalistic compromise, the function of which would be to retard the rate of social change and thereby re-establish the social peace. As a formula it will probably be acceptable to moderate whites who are uncomfortable about "complete" racial integration. It may also be acceptable to many Negroes who reject the idea of hereditary inferiority but who want to remove themselves from the class struggle and be treated as persons rather than as representatives of a type.

LEONARD BLUMBERG

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SHELDON and ELEANOR GLUECK. *Predicting Delinquency and Crime*. Pp. xx, 283. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959. \$6.50.

In this book the Gluecks, who were among the first to pioneer in the design of methods to predict various phases of criminal behavior, bring together the results of their work covering a span of about a quarter of a century. The book not only contains a clear and precise summary of the theoretical basis upon which predictive methods rest but also includes a great variety of expectancy tables which may be utilized to increase the effectiveness of both preventive and treatment measures. This, it is assumed, may be done by employing methods which summarize systematically and concisely the factors associated with deviant behavior in the selection of individuals most apt to respond to available specific treatment or preventive programs.

In general, the argument in support of the use of predictive devices rests upon the assumption that all delinquents and criminals are not alike in their capacity to respond successfully to any specific treatment or correctional measure. The nature of the response is conditioned by or associated with certain clusters of pretreatment factors that characterize the individual delinquent or criminal. That is to say, not all delinquents respond successfully to probation or to parole. Some delinquents, on the basis of their backgrounds, would profit from being placed in an institution rather than on probation. The decisions concerning what should be done with any specific individual delinquent should be based upon knowledge of what is most likely to bring about his rehabilitation. It is this kind of knowledge that predictive devices are believed to provide, and the utilization of these instruments in the decision-making process should, it is hoped, increase the efficiency of correctional and preventive work.

Although the results of the work of the Gluecks, as well as of others in the area of prediction, are well known, little unfortunately has been done to discover whether the results if used in making decisions actually improve the effectiveness of treatment and preventive programs. Only a few of the prediction tables developed by the Gluecks and by others have been subjected to a rigorous test to determine whether they work. The attempts that

have been made to test the efficiency of the Glueck tables have used study designs that do so indirectly. It is only recently, in 1952, that a really rigorous study was begun to test the validity of the Gluecks' Social Factors Prediction Table first presented in their *Unravelling Juvenile Delinquency* in 1950. Until the results of this study and of others are definitive it will be impossible to evaluate the role that prediction devices might play in the control and treatment of delinquents and criminals.

It is to be hoped that the book *Predicting Delinquency and Crime* will be instrumental in developing research designed to test whether predictive devices actually work.

ELIO D. MONACHESE

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MORRIS JANOWITZ. *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*. Pp. xiv, 464. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960. \$6.75.

For many reasons, few of them rational, sociologists have done little research on the place of military institutions in American society. Janowitz, in his recent *Russell Sage Bulletin, Sociology and the Military Establishment*, and now in this more extensive volume, has contributed much toward remedying this neglect.

The professional soldier whose "social and political portrait" the author attempts to paint is not simply the career soldier. Janowitz is using "professional" in a stricter sense. His attention is restricted to the successful officer who becomes a "military leader," a general or flag officer prior to the second World War or a "two-star" officer subsequently and, in certain sections, his concern is exclusively with those much more select numbers who comprise what he regards as the power-holding "elite nucleus" of the military establishment.

This "social and political portrait" painting is portraiture with a purpose—indeed, a tendency. He is concerned with the import of the evolving professionalism of military leaders for major politico-military issues of the present and future. In sketching the emerging professional self-

identity of the military leader and the bodies of ethics, responsibilities, ideologies, and skills associated with that identity, his attention is constantly cast on the nature of the influence our military leaders are likely to exert. The material he presents appears oriented largely toward explaining why certain military leaders lend their weight to what the author regards as sound positions with respect to these issues and others support unsound ones. It is this orientation that integrates his discussions of the social origins, career lines, hierarchical organization, life styles, ceremonies, and beliefs of the military professional.

In his analysis he uses systematic data from several sources: biographical data on a sample of 761 of the generals and admirals of the past 50 years; questionnaires originally collected from Pentagon staff officers by Masland and Radway for their study of military education, and "intensive interviews," presumably by the author, with "a sample of 113 future military leaders." He occasionally introduces comparative information on foreign military forces and also makes free use of anecdotal information from a large variety of sources.

The author's preconceptions about the model of the future military establishment are evidenced in the number of officers of each of the three services he has included in his sample of "future military leaders": Army, 54; Navy, 32; Air Force, 27. Some Air Force officers will feel that this is one of many manifestations of the bias of a "ground-pounder" who does not understand the role the Air Force plays. Admirers of General Douglas MacArthur and of "absolutistic" military doctrines are also likely to be unhappy with some of his comments.

Janowitz has firm command of his data and is inclined to tolerate no disobedience from them. On occasion, he firmly leads the data to his objectives, even when they are powerfully inclined in another direction; his reverse interpretations of a clear-cut difference between Air Force officers and officers of the other services in conservative-liberal identifications (pp. 240-241) are illustrations.

His purposefulness, however, makes the author's selection, presentation, and analysis of data on the military of singular

pertinence and utility. Never before have so many critical sociological facts been presented in one place regarding central questions which political and social scientists are asking about military institutions and their role in the contemporary world. More important, by applying a sociological perspective to these issues, Janowitz raises new questions that others should be asking.

ALBERT D. BIDERMAN

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SIDNEY HOOK (Ed.). *Dimensions of Mind*. Pp. xiii, 281. New York: New York University Press, 1960. \$5.00.

The mind-body problem remains an unsolved puzzle, the complexity of which has only been increased by the development of computers, robots, and teaching machines. This volume, comprising twenty-nine papers delivered at New York University's third annual Institute of Philosophy, held in May of 1959, illumines some dark corners of the problem but—to nobody's surprise—provides no novel or thoroughly persuasive solutions. The levels of discussion and argument are, however, consistently higher than is usually the case in a symposium, and the angles of regard from which the topic is perceived are usefully diversified. Philosophers, psychologists, and computer-communications experts contribute thoughtful, and sometimes even witty, ideas, and there are few places where one can find a fuller exposition of the practical as well as the purely intellectual ramifications of a conceptual issue that has plagued our species ever since it became reasonably self-conscious and knowledgeable about itself.

Despite the diversity of approach, there are some shared assumptions among most of the symposium participants that make for an odd homogeneity among men who often disagree sharply with each other. For example, only one or two contributors dissent from the general proposition that it is impossible for one to know other minds—or selves—directly. While it is quite conceivable that this position may be correct—in the sense of most fruitful—its widespread acceptance here means that

the mind-body problem is attacked almost exclusively from a positivistic, objectivist point of view. There are others. And the significance of these other outlooks lies in the newly evolving interest in a question that is relevant but ignored in this provocative anthology: Are there differences between the sciences of man and those of the nonhuman universe? One need not have an answer to this query to discern its importance for modern considerations of the dimensions of mind.

Similarly, one of the paradoxes of mind is that thought, its most ubiquitous product, if not its defining attribute, is at once a form of behavior in the service of needs and drives, many of which are somatically instigated, and the primary device by which men transcend their most primitive motives and control their actions. One looks in vain for a discussion of this rather central point in these explorations of the relation of mind and body.

But such omissions may be little more than a reflection of the intellectual finitude that leaves all our major efforts a little troubled, whether we work as individuals or capitalize, as is the case here, on the productive frictions of group discussion. Meanwhile, *Dimensions of Mind* rewards handsomely those who take serious joy in the puzzle of man.

EDWARD JOSEPH SHOEN, JR.

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Teachers College
Columbia University

BARTLETT H. STOODLEY. *The Concepts of Sigmund Freud*. Pp. xii, 274. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959. \$6.00.

The author of this book is, as he states himself, neither a psychiatrist nor a psychoanalyst. He considers the effectiveness of the theory in "terms of the facts Freud presents." It is the sociological approach, that is, the postulated road "from the libidinalized ego to the collective representations of Durkheim," that interests him. The libido theory is analyzed in Chapters 9 and 10, and the failure of the libido theory to explain the socialization of the ego is demonstrated. This is done in a somewhat scholastic way. The author quotes extensively from Freud, and only

occasionally does he enliven these quotations by reference to facts that might be present in the mind of the not too well versed reader.

It is, on the other hand, a valuable trait of this book that it makes the reader travel in the path of Freud's thoughts from the primary conceptions of the classical phase of the libido theory to the time when Freud tried to understand the socialization of the ego.

Readers who will not shun the effort of plodding through many quotations will in the end find themselves rewarded, if not with a definite insight, then at least with the anticipation of how psychoanalysis can be utilized in the social sciences and of the way psychoanalysis may develop its own motivation theories under the impact of a sociological view.

W. G. ELIASBERG

New York, N. Y.

EUGENE A. WEINSTEIN. *The Self-Image of the Foster Child*. Pp. 80. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1960. \$2.00.

The value of this small book of seventy-five pages is twofold. First, it adds to the growing body of knowledge about self-conceptions and their function in a social system, and, secondly, it clearly indicates that this concept has some very practical utility in an analysis of the foster-home situation and that from paying attention to this variable the work of the social worker and the agency in foster-home placement may be facilitated.

In concentrating his attention upon self-conceptions, Weinstein pays attention to a variable which has frequently been overlooked in the research efforts of the social scientist. His work emphasized that in an analysis of social relationships in general and foster home relationships in particular, the behavior of any party in the relationship is in part a function of his self-conceptions, including his role definitions, which in turn are related to the manner in which he defines the current situation.

This book primarily reports a study in which this orientation is applied to the foster-home situations of sixty-one children. The self-dimension is measured in terms of answers to questions such as:

Who am I? Where am I? Why am I here? and What is going to happen to me? These answers are in turn related to the foster child's relationship with his natural parents, his foster parents, and the case worker, and significant relationships are discovered.

Some of the practical implications of paying attention to self-conceptions are reflected in conclusions such as: (1) Children who identify predominantly with their natural parents have the highest well-being rating of any group in the study. (2) Children whose natural parents visit them regularly but who also tend to identify with their foster parents are more adjusted than children with similar identification patterns but whose parents do not visit them. (3) Adequate conceptions of the meaning of foster status and the role of the agency are important for the child's well being.

Although its theoretical discussion is not so extensive as this reviewer would have hoped, the book is a worth-while addition to the library of both the pure and the applied social scientist.

GLENN M. VERNON

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PHILIP BAGBY. *Culture and History: Prolegomena to the Comparative Study of Civilizations*. Pp. ix, 244. Published in Great Britain in 1958. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959. \$5.00.

This volume may be characterized as a layman's attempt to find a more meaningful approach to history. The author is not satisfied with history as a chronicle of events nor with the manner in which historians interpret events. He considers history to be "only a semi-rational activity" and searches instead for "a more rational, a more 'scientific' approach."

His search leads him to the discipline of anthropology, where he finds concepts which, according to him, make it possible to discern regularities in the historical record corresponding to the laws of science. The greater part of the volume is devoted to these concepts. Foremost among them

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are "culture," defined as regularities in the behavior of mankind, such as customs and beliefs, "a culture," by which is meant the customs and beliefs distinctive of a group of communities; and "a civilization," which is said to be a culture with cities.

The author is at his best in discussing these concepts. In simple language, he gives the history of their development, their range of meanings, and a precise, original definition for each of them. In addition, he examines the ways in which anthropologists and other social eventists have interpreted culture change. The book will be most useful to readers who are interested in these problems.

The author is less successful in applying anthropological concepts to history. He presents a reasonably good outline of the world's great civilizations in the next to the last chapter; but when he tries, in a brief final chapter, to compare civilizations and to perceive regularities in their development, he is not very convincing. He produces little more than previous writers although, as he points out, little more can be expected, since his work is preliminary.

The author's approach in the final chapters is closer to that of the philosophers of history, such as Spengler and Toynbee, than it is that of the anthropologists who have written upon the subject. He tends to stress the role of ideas and values in the development of civilization, whereas most anthropologists would start with more empirical factors, such as irrigation and writing. The reader who wishes to know the anthropological approach to the problem would be better advised to consult works such as Julian H. Steward, *Theory of Culture Change: The Methodology of Multilinear Evolution* (Urbana, 1955) and Leslie A. White, *The Evolution of Culture: the Development of Civilization to the Fall of Rome* (New York, 1959).

IRVING ROUSE

Professor of Anthropology
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EDWARD McNALL BURNS. *Ideas in Conflict: The Political Theories of the Contemporary World*. Pp. xiv, 587. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1960. \$6.95.

This is a book of the first order. Burns is exceptionally able in the realm of contemporary political thought. This well-written volume is far more than a summary and catalogue of ideas. This reviewer is greatly in the author's debt.

Ideas in Conflict is a comprehensive and panoramic exposition, interspersed with critical and perceptive comments, of the beliefs and issues that constitute the substance of twentieth-century political thought. The author covers a staggering and ramified field. He deals with positivism, pluralism, socialism, democratic collectivism, Fascism, communism, Nazism, idealism, conservatism, existentialism, romanticism, imperialism, nationalism, internationalism, and cosmopolitanism. He presents, also, various religious, psychological, anthropological, and sociological approaches to political theory. Finally, Burns discusses democratic and antidemocratic thought, power politics, geopolitics, various schools of jurisprudence, nonviolence, passive resistance, and contemporary approaches to the nature of political theory.

Although the book does not deal with Burns' own political philosophy per se, it is clear that he is deeply troubled by the current wave of pessimism about man—the belief that human nature is evil and vile. He conceives such a view to be incompatible with the possibility of human progress (pp. 450, 459). Conflicting conceptions of human nature, he believes, separate the children of light from the children of darkness and animate philosophical warfare. The contemporary philosophical conflict "has no necessary connection with the familiar polarity of democracy and totalitarianism but grows out of a cleavage along broader lines. On the one side are those philosophies which take an optimistic view of human nature, recognize the possibility of progress, accept the universality of change, welcome inquiry and experiment as sources of knowledge, and emphasize the values of tolerance and freedom" (p. xiii). On the other side are those philosophies which deny these propositions. Burns champions the "optimistic" view. His dichotomy expresses a widely held, though perhaps erroneous, presupposition. There is no compelling evidence

for the assumption that there is a necessary relation between doctrines of human nature and such specific beliefs as the possibility of progress, the inevitability of change, and the desirability of tolerance, freedom, inquiry, and experimentation. Consider, for example, Reinhold Niebuhr's eloquent defenses of freedom, tolerance, experimentation, and other institutions designed to achieve greater justice. In regard to progress, everything depends upon its definition and criteria. Progress in and toward what? No sane individual can deny the possibility of scientific and technological progress. Moral progress is another and more difficult problem.

Critical reflection indicates that almost any ideological object of value has both friends and foes among those who are "optimistic" and those who are "pessimistic" about the human estate. Indeed, such adjectives as these are too ambiguous and elusive to be made the basis of any meaningful philosophic division. Perhaps Morris R. Cohen would call such labels "snares and stones of stumbling." Besides, "human nature" itself is by no means a univocal term.

SAMUEL DUBOIS COOK
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ECONOMICS AND LABOR

WILHELM RÖPKE. *A Humane Economy: The Social Framework of the Free Market*. Pp. 312. First English edition. Pp. 312. New York: Henry Regnery Company with the assistance of the Institute for Philosophical and Historical Studies, 1960. \$5.00.

Wilhelm Röpke as a young doctor of political science worked on reparations for the Weimar Republic; studied in the United States; returned to Germany as economic advisor to the Brüning government. As refugee from the Nazi regime, he taught in Turkey. Repatriated after the war he again entered the government, and is sometimes called the "architect" of the economic policy of the present West German government. This is an American

translation of a book published in German in 1958.

Röpke is a solidly based, nineteenth-century classical economist of the school of F. A. Hayek and Ludwig von Mises. He wants as little government in economics as possible. Current practices in public finance and high taxation he considers a kind of "fiscal socialism." Competition and price determination by free market are essential. The most dangerous monopoly at present is obviously that exercised over wages by labor unions. Rising population is a peril; the emerging mass-society threatens the essential graces and dignity of human life. Planned society, if successful, could lead only to complete boredom resulting from comfortable slavery. The "open market" and the free market economy, he insists, are not mere devices of economics but moral imperatives, though he considers undue commercialism, such as that which produced "Mother's Day," unhealthy. Some regions of life, he concedes, are beyond the laws of supply and demand.

Social security, in this doctrine, is an illusion. The Rooseveltian phrase, "Freedom from Want," is dangerous dogma. It is even more dangerous when carried to the international plan as, for example, by the European Coal and Steel Community. Industry and occupation should be small-scale. "Decentrism" should be a continuous goal.

The three most threatening enemies of society and of human freedom are, Röpke thinks, taxation, welfare legislation, and inflation. As full employment necessarily means inflation, so a margin of unemployment—Röpke thinks it can be low but insists on its necessity—is a safeguard. All these conclusions are placed on a moral basis, since, according to Röpke, economy on any other basis impairs the ultimate protections of individual spiritual life. The author unhesitatingly names "three great ruiners of history," to wit: John Maynard Keynes, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and Karl Marx.

Well, if this is what Röpke effectively advised the Weimar government in 1930-1931, its fall in 1933 is not wholly surprising. Regrettably, the world just now

is working on rather different lines. It is pleasant to have this neat, clear-cut, "all-wool-and-a-yard-wide," John Stuart Mill theory of nineteenth-century laissez faire economics, all based on safeguarding the moral dignity of the individual. But one wonders how the individuals described, unfortunately, quite accurately, by Charles Dickens, Emile Zola, and Upton Sinclair felt about their spiritual dignity thus mightily preserved. I can, of course, understand the revolt of men like Röpke as the Nazi state ground them out of existence. Reacting against that, they do not want any kind of state control in economics, anywhere, any time, or on any terms. But I suggest that there are other states than those dominated by either Nazis or Communists—and that the nineteenth century has passed into history. If it returned today, 75 per cent of its population would probably revolt immediately. In the foreseeable future, even to satisfy Wilhelm Röpke and Ludwig von Mises, the world is not likely to return to the economic practices and doctrines of the year 1860.

For antidote, try Karl Polanyi's *The Great Transformation* which argues powerfully that the twentieth-century revolutions resulted directly from the inhumanities of the free-market economy of the nineteenth.

A. A. BERLE, JR.

Columbia University

RICHARD EELLS. *The Meaning of Modern Business: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Large Corporate Enterprise*. Pp. xi, 427. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960. \$7.50.

The subtitle of this book, "An Introduction to the Philosophy of Large Corporate Enterprise," adequately states its purpose. It is concerned not with all business but with business as represented by the large corporation. And the interest of the author is not so much in what corporations do as in what they should do in a well-regulated society. The large corporation and its counterpart, the large trade union, are relatively new forms of social organization and, unlike the church, the army, the university, and other traditional forms, their prerogatives and responsibilities are not yet well demarcated in law or in public atti-

tudes or opinions. The author is suitably modest in calling his study "An Introduction" to this subject and, indeed, in the light of current thinking, it is difficult to write more than an introduction. As such, the book provides a highly useful guide to contemporary thought, and its usefulness is greatly increased by extensive Footnotes commenting on the literature.

The theme is developed through the use of certain ideal constructs, the "traditional corporation," the "metro-corporation"—mother corporation, and the "well-tempered corporation." The traditional corporation typifies the firm operated solely in the interests of its owners with a single eye to the maximizing of profits. It is the firm of traditional economic theory, and, indeed, it is the corporation in the established contemplation of the law, with management exclusively responsible to the owners. This traditional corporation, according to received doctrine, serves the interests of society as well as the interests of its owners, mainly because of the limitations placed by the market on antisocial types of behavior. Currently, there is a rather strong reaction in business and other circles against the vague but far-reaching claims of social responsibility advanced by modern management, and toward the philosophy of the traditional corporation. If business takes care of its own profits, it is said, the market will take care of the interests of other groups. But will it?

