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Philosophical Quarterly

Oct-1960



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THE
PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Vol. XXXIII, No. 3]

[October, 1960

AN ORGAN

OF

454

THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

AND

THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS

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
Yearly Subscription Rs. 6

For Congress Members Rs. 5

Foreign 10 Shillings or \$ 2-50. Single copy Re. 1-50 or 3 Shillings

CONTENTS

Some Main Types of Metaphysical Logic Historically Surveyed by Dr. Ganeswar Misra ..	137
The Concept of Mind by Dr. S. N. L. Shrivastava ..	145
The Concept of the Mind by S. H. Divatia ..	155
Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedānta by C. Kunhan Raja ..	161
Bergson's and Husserl's Concepts of Intuition by J. de Marneffe, S. J. ..	169
Wittgensteinian Technique and the Cartesian Doubt by Suresh Chandra ..	181
An Exposition of the Philosophy of Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa by Gaurang Charan Nayak ..	191
Book Reviews ..	199
Books Received ..	204



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Some Main Types of Metaphysical Logic Historically Surveyed

by

DR. GANESWAR MISRA

I shall examine the main logical doctrines of Sankara, the Buddhists, Bradley and Russell. I propose to discuss first, their theories of Predication and basic types of propositions; their arguments for and against the existence of substance, reality of time, change and relations, and their theories of meaning and truth. Secondly, I shall examine these arguments. I shall then give my conclusions about the nature of Metaphysical logic and Metaphysical arguments.

(A)

(i) Sankara adopts the Bhatta Mimāṃsaka's theory that both the denotative and the connotative interpretations of a proposition land us in difficulties. The denotative analysis renders the proposition a tautology, unless the terms are taken negatively. The connotative interpretation results in self-contradiction, unless the qualities signified by the terms are construed as belonging to the same substratum. So far, this argument is exactly similar to the Bradleian doctrine that every subject-predicate proposition asserts the identity of the subject with differences of qualities. According to this way of interpretation, a subject-predicate proposition like 'This lotus is blue' means there is an 'x' in which lotusness and blueness go together. But though Sankara and Bradley analyse the subject—predicate proposition in much the same way, the theories that they deduce are completely different.

Both the theories are attached to a doctrine of the basic type of proposition. According to Sankara, identity propositions are most significant since they remove an immediate puzzle. In them, words have the minimum descriptive function. They serve only to direct our attention to where the proposition holds true. The real purport of such propositions is to assert the identity of the subject. Identification propositions are of the basic type and reveal the pattern of thinking. Subject-predicate and relational propositions assert, though in a less manifest form, identity of the subject. Hence pure non-dual non-qualified substantial identity of the world is the very assumption of our thought and speech. Because most of our assertions are cast in the subject-predicate form where descriptive words appear to convey information and render the proposition significant, we might be misled to search for truth and reality in the direction of name and form. But that is an impossible process. Any subject-predicate proposition taken in the descriptive manner will involve at once an infinite-regress in order to complete its meaning, by giving rise to interminable questions. So multiplicity is false, change is unreal, external relations self-contradictory, internal relations truer but not ultimately true.

Bradley starting from the same premises however arrives at a different metaphysical theory. According to him, identity propositions are tautologous. They assert nothing. Subject-predicate propositions are of the basic type. They reveal the pattern of thinking. They assert the identity of the subject with differences of attributes. Hence identity-in-difference is the very assumption of our thought and speech. Meaning is a whole and truth is a system. The system of truth is infinite and therefore unattainable for human thought. But this is what we seek in theory, though it is not attainable in practice.

The Buddhistic and the Russellian Logic starts from the same point. Like Sankara and Bradley, they try to deduce the metaphysical implications, if any, from our ordinary discourse. The *Apoha* theory of meaning of the Buddhists assigns a negative or eliminative role to the constituent words of a sentence, and deduces from it a negativistic or non-substantiality doctrine.

Russell believes that relational propositions are of the basic type. The two propositions 'Brutus Killed Caesar' and 'Caesar Killed Brutus' have the same constituents. But a mere change of place of the terms brings about an enormous change in meaning. Hence a pluralistic universe with external relations is the

very assumption of all meaningful discourse. Even a subject-predicate proposition like 'This is red' asserts only a case of monadic relation. It asserts that redness is here. In his book 'Enquiry into Meaning and Truth' (page 347) Russell writes as follows: "For my part, I believe that, partially by means of the study of syntax, we can arrive at considerable knowledge concerning the structure of the world".

Against the absolutistic doctrine that reality is the subject of every judgment, both the Buddhists and the Russellians advance the non-substantiality doctrine. The Buddhists boldly assert that the denotative interpretation is the natural one, and that this way of interpreting a proposition does not lead to tautological assertions because the words have only a negative function in a sentence-context. The Buddhist Logician protests that there are no substances, and in knowing an object we do not know a substratum with qualities. All that we know in knowing a blue lotus is the co-existence of certain momentary sense-impressions.

Russell tries to refute the Bradleian logical doctrine about reality being the subject of all judgements by his doctrine of logical construction wedded to his doctrine of atomic or protocol propositions and logical analysis. Russell writes in his 'Mysticism and Logic' as follows:—"The essence of Philosophy is analysis, not synthesis. 'Divide and Conquer' is the maxim of success here as elsewhere. All the aspects of a thing are real, whereas the thing is a logical construction".

(ii) Both Sankara and Bradley assert a coherence theory of meaning and truth, against which Russell and Wittgenstein advance the atomic theory of meaning and non-entailment among factual propositions, and also a correspondence theory of truth. Bradley and Sankara maintain that a descriptive proposition like 'Caesar Crossed the Rubicon' or 'So and so will perform *Yajna*' involves at once all other meaningful propositions. So meaning is a whole and truth is a system. And yet the system is such that its members always fall back upon each other. So human truth is a vicious abstraction, a make-shift or a practical compromise, and hence an appearance, and not ultimately tenable. So Reality is one and relations are unreal.

Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein on the other hand advocate that all true atomic propositions are mutually independent. Atomic

propositions mirror facts. The relation of logical entailment holds only in a system of tautologies. Relations are real and external in character.

(B)

I have so far only expounded the logical theories of these veteran metaphysicians. We will now try to appreciate the arguments on which these theories are based. If the arguments on which these theories are based can be shown to be fallacious, the theories automatically fall to the ground. But before we take up this examination of the actual arguments, I must state what strikes me most about these theories in general. All these metaphysicians start from the same premises, namely, the logical analysis of our normal way of talking in different sentence forms. But the logico-metaphysical theories which they deduce from these facts are sharply opposed to each other. But since any fact can be interpreted to suit them, it is obvious that these theories are not of a sort which can be established or refuted in the light of facts. Their advocates will never give up these theories, even if a contrary instance is brought forward. They will maintain the theories, and try to fit in all facts within them at all cost.

Sankara puts forward the claim that identification statements are impure forms in different degrees, since all of them are seen, in the ultimate analysis, to seek only to affirm the identity of the subject. Bradley, on the other hand, asserts that subject-predicate propositions alone are genuine, and identification propositions are significant just because they are in essence of the subject-predicate form. Similarly Russell insists that even a significant subject-predicate proposition is essentially relational in character. All this shows that these metaphysicians are twisting facts to suit their theories. They are all anxious to maintain their logico-metaphysical doctrines at the cost of facts.

Now leaving aside this word of warning, let us try to examine the arguments themselves.

(i) Let us first examine the difficulties of predication which these logico-metaphysicians consider, and which leads the monists on the one hand to assert that reality is the subject of all judgements and pluralists on the other to assert that all our judgements imply the atomic and non-substantialistic structure of the world.

Both Bradley and Sankara hold that Reality is the subject of all judgements, because the traditional S-P analysis of propositions either on a denotative or a connotative interpretation breaks down. But the difficulty which they point out is not a genuine one. In the traditional S-P analysis, both the terms are not homogeneously taken. The subject-term is referentially taken and the predicate-term is either classificatorily or descriptively used. In the sentence "the cow is red," the word 'cow' has both a semantic and a syntactical function. But Bradley and Sankara split up the two functions, and classify the word in respect of its meaning function with the adjective and yet keep the sentence in the subject-predicate form. The place vacated by the substantive word is assigned to a meaningless substance. This linguistic innovation is misleadingly put forward as reality, which is the subject of every judgment, and that reality is ungraspable and indescribable. The people who meaningfully employ the sentence to make statements in their day-to-day commerce of life have no difficulty in understanding and using it. The Philosopher exaggerates the similarity of substantive words with the adjective words. He then deprives the substantive words of their formal role in a sentence-context, and then assigns the formal role to a meaningless symbol. After all these verbal changes are effected, he then asks what this symbol means. He discovers that it does not mean anything, and yet it is most essential to keep the syntactical form of the sentence. This linguistic discovery in his own linguistic game is misleadingly put forward as "things of this world enjoy only an adjectival status and ultimate reality is indescribable and ungraspable."

(ii) There is one more confusion which clouds the issues raised by the logico-metaphysicians here. All these philosophers, Sankara, the Buddhists, Bradley and Russell definitely make the mistake of taking a meaning-relation for a naming relation.

Sankara, the Buddhists and Bradley assert that in the denotative interpretation both the terms of a proposition must name the same sort of individuals, and hence the propositional meaning becomes tautological. The difficulty can be avoided only if the words are taken in the negative way, which Buddhists accept and Sankara rejects. In the connotative view again both the terms are said to name qualities and hence a contradiction results. Russell tries to get over this difficulty by his method of logical analysis so that in the basic proposition only one connotative word remains, the subject term being replaced by what he calls the logical proper name.

(iii) Finally, before we go to the examination of their theories of meaning and truth, we may say a few words regarding the search for the basic type of propositions which would reveal at once the immutable form of thinking and reality. This entire programme of discovering and ontologizing the one immutable form of all propositions is a misdirected programme. Left to themselves propositions have no form of their own. Aristotle talked of logical form only in the context of subject-predicate pattern of inference. Similarly, we can talk of the relational form of a proposition, if it can be shown to be capable of playing its role in the inferential pattern of relational logic. But because a proposition can play a certain role in the context of a certain inference pattern, it does not mean that the proposition has that immutable form and it cannot play any role in any other inference pattern. So this entire procedure of logico-metaphysicians to search out the one immutable form for all propositions is a fruitless process. Nothing of philosophical consequence follows from such discussions of logical form of propositions. Here the ontological assertion creates the illusion of a proof about the ultimate structure of reality. But our language has no immutable form. Supposing that language has any such form which the metaphysician intuitively discovers, he will not proceed even one step towards discovering the ultimate form of things. Demonstrative ontology is impossible. No truth about what exists can be proved to be logically necessary. As Prof. Ryle so nicely puts it "... the reasons for the assertion of existence or occurrence can never be purely conceptual considerations. When we want to know what there actually is.....in the universe, we have to quarry in the appropriate parts of the universe."

(iv) We will now examine the coherence theory of meaning of Bradley and Sankara, and the coherence and correspondence theories of truth of the absolutists and the atomists.

The coherence theory of meaning is a tautology. It cannot make any factual claim that we do use language in this way. It only asserts the tautology that the all-inclusive system of all meaningful propositions is self-complete in the sense that it includes all the meaningful propositions. There is also something paradoxical about it. It only suggests a strange way in which language should have been used, and then makes a candid confession that we could not have used language in that way.

This coherence theory of meaning also involves the mistake of confusing what is now called in modern terminology, "The

open texture of language," for a meaning-relation in the actual employment of language. Language is a human institution devised for a particular purpose. To use language in a manner devoid of human context is to cut out the root of its meaningful employment.

Both the Coherence and Correspondence theories are also fantastic theories. Correspondence theory is based upon the misconception that every symbol must copy facts. Both Russell and Wittgenstein hold the view that basic propositions mirror facts. Here we can point out that a railway map is a copy of the landscape it represents. But language is not such a copy, and its not being so does not detract from its value as a system of symbols.

The relation of a true proposition to the fact it represents is the conventional relation of a symbol to the symbolised. That is why the two expressions "it is true that 'A is B'" and "it is a fact that 'A is B'" can be substituted for each other. 'A is B' is true means that the situation for which it is the conventional expression obtains in the empirical world.

The coherence theory of truth represents the philosophers' quest for certainty. It is based upon the misconception that logical necessity is the ideal limit of factual certainty.

(C)

We have examined a number of logical arguments advanced in favour of monistic and pluralistic metaphysical theories. We have seen that each of these arguments is untenable. So the metaphysical theories which they are designed to prove have no basis.

But then it may be asked why the logico-metaphysician advances these arguments. C. D. Broad, while examining the arguments of Bradley to the effect that relations are unreal, observes (Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy) as follows:—"The metaphysician brings forward arguments which a savage would avoid. But I do not think this correctly depicts the nature of metaphysical logic. Every metaphysician knows as much logic and grammar as anybody else. To say that Bradley and Russell do not know the rules of meaningful employment of language is preposterous. It seems to me that the metaphysician is busy in discovering linguistic peculiarities. While doing this he enjoys drawing and re-drawing the map of our concepts in different manner. He indulges in this because the changed look of the world through these concepts gives him pleasure. But to avoid the

charge of pursuing a triviality he adopts deliberately a factual mode of speech for what are merely formal questions."

When Bradley and Sankara announce that the objects of the world enjoy only an ajectival status, they are only drawing our attention to the linguistic fact that thing-words are semantically similar to adjectives. Similarly Bradley's assertion that statements which state mere matters of fact are self-contradictory. Here he only draws our attention to the logical fact that factual statements can never be logically certain. Again his assertion that relations are not real draws our attention to the linguistic fact that relation-words do not behave in the way substantive words behave. By his theory that reality which is the subject of all judgments is ungraspable by thought, Bradley perhaps wishes to say that referring words which refer our statements to the world of objects have no descriptive function. Russell's theory of description only suggests that language can dispense with referring words. When the metaphysicians dispute among themselves about the correctness of their metaphysical theories, each of them is only maintaining that his picture as a result of redrawing the conceptual map would be a better picture only if it could be a true picture.

Thus the logical arguments of the metaphysicians are only formal discussions put in a material mode of speech. The metaphysical theories themselves are linguistic innovations. But a linguistic innovation can neither be true nor false. It is not factual either about the world or about the common verbal usage.

The metaphysical style is a mixed style. Metaphysicians use certain obvious tautologies and use the material mode of speech for verbal changes. The tautologies lend a compelling character to the metaphysical theory, and the material mode of speech puts a deceptive claim for a theory about the deepest secrets of the world. The general picture it creates either satisfies or repels the temperament of the reader. People read and enjoy these pictures as they enjoy novels and poems. They accept a metaphysical theory if it gratifies their temperament and arouses hopes. It is enough if the metaphysician gives some semblance of a proof. If the reader does not understand the arguments, so much the better for him because he is mystified, and he retires with the feeling after all what the metaphysician says cannot be wrong. Though I cannot comprehend his arguments, the general conclusions that he draws are too true to be doubted.

