

H53

Philosophical Quarterly

July 1960

32
QMm2, N25
N60.33.2
124047

3.621

THE
PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

4

Vol. XXXIII, No. 2]

[July, 1960

AN ORGAN
OF
THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY
AND
THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS

453


Managing Editor :
PROF. G. R. MALKANI

Editorial Board :
PROF. N. A. NIKAM
PROF. P. J. CHAUDHURY

Yearly Subscription Rs. 6
For Congress Members Rs. 5
Foreign 10 Shillings or \$ 2-50. Single copy Re. 1-50 or 3 Shillings

CONTENTS

G. E. Moore as I Knew Him by G. C. Chatterji ..	71
On Professor Moore by G. N. Mathrani ..	79
On G. E. Moore by Professor N. A. Nikam ..	85
Moral Freedom in the Philosophy of G. E. Moore by K. J. Shah ..	89
G. E. Moore by Kali Krishna Banerji ..	93
Some Misconceptions of Idealism by Warren E. Steinkraus ..	103
Idealistic Trends of Contemporary India by A. C. Mukerji ..	111
Book Reviews ..	123
Books Received ..	132
Indian Philosophy at the International Congress of Philosophy, 1958: A review by J. F. Staal ..	132



SL
R100 2012
2/60

THE

PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Vol. XXXIII, No. 2]

[July, 1960

G. E. Moore as I Knew Him

by

G. C. CHATTERJI

*Presidential Address delivered at the Memorial Meeting held on
30th December, 1959*

I went to Cambridge in the October term of 1915 as a Government of India State Scholar. I had just taken my M.A. in Philosophy from the Punjab University and established a new record. Amongst my text books for the paper on Ethics was G. E. Moore's *Principia Ethica*. This book had made a deep impression on my young mind by its use of the Analytical method then quite new in the field of Philosophy, and by the originality of its conclusions.

Before my departure from India, I had obtained admission in Trinity College with which all the great galaxy of Cambridge philosophers of that time was associated. James Ward, Prof. of Mental Philosophy, was a Fellow of our College, so also were G. E. Moore, and Bertrand Russell. J. E. McTaggart, the great Hegelian, was Lecturer for Moral Sciences in the College and became my Director of Studies.

I well remember my first interview with Dr. McTaggart. We discussed the programme of lectures that I was to attend. These included lectures by Professors James Ward, and W. R. Sorley, W. E. Johnson, the great Logician of King's College, G. E. Moore and McTaggart himself. It is difficult to imagine the thrill I felt. These were names already familiar to me from their great books, but to be able to meet them face to face, and to be taught by them by direct word of mouth, seemed to be indeed a miracle.

Nor was I disappointed in my expectations, for all of them proved to be not only great thinkers, but also great teachers. Each was different from the other though they had great qualities in common. Each was absorbed deeply in the philosophical problems with which he was concerned, and each looked out with a keen eye to discover some talent in his students, and having found some spark of it, was prepared to take endless trouble to nurse it.

They were all a little eccentric, as all great philosophers should be. But the most eccentric of them all was G. E. Moore, who was also the most original. On an assessment of the history of philosophy for the last half century or more, it was Moore, who exercised the biggest influence on the current of living thought.

During my days in Cambridge, Moore was a University Lecturer in Mental Sciences. The salary he received in this position was only fifty pounds. He had of course his Fellowship at Trinity, which entitled him to something like £ 300 in those days, and rooms in the College with the privilege of dining in Hall at the High Table without any payment.

Mental Sciences in Cambridge terminology meant Logic and Psychology. Neither of these were Moore's special interest. But he felt more competent to deal with Psychology than Logic. He gives a most disarming account of his first teaching appointment in Cambridge in the Autobiographical note which he contributed to the volume on G. E. Moore's Philosophy, in the Library of Living Philosophers. The story of how he persuaded Johnson who was lecturing on Psychology to exchange with him and take up Logic instead, was indeed one of those small personal incidents which can bring about very big results. Not only it enabled Moore to lay the foundations of his Analytical approach to the great problems of Epistemology, Metaphysics and Ethics, but also enabled Johnson to complete his monumental work on Logic.

The syllabus ran somewhat as follows :—"Psychology; Science of Mental Phenomena, the Stream of Consciousness, the Subject-Object Relation, etc.

During a whole term Moore never got beyond these first items. What is a mental phenomenon, how mental phenomena differ from physical phenomena, the status of sense-data, and the nature of their awareness by a conscious being occupied him for full three months.

His method of lecturing was extraordinary. He would come in great haste to his lecture room, carrying reams and reams of notes. After a few preliminary remarks, he would rush to the blackboard, and start drawing some queer figures and jotting down some unintelligible formulae. He would then rush back to his notes only to return to the blackboard. He would wipe out all he had written before with the long sleeves of his doctorate gown. He could never see the duster prominently displayed on the top of the blackboard. He would then exclaim, "I am very sorry. It was all wrong. It should have been like this!" But the revised version made no more sense than the original except to the few initiates.

Like all good teachers, Moore disliked any question being asked during the course of his lecture. But on every Saturday he held a discussion class. There was a very special etiquette which had to be followed on these occasions. Every question had to begin in the form, "You said so and so, what exactly did you mean, and how do you reconcile it with such and such which you said earlier?"

The Moral Sciences Tripos attracts a lot of women students in the first term. Philosophy is a new thing to them for it is not taught in schools. They come with romantic ideas of new pathways of knowledge which it will open out for them.

In my first term in Cambridge, there were only three or four men who took up this Tripos. Those were lean years of the First World War. But there was no dearth of women. Some twenty of them elected for this subject. It was amusing how as the term progressed their numbers shrivelled. The most potent cause of this loss of feminine talent to the cause of philosophy, was Moore's discussion class.

When a discussion class started, we men were slow to take part. But women jump in when men hesitate. As some fashionably dressed Newnhamite or Girtonian framed her question, starting with "You said.....", Moore would go into a frenzy. He would tear his hair, he would throw up his hands in holy horror, and yell, "I never said anything of the kind! But what on Earth do you mean? Or do you mean anything at all?"

A demonstration or two of this kind shut the ladies up for the rest of the time. Then mustering courage a few of us would ask some cautious questions. Immediately Moore's attitude would

change. He would follow the question most closely. He would repeat it, making some statement which was somewhat vague, more exact. He would then try to answer the question, and very often admit that what he had said required modification.

It was this quality of constant willingness to revise, and re-shape his ideas, which endeared Moore to all his students. He was impatient with woolliness of thought or language. "What on Earth do you mean?" was his favourite expression. But while he used it often when talking to friends as well as students, one knew that it was a question which he addressed to himself even more frequently.

After my first term in Cambridge, Mc Taggart thought I should write a fortnightly essay for Dr. Moore. This was to be additional to the weekly essay I wrote for Mc Taggart. For this I would have to pay an extra fee of two guineas a term. Moore did not accept more than two or three pupils for these special exercises. But he had expressed his willingness to take me. This was a privilege which I greatly appreciated.

I wrote my first paper for Moore with extreme care. I have forgotten now what the exact subject was. It had something to do with the "Status of Sense-data".

Consider my consternation when it came back to me, scribbled over in red pencil, with marginal remarks against almost every line, "What on Earth do you mean?", "What utter nonsense", and compliments of a similar kind. I was to see Moore in two days time to discuss the essay with him personally. If I was ever seized by suicide impulse it was during this interval. In the end some kind of stubbornness made me postpone my exit from this world till I had bearded the lion in his own den.

It was with shaking knees and a quaking heart that I went to Moore's rooms on the fateful day. As I entered the room, I sensed that the scene was not laid for an execution but for a very friendly and intimate discussion. Old Moore was wearing gray flannels and a threadbare Norfolk Jacket. There was a blazing fire on the hearth, and coffee was simmering in a silver pot. Moore greeted me with a shy smile and said, "I was delighted with that essay of yours. Come and sit down. How do you like your coffee?"

I mumbled something about his cutting remarks on my exercise and told him that I had nearly thought of committing suicide.

He seemed terribly upset and a very sad look came on his face. "I am very sorry," he said, "but you know I don't write such remarks on an essay unless it is very good. If someone sends me a lot of rubbish, I only say,—'Excellent'. You don't need to write any more papers for me".

Then followed two hours of a deeply interesting discussion, during which Moore smoked some two hundred matches. It was a standing joke amongst us, that having filled his pipe, Moore would light a match, forget to apply it to his pipe, and then suddenly drop it on the carpet, when it began to burn his fingers. How he never set the whole place on fire was due only to some kind intervention of fate. I had gone to Moore at 6 p.m. The College clock struck 8, when he jumped up—"Good Heavens", he exclaimed, "It is time for Hall. We must rush for it, or we shall get no dinner!"

From that day a peculiar bond grew up between Moore and myself. I can only describe it in terms of the bond between a *Guru* and his *Chela*. But what a wonderful *Guru* who did not exact acceptance of his views, but demanded forthright criticism, and what a *Chela* for I also delighted in playing the part which he expected of me.

Two years passed. I took the First Part of the Moral Sciences Tripos and managed to secure a First Class. Amongst my internal examiners were, Prof. James Ward, W. E. Johnson, and G. E. Moore. The external examiner was T. F. Stout.

Regarded from a purely intellectual angle, G. E. Moore was my ideal. But I also had a very high regard for Prof. Ward, both as a man and as a teacher. Moore himself has paid a very high tribute to his qualities in the Autobiographical note to which I have already referred. His charm lay in his warm-hearted personal relationship with his chosen pupils. I was fortunate to gain this position. He was also beautiful to look at, with his venerable beard, his sharp aquiline features and his slim straight figure.

After the Tripos results were declared, Prof. Ward gave a lunch in his beautiful home to which all the successful candidates were invited. In a relaxed mood, he asked me, "Who do you think gave you the highest marks in the Tripos?" I replied, "It must have been you, Sir". "No, No! Guess again", he exclaimed. I said hesitatingly, "Was it Moore?" "Wrong again!" said he. "It was Johnson. In the papers on Logic!" But by that hangs another tale which I must relate on some other occasion.

Part I of the Moral Sciences Tripos entitled me to get my B.A. Degree. But I decided to stay on another year to do Part II of the Tripos. For this one has to specialise on a particular philosopher, and the choice is limited. In my year Hegel seemed to be the only one.

Those who have read Moore's Autobiographical note, will recall that in his time Moore had also made the same choice. This of course meant that most of my work lay with McTaggart. But in addition to one's speciality, one could choose a number of additional papers, and I chose advanced Ethics and Experimental Psychology. My middle choice again brought me in close contact with G. E. Moore.

By this time I had gained a fair amount of maturity. I had become Secretary of the Cambridge University Moral Sciences Club, which ranks quite high in the hierarchy of Philosophical Societies in Great Britain, just below the Mind Association and the Aristotolian Society. The Moral Sciences Club met about twice a month usually in the rooms of one of the Senior Members, which included all the Professors, and Dons. I had also been elected a member of the *Heretics*, an esoteric society of the ultra intellectual type. Soon after my election I was asked to read a paper by this Society.

The subject of my paper was "The Individual and Society," but under this tame title, what I actually attempted was a criticism of Moore's Ethical doctrine, on the ground that he had conceived of morals, or the good life in purely individualistic terms. But the individual was part of a social whole, and this altered not only the concept of the ideal, for which he had to strive, but also his duty or the means that he was to adopt to achieve his goal.

Dr. Moore paid me the compliment of sitting right through this meeting, and asked me a few questions at the end which left me bewildered. But I tried to protect myself with his own technique by asking in return, "What exactly do you mean?" I did not have the courage to say, "What on *Earth* do you mean!"

In the end Dr. Moore got up and made a little speech, in which he said, that I had pointed out a serious omission on his part, for when writing the *Principia*, he had not touched upon the relation of individual good, with social good, and that he intended to bring out a revised edition of his book in which this matter would be fully discussed.

But inspite of all his good intentions, the revised edition of *Principia* never appeared. When the book was reprinted it came out just as it was in its first edition.

The fact is that in his later years Moore had lost interest in the Ethical problems as such and had become much more absorbed in problems of Epistemology, and philosophical method. Nevertheless, the *Principia* remained not only a landmark in the domain of Ethics, but also as the starting point for Moore's excursions into other philosophical domains.

Just about this time a very interesting event happened. G. E. Moore got married to one of his own pupils, Miss Ely, who had been a classmate of mine, and one of the few faithfuls amongst the women who had stuck to the continued pursuit of Philosophy. This took place in the summer vacation and we only heard of it on our return to Cambridge.

I did not see much of Moore after this event. In June 1918 I appeared for Part II of the Tripos and was again lucky enough to get a First Class, the only one to gain this distinction.

After the results were out, I met Dr. McTaggart who was most happy and advised me to stay on in Cambridge for another two years and work for a Fellowship. He was furious when I told him that the India Office had refused to prolong my scholarship, unless I joined a Training College and took a Diploma in Education. He hinted that financial help could be found for me, from other sources. But I had to explain that my first duty lay towards my own country and I felt that I must go back and teach in India, so that I could pass on to others the fruits of the education I had received in Cambridge. It was a sad parting, and it was the only occasion in my relations with McTaggart in which some emotional warmth entered our otherwise purely Hegelian relations.

The parting with Prof. Ward was much more painful. He was enraged when I talked to him about joining the Indian Educational Service. He told me about what had happened to Samuders, another of his students, who had been chucked out of the I.E.S. for not passing his test in Hindustani. When I explained my own personal circumstances, he relented and said, "All right, if you must return to India and join that rotten service, I shall write to Austen Chamberlain."

Austen Chamberlain was then Secretary of State for India, and one of Prof. Ward's old students. That letter no doubt went a long way in getting me my eventual appointment.

The last of my teachers to whom I went to say goodbye, was G. E. Moore. McTaggart had earlier spoken to him about the possibility of my staying on and doing some research and Moore had agreed to be my guide. When I explained to him that circumstances had forced me to alter my plans and I was leaving Cambridge to go and study education in London, a puzzled look came over his countenance, not unmixed with pity. Clearly Moore thought that any man who could abandon a career of research in philosophy for the study of Pedagogics must be some kind of a moron. As he held out a limp hand to say "Good-bye" to me, I knew that I had lost caste with him.