The "metro-corporation," as delineated by the author, represents the other extreme. Here the owners, far from being the sole claimants to earnings, are merely one group among many, including suppliers, workers, customers and, frequently, a vague entity variously called the public, society, or the general interest. The constraints of the market no longer limit the freedom of action of the firm and, in place of the market, we have the responsibility of management to these various clienteles. The "metro-corporation" is conceived as serving not economic man but the whole man. This notion, according to the author, claims too much. He is willing to admit that the large corporation has, to some unspecified extent, escaped from the limitations of the market. But he is not willing to con-

cede the claims of corporate management to be sole arbiters of the division of the proceeds of business enterprise.

This leads him to a consideration of the position in society of the "well-tempered" corporation. The analogy is to the keyboard of a piano. Of the seventy-eight intervals in a single octave, "not a single one is in perfect tune, though every interval could be improved if there were not others to think about." This suggests that although the perfect harmony of perfect competition may not be achievable in a society dominated by the large corporation there are restraints that may prevent too great a discordance between the private and the public interest. Unfortunately the discussion of the nature of the restraints and of the character of the resulting accommodation here takes refuge in analogy and in somewhat rotund pronouncements at once vague and impressive. But the reader should, perhaps, curb his tendency to cavil. This area of discourse is a cavern in which illumination is as yet both dim and fitful. The author has put us in his debt by showing us at least where the cavern is.

EDWARD S. MASON

Professor of Economics
Harvard University.

JOHN M. FIRESTONE. *Federal Receipts and Expenditures During Business Cycles, 1879-1958*. Pp. xvi, 176. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1960. \$4.00.

MELVILLE J. ULMER. *Capital in Transportation, Communication, and Public Utilities: Its Formation and Financing*. Pp. xxviii, 548. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1960. \$12.00.

These volumes fall in two different series of National Bureau studies. Mr. Firestone has furnished the most recent contribution to the series on business cycles. It deals with the role of federal receipts and expenditures. Mr. Ulmer provides the most recent contribution to the series on capital formation and financing. It deals with the "regulated industries." Where Firestone is following in the path of Wesley Mitchell, Ulmer's intellectual parent is probably Raymond Goldsmith.

The volumes are, however, alike in the National Bureau tradition of assembling for the first time a great range of detailed quantitative data. Nearly half of each book consists of statistical Appendices, including notes on the data and estimation methods, as well as comments on the quality of the results. The two are also alike because they contain for the general reader not one but two summaries of the principal findings. In the Firestone volume these are found in the first chapter and supplemented in a Foreword by Geoffrey Moore. In the Ulmer volume, the general reader should peruse a longer and more detailed Foreword by Simon Kuznets together with Ulmer's own concluding ninth chapter.

"Built-in flexibility" is a relative newcomer to the economist's kit of tools and jargon, but Firestone shows that the federal government has been practicing it involuntarily since 1879 or perhaps earlier. Government receipts have acted in a "stabilizing" direction, rising in booms and falling in depressions, except for wartime and some immediate postwar business cycles. Government expenditures have shown no such flexibility but rather an upward trend. The federal budget has accordingly tended toward surplus in boom and deficit in depression, in substantial accord with the precepts of the "new economics." All this flexibility has arisen behind the backs of legislators and in contradiction to the precepts of "sound finance" as maintained by most of them. Indeed, Firestone shows that when legislative changes were made, their effect was more frequently destabilizing than otherwise, as was to be expected from contemporary views of fiscal soundness. Until 1913, the main stabilizer was customs receipts, which naturally rose and fell with the state of trade. Since 1913 it has been the personal income tax and has become increasingly powerful as the rate and progressiveness of this tax have risen. Firestone is, if anything, too complacent at times in emphasizing the role of flexibility, built unconsciously into our fiscal system by ostensible budget-balancers, in mitigating the business cycle since 1939.

Three significant war cycles—World War I, World War II, the Korean War—are covered by Firestone's data. Despite tax

increases, expenditure increases in each wartime period have accentuated inflationary booms and destabilized the economy.

Ulmer presents a less optimistic picture of the future of capital formation in the regulated industries than Firestone provides of the federal budget as a cyclical stabilizer. He covers approximately the same period, 1880-1950; the greater length of his study is due to the necessity of separate detailed estimates for the regulated industries as a whole and for a number of important subgroups with special problems, for instance, steam railroads, electric light and power, telephones, street and electric railways, local bus lines, and miscellaneous others.

These industries have all grown along roughly S-shaped or logistic statistical trends. These trends have by now flattened out, or in some cases, for example, street railways, actually declined. As percentages of the national income, the decline has been quite general. Whether Ulmer ascribes this to fate—the logistic curve—or to unpredictable random shocks—the automobile—or rather to his division of responsibility between the two, is not entirely clear. At any rate, barring extraordinary developments in such new "public utilities" as atomic power, Ulmer sees no outstanding growth possibilities in the regulated industries.

In addition, these regulated industries have tended increasingly toward lower capital coefficients and higher rates of internal financing. A capital coefficient is the dollar amount of new investment required for a dollar increase in output. This has been falling for the regulated industries as the basic fixed capital plant has been built up. Internal investment is the financing of investment from "ploughed-back" profits and from depreciation reserves. It was not important in the regulated industries at the beginning of the period studied by Ulmer, but the significance particularly of depreciation reserves has been increasing steadily despite price inflation. Both these developments point in a single direction: declining relative or even absolute demands for outside capital investment by these industries. Or in different words, Ulmer expects the regulated industries to play a

consistently smaller role as outlets for the public's savings.

This reviewer believes that the author feels that the regulated status of the industries concerned has had little effect on these results and predictions. This is a topic of considerable controversy, particularly in inflationary times, when the regulatory process may lag behind cost increases and result in partial confiscation. It is unfortunate that we do not have an explicit statement of Ulmer's position on this controversial issue. Perhaps National Bureau policy is responsible for avoiding it, since it involves a good deal more than "the facts" of the case.

MARTIN BRONFENBRENNER

Professor of Economics
University of Minnesota

ROLAND I. ROBINSON. *Postwar Market for State and Local Government Securities*. Pp. xxiv, 227. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1960. \$5.00.

This study of the postwar market for state and local government securities is the first to be published in a series of studies on the postwar capital market in the United States being undertaken by the National Bureau. Companion studies of the markets for Treasury securities, corporate securities and loans, and residential mortgages will serve to complete the investigation of postwar capital markets.

In the course of the present study, Dr. Robinson considers in detail the problems of the market, the demand for funds by state and local governments, the supply of funds by investors in the securities of these governmental units, the marketing of new issues, the secondary market, and the tax-exempt feature of such securities. A final chapter deals with the market for tax-exempt revenue obligations—such as toll road bonds—contrasted with the full faith and credit obligations of state and local units.

Much of the substance of a study of this sort is concerned with technical details of the market which, though highly important, are of little interest to the general reader. It will suffice here to point out that data on this market are much less readily available than on the markets for

Treasury and corporate securities, which made the gathering of much of the material an arduous task. This fact makes it difficult to draw definite conclusions in some instances. Nevertheless, the information amassed by Dr. Robinson in the course of his investigation has been sufficient to make the study eminently worth the effort.

One point of general interest in this piece of research is related to the advantages derived by state and local units through the tax exemption feature applicable to interest on their securities. In this connection the author demonstrates that the tax-exempt feature has favored investors far more than the issuing governmental units in recent years and that the smaller local governments, which need help the most, derive very little benefit therefrom. Dr. Robinson suggests that a direct subsidy by the federal government, equal in dollar amount to the savings afforded by tax exemption, would save the federal government a goodly sum and permit the benefits to be disbursed in a more equitable manner in accordance with the need of the local governments.

From a purely financial standpoint, a direct subsidy would doubtless save the federal government a substantial amount, and, from an ethical standpoint, the funds might be more equitably disbursed. From a political viewpoint, however, it would mean further concentration of power in the central government, a disadvantage which, in the reviewer's mind, would far outweigh any possible benefits. Also, it is highly improbable that such a subsidy, once instituted by the federal government, would for long be confined to the dollar savings now accruing to the state and local units through the tax-exempt feature.

FREDERICK A. BRADFORD

Head, Department of Finance
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ROY B. HELFGOTT, W. ERIC GUSTAFSON,
AND JAMES HUND. *Made in New York:
Case Studies in Metropolitan Manufac-
turing*. Pp. xv, 388. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1960. \$6.75.

This is the second volume in the New York Metropolitan Study, a series devoted to analyzing the forces shaping the tri-state

area comprising the nation's largest and most complex metropolitan region. It amplifies the summary of the characteristics of the region's manufacturing economy presented in the initial study, *Anatomy of a Metropolis*, by examining three key industries—women's and children's apparel, printing and publishing, and electronics—to discover how they respond to interacting economic, social, and cultural forces.

In each case, the approach is similar: the past, present, and future of the industry is surveyed to find meaningful generalizations which account for the rise and decline of particular segments of that industry in the region.

Despite their diversity, these industries exhibit similar patterns of growth and dispersal. In each, there has been an exodus of lines closely associated with intensive division of labor, employment of low-wage and unskilled workers, standardization of products, and large-scale production. The geographic advantage of the Midwest in a nationwide market has also played a part. The city has retained its attractiveness, however, for branches of industry producing unstandardized products, such as fashionable garments, magazine articles, or brief assemblies, and producers of goods whose volume is small or unpredictable, such as women's high fashion shoes or military electronics. The region offers a common pool of materials, equipment, and skilled labor which can provide such producers with specialized goods or services on short notice when sudden demand arises. The presence of such facilities, in turn, generates certain economies, for it reduces the need for investing in specialized equipment or hiring technicians on a permanent basis. In addition, the concentration of interlocking industries in a small area facilitates face-to-face communication, so necessary for constant buying, selling, consulting, adjusting, checking, and the like. When unstandardized products, such as high style dresses, magazine advertisements, and electronic rocket equipment, are being produced.

To leave the impression that this book does no more than trace impersonal economic forces would be distinctly unfair, for each author has an intimate understand-

ing of the industries he surveys and manages to convey some of their color and spirit. In this sense, this volume of industrial case histories can be read not merely as part of a series, but as an individual study of three important industries that account for some 28 per cent of the manufacturing jobs in the region. It offers, in its own right, a solid contribution to the literature on the economy of the metropolis.

FREDERICK SHAW

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Board of Education of
the City of New York

BENJAMIN CHINITZ. *Freight and the Metropolis: The Impact of America's Transport Revolutions on the New York Region*. Pp. xv, 211. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960. \$4.50.

This volume is one of a series dealing with the New York Metropolitan Region. It is concerned with the impact of freight transportation on the growth and structure of the area. The first three chapters relate to New York as a port through which flows a large part of the import and export trade of the country. These chapters describe the early rise of New York as a port; its relative decline—though continued absolute growth—since the Civil War; and its future in the foreign trade of the country. The port's relative decline is attributed to (1) geographic shifts in population; (2) the reduction in its margin of superiority in service over other ports; and (3) the higher costs of moving freight to and from New York as compared with other ports. It is apparent that New York could not have maintained its early dominance unless other ports and areas of the country had failed to develop their economic potentialities. For the future, a modest increase in the export-import tonnage over the next twenty-five years is predicted, but a further decline is indicated for its share of the United States total.

The second part of the book deals with the New York area as a manufacturing center. It is shown that because of the disadvantage of higher transport costs there has been a tendency for the region to specialize in industries generating little freight

in relation to employment, while industries sensitive to transport costs have tended to avoid the region. Three developments since the 1920's are noted which have been drawing industries closer to their markets. These are (1) the rise of the manufacturer's transport costs in comparison with his other costs; (2) a widening spread between the costs of transporting manufactured products and raw materials; and (3) a lowering of transport costs on short hauls relative to long hauls. These developments have caused many industries to follow population shifts, to the detriment of the New York area. On the other hand, the trend toward market orientation has brought to the populous New York area, as an important market, some establishments representing industries formerly concentrated in other parts of the country. Recent developments in transportation are noted which might slow down or reverse the trend toward market orientation of industries.

Although this study is distinctly centered in New York it should prove of interest to economic historians and economists generally because of its analysis of economic factors responsible for and limiting the growth of an important area.

D. PHILIP LOCKLIN

Professor of Economics
University of Illinois

W. KLOOSTERBOER. *Involuntary Labour Since the Abolition of Slavery: A Survey of Compulsory Labour Throughout the World*. Pp. 215. Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1960. No price.

The major purpose of this excellent survey is to appraise the validity of H. J. Nieboer's theory, as expressed in *Slavery as an Industrial System* (1900), that slavery, or compulsory labor, is associated with conditions of "open resources," free land or other means of sustaining life or making a living without the help of capital. Where the living is easy, primitives dislike to work merely for money. They are not interested in improving their economic status or in helping to develop the resources of their country. Thus if they are to work beyond the necessary minimum, somebody has to make them. This task has been undertaken

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pulsory labor with their attendant abuses of fundamental human rights do not disappear through legislative reform. Such undesirable conditions can be eliminated only through the slow process of education and the countervailing power of organized labor. Entrepreneurs and managers must be helped to realize that genuine progress can be accomplished only by seeking to develop voluntary co-operation and by learning how to work effectively with rather than through people.

Two minor criticisms may be made about Kloosterboer's book. In a survey of compulsory labor throughout the world, one misses a discussion of conditions in China and other Far Eastern countries. The book would also be more useful if the author had provided a Subject Index.

But such criticisms do not detract from the value of Kloosterboer's work. His survey is both scholarly and timely.

PAUL FIGORS

Professor of Industrial Relations
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

WALTER GALENSON. *The CIO Challenge to the AFL: A History of the American Labor Movement 1935–1941*. Pp. xix, 732. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960. \$9.75.

Professor Galenson's excellent volume is a welcome addition to the literature dealing with the formation and early years of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) and the rise of unionism in the mass production industries. Some of the earlier works dealing with this period were strongly partisan, as contrasted with Galenson's more objective and scholarly approach. He has profited also from the use of sources, including minutes of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) Executive Council and of the CIO, that were not available to earlier writers.

After presenting a background discussion of the AFL-CIO split and the relations between the two federations in the years that he surveys, Galenson devotes separate chapters to unionism in the industries of greatest interest to him. Twelve of these—steel, automobiles, coal mining, electrical and radio manufacturing, rubber, men's

clothing, women's clothing, textiles, meat packing, lumber, petroleum, and maritime—were those in which the CIO was dominant, whereas only five chapters, dealing with the Teamsters, the Machinists, the building trades, printing and publishing, and railroads, are devoted primarily to AFL unionism, and some of these receive rather sketchy treatment. It is evident that the main title of the volume is more descriptive of the contents than the subtitle. A summary chapter deals with such general aspects of the labor movement as membership, finances, strikes, political action, legislation, corruption, attitudes toward Negroes, agricultural unionism, and foreign affairs.

The volume treats differences of opinion within each of the federations as well as the major conflict that raged between them. The dependence of the CIO upon government help in organizing mass production industry is emphasized, as is the change in structure of some of the leading AFL affiliates in response to the CIO threat. The present merged federation, the author suggests, is far removed from the AFL of Gompers and Green in terms of concepts of jurisdiction and national union sovereignty, as well as in size of staff, degree of authority, and type of political action.

Economic factors affecting an industry, Galenson believes, were often more crucial than the social philosophy of the union leadership in determining organizational success. Yet dynamic leadership, such as that furnished by John L. Lewis, was needed to take advantage of an organizing opportunity. It is equally clear, in this account, that Lewis bore major responsibility for the split into rival federations.

Galenson has made exhaustive use of sources, both primary and secondary, and unpublished as well as published, and has documented his discussion with almost seventy pages of notes and references. His work is as carefully done as it is thoughtful and judicious. The student of industrial relations will find in it a full and impartial record of an important era in labor history.

JOEL SEIDMAN

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HENRY PELLING. *American Labor*. Pp. vi, 247. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960. \$5.00.

This brief survey of American labor, from the colonial era to the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, is one of a series published as the Chicago History of American Civilization. The author, Henry Pelling, is an Oxford social historian who has written extensively on the British labor movement.

Mr. Pelling tells us that *American Labor* was written during the course of a single summer, and it obviously does not pretend to be an original piece of research. The purpose was rather to present in simple form the main features of American working life, the broad sweep of labor's organizational development, the unique aspects of the American labor scene. Standard sources were used, and the interpretation advanced will be quite familiar to the American student.

One might quibble with the author about his facts in a few places. There is a great deal more than "little doubt" that John L. Lewis was responsible for the failure of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) unity negotiations in the nineteen-thirties; the formidable figures of Hutcheson and Wharton were looming in the background just in case Lewis weakened. The United Mine Workers flirted with the AFL in 1943, and the author leaves the impression that their efforts to affiliate came to nought. Actually, their application for membership was renewed in 1946, and this time was successfully consummated, although Lewis withdrew soon after. In general, however, Mr. Pelling handles his facts in an exemplary manner, and this, combined with a lucid style, makes the volume ideal for textbook purposes.

If *American Labor* had been published in paperback form at \$1.50 instead of in hard covers at \$5.00, I should have assigned it unhesitatingly in my introductory labor course. However, in view of the price, it does not enjoy any particular advantage over the one-volume histories of Dulles and Rayback. It is a pity that the cost

factor should thus limit the usefulness of a very worth-while book.

WALTER GALENSON
Professor of Industrial Relations
University of California

E. M. HUGH-JONES (Ed.). *Human Relations and Modern Management*. Pp. x, 256. First American Edition. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1959. No price.

Because five of the eight contributors to *Human Relations and Modern Management* are European or English, the book, which is the introductory volume of a series called Studies in Industrial Economics, presents viewpoints on management that might otherwise remain unfamiliar to the American reader. In the Introduction, the editors of the series, E. M. Hugh-Jones, University College of North Staffordshire; J. L. Meij, University of Groningen, Holland; and J. P. Miller of Yale, declare their purpose to be the study of the problems of "the micro-world of the firm, and the influence of its behaviour on society as a whole" by "interchange of ideas and results on an international basis."

In view of the development of the idea of economic community in our time, the text offers Americans interested in business a timely opportunity to compare notes with their foreign colleagues.

With one or two exceptions the over-all quality of the papers is high, and not infrequently the European contributors express themselves better than do their American counterparts. It is the reviewer's impression, however, that the more abstract essays dealing with topics like fundamental principles of management and industrial social systems do not succeed so well as the more empirical presentations.

Two outstanding chapters are those by R. W. Revans, of the University of Manchester—on "Human Relations, Management, and Size," and E. F. L. Brech, well-known English management consultant,—on "Human Relations in the Board Room." Professor Revans calls attention to the statistical fact that in the British coal industry the number of accidents increases more than in proportion to the size of the mine,

while in the United States practically the opposite is the case. As a revealing explanation he suggests that "morale begins at the top and is in some way transmitted through the management structure down to the very coalfaces where the men work; further analysis of the records shows beyond doubt that junior managers tend to pass on the quality of treatment that they themselves get at the hands of their superiors."

Mr. Brech's excellent study of the board room is also concerned with the role of executive management in setting the tone of a business enterprise, but his approach is horizontal rather than vertical. With the aid of a number of cases he diagnoses the infirmities of management at its highest level. This discussion is both interesting and informative. He seems to locate the failings of the corporate high command in the temperament of the "old man."

Part of Mr. Brech's study deals with the politics of the board of directors and top executive management. However, he also discusses some of their attitudes towards the corporation as an institution. He believes that as a group they have generally been too absorbed with "technical problems of production or research, or actively immersed in major sales activities. He discerns a "lazy" attitude towards the work force, traceable perhaps to the days of labor surplus in the 1920's and 1930's.

