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THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

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Modern Psychology and Hindu Thought

by

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I

It is only when a science is sufficiently advanced that it turns back upon its *concepts* and analyses them. Decidedly, modern psychology is not so advanced. It has yet to explore many facts, postulate newer hypotheses and build theories. As yet in a formative stage it has little time, and lesser interest, to probe its fundamental concepts.

Classical Indian psychology, on the other hand, is mainly confined to such probing. It examines the nature and function of consciousness in general, asks whether there is a soul over and above mental states, how exactly the soul, if there is any, stands to different mental states, whether there is anything called "unconsciousness" and, if there is any, how it influences the conscious life, what are the general types of knowledge, feeling and will and how in general they originate, etc., etc. Such questions are asked in a general speculative interest and answered quite as much as other *philosophical* questions, i.e., not in the way on account of which modern psychology is called *scientific*. In short, there is no subtle experimentation, no close sifting of facts, no systematic statistical study, no pragmatic testing—therapeutic or otherwise, etc. Not that classical Indians were unaware of all these scientific requirements. In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Advaita psychologies we sometimes come across cleverest sifting of facts, and often there are references to esoteric experimentation, as in Yoga; but this is not the general rule.

This clarifies another aspect of Indian psychology. It is that, though philosophical, Indian psychology is no philosophy of the science of psychology, no philosophy, in other words, which presupposes a corresponding science the fundamental concepts of which it takes upon itself to probe, the like of which we find, for example, in the modern philosophy of physical sciences. Indian psychology is philosophy from the beginning to the end. Naturally it is open to correction at many places, particularly where there are *a priori* excesses, by modern psychology which is thoroughly empirical.

This is a very natural weakness of Indian psychology, as indeed of any study in ancient India. Yet there is much to speak in its favour. Unlike a philosophy of science which can in no way correct the findings or theories of the corresponding science but can only place them in a clear perspective, a philosophy which is original in the sense of not having developed out of a science can so correct. If a verdict of such pure philosophy clashes with that of a science each party ought to be on its guard. The modern attitude of too easily condemning pure philosophy is not justified. A scientific verdict is undoubtedly based on facts and cautious at every step. But the fact that one is cautious and faithful to facts is not enough. For, philosophy also proceeds on the basis of some *facts* and *argues out* its case. Unless, therefore, one actually demonstrates errors in a contrary philosophic verdict one has not properly made out his case in the science of psychology. It is in this sense that philosophy can correct science.

The second merit of classical Indian psychology is that it is extremely thorough and systematic in its analysis of fundamental psychological concepts. It may not be scientific in the modern sense of the term, but its thoroughness and systematic character is a bulwark against easy attacks.

The third merit is that it often, though mostly in an unsystematic manner, refers to psychological data many of which would startle a modern psychologist. We find such data mostly in the Yoga system of philosophy and often in Advaita Vedanta. The analysis of dream, dreamless sleep, trance, etc., are examples to the point. We do not mean that the old Indian psychologists were always correct in their observation. The least that we claim is that modern psychology would do well to ponder over these.


II

Indian psychology, thus, is not merely worth reading, there is every reason to believe that it may throw unsuspected light on

modern psychological problems and suggest corrections and improvements.

The method of the old Indian psychology was certainly introspection from the beginning to the end, aided, as every perception ought to be, by inference wherever necessary. But this introspection was not always what we in modern times take it to be. There was in Indian philosophy a thorough and systematic study of the nature and content of introspection. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika which is the least mystical of all the Indian systems holds that introspection has for its content the fact "I know x" where x is the object of the knowledge which is now being introspected into, so that every introspection is the knowledge of three things at one and the same time, viz. of a self, a knowledge and the object of this knowledge. It is not the awareness of a mere unreflective knowledge, it reveals two more things, viz. the self and the object of that unreflective knowledge. This last-mentioned object may be revealed in introspection in two ways. It may be revealed as only secondarily attached to the knowledge that is revealed, where this *knowledge* is the central theme and the object just adjectivally tagged on to it. But it may also stand as itself the central theme, when the content of introspection would be of the form "x as known by me".

Modern psychologists either admit introspection in the first sense only or deny introspection altogether. But scarcely has any of them paid sufficient attention to the second form of introspection mentioned above. Those of them who want to lay more emphasis on the object x have generally turned toward objectivism of some form, knownness as subordinately tagged on to x being too easily interpreted as either a form of being physiologically responded to or just a postulational constructed subjectivity having no claim to reality. Not that there is no reason for such objectivism. Knownness is an objective property in contrast with *knowledge* which is somehow understood as subjective, and naturally these psychologists feel tempted to interpret it in a qualitatively different manner. But this is not necessary. For, first, the very concept "subjectivity" is shrouded in mystery, and, secondly, one must note that even knowledge, as according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, may itself be an object to introspection. Whether that introspection, itself a knowledge (though of another knowledge), is not in its turn an object to another introspection, is a different point with which we need not be concerned now. It is enough here that if even knowledge, as distinct from knownness, can be objective one need not mystify, though often in the name of clarification, this knownness.



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Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika would hold that behaviorism and the other form of objectivism just referred to are both of them unnecessary.

What I am aware of in introspection is either "I know x" or "x is known by me". In the first case the knowledge that is known is known as related to x, and in the second case the object x is known as related to knowledge. Indian psychologists, particularly of the neo-Nyāya school, have studied these relations in meticulous details, and in this study they have relied chiefly on introspection. They have recorded the diverse ways in which a factual complex appears to the subject perceiving it. In this doctrine of *viśayatā* developed by the thinkers of the neo-Nyāya school we find a complete account of judgment—perceptual and non-perceptual—that would equally interest a modern psychologist and a logician.

The other pole in introspection is the self. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika believes that the self is revealed in every introspection, for when a knowledge is revealed it is revealed as belonging to me. Everybody says "I know", and this I is felt inevitably as self-identical behind all such knowledges (and feelings and wills), which means that the I is revealed as a permanent locus of these mental states. This is the general Hindu view; none of them would, like the Buddhists and modern Western psychologists, understand it as adjectivally distributed among the mental states. This self is a substance not merely behind knowledge, it is revealed as equally behind feelings and wills, for we all have a mental perception of the form "I am happy", "I am willing", etc. Indian psychologists would, practically all of them, differ here with modern psychologists in two more basic points. (1) They would, all of them, reduce the propositions "I feel", "I will" and "I know" to "There happens a feeling, there happens a will, there happens a knowledge in I the self" and, with but the solitary exception of the "Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsākas, would never take feeling, willing and knowing as acts of any kind. It is only the Mīmāṃsākas mentioned who considered knowledge as an act, and they too had to struggle hard to prove it. (2) The second point of difference between the old Indian and modern psychologists is that feeling and will, as distinguished from knowledge, are not taken as by themselves conscious. All the three are undoubtedly *mental* phenomena, but not all are conscious. The word "mental" means that these all are special characters of the self; or, as we shall later see, they all belong to *antah-karana* which, however, is other than the self.

According to the first view knowledge alone is conscious in the sense that, though all the three are internal phenomena, know-

ledge alone is that which reveals other things, "consciousness" meaning that which being internal so reveals things. According to the second view, as we shall see later, consciousness is that which is *subjective proper*, i.e., never an object, from which it follows that even the mental event called "knowledge" is not intrinsically conscious, but that there is a principle still further behind, and that principle alone is consciousness. But as even that principle also *reveals* the mental states it too is called "knowledge". Thus always in Indian philosophy knowledge, understood in an appropriate sense, is literally equated with consciousness. This is a point absolutely novel of Indian psychology and should be thoroughly investigated not merely because it is novel but because it has far-reaching implications for psychology. This is explained as follows:

First, if feelings and wills are not conscious they do not reveal other things and have, therefore, no objects, the so-called object of a feeling or will being nothing but the object of the *cognition* that produces that feeling or will.

Secondly, introspection as knowledge of a knowledge must be qualitatively different from the knowledge that is known. For, if both were consciousness and if there were nothing against one consciousness being revealed by another consciousness, this introspection could again be introspected into. But this is absurd. Not merely would this lead to the difficulty that the second introspection could equally be revealed by a third, and so on *ad infinitum*; as a matter of fact, the very first introspection is self-revealing. It follows, as we have already noted, that there are two kinds of knowledge, one self-revealing and the other not. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position on this point is not always clear, but other Indian psychologists have, most of them, admitted this. Add to this the problem whether this self-revealing introspection occurs *after* the primary knowledge or simultaneously with it and we are face to face with a fundamental difference between Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Vedānta. With the former the primary knowledge may go without being intuitively grasped, with the latter it cannot. In the latter case, therefore, we have to admit a type of knowledge, called "*sākṣin*", which reveals the primary knowledge (as also a feeling and a will). The question would now arise whether corresponding to each mental state that occurs in my mind there is a distinct *sākṣin* or whether one and the same *sākṣin* perceives all these mental states in me. Advaita favours the second alternative on the ground that the knower *sākṣin* is self-evidently felt as one and single.

Indeed if there were no unitary knower recollection and allied phenomena could not be accounted for.

To Advaita, then, this *sākṣin* knower is the self. This is a notion of self fundamentally different from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika notion. To Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika the self is not conscious in the sense that consciousness is its own nature. Consciousness as knowledge is, according to it, an accidental happening in it. To Advaita, on the other hand, consciousness is the very nature of the self. Indeed it equates self absolutely with consciousness. Other systems of Hindu philosophy have sided with one or the other of these two schools, and some have attempted synthesis. Sāṅkhya and Yoga, for example, are with Advaita in this respect; the Prābhakara Mīmāṃsakas are with Nyāya in that the self, according to them, is a non-conscious locus (substance) in which knowledge or consciousness happens; the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas believe that the self is in part conscious and in part non-conscious; and Rāmānuja holds that both the self and knowledge are conscious. The analysis of self-consciousness that these Hindu psychologists have offered will appear to a modern thinker a grand psychological study.

III

Consequent upon this concept of self-revealing *sākṣin* there has grown in Advaita and Yoga a stupendous transcendental psychology which may be called a type of depth-psychology, not, of course, in the modern sense of the term. The self as pure consciousness has been distinguished from mental states like knowledge, feeling and will. These latter have been called *vr̥ttis*, and as every change presupposes a permanent substance that has undergone that change the Indian psychologists under consideration have recognised a substance, other than the self, of which the *vr̥ttis* are changes. This substance is sometimes called *antaḥkaraṇa*, sometimes *citta* and sometimes *manas*. We may use the English word "mind" to represent it. The self and the mind are two different substances. The idea is that while the self is self-revealing, the mind is revealed by the *sākṣin* self. In other words, while the self is truly subjective in the sense that it is always the knower, never the known, the mind is an object because it is revealed as an other by the self. Mental states as changes of the mind are thus objects, not truly subjective. Needless to say, this is the view of Advaita and Sāṅkhya-Yoga. The Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsakas, as we have already pointed out, hold a different view. While according to Advaita and Sāṅkhya-Yoga the self in self-consciousness is conscious of the mind

which is other than the self, these Mīmāṃsakas hold that the knower self knows *itself* as an object, so that in so far as it *knows* it is truly subjective, i.e., consciousness, but that in so far as it is *known* it is an object, i.e. *jaḍa*.

In developing this depth-psychology Advaita and Sāṅkhya-Yoga have gone still farther. They hold that the self as consciousness can even stand by itself, i.e. apart from the mental states. There is, in other words, autonomous pure consciousness capable of standing all alone. This follows, according to them, not only from the fact that in self-consciousness the *sākṣin* demands such pure status, though as yet it is revealing a *vr̥tti*; the Advaita psychologists have, through a thorough analysis of dreamless sleep, shown that such pure consciousness actually exists. If dreamless sleep be a fact, the Advaita analysis is startlingly novel. Incidentally, though rarely in thorough details, they have analysed dream and argued that in dream the self gets dissociated from the actual world centring round the physical body and perceives the maturations of unconscious traces stored up in the mind. (There are other theories of dream also.) It is a pity that the laws of such maturation were never discussed in philosophical treatises. This was with them a close secret. But they unambiguously asserted that there are such laws and have even claimed that one can through the practice of *yoga* penetrate to the very laws according to which even unconscious traces of our past life (*pūrvajānma*) mature into the actual experiences of this life. On this they based their science of astrology the worth of which needs thorough examination in this century.

Once consciousness is thus separated from mental states it follows that the apparent conscious character of these latter is due either to a confusion between or to a fusion of the autonomous consciousness on the one side and the mental states on the other.

These philosophers were firmly convinced that the chief aim of our life is to realise this pure consciousness because this is freedom *par excellence*. This, they held, could be achieved through the culture of an attitude deeper than introspecting into mental states. The culture in question consists in being progressively aware of introspection itself in an intensive dimension, and the progress in this line is attended by more and more dissociation from the world of objects including the mind. The dissociation need not always be withdrawal. Philosophers outside the Advaita fold hold that it has equally a positive outward attitude to objects, but an attitude which is free. In plain language, it is a high order of

reflective attitude unbound by empirical bias and pre-possessions. Such free looking toward things of the world reveals, we are told, a whole host of deeper truths in a progressive systematic manner, some parallel of which we find in the transcendental psychologies of Kant, Hegel and other transcendentalists in the West. Though ordinarily a close secret, this transcendental psychology has been systematically developed in Pātañjala Yoga and half systematically in many Śaiva and Śākta texts. Later in the texts of Haṭayoga we find a similar study of sensation and body-feeling, though, it appears, with excesses at places.

IV

So far with transcendental psychology. As for normal empirical psychology, we find a complete study of all relevant details in the different systems of Indian philosophy. We give below a short account with emphasis on novel points.

Psychology of Sensation and Perception: Sensation is direct awareness corresponding to sense-data. These sense-data are not merely colours, tastes, smells, touch-qualities and sounds, they also include substances, universals, etc., and, according to some, negation in addition. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that sensation is no introspectable stage, but just a presupposition to be inferred from the complexity of the content of perceptual judgment or, better, of judgmental perception, which is introspectable at the lowest. Other Indian psychologists, on the other hand, hold that it is an actually introspectable stage, and some hold, like the Hegelians, that though it is an introspectable stage the datum here is only a homogeneous experience out of which distinct items, relations and the resulting complex later develop.

Hindu psychologists all believe that where a substance has colour and moderate size it is taken in by the senses if it is in contact with the eyes. In the case of auditory and other sensations the corresponding substances are sensed if only they are simultaneously in contact with the eyes also. Hence air as a substance is not sensed though we sense its touch-quality.

Hindu psychologists do not admit kinaesthetic sensation of *weight*. The weight of a thing is, according to them, only inferred, not sensed. But other kinds of kinaesthetic sensation are in a way allowed. Motion (*karma*), for example, is sensed as inherent in a substance. Some of the *karmendriyas* correspond to, though certainly they are not identical with, motor nerves. (The Hindu classi-

fication of *karmendriyas* would be an interesting subject for modern research.) If motor sensibility is allowed in modern psychology, the old Indian thinkers may be taken as having admitted this also in their doctrine of *karmendriya*. As for organic sensation, this too is included in that doctrine. Some of these thinkers have even allowed coanaesthesia as general undefined tactual sensation. Interesting details of these sensations have also been worked out in different systems, particularly in Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya.