I came away feeling heavy in heart. I wrote to him once or twice after my return to India, but I had no reply. But in spite of that I followed his later career with great interest and read everything he wrote including the last three articles on Wittgenstein's Philosophy in Mind. Friends wrote to me of the delight he took in wheeling about his two children in a "Go-Cart", and in later years of the decline in his health, and how he himself had to be wheeled about in a Bath-chair.

In December 1958, forty years later, came the chance for me to revisit Cambridge. Moore died two months before I could reach there. It was perhaps just as well that I did not see him aged and infirm, for the image which I preserve of him is of what he was like when he was at the height of his powers both in body and in mind.

When I revisited Cambridge none of my old teachers was there to greet me, and of my contemporaries only Sir Fredrick Bartlett, Britain's topmost psychologist, remained to give me a warm welcome.

I met Wisdom, Moore's successor in the Chair for Moral Philosophy, who had joined Trinity College in 1918 after I had gone down. We spent two delightful hours together discussing Moore, Wittgenstein and Bertrand Russell. But it was a different two hours to those which I had spent with Moore when I took him my first exercise. I remember my parting words to Wisdom, "The sooner you forget Wittgenstein and return to G. E. Moore, the better it will be for Cambridge and for World Philosophy".

On Professor Moore

by

G. N. MATHRANI, M.A. (CANTAB.); DIP. ED. (LEEDS)

Through this paper I pay my homage to the honoured memory of Professor G. E. Moore. I feel it was my good fortune to have been able to attend Professor Moore's class lectures, regularly for two years, at Cambridge. During my time, 'Principia Ethica' and 'Philosophical Studies' of Moore were considered to be most valuable books for students of philosophy. I must admit however that the students did not find it easy to grasp the class lectures or the writings of Professor Moore. Soon after I joined the university, Mr. Wisdom, who was my supervisor, advised me to read Moore's 'Philosophical Studies'; but he said, "Do not hurry through the book, it is not very easy to follow him, I take ages to read Moore's pages".

453

It is a well known fact that Moore was not a system builder; but he had very definite views about many matters of philosophical importance. Many of his philosophical views were the results of his critical examination of the views of other philosophers. He had tremendous capacity for making a deeply penetrating analysis of the statements and arguments of other philosophers. In his writings he gives the impression of being thorough but not final. *He is thorough in his thinking, but not final in his views.* He was therefore always willing to rethink, a very rare quality among philosophers.

In the traditional sense of the term 'Philosophy', 'God', 'Self', 'Nature' and 'Values' are considered to be some of the major problems in Philosophy. In his own characteristic way, Moore in his writings has dealt with the last two problems. The problems of 'God' and 'Self' do not seem to have engaged his attention much.

I should like to add that the lectures of Prof. Moore, which I attended at Cambridge, made me feel that he was doing something very similar to what Mr. Wisdom and other younger members of the Cambridge school of logical positivists were doing. In those days the philosophical activity of the Cambridge positivists was described as the 'practice of the Wittgensteinian method of analysis'. According to Wittgenstein, Philosophy is 'Critique of

language'; its function is logical clarification of thought,—to specify the unspecified conventions of the usage of language. "The philosopher's purpose is to gain a grasp of the relations between expressions used in different manners". (Wisdom). Study of the 'rules of grammar' (rules of conventional usage), according to the Cambridge Wittgensteinians, is a very important philosophical activity. Study of the 'rules of grammar' largely consists in clarifying different uses of the same word and distinguishing the use of allied words. Philosophical activity, according to them, is a pursuit of meaning and not a pursuit of knowledge or truth.

Very often I found Prof. Moore giving a logical analysis of the common usage of words. In the Lent Term of the year 1937-38, he discussed the problem of perception. First he wrote down on the black board a list of different senses of 'seeing'.

- (1) I saw a man (in waking life).
 - (a) I saw a man (in waking life, from a near distance).
 - (b) I saw a man (in waking life, from a long distance).
- (2) I saw a man (in a dream)
- (3) I saw a man (in hallucination).
- (4) I saw a bunch of grapes (in a seance).
- (5) I saw my face (in a mirror).

According to Moore, all these uses of 'see' are different because their implications are different and yet they are all instances of 'seeing', because they are all similar in one respect. They are all instances of 'seeing' because they all imply the direct apprehension of sense data. He pointed out that in the above list the first and the fifth cases imply the existence of a real man and a real face respectively; whereas the remaining three cases do not involve such an implication. He said "in case (1), to say that I saw a man but really there was no man would involve a self-contradiction, but that would not be so in other cases". In this way he tried to analyse the various usages of 'seeing'. He also gave a few instances to bring out the distinction between seeing and knowing. He said, "Sometimes we see a thing but do not know it, sometimes we know a thing but do not see it, and sometimes we do both, see a thing and also know it." For example, I see some-one at a distance, and later on a certain friend tells me that he was standing at such and such a place and time, and immediately I say, "Oh yes, I saw you, but I did not know that it was

you". This is an instance of seeing x without knowing it. He also gave an example of knowing without seeing. 'I go to an optician to get my eyes examined. He asks me to read letters printed on a card board sheet, from a certain distance. Suppose I remember those letters, but actually I do not see them clearly. This would be a case of knowing without seeing.'

I do not wish to suggest that I have given a complete summary of that particular lecture of Prof. Moore. Perhaps I have given a very simplified and inadequate report. He must have said many other things, more difficult and complicated, which I have forgotten. But what I have stated does give a fairly correct idea of the sort of thing which Prof. Moore used to do in his class lectures during my time. And this sort of philosophical activity was described as 'study of the rules of grammar or analysis of the common usages of words.'

It is for this reason that in my book 'Wittgensteinian Philosophy' I wrote, "Professor G. E. Moore is more or less a Wittgensteinian philosopher, though he has developed his method independently." I would call Moore a Wittgensteinian philosopher only in the sense that sometimes he did engage himself in the sort of philosophical activity which was strongly recommended by Wittgenstein; but he (Moore) did not do it because it was recommended by Wittgenstein.

It should be specifically mentioned that Moore does not seem to subscribe to some of the well known views of the Wittgensteinian school. I shall touch upon one such point of difference. Whenever Moore has written or spoken about physical objects, he has consistently maintained a clear distinction between physical objects and what he calls 'sense data'. He has always conceived and defined physical objects as something distinct from sense data. In one place he writes, "No sense-datum, or part of a sense datum, or collection of sense-data, can possibly be a material object. Many philosophers have spoken as if certain collections of sense data or sensations were material objects. I wish to emphasise the fact that I am not going to use the word 'material object' in this sense." The popular Wittgensteinian view, repeatedly stated by Mr. Wisdom, is that physical objects are 'logical constructions' in the sense that physical object propositions are reducible to sense-data propositions. According to Wisdom, reduction of physical object statements to sense-data statements is 'different level material analysis.' "To translate sentences about any abstraction

into sentences about what it is an abstraction from is to give a new level or a different level analysis of the sentences. . . . When a biologist translates sentences about rabbits into sentences about rabbitish-sense-patterns, he is doing new level analysis." (Wisdom). Mr. Wisdom's view, that physical objects are logical constructions, as explained above, apparently implies that a physical object is a collection or a series of sense data. According to Prof. Moore, as I have already pointed out, physical object is not a sense datum or a collection of sense data.

According to Mr. Wisdom, the question about the knowledge of physical objects (as something over and above sense data) is a pseudo question and not a significant question. The philosopher's statement "I cannot perceive physical objects, I can only perceive sense data" is often ridiculed by Mr. Wisdom as a sense-less statement. Prof. Moore would however maintain that the statement 'I cannot perceive physical objects' is a perfectly significant and a true statement. Prof. Moore writes in one of his essays ".....material objects are never directly apprehended by us, since nothing that exists is ever directly apprehended by us except sense-data and our own minds and acts of consciousness." According to Prof. Moore, the question about the knowledge of the physical objects is not only a meaningful and significant question, but also a very important philosophical question. In his examination of Hume's philosophy, he suggests that we have a non-sensory immediate knowledge of the physical world. According to him, direct apprehension of sense data is a part and only a part of what is commonly called 'perceiving a physical object.' The other constituent in it is the immediate knowledge or awareness (other than sensory awareness) of the physical object.

In all his discussions he always maintains that physical objects are distinct from sense data and that we know of their existence. But it seems that he cannot be sure of the nature of the relation between sense data and physical objects. He finds many logical difficulties in believing that the relation between sense data and its physical object could be that of identity or that of part and whole. Sometimes he seems to find less difficulty in believing the physical objects to be in some sense a source of sense data. Thus Moore is inclined to believe that there is some kind of causal relation between physical objects and sense data.

Prof. Moore claims that he has an immediate knowledge of the physical objects. Against this view the argument would be that

sense perception and introspection are the only two sources of immediate knowledge and that neither of these two could be the means of knowing the existence of physical objects and their relation with sense experience. Prof. Moore claims that it is an additional type of immediate knowledge.

I am inclined to accept Prof. Moore's point of view in regard to the distinction between physical objects and sense data; but I am not very sure about the nature of our knowledge of physical objects.

In a recent paper I gave a three-fold classification of significant propositions, propositions about logical correspondents, propositions about logical constructions and propositions about logical emergents. Propositions about logical correspondents are statements about entities which can be directly apprehended (in Moore's sense), e.g. sense data propositions. Propositions about logical constructions would be propositions which are not direct statements about any logical correspondents, but whose sense could be adequately brought out by a series of statements about logical correspondents, e.g. statements about a nation or a community. Statements about logical emergents are statements about objects of thought, whose presence and operation is merely suggested by the experience of logical correspondents, but is not fully analysable into or reducible to the experience of logical correspondents, as is possible in the case of logical constructions.

I would venture to suggest that propositions about physical objects are propositions about a sort of logical emergents, because in a sense our knowledge of physical objects is suggested by our direct apprehension of sense data. According to this view, physical objects are objects of thought and not objects of direct experience or apprehension, and secondly knowledge of physical objects is suggested by or derived from the direct apprehension of sense data. But for Prof. Moore, physical objects are objects of immediate awareness and not mere objects of thought, and their knowledge for him is immediate and not derived from some other immediate knowledge.

In conclusion I would add that, as a pupil of Prof. Moore, I have always felt that Moore's intellectual humility coupled with his power of analysis should be the ideal for all students of philosophy.

On G. E. Moore

by

PROFESSOR N. A. NIKAM,
Mysore University, India

I read for Part II of the Moral Sciences Tripos with Metaphysics and Moral Philosophy as Optionals. I was a member of St. John's College, Cambridge, and was in residence in the years 1931-33. My teachers in Philosophy were Professors W. R. Sorely, G. E. Moore, C. D. Broad and Dr. A. C. Ewing, who was my tutor. Professor G. E. Moore lectured on Metaphysics twice a week and held a conversation class on Saturdays, while Professor C. D. Broad lectured on History of Philosophy and on McTaggart's *The Nature of Existence*. The class listened to Broad reading the manuscript of his lectures on McTaggart. Towards the end, I was the only one attending these lectures. Professor C. D. Broad's volumes on *The Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy* and Ewing's *Idealism,—A Critical Survey*, were written during my undergraduate days and these books are very firmly rooted in my philosophic consciousness. I attended a two hour class given by Dr. Wittgenstein, who was, then, at the height of his powers and fame. Wittgenstein's name used to attract a very large body of students to his class, although not all of them could have serious interest in what he was saying. One day, Wittgenstein having seen an unusually large class permitted people to retire if they wished. No one left. Wittgenstein then said: "If any of you here go out to the world and popularise philosophy, my curse is on you!" Professor G. E. Moore sat in the front seat in silence taking down notes of what Wittgenstein was saying. Moore published these notes in *Mind* (July 1954, and January 1955) under the Title: "Wittgenstein's lectures 1930-33".

2. Two broad statements could be made about Moore's Method in Philosophy: (a) Moore said that Philosophical statements were Common Sense statements, and understood by all and not exclusively by a class of men called "philosophers", although it is the philosophers who tried to analyse common sense statements; but even they did not succeed in giving a correct analysis of philosophical statements. It was even doubtful whether

there was, in fact, the analysis of a philosophical statement. Moore was not caught up in a Cartesian Doubt in philosophy but, he said, he was "puzzled". Philosophy as common sense, as Moore conceived it, was not a transition from "ignorance" to "knowledge", but a transition from a position where philosophical statements were, in fact, "understood" to a position where philosophers did not "know" their analysis. I recall a statement which Moore made in his class: "There is a sense of the word understand such that when you *misunderstand* a statement you *understand* it". Moore's philosophical position, viz. that philosophical statements were "understood" by all although no-body knew *the* analysis of such statements saved his philosophy from offering "proofs" as philosophical systems did in History of Philosophy.

(b) Moore said that Philosophy is concerned with the notion of "follows from", which is different from the notion of "follows from" present in Logic, or I suppose in Mathematics. Although Moore used the method of Logical Analysis, he did not identify philosophy with Logic. Moore said that the notion "If P, then Q" was ambiguous, and he was constantly analysing such notions as "could not be" and "might have been". Moore's distinction between Entailment and Material Implication was part of his analysis of the conception of "follows from", which Moore was analysing in philosophy. I also recall Moore's statement that a proposition asserting identity, an analytic proposition, and a tautology were distinct, but Moore said it was extremely difficult to state the distinction clearly.

3. Moore's extreme care in using the English Language or in distinguishing between the different senses of words in Philosophy appeared to many as if he was not teaching philosophy but the use of the English Language. In one of his conversation classes, I put him a question giving for analysis a statement. He said: "your English is wrong". I replied that the statement was a quotation from Russell's *Our Knowledge of the External World*. He replied: "Even so, it is bad English". Professor W. T. Stace told me in 1953 at Princeton that Moore did the same to him: corrected his English, but I do not think Moore identified Philosophy with Logical Syntax.

I saw Moore in 1951 and 1956 in his home at Chesterton Road, Cambridge. He had retired from his Chair at the University and from his office as Editor of *Mind* but was engaged in revising and re-writing his unpublished papers in spite of his ill-

health. He said he was trying to get them "clearly stated", but found it extremely difficult to do so. These papers are now published under the title: *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*.

Moore was in search of Truth, he was not constructing a system in philosophy; and, by identifying philosophy with common sense he made philosophy, as it were, "every body's business". Moore was, undoubtedly, a very acute mind in philosophy of our century, but he had an extraordinary sense of humility. His never-ceasing activity of thought was such that, even after a very careful analysis of philosophical statements in his class, Moore would return next time to the class and say: "I am afraid all that I said the other day was wrong", and would begin it all over again.