A short list of references following each chapter offers wider reading in English and European publications.

RICHARD EELLS

Public Policy Research
General Electric Company

ARTHUR M. ROSS AND PAUL T. HARTMAN.
Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict. Pp. x, 220. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960. \$6.50.

Ross and Hartman analyze patterns of industrial conflict in fifteen countries by using six comparative statistical measures: union membership as a percent of nonagricultural employment, number of workers involved in strikes as a percent of union

membership, the involvement ratio—the ratio of workers involved in strikes to the number of nonagricultural employees, the duration of strikes, the loss of time by strike per hundred union members, and the average loss of time per hundred nonagricultural workers.

The relationship between membership involvement and the duration of strikes is found as the most significant, and it is used to define four distinctive patterns of conflict characterizing the industrial relations of this century. The derived patterns are a northern European pattern—with a first and a second variant, a Mediterranean-Asian pattern based on data from France, Italy, India, and Japan but with broad applicability to most of the underdeveloped countries, and a North American pattern. Australia, Finland, and South Africa are seen as *sui generis* and discussed separately.

The central finding of the study is that "strike activity is declining generally throughout much of the industrialized world." The "withering away of the strike" characterizes northern Europe and is most notable in Denmark, Germany, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom which make up the first variant of the northern European pattern. Here the data show very low membership involvement and strikes of short duration. The abandoning of the strike as a form of industrial conflict is less obvious in other areas but sufficiently clear to justify the authors' contention.

But why fewer strikes? The answer is found in the changes of the essence of the various industrial relations systems, including the rise of workers' conservatism—a corollary of higher incomes; union maturity—with which come lessened factionalism, changes in employers' attitudes and policies; and, in a major way, in a worldwide expansion of the role of the state. Each of the causes is discussed in broad general terms as well as in specific details. Though moderately stated, the conclusions are clear and forthright; they show insight and full realization of the complexities of the issue. Thus, on the role of the state—

a knotty issue on which opinion is divided and about which much has to be written—the authors conclude: “. . . but sustained and purposeful human effort generally achieves its objective to some extent, and we see no reason to doubt that the repeated efforts of governments throughout the world to reduce overt manifestations of industrial conflict have had a certain amount of success. . . .”

The book can be said to be divided into roughly equal parts: (1) The first six chapters dealing with the general argument, the data with their shortcomings and limitations, the techniques, the findings, and the theoretical and methodological issues; (2) The five following chapters describing in greater detail the relationships between economic and political institutions and strike activity in each of the countries studied; and (3) The final chapter dealing primarily with the study's implications for the United States and concluding that here, strike activity “may well increase” periodically, but will continue to diminish over a longer period of time. The “withering away of the strike” in European fashion is not envisaged.

Scholars, practitioners, and policy-makers—even though aware of the general drift of strike frequencies—will profit greatly by reading the book. *Changing Patterns in Industrial Conflict* should be widely used as supplementary reading in basic college instruction about labor; it should be required reading for all students majoring in labor; and it is a must for the specialist in comparative labor and labor theory.

OSCAR ORNATI

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ROBERT EDWARD LEE KNIGHT. *Industrial Relations in the San Francisco Bay Area, 1900-1918*. Pp. x, 463. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960. \$6.50.

With Dr. Ira B. Cross leading the way in his *Collective Bargaining and Trade Agreements in the Brewery, Metal, Teaming, and Building Trades of San Francisco and History of the Labor Movement in California*, a number of studies have dealt

with various facets of these interesting relationships. Professor Robert Knight has made a valuable contribution to an understanding of industrial relations by centering his study upon the San Francisco Bay area and by limiting the period from 1900 to 1918. By doing this he has been able to delve deeply into the economic and social relationships that made San Francisco a “union city.” The successive steps by which this was accomplished, especially the successful millmen's and waterfront strikes of 1900 and 1901, respectively, were important labor advances leading to union acceptance by the San Francisco community.

Professor Knight has successfully sought answers to questions such as why the San Francisco employers were either unable or unwilling to fight for the open shop, and why the community was inclined to be sympathetic in its attitude toward the unions. He points out that in this cosmopolitan area, the reasons lie in the basic customs and habitual standards of the people, in the composition of the population, and in the geographical location of the city. The San Franciscans were liberal and democratic from the earliest days, and they were far separated from competition from the East. As a result, not only could the employers accept unionization without fear of competition from outside, but there were positive advantages for them in the union shop because wages and purchasing power were high; there were long periods of industrial peace; and the unions were, in general, trustworthy. This trustworthiness extended so far that the people granted the unions political power during the years that P. H. McCarthy was mayor of San Francisco.

The San Francisco Labor Council and the San Francisco Building Trades Council, as might be expected, occupy the center of the stage, and considerable attention is given to the activities of their officers and the actions of these bodies, but the East Bay labor councils and unions are not neglected. One of the most valuable aspects of the study is the careful attention given to the various employers' organizations; the foundation of the present multi-employer type of bargaining was laid in these years.

The reader will be impressed with the careful evaluations that Professor Knight has given to the roles of the labor leaders and to those of the leading representatives of the community. The labor leaders were guided very strictly by “business union” principles; the leading representatives of the community frequently turned the balance of power in favor of the unions.

Any community, possibly, may have particular aberrations, and San Francisco's departure from the normal came with the Mooney and Billings case, which Professor Knight describes and evaluates. Human behavior is such that some San Francisco employers continue to say to the present day, in spite of the weight of evidence on the other side, that Mooney and Billings were guilty. The conservatives' fear of radicalism neither dies nor fades away.

FREDERICK L. RYAN

Professor of Economics
San Diego State College

JOSEPH W. GARBARINO. *Health Plans and Collective Bargaining*. Pp. xi, 301. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960. \$5.00.

More than twelve million workers are enrolled in health insurance plans in which unions have a voice. Since most of these arrangements include workers' dependents, it is estimated that more than one-fourth of all persons covered by health insurance participate in plans influenced by unions. As the title of Dr. Garbarino's book indicates, his study includes health systems that are a result of collective bargaining.

Actually, the title is somewhat inaccurate since the writer also includes health plans that have not been negotiated by unions and management. Moreover, most of his research is devoted to medical and hospital insurance around the San Francisco Bay Area. California and the Bay Area are to some extent different from the rest of the United States in respect to health insurance. In the first place, it is doubtful whether any state has had a governor who was such a formidable supporter of compulsory state health insurance as the present Chief Justice, Earl Warren. Secondly, the Kaiser Foundation has been open to the public in the Bay Area since 1945. Through its own staff, hospitals, and

outpatient centers it offers comprehensive medical, surgical, and hospital policies covering 85 to 90 percent of all expenses. These factors furnished unions around the Bay Area important leverage in negotiating with the county medical societies, especially in the late nineteen-forties. Every expansion of Kaiser facilities continues to be a powerful weapon for organized labor in bargaining with the medical profession.

To this reviewer, two of the most interesting sections of the book are Chapters VIII and XI. Chapter VIII deals with the Pittsburg, California, incident of 1953. Here the reactions of the medical profession to a union local negotiating with the Kaiser Foundation Health Plan somewhat resembled management tactics in a strike. Fearful of losing substantial income, the Pittsburg private practitioners made several counter offers and attacked union officials through such devices as full-page advertisements, direct mailings, handbills, and speeches.

In Chapter XI, the author attempts to predict the future of health plans. Some unions, particularly those which are dissatisfied with their present contracts, he believes, will support a comprehensive federal program for the entire nation. However, Professor Garbarino predicts that most unions will work for governmental programs as a supplement to their negotiated plans. According to him, these organizations will also generally support the “category approach” to legislation selecting such problem groups as the recipients of old age pensions.

Students of health plans, especially those related to organized labor, will find this objective study most useful.

MELVIN J. SEGAL

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Michigan State University

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY

ROBERT H. CONNERY and RICHARD H. LEACH. *The Federal Government and Metropolitan Areas*. Pp. x, 275. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960. \$4.75.

This volume is the first serious effort by political scientists to outline and analyze the proper relationship of the federal government to the many difficult and complex problems confronting the metropolitan areas of the United States. Since probably two thirds of our people now live in these areas the book should be of value to everyone seriously interested in American government.

The authors are respectively Professor and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Duke University. While neither has special competence in the urban intergovernmental area, both are well-trained scholars who deal with their subject objectively.

The chapter headings indicate the scope of the work. The nature of federal programs is first described: housing, water resources, air and water pollution control, airports, military installations, civil defense, highways, and recreation. One wonders why urban highways are discussed, and metropolitan area education omitted.

There follow chapters on "The Representation of Metropolitan Interests in Washington;" "The Congress and Metropolitan Areas;" "Presidential Leadership;" a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of a department of urban affairs; and, finally, "The Case for Federal Action."

The authors conclude, not surprisingly, that "metropolitan problems cannot be solved without federal leadership;" that "to date, no President has exerted himself in behalf of an attack on metropolitan problems;" and that because rural interests dominate Congress "there is little likelihood of effective action in the long run unless leadership is exerted from the White House."

The final chapter contains a series of recommendations based largely on a somewhat pessimistic prognosis of the chances of immediate effective political action.

It is most ungracious for a reviewer who is mentioned favorably six times in the book to speak critically of a volume so soundly conceived and written. Yet cannot compel the statement that the authors suffer from that same political lag which they deplore in urban, congressional, and presidential leadership. Moreover, Mes-

sieurs Connery and Leach are on sounder ground when they outline the problems than when they suggest the solutions. Perhaps this is due to their inexperience on the firing line: For example, as these lines are written the bill to establish a department of metropolitan affairs, which the authors contend is not politically feasible, is on the Senate calendar with a favorable committee report. The Democratic Platform promises to "give the city dweller a voice at the Cabinet table by bringing together within a single department programs concerned with urban and metropolitan problems." A specific "ten year action program to restore our cities and provide for balanced suburban development" is outlined. The Republicans can hardly do less in their platform without opening themselves to the charge of turning their backs on the metropolitan areas of America, which will gain them few votes.

There is a real chance for effective federal action in the next twelve months. Those who are interested in following the fight intelligently will be well advised to read this book even if they find some of its conclusions less than persuasive.

JOSEPH S. CLARK

United States Senator
from Pennsylvania

WILLIAM BURLIE BROWN. *The People's Choice: The Presidential Image in the Campaign Biography*. Pp. xiv, 177. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1960. \$4.00.

In a time when there is much discussion of campaign techniques and a bumper crop of biographies of presidential hopefuls has just been produced, a study of campaign biographies of candidates for the American presidency is a timely contribution. *The People's Choice* states that such biographies have been a feature of every campaign since 1824 and attempts to: 1) present the appeals they have made and note the changes between 1824 and 1960; and 2) "attempt to relate each appeal and its evolution to the society toward which it was directed." For example, the reader is given some conception of how popular

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by DON MARTINDALE,
Professor of Sociology,
University of Minnesota

Organized around the theme of mass society, this new introductory text from *The Van Nostrand Series in Sociology* portrays the dramatic changes in 20th century America with their accompanying liquidation of traditional values.

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1960, 570 pages, \$6.75.

Algeria—An Impartial View

ORDEAL IN ALGERIA

by RICHARD M. BRACE,
Professor of History,
Northwestern University,
and JOAN BRACE

Ordeal in Algeria represents one of the first attempts to write an impartial account of the controversial French-Algerian problem. Carrying the story to the brink of the present (the uprising last January and the changes wrought by it), the authors paint a vivid picture of the tragic struggle which touches on so many important aspects of modern history. The result is a clarification of the complex issues behind the war for independence and a documented account of the fantastic machinations that destroyed the Fourth Republic and threaten the Fifth.

November, 450 pages, \$4.95

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pose, an effort to secure preferment, access to a winner, or what. Indeed, the study proceeds to show that many campaign contribution situations do not involve persons at all but are gifts to a National Committee or to some special referendum purpose—to tax chain stores, to regulate the oil business, to promote socialized medicine, or whatever it may be the dollar-giving voter wants.

Dean Heard's work is a mine of information, competently constructed for maximum utility to the researcher, the student, or the general reader. He has assembled a wealth of detail that is difficult to obtain, and offers his analyses of this material in a clear, concise style. In the present state of the social sciences, it gives one real pleasure to read a book in which the author can tell what someone said in an interview without asking the reader to "... 'cognize' conscious verbal materials. ..."

RICHARD M. SCAMMON

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GEORGE S. BLAIR. *Cumulative Voting: An Effective Electoral Device in Illinois Politics*. (Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, Volume 45.) Pp. xi, 145. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960. No price.

The cumulative voting form of minority representation has prevailed in elections to the Illinois House of Representatives since 1870 and in nominations to that body since 1910. Its essence is the use of three-member districts in which the voter is permitted either to divide his three votes among as many persons as are to be chosen or to consolidate his support behind a lesser number, even to the extent of casting his entire vote for a single candidate. The result is that each representative district regularly elects two members from the dominant party in the area and one from the local minority.

That result alone would cause many to concur in the Blair identification of cumulative voting as an effective device, since the original motivation was displeasure with a North-South sectionalism that produced phantoms of Republicans from one part

of the state and Democrats from the other. In addition, the compelled minority representation divides the aggregate party delegations in quite precise accord with the parties' proportionate state-wide strength. An incidental characteristic is that most representatives are re-elected despite political upheavals, so that the average level of legislative experience is uniformly high.

Most objections to cumulative voting are analyzed in the Blair volume and deemed to be neither inherent defects nor traceable exclusively to the minority representation device. We are thus informed not to place particular emphasis on the lack of November contests in half the districts, because this is a result of the frequency with which the majority party in an area chooses to nominate but two candidates and the minority party a single contender. Such other manifestations as difficulties in counting the variously marked ballots and the tendency for cumulative voting to mean a narrow working majority for the party in power are also minimized.

The volume under review covers the period extending to 1956, when the Illinois General Assembly was reapportioned and redistricted for the first time since 1901. This alone suggests that anything like an unqualified endorsement of cumulative voting should be deferred pending an opportunity to examine the reciprocal impact, under twentieth-century conditions, of district realignment and assured minority representation on a district basis.

More than that, the competently framed and executed Blair study is still not sufficiently comprehensive to provide full insights into intraparty behavior under the conditioning influence of cumulative voting. What kinds of groups and candidates really benefit from a minority representation formula applicable at the nominating stage? And for the November election, what is the effect of being unable, in the typical case, to disassociate efforts for increasing the size of the party delegation from the risk that an added nominee will only unseat one of the party's incumbents?

JACK F. ISAKOFF

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MURRAY B. LEVIN. *The Alienated Voter: Politics in Boston*. Pp. viii, 84. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960. \$1.25.

This is a case study, with an interpretation and analysis, of the Boston mayoralty election of 1959. That election provided an unusual opportunity to investigate the nature and size of the phenomenon known as political alienation—an attitude in the electorate that it is "politically powerless, because it believes that the community is controlled by a small group of powerful and selfish individuals who use public office for personal gain." Many of the partisan, religious, sectional, and other factors that are common in elections were not present in this one: both of the candidates were Irish, Catholic, Democratic politicians, natives of Boston. The election, moreover, occurred in an off year, when the candidacies of nominees for national and state offices did not bring broader issues than Boston problems into the campaign.

One candidate, John E. Powers, had ample campaign funds and obtained endorsement from most of the leading figures in Boston religious and political life. The other, John F. Collins, called his opponent's campaign "power politics" and used the underdog appeal in his own. He won.

With the support of the Boston University Graduate Fund, a public opinion survey—data are given in the Appendix—was conducted three days after the election. Boston is "a sick city," and the results of the survey clearly showed that at least in Boston a strong attitude exists that the situation is hopeless: "Of those who voted for Powers, 43 per cent thought he would be no better when in office than Collins, while 57 percent of those who voted for Collins thought he would be no better than his opponent." The attitude of hopelessness increased with age: "The older voters, particularly the group over 50, who have lived in Boston for a long time, are more cynical about the political process. This group tends to believe more strongly than younger voters that the candidates are not very different and that all politicians are insincere and corrupt. Many of them expressed the view that they have seen too many

mayors come and go to believe that an election makes much difference." The book analyzes the attitude further in terms of the social and economic status of the voters.

The dangers to democracy of widespread feelings of political alienation are obvious. The present work offers the suggestion that a more realistic theory of democracy should replace eighteenth-century theories, and that "a re-examination and reorganization of the political structure is also indicated."

DAYTON D. MCKEAN

Professor of Political Science
Dean, Graduate School
University of Colorado

GLENDON A. SCHUBERT. *Constitutional Politics: The Political Behavior of Supreme Court Justices and the Constitutional Policies That They Make*. Pp. xvi, 735. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960. \$8.50.

Professor Schubert has produced a pioneering text, and it is almost axiomatic that pioneering efforts are given a "yes, but" reception. The author describes his book as a "behavioral approach to the Supreme Court," and thus invites criticism both from the antibehaviorists and from the splinter factions among the behaviorists themselves. He is writing about the political role of the judiciary, and thus can be assailed, even if largely *pro forma*, by those who profess that the judicial process is not political. He has taken a definite position—in favor of the court's assuming a dynamic role in national policy—and thus cries havoc upon the classic concept of a judiciary which was supposed, although it never really did, to confine its function to what Mr. Justice Holmes once described as applying legal litmus paper to constitutional issues.

This is a text about the Constitution suited for political science majors and pre-law students, and as such it focuses, as the author explains in his Preface, "upon the decision-making behavior of Supreme Court Justices, and upon the policy-making role, in selected major areas of substantive constitutional politics, of the Justices as a group and as the formal leaders of a governmental agency." While the substance

of the major constitutional opinions is included in the book, emphasis is on "how and why the Supreme Court makes certain decisions (i.e., chooses certain policy alternatives in preference to others), and with what consequences."

As such, the text is excellent—a much better approach, indeed, than preparing a casebook in the law school tradition for nonlegal students. The work should help advanced undergraduates to understand the mechanics and strategy of the judicial process, the general philosophy of constitutional adjudication as reflected in the Frankfurter and the Douglas-Black schools, and the practical politics of spelling out a specific constitutional rule. The author acknowledges the recent work of Jack W. Peltason, C. Herman Pritchett, Alpheus T. Mason, and others in this area, but his book stands on its own particular merits.

The organization of the book is sufficiently efficacious to be worth special mention; the subject is divided into four major topics: The mechanics of staffing and operating the court in the federal system; the practical position of the judiciary in a government of separated powers; the basic constitutional principles arising from the federal-state relationship; and these principles as they apply to relationships between government and the individual.

Professor Schubert's tables and statistics will evoke the most violent criticism. The mildest protests will be issued against the breezy captions for some of these, for example, "Pay-Off Matrix for the Hughberts Game." Arguments that both the statistical and political analyses in some of the charts are "wrong" will be more pertinent. The most anguished outcries will be over five "scalograms" of as many civil rights issues, mostly involving the Warren court, which the author has reserved for the end of his text where he perhaps hopes that the student will be sufficiently prepared to follow his analysis.

On the whole, this reviewer would give this book a "superior" rating. He would like his own students in a law school course on the Constitution to have studied such a book in a prelaw political science seminar, although at the same time agreeing with the book's anticipated critics that it

should be used with caution. He is reminded of the example of a brilliant social psychologist under whom he once studied, who made it clear that the course lectures would be entirely in support of the instructor's challenging theory of institutional psychology, but the required reading would be entirely devoted to the criticisms of this theory. Whoever uses the present book in a similar manner ought to have a highly rewarding result.