As for the mechanism involved in sensing, we often find subtle details discussed. The general theory of the origination of visual sensation is, however, exactly the opposite of any that is modern. It is that the *indriya* concerned, i.e. the subtle power operating in the physiological eye, in the form of subtle light, goes out and touches the object. This may be naive from the modern point of view: the empirical evidences adduced by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika may not stand modern scientific scrutiny. But a hypothesis of this kind explains many of the puzzles involved in visual sensation; and be it noted that most of the Indian thinkers admitted that light is fast-moving. As regards other sensations, however, there is no question of this going out, though in the Advaita system we find another general theory, viz. that *antaḥkāraṇa* comes out through the end-organs and gets shaped according to the shape of the object. "Shape" is here a most generalised concept.

The view that the substance (and equally the whole over and above parts) is *sensed* dispenses with the necessity of the modern doctrine that perception, as distinct from sensation, is presentative-representative. (Indian psychologists would in this respect side with the Gestalt psychologists.) That, however, it involves simultaneous differentiation and integration is admitted in their doctrine of *savikalpa pratyakṣa*. This *savikalpa pratyakṣa* is the perception of a closely integrated complex where not merely different qualities are integrated with one another, but qualities are integrated with substance, one substance with another, a particular with a corresponding universal, and so on. If the forms of this integration are called "thought forms", we should say that these forms are, in perception, fused with the sensed contents, so much so that one should call the resulting complex "judgmental perception" rather than "perceptual judgment". In thought proper these forms stand relatively free. It should be noted in this connection that according to most of the Hindu thinkers these forms of integration are as much factual objective relations as subjective forms.

The phenomena called "complication" or "fusion" and "synaesthesia" are admitted by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in its doctrine of *jñāna-lakṣaṇa-pratyakṣa*, though philosophers of other schools have stoutly denied this.

As for perception of space and time, there are different opinions among Indian psychologists; but few of them have proceeded on solid introspective grounds. Here they have relied more on inference. What they have worked out in this connection is more philosophy than psychology. Probably Yoga is the solitary exception.

Psychology of Memory and Thought: Memory is a favourite subject to Indian psychologists. As already noted, they explain retention by unconscious traces. They have not indeed studied the acquisitive phase of memory. But about traces they have always to say something interesting, though mostly in a speculative interest; and Yoga has even spoken of deliberate manipulation and control of such traces in *asamprajñāta samādhi*. Details, however, are lacking, and often the whole approach is esoteric. With regard to *revival*, however, we find systematic study in connection with the consideration of *illusion*. Particularly in Vivaraṇa and Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha we find this systematic study.

The psychology of *thought* is extremely well developed in Indian philosophy. There is seldom any Sanskrit synonym of "thought". This is because Indians never recognised any attitude that is common to *meaning* (of words and sentences), *perceptual judgment* (better, judgmental perception) and *inference* (and allied processes). These, according to them, are all distinct processes, not modes of a common process called "thought", and as regards the *subject's reference to objects*, a process which often in modern psychology goes by the name "thought", Indians would all refuse to recognise it as at all a psychical phenomenon. It, according to them, is nothing but knowledge, and knowledge is understood as only a mental event that reveals an object. *Reference*, *assertion* and the like are acts *in name only*. They are only *grammatical* verbs representing no real acts. Even Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas who take knowing as really an act never take it as an act of meaning or referring to an object. Hence the modern concept of intellectual manipulation of problems, or even of inference as an intellectual act, is equally banned. Indians would on this point side with the Structural psychologists.

The details they have worked out of the thought forms they have recognised are extraordinarily thorough. All the systems

are equally interested in these. The entire theory of knowledge that they have developed would considerably improve and correct the modern psychology of thought.

Psychology of Feeling and Emotion: There is some analysis of pleasure, pain and bewilderment in all systems of Indian philosophy; and in Sāṅkhya, and particularly in Yoga, in their doctrines of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, the analysis is a little more thorough and interesting. Some philosophers have added another feeling called *upekṣā* (conscious indifference); but many of them have also uncritically called it cognitive (*upekṣābuddhi*). *Rāga* (attraction) and *dveṣa* (repulsion) for an object would go under *emotion*.

Rarely, however, have these philosophers distinguished different types of pleasure and pain, viz. somatic resonance or hedonic tone, pleasure and pain as full-fledged psychic states, higher forms of pleasure, etc., etc. The only distinction they have drawn is between bodily and mental pleasure (and pain), and that also from the point of view of their cause; and the Vedāntins have distinguished between these, on the one hand, and absolute bliss, on the other, which bliss they either fully or partly equate with the pure self.

As for emotions and their relation to body, on the one hand, and pleasure-pain, idea and conation, on the other, this has been studied as thoroughly as possible in some Vaiṣṇava systems, particularly of Bengal, and in the texts on aesthetics. The analysis and classification worked out there is an achievement of Indian psychology.

Psychology of Conation: Wish and will are analysed in most of the systems, though, except in Mīmāṃsā, we do not find all necessary details. Mīmāṃsā, however, offers a thorough analysis of these, at places more thorough than any in modern psychology. It has examined in all details the nature of these psychoses and the relations they bear to the subject, his ideas, traces and emotions and also to the objects willed and the objects used as means.

As for automatic actions, many of them are explained in their doctrine of *karmendriya* and *prāṇa*. The systematic study of these is found in treatises on Medicine, and, to some extent, in other systems including the Śaiva. Some of the automatic activities—those which a modern psychologist would call "instinctive", "racial" or "hereditary"—are all explained by their theory of *karma* and *janmāntara*; the traces of the previous life mature into the biological activities of this life. This theory does not deserve immediate

dismissal. The modern concept of instinct is certainly not less mysterious than this theory; and though heredity and racial traces have to an extent been covered by modern science there is undoubtedly much left over to conjecture. Para-psychological phenomena, again, lend some support to this old Indian theory. Further, if abnormal activities are largely and vitally determined by complexes, and if this can be extended to many an activity of even the normal person, *prima facie* there is no reason why it may not be extended still further to accommodate biological activities, and in that case the complexes concerned have got to be pushed back for their origin to the previous life. This is Hormic psychology on a grand scale, though to be thoroughly re-examined in this twentieth century. Analysis of habitual actions rarely interested the old-day Indians. Some analysis we find in Yoga.

The problem of freedom of will was seldom discussed in Indian philosophy. Their analysis of will was generally in the line of the modern-day Structural psychologists. Yet, obviously, freedom could not be denied. For, were all acts absolutely determined by previous conditions and attending circumstances, and in the long run by traces of the past life, there could be no question of *mukti* (final liberation). Hence free will must have been accommodated somewhere. This we find in their doctrine of *vairāgya* (detachment). Ordinary wills are all initiated by attachment in the form of *rāga* or *dveṣa*. Activities springing from detachment, according to Indian thinkers, leave no *saṃskāra* behind, so that if we go on practising such acts, in course of time when all the *saṃskāras* that are maturing in this life are exhausted, we shall have no further *saṃskāra* accumulating in this life to mature again. This is *mukti*. Some, however, hold that such detached activity first leads to philosophic intuition which, in turn, yields *mukti*. Some, again, hold that the so-called detached activity is really no activity at all, but a type of *cognition*. Free will, thus, is an intriguing topic for Indian philosophy.

Rehabilitation of the Subject and the Subjective

by

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I

Professor D. T. Suzuki said, in a lecture, that western philosophy divides the world into the subject and the object, that therefore there are two objects in the world, and the subject has disappeared from it. But a worse fate has really overtaken the subject than what Professor Suzuki meant. He meant that the subject has been turned into an object, and that the subject's peculiar nature is thereby ignored. But in fact, in the writings of many western philosophers, the subject is treated not merely as an object, not merely as redundant, but even as the unreal and the false. When, for instance, it is said that, in scientific observation, the subjective factor should be kept in the background and should be eliminated from the result, it is implied that the subjective is not merely redundant but is even false. But it is open to question whether the scientist succeeds in not using his subjective senses and mind in observing phenomena either directly or with the help of his instruments. The question therefore should be raised whether the subject is such a culprit as some of the modern western trends of philosophy represent it to be. The importance of raising the question can be gauged from the fact that this tendency of modern thought has created a crisis particularly in ethics. Ethics is concerned with the subject. But if, as the scientific attitude implies, the subject is false, then we have to say that ethics is concerned with what is false and is a waste of labour. Then what importance can we attach to theories like that ethics and politics aim at the fullest development of personality? Do we mean that they aim only at the fullest development of the so-called object man, that is, at the fullest development of the physical particles and biological cells which constitute man's physical body? It is not satisfactory even to say that these two disciplines aim only at the proper develop-

ment of the structural patterns of the material and biological constituents of man's body. Ethics treats the subject as an agent responsible for his actions, not merely as a robot which does what it is made for doing. Even the scientist is responsible for the results he obtains both during and after his observations. And agency and responsibility cannot be attributed to a mere structural pattern. The question about the status of the subject, therefore, is of both epistemological and ethical importance. This paper will be concerned mainly with the epistemological aspect of the problem.

It is S. Alexander who declares that in his philosophy the subject enjoys no privileged position, and that it is an object among objects. But experience contradicts what he maintains. No one perceives the subject of his experience as an object among objects. I cannot perceive the subject of my cognitions; I cannot even make it an object of my mind, just as I can make my ideas, emotions, pains and pleasures its objects. The subject adds nothing to the weight of the material world and does not enter the constitution of the objects. The emergent evolutionists treat the subject as a new quality that emerges when a conglomeration of material and biological particles enter a particular structural pattern. But the subject must not be placed under the category of quality. A quality is a passive something that depends entirely on its base, whatever it is. But the subject, although it depends, up to a degree, on its body which is its base, nevertheless acts on its own base; the subject is an agent. It will perhaps be called an active quality in order to distinguish it from passive qualities like color. But a quality, as we understand the term, depends upon its particular base; if the base changes, the quality changes, and the continuity of the identity of the quality is destroyed. But although the physical body and the experiences of the subject change, the subject feels its continuity and identity. It may be said that the experience of continuity and identity is due to the continuity and identity of the pattern of the physical body, that though the content of the pattern changes the pattern does not change, and that when it too changes, there is no continuity of the subject. But there is here a peculiarity: the subject knows its own physical body as an object, but no subject can be its own object. Furthermore, the subject is non-spatial, whereas the object is spatial. It is true that one says: "I am six feet tall;" but his consciousness is not six feet tall. The consciousness of the six feet tall body belongs to the subject of the experience of that body. If we accept that the consciousness also is

six feet tall, then there must be no objection to saying that my idea of the mountain is as big as the mountain. And if it is as big as the mountain, *a fortiori* it is not limited to the comparatively small physical body to which it is said to belong. Moreover, the physical body cannot be the subject of this consciousness. It is contrary to the nature of experience to say that the physical body is conscious of itself. The object of this consciousness cannot be its subject also. When I make my physical body the object of my consciousness, I do not identify myself with my physical body. In the experience of any object, the subject of that experience cannot be the object also of the same experience and *vice versa*. In epistemology, therefore, although the subject need not be given a privileged status, it must still be given the peculiar status of its own. To be sure, it does not add to the weight of the objects in the world. But it is not an object among objects. It is that which knows the objects, and can know them as they are. And what is more important, although it is not an object among objects, it can initiate activity in them and transform them.

One may say at this juncture that there is an ambiguity in the meaning of the word object. "Object" may mean whatever is cognized, the object of a cognition. Not only material objects but also feelings, emotions, mental images are all objects of cognitions. Samuel Alexander may not mean that the subject is a physical object, when he said that the subject is only an object among objects. But in our experience the subject is never an object of cognition even as a mental image is. The word object may be said to mean also anything we think about,—any entity, physical, mental, or spiritual. Certainly, we are at present thinking about the subject. But we have also to recognize its peculiar nature. When I am thinking about the subject, the subject of my thinking is still at the back of my thinking, not in its front. And unlike other objects, both physical and mental, it is always present in my experience and is always the subject of experience, thought or perception. Next, "object" may be said to mean the real, the true, the actual, the existent. In that sense, the subject may be said to be one among objects. But if its peculiar nature and status among the "objects" of the world are to be recognized, we have to realize that to say that the subject is a real among reals is different from saying that it is an object among objects. The latter expression deprives the subject of its peculiarity. Even the ability to say that the subject is an object among objects confers on the subject saying it a distinctive role not conferred on the objects.

II

Now that we have raised the question about the meaning of the subject and the object, we may discuss it further. The word object is derived from "ob+jacere", meaning "to throw before", to oppose. The word subject is derived from "sub+jacere", meaning "to throw under". The object is that which stands against (the subject), which opposes. The meaning is more closely associated with objection than with the epistemological meaning. The German word *gegenstand* (to stand against) expresses the original meaning clearly. The Sanskrit word for object is *viṣaya*. Its etymological meaning is "that which strongly binds" (*viśeṣeṇa sinoti iti viṣayah*). It is that which binds down the consciousness of the subject; it is that which makes consciousness definite, determinate, ties it down to a particular. The English word subject, in its root meaning, is made subservient to the object. The object is what is "thrown before", but the subject is what is "thrown under", and so "under the object." One suspects that this etymological meaning of the word subject has something to do, in western thought, with the primary importance given to the object and the gradual ignoring of the importance of the subject, although in western ethics and technology the subject places itself only temporarily "under" the object in order to know its nature and laws and then to act on it and control it.

Even in the epistemological doctrines of Indian philosophy, the consciousness of the subject is generally made dependent on the object. In the Advaita of Saṅkara, in which the subject and its consciousness are of primary importance, the epistemological object is that which "offers its form to the consciousness" (of the subject). The Mīmāṃsakas understand the subject as the limit, limiter (*niyāmaka*) of consciousness. On the whole, for most of the Indian schools consciousness is dependent on the object for knowing it. Yet the word *viṣaya*, in its root meaning, has an ethical and spiritual connotation, namely, that which is responsible for the ethical and spiritual bondage of the individual, and which is a hindrance to his freedom. We may therefore say that Indian epistemology originated in an ethico-spiritual context. But western thought, though it started by subjecting the subject to the object, aims ultimately at subjecting the object to the subject. It is for controlling and utilizing the object that the subject subjects itself to the object.¹

1. Christian other-worldliness and some extreme forms of idealism are exceptions. We are here considering the root meanings.