In 1950 I wrote to Professor G. E. Moore for a Message to the Indian Philosophical Congress on the occasion of its Silver Jubilee. He wrote a gracious letter:

"I feel greatly honoured to have been asked to send a message of greeting to the Indian Philosophical Congress on the occasion of its Silver Jubilee. I heartily wish for the Congress every kind of success. In spite of all the pains which have been devoted to them by men of genius and men of first-rate ability, there are still, it seems to me, very many philosophical problems the correct solution of which is far from clear. May the Philosophers of India make a great contribution towards their definitive solution!"

Moral Freedom in the Philosophy of G. E. Moore

by

K. J. SHAH,

Karnatak University, Dharwar

In the Philosophy of G. E. Moore, replying to Mr. A. C. Garnett's discussion of his (Moore's) account of moral freedom, Moore says; "I still think that if all our choices are caused, then it is true in a sense, that we never could have made any choice which we did not make; and that, since it is certain that we do sometimes make choices which are morally wrong, and *certain* also that this entails that in those cases we *could* in *some* sense, have made a choice which we did not make, then, if all our choices are caused, there must be two different senses in which we use the phrase 'could have made a different choice', since in cases where we make a morally wrong choice, there is a sense in which we could have made a different one, whereas to say that our choice was caused entails that there is a sense in which we could not".

"What is the sense in which, when we make a morally wrong choice, we could have made some other choice instead?"

In this paper I propose to discuss the sense in which, when we make a morally wrong choice, we could have made some other choice instead.

Consider the case where some man A who is unaware, is pushed by another, strikes against a child, and the child falls into the river and is drowned.

In this case we should say, that A could not have helped what happened. His striking against the child was unintentional, involuntary, mechanical, as the striking of a rolling stone against someone in its way. And we should not hold A responsible for his striking against the child, and the child's drowning, as we do not hold the stone responsible for striking against a person and killing him. The reason for absolving A is not that to cause the death of a person is not wrong, but that his striking against the child has caused death, and yet he did not intend to cause the death of the child. In fact he has not acted at all. His striking against the child is involuntary.

How are we to distinguish between a voluntary and involuntary act? When a doctor tests our knee-reflex, our leg kicks upwards. We could not stop this movement of the leg once the doctor has tapped us on the knee; nor could we give a reason for the movement of the leg, (though the cause of it is the tapping on the knee by the doctor). The movement of the leg in a knee-reflex is involuntary. The same movement of the leg may occur when I move it to displace a fly from the foot. In this case I could have stopped the movement of the leg in the middle if I wanted to; and I could also give a reason and not only the cause for the movement of the leg. This movement of the leg is voluntary.

It is important for us to note that there is a distinction between involuntary and voluntary movement; and yet it is not that the one is caused and the other is not.

It is only in the case of voluntary acts, those acts which I could have prevented if I had so chosen, could we say that they are right or wrong; could we hold the individuals whose acts they are, responsible. The involuntary acts do not at all fall within the moral field.

In our example, he could not have helped what happened in the sense that his striking against the child was involuntary. And this is sufficient to disallow—ward off—any moral judgement regarding the act or the person. The person is not morally responsible.

But if 'he could not have done otherwise' is always understood in the sense that his act was involuntary (mechanical), then for all our voluntary acts we would be held responsible. Then in order to decide whether a person is responsible or not, we have simply to decide whether the act is voluntary or not. But even when the act is voluntary, in the sense we have explained, we sometimes say that the person is not responsible, that he could not have done otherwise.

Some such cases arise out of the ignorance of the agent, e.g., Oedipus's marriage with his own mother. With these we shall not concern ourselves.

Some others arise out of the circumstances which are considered to constitute compulsion, e.g. when I am forced to steal or injure some-one at the point of a gun.

What are the criteria according to which we say in this case that one could not have acted otherwise as against the case in which we say that one could have acted otherwise?

This distinction between the cases where one could have acted otherwise and those in which one could not have done so, is made, certainly not on the ground that the one is not caused and the other is. Moore in his 'Ethics' suggests the criteria for "we could have done otherwise than we did". According to him, we could have done otherwise than we did, if

(i) we often should have acted differently if we had chosen to,

(ii) we often should have chosen differently if we had chosen so to choose;

(iii) it was almost always possible that we should have chosen differently, in the sense that no man could know for certain that we should not so choose.

Moore thought that the three conditions, were perhaps sufficient to constitute what we mean by saying that we could, in the sense in which being morally responsible entails that we could. But certainly, these conditions are not sufficient at all. In fact they do no more than state the conditions for an act to be voluntary. The first condition is clearly the condition for an act to be voluntary. The second condition is the statement of the first condition with reference to a particular kind of action, i.e., choice. The third condition is unimportant, in that it makes the voluntariness of an act dependent on whether we sufficiently know the causal laws to be able to predict the act or not. If this is so, then these conditions are not sufficient to explain the sense of 'we could have done otherwise', which is necessary to attract moral responsibility.

But if we are not to understand 'we could have done otherwise' in the sense explained by Moore, in what sense could we say that when we make a morally wrong choice, we could have made some other choice instead?

The answer seems to be that the judgment that we could have made some other choice instead, is founded on our view of the moral ideal. With time, place and person, the judgment of whether one could have done otherwise varies, e.g. one person might think that he could not have stolen in spite of the circumstances, whereas another might think that he could not have helped what he did in the circumstance. As such, this judgment is independent of its being causally determined.

If so, 'we could have made some other choice instead' is a moral judgment, and has all the characteristics of a moral judgment.

If so, we could have done otherwise than we did has two senses. In one sense, it refers to the voluntary character of the act, and makes room for the logical possibility of a moral judgment. In the other case, not only does it make room for the possibility of a moral judgment, but is itself a moral judgment.

In the first sense, we could have done otherwise is presupposed by our moral judgment; in the second sense it is not presupposed by our moral judgment, but is itself a moral judgment.

In both the senses, the negative judgment that we could not have done otherwise, implies the warding off of moral responsibility, but with a difference. But the affirmative judgment in the first sense does not necessarily imply moral responsibility, though it leaves open the possibility of moral responsibility. The affirmative judgment in the second sense necessarily implies the attribution of moral responsibility.

It is the confusion of the second sense with the first, and the identification of the first sense with causal connection, that gives rise to the problem of moral freedom.

G. E. Moore

by

KALI KRISHNA BANERJI,

Reader in Philosophy,

Jadavpur University, Jadavpur, Calcutta-32.

Prof. Moore was one of the founders of the analytical movement, and the philosophers most influential in England to-day are the analysts. It may be unhesitatingly asserted that Prof. Moore was a man of genius. In the winning over of the English thinkers from Hegelianism, his character played not a small part. A review of contemporary English philosophy makes it quite clear that Prof. Moore was a man of genius and character. No student of philosophy should, I think, hesitate to pay him this tribute. But it is not impossible that some-one may think that the analytic movement is just another movement in philosophy, and that Prof. Moore was just a pioneer like some other pioneers. Indeed, one may go to the length of asserting that the analysts have betrayed philosophy and so may look at Prof. Moore's genius and character in a way that may remind us of Aristophanes' way of looking at Socrates's genius and character. So I shall in the first place say a few words on the analytic movement and its relation to Prof. Moore. Then I shall attempt to relate Prof. Moore's genius with his character. And finally I shall try to draw attention to an aspect of the appeal that Prof. Moore made to common sense and to usage by comparing it with that of the Neo-Naiyāikās of India.

I

The analytic movement is not just another philosophical movement like realism or idealism or materialism or Marxism or existentialism or any other similar 'ism'. There is no such thing as analysisism, and in our vocabulary 'analysisism' finds no place. Indeed, it is not even possible to coin such a word, and the impossibility is not merely linguistic. It is of a different sort altogether. To believe in analysis is not to take any side or to commit oneself to a set of philosophical propositions. The analytical movement is

not just another philosophical movement. Clarity may not be enough, philosophy may not be just analysis and may be something besides, and the indignation that Prof. Moore is reported to have felt when a close associate of his identified philosophy with analysis may be a perfectly righteous indignation. Still the relation between analysis and philosophy is not such that one may be a philosopher without being an analyst. A philosopher who proposes to do philosophy without doing analysis can proceed only in the 'Thus spake Zarathustra' style. He may be very inspiring, he may even shake the world, but he cannot be called a philosopher. A writer of fiction can achieve the same result, and no one will, I think, be prepared to call him a philosopher. Indeed, I cannot give up the qualm that when some insular philosophical utterances are found to shake the world or to move so many men, they do it in the rather Magna-Charta manner. We read into them meanings that their authors had not even dreamt of. The Brahmasūtras and the Upaniṣads are cases in point. Different commentators belonging to different schools have interpreted them so differently that one cannot even guess what their authors had meant. Even the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika sūtras may be similarly regarded. The theses on Feuerbach, a curious mixture of pragmatism, Kantianism and materialism, may also be mentioned. And I am not ashamed to confess that the Tractatus created in me a similar impression. How relieved I felt when I learned from Miss Anscombe that the most common view of the Tractatus was hardly that of its author! A Zarathustrian statement may be rich in meaning, it may contain important ideas. But these cannot be ranked philosophical, when not founded upon reflection. That is why the classical writers of India were fond of saying that the Sūtras, taken together with the Bhāṣya, the Vārtika and the Tīka constituted a Śāstra. Indeed the proposition that philosophy is an enterprise of the rational side of our being is a truism. It is accepted almost universally, and those who do not accept it are rightly beyond all arguments and it is no use arguing with them. But is not the acceptance of the proposition that analysis is the essence of philosophy a necessary condition of accepting it? I think that the question should be answered in the affirmative. But this is not clearly seen. That is why while the proposition that philosophy is a reflective study is so universally accepted, the proposition that it is essentially analytic is not. This is the outcome of the failure to command a clear view of philosophical thinking, if not also of the sort of activity for which the word 'analysis' stands.

Speculative philosophy is either a pathetic attempt at forcing the diverse aspects of our experience to some obscure a priori notion, or it is an attempt at unifying the sciences and the other characteristic human activities, or an exercise in the logic of analogy. But the attempt to unify the sciences when not dogmatic like that of Haeckel is an attempt to connect the language of the different sciences. And this is exactly what the analysts often fight for. The critics of the analysts are not infrequently misled by the word 'analysis'. They imagine that it is just dissecting or dividing or breaking up. The clever person who said that a Cambridge man knows more and more about less and less till he knows everything about nothing spoke for all the critics of the analysts. But whatever analysis is, it is not just breaking up. Even Prof. Moore, who was always ready to defend the analysandum-analysans-equivalence notion of analysis, and had observed frequently that *this* or *that* was unanalysable when he meant nothing more than that *this* or *that* was indivisible or incapable of being reduced to simpler statements, did not hold this. He had recognised that analysis is by inspection also, and that analysis by distinction is also analysis, if it is in consonance with analysis by inspection. Similarly, when the contemporary analysts describe themselves as the cartographers of concepts, they make it quite clear that their aim is to grasp the relations of the concepts, to see how the sub-languages or the different categories of being are related. The idea that to analyse is to break is hopelessly wrong. It is owing to some extent to the popular use of the word 'analysis', but largely to the fact that the analytic movement came as a reaction against absolutism and pleaded for 'the substitution of piecemeal, detailed, verifiable results for large untested generalities recommended only by certain appeal to imagination'. But whatever might be the origin of the error, it is an error nevertheless, and the practice of analysis by Prof. Moore himself should have dispelled it. As early as 1900 while writing on the notion of necessity he had observed, 'My primary object in this paper is to determine the meaning of necessity. I do not wish to discover what things are necessary, but what the predicate is which attaches to them when they are so'. This was obviously not a proposal to break up, as the Socratic attempt to arrive at universal definitions was not. And it is a pity that we call the Socratic method inductive or universalistic, but that of Prof. Moore analytic in the sense of being dissective. It is not my intention to deny that Prof. Moore had a great affection for the view that analysis is division. But I insist that analysis by inspection and

its consonant analysis by distinction had firm hold on him, and this is borne out by his appeals to common sense and usage. That is, if we hold that 'to know' the meaning of a notion or expression is to be able to say what it is that we see before our minds, i.e., to say what it is that we see clearly as constituting the property common to all the things in regard to which the expression is used correctly, then undoubtedly we assume that common sense or usage is perfectly justified in regarding those things as the denotations of the expression. Analysis by inspection when not an esoteric or private affair but something social or communicable involves common sense and usage. Rather they are the two coordinates of the same philosophical activity. This was seen by Prof. Moore, and no less by Socrates or the Neo-Naiyāikas. Anyway, Prof. Moore was not of the opinion that analysis is division merely, and the analysts are not murderers who dissect to kill.

Speculative philosophy, when not an attempt at deducing everything from some obscure notion, is not an alternative to analysis. The speculative philosophy that proceeds rather empirically, that is, through an analysis of the language of the sciences, is as much analytic as it is speculative. Now, there is another kind of speculative philosophy which is neither empirical nor obviously deductive; and almost all the famous speculative philosophies are of this kind. Its essence consists in drawing key analogies. The square-toes may deem this statement highly prejudicial. So I would like to confess that this statement is not mine, and that I have borrowed it not from Prof. Emmet who might be regarded as a near-analyst, but from so bitter a critic of the analysts as Prof. Collingwood. And if the western philosophical systems bear witness to its truth, the Indian systems also do. Thus, the theory of the empirical world was constructed by the Buddhists on the analogy of the passing cloud, and by the Advaitins on the analogy of the illusory datum. Similarly, the Naiyāikas constructed their theory of the world or of its creation on the analogy of the production of a pot by a potter. Anyway speculative philosophies are often an attempt at drawing key analogies, and it is true that analysis forbids us to accept them in the spirit in which they are offered. But this does not mean that analysis is opposed to this type of philosophy as such. The analyst is quite ready to admit that such systems are not necessarily the outcome of linguistic confusion. They are often the result of what Prof. Waismann calls vision or insight into the relation of the various concepts and categories that we use, or, to speak in the old way, into the hidden similarities and dissimilarities of the facts experienced. In short, it is not unanalytic

to hold that such speculative philosophies show, to use Prof. Wisdom's expression, linguistic penetration also. Besides, does not analysis, when it is not merely descriptive but persuasive or recommendatory, consist in doing the same thing? However, analysis is not the negation of speculative philosophy, and the analytic movement is not just another philosophical movement. Indeed, to assert that the philosophical statements are neither factitive and verifiable like those of the sciences nor tautologies like those of logic and mathematics is to assert also that they are chiefly on meanings, and that accordingly, the distinctively philosophical task is analysis. But it may be said that if this be analysis, then it is as old as philosophy is, and the statement that Prof. Moore was one of the founders of the analytic movement is not less paradoxical than a statement of speculative philosophy, say time is unreal, is. To this the answer obviously is that a philosophical discovery is never an invention, it is not even a discovery like Columbus's discovery of America. It often consists in making obvious, what probably on account of being obvious is repudiated. Besides, it must not be forgotten that philosophers when not frankly sceptical have harboured what Mr. Warnock calls cosmic anxieties. They have tried to cater for moral or religious or political or some other extra-philosophical needs. It is only recently that philosophy has come to its own, and has become a really academic subject. So it is no wonder that analysis, though as old as philosophy, should be sponsored as a philosophical creed only in the twentieth century.