WILLIAM F. SWINDLER
College of William and Mary

G. THEODORE MITAU. *Politics in Minnesota*. Pp. 140. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960. \$1.95.

Despite its brevity, this book covers a wide range of topics. Included among them are party patterns and leaders; the election laws of Minnesota and party organization in that state; an analysis of the so-called "nonpartisan" legislature; and an examination of some of the more important pressure groups operating in the legislature. In addition, there are biographical sketches of Minnesota's members in the national Congress, a list of the governors and their terms of service, and several pages of voting statistics. For those who are interested in more extensive reading, there is an excellent Bibliographical Note.

The book does not describe the actual organization of state and local governments, nor does it cover government operation. Moreover, there is only a very limited discussion of issues.

The political situation in Minnesota is particularly significant since the percentage of voters who habitually split their tickets or who switch allegiance several times in a lifetime seems to be unusually large. As the author points out, this means that "no party can rest on its laurels." Constant readjustment and readaptation are necessary. Under these circumstances, one might expect the two political parties to pull toward the middle-of-the-road and to take very nearly identical positions on issues. Apparently this has not been quite the case. The Democratic-Farmer-Labor party has been "New Dealish" and closely associated with the liberal wing of the national Demo-

cratic party. It has been committed to high and fixed supports for farm products. It has also favored the protection of the rights of organized labor, more social welfare services, and an international emphasis in foreign policy. The Republican party, on the other hand, has been more conservative on economic matters and more sympathetic to private rather than governmental responsibility. Similar differences are apparent on the state level.

As Professor William Anderson points out in the Foreword, "There must be many citizens of Minnesota and many political observers elsewhere, who have long felt the need for just such a book as this—a brief, systematic, reliable, and up-to-date account of politics in Minnesota." Similar studies would be equally valuable in many other states, if made by people who are well qualified for the task. It is obvious throughout this volume that Mitau is well qualified and that he has made an authoritative contribution to greater political understanding.

E. ALLEN HELMS
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GILBERT Y. STEINER AND SAMUEL K. GOVE.
Legislative Politics in Illinois. Pp. x, 208. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960. \$4.50.

The late James Hilary Mulligan, author of the poem "In Kentucky," is responsible for the lines: "The landscape is the grandest/And politics the damndest/In Kentucky." In the language of the conventions, Kentucky yields to Illinois.

Messieurs Steiner and Gove have produced an uncommonly good book on state politics which differs from both traditional and behavioristic analyses in two important respects. In the first place it is concerned with the policy-making process in the General Assembly of the State of Illinois and with the sources of policy leadership within the institutional framework of the Illinois state government. It is neither a manual of legislative organization and procedures nor a Freudian interpretation of the legislative product, although it deals in a thoroughly competent way with both

the mechanics and the human imponderables of legislative action. In the second place, after establishing the institutional framework, its argument is developed through a series of case studies of legislative action involving major issues of public policy, bringing into bold relief the ways in which legislative institutions and legislative behavior interact.

The first three chapters of the book, entitled "The Legislative Process," "Pressures on the Legislature," and "The Influence of Standing Committees," make explicit and clear the general conditions under which the Illinois General Assembly, and probably most state legislatures, do their work. First, the legislative output is the product of planned and managed logrolling. Second, the major pressures on the legislature are public pressures—the Governor and the Administration program and the local officials, of whom the Mayor of Chicago is not the least,—while the press and the private lobbies occupy an important, but generally secondary, position. Third, legislative policy is decided by political leaders, including leaders outside the legislature, and the free range of standing committees is far less extensive and their role as policy determinants less consequential than is the case in Washington.

The remaining four chapters of the book deal with: (1) legislative redistricting and its consequences; (2) legislative action in the reorganization of state fiscal administration; and (3) legislative proposals for judicial reorganization. The two chapters on 1955 redistricting and its consequences not only provide a highly illuminating example of the way in which forces and pressures organize themselves around so pervasive a problem in basic political power, but also constitute an interesting commentary on *Colegrove v. Green*, the Gateway Amendments, and the Illinois redistricting amendment of 1954, as well as on the federal redistricting amendment resolution recently introduced by Senator Clark. The chapter on fiscal reorganization is the story of legislative initiative in tightening financial management following the Hodge scandal of 1956. It affords many interesting comparisons and contrasts with President Truman's action in clearing the Bu-

reau of Internal Revenue of overlapping personnel. The chapter on judicial reform lends color and emphasis to what is perhaps the most significant and permanent truism of Illinois politics: "The combination of a determined Republican Governor exercising effective control over downstate Republicans and a determined Democratic Mayor exercising effective control over Chicago Democrats is more likely to produce any desired result than is any other combination of public or private interests."

ROWLAND EGGER

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DAVID J. SAPOSS. *Communism in American Politics*. Pp. viii, 259. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1960. \$5.00.

This volume is mainly about the American Labor party, the Wallace Progressive party, and the use of established political party machinery and the American labor movement by American Communists in their long-range propaganda program for domination in American politics.

With the prospects for world revolution dimmed, Moscow dictated a policy of working within the traditional political parties. Some gains came during the period of social unrest in the 1930's in their active endeavor in the California Democratic party and the Minnesota Farmer-Labor party. These were soon disadvantages with strong, unfavorable reaction from labor and even from some radical elements who earlier had favored direct collaboration with the Communists. The author declares that thereafter neither the Communist party nor any openly acknowledged Communist organization participated directly in what became known as Popular Front movements (p. 17). This is not a generally accepted view.

Generally the emphasis was on disguised methods through undercover activities intended to conceal the real purposes of furthering the Communist program. Their leaders resorted to camouflage, pretending to be liberals, while plotting to dominate liberal and labor groups in the interest of the Communist cause.

The emergence of the Soviet Union as

an American ally in World War II cleared some obstacles for more favorable action. Communist slogans were the slogans also of the two major parties. But dissension among the Communists and within labor's ranks ended the American Labor party as the chief vehicle for political action. The New York branch soon became the nucleus of the new Wallace party. The story of the rise and fall of Henry Wallace is a familiar one. Whether he was duped or not, his progressive movement had far more noise than strength. Perhaps convinced of their lack of voter strength, Wallace and his supporters encouraged or permitted obvious pro-Soviet groups to come into positions of party influence. But because of Wallace's resignation as party leader and the Soviet support of North Korea in the early 1950's, the party rapidly declined.

Dr. Saposs concludes by saying the American Communist movement "continues to operate as a vassal of a foreign power. . . Its success depends on the intellectual climate and lack of awareness of its true intentions" (p. 229).

This book is recommended for anyone not familiar with the American Labor party and the Wallace Progressive party. Those who look for something new will find little. The volume is readable but is hampered by excessive use of quoted materials and an exceptionally heavy reliance on newspaper sources.

ADAM C. BRECKENRIDGE

Professor of Political Science
University of Nebraska

RAY D. HENSON (Ed.). *Landmarks of Law: Highlights of Legal Opinion*. Pp. xiv, 461. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. \$8.50.

This collection of essays and articles is organized in two roughly equal parts. Part I, entitled "The Theory of Law," brings together a variety of modern views on the broad subject of jurisprudence. In terms of chronology, the entries range from 1897, Holmes' "Path of the Law," to 1958, Walter Probert's article, "Law, Logic, and Communication." Of the sixteen items, Holmes accounts for three, and Dean Pound, two.

In Part II, "The Substance of Law," the editor has brought together such classics as Warren and Brandeis' seminal article "The Right to Privacy" and such recent items as an analysis of the background of a 1958 decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, involving the ownership of notes taken by William Clark in the course of the Lewis-Clark Expedition.

The editor's Introduction to the volume explains his choices by the admission that, considering the abundance of legal writing, personal taste will obviously prevail. I can only applaud his taste. To have Lon Fuller's "Case of The Speluncan Explorers" within reach on my bookshelf is a pleasure I have long awaited. Indeed it would be difficult to argue that there is any one item in the volume that one would delete—though, of course, other possible choices might be suggested.

It is, perhaps, unfortunate that the editor and his publisher chose to provide the volume with a subtitle and the jacket with a descriptive text which do not accurately reflect the contents. The jacket announces that the reader will find here "Great decisions and commentaries of this century which embody the wisdom, humor, and irony of the law in confronting human problems." But there are no decisions—though this century has had and still has some great decision writers—and I could find little that I would class as humor or irony. To the law-trained person, even the word "opinion" in the subtitle may be misleading.

But this matter of the title is a petty objection. The volume presents a fine choice and an excellent arrangement of what are indeed some of the landmarks of recent legal thought. We are in the editor's debt for having brought them together within the covers of one book.

FRANCIS H. HELLER

Professor of Political Science
University of Kansas

DAVID DALE MARTIN. *Mergers and the Clayton Act*. Pp. xii, 351. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959. \$6.00.

This volume grew out of a doctoral dissertation for the University of California,

Los Angeles. The author is now Associate Professor of Business Economics and Public Policy at Indiana University. He tells the story of Section 7 of the Clayton Act—the antimerger section—to the most recent available date, focusing his account closely on that one section. He traces the legislative history of its enactment as part of the 1914 antitrust legislation, its emasculation by judicial decisions, the legislative history of the 1950 amendment, and its more successful enforcement, including some lower-court decisions. When and if fresh Supreme Court decisions become available, a more definitive account may be possible. Meanwhile, Professor Martin's record renders a useful service. It gives the careful reader material from which he can frame his own summary, which may or may not agree fully with that of the author.

The revival of the effectiveness of Section 7 hinges on two main points: (1) The new section covers mergers by acquisition of assets as well as by acquisition of stock, thus closing a loophole which had been used with crippling effect; (2) Effect was given to the intent, which was present in the 1914 legislation, to check monopolistic tendencies in their incipency. This required that lesser degrees of immediate effect be made illegal than were required to establish a Sherman Law violation. The author credits the 1950 amendment with this second effect, though nothing in the verbal changes cited definitely requires this. Apparently, it must be attributed to renewed and strengthened expressions of legislative intent, as well as an altered judicial climate, more favorable to accepting the judgments of the Federal Trade Commission. Thus the Commission gained the result which the author blames it for not explicitly seeking in the 1950 amendment.

The omission of merger via assets in 1914 was deliberate, but this hardly warrants the author's conclusion that Congress intended Section 7 to attack only aggressive tactics and holding-company abuses. This approximately characterized one group, to which concessions apparently had to be made by those who wanted a more inclusive attack on incipency. On this there

was in 1914 no clear and predominant legislative intent, such as had developed by 1950. The author's account of cases, while useful, is elliptical in spots, leaving the interested reader's curiosity not fully satisfied.

JOHN M. CLARK

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JOSEPH DORFMAN AND R. G. TUGWELL.
Early American Policy: Six Columbia Contributors. Pp. 356. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960. \$6.00.

This book consists of half a dozen essays on political and economic thinkers of the early republic. Its unity is a little adventurous, since its subjects are linked mainly by their association, at various times from 1774 and thereafter, with Columbia College. But the pietistic aspect of the book is minimal; the essays are crisp and scholarly; and the result enlarges our knowledge of the public policy debates of the first century after independence.

The essays vary in character. Those on less familiar people, like John McVickar, Henry Vethake, and William Beach Lawrence, concentrate on gathering and setting forth the basic facts of forgotten lives. Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and Francis Lieber are better known figures; and here the authors deal more in interpretation.

The Hamilton essay, though its argument seems less audacious now than when the authors first set it forth a quarter of a century ago, is easily the most brilliant in the book. Professors Tugwell and Dorfman see Hamilton, not as the devil figure of Jeffersonian folklore, but as an able, high-minded, and creative statesman. While he had his class partialities, these did not, in their view, exhaust his politics; "if it was desired to have business men profit from the establishment of union this was never for the sake of the businessmen but always in the interest of union." Their conclusion is generous but just: "We were better prepared for the years through which we later passed because Hamilton lived and loved his country, when our Constitution was first beginning to be created."

The attempt to rehabilitate John Jay probably exaggerates his chances for the

Presidency and does not erase the impression of a deep and fundamental blandness in this impeccably dignified man. The essay on Francis Lieber is more like a catalogue than an interpretation and does not go far towards revealing the inwardness of this learned and versatile figure. Nonetheless, both essays, like the volume as a whole, offer an interesting, if at times somewhat random, commentary on our early intellectual history.

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.

Professor of History
Harvard University

WALTER HUGINS. *Jacksonian Democracy and the Working Class: A Study of the New York Workingman's Movement 1829-1837.* Pp. vi, 286. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1960. \$6.00.

The work of Turner, Beard, and Commons at the turn of the century focused the attention of historians on the environmental and economic aspects of American history. The allegiance of the West to Jackson and its share in the new Democratic party have been obvious, although the complexities of Western motives and desires need further study, but the part played in the creation of "Jacksonian Democracy" by the urban workingmen's parties and the labor movement in general has been accepted without detailed exploration of their composition or reasons for supporting Jackson.

It is this careful study that Mr. Hugins has undertaken for the New York workingmen's movement for the brief period 1829-1837. He has examined its connection with the new Democratic party and with both Tammany and locofocoism and has made not only a biographical catalogue but also an occupational analysis of the workingmen in the labor movement and in politics during the period. A third section of the book indicates the connection between the New York workingmen and the reformers and gives an account of the workingmen's position on the critical antimonopoly and bank issues.

Mr. Hugins has done a great service to the social historian by placing in perspective the various components of the "rise of

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
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the common man." It can no longer be asserted that the Jacksonian "Revolution" was the result of any conscious unity of agrarian and labor interests. In the first paragraph of the text he states that the rise of the workingmen's party in New York in 1829 was unrelated to the political changes in Washington but "was largely the result of local factors, economic and social as well as political," and the rest of the book gives ample proof for this statement. Twenty tables indicate the occupation and party activities, the political affiliation, and the voting record of 850 carefully selected members of the movement. Biographical sketches are provided whenever possible for all the leaders in the movement and in the faction of the New York Democratic party which they supported.

This exploration of the New York movement makes it quite clear that there was no common ground in ideology or issues and no close connection in activities or organization with the Western Jacksonians. The New York political agitation was anti-monopolistic and antiaristocratic and in defense of the rights of the journeyman mechanic, although it was not closely connected with the infant labor organizations. The list of manuscripts, newspapers, and periodicals used by the author is impressive, and the tables represent both meticulous research and adequate proof for his major conclusions. The Bibliography and Index are comprehensive and detailed and will be very useful to workers in the field.

ALICE FELT TYLER

Minneapolis, Minn.

MERRILL D. PETERSON. *The Jefferson Image in the American Mind*. Pp. x, 548. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960. \$8.50.

There is no end to the making of books about Thomas Jefferson, nor should there be. This book is neither a biography of Jefferson nor a history of his times. It is a study of what history has made of him. As interpreted by the author, the concept of *The Jefferson Image* was a composite representation of the historical character and of the ideals and ideas, the policies and sentiments usually identified with him. As have all outstanding personalities, Jefferson

presented a perplexing array of contradictions. In spite of, or possibly because of, this fact, the impact of the Jefferson image on America has been tremendous. For example, in the realm of political thinking alone, the "Sage of Monticello" united the basic ideas of provincialism, agrarianism, and democracy.

So universally appealing has the American mind found the versatile Jefferson, that scarcely a movement has evolved that has not had Jeffersonian imagery associated with it. Nineteenth-century southerners saw Jefferson as the "Father of States Rights," while a century later extreme nationalists saw the Jeffersonian spirit as the directing force of the New Deal.

Although the Jeffersonian image has always denoted change, it has not always evolved evenly. There have been periods, as the author correctly states, in which there was an eclipse. From the Jacksonian era to the appearance of Randall's *Life of Jefferson* in 1858, Jefferson suffered from an avalanche of detractors. Although the Jefferson symbol was influential in the Jacksonian mind, Jackson's aggressive nationalism played havoc with Jefferson's provincialism. Moreover, Jefferson's concept of government was antiauthoritarian to the degree that sometimes it appears as if rebellion seemed natural to him. The masterful Lincoln combined Jefferson's principles with Hamiltonian authoritarianism to produce the Jefferson-Lincoln tradition. After the Civil War, Jefferson's image faded until the dawn of the twentieth century when it reappeared with much of its luminous enchanting power.

The new interest in this idealistic philosopher was chiefly in two areas, namely, the man and his politics. The beauty of Jefferson's domestic character was successfully established by the literary efforts of Parton and others. Senator George Vest and Congressman John Sharp Williams proclaimed Jefferson's politics in a day when most men were Hamiltonians. By 1900 historians were devoting more attention to Jefferson, but it was not until the publication of Bowers' *Jefferson and Hamilton* (1925) that American scholarship was won to the Jefferson image. With this conversion, Professor Peterson declares, Jefferson

sonian imagery was investigated, analyzed, and written about from every angle. All of this greatly enriched the American mind.

With the dedication of the Jefferson Memorial by Franklin Roosevelt in 1943, during the Jefferson Bicentennial, the "Sage of Monticello" passed into the American pantheon, where, as the first of the great American liberators, he lives on.

The author has written a fine, scholarly book. The guide to the sources alone comprises approximately sixty-four pages, an achievement in itself. This book is a "must" for all students of Thomas Jefferson.

GEORGE C. OSBORN

Professor of Social Sciences
University of Florida

HERBERT APTHEKER. *The American Revolution 1763-1783: A History of the American People: An Interpretation*. Pp. 304. New York: International Publishers, 1960. \$3.50.

This book, the second volume in *A History of the American People*, is an historical synthesis based on the work of many historians, discussed in the text or listed in the Bibliographical Note, and on contemporary newspapers, "letters, diaries and writings." There are occasional Footnotes but practically no specific references.

The clue to the author's theme is expressed in the last line of the book: the American revolution was "a momentous landmark" in "the continuing struggle" to establish a social order in which the people direct their own affairs. He has presented a series of chapters on various aspects of the revolution, many of which have topics which would demand full books, such as "England and the Revolution," "The British Empire and the Revolution," "Diplomacy of the Revolution," and two on social and economic effects of the revolution, each handled in approximately twenty pages. One chapter, called "The Nature of the Revolution," is really an historiographical essay in which he presents various historians, past and present, and their emphasis in interpretation. The author himself

leans toward "the philosophical outlook" of Marx and finishes the book by giving his own idea of the cause of the revolution. It was the result of the interpenetration of three currents: first, conflict in interest between the rulers and the vast majority of the colonists; second, the class "stratification" in the colonies; and third, the developing sense of American nationality. He thinks the revolution, in its opposition to colonialism, its democratic trend toward political and social democracy, and its assertion of the right of national self-determination, could justify Lenin's characterization as "one of those great . . . really revolutionary wars."

In his analysis of the first current of conflict he treats the subject of British colonial policy, which he is apt to view from the standpoint of colonial propagandists without also furnishing the views of the other side. For example, he lists restraints on manufactures as a potent cause of revolution without mention of the freedom the colonists possessed to manufacture anything and everything except certain stages in the wool, the hat, and the iron manufactures. He ignores the attempts of the colonists from time to time to develop manufactures such as glass and paper, but usually without success because, as the governors' answers to a questionnaire of 1767 showed, they were not ready for it. He refers to the monopoly given by the navigation acts to British shipping but fails to note that the colonists were here classified as British and by the regulation greatly profited both in the shipping and in shipbuilding. He mentions the restrictions on westward expansion as a hardship and charges that the government failed to keep its promise that the proclamation line of 1763 would be only temporary. He ignores the fact that the line so sketchily mentioned in the proclamation was later in 1768 drawn more realistically farther west by careful surveying and by treaties with the Indians.

As an historical synthesis the book contains many significant parallels, and much of it is interesting to read. However, it lacks unity because of the great volume

of factual detail included from condensation of so many histories.

VIOLA F. BARNES

Professor of History, Emeritus
Mount Holyoke College

LEO HUBERMAN and PAUL M. SWEETZ. *Cuba, Anatomy of a Revolution*. Pp. 176. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1960. \$3.50.