The Concept of Mind

by

DR. S. N. L. SHRIVASTAVA

It has been rightly observed by C. A. Mace, "The present century has been to a quite unusual degree a period of great revolutions in the philosophy of mind."¹ Mind, in contemporary psychology and philosophy, is viewed from a new, we may even say revolutionary, angle of vision. The older concept of mind against which present-day psychology and philosophy are in revolt, had, as Mace points out, five characteristic features. It was "dualistic, intellectualistic, sensationistic, atomistic and associationistic."² It divided, say the contemporary critics, nature or reality into two separate and distinct realms, the realm of matter and the realm of mind; the former to be studied by the observational and the experimental methods by the sciences of physics, chemistry and biology etc., and the latter by psychology by the introspective method. It is against this dualism of mind and matter or mind and body that contemporary psychology and philosophy are in revolt.

The *locus classicus* of this new or revolutionary philosophy of mind is Gilbert Ryle's *The Concept of Mind*, first published in 1949. In view of the wide popularity which the book enjoys and the deep appeal it makes by its bracing style and the arresting manner of the presentation of its subject-matter, it may not inaptly be described as 'the Bible of the new philosophy of mind', although it is for the most part destructive and polemical and offers very little by way of a constructive philosophy of mind.

The main target of attack in Ryle's book is what he terms the 'Official Doctrine' which, according to him, is the legacy of Descartes, although he could have gone as far back as Plato in tracing the origin of this doctrine. This is the doctrine which he dubs "Descartes' Myth", "the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine," "the intellectualist legend," and so on.

1. C. A. Mace: *British Philosophy in the Mid-Century*, p. 99.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 99.

The doctrine referred to above is, according to Ryle, a category-mistake which "represents the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category (or range of types or categories), when they actually belong to another."³ He cites as examples of this category-mistake the mistake of taking a University to be something *in itself*, and belonging to the same category as its Church, Library and Museum; or, of taking a division to be different from and belonging to the same category as its battalions, batteries and squadrons etc.; or, similarly taking in a game of cricket, the *esprit de corps* as different from the bowlers, batsmen, fielders, umpires and scorers etc. The mistake of the adherents of the 'official doctrine' consists in thinking that mental operations are tandem operations going on in the inner theatre of the mind and authentically knowable by introspection, harnessed to the overt physical processes which are observable by everybody. Ryle chafes against the postulation of mind as "a second theatre" and against regarding mental processes as "esoteric episodes" in what he would derisively term "the occult stream of consciousness". Ryle would yield no quarter to the slightest specific difference between mental processes and physical processes or overt behaviours. He completely equates the one with the other. He essays "to show that when we describe people as exercising qualities of mind, we are not referring to occult episodes of which their overt acts and utterances are effects; we are referring to those overt acts and utterances themselves."⁴

It is not possible within the short space of this paper to consider *in extenso* or even summarily the arguments which Ryle has advanced and the illustrations which he has cited to sustain his contention. We shall just consider one illustration given by him in the following passage: "The clown's trippings and tumblings are the workings of his mind, for they are his jokes; but the visibly similar trippings and tumblings of a clumsy man are not the workings of that man's mind. For he does not trip on purpose. Tripping on purpose is both a bodily and mental process, but it is not two processes, such as one process of purposing to trip and, as an effect, another process of tripping. Yet the old myth dies hard. We are still tempted to argue that if the clown's antics exhibit carefulness, judgment, wit, and appreciation of the moods of his spectators, there must be occurring in the clown's head a counterpart performance to that which is taking place on the sawdust.

3. Gilbert Ryle: *The Concept of Mind* (1952), p. 16.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

If he is thinking what he is doing, there must be occurring behind his painted face a cogitative shadow-operation which we do not witness, tallying with and controlling, the bodily contortions which we do witness."⁵

Now, we admit that there are not two processes of trippings and tumblings, one bodily and visible, and the other invisible and a mental counterpart of the former. So far as the performance is concerned, it is certainly one and it has not another mental duplicate inside. But are the mental factors concerned, *completely and exhaustively, without any residua*, objectified in the overt physical behaviour? Emphatically not. Ryle has oversimplified the situation. Take, for example, the factor of 'purpose'. In the passage quoted above, Ryle rightly says that the trippings and tumblings of a clown differ from the trippings and tumblings of a clumsy man on account of the former being done 'on purpose', although the two processes are "visibly similar."

Is the purpose of the clown, *in its entirety and completeness*, visible to the on-lookers of his performance? Certainly not. All that the on-lookers can 'see' in, or gather from, the performance of the clown is that his purpose is to please or amuse the spectators. But this rather obvious purpose, far from being a self-contained purpose in itself, is connected with other purposes or forms a tissue of a system of purposes, ideally present in the clown's mind, of which the spectators can know nothing. The clown's purpose may be to amass a fortune through his performances and further, to invest this fortune in some great philanthropic work, and so on. His ostensible purpose is only a bit of a system of purposes ideally present in his mind, all of which has not objectified in observable behaviour.

It is all too easy to equate the mental process altogether with the observable overt physical action or behaviour when the instances of 'action' are in question. But what about our pure intellectual and aesthetic judgments—'pure' in the sense that they do not issue in overt actions? Are they not mental operations *sui generis*? Ryle would certainly say 'No'; but such a view hardly appears to me satisfactory.

Challenging as Ryle's *The Concept of Mind* appears to be, I cannot help agreeing with Warnock's apt criticism of it that "it

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34.

looks at first sight a good deal more precise and illuminating than it actually turns out to be, and thus has at least the deficiency of being liable to arouse expectations which are ~~not~~ unsatisfied".⁶ Warnock tells us wherein Ryle leaves us unsatisfied. We are told by Ryle, he points out, that the theorist assigns mind to a wrong category, without being told what is that wrong category to which mind is assigned and the right category to which it should properly be assigned. And that, I think, is a right indictment.

In spite of his disavowal of behaviourism, Ryle gives us an account of the mind and the mental processes which could not inaptly be described as behaviourist. In fact, all theories of mind which have come into being in the present century, are in one way or another, theories with a behaviourist slant. Mace makes a correct observation when he says that "the great transition in the present century did not come about by the suggestion of yet another model for the description of the mind. It came about in quite a different way—through the emergence of and the successive transformations of the doctrine of Behaviourism".⁷

Earlier than Ryle, S. Alexander propounded a theory of mind and the mental processes which agrees with Ryle's view in its denial of a duality between mind and body and in denying to the mental process a status *sui generis*.

"Our mind" says Alexander, "is experienced by us as a set of connected processes which have the character of being mental, possessing the quality of 'mentality' or as I shall most frequently say, the character of consciousness".⁸ And "a process with the distinctive quality of mind or consciousness is in the same place and time with a neural process, that is, with a highly differentiated and complex process of our living body. We are forced, therefore, to go beyond the mere correlation of the mental with the neural processes and to identify them. There is but one process which, being of a specific complexity, has the quality of consciousness a neural process of a certain level of development possesses the quality of consciousness and is thereby a mental process; and alternately, a mental process is also a vital one of a certain order".⁹

6. G. J. Warnock: *English Philosophy Since 1900*, p. 96.

7. C. A. Mace: *British Philosophy in the Mid-Century*, p. 106.

8. *Space, Time and Deity*, Vol. II. p. 4.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

While Ryle identifies the mental process with the behavioural, Alexander identifies it with the neural and conceded to it a certain *insideness*—which Ryle would refuse outright—in so far as it is located "in the same place and time with a neural process". In yet another way Alexander differs from Ryle. While the latter would not admit a way of knowing the mental as different from our ways of knowing the physical, Alexander though maintaining that the mental and the neural are one and the same, holds that while the former "is experienced from the inside or enjoyed", the latter "is experienced from the outside or contemplated".

Alexander does not tell us what precisely is that "specific complexity" and that "level of development" in a neural process which endows it with the quality of mentality or consciousness; nor does he produce any evidence, scientific or otherwise, to prove the assumption.

454

In contemporary psychology and philosophy, much capital has been made of the connection between the cerebral and the mental processes, and from the fact of their close connection a variety of inferences are drawn for which there are no solid grounds or proper evidences. The general drift of the conclusion is either towards identifying the two or asserting a close parallelism between them, or, worst of all, declaring that the mental process is dependent upon or emergent from the cerebral process. Bergson's observation in this connection is pertinent and instructive. "That there is a close connection between a state of consciousness and the brain" he writes, "we do not dispute." But there is also a close connection between a coat and the nail on which it hangs, for, if the nail is pulled out, the coat falls to the ground. Shall we say, then, that the shape of the nail gives us the shape of the coat, or in any way corresponds to it? No more are we entitled to conclude, because the physical* fact is hung on to a cerebral state, that there is any parallelism between the two series psychical and physiological".¹⁰

According to Bergson the psychical state is immensely wider than the cerebral; the mind overflows the brain and "the brain is no more than a kind of central telephonic exchange: its office is to allow communication or to delay it. It adds nothing to

* The word 'physical' in the text obviously seems to be a misprint. It should be 'psychical'.

10. H. Bergson: *Matter and Memory*, Intro., p. xi.

what it receives".¹¹ The sole office of the brain is "the transmission and division of movement". According to Bergson, "the living body in general, and the nervous system in particular, are only channels for the transmission of movements, which received in the form of stimulation, are transmitted in the form of action, reflex or voluntary. That is to say, it is vain to attribute to the cerebral substance the property of engendering representations."¹²

Bergson's *Matter and Memory* is a sustained argument for the independence of consciousness, or 'pure memory' as he calls it, of cerebral processes. The singular importance of Bergson's analysis of memory lies in his repudiation of the usual view of memory as something stored up in the brain. Against this view his argument is telling: "If recollections were really deposited in the brain, to definite gaps in memory characteristic lesions of the brain would correspond. Now, in those forms of amnesia in which a whole period of our past existence, for example, is abruptly and entirely obliterated from memory, we do not observe any precise cerebral lesion; and, on the contrary, in those disorders of memory where cerebral localisation is distinct and certain, that is to say, in the different types of aphasia and in the diseases of visual or auditory recognition, we do not find that certain definite recollections are as it were torn from their seat, but that it is the whole faculty of remembering that is more or less diminished in vitality, as if the subject had more or less difficulty in bringing his recollection into contact with the present situation".¹³

Bertrand Russell is a notable contemporary philosopher with a wide sphere of influence who has sought to smash the dualism of mind and matter by expounding a philosophy of neutral monism, according to which "mind and matter are neither of them the actual stuff of reality, but convenient groupings of an underlying material".¹⁴ He has sought alliance with behaviourism and psychoanalysis alike to support his thesis that "'consciousness' is not the essence of life and mind".¹⁵ Russell is a behaviourist *a outrance* in denying any distinctiveness whatsoever to mental phenomena. "The things which we can discover by introspection", he says, "do not seem to differ in any very funda-

11. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 81.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 315-16.

14. B. Russell: *The Analysis of Mind*, p. 35.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

mental way from the things which we discover by external observation",¹⁶ and that "psychology and physics are distinguished by the nature of their causal laws, not by their subject matter".¹⁷ Russell's *The Analysis of Mind* may be said to have given a finishing touch to the argument started by William James in his well-known essay 'Does consciousness exist?', wherein James said that "the stream of thinking . . . when scrutinized, reveals itself to consist chiefly of the stream of my breathing" and that "the 'I think' which Kant said must be able to accompany all my objects is the 'I breathe' which actually does accompany them".

I shall take here a single instance of how Russell disposes of mental phenomena, the instance of 'desire'. Russell advances a view of desire which, as he says, is "an almost complete reversal of the ordinary unreflecting opinion". Desire is not the longing for an imagined 'end' or 'object'. There is no purpose governing the series of actions leading to the fulfilment of a desire. There is simply the cycle of actions itself. "Birds mate, build a nest, lay eggs in it, sit on the eggs, feed the young birds, and care for them until they are fully grown. It is totally impossible to suppose that this series of actions, which constitutes one cycle-behaviour, is inspired by any prevision of the end, at any rate the first time it is performed".¹⁸

Russell likens our speaking of the desires of animals to our speaking of rivers 'desiring' the sea; and just as, he says, we could explain the rivers' flow of water upto the sea by the laws of physics, so also "if we knew more about animals, we might equally cease to attribute desires to them, since we might find physical and chemical reactions sufficient to account for their behaviour".¹⁹

What about desires which remain in the mind and do not issue in any 'cycle of actions'? I wonder how Russell would explain such an ever present and never finally satiable desire in man as 'the desire for knowledge' in terms of physico-chemical reactions, or, his own noble desires for the complete outlawry of war and the establishment of a World Government, and so on! Russell thinks that the astonishing discovery of 'unconscious desire' by psycho-analysis lends support to his view that desires are 'unconscious', but he forgets that the psycho-analysts admit

16. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 287.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 66.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 64.

that the 'unconscious desires' are originally, prior to their being 'repressed', conscious, and can be made 'conscious' again by certain processes. I wonder if any psycho-analyst has ever equated these 'unconscious desires' with physico-chemical processes.

In the lines above we have passed in review some of the contemporary theories of mind. They all converge on the point of denying that the mind is a principle with its own specific nature or a principle *sui generis*. The bearing of such a conception of the mind on the cognitive relation is obviously to deny that there is anything unique in this relation. This is precisely what Alexander has said. According to him there is nothing unique about the cognitive relation. It is a relation of the simplest kind, a relation of compresence between the mind and its object "comparable with the relation of two compresent physical finites, like the floor and the table".²⁰ Yet it is the cognitive relation or the knowledge situation which, when carefully scrutinized, reveals mind in its real nature as a principle *sui generis*, foundational and fundamental, inexplicable in behaviouristic terms and unintelligible as something on a par with physical objects.

Mind can be understood in several contexts, principally two, one in the psychological context in which it is a stream of psychical presentations constituting the life-history of an individual mind, and in the other in what Hoernle has called the "metaphysical" or "Universe-revealing" context. When understood in this latter context, mind is not an object among objects, a phenomenon amongst phenomena, of any kind whatsoever, but the *prius*, the precondition or the inexpugnable logical presupposition of the entire world of connected objects. "Mind (in the metaphysical, Universe-revealing, sense)" says Hoernle, "may not be treated as a phenomenon among other phenomena. It can be viewed only as the matrix, so to speak, or field of all phenomena whatsoever. Of experience, or mind in the metaphysical sense, it is meaningless to ask: What is its relation to 'matter', or to 'body', or to anything else whatever? Such questions have meaning only in contexts in which experience or mind is contrasted, as phenomena of a distinctive kind, with phenomena of other kinds. But, so understood, mind has not, and cannot have, the metaphysical or Universe-revealing function. So understood, it is an object among objects—not the revealing of an object.

20. *Space, Time and Deity*, Vol. II, p. 83.

