


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
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Critique of Psychological-Positivism by A. Lakshmana Rao ..	221
Knowing and Understanding by Sibapada Chakravarti ..	229
A Note on Modern Nominalism by J. N. Mohanty ..	237
In Defence of Sāṅkhya Dualism by S. K. Chattopadhyaya ..	245
The Sāṅkhya Arguments for the Puruṣa by D. D. Vadekar ..	257
The Logical and the Mystical in Advaita Vedānta by G. R. Malkani ..	261
Mystical Experience, the Meeting Point between India and the West by Fr. J. Britto ..	267
Polarities and Metaphysics by Punya Sloka Ray ..	279
The Analysis of Negation in Navya Nyāya by Hari Mohan Jha ..	283
Book Reviews ..	289
Books Received ..	292



52
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[January, 1960,

Critique of Psychological-Positivism

by

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“Many people can talk sense with concepts but cannot talk sense about them” says Gilbert Ryle in the introduction to his work, ‘Concept of Mind’. It could readily be admitted that Mind, matter, space, time, God, Infinite and the like are a few among countless of such concepts. The very fact that we talk sense with these concepts shows that they are not senseless; and as for talking sense about them it requires no doubt careful analysis and understanding. But the method Gilbert Ryle proposes in order to understand the ‘logical geography’ of knowledge, I submit, scarcely contributes to any addition to the understanding which we already possess of these concepts, in as much as his method hardly ever touches the fringe of the problem. The key arguments employed in the book “are intended to show why certain sorts of operations with the concepts of mental powers and processes are breaches of logical rules”. He could as well have called his method logical analysis of the syntax of Psychological language, in which case his efforts would have come in line with those of the famous linguistic analysts of the present century. In my view what he did was no better.

Part of the thesis of his work, Ryle observes, is to explode the Cartesian myth of the two-worlds theory. 'To explode a myth', according to him 'is not to deny the facts, but to reallocate them'. He certainly has succeeded in not denying the facts as he has not denied the inner workings of the mind; but the explosion itself

was not complete because he rejects the Cartesian two-worlds theory as well as Hobbes-Gessendi one-world theory in the same breath with the remark that "the Cartesian myth indeed repairs the defects of the Hobbist myth by duplicating it." One may be tempted to ask then, what is Ryle's position? As far as I can see he takes up no definite position at all. He allowed himself the indulgence of being 'Stigmatised' a behaviourist; and his sympathies for this particular brand of philosophy owe to the fact that it rejects the two-worlds theory; but at the same time it is of 'relatively slight importance to him that it has tended to espouse as well a kind of Hobbist theory'. I wonder what could accrue from a mere rejection of a two-worlds theory without at the same time 'reallocating the facts', which, according to his own admission, is necessary while exploding a myth. There is here a genuine case for rehabilitation of refugees who have been forcibly turned out from their native habitat; where does he seek to rehabilitate them? Ryle apparently thinks that his business was only to turn them out from a place, but not to rehabilitate them; if he protests that there are no refugees at all and so the question of rehabilitation would not arise, then we may pertinently ask whether he would deny the inner workings of the mind at all? He could not, even if he would; and actually he did not. He clearly admitted them while calling them 'back-stage incidents' in contrast to the 'front-stage incidents'. The latter, we know, are overt and so can be witnessed, while the former are covert and are therefore subjective. When once this admission was made, it was then only a matter of opinion what it was that could properly be termed 'Psychological Research'—a search for 'causal explanations' by probing the covert workings, or a search for methods of mensuration and quantitative measurements of overt behavior. To my mind, Ryle appears to have leanings more towards the latter view.

Bertrand Russell in an article in the Hibbert Journal of July '56 on 'philosophical analysis' has taken to task the philosophers of the present day 'for having abandoned without necessity the grave and important task which philosophy through ages has hitherto pursued' and for having reduced it to triviality. In two of my previous articles,* I tried to give reasons for the present-day

*1. 'Philosophy, Philosophers and Philosophical Analysis'—The Philosophical quarterly Jan., '58.

2. 'Metaphysics and Linguistic Analysis'—Indian Philosophical Congress—1958—part III—The Philosophical quarterly Jan., '59.

restriction of philosophy to triviality. I pointed out that the failure to see that metaphysical material is, by its very nature, not amenable to physical analysis has resulted in the thoroughly artificial doctrine of logical atomism which, leading by gradual steps to Logical Positivism, finally landed us into linguistic analysis.

In this article it would be my endeavour to bring forward a similar complaint against psychology of the present day, that it has 'abandoned the grave and important task which philosophers down the ages have hitherto pursued' and that it has failed to carry out the best traditions handed down to us by the philosophers of the past—particularly of India—who have genuinely tried to understand the nature of the self, whether completely successful in their efforts or not. The reason for this restriction of psychology to triviality, it appears to me, is due to the malign influences brought to bear on philosophy by the extreme positivist trends of the recent times which cut at the root of Western thought. This pest has now spread, and has begun to eat even its erstwhile green and flourishing branches, psychology and Ethics.

Sciences can be classified into physical and non-physical depending on the nature of their subject-matter. I have purposely avoided the words 'objective' and 'subjective', because even the so-called 'objective' could be treated as being included within the domain of the 'subjective'. But the 'Physical' means the existence—for all practical purposes—of a physical world, extra-subjective, not depending on the individual subject for its existence. All the physical sciences, so far as I know, make this fundamental assumption. This, in fact, is a metaphysical presupposition without which no physical Science can proceed and on which all its investigations and discoveries are based. The question for the physical scientist is regarding the constitution of 'matter' itself, and he is still on the way toward knowing what exactly it is. He believes, however, that it could be understood only in terms of the simple elements of which it is composed. Analysis of the 'Complex' into simple elements has thus come to be recognised as the proper endeavour for all pure science.

Psychology entered the scientific field as one among the other sciences rather late in the history of human knowledge. Born out of an illicit connection between philosophy and natural science it was later neglected by both. Frustrated, it left mother philosophy for good, and went headlong with its other parent 'natural science', accepting everything it stood for despite its own different heritage,

origin and resources. In its overweening ambition to become a natural science it identified itself so completely with its model that it lost much of its own individuality. It was indifferent to the fact that its subject-matter was different from that of the natural sciences, different not merely in degree, but in kind. Whether consciousness or conscious experience could ever be made a proper subject for a material investigation never bothered her. Wundt started this venture in 1879, and psychology was officially launched as an experimental science. As Augustus Comte was the father of positivism in philosophy, so was Wundt in the field of psychology. Titchener, the celebrated disciple of Wundt, found that the subject-matter of physics and psychology was fundamentally the same, but different only in points of view. He defined psychology as the study of conscious experience 'with man left out', and pursuing the parallel with physics he sought to analyse mental experience into the simplest components. He called his system 'Structuralism' because his aim was to understand the 'Structure' of consciousness. Later enthusiasts, however, revolutionised the whole field of psychology by removing from it any thing that savoured of consciousness or conscious experience, with the result that what remained for them was only 'Behaviour' for scientific investigation and analysis. These so-called Behaviourists and behavioral psychologists made Behaviour the subject-matter of an objective study. But we have seen in the very beginning that there is an important distinction between the physical and the 'objective'. Behaviour may be objective in the sense that it could be observed and described, but that would not make it physical as are the data of physics or chemistry. Behaviour is the product of the subject and the object—subject in the sense of the subjective individual—the self—and the object in the sense of his physical body and his environment. It is now seen that analysis, if we use it in psychology, cannot obviously be of the same nature as that we use in physical sciences, because in the former the data we analyse are a material different in kind, not alone in degree. Behaviour being a product of the subject and object as above understood, no analysis of them either separately or together will give us any idea of the product, namely 'Behaviour', which is unique. Neither analysis of consciousness, which is the chief factor in behavior, nor the situation in which behavior has taken place, separately or in coordination, will help us, because there are at present no known scientific means of analysing the behaving self of the moment; for it should be clearly understood

that this analysis is entirely different from a structural analysis of, say, a diamond, or a chemical analysis of water; and even if psychologists claim that they do have such analysis, it could only be a 'post-mortem' and piece-meal kind, which could not be the same thing as analysis of the original acting self of the moment. This is not only an objection against introspectional analysis, but a fundamental objection against structural analysis as applied to self or behavior. Behavior can be analysed in the sense that one can observe, and describe its inception, duration and cessation; but observation and description are not the same thing as a complete understanding. No understanding of behavior would be complete that is not also at the same time an understanding of the self which originated it. Analysis of the individual personality through questionnaire and other questionable methods could at best grope on the surface of the overt self; part of the covert attitudes also and motives—in the main, morbid—could be reached by the psycho-analytic techniques; but the deeper and more profound—'subliminal', if we may call it—self which forms the major part of what is really 'self' is beyond the reach of any of the scientific analytic methods known to the westerners, not excepting even psycho-analysis. The real subject-matter of psychology is that inner core of self which is very elusive.

Analysis as we understand it is wholly inadequate and even unsuitable as a method for psychology, which is the science of the 'self' or the 'Atman'. The problems of psychology necessitate the giving up of analysis altogether, or at least demand a thorough reorientation of it to suit their particular character. To think that consciousness is an entity which could be dissected into elements in the same way as matter, or to conceive the self to be like a shelf the contents of which could be understood by simply looking into them is to misunderstand the very nature of consciousness and self. Consciousness is different in kind from matter. The latter has structure, the former has none. Obviously what has apparently no structure and boundaries cannot be understood in the same way and by the same methods as that which has. The use of analysis and quantitative methods in psychology is on the face of it absurd, and it is no wonder that this young science had no single achievement to its credit, though it had immense success; and success, we all know, was a different matter. The whole history of psychology is a story not of advance and progress, but a woeful mess of controversy and regress. Psychology became a science alright, but only at the expense of losing its spirit and substance.

Analysis thrives nowhere else better than in the physical science. Even there, I am sure, scientists are going to be disillusioned if they put too much faith in it. Analysis is a means, and only one of the means, and never an end in itself.

Albert Weiss, in his book, "A theoretical basis of human behaviour" takes up the position, that there are no other ultimate entities than those recognised in Physics, namely, atoms, electrons and protons. We quite agree with him that psychology should not claim a different world, but this admission need not necessarily bind us to the view that the stone and the man were essentially made of the same stuff because they are derived from the same elements. It is quite true that living processes could be reduced to or translated into physical motions of electrons and protons, but these motions do not represent the conscious experience relating to these processes any more than the rise in mercury level in the Thermometer gives one the experience of fever. They are only physical representations, not even equivalents, of some thing going on in the mind entirely on a different plane, if not in a different world. Psychologists talk about 'body chemistry', 'brain waves', 'psychogalvanic response' and so on; all this gives us only physical representation in quantity and intensity of life processes and conscious phenomena, which definitely cannot be regarded as physical. They are more than physical. It is precisely in this sense that Bergson said that "Mind overflows the brain".

Science at best is a representation in terms of quantity and intensity; it could manipulate a unity, but only an artificial one. It can never get beyond its own representation and take the place of experience, which is real unity. It is this experience that is self; a stone is not a self only in this sense. Science, especially as it is understood today, could be perfectly at home with stones and the like, but not with selves which 'breathe' life, and 'will' free acts. Even with stones and the like science cannot be said to be entirely free without reserve. In fact its knowledge of even stones is limited. Science cannot hope to solve ultimate problems of even 'Primitive matter' without plunging itself into abstractions; how then about an "advanced matter" like Mind?

Science looks at its object from a certain point of view, and studies it for a certain limited purpose. Analysis which it uses is a method and an approach, but it certainly is not the only one, even for science. A new approach is certainly conceivable, and a new method is possible, especially when new kinds of phenomena

present themselves. Consciousness is such a phenomenon. In psychology which seeks to study the living organism, the self, its conscious experience and behavior, the so-called scientific analysis does not work, because we no longer deal here on a physical plane. We are face to face with consciousness, and consciousness is life itself. Life is killed the moment it is subjected to a material operation. If we attempt an analysis of life and consciousness as we do in the case of inert matter, either they elude us or they simply go to pieces; and we are left with no more than mere words coined by ourselves to name the fragments of behavior which no more explain self than a dissected human body explains the living man in flesh and blood. Psychologists have no doubt an unending capacity to invent more and more technical terms, but that should not deceive us into thinking that the terms really explain what they allegedly stand for. The modern behavioral experimental psychologists have certainly built up sufficient technical vocabulary to be able to proudly assert that it would vie with any of the natural sciences in the sheer amount of diction; but the fact remained that its whole structure was built with symbols which merely name, but which do not explain, nor do they have real counterparts in life, mind, self or behavior. If we remove the symbols the whole structure tumbles down like a pack of cards, nothing remains of it worth mentioning except expensive apparatus mostly borrowed from other sciences, a few amazing mazes, a number of hungry white rats, some puzzle boxes, and impressive diagrams, graphs, curves and correlations. If psychology were really a study of the self, consciousness, conscious experience or even behavior correctly understood, I have no doubt in my mind that a great part of what goes by the name 'psychology' today should be pronounced a mere sham, devoid of sense and substance. The chief reasons for this poor show of psychology and its sad plight are, to my mind, its overweening ambition to become a so-called science (which I would term 'science-mania'), absolute indifference to or ignorance of its own subject-matter, and misunderstanding and misapplication of the scientific method. The pseudo-psychologist scientists deceive themselves into thinking that the use of experiment, analysis and quantitative methods will automatically transform their subject into a full-fledged science. It does not matter to them whether their subject-matter is amenable to such treatment or not. One could as well dress a dummy with all sorts of costly clothes and jewels and then treat it as a lady. Psychology should better remain 'non-scientific' than thus be reduced to a mere triviality in the name of science.

To sum up my thesis: there is no psychology which is just an empirical science of behavior. Psychology is only one branch of Philosophy, and divorced from philosophy and religion, it is nothing. By philosophy and religion I do not mean the dogmatic. Our aim, after all, is to unravel the mystery of the universe and realise its unity; and as consciousness forms an important aspect of the cosmos, if not the whole of it, it is but natural that we should try to concentrate on this factor when we try to understand the universe. If we cut consciousness and conscious self out of the picture, there would hardly be left any picture of even the slightest significance.

Indian psychology which was from the ancient past inextricably bound up with philosophy and religion showed us the correct path in this respect. While the Western psychology looked at the whole universe as a system of physical forces, in India our ancient Seers considered Nature as a manifestation of spirit. Even Westerners are now beginning to realise that human nature cannot be explained entirely in terms of the 'Stimulus-Response' formula or the so-called 'muscle-twitch' Psychology. Indian Philosophy recognised this long ago; it proclaimed that Human Spirit is boundless, and that it cannot simply be identified with the body, its physical manifestation; practical religion in India has never been anything but the realisation of this 'limitless' which they termed the 'Atman'. There is no opposition between Religion on the one hand, and Science, Philosophy, Psychology and Ethics on the other. The latter in a way formed the theoretical foundations for the former. On the other hand, the present-day Western psychology and philosophy are more and more turning away from the self and the world, the one force-landing into the blind world of physics, and the other dashing itself against the shadow world of language. Psychology and Philosophy have ceased to be the sciences of the self and the world, and both have given up their age-old traditions. Neither has any significant problems to tackle or solutions to offer. They are reduced to a mere triviality.

Knowing and Understanding

by

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Consider the following dummy questions:

- (a) Do you understand the meaning of x ?
- (b) Do you know the meaning of x ?

When the values of the variable x are identical, we use the two question-schemata synonymously in ordinary language. This may lead to the view that 'knowing' and 'understanding' are same. But I wish to maintain their distinction. I also maintain that the (b) form of the interrogative sentence is improper; for we do not, in a significant sense, *know* the meaning of a symbol, but *understand* it. The distinction between knowing and understanding may be formulated thus: We know facts and understand meanings. Meanings are not facts, nor are facts meanings.