The Sanskrit word for "subject" is *viśayin*, which means that which has an object (*viṣaya*). The word has no connotation of being subjected (to the object). For the Advaita in particular, consciousness is originally free and is not subjected to, or limited by, any object. The limitation is temporary and accidental. The idea of "binding" or "being bound" by the object is there. But it is an accidental feature and does not constitute the essential nature of the subject. In the ethico-spiritual context, however, the idea of "being bound" is important; for the ultimate aim of knowledge is freedom from bondage to the object. But in the epistemological context, the *viśayin* (subject), whether it is consciousness or possessor of that consciousness—on this point there are different views—is the determiner, pointer (*nirūpaka* according to the Nyāya) of the object or the remover of the cover of unknownness (*āvaraṇanivartaka* according to the Advaita) from the object. In the ethical situation, however, the agent is bound by the object and becomes attached to it. But he has the power also to free himself from that attachment. This freedom of the subject as the agent of cognition and as the appropriator of the experience obtains special recognition in Indian thought.

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Thus although dependence of the subject on the object is accepted by Indian epistemology, this dependence does not constitute an essential element of the nature of the subject and is not part of the root meaning. But in modern western philosophies which claim to be scientific, this dependence forms a part of the essential nature of the subject. And because of this dependence (*paratantratā* without *svatantratā*), the subject becomes unimportant. It may be admitted that in the scientific study of objective nature the subject must not be allowed to influence the results. But this demand of science is made a universal demand of philosophy, and in every branch of philosophy the subject's importance is ignored. Even in ethics, in which the centre of interest is the subject and its activity and freedom, the subject is losing its proper place. That is why some interpreters of western culture say that it is object-centred, and that correspondingly Indian culture is subject-centred. But in Indian thought, although the reality and freedom of the subject are accepted and emphasized, in epistemology the dependence of the subject on the object is recognized. Certainly, the ethical teaching that the subject should cut itself off from the object, in some of the interpretations and applications of Indian thought, did become very much subject-centred.

III

We have already raised the doubt whether the scientist, though demanding that the subjective factor should not be allowed to intrude into objective observation, has succeeded in not using his mind and senses, which are subjective, in those observations. Certainly, no scientist will say that he has not used his mind and senses. If scientists had not worked with their mind and senses, there would have been no science at all. This may sound a truism. But in this truism is hidden an important feature of the contribution of the subject to the determination of true objectivity. Mind and senses are subjective; as such they should not be used by the scientists, if they are to stick to their principle that all subjective factors should be kept aside. As they cannot stick to the principle, it will have to be said that the scientists do not mean that all subjective factors should be checked out, but only some. This interpretation means that some subjective factors are necessary. If so, then the subject cannot be completely excluded from scientific observation in determining the nature of the object. What have to be excluded are the subject's personal likes and dislikes, emotions etc. The subject indeed does not enter the object and become part and parcel of it. Yet its presence is necessary in determining the nature of the object.

If the presence of the subject is necessary for determining the nature of the object, and yet if a part of it has to be cut off in order to obtain the true nature of the object, are we then to say that part of the subject has to be retained and part to be discarded? Can the subject be divided into parts, as we can divide an object into parts? When the scientist attains truth in his observations, he says: "I have got the truth." And when he obtained a false result earlier, he had said, "I have committed an error." The "I", that starts the process, makes false judgments in the beginning, and later obtains the correct result. It is the same "I". The same "I" went through the whole process, and cannot be divided. It is unitary, self-identical and continuous. Division of the I-consciousness into parts is contrary to experience. Otherwise, the "I" that started the process would have been different from the "I" that committed the mistakes; and both again would have been different from the "I" that obtained the correct result. If the three are really different from one another, there can be no learning from experience, and no recognition of mistakes,

What then is the solution of the problem? The subject that commits the mistakes has to be the same as the one that obtains the true result. We now return to the scientist. We say that, when subjective factors intrude into our observations, the result will be falsified. One answer suggested to meet the difficulty is that part of the subject is necessary and part has to be discarded. But then we find it difficult to divide the subject into parts. The solution therefore lies in the recognition that the subject which commits mistakes can transform itself into the one that does not commit them and *vice-versa*. This is a recognition of a peculiar nature of the subject. Often it has been said by philosophers like Descartes that we should weed out emotions, feelings and other disturbing factors from our mind if we are to have true cognition of objects. These philosophers mean that the subject can then become pure and its consciousness can present objects as they are. The test of the pure subject then is its ability to present objects in their truth.

We speak of the pure and impure subject, just as we speak of the true and false object. We do not speak of the true and false subject. The pure subject is the correlate of the true object and the impure subject is the correlate of the false object. Here we should note that the correlate of a false object is not a false subject. There is here a peculiar difference between the subject and the object. There is no objective relation between a false object and a true object. In the classical example of the illusion of the snake, in which a rope is perceived as a snake, there is no objective continuity, causal or any other, between the rope and the snake. If we can conceive at all of a relation between the two, it can be conceived only *via* the perceiving subject. There is a relation, independently of the subject, between any two true objects existing in space and time. But there can be no such relation between the rope and the snake. When, after the illusion, we perceive the rope as a rope, we do not think that the rope first transformed itself into the snake, and that the snake next transformed itself into the rope.² There is no objective continuity between the true and the false, as there is between a piece of solid wax and liquid wax. But our experience is different in the case of the subject. There is a conscious continuity between

2. Only the Sāṅkhya holds this view. It is not accepted by the Nyāya or the Advaita.

the subject which sees the false object and the subject which sees the true one. The very subject which saw the snake says: "I saw the snake, but it is a rope, and was a rope even then." It is meaningful, therefore, to say that the mind of the subject did not work properly when the snake was seen, but it worked properly when the rope was seen. That is, we can speak meaningfully of the *transformation* of the subject from the impure to the pure.³ But this transformation does not break the continuity of the subject. It is the same. That is why we have to say that the subject corresponding to the false object is impure, but not false. To be called false, it has to be another subject, not the same.

Now, we may ask: What is this pure subject? It has often been maintained that there is no subject without an object, and no object without a subject. The two are correlates. If they are correlates, then the pure subject must be the correlate of the true object. Any true object is the same for all percipients; it is their common object. If the object in front of me is really a pen, then it is a pen for all. Logicians like Bosanquet say that it is universal, meaning thereby that the judgment, "It is a pen", is true for every-one. Similarly, the subject that corresponds to a true object must be similar in all men; that is, it also must be universal in a similar sense. The consciousness that presents the same object to all the percipients must be alike in all. Such a consciousness divests itself of all the features of particularity. If these features remain as factors in the consciousness of any-one, then the object is cognized by him differently from what it is cognized by others. When the scientific observer is asked to weed out emotions etc., from his mind, he is asked to divest himself of all features of particularity. That is, the demand is made that the subject should raise itself to the level of universality. It is the subject which any particular subject ought to become in order to know the object in its truth. The particular subject is asked to become the universal subject. The demand, then, that the subjective factors should not intrude into our observations will mean that the particular subject should universalize itself, should undergo the transformation from particularity to universality. Any observer who cannot undergo the transformation will be unfit to be a scientific observer.

3. Similarly, the dream subject is continuous with the subject of waking consciousness, but the dream objects are not continuous with the objects of waking consciousness.

Now, if the universal belongs to reason, and if consciousness at the level of the pure subject is universal, then that consciousness is reason. And if such consciousness exists, then reason exists. Reason is not merely the method of ratiocination; it is the subject itself that has transformed itself into the pure state, that has universalized itself and has risen above its prior particularity.⁴

One may doubt whether the subject really becomes universal in the act of purifying itself and whether it is able to shed off all features of particularity in the act of cognizing the object. If this doubt is to be fully cleared, a deeper and wider study of the subject and its consciousness is necessary. We are at present concerned only with the cognitive situation, in which the subject's activity is confined to knowing the objects. Our analysis has revealed that even in this situation the subject is able to rise to a pure state above its particularity, above its feelings, emotions, likes and dislikes, and that it has the peculiar ability to identify itself with its lower or higher states. We may therefore conclude that the subject has the peculiar nature of identifying⁵ itself with different forms which can really be made objects of its own consciousness, and that it can free itself, if it likes, from this identification. It can raise itself to the level of pure rationality or universality or it can lower itself to irrationality or particularity.

IV

To say, therefore, that the subjective factors should be excluded completely from the objective study of phenomena is an overstatement. The subject as reason, as universalized consciousness, cannot be so excluded; as universal, it is absolutely necessary and is an indispensable factor in all objective studies. *A fortiori* we have to admit that all that is subjective is not false. We know that the objects of illusion and hallucination are false. Instead of saying that they are false, we often say that they are subjective, mental, imaginary etc. But these adjectives are misleading, and their use has resulted in treating everything that is subjective as unimportant and false. And this practice has led to the ignoring

4. Cp. the Greek doctrine of the Logos and the Sāṅkhya doctrine of Mahat.

5. One may be tempted to relate this power of identification with the concept of identification used in psycho-analysis. The study may lead to interesting results, but is beyond the scope of the present paper. In psychopathology there can be the false subject, not merely the impure.

of the value of the subject. But without the subject, who will determine the truth of cognitions? One has therefore to distinguish between the subject and the subjective as true and the subject and the subjective as false. As has already been mentioned, so far as epistemology is concerned, the subjective may be called false sometimes, but the subject is never false but may be impure. Just as we draw a distinction between the true and the false object, we have to draw a distinction between the pure and the impure subject or between the subject in its universality and the subject in its particularity, and take into consideration the pure subject and subjectivity more seriously than we have tended to do under the influence of some contemporary trends of western philosophy.

A Defence of Idealism

by

G. R. MALKANT

There are many different forms of Idealism. Different people understand differently as to what constitutes Idealism. One thing however is common to all forms of Idealism,—and that is the necessary relatedness of matter or physical reality to the principle of intelligence or the mind or the Spirit. Matter is not a reality *in itself*, and it cannot be said to exist independently of all relation to the mind. If therefore we can show that matter can so exist, Idealism in all its forms would be refuted.

In the history of philosophy, the relatedness of matter to the Spirit has taken many different forms. According to Berkeley, to be is to be perceived. According to Hegel, to be is to be posited as object by thought. According to Plato, to be is to be a rational essence or an idea. All these different views have one thing in common. Matter by itself is no kind of reality, and it cannot be said to exist as such. It can only exist in relation to the mind or as something mental. In the end, mind or Spirit alone is real. Matter can at best possess a lower kind of reality. It has what may be called phenomenal existence or apparent existence or illusory existence.

It thus becomes necessary for non-Idealistic philosophers to prove that matter can exist without any necessary relation to the mind. The only way they can do this is by rejecting the Idealistic analysis of the knowledge-situation. After all we know the fact of matter only in perception. It is the only primary form of knowledge appropriate to matter. If we have no perceptual knowledge of matter, we have no proof that matter exists, and we can raise no kind of problem about the reality or otherwise of matter. The argument from perception then is the most important argument for a realistic view of physical nature. The very fact of perception, which is a species of knowledge, proves that matter really exists. What other proof can we possibly demand of the reality of a thing except that it is perceived or known? It is part of the meaning of knowledge that it has a necessary reference to reality, and further that it reveals that reality for what it is. This reality

cannot possibly depend for its being upon the knowledge of it, for such dependence would reduce it to a mere subjective idea or appearance; and an idea or an appearance is subjectively constituted, not literally *known*.

The common-sense philosopher relies upon a certain analysis of perception in order to prove that it is a veridical form of knowledge and that therefore what it reveals or makes known to us is a reality that exists independently of all knowledge, and so of the mind as such. If this analysis of perception is accepted, we have epistemological Realism, and *all forms* of Idealism are thereby refuted. For, if the battle of perception is lost, what can the Idealist take his stand upon in order to prove the necessary relatedness of matter to mind? Can he take his stand upon thought? But thought evidently is only a factor in perception. Nobody ever proved the existence of matter through thought alone. Thought is not a form of intuition and therefore of knowledge. It mediates what may be said to be sensibly intuited. If we set up thought as an independent instrument of knowledge, as Plato did and as Hegel did after him, we have practically no problem about the reality of matter at all. It is as good as nothing. The Idealistic conclusion is taken for granted, and no attempt is made to prove its truth through an analysis of our experience. Thought, pure thought, is not a species of knowledge, and it cannot therefore account for the very appearance of matter as something existent. We do not face the issue of our knowledge of the physical world, we just side-track it.

The real issue is perception, which is a species of knowledge. It is here therefore that the Idealist must join issue with the Realist. Is perception a valid form of knowledge? That we go from perception to posit the existence of the thing perceived may be admitted. It is common ground for both the disputants. But is going over from perception to the reality of the thing perceived a correct or rational step? There are many considerations which give us pause and throw doubt upon its rationality. It is the most unreflective thing to say that it is part of the very meaning of perception that what is perceived is necessarily true and real. After all there is such a thing as *erroneous perception*. But if error is possible in perception, it means that perception is not a direct or immediate way of knowledge as an intuitive knowledge of reality ought to be, but that it is a conditioned or a mediated form of knowledge. Once this is admitted, perceptual knowledge remains on one side as an activity of the subject, and reality

remains on the other as independent of the subject. How is the gulf to be bridged? Nothing that we can do can take us out of our subjectivity. Only a new form of knowledge which is more direct and more immediate can achieve the miracle. Indeed, all knowledge must be on the part of the subject. But there is knowledge and knowledge. Knowledge which is mediated separates us from reality. All judgmental knowledge does that. We cannot jump from such knowledge to reality and make any correct declarations about the latter. Only a form of knowledge which is non-judgmental, which is literally free from doubt and error, and which is therefore self-evidently true, can reveal reality for what it is. Perception under the best of conditions is still open to doubt and error to a greater or less extent. It cannot possibly give us the literal truth. It is over-loaded with subjective elements.

The fact of perceptual error then is the principal argument of the Idealist; and there is no possible reply to his criticism. All mediation is distortion. Truth must be seen directly, immediately, face to face. This is never possible in perception which is therefore suspect. It is certainly not a true form of knowledge. It is more akin to erroneous knowledge. In erroneous knowledge we perceive something which appears to be objectively real, but which is only an illusory appearance of reality. This appearance is midway between reality and our knowledge. It is *constituted* by knowledge, but appears *in* reality or as identified with reality. It is a creation of the subject, but a creation that is grounded in reality. The ground is the truth, but what is grounded is other than the truth.

Our perceptual knowledge is similar. It is a mixture of truth and error. It is neither pure truth, nor pure error. This is the only true and ultimate form of epistemological Idealism. Every other form is one-sided, exaggerated and untenable. Matter cannot be reduced, without residue, to perceptions of the mind, or ideas, or rational essences, or thought, etc. It is, in the end, a subjective formulation which is superimposed upon reality and passes for this reality. *This form of Idealism therefore necessarily gives rise to the problem of metaphysical truth or the problem about the nature of that reality which underlies sensible appearances.*

Once we accept the thesis that matter is necessarily related to a percipient mind and that it is what it is only as perceived, a question naturally arises. If matter cannot exist in itself, do per-

ceptions exist in themselves? Do ideas, or thought in general, so exist? Berkeley reduced matter to primary and secondary ideas. But what about those ideas? His instinct was true when he said that the ideas cannot exist of themselves or in a vacuum, but only in a mind. If the ideas which constitute the entire big world cannot be contained in a finite human mind, they must be contained in a divine mind. Mind thus is more real than the ideas and constitutes their real ground. He of course did not ask the question, what is mind and what constitutes its reality? The divine mind was taken for granted, and certain awkward questions were not even raised. For instance, how can the human mind know what is contained in the divine mind? Does God perpetually think the ideas which constitute the world? Ideas evidently require to be thought. *Mind* or *spirit* is in this sense more real than ideas.