Messieurs Huberman and Sweetz have written an interesting book which deserves serious consideration. It is the only extended study yet made of the Cuban Revolution as a revolution, and it is done by two professionals—left-wing Socialists who apply the "scientific" measuring rods of their own brand of Marxism.

To say this is to indicate the limitations of the book. It is heavily biased in favor of the Revolution, which is seen with starry-eyed vision through rose-colored glasses. "One of the most original and important social transformations of our time . . . a development of enormous historical interest and importance . . . one of the great historic and prophetic events of our time"—so we are told.

This may be so, but the authors themselves concede at the beginning that it is too early to pass judgment. Of one thing they are certain. "For our part we have no hesitation in answering: *the new Cuba is a socialist Cuba* . . . This is the first time—ever, anywhere—that a genuine socialist revolution has been made by *non-Communists*."

Considering that the authors only spent three weeks in Cuba last March to get firsthand information for their book, they have done a surprisingly good job of description and analysis. There are a lot of facts, and they are used with understanding. This is where their Marxist technique serves a purpose.

"A revolution," as they truly say, "is a process, not an event." Their interpretation of the reason for the poor news coverage of the revolution in the United States is that "bourgeois reportage and scholarship . . . are constitutionally incapable of understanding historical phenomena in

their development, that is to say dialectically, and hence must interpret them irrationally, in terms of surprise or catastrophe or both."

There is some truth in this, but, as a "bourgeois" journalist, I see the failure of my colleagues to be rather in their professional and technical insufficiencies. The revolution is not being described in the American mass-media of communication as a social revolution in its own terms and as a Cuban and Latin-American phenomenon. And the value of this book, for all its bias and deficiencies, lies in the fact that the "process" being described is treated as a Cuban social revolution. It may or may not, as the authors see it, be "helping to blaze a new trail for humanity to a brighter socialist future." But it is the most important social upheaval in Latin America since the Mexican Revolution, and it is having a more profound effect on the Western hemisphere than any event since the Wars of Independence 150 years ago.

This is reason enough to welcome the interpretation that is made by Huberman and Sweetz.

HERBERT L. MATTHEWS

Editorial Board
New York Times

OTIS A. SINGLETARY. *The Mexican War*. Pp. vii, 181. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960. \$3.75.

This small volume is one in the Chicago History of American Civilization series published by the University of Chicago. Professor Singletary has attempted to fulfill the prediction for the project, "that the layman who is seeking a sound introduction to a particular segment of history cannot do better than to consult the appropriate item in this series." The author has managed to meet this challenge, but little else.

Dr. Singletary fails to tell the story of our plenipotentiary, John Slidell, and his crucial mission to Mexico, in its proper light. Mexico offered to accept a commissioner; Polk sent an "envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary." This diplo-

matic misstep was as much a cause of Slidell's failure as any other.

The author has attempted to tell the story of the coming of the war with a mere mention of the famous cabinet meeting of May 9, 1846. And this gathering of Polk's Cabinet has helped to make the adjective "mendacious" applicable to him. The author passes over the fact that General Taylor moved with considerable reluctance to the Rio Grande.

The chapters dealing with the war are well done. The story of unpreparedness on both sides sounds like the editorials of some of our current newspapers. The harsh words that were exchanged by the commanding generals of our armies are similar to the writings of Bradley, Patton, and Stilwell. The appointment of political friends to command rank seems to have set the scene for the large number of Brevet-Generals that overran the White House after the Civil War.

The story of General Winfield Scott and his expedition to Mexico City reminds one of a Gilbert and Sullivan operetta. Scott's political ambitions had postponed his appointment for months, even though the administration realized that victory would not be decisive without an attack on the Mexican capital. Santa Anna was able to get Scott to sign an armistice that weakened the American position. This respite gave Santa Anna an opportunity to regather his army; the two week rest gave the Mexicans an opportunity to refortify Mexico City.

When Professor Singletary tells the story of a battle, he is most effective, but when he tackles the diplomacy behind it, he leaves much to be desired. The chapter, "The Diplomacy of War," contains much material that the author has discussed in a preceding chapter, "Politicians and Generals." To discuss the diplomacy of the Mexican War in twelve pages is quite an historical feat.

Historians have complained for years that one of their greatest problems is the continued half-truths and lapses that mar our works of history. The reviewer is aware of the restrictions under which Dr. Singletary must have worked. To write a definitive history of the Mexican War in

one hundred and sixty-two pages is an impossibility. Perhaps it would be better to give up the *Reader's Digest* approach, at least in the field of history.

JAMES J. FLYNN

Associate Professor of History
Fordham University

EUROPEAN HISTORY

EDWARD HALLETT CARR. *Socialism in One Country 1924-1926*. (A History of Soviet Russia, Vol. 2.) Pp. viii, 493. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960. \$7.50.

This is the second of a series of three volumes which E. H. Carr is devoting to that period of Soviet history during which the slogan of "socialism in one country" became the party line.

The first half of the volume, chapters eleven through nineteen, deals with the struggle for power within the Soviet Communist party from the autumn of 1924 through the early months of 1926. It commences with the appearance of Trotsky's *Lessons of October* and a consideration of the way in which the Triumvirate of Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Stalin created the deviation of "Trotskyism." After tracing the genesis of the "socialism in one country" doctrine, the author presents a detailed account of the dissolution of the Triumvirate. In separate chapters he relates the conflict within the Party to developments in the Soviet literary world and in the Komsomol organization. One of the best chapters is that dealing with the Fourteenth Party Congress in December, 1925, at which Zinoviev's Leningrad organization was easily defeated by Stalin's machine. Attention is also given to changes in the party membership and to the various measures taken to reduce political illiteracy within the party's swollen ranks including the establishment of various Communist "universities" and other institutions for indoctrination. The emergence of the local control commissions and of the Central Control Commission is charted in terms of the development within the party of a counterpart of the secret police.

The second half of the volume is devoted to governmental affairs and includes treatment of the Central Executive Committee and of developments within the national republics primarily from a constitutional point of view. Other chapters deal with the determination of regional administrative units, the local soviets, the Red Army and the security organs.

As in previous volumes, Carr has carefully documented his account from Soviet sources, but he has also relied upon various of Trotsky's publications issued in exile and has utilized many valuable unpublished data from the Trotsky Archives at Harvard University. Enjoying no apparent limitations on space, the author has included numerous rare quotations and an enormous amount of detail which at times give parts of the volume the appearance of a reference work. It is not likely that he will have any competitors approaching him either in general scope or in depth of detail.

JOHN S. RESHETAR, JR.

Associate Professor of Political Science
University of Washington

GEORGE VERNADSKY. *Russia at the Dawn of the Modern Age*. (A History of Russia, Volume IV.) Pp. ix, 347. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959. \$7.50.

Russia at the Dawn of the Modern Age is the fourth in the planned nine-volume *A History of Russia* by Professor Vernadsky and the late Michael Karpovich. This composite work, the chronological starting point of which occurred in the period prior to Kievan Russia, was the most ambitious study of Russian history ever attempted in English, and in its scope might well have eclipsed the Russian classics such as Soloviev or Kliuchevsky. But with the untimely death of Professor Karpovich in November of last year, it is uncertain whether the work will in fact come to fruition.

The volume under review deals with the post-Mongol period when the unification of Great Russia was achieved, and the basic patterns of the political institutions of tsarist Russia were laid down. In Western Europe it was the age of the Renaissance and Reformation, and repercussions

of these movements were felt even in Russia.

The domestic and foreign policies of the Muscovite Grand Princes, Ivan III and Vasili III, affairs of West Russia—Belorussia and the Ukraine—the decline of Lithuania, the rise of the Ukrainian Cossacks, and the Church Union of Brest, 1596, are the main threads followed in the discussion. Of particular interest are the careful examination of foreign policies, notably lacking in the writings of older Russian historians, and the resuscitation of such a figure as Vasili III. Coming between his father Ivan III—to whom most credit has hitherto been given as the pioneer unifier of the Russian lands—and his son Ivan IV, the dramatic and perhaps pathological Ivan the Terrible, this interesting Muscovite prince has been too often passed over as a mere figure of transition.

Professor Vernadsky has a sure command over his difficult materials, and his presentation is at once detailed, informative, and stylistically agreeable to read. Crisp strokes delineate character, as with his terse description of the rather complex personality of Vasili III.

Excellent supplementary materials include maps—some quite unusual—genealogical tables of ruling houses and princely families, Polish and Russian, Bibliography, and both a Glossary of foreign terms used and a general Index.

If one were to say anything negative about this work, it is the "old-fashioned" tone that is present on occasion both in presentation and interpretation. But perhaps this quality is an inescapable attribute of the classic.

DAVID HECHT

Associate Editor
Collier's Encyclopedia

DENIS SINOR. *History of Hungary*. Pp. 310. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. \$5.00.

We are told on the jacket that this is "a lucid and readable history" of Hungary "based almost exclusively on original sources." For the latter we must accept the publisher's word, for there are neither Footnotes nor Bibliography; with regard to the former the reviewer can hardly share

the publisher's enthusiasm. The author, Professor of Hungarian and Altaic studies at Cambridge University, states as his aim to give the general reader a continuous narrative history and to provide the historian with a reliable handbook. If the reader wants a political history of the reign of one king after another, here it is; the same can be said for the historian who is seeking factual details especially about dynastic and family relationships. Much of this information and the material on the rules of Transylvania are very difficult to obtain, and should prove useful to historians.

The book is conveniently divided into six parts: the first three bring the story up to the Turkish conquest during the sixteenth century in 150 pages; the fourth covers the period of Turkish domination in 80 pages, leaving about 60 pages for the period from circa 1700 to the end of World War I, with only 10 pages devoted to the years 1920-1944. Only now and then does the author permit himself excursions into social, religious, or economic history, but the few pages that he does give make a reader wish for more. Two and one-half pages on the Reformation with only slight subsequent references to the Counter Reformation seems scant coverage, even in a volume where emphasis has been placed on brevity. The author speaks only of Hungarians, the other nationalities within the kingdom are first referred to as aliens (p. 253), and after 1867 as minorities (p. 277), although early in the volume he writes, "From its inception, Hungary was a multilingual, multiracial realm" (p. 38). In the volume one misses any real discussion of the status of Croatia within the monarchy or an appreciation of the plight of any of the minorities. The following statement indicates Sinor's point of view: "Ignorant politicians and naive scholars alike were distressed at the oppression of the minorities [before 1914] and failed to notice that the treatment they received was not worse than that meted out to Hungarians. They also failed to perceive the obvious, namely that oppression would be infinitely worse under the rule of any of these maltreated national groups" (p. 277).

The reader who dips into the volume for the later periods will be troubled by the au-

thor's use of Hungarian words, which are not always clearly explained even the first time they are used and are not all listed in the Index. While the difficulty of giving a precise translation must be admitted, it seems hardly necessary in a book specifically designed for the English reader (p. 9) to use *jobbágy* regularly for peasant—serf—or *megye* for county—defined as department by the author, or *nádor* for Count Palatine, "dignitary second only to the King" (p. 39), and many others. The word "Delegations" is an accepted term used in connection with the Austro-Hungarian government under the *Ausgleich* of 1867, and it seems hardly appropriate to replace it by "committee." Anyone used to working in Central and Eastern European history is prepared to accept various spellings of places and names, but why use Moldova and Walachia on p. 176 and Moldavia and Valachia on p. 212, with no reference under either spelling in the Index? The latter, by the way, omits all listing of the Kings of Hungary, even though this is a volume filled with dynastic history. The volume does include a select and useful list of dates.

E. C. HELMREICH

Chairman, Department of History
Bowdoin College

FREDERIC B. M. HOLLYDAY. *Bismarck's Rival: A Political Biography of General and Admiral Albrecht Von Stosch*. Pp. x, 316. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1960. \$7.50.

"A rival of Bismarck," says Professor Hollyday of Albrecht Von Stosch. And it is true that the General and Admiral who became the first secretary of the imperial navy aspired to this title. Indeed Bismarck distrusted Von Stosch because he suspected that Von Stosch was aiming at the highest political office in the German empire. However, Professor Hollyday's "political biography" makes it abundantly clear that Von Stosch had few qualities to recommend him for such responsibilities. A gifted officer, who had distinguished himself as administrator and as field-commander, he owed his appointment to the Crown Prince Frederick William, to whom

he became attached during the war of 1866. It is one of Professor Hollyday's aims to destroy the legend that Von Stosch was a liberal at heart, and as such, the favorite candidate of Frederick William and of the Crown Princess Victoria, who opposed Bismarck on ideological and personal grounds. Professor Hollyday had access to Von Stosch's unpublished memoirs, and he has used these, together with the printed source material, in a sagacious and discerning manner. He pictures Von Stosch, not as a liberal, but as a conservative nationalist with strong feelings of loyalty toward the Hohenzollern dynasty. Nevertheless, Von Stosch's closest political friends belonged to the National Liberal party, and Von Stosch shared most of their opinions and prejudices. He favored a strong Fleet and colonial expansion for Germany; in a word, he was an imperialist. His judgment may have been sound on practical details, but he was lacking in political vision, both in foreign affairs and in domestic concerns.

In the long conflict with Bismarck, Von Stosch was moved less by disagreement on the principles and aims of German policy than by greed for power. Bismarck returned the hostility with the full force of his ire, and was as unscrupulous in his choice of weapons as he had been during the "Arnim affair." It is, nevertheless, difficult to entertain much sympathy for Von Stosch; he was definitely Bismarck's inferior in the mastery of international relations and was just as shortsighted as Bismarck in his assessment of Germany's internal problems.

One may, therefore, question whether Von Stosch deserves a "political biography." The value of the book under consideration lies not in its portrait of a high-ranking German official, but in its contributions to the working of the political machinery that Bismarck had created in 1867 and that he dominated until 1890. The system was tailored to guarantee the control of the executive power in the hands of the chancellor; its caesaristic features, to speak with Max Weber, made no provisions for new developments, once the caesar was removed or lacking. It was unavoidable that the system deteriorated when the Kaiser exerted the imperial prerogative un-

checked by the resourcefulness and the wisdom of the old chancellor.

Indirectly, this volume also contributes to our knowledge of the hapless Crown Prince. Frederick William, emerges from Professor Hollyday's book as a man without spirit or determination and with little genuine interest in the unsolved problems of imperial Germany. His opposition to Bismarck was largely based on impotence and spite, and held, in the eyes of this reviewer, no promise for constructive developments. If Von Stosch was guilty of ambition, he was, at least, not blind to the shortcomings of the Prince.

The over-all impression that the reader gains from Professor Hollyday's book is very like the viewpoint already presented by other sources—the Holstein Diaries, for instance. Germany's political life tended more and more to aimless intrigue and jockeying for position. The seeds of the disintegration that took place in 1918 had all been planted; it only seems strange that their fruition was so long delayed.

GERHARD MASUR

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Sweet Briar College

ALFRED DIAMANT. *Austrian Catholics and the First Republic: Democracy, Capitalism, and the Social Order, 1918-1934*. Pp. xii, 325. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1960. \$6.50.

The book is a synthesis and a culmination of Professor Diamant's earlier and smaller studies in Catholic philosophy and its impact on the First Austrian Republic. For the sake of a proper understanding of Austria between 1918 and 1934, it was most desirable that this book was published. Up to now, Socialist thought in the politics of the First Republic has been quite widely known and fairly well articulated. But the corpus of Catholic social ideology and its influence on the Austria since St. Germain were not systematically clarified. This is why the present work, closing as it does a large gap, will be highly valued. Aside from its worth for Austrian political scholarship, the book is also important for a richer view of Catholic social

thinking generally, beyond the twentieth-century Austrian framework.

Professor Diamant's two major concerns are Catholic criticism of democracy and Catholic criticism of capitalism. He traces both to their pre-World War I origins and then shows how they combined to lead to the anti-Marxist protest in the nineteen twenties and thirties and finally to the corporative authoritarian Constitution of 1934. At the same time he competently explains how the often contradictory positions, ranging from a semi-Christian socialism to fascism, caused severe internal struggles within the Christian Social *Lager*, and how hopeless it was to arrive at a common denominator satisfactory to the whole anti-Marxist complex in the First Republic. Professor Diamant also solved the harsh problem of explaining how the pressure of this internal struggle among anticapitalists, antidemocrats, procapitalists, prodemocrats, and various combinations thereof, added to the pressure of foreign developments, caused the prodemocratic forces to be sacrificed in the interest of the 1934 "solution."

The author is to be congratulated not only for making a splendid contribution to scholarship but also for doing it without overdrawing his case at any time, for using his sources closely and *sine studio*, and for avoiding, even in his rather subjective Epilogue, sheer polemics. One wonders what this book might have been without Professor Diamant's self-discipline and sense of restraint. To illustrate: The book may reinforce the view of fair-minded Marxists that Catholic corporativists are hopelessly antiquated in their vision of a preindustrial society, but the book will probably convince them that Catholic criticism of the mechanization, dehumanization, and collectivization in our society stems from an honest anxiety about the fate of modern man.

ROBERT SCHWARZ

Associate Professor of History
Carnegie Institute of Technology

HAYWARD KENISTON. *Francisco de los Cobos: Secretary of the Emperor Charles V.* Pp. xvi, 463. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1960. \$7.50.

Francisco de los Cobos was not only Secretary of the Emperor Charles V. He was also, as Dr. Keniston makes abundantly clear, *fundidor*—officer in charge of minting and assaying all specie—of the Indies, *regidor* of Valladolid and Ubeda, *contador mayor* of Granada, Grand Commander of the military order of Santiago, owner of towns, castles, and palaces—in short, one of the most influential men in Spain.

Professor Keniston carefully traces the rise to power of this man who was born into the lower gentry in Ubeda about 1477, served the Catholic Kings and then, before the young King Charles had been on the throne a year, traveled to Flanders to begin thirty years of service at his side.

In the final chapters the author presents the reasons which he assigns for the success of Cobos. Cobos was industrious. He was loyal to his king, first, but also to his friends and putative friends. He was a skilled political tactician who pursued a wise strategy: he limited his activities to the political and financial administration of Castile and its possessions and thus avoided conflict with other royal councillors such as Granvelle.

Dr. Keniston's meticulous biography is founded upon a wide knowledge of Spain, Spanish literature and history, and Spanish and other European archives. But the book is, as the author acknowledges, defective in a vital condition: almost no private papers of Cobos exist. Lacking these essential documents the biography takes on a tangential character; it becomes an account of known political events mixed with a thorough catalogue of the promotions, emoluments, gifts or bribes, official papers, nepotistic practices, and public family relationships of the Grand Commander. The influence of Cobos upon the emperor is clearly established as a general principle, but the specific authority of the Secretary is not enumerated, except in terms of his power to control access to the monarch.

Yet the book is an important one in the sadly undercultivated field of Spanish history, and probably no more excellent book could be written on this topic. The author displays Spanish administration from the

The Hoe and the Book: *An Italian Experiment in Community Development.*

By F. G. FRIEDMANN, *Wells College*

INTO many isolated villages in southern Italy, UNLA—an organization formed chiefly to wage war against illiteracy—has come, to set up community centers where villagers and peasants can learn to read and write. Adult education courses and discussion groups have aimed beyond immediate goals to the establishment of community consciousness and the attempt to bring people away from their suspicions, frustrations, and resignations into a new spirit of co-operation with each other.

The author cites many instances of the program's success and has perceptive comments to make on its possible future achievements.

179 pages, \$3.00

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THOMAS F. MCGANN

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ASIA AND THE ARAB WORLD

I. D. S. WEERAWARDANA. *Ceylon General Election 1956.* Pp. 262. Colombo: M. D. Gunasena & Company, 1960. Rs 15/—.

The election of 1956 stands out as a landmark in Ceylon's political history because its course was dramatic, its temperature feverish, and its results largely unanticipated. An eminent Ceylon historian even christened it with the portentous title "The Revolution of 1956."