Symbols themselves are no doubt facts; but when symbols mean something to somebody, i.e., when symbols are symbols, they are not taken as facts. Hence in the meaning situation the question of knowing facts does not arise. There is indeed a fact of reference in the meaning situation and this fact is to be known in that situation. But the fact of reference is a symbolic or linguistic fact, established by convention and usage. It is not a fact of nature. Thus knowing a natural fact is not involved in meaning situation. A semantic fact is to be distinguished from a natural one.

Science is knowledge of facts. Philosophy is investigation of meanings. Philosophy understands, and science knows. The former rests on a systematic symbolism, to which the latter is indifferent. "What do we mean by the word 'cause'?" for example, is a philosophical question; "what is the cause of x ?" (when the values of x are facts and events), is a scientific question. Both knowing and understanding are intellectual states, and hence philosophy, like science, is a theoretical undertaking. This is the

reason why there are border-line cases where understanding and knowing tend to coalesce. We formulate scientific knowing symbolically in statements and say what we know. There are, therefore, occasions in scientific knowledge when knowing and understanding are telescoped, when we not only know facts, but also explain these facts with reference to some concept or hypothesis. Science need not avoid understanding; but that, I maintain, is a rather philosophic aspect of science than scientific. Knowing and registering the facts of experience are the proper functions of science. It can perhaps be maintained that understanding as exhibited in science is not deep enough. True philosophic understanding is deeper.

This points to the fact that there may be degrees of understanding, but not of knowing. Meanings are to be necessarily correlated to somebody's understanding. We can even substitute one for the other in some cases. When I say "x means by p such and such", I can replace it by saying "x understands by p such and such" without linguistic distortion. Similarly "x understands p" is equivalent to "p has meaning for x". Somebody's *comprehension*, to which meanings are necessarily related, may be more or less deep, adequate or inadequate. But there cannot be more or less of knowing. Either we know or we do not know. There is something final about knowledge. But because we understand symbols better or worse, there are various modes of meaning—extensive, intensive, operational, emotive, etc.—that are logically connected with each other in one understanding. Consider the two statements: (a) "Mary's husband is Tom Rogers", and (b) "Mary's current husband is Tom Rogers". The conditions that make the two statements true or false are identical. Hence these have the same literal meaning—intensional and extensional, i.e., they are synonymous. And yet (b) has an emotive meaning, as it suggests that Mary's husband last year was someone else and next year will probably be still another! Thus it covertly says that Mary has no proper respect for the institution of marriage. This suggestion is absent in (a), and yet (b) will be true if Mary is married to one man throughout her whole life. A man may lack a sense of humour to understand the emotive suggestion of (b), though he may grasp its literal meaning. A man who grasps both, understands better. Hence there is no sense of finality in our understanding. Philosophy, particularly; cannot be final as it seeks to understand the ultimate meaning of life and experience considered as a series of symbolism.

If, then, we maintain the distinction of knowing and understanding, we must hold that one can understand meanings without at the same time knowing some fact or other. This, I hope, will be admitted by all. I can understand the meaning of the sentence "there is a mountain on the other side of the moon", even without knowing whether it is a fact or not. Of course, it will be maintained by the verificationist that I must be able to mention the fact that will verify or disverify the proposition, if the statement is to be meaningful. And unless the statement be meaningful there is no question of understanding it. But mentioning a possible fact and knowing it are different. Verifiability is not verification. I, therefore, do not think that the thesis maintained here goes against the verificationist's theory of meaning. The literal meaning of a statement may be factual in the informative language of science, emotive in the expressive language of metaphysics, directive in ethical language, or meta-linguistic in logic and mathematics, as held by thinkers with positivistic leanings. But even in case of *factual* meaning, knowing of fact is not presupposed, though it may involve a mention of fact. 452

Again if we emphasise the distinction, we must hold conversely that we may know facts without understanding meanings. This may be controversial, and yet the thesis can perhaps be maintained. Prof. Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, in his paper "Concept of Philosophy", says that facts or contents of science that have a necessary reference to sense-perception are at least *speakeable* in the form of literal judgments; but such "speakeability is a contingent character of empirical thought".¹ He perhaps means that even without recalling the name of a fact we can know it by mere sense-confrontation. There may be prejudgmental cognition according to some, where the meaning situation is yet to emerge. We may even go further than Prof. Bhattacharyya and hold with Wittgenstein that there are known facts which are not even speakable. Consider the questions: (a) "How many feet high is Mt. Everest?" and (b) "How does a clarinet sound?"² I can answer the first question by saying literally the exact height. But I cannot, even possibly, give a verbal formulation of my knowing how a clarinet sounds, and here at least there is knowledge of fact that does not involve understanding of symbols. This is a case

1. "Concept of Philosophy", published in *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. II, Ed. Sri Gopinath Bhattacharya, p. 102.

2. *Philosophical Investigations*. Wittgenstein. I. 78.

of *knowing that* something is the case. Cases of *knowing how* need not involve interpretation of a datum. Prof. H. H. Price holds that in "sign-cognition" there is pre-verbal knowledge, formulable in words, but not so formulated until the use of words has been acquired.³ Such cognition is closely connected with practical behaviour, and is as much a form of action as of cognition. A sign here is a "releaser". To the cat a bark is a sign of the presence of a dog and is also a sign for running away.⁴ In these cases of knowledge-practice blend there is no question of receiving the sign and understanding it *apart from* the reaction that ensues. Such practical knowledge is present in children and even in adult human beings. Only gradually does cognition of fact separate itself from reaction on fact, and then we have full-dress cognition that is speakable. Russell holds that sign-cognition or habit-knowledge is knowing proper, as it can be true or false. The sign, after being conditioned, may influence the animal subjectively without having any objective basis. Animals can be deceived by mirrors and scents.⁵ Thus knowing that does not involve understanding of symbols is possible.

Logic as the science of understanding is concerned with meanings and implications and hence is a part of philosophy. It is not concerned with what actually happens and does not hunt out new facts of nature. It only tries to understand something that is already fully known. Prof. Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya holds that logic occupies the lowest grade of philosophic understanding. It is the theoretic consciousness of pure objectivity or the self-subsistent, the concept of which is not formulated by science.⁶ This self-subsistent pure object is, to my mind, a cluster of meanings only or of categories of objectivity. Philosophy, according to Krishnachandra, rests on a series of symbolism, and speakability is a necessary character of philosophic content. There is a gradation of these speakable contents, lower and higher, consisting of self-subsistent pure object, self-existent pure subject and Truth, in order.⁷ This appears to me to be a gradation of meanings, more or less deep. Philosophy is not knowledge in the literal sense, according to Krishnachandra, but is understanding the speakable

3. *Thinking and Experience*. H. H. Price, p. 98ff.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 91.

5. *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*. B. Russell, pp. 13-14.

6. *Concept of Philosophy*, Prof. Bhattacharyya.

7. *Ibid.*

symbols. I can only hope that my interpretation of the subtle thoughts of Prof. Bhattacharyya is not misleading.

The speakability of the content of scientific knowledge is only contingent, and hence science need not primarily deal with meanings. The factual knowledge of science is relevant to practice, and thus there are applied sciences based on theoretical ones. This is because life begins with theory-practice blend, as we have already seen in the practical knowledge of animals and children. It is only afterwards that we abstract pure theory, and then come back again to practice. Theoretical science may perhaps be regarded as a stage in this process, and we are reminded of our animal heritage by the application of scientific theory to practice. Sciences, therefore, have little that is purely human *par excellence*. This is perhaps the reason why sciences do not form a part of the curricula of "humanities" or polite scholarship. But philosophy is not a concern of the brutes.

I have said that philosophy understands, and understanding is a kind of intellectual state. Wittgenstein applies his therapy of linguistic analysis in removing the prejudice that understanding is a mental process.⁸ The grammar of understanding, like that of 'knowing', is, according to him, connected with the grammar of 'can', 'is able to'.⁹ 'I understand x' implies 'if I hear, read or say x I can react appropriately'. It will be odd to say "x was having meaning for S at 12 noon yesterday". Understanding is a capacity or disposition, and not a mental process. Wittgenstein admits that capacities are sometimes actualized. When I say "Now I understand", the capacity of understanding makes its appearance in a moment.¹⁰ Now, though some particular manifestation is neither necessary nor sufficient precondition of some disposition as held by G. Ryle,¹¹ yet it seems to me that *some* manifestation or other is absolutely necessary. How can we, otherwise, recognise a disposition? But an actualization of the disposition of understanding is only an "achievement" and not a process, mental or physical, according to Wittgenstein. The meaning that is understood comes in a flash. There may be an image or an idea, but these are "accompaniments" of understanding and not understand-

8. *Philosophical Investigations*. Marginal note (a) p. 59.

9. *Ibid.*, I. 150.

10. *Ibid.*, I. 154.

11. *Concept of Mind*. G. Ryle, Chapter V.

ing itself. But as Prof. Price points out, understanding as an achievement may be realized in various ways.¹² It seems to me that there is some intellectual effort before the dawning of understanding, and the latter is at least dependent on the former. When, for example, I understand the word 'triangle', I may construct a closed figure by drawing three straight lines in imagination, and this is a process. There are cases where 'achievement' presupposes some synthetic activity of mind. Consider the understanding of the theme of a drama as it unfolds itself through successive scenes and acts. When the meaning of the artistic whole comes, it comes in a flash. But it will require some synthetic activity on the part of the enjoyer, and even after the dawning of understanding the enjoyer may have to retrace the ground already gained, for the sake of full understanding.

The contention of this paper merely echoes the view expressed by Dr. R. Das in his paper "Philosophy as Autonomous Spiritual Activity".¹³ Says Dr. Das, "And if it is the business of science to give us knowledge, we may even say, philosophy does not give us knowledge at all, but clarification and insight". Yet Dr. Das seems to suggest that in regard to one and the same object we may have different sorts of knowledge; and philosophic knowledge, as distinguished from scientific, implies a deepening of knowledge or a rise in the level of consciousness. I, on the other hand, should like to maintain that philosophical understanding is not a sort of knowledge. My difference with Dr. Das is perhaps a verbal one, for Dr. Das holds that scientific knowledge is knowledge proper. Philosophic thinking, according to Dr. Das, "is concerned with our *understanding* of the object, an understanding in which the object functions in an attenuated form and, in certain cases, may wholly disappear."¹⁴ I should like him to mean by this that to philosophic understanding, the objects, and even life and experience in their entirety, take a symbolic form and refer to meanings that are more important. Dr. Das sometimes suggests that the difference between science and philosophy is one of degree; for he says "Philosophical thinking is thinking at a higher level and more reflective than scientific thinking".¹⁵ But this seems to be misleading. I

maintain that if there be reflection or understanding in science, that is only a philosophic aspect of it. Science is concerned with sensible facts and not with meanings proper. The difference is one of kind. Science or its language is itself an object of philosophic understanding, and this understanding will even take our whole life and experience as symbolic of some ulterior significance. We may ask in philosophy "What is the meaning of all this?" The meaning here is the purpose or the ultimate value of all that is. It must be remembered that values are not facts of experience, and speakability of value is no information in the literal sense. Hence there is no knowledge of fact in philosophy. The meaning of life and experience, considered as symbols and as grasped by different philosophers, may be more or less deep, and if this is remembered, the philosophers may, some day, see eye to eye with one another.

12. *Thinking and Experience*, p. 344ff.

13. Published in Silver Jubilee Commemoration Vol. Indian Philosophical Congress, 1950.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 206.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 206.

A Note on Modern Nominalism

by

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I

The purpose of this note is to draw attention to a most perplexing characteristic of modern nominalistic theories, especially as we find them in the writings of Quine and Goodman.

Before coming to the main point of this note, it would not perhaps be out of order if I recall that I have elsewhere¹ drawn attention to some distinguishing features of modern Platonism (using that much-abused term in a very wide sense), as we find it in German Phenomenology as well as in Whitehead, Russell (in some phases of his philosophical career) and Santayana. Two such features may be mentioned straightaway; first, Platonism has ceased to be a speculative and metaphysical doctrine and has been given a phenomenological, descriptive basis; secondly, the Platonic entities are no more taken to be universals in the traditional sense. Whitehead, Santayana and the German Phenomenologists refuse to identify their Platonic entities with universals. On the contrary, they speak of *ideal singularities* and of fully determinate essences. I cannot here substantiate these two characterisations. But let me conclude this digression by remarking that in these modern forms of Platonism, the distinction between individuals and universals has been blurred, in fact rejected, the distinction admitted as fundamental being that between the *real* and the *ideal*.

Turning now to the type of Nominalism (the very antithesis of Platonism) developed by Quine and Goodman, we come across another most interesting, and yet perplexing, manner in which the same distinction, i.e., that between individuals and universals, is

1. Cf. my "Nicolai Hartmann and A. N. Whitehead, A Study in Recent Platonism" (Calcutta, 1957).

sought to be blurred. What we get at the end is so very different from what traditionally has been called 'nominalism', that we are left wondering what has in the long run been achieved. One even wonders if what has been achieved is not, in some sense, a "meeting of extremes", i.e., the extremes of Universalism and Nominalism!

I should now hasten to explicate and substantiate this last remark. Universalism is not the same as Platonism. For, what has come to be called 'Platonism' consists in the admission of 'abstract' entities into one's ontological scheme; but this admission does not necessarily entail an expulsion of concrete particulars from that scheme. Traditional Platonic realism is, in fact, dualistic. Universalism is the ontological theory which denies particulars and reduces them to universals; if a universalist is a linguistic philosopher, he may content himself with a substitution of names of particulars by names of universals. A well-known example of this is found in Russell's "An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth". Strictly speaking, nominalism is the exact antithesis, not of Platonism, but of Universalism. For, just as Universalism admits *only* universals into ontology (or 'names' of universals into the *ideal* language), so does Nominalism admit *only* concrete particulars; both are monistic. Now, the type of Nominalism, developed by Quine and Goodman, is, in one of its major aspects at least, not far removed from what has been called here Universalism. Quine, for example, considers the whole category of 'names' as superfluous and would permit reference to particulars only indirectly over variables within the quantifier. So far as Goodman is concerned, the basic elements of his ontology are identically repeatable qualia that are as much individuals as universals, the concrete particulars like tables and chairs being constructions out of such elements. Before considering these two points in some more detail, let me state the main motives, principles and devices of this type of Nominalism.

II

Modern nominalism springs from two motives: there is, to start with, a distrust of abstract entities, a distrust that, Quine and Goodman confess, "is based on a philosophical intuition that cannot be justified by appealing to anything more ultimate".² One

2. Quine and Goodman—Steps towards a constructive Nominalism (Journal of Symbolic Logic, 1947, No. 4, p. 105).

may conjecture that this distrust and this refusal are strengthened by the refusal of 'commonsense' to admit such absurd and fictitious entities as 'the present king of France', 'the round square', etc. It would, however, be too hasty to invoke commonsense for supporting our refusal to admit such entities as redness or circularity. In fact, one cannot agree with the tendency to huddle together such entities as redness and circularity with such others as the present king of France and round square, to label them all as "abstract", and then to banish them together from ontology. This procedure is unjust; commonsense rebels against the admission of fictitious entities, whereas it is not commonsense but a certain philosophical *theory* that rebels against the admission of redness and circularity. In the former case, we may call to our aid an intuition that is not further justifiable;³ in the latter case, what moves the nominalist is not an intuition but an article of faith!⁴

The other motive, clearly stated by Goodman,⁵ is the logical incomprehensibility of classes (an incomprehensibility which, as M. E. Dummett has pointed out,⁶ has puzzled also McTaggart). There may be two classes, A and B, which are as classes different and yet have no difference in their contents.

It is not the purpose of this note to answer this difficulty. Wang has complained that Goodman does not make explicit what is meant by 'content'.⁷ But, quite apart from that, a Platonist of the modern type may not undertake a defence of extensional classes; he may agree that classes are constructions; he may still insist that the basic entities are fully determinate individuals,

3. But even amongst entities banished as 'fictitious' one should pause to be able to detect valuable distinctions. The case with 'the present king of France' is different from that with 'round square'. Strawson has convincingly shown that the former expression is not meaningless, even if a certain use of it may have no reference.