Plato and Hegel had a similar question when they reduced all reality to the ideas of reason. Unfortunately, reason was for them the highest part of the soul, and there was nothing more real or more ultimate than reason. They did not realize the necessity of a *spirit* which could *think* the ideas of reason. The ideas of reason were therefore, for them, the last word in Spirit. For Plato, it was the realm of pure ideas which constituted the ultimate reality. For Hegel, it was the Absolute Idea which had this honour. There was nothing beyond the ideas to which the ideas may be said to belong or to which they may be said to be related. But any idea whatsoever needs to be thought. It is a function of the spirit. An idea, however rational, cannot exist as a self-subsistent reality. It can only subsist in a mind or a spirit; because a mind or a spirit alone can think an idea.

It will perhaps be argued against this that the mind is not an entity. It is only a name for *psychical activity*; and all psychical activity occurs in time. What occurs in time is phenomenal, and it can only be known through the ideas of reason. These ideas therefore are more fundamental and ultimate than any psychical activity. This argument appears to us to be quite erroneous. What are ideas without the psychical activity of thinking them? Ideas are mere instruments for the cognitive activity of a self. Thinking of ideas is therefore more ultimate than the ideas taken by themselves. Taken by themselves, the ideas are mere abstractions. They have no kind of reality whatsoever. We naturally ask, whose idea? In this question, we presuppose that there is a thinker of the idea. Without the thinker, the idea cannot emerge. It can

have no kind of reality. We designate the thinker by the specious term of "a mind". Mind in this sense is a more concrete reality than an idea, which is necessarily contained in it. We cannot substitute the "idea" for the mind or the thinker that thinks it.

The Idealism of Western philosophers is based upon perception or thought. These are certain activities of the mind. Mind is in this sense the reality of matter. But what is mind? Can we not go beyond the mind? Is it the *ultimate spirit*? We think that the mind is nothing but what are said to be its activities or its states. These are known to us objectively. But what is that intelligence to which they are objects? It may be that there is no higher or non-mental intelligence to which they are objects. It may be that the mind knows its own acts and states. The later thought knows what goes before it. But how is this possible? We think that the mind cannot be treated as a kind of internal sense. It is quite evident that the earlier cannot be just given to the later. How can the later *know* the earlier directly? How can there be perception of what is mental? Even if we suppose that there is this perception of the earlier by the later, such a procedure would result in a regressus ad infinitum. Each act of the mind would demand to be known by the act that is subsequent to it; so that in order to know one act, we should have to undertake an infinite series of acts. If, for convenience, we do not carry the series very far, the last act would not be known at all. We could not then speak of it as the last act, much less recover it or remember it at will. In fact, if the last is not known, there is no 'last'. How can the previous series be established? Either then we know no mental act, or in knowing one mental act we require an infinite series of acts.

The Idealism that stops with the mind and its acts is unreflective, and it contradicts itself. After reducing matter in terms of a cognitive act of the mind, we have the same question about the latter. If the cognitive act can exist without being known, why cannot matter exist without being known? After all, the cognitive act itself is some kind of object to be known. If it is not known, where is the evidence that it is there? But if it is known, an infinite series of acts is demanded in order to know one act, so that we can know nothing else and nothing outside. Idealism must go beyond the mind. It must accept an intelligence that is immutable, that is pure, and that reveals mental objects without any act. We contend that there is this intelligence called *sākṣin* which reveals itself in all the mental acts, and reveals the acts them-

selves, but itself remains all the while actionless and immovable. It is the ultimate Spirit.

True Idealism is not the Idealism of the mind as the ultimate reality or as the pivot of all being, but the Idealism of the Spirit which is beyond the mind. The knowing subject (*pramātā*) is not a simple entity. It is the cognitive function of the mind in the relation of false identity with pure intelligence, which is the true Spirit. The whole objective world outside, known by the subject, is related similarly to the Spirit through the subject. The world is thus necessarily related to the subject, and the subject necessarily related to the Self or pure intelligence. The Self is not necessarily related to anything at all. It is essentially unrelated. The only relation it has is the relation of false identity, which is not a real relation at all; and it has this relation directly and primarily with the mind (*antahkaraṇa*) and its functions. The Self is thus the ultimate ground of both mind and matter; for mind and matter are necessarily related to it, and are real only in this relation. The Self, on the other hand, is not necessarily, or even really, related to anything whatever. It is thus the Absolute Reality.

The Idealism of the Absolute Spirit thus entails that the whole empirical existence of mind and matter, subject and object, is only an illusory appearance of the ultimate truth. Mind and matter have no existence in themselves. They appear to exist only in relation to the true Spirit or the Self. If Idealism can make any sense, it must lead us from the external world to the perception of that world; and from the perception of the world, or mind in general, it must lead us on to the spiritual ground of the mind itself. This spiritual ground is the Self beyond which we cannot go. It is the Absolute Spirit. All true Idealism, which seeks to go beyond the appearance of things to their ultimate ground and reality must end here; for the urge for truth is here fulfilled. Short of this absolute goal, Idealism appears to us to be wholly unjustified and irrational.

This Vedantic form of Idealism is to be distinguished from another kind of Absolute Idealism common in the West. Hegel and his followers have argued that the ultimate reality is spiritual, and it is to be conceived as the unity of the subject and the object. The object cannot exist in itself, nor can the pure subject. What is real is the concrete unity of the subject and the object. For Hegel it is the Absolute Idea become object to itself. For others,

it is an all-inclusive experience. The important thing is that the Absolute must be an experience; and an experience must have both a subject and an object, or at least a content.

We cannot agree with this view. The subject that is *necessarily related* to the object constitutes together with the latter a whole which is itself objective. It can be known; and being known, it is naturally transcended. The "whole of the subject and the object" thus gives place to an "objective whole"; and an objective whole is a spurious whole. It can be transcended and demands to be transcended. It demands a higher-grade subject that is subject only, never an object to be known. This is the pure subject. All objects of all grades have a necessary reference to it, because it alone reveals them for what they are. The pure subject has no necessary reference to anything whatsoever. The only relation it sustains to the objects it reveals is that of false identity. In other words, the objects achieve a semblance of reality through their relation to this subject, but the subject itself achieves nothing through the relation, because it is *in-itself* and essentially unrelated.

True Idealism then is not the Idealism based upon the unity of the subject and the object (for this will constitute only an object of a higher grade), but the Idealism based upon the pure subject or the Absolute Subject. We may naturally seek to know the Absolute Subject as such. That is quite possible and even necessary; because it is the ultimate reality and the only thing, by our analysis, that exists *in-itself*. But we can never know it in the objective attitude. If we reduce it to an object of some sort, it ceases to be itself. We can only succeed, if our knowledge can transcend the dualism of the subject and the object and conform to the pure subjectivity of the Absolute Spirit. It is the Truth that must make our knowledge after its own image, not vice-versa. In other words, we must become the Truth,—Truth cannot come to us or reflect itself in the finite ways of our knowing. This is the only genuine form of Idealism. The only reality is the Absolute Spirit, and the Absolute Spirit has the nature of pure subjectivity. We call it *ātman*.

Philosophy and Science as Integral Parts of Wisdom

by

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Aristotle and the Medieval Schoolmen had a precise criterion for distinguishing the various disciplines as well as the various modes of knowledge: the difference of their *formal* object. Regarding the same subject-matter or material object there can be different considerations, complementary, yet neatly distinct. To know an object as revealed or reported is obviously not the same thing as to know it directly through one's senses or through the unaided intellect. Hence, for instance, testimonial sciences, such as history or supernatural theology, are distinct from the empirical sciences as well as from metaphysics. The distinctions which may obtain within the subject-matter of a single science serve only to distinguish the diverse parts of that one science and not to diversify that science itself. Natural theology, metaphysical cosmology or metaphysical psychology are but parts of metaphysics, but history or religions, empirical physics or positive psychology stand apart from metaphysics as distinct disciplines capable of being developed fully within the scope of their different viewpoints.

The one term 'philosophy' understood broadly as 'love for wisdom' used to designate those many disciplines considered as resulting from the effort of man to assimilate the truth of the universe. Wisdom appeared as the asymptotic ideal and goal of this effort.

Modern usage has tended to restrict the area of signification of such terms as 'philosophy' and 'science' and, to-day, we generally oppose philosophy, understood either as metaphysics or as the science of the *a priori*, to science, understood as positive science. But we still share in common with the Ancients the idea that, in spite of their distinction, the diverse branches of human knowledge must constitute a synthetic whole, a universal *mathesis*, and that, as Descartes expressed it, their unity must be that of a tree of which philosophy is the root, physics the trunk, and the other

sciences the branches that depend upon that very trunk for their life and validity.

This conviction has led philosophers to reflect upon the relationship between philosophy and science and, more precisely, upon the question of the foundation of the sciences and even of all human knowledge. This problem is the more acute when, with Descartes for instance, one exaggerates the distinction which obtains between philosophy and science.

The Foundation of Science for Descartes

At the very starting-point of his enquiry Descartes isolated the two basic notions of thought and space and, further, he immediately objectified them, thus committing the fallacy of identifying the modes of reality with the modes of the human knowing. This obliged him to conceive two separate spheres of reality: the sphere of the *res cogitans*, comprising the human ego as well as God, which was to be the proper domain of philosophy; and the sphere of extension, reducible to figures and motion quantities,—the domain of science, which it must be possible to construct entirely after the model of mechanics with the aid of analytical geometry. Accordingly he developed as two separate bodies of doctrine his metaphysical meditations and his world treatise.

Yet he had retained the guiding idea of a universal knowing which goaded him to discover a bridge of some sort between the two parts of his universe. He found it in the idea of foundation: if philosophy, which springs up from the *cogito*, can justify the idea of space, science which is nothing but the study of space will find a foundation in the *cogito*.

How is Descartes assured of the validity of his geometrical demonstrations? Because they are made in the evidence of the clear and distinct idea. But how can he be assured that such ideas correspond to the reality of the world? Because of the divine veracity and because God is the creator of the world. In short, his solution to the problem of the bridge is obtained through a double transcendental reduction: transcendental reduction of the reality of my ideas to the divine reality, and simultaneous reduction of the reality of the world to the divine reality. This double reduction assures him of the correspondence between his ideas and the world, and assures him of it *a priori*. This constitutes the philosophical strength of his position.

PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE

The Foundation of Science for Husserl

Descartes was sure that he had secured the unity of our knowing at the very moment when that unity was splitting into two directions that were apparently irreconcilable. As time passed philosophers were less sure of his success, but they did not fail to recognize the rightness of his inspiration. The search for a philosophical foundation of science has been at work throughout the course of Post-Cartesian philosophy; but without stopping at the better known solutions of Kant, Hegel, etc., we may consider for a while the transcendental phenomenology of Edmund Husserl.

He accepts explicitly two fundamental ideas of Descartes: one, the idea of philosophy as a rigorous science which must really make possible a unified knowing; the other, the return to the evidence of the *cogito*, as the essential instrument of philosophical critique.

But Husserl's idea of a universal *mathesis* is less simple than that of Descartes: it has the meaning of a general science of formal systems. Besides, it does no longer appear that every science can be perfectly formalized and reduced to mathematics. The historical sciences attain the singular, and the singular can at the most be generalized, but not, strictly speaking, formalized. This leads Husserl to his distinction between the material *a priori* and the formal *a priori*.

The *a priori* in the Husserlian sense is that which science attains beyond the mere contingency of the bare fact, that which is common to different cases; in one word, it is an essence. Cases are generalized through various degrees of abstraction, and this is why we must speak of material *a priori*, which do not generalize beyond the limits of particular classes of facts.

But we can cease to consider the content of all particular categories of phenomena and rise to the level of the principal forms, above all the material essences: when we attain to this *idea*, beyond all that belongs to the concrete, at that moment we reach the formal *a priori*.

Sciences such as history, phenomenological sociology or psychology are sciences of the material *a priori*: they tend to grasp concrete essences; for instance, the totality of a civilization reached through the principle of unity which has commanded the whole display of its manifestations.

On the other hand, in the formal sciences we consider the formal *a priori*, i.e., the properties which belong to the object for the sole reason that it is an object.

To be an object is essentially to be opposed as a *cogitatum* to a *cogito*. This opposition results from, and is the only result of, the action of knowing. This is why intentionality is the essential characteristic of the *cogito*. And it is to this that we must turn if we wish to understand the constitution not only of the formal sciences but also of the sciences of the concrete essences. This endeavour is the task of *transcendental logic*, which alone can provide an absolute foundation of all sciences and of knowing itself.

We can discover the direction of such an absolute foundation by reflecting upon the conditions of evidence. Science aims at evidence; it aims at what appears in full clarity as imposing itself in an absolute and apodictic manner. There are of course degrees of evidence, and the construction of theoretical systems has precisely as its aim to reduce the less certain evidences to others more certain. The fundamental ground of evidence is the thing itself. There only can be found the perfect correspondence between the *noesis*, the act of knowing which is properly ours, and the *noema*, the content which we reach through it.

But the thing itself is not the only pole of evidence. Evidence is necessarily evidence for a subject. And as the correlate of the whole hierarchical system of evidences there must stand the pure ego, or the *transcendental ego*. This ego cannot be a worldly ego, a mere piece of the world, since it is for this ego that the world is a *datum*. We reach here the level, beyond the particular data, of the radical "giving." This giving is absolute, which means that it is not effected within a field that is already there, for then we would have to explain how this field itself is given. The transcendental ego is therefore the fundamental *topos* or place of all giving. It is a sort of pure point; it is the ultimate and supreme condition of experience as such. It is *arche*: principle and foundation. Husserl calls it a constituting ego. But its constituting is not at all an active creation; it is a passive genesis. This ego is not a cause but a radical condition of the birth of experience as such.

Experience then diversifies itself according to various types of intentionality. To describe the various fields of experience is to describe the life of the transcendental ego. It is the object of transcendental phenomenology. Transcendental phenomenology

describes, first, the radical intentionality characteristic of science in general, and then, inside that general intentionality, it discovers the internal diversification that leads to the differentiation of the various sciences, both formal and material. Obviously, we can know those different intentionalities only by starting from their products. But we can rise from them to their immediate and mediate *a priori*, and further on to the ultimate *a priori* which is the pure field of the transcendental ego, beyond the particular "ontological regions" of the various sciences. Each such region corresponds to a particular type of intentionality, which itself is established in the transcendental life of the pure ego. To show that is to lay the foundation of the various sciences and ultimately of science as such.

Thus the distinction between science and philosophy is maintained, but a certain kind of unity is re-established, because from now on philosophy appears as giving the key to the foundation of science. Science is the description of regional ontologies, while philosophy is the foundation of those ontologies by a return to transcendental subjectivity. Their relationship does not consist in a mere juxtaposition, but in an internal articulation which respects their distinction, yet realizes the ideal of a synthetic universal knowing.