Anyway, the analytic movement is not just another philosophical movement. Similarly, Prof. Moore is not just another pioneer. Aristotle founded logic and completed it. This was the tribute that Kant had paid to him. I do not think that Kant was justified in this. The recent developments in logic make it quite clear how inappropriate his statement is. But may we not pay a similar tribute to Prof. Moore? May we not say that he had founded and completed the analytic movement? My answer to the question is both 'yes' and 'no'. It is 'no' in that it is not true to hold that the analytic movement has not made any progress since Prof. Moore, or that it had moved only by disfiguring it. In fact, Prof. Moore was unsatisfying in many respects, and it is the subsequent development in the analytic philosophy that has made us see this clearly. Thus, Prof. Moore was essentially a philosopher's philosopher. Common sense and science had not been the main stimulus of his philosophical thinking. What set

him thinking were the puzzling or paradoxical statements of the philosophers. But then the question of the nature of philosophy was never asked and discussed by him seriously. Indeed in the lectures that he had delivered in 1910-11, he had with surprising coolness observed that there were three kinds of philosophy arising out of adding something to the common-sense view of the world, of contradicting it, and of doing both these things. The philosophical statements contradicting common sense puzzled him. But the question if the puzzling statements were the outcome of linguistic confusion, or if they involved linguistic penetration also, or if they resulted from the attempt at saying what was unsayable, was neither asked nor discussed by him. This is quite puzzling, and his view that the puzzling philosophical statements record some unintelligible analysis of the common sense propositions they contradict is not less puzzling. It displays the naivety of his attitude towards philosophy.

He could not give up the old and naive view that a philosophical proposition may in some sense be proved or disproved. This was hardly in keeping with the analytic attitude. The contemporary analysts have seen it, and so they have undoubtedly moved beyond. His not tackling seriously the question of the nature of philosophy was not the only dissatisfying thing about him. To him common sense was the ultimate court of appeal, but he was not a philosopher of common sense as the Naiyāikas were. His respect for common sense and usage was responsible for his refusal to accept the doctrine of logical constructions as had been enthusiastically formulated by the logical atomists. Indeed he admitted that the word 'see' is not used incorrectly in sentences like I see a hand or an inkbottle. But he was not prepared like Prof. Broad to hold that there are situations which may rightly be described in this way, though it is doubtful if there are things or physical objects like hands or inkbottles. He thought that such statements guaranteed the reality of physical objects. But then he was strongly impressed by the sense-data philosophies. He was so warm a supporter of this theory that while usually reluctant to add to or alter ordinary language, he did not hesitate to add the word 'sense data' to our language. This is quite unsatisfying. But what is more unsatisfying is that his recognition of the merits of the thing-language (or of thing-philosophy?) as well as of the sense-data language had not even suggested to him that the sense-data doctrine was an alternative way of speaking. He was naive enough to construct this doctrine as the old doctrine on the

relation of substance and qualities. This curious mixture of naivety with analysis is also seen in his treatment of the concepts of analysis and meaning. He could not give up the view that analysis is translation, and that meaning is naming in a way. So Prof. Moore was not satisfying in many ways, and to the question if we should pay him the sort of tribute that Kant had paid to Aristotle, the answer is 'no'. But the answer is 'yes' also. For he had seen some basic principles of the analytic philosophy so clearly that when the analysts try to go beyond him they disfigure the analytic movement. I am referring to logical atomism and logical empiricism, to the attempts at constructing ideal languages, to the failure to see that the logical constants of ordinary language cannot be replaced by those of Lord Russell's logic or by any other similar logical calculus, and to similar other matters. Indeed Prof. Moore was a rather lonely figure. He could not associate himself with the logical atomists and the other enthusiastic analysts of his period. This was no doubt the consequence of the great regard that he had for common sense and usage, and he was highly dogmatic in this. But so long as the precise nature of this dogmatism is realised, neither the unique character of Prof. Moore's philosophy nor that of the analytic movement is seen. It is this dogmatism that saved Prof. Moore from being a sceptic, and also saves analysis from being sophistry. It also made him see that analysis as done by Lord Russell and other enthusiasts was grounded in far more objectionable dogmatic ground. And obviously, the dogmatism of common sense is preferable. There is no meaning in exchanging it for some other high-flying dogmatism because while doing philosophy we cannot avoid the *reductio ad absurdum* technique and so appealing to common sense, even if we ignore the fact that the philosophers who contradict common sense and usage accept them in their daily life and cannot introduce their puzzling doctrines by brushing aside usage altogether. The thinkers who still think that they can unify the sciences by developing the techniques of mathematical logic and doing nothing else should read their Moore carefully. The recent appeals to ordinary language have many things that would have been objected to by Prof. Moore. But they unmistakably show that Prof. Moore had seen some basic features of analysis so clearly that to ignore him is to invite peril. Prof. Moore was not an ordinary pioneer.

II

Now we may attempt to relate Prof. Moore's genius with his character. It is true that a philosopher's genius is an expression

of his character. But this is not seen very clearly in every case. At least, the truth of this statement is not so convincingly brought out by every philosopher as it is done by Socrates or Spinoza or Prof. Moore. And what strikes us most in Prof. Moore's genius and character is honesty. We all know what great regard his colleagues had for his character. Lord Russell has gone to the length of asserting that he told no lies, and that the only lie that he was forced to tell was that he told lies. I am sure that Lord Russell has overdrawn the true picture. For after all Prof. Moore was a married man, and is it Oscar Wilde or some unknown Frenchman who has said that nothing is more boring to a wife than a perfectly truthful husband whom she cannot frequently 'catch' and put in his proper place?


But it is not misleading. It may not represent Prof. Moore when looked at from the uniquely feminine point of view. But it is successful in presenting him from every other point of view. Prof. Moore was a man in whom conscience was always alert. He hated heartily the idea of deceiving others or himself. That is why he was so successful in achieving so great a success. He did not consider himself cleverer than McTaggart or Bradley. Probably he was not. But he was more sincere in that the stimulus to philosophy in this case was not the desire to find good reasons for what was instinctively believed, viz., that there was a harmony between ourselves and the world at large, etc. He did not deny that the belief that reality is spiritual is comforting, but he was too sincere to allow the arguments in favour of it to go unscrutinised. Indeed, paradoxical statements lose their paradoxical character when they are asserted frequently and by men of established reputation, and it requires a man with exceptional love of truth to confess to himself and to others that they are paradoxical. Prof. Moore was such a man, and so could not help arguing persistently even in his student days with his great teacher Prof. McTaggart, when the latter had asserted that time was unreal. It was his sincerity that prompted him to refer constantly to usage and common sense, and to see clearly that the scornful attitude in which some philosophers hold common sense and usage is hardly just, if not a symptom of insincerity. The observation of Mr. Warnock that 'among the immediately operative factors contributing to the decay of Absolute Idealism special notice should be paid to the character of Moore' is perfectly right. His problems, his method and his style are made intelligible when reference is made to his character. Moore, the man, explains Moore the philosopher;

or rather, we accept Moore the man first, and as we realise that the man is essentially a philosopher, a philosopher for whom Philosophy is an end in itself and an autonomous activity of the spirit, we breathe the fresh air of emancipation and accept the philosopher also.

III

Now I shall be concluding my paper by offering an analysis of Prof. Moore's appeals to common sense and usage. I have already observed that analysis by inspection and its consonant analysis by division involve common sense and usage. Now I shall be attempting to show very briefly that this sort of analysis has for its consequence the view that certain concepts are rather indefinable. In other words, the contention of Prof. White that the statements of Prof. Moore to the effect that so and so are unanalysable is equivalent to so and so are indivisible or irreducible to simpler elements is quite just. They show what a firm hold the view that analysis is division had on him. But I think that we shall be doing injustice to him if we hold that his statements asserting indefinability are to be taken always or only in this way. For this may be treated equally as the outcome of the view that analysis is inspection. This is borne out by the Socratic use of this method which had as its outcome the realisation of ignorance, and also by the *Yadrśa-tadrśa* or the *Yatkiñcit* technique adopted by the Neo-Naiyāikas. That is, things called by the same name resemble in certain respects but they also differ in some other respects. Without entering into the question if this resemblance is just family resemblance, it may be observed that for a proper appreciation of the meaning of the expression not only the similarities but also the dissimilarities,—both internal and external,—should be taken into account. But this is a weighty job. A set of symbols capable of doing this is hard to coin. Clever people may propose this or that set which even a non-clever person can show with success to be deficient, involving as it does *avyāpti* (narrowness) or *ativyāpti* (wideness). When a Neo-Naiyāika concludes that a certain concept is an *akhaṇḍopādhi* or not definable, he does not express his willingness to accept *Sunyavāda* or *Māyāvāda*. Similarly the Socratic confessions of ignorance encouraged neither scepticism nor dogmatism. And Prof. Moore's assertions of indefinability do not imply the futility of the analytic enterprise. Such assertions when backed by a realistic theory of universals imply that the expression for which analysis is being sought stands

QM 2, 1525
N603322



for a universal or its like, which, though directly apprehended in some sense at the level of common sense, requires a tortuous method for the apprehension of its uniqueness through an apprehension of its relation to other universals and its own various instances. And when not backed by such a theory of universals and for that by any theory of universals, they imply that every statement has a logic of its own, and that language has many tasks and many levels and so the attempt at reducing all statements to one favoured pattern is doomed to failure. Prof. Moore had not drawn such a conclusion. The hold which the view that analysis is translation had on him stood in the way of drawing it. But his assertions on the indefinability of certain concepts do not unequivocally bring out that analysis was for him division. And it is to this aspect of his philosophy that we should pay more attention.

Some Misconceptions of Idealism

by

WARREN E. STEINKRAUS,

Union College, Barbourville, Kentucky, U.S.A.

In their recent book, *Contemporary Philosophic Problems*,¹ Yervant Krikorian and Abraham Edel, the editors, have selected essays by over sixty different authors which supposedly represent current philosophical themes. As with most American publications of this sort, this book reveals but casual awareness of the grand issues of Oriental thought. In seven hundred and four pages of text, there are but twenty-two pages of material from Eastern authors, only one of whom is a professional philosopher (Gandhi, Nehru, Radhakrishnan). All the remaining essays are by Europeans or Americans. Furthermore, among the sixty-five essays in the book, only six have any significant sympathy with what is ordinarily known as Idealism. An uncritical observer might gather from this that contemporary philosophic thinking is not only virtually disinterested in Oriental thought, but also that it has little regard for metaphysical Idealism. If one consults most of the "standard" American and European journals for the past twenty years, he will find a marked paucity of discussion of idealistic themes. Though there is little merit in trying to work out the historical, psychological, or even socio-economic causes for this, it is my contention that there are at least four basic misconceptions about the general nature of Idealism which have dissuaded some contemporaries from a thorough study and evaluation of this great tradition.

1. The first and most serious misunderstanding is that it is all of one piece. Many Western professors and textbooks give the impression that the term idealism is synonymous with Hegelianism. Then, after showing certain of the obvious weaknesses in Hegel's *Philosophy of History*, and pointing out difficulties often suggested by the most cursory reading of books attributed to Hegel but really compiled from students' lecture notes after Hegel's death,

1. Published in late 1959 by Macmillan Co., New York.

they reject not only Hegel, but his followers Green, Bosanquet, Bradley and Royce. It is then a short step to the conclusion that Idealism is passé. And it is not much more of a step for the hasty and uninformed thinker to equate Advaitic thought with Bradley and thereby discount Indian Idealism without giving due consideration to the subtleties and unique contributions of Indian Idealism which existed centuries before Hegel and Bradley.

Idealism has similarly been identified with Berkeley's thought; and with the rejection of that, some minds are prepared never to reconsider it in any form. But misinterpretations of Berkeley are rampant and there are some (including the present writer) who maintain that his basic argument has never been thoroughly refuted. Historically, one may trace the widespread rejection of Berkeley to G. E. Moore's famous 1903 essay, "The Refutation of Idealism", which has become, it seems, part of the folk-lore of realism. In later life, after a critical analysis by C. J. Ducasse,² Moore denied the force of his pivotal argument (regarding the distinction between blue and a sensation of blue), remarking: "And I may say at once that on this point, I now agree with Mr. Ducasse and Berkeley, and hold that the early paper of mine was wrong."³ Unfortunately the retraction is not as well known as the original. Nor has Ducasse's further detailed analysis of the same argument in his *Nature, Mind, and Death*,⁴ been given the attention it deserves.

The readiness to identify idealism with either Hegel or Berkeley leads to a failure to consider other types which might well withstand the type of criticism levelled against these two thinkers. Within contemporary Vedantic Idealism alone there are striking differences in approach⁵ which prohibit any easy dismissal of that position. But what Western minds are willing to take the trouble to acquaint themselves with such possibilities before bypassing idealism? One error common to opponents of idealism is to identify all idealism with pure quantitative monism—that

2. Ducasse, "Moore's Refutation of Idealism" in Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore* (N. Y.: Tudor, 1942), pp. 225-51.