'As a positive science, therefore, Psychology omits, or abstracts from, the metaphysical character of mind, and so do all other 'scientific' theories of mind, especially those which treat mind in a biological context as a product of evolution, as response to a non-mental environment, as a function of a certain kind of animal body. In none of these contexts can the metaphysical function of the mind be recognised or dealt with".²¹

If there has been any serious 'category-mistake' in contemporary thought regarding mind, it is just here, in the reduction or degradation of mind to the category of objects or phenomena of one kind or another; and no rectification in logical geography seems to me more urgent and imperative at the present day than the one in the direction of restoring mind to its prominent, metaphysical, Universe-revealing position.

To conclude, theories of mind, both in contemporary psychology and philosophy, have been, so to speak, running down mind; the former, by bleaching away, in its extreme behaviouristic fervour, all that is distinctive of mental or psychological processes properly so called, and the latter, in its extreme realistic fervour, by robbing mind—to borrow a phrase from Bosanquet—to swell the bank-balance of Mind's objects. For a correct appraisal of the nature and status of mind, a re-examination of basic assumptions in both the fields is necessary.

21. R. F. A. Hoernle: *Studies in Philosophy*, pp. 255-56.
P. Q. 3

The Concept of the Mind

by

S. H. DIVATIA

It is perhaps characteristic of philosophical problems that there should be a dispute about what is most evident. If one tells a layman that philosophers are going to argue about mind, he will wonder what all this fuss is about. 'Surely', he would say, 'my own mind is something which is most familiar to me'. But then as Rajendra Prasad, the previous symposiast, has told us 'concept of the mind is not the same thing as mind'. We are not conducting a factual inquiry but a logical inquiry. No new facts are going to be established, but we are concerned to put our mental concepts on the language map as it were.

Prof. Moore remarked once at Cambridge that he knew in the strictest possible sense of the word that 'there is a pencil in my hand', but what he was not sure about was the analysis of the sentence, 'there is a pencil in my hand'. In the same way there cannot be any dispute about the reality of feelings, sensations, beliefs, etc., but there is a real dispute about the analyses of these. The naive behaviourists as opposed to analytical behaviourists have just abandoned empiricism when they deny such obvious matters as mental facts. Prof. Ryle himself has made this point clear when he says, "I am not, for example, denying that there occur mental processes. Doing long division is a mental process and so is making a joke. But I am saying that the phrase 'there occur mental processes' does not mean the same sort of thing as 'there occur physical processes', and therefore it makes no sense to conjoin or disjoin the two".

If one reads all that is said by philosophers on the concept of the mind one has a feeling that something has seriously gone wrong. As Ryle puts it himself 'some people talk sense with concepts but cannot talk sense about them'. (This includes Prof. Ryle himself). It is my purpose to show some of the reasons why philosophers' analyses of the concept of mind have gone wrong.

It is, to my mind, one of the chief merits of Wittgenstein to have shown that understanding of concepts cannot be had by

a kind of 'intellectual gazing' at them, but we must put the concepts back to work by examining how our language makes actual use of them. An engine idling cannot exhibit what it is for, the engine must be put to work. One must understand the various uses of such words as 'feeling' 'Desiring' 'willing' etc.

Now, if we carefully examine our language we find that mental concepts are mixed up with physical concepts in such an intimate manner that a language constructed wholly of physical terms or mental terms looks extremely artificial. Suppose I say 'I got out of my bed at 7 O'clock, had my bath and breakfast, thought out the points of today's lecture, walked to my faculty, called my students and explained the motives behind the introduction of new discussion classes, discussed the meaning of a poem with a friend during recess, walked back to the hostel, read the newspaper thinking what a mess the politicians have made, shrugged my shoulders, and went to bed in a depressed state of mind'.

Here mental concepts and physical concepts are mixed up together. No doubt one can separate the mental concepts from the physical concepts here, but such a language would be artificial. As Stuart Hampshire has pointed out in his excellent review of Prof. Ryle's book, Prof. Ryle is wrong in foisting the myth of the ghost in the machine on the poor Cartesians, the myth is embedded in our ordinary language itself. And is it not strange that such an exponent of 'ordinary language philosophy' as Prof. Ryle should have committed such a mistake?

So a description of an individual's activities can only be given in a mixed language. A person is 'body-mind' combined in an intimate way. Curiously enough, Descartes himself, dualist though he is, concedes this. As he says, 'It is not sufficient that it (the soul) be lodged in the human body, exactly like a pilot in a ship, unless perhaps to move its members, but that it is necessary for it to be joined and united more closely to the body in order to have sensations and appetites similar to ours and thus constitute a real man'. Or again, "Those who never philosophize and who make use only of their sense entertain no doubts that the soul moves the body and that the body acts on the soul. They consider the two as one single thing; that is to say, they apprehend their union; for to apprehend the union of two things is to apprehend them as one single thing. It is by relying exclusively on the activities and concerns of ordinary life that we can learn to apprehend the union of soul and body".

But philosophically there is a problem because we must explain how within myself I can combine two realms of mind and body. But of course talking in this material mode of speech is apt to generate bogus problems. As the previous symposiasts have pointed out, body is not an entity and mind is not an entity, (though we do talk of 'exploring the recesses of one's mind' as a lady explores the contents of her purse to find out something).

Putting the problem into a formal mode of speech, one finds that every man has got two stories to tell. I can tell my day's activities in words that do duty for physical concept, and I can tell my story in words that do duty for mental concepts. The 'mental story' is required, because how things 'were felt' or 'seemed' to the person in question is an important part of the whole story. The physical story omits this important part. Just as Prof. Ryle himself in his 'Dilemmas' has shown, though there are no two worlds, 'a scientific world' and the common world, yet the 'scientists' story' is not the whole story.

The contrast is not between two worlds, a 'mental world' and a 'physical world' (in that sense dualism is dead), but between the physiologists' language and the 'common man's language', where both physical concepts and mental concepts are freely used. Prof. Ryle has gone wrong in his 'concept of the mind', because he has tried to prove that mind and body dualism is faulty. Prof. Wisdom calls this mistake one of 'proving a myth a myth'. The myth of 'the ghost in the machine' is not useless and fanciful. After all even myths have a point. 'The ghost in the machine is how the machine appears to itself', as C.A. Mace has told us. Prof. Ryle has not done enough justice to the logic of such words as "only I can feel my pain (anger, sorrow, etc.)". I think this is illustrated in the very opening part of his book where he says, "The university is not a word of the same logical type as the words standing for various colleges. It makes no sense to ask 'where is the university' ". But one does come across one's mental processes as one can come across nothing else.

Here I want to take up Rajendra Prasad's point that 'there cannot be a private language'. I suppose by 'a private language' we are to understand a language of which the individual names refer solely to the sensations of the user of the language (or if you like, it is a language where speaker and audience are one). The man does not apply any criteria to refer to his sensations. There cannot be any rules by which we can check the references.

But all that this can mean is that certain conditions must be satisfied for the existence of a common language in which sensations are ascribed to those who have them; and that we must have a better understanding of the way language of sensations functions. But to say that no word 'names' sensations and in particular the word 'pain' does not, is to go too far. P. F. Strawson I believe has made this point clear in his review of 'Philosophical Investigations'. Pain has got a subjective and an objective aspect. Objective pain is the neural excitation, felt pain is personal. The difficulty of separating the two aspects of pain is illustrated in such puzzles as—if I have an earache and a friend engage me in an argument to distract my attention, does it mean that the ear has stopped aching or does it stop me from feeling it aching, and the correct answer to the puzzle is to smile. 'Well if you take pain in an objective sense, then the pain has not stopped; but if you take pain in the sense of feeling of pain then the answer is that it is necessarily true that it has stopped. The puzzle contains its own answer. One cannot refer to or identify one's sensation without applying criteria. In a sense, the sensation itself is the test. Any way, whether we admit that there is a private language or not we must admit sensations, and if that is admitted, how is dualism refuted?

The second point that I want to take up is that about 'factual inquiry' and 'linguistic inquiry'. Some linguistic philosophers have passed a self-denying ordinance that all talk about relation of language to facts is to be vetoed. But they forget that language itself is an empirical phenomenon and no inquiry, philosophic or otherwise, can be wholly linguistic. If mental behaviour concepts are to be constructed as of higher logical type than physical behaviour concepts, can it not be that they picture a higher order of reality? I do admit that philosophers of the linguistic school do not like this way of talking, but I personally find it extremely difficult to stick to the ban which they have imposed on reference of language to reality. Of course there is no one—one relation of picturing and the pictured. Prof. Ryle has performed a signal service in pointing out the dispositional character of many words standing for mental concepts. But he has not shown that all such words are dispositional. So I suggest that the inability of some philosophers to alter ordinary language is a pointer that there is in a sense a ghost. The ghost can be finally exorcised, if at all, by a joint committee of physicists and psychologists who can declare that their subjects have become one. Though I think that the recent advances in both subjects have brought them

nearer to each other, I believe that the distance cannot be completely bridged. Bertrand Russell in his 'Analysis of Mind' as well as in a review of 'Ryle's Concept of the Mind' has stressed the importance of scientific data for settling the controversy. Because our knowledge of physics and psychology is continuously changing, no definite pronouncement on the concept of the mind can yet be made. Kant made the mistake of talking about his 'Categories' as absolute and final, because he was impressed by the development of Newtonian physics; but Physics has gone a long way since Newton, and it appears that 'substance', 'cause', etc. are not so indispensable to scientists at present as it appeared at that time. Perhaps that is why Prof. Ryle is so unwilling to tell us definitely what category was mind mistakenly taken to be, and to what category it ought to belong.

So the one conclusion that we can draw at present is: Those who appear to dispense with the concept of mind are profoundly mistaken. We need both a linguistic inquiry about the various uses of mental concepts in our ordinary language, and a scientific inquiry about the functioning of physical and mental behaviour. Then we might say tentatively what reality is like.

To some this paper of mine might seem too meagre. But what is said about the concept of 'time' applies to 'mind' with still greater force, viz. 'we might not know fully well what time is; but at any rate we can stop talking nonsense about it. Substitute 'mind' for 'time' and the sentence stands.

Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedānta

by

C. KUNHAN RAJA

In a recent book "Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedānta",¹ Dr. K. Satchidananda Murty has for the first time, so to say, thrown a challenge to some of the philosophical doctrines maintained in the Advaita Vedānta system as fundamentals. There have been challenges to the system in India from the earliest times; but such challenges are made from the point of view of sectarian doctrines and not from an independent rationalistic point of view. In recent times it was Max Müller who first gave an exposition of the different systems of philosophy in India, and Deussen followed up with his expositions of the Upanishads and the Vedānta. Both had a partiality for the Vedānta, by which was meant the Advaita School. There have been presentations in a historical way of the philosophical systems in India and in all of them the Advaita Vedānta takes up more space relatively than the other systems. In an ancient work called the "Sarva-Darśana-Saṅgraha" the Advaita Vedānta comes at the end thus implying its importance. There are some recent books giving an account of the religions of the world, and in such books, Hinduism is identified with the Advaita Vedānta. Swami Vivekananda has definitely said that the Advaita Vedānta presents the real philosophy of India. There are many works on the Advaita Vedānta system written in modern times and in all of them there is a view that the system marks the highest point in Indian philosophical thought. Thus, it has come down as a settled belief that Indian thought is Vedānta and that Vedānta is the Advaita Vedānta. With such a background it is a rather bold step taken by Dr. Murty in challenging the supremacy of this system of thought. He has openly questioned the soundness of the fundamental doctrines of the Vedānta when scrutinised rationally. The work is divided into two Books and each Book is divided into two parts. In the first part of the first Book there is a very lucid and comprehensive presentation of the problems of God and Revelation as developed in the

1. Published by Columbia University Press, New York; and Andhra University, Waltair, India.

Advaita system, and this covers about a third of the whole book. It is the points dealt with in this portion that become the target for Dr. Murty's attack later. The problems are presented without prejudice, in a very impartial way, based on authoritative texts belonging to the system. Even the most loyal follower of the system cannot complain that the case has not been presented with fairness. In the second Part of the first Book, there is an exposition of the place of reason in the system. This covers about 60 pages, just a fifth of the book.

In the second Book, the first part is devoted for presenting the views of the other schools of Indian thought with reference to God and Revelation, again in about a fifth of the whole book. The criticism of the Advaita Vedānta stand-point and the presentation of the author's own views are contained in the second Part of the second Book, in nearly a hundred pages. It would be noticed that the author has given more space to the presentation of the opponents' view point than to the presentation of his own standpoint. Practically he has supplied the necessary weapons to his adversary and then challenged him for a straight fight.

In all the schools of thought in India that follow the Vedic Path, there is a mode of knowing called the authoritative statement of a reliable person. In the Sāṅkhya system all the categories included within the system come within the sphere of direct experience and reason, and if there is any mention of another mode of knowing called verbal statement by a reliable person, it is only meant to cover points that do not come within the system. In the Nyāya system also, all the categories dealt with come within the sphere of reason or direct experience. Thus in these two systems, perception and reason are sufficient to have a cognition of all the categories constituting the universe; verbal authority is only an extra mode, accepted as a fact and not as a necessity for philosophy.

There are two systems of thought in which perception and reason occupy only a subordinate position and it is verbal authority that can enable one to have an understanding of the real subject-matter of the systems. In the Mīmāṃsā, the nature of the Law governing good life (Dharma) and in the Vedānta the nature of the Ultimate Reality are outside the scope of perception and reason and can be understood only from an authoritative statement, and that statement is what is called the Veda, the revealed text, the scripture. In both the systems, the Veda is eternal, and in the Vedānta, it is revealed to man by God. Neither

of the systems accepts the text as created by God. The point is not discussed in the Sāṅkhya system, being superfluous for philosophy; and in the Nyāya system the Veda, the scripture, is formed by the words of God, having been produced by him. In the Mīmāṃsā there is no God who is the giver of the Law and who is also the creator of the world.

Dr. Murty has in the final part dealt with the subject under three main headings. There is the problem of God, there is the problem of the revealed Texts and there is the problem of the nature of the Absolute Reality. The nature of the Absolute is that it has no second; Reality is the Non-dual Brahman. In the second chapter in the second Part of the second Book, the author ably refutes the position of the Advaitins that there is a middle marginal region between the Real and the Unreal, what is neither real nor unreal. If Brahman has no attribute, then it has neither reality nor unreality, and what is neither real nor unreal is what is called illusory in the Advaita; thus according to this definition of what is illusory, Brahman becomes illusory. Against pluralism the Advaita has only one positive argument, viz., that difference cannot be logically defined—but inability to give a logical definition only shows either the incapacity of our thought or the inadequacy of language. (p. 249 and 250). The doctrine of Māyā leads one to Dualism and not non-dualism. If there is Brahman which is eternal and if there is also Māyā, which too has no beginning, then there are two eternal categories, since Māyā which has no beginning cannot have an end. To say that Māyā is what has no beginning but what has an end like prior non-existence is not sound logic, as there is no comparison between what is true of a positive thing and what is true of a negation. Nescience is a positive thing according to the Advaita, and what is positive cannot be removed by knowledge; what is cannot be destroyed by our knowledge that it does not exist. Finally, is the falsity of the world false or not? If falsity is false, the world is true; and if falsity is true, then there is dualism in so far as falsity is real besides Brahman (pp. 251 and 252).