Difficulties.

We may now ask ourselves whether Husserl's analysis does justice to science and philosophy as the real sorts of rational enquiries actually developed by scientists and philosophers.

As to philosophy, it has been reduced by him to a pure science of forms deprived of any existential content, transcendental though it be, it is a mere logic. Many will find that this is a mutilated philosophy, a mere part of the noble science of critical Metaphysics. Existentialism is in part a reaction against this failure of Husserl to lead us to the existent itself.

As to positive science, Husserl unfortunately conceived it still according to the old Cartesian concept as purely the science of exteriority. Such a science is essentially naive, uncritical, unconcerned about its own foundation. But if we examine the development of science in recent times, of those sciences at least which are most lucid about themselves, we must admit that preoccupation about their basis and foundation is not at all unknown to them. They are concerned not only about the content of their respective

domains, but also about the operations by means of which those domains are given to us. We must even say that the content is known through knowledge of those operations. Science is now concerned with the *a priori*. Theory precedes practice and regulates its steps. Science has become meta-science.

In physics, for example, there are systematical developments about the possible forms of theories and about the special type of results that can be obtained with such or such forms of theory. Eddington even ventured the idea of a sort of deduction of physical laws from quite general considerations about the manner in which physical facts can be given to us, and in which mathematics can express the structure of this giving, rather than the data themselves. Mathematics themselves have attained to theories pertaining to the general properties of the different possible forms of theories. Thereby results of an extreme generality are obtained. This is no longer induction, it is really deduction. The particular as particular is discovered from general principles.

By turning towards this new dimension of achievement, science has now included subjectivity, at least in the sense of an operative subjectivity. It becomes aware of the manner in which it knows, of the operations which actually originate and constitute the domain of each science. It is concerned with its own foundation.

The Leading Idea of Philosophy

It would then appear that the Procrustean manner of fitting the patient to the bed rather than the bed to the patient vitiates to some extent even Husserl's imposing endeavour, and we should turn away from all ill-fitting theories and consider anew the actual reality of both science and philosophy as manifested in their historical life.

We could perhaps say then that the deep intention of philosophy is that of a *radical knowing*, a knowing which goes as far as it is possible to go. But in knowledge it is possible to go in two opposite directions: either in the direction of the greatest generality, or in the direction of the greatest singularity. In the first direction our knowing will be radical if it succeeds in grasping at one glance the whole of what is knowable, and in seizing this totality as such. In the second direction radical knowing should succeed in discovering the most minute particularities of the existent, the secret intimacy of the individual, the radical difference which sets it apart from all the rest.

Apparently it is impossible to go equally far in those two directions at the same time: how can one attain through the same movement to the highest generalization as well as to the most concrete particularization? And yet the proper ambition of philosophy is to find a point of view which can serve at the same time to view the totality as totality and the singularity as singularity. It succeeds in that, at least to a certain extent, by appealing to the idea of foundation.

What is a foundation? It is an absolute beginning, an absolute *arche*. Philosophy is the science of the absolute *arche*. According to an expression of J. Ladriere,¹—to whose thought this paper owes most of its content—philosophy is absolute "archeology." The *arche* which it reaches must, of course, be the real beginning, from which the real genesis of things actually arises. And this genesis is a genesis of concreteness as well as of totality, because totality is made of concrete being. It is then in the absolute *arche* alone that all things can be known in their extreme singularity as well as in the commonness of their totality. In the words of the Upanisad, the absolute *arche* is that "after which everything else is known."

That this *arche* has been variously conceived need not detain us here. It will suffice to recall Plato's *a priori* realm of ideas, Aristotle's unmoved Mover, Plotinus's transcendent One, Hegel's absolute Mind, Husserl's transcendental Ego, the Vedantins' Brahman, and the Christian philosophers' pure Act. Thus the result of philosophical endeavour may vary, but what constitutes it as philosophical endeavour is the fact that one undertakes to return towards the absolute foundation and to contemplate the *arche* of all things.

The Leading Idea of Science

Positive science, on the contrary, always aims at a domain that is particular: it is science of nature, or of life, or of society, and so on. And in each domain it reaches only generalities. It departs, indeed, from totality and from singularity, in order to establish itself in the intermediate zone of abstract generality.

Yet, is it not true that generality is a parasitic thought-product, which feeds on both totality and singular concreteness? Science is

1. J. Ladriere, *Philosophy and Science*, in *Philosophical Studies* (Maynooth, Ireland), Vol. VIII (1958), pp. 1-23.

sustained by the idea of a unity of knowing: virtually at least it is a systematic knowing of the universe. And, on the other hand, through its general propositions, it aims at the concrete. General propositions have no substance apart from their possible applications, and the variables in them represent the role of individuals as individuals. We must also add that science aims at this concreteness in the very measure in which it aims at the totality. Its fundamental proposition is that there is a "given" world, a unity of concrete existents, and it is this unity that inspires its proper operations. It cannot reach this totality of the world except by assuming the concrete, which is the very matter of this totality; and it cannot reach concreteness except by assuming the totality, because the concrete is not only this one singular, but this one singular together with all the relations that unite it to all the singulars that surround it.

The Mutual Complementarity of Science and Philosophy

Philosophy and science, then, aim at the same totality-singularity, but from opposite directions, and this is why they tend to meet and can complement each other.

Philosophy aims at the totality-singularity by the roundabout way of the foundation from which it radically springs up, from which the truth of the world constitutes itself as truth. That is why philosophy is the only way of ultimately justifying science, since it alone can describe the genesis of science as part of the total genesis of reality and truth.

Science, in its turn, takes totality as something which is given. In this sense it is naive. But it does not simply try to describe this totality point by point. It tries to grasp its structure and to understand its organizing principles. And in order to do that, it endeavours to re-make, to re-effect that totality. It re-performs in its own operations, not only the empirical operations that take place in the world, but more deeply, the constitutive operations that make it a world. Accordingly, it repeats in its own way the genesis which philosophy describes. But it repeats it by describing its performance, its realization; while philosophy describes it in itself, in its gushing forth, in its origination as such.

There is then a common inspiration, a common intentionality of science and philosophy: they both toil to realize the one project of reason, of *logos*, which is to know authentically the totality-singularity of the world. This explains their unity. But they are

distinct as two modalities of this general project of reason: philosophy aims at unveiling the source and the springing up of the world; science accepts it as given and then tries to re-duplicate its becoming through operations which start from this effected world to reach up to its origin. To use a happy phrase of Ladriere, "philosophy is absolute 'archeology' and science is absolute 'morphology'."

Both are limited: philosophy is essentially science of the *arche* and of the original springing up, not of the results in their infinite complexity; science can only describe what is there, what is given, but not directly the giving or the giver. But this is why each of them can achieve in its own way what the other fails to realize in its own field with its limited means. And through their mutual collaboration, they aim at achieving wisdom, the one goal of reason, which integrates both science and philosophy.

The Role of Sense-data in Perception

by

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It is generally held these days that sense-datum theorists are unable to give a satisfactory account of the perception of physical objects. Hence there is a general tendency to deny the very existence of sense-data. In this paper I wish to argue that sense-data are no barriers to perception, rather they make perception possible.

Those who ask, 'How are sense-data related to material objects?', somehow harbour the idea that sense-data are some kind of entities. They think that perception is a three-term relation between a perceiver and a sense-datum and a physical object. And thus they are lured into a desperate attempt to find out the exact nature of the relation between sense-data and physical objects. But when they come across the difficulties which this sort of 'relational' approach entails, they either begin to despair or tend to draw sceptical or agnostic conclusions.

We hold that sense-data are no objects; they are no entities. The term 'sense-datum' is indeed an entity-term; but what it designates is not an entity, but an occurrence. Talking in terms of sense-data is a special way—a convenient way—of talking about our sensory experiences. So the question of the relation between a sense-datum and a physical object simply does not arise.

The critic will, however, say that this attempt to get rid of the problem does not really succeed. It merely changes the form of the problem. Instead of asking 'How are sense-data related to physical objects?', one will now ask 'How are sense-experiences related to physical objects?' This, I admit, is a genuine question, and no analysis of perception is complete unless this question is satisfactorily answered. I shall try to answer this question in the sequel.

First of all, I would like to say that the relation between a sense-experience (or, for that matter, a sense-datum) and a physical object can be, and often is, one that holds between a revealer

and a revealed. In other words, a sense-datum performs a revelatory or presentative function in perception. My visual 'chairy' sense-datum reveals or presents the chair to me. Without this presentation I could not have seen the chair. In short, perception is a 'finding' or a 'getting', by means of or through a sense-experience, a sense-datum. But there are certain difficulties which crop up here. We shall try to tackle them one by one.

The first difficulty is an ontological one. We hold that sense-data are not physical. Had they been physical, the sense-data could have been sensed by any number of sentients. Sense-data are private and proprietary to those who have them. So they are not physical, and are ontologically different from physical objects. Now, one may ask, can a non-physical something reveal or present a physical thing? My answer to this question is in the affirmative, because I find no logical difficulty in a non-physical something revealing a physical object. The idea of a thing of one kind revealing a thing of a different kind is not logically absurd. To say that a transparent glass reveals a non-transparent wall is not to make a self-contradictory statement. So the categorial difference between sense-data and physical objects need not stand in the way of the former revealing or presenting the latter. Even if it is accepted that the non-physical and the physical cannot interact with each other, it need not be denied that the former can reveal the latter. For interaction is a *causal* relation, and revealing is an *epistemological* one.

It is important to note here that from the fact that sense-data can reveal or present physical objects, it does not follow that all sense-data must be revelatory or presentative of physical objects. There is nothing inconsistent in the idea that some sense-data are presentative and some are not. Only runners can win a race; but from this it does not follow that all runners are winners. Nonetheless, a runner, whether he wins or loses, is a runner. Similarly, it is only sense-data which can reveal physical objects, but from this it does not follow that all of them must. Often they do, but sometimes they do not.

The critic will perhaps object that if physical objects are revealed through or by means of sense-data, then it is clear that physical objects are not perceived directly. And so the 'iron curtain' objection still remains. But, we may ask, how does this 'iron curtain' objection still remain? If sense-data are revelatory, then they *reveal* rather than *conceal*. From the fact that they are different from physical objects, it need not follow that they cannot be

revelatory of physical objects. When the optician asks a person to wear glasses to enable him to see things, the latter does not refuse on the ground that the things that he wants to see are different from the glasses. It is wrong to exploit categorial difference for agnostic or sceptical purposes. Sense-data do not prevent one's access to physical objects, even though they are not themselves physical.

The critic might still regard perception as indirect. He might argue that perception can be direct if and only if the percipient somehow gets rid of his sense-data and establishes some sort of communion with the object of perception. But I utterly fail to understand what this communion would be like. Even if this communion is possible, I am afraid perception would still be indirect. For, if the criticism urged against us is justified, the communion itself would become a *tertium quid* between the perceiver and the perceived. If our critic's line of thinking is accepted, then it automatically follows that there is no direct perception at all. Even the behaviouristic theory does not fare any better, because here also either a behaviour, or a propensity to behave, or an acquisition of a propensity to behave, spoils the direct relation between the perceiver (the organism) and the perceived.

If our critic's conception of directness is meaningful, then a direct perception occurs if and when it does not occur. Real seeing is the absence of seeing. For, if seeing is actually present, then it is there to intrude and to make perception indirect. According to this newly suggested conception of directness, he who sees the least sees the best, and perhaps it is only the completely blind who really see.

I do not think that any serious philosopher can have any truck with such fantastic theories and can sincerely think that the occurrence of sense-experience makes perception indirect. Of course, if I am seeing the reflection of my table in a mirror or if I am touching the table not with my hand but a stick, I can be said to be seeing or touching it indirectly. And the reason why these perceptions are called 'indirect' is that there are perceptions which are called 'direct'. Indirect perceptions are called 'indirect' only by contrast with ordinary direct perceptions. If all perceptions were indirect, the phrase 'indirect perception' would itself lose its meaning.

It is unfortunate that Moore in his *Some Main Problems of Philosophy* called our knowings of material objects indirect appre-

hensions. In this book he makes a distinction between 'direct apprehension' and 'indirect apprehension'.

Sense-data, according to him, are directly apprehended, whereas material objects are indirectly apprehended. In his later writings he makes corresponding distinctions between 'directly see' and 'see', 'directly hear' and 'hear', and so on. It is true that Moore, by making these distinctions, does not intend to deny the possibility of the knowledge of material objects. But his use of 'direct' and 'indirect' in the way mentioned above tends to suggest that in perception there is no direct 'contact' between the perceiver and the perceived. He should have avoided calling seeings and other perceivings 'indirect'; the more so because he claimed that material objects are *known* by seeing or other kinds of perceiving.

If our reasoning is correct, then it shows that sense-data are no barriers and the 'iron curtain' objection does not hold. But a really troublesome difficulty still remains. We have said that sense-data are the type of things which can, and often do, reveal or present physical things. And we have also said that sense-data may not, and sometimes do not, reveal or present physical things. Now, the acceptance of both these propositions at once forces us to face the question: How do we know which sense-data are presentative and which not? It should be noted that this question arises only because some of our sense-data are unrepresentative. Had all sense-data been presentative, this question would not have arisen at all.

Some philosophers have exploited the existence of non-presentative or non-veridical sense-data for arguing that knowledge of physical objects is not possible. They have argued that if some sense-data are non-veridical, why not all? Thus Broad argues.

"..... since there is no relevant internal difference between the veridical and the delusive perceptual situation, it is reasonable to suppose that in no case does a perceptual situation contain as a constituent the physical object which corresponds to its epistemological object, even when there is such a physical object".¹

In his essay 'Critical and Speculative Philosophy'² he recommends what he calls the Principle of Exceptional cases for solving philosophical problems. He says,

1. *The Mind and Its Place in Nature*, p. 154.

2. *Contemporary British Philosophy*, 1st series, p. 90.

"If we want to clear up the meaning of some commonly used concept it is enormously important to see how it applies to exceptional and abnormal cases".³

Now, I do not wish to deny the enormous importance of exceptional cases in philosophical analysis. But the point is that a philosopher must consider exceptional cases as what they are, and must not draw conclusions which do not follow. On the ground that some perceptions are delusive Broad thinks it reasonable to suppose that all perceptions are possibly delusive. But is this supposition really reasonable? Can we argue here from some to all? The very fact that *some* perceptions are delusive conclusively shows that there are others which are *not* delusive. It is not wrongly said that exceptions prove the rule.

Delusive perceptions are called 'delusive' only because they can be contrasted with non-delusive perceptions. The real character of the former can be understood only in the light of non-delusive or veridical perceptions.

Broad's Principle of Exceptional Cases does not weaken the claims of veridical perceptions; rather, it strengthens them. This Principle, being a principle of *exceptional* cases, can hardly apply to perceptions in general. It supports, rather than undermines, what Price calls the Principle of the Primacy of the Normal.