It is this historic event that is the author's subject matter. "My aim has been partly to tell the story of an Asian general election and partly to relate that story to the conflicting and sometimes confusing web of a complex and heterogeneous society." The story is fairly well told, but its meaning inadequately analyzed.

If indeed the election was "revolutionary," then the key to its nature is the answer to the question why the United National Party (UNP), a party that remained firmly in power from 1947-1956 and complacently expected another term of office, was not merely defeated but crushed. The author has plotted the immediate issues and brought the actors on stage, but the impression is that we are witnessing the climax of the drama without fully understanding its unfolding. In short the analysis lacks perspective and historical depth. The immediate misdeeds of the UNP and the exuberances of Sir John must be separated from the fatal strategy of opposition groups, and this again from the vastly more important social processes that led to the emergence of new pressure groups. To understand their aspirations and strength

one has to delve many years into the past and trace the nature of elite formation in colonial times, the distribution of wealth, prestige, and power in a constricted society, and the economic processes in the twentieth century that at the rural level led to the emergence of a new acquisitive and socially mobile elite having unity with traditional eclipsed interests and claims to recognition as conservers of traditional culture and religion. No less important is the acceptance by the rural masses of these ideological themes as valid measures for broadening and reconstructing the society.

One way of calculating the significance of this election is to look at the social composition of the elected rulers. The author in Chapter IV provides the information, in somewhat incomplete form, but fails to draw the inferences. The majority of candidates including those in the winning party were educated by the English, followed middle-class professions, and certainly did not spring from the masses. This poses the classic Marxian question regarding the relationship between the political representatives of a class and the class they represent. The author's casual remark that "the situation of course will not last for ever" is too facile an opinion on the intricacies of the politics of an Asian country.

The policy of the new government both in theory and practice is some indication of the character of its politicians and its supporters. In Chapter X the author moves from story-telling to evaluation, and he characterises the Mahajana Eshkath Peremuna (MEP) in glowing terms, "It combined therefore liberalism, socialism and nationalism." On the basis of the information he provides, it is equally arguable that the orientations of the MEP and its supporting pressure groups show sectarianism—later manifest in communal riots; that the exclusion from citizenship of Indian labor, which has for several generations contributed vastly to national wealth, cannot be the basis of a socialist society; and that a party with which minority groups strongly disagree cannot be national. It is true that the MEP manifesto proclaimed some socialist economic measures. But the gap between pronounce-

ment and intent is seen in action. The MEP's motley composition of right and left and other opposites appeared in later disastrous power struggles and the sabotage of progressive legislation such as the Paddy Lands Bill.

The indecisive election of 1960 and the now impending election should help us to judge the significance of the 1956 election. The UNP has staged a comeback as a major party; the MEP has split up, and its core group at the eve of election has been forced to make new left alliances. The gains of 1956 in regard to language and religion have become consolidated, but Ceylon politics has yet to crystallize into a battle between the right and the left. Mr. Weerawardana's national, liberal, socialist sun has still to rise.

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B. B. MISRA. *The Central Administration of the East India Company 1773-1834*. Pp. xii, 476. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1959. Distributed by Barnes & Noble. 45 s net.

Professor Misra of the University of Bihar has, in this work, supplemented his *Judicial Administration of the East India Company 1765-1782* (Patna, 1953) with a massive study of the development of the East India Company's administration in Bengal into the British Government of India. Twenty years ago, Professor C. H. Philips, who contributes a Foreword to this book, presented a masterly account of the Company's home administration and of the subordination of both its home and Indian administration to the British government, in his *East India Company 1784-1834* likewise published by the Manchester University Press. Together, these two books cover the field of Indian administrative history during this period in so thorough and competent a manner that they are unlikely ever to be superseded. Dr. Misra's work is by no means of mere academic interest. The present Government of India is so much the heir of its predecessors that every aspirant to a career

in any of India's administrative services, high or low, would benefit from a careful reading of what Dr. Misra has to say. As long as India remains preponderantly an agricultural society composed of several hundred thousand villages, many of the problems presented to the young administrator in 1960 will not essentially differ from those confronting the Company's covenanted servants two centuries ago.

To students of political science, whether in India or elsewhere, the chief interest of this volume will lie in its drawing together of many facets of Indian administrative history which have formerly received separate or partial treatment. There have been previous studies of Mughal administration, of British-Indian judicial administration, and of British-Indian revenue and financial administration, especially of such measures as Cornwallis' "permanent" revenue settlement in the 1790's, but there has been no study of the period which has welded all this together. The peculiarly intimate connection between judicial and revenue administration in modern India has its Western counterparts and analogies chiefly in the Middle Ages, and the topic is not one which has attracted Western medievalists. Even if it had, the Western medievalist lacks the deep knowledge of Muslim and Hindu institutions which is essential. Therefore an Indian scholar profoundly versed in these matters and fully conversant with the evolution of Western institutions is the best interpreter of the bewildering mass of material in the East India Company's records. Dr. Misra has given a very clear exposition of the Mughal administrative system, of the influence upon it of the decline and fall of an effective Mughal central authority after 1707, and of its supersession by a British central authority evolved over half a century of trial and error, adapting, discarding, and then readapting a basically Indian framework in the light of British experience.

In Indian terms, this story is one of the scattering of power, formerly centered at Delhi, among numerous regional and even local authorities, and then the reinvigoration of one of these—a new *nawab* of Bengal, that is, the East India Company, who reasserts himself and gradually estab-

lishes his sway over almost all the others. In British terms, it is the story of the Company's penetration of the *mufassal* through its civil servants—self-seeking traders metamorphosing themselves first into revenue-collectors, then into judges and magistrates, and finally into professional administrators—ubiquitous representatives of a new and not wholly Indian "country-power" dominating nearly all other "country-powers" of the subcontinent by 1834. Dr. Misra's method is to describe the structure of the Company's "supreme government" of Bengal in the late eighteenth century before proceeding to analyze revenue administration, the administration of civil justice, of criminal justice, and finally the evolution of personnel—the foundation of the modern Indian Civil Service. He is at pains to point out the instances in which British-Indian administrative practice, due primarily to utilitarian influence, was ahead of British administrative practice at home.

Many of Dr. Misra's readers will regret the excess of detail and the concentration upon the administrative machine rather than upon the men who ran it. Indeed the work would have been better balanced had the documentation of almost every administrative change been sacrificed to make possible more than cursory treatment of the administrative history of the other two presidencies. Apart from Sir Thomas Munro's achievements, developments in Madras are hardly mentioned, and Bombay is almost entirely neglected. Somewhat more attention to the careers of individual civil servants would have brought out more clearly the intimate connection between administrative and social history, which much concerns Dr. Misra. He points out (p. 196) that the class of rural capitalists created by the Permanent Settlement and interspersed with several layers of absentee landholders "constituted a new feature in the social history of the country." We look forward to the further development of that theme in his forthcoming work on the evolution of the Indian middle-class.

HOLDEN FURBER

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FRANK MORAES. *India Today*. Pp. 248. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960. \$4.00.

Frank Moraes proves once again that he is one of India's best journalists and trenchant political observers. A few years ago, his *Report on Mao's China* startled India with its frank and searching report of those facets of Communist China which official India refused to acknowledge or convey to the Indian public for fear of disturbing friendly relations between two great Asian neighbors. Had India paid more attention then to Moraes' book and less to Nehru's tranquilizing speeches, there might have been better mental preparation for recent Chinese moves in Tibet and the frontier regions of India.

As an astute political observer who has proven that he is worth listening to, Moraes turns the searchlight of critical analysis inward to report to his countrymen and the free world on the state of India and to warn of impending crisis. In surveying what his country has done with twelve years of independence, he finds much that is impressive and remarkable. But this totality of achievement, outstanding as it might be, does not erase the hard fact that India is, "not yet" a democracy but only a "developing democracy" increasingly on the defensive against communalism on the right and communism on the left. The battle for a modern, rational, progressive India has not been decisively won, and the prospects of victory are not bright unless India adopts a "new attitude of mind." In highly critical terms, Moraes describes Nehru's India variously as "inchoate" and "amorphous," neither Eastern nor Western, and guilty of shedding ideals for ideas, that are implemented by a new, growing, "monstrous" bureaucracy of declining caliber, and little initiative or intellectual integrity. This Great Leviathan is led by a single omnipotent individual with an "authoritarian streak" who, while neither a demagogue nor dictator, is "perilously near" to both characterizations.

Nehru's great weakness, and India's danger, is that in both his domestic and foreign policies, he has failed to provide "a decisive moral resistance to Communism" by

-blunting sharp distinctions between democracy and communism, the free world and the Soviet world. At home he has paved the way for communism by suffusing programs of co-operative farming, land ceilings, and high taxes with a spirit of stateism amounting to "undue regimentation" and "excessive bureaucratization" of both public and private life that "oppresses" the people. Abroad, his willingness to give the Soviet bloc the benefit of the doubt when they are in the wrong is "unconscionable."

The difficulty, as the author sees it, is not that Nehru's objectives of democratic socialism for internal development and non-alignment in foreign policy are wrong, but that they are being implemented very badly. Nehru, the successful strategist, is defeated by Nehru, the unsuccessful tactician, whose short-term methods obscure and confuse his long-term objectives. In his zeal to obtain worthy objectives, he propels democratic socialism beyond the democratic and nonalignment beyond genuine neutrality.

Meanwhile, India still needs to achieve national unity and consolidation and to imbibe and implement the spirit and workings of democracy, while the fissiparous forces of entrenched orthodoxy and communism gather strength beneath the surface awaiting Nehru's demise.

Seeing that the Nehru era will draw to a close in a few short years, Moraes presents a few possibilities after Nehru's death or withdrawal. The chances are excellent that a successor government will move to the right of Nehru's policies. If the Congress party remains united, which is questionable, a strong demand will arise in the country for a strong Opposition party as a center or right of center group. But the best chances for democracy in India lie in the Congress splitting into two main groups, a right and a left, who between them could gather the conservative and non-Communist forces around them to establish a stable workable two-party system in India. Moraes anticipates the possibility of the Congress left merging with the Praja Socialist party and other socialist forces to form a formidable party that might be able to wrest political power from

conservative Congress forces. Led by Jayaprakash Narayan, Asoka Mehta, J. B. Kripalani, and with the outside moral support of Vinoba Bhave, such a new party should be able to govern India in a new type of Gandhian democratic socialism that avoids the extremes of reactionary obscurantism or totalitarian communism. They should be able between them to fill the void left by Nehru, since no individual can hope to do this, and continue the work of creating an integrated, progressive Indian India that can help significantly, perhaps even "decisively," in the world effort of blending the achievements of a Western science with the Eastern spirit of man's affinity with God.

Moraes' predictions and assumptions are no doubt controversial and will excite comment both in India and abroad. It remains to be seen whether he proves as good a prophet as he is a writer.

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China and the United Nations. Report of a Study Group Set Up by the China Institute of International Affairs. (National Studies on International Organization.) Pp. xi, 285. New York: Manhattan Publishing Company for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1959. \$3.00.

Among the twenty-odd volumes initiated by the Carnegie Endowment for study of the relations of particular countries with the United Nations, none has the particular value of *China and the United Nations*, since it springs from firsthand experience with a local Communist party, certain Communists, and communism in general that goes back to the very early 1920's. The book, however, has the limitations as well as the strengths of a short historical record, a record, moreover, in which the United Nations—principal supporter of the Free China government at Taiwan—continues to play a not inconsiderable role. The result is an account that is straightforwardly factual on practically every topic in which the United Nations has been involved, not only since its inception but

also during its germination from the League of Nations period to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. Necessarily missing from the account is the detailed, highly penetrating, and sophisticated understanding of Russian and Chinese Communist maneuvers as exemplified by the writings of such Chinese liberals as Hu Shih, George K. C. Yeh, T. F. Tsiang, and Chiang Monlin, not to mention the authors of this particular study themselves.

China provides a unique opportunity, of course, for the examination of mutual security organizations since it suffered from extensive foreign exploitation in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the inaction of the League of Nations in 1931, the Sino-Japanese War, and the Communist assumption of power after World War II. While the study considers these and other topics ranging from United Nations voting procedure and trustee arrangements to collective security and technical assistance, its main focus is on China's case against the Soviet Union and the question of Chinese representation—the actual headings of the two concluding chapters and the content, explicit or implied, of much of the other nine chapters. The treatment of these subjects is accurate. It may not appear accurate to readers who make such a cult of so-called "two-sided" objectivity that they maneuver facts to produce two sides. To this reviewer, who is persuaded that observed fact includes the observer, the case presented against the Chinese and Russian Reds is a trifle pallid. Personal observation at Taiwan and Hong Kong and reading, when time allows, of the mainland Communist press lead this reviewer to conclusions that would hardly be politic for Free China writers to make concerning subjects that involve United States foreign policy and thus United States aid.

The writers do, however, present a good factual case for the vitality of Free China culture, for the dubious permanency and the culturally anti-Chinese character of the mainland regime, and for the duplicity of Communist dealings and negotiations. It is particularly helpful to have in one place a list of Soviet violations of the United Nations Charter and of the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1955, itself a humiliating agree-

ment that the United States prepromised at Yalta to force on an unknowing Chinese government. Perhaps it may even be that the book does represent true Chinese sophistication and that understatement may serve to awaken foreign opinion more readily than full and pointed statement.

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CHANG-TU HU. *China: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture.* (Survey of World Cultures.) Pp. 610. New Haven, Conn.: Human Relations Area Files (HRAF) Press, 1960. \$10.00.

This valuable book in the Survey of World Cultures series is the first comprehensive study on the Communist state led by Mao Tse-tung—a state which by the year 2000 will have a population of 1.5 billion or more than half the present world population. Here can be found twenty-four well-written chapters on Chinese society: the historical setting, geography, and population, ethnic minorities, languages, religion, social organization, family, dynamics of political behavior, theory, and structure of government, diffusion and control of information, foreign relations, basic features of the economy, organization and use of manpower, financial system, agriculture, industry, domestic and foreign trade, public health and welfare, education, science and technology, art and intellectual expression, values and patterns of living, and national attitudes. The most important sections of this significant volume are found in the portions dealing with the intellectuals, the middle class, and the peasantry.

Generalizations are difficult to give regarding the feelings of the intellectuals, but a few deductions are valid. The majority are patriotic and accept the Communist emphasis on loyalty to the state in contrast to the age-old loyalty to the family. Many are gladdened by the manner in which Communist China has taken a dominant position in world affairs and, after years of frustrations, achieved unity.

A new middle class is emerging. The

scholar-gentry and landlord classes are being supplanted by the rise of an urban population. Many Communist party members have stepped out of obscure niches in society into high governmental positions. The peasants are losing their fear of the supernatural and entering a new, fascinating life, a life of education, blending science and some of the better features of materialism.

Communist China, for good or evil, is thus described: "The legacy left by twenty centuries of Chinese cultural primacy in Asia, combined with memories of a hundred years of Chinese weakness in the face of western and Japanese intrusion after 1840 and augmented by the drives of modern Chinese nationalism in the twentieth century, has now passed to the account of the Chinese Communist party. Peking is again the capital of a unified China under firm, centralized control. The regime in power in Peking, however, is radical and Communist, not conservative and Confucian. . . . China's international influence is now dynamic, endowed with distinctively new characteristics, powered by political and technological forces never found in the imperial past" (p. 257).

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CHOW TSE-TSUNG. *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China*. (Harvard East Asian Studies 6.) Pp. xv, 486. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960. \$10.00.

Though scholarly, this book is not a dry treatise. It contains such an absorbing account of the May Fourth Movement that it might well have been journalistically entitled "The Awakening of the Dragon." This movement, named for the student mass demonstrations of that date in 1919, marks a turning point in China's recent history, as Dr. Fairbank has rightfully indicated on the flyleaf. The Chronology of Relevant Events; the Appendices analyzing the social forces of the period, itemizing the schools, colleges, and universities involved, and presenting the data on com-

plementary workers' strikes; the detailed notes on each chapter; and the lengthy Index demonstrate the amount of effort which was put into the volume. This book is truly worthy of its beautiful physical presentation. Only a Chinese could so successfully have read and digested the numerous Chinese source materials. However, it is just on this score that a minor criticism may be leveled. Much of the detail in the body of the book is inconsequential, and its wealth of such details, multiplied by a great deal of repetition, detracts from the readability of the text.

It is interesting to note that in speaking of this movement, which protested the authority of Confucian ethics as a state ideology for China—although this system had proved effective in Imperial Japan, Dr. Chow follows the Confucian method of "Rectifying Names," in that he is particularly careful to define his terms. He states clearly that he is considering principally the years 1917 to 1921 and discoursing on the preliminary intellectual phase of the movement as well as on the later attack on tradition and conservatism. He describes well the "new-thought tide," the literary revolution, the student activities, the merchant and worker strikes, and the boycott against Japan inspired by patriotic sentiment resulting from the Twenty-one Demands and Shantung and the desire to modify tradition in the light of Western science and democracy. He therefore concludes that the movement was a combined intellectual and sociopolitical one to achieve, through the modernization of China, national independence, the emancipation of the individual, and a just intellectual, social, and political development in the following decades.

This reviewer, having had the good fortune to attend many lectures given by Dr. Hu Shih, is pleased at the recognition given to Dr. Shih's great influence on the Chinese literary renaissance and at the excellent discussion of this subject. However, the question of whether the Liberals, the Kuomintang, or the Chinese Communist party is right in claiming leadership of the movement and denominating it as a precursor of their own development is purely a matter of subjective interpretation and cannot

be decided by any quantitative measurement.

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MOHAMED ALWAN. *Algeria Before the United Nations*. Pp. xii, 121. New York: Robert Speller & Sons Publishers, 1959. \$3.50.

MICHAEL K. CLARK. *Algeria in Turmoil: A History of the Rebellion*. Pp. xvi, 466. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. \$6.00.

The first of these timely volumes is the outgrowth of a master's thesis which was prepared at American University. Its author, First Secretary of the Iraqi Embassy, is to be commended for having produced an objective, although somewhat technical, study which is based on thorough research and surveys at the United Nations.

After identifying the sources of the Franco-Algerian conflict, Mr. Alwan presents a systematic analysis of the progress of the issue in the United Nations. Procedural and substantive arguments as well as underlying political factors relevant to each significant vote are ably and dispassionately summarized. The study also provides much instructive data concerning the bloc voting system which is operative in the United Nations. Students of political behavior will be particularly grateful for a thirty-eight page Appendix that contains tabulations of votes on the principal resolutions pertaining to the Algerian question.

In a concluding section of this short monograph, Mr. Alwan offers a few speculations concerning probable developments. Some of his predictions have been proven faulty by events that have occurred since completion of his manuscript. Thus, the de Gaulle government did have a "solution to offer which is basically different from those proposed previously" (p. 73), and the Assembly did not recognize the independence of Algeria in September, 1959 (p. 75). On the other hand, the author was correct in predicting "sooner or later France will have to negotiate" with the Algerian rebels.

It is to be hoped that the direct negotiations which began in mid-1960 will find

both groups—Algerian and French—attempting to be as realistic and temporizing in their demands as Mr. Alwan suggests the restoration of peace requires them to be. Although he is confident of ultimate statehood for Algeria, it is significant that this Arabian scholar-diplomat proposes an interim solution that is far short of this goal.