If language is eternal, then both the Veda and the words of the ordinary person and also of a lunatic must be eternal, and the relation of such language with the objects must also be eternal. We cannot say that the language of the Veda and the language of the ordinary persons are not identical. The Veda too must be the words of some one (p. 243). If there is a God as the revealer of the Vedas, that cannot be the Brahman of the Advaitins. There

is no sense in saying that the eternal consciousness without a second is revealing itself, because there is no one else to whom it could reveal anything (p. 247). Reason demands that there be a God and world and man.

I have the above arguments from the book to show how the author applies strict logic to substantiate his position. Nothing can be accepted which does not satisfy the intellect of man, which contains the elements of direct experience and reason. It is the super-rationalism of the later exponents of the Advaita that goes against man's reason. From the way in which the whole subject is developed in the book, it would be found that it is the later exponents of the system that form the main target of the author's criticism. Such latter-day exponents applied reason where reason has no relevancy. The Advaita is not what has been or what can be established on the basis of reason. It is imposed on reason in the course of a certain approach to the problem of the nature of the world.

Strict Advaita (Monism) and the existence of a *Māyā* (illusion) are not found in the early texts, especially the Upanishads. There is a distinction drawn between the Absolute and the Phenomena; but nowhere in the Upanishads is it said that the world is an illusion. It is only the facts of the phenomena that come within our experience and our reason. The Absolute is beyond experience and reason; it is what is not anything within the phenomena. We do not know what exactly the position of Śaṅkara is; but we must distinguish between Śaṅkara's own philosophy and the interpretation of Śaṅkara's thought.

Śaṅkara found himself in a specific environment in which there was a conflict between two currents of thought—the Upanishadic and the Buddhistic. A is not a positive object. It is an aggregate of differences from what are not A. Thus every object appearing as a positive thing is in reality an aggregate of differences from others and each one of the others is similarly an aggregate of differences. A difference is a negative object. Thus the real nature of the world is negative. This is the Buddhistic view.

Every object is a combination of two factors, a thing-in-itself and difference from others. As between two objects like a cup and a ring, there is the mutual difference and there is also their real nature as thing-in-itself as gold. This gold too has a double nature, and in this way every object that is different from others

has a dual nature, one being positive as the thing-in-itself and the other being negative as difference from others. When the differences are eliminated, what results is not a negation, but a positive object. This is the Upanishadic view.

As between these two positions Śaṅkara's own preference was for the second, what is found in the Upanishads. In the ultimate stage, there is only a thing-in-itself without a difference in so far as there is nothing from which it can be different. It is this thing-in-itself that is called the *Sat*. I have not myself seen anything more than this in the Monism of the Upanishads. This absolute *Sat* does not exclude the existence of the phenomenal world. We speak of difference between two objects coming together in a process of division and classification, and we can speak of difference between a ring and a cup, both being made of gold. But we do not speak of the difference between the cup and the gold. Similarly, the Absolute and the objects of the phenomenal world do not come together as co-ordinates creating a scope for differentiating one from the other, and to that extent the Absolute does not have a second from which it is different. Thus there is the absolute *Sat* in itself and there is also the *Sat* as the objects of the phenomenal world. It is Buddhism that first postulated the theory of the phenomenal being an illusion, the Absolute alone being real. Śaṅkara accepted this differentiation.

If there is anything that is an illusion, it is the difference and not the positive nature of the thing in the phenomenal world. The illusion doctrine is what has come to Śaṅkara from Buddhism. A ring has double reality, as a ring and as gold, and its reality as a ring is perishable and not absolute. This process goes on until we come to the stage of the Absolute. So the reality of the Absolute is different from the reality of the things of the world, which are perishable and associated with a difference. In the phenomenal world, which is the factor between the positive element and difference element that represents the real nature of the Absolute? If we apply pure reason, it is more in accordance with reason to assert that when differences vanish, the positive *different* also vanishes and that as such the Absolute is of the nature of a negation. But Śaṅkara says that he has the evidence of some passages in the Upanishads according to which the Absolute is of the nature of a positive thing. The dictates of his own intuition are in favour of the one being of the positive nature of "I am".

Every object in the phenomenal world has the double nature of being the thing-in-itself and as an object belonging to a higher genus with a difference from other objects within the same genus. But we must reach a stage where there is only the one aspect of being the thing-in-itself without any difference. In this stage where differences are completely eliminated, there is only the positive Absolute. This is the Upanishadic view. The Upanishadic statements that the Absolute is positive, pure Sat (reality), agrees with reason also. What unreasonable element is there in thus accepting two kinds of realities, one without a negative side or difference and the other associated with a negative side or a difference? It is a division of the world into reality and unreality. There is the further division of the reality into what is absolute reality and what is associated with difference. In this way, Brahman and Māyā become both positive.

Śaṅkara had inherited from Buddhistic thought another belief that this Māyā has a cessation at some future time. There is not even a hint in the Upanishads of a cessation of life in the phenomenal world and a migration to an absolute life. The Universe consists of intelligence, object and activity in the object. The Absolute cannot have activity. It cannot be the object of an external intelligence. If there is objectivity persisting in Brahman, it can be the object only of itself as intelligence, and so the Absolute becomes absolute intelligence without being the object of an external intelligence and without having an external object.

As for language and Veda, the Vedic language and the popular language including statements of a lunatic are both aspects of language; but there is a difference. In a Vedic statement, the words designate the truth; while in the statement of the ordinary man, they designate the view of the speaker about the truth. There is no person with a view about truth finding a place in a Vedic statement. Every statement of an object as it is is a Vedic statement; every statement about an object as it is known to a person is a popular statement.

As for the eternal nature of language, there is a metaphysical theory about some subtle aspect of material world forming the basis for the cognition of sound. That can manifest in various ways and so different languages are manifestations of the same sound in its absolute stage. This absolute is identical with the Absolute of the Universe, according to the school of grammarians, an evolute from the Absolute according to Vedānta and one of the

eternal categories according to Mīmāṃsā. Thus thought and language are identical in grammar, thought and language are parallel categories in Mīmāṃsā and thought is the basis from which sound has evolved in the Vedānta. The eternal relation between thought and language is accepted in all systems. If language is the audible sound then it is a creation of the speaker; if it is some subtle entity which is manifested as audible sound, then it is eternal, and it is only its manifestation that is the operation of the speaker.

The term Veda is not confined to the texts now known as the Veda. Śaṅkara simply says that the texts known as the Veda contain certain statements about objects as they are. He never said that all that is in the texts belongs to this category, nor does he say that there is no statement possible outside the texts that can relate itself to the objects as they are. What Śaṅkara attempted was to interpret the Vedic philosophy in the environment of Buddhism. In this effort he had to adopt the theory of Māyā, the theory of the termination of Māyā and the infallibility of statements of a particular variety, that is, the statements of Buddha, according to Buddhists.

What Dr. Murty has succeeded in accomplishing is to challenge the soundness of latter-day Vedānta, which is supposed to be an interpretation of the philosophy of Śaṅkara. But the current had deviated considerably from the original course of the current between the time of Śaṅkara and of his interpreters. Along with such a demolition of this latter-day edifice, there is scope for rebuilding the original philosophy of the Upanishads and the philosophy of Śaṅkara who attempted to present the Upanishadic philosophy of realism, in an atmosphere of Buddhistic nihilism. Now we have to present the same philosophy in an environment of modern science and rationalism. What is not in harmony with modern rationalism is only the latter day interpretations and not the original philosophy of Śaṅkara.

Bergson's and Husserl's Concepts of Intuition¹

by

J. DE MARNEFFE, S. J.

When one examines the philosophies of Bergson and Husserl, one is struck by the importance which they give to intuition. In the writings of both philosophers the word "intuition" comes up again and again. Yet as one soon realizes that their philosophies are not similar, so also one feels that their meanings of intuition are not the same. As the philosophy of duration and the *élan vital* is not the philosophy of transcendental consciousness and eidetic objects, so also the Bergsonian intuition does not seem to be that "pure glance" which, according to Husserl, perceives the essence, the *Eidos*.

What is the nature and value of intuition in each of these two philosophies? Those who are rather sceptical about any type of intuition might be tempted to reject their philosophies wholesale, because intuition plays too great a part in them. On the other hand, those who are ready to admit some value for intuition, may not agree completely with what either Bergson or Husserl has thought it to be. What then remains valid in their views?

We shall first examine the place of intuition in Bergson's philosophy. A critical appreciation of his view will lead us to examine next what Husserl added to it. A further consideration bearing on Husserl's thought will lead us to a final problem which, we think, is the one which English speaking and Continental philosophers have to face and solve, if they wish to reach again a certain agreement.

Bergson's Concept of Intuition

Bergson made his discovery of "duration" when he was teaching philosophy at the Lycée of Angers and then at Clermont-Ferrand.² Bergson has described this duration in many passages of

1. The present article is an abbreviated form of the *Bergson and Husserl Centenary Lecture* (1859-1959), delivered before The Bombay Philosophical Society, on February 12, 1960.

2. Cf. R. M. Mossé-Bastide: *Henri Bergson, Ecrits et Paroles*, Tome second, pp. 294-5, "Lettre à W. James",

his works, yet to some the notion seems to remain somewhat difficult and obscure. The difficulty arises from the confusion between the qualitative change which occurs and the time it takes to occur. Yet the difference is as clear as the one existing between two aspects of the same inner state. The first aspect may be illustrated in this way: "At first he became a little impatient, but finally he grew so angry that he banged the table and left the room." The second aspect is the simple record: "He was angry for one hour," or "he happened to be angry between 8 and 9 o'clock. The latter statement speaks of anger in terms of time; the former in terms of duration. Even if one realizes that the first aspect speaks of a growth in intensity, while the second indicates a continuation which could be uniform, the mistake is sometimes made, Bergson points out, of thinking that the growth of the quality in intensity could be measured in terms of extensive magnitude. The terms "great" joy, or "deep" sorrow all suggest a possibility of measuring such states, though, in fact, they cannot be directly measured, but only lived. The example of increasing anger which I mentioned above, still fails to indicate correctly what "duration" is, for it presents it through its exterior manifestations, while in fact, as an instance of duration, it must be lived and caught from within.

In his two first works, *Time and Free Will* and *Matter and Memory*, Bergson already mentioned "that it is intuition which reveals to us that reality is duration." But in his interesting "Introduction to Metaphysics" of 1903, Bergson gave a more elaborate explanation of the nature of intuition as opposed to analysis: "we call intuition here", he writes, "the sympathy by which one is transported into the interior of an object in order to coincide with what is unique and completely inexpressible in it."³ Only intuition, he thinks, could give the absolute which metaphysics seeks to attain. "There is at least one reality which we all seize from within, by intuition and not by simple analysis. It is our own person in its flowing through time, the self which endures."⁴ "But," Bergson continues, "if metaphysics is to proceed by intuition, if intuition has as its object the mobility of duration, and if duration is psychological in essence, we are not going to shut the philosopher up in the exclusive self-contemplation?"⁵ Bergson answers his own objection by the claim that intuition "is not a single act but an infinite

3. *The Creative Mind*, New York, 1946, p. 190.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 191.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 217.

series of acts, all doubtless of the same genus but each one of a very particular species,"⁶ and that "this variety of acts (within us) corresponds to the degrees of being (outside us)".⁷ Between the two extreme limits of a duration which at one end would be pure repetition and at the other end eternity itself, "intuition moves, says Bergson, and this movement is metaphysics itself."⁸ "Intuitive knowledge establishes itself in the moving reality and adopts the life itself of things. The intuition attains the absolute."⁹ In a note to this Essay, Bergson makes the following admission: "I hesitated a long time before using the term 'intuition'; and when I decided to do so I designated by this word the metaphysical function of thought: principally the intimate knowledge of the mind by the mind, secondarily the knowledge by the mind of what there is essential in matter."¹⁰

In the subsequent books Bergson develops the type of metaphysics which he has here clearly defined. His great book *Creative Evolution* (1907) takes up the ambitious task of explaining not only man's inner life, as in *Time and Free Will*, not only the union of body and soul within man as in *Matter and Memory*, but the whole cosmic reality which finds its culminating perfection in man. The intuitive view is that life has evolved and is also duration. Life is a vital impetus (*un élan vital*) which runs through matter. The great movement of life bursts like a piece of shrapnel and each new bursting has caused a new type of life. When life concentrates on a pattern and reproduces that pattern with too much regularity, we have instinct; where conscious life concentrates on matter, we have practical intelligence; but where conscious life concentrates upon itself, we have intuition. Here man realizes that he is duration and that he can intensify this duration. The thesis thus turns out to be the vindication of the very intuition on which it rests.

Bergson took a long time before he published the result of the application of his intuitive method to Morality and Religion, in his book *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* (1932). Besides the social pressure from which the closed morality springs, intuition recognises a source of open morality in the impulse of


6. *Ibid.*

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*, p. 221.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 227.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 306, note 26.



eharity. Besides the fears which give occasion to the static religion of imagined spirits and gods, intuition discovers our partial coincidence with the creative effort which is God. The mystic is thus able to continue and extend the divine action.

From what we have said it is clear that intuition is the pivotal point of Bergson's philosophy. In the Introduction to his work: *La pensée et le mouvant*, translated under the title *The Creative Mind*, Bergson emphasized again the importance of intuition in his philosophy. He frankly admits that while Harold Höfding had discovered four types of intuition in his (Bergson's) writings, he would be ready to point to more than four.¹¹

As our aim is not the classification of views on intuition, but to understand Bergson's concept of intuition in order to judge what is valid in it for philosophy, we need not mention Höfding's division nor search for the alleged other types. What matters to us is the overall estimate of Bergson's main tenet in epistemology.

Bergson's account of the pragmatic function of the intellect as opposed to its intuitive function has often led historians or writers to count Bergson among the Pragmatists. Strictly speaking, Pragmatism is the doctrine which holds that the criterion of truth is success either in the speculative or practical order. Monsieur Léon Husson published in Paris in 1947 a very useful study on the Genesis and Development of Bergsonian notion of intuition, and he entitled his work: *The Intellectualism of Bergson*. He thus defines intellectualism: "a belief in the intelligibility of the real and a confidence that the human mind is capable of catching this intelligibility". According to this definition I am ready to admit with him that Bergson is not fully a pragmatist but also an intellectualist. No doubt Bergson speaks of our intellect as being made for action on matter and thus forming its views on matter according to its practical aims. But that is not Bergson's whole theory of knowledge. He claims, as we have seen, that we have a higher power of knowledge, namely, intuition, and this power according to him is greater than many intellectualists or realists would admit.