3. Moore, "Reply to Critics" in *Ibid.*, p. 653.

4. Published at LaSalle, Ill., by Opencourt, 1951. See Chap. XIII.

5. Eg., the disagreement between P. T. Raju and G. R. Malkani referred to in Malkani's "The Logical and the Mystical in Advaita Vedanta", this journal, Vol. XXXII, No. 4, (January 1960), pp. 261-66. See also N. P. Rao's *The Schools of Vedanta*.

there is but one all-inclusive consciousness. To be sure, monistic inclusive idealism may be the most adequate type, but one may be an idealist and also a pluralist. Thus the critics who attack A. E. Taylor's monism overlook James Ward's panpsychism, or in discrediting Bosanquet's Absolutism, they forget Lotze and Renouvier. Again, a criticism of Royce's position may be taken as tantamount to a refutation of the pluralistic personalism of Bowne or Howison. And the critic of Sankara might overlook the endeavors of Ramanuja or Madhva, or vice versa.

I am not here making a roundabout plea for idealism, but I am saying that one of the serious mistakes of "contemporary" thinkers is a failure to recognize the richness and diversity of idealistic movements in both East and West. Even a book by such a scholar as A. C. Ewing, entitled *The Idealist Tradition*, hardly does justice to pluralistic types and has little regard for Indian thought. One who had honestly worked through the subtleties of a K. C. Bhattacharya or a Brand Blanshard would be slow indeed to view idealism as out of touch with "contemporary problems", but the West, for no sound reason, has not treated idealism with much serious concern for two decades.

2. Another misconception of Idealism comes from those who say it goes against both commonsense and science. They take the view that the idealist's denial of the ultimacy of materiality is a denial of its factuality. And they echo Dr. Samuel Johnson's alleged refutation of Berkeley,—by kicking stones to show materiality! They thereby miss the point of an idealist view which doesn't begin by denying experienced facts but seeks their ultimate ground or explanation. Yet, for some reason, idealistic thought which only *seems* to go against commonsense is not given a fair hearing. This may be because of the subtlety of idealistic explanation. "Advaitism is too delicate a discipline for the average mind", G. R. Malkani once suggested.⁶ Or, it may be a failure to trust *true* commonsense. A. A. Luce once characterized Berkeley's view as "sound commonsense."⁷

The similar allegation that idealism is outmoded and irrelevant in an age of modern science may account for the small consideration given to idealism in such books as *Contemporary Philosophic*

6. G. R. Malkani, *Method of Philosophy, Advaitic Series No. 2*, (1920), p. 45.

7. A. A. Luce, *Berkeley's Immaterialism*, (London: Nelson, 1945), p. vi.

Problems, but that allegation is likewise based on misconception. Such a charge comes largely from those who have already presupposed a naturalistic interpretation of events and have adopted the "scientific method" in philosophy. Idealism is discharged because it presumably flies in the face of science. But how can a metaphysic be rejected when it never claims to be a substitute for physical science, but rather endeavors to interpret the meaning and significance of science? Errol Harris has undertaken to show the high relevance of idealism to science in his comprehensive *Nature, Mind and Modern Science*,⁸ and interestingly quotes Sir James Jeans that "modern physics is not altogether antagonistic to an objective idealism like that of Hegel."⁹

When it comes to the science of psychology, it is hard to see how the casual opponents of idealism retain their position. Yet there persists a facile identification of consciousness with bodily processes. Few modern psychologists are prepared to take consciousness seriously and will give priority in their theories to unexperienced neural processes and chains of cell assemblies, overlooking the centrality of introspective data, which data themselves give rise to physicalistic analyses. If there were no conscious experiences of differences among sensations, it is unlikely that theories explaining consciousness away would have been developed, as Blanshard has pointed out.¹⁰ Western scientific psychologists whose preoccupation has often been with rats in mazes and Western philosophic naturalists who reduce mind to brain and thought to a stimulus-response mechanism, would be wiser men indeed if they familiarized themselves with the researches in and experiences of heightened consciousness so profoundly studied and set forth by Indian philosophers.¹¹ Idealism might then be seen not as out of harmony with science but as presenting types of data unavailable to "scientific observation", which data are, nevertheless, worthy of the most careful consideration and evaluation.

8. London: Allen and Unwin, 1954.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 390.

10. Brand Blanshard, *The Nature of Thought*, Vol. I (N. Y.: Macmillan, 1940), p. 331.

11. E.g., B. G. Ray comments: "Indian thinkers have proved and demonstrated the existence of purely mental data". (from his article: "Ryle on Psychology", this journal, Vol. XXXI, No. 3, October 1958, p. 185). See also G. R. Malkani's "Dialectical Consciousness", this journal, Vol. XXX, No. 2 (July 1957), pp. 77-85.

3. A third reason why idealism has not always been given a fair hearing is because some minds have associated and even identified it with religion. The implication then is that any philosophy whose adherents are significantly related to religion has some weakness in it, *apriori*, and is not worthy of serious attention. Forty years ago, W. T. Stace gave as his basic reason for excluding Indian Philosophy from his treatment of the history of philosophy,—"that philosophy in India has never separated itself from religion and practical ends. The ideal of knowledge for its own sake is rarely found."¹² Stace's misconception has by no means vanished in the persistent general lack of interest in Indian Philosophy on the part of Western thinkers. S. K. Saksena has effectively commented on this mistaken notion by observing that the Indian interest in life and practical questions "has not been due to any special characteristics of its philosophical thought." He adds: "This practical bias is due more to the dominance of the religious and the affective attitude than to the force of philosophical thought."¹³

Similarly, of course, opponents of idealism remember that Berkeley was a Bishop of the Anglican church and they have been wary of him for this reason. One man is so baffled by Berkeley's views that he sets out to study "The Unconscious Origins of Berkeley's Philosophy,"¹⁴ attributing Berkeley's theism to Freudian motives. Hegel's profound interest in Christianity is also distasteful to some and serves as a warning flag. To apply the term "religious" to a philosophy has, for some Western thinkers at least, been considered the equivalent of a refutation. Some Westerners have been peculiarly blind to the difference between religion and philosophy in India, a confusion which, Prof. Saksena declares, needs to be cleared up.¹⁵

Now it is true that many recent as well as classical idealists in both East and West have shown far more interest in religion than Naturalists, Logical Positivists, or Linguistic Analysts. Some

12. W. T. Stace, *A Critical History of Greek Philosophy*, (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1920), p. 14.

13. S. K. Saksena, "Are There any Basic Tenets of Indian Idealism" this journal, Vol. XXXI, No. 1 (April 1958), p. 20.

14. John Oulton Wisdom.

15. Saksena, *op.cit.*, p. 24.

have even been engaged in active denominational work.¹⁶ But interest and activity in religion which may well flow out of philosophical concerns rather than vice versa, hardly provides a reason to ignore the arguments and evidence for idealism. If a distaste of religion has led thinkers away from a fair appraisal of the various idealisms, the distaste itself should come under rational scrutiny. That there is deep-seated misunderstanding of idealism in this connection, incidentally, is clearly shown by the charges of some Barthian-type theologians who claim that idealism destroys genuine religion!

In conversation, one occasionally discovers that antipathy towards religion approaches a level of irrationality more serious than that allegedly found among idealists with religious interests. Idealists as a group are no more mere apologists for religion than opponents of idealism are mere defenders of irreligion. The question must always be "What is true?" And what follows in the practical life from such truth is of secondary importance philosophically. Probably the majority of Indian and Western Idealists are convinced that some sort of religious expression is compatible with their metaphysics, but there is no obvious or logically necessary tie-in of religion and idealism.

4. One other reason for a failure on the part of many Western minds to consider idealistic world-views seriously is the misconception some entertain that idealists are not concerned with practical and immediate human problems. Accordingly, idealism has been charged with being "other worldly" and not in tune with basic socio-economic problems. The Marxist, for example, tends to think of idealism as a throwback in the historic process, as a bourgeois bulwark against social advance. Thus, Prof. Bychowskij of Moscow, interpreted personal idealism, several years ago, as "philosophic devilry" and noted: "The slaves of reaction who proclaim this seeming philosophy do not hesitate at any means in their struggle against modern economic ideas and the liberation of nations."¹⁷ One personalist, R. T. Flewelling, is charged with blessing "with the holy water of personalism the aggressive expectations of American monopolists."¹⁸

16. Eg., W. E. Hocking, *Re-thinking Missions: A Layman's Inquiry*, (New York: Harpers, 1932).

17. Bychowskij, "American Personalism: Philosophic Devilry", *The Personalist*, Vol. XXX, No. 2 (Spring 1949), p. 170.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 174.

Now if it ever was true (and I doubt it)¹⁹ that idealists as a group were less concerned about live social and international questions than others, it is certainly not true today. As a movement, Idealism is not of course necessarily related to any political or economic scheme as is, for instance, the metaphysic of Dialectical Materialism. But the recent East-West philosophers' conference at the University of Hawaii in the summer of 1959, gives ample evidence of the concern of individual idealists for immediate problems. In his report on this conference in the *Hibbert Journal*, Arthur Munk points out the profound social vision expressed in one of the leading addresses by none other than so thoroughgoing an idealist as Dr. Radhakrishnan. Prof. Munk also remarks that it was an idealist "who charged the conference with being altogether too academic and lacking in a sense of urgency", and that, "the most violent criticism [of this idealist] came from an outspoken naturalist."²⁰ Indeed, if concern for live social issues is to be taken as a basis for giving consideration to philosophical viewpoints, idealism will fare better than most contemporary movements. At the bottom of the scale, incidentally, one might well find linguistic analysis of the Wittgensteinian type which Bertrand Russell has recently characterized as "at best, a slight help to lexicographers, and at worst, an idle tea-table amusement."²¹

In conclusion, one might observe that though books like Krikorian and Edel's *Contemporary Philosophic Problems* continue to be published and continue to give the false impression that idealism is of no great current consequence, it is true that there has not only been an undiminished persistence of the idealist tradition in both East and West, but there has also been evidence of a resurgence of interest in idealistic systems despite lingering misconceptions which lurk as prejudices in the minds of idealism's opponents.

It ill behooves editors of books purporting to deal with "contemporary problems" to give on the one hand the parochial implication that most serious thought is taking place in the West, and on the other, the naive implication that current idealism is not of present-day importance or concern.

19. One needs only to recall the practical concern and reforming zeal of Plato, Sankara, Berkeley, Fichte and J. Ward, for example.

20. A. W. Munk, "Philosophers' Conference in Retrospect", *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. LVIII, No. 2, (January 1960), p. 139.

21. Quoted by Paul Schilpp in his Presidential Address before the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association and published in *The Proceedings*, 1958-59, p. 31.

Idealistic Trends of Contemporary India

by

A. C. MUKERJI,

Retired Professor of Philosophy, Allahabad University

An attempt is made in the following lines to envisage the lines on which the metaphysical trends of contemporary India have been influenced by absolutist thought, which in certain cases has produced remarkable results, not yet adequately known to the philosophers of the West. From what has appeared in print, it is tolerably obvious that the attitude of the present-day philosophers of England particularly towards their Indian colleagues is not only unsympathetic but often mixed with disdainful indifference. It is still believed that the Indian thinkers are under the impression that philosophical wisdom, as put by an English reviewer of "Contemporary Indian Philosophy," reached its completion long ago and stands to this day as unsurpassed and unsurpassable. Such impressions are no doubt provoked by the fact that the contributors to that volume did not as a rule consider the intellectual atmosphere of the contemporary western thought in presenting their own philosophical views. The days have certainly long passed when a country could profitably limit itself within its geographical frontiers even in the matter of philosophical speculations. We have all to realise that the intellectual atmosphere has now cut across the physical boundaries, and welded the nations into one concrete whole in which every culture has made and is still capable of making valuable contributions. The days of isolated existence have expired not only in the political and economic spheres, but also in those of material and philosophical explorations of the universe.

But the fact cannot be denied that Indian philosophical and speculative adventures of to-day have remained more or less untouched and untouchable, without a just appreciation, by those who have supplied the seeds, of the development of original and sometimes remarkable world-views that would at the least tend, when fully worked out, to enrich the philosophical literature of the world, and offer unexpected help to eradicate the evils of human existence. It is well known that philosophy in India has had a perfectly practical motive, and this prevented philosophy from

becoming a mere amateurish pastime. When philosophy does not sit lightly upon the philosopher, dogmatism and fanaticism become no longer possible; and critical thinking in the light of the prevailing intellectual atmosphere comes to be a dire necessity. This is why we, living in an altered environment, may yet find inspiration in some of the systems of the ancient and medieval periods of history. Howsoever we may have changed since the old days of Indian civilization, there can be no discontinuity between the past and the present; one can appreciate the past only if it be a fact that the past and the present have a continuity that lends significance to their difference. Rational nature never changes; and the principles of reason remain identical in their various applications. It has to be admitted, however, that a correct envisagement of these principles is not an easy task; hence arises the necessity of putting old systems in the language of the new age, and thus develop them in the context of living currents of thought. Our philosophical environment, it must be confessed, is provided by the theories of English philosophy which have developed in diverse directions during about half a century, and some of them promise to make valuable contributions to the building up of a metaphysical edifice through mutual criticism and supplementation of arguments.

So much for pleading the need of comparative philosophy. Without going into the merits of linguistic fanaticism, it may be asserted that philosophical thought requires for its development an international means of communication, which in its turn is made possible by an international medium and not by a so-called regional language. It is needless to add that this requirement is satisfied only by the English language which, therefore, must continue to be cultivated for international understanding. Coming now to the developments of English thought on the Indian soil, we may profitably remind ourselves of a profound remark by Richard Falckenberg, one of the great German historians of philosophy, to the effect that the Frenchman tends chiefly to acuteness, the Englishman to clearness and simplicity, and the German to profundity of thought. Contemporary metaphysics bears an interesting testimony to the general correctness of this characterisation of national temperaments. It is now a historical commonplace that G. E. Moore who came to Cambridge as an amateur did not know that there was such a subject as philosophy; he raised such questions as would put the merest tyro in philosophy out of countenance. Even a smattering of scientific theories was enough to put a check upon his curiosity and convince him that a subject like philosophy

needed initiation. Mere simplicity or directness, clarity and rigour, howsoever sincere, would, in the absence of a proper initiation, lead one astray. This craze for superstructural clarity at the expense of depth has been the source of many unnecessary, artificial problems, over which philosophers have exercised their sterile ingenuity. It is of course true that the endeavour to reach the depth has in some cases resulted in the opposite danger of leaving important points undefined and ambiguous. But this danger may be obviated with sufficient circumspection and caution. The German characteristic of profundity should be an indispensable virtue in philosophical thinking; this, it is hoped, will be tolerably clear from what Kant had suggested to be the foundation of transcendental philosophy. The British revival of pre-Kantian empiricism, however flattering to a superficial view, is an unfortunate incident in the history of western philosophy. This will be elucidated below.