4. Compare Alonzo Church: "The extreme demand for a simple prohibition of abstract entities under all circumstances perhaps arises from a desire to maintain the connection between theory and observation. But the preference of (say) *seeing* over *understanding* as a method of observation seems to me capricious". ("The need for Abstract Entities in Semantic Analysis" in 'Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences' Vol. 80, No. 1, p. 104).

5. Goodman—The Structure of Appearance, Cambridge, Mass, 1951, p. 108.

6. Mind 1955, pp. 101-109.

7. The Philosophical Review 1953, p. 413-4.

abstract or concrete,—the concrete individuals being unrepeatable and spatio-temporally unique, and the abstract individuals being identically repeatable and qualitatively unique.

I am aware that this would not be far from the position accepted by Goodman himself. Qualitative ("abstract") particles of experience and spatio-temporally bounded ("concrete") particles are equally acceptable basic elements for him.⁸ Goodman's system is not 'particularistic' like Carnap's. His basic elements are abstract. He is a nominalist in whose system the basic elements are abstract, identically repeatable qualia! Such nominalism is welcome to Platonism, for was not the point at issue between traditional realism and traditional nominalism the question if there are or are not identically repeatable common characters?⁹

Goodman no doubt calls his basic elements individuals. But his concept of the individual defies any attempt to assimilate it to any of our common or philosophical notions of it. I would only refer to the two interesting criticisms of this notion by Victor Lowe and Hao Wang.¹⁰

III

Quine, I suppose, is more thoroughgoing in his Nominalism. It seems to me that he would not subscribe to the ontology of qualities, for such an ontology takes predicates as names and is implicitly committed to using variables of quantifier to refer to universals by "binding predicate letters", a procedure against which Quine's campaign is primarily directed.

"To be is to be the value of a variable".¹¹ Names alone are substituends of variables;¹² the named entities are the values. It follows that whatever is designated is or, better perhaps, is to be the designatum of a name. Predicates are not names. But, why? To say they are not names because they are not substituends of variables or that they do not designate any entity is to state that

8. Jr. Symbolic Logic, 1947, No. 4, p. 105.

9. Compare Price—Thinking and Experience.

10. Victor Lowe—Goodman's Concept of an Individual (The Phil. Rev. 1953, pp. 117-126), and Hao-Wang—What is an Individual? (The Phil. Rev. 1953, pp. 413-420).

11. Quine—Designation and Existence (Jr. of Philosophy, Dec. 1939, p. 708).

12. Ibid., p. 707.

very thing in another language. In reply, we find that a word to be a name must fulfil a condition, namely, the condition that "existential generalisation" with respect to that word must be possible.¹³ This means as is well known that whereas the singular existence statement "Calcutta is a city" entitles me to infer the general existence statement "(fx) (x is a city)" or "there is something which is a city", the statement "17 is a prime number" does not permit a similar generalisation of the form "(fx) (x is a prime number)"!

Against this argument and this methodological device, let me sum up my objections as follows:

Firstly, the argument, if intended to prove that predicates are not names, hopelessly fails, because it is incurably vitiated by *petitio principii*. It assumes what it intends to prove, and it conceals that assumption under the mystifying garb of logical symbolism. But let me confess, I am not sure if it is intended by its authors as a proof. Perhaps it is only an explication of the ontological position they advocate; or, perhaps, it is only a prescription of how predicate words should be used.

But, in any case—and this is my second point—it cannot be said that this rule regarding existential generalisation conforms to our ordinary use of predicate-expressions. For, as G. J. Warnock has shown,¹⁴ we may, and also we do, use statements of the form "there is something which is....." with regard to predicate words or the corresponding singular abstract nouns. So the mere use, or absence of such use, by itself does not decide any issue, nor can the ontological issue be decided by banning such use.

Thirdly, here again I am indebted to G. J. Warnock—Quine's insistence on the *ontological importance* of the existential generalisation "embodies the presupposition that the question whether there are or are not abstract entities is just like the question there is or is not a city called 'Leeds'." (Warnock). Whatever else the Platonists may have said, they have certainly laid stress on the *radical difference* between the way in which particulars exist and the way in which universals or Ideas exist. To reduce both forms of existence to a common logical scheme—'to be is to be the value

13. Ibid., p. 708.

14. G. J. Warnock—Metaphysics in Logic (Proc. Arist. Soc. 1950-51, pp. 197-222).

of a variable'—is not to do justice to what the Platonist *intended*. The word 'entity' deludes.

IV

To make clear what possibly could have been meant by the Platonist—I am not claiming that any Platonist has actually said this—let me draw upon some of the ideas of people who are either nominalists or nearer the nominalists' camp. In his paper "Form and Existence",¹⁵ P. T. Geach has sought to bring out the nature of Form according to Aquinas, and has contrasted it with the nature of Form according to Plato. For the moment, I am not interested in the question whether the contrast as developed by Geach is historically true, that is to say, whether Plato and Aquinas held the opinions ascribed to them in that paper. What interests me is the possibility that the conception of Form may be formulated in two different ways. For Aquinas, as also for Frege—so we learn from Geach—what holds good of, or can meaningfully be said of, an individual does not hold good of, i.e., cannot meaningfully be said of, a Form. For example, manyness cannot be meaningfully predicated of an individual; it is only Forms that are repeatable and capable of manyness. An object is never repeated; a Form alone may be repeated. If we bear this in mind, the common Platonic doctrine that a Form is a single entity over against its many instances is to be rejected. So far as this part of the argument is concerned, it seems to me that there is something deceptive about the concepts of 'repeatability', 'manness' and 'oneness'. For, it could be replied that a Form is repeatable *just because* it is one, and its identity precisely is such as to make room for this repeatability; that nothing is repeatable unless it retains its identity through repetitions. Similarly, an individual is one in the sense that its identity does not permit repetition; it does not admit of manyness in the same sense in which a Form does. The two formulations, therefore, the one ascribed to Plato and the other to Aquinas and Frege, are not incompatible with each other. What interests me here especially is the next step in Geach's argument, where he goes on to develop the conception of Form as a Function, taking the cue from Frege. What constitutes an example of a Form is, according to Geach, not "wisdom" simply nor "the wisdom of Socrates", but "the wisdom of.....".

15. Proc. Arist. Soc. 1954-55, pp. 251-272.

This admits into the very constitution of a Form a certain openness, a certain indeterminateness, *demanding* determination. Now, it seems to me that even if the Platonist continues to think of 'wisdom' as an entity, he may nevertheless make room for the recognition that it is a peculiar entity of such a kind that it has an indeterminateness about it, an indeterminateness that *claims* determination.

When Quine tells us¹⁶ that abstract terms are syncategorematic or when he prefers¹⁷ to understand attributes as "open sentences" rather than as propositional functions, he has the same peculiar character of abstract entities in his mind. And Platonism may quite well admit this element into its notion of abstract entities. A similar suggestion, though couched in the language of old-day philosophizing, is found in Stout's idea of universal as a "distributive unity of particulars";¹⁸ the universal term is a unity, a unity that, as Stout emphasizes, is irreducible to any of the other types of unity, including the unity of a substance; to this peculiar type of unity *belongs* a distributive reference, an indeterminateness demanding determination or individualisation. I should here add that I have already spoken of two kinds of determinateness (and of indeterminateness). The modern Platonist speaks of *determinate* essences; but, again, as I have just remarked, even the most determinate essence has an indeterminateness (in quite another sense). "Wisdom" is always "wisdom of....."; "this specific shade of red" is also "this specific shade of red of....."

Nothing that Quine has said serves the purpose of demolishing Platonism.

I would conclude this note by referring again to that peculiar, and often perplexing, blurring of the distinction between individuals and universals that we find not only in modern Platonism, but also in modern Nominalism. Also, we have seen in part how the position advocated by Goodman is a "meeting of extremes", Universalism and Nominalism. I would now urge that the same strain is also there in Quine's thinking. But for substantiating this point, I can do no better than quote from P. F. Strawson's

16. Jr. of Philosophy, 1939, p. 708.

17. Quine—On Frege's Way out (*Mind* 1955, pp. 145-159).

18. Stout—on the Nature of Universals (Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. X).

"Singular Terms, Ontology and Identity".¹⁹ Strawson rightly detects in Quine, on the one hand, "a professed nominalism, the acknowledged preference for an ontology of concrete particulars" and, on the other, an "unconscious drive towards platonism, showing itself in the consequences—not, of course, envisaged by Quine himself—of the attempt to discard singular terms as fundamentally superfluous".

This perplexing situation, in which the traditional controversy about Realism and Nominalism finds itself, demands that some fundamentally new way of establishing the difference between individuals and universals be found out. But to do that is not the purpose of this note; to have drawn attention to the situation is enough for me.

19. *Mind* 1956, pp. 433-454.

In Defence of Sankhya Dualism

by

S. K. CHATTOPADHYAYA

In his commentary on the Brahmasutras, Sankar, the architect of absolute non-dualism and advocate of Brahma-vivartavāda describes the Sāṅkhya as the most formidable opponent.¹ But, strangely enough, this impression is not very much reflected in Sankar's criticism of the Sāṅkhya system of thought. He seems to take the Sāṅkhya doctrine rather lightly, and praises or condemns it according as it suits his own purpose or clashes with it. Sometimes he fails to see that the arguments by which he assails the Sāṅkhya may apply *mutatis mutandis* against his own position. The Sāṅkhya, according to him, is a glaring instance of *śrutyābhāsa*, *smṛtyābhāsa* and *yuktyābhāsa*. Its affinity with the *śruti*s or revealed texts, its validity (*prāmānya*) as a *smṛti*, and lastly, its logical rigour and sufficiency are all apparent only. Such a conclusion, to be sure, is quite in keeping with the general spirit of a philosophy which is out to demonstrate 'apparentness' or transcendental nullity of all that seems to be 'other' than Brahman, but it is very much doubtful if Sankar has been able to prove his case. It is really unfortunate that a theorist who, in his account of the phenomenal order, seems to have adopted the fundamental thesis of the Sāṅkhya under changed complexion,² should go all out to combat it on every possible ground. It may be that the primary responsibility for antagonizing the Sāṅkhya is Bādarayana's and that Sankar's responsibility in this is only indirect. But, as the *sūtras* of Bādarayana do not claim to be themselves integral parts of the revealed texts, since they are at best a rationalistic or logical exposition of what is believed to be the revealed truth, it seems unconvincing that the authority of Bādarayana should weigh more than the authority of Kapila, Pāñcasīkha or even Isvarakṛṣṇa. Sankar's plea that the *sūtras* have no other purpose than to present the revealed texts in a well-knit form,³ even if it were true, cannot alter the fact that they

1. *Sankar Bhāṣya*, II.1.7.

2. *S.B.*, II.1.13.

3. *S.B.*, I.1.2, also II.

are interpretative in character and that their appropriateness or validity may be disputed without prejudice to the revealed texts themselves. It is beyond the scope of this short paper to attempt a thorough re-examination of Sankar's arguments against the Sāṅkhya. But, since Sankar's influence seems to have brought about a certain prejudice against the Sāṅkhya with the result that many modern scholars, instead of seeking to understand the Sāṅkhya doctrine sympathetically and reconstructing its missing logical links, have indulged in cheap criticisms and frivolous comments, I shall, in what follows, try to make out a case for a more patient and impartial survey of the Sāṅkhya doctrine.

Although its basic tenets and principal concepts can all be traced to the upanishads,⁴ in its logical formulation the Sāṅkhya is a rationalistic system. It does not subordinate reason to authority⁵ as the advaita vedānta does, nor, again, when faced with logical difficulties, does it defend its doctrine by an appeal to the revealed texts.⁶ As an orthodox system it believes implicitly in the authority of the scriptures, but solves its logical problems in a logical way. It accords to reason a place coordinate with authority and does not believe in absolute opposition of intuition to intellect (*buddhi*). The intellect, in its highest and most refined state, ceases to be an instrument of mediate knowledge, and culminates in direct spiritual insight which is the perception of truth. It is curious, therefore, that the biased critic should import into this system logical difficulties which are due to his confused thinking and not inherent in the system itself, and thereafter, should charge the Sāṅkhya system with irrationalism or dogmatism.

The intellect or *buddhi* occupies the pivotal place in the Sāṅkhya doctrine. Like the *citta* of the yoga philosophy,⁷ it executes two diametrically opposite functions. It is the source of the bondage of the spirit, since it subjects it apparently to the enjoyment of phenomenal life with its attendant sufferings. It, again, releases the spirit from that state of apparent enjoyment and bondage and cures that delusion which is of its own making by self-transcendence and self-liquidation. Although *Prakṛti* is the ultimate ground of the manifested world-order which includes

4. Cf. Johnston—*The Early Sankhya Introductory*; also Keith—*Sankhya*, p. 60.

5. na hyāpta vacannabhase nipatanti mahāsurāḥ ... 'Aniruddha vṛtti'.

6. S.B., II. i. 6. 'pariṇiṣpannatvāt tadapi manorathamātram'.

7. *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* 12.

the *buddhi*, it is the *buddhi* which unfolds all phenomenal multiplicities, causes the division of nature into the subjective and the objective, and lastly, becomes the *ratio cognoscendi* of all existence. The *tattvas* or principles which make up the essence of all existence can be established by valid knowledge only,⁸ and all valid cognitions are functions of the *buddhi*. The two ultimate *tattvas*, *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*, have been transcendently deduced not only by means of the *buddhi* but also through a transcendental reflection on the nature of the *buddhi* as a given fact or datum. It becomes the *linga* (logical sign) both of its immanent material cause (the *avyakta*) and its transcendental cause (*puruṣa*). So far as the lower *tattvas* (principles) are concerned, they are not merely proved by the *buddhi*, they evolve from it; and in it, again, are all united along with their specific functions. It is the *buddhi* that binds and again releases, that causes a mistaken sense of identity of *Puruṣa* with the *buddhi* and, again, removes that confusion by developing discriminative wisdom. It is the *buddhi*, therefore, which runs the whole show from the beginning to the end. If faulty understanding causes misapprehension and delusion, right understanding, that is, disciplined and purified thought, removes it; and so bondage and release are not only two functions of the *buddhi* but are operative forces which fall within the *buddhi* and remain limited to it. Bondage and release are nothing to the spirit,⁹ since they are due to the mode of apprehension or understanding. The revealed texts can only inspire self-confidence in the *buddhi*. So the rationalist Sāṅkhya believes unreservedly in the capacity of reason; the *srutis* can at best be auxiliary proof.

Before attempting a theoretic defence of the Sāṅkhya against unfriendly criticisms it may not be out of place to give a brief exposition of the Sāṅkhya doctrine as we understand it. The Sāṅkhya argument, as Dr. Maitra has explained,¹⁰ is a transcendental argument in precisely the same sense in which Kant employs the word. The various *tattvas* are closely reasoned out¹¹ and 'transcendentally deduced', and there is no place for any arbitrary assumption in Sāṅkhya rationalism. The Sāṅkhya procedure has thus no affinity with the synthetic

8. S.K., verse 4.

9. S.K., verses 37, 62.

10. S. K. Maitra—*Studies in Philosophy and Religion—The Sankhya Realism*; also *Fundamental Questions of Indian Metaphysics and Logic*, pp. 72-80.

11. Cf. *Sankhya Karika*, verses 10-21.

deductive procedure of Descartes and his followers. The Sāṅkhya is out and out critical, and the necessity for its various principles is demonstrated through a criticism of experience. With the Sāṅkhya philosophy, Prakṛti, Puruṣa, and their mode of contact are not the primary facts to start with. The starting-point is the given order of experience with its three-fold suffering. The various tattvas or principles are reasoned out by a process called *śeṣavat* inference.¹² It is a process from the given to its underlying or constitutive principles, from the effect to its cause. The Sāṅkhya concept of 'tattva', it should be clearly noted, cannot be translated as 'categories' or 'padārthas' although such mistake has been very common. The tattvas are *principles* which are connected together by certain logical links, and these links can be discovered through a reflective process. It is an upward process, from the gross to the subtle, from the empirically evident to the logically necessary and fully intelligible. This logical procedure is just the reverse of any supralogical spiritual intuition. Unlike such intuition, it is a gradual and successive process moving from a lower view-point to a higher view-point, from the gross to the more and more subtle. Such is the process involved in a 'logic of metaphysics',¹³ and the Sāṅkhya as a philosophical quest illustrates eminently the operation of this logic of metaphysics.