It is clear then that hallucinatory perceptions cannot be used for sceptical purposes. But our problems still remain. How are we to know which perception is veridical and which not? How are we to distinguish between presentative and non-presentative sense-data? It would be wrong if we said that presentative sense-data carried some internal mark with them. For, had it been the case, no presentative sense-datum could ever have been mistaken for a non-presentative one, and conversely no non-presentative sense-datum could ever have been mistaken for a presentative one. But such mistakes sometimes take place. So it is clear that phenomenology by itself could not be a sure guide for epistemological purposes.

Nor could we say that a sense-datum is veridical if it is experienced with a conviction that it is veridical. Our feeling sure of the veridicality of a particular sense-datum has nothing to do with its really being veridical. A sense-datum may be unveridical and yet may be experienced with strong overtones of beliefs

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 90-91.

that it is veridical. This is evidenced by the fact that sometimes people are deceived by their hallucinations. Sometimes the opposite of this also happens. A sense-datum might in fact be veridical and yet the person having it might treat it as unveridical. My own experience of seeing a vapour trail for the first time serves as an example.

It appears then that the psychological feeling of being sure of the veridicality of sense-datum does not confer on a person the right of being sure of the veridicality of that sense-datum. But then it can hardly be denied that veridical perceptions do occur, and that we have experienced them ourselves and have known them to be such. For otherwise how can we say that they do occur? It follows then that with regard to some of our experiences we must have had the right of being sure that they are veridical. It can hardly be possible for us to say that veridical perceptions do occur, if we have never acquired the right of being sure of the veridicality of even one of them. A complete denial of the right of being sure of the veridicality of perceptions is hardly compatible with an epistemology in which the occurrence of veridical perceptions has been accepted, not without reasons, as a certainty.

Let us therefore find out one perception with regard to which the percipient has the undeniable right of being sure of its veridicality. By considering one such perception we might be able to know how the veridicality or otherwise of sense-data is ascertained. In order to establish anything about perception, nothing can be more useful than the argument from a particular case. As Moore says,

"..... the strongest argument to prove that Hume's principles are false is the argument from a particular case, like this in which we do know of the existence of some material object. And similarly, if the object is to prove *in general* that we do know of the existence of material objects, no argument which is really stronger can, I think, be brought forward to prove this than particular instances in which we do in fact know of the existence of such an object".⁴

At the present moment I am seeing a black pen in my hand—the pen with which I am writing. Let us consider this perception. Could this perception be non-veridical? Could my present visual sense-datum be non-presentative? But I am also feeling the pen

4. *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 125-126.

by touch. I handle it in a variety of ways. I find that I go on sensing only these sense-data which I should sense if a real pen existed in my hand.

We need to explain this point in some detail. Let us consider my present perceptual situation. It is such that I am sensing a visual sense-datum characteristic of the look of my pen. Let us call this visual sense-datum 'A'. As I am holding the pen in my hand I am also sensing a tactual sense-datum of the appropriate sort. Let us call this tactual sense-datum 'B'. By changing the position of the pen in suitable ways and by handling and pressing the pen with my fingers in various ways, I sense a series of sense-data C, D, E, etc. Now, my point is that it is very unlikely that A, B, C, D, E, should occur if there did not exist a real pen in my hand.

It may be objected here that I am falling back either into Phenomenalism or into Causal Inference Theory. But this objection is obviously misplaced. For I am *not* saying that the existence of the pen is identical with A, B, C, D, E and other possible sense-data of the relevant kind. Nor am I taking recourse to the argument, "Because A, B, C, D, E, etc. occur, therefore I am justified in concluding that they are sense-data 'of' a real pen".

In order to appreciate what I am saying it is necessary to distinguish between the following two things: viz. (1) A's presenting the pen and (2) my being sure that A is presenting the pen. It goes without saying that A's presenting the pen is one thing, and my becoming sure that A is presenting the pen is a different thing. The former cannot be regarded as being conditional on the latter. This, however, does not imply that the sensing of A should necessarily be accompanied by any sceptical feeling about its presentative character. Now, if for any reason I happen to doubt whether A is presenting a real pen or not, I can utilize B, C, D, E etc. for removing my doubt. B, C, D, E, etc. do not and cannot help A in being presentative; A is presentative in its own right. For A to present the pen, it is not necessary that B, C, D, etc. should occur. So it is not the case that B (or any other sense-datum) joins A in 'composing' the pen. Nor is it necessary that B (or even A) should figure as a premise in a causal inference because A is *presenting* the pen. The importance of B in the context of our present discussion is that, if for any reason I happen to doubt whether A is presentative or not, it (B) is there to remove my doubt, and what it does is further corroborated by C, D, E, etc. Such doubts need not and do not always arise. Hence, inter-

sensorial confirmations are not usually needed. But, if by any chance any such doubt happens to arise, the inter-sensorial confirmation procedure is there to remove it.

It may be objected that the sense-data that I am talking about might be merely the contents of a coherent dream. But was I really having a dream a little while ago? Perhaps I was. But then I am now awake. It can hardly be maintained that I am always dreaming. 'Being perpetually in a dream' is a nonsensical phrase. Moreover, we could not call dreams 'dreams', unless we did have experiences of the 'non-dreaming' type, and unless we contrasted the former with the latter. Now, is it wrong to contrast my present experience with a dream? If it is, I fail to understand what other experience of mine will have the privilege of being contrasted with a dream. Or, will it be maintained that none of my experiences undergone so far is to be contrasted with a dream? But it is surely preposterous to say that all my experiences so far are dream-experiences. So some of my experiences must be waking experiences. And my present experience must be one of them, precisely because it is one of those experiences with which dreams are contrasted. So at the present moment I am awake. And I find that I am having only those sense-data which I should have if a real pen existed in my hand. Thus, it follows that I am seeing a real pen at the present moment.

It is of signal importance to note that the way in which I have become sure of my seeing a real pen at the present moment is not the usual way of becoming sure of the veridicality of sense-perceptions. It is not that in each case one has to go through a long process of checking against mistakes. Thanks to the rarity of non-veridical cases, we have not to bother about the epistemological status of most of our sense-experiences. The world of physical objects being what it is and our perceptual capacity being what it is, we automatically develop the necessary knack of perceiving physical objects with the proper epistemological attitude at the first encounter. At times we fail, but that is as it should be. Perception being what it is, occasional failures are inevitable.

So we conclude that sense-data (not all of them) present or reveal physical objects. The concept of perception is a complex concept and, when analysed, it is found to incorporate within it the concept of a sense-datum. Sense-data 'enter' into perception, and it is largely because of them that perceptual consciousness is what it is.

Linguistic Analysis—A Bankrupt Philosophy

by

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In this paper I am going to examine some of the basic tenets of the latest trend in Philosophy which goes in the name of Linguistic Analysis and which seems to hold its sway over some of the most reputed seats of philosophical learning both in the United States and the United Kingdom. This philosophy is yet in the making. I shall, therefore, state what I consider to be its chief traits. Like other systems, this new philosophy does not have well-defined boundaries, and therefore the chief traits selected here may not be the universally-accepted ones.

(I)

(a) According to this School of Philosophy, philosophy is quite unlike science. "In philosophy there are no proofs; there are no theorems; and there are no questions which can be decided, yes or no",¹ so says Dr. Waismann. Wittgenstein thinks that philosophers had made a mistake in trying to model their activities on those of the scientists and he says, "It was true to say that our considerations could not be scientific ones there must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations".²

So we find that these philosophers are very anxious to make a rigid distinction between these two kinds of activities, scientific and philosophical. They seem to suggest that philosophical activity is not just a shadow of scientific activity, but is altogether a different and perhaps an equally important activity.

(b) We have already seen that the function of philosophy is neither to prove nor to disprove; nor does it build any theory. The question naturally arises: what does it do then? The answer is provided in a simple and straight-forward statement of Dr. Waismann. He says, "When a philosopher wants to dispose of a

1. *Contemporary British Philosophy* — 1956 — p. 447.

2. *Philosophical Investigations* — Sec. 109,

question, the one thing he must not do is: to give an answer. A philosophic question is not solved: it dissolves. And in what does the 'dissolving' consist? In making the meaning of the words used in putting the question so clear to ourselves that we are released from the spell it casts on us."³

It means that the problems of philosophy arise because of the confusion in the use of language. Certain uses in certain contexts cast a spell over us, giving rise to philosophical problems. When the meaning of the words is made clear to us, confusion vanishes and so do the problems of philosophy. Wittgenstein, the arch-builder of this school, says, "A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words."⁴ According to him, such confusions and misinterpretations of the forms of language lead to deep disquietudes in the minds of the philosophers. He says, "The problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of depth. They are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the forms of our language and their significance is as great as the importance of our language."⁵ Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Augustine, Descartes, Kant, etc. are supposed to be the unfortunate victims of such disquietudes and confusions, and these modern thinkers take upon themselves the generous task of liberating them from their confusions and deep uneasiness.

(c) Now the question arises: does the work of philosophy lie in merely dispelling confusions? Does it perform merely a negative task, having no positive functions of its own? Dr. Waismann admits—"We do not use arguments in order to prove or disprove any *philosophical views*. As we have no use we can afford to look at things as they are."⁶ "Next we only describe; we do not explain."⁷ Wittgenstein also says, "We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its power of illumination, i.e. its purpose, from the philosophical problems Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language."⁸

3. *Contemporary British Philosophy*—1956, p. 458.

4. *Philosophical Investigations*—Sec. 122.

5. *Ibid.*, Sec. 111.

6. *Contemporary British Philosophy*—1956—p. 460.

7. *Ibid.*, 1956—460.

8. *Philosophical Investigations*—Section 109.

So we find that both the master and the disciple admit that the function of philosophy is merely negative in its nature. But does not philosophy itself dissolve as a result? To this query Dr. Waismann gives a highly emotional reply. "Yet philosophy is not dissolved. It derives its weight, its grandeur, from the significance of the question it destroys. It overthrows idols, and it is the importance of these idols which gives philosophy its importance."⁹ It amounts to saying that philosophy is important because it performs the important task of dislodging important idols in philosophy. In the words of the master, "The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language. These bumps make us see the value of the discovery."¹⁰

(d) This negative view of philosophy, that philosophical problems are just 'muddles felt as problems' which wither away when the ground is cleared, seems itself to create disquietude in the minds of some philosophers of this school. Dr. Waismann exclaims, "What, only criticism and no meat. The philosopher a fog dispeller! If that were all he was capable of I will be sorry for him and leave him to his devices."¹¹ But according to him philosophy also does something positive. The negative function of clearing linguistic confusions may lead to a profounder understanding of language. "For one thing, a philosophic question, if pursued far enough may lead to something positive—for instance, to a more profound understanding of language."¹²

This positive result of gaining 'a more profound understanding of language' does not appear to be quite significant even to the propounders of this trend in philosophy. It is why we find them saying many kinds of things just to prove the utility of doing philosophy in the new fashion. It is in some such context that Dr. Waismann says, "The genius of the philosophers shows itself nowhere more strikingly than in the new kind of question he brings into the world. What distinguishes him and gives him his place is the passion of questioning". So, from this point of view,


9. *Contemporary British Philosophy*—1956—p. 460.

10. *Philosophical Investigations*—Section 119.

11. *Contemporary British Philosophy*—1956, p. 461.

12. *Ibid.*, 1956, p. 461.

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the value of philosophy consists in raising new questions, and not in answering any.

This philosophy makes a further claim that by dissolving linguistic confusions which give rise to problems it succeeds in transforming the whole intellectual scene. "Arguments are used in such a discussion, not as proofs though but rather as means to make him see things he had not noticed before: e.g., to dispel wrong analogies, to stress similarities with other cases and in this way to bring about something like a shift of perspective".¹³

All this and the strictly Wittgensteinian point of view leave some of his followers and specially Dr. Waismann dissatisfied with the positive results of doing philosophy in this way. This becomes evident from some of the statements of Dr. Waismann. He says, "There is something deeply exciting about philosophy, a fact not intelligible on such a negative account. It is not a matter of 'clarifying thoughts' nor of 'the correct use of language' nor of any other of these damned things. What is it? Philosophy is many things and there is no formula to cover them all. But if I were asked to express in one single word what is its most essential feature I would unhesitatingly say: vision. At the heart of any philosophy worth the name is vision, and it is from there it springs and takes its visible shape."¹⁴ Dr. Waismann seems to realise that the use of the term 'vision' may be vague and may give rise to misleading interpretations. And so he tries to explain it by saying, "When I say 'vision' I mean it: I do not want to romanticise. What is characteristic of philosophy is the piercing of that dead crust of tradition and convention, the breaking of those fetters which bind us to inherited preconceptions, so as to attain a new and broader way of looking at things What is decisive is a new way of seeing and what goes with it, the will to transform the whole intellectual scene. This is the real thing and every thing else is subservient to it."¹⁵ The above statement seems to suggest that Dr. Waismann appears to feel completely 'cramped in' and he is trying hard to get out of the tight jacket of the Wittgensteinian philosophy. It is why he tries to give a wide and general interpretation of the function of philosophy by calling it a 'vision'. He goes so far as to say, "To go on with some hair-

13. *Ibid.* 1956, p. 464.

14. *Contemporary British Philosophy*, 1956, p.p. 482 to 83.

15. *Ibid.*, 1956, p. 483.

splitting as to what substance is and how it could be defined was to miss the message. It was a colossal mistake. A philosophy is there to be lived out. What goes into the word 'dies', what goes into the work 'lives'."¹⁶

(II)

This new trend in philosophy has varying colours and shades and is being developed in many ways by some of the eminent philosophers of the west. It is, therefore, difficult to sum up in a few paragraphs its basic or salient features. Some features of this new trend have been stated and explained. They will now be subjected to a critical examination with a view to assessing the value of this new trend in philosophy.

To start with, we have said that this new trend in philosophy makes a clear-cut demarcation between the scientific and the philosophical activities. In doing philosophy we neither prove nor disprove; we simply argue; we make a case. Why do we do so? We certainly do so with a view to convincing others about the cogency, validity and sometimes truth of a particular point of view with regard to the question under discussion; otherwise there is no point in arguing out a case. Ryle throughout his book 'Concept of Mind' is arguing by analysing the words which we use to indicate mental activities, with a view to convincing his readers that there is no 'ghost in the machine'. Even if we argue that something is an illusion, that something is a muddle, this also amounts to proving in a sense something in a negative way. Of course, such a proof is not like a proof in a deductive system, such as Logic and Mathematics, where the acceptance of some arbitrary definitions compels us to accept the theorems as necessary. In disciplines like philosophy, politics, economics, etc., and even in physical sciences, there definitely is much greater freedom and scope for arguments. There are and there can be various opinions and sometimes contradictory attitudes to the same problems or questions. But this does not mean that here we do not prove or disprove in a general sense anything when we argue out a case. It, therefore, appears to be wrong to say that philosophy is quite different from sciences in as much as it does not prove or disprove as sciences do. Philosophy is different from science not in this sense, but in the sense that it deals with a different set of questions.