Philosophy, in contemporary India, has not yet crystallized into definite systems. Yet it cannot be denied that the contemporary thinkers of India have given a good account of themselves in the metaphysical field within a short time, owing chiefly to the reaction induced by British philosophy. Our contact with the west has been in this respect an unmixed blessing. Most of the constructive suggestions in philosophy are, directly or indirectly, encouraged by the trends of contemporary British philosophy. In illustration of the influence of British thought, we may begin with a more or less pervasive tendency to develop Indian tradition in the light of the British version of Kant and Hegel. Hegel's philosophy has attracted many Indian thinkers, though their attention has not, except in one or two cases, been concentrated on the whole range of Hegelian philosophy. Leaving aside the constructive effort of the late Hiralal Halder for the time being, it may be interesting to add a few words on the reconstruction of the theory of *Bhedābheda* on the lines of Hegel's doctrine of Unity-in-Difference. This effort at a re-interpretation of an Indian metaphysical position was sponsored by the late P. N. Srinivasa, a thorough and widely read scholar. That the Hegelian and the Indian doctrines are identical formed the corner stone of his presentation of Bhāskara, and he adhered to it till the last days of his earthly career. "The Absolutism of the West", he observes, "is more allied to Bhedābheda than to Viśiṣṭādvaita, and the Hegelian view of the fusion of opposites is a western version of Bhāskara's view of *upādhis*". (The interested reader may see *History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western*, Vol. I, p. 310). In comment-

ing upon this reconstruction of *Bhedābheda* or Difference-and-Identity, it has to be admitted that here there is a confusion between the concept of Difference-and-Identity on the one hand and Identity-in-Difference, on the other. Hegel was formulating the highest principle of thought against its wrong formulation by Aristotle, who did not see the contrast of abstract identity and abstract difference with concrete identity and significant difference. While Bhāskara depended on the principle of Identity-and-Difference to get over the contradiction in the conception of the relation between God and Man, he did not invest it with the dignity of a universal law of thought. Hegel would certainly reject a host of Indian positions along with that of Bhāskara as vitiated by the fallacy of abstract identity and of abstract difference. Though Rāmānuja had also rejected the theory of identity-and-difference as self-contradictory, his rejection was based, not upon the paradox of abstract identity. Hegel's contention against the Indian notion, on the contrary, is this that identity, such as A is A, when divorced from all difference, reduces itself to a tautology and, as such, carries no meaning. Similarly pure difference is meaningless in the absence of an underlying unity. We cannot attach a significance to such a judgment as 'honesty is different from the tail of an elephant'. This being the real meaning of the Hegelian principle, it would be a mistake to foist it on the position of Bhāskara or the other dualists of the Vedānta tradition. It is, however, re-assuring to find that some Indian thinkers have felt that there is here some confusion; but we must find out where the confusion lies. It is not enough to leave it in the region of probability as has been done by Joad or Hiriyāna. The interested reader may refer to Dr. P. T. Raju's work, *Idealistic Thought of India*, p. 148. He has rightly suspected a confusion in this identification of *bhedābheda* with identity *in* and *through* difference. But some of us will find it difficult to agree with him when he remarks that the concept of *bhedābheda*, according to some teachers of the vedānta, means identity in difference as understood in Western Idealism. This is a vital point, and in the interest of clarification the remark needs authentication. But any way it is clearly a mistake to assimilate the Hegelian principle to the *bhedābheda* as understood by Bhāskara.

Before proceeding further, it must be noted that the principle of identity-in-difference, though important for the solution of many puzzles, has within it equally puzzling implications. To put these internal puzzles in the language of ordinary common-

sense, an identical item of thought is different from another item, because there is an identity between these different items. A close scrutiny may reveal that such judgments presuppose both identity and difference in the ordinary sense, as distinct from the sense in which one implies the other. The different parts of a parabola, for instance, are first known to be different from one another and then known as governed by one rule. Here difference as well as identity are presupposed by the conception of identity-in-difference. This reminds one of the puzzles which F. H. Bradley brought to prominence by his analysis of relation. At one place he remarked that each term of the relation "has a double character, as both supporting and as being made by the relation. It may be taken as at once condition and result, and the question is as to how it can combine this variety. For it must combine the diversity, and yet it fails to do so". The root of the Puzzle here is our tendency to hypostatize every part of a sentence in the very process of naming. When the attempt is made to find a relation between relations, these have already disappeared from their actual status as relations and transformed themselves into substances. We shall come across some of the gravest mistakes philosophers are prone to commit because of the language in which our thoughts have to be expressed. In fact, the ordinary procedure of uncritical acceptance of the common distinction between the knower, the known, and knowledge, has lent support to a mode of thinking which has been the breeding ground of a large number of philosophical conundrums and perpetuated fruitless controversies. Language has been compared to a soiled garment in certain sections of Indian philosophy, and this for very good reasons. One of them is signified by the non-dualistic system of philosophy when it discusses the relation of the Absolute to Māyā which is said to be essentially name and form. Language and thought are intimately connected and this has been the source of clearness as well as some basic perplexities in our thinking.

Philosophers, though notorious for mutually conflicting opinions, may certainly agree on the point that difference and distinction are in a sense inevitable for our thought; yet there are likely to crop up such important issues in the course of our explanation as to show clearly that discursive thinking is no match for the analysis of the issue in its deeper aspects. To take a simple instance, we generally do not see any difficulty in the phrases 'my consciousness', 'my mind', 'my conscience', etc. The result is, as every student of philosophy is aware, that it is gene-

rally assumed that corresponding to the distinct parts of these phrases there are distinctions in the self. Yet it is obviously absurd to think that 'mind' belongs to me as a cow or a horse belongs to me; or in other words, the relation between the possessor and the possessed is equally applicable in the cases where a horse is my possession or my mind is my possession. It is this grammatical structure of the language that creates an illusion of distinction giving rise in philosophy to many artificial problems that have occupied philosophers of all ages. Similarly, I think, a phrase which was used by Kant to signify the ultimate condition of experience does not mean that 'I' is the possessor of the thought which is possessed by the 'I' much as the book is possessed by me. In spite of the obvious absurdity of these assumptions, philosophers, both in India and England, have succumbed to the illusions created by the grammatical structure of the language. It is true that difference enters into the object of thought, otherwise no *definite* knowledge of an object could grow in the absence of a counter-object. This has been one of the vital contentions of even the exponents of the non-dualistic system of Indian thought. But an equally vital contention of this non-dualistic tradition consists in this that the self is not a finite object in the midst of other finite objects. Being the universal condition of all objects, the 'I' may be *indirectly* indicated by the object much as light is indirectly indicated by the illumined objects. It is generally described as the subject, but even the subject cannot be grasped except as pointing to the object, and as such it cannot be the universal condition of all objects.

We have tried to explain so far one of the deepest points in the analysis of experience which has been more or less deliberately ignored in the current epistemological theories. Our age particularly is wedded to the psychological attitude of mind and any principle that resists the mechanism of objectification is summarily dismissed as a non-entity. The mistake of this attitude is the mistake of missing the wood for the trees, of missing the space for the particular figures, or of missing the light for the lighted things.

Here we have come to the most crucial point in the analysis of knowledge which has historically provided the bone of contention between the absolutist and the pluralist. The former is in the habit of disregarding the implication of difference encouraged by language, while the latter is insistent on his emphasis on the clear suggestion of plurality involved in linguistic thinking. These

conflicting tendencies of knowledge come to prominence in the conception of the self. As we have just seen, there is absurdity and unintelligibility in certain phrases such as, my mind, my will, my consciousness, etc. On the other hand, such words as Thought, Knowledge, Consciousness, seem to point to a thinker, a knower or a conscious subject. Philosophy as a rule has kept this dilemma out of its serious consideration, the result being an interminable and unprofitable discussion on the nature of the self. This discussion, as is well known, was started in modern philosophy by the 'I think', which was said by Kant to be the ultimate transcendental condition of all experience. The controversy between the post-Kantian idealists on the one hand and their critics on the other is too well known to need elaboration. An interesting solution of the dilemma has been suggested by the Indian thinkers, and the present writer also may share the responsibility for some suggestions made in his work, "*The Nature of Self*". As this work has been long before the public, the elaboration may be left to those who may be specially interested in the controversy. Here we may take up a few aspects of the problem only. It will be useful to start with Kant's own remarks in explanation of the 'I think'.

The unity of consciousness, he says, must not be confused with the category of unity. The unity of consciousness is transcendental and is a "qualitative unity" which precedes any conception of combination. To grasp this unity "we must go further back, and seek it in that which, as the ground of the unity of various conceptions in judgment, is implied in the possibility even in the logical use of understanding". It is easy to see, he adds, that 'I think' is the common vehicle of all conceptions, and therefore of transcendental as well as empirical conceptions. As the vehicle of transcendental conceptions it is itself transcendental, but it cannot claim a special place in the list of these transcendental conceptions, because it merely serves to indicate that all thought belongs to consciousness.

We have here quoted a fairly lengthy remark by Kant, because it, though known to every student of Kant, has been interpreted in the light of his followers' analysis, which has generally missed the particular implication we wish to emphasise in his profound position. That is, the development of German idealism after Kant has taken the transcendental unity of apperception to be, not merely an analytic identity in spite of Kant's clearest pronouncements, but in reality an identity that presupposes a synthesis, not,

that is, an unmediated identity, but an identity that is developed in the process of coming back from its 'other'. This, however, as we have tried to argue elsewhere, has been a onesided emphasis, the result being that the exponents and commentators of Kant have done an injustice to the profounder aspect of his thought in their anxiety to save Kant from falling into the fallacy of abstract identity. But that Kant is serious in his theory of transcendental apperception is undeniable from what he has said as well as from the development of his thought by his immediate follower, Fichte, who is generally interpreted as a mere step towards the idealism of Hegel. It is not perhaps as widely known as it should be that it was the considered opinion of the late Bhagavan Das, one of the most learned of the contemporary Indian philosophers, that Fichte was a greater seer than Hegel; as he realised that the ego is the only true universal perfectly unconditioned in and by matter as well as in and by form. Fichte is a great German thinker, and his statement as to the transference of their characteristics to each other by the ego and the non-ego "is the language of Shankara". (The interested readers may read the *Science of Peace* by Bhagavan Das). Some of his observations are of immense value to the appreciation of the logical development of the non-dualistic system of India.

Those who are familiar with the 'advaita' tradition of India, will see in Fichte a major struggle to rise above the linguistic handicaps of thought and yet to indicate what lies beyond the necessarily relational machinery of discursive thinking. Kant's transcendental self, it is said by his critics, is simply transformed into a metaphysical Self by his followers, and this is the fundamental mistake of the misguided followers of the critical philosophy. Such complaints perhaps would appear as the offspring of a new way of philosophy not adapted to the traditional relativity and relationality of speculative thinking. It is no doubt true that our thinking cannot divest itself of space, time and causality, and as such, we find it difficult to grasp what lies beyond the category-infected reality. But there are methods of framing a general conception of the reality beyond the categories. Fichte is clearly in earnest here, and his exposition has an element of profundity even when we do not go to the positive part of his ethical idealism. Pure Ego, according to Fichte, "lies at the basis of all consciousness and alone makes consciousness possible". The Absolute Ego "is absolutely identical with itself;...there is nothing here to distinguish, no multiplicity. The Ego is everything and is nothing

because it is nothing for itself". The later version of Fichte's Absolute is clearer than his earlier description. To get rid of the relational implications, the Absolute Ego is said to be "absolute knowledge" or "universal thought". Then, in this context, he remarks, almost in the spirit of Śaṅkara, that those who cannot grasp the universal knowledge or universal thought without a subject are merely setting the seal to their own philosophical incompetency. Śaṅkara, it is familiar to every serious student of the non-dualistic tradition of India, attributes the difficulty of grasping universal knowledge to one's intellectual weakness or a lack of comprehension. When, for example, it is urged that knowledge exists only as the knowledge of a knower, and that to knowledge or thought as such, we can attribute neither existence nor causal activity, the critics conveniently forget the reason why a large number of absolutists including Kant emphatically repudiated the practice of misapplying the categories of substance and cause to the self.

Fichte was, it is clear, not slow in recognising the absurdity of this misapplication, and so "absolute knowledge" was carefully kept free from the implication of a knower. As we have observed above, the ordinary practice of regarding the self as the bearer of knowledge would naturally require a distinction between the substance of self and the property of knowledge; my consciousness would then be exactly like my cloth or my horse. No careful thinker would swallow this absurdity which is involved in the insistence on the 'thinker' of thought or 'knower of knowledge'. Here the 'advaita' distinction between the adjective and what is known as *lakṣaṇā* has saved its exponents from one of the disastrous and far-reaching fallacies of thought. The 'absolute knowledge', it has been repeatedly stated, must not be brought under the category of quality (*viśeṣaṇa*); and yet the 'knowledge' may be indicated through a sort of reflexive or regressive envisagement of the implication of every object of knowledge. In a well known explicatory passage Kant has said that "it is indeed quite plain that what I must presuppose in order to cognise any object at all, I cannot also cognise as an object." (*Prolegomena*, Tr. by Mahaffy, p. 229). Having assumed that whatever can be known must be an object, Kant was led to agnosticism, and his famous theory of the 'thing-in-itself' has been considered as the weakest point of his theory of knowledge. And so Fichte has kept to the critical spirit of Kant, and has resisted the natural illusion of applying to the self the categories of substance and cause and also the agnostic tendency of Kant's analysis.

Looking at Kant's position from the standpoint of the non-dualistic system of India, we may see clearly that the pre-supposition of the knowledge of an object, though itself not knowable as an object, cannot be a mere non-entity (or *śunya* as put by the *Madhyamika* school of Buddhism). Nor can it belong to another world entirely above and inaccessible to the world of objects. On the contrary, the presupposition of an object of knowledge must be immanent almost in the same sense in which space is immanent in the geometrical figures. Here is the important implication of the assertion that the Brahman is *pratibodhaviditam*: what it really means is that the Absolute is the necessary pre-condition of every object, and though not comprehensible as an object, it is as clearly grasped in knowing an object as '*ākāśa*' is grasped in knowing a particular thing occupying a definite place. (This reminds us of Kant's doctrine of infinite space of which a limited space is but a particular configuration.)