The Sāṅkhya, as it has been said already, starts with the given order of experience and traces it progressively to more and more fundamental principles (tattvas). It does not isolate facts from the knowledge of them, does not abstract knowing from the facts known, and manufacture such pseudo-problems for philosophy as: 'can knowing know truly all that it knows?'; 'how can objects which are independent of knowing really figure in knowledge and be known?' Such problems of the western epistemology are no problems for the Sāṅkhya philosopher. The given order is an 'enjoyed' order, and experience means enjoyment,—the word 'enjoyment' is being taken in its usual meaning and not in the sense in which Alexander takes it.¹⁴ This enjoyed order has this fundamental characteristic that it is not limited to *this* or *that* mode of enjoying it, not limited to *this* or *that* enjoyer. We have thus a common world of objects (*sāmānya*)¹⁵ which is differently

12. S.K., verse 5, Tatva Kaumudi with glossary of P. C. Vendantacuncu.

13. See my Presidential Address—The Logic of Metaphysics—*Proc. Ind. Phil. Congress* 1957.

14. Alexander—*Space, Time and Deity*, Vol. I, Introduction.

15. S.K., verse 11.

enjoyed by different individuals. This fact is a brute datum which needs no proof and none but the unduly sophisticated can dispute it. The common, public or sharable world is no problem for the Sāṅkhya philosopher, and it is not very clear why an acute metaphysician like Dr. Maitra should find in this an insoluble problem for Sāṅkhya philosophy.¹⁶ The real problem for the Sāṅkhya is how that which is the self-same order comes to express itself in infinitely various ways, how the same object comes to be 'enjoyed' differently by different individuals. It is empirically evident that what causes pain to some one may cause pleasure to some other, and complete apathy to a third. Nature seems to be perfectly malleable—it seems to exhibit an infinite variety of forms and traits suiting infinitely varied dispositions of the enjoyers. There seems to be a rigid correspondence between any given subjective form and the object of its enjoyment, between an enjoying mode and an enjoyed content, between a given subject and its object. This latter seems to suggest a certain unity of both—a certain consubstantiality of the phenomenal subject and the phenomenal object. So the Sāṅkhya conceives Prakṛti or nature as the matrix of all phenomenal manifestations. That which is the ground of an infinite variety of developments can only be an infinite potentiality or the indeterminate. The indeterminate in so far as it expresses itself in an infinite variety of manifested forms is graphically called Prakṛti¹⁷—that which manifests itself in a variety of forms. Two logical problems arise at this point: (1) How or under what circumstances can the infinite potentiality of Prakṛti come to be realised in actual and concrete forms, and (2) what is it that regulates or determines the one-one correspondence between a subjective form and an objective form, between an enjoying mode and the content enjoyed.

For the sake of convenience we may begin with the second problem. According to the Sāṅkhya, the evolution is both subjective and objective. A reciprocity of relation obtains between these two features so that without a corresponding subjective evolution there cannot result any objective evolution and vice versa.¹⁸ The subjective and the objective division, however, takes place in the *buddhi* (or Mahat) and this *buddhi*,

16. S. K. Maitra—*Fundamental Questions of Indian Metaphysics and Logic*, pp. 72-80.

17. Tatva Kaumudi, 4. 'pra karoti iti prakṛti'.

18. S.K., verse 52.

again, is conceived as the unity of the two. Though an evolute of unconscious nature, the *buddhi* is taken as an intelligent principle. In it or through it is expressed a principle of judicious arrangement or determination. Besides the correspondence between the subjective mode that enjoys and the objective mode that is enjoyed, there is a certain specific and peculiar determination in each *buddhi*-form, that is, in the world of experience of each individual. No two individuals have the same experienced order. Each is unique and different from the rest. Yet all the several world-orders proceed from the same source, the unmanifest *Prakṛti*. So the question arises: what is it that regulates these diverse and dissimilar developments in *Prakṛti*? The Sāṅkhya does not believe in mechanical causation. It is no explanation to say that such developments are automatic and the world evolution is a blind process. That which is blind cannot regulate, cannot give rise to any specific mode of determination. So the Sāṅkhya believes that underlying the peculiar modes of manifestation of this infinite variety of forms of the plural world-orders, there is a certain regulative principle—an immanent purpose.¹⁹ The specific differences of the manifest world-orders cannot, however, be explained by reference to the plurality of *Puruṣas*, since the *Puruṣas* do not have any specific determination in themselves, since they are all essentially *non-different* and are a plurality only numerically. It should be remembered that when the Sāṅkhya transcendently proves the existence of plural spirits from the fact of there being qualitative, quantitative and other differences in the phenomenal subjects, it does not prove also corresponding qualitative differences in the nature of the spirits. A suggestion like that would be opposed to that sublime philosophical truth which the Sāṅkhya seeks to propagate, namely, the eternally accomplished freedom of the spirit. Moreover, the spirit being a simple entity²⁰ and free from all determination in terms of quality or essence (*triguṇātita*), no specific or determinate nature can be traced to it. If this is admitted, it follows that the specific differences in the composition of the phenomenal modes cannot be explained by reference to the plurality of spirits. The explanation is to be sought in some other direction. The numerical plurality of the spirits can become the ground of a corresponding

19. This purpose, however, is wrongly ascribed by us to the Self. In this way, that which is really immanent seems to be transcendent.
20. S.K. verse 17.

numerical plurality in the 'forms' of the *buddhi*, but the spirits, (which though plural are not essentially different from each other,) cannot account for the specific differences in the manifest orders of the phenomenal subjects.

The explanation can be found in the law of Karma, the law of conservation of forces, formed attitudes and acquired dispositions. Not only the transmigration or future existence of the *linga* (which includes the *buddhi* and its subtle evolutes), but its present and previous modes of existence also are determined by the self-same principle. Then, again, this law not only explains why an individual's world of experience is what it is, it explains also the strict correspondence obtaining between an enjoying subjective mode and its appropriate enjoyed object. This law is not, however, a transcendent principle. It is immanent in nature, and is manifest in all her operations. The infinite potentiality of nature, it has been said, gets infinite modes of determination and distribution through preponderance of one of the essences (*guṇa*) over the other two, and this preponderance of any specific essence (*guṇa*) is due to upsetting of the original state of equilibrium or equipoise. It has been said also that this happens due to the transcendental influence of *Puruṣa*. But the Sāṅkhya does not attribute any causal activity to the spirit and does not explain this influence of *Puruṣa* in any causal manner. It is not a fact that the spirit has any purpose, it is not true either that the spirit influences,—the truth is that *Prakṛti* is influenced. To put it poetically, she is infatuated at the sight of her beloved but her beloved is absolutely indifferent. The equilibrium is disturbed by the mere proximity (*sannidhimatram*) of the spirit and not on account of any interest, active or passive, taken by it in the affairs of nature. It is not to serve any purpose of *Puruṣa*, such as, experiencing the evolutes of *Prakṛti* and realising ultimately its own absoluteness, that evolution proceeds.²¹ The real purpose is to serve the ends of *Prakṛti* herself—such as, being experienced and being finally isolated and excluded. It is true that, according to the Sāṅkhya doctrine, *puruṣārtha* (fulfilment of *Puruṣa*'s end) is the one goal towards which the whole evolutionary process tends. But since like the *Brahmatva* of the Advaita vedānta, the *puruṣatva* of the Sāṅkhya is the only true end, and since this end is an ever accomplished fact (*siddhavastu*) and not an excellence

21. S.K. verse 62.

Qm m2, m25
N60-32-4



newly to be acquired (*bhāvyaṣaya*), it stands to reason that the *puruṣārtha* spoken of is the empirical individual's end and not the end of the transcendental self. One meaning of the word '*puruṣa*' is, as Vācaspati has explained,²² 'that which lies in the abode of the *buddhi* or the subtle body'. *Puruṣa* taken in this meaning is the reflection of the transcendental self housed in the *buddhi*,—the empirical individual or the person. The spirit is not a person, not an individual; it is an impersonal state of self-luminosity, boundless and infinite. Its *bhoga* (enjoyment) is *pratyupabhoga*²³ (symbolic enjoyment); all descriptions of this *Puruṣa*-state are figurative and symbolical. There is no other way of pointing to the transcendental than by means of the phenomenal; what is beyond the given can only be expressed (though negatively and figuratively) in terms of the given, by means of known figures and categories. This shows that the words such as, *Puruṣa*, *Prakṛti*, *Avyakta*, *Pradhāna*, *Mahat* etc. are descriptions, from the level of given experience, of principles or realities which lie beyond the given and constitute the basic conditions of its explanation. That is *Prakṛti* in the absolute sense which is in no way a *vikṛti*, but is the ultimate ground or matrix of the *vikṛtis*. The *avyakta* is the precondition of the *vyakta* and different from it. In a similar manner, *Puruṣa* is conceived as the principle which underlies the empirical unity of the *buddhi* or the Ego but is absolutely devoid of all empirical content and is thus completely transcendental. It is that which explains the intelligent and apparently conscious character of the *buddhi*, which makes the *buddhi* a world of 'experience', changes it from a state of objective becoming to an order of conscious experience.²⁴

It is not my intention to suggest that *Puruṣa* has no contribution in the evolution of the experienced order. At the same time, I would like to insist that its contribution is unintentional and motiveless, that without any active participation from the side of *Puruṣa*, *Prakṛti* or the primal stuff gets the benefit of such participation. This idea is conveyed by the notion of the so-called 'conjunction without actual connection', by the concept of apparent relation due to sheer proximity. As a matter of fact, a spatial metaphor like this is quite inappropriate here, since space and time are characteristics of the evolved empirical order, and *Puruṣa*

22. *Tattvakaumudī* 55.

23. *S.K.* 37.

24. *S.K.* 20.

and *Prakṛti* being the trans-empirical grounds of the empirical order cannot be supposed to have any spatial relation or determination.²⁵ Yet such a description becomes unavoidable from the nature of the case. A transcendental reflection on the nature and composition of the given empirical order shows that the relation between the two primal realities, *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*, is to be both apparent and existentially true.²⁶ It is to be a conjunction without a connection, an apparent interlocking in spite of absolute separation. The spatial analogy of a *samyoga* occasioned by mere proximity of two eternally isolated existences is to suggest figuratively such a relation—a relation which is not a relation. There is no mystery²⁷ shrouding this relation and no logical absurdity unless it is imported from outside. If the Sāṅkhya theory of causation is true, if a manifest effect is to be necessarily supposed as having been contained in the potentiality of its material cause, the phenomenal pluralities, both in their formal and their material character, will have to be conceived as having been latent in their immanent material cause, the primal *Prakṛti*. Consequently, *Puruṣa*'s contribution in the world evolution comes to be limited to the assumption of conscious character by the *buddhis* and the splitting up of the orders of *buddhi* into the subjective series of enjoying modes and the objective series of enjoyed contents. The self-luminous light²⁸ of *Puruṣa* sets the order of nature a-glow with an acquired luminosity, with the result that that which is a *fact of nature*, materially and existentially, turns out to be an experienced or enjoyed order with the empirical subjects and objects as integral parts or factors thereof. *Puruṣa*, being inactive and indifferent, does not effect any change, formal or material, in the order of nature; what results from its non-causal influence is a simple expression or manifestation in the light of consciousness of a process of becoming having the absolute indeterminate for its immanent material cause and the law of Karma for its immanent efficient and formal cause. The suggestion that *Puruṣa*'s influence transmutes and transforms the primal *Prakṛti* and gives rise to determinate forms in the original indeterminate is unworkable, firstly because it conflicts with the Sāṅkhya theory of causation

25. Cf. *Sāṅkhyatattvaloka*. 4, 5.

26. Contrast the Vedānta conception of the apparent as that which is neither real nor unreal.

27. Cf. Sinha—*Ind. Phil.* Vol. II., p. 94; Radhakrishnan—*Hist. Ind. Philosophy*, Vol. II, pp. 326-27.

28. Cf. 'Tamevabhantem anubhati sarvam'.

and secondly because it conflicts with the Sāṅkhya notion of Puruṣa. I believe Dr. Mitra is not correct when, by following the Kantian analogy, he regards the plural *buddhis* as 'determinations' of Puruṣa and regards the Puruṣas as synthetic principles of the manifold of Prakṛti.²⁹ This is importing an idealistic thought in the realistic fabric of Sāṅkhya.

The absolute beginning of the phenomenal existence or world-process is unknown even to the gods, says the Ṛg Veda.³⁰ For all practical purposes, the process of becoming has to be regarded as beginningless (*anādi*). On this point, all the principal orthodox and heterodox systems of Indian philosophy concur. Theoretically regarded, however, the process of becoming has to be traced to some ultimate beginning, although that ultimate beginning of all things can only be regarded as shrouded in mystery. From the idea of the given order of pluralities as *vikṛtis*, the Sāṅkhya, driven by the logic of its theory of immanent causation, is led up to the idea of principles which are *prakṛtis cum vikṛtis*, and finally, to the notion of that which is the primal Prakṛti and no longer a *vikṛti*. The process of becoming is traced to this as the first principle which as the immanent cause of infinite variations is conceived as the infinite potential, the indeterminate prius of the determinate pluralities. Now, evolution being transformation, that is, change of form, the primal Prakṛti has to be conceived as absolutely formless. It is to be barely the *materia pura* of the phenomenal pluralities, devoid of all determination. So we get the notion of the absolutely indeterminate,—the stage of equipoise of the three essences which by varied combination give rise to the phenomenal varieties. Puruṣa's influence is said to end this state of equipoise. This cannot mean that Puruṣa imposes any determination *ab extra* on the primal stuff and transforms or transmutes it into 'the systems of the *buddhis*.' The implication is that under the illumination of Puruṣa the primal stuff assumes a conscious character,³¹ and this acquired or adventitious character prompts it to rearrange its formative principles³² or essences and transform itself into the totality of *buddhis*, called *Mahat*. *Mahat* symbolises the first stage of the evolved world-order. In its collective aspect, it is the first term in the series of cosmic evolutions;

29. S. K. Maitra—*Ibid.*

30. *Mandala* X. 129.

31. S.K. 20.

32. 'Prasavadharmita' of Prakṛti means this. S.K. verse 11.

in its distributive aspect, that is, as *buddhi*-units, it is the earliest beginning of the evolution of the individual's world-order. All subsequent developments, that is, evolution as a temporal process passing from stage to stage and moving through the cycles of existences, are regulated and determined by the law of Karma, an immanent principle operative through the whole course of nature. This principle is nothing new; it is merely the ethical statement of the logical theory of causation of the Sāṅkhya viz., the *satkāryavāda*. Thus Puruṣa becomes merely the 'occasion' of the evolution of Prakṛti into the experienced phenomenal order, its unmoving mover.³³ Puruṣa does not move Prakṛti, yet Prakṛti is moved on account of it. Puruṣa does not transform Prakṛti, yet Prakṛti undergoes transformation, partly because to undergo transformation is its very nature, and partly because the illumination of Puruṣa proves effective in starting its natural movement from *svarūpa-parināma* (involution) to *virūpa-parināma* (evolution). All these are not merely postulated—they follow from a rigid process of transcendental deduction. The evolution of the world of *vikṛtis* from a primal *prakṛti* is logically, although one-sidedly, dependent on that which is *anubhaya*, that is, neither *prakṛti* nor *vikṛti*. This nature of Puruṣa as a non-participating (*udāsina*), inactive (*niskriya*), motive-less principle follows transcendently also from the capacity of the *buddhi* to liquidate itself and terminate in the realisation of absolute freedom. The spirit is the transcendently transcendent principle. The residual fact (not a person or individual) is the pure self-luminosity, otherwise called pure consciousness, which remains as the only manifest being when the *buddhi*, after attainment of full-enlightenment, withdraws itself from the scene and returns to the original unmanifest. The slightest emphasis on causal efficiency of Puruṣa is likely to spell disaster to the peculiar conception of liberation we have in the Sāṅkhya (also in the Advaita vedānta).