Sharply in contrast to the realistic moderation displayed by Mr. Alwan is the uncompromising partisanship which is apparent throughout Michael K. Clark's *Algeria in Turmoil*. This *History of the Rebellion*—from 1943 to 1958—was prepared by a journalist who for several years was a correspondent for the *New York Times* in the Middle East and North Africa. His firsthand contacts and observations enable the author to report in great detail on the carnage that has accompanied this devastating civil war. Thus, the principal contribution of Mr. Clark's detailed work lies in its chronological account of the course and the consequences of the rebellion. It also provides an invaluable guide to "who's who" on both sides of the conflict. The author's emphasis on personalities probably led to the unfortunate decision to limit the book's Index to the proper names of the principals involved in the struggle. This decision vastly reduces the usefulness of the author's work for reference purposes.

Readers will do well to discount the publisher's claim that this "is a complete analysis of the political, religious, and ethnic realities that underlie the present Algerian struggle." The author's discussion of the basic social conditions and social forces at work in the Algerian situation is generally fragmentary and rarely documented. The sources that are cited, however, are usually articles from French newspapers.

The most serious defect of Mr. Clark's effort, as previously noted, is his extreme partisanship. The story he tells and the "analytical, rather than merely descriptive, objectivity" he professes have produced a work that cannot fail to be widely praised among the Europeans whose homes are in Algeria.

A review of only a few of the biases and distortions that dominate Mr. Clark's work is possible in the space available

here: (1) Arab nationalism is a bogus and inferior nationalism that has not discovered the twentieth century. Its leaders are megalomaniacs and unrealistic dreamers who are hated and feared by most of their own people. (2) Moslem culture is inherently antidemocratic, intolerant, terroristic, and the enemy of progress. The *Koran* is frequently quoted as "proof" of these charges. (3) Independence, therefore, has been a tragedy for all of France's former colonies in North Africa and the Middle East. Frenchmen who are reluctant to fight for the status quo are sacrificing "a precious part of the nation's patrimony."

And, in addition, the French "leftists," the "Parisian intellectuals," and their powerful allies within the Catholic Church who aid the anticolonialist movement are guilty of "moral fraud" and are imbued with a "strong strain of Vichy." The United Nations decision merely to discuss the Algerian situation vitiates "the concept of an international policy grounded in law." The author is convinced that he who "capitulates" to the new anticolonialism—even by negotiating with rebel leaders—"digs his own grave." The bases of French capitulation are varied and are to be found, for example, in "ponderous judicial rituals" and in failure properly to impose martial law. Thus, "France, if brought to her knees in Algeria, would have been vanquished, not by the rebels, but by her own internal rot, just as Rome was" (p. 132). But responsibility does not rest with France alone. Britain and America have "betrayed the West" by concessions to rebels which, if continued, will permit the Soviets to establish their hegemony in the area. All this, we must remember, is offered in the name of "analytical objectivity."

The duty of France, according to Mr. Clark, is to reject the softness that has characterized past policy, and prudence requires the United States to help France preserve the status quo and the situations of strength that once accompanied it. The rebellion must be thoroughly crushed to preserve liberty and to permit social progress in "a true racial partnership." Peace must be followed by reforms in Algeria, but the European minority must be pro-

tested against the Moslem majority, at least until the latter are thoroughly westernized.

The fundamental difficulty with Mr. Clark's suggestions concerning Algeria's future is that there is no evidence to suggest that the rebellion can be suppressed or that its leaders will accept the "association with France for orderly evolution" he regards as essential. A solution that ignores power realities is meaningless. Meanwhile, the rebellion daily adds new scores to be settled when the leaders of nine million Algerian Moslems are in a position to dispense justice among one million Algerian Europeans. The dilemma facing statesmen is truly grim, but there is no reason to hope that turmoil in Algeria can be abated by following the counsel of Mr. Clark.

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KEITH WHELOCK. *Nasser's New Egypt: A Critical Analysis*. (Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, Number 8.) Pp. vii, 326. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960. \$6.00.

This is perhaps the most comprehensive and critical study of Egypt since the Revolution of 1952 ever written by a Western writer. Although Lacouture's *Egypt in Transition*, reviewed in THE ANNALS by the present reviewer, provides a more detailed background of the story of the Egyptian Revolution, Wheelock's book pays more attention to the impact of the Revolution on social, economic, and cultural development than Lacouture's. The author of this book is a young scholar who, although not an Arabist, has visited Egypt several times and has become fully acquainted with its modern history and culture. He established close relations with a number of high ranking officials in the Egyptian Government and interviewed President Nasser.

The first three chapters of the book are devoted to a short account of the background of the Egyptian Revolution and the structure of the military regime. Although less detailed than Lacouture's account, a

more balanced evaluation of military rule is given. Wheelock deplores Nasser's military dictatorship but admits that the regime has provided a stable government and ended the monarchy that brought Egypt to the brink of anarchy. Four more chapters are devoted to the social, economic, and cultural development. Mr. Wheelock is justified in paying more attention to the social and economic problem than to the political, because it is in this field that the ultimate success or failure of the Egyptian Revolution should be judged. Mr. Wheelock pays tribute to the efforts of Egypt's experts who are undertaking to solve Egypt's greatest problem, namely, the race between economic development of the country and its population growth. Although no previous Egyptian government could with courage attempt what the present rulers of Egypt have accomplished, it is doubtful whether the economic development can keep pace with the rapid growth of population. Mr. Wheelock's treatment of cultural development is too brief, and, although he rightly observes the rigid control of schools by authority, he fails to indicate the decline in the Egyptian literary and cultural life which was maintained at so high a level in the interwar period.

The last four chapters are devoted to a study of Egypt's foreign policy and its relations with Western and Eastern powers. Mr. Wheelock is more critical in evaluating Nasser's achievement in his foreign than in his domestic policy. Although Nasser secured certain concrete advantages in his ventures—full sovereignty for Egypt, a respected position among small powers, control of Suez Canal, and so forth—Mr. Wheelock thinks, not without justification, that Egypt's relations with its neighbors and the Great Powers are far from satisfactory. "Nasser is skilled in the game of political survival," writes Mr. Wheelock, "he has also been extremely lucky. He has played the cards of 'positive neutrality' for high stakes and, to date, bluff and courage have kept him in the game. But Egypt has benefited little from Nasser's international adventures. Much has been undertaken in the name of lofty principles, yet Egypt has paid a high price for Nasser's tactical success."

Most of the material of the book is drawn from sources in Western languages, including official reports published by the Egyptian government. Mr. Wheelock has verified some of his data by his close contacts and interviews with Egyptian government officials, civil and military; but he has neither used local Arabic sources nor consulted some leading Western reviews, such as *The Middle East Journal*, *Orient* and *Oriente Moderno*. There are several relevant studies in Western languages which he likewise failed to consult.

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GEORGE A. LIPSKY. *Saudi Arabia: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture*. (Survey of World Cultures.) Pp. 366. New Haven, Conn.: Human Relations Area Files (HRAF) Press, 1959. \$7.00.

BENJAMIN SHWADRAN. *Jordan: A State of Tension*. Pp. xii, 436. New York: Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press, 1959. \$7.00.

These volumes, devoted to the history and development of two neighboring Arab states, are important contributions to an understanding of an area to which American scholars are only now beginning to pay adequate attention. For decades the interests of British, French, and German scholars there have been keener than our own. These interests also appear in each case to have followed the march of political events. That, at least in part, accounts for the more tardy activity of American scholars and writers in this field. Until the end of World War I in 1920, America prided itself on a strictly "hands-off" policy in the territorial problems connected with the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, which possessed the extensive area of the present Arab states. Then followed the feverish exploration of the vast oil resources of the Arab World which awakened American public and private participation and created a desire on their part to become more enlightened about the people, culture, history, international politics, and resources of this area.

Except for the most recent period in which the State of Jordan was rather artificially bound together, little has popularly been known of the historical background of this state or the reason for its existence. Therefore, the author does a service to his readers in sketching, briefly and with clarity, conditions in the bronze and iron ages, the conflicts in Old Testament times, the tragic and cruel battles between Jews and Romans, and the struggles between Byzantines, Arabs, the Crusaders, and the Turks. After the overthrow of the Ottoman Empire and the struggle of the imperialist powers for the pieces, one enters the period of the formation of the new Arab states, of which the former Transjordan, now known simply as Jordan, is one. The aggressive and astute leader of Jordan was King Abdullah ibn Husain. He had real difficulties with members of his family, but he got along well with the authorities of the British Empire. The story of the rise and overthrow of Glubb Pasha—Major John B. Glubb, the organizer and commander of the famous desert patrol—is a fascinating episode in the tempestuous life of Jordan.

In the last decade the immixture of Soviet Russia in Middle Eastern affairs and the emergence of Nasser in Egypt as self-appointed potential leader of the Arab World threatened weak Jordan with additional major tensions. In a sense, and for a time, it was a case of the Soviet Union and Nasser leaning upon each other. A concluding comment of Professor Shwadrán is, "Should the West decide to stop Nasserism, expose it for what it was, and, with a dynamism comparable to that of the Soviet Union's, help all the elements that were ready to resist Nasserism, stability could be established in the Middle East, and the attempt of the Soviet to dominate the area could be defeated." The present judgment of the author might be different.

There is a great contrast between the weak and artificial state of Jordan, which has been "pushed around" by the great Powers, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in whose concerns these same great Powers maintain a scrupulous "hands-off" policy. As the center and source of Arab culture including in its domain the holy places of Islam, Mecca, and Medina, this country is

the most conservative, and doubtless the least well known, of all the Arab states. Dr. Lipsky's volume, written in collaboration with seven other specialists, is the fourth book to be published in a series entitled *Survey of World Cultures*. Works on Poland, Jordan, and Iraq have already been published in this series. The first sentence in the Preface of this volume states that, "The focus of this book is on society as it functions. Emphasis is on the dynamics of the culture, the presence and impact of forces in change, the constant attitudes and behavior, the abiding values."

None of the Arab countries was more primitive or conservative than Saudi Arabia. Its dealings with the outside world were at a minimum; indeed in some parts, it was a closed society. But since the discovery of vast quantities of oil in this huge country, tremendous changes have come in its life and culture—in the political, social, and economic organization. The result has been a challenge of the old traditional institutions that could not resist the inevitable changes that ensued. In this situation it is inevitable that the author should describe the dramatic and sudden changes that have overtaken Saudi society. Their great leader, Ibn Saud, from whom the country itself takes its name, now years after his decease, is a great influence in tribal, religious, and the newly developing political affairs. These several loyalties are important in binding together an embryonic nation in which loyalty to a family is dominant in the thinking of the people.

The influence of the bedouin in Arab society, and especially in Saudi Arabia, is significant. In his concluding paragraphs, the author observes that "it is the bedouin who is romanticized in Arab society as well as in others: brave, virile, bold in war, magnanimous to the defeated, a defender of Islam. Ibn Saud's identification with this stereotype was one of the great sources of his strength, and he made every effort to epitomize himself as the virile, bold, magnanimous leader." The wealth from oil is producing great changes, and among them is the blurring of the bedouin ideal. Nomadry and tribal society are gradually giving way to more settled life. The deepening importance of urban life and the new

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James C. Charlesworth
President

class of oil workers eager for improved education and a higher standard of living forecast changes that are bound to transform even Saudi Arabia into a society of more modern aims and purposes.

Useful maps and tables are included in both of these volumes, as well as a Bibliography. Professor Shwadran's work includes also a profusion of illustrations many of which bear witness to the rich archaeological remains in Jordan. The volume on Saudi Arabia has a list of generally available Recommended Readings and a longer listing of Other Useful Sources. It also brings together for convenient use eleven tables as follows: Publications of Saudi Arabia, Radio Stations, Budget Estimates, 1957-58, Development Monthly Stocks, Crop Production Estimates, 1948-1952, Balance of Trade, Direction of Saudi Arabian Trade, Hospitals, and Weekly Timetable of Primary Schools in Saudi Arabia. Our appreciation and understanding of these countries has been greatly furthered.

EDGAR J. FISHER

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Saint Paul's College

EMIL LENGVEL. *The Changing Middle East*. Pp. 376. New York: John Day Company, 1960. \$5.75.

This is Mr. Lengyel's story of the changing Middle East, essentially during the decade since 1950, the era of the so-called "Pax Americana." This decade is replete with all the problems which have confronted and continually confront the American people and the world at large as the Middle East moves from the periphery of interest to the focus of attention.

There is no doubt of the fundamental changes which are gradually revolutionizing the world of the Middle East and, for that matter, of the greater world of which it is an integral part. In this volume, Mr. Lengyel literally has covered the Middle Eastern waterfront and moved into the deserts and oases beyond, from Libya to Iraq, Turkey, and Iran, and from the Persian Gulf to the Sudan. The author has caught something of the spirit of the changes, the ideologies and the tech-

nologies which are altering old outlooks and habitual modes of living, and of the leaders, with all their human frailties, who now have the stage. There is, however, a certain journalistic approach which is often superficial and sometimes flippant. If the chapters that deal with the events in Lebanon and Iraq during the year 1958 appear well balanced, they do not probe deeply, while the chapter that deals with Israel and Palestine is hardly a model of balanced or objective historical writing.

The Changing Middle East is designed neither for the student nor the scholar. It contains neither maps nor a Bibliography. When the general reader, still interested in the Middle East, has completed this volume, he should turn to the equally convenient, but more authoritative, guides to Middle Eastern history and contemporary developments by Bernard Lewis, William Yale, Sydney Fisher, and George Lenczowski, all of which are of recent date.

HARRY N. HOWARD

Beirut, Lebanon

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

W. W. ROSTOW. *The United States in the World Arena: An Essay in Recent History*. Pp. xxii, 568. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. \$8.75.

This is "an essay in recent history" issued by the Center of International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. It is an able book by a sincere scholar who seeks to understand why World War II did not yield better results from our standpoint.

Essentially, it is the familiar explanation that the Russians fought the war for political reasons and the British for mixed reasons, but the Americans concentrated on military objectives and lost East Europe. The Western Allies should have established "such a strong *de facto* position throughout Europe during the war that Moscow would have to negotiate defensively to ensure its national security. The problem was not defined as one of forcing the Soviet Union into a position . . ." (pp. 144-45).

This postulation omits the following basic factors: (1) The resolute rejection

by the appeasement governments of Britain and France during 1934-39 of many Soviet offers to help stop Hitler and their determined presentation of East Europe to him at Munich in 1938; (2) Churchill's equally stubborn frustration of our efforts to open a Second Front in Europe in 1942, 1943, and the first half of 1944; and (3) Our consequent dependence on the Red Army to bear the brunt of driving back the Germans from Stalingrad to Berlin and Vienna, and of winning the war in Europe. After Munich, it was never possible both to win the war and to keep the Russians out of East Europe, except by a massive assault on and through Germany into Poland that would have cost us enormous casualties and saved the Russians some of their millions of dead and years of devastation. Churchill was never willing to do this, and we felt compelled to support him in the long African and Italian detour, in peripheral war which could not be decisive. Nor was it ever possible thereafter to dissuade the Russians from keeping their hard-won security zone in East Europe.

Nowhere is there any recognition that the "loss" of East Europe was inherent in World War II, could not have been prevented, and cannot be reversed. On the contrary, the end of the cold war is made to depend, as always, on (a) "the granting of political freedom to Eastern Europe" and (b) "the creation of an effective international system of nuclear arms control," which would "permit international inspectors to roam the Soviet Union on a scale and with a freedom that would make Russia virtually an open society in Western terms" (p. 422).

The "truce" lines inherited from the war must be "steadily protected from direct or indirect assault." This includes, presumably, the perpetual defense of such untenable positions as West Berlin and Quemoy-Matsu-Formosa. We are summoned to "mobilize the strength, will, and imagination to bring about the process of persuasion in the Communist bloc which, by denying all other alternatives, would permit without major war the gradual evolution and release of the forces for good within it" (p. 538). In other words, we

must continue trying to enforce containment until the Communist threat is diminished.

Given the tremendous dynamism which they demonstrate, which is partly engendered by our armed encirclement, this is indeed a somber outlook. Like all balance-of-power thinking since time began, the book is certain that everything we do is defensive and "reactive," while all that the Communists do is offensive and hostile. Communism is defined repeatedly (pp. 424-425) as "a society structured and motivated for war." There is no suggestion that the Soviet Union has suffered three invasions from the West since 1914; or that the Soviet Union and China are beleaguered by our armed bases encircling their frontiers, blockaded and "contained" in every known manner; or that this is a game which is self-defeating.

The book contains thoughtful discussions of internal issues, including problems of administration. It presents alternatives on many questions and is written in a constructive spirit. It is notable also for its recognition that hereafter there is to be a diffusion of power instead of a polarization.

I am continually impressed by the willingness of American scholars to permit their Footnotes to be placed in a morgue in the back of the book. In this case, the author attempts to minimize the process of flapping the pages back and forth by sequestering the Footnotes in six different parts of the book, but this solution only makes more places to look if the place is lost. The Footnotes contain long tables and quotations which are difficult to consider in context. Few readers will ever try. It is reasonable to expect that the continued disuse of Footnotes will decrease them to the point where scholarship itself is undermined. Many will find it increasingly difficult to document their work faithfully, knowing that few will ever laboriously disinter the Footnotes.

D. F. FLEMING

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ROBERT A. GRAHAM, S.J. *Vatican Diplomacy: A Study of Church and State on*

the International Plane. Pp. xii, 442. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1959. \$7.50.

The author of *Vatican Diplomacy*, Father Robert Graham, associate editor of the Jesuit weekly *America*, recognizes that his subject matter involves the two topics, religion and politics, that are often thought of as threats to the decorous cohesion of a social gathering. And, though this index of prohibited social topics is frequently and happily disregarded, the interrelation of religion and politics is a notorious "heat-raiser" for it inevitably challenges the secularism which may tolerate religion as an archaic theme suitable for interesting discourse. Moreover, the Catholic concept of a visible church, a society so autonomous that its papal monarch maintains diplomatic relations with sovereign states, still presents difficulties for many Protestants, notably in the United States where a principle of nonestablishment is often supported by an emphasis on the necessity of separation of church and state.

The subtitle accurately categorizes the book. In Father Graham's view church diplomacy is necessary because of the dualism of the temporal and spiritual spheres and all the more necessary because of the plurality of political authorities. The necessity and propriety of Vatican diplomatic activities derive primarily not from the temporal sovereignty of the Pope but from the utility of promoting co-operation between authorities over distinct spheres that in practice cannot and should not be isolated. Indeed, the author, in recognizing the value of the freedom acquired by the church in modern, liberal, constitutional states, sees papal diplomacy as a response to the differentiation of international civil society.

Papal diplomacy is ecclesiastical, that is, concerned with the church and its activities. In its broad outlines, however, he insists, "papal diplomacy conforms closely to the genius of diplomacy in general" (p. 7). The reader of this book, which ranges through the origins and organs of modern papal diplomacy, through its international legal aspects as well as papal diplomacy in two World Wars and in relation to the United States and the Soviet Union, will

agree that it makes an important contribution to the study of international relations and diplomacy and, of course, church and state. There is protocol aplenty in its pages, but often enough the "striped pants" matters involve questions of political symbolism that inevitably play a large part in the intercourse of the representatives of sovereignties. The volume provides new and relatively new light on many historical issues from the diplomacy of Bismarck to French imperialist claims in the Ottoman Empire and China. Students of international relations may find the work of the Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, "to reconcile principle with expediency," particularly interesting. Unfortunately, material is not available for much of the modern period. The same holds true for much Vatican source material on modern diplomacy, but the author has done remarkably and painstakingly well in opening up the subject in this comprehensive and dispassionate study.

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GUNNAR MYRDAL. *Beyond the Welfare State: Economic Planning and Its International Implications.* Pp. xiii, 287. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1960. \$4.50.

In these anxious times of world revolution when each week brings forth a new political or economic eruption, the need for a clear perspective of the process of change is indeed urgent. If the unfolding events are to be properly assessed and if we are to have some chance of averting catastrophe, we must be able to penetrate history's veil and overcome the narrow myths and preconceptions which often inhibit intelligent action. In *Beyond the Welfare State*, Gunnar Myrdal suggests, with his usual wisdom, where we are going, why, and what the essential prerequisites are for shaping the course and reaching the destination.