Before concluding this part of our interpretation of Fichte, we must raise a rather puzzling question. Hegel it is familiar to every modern idealist, has emphatically rejected the idea of a purely analytic judgement which, as a mere tautology, conveys no meaning at all. The non-relational Absolute, it may be said, would be an entirely unmediated entity which cannot be described as anything in particular. Why should then the Absolute be called either a Self, or Consciousness, or Knowledge? This is surely a formidable objection which cropped up between Schelling and Hegel, and it was one of the causes that led to the rupture between them.

This objection was anticipated by F. H. Bradley and he sought to solve it by his theory of degrees of truth and reality. The self, he said, was the highest of the appearances, and though a nest of contradictions, yet needed the least transmutation to reach the status of the Absolute. But at the same time he acknowledged repeatedly that it is not possible to know how such transmutation may be effected. It is interesting in this connection to remember the Indian absolutist's significant exposition of the Absolute Knowledge from the finite and the infinite standpoints or, to put it in the monist's technical language, the standpoint of *buddhi* and the standpoint of *bodha*. Our knowledge which is necessarily based upon distinction is capable of understanding finite objects that are mutually determined; but it cannot grasp directly the Infinite Knowledge which is beyond all distinctions. But, and here is the important peculiarity of Indian absolutism, the distinction-less Knowledge, being always present in finite knowledge, can be indirectly envi-

saged by means of and through the finite knowledge, much as the laws of grammar, to use an excellent metaphor of the Hegelian idealist, are not beyond the language nor are they before the mind of the man who speaks it.

It is a very pregnant observation of the modern absolutists that self-consciousness represents the highest principle of knowledge, though their interpretation of self-consciousness is not the same as that of Kant, Fichte, or the Indian absolutist. We shall try to expose the root-fallacies of some of the recent movements of British philosophy following from a radically unstable and perverted notion of the self, on another occasion.

Book Reviews

The Nature of Man According to the Vedanta by John Levy, published by Routledge & Kegan Paul, price 12s. 6d. net.

This is a small book of 101 pages only. It is written by an Englishman on a subject which contains the quintessence of Hindu philosophy and which is rarely understood, much less appreciated, by persons brought up in the European tradition of thought and culture. The writer of the book is essentially a seeker of Truth. In the Preface, he gives the story of his experiments with Truth. He experimented in turn with Cabbalistic Judaism, Islam and Sufism. According to him, every religion contains in a veiled form certain elements of the highest Truth, but they are lost upon their followers, who do not understand them. Mr. Levy found the Truth in its unadulterated and most satisfactory form in Advaita Vedanta. Guénon's expression, "the Supreme Identity", by which he referred to the essential oneness of the individual soul and the universal Soul, struck the deepest chord in his being. "It was this and one other thing that really gave me my direction—the need of finding a competent personal guidance, without which absolute knowledge cannot be attained" (p. 5). He was fortunate to find a Hindu Sage, at whose feet he learned the Truth. There is no doubt that he has learnt the Truth well. Only we would have welcomed some little account of the Sage, how he happened to get into contact with him, and how the Sage was able to convey the Truth to him so well and thoroughly.

Mr. Levy takes into account the modern mood of doubt. Accordingly, his presentation avoids "the gratuitous assumptions of traditionalists" and states the Truth in a language which the West can easily understand. It is the rational presentation of a Truth which is essentially beyond reason. At the same time, Mr. Levy is a radical. He says, "I have not stopped to make any of those compromises attendant upon the childish desire to convert others" (pp. 18-19). His argument is very compact. The small book traverses a wide field and says things in a few pages which require volumes to explain and to justify. While this is certainly its strong point, the argument could have been made easier and the presentation more attractive by a little expansion for the uninitiated reader. Some portions do appear to be rather abstruse. The terminology employed is unexceptionable. But while the Indian who is already

acquainted with Vedantic thought and Sanskrit terminology can readily understand the author's meaning, it is not quite certain that the Western reader will do so. The Indian misses the atmosphere of the original Sanskrit thought, and the Westerner will perhaps find the running idea of Non-duality rather suffocating. For both, the answer seems to be that the book contains the statement of Truth as the Truth-seeker finds it, without caring overmuch about who is pleased and who is not.

The school of Advaita Vedanta is unanimous about the nature of the ultimate Truth and the way to realize it. But there are many differences, among its exponents, about subsidiary doctrinal matters. The standpoint of Mr. Levy on all those matters is that of consistent and thorough-going subjectivism. It is the higher standpoint in Vedanta, meant for the few—and those few the best qualified seekers of the Truth. It clearly shows the competence and the level of certitude of the author. A person who is well-versed in the art of pure introversion cannot be cheated out of the Truth and he has a sure way of resolving all problems and all difficulties. Only it is a difficult method for the average individual, who has to take a roundabout way to reach the same goal.

The book contains four Parts and a Preface. The whole standpoint of the book is well expressed in the statement: "To find a peace and happiness that is beyond every possible circumstance, including death, we must be in a position to discern the changeless principle within us. This will entail an examination of human experience as a whole" (p. 19).

The first Part considers the three main states—wakefulness, dreams and deep sleep. What is the significance of these three states? We find on analysis that there is no difference between the dream state and the wakeful state from a subjective standpoint. We cannot therefore say that there is more truth in wakefulness than in dreams. Wakefulness is just another dream, considered purely from its own internal evidence. There is no difference. The state of deep sleep again appears in wakefulness to be a state of nescience—but in itself it is not that and is never felt to be so. It is the state of unconditioned being, or the state of Non-duality. This Non-duality is ever-present as the background of duality. It is as though the non-dual Self puts on the shirt of the mind and becomes the dreaming ego, and puts on in addition the physical coat of the body and becomes the waking ego. The non-dual Self continues as the witness in all the three states,

The second and the largest Part deals with our experiences in wakefulness. Here Mr. Levy shows that the world is an idea, the body is an idea, the ego is an idea, etc. There is no difference between mind and matter. All our troubles come because we have wrongly identified our non-dual Self with the physical and the mental body and thus become victims of desire and aversion. Our highest good consists in looking upon our inner Self as the witness of desire and aversion, pain and pleasure, etc., and thus dissociating it from its attachment to the body and all that this attachment implies. From the conception of the witness to that of the non-dual Self is a natural step. The epistemological standpoint of Mr. Levy is best described by the Sanskrit technical term, *dr̥ṣṭi-sr̥ṣṭi*, i.e., perception makes the world. It is the same as Berkeley's *esse is percipi*".

The third Part deals with the Self. Here Mr. Levy distinguishes three levels—the ego, the witness and the non-dual Self. The ego is not a permanent entity and is the product of the identification of the permanent Self with the body. We rise to a higher level in the witness. The witness is permanent and is of the nature of pure consciousness. All objects appear in it; it does not appear in anything else. It is the only real knower. But the witness is still relative, because it implies the notion of objects of which it is the witness. When we have negated all objects, we rise to the level of the non-dual Self. This Self is "that unique principle whose existence cannot be doubted, whose being depends on no other, and which is immutable" (p. 83). It is the only ultimate Reality. It is never *really* incarnated. It is incarnated only through our error of identification. True knowledge removes this error.

The last part deals with Self-love. It is a small section, but very important in what it says. Our true happiness is not in objects outside of us. Objects are only the occasion of our refinding the joy of the Self. There is in this sense no joy except the joy of the Self. True joy is the very nature of the Self and is as eternal as the Self. "Happiness is ever-present as the Self" (p. 98). "Felicity and Self-knowledge go hand in hand" (p. 99). The section ends by giving the Vedantic view of the place of ethics in the search for the ultimate Truth. Since knowledge of the Truth is of the highest value, since it alone can bring about our ultimate freedom from pain and bondage, helpfulness to others occupies a secondary place. It may even be an obstruction to the seeker. "Anyone who aims at spiritual realization must be prepared to give up all systematic attempts to help others, even at the risk of being called selfish"

(p. 101). It involves a dissipation of energy. But a person who has realized the Truth can help, and does help, according to his inclination and temperament. There is however no obligation upon him, because he is free. His help is like a gift from above, natural and spontaneous. He is above the law, beyond good and evil.

The book is small, but well written. Its great merit is that it is written by an Englishman who is personally convinced of the Truth and who thinks that the human race will be the wiser for learning it. The great Truth here propounded is a solvent for all social and human ills, for it transforms the individual completely from within. The individual renounces his individuality and assumes his true role of divinity. For him, all differences are gone, and love naturally takes the place of animosity in all human relations. It is an ancient tradition of the Hindu religion, but it is evergreen; for it has been the highest source of inspiration for all times. Mr. Levy is to be congratulated for introducing this all-important school of Hindu thought to the Western mind in his own enlightened way.

G. R. MALKANI.

Logical Positivism: Edited by A. J. Ayer: The Library of Philosophical Movements, General Editor: Paul Edwards, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois: PP. 455+viii, 1959. Price \$6/75 c.

As is evident from the title, the present volume is a collection of papers and writings concerning the Viennese Circle philosophy. There are several papers which have appeared for the first time in English which makes the volume more valuable for those who have access to logical positivism through English language only. But the inclusion of the papers on logical atomism and analytic philosophy goes beyond the limits imposed by the title of the volume. In the name of one system, the present volume deals with three different systems. However, this does not take away from its philosophical importance.

A brief discussion of these papers is proposed here. The writings of Russell, Ramsey, Ryle and Waismann have been excluded from this discussion. Though they are philosophically very illuminating, they are outside the fold of logical positivism, with which alone we are concerned here.

Philosophy, Metaphysics and Meaning:—(1) Schlick's paper "The Turning Point in Philosophy" expresses a very strange

view about philosophy. Schlick thinks, (a) "The task of philosophy does not consist in asserting statements—bestowing meanings upon statements cannot be done in turn by statements" (P. 57). (b) "Whenever there is a meaningful problem one can in theory always give the path that leads to its solution" (P. 56). The statement (a) implies that a system of philosophy cannot be expressed; a system consists only of statements. In the same way, (b) implies that the problems of philosophy are not problems at all, because they are insoluble. In the future, according to Schlick, there will be no 'philosophical problems', for all problems will be expressed in a philosophical manner, i.e., clearly and meaningfully. But Schlick's conclusions are not free from objections. His idea that a philosophical system cannot be expressed entails the absurd position of the child, pointed out by Ramsey in the same volume—"say breakfast". "Can't". "What can't you say"? "Can't say breakfast", (P. 325). So also when a philosopher poses a problem, does not he also give its possible explanation? It is a different thing that the same problem may have different explanations. Even in sciences such differences exist.

(2) Carnap's concern is clear from the very title of his paper "Elimination of Metaphysics". He eliminates metaphysics through the help of the criterion of cognitive meaning, which implies that a word is meaningful if it can be reduced to other words occurring inside a protocol sentence (P. 63). This criterion does not imply that such a word as "God" is absolutely meaningless. In its mythological use this word has a clear meaning. It is only in its metaphysical use that it lacks meaning. In its mythological use, "God" is supposed to manifest Himself in the visible world. But in its metaphysical use, "this word is deliberately divested of its reference to a physical being or a spiritual being that is immanent in the physical", (P. 66). A metaphysician deliberately makes a meaningless use of a meaningful word. Again, by saying that a metaphysical statement is meaningless, Carnap simply means that it does not express a cognitive claim.

(3) In "Positivism and Realism" Schlick describes the nature of disagreement existing between these two systems. It is in this connection that he arrives at the conclusion, "a question concerning the reality of an experience makes sense only if its reality can significantly be doubted", (P. 99). Schlick's view implies that the statement, 'I feel a pain now', can be doubted as much as any other hypothesis. But doubting the statement 'I feel a pain now'

does not make sense, for the reason that it does not make sense to say, "Is it really true that I feel a pain now?" For when I raise this question, I commit myself to know what the word "pain" means. And if I know what the word "pain" means, then there is no possibility of doubting that what I feel is a pain. So Schlick has to agree that there are experiences whose reality cannot be doubted.

(4) In his paper "The Empiricist Criterion of Meaning" Hempel discusses the technical difficulties involved in the criteria of meaning proposed by Schlick, Waismann, Rupper and others. It is to avoid these difficulties that he introduces a new criterion of cognitive meaning, which he calls the "Translatibility Criterion". The fate of his criterion depends on the ambiguous use of "empiricist language". Neither he believes that this criterion expresses an empirical hypothesis nor that it is a tautology. He also does not accept it as a definition or a linguistic proposal. He may be said to treat it as a "provisional hypothesis" concerning the cognitive meaning; for he clearly believes that it may be replaced by another in the future. His language simply dodges the issue. Like his other fellow-travellers he fails to solve it.

Logic and Mathematics:—(1) In "The Old and the New Logic", Carnap points out the importance of the new logic. A new era of philosophizing is supposed to have arisen with the advent of the new logic, which is characterised by its Theory of Relational Sentences and the Theory of Sentential Functions. According to the traditional logic every sentence expresses the subject-predicate form. As Russell says, "If every sentence attributes a predicate to a subject, there can, after all, be only one subject, the Absolute, and every state of affairs must consist in possession of a certain attribute by the Absolute". (P. 138). The theory of relational sentences proves the impossibility of translating a relational sentence in the subject-predicate form. So logic no more remains the support for the Absolute. Further, the discovery that logic is tautological in character and that there are no surprises in it makes the affair even more complex. For if nothing can be inferred which is not already contained in the premisses, it becomes impossible to take a jump from experience to transcendence.

(2) Hans Hahn's paper "Logic, Mathematics and Knowledge" is a fine example of how a technical problem can be discussed in ordinary language. His task is to show that logic has a tauto-

logical character, and hence it fails to furnish any information about objects. The proposition "Miss Erna's new dress is not both red and blue all over" fails to give any information about her dress, it merely expresses our way of speaking about her dress. What seems to be a case of material a-priori is simply a case of a tautology. (Pp. 151-7). Hahn's paper is so lucid that even a believer in the material apriori may relish his arguments.