To bring home to the lay reader this peculiar relation between Puruṣa and Prakṛti, a relation, which from the side of Puruṣa at least is not a relation, the Sāṅkhya introduces a number of analogies. It is surprising that Sankar in his polemics takes these as illustrations (*dṛṣṭānta*) while their main purpose is figurative description. Sankar's criticism that the Sāṅkhya doctrine has no grounding in the upanishads, that as a *smṛti* it has no validity on account of its non-conformity with the revealed doctrine of

33. Cf. The Aristotelian notion of the prime mover.

the scriptures, will not convince anybody with an unbiassed mind. It may be very well disputed whether the various *śrutis* reveal one consistent doctrine.³⁴ This takes away the force of the *sūtra*—*tattu samanvayāt*. It is also very much doubtful if Sankar gains anything by proving that it is a conscious agent and not an unconscious material stuff which is responsible for the emergence of the phenomenal order. Even in his own theory, the phenomenal order is the creation of cosmic nescience and this nescience is not certainly a conscious agent. If *avidyā* with Brahman as its substratum can explain the world, it is difficult to follow why Prakṛti illuminated by Puruṣa's light, or Mahat with Puruṣa as its substratum, should fail as an explanation. As for the modern critics of the Sāṅkhya it will be enough to say that had they considered the Sāṅkhya system with greater care and sympathy they would not have indulged in frivolous comments as they seem to have done.³⁵

34. The *sūtra*—*Tat tu samanvayāt* may very well be rejected. S.B.I. I. 4.
35. Cf. C. D. Sharma—*Hist. of Ind. Philosophy*, His criticism of the Sāṅkhya doctrine.

The Sāṅkhya Arguments for the Puruṣa

by

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The Sāṅkhya is a system of rationalistic metaphysics which is often said to be purely a rationalistic edifice based on logical argumentation at every step. For instance, the Sāṅkhya begins with an elaborate argument for their 'real-effect' theory, (*Satkārya-Vāda*) on which they base their doctrines of Prakṛti and the *guṇa*ic structure of it. It would be an interesting exercise for a student of the Sāṅkhya to subject all such arguments employed in the system to a close logical scrutiny and to ascertain what they are *intended* to prove and what they *do* actually prove. In this brief paper it is proposed to scrutinize, from this point of view, the Sāṅkhya arguments for the existence and nature of the Puruṣa, as they have been formulated in the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā of Iśvarakṛṣṇa.

The seventeenth Kārikā, which states these arguments, five in number, runs as follows:

Saṅghātaparārthatvāt, triguṇadiviparyayādadhīṣṭhānāt |
Puruṣo 'sti, bhoktṛbhāvāt, kaivalyārtham pravṛtteśca || 17

The exact and literal English version would be as follows:

"The Puruṣa exists (1) from the character of being-meant-for-other of the collocations, (2) from (this other having to be) the opposite of the three *guṇas* and so on, (3) from (the necessity of there being) a controller (for the collocations), (4) from (the necessity of there being) an enjoyer (for these collocations), and (5) from (the fact of the existence of) an activity for the purpose of aloneness (freedom or release).

And these arguments (especially the second) are supposed to prove the existence of the Puruṣa, of which the nineteenth Kārikā details the properties as follows:

Tasmācca viparyāsāt siddham, Sākṣitvam asya puruṣasya |
Kaivalyam, mādhyasthyam, draṣṭṛvam, akartṛbhāvaśca ||

Of this, the exact English version would be as follows:

"And from the contrast with that (i.e. with the prakṛti with three guṇas or constituents, etc.) is proved this Puruṣa's (1) character of being a witness, (2) aloneness (or freedom), (3) neutrality, (4) percipience and (5) non-agency.

Our concrete question now is whether the arguments in the Kārikā seventeenth succeed in proving the existence of the Puruṣa with the nature or characteristics embodied in the Kārikā nineteenth: and our answer to the question is in the negative.

Now to take these arguments for examination in their order:

(1) *Argument One: Saṅghātparārthatvāt*

This is a teleological argument, which purports to maintain that, since things of the world, which are collocations or combinations (*Saṅghātas*) of the different cosmic elements, appear to be meant for other-than-themselves, i.e. to be purposive, there must be this 'other', and that this 'other' is the Puruṣa.

But, if we suppose that the purposive character of things implies a being other than the things themselves, it is evident as a consequence that such a being must obviously be a *purposeful* being, one who has ends or purposes to be served by those things. And yet it is clear that such a being cannot be identified with the Sāṃkhya Puruṣa, whose non-agency (*Akartṛbhāva*) is announced in Kārikā nineteenth, or who is referred to as 'indifferent' (*Udāsīn*) in Kārikā twentieth.

(2) *Argument Two: Trigunadiviparyayāt*

This argument purports to maintain that, since the prakṛti and its evolutes appear to serve this 'other', i.e. 'the puruṣa', this puruṣa must have a nature, which is the opposite of that of the prakṛti. This latter, i.e. prakṛti, has been characterized as (1) composed of the three constituents (*Triguṇam*), (2) non-discriminating (*Aviveki*), (3) objective (*Viśayah*), (4) non-intelligent (*Acetanam*) and creative (*Prasavadharmi*). This argument would, if accepted, involve us into supposing that the puruṣa is (1) non-composite (of the three guṇas), (2) discriminating, (3) subjective, (4) intelligent, and (5) uncreative.

But if the Puruṣa is 'discriminating' and 'subjective', and 'intelligent', it will be realized that it cannot be neutral

(*Madhyastha*) (Kārikā 19) or indifferent (*Udāsīn*) (Kārikā 20) as it is said to be, as 'discrimination' and 'intelligence' and even 'subjectivity' do involve 'valuation', which would give a direct lie to the alleged 'neutrality' and 'indifference' of the puruṣa. Thus this argument also does not prove the puruṣa of the requisite characters of the Sāṃkhya-conception. (It will be seen that the premise for this argument in Kārikā 17, viz. opposition or contrast with the three guṇas, for the existence of the puruṣa is also the premise for the argument in Kārikā 19 for the peculiar nature of the Sāṃkhya puruṣa).

(3) *Argument Three: Adhiṣṭhānāt*

This argument is not much different from the first, and belongs to the same general teleological category to which the first belongs. Its purport is to maintain that, since the tri-composite (*Triguṇāt-maka*) things of the world appear to require a controlling agency, there must be such a controller and that is the puruṣa. This argument, most evidently, proves, if it proves anything, the 'agency' (*Kartṛbhāva*) of the puruṣa, rather than its 'non-agency' (*Akartṛbhāva*) or its 'indifferent witnesshood' (*Udāsīna sākṣitva*), which are considered the essential qualities of the puruṣa of the Sāṃkhya conception. (Vide Kārikās 19 and 20).

(4) *Argument Four: Bhoktṛbhāvāt*

This argument seeks to prove that, since pleasure, pain and other subjective feelings and emotions, evoked by the collocations, i.e. the things of the world, which are the products of the tri-composite prakṛti, have no meaning apart from a subject to enjoy or appreciate them, there must exist such an 'enjoyer' (*Bhoktā*), and that is the puruṣa. But what does this argument amount to? It only means that the puruṣa, which emerges from this argument, is by no means the 'neutral' (*Madhyastha*) or the 'indifferent' (*Udāsīna*) being he is said to be by the Sāṃkhya (Kārikas 19 and 20), but is one which has its own ends and purposes as also the characteristic capacity for pleasure-pain, attendant on their fulfilment or non-fulfilment.

(5) *Argument Five: Kaivalyartham Pravṛtteḥ*

This last argument also fails to establish the Sāṃkhya puruṣa as conceived in that system. This argument seeks to establish the existence of the puruṣa from the observed fact of the world, viz.

the activity or effort, seen being made as e.g. by sages, for the purpose of aloneness, i.e. freedom or release. This must be freedom from 'something' and freedom for 'somebody', and that something is prakṛti and that somebody is the puruṣa. Evidently, this, in effect, means that the striving for aloneness implies a 'striver', or that aspiration implies an 'aspirer', and that this 'striver' or 'aspirer' is *not* the prakṛti, for it is the prakṛti from which separation is sought for, and therefore the striver or aspirer must be other than the prakṛti, and this other, therefore, is the puruṣa. But if so, again it is clear that this striving, aspiring puruṣa is *not* the puruṣa of the Sāṃkhya conception, who is a mere neutral, indifferent and non-acting witness.

Thus the entire panoply of the five arguments in Kārikā 17 for the existence of a puruṣa fails to establish the specific nature or the characteristics of the puruṣa as envisaged in Kārikā 19, viz. witnesshood, aloneness, neutrality (or indifference), percipience and non-agency. These arguments, on the other hand, point to a different kind of puruṣa—a purposive and active kind of principle or agent or *elan* which directs and activates the evolution of nature towards the ends cherished and appreciated by it.

This debacle of the Sāṃkhya, who wants to prove one kind of puruṣa and actually proves another, has to be traced back ultimately to his uncompromising dualism, which separates, 'as if by a hatchet', the puruṣa and the prakṛti, and credits them with utterly distinct natures, and yet rests the creation and explanation of the world on their mysterious and inexplicable conjunction, which again is said to be unreal and illusory! But the universe is not made of two such utterly disparate things, but just one whole with an inner purpose and impulse for self-expression. But any further dilation on this point will take us beyond the original scope set for this paper.

The Logical and the Mystical in Advaita Vedānta

by

G. R. MALKANI

Advaita Vedānta is claimed to be both logical and mystical. As logical, it appeals to reason. As mystical, it leads to a great experience. The two aspects are intimately connected. A great experience which does not appeal to reason will not be really great. It will be hallucinatory or a matter of irrational feeling. Mysticism as ordinarily understood has a bad taste just on that account. On the other hand, if philosophy is all reason and leads to no great experience, it will fail to convince and also fail to influence life. It will not raise life to a higher level or change the fundamental values of life. Only a great and absorbing experience can do that and infuse in life a new purpose and meaning. Advaita Vedānta claims to be mystical in the best sense of the word.

Prof. P. T. Raju, in his "Idealistic Thought of India", thinks nothing of this mystical element. He is enamoured of the Western method of doing philosophy. It is the method, let us say, of pure reason. According to this method, experience must be kept as it is. We are not required to change it or to raise it. There may be a higher experience or there may not be one. We are simply not concerned with it. We are at best concerned with finding reasons for believing in a higher kind of reality than the one we actually know. Prof. Raju, with his Hindu traditions, finds no difficulty in accepting Vedāntic conclusions; but as a lover of Western thought, he seeks to justify them through Western logic. The Absolute of Advaita Vedānta, according to him, is comparable with the Absolute of Western Idealists. It satisfies the criterion of non-contradiction. The Brahman of Vedānta can only be reached rationally in that particular way. If it is reached in any other way, say through *śruti*, it would have no philosophical value. Philosophical value apart (and about that there can be differences of opinion), Prof. Raju at least fails here to interpret Vedānta correctly. Vedāntic Brahman is not a mere concept to be reached through logic. Vedānta does not seek to give us abstract knowledge

of a theoretically-proved Absolute in the Western style. It seeks to give us direct knowledge of Absolute Reality, more reassuring than any intuition we at present possess. The whole purpose of Vedānta is to make it possible for an average intelligence to rise to this knowledge through a method, which may demand certain moral or spiritual qualities for its ultimate success, but nothing that is inherently mysterious or unintelligible about it. It is truly a science of Freedom or *mokṣa-pāstra*.

The logical requirements of any system of philosophy may be said to be two-fold: (1) To determine the true nature of Ultimate Reality; and (2) to deduce the facts of our experience from it. As to the first objective: Certain European philosophers achieve this through a dual process. They criticise our present experience of reality, find fault with it, and thus make room for a higher concept. This higher concept is then reached through a speculative effort with the aid of certain principles accepted as true. These principles,—such as, the real is rational, the real is efficient, the real is non-contradictory, etc.,—are not self-evident as applied to reality; and the speculative effort based upon them leaves much to the imagination. The result is a concept of reality which is quite arbitrary and unconvincing. As against this approach, Vedānta does not demand a *concept* of Absolute Reality, and does not rely on any speculative effort in order to get at the truth. Instead, it demands an *intuition* of reality which can be accepted as self-evidently true by all men of intelligence, even as, at the common-sense level, sensible intuition is so accepted. The method to elicit this higher intuition must be one, which has been tried, which can be common to all men, and which is competent for the purpose in hand. This common method cannot be merely some kind of subjective training or spiritual discipline. It must be in some sense *objective*. The only such method according to Vedānta, is the revealed word or *śruti*. Imagination, as a way of knowledge, is thus completely eliminated, and the testimony of the Word or *śabda-pramāṇa* is substituted in its place. The peculiarity of this method of knowledge is that it gives us indirect knowledge where the object itself is not present, but it gives us direct knowledge where the object to which it relates is directly given and present. The Absolute of Vedānta, being identical with the *ātman* (Self), falls in the latter category. Criticism and interpretation there must be. This safeguards the rational character of the truth. But the positive method of knowledge can be neither criticism

nor imagination, the two weapons of the Western theoretical philosopher. The ascent from the world to the higher reality is based on a direct revelation of that reality to us through the *śruti*, and not through the application of any formal principle of logic, such as that of non-contradiction:

The other logical requirement of a system of philosophy is the explanation of the common facts of experience which constitute our world. Here Western philosophers and Vedānta appear to be in the same boat; for neither can deduce the world from the Absolute. But there is a difference. If the world is proved to be not real but illusory only, it requires no further explanation. It is sufficiently explained by saying that the illusory is a creation of erroneous perception and that therefore it need never be perceived at all. Nothing in the nature of reality itself necessitates it. We misperceive reality. Let us correct this misperception through right knowledge, and the illusory will be found to be nowhere and in no sense. If however the world is real, it requires no explanation at all. It is self-explained. It can be caused by nothing outside of itself and deduced from nothing.

Western Idealists cannot make up their mind to regard the world in either of these two ways. For them the world has some kind of reality, but not ultimate reality. It is therefore a problem with them how to relate it to ultimate reality. The conceptions of emanation, free causality, descent and degradation, etc., have been used to understand the relation. But none of them is found logically satisfactory. They explain absolutely nothing. They are merely verbal devices to deceive ourselves that *some explanation* has been offered. Vedānta however is quite forth-right in this respect. It rejects any *real relation* between the world and Absolute Reality. The distinction of the 'higher' and the 'lower' is not abrogated. The fact-hood of the world is also not denied. But then the illusory too is a fact of a kind. Only it is a fact that is sufficiently explained when we say that it is not self-grounded, but other-grounded. No other explanation of it is possible or is rationally demanded. To describe the world as *anirvacanīya*, i.e. indescribable either in terms of the real or in terms of the unreal, is to be free from all questions in respect of it. It is the climax of wisdom, not the beginning of a new, ultimate and inescapable ignorance, as supposed by some west-inspired modern thinkers of India. The latter make no secret of their belief that no system of philosophy, either Eastern or Western, has succeeded in resolving

the conundrum of the world. They misunderstand the nature of the problem.

Prof. Raju, in his *Idealistic Thought of India*, says, "... We find that the idea of *māyā* is utilized by the Advaitin not only to get at the Brahman by ascending from the phenomenal world but also to explain the world by descending from the Brahman. The ascent to the Brahman is of-course logical. It is the non-contradictory, presupposed by the contradictory, the absolute presupposed by the relative, and truth presupposed by falsity; This ascent, we may even say, is a sort of deduction; just as Hegel's dialectic is a deduction of the Absolute from the category of Being. But unlike Hegel's dialectic, the descent from the Brahman is not logical, and can hardly be called a deduction. Neither the Brahman nor *Māyā* has a logical structure" p. 114.