16. *Contemporary British Philosophy*, 1956, pp. 489-90.

Philosophy at one time commanded respect because it claimed to give a consistent picture and view-point with regard to all aspects of human life and activities. This is what we find in Plato, Aristotle, Kant and Hegel. They were respected as great thinkers, because they tried to command the whole panorama of human life and its activities. What matters is not what the empirical and social scientists are doing in their over-specialised fields, but what implications their findings have with regard to the problems which humanity has to face. It is in the failure to give such a panoramic view that the new philosophy has miserably failed. It claims to distinguish itself completely from science, but tries to follow in the foot-steps of science in discussing and analysing small linguistic confusions in an over-specialised manner.

We have already seen that, according to this new trend in philosophy, a philosophical problem is not solved,—it dissolves. It appears as if the philosophers in the past created philosophical problems due to the confused use of language, and these modern thinkers are trying hard to dissolve those confusions. It is surprising to note that both these activities—the creation and the dissolution of metaphysical problems,—are named 'philosophical activities'. The new philosophy gives its case completely away when it admits that it is not important in itself, but 'it derives its weight and its grandeur from the significance of the question it destroys'.

One peculiar feature of this new philosophy is that it seems to be enclosed within the prison-walls of language. To understand the meaning of a word we are not to refer to any object to which it refers, because some words do not have such a reference. It is its various uses in language which alone can and do make its meaning clear. This position appears to be similar to that of the subjectivists whose empiricism makes them a prisoner of their own ideas. These new philosophers seem to have built a cell of linguistic uses round themselves and have thus succeeded in making the scope of philosophy extremely narrow. Russell very rightly points out, "Philosophers and bookish people generally tend to live a life dominated by words and even to forget that it is the essential function of the words to have a connection of one sort or another with facts, which are in general non-linguistic. Some modern philosophers have gone so far as to say that words should never be confronted with facts but should live in a pure, autonomous world where they are compared only with

other words. These authors tell us that the attempt to confront language with fact is 'metaphysics' and is on this ground to be condemned. This is one of those views which are so absurd that only very learned men could possibly adopt them.¹⁷

There is no denying the fact that one should be very careful in the use of words. Certain confusions do arise due to wrong linguistic uses. Words do have varying shades of meanings due to the variety of uses to which they are put. In trying to answer a question, it is true that one should be very clear about the sense or meaning of the question concerned. But this is not the same thing as to say—"In philosophy the real problem is not to find the answer to a given question but to find a sense for it." We try to find the sense of a question so that we may clearly understand it with a view to finding out its answer. If the activity merely consists in understanding the sense of a question, it becomes futile and purposeless.

It looks absurd to think or to say that philosophical problems arise out of linguistic confusions. All human disciplines, scientific or non-scientific, make use of some sort of language, verbal or non-verbal. All such disciplines have certain questions and problems which they discuss in the context of the already available knowledge in their respective fields, and in so doing they do make use of some sort of a linguistic apparatus. It is as important for these disciplines as for philosophy not to fall a victim to wrong or confused uses of language. If all disciplines make use of some sort of a language, why should linguistic confusions be the sole monopoly of philosophy or philosophers? Do we ever hear any one saying that the problems of economics, politics, psychology or physics arise out of linguistic confusions and are merely pseudo-problems, though they also make as much use of language as philosophy does? There are and there may be certain linguistic confusions here and there in these disciplines also, but no thinker has so far asserted that all their problems arise out of some sort of confusion in the use of language. Why is it that such a question is posed in the realm of philosophy? This seems to be because of the bewildering variety of problems, methods and view-points in philosophy. We have varieties of views and problems in other disciplines also, but in these fields we do not come to the same

17. B. Russell—*My Philosophical Development*—published in *Encounter* Feb. 1959, p. 26.

conclusions as we do in the field of philosophy. It is because the problems in these human disciplines appear to be intimately connected with the basic needs and urges of humanity, whereas the problems of philosophy do not appear to be so intimately interwoven with our life and existence.

It is here again that the new philosophy blunders. The problems of philosophy are as much rooted in human needs and urges, as the problems of any other discipline. They are as urgent human problems, which stand in need of being clarified, understood and progressively solved, as the problems in any other field. The difference between philosophy and other disciplines lies in the fact that philosophy tries, and has tried in the past, to present an integrated outlook on life and its problems with far-reaching implications affecting all other human disciplines, whereas the scope of other disciplines is limited to a specialised study of a particular field of nature, man or society. There has always been a relation of give-and-take between philosophy and other human disciplines. Philosophy not only 'describes', it also explains; and it determines our activities in all fields of human life and existence.

It, therefore, is wrong to say that the positive function of philosophy lies only in giving a profounder understanding of language 'by dispelling wrong analogies and stressing right similarities'. We have already seen how Dr. Waismann himself tries to get out of the cramping restrictions of this new philosophy when he says, "It is not a matter of 'clarifying thoughts' nor of 'correct use of language' nor of any other of these damned things".¹⁸

After getting rid of 'these damned things', he unhesitatingly characterises philosophy as 'vision'. Yes, philosophy certainly is vision—a vision which sees through the maze of bewildering and perplexing facts and their inter-relations. Such a vision presents to us an integrated outlook which helps human understanding and action in relation to nature, man and society. Such integrated outlooks are bound to differ from age to age, and may be from place to place, depending on the concrete human situation of the thinker, his environment and the intellectual climate of the time.

Now, if this be the positive role which philosophy through ages has been and is performing, this new philosophy of 'linguism' has miserably failed to give us any such outlook. If it at all repre-

18. *Contemporary British Philosophy*—1956, page 482,

sents an outlook, it is the outlook of decadence and stalemate from which all roads to further thinking in a fruitful and constructive manner seem to be completely closed. It is in such a context that Bertrand Russell says, "The most serious of my objections is that the new philosophy seems to me to have abandoned, without necessity, that grave and important task which philosophy throughout the ages has hitherto pursued. Philosophers from Thales onwards have tried to understand the world. Most of them have been unduly optimistic as regards their own successes. But even when they have failed, they have supplied material to their successors and an incentive to their new efforts. I cannot feel that the new philosophy is carrying on this tradition. It seems to concern itself, not with the world and our relation to it, but only with the different ways in which silly people can say silly things. If this is all that philosophy has to offer, I cannot think that it is a worthy subject of study. The only reason that I can imagine for the restriction of philosophy to such triviality is a desire to be separated sharply from empirical science. I do not think such a separation can be usefully made. A philosophy which is to have any value should be built upon a wide and firm foundation of knowledge that is not specifically philosophical. Such knowledge is the soil from which the tree of philosophy derives its vigour. Philosophy which does not draw nourishment from this soil will soon wither and cease to grow".¹⁹

If we accept that any philosophy worth the name has got to be rooted in human needs, we can say with Dr. Waismann that 'a philosophy is there to be lived out. What goes into the word dies, what goes into the work lives'. Can we not say now in the light of the above discussion that the new philosophy as propounded by Wittgenstein and interpreted by the faithfuls is completely a bankrupt philosophy?

19. Bertrand Russell—*My Philosophical Development*—published in Feb. '59 in *Encounter*, p. 29.

Causation and Similarity

by

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This paper aims at justifying the position that cause and effect must always be similar. But the work of justification should be preceded by an explanation of the importance of the position, in order that whatever value this attempt has may be adequately assessed.

I

The importance of the position lies in that its truth and falsity largely determine the validity or invalidity of the psychophysical dualism of Descartes, and thereby determine, to a certain extent at least, the value of much of what has been done in philosophy after him.

Of all the factors that tend to justify the epithet "the father of modern philosophy" being given to Descartes, his dualism of body and mind is, in a sense, the most important. For it may be said to have determined negatively the course and pattern of philosophy after him. Post-Cartesian philosophy may be said to be a reaction against his psychophysical dualism; it is a series of attempts to discover a suitable alternative to this doctrine, to subordinate mind to matter, or matter to mind, or to go beyond both mind and matter and reach out to a neutral stuff.

But what has prompted this reaction against dualism, this continued search for a substitute for it? The reasons for the reaction, as we know, are many. But the most important and well-known among them is the failure on the part of Descartes and his dualistic successors to explain how body and mind which are in their essence opposed to each other are correlated in their functions. Neither Descartes nor any of his dualistic successors has succeeded in suggesting a hypothesis which, consistent in itself, is also consistent with the dualistic contention that body and mind are radically distinct.

As we know, Descartes has explained the functional correlation between mind and body by the hypothesis of their interaction.

The relation of interaction between mind and body is nothing but a form of reciprocal causation, in the sense that a mental phenomenon producing a physical phenomenon may, in turn, be produced by *another* physical phenomenon, or a physical phenomenon producing a mental phenomenon may itself be produced by *another* mental phenomenon.

But the Cartesian explanation of body-mind correlation has satisfied none, not even the dualistic followers of Descartes. The relation of interaction or the causal relation between mind and body has been supposed to be incompatible with their dualism. Body and mind, conceived as completely opposed, it is pointed out, exclude the possibility of their being causally related. And obviously the assumption on which this argument is based is that *causal relation can hold only between similar things*.

This assumption, strangely enough, has come down to us as if it is an axiom without so far being challenged or disputed; and, so even those who have attacked dualism on its strength have not felt any need to substantiate it. But there is a tendency in some contemporary thinkers, e.g. Ewing,¹ Stace,² Lovejoy³ and others, to revive Cartesian dualism in a modified form. They refer to the parallelistic explanation offered by Spinoza of body-mind correlation sometimes with obvious contempt. They also do not show any inclination or interest for the mythical explanations of Leibniz and the occasionalists. Both posit a transcendent divine Being. But while the latter conceive the divine Being as one who, whenever anything occurs, intervenes to connect it with its corresponding physical or psychical process, the former conceives Him as one who has given to mind and body such a harmony at the time of their creation that they, like two clocks, vary concomitantly but without interfering with each other. The explanation of body-mind correlation which these neo-dualists propose is, in fact, the Cartesian hypothesis of interaction over again. Such thinkers, therefore, have, at last, felt the need of challenging the validity of the assumption mentioned above. The assumption, they maintain, is a 'medieval idea', a sheer prejudice. Now, if these

1. Vide "Are Mental Attributes the Attributes of the Body?", "Is there Mind-Body Interaction?" and "Professor Ryle's Attack on Dualism" published respectively in Vols. XIV, XXXI and LIII of the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (New Series)*; also *Fundamental Questions of Philosophy*.

2. Vide "Russell's Neutral Monism" in the *Philosophy of Bertrand Russell* (Edited by Schillip).

3. Vide "Revolt against Dualism."

thinkers are really justified in denying the validity of this assumption, then it must be granted that they have re-established to a considerable extent the case of psycho-physical dualism. And philosophers who, after Descartes, have been trying to find out a substitute for his dualism, have indeed been doing something which is positively unphilosophical; they have been refuting a doctrine that is true. Hence to restore the value and significance of post-Cartesian philosophy the position that cause and effect must always be similar calls for justification.

II

The ground on which the position is attacked is that it cannot be empirically justified. As a generalisation based on experience, it is vitiated by instances of causal relation subsisting between utterly dissimilar things. Thus "lightning is the cause of thunder, yet", as one of the neo-dualists says, "the two are totally unlike....". "Cold", again, "is utterly unlike the solidity which it causes in water".⁴

Now, whatever value the above argument may have rests upon two conditions; first, the validity of the supposition that the relation between thunder and lightning, or that between coldness and solidity is genuinely causal; and second, the validity of the view that lightning and thunder, or coldness and solidity are totally unlike. But both these are extremely doubtful. It seems to be an elementary scientific mistake to suppose that lightning is the cause of thunder or coldness is the cause of solidity. In both these cases, the events are related, not as cause and effect, but only as co-effects of the same cause. Again, how is the idea that lightning and thunder or coldness and solidity are totally unlike each other arrived at? Probably on the basis of the traditional notion of likeness between two things as consisting in the possession in common of something either by way of substance or by way of attribute. But we have shown elsewhere⁵ that this notion of likeness is incorrect. And this incorrect notion of likeness, it may be noted, has probably been one of the conditions that made for the dualism of Descartes.

4. "Russell's Neutral Monism", p. 378.

5. Vide Our paper entitled "Is the Unity of a Class Ultimate or Derivative?" published in the *Journal of the Philosophical Association*, January-April, 1957.

As we have seen, the argument "that cause and effect are similar cannot be empirically established" is incorrect. But there is no need for saying this. For even if it is assumed to be valid, the argument fails to provide any ground for overthrowing the position that two things causally related must be similar. The argument proves merely that the position cannot be inductively justified. But induction is not the only basis of a general proposition—the sole means of proving it. A proposition incapable of being justified inductively may often be justified *a priori*; and the justification which we propose to offer for this position is based on an *a priori* ground.

The position could be deductively proved if it were possible to suppose, on any *a priori* or inductive ground, that similarity of the cause and the effect is the *cause* of their being causally related. But such a possibility is clearly ruled out inasmuch as it is neither a fact nor even conceivable that all similar things are related as causes and effects. In fact, it seems impossible to explain causal relation in causal terms. It may be that the unity of the cause and effect is, in this sense, ultimate. But, though causally ultimate, the unity of cause and effect must not be supposed to be deductively so, because that would make causal unity a mystery, a phenomenon absolutely incapable of scientific explanation. This means that although we may fail to explain the causal unity by referring to anything as its cause, it must at least be referred to some ground from which it may be said to follow as a consequent. In other words, for the sake of intelligibility, the unity of cause and effect must be explained by reference to a larger or more general unity in which it is comprehended along with other kinds of unity.

Of all the modes of unity known to us the only one that survives scrutiny and works successfully as the unity we are in search of, is, we maintain, the *unity of the class*. For the unity of the class satisfies not only the criterion of generality, but is also compatible with the notion of causality as well as with any instance of causation. But before we proceed any further to substantiate this, we should make clear what exactly is the meaning of the phrase, "unity of a class".

The unity of a class, in our opinion, cannot be defined or described in causal terms such as "due to", "because of", etc. Nor do we think that it is definable or describable, after Mill or Johnson, as the unity of members whose denotation is determined connotatively. For all this implies that the unity of the class

is derivative; but following the lead of Stout,⁶ we believe that the unity of the class is ultimate, and this belief we have defended elsewhere.⁷ All that we may say by way of clarification about the unity of the class is simply that it is the unity of members referred to by a general term.

Now the unity of the class, thus understood, must be supposed to comprehend cause and effect as its members, so that the causal unity may be deduced from the class-unity as its modification. And the supposition, unless vitiated by any formal or factual contradiction, must be taken to be true, simply for the negative reason that without the supposition the causal unity remains completely unexplained,—unexplained even deductively. Formally, it is surely possible that cause and effect should be co-members of a class; for the idea of two things being causally related and that of their belonging, at the same time, to the same class do not in any way exclude each other, as the idea of a figure being square and the idea of the figure being at the same time round do. But is it also factually justified to speak of the causal unity as universally contained in the unity of the class? Or is there any instance of causal relation holding between two utterly disparate things so as to vitiate this belief? A psychophysical dualist, sharing the belief in the interaction hypothesis, we are aware, cites such an instance in the causal relation between mind and body.