The difficulty then in judging Bergson's epistemology is rather to know whether or not he has overestimated our capacity to know. Do we really have intuition and those types of intuition which Bergson claims that we have?

11. *Loc.cit.*, p. 28.

To answer this question we may define intuition as "the immediate apprehension of the existence of an individual reality." Strict intuition would exclude any intermediary, even a transparent one as a representation of the object might be. If there is an intermediary at which knowledge first stops, the intuition can only be improperly so called. Most of the time, Bergson seems to use the term *intuition* in the strict above-mentioned sense, for instance in the case of the intuition of the duration of the self, of the mental life of others, of the vital impetus, etc....¹²

Now we are still left with the problem of knowing whether we have at all any of these types of intuition. The problem in its entirety is too complex to be solved at once. For the time being I content myself with making a few remarks on some of Bergson's claims and pointing to a type of knowledge which he admits and which, I believe, is useful for philosophy, even if it is difficult to say in what measure it is intuitive.

And first of all, so far as the general view of evolution which science has elaborated is concerned, it can hardly be said that we had an intuition of this duration. We might intuitively experience a present evolution as duration; we surely cannot experience the past evolution intuitively nor know intuitively that it was duration.

Further, the existence of God proved by appeal to the intuitions of the mystics remains for us an inferred conclusion and not an intuition. The knowledge which the mystics themselves would have of God through the vital impetus, would not be strict intuition, since the impetus serves as intermediary.

What cannot be controverted, we believe, is Bergson's giving to intuition the value of a reflection on the acts of our intellect. Answering the blame that he had reduced our capacity of knowing to instinct and feeling, he wrote: "Not one line of what I have written could lend itself to such an interpretation. And in everything I have written there is assurance to the contrary: my intuition is reflection."¹³ The context of this passage indicates that here reflection is mainly opposed to instability of mind or intellectual uncertainty. But there is no doubt that the knowledge

12. On various types of intuition and their place in Bergson's philosophy, cf. Franz Grégoire, *L'intuition selon Bergson*, (Cyclostyled Course), Louvain, 1950.

13. *The Creative Mind*, p. 103.

of the self and the experience of duration within us is fundamental to Bergson's philosophy: "an intimate knowledge of the mind by the mind," to repeat his own words.¹⁴ We think that this is the most valuable contribution of Bergson to philosophy. We are ready to accept Bergson's views on reflection, at least in the sense of the turning inward of the mind on a life which is not merely a succession of states but a spiritual growth, a duration. The reasons for our agreement on this point can be made clear later. In the history of philosophy reflection had not waited for Bergson to find a place in philosophy. But, in his time, Bergson had the merit of reinstating it in the place of honour which it had lost.

Husserl's Concept of Intuition

Our discernment of reflection as one of the most significant features of Bergson's philosophy leads us straight, not simply to the central point, but even to the exclusive topic of Husserl's philosophy.

Husserl's philosophy is known as phenomenology. But in fact, as he himself said, it is nothing but "consciousness analysis,"¹⁵ and thus is reflection, the act which Bergson had acknowledged to be present in intuition.

It is very difficult to have an exact perspective of Husserl's philosophy; for most of his writings, instead of being a progressive development of various questions, as were the works of Bergson, are a perpetual coming back to the beginning. The later parts of his *Ideas, or General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, first remained unpublished; and a new work like his *Cartesian Meditations* took again the same problem as the *Ideas*, just to clarify the same starting point. It is not as if Husserl did not know how to start his philosophy and was proposing now one solution and then another. No, it is always the same solution but presented with increasing caution and precision.

Husserl's philosophy is born from a question and a challenge: "Can philosophy ever be a 'strict science' or a 'strict knowledge'?" The naturalistic philosophy of his time was answering this question in the negative. All knowledge is relative to our way of

14. Cf. the interesting book of Ian W. Alexander: *Bergson, Philosopher of Reflection*, London, 1957, especially, pp. 83-4.

15. "Philosophy as a Strict Science" translation by Q. Lauer, published in *Cross Currents*, Vol. VI, 1955-6, p. 327.

finding it. Since we rely on the empirical sciences for building philosophy, philosophy changes together with these sciences and thus reveals itself as a knowledge which is not strict. To such an objection Husserl answers that true, unvarying philosophy is possible. For strict knowledge is available if we seek, not what a particular experience reveals to us, but what constitutes experience itself. He thus took the lines followed by two great philosophers, Descartes and Kant, but he adopted a standpoint which, he claimed, was more critical and secure. In concentrating on consciousness, he follows the line of the Cartesian *Cogito*, but in the way he analyses consciousness, he adopts something of the Kantian transcendental method. Yet in both lines he adds a corrective so that he is neither a strict Cartesian nor a strict Kantian philosopher. He differs from Descartes in that the consciousness of the Ego is taken at its transcendental level. He differs from Kant in that the transcendental is not inferred but intuited. Hence the place of intuition in his philosophy, a place which is as great as that in the philosophy of Bergson. Yet the intuition does not consist in immediacy of contact as with Bergson, but in pure vision. In describing the types of intuition which he admits, we shall have occasion to define exactly what his phenomenology consists in.

Husserl distinguishes very sharply two types of intuition: the first is perception, and the second is "essential insight."

He describes perception from the natural standpoint as an awareness of a world in space and time. "I am aware", he writes, "of a world spread out in space endlessly, and in time without end. I am aware of it, that means, first of all, I discover it immediately or intuitively".¹⁶ "For me", he continues, "real objects are there, definite, more or less familiar, agreeing with what is actually perceived without being themselves perceived or even intuitively present.... (This) knowledge (may have) nothing of conceptual thinking in it, and first changes into clear intuiting with the bestowing of attention...."¹⁷ "This world is not there for me as a mere world of facts and affairs, but, with the same immediacy, as a world of values, a world of goods, a practical world."¹⁸ The world is thus known by outer perception, to which, as we saw, Husserl grants a certain intuitive character. But there is also

16. *Ideas, or General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, London, 1952, p. 101.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 101-2.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 103.

inner perception of our own inner states and ourselves. Husserl concedes that, from the natural standpoint, our selves may appear as in the Cartesian reflection or *Cogito*. My being then appears as a being in the world and of the world.

After saying all this about the natural standpoint, Husserl introduces his special outlook. To reach a strict knowledge he sets into action the triple reduction, also called "disconnection" or "bracketing"; to this action of withdrawing one's consideration from some aspects of things in order to consider only some others, Husserl gives the Greek name of *Epoché*.

The *historical* "disconnection (*Epoché*) will keep aside all preformed opinion coming from science or philosophical theories. The *eidetic* "disconnection" will keep aside all consideration of the individuality in order to concentrate on the essences of things. But the *transcendental* "disconnection" will keep aside the essence of whatever is transcendent to experience in order to concentrate on the essence of pure consciousness itself.

Thus while Husserl was ready to grant an intuitive character even to outer perception, it is on the intuitive character of the inner perception, and especially of pure experience, that he relies in order to give to his philosophy that character of "strict knowledge" which he claimed could still be found, at least here.

Let us illustrate the steps which Husserl follows and their definitions by the concrete example of the perception of a tree. I see the tree which is out there; I perceive it intuitively and, according to the natural standpoint, I believe that I know its existence and its nature. This is ordinary knowledge. Scientific knowledge may perfect my view, but, though it is general, it can also concern itself with the individual tree. The historical "disconnection" will leave aside whatever common or scientific knowledge has said. Now the eidetic "disconnection" will leave aside the individuality of this tree. As an idea, my imagination of this tree is as good as the real tree, which now could be burned down. What is the sure knowledge which remains with me at this stage? It may seem very little. But for Husserl the immense field of phenomenology just opens out. This essence of tree is an object of my consciousness, an immanent object no doubt, but still opposed to my consciousness. Though immanent, it is transcendent to my thinking. And it is this thinking which now must be explored; for here I can know much more immediately, evidently and adequately what it is to be conscious. Consciousness appears here

as the primary requirement for the manifestation to me of all objects. In studying it and describing it as the condition of all phenomena, Husserl considers that he builds up the true phenomenology, not the one which describes accidents of things but the very essence of "appearing" as such.

Pursuing our march, we find here that consciousness is essentially intentional, that is of another, which is constituted by it as its object. According to the variety of attitudes which the subject can take—to perceive, to imagine, to remember, etc.—the object will now be essentially the "perceived", the "imagined," the "remembered," etc. This aspect of the object will be known with strict knowledge, because we know intuitively the acts of perceiving, imagining and remembering. We can do now one act, now the other, or again the same act and, surely, in this variety we still know what is the essence of each. Husserl gives us long analyses of all the aspects of consciousness, such as belief, affirmation, negation, neutralization (by which he understands such activity as his *epoché* or "disconnecting"); further still he examines the modifications of consciousness in fancy, in actual or potential positings. And this is carried on and adapted to feeling and will. The ultimate rule of certitude in all these analyses is the proximity to the primordial evidence of intuition at the highest rational level, which is the reflection of reason upon pure consciousness. While some knowledge of what transcends experience itself may be incomplete because we have not yet perceived the object in all the perspective variations in which it can appear, consciousness itself, which is strictly immanent, does not undergo these variations. The incompleteness comes only from the flow of consciousness in time. Yet, writes Husserl, while "all corporeally given thing-like entities can also not be," no actual present experiencing can also not be: it is thus necessary. Besides having an essence which can be known, it has also the necessity of a fact.

I am very far from having explained even all the basic elements of Husserl's phenomenology. I should, for instance, pursue his analysis of the *noesis* and the *noema* and their mutual relations. But what we have said is enough to make us realize that Husserl is also and much more than Bergson the philosopher of reflection and intuition. He has developed a much more technical analysis of reflection and has vindicated better many of its true aspects.

Husserl would, no doubt, claim that the eidetic intuition is a strict intuition in the sense in which we defined it above, viz., an

immediate experience of reality. If one would object that this intuition does not verify the definition, because it is not an apprehension of an individual reality, Husserl would answer here that the eidetic reality and especially the eidetic reality of consciousness is the true real, since for him the "real" is the experienced and the evident.

Again what matters here is not so much the question as to which type of intuition is involved, as to find out whether he was right or wrong in the use which he made of it for his philosophy. Through intuition he restored the validity of strict intelligibility against all naturalist denial of the same. The explicit knowledge of our experience and its modalities might not be a strict or proper intuition, but, to me, it seems true that we know reflectively whether we perceive, or imagine, or remember and the nature of those acts, at least to the extent of not mixing them up, if we pay attention to them.

The classical question regarding Husserl's phenomenology bears on the type of reality which the intuited *eidōs*, or essence, has. He denied that it is a "thing", as the Platonic essence is, according to his interpretation of the latter. Against the Empiricists, he claimed that without the "essential insight" they could not even justify their universal proposition that "all valid thought is grounded in experience." Against the Idealists, he thinks that the "essence" is not pure thought or pure *a priori*, for essence is given as an object in reflective intuition. Against those who explained the "essences" by abstraction, he says that the essence itself can never be engendered as the product of abstraction, but only the consciousness of the essence can be thus engendered.¹⁹

Whatever be then the origin of the essences and their ontological status, have we not to acknowledge that we have in our mind the evidence of some principles, and that we can form some ideas, at least those which constitute the very basis of all experience? This is, I think, a truth in Husserl's philosophy, and we can admire the penetration with which he has analysed and brought out those basic principles and ideas.

Yet, once this is acknowledged and granted, the solution of Husserl leaves me only partially satisfied. We have been shown the ground of some "strict knowledge", no doubt. But the barriers of the triple reduction which we had to accept at the

19. *Ideas*, §§ 19-21.

start have never been lifted. Can the object of philosophy be so restricted? For it is not only the method of philosophy which is limited by the reductions, but its very object. Phenomenology examines the possibility of objects but leaves out of its scope the fact of their existence. It does not deny their existence. But it shows only *how* objects *could appear*, not *that they are existent*. Can this be the whole of philosophy?

The Existentialists, who came after Husserl and received so much from him, jumped over the wall, into the field of existence!

The Problem Raised by the Philosophies of Bergson and Husserl

Now that we have considered the philosophies of Bergson and Husserl and tried to give a certain evaluation of them, we realize that their standpoints pose a problem.

Bergson thought that intuition gave him a sure knowledge of a vast field of reality. We saw that a doubt can be raised regarding the scope which he assigned to intuition. But we agreed that in the use of reflection he had something valid for philosophy.

Husserl, on the other hand, scrutinized reflection and its object; he found a field of very strict knowledge, but he remained still too far away from the existential aspect of reality.

If we do not go back to Bergson's views, are we to make the jump towards existence with the existentialists? But then we might lose all the benefits which Husserl's philosophy was offering and find ourselves in a philosophy which cannot clarify itself.

A solution is, of course, to reject both Bergson's and Husserl's philosophies and to adhere to some form of positivism, if not the old one, at least a modern substitute of it, such as language analysis. But to one who has recognized the values inherent in reflective philosophy, language analysis, despite all the usefulness that it can have, will still seem too poor a substitute.

The problem then remains to correct and complete Bergson's and Husserl's philosophy. This task is too long to be done here. I can only suggest the lines along which, I think, one should seek a solution and the kind of problem one must face.

Bergson's reflective outlook, good as it is basically, should be modified by a type of method on the lines of Husserl's analyses. But Husserl's solution should be corrected at least in one important point. The radicalism of his "disconnections" or "reductions" has yielded some sure knowledge; but it seems to me that we

could enter again the field of concrete existence, if the reflective analysis extended itself to our experience of passivity in knowledge. The problem is difficult. It is simpler to say that we are either purely active or purely passive in knowledge. Kant had already seen the difficulty. But his solution, I think, was still incomplete, for he did not justify our knowledge of reality, but only of how things appear to us. Bergson has tried to solve it in *Matter and Memory* and his solution there, I believe, is closer to the truth, because he was careful not to sacrifice any of the aspects of our knowledge. I refer to his analysis of perception where he exposes the view that the mind projects images to represent the material world with which it is in contact intuitively.

It may seem that from the breadth of vision of two great philosophies we have come down to the very small problem of the mutual determination in knowledge of the knower and the known. The problem is with us, no doubt, but also the truth of the great philosophies which raised it. The truth of these philosophies is that we have in reflection the basis of a strict knowledge. The problem of causality between the object and the subject of knowledge could be solved, we think, in a type of metaphysics, more articulated than either Bergson's or Husserl's.

Without such a solution we may be living in the exaltation of an existentialist creed; but reason then asks us to clarify and justify that creed. Or we may be working in the large pastureland of language analysis, but Bergson and Husserl have taught us that, before talking, man usually thinks and can know his thinking through reflection. The philosophy of language might find here a way of going deeper to its own root. If this lesson of Bergson and Husserl is now better understood, our effort has not been in vain. We are on a good path.