The comparison of Brahman with Hegel's Absolute is revealing. It shows to what lengths some Indian scholars can go to squeeze ancient Indian wisdom into European moulds, even though they have to mutilate the truth beyond recognition. The so-called ascent is quite fictitious. Brahman is never arrived at logically or through a dialectical process, as is here claimed. Brahman is not a logical idea. It is transcendent reality. It has a positive nature. We therefore require a positive method of knowledge in order to know it. That method has no resemblance to Hegel's method. Hegel's Absolute was a purely logical concept, and so it could be dialectically deduced from the concept of Being by the method of negation. Brahman has nothing in common with the Absolute Idea of Hegel, except the name "Absolute". Any kind of deduction of Brahman is accordingly out of place. The only way to know it is not an argument or a logical process, but a method of knowledge which can reveal it directly to the intellect. The only way the super-sensible can be thus revealed is through the method of revelation or *śruti*. Reason comes later to clarify, to reinforce and to remove all obstructions to understanding.

The second proposition that Advaitism seeks to deduce the world from Brahman is equally wrong. The illusory cannot be deduced from the real; for the real is reached only through the negation of the illusory. Any explanation of the illusory in terms of the real is therefore doomed to failure. An error can be discarded, but never explained. It is by its very nature *irrational* and so *inexplicable*. There is no problem in Advaita Vedānta about

the deduction of the world from Brahman. The term "deduction" can cover many inaccuracies of thought. The only descent which Vedānta accepts is not the descent of the world from Brahman, but the descent of the truth from above in the form of the revealed word or *śabda*. It alone can illumine where human reason fails.

Śabda (Word) is objective and impersonal. It is free from subjectivity, because it is not based upon any single individual's private experience or mystical intuition. It is just the other way. It is the mystical intuition that is initiated through the word. The word is in this sense super-personal. It is hallowed by tradition and by the experience of innumerable persons, who have testified to its truth. It finds its exemplification in the lives of men. All this invests the word with a peculiar authoritativeness and objectivity. When the evidence of the word is combined with a proper frame of the mind of a truth-seeker, who is prepared to make full use of reason in this new dimension opened to him by the scripture, the requisite intuition is bound to follow. This method of knowledge is unassailable by all human standards. We can criticise all sensible or rational knowledge as ordinarily understood; but we can do nothing with the word, which has no human origin, and which does not therefore suffer from human limitations. The word is the Eternal Truth itself. We cannot criticise it or its authority. We can believe in it and try it out in our lives; or alternatively, disbelieve in it and reject it without giving it a trial. We cannot blame the word, we can only blame ourselves for failing the word. The mysticism of Vedānta has thus its source in *śruti*. *Śruti* directly reveals the truth. Reason comes later in order to remove certain obstructions or *pratibandha*, and thus fulfils the initial intuition.

This knowledge is unlike any other knowledge that we have. It is the only true form of realism in knowledge; for it dispenses with sensation and with the ordinary form of judgment, which introduce subjectivity. The statements of *śruti* have the form of judgment; but their meaning is non-judgmental and non-ideal. They point directly to reality. The idea, as determining reality, is dispensed with. The mediating role of thought is eliminated. Thought is made to recognise directly reality which is beyond thought. The roles of thought and reality are in fact reversed. It is reality that imprints itself upon thought and makes thought after its own image, not vice-versa. Truth thus coincides with reality and is reality.

Advaitism may be described as mysticism based upon knowledge, and not upon feeling or imagination; and just because it is based upon knowledge, it can stand up to the criticism of reason. As a matter of fact, reason has a vital role to play in this knowledge. It must answer all objections to the truth of Advaitism, criticise other possible theories which are offered, remove all doubts, and thus pave the way for complete understanding of the truth. Thus logic and mysticism are not opposed to each other in Advaitism. They supplement each other, and fulfil each other.

Mystical Experience, the Meeting Point between India and the West

by

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World has grown small on account of the recent scientific achievements in the field of communication. These conveniences for external communication should naturally lead to a spiritual communion among the peoples of the whole world and form the whole humanity into a harmoniously united family. But the fundamental requisite for such a communion is the possibility of mutual understanding. Hence the problem of knowledge has, more than ever, gained importance in our time: what is truth, and what is the proper approach to truth? What appears as an insurmountable barrier to any real spiritual unity in the present world is the difference of approach to this fundamental problem between East and West. The difference appears so sharp that some think that all synthesis is impossible.¹ A closer examination, however, can show that the difference of approach, which really exists, is no barrier to harmony, if we fix our attention on the unity of the final solution: both East and West consider the final direct intuition of Absolute Truth, the mystical experience of the Supreme Reality, the goal of the whole human endeavour.

1. *The Difference between the Indian and the Western Outlook.*

Nobody can deny the radical difference of approach to philosophical problems in general and to the problem of knowledge in particular which exists between East and West. In this, India has

1. cf. e.g. Giuseppe Tucci, Director of the Istituto per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente On Philosophical Synthesis—in *Philosophy East and West*. Vol. II, p. 3: "I do not think that a synthesis of the East and West and their different thought is possible. Apart from these points of contact which are due to the fundamental identity of the human mind and of the instruments at its disposal, the two trends of thought too often look at the same problems—nature, man, and God,—and at their relations with each other altogether differently".

taken the lead of the typically eastern approach. In India philosophical inquiry was born from a deeply felt religious need to discover truth. Man was spontaneously led to think about the meaning of his life in a world of ever changing phenomena. He was naturally led to find the permanent support of everything within his own self, which seemed to him the most permanent of all things falling within his experience. He had no doubt about the existence of such a Supreme Being, the support of all. He wanted only to discover it. Hence, he named his approach to that One Reality '*darśana*', a vision, an intuition.

On the contrary in Greece, the cradle of Western philosophy, what led to the discovery of reality was not any religious quest. A group of city states often warring among themselves and sometimes faced with foreign invaders had always the necessity to occupy themselves with the means of having under their control the natural resources. Their investigation into the nature of reality, as such, arose as a side consideration to the use of things. Hence the first Greek philosophers such as Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes, were materialists, who described reality in terms of water, air and other material elements. On account of this extrovert attitude on the world they discovered only very gradually an ultimate Supreme Intelligent Being. According to Aristotle, when later Anaxagoras postulated a *Nous*, a governing intelligence for the world, he appeared "like a sober man from the crowd of random talkers who preceded him".² But even he did not consistently evolve his doctrine of the *Nous*; it had only a very partial role to play in his system.

This radical difference of approach between India and the West is clear also in the first philosophical notions evolved by the two streams of thought. The Greek '*Hylè*' and the Indian '*âtman*' in their pre-philosophic use conveyed almost the same idea: *hylè* meant a trunk without the branches, *âtman*, a body without limbs or the self, to which the actions of the whole are referred reflexively. Philosophy assumed the same terms for the same purpose, namely, to designate the fundamental substratum of things. But *âtman* was interpreted as spirit, the self of all, while *hylè* was taken as matter from which things are shaped by external operation. The introspective Indian thinker conceived the ultimate

2. Metaphysics I, 3, 984 b, 17; cf. I, 4, 985 a 15-22.

reality as spirit; the extrovert Greek considered it as the crude matter from which things are shaped.

Greeks named the primary elements '*stoicheia*', a term derived from the root '*steicho*', which means to arrange in order, as a builder arranges the stones, an extrinsic activity. In India, on the other hand, the same idea was expressed by *prakṛti* or *pradhâna*, something evolving by its internal dynamism, and closely allied with, and not opposed to, the *âtman*. The soul or the vital principle was designated in western philosophy by terms such as *psychè* and *anima*, derived from the roots which mean to blow, breathe into, which are external actions. In India the corresponding terms *jîva* and *âtman* have the connotation of something auto-active. Westerners always define the production of things by some activity on the material plane, or if it is notion of pure creation by denying all material cause: "Production of things from nothing", as if nothing were some material from which things were shaped. On the contrary Indian Philosophy, consistent with its mode of procedure, defines origination of things in terms of the operative cause: *janmâdyasya yatah* — that from which is the origin, etc.³

This general divergence of approach to the philosophical problems is all the more marked in the question of knowledge. The western mind, bent as it is upon the investigation of the external world, places the emphasis on the rational activity of the intellect. The Indian mind with its contemplative bias gives importance to intuition and realization.⁴ In the West to know is to control; what cannot be controlled is not worth knowing. For the Oriental, knowledge is the discovery of the community of the knower with the known.⁵ Hence the oriental view is value-centric; everything

3. Vedanta Sutra I, 1, 2.

4. cf. Giuseppe Tucci l. c.: "The western mind has made such progress along the scientific paths that it places intellect above all else. What we want is knowledge and action. On the other hand, the East, despite its varieties of thought, has placed the accent on realization and experience".

5. cf. Alan W. Watts — On Philosophical Synthesis: Philosophy East and West Vol. III, pp. 99-100: ".....in the West, for us, 'to know' really means 'to control', that is, to see how events may be fitted to consistent orders of words and symbols so that we may predict and govern their course. But this mania for control leads ultimately to a barren confusion, because we ourselves are by no means separated from the environment we are trying to control.....For Oriental Philosophy, knowledge is not control. It is rather the 'sensation' — the vivid realization — that 'I am not this individualized consciousness alone, but the matrix from which it arises. This

is valued in relation with the ultimate reality: that knowledge is true which leads us to the discovery of the one Real Being.⁶ This relative value of all cognition naturally led to an emphasis on symbolism, namely the consideration of material things as signs and representations of the spiritual. In the western rational outlook symbols have much less importance. For the same reason we do not find in India the sharp distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge which is made much of in western thought.⁷

But this difference of outlook has often been exaggerated as if it were a total irreconcilability of Indian and Western Philosophies. On the contrary, it marks only a difference of mentality, which is in fact prior to any definite philosophical elaboration, a manner of looking at things. Indeed, this quasi-natural insight guides and controls the investigation and to a certain extent even determines the nature of the problems that are proposed. But it does not at all dictate the solutions. This is clear from the fact that both the currents of thought, as if unconsciously, point to the same final point, the ultimate intuition of the Supreme Reality as the ideal and source of all true knowledge.

ii. *Mystical Experience, the Goal of all Philosophical Inquiry.*

(a) *The Indian Theory of Truth:*

Quest for absolute and infallible truth was undoubtedly the cardinal point in the Indian philosophical inquiry. If you neglect a sprinkling of nihilists and materialists, the majority of Indian thinkers always believed in the transcendental value of knowledge. All of them admit the ordinary validity of our experience, and from it rise to a notion of absolute consciousness, the fulness of which is found in the Supreme Reality. Only in union with this Absolute Consciousness, can man attain liberation from this state of ignorance.

But this unity of introspective approach does not mean a unity of procedure in the investigation. At least two main currents of thought are discernible: One starting from our ordinary indi-

knowledge consists, not in a verbal proposition, but in a psychological change, similar to that which occurs in the cure of a psychosis".

6. cf. S. K. Maitra — *Philosophy East and West*, vol. III, pp. 195-198.

7. cf. S. K. Maitra — *ibid.*

vidual consciousness by which we perceive things takes it as the pattern of all knowledge, while the other discarding the time and space limitations of our ordinary knowledge rises to the conception of pure consciousness.

For a good number of Indian schools, namely, the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the Jaina logicians, the Grammarians, and even for a good many Vedantins, knowledge is the union of a knower with the object. According to the Nyāya school, *pramā*, true knowledge, is the apprehension of something as it really is; true knowledge itself is something joined to the subject by the *samavāya* connection. For the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, if you exclude its notion of Puruṣa as pure intelligence, knowledge is nothing but the illumination of the evolutes of *prakṛti* reflecting the *citiśakti* of Puruṣa. For the Logicians and Grammarians knowledge necessarily demands the synthesis of various perceptual and linguistic elements through *dhwani*, *ākāṅkṣa*, etc. According to Bhartṛhari "cognition without a word (*śabda*) is light without illumination". Ramanuja, the Vedantin, who may be taken as the leader of this trend of thought, emphatically asserts that "all consciousness implies distinction between the knower and the known". Hence even Brahman who is of the nature of consciousness has within Himself the distinction of various qualities, powers and energies.

The other current of thought following the spirit of the Upanishads considers knowledge as something simple and absolute, identical with reality. Here Śaṅkara may be taken as the unquestioned leader. He maintains that in a metaphysical analysis of knowledge, what is essential and permanent in all states of cognition is *cinnātra*, pure consciousness alone, without time, space, determinations, as sound in the blowing of the horn, and voice in music.⁸ Hence true knowledge is pure consciousness, the source and common factor in all manifestations of cognition.⁹ Brahman is this absolute consciousness; realization of our identity with Him alone can give us true knowledge.

But, both these trends of thought assert that the true knowledge which can liberate man from his ignorance and suffering is a direct contemplation of the absolute reality, which is defined

8. Brih. Up. Bhashya II, iv, 7.

9. *ibid.* II, iv, 9.

as 'satyamjnānamanantam'.¹⁰ Though there are various ways of knowing, such as direct sense-experience (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), and revelation (*śabda*), they cannot give us a proper knowledge of the Absolute reality. Brahman is not attainable by the senses. It can be properly known only through *anūbhava*, direct experience.¹¹ Scripture, according to Śankara, can lead us to Brahman only because it contains the direct intuitions of the ancient sages. This liberating knowledge, according to Ramanuja, is the devotional knowledge of the Supreme Lord, and the blissful realization "that the soul stands in a relation of subservience to the Supreme Brahman, because this Supreme Brahman is the principal to which the soul is accessory or subservient".¹²

(b) *The Western Approach.*

If the various trends of Indian thought in quest of truth converge to a final direct knowledge of the Supreme Reality as their culmination, the western attempts present themselves as a slow, unconscious, evolution, somewhat in a spiral fashion. It is enough for us to examine the various phases of this unconscious evolution in the present-day philosophy.

The Western approach is, as already noted, radically governed by man's dealing with his *Umwelt* (environment) for reaching the *Welt* (the world). This passing over to the *Welt* is done mainly in three ways, namely, by pure thought, by pure action, and by direct experience.

The intellectual mode of approach to the world has given us the various forms of Logo-Logic and Dialecto-Logic, which reduce all reality to mere ideas. For the Neo-Kantians like Albert Görland, the starting point of the investigation is a question 'what is it?'. It is answered by the purely logical elements of subject, predicate, copula, distinction, meaning and universality.¹³ For Heidegger on the contrary, our logical activity is not 'upon' an object, but only 'in the presence' of an object, and hence it can

10. Tait. Up. II, 1.

11. Ved. Sutr. S. Bhashya I, 1, 2: 'anubhavāvasānatvā bhūtavastu-viśayatvācca brahmajñānasya'.

12. Vedartha Sangraha § 142.

13. Here also, as in the Indian approach, we can neglect the materialists, the English and American Pragmatists, and Positivists, who have exerted very little influence in the evolution of the continental philosophy.

validly form purely deductive theories and systems, independent of the objective world, provided the procedure itself is consistent. Husserl, Natrop, and Häberlin lead this abstractive process further when they assert that every judgment implies a voluntaristic deciding as well as an intellectual distinguishing. Dialecto-Logic tries to build a Metaphysics on the above Logic, cut away from the outside reality. For Theodor Litt, Jonas Cohn, Rolf Goldl and others dialectics is nothing but thought being questioned and divided up, and made to reveal its internal dynamism. Hegel and Krause interpret this dynamism of thought in the form of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Thesis represents an action upon an object which is foreign to thought, the antithesis unites this object with the thought thinking it, and in the synthesis action is transcended and the object is clarified into something intelligible, something which can be dealt with by thought. Heidegger liberated this dialectics from the clutches of idealism by his distinction between ontic and ontological consciousness, and showed that we are seeking after something beyond both ordinary realism and idealism.

