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Ch. I of Lokapalasabhāparva (Mbh Bk. II Ch. V)—
A Critical Study

By

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Lokapālasabhāparva (henceforth LSP) is a part of Sabhāparva of Mahābhārata. It has 8 chapters. The first of these chapters deals with political exhortations of Nārada to Yudhisthira at Indra-prastha, the capital of the moiety of the ancestral kingdom received by the Pāṇḍavas from Dhṛtarāṣṭra. The chapter under study has 129 verses. The first 16 are introductory. Out of the remaining 113 verses, 110 deal with the talk of Nārada.¹ 2 of the remaining 4 verses refer to some questions raised by Yudhisthira² and the remaining 2 deal with the remarks of Vaiśampāyana³, the narrator of MBH to Janamejaya.⁴

The speciality of this exhortation lies in its being interrogatory in form. Nārada is represented here as having asked a number of questions to Yudhisthira which also in a way described the political and administrative institutions of an ideal state. However, it appears probable that the institutions referred to here bear to some extent the nucleus of the actual political arrangements current at some period in ancient India. If so, it is very necessary to discover their period. Such a study is likely to yield an independent chronological clue to fix the time of some of the political institu-

1. All the citations from Mahabharata are taken from Gita Press edition.


2. All the citations from Lokapalasabhāparva are cited in verses only, verses 10, 101 etc.

verses 17 to 111, 113, 115 to 128, 129.

verses 112, 128.

verses 114, 127.

MS I/60/22.



tions as links in the evolution of the administrative system in ancient India.

An attempt of this type will necessarily be double-forked, viz.,
(1) to fix the time of this chapter; and
(2) to depict its the political and administrative institutions.
The present article deals with both these aspects..

* * *

(1) *Time of Chapter I of Lokapālasabhāparva*

The absence of any reference to the ten-incarnations of Viṣṇu renders the task of the fixation of the time of this chapter circuitous. Only two types of clues can help us, viz., (I) the epithets used for king, prince, ministers, etc.; and (II) the other circumstantial evidence.

Epithets used