But this, on our interpretation, instead of presenting any serious difficulty to our proposed inclusion of the causal unity in the unity of the class, weakens the case of psychophysical dualism itself. The dualism of body and mind is no indubitable fact of the kind as "the sky is blue" or "fire burns"; nor is its truth, in any way, self-evident like that of the proposition "a thing is what it is". It is just a supposition (and, as the history of philosophy would testify, a supposition of a highly controversial nature) which calls for verification. The supposition can therefore hardly claim to have any strength when advanced against a hypothesis which is not only necessary but also efficacious for the explanation of a fact. As a matter of fact, we can advance an argument against psychophysical dualism itself, if its acceptance hinders the explanation of any fact, e.g. causation in the

6. Vide *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology*.

7. Our paper on "Is the Unity of a Class Ultimate or Derivative" published in the *Journal of the Philosophical Association*, January-April, 1957.

present context. Besides, to deny the possibility of causal unity being contained in the unity of the class on the ground that it is repugnant to the supposed dichotomy of body and mind is *begging the question*. It is like refuting an objection against a doctrine with the help of the doctrine itself. The proposition that cause and effect must be members of the unity of the class is intended to be used in this paper as the ground for the position that cause and effect must be similar. Psychophysical dualism must either abandon itself if it adheres to the interaction hypothesis, or it must abandon the interaction hypothesis and thus fail to give a satisfactory solution of the problem of mind-body correlation.

Thus the causal unity, to be intelligible, the cause and the effect must be members of the same class. Once this is accepted we may find a justification for the cause-effect similarity. The position that the cause and the effect must always be similar may be inferred from the fact that they belong to the same class, either as the *consequent* of the class-unity or as the *ground*. Those, who, like us, believe that the unity of the class is ultimate, and interpret accordingly the meaning of the similarity of two things as consisting merely in the co-membership of the same class, would adopt the former course; while others, who, in conformity with the traditional ideas, derive the class-unity from the similarity of its members, would adopt the latter. Thus two things causally related must be similar. We may not be always aware of exactly where their similarity lies. But that merely implies that the similarity has to be discovered, not that it is not there.

Book Review

The Bhagavadgītā as a Philosophy of God-Realisation (Being a clue through the labyrinth of modern interpretations), by Dr. R. D. Ranade; Price Rs. 10; Pp. 321 + xiii; Published (1959) by the Nagpur University.

The Bhagavadgītā epitomizes India's age-old philosophy as contained in the Vedas and the Upaniṣads. It is one of the three sacred canons of Hinduism, the other two being the Upaniṣads and the Brahma Sūtras. It has itself been called an Upaniṣad. Its popularity is by no means confined to India. It has already earned world-wide recognition. The truths that the Gītā proclaims are universal truths and the philosophy it propounds is 'perennial philosophy' which is valid for all times and places. The Gītā is both *Brahmavidyā* and *Yogashāstra*. As *Brahmavidyā* it enunciates the highest metaphysical truths, and as *Yogashāstra* it points out various ways to attain these truths. For a proper understanding of the Gītā both these qualifications, viz., some grounding in metaphysics and in practical *Sādhana*, seem to be indispensable. Both these qualifications are to be found in an eminent degree in the author of the work under review. The late Dr. Ranade not merely studied and taught philosophy, he also lived it.

The present posthumously published work of the author is the 'developed outcome' of his lectures which he delivered at the Nagpur University so far back as the year 1928 and subsequently at Allahabad and Delhi. He took great interest in the work, and it is reported he continued to give finishing touches to it right up to the end of his life.

We propose to offer a critical introduction to this valuable and interesting work in this review.

The book consists of a General Introduction and twenty-one chapters which are divided in five parts. Every chapter is further sub-divided, topicwise, in many sub-sections.

In the *General Introduction* the author seeks to explain his fundamental thesis that God-realization is the supreme teaching of the Gītā. It is this clue that has helped him in arriving at the real meaning of the Gītā through the labyrinth of various interpretations but which, according to the author, "has been missed by the great interpreters of the past" (P. 7). It seems to us, how-

ever, that all the orthodox interpreters of the Gītā have kept this very 'clue' in the forefront. All the Vaiṣṇava Ācāryas have done this. When the Advaitic interpreters say that Self-realization or realization of Brahman is the principal teaching of the Gītā, they surely say something more, not less, than Sri Ranade does; for Īshwara is, in the Advaitic parlance, Brahman with the limiting adjunct of Māyā. How can it be justifiably said, then, that this clue is missed by the great interpreters of the past?

Part one deals with the relation of the Gītā to the Upaniṣads, Sāṃkhya-yoga and the Brahmasūtras. The author rightly says that the Upaniṣads are the source of the Gītā's teachings. He illustrates this relation in case of five principal Upaniṣads. But we have differences with the author when he says that unlike the Gītā, the Kaṭhopanishad regards the world as real and equivalent to Brahman (P. 15). It seems to us the Gītā is only following the Kaṭhopanishad in regarding the world unreal with the help of the imagery of an Aśvattha tree. Sri Ranade's interpretation of the Upaniṣadic verse in question seems to be faulty both grammatically and contextually. It is worth noting that no interpreter of the said Upaniṣad (not excluding the one who regards the world real) has put this meaning on it.

The second part deals with the Vedāntic interpretations of the Gītā—those of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva and Vallabha—and the mystical interpretation of Jñāneśvara.

While considering 'Absolutistic Reality' in this part the author makes a remark which may easily be misunderstood. He ascribes to Śaṅkara the view that an illusory thing may be the cause of 'a real thing' (P. 44). What is really meant is the cause of 'the attainment of the real thing', for the simple reason that Reality has no cause; far less can the illusory be its cause.

In a subsequent sub-section entitled 'Personalistic Reality', the author says that 'Śaṅkara understands Jīva by *Akṣara Puruṣa* and calls him *Kūṭastha*' (P. 46). Any one who has read Śaṅkara's commentary on the Gītā can see that by *Akṣara Puruṣa* Śaṅkara means Māyā itself and not Jīva. This factual inaccuracy ought not to have found a place in a work like this. In the same context the author calls the *Kṣara Puruṣa* 'a misnomer' and the *Akṣara Puruṣa* 'a Puruṣa only by sufferance' (P. 46). In a subsequent chapter the author says, "But to call all elemental and animate existences by the name of Puruṣa is a travesty of words" (P. 240). It seems to us it is a very significant

misnomer and a useful travesty if at all it is a misnomer and a travesty. The Vedas and the Upaniṣads time and again declare, 'Verily all this is Puruṣa'; 'verily all this is Brahman'; 'all this is nothing but Ātman'. *Uttama Puruṣa* is, as our author rightly says, Puruṣa in the primary sense of the term. But the secondary sense of the term also serves an important purpose of pointing to the unity of Being and the non-dual nature of Reality.

The mystical interpretation of Jñāneśvara in this part makes very illuminating reading. Take, for instance, Jñāneśvara's description of the Sun of Absolute Reality: "While the physical Sun makes the phenomenal world rise into view, the spiritual Sun makes it disappear altogether" (P. 57). When the Sun of Absolute Reality rises, there is nothing left for him to illuminate; the subject-object relation comes to an end; the Absolute, the Sun of Spiritual Reality alone remains (P. 58). Sri Jñāneśvara resorts to the imagery of the 'river of illusion' (*Māyānadi*) to point out the nature of the world, and adds that as soon as we begin to cross it, no water remains to cross (P. 62).

Part three is entitled 'The Labrynth of Modern Interpretations' and covers in its wide sweep a number of views on the Gītā that have been offered in modern times. Beginning with the view of Garbe and ending with the view of Sri Aurobindo, we learn in a nutshell, the views of Tilak and Gandhi, Radhakrishnan and Rajgopalachari, Aldous Huxley and Otto and a host of others. It is in this part that we come across a beautiful and telling phrase coined by the author and which is further elaborated in the following part. Sacrifice constitutes, according to the author, a 'spiritual income-tax' (P. 82). "He who utilises all the products of his work for himself", says the Gītā, "is a thief" (P. 202).

The author discusses in this part the controversial issue whether liberation can be had through knowledge alone or through a combination of both knowledge and action (*Jñāna-Karma Samuccaya*). According to the author, "...this controversy cannot be resolved except on the ground of temperamental differences between men and men" (P. 136). It seems to us that the question is not personal and psychological, but logical. If the Advaitic metaphysics is true, if it is true that the individual is no other than Brahman but thinks himself limited, weak, etc., through ignorance, knowledge alone can deliver the goods. Knowledge alone can dispel ignorance along with its products, since knowledge alone is opposed to ignorance and not action which is itself

a product of ignorance. The utility of action prior to the rise of knowledge is by no means denied on this view. Advaitism accepts *Krama Samuccaya*. Action precedes knowledge, it cannot be simultaneous with it.

In Part IV the author finds the way out of the labyrinth of the various interpretations, catching hold of the clue of God-realization which is sought to be presented "in terms of contemporary thought and ways of reasoning" (P. 7). In this part we find discussed many important and interesting problems connected with the *Gītā*: The Antinomies of Metaphysics; The Categorical Imperative, Activism and its Limitations; Moralism, Super-Moralism and Beati-fism; The Problem of God; Methods of Meditation; and 'A Sublime Vision of God'. But we must admit that many of the antinomies dealt with by the author seem to be forced and artificial and their solutions arbitrary. Some of them set topsyturvy the commonly accepted meanings of the *Gītā*'s verses in the light of Advaitic interpretation with which generally speaking the author seems to agree. 'Puruṣottama', for example, according to the author, stands for the *personalistic* conception of God, which is pitted against the *impersonalistic* conception. According to the Advaitic interpretation, 'Puruṣottama' stands for the Absolute or the ultimate Reality which transcends both the *Kṣara Puruṣa* and the *Akṣara Puruṣa*. Likewise one of the two verses quoted by the author as an illustration of the Impersonal Absolute stands for the conditioned or the personal (*Sopādhik*) aspect of the Absolute.

Take another instance. The author seeks to reconcile the Reality of Brahman and the unreality of the world through the doctrine of ephemerism, the doctrine of what the *Gītā* calls *Vyakta madhya*, meaning thereby something existing neither in the beginning nor in the end but appearing only in the middle. But this exactly is the nature of an illusion according to Advaitism. It is neither in the beginning nor in the end; its whole being is exhausted in its appearance (*Pratibhāsa mātra śarīra*). So the said antinomy is only confirmed and not removed through the device of the doctrine of *Vyakta madhya* or ephemerism.

In the antinomy of '*videha-mukti* or *krama-mukti* reconciled with *jīvanmukti*' (P. 188), the author makes confusion worse confounded with regard to the commonly accepted meanings of these terms. As a matter of fact no antinomy is involved here. These various kinds of liberation refer to different kinds of spiritual aspirants and their stages of spiritual evolution. Hence there is no conflict anywhere.

The author concludes his discussion of the antinomies by saying, "This mystical view of Reality alone will enable us to reconcile all the intellectual dogmas that have infested the philosophies of the world" (P. 191.). It seems to us, philosophical problems must be faced boldly on the philosophical plane itself. Mysticism surely has full scope in its own sphere, but its intrusion in the field of philosophy may not find universal acceptance. Philosophers have looked askance at mysticism, and it seems with some justification.

In this very section the author strikes an agnostic note on the basis of some of the verses of the *Gītā*: "...nobody has ever been able to know Him and that He alone probably is able to know Himself." There is hardly any warrant in the *Gītā* itself for any kind of agnosticism. The *Gītā* time and again emphasizes the importance of divine knowledge and also seeks to impart it.

In another section of this part the author discusses the question whether there is any 'ought' after God-realization, and offers his own solution of the problem by saying that knowledge "is not an event but a process". "Illumination never comes finally and fully. We always keep making an asymptotic approach to illumination, but never actually reach it" (P. 207). The remedy proposed by the author seems to be worse than the disease, and the prospect of an endless illumination may well dishearten a spiritual aspirant. This is anything but Upaniṣadic philosophy on which the *Gītā*'s teachings are based. According to this philosophy, knowledge is an occurrent. *Brahmākāra Vṛtti* constitutes the liberating knowledge. It is generated by the *Mahāvākya*—"That art Thou" (*tatvamasi*) under the instructions of a competent teacher. This final psychosis (*caram vṛtti*) dispels all ignorance along with its products and subsequently it liquidates itself, too. This is also sound commonsense; for if the first act of knowledge cannot remove ignorance, how can subsequent repetition of the same do so? If the first act of knowledge is competent to deliver the goods, all subsequent acts are rendered futile and unnecessary. The *Gītā*'s verdict on the question whether there remains any 'ought' after God-realization is quite clear and unambiguous. 'No duty remains for a man of self-realization', declares the *Gītā*—'*tasya karyam na vidyate*' (III-17). This, however, does not mean that a man of knowledge does not act for the welfare of others. It only means he acts out of the spontaneity of his bounteous nature, not out of any sense of duty or 'ought'.

According to the author, the doctrine of *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* (the state transcending all work) of Sureśvara as propounded by him

in his famous work bearing the same name is different from that of the Gītā, and that Sureśvara brings *Jñāna* by the backdoor. Our author thinks that Sureśvara could have dispensed with the word *Naiṣkarmya* and could have directly stated the supremacy of *Jñāna* (P. 216). It seems to us the *Paramāṇ Naiṣkarmyasiddhiṁ* spoken of by the Gita (xviii. 49) is not a whit different from the one established so ably by Sureśvara in his work. He gave this name to the work to show his complete dissociation with his past when he was an ardent champion of the theory of action.

We now come to Part V and the last part of this work which is entitled 'The Sublime and the Divine: A Study in Comparative Thought'. The author has endeavoured to show here, with the help of illustrations from metaphysics, science and morality, how the Sublime leads to the Divine. His conclusion is that 'the Moral, the Sublime and the Divine all merge in one consummate philosophy of spirit like that of the Bhagavadgītā' (P. 297).

We have endeavoured so far to offer a critical introduction to the book under review. We have no hesitation to remark, in conclusion, that Sri Ranade has given us a scholarly and a thought-provoking work on the Bhagavadgītā. We get here a sort of *résumé* of all sorts of studies on the subject along with the author's own mystical interpretation. The treatment of the subject is philosophical throughout. Sri Ranade's work is a welcome addition to the Gītā literature.

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S. M. CHINGLE

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1. 'Stay with God' by Francis Brabazon, published by Edwards and Shaw for Garuda Books (Australia), price Rs. 10/- (incl. postage).
2. "Humanism and Moral Theory", by R. Osborn, published by George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., price 18 s./- net.
3. "Pictorial History of Philosophy", by Dagobert D. Runes, published by Philosophical Library, New York, price \$ 15/00.
4. "Theories of History", edited by Patrick Gardiner, published by The Free Press (Illinois)—London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., price \$ 8/50 c.

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
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