Hence an existential reaction to Logo-Logic and Dialecto-Logic was inevitable. Existentialism emphasised the transcendence through action. In face of reality it poses the question, 'what does it mean for me?' The answer has necessarily to imply a decision in action, a consent of the will, an assertion of its autonomy, as the point of convergence of all reality, the 'pour-soi' (the For Oneself). But to assert thus its autonomy the subject has to make a leap in the dark, as all the existentialists from Kierkegaard down to Sartre and Merleau Ponty have pointed out, a leap beyond our nothingness, want and suffering, a self-annihilation in supreme anxiety and despair; when our self annihilates itself in despair the Absolute will reveal itself in the heart of the reality, that we are.

But it is easy to see that such a leap in the dark to the Absolute is meaningless and unreasonable unless one felt in some manner the nearness of that Absolute, and a call to approach it. Otherwise the blind leap can land us only in the avowal of Sartre, full of despair: "Man is a useless passion". Thus this gradual evolution in the relation of man with the world through thought showed that the climax is not mere action, but a discovery. Wilhelm Dilthey had already introduced *hermeneutics* into philosophy to find out the true "interpretation of the world". Heidegger too

was in search for a "fundamental ontology" which would give us not an interpretation, but the true "sense of being". Only in this sense of being can one discover the concrete unity of the human speech in which the true, the good and the genuine meet.

Thus the final point to which contemporary philosophy has been gradually led is Mysto-Logic, the direct experience of the Absolute, which is simply inexpressible in any thought form. It is a discovery in which the subject-object distinction and the articulations of judgment are lost in a simple experience. All the theistic existentialists, such as Kierkegaard and Gabriel Marcel, have held this discovery as the final goal of all philosophy. For Henry Bergson it is the true knowledge and the distinguishing mark of the dynamic religion. Max Scheler has defined man in terms of it when he called him 'the God-seeker'.

iii. *Mystical Experience, the Meeting Point of All Philosophy.*

Only in this discovery and direct experience of the Supreme Intelligence does our quest for truth reach its real unity in all its aspects: It unites the ontic and ontological aspects of being; it combines our intellectual and volitional activities; it brings together metaphysics and religion. Here East and West find their basic agreement.

Knowledge is not perfect until the ontological and ontic aspects are united in the same act of cognition. In the ontic experience we take hold of the existent, be it the external thing, or our own individual being, in immediate perception. It brings about a synthesis between the perceiver and the perceived. But this our cognitive act remains incomplete until we discover the ultimate intelligibility of what comes into our cognitive sphere; this is its ontological aspect. Whatever is perceived is perceived as being. Hence, the element of being or reality is what has excited our intellectual curiosity. That curiosity is bound to remain until we discover the ultimate source of its reality, which can be no other than the Supreme Real. The relation to that Supreme Real is the 'Logos', the reason of this particular being; it is the ontological basis of its intelligibility.

Similarly our intellectual quest and volitional tendency find their unity only in a direct experience of the Absolute. Our intellect does not live on abstract speculation. Truth and reality are realised in the concrete. As full truth alone can satisfy our

intellectual curiosity, so only the fullness of reality and goodness can satisfy our desire. As particular truths cannot compel our acceptance, so particular goodness too cannot fully satisfy. Our will submits to a particular good only in view of the Supreme Lovable, whose images these particular things are. Thus in the Supreme Reality our higher powers of intellect and will unite, finding in it absolute truth (*satyasya satyam*) and absolute bliss.¹⁴

Here we find also the perfect unity between metaphysical and religious experience. Religion and metaphysics have their autonomous spheres. Still, there is necessarily a basic experience in which both are rooted. Indeed, Metaphysics by its very nature seems to imply the restlessness of an inquiry, while religion connotes a satisfaction and peace which is not disturbed by any number of problems. Yet, the philosopher's problems are not without a solution, nor is the peace of a religious man without problems. If metaphysics should not end in a barren heap of concepts cut away from life and religion in a chain of unreasonable superstitious beliefs and practices, there should be a real dialogue between the knowledge of metaphysics and the love of religion. Both reach their perfection and full harmony only when they enter the silence of Mystery. There the meeting with the Ultimate Truth casts a glow over the whole philosophical inquiry, and the meeting with the supreme object of religious devotion puts a halo over all the travails of inquiring love.

There is no wonder then that all sincere inquiry into truth, be it eastern or western, finds its basic agreement in this ultimate goal. The knowledge of the Supreme is the basis of all knowledge.¹⁵ Indeed, taking the powers of man in his present condition, with his mode of knowledge intrinsically tied up with time and space and dependent on the senses,¹⁶ he cannot by his own efforts attain to a direct knowledge of the Supreme Reality. The Divine has to reveal itself to man. Philosophy has to leave to history the investigation whether the Supreme has revealed Himself, or promised such an ultimate meeting with Himself to poor humanity. Such a meeting, if it takes place, is beyond the ordinary mode of our knowledge. Hence the Western mystics call it a dark night, since sense-experience has no part in it. The Supreme Intelligence is

14. cf. Brih. Up. II, 1, 20; III, ix, 28; Chand. Up. VIII, vii, 12.

15. Mund. Up. I, 1; sa brahmavidyām sarvavidyāpratiṣṭham'.

16. cf. Vedant. Sutr. Sank. Bhashya — Introd.

not known by those who think they know it, while those who think they do not know it may be really knowing it.¹⁷

Such a direct knowledge of the Supreme demands a certain transformation of the knower into the known. Indeed, those who speak of that union, even the Advaitins, do not intend to deny all distinction between the individual knower and the Supreme. But the basis of this knowledge is not distinction, but union and a certain identity of the knower and the known. The closer the union, the more intimate is the knowledge. Hence, even Ramanuja, who emphatically upholds, against the Advaitins, the eternal real distinction of the soul from Brahman, says that in the *nitya-vibhûti*, the eternal contemplation of Brahman in His *śudhasattva*, the soul is as it were indistinguishable from the Lord. Hence the general principle, '*Brahmaveda brahmaiva bhavati* (He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman)', is common to all systems of Philosophy.¹⁸ This statement need not at all be taken in a monistic sense.

The western mystics also speak in the same strain. Thus St. John of the Cross, the well-known Spanish mystic, speaks of "the true and total transformation of the soul into God", by which she is made participant in the divine activity of knowledge and love, "doing by participation, what God is by his own nature"; "the soul united and transformed in God, breathes in God into God the same Divine breath that God, when she is transformed in Him, breathes into her in Himself"; "she becomes deiform and God by participation".¹⁹ When we remember that St. John of the Cross always maintained that the soul ever remains a creature and never passes over to the status of the Creator, we can understand how in mystical experience the highest ideals of Theism and Advaita are combined. According to him, only in this sublime deification in the intimate communion with God is fulfilled the end for which the soul is created.²⁰

17. Kena. Up. II, 3.

18. Mund. Up. III, ii, 9.

19. Spiritual Canticle Stz. 39 nn. 3-5. This western mystic too ascribes great importance to the introspective method: "It will be fitting that in order to find Him (God) thou forget all that is thine, withdraw thyself from all creatures, hide in the interior closet of thy spirit and, shutting the door upon all things, pray to the Father who is in secret.....Thus shalt thou then experience His presence in secret, and shalt love Him, and have fruition of Him in secret, beyond all that is attainable by tongue and sense" (*ibid.* stz. 9).

20. *ibid.* stz. 39, n. 4.

Conclusion: Thus history is not a barren battle-field where systems appear one after another, and demolish each other. On the contrary, the whole humanity is engaged in a common endeavour, in which each one contributes his mite to the common fund. East and West are enemies only when taken apart from the common goal which they try to attain. But with this common ideal of all philosophy, the direct attainment of the Supreme Reality, which is the common uniting bond, the diversity of approaches can only add to the beauty of the harmonious unity of humanity.

Polarities and Metaphysics

by

PUNYA SLOKA RAY

A polarity is a pair of concepts, each of which is the opposite of the other and is indefinable except in terms of mutual opposition. Reality and appearance are, for an example, terms that have meaning only in reference and opposition to each other. It is not at all possible to think or experience reality except in contrast with appearance. We can apply this polarity to all sorts of terms. For instance, we can talk about the really clear, the apparently clear; the really big, the apparently big, etc.

Such polarities are not necessary in any absolute sense. It frequently happens that we are either unable or unwilling to apply a particular polarity to a term. It is possible to interpret this lack of contrast sometimes as the middle point in a series of gradations between opposites. For instance, the mediocre may be defined as the point which is exactly between the intelligent and the stupid and is therefore describable as both and neither. But we can also find gradation inadmissible, and speak of a field where the polarity is simply not applicable. For example, there have been important philosophers who have rejected at some point the polarity of reality and appearance. Let us only think of Protagoras in his theory of truth, Hegel in his Logic, Husserl in his Phenomenology or Moore in his theory of the sense-data. When we exclude a particular polarity as not applicable to a term, we may certainly find another polarity applicable to it. The plot and the characterisation of a work of fiction does not allow the application of the reality-appearance polarity, but it does allow such polarities as consistent-contradictory, clear-vague, and also perhaps true-false.

We may consider these polarities as a presupposition of speech. Particular polarities are not indispensable. But perhaps we have to admit that some polarity or other is necessary. Even if we turn mystics and talk about the inadequacy of all speech, we cannot avoid applying polarities. For the inadequacy of speech will be explained as in relation to the representation of reality as contrast-

ed with appearance, or as in the comprehension of truth as contrasted with falsehood, or as in reaching the one as contrasted with the many, or as in understanding of the whole as contrasted with parts. To deny all polarity we shall have to practise total silence.

From the logical point of view, each of these polarities is indefinable, is ultimate and irreducible to any other polarity. The attempt to reduce one polarity to another is, though not an error, an arbitrary act for which no logical justification can ever be found. Such arbitrary decisions are met with both in methodology and metaphysics, and consist in the interpretation of one polarity in terms of other polarities. This sort of interpretation furnishes us with one of the most reliable clues as to the difference between the statements of ordinary knowledge and the statements expressing methodology or metaphysics.

When a methodologist combines polarities in a certain way rather than in some other way, he is only formulating a method that will be tested by its fruitfulness in the acquisition of particular concrete knowledge. He is being arbitrary to be sure, but his arbitrariness will, so he hopes, be justified by practical results in the development of science. How a particular polarity may be interpreted in terms of another within the limits of a specific methodological approach can be illustrated by the following example. The fact-illusion polarity operates quite differently in connexion with different methods of science. It may coincide with the "causally effective-causally ineffective" polarity, or with the measurable-unmeasurable, or with the experienced-inferred, or with the intelligible-unintelligible. That will depend on whether we are using the method of causal analysis or that of physical measurement or that of phenomenology or that of analytic induction. A method of inquiry can only be defined by specifying its assumptions. And these assumptions always mean a specific way of combining or excluding particular polarities.

The case is somewhat different for a metaphysician. When Parmenides interprets the reality-appearance polarity in terms of being-nothingness, permanent-transient, intelligible-sensible, spatial-temporal polarities, and Bergson does it in the inverse way; when Bradley interprets reality-appearance as consistent-contradictory, and Simone Weil as contradictory-consistent, what is the ground for preferring one interpretation against the other? There is no obvious and universally agreed test in metaphysics as there

is one in methodology, which is the advancement of scientific knowledge. Or is there such a test after all also in metaphysics?

In the absence of a test the metaphysicians seem to have been playing a parlour game of combining and re-combining particular polarities in endless arbitrary ways. Perhaps there is a test for metaphysical statements. But this short paper is not going to be a vindication of metaphysics. My purpose has been only some jungle-clearance. The logical character of metaphysical statements should be clearly understood before we begin to justify or point out how to justify them. I am convinced that it is possible to apply the polarity true-false or the polarity good-bad to metaphysical statements. But I would say that the truth or the falsehood, or the goodness or the badness of particular metaphysics have to be justified on grounds other than logical. Here I have only tried to define with logical tools and in one of many possible ways, the essential para-logicality of metaphysics.

The Analysis of Negation in Navya Nyāya

by

PROF. HARI MOHAN JHA

The Concept of Negation has been subjected to a thread-bare analysis by the logicians of the Navya Nyāya School. Like the founders of Symbolical Logic in modern times, the Naiyayikas, in their own days and in their own manner, employed a highly specialised technique and terminology to express subtle logical distinctions. The object of this paper is to give an account of some distinctions and specifications made by the Naiyayikas in connection with negation.

A negation can be understood only with reference to something which is negated, eg: the absence of a pot can be understood only with reference to the pot. In this example, the pot (*ghata*) is the counterpart (*pratiyogī*) of the non-existence (*abhāva*).

A non-existence and its counterpart cannot reside in the same locus (*ādhāra*, *adhikaraṇa* or *āśraya*) simultaneously, eg: both a pot (*ghata*) and absence of pot (*ghatābhāva*) cannot co-exist in the same spot, at the same time, in the same manner. The relation between a thing and its non-existence is one of contradiction or incompatibility (i.e. *pratibādhya-pratibandhaka bhāva*). In other words, the affirmation of the one means the denial of the other and vice versa.¹

Symbolically, this may be expressed as:

$$\sim (p \sim p)$$

The Naiyayikas, as a rule, accept the principle that the negation of negation amounts to affirmation.² That is to say,

$$\sim \sim P \equiv p$$

1. *Abhāvātvaṃ Pratiyogitā-jñānādadhina jñān viśayatvaṃ*
2. *Pratiyogyabhāvānvayayoh tulya Yogakshematā.*

They also lay down the formula that the negation of negation of negation is equivalent to negation,³ i.e.

$$\sim \sim \sim p \equiv \sim p$$

A negation can be understood in its different aspects with the help of the following factors:

(i) *Anuyogī* i.e. the locus of the non-existence. There is no pot on the ground (*Bhūtaḥ ghataḥ nāsti*). Here the locus of the non-existence is the ground (*Bhūtala*). The locus or substratum of existence is called *Anuyogī*.⁴ The *anuyogitā* in the above example lies in the ground. This non-existence will be described therefore as "a non-existence determined by the locusness lying in the ground".⁵

(ii) *Pratiyogī* i.e. the counterpart of the non-existence. There is no pot on the ground. Here the counterpart of the non-existence is 'Pot'. Such counterpart is called *pratiyogī*. In other words, a *pratiyogī* is that thing of which there is non-existence.⁶ In the above example, the *pratiyogitā* lies in the pot. Hence this non-existence will be described as "a non-existence of which the *pratiyogitā* lies in the pot".⁷

(iii) *Anuyogitāvachchedaka Dharma* (i.e. the adjunct which limits the scope of the substratum of non-existence). There is no pot on the ground. Here it is not clear whether the locus of non-existence is 'this ground' or 'ground in general'. So it has to be specified. This specification can be made with the help of an adjunct or limit or (*avachchedaka*) which qualifies the locus. This is known as *anuyogitāvachchedaka dharma*. (Let us abbreviate it as a.d.). If it is meant that the absence of the pot lies 'in this ground', the a.d. will be 'this-ground-ness' (*etat-bhūtalatva*). If it is meant that the absence of the pot lies in ground-in-general (i.e. the pot is nowhere on the earth), then the a.d. will be simply 'groundness' (*bhūtalatva*). This latter non-existence will be described as "a non-existence determined by the locusness which

3. *Trāyābhāvascha prathamābhāva rūpaḥ.*

4. *Yasmin abhāvah Sah anuyogī.*

5. *Bhūtalaniṣṭha-anuyogitā nirūpita abhāva.*

6. *Yasyābhāvah Sah pratiyogī.*

7. *Ghātaniṣṭha-pratiyogitāka abhāva.*

is limited by the specifying adjunct, groundness".⁸ The former non-existence will be described as "a non-existence determined by the locusness which is limited by the specifying adjunct 'this-ground-ness'".⁹

(iv) *Pratiyogitāvachchedaka Dharma* (p.d.) i.e. the delimiting adjunct which specifies the nature of the counterpart of non-existence. There is no pot on the ground. It is not clear whether the pot denied here is a particular pot (*Etat ghata*) or Pot-in-general (*Ghata Sāmānya*). Hence a specification is needed to show whether it is a case of generic absence (*Sāmānyābhāva*) or a specific absence (*Viśeṣābhāva*). This is done with the help of an adjunct (*avachchedaka*) which specifies the nature of the counterpart of the non-existence. If the non-existence is of 'Pot-in-general', the p.d. will be 'Potness' (*ghatātva*). If the non-existence is of a particular pot, the p.d. will be 'this-pot-ness' (*etat-ghatātva*). In other words, the former non-existence will be described as "a non-existence, the counter-part of which is limited by the adjunct of Potness";¹⁰ the latter will be described as "a non-existence, the counter-part of which is limited by the adjunct of 'this-pot-ness'".¹¹

(v) *Pratiyogitāvachchedaka Sambandha* (p.s.) i.e. the adjunct delimiting the relation of the counter-part of non-existence. There is no pot on the ground. This proposition may be interpreted in two ways: It may be taken to mean that (a) the pot does not exist by way of contact¹² i.e. the pot is not conjoined to the ground. (b) That the pot does not exist by way of inherence¹³ i.e. the pot is not inherent in the ground. In (a), the p.s. of non-existence will be the relation of conjunction, in (b) the p.s. will be the relation of inherence. In other words, (a) will be described as 'a non-existence, the counter-part of which is limited by the relation of conjunction'¹⁴ and (b) will be described as a non-existence, the counter-part of which is limited by the relation of inherence.¹⁵

8. *Bhūtalatvāvachchinna bhūtalaniṣṭha anuyogitā nirūpita abhāva.*

9. *Etat-bhūtalatvāvachchinna bhūtalaniṣṭha anuyogitā nirūpita abhāva.*

10. *ghatātva dharmāvachchinna ghataniṣṭha-pratiyogitāka abhāva.*

11. *etat ghatatvāvachchinna ghataniṣṭha pratiyogitāka abhāva.*

12. *Samyogena ghataḥ na asti.*

13. *Samavāyena ghataḥ na asti.*

14. *Samyoga Sambandhāvachchinna pratiyogitāka abhāva.*

15. *Samavāya Sambandhāvachchinna pratiyogitāka abhāva.*

Thus a negative proposition like 'There is no pot on the ground', can lend itself to the following ways of interpretation, viz.