Wittgensteinian Technique and the Cartesian Doubt

by

SURESH CHANDRA

In this paper I shall first exhibit the logic of Descartes' arguments in connection with his doubt concerning the knowledge derived through the senses, and then consider some objections raised by Wittgensteinians against the Cartesian Scepticism. Descartes' arguments have become very popular among the contemporary philosophers, though Descartes himself would think that his arguments are misused rather than used by our present-day philosophers. For, he did not make scepticism an end-in-itself, as is clear from his remark, "Not, however in doing so I imitated the sceptics, who doubt only for doubt's sake and desire permanent uncertainty; for, on the contrary my whole design tended only to assurance and to the rejection of the shifting soil or sand, to find solid foundation on the rock or the hard clay."¹ This remark clearly indicates Descartes' motive for doubting a particular piece of knowledge. He invites doubt so that he may achieve the state of certainty. It is owing to this characteristic that his way of doubting is described as "methodological" or "provisional" scepticism. He found the beliefs and opinions of the common people as well as of the learned conflicting with each other. Amid this confusion and uncertainty the problem arises, which beliefs are to be adopted and which rejected. But Descartes preferred the way of systematically doubting every belief, whether it is the belief of a common man or that of a philosopher. His doubt however was only provisional; it was expressed simply to clarify his mind from the dust of confusion and uncertainty. Once the mind is clear from this dust it would distinctly and clearly perceive the truths that are certain. So the method of systematically doubting whatever comes before the mind was to Descartes a way of making preparations to welcome those truths which cannot be doubted.

To understand Descartes' position the expressions 'provisional doubt' and 'methodological doubt' need some further clarifications.

1. Vide *The Philosophy of Descartes*, Selected and translated by A. P. Torrey, p. 56. Henry Holt and Company, 1908.

These expressions imply that Descartes proposes or decides to doubt what ordinarily goes for knowledge. Therefore there seems to be some artificiality attached to his way of doubting. If I say to someone 'I now propose to doubt that there exists a chair on which I am at present sitting', he would laugh at me and think of me as a suitable candidate for the mental hospital. Things are doubted or they are not doubted, but no one proposes to doubt them. Certain reasons lead someone to doubt the truth of a thing, they do not lead him to *propose to doubt* the truth of a thing. "Proposing to doubt" means "not having a real doubt". Had there been a real doubt, Descartes would not have proposed to doubt; in other words, he would have already acted on such a proposal. So if Descartes was merely proposing to doubt, his doubt was not real. To any reader of Descartes it would seem that he was not a sceptic in the real sense of the term. He was merely acting as a hero on the stage, not undergoing the heroic emotions which one feels in the real drama of life. However, when Descartes was proposing to doubt, his proposal was not groundless. And in this also he was behaving just like an actor on the stage whose outward actions are not without reasons to his spectators. So it is very difficult to say that Descartes would have kept his scepticism *merely as a means*, had he entertained a real doubt. Had he entertained a real doubt on the grounds on which he merely proposes to doubt, it is possible he would have also made scepticism a goal of his philosophy rather than its beginning. Whether Descartes was or was not a real sceptic is an irrelevant question for my purpose, since the reasons which he expressed in support of his scepticism are the same which would have been expressed by a real sceptic. So it can be taken for granted that he was a sceptic in the real sense of the term.

Descartes doubts the knowledge derived through the senses by saying, "All that I have hitherto received as most true and assured I have learned from the senses or by means of the senses. But I have sometimes found that these senses were deceivers, and it is the part of prudence never to trust entirely those who have once deceived us".² Since the days of Descartes this argument has become a commandment of the sceptics. All these years it has been defending their philosophical creed. Once a 'sinner' always a 'possible sinner'. But in ordinary life 'doubt' does not have such an application. The cited argument would lead us to suspect

2. *Op. Cit.*, p. 108.

even those pieces of knowledge which are not ordinarily suspected. As Descartes himself puts, "Although the senses may deceive us sometimes in regard to things which are scarcely perceptible and very distant, yet there are many other things of which we cannot entertain a reasonable doubt; although we know them by means of the senses; for example, that I am here, seated by the fire, in my dressing gown holding this paper in my hands, and other things of such a nature. And how can I deny that these hands and this body are mine?"³ By 'reasonable doubt' Descartes means the doubt which is believed to be reasonable by common sense and ordinary language. And in this common-sensical sense Descartes thinks that people do not doubt certain things; and one who entertains doubt in regard to them would be considered as a crazy man. At this level of thought it would seem absurd to deny the existence of a cake I am eating, a dressing gown I am wearing or a paper I am holding in my hands. But Descartes proceeds to shock commonsense by producing arguments against even these truths about which we are most assured in our ordinary life. The reason why such truths should also be doubted is that "I have to consider that I am a man, and that I fall asleep and in my dreams imagine the same things, or even sometimes things less probable than these crazy people do while they are awake. How often have I dreamed in the night that I was in this place, that I was dressed, that I was before the fire, although I was quite naked in my bed. It seems to me indeed at present that I am looking at this paper not with eyes asleep, that this hand which I shake is not in a drowse, that it is with deliberate purpose I stretch my hand, and that I perceive it. What happens in sleep does not appear so clear and distinct as all this."

"But when I consider carefully, I remember that I have often been deceived, while asleep, by similar illusions, and, pondering on the matters, I see so plainly that there are no certain marks by which the waking life is distinguished by the sleeping state that I am quite astonished, and my astonishment is so great as almost to persuade me that I am asleep."⁴ It is clear from the above remarks that (i) firstly the possibility of dream experience and (ii) secondly, the similarity of dream experience with waking experience, lead Descartes to cast doubt even on those propositions which cannot reasonably be doubted on the commonsense

3. *Op. Cit.*, p. 109.

4. *Op. Cit.*, pp. 109-10.

level. To Descartes' argument it is not necessary that one would have dreamt many times in one's life; one dream in one's whole life is sufficient to raise the question 'am I not dreaming?' when one is having a sense experience. Unless this question is settled the experience in question cannot be described as true and valid, for it may be a dream experience. And Descartes finds that this question cannot be settled at all, since the criteria which one might use to decide that one is not dreaming could themselves be used while one is dreaming. There are cases of dreams inside dreams. In other words, Descartes so uses the dream argument that he takes away the criteria of deciding whether one is having a dream or a waking experience. But one thing should be kept in mind that by his argument Descartes does not mean that all life is a dream. He begins with the distinction that there are both dream experiences and waking experiences. But he is puzzled to see that the same sense-organs which are used to express dreams are also used to express waking experiences. And this state of affairs leads him to think that it is impossible to know that one is not having a dream experience when one is waking. The puzzle which Descartes has put before us is epistemological and not metaphysical. It is as to the scope and the limits of knowledge, not as to the nature of the external reality. When it is impossible to decide about an experience whether it is a dream or a waking experience, howsoever incorrigible the experience in question may seem to be on the commonsense level, it remains open to doubt.

Now I shall consider some objections raised against the Cartesian doubt. The arguments of Moore, Wittgenstein and Wisdom against the sceptics in general have become very popular these days. One of the corollaries of the Cartesian Scepticism is that the existence of the external world cannot be known with certainty. Moore argues against this corollary.⁵ But his argument is not convincing. When he proves the externality of the world by raising his hand and saying 'here is my right hand', he forgets that all these actions and utterances which he makes against the sceptic are themselves possible inside a dream. So his actions and utterances fail to *prove* that he knows 'here is my right hand'. For 'knowing here is my right hand' entails 'knowing I am not dreaming', and there exist no criteria by which it can be decided that one is not dreaming. Wittgenstein and his disciples have raised a different kind of objection.

5. *Proof of An External World*, British Academy Lecture, 1939.

In his lectures Wittgenstein used to analyse metaphysical propositions to show that they do not make sense. To exhibit his technique we can take an actual instance of how he dealt with a metaphysical puzzle. When the sceptic says 'one cannot know the mind of another', Wittgenstein thinks that it is a metaphysical puzzle; and the question immediately appears in his mind how to dissolve it. On this puzzle, as Wisdom informs us, "Wittgenstein said that if someone says 'one can't know the mind of another', one may ask 'would you call this knowing the mind of another, or that or that'. For example, one may ask 'suppose a nerve of your body was joined to a nerve of Smith's, so that when someone stuck a pin into Smith you felt pain. Would that be knowing, having, Smith's pain.'"⁶ What Wittgenstein meant by giving such a description of 'knowing the mind of another' is to show that the sceptic's 'can't' is such that no description would satisfy him. And if no description would satisfy him, then 'knowing the mind of another' is a senseless expression. Here Wittgenstein applies his own theory of meaning, which implies that an expression is meaningful if it express a describable state of affairs. Since the sceptic himself denies that 'knowing the mind of another' is describable, so, if Wittgenstein's theory of meaning is correct, then this expression is senseless. But this makes the sceptical proposal 'one can't know the mind of another' itself senseless, since the sceptic is already shown that the contradictory of this proposal is senseless. Thus Wittgenstein removes the sceptic's puzzle by showing that the sceptic uses language nonsensically.

Before we consider objections on other sceptical propositions it would be interesting to discuss some implications of Wittgenstein's theory of meaning. This theory leads Wittgenstein to believe even in such an extraordinary view as that two persons can share the same pain. As he says, "In so far as it makes sense to say that my pain is the same as his, it is also possible for us to have the same pain (And it would also be imaginable for two people to feel pain in the same—not just corresponding—place. That might be the case with Siamese Twins for instance)."⁷ Wittgenstein begins with the assumption that it makes sense to say 'my pain is the same as his'; perhaps because such an expression is used in ordinary language. For example, people say: 'you are

6. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Wisdom*, p. 259, *Mind*, 1952.

7. *Philosophical Investigation*, Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, p. 91, P. Q. 7

so insensitive that you cannot feel my pain' or 'my beloved's pain is the same as mine'. Thinking that it makes sense to say 'my pain is the same as his,' Wittgenstein is led to conceive the state of affairs referred to by this expression. So the meaning of this expression imposes a possible picture of 'two persons sharing the same pain' in his mind. And this picture emerges with all distinctness when he inspects the cases of joint-bodies, forgetting that these joint-bodies may not have a joint-mind. So even in his most mature work Wittgenstein is clinging to the traditional picture theory (or name theory) of meaning as expressed in *Tractatus*. The only difference is that he has reversed the use of this theory. In *Tractatus* he used to decide the meaning of an expression by referring to a possible situation. But now he decides a possible situation by referring to the meaning of an expression. This difference is important because in *Tractatus* this theory led him to a perfect solipsistic world whereas now the individual's world is so much extended that he can even share the headache of his friend. One who wants to deny Wittgenstein's inference that two persons can share the same pain may take the *Tractatus* stand. He may say that it is not imaginable that two persons feel the same pain, so the expression 'my pain is the same as his' does not make sense. But this way of denying Wittgenstein's inference is not to deny his theory of meaning, rather it is to assume the truth of his theory. My objections are against this theory itself.

Wisdom extends Wittgensteinian Technique on such other material object propositions as 'One can't know that there is cheese on the table.'⁸ Just as Wittgenstein raised the question 'what is it to know the mind of another?' Wisdom raises the question 'what is it to know that there is cheese on the table?' As in the former case so also in the latter case, the sceptic would not regard any description as a legitimate description of 'knowing that there is cheese on the table'. And so Wisdom has every right to treat the sceptic's puzzle about material objects in the same fashion in which Wittgenstein treats his puzzle about other minds. Now we have to see whether the sceptic's puzzle concerning dream can also be treated in the same fashion. When the sceptic says, following Descartes' way of doubting, 'one can't know that one is not dreaming', how is his proposal to be questioned on the Wittgensteinian lines? When the sceptic makes such a proposal, one may ask "would you call this 'knowing that one is not dreaming', or that

or that." 'Suppose some one inserts a pin in your body and you cry with pain, would you call this as the state of knowing that you are not dreaming?' Could such a performance produce faith in the sceptic's mind that he is not dreaming or that he is awake? Instead of being satisfied, the sceptic may say some such thing as, 'But pain can be felt inside a dream as well. Is it not possible that you are inserting a pin in my body inside a dream? And so also I am feeling pain when I am dreaming?' So the sceptic would not accept the legitimacy of any possible description of 'knowing that one is not dreaming'. And if one believes in the Wittgensteinian theory of meaning, then it does not make sense to say that 'one knows that one is not dreaming'. And therefore also it does not make sense to say that 'one can't know that one is not dreaming'. So whether the sceptic's puzzle is about other minds or material objects or dream expressions, it is a puzzle based on the senseless use of language.

Now I shall plead the case of the sceptic in short. The objections based on Wittgensteinian technique are misleading. The first feature of these objections is that they are based on the theory of meaning which implies that every sentence and phrase baptises a state of affairs. This theory suffers from the 'Fido-Fido Fallacy'.⁹ Even if, Wittgenstein's theory does not suffer from this fallacy, it fails to refute the sceptic. The sceptic may say that the contradictory of his proposal is not senseless, though it may not describe any situation at all. Not all meaningful expressions are descriptive. There may be expressions which are meaningful yet not descriptive. But the fundamental objection is that Wittgensteinians take it for granted that when the sceptic makes his proposal he is making an empirical claim. And if he is making an empirical claim, then showing that its contradictory does not describe any possible situation does refute the claim in question. But the sceptic would himself deny that his claim is empirical, so Wittgensteinian Technique has no use against him. It has use only against empirical claims. When the sceptic says 'one can't know that one is not dreaming', his 'can't' has the same sort of use which one makes when one says 'red and blue can't occupy the same area all over'. The contradictory of the latter is also inconceivable and indescribable like the former proposition, yet Wittgensteinians do not declare that the latter proposition is senseless or even that it is metaphysical. If by

8. *Philosophical Perplexity*, Aristotelian Society Proceedings, 1936-37,

9. See on this fallacy in Ryle's *Meaning and Necessity*, Philosophy, 1949,

'descriptive proposition' is meant the proposition which has a 'descriptive contradictory', then the instance of the colour proposition implies that there can be a proposition which has a descriptive air about it but is not a descriptive proposition. The contradictory of the colour proposition does not have a 'descriptive contradictory'. If it is true, it is logically, not empirically, true. On the analogy of this proposition a sceptic may say that though his claim, namely, 'one can't know that one is not dreaming', has a descriptive air about it, is only a logical claim. The sceptic may even deny that his claim is metaphysical.