Knowledge and Truth:—(1) In "Psychology in Physical Language" Carnap brings out the thesis of physicalism. In his own words, he is concerned with robbing of the spirituality of psychology by degrading it to the status of physics. (P. 168). What sort of robbery is this? It is to reduce such sentences as, 'I am now excited' and 'my friend is now excited' to physical-language statements. Physical language is characterised by the fact that there is no privacy in it. To make language intelligible to others it is necessary that its words should refer to public physical facts or events. For example, if I am using the word "pain" in such a sense that it refers to some private quality of my experience, then other persons cannot be said to understand the meaning of this word, for they cannot have access to any private quality. So other persons can understand this word only when it refers to the behaviour of my body. But such a Translatibility has absurd consequences. Following the thesis of physicalism, for example, when I say 'I have a headache', I simply mean to say "I press my head with both hands'. This implies that a majority vote of others can disestablish the truth of my sense-statement. I do not have any veto powers. For, if my head-ache-statement refers to my aching-behaviour only, then I am in no way in a better position than the others. But sense-statements are of such a nature that I can exercise my veto even if the whole world goes against me.

(2) The problem of solipsism is lurking behind Neurath's paper "Protocol Sentences". If scientific statements are verified by reducing them to experiential statements, then solipsism cannot be avoided. Science loses its intersubjective, universal character. So Neurath adopts the coherence theory of truth. He makes the distinction of protocol sentences and non-protocol sentences, but the former are different from the latter, not in the sense that they are more primitive than the latter, but in the sense that they have a personal pronoun. (P. 202). Otherwise protocol sentences are also open to changes and rejection like the non-protocol ones. There are various objections against Neurath's position, but Ayer's

objection is very striking. Ayer thinks, if experience has nothing to do with a protocol sentence then the term 'protocol' becomes merely an arbitrary syntactical designation. "There is no more justification for it than there would be for making a collection of all propositions....beginning with the letter B, and choosing to call them as Basic propositions". (P. 231).

(3) In his paper "The Foundation of Knowledge" Schlick seems to have corrected his earlier mistake of thinking that an experiential statement, or confirmation, can be doubted. But even in this paper he carries the old belief that an experiential statement can be verified. (P. 225). But as Wittgenstein points out, there is no such thing as a verification for 'I have headache', since the question 'How do you know that you have a headache?' is senseless. (Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-33, *Mind*, 1955). Wittgenstein means to say that the verification of a statement makes sense only when the statement in question can be doubted. And we have already seen in Schlick's earlier paper that doubt concerning an experiential statement makes no sense.

(4) Ayer discusses the nature of basic statements in his paper "Verification and Experience". He disagrees with the views of Carnap and Neurath on this issue. But his own view is no less paradoxical. He says, "If the words 'I am angry' are used to say that I am angry, then it does not seem in any way mysterious that my being angry should verify the proposition that they express". (P. 241). There is a good sense why it may seem mysterious to say that my being angry should verify the proposition that I am angry. To say that a proposition can be verified means that some further observations or tests can be performed. For example, when it is said that a hypothesis, such as, there is an ash-tray on the table, can be verified, it is meant that I can touch the ash-tray and strike a hammer on the table. It is because I was capable of doing these activities that this hypothesis can be described to be of a verifiable nature. Can I be said to perform any such further observations or tests in connection with 'I am angry'? I can feel anger which would verify that I am angry. But what is the meaning of 'can' here? Does it mean that I can feel anger in the same way in which I can strike a hammer on the table? If I cannot, how can my being angry verify the statement that I am angry?

Ethics and Sociology.—"What Is the Aim of Ethics" is a chapter from Schlick's "Problems of Ethics". Just as Carnap

degrades psychology to physics, Schlick degrades Ethics to a factual science. Like other philosophers he takes his start in Ethics by attacking Moore's views. To Moore the end of Ethics is the definition of "Good", all else is an affair of casuistry. To Schlick the end of Ethics is not the definition of "Good". If Ethics ended with a definition, it would at the most be an introduction to a science. (P. 250). The real Science of Ethics does not even begin. So also to Schlick the fundamental question of Ethics is not 'What is Good'? The fundamental question is "Why does man act morally?" which involves a psychological enquiry. Schlick's ethics has only this much importance, that it stands as the first positivistic manifesto on Ethics.

(2) Stevenson in his paper "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms" expresses a view which was afterwards developed in his "Ethics and Language". It is not Schlick's, but Stevenson's, view which represents the recent positivistic attitude. In his paper Stevenson agrees with Moore that an ethical judgment cannot be defined purely in terms of scientific judgments. But the reason why he thinks so is different from Moore's. Moore believes that an ethical judgment predicates a non-natural quality of its subject. Whereas Stevenson's reason is that ethical judgments are not used merely to indicate facts, they are also used to create an influence. They have quasi-imperative force. Their importance lies in the latter function. (P. 269). They could have been analysed in terms of scientific judgments had their function been merely to indicate facts. But then they would not have been ethical at all.

(3) In "Sociology and Physicalism" Neurath extends the thesis of physicalism to sociology, which was so far treated as a branch of moral science. Neurath thinks that the dualism of "natural sciences" and "moral sciences" is a residue of theology. All sciences are parts of a Unified Science. Sociology, being a science of social behaviour, is governed by the laws of this mother science. Of course the laws of social behaviour or sociology are not the same as the laws of physics. This is to confuse physics, in the academic sense of the term, with the whole of Unified Science. The truth is that physics like any other science is only one part of the Unified Science. Physicist language is appraised because it is comparatively nearer to the ideal of intersubjectivity and universality. Though one may not agree with Neurath's view about sociology, nevertheless the paper is a significant contribution on this subject.

The importance of the present volume is undeniable. It is sure to create interest in a student who desires to obtain a first hand information about logical positivism. To a great extent the present volume satisfies this desire.

SURESH CHANDRA,
Indian Institute of Philosophy.

Books Received

1. *The Structure of Scientific Thought* (An Introduction to Philosophy of Science). Madden. Published by Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston.
2. *An Analysis of Morals*, by John Hartland-Swann, published by George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, price 25s./- net.

Indian Philosophy at the International Congress of Philosophy, 1958:

One of the 8 sections of the 12th International Congress of Philosophy, which was held at Venice and at Padua from the 12th to the 18th September, 1958, was devoted to: Relations between Western philosophies and Eastern thought. It consisted of four subdivisions, relating to the philosophies of China, Japan, India and the Muslim countries ("Arabi"). In the following only a short review of the proceedings of the Indian section is given.

The official Indian delegates were Prof. N. A. Nikam (Mysore) and Prof. P. R. Damle (Poona). Though Prof. Nikam did not read any paper, it may be mentioned here that he addressed the section in a detailed comment upon the two talks given by Prof. Y. Nomura (Tokyo), who spoke on "East and West: some actual problems of the comparative philosophy of culture in Japan", and Prof. J. Katsura (Tokyo), who spoke on: "Der Weltbegriff im europaischen und orientalischen Denken." Prof. Katsura had distinguished rather sharply between the European view, where the world is in the first place looked upon as an object of knowledge, and the more practical Oriental view of the world as the scene of man's destiny (against which view reference could be made, e.g., to the Christian or to the Existentialist view of the world in the West and to the distinction between *jagat* and *samsāra* sometimes made in India). Prof. Katsura gave illustrations from Mahāyāna Buddhism.

Prof. Nikam stressed the dangerous consequences of the use of generalisations such as East and West. One should especially avoid such identifications as that between the West and science or between the East and religion. It is more important to study human thought on its own merits and as it has manifested itself, whether this happened to be in the Orient or in the Occident.

In the meeting which was presided over by Prof. F. H. Young (New Jersey), Prof. Damle read a paper which was entitled: "Oriental philosophy: some reflections". He took exception to a common but erroneous view, that Western philosophy is a search for intellectual satisfaction carried out with the aid of reason, whereas Indian philosophy is not based upon reason but upon authority and has but practical aims such as *mokṣa*. The lecturer argued on the contrary that *mokṣa* was a state of consciousness resulting from true knowledge only. This may be clearly seen when Śaṅkara is compared with Bradley. Also the widespread contention that Indian philosophy is based upon uncommon states of consciousness and upon exceptional experiences cannot be maintained: even though *śuṣupti* is taken into account by some thinkers, Indian philosophy in general is based upon ordinary experience and reason. The mere occurrence of certain terms from which such opinions are sometimes derived, is certainly misleading. In Nyāya, for instance, *alaukika* perception is not related to anything supramundane, but refers to our awareness of the species or class which accounts for our knowledge of the individual. It is the perception of "cowness" as distinct from that of "cow". That Indian thought is not hostile to scientific data can be seen from the incorporation of these in philosophy by modern Indian thinkers, who are clearly connected with the Indian tradition, such as Shri Aurobindo.

If thus the Indian philosophical method is not very dissimilar to the Western, Indian philosophy is often at variance with Western philosophy because of a very different background. Hence direct assimilation between Indian and Western thought should not be aimed at. Each should develop on its own lines but reckon with what the other tradition has to offer. In particular Indian philosophy should take into account the data of modern science.

In a contribution entitled: "Present and possible relations between Oriental philosophy and Western thought" Prof. F. H. Young contrasted the Oriental conceptions of unity, continuity and identity with the Occidental ones of diversity, discontinuity and difference. He stressed the desirability for mutual understanding

and cooperation, and pointed at the need for Western civilisation to be aware of the Eastern achievements. Moreover, there are important truths which could be commonly adopted, such as that of a self which is empirical as well as transcendental or *jīva* as well as *ātman*. After the Kantian critique in the 18th and the Hegelian critique in the 19th century, it would be appropriate to accept a critique of 20th century philosophy based upon Indian thought.

In the discussion Prof. T. F. Lindley (Connecticut) asked whether there was no contradiction between the views of Professors Damle and Young. Prof. Damle pointed out, however, that he had nowhere denied the need for cooperation, but had stressed the fact that understanding of important differences, which are often neglected, should come first.

Thereafter Prof. J. J. Poortman (Den Haag) delivered a lecture on: "Die Fruchtbarkeit der Grundgedanken des Vedanta für die abendländische philosophische Problematik". He said it was deplorable that nowadays the Kantian achievements are neglected, whereas Kant's position remains actually unchallenged. For instance, synthetical judgments a priori do certainly exist (e.g. nothing can vanish). The main problem which remained unsolved in this context was the solution of the question, how the subject can actually reach any object. For even if it is true that the individual thinks about the things, he has not in any way created or posited them ("hat sie nicht gesetzt"). The Netherlands philosopher G. Heymans solved this problem by means of the following answer: the individual subject can only think along the lines of ("nachdenken") what the divine being thinks. This solution prepares the way for a European assimilation of the Vedantic views on this topic, which could contribute essentially to a further development of the solution of the problem. It is unfortunate that Prof. Poortman could not complete the exposition of his views.


In the meeting which was presided over by Prof. Katsura, Prof. R. L. Patterson (Durham, New Carolina) gave a talk on: "Absolute dualism in Hindu philosophy and its significance for Western thought". He drew attention to important aspects of Indian thought which are often neglected in the West. Systematically, three main varieties of philosophical dualism may be distinguished: (1) the view that the divine is independent, whereas all the rest depends on it; (2) epiphenomenalism, where matter is presupposed; and (3) the view that there are two co-existent and

everlasting entities. The last view may be called absolute dualism. In the West it became preponderant, e.g. with Philo of Alexandria. In India this doctrine or something like it was held in Jainism, Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Śāṅkhya and Yoga (the correctness of this statement could be questioned). None of these philosophies is in need of the vague and unclarified concepts of creation or of emergence. Amongst these, however, the theistic systems give a more intelligible account of the occurrence of *dravya*, "substance", and of the working of *karmā*. Because of this explicative power, Nyāya is to be preferred to the others. In this system of thought the individual selves are free but come under the law of *karma* which is administered by *Īśvara*. There are only two weak points in the Nyāya philosophy: (1) the doctrine of matter, which presupposes the existence of atoms as ultimate, contradicting modern physics (it may be asked here, whether this weakness does not safeguard the absolute dualistic position which was the lecturer's point of departure—unless, of course, energy takes the place of matter); (2) the empirical approach.

In the discussion Prof. M. M. Sharif (Lahore) remarked that the position finally reached by Prof. Patterson was not very different from familiar doctrines held in Islam or in Christianity. The present reviewer may add that it is but natural that a Westerner, who wishes to select out of Oriental philosophies whatever he approves of without trying to enter into the heart of each system of thought, finally returns to his starting point.

Earlier, the present reviewer had spoken on: "Means of formalisation in Indian and Western logic". Continuing previous work done by S. Sen, D. H. H. Ingalls and I. M. Bochenski, he showed how a Navya-Nyāya argument could be represented in the symbolism of modern mathematical logic. It can be shown in greater detail how in this way the definition: *sādhyaḥbhāva-vadavṛttitvam* can be written as: $\sim A(h, ay(y \neq axB(x,s)))$, where A and B are binary predicates defined earlier and where α is used to express restricted quantification. Such an analysis shows the precise function of the Sanskrit expressions, which constitute a formalisation which is similarly related to ordinary Sanskrit as mathematical logic is to ordinary English. It can thus be seen which logical laws are used by Indian thinkers, and which may elucidate the comparison between Indian and Western thought. Ultimately it contributes to the study of the relation between logical structure and linguistic expression, either in the Indo-European languages or in general.

Qm 125
N60-33-2



In the discussion Prof. Lindley referred to the views of F. C. S. Northrop, where it is assumed that the law of the excluded middle is nowhere adopted in Oriental thought. The lecturer rejected such a view and was joined in this by Prof. Damle. Prof. Sharif showed, however, that the example from Sāṅkara adduced by the speaker illustrated the use of the principle of contradiction but not of the principle of the excluded middle.

J. F. Staal

Books published by
THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY,
Amalner, (E. Khandesh), India.

1. **Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya Memorial Volume**—Philosophical Essays by distinguished writers, price Rs. 10/- (inland) and \$3/50^c (foreign).
2. **The Subject as Freedom**, by Prof. K. C. Bhattacharyya, price Rs. 2/50^{nP} or \$1/25^c.
3. **Vedantic Epistemology**, by G. R. Malkani, price Rs. 3/- or \$1/50^c.
4. **Srimant Pratap Seth Diamond Jubilee Volume** (Philosophical essays by different writers), Part III, price Rs. 2/- or \$1/-.
5. **A Life Sketch of the Founder of the Indian Institute of Philosophy and "A brief account of the Advaitic System of Thought"**, by G. R. Malkani, price Rs. 2/50^{nP} or \$1/25^c.
6. **A Study of Reality**, by G. R. Malkani, price Rs. 1/50^{nP} or \$0/75^c.
7. **Metaphysics of Energy**, by G. R. Malkani, price Rs. 2/- or \$1/-.
8. **Problem of Nothing**, by G. R. Malkani, price Re. 1/- or \$0/50^c.