- (i) There is no pot on any ground by way of contact.
- (ii) There is no pot on this ground by way of contact.
- (iii) There is not this pot on any ground by way of contact.
- (iv) There is not this pot on this ground by way of contact.
- (v) There is no pot on any ground by way of inherence.
- (vi) There is no pot on this ground by way of inherence.
- (vii) There is not this pot on any ground by way of inherence.
- (viii) There is not this pot on this ground by way of inherence.

The first of these will be described as a non-existence, the locusness of which is limited by 'Ground-in-general', the counterpartness of which is limited by 'Pot-in-general', and the relation of counterpart of which is limited by contact".¹⁶

The p.d. may be one or more than one. There is no pot (*Ghaṭahnasti*). In this case, there is absence of pot (*ghatābhāva*). The counterpart of this absence is 'pot' (*ghaṭa*). The p.d. is potness (*ghaṭatva*).

Now take another case. There is no blue pot (*Nilah ghaṭah nāsti*). Here we deny the pot as qualified by blueness. It is a qualified absence (*Viśiṣṭābhāva*). The counterpartness lies in 'Pot of blue colour' (*Nilatva-viśiṣṭa ghaṭa*). The p.d. here is potness (p) + blueness (b). What is denied is the conjunct p + b. Such negation is called *Ubhayābhāva* (i.e. absence of both taken together). The absence-of-blue-pot (*Nila ghaṭābhāva*) resides in all the loci where:

- (i) there is potness, but no blueness,
- (ii) there is blueness, but no potness,
- (iii) there is neither potness nor blueness.

In other words, *Ubhayābhāva* may be conditioned by the absence of the first term, of the second term or of both.

In the above example, the counterpart of absence can be either pot (p) or blue (b) or both (pb).

16. *Bhūtalatva-dharmāvachchinna-bhūtalaniṣṭha-anuyogitā nirūpita Samyoga Sambandhāvachchinna ghaṭatva dharmāvachchinna ghaṭaniṣṭha pratiyogitāka abhāva.*

That is to say, the p.d. lies in potness (*ghaṭatva*), blueness (*nīlatva*) or both (*ubhayatva*).

Symbolically speaking,

$$\sim (p. b) \equiv \sim p \vee \sim b$$

It can cover the following cases:

$$\begin{array}{ll} p. & \sim b \\ \sim p. & b \\ \sim p. & \sim b \end{array}$$

Thus we find the Naiyayikas applying the principle that the negation of conjunction is equivalent to alternative denial of the conjuncts.

The range of 'Blue Pot' is more limited than that of 'Pot' or that of 'Blue' taken separately. But when we come to the non-existence of Blue Pot ($\overline{BP}$), we find that its range is wider than that of $\overline{B}$ or $\overline{P}$ taken singly. For $\overline{BP}$ resides in all loci of $\overline{B}$ and $\overline{P}$, but not vice versa That is to say, $\overline{B}$ or $\overline{P}$ does not reside in all the loci of $\overline{BP}$. In other words, while 'Blue Pot' is the logical product of the two classes, Blue and Pot (i.e. $B \cap P$), the non-existence of Blue Pot is the logical sum of the two classes $\overline{B}$ and $\overline{P}$ (i.e. $\overline{B} \cup \overline{P}$).

Suppose, P is a generic term standing for 'Pot', and $p^1, p^2, p^3, \dots, p^n$ are specific terms standing for the pot of Devadatta, the pot of Brahmadata, the pot of Yajnadatta, etc., then the sum total of $p^1, p^2, p^3, \dots, p^n$ will be equal to P. Now take the case of absences. The heap of specific absences, eg, $\sim p^1, \sim p^2, \sim p^3, \dots, \sim p^n$ is known as *Abhāvakūta*. Here, every locus of $\sim p^1$ is not a locus of $\sim P$, but that which is a locus of $\sim p^1, \sim p^2, \sim p^3, \dots, \sim p^n$ will be a locus of $\sim P$. That is to say,

$$\sim p^1 \cap \sim p^2 \cap \sim p^3 \dots \cap \sim p^n \equiv \sim P$$

The Naiyayikas express this by saying that the counterpartness to the heap of specific absences is limited by the class character.¹⁷

The relation between P and p^1 is one of pervasion (*Vyāpti*). P pervades p^1, p^2 etc. That is to say, wherever there is p^1 or p^2

17. *Viśeṣābhāva Kūṭānām Sāmānyadharmāvachchinna pratiyogitākatvam.*

etc., there is P. Thus p^1, p^2 etc. are pervadends (*Vyāpya*) and P is the pervader (*Vyāpaka*). But this relation is reversed in the case of negation. $\neg P$ does not pervade $\neg p^1, \neg p^2$ etc, but is pervaded by them. Hence, the absence of p^1 does not imply the absence of P. But when we take the entire heap of absences, the denial of all specifics taken together amounts to the denial of the General. In short $(p^1 + p^2 + p^3 + \dots + p^n) \equiv P$. That is why the Naiyayikas regard P as the counterpart of the heap of absences ($\neg p^1, \neg p^2$ etc.).

Now let us take another case. The pot is either blue or red. The above proposition is an alternative proposition. It is true if one of the alternatives (*anyatara*) is true, it is false if none of the alternatives is true. The negation of both alternatives is called *anyatarābhāva*.

The Naiyayikas define *Anyatara* as that which possesses a mutual absence of which the counterpartness is limited by two mutual absences.¹⁸ According to this definition, the proposition:

The pot is either blue or red (*Ghaṭaḥ nīla rakto'yaḥ anyatarah*) will mean that "the pot possesses that which is different from *that which is both* different from blueness and redness". In short, either blueness resides in the pot or redness resides in the pot.

The negation of such an alternative proposition amounts to the denial of both the alternatives; (*anyatarābhāva*), i.e. The Pot is neither blue nor red.

Symbolically: $\sim (b \vee r) \equiv \sim b \cdot \sim r$

The Naiyayikas thus apply the principle that the contradictory of an alternative proposition is a conjunctive proposition (i.e. the denial of alternation is equivalent to a conjunction of denials).

A comparative study is apt to reveal that many formulas of mathematical logic are applied or tacitly assumed in Navya Nyāya.

18. *Bhedavayāvachchinna pratiyogitāka bhedavat.*

Book Reviews

(1) *Great Thoughts of Great Men or Ideas and Ideals*: By the late Principal Sain Das; pp. 208 + xxi. Price Rs. 3.50. S.U. Series-26.

(2) *The Religion of the Buddha And Its Relation to Upanishadic Thought*: By Sri Bahadur Mal; pp. 310 + xvi; Price Rs. 4.50; S. U. Series-27.

Both the works published by Vishweshwarananda Vedic Research Institute, Hoshiarpur.

(1) This posthumously published work of the author deals, as the title suggests, with great thoughts of great men, their ideas and ideals. But it is not a mere mechanical collection of such thoughts and ideas. The author, who led a dedicated life, himself tried, during his life-time, to live these high ideas and ideals. This fact considerably enhances the value of the work, saves it from becoming purely didactic, and adds to its inspiring and ennobling effect.

The first section deals with *Spiritual Realization*. It is in a way foundational to the subsequent sections. It formulates the end to which the subsequent sections become the means. The ideal of spiritual realization enunciated here is no other than the ideal of self-realization to be found in the Upaniṣads and the Gita. Other sections of the book are: — *Outlook on Life and Death*; *Art of Living*; *Happiness*; *Education*; *Social and National Well-being*. In these sections we find an emphasis on a balanced, healthy and an all-round development of man. No side of life is neglected here and no side is unduly emphasized. This surely is the traditional ideal of India which aims at an all-sided development of man's personality culminating in the highest spiritual realization, the realization of the Self which is the ultimate Reality. Young and old, man and woman, stand to read this book with profit.

(2) Various books have been written and are being written on Buddhism. In this plethora of works Sri Bahadur Mal's book stands to serve a distinct purpose. Firstly, we get in the space of a little more than three hundred pages concentrated information, which is brought up-to-date, on the subject. No item of importance has escaped the author's notice. Secondly, the author's

main concern has been to show that Buddhism is in no way alien to Hinduism. It arose from and ultimately disappeared in Hinduism. It borrowed a good deal from Hinduism and also enriched the parent religion. This should help in removing the misunderstanding that Buddhism as a religion has nothing to do with Hinduism.

The book itself consists of an *Introduction* and three parts. The *Introduction* supplies information on the background for the rise of Buddhism. Part I deals with the life of Buddha, the fundamentals of Buddhism and a comparative study of Buddhism and the Upaniṣads. Part II deals with the *Development of Buddhism*. Part III deals with the propagation of Buddhism outside India, its decline and disappearance from the land of its origin, its present revival, etc. An appendix gives information on the literature on Buddhism.

We must, however, draw the attention of the author to three things which may be called our notes of dissent. (1) We read in the book that Gautama Buddha was born in 564 B.C. (P. 59) and that his *Nirvāṇa* took place in 544 B.C. (P. 82). This makes Buddha's life-span of twenty years only! This obvious but unfortunate error in printing does not find a place in the long list of the *Corrigenda*.

(2) Our author sees "a little vagueness in the Upaniṣads as regards the ultimate fate of the soul after the attainment of liberation; that is, whether it is completely absorbed into Brahman or retains some sort of self-feeling even after emancipation" (P. 15). In this connection the author quotes with approval Sri Radhakrishnan's view that 'The song of the individual is not lost in the music of the world march'. It seems to us the vagueness lies in the author's understanding of the subject and not in the Upaniṣads themselves. The author's position on this subject is self-contradictory, because, according to him, the Upaniṣads declare the absence of difference in the Ultimate Reality (P. 20) and 'the Jiva attains complete union with Brahman' (P. 21). This makes the individuality of the individual along with its song and the music of the world a product of nescience, which is dispelled by the cancellation of its root—the primal Ignorance, through right knowledge.

(3) Lastly, according to the author, there was no *Māyāvāda* in the original Vedānta of the Upaniṣads. "Belief in *Māyāvāda* is the direct result of the influence of Buddhist Idealism on Hindu thought and practice" (P. 289). This seems to us to be a wrong

view of the matter. Vedānta of the Upaniṣads without *Māyā* is like *Hamlet* without the Prince of Denmark. This view is endorsed by all the eminent scholars of the Upaniṣads. Sri R. D. Ranade, for example, concludes his refutation of the opposite view with the following exhortation: "...let no man stand up and say that we do not find the traces of the doctrine of *Māyā* in the Upaniṣads!"¹ Sri Prabhu Datta Śhastrī has dealt at length on this topic in his book entitled *The Doctrine of Māyā*. In a more recent work, *The Cultural Heritage of India Vol. I*, the learned editors have pointed out that even the *R̥gveda* (not to speak of the Upaniṣads) uses the terms *Māyā* and *Rupa* 'precisely in their vedantic sense'.² We hope these matters will be reconsidered by the author in course of time. We have no hesitation for the present to conclude that Sri Bahadur Mal has given us a useful book on the subject.

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
Popular Talks on Psychological Topics: by Prem Nath, M.A., Ph.D., P.E.S., Govt. Training College, Jullundur; Vishvesvarananda Vedic Research Institute, Hoshiarpur, 1959: Pp. 141; Rs. 2.50.

This book is a collection of the writer's talks, broadcasted from the All India Radio, Jullundur, and some of his articles published in *The Tribune*. The writer couches his talks in the technical idiom of the Freudian psychology. One has to undergo a sufficient training in the Freudian psychology to bear such shocking statements as, the child's "commingling of love and hate is sexual in character", "each of us is a potential criminal", "genius is the outcome of ill-health, neurosis and intense mental conflicts", "religion is the product of sex repression", etc.

The book sheds light on various topics to which the assumption of the Unconscious has any relevance. And though Shri Prem Nath recognises the importance of the Freudian interpretation of the Unconscious, he keeps himself free from this fashionable interpretation. This is seen when he is dealing with genius. So far as the popular explanation goes, it may be true to say that "the work creates the genius rather than genius the work, for work becomes an obsessional necessity to charge off mental tensions and to preserve sanity." But the difficulty arises, as the writer himself points out, when we are considering the cases of 'gifted children'. For

1. A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy p. 228.
2. pp. 1-11.

Q57-2, 212-5
N60-32-4



no one would believe that a child of four is a full-fledged neurotic. John Stuart Mill could read Greek and write beautifully-worded letters at the age of four.

The writer has not merely kept a theoretical aim but also a practical aim in writing this book. For example, while writing about mental conflicts he points out that there is no professional efficiency co-ordinated with cheerfulness in those "who follow the simple logic of aping other people." "The mental health and output of work of those people who follow their natural bents are very high."

The writer has also justified philosophy and religion on psychological grounds. The philosophies which teach that "the difference between life and death is only a matter of two different phases of the universal process" remove from our mind the fear of death. While justifying religion he quotes Voltaire saying "If God does not exist, it would be necessary to invent him"; likewise Jung thinks, "the belief in God is prophylactic against neurosis. And when belief in personal immortality is added to the belief in God it fortifies the individual against all pathological condition that the fear of death occasions."

The writer has presented us with a very good introductory book for the advanced study of abnormal social and educational psychology.

Indian Institute of Philosophy

SURESH CHANDRA.

Books Received

1. *The Nava-Nalanda — Mahavihara Research Publication, Vol. I.* Edited by Satkari Mookerjee, the Director, Nalanda.
2. *A Dictionary of Thought*, by Dagobert D. Runes, published by Philosophical Library, New York, price \$5/-
3. *Logical Positivism*, edited by A. J. Ayer, published by The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, price \$6/75 c.
4. *Ethics*, by K. N. Kar, published by Indian Publicity Society, Calcutta. Available from: Miss Gita Kar, 221/4, Netaji Subhas Road, Howrah, Bengal.

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