Lastly I shall discuss an argument of Mathrani. Mathrani writes against the sceptic, "the philosopher so uses the illusion argument that 'all the sense organs of all men are always under illusion' ".¹⁰ This the philosopher is never doing by his argument. It seems to me that Mathrani has failed to understand the logic of the sceptical arguments. When the sceptic, as we have seen while discussing the Cartesian arguments, doubts a particular perception, he does not doubt it on the ground that 'all the sense organs of all men are always under illusion'. There would have been no place for doubt if such a situation were true. The ground for the sceptic's doubt is that 'all men are sometimes under illusion'. What is necessary for the sceptic's position is not that all men should always be deceived by their senses, but that they should sometimes—at least once in their life—be deceived by their senses. To call a man criminal it is not necessary that he should commit crimes all his life, only a few crimes would do. Mathrani further makes a false report about the sceptic when he says, "Dreaming implies 'waking up from the dream'. But if, as the philosopher says, we are always in 'dream', what is it like to wake up from the dream?"¹¹ Mathrani's raising the question "what is it like to wake up from the dream?" or his defining 'dream' in terms of 'waking up from the dream' has a use if it is true that the sceptic maintains that we are always in dream. Otherwise defining 'dream' in the way he does is as irrelevant to the issue as is defining 'waking state' in terms of 'going to dream', or asking the question 'what is it like to go to dream'? But in so far as Mathrani thinks that the sceptic means that we are always in dream, he is absolutely wrong. We have seen that Descartes did not mean such a thing as 'we are always in dream'. Rather he

distinguished 'dream experience' from 'waking experience'. What Descartes meant was simply that these occasional dreams lead us to cast doubt on whatever experience we are having. When a sceptic doubts a perception by saying 'one can't know that one is not dreaming' he means to say 'may be one is dreaming, may be one is not'. And this doubt can no more lead us to say 'we are always in dream' than it can lead us to say 'we are always in a waking state'. His doubt is neutral to such inferences. To express one's indecision regarding a particular state is not to express one's decision regarding a particular state. To express one's indecision whether one is having a dream or not is not to express one's positive decision that one is having a dream.

10. *Wittgensteinian Philosophy*, p. 92.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 93.

An Exposition of the Philosophy of Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa

by

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My aim in this paper is to give an exposition of the main features of the philosophy of Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa who was born in the 18th Century A.D. in a village near Remuna in the district of Balasore in Orissa. He was generally known as Govinda Dāsa during his life time and was a disciple of Sri Rādhā Dāmodara Dāsa belonging to the Vaiṣṇava School of Sri Chaitanya. He was the author of a number of books of philosophical importance of which a few may be mentioned here—Govinda Bhāṣya (a commentary on the Brahma Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa), Gītā Bhūṣaṇa (a commentary on the Bhagavad Gītā), Prameya Ratnāvali Siddhānta Ratna, Stavamālā-Vibhūṣaṇa-Bhāṣya (a commentary on Rūpa Gosvāmī's Stavamālā), Tattva-Sandarbhā Tīkā (a commentary on Jīva Gosvāmī's Tattva-Sandarbhā) etc.

His views were, no doubt, considerably influenced by the thoughts of other Vaiṣṇava thinkers and specially by those of Madhva and Sri Chaitanya. But it is worth while to discuss his philosophy not only as an off-shoot of Vaiṣṇava theism, but also as a system of speculative philosophy which, through its intrinsic merit, is capable of throwing some light on certain important problems uppermost in the minds of the philosophers of India in the past. Even though his main aim was to preach the doctrine of devotion towards the Lord, his critical acumen seems to be simply astounding. But a systematic study of his philosophy, so far, has been practically neglected. Small but useful accounts of his doctrine are, of course, found in Dr. Radhakrishnan's "Indian Philosophy" Vol. II and Dr. Dasgupta's "History of Indian Philosophy" Vol. IV. In this small paper, I propose to give, as far as possible, a systematic account of certain features of his philosophy as contained in his two works, viz., Prameya Ratnāvali and Govinda Bhāṣya.

1. *Pramāṇas* (Means of Valid Knowledge):

Baladeva accepts only three *pramāṇas*, viz., perception, inference and verbal testimony, which includes Śruti or Scripture, the words of inspired sages and of competent and honest persons. Among these *pramāṇas*, Śruti according to him is the highest means of valid knowledge: "*Tatra mukhyā śrutih bhavet*" (Prameya Ratnāvali). Baladeva raises certain interesting points against the absolute validity of perception and reasoning which are worthy of being considered. Perception, says Baladeva, is not altogether free from mistakes. There are cases of mal-observation and non-observation. Perception sometimes becomes deceptive as when one sees a head created by magic. "*Māyāmunḍāvalokādaḥ pratyakṣam vyabhicāri yat*" (Ibid). Similarly the knowledge based upon inference is also liable to error. The inference of the existence of fire from the perception of the existence of smoke at a distance is not invariably valid. Sometimes smoke also arises from the fire quenched by water, and if a person suffering from cold infers the existence of fire from smoke arising at a distance and goes there in order to get rid of cold, he will surely be disappointed: "*Anumā cāti dhumādaḥ vṛṣṭinirvāpitāgnike*" (Ibid). From such examples of error in inference and perception, Baladeva concludes that they are not absolutely reliable, and therefore they are not independent means of right knowledge.

These sceptical remarks of Baladeva with regard to the validity of perception etc. can be very well compared with similar observations made by Descartes in his *Meditations*. "The Senses", says Descartes, "sometimes mislead us and it is the part of prudence not to place absolute confidence in that by which we have even once been deceived." But the conclusions arrived at by the two thinkers are different. Descartes arrived at a general rule that all that is very clearly and distinctly apprehended or conceived is true, and this principle he accepted without any doubt. Thus he appealed to a direct and clear intuition of truth. But as is well known, the standard that Descartes supposed to be invincible is anything but that. For there is no established criterion by which one intuition can be distinguished from another as a clearer and a more distinct intuition of truth. According to Baladeva, on the other hand, the only proof free from all the possibilities of errors is the verbal testimony, whether it is the word of God as found in the Śruti, or the word of an inspired sage or of a competent and honest person. Verbal testimony as an instrument of proof supports and corroborates perception and

inference. Perception and inference are subsidiary to the word, because they are corrected by means of the word: "*Pratyakṣam anumānam ca yat sāvīryena śuddhimat*" (Ibid). But the defects in such a conception are obvious. The validity or otherwise of 'word' itself is discovered through other means of right knowledge. So there is no ground for saying that the word is absolutely reliable. And when any scripture can possibly be claimed as a divine revelation, and any word as the word of a competent and reliable person, reliability or otherwise of such words can be ascertained not through those words themselves, but through other means of right knowledge only. If there are cases of mal-observation or wrong inference, there are instances of valid perception and inference too.

Nor can it be said that there is no reasoning which is absolutely unassailable, for then the reasoning by which reasoning is held to be inconclusive would itself become invalid. Most of our activities are based upon inference. The future is predicted from the past and the present, relying upon inference. The actions which have been found pleasant or painful in their results in the past are followed or avoided by reasoning alone. So if every reasoning be inconclusive, then all worldly activities would be impossible.

All these objections against Baladeva's arguments to show non-finality of reasoning were anticipated by Baladeva himself in his commentary on the *Brahma Sūtras*. Here, his reply is akin to that of Śaṅkara in the same context. He says, "In certain secular matters (such as mathematical reasoning), reasoning is absolute; but in matters transcendental such as the existence of God, of after-life, of final release, etc., the pronouncements of human intellect can never be perfectly free from doubt; because these are matters not within the scope of our mind. For Brahman is inconceivable and consequently unarguable" (Govinda Bhāṣya, 2.1.11). From such statements of Baladeva, it is quite clear that he does not disregard reasoning in secular matters, nor does he make it the handmaid of Śruti in all matters. The jurisdiction of Śruti, therefore, is mainly confined to the transcendental and theological matters, and Śruti is the highest authority in such matters. This can be very well compared with the following remarks of Śaṅkara in the same context.—"*Yadyapi kvacid viśaye tarkasya pratiṣṭhitatvam upalakṣyate, tathāpi prakṛte tād viśaye prasajyate eva anirmokṣaḥ tarkasya*" (Śāriraka Bhāṣya, 2.1.11).

Śaṅkara as well as Baladeva both regard reasoning to be well established in its own sphere, i.e., in secular matters. In matters

that are transcendental, reasoning should play an auxiliary role only: "*Anukūlo matah tarkah śuṣkam tu parivarjayet*" (Prameya Ratnāvali). In the words of Śaṅkara, *tarka* should be *āgamānu-sāri* while dealing with such matters.

2. The Conception of God or Brahman:

Relying absolutely upon Śruti with regard to transcendental matters and taking resort to reasoning as auxiliary to Śruti, Baladeva in his Prameya Ratnāvali begins the enunciation of his first prameya, according to which Lord Viṣṇu or Kṛiṣṇa is the Supreme Reality or Brahman.

Baladeva vehemently criticises the doctrine of Advaita which reminds us of a similar criticism made by Rāmānuja in his Śrībhāṣya. Nirguṇa Brahman, says Baladeva, is unreal and illusory in as much as it is not an object of any means of valid knowledge: "*alīkam nirguṇam brahma pramāṇāviśayatvataḥ*" (Prameya Ratnāvali). Rāmānuja makes a similar observation in his Śrībhāṣya: "*Na kenāpi pramāṇena nirviśeṣavastusiddhiḥ*". Attributeless indeterminate Absolute is as good as a mere void.

Śaṅkara in his comentary on Taittirīya Upaniṣad states that words like "*Satyam*", "*Jñānam*", and "*Anantam*" used in the Śruti do not describe Brahman in as much as He is by nature indescribable. But these words are used only to suggest or indicate Brahman: "*Satyam jñānam anantam Brahma iti Brahmano lakṣaṇārtham vākyam*". Baladeva objects to such an interpretation of Śruti. If Nirguṇa Brahman of Śaṅkara cannot be described by any word, It cannot also be suggested by *Lakṣaṇā*. For *lakṣaṇā* can apply only to those things which are capable of being expressed by words: "*Sarvaih śabdaih avācye tu lakṣaṇā na bhavedataḥ, lakṣyam ca na bhaved dharmahīnam Brahmeti me matam*" (P.R.).

Brahman or God according to Baladeva is not totally inexpressible or indescribable by words. In certain passages of Śruti like "*Yato vāco nivartante aprāpya mānsā saha*" Brahman is said to be ineffable, but this only implies that He is not expressible by words in His entirety. Otherwise the very teaching of the Vedas would become useless when they try to describe Brahman. Why should one study the Vedas if the Lord is not at all expressible by words? "*Kvacid kvacidavācyaṭvam yad vedeṣu vilodkyate, kārtsnyena vācyaṭ na bhavediti syāt tatra sangatiḥ*" (P.R.). Brahman is said to be indescribable in the sense that He is not

completely describable or expressible. It implies no more than the Biblical challenge: 'Can'st thou find out the Almighty unto perfection? It is as high as heaven, what can'st thou do? Deeper than hell, what can'st thou know?'

Brahman is *Nirguṇa* only in the sense that He does not possess the three guṇas or qualities of Prakṛiti i.e. *sattva*, *rajas*, or *tamas*. But He is the abode of other qualities like all-pervadingness, intelligence, bliss, etc. But these attributes of the Lord are not separate from His own self. There is no difference between the quality and the substance qualified, so far as the Lord is concerned. By virtue of the category of *Viśeṣa*, the differential predication may be regarded as true even though there may actually be no difference between the two. Statements like "Being exists", "space is everywhere", "time always is", are not false, nor are they super-impositions, nor figurative speeches like "Devadatta is a lion". They are meaningful and legitimate uses of language. "Being exists" is no less informative in its own way than the statement "jar exists". But at the same time, in this case, the predicate and the subject are not different from each other. In these instances as also in the case of God there is no difference between the attributes and the substance which is the substratum of the attributes. But at the same time, it is not illegitimate to predicate the qualities of the substance due to the peculiarity of *Viśeṣa*: "*Na bhinnā dharmiṇo dharmā bhedabhānam viśeṣataḥ*" (P.R.).

The Lord is pure intelligence and bliss as such, but at the same time He is conceived by Baladeva as having a form. He is not an indeterminate formless Being devoid of all predicates who is to be indicated by a cluster of negations, but a Lord endowed with all virtues and a body or *vigraha* constituted of existence, knowledge and bliss (*Saccidānanda Vigraha*). He is consciousness solidified (*Vijñāna-ghana*) and not mere consciousness or *Vijñāna*, and bliss solidified (*Ananda-ghana*) and not mere bliss or *Ananda*. In His case, His very body is His Self and His Self is His body (*Vigraha eva ātmā, ātmā eva Vigraha*). There is no difference between the form and the Self of Brahman. Brahman is conceived to have a form for the sake of meditation. But this conception of a form of Brahman for the sake of meditation is not illusory. Brahman has a real form, but in His case form is His very Self. Such is the supra-logical power of the Lord that He is revealed in a limited form to a devotee, remaining at the same time as an all-pervasive *Vibhu*. Thus God is conceived as

having inconceivable powers, and as being the substrate of all contradictory and paradoxical qualities.

3. Reality of the World:

According to Baladeva, the Lord possessed of inconceivable and infinite power creates the world as a sport or *Līlā*, through the mere exuberance of His spirit. This *līlā* or the sport of the Lord is natural to Him, because He is full of Self-bliss. The omniscient Viṣṇu has created the universe as a reality, through His powers. There are of course passages in the Śruti which declare the world to be *asat* or unreal. But they should not be taken in their literal sense. Such passages have the purpose of evoking an attitude of dispassion and indifference towards the world, on the part of those who are attached to worldly objects. Baladeva's own statement in Govinda Bhāṣya is as follows—"In the Scriptures the world is sometimes said to be mere illusion, no doubt, but it is said so in order to produce disgust and indifference towards it, and not that the world is really non-existent or an illusion": "*Svaśaktiā sṛṣṭvān Viṣṇu yathārtham sarvavit jagat, ityukteḥ satyamevaitad vairāgyārtham asat vacaḥ*" (P.R.). A similar interpretation of Śruti is to be found in the following Sāṃkhya Sūtra of Kapila—"Na śruti-virodho rāginām vairagyāya tatsiddheḥ".

Baladeva's interpretation of Śruti describing the world as *asat* or unreal can be compared to the remarks which a great philosopher of the present century has made in a different context. Prof. Lazerowitz, in his 'Structure of Metaphysics' gives a similar analysis of the possible connotations of the terms 'real' and 'unreal' as they are used by the metaphysicians in different contexts. "It is pertinent to note", says Lazerowitz, "that the sense of important is one of the obsolete meanings of the 'real', and the word still carries with it emotive overtones of approval. The terms 'unreal', 'mere appearance', and the like, also, in addition to their literal meaning carry with them emotively derogatory connotations which are associated with such terms as 'non-genuine' and 'worthless'. Thus it would hardly stretch present usage if the metaphysician of the unreality of the physical world unconsciously used the terms 'real' and 'mere appearance' in their obsolete senses of important and worthless. It seems plain that for him, as well as for others who have his needs and are able to make his associations to the words 'things are but appearances', these express the belief, 'Things are meaningless and without worth'." (Page 229).