Myrdal's theme is one which commands attention and reflection: at the same time as the welfare states of the Western world, including the United States, are moving

more and more toward economic integration and planning, the effects of this development have been to accelerate the tendencies toward disintegration in the world community. The trend toward increased planning has been determined in large measure by the internal accommodations to the major economic interest groups and by the complications of the international crises which have, in recent decades, confronted the world. With the many restrictions imposed on a free market economy in time impeding its effective operation, democratic governments have been compelled to maintain the economy in balance through co-ordination and extension of over-all controls. The forces of economic nationalism which extended their policies widely during the Great Depression contributed much to the breakdown of international stability that existed in the period before the first world war. Economic nationalism furthered international anarchy—political and economic. This international disintegration has continued as the widening material gap between the "have" and "have-not" nations has aroused sharp international class conflicts.

The only democratic solution to the extension of state intervention domestically and to the continued breakdown of the world community is the welfare world. In Myrdal's own words:

"... though planning is continually being necessitated by the rising volume of intervention, the purpose and accomplishment of planning in the Welfare State is ... constantly to simplify, and largely to liquidate, old and new intervention: to substitute a few, mostly overall state policies for a growing mesh of detailed and direct ones, and ... to recondition the national community in such a way that for the most part it can be left to the cooperation and collective bargaining of the people themselves, in all sorts of communities and organizations beneath the formal state level, to settle the norms for their living together. ... When once the national Welfare State has come into existence and built its moorings firmly in the hearts of the peoples who in the democracies have the political power, there is no alternative to international disintegration except to begin, by in-

ternational cooperation and mutual accommodation, to build the Welfare World."

One hastens to emphasize that Myrdal's solution is not, by his own admission and discussion, as simple as the sketching of it may imply. Myrdal stresses the economic, social, political, and psychological barriers to the fuller realization of the democratic welfare state and the implementation of a welfare world. His is not a utopian solution; it is the only solution, however, consistent with the ideals of liberty, equality, and brotherhood which is possible given the realities of the world today. It is a solution which, paradoxically, calls for more government intervention of a certain quality in order to reduce the role of the state in regulating our lives.

Myrdal's little book reflects not only a keen insight into domestic and international economic developments and problems but also a profound understanding of human nature and the social process. Not only is its author a citizen of the world, he is also a worldly scholar whose thinking transcends the narrow bounds of ethnocentrism and cultural myth.

CHARLES HOFFMANN

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HUGH SEARON-WATSON. *Neither War Nor Peace: The Struggle for Power in the Postwar World*. Pp. 504. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960. \$7.50.

The author, Professor of Russian History at the University of London, is an internationally recognized authority on East European history. His present book is not a mere history of the cold war; the subtitle of the work reveals its true scope.

In the first part the book tells the story of international conflict, from the end of the last war to the time of Stalin's death, in various parts of the world. Three trends emerge from this survey: the conflict between Russia and the West in Europe, the growth of nationalism in the Middle East and Asia, and the establishment of totalitarianism in China. "Both totalitarianism and nationalism are revolutionary forces, and derive their strength from revolution-

ary conflicts, between class and class and between nation and nation" (p. 99). Hence the scope of the author's exploration into the causes of conflict: He first discusses the two main forces of class conflict—between peasants and other classes and between industrial workers and the upper classes of urban society. In this context the author also examines the role of the intelligentsia as revolutionary leader, especially in underdeveloped societies, and the seizure of power. From this discussion of the forces of revolution the author proceeds to an examination of the nature of totalitarian power, of anti-European nationalism, and of Soviet and colonial imperialism including racialism. In the light of this analysis the author resumes the story of international conflict in the years since Stalin's death and concludes with a discussion of the problems presently facing Western policy. There is little space to record the author's opinions. "I have stated my conviction that the two main themes of the last fourteen years are totalitarianism and anti-European nationalism" (p. 12). "Today almost every nationalist movement and racial conflict is an international problem. Indeed it is on this ground that the conflict between the totalitarians and the West is principally fought" (p. 10). "In the underdeveloped societies it is the intelligentsia that is leading the nationalist, modernist and revolutionary movements" (p. 182). "The appeals of communism to the intelligentsia ... will not diminish" (p. 450). "The peoples of the northwest corner (of North America and Western Europe) are going to need all the skill and leadership they can find if they are to survive the dangers which press on them both from the 2,000 million who live in poverty, and from the ambitions of the totalitarians" (p. 464). "In Soviet society there exist both pressures for reform and pressures for revolution, the former coming mainly from the State bourgeoisie and the latter mainly from the intellectual youth. At present the former are the stronger of the two. The communist party is far stronger than either. It is thus possible that the party will resist both types of pressure for a long time. But Russia no more than any

other country can remain impervious to change" (p. 244). "There is not necessarily any harm in using their phrase, 'peaceful coexistence,' provided that it is understood that peaceful coexistence and cold war are exactly the same thing. . . . It is only when it is believed in the West that 'peaceful coexistence' is something new, denotes a change of heart in the Soviet leaders and a desire for true friendship with non-controlled governments and nations, that harm is done. Provided that this error is avoided there is no reason why the West should not successfully endure the condition of permanent warfare without shooting war, and survive until, whether through evolution or revolution, men come to power in the Soviet Union who genuinely renounce totalitarian imperialism" (pp. 256-67).

To have elucidated the underlying problems from every angle is the author's merit. His combination of the descriptive and the analytical method makes the book all the more valuable for the resulting uniformity of approach and treatment. The selection of his material is admirable, his treatment authoritative, and his conclusions are convincing. This is history at its best.

OTTO HEILBRUNN

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LEO PERLA. *Can We End the Cold War: A Study in American Foreign Policy*. Pp. xii, 251. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960. \$4.50.

In 251 pages of analysis and criticism of our thinking and conduct in the prosecution of the cold war the author seeks to demonstrate that we must finally end it as the price of survival in a nuclear age. In addition, we must abandon resolutely and with a realistic sense of urgency the archaic and now suicidal notions regarding statecraft that we have nurtured from the time of Machiavelli. Mr. Perla's "minority report" calls for "an entirely new and revolutionary approach, a truly ethical diplomacy" (p. 11). This, in his opinion, is "a most obvious necessity in terms of common sense and pragmatic realities" (p. 42).

The Machiavellian dictum that there should be two moral standards, one required in the sphere of interpersonal relations and another justified for national conduct, has, with few exceptions, been the accepted rule in the foreign relations of national states. And present-day writers, like George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau, endorse it—the former reluctantly—in terms of national interest and in view of the absence of a supernational authority capable of dispensing justice in the international sphere.

In the author's view, this endorsement, reluctant or otherwise, of the double standard today, even with the elastic "national interest" thesis currently employed to justify the amoral conduct of national states, amounts to a prescription for the eventual suicide of the human race. In an age when both sides possess nuclear weapons, force as an instrument of foreign policy has become obsolete, and sole reliance upon it will lead to mutual annihilation.

It is therefore imperative that if we would survive we must end the cold war and create "an entirely new ethic in foreign relations" (p. 235). The scheme of values necessary for survival will reverse the order which at present places money, power, and material possessions first and will elevate moral qualities to first place. "In union and cooperation, in mutual aid and brotherly love we see not only practical idealism but a biological necessity" (pp. 237–38). We cannot expect "a radical change in Russian character and conduct before we ourselves take any bold and imaginative steps to lay foundation stones for peace" (p. 241). To build a sane world order we must "forsake all doubletalk, double-standard ethics, double-standard reasoning, and double-standard judgment" (p. 245). And, while maintaining reasonable military strength, we must be willing to "assume prudent and gradually increasing risks for peace based on faith in our fellow men" (p. 251).

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IVAR SPECTOR. *The Soviet Union and the Muslim World 1917–1958*. Pp. xii, 328. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1960. \$5.00.

One of the serious problems of the Soviet government has been the reconciliation of the classic Marxist attitude of uncompromising hostility toward Islam with the new policy of rapprochement with the Muslim world. In fact, all evidence shows that Islam has always been conceived as potentially more objectionable and obnoxious than any other religion in the Soviet Union.

The present work, earlier versions of which have appeared in mimeographed editions, is a study, based largely on Soviet sources, of the Muslim world as a field of marked Soviet and Communist interest. The author has placed greater stress on the periods when Soviet policy in regard to the Muslim world has been most dynamic than on those in which relations have been largely routine in nature. Thus, greater emphasis has been granted to the Bolshevik Revolution and the years immediately following it, from 1917 to 1925, and to World War II and the postwar period, when the Soviet regime gave a degree of priority to its relations with Muslim countries that was not characteristic of the thirties. Emphasis has been also given to those Muslim countries with which the Soviet Union was first in closest contact, namely, the border countries of Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan. Official Soviet relations with most of the Arab countries, and with Pakistan, and Indonesia, date either from World War II or the postwar period, and, even in recent years, the Communist party has ordinarily operated underground in those areas. The impact of the Bolshevik Revolution on Muslim countries forms the core of most of the chapters, and Chapter Nine is a pioneer effort in the direction of an evaluation of the Soviet cultural impact on the Muslim world.

The most valuable feature of Spector's survey is that it is based largely upon Soviet primary sources, although the author frankly admits that such documents are all carefully supervised and scrutinized by the authorities. Interestingly enough, this is

publicly admitted by Soviet specialists in the first volume of *Novyi Vostok (The New Orient)*, published in 1922. One valuable contribution of the book consists in the inclusion of the first complete English translation of the "Documents of the Programs of the Communist Parties of the East"—Turkey, the Arab countries, and Palestine—as published by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute of the Central Committee of the all-Russian Communist party in 1934. These documents are indispensable for the understanding of Soviet relations with the Muslim world; not only have they never been renounced by the Soviet Union, but recent developments in the Middle East indicate that they are still being implemented, thus serving as a warning to the world what the fate of that region will be under any Communist regime.

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FRED ALEXANDER. *Canadians and Foreign Policy: The Record of an Independent Investigation*. Pp. 160. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960. \$3.95.

This little book by an Australian scholar is an analysis of Canadian opinion, or rather attitudes, on foreign policy. Although the book is the fruit of a three-months' visit to Canada in 1958, Professor Alexander writes from the perspective of two previous visits and a reading acquaintance with Canadian developments.

The titles of the more important chapters give some indication of the ground covered: "Economic Realities;" "Strategic Interests;" "Political Trends;" "Cultural Considerations;" "Idealist and Spiritual Influences;" and "Nationalism and Regionalism."

Canadian-American relations loom large in nearly every chapter, but no larger than they are in fact, economically, strategically, and culturally. Canadians, the author feels, are beginning to evaluate realistically the assets, as well as the liabilities, of their North American partnership even if they seem unduly shrill at times

about United States policy and particularly about economic policy. Regarding Commonwealth relations Professor Alexander finds Canadians surprisingly nostalgic in their attitude towards the United Kingdom but somewhat confused and uncertain about their relations with the rest of the Commonwealth. Despite the centrifugal pulls of regionalism, he detects a growing national consciousness which, if not yet a synthesis of regional interests and loyalties, is at least an effective working compromise as reflected in external relations.

His technique is neither that of quantitative measurement nor that of sampling opinion, but it is rather that of personal interviews with political leaders and leaders of other functional groups. There is perhaps a heavy weighting of the views of university dons, among whom as a university professor Professor Alexander naturally found congenial spirits. The technique is as old as journalism and in the hands of a less skillful and impartial investigator might well have produced only journalistic results. But Professor Alexander has done similar studies elsewhere, and he has the true scholar's objectivity, even though he dispenses with the usual scholarly impedimenta of Footnotes and Bibliographies.

This book can be unhesitatingly recommended as a useful contemporary analysis, not so much of what Canadians think of foreign policy, but of why they think the way they do about it. The author's colloquial and incisive style and apposite quotation or paraphrase of comments of Canadians he interviewed make this book easy to read, indeed, so easy that the reader may underrate its value.

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THOMAS HOVET, JR. *Bloc Politics in the United Nations*. Pp. xviii, 197. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960. \$6.50.

As explained by Lincoln Bloomfield in his Foreword, Mr. Hovet was asked to undertake this study of negotiating and voting blocs, part of the United Nations Project of the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-

nology Center for International Studies, because of his access at New York University to a uniquely comprehensive collection of statistics on United Nations votes and because he was cognizant of their use and application. Mr. Bloomfield indicates that he is not disappointed with the result. This reviewer joins him in regarding it as "the most comprehensive and penetrating analysis thus far made of this important development in international politics."

Mr. Hovet devotes successive chapters to "History and Method," "An Over-all View of Blocs and Groups," "Bloc and Groups Examined Individually," "Bloc and Group Coalitions," and "Some Policy Implications." This analysis is reinforced and illuminated by seventy charts at the end of the book, in addition to numerous charts and tabulations interspersed in the text. The study "embraces an over-all survey of the blocs and groups that have developed, an individual consideration of each of the blocs and groups, an examination of the combinations and coalitions of blocs and groups in the United Nations, and some conclusions on the role of the United States in relation to blocs and groups" (p. 13).

The analysis is based on official records, secondary source material, interviews with officials of the United Nations and various delegations, and examination of General Assembly voting. The study of voting is based on an "adjusted gross" number of roll-call votes and "significant resolution" roll-call votes.

In a sense the title is misleading because Mr. Hovet defines "bloc" as a group of states that votes regularly in caucus and whose members are bound in their votes by caucus decision. By this definition there is only one true bloc—as he points out—the Soviet. His study is chiefly concerned with established "caucusing groups" and "regional groups" which have common interests without enforced voting solidarity. These groups show varying degrees of solidarity in Assembly voting. What the study does not attempt to show is the extent to which patterns of greater uniformity exist within the groups themselves. Thus in the case of the Latin-American group, while the over-all record of cohesion is not high,

a more detailed analysis would show a high degree of cohesion among certain members of the group.

Mr. Hovet finds that bloc and group politics in the General Assembly are increasingly important phenomena certain to be extant as long as the United Nations itself. It is also clear that bloc and group politics require different skills in the conduct of Assembly business than were demanded of professional diplomats of the past. His study should be of great value to those thus engaged, as well as to those whose interest is of a more theoretical nature.

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RICHARD N. ADAMS and CHARLES C. CUMBERLAND. *United States University Cooperation in Latin America: A Study Based on Selected Programs in Bolivia, Chile, Peru, and Mexico*. Pp. xxxii, 264. East Lansing: Institute of Research on Overseas Programs, Michigan State University, 1960. \$3.50 paper-bound; \$4.50 clothbound.

BRUCE LANNES SMITH. *Indonesian-American Cooperation in Higher Education*. Pp. xxii, 133. East Lansing: Institute of Research on Overseas Programs, Michigan State University, 1960. \$2.00 paper-bound; \$3.00 clothbound.

In January, 1957, Michigan State University's Institute of Research on Overseas Programs began a three-year study of the international programs of American universities. First to appear was a reference volume describing the 382 programs carried out in some 70 countries by 184 United States universities and presenting useful over-all statistics. The two works on Indonesia and Latin America reviewed here are part of a projected series of eight "country studies," describing selected projects in a country or group of countries. Projects include such diverse forms of cooperation as establishing an Economics Research Center in Chile, sending American undergraduates to study in Mexico, and expanding the curriculum of teachers' colleges in Indonesia. Projects are sponsored

by the United States Government, private foundations, participating universities, and occasionally by business firms.

Educational problems in Indonesia and Latin America show a certain similarity, despite historical differences between the two areas. Both must educate a wider segment of the population to provide a broad base for economic progress and political stability, and both must train more teachers, providing them with greater incentive to perform an effective job and to remain in the teaching field. Administrative problems associated with university affiliation are also similar: resolving conflicting objectives, especially when more than two parties are involved, recruiting personnel who are both professionally qualified and able to work effectively in a foreign culture, and maintaining long-distance communications. Case histories appended to each volume make instructive reading.

The studies disagree on some points. Smith stresses the need for extended tours of duty for American personnel to take advantage of the area knowledge they gradually acquire. Adams and Cumberland argue that turnover of personnel has certain advantages, since new men who have not been subjected to a long period of frustration bring fresh ideas and enthusiasm to the job. In selecting an individual or institution to render assistance to a foreign university, Smith says that only the best man in the field will be acceptable, while Adams and Cumberland favor an institution which may not be the best in its field, but is similar to the affiliated institution. In both these instances a cogent argument can be made on either side.

The Latin-American study suffers from the rigid conceptual framework within which the authors chose to work. Topics of vital interest, such as undergraduate study abroad for Americans and creative innovation in developing countries, are introduced but not pursued sufficiently to shed light on the subject. The Smith study, informal in style with touches of humor, is also more enlightening. The author's sympathetic understanding of Indonesia is conveyed to the reader. He describes Indonesia's educational problems

with clarity and makes clear the frustrations experienced by both Americans and Indonesians living abroad in such passages as: "Besides police registration of cars, Indonesians enjoy registration of all individuals, repeatedly." He suggests a solution to the perennial problem of foreign students working for American degrees which may not be recognized or useful at home: take courses abroad for credit but obtain a degree, if desired, from a university at home.

Two basic problems common to programs of university affiliation are how to transcend cultural differences so that methods and ideas which work in one country are applicable in another and how to make the affiliation equally beneficial to both parties. The Latin-American and Indonesian studies amply document these problems but find no solutions. The studies do, however, offer some important recommendations that are relevant to these problems: 1) training of teachers and establishing libraries should be given the highest priority overseas, since these will pay educational dividends in years to come; 2) despite the immediate need for trained people in technical and professional fields, the humanities and social sciences should not be neglected; 3) all personnel going overseas should be exposed to language and area orientation of some kind, preferably before being sent abroad but otherwise after arrival in the foreign country. Both studies agree that, to be truly successful, an international program must produce an institution or group of individuals competent to continue their work after the affiliation ends.

KENNETH HOLLAND

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LOUIS P. LOCHNER. *Herbert Hoover and Germany*. Pp. vii, 244. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960. \$5.00.

In his long career as a statesman, former President Hoover was required to deal with Germany and the Germans at almost every critical turning point in his public life. He headed the Committee for the Relief of Belgium during the German occupation in World War I; he waged a suc-

successful fight at the Paris Peace Conference to raise the blockade of the Central Powers and permit food to reach the starving populations; as President he conceived and initiated the Hoover Moratorium to avert the financial collapse of central Europe; and after World War II, as chief of a special mission to Germany, he rendered a report on economic conditions which contributed substantially to the reversal of our occupation policies and the beginning of reconstruction in the devastated country.

To each of these focal points in Mr. Hoover's career, the author, who for many years served as chief of the Associated Press bureau in Berlin, devotes a narrative chapter deepened by personal knowledge and experience of the events which he describes. Added to the chapters on public affairs are accounts of the Hoover translation of Agricola's *De Re Metallica*, Mr. Hoover's first encounter with a major German figure; his sponsoring of the European Children's Fund after World War I; the publication of the Hoover memoirs in Germany after World War II; and the public honors accorded him on his visit to Germany in 1954. The latter account serves well to remind us of the veneration attached to the former President's name in Germany. An admirer, speaking to a group of German children, expressed it quite simply: "I believe he saved more lives than any other man of our times."

It must be said in conclusion that Mr. Lochner's book makes little pretense of critical or probing scholarship, nor does it add greatly to our knowledge of events. In fact, Mr. Hoover has been such a diligent and prolific historian of affairs in which he played a major role that he leaves only gleanings for others. However, from the Hoover papers, but mainly from the subject's printed works, the author has assembled a warm tribute to a great figure in American and world history.

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