4. Status of *jīva* or the individual soul:

According to Baladeva, *jīvas* are all atomic and intelligent knowers. "*Jīva* is a part of the Lord like the rays of the Sun, which are separate from it, but which continually accompany it and which in a way are dependent upon it." "The soul is not a part of Brahman in the sense of a piece of stone cut off from a rock by the chisel. *Jīva* is described as a part of Brahman, in the sense of being a subordinate member of Brahman, separate from Him, but related to Him, as the created, the ruled, the supported, etc." All the energies of the soul are from the Lord. The phrases like "Thou art that", etc., declare that the "thou" is dependent upon the "that" for all its functions. But for all that, *Jīva* is not a mere automaton. He is a responsible moral agent, though no doubt a secondary agent, while the Lord is the causative agent without whose permission the soul can do nothing. Though the Lord is the impelling force, responsibility of the soul does not cease for that reason. God is the exciting cause just like the rain in the case of the growth of a tree. Even though the rain is the general cause, seed is the particular cause of the particular kind of fruit produced. So also, even though the Lord is the general cause, soul is particularly responsible for its actions. Thus ethics is not out of place in the philosophy of Baladeva. The world for him is not a mere puppet show where the Absolute is the direct agent in everything that is done. Baladeva clearly remarks in his Prameya Ratnāvali that even though there is similarity among the individual souls so far as they are all atomic and intelligent knowers, they also differ from each other due to their diverse activities or *sādhana*s: "*Sāmye satyapi jīvānām tārātamyam ca sādhanāt*."

5. The conception of Mokṣa or Liberation:

Liberation or Mokṣa according to Baladeva consists in the attainment of the Lord whose servants the souls are and the means towards liberation is one-pointed devotion towards Him. *Bhakti* or devotion is divided into two types—*vidhi bhakti* and *ruci bhakti*. The devotee adopting the path of *vidhi bhakti* worships God as a Supreme Being who transcends humanity, whereas the devotee adopting the path of *ruci bhakti* worships Him in a human form. Any one of these paths may be adopted.

Mokṣa, according to Baladeva, is not a complete merging of the individual soul in the Absolute. *Jīva* becomes like Brahman

and not actually Brahman: "Because I desire to be made more and more in the likeness of God, I do not therefore desire to be God" (P. Pattison). The liberated soul is equal to God in all matters of enjoyment, but it has no power of creation and it retains its atomic form even after its liberation. Thus the difference between the Jiva and God is ultimately and eternally real according to Baladeva. Brahman should not be conceived as an all-engulfing absolute in which "there is an all-pervasive transfusion with a reblending of all materials, and in which the finite centres blend and are resolved. In the state of liberation there is an eternal communion of the soul with the Lord". "Our destiny, our being's heart and home is with infinitude and only there" (Wordsworth, *The Prelude*, Book VI). And in Mokṣa, this destiny of the soul is fulfilled, and a happy return to its home is accomplished.

There is an excess of reciprocal love between the Lord and the liberated soul. "On the one hand, the Lord has the strong determination not to leave his devotees, and on the other hand his devotees have an equally strong love for Him which does not allow them to leave Him" (4.4.22). And this perpetual love and devotion of the soul towards the Lord even after the liberation, and the yearning, in return, of the Divine for fellowship—this mutual relationship between the Lord and his devotee is not mere māyā or avidyā. For Baladeva and for those who belong to his school of thought, the recognition by the finite individual of his own groundedness in the Infinite is the supreme achievement of which he is capable, and "in the society of such individuals, and in their communion with God, the supreme values of the universe emerge; and it is not personal vanity which suggests that for the Absolute such communion must possess a living value which no solitary perfection or contemplative felicity could yield."

Book Reviews

Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedānta. By K. Satchidananda Murty, Head of the Department of Philosophy, Andhra University, Waltair; pp. 365+xix; Price Rs. 25; published (1959) by Andhra University, Waltair; Columbia University Press, New York.

The discussion of the means of valid knowledge forms an important part of Indian philosophical works. Thus the importance of epistemology was recognized early in Indian Philosophy. Every school took care to define its position in epistemology, for its epistemology had a distinct bearing on its metaphysics and its overall philosophical position. This metaphysical bearing was not altogether lost sight of even when independent treatises came to be written on the epistemology of a particular school. The means of valid knowledge ranged from one to six. Verbal testimony (*Śabda Pramāṇa*) is accepted as means of valid knowledge in almost all the orthodox systems of Indian philosophy. This verbal testimony is constituted by the Vedas which, in the eyes of the orthodox, are the repository of Divine Revelation.

Verbal testimony or the acceptance of authority may seem to many Westerners to be no method of knowledge at all. But in Indian Philosophy it has very great importance. It is the only means of knowledge about supersensible matters. The claim of reason is by no means ignored, but it is kept within bounds. It is not itself an independent means of knowledge (*Pramāṇa*), but an accessory to *Pramāṇa* (*Pramāṇa Sahakārī*). This procedure saves us on the one hand from agnosticism, and on the other from dogmatism.

Revelation along with its philosophical implications has engaged the attention of many thinkers in Europe too, as Sri Murti, the author of the book under review, points out in his *Preface* (p. vii).

Among the systems of Indian philosophy Advaita Vedānta occupies a predominant place. But no work has so far been written exclusively on the roles of Revelation and Reason in this system. Sri Murti, in giving us a book on this topic, has filled up a great lacuna and has done a distinct service to Indian Philosophy.

The book is divided into two parts. The whole of Book I with its two parts is exclusively devoted to a detailed, and on the whole a faithful, exposition of Revelation and Reason and other allied topics according to Advaita Vedānta. The exposition covers more than half of the total book and is based on a first-hand study of the Advaitic classics which by no means make an easy reading.

Part I of Book Two is devoted to a consideration of the topics referred to above, as we find them discussed in the remaining five orthodox systems of Indian philosophy. The inclusion of the views of these systems makes the present work pretty comprehensive, and at the same time it helps us in seeing the Advaitic position in proper perspective. Part II of Book Two contains the author's own views. Here the author makes "an independent criticism of the Advaita metaphysics, theology and 'Vedic revelation'" (Pp. viii-ix, *Preface*). So far as his metaphysical position is concerned, the author owes allegiance to the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* of Rāmānuja, which seems to be a matter of faith to him. His views on Revelation agree with those of the Nyāya writer Jayanta Bhatta. This realistic bias of the author seems to have been enhanced by the author's study of European thinkers (*Preface*, p. ix).

The realistic bias of the author makes itself evident even in the expository part in which he has generally tried to refrain from criticism. Śaṅkara, for example, is said to 'quibble' in reply (p. 126), and the Advaitin is said to 'throw up his hands' when there is a reference to the *anirvacaniya vāda* of Vedānta. While saying so, the author finds it convenient to ignore the hard philosophizing which has gone into the establishment of the said view, and to which Sri Harsha's *Khaṇḍana* and Madhusudan's *Advaita Siddhi* bear ample testimony.

It is this realistic bias that vitiates the critical part of the book, especially the author's criticism of Advaita Vedānta. The author does not offer any new point by way of criticism of Advaita Vedānta, but simply finds satisfaction in repeating and piling up old and trite arguments, which have been effectively refuted in Advaitic works.

The author himself refers in his *Introduction* (p. xvii) to a remark made to him by Karl Jaspers in 1954 that "there was no metaphysics superior to that of Śaṅkara". But it seems the author's main concern is to refute this view and to vindicate the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* of Rāmānuja with the zeal of a missionary, and we may even add in the spirit of 'cold war.' Naturally, therefore,

emotion seems to get the better of reason in his treatment of the subject, and this is most evident in his unwarranted tirades against Advaitism.

In the *Preface* (p. viii), the author himself quotes Paul Deussen's view on Advaita Vedānta: "On the tree of wisdom there is no fairer flower than the Upaniṣads and no finer fruit than the Vedānta philosophy" (*Outline of the Vedānta*, Prefatory Note). We want to remind our author of another remark of P. Deussen on other varieties of Vedānta, not excluding the *Viśiṣṭādvaita*: "It is true, that even here in the sanctuary of Vedāntic metaphysics, the realistic tendencies, natural to man, have penetrated, producing the misinterpreting variations of Śaṅkar's Advaita, known under the names *Viśiṣṭādvaita*, *Dvaita*, *Suddhādvaita* of Rāmānuja, *Madhva*, *Vallabha*,—but India till now has not yet been seduced by their voices, and of hundred Vedāntins (I have it from a well-informed man, who is himself a zealous adversary of Śaṅkara and follower of Rāmānuja) fifteen perhaps adhere to Rāmānuja, five to Madhva, five to Vallabha, and seventy-five to Śaṅkarācharya. This fact may be for poor India in so many misfortunes a great consolation....Indians, keep to it!" (Appendix to *My Indian Reminiscences*).

Logical acuteness and high-level philosophical criticism have never been the forte of the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* school, as certainly these have been of Advaita Vedānta (*vide* History of Indian Philosophy, vol. III by S. Dasgupta, Pp. 111-112). The logical discrepancies of the former are too evident to be missed by any unbiased thinker (*vide* Outlines of Indian Philosophy by M. Hirani, Pp. 409-10). It is from this logically vulnerable standpoint that our author undertakes to criticize Advaita Vedānta, and so the results seem to be foredoomed to failure. His criticisms do not stand philosophical scrutiny. But at places our author outdoes Rāmānuja himself. Rāmānuja certainly accepts the testimony of the scriptures. Without denying their sanctity and validity he only puts his own interpretations on the scriptural texts. But our author goes to the length of repudiating the authority of the scriptures outright whenever he finds it convenient. Speaking, for example, about the *Mahāvākya*—"That Art Thou"—our author says, "Once we abandon the notion of scriptural infallibility, there is no reason why a repugnant statement should be accepted even if it is found in a scripture" (p. 266). Surely you cannot eat the cake and have it, too. Either you accept verbal testimony or reject it. Personal repugnance has no philosophical value.

P. Q. 9

Our author accepts the principles of scriptural interpretation as laid down by the Mīmāṃsā school and followed by Advaita Vedānta. But he refuses to accept the results of the application of these very principles. According to him, Śaṅkara started with the wrong presumption that the Veda is meant for teaching Advaita (p. 331). But while making this remark our author conveniently ignores the repeated and unambiguous assertions of the Scriptures about the denial of all plurality: 'neha nānā'sti kiñcana', 'mṛtyoḥ sa mṛtyumāpnoti ya iha nāneva paśyati': "There is here no multiplicity whatever; who sees here as it were many passes from death to death." (Brh. IV. 4. 19; Katha ii, 4. 11).

It is futile to deny these clear declarations of the scripture. Advaitism does full justice to these, and also finds, at the same time, due place for theistic and dualistic statements of the scripture on the empirical plane. The theistic systems, on the other hand, either explain away the non-dualistic passages or offer distorted interpretations of the same. 'Tattvamasi'—Thou Art That is explained, for example, as 'atatvamasi'—Thou Art not That. Unfortunately our author belongs to their class. This shows, if at all, the 'reign of religion' in philosophy.

On some issues the author accepts the realistic standpoint of Nyāya. Take, for example, the case of the validity of knowledge which is an important problem of Indian philosophy. According to Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta validity is intrinsic to knowledge, whereas its invalidity is extrinsic. This is a sound position on any consideration. Not so, however, according to our author: "... we must reject the Vedānta Theory that knowledge testifies to its own authenticity the criterion for the truth of a statement is independent of the statement itself" (p. 307).

This may be good commonsense (or not even that) but surely not sound philosophy. The defects of this view are obvious. Sri Kumārila Bhatta has rightly pointed out with great philosophical acumen that unless validity be intrinsic to knowledge itself, nothing else can make it valid:

*Svataḥ sarva pramāṇānam prāmāṇyamiti gamyatām
Nahi svato'sati śaktiḥ kartumanyena śakyate*

(Śloka Vārtika)

knowledge must be the guarantee of its own truth. Infinite regress is inevitable if any external criterion be granted; for the validating knowledge must itself be validated. Any pragmatic test cannot

theoretically be a reliable guarantee of truth. All that pragmatic tests, coherence etc., can do is to remove the doubts that may creep in occasionally, and not to establish validity. The validity of knowledge must be intrinsic both in its origin (*Utpatti*) and its apprehension (*Jñapti*). Situated as we are, empirically speaking, the only condition that is demanded is the negative one of the absence of any vitiating factor (*doṣābhāva*) in the causes that give rise to knowledge. But even this negative condition accounts for the absence of invalidity, and not for the positive fact of validity. Validity is the rule, and invalidity an exception. A common man proceeds to act on his knowledge without waiting to verify it. This is sound philosophy as well as commonsense. Unfortunately both these are ignored by our author in espousing the realistic standpoint of Nyāya.

We may here draw attention to certain avoidable inaccuracies in the book which certainly do not make a pleasant reading. Our author's translation of 'yajamanaḥ prastaraḥ' as 'The sacrificer is a stone' (p. 122) is surely incorrect and betrays an ignorance of *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*. The word 'prastara' certainly means 'stone' in some contexts, but in the sacrificial context it means a handful of *Kuśa* grass (Poa Cynosuroides).

Though our author says in the *Preface* (p. xi) that he has followed the usual method of transliteration of Sanskrit terms and passages, we come across numerous mistakes with regard to the same which cannot be called misprints. One persistent wrong use is *Śṛti* for *Śruti*. The word *Kaṭaka* with a dot under 't' makes altogether a different meaning from the one intended by the author viz., clearing nut (p. 116). So also the word *lakṣanā* with 'ā' does not mean 'characteristic' as given by the author. So also we fail to understand why the word 'bhrama' should be written as 'bhramā'. Even the Upaniṣads are not properly spelt. We wish greater care had been exercised with regard to these seemingly trifling things.

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Upaniṣad Digdarśana (Hindi) by Dr. Divanchand; Pp. 204; Price Rs. 2.75; Published by Viśveśvarānanda Vaidic Saṁsthāna, Hoshiarpur.

The present work is based on the author's *Short Studies in the Upaniṣads*. The author takes up some important topics from

the Upaniṣads and offers critical reflections on the same. His comparisons of some of these topics with similar thoughts of the Western thinkers makes the book interesting reading. But it seems the author has not been able to grasp properly the monistic spirit of the Upaniṣads. The book may be of help in creating an interest in the original study of the Upaniṣads.

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Books Received

1. *The Concept of Mind in Indian Philosophy*, by Sarasvati Chennakesavan, published by Asia Publishing House, Bombay, price Rs. 10/-.

2. *Exposition and Critique of the Conceptions of Eddington Concerning the Philosophy of Physical Science*, by Johannes Witthansen, published by G. E. C. Gode's Forlag, Copenhagen.

3. *The First Five Lives of Annie Besant*, by Arthur H. Nethercot, published by the University of Chicago Press, price \$7/50 cents.

4. *An Introduction to General Philosophy*, by Sibapada Chakravarti, published by Kamala Book Depot., Calcutta.

5. *The Theory and Art of Mysticism*, by Radhakamal Mukerjee, published by Asia Publishing House, Bombay, price Rs. 14/-

6. *Sri Aurobindo and the Mother on Education*, published by Sri Aurobindo International Centre of Education, Pondicherry, price Rs. 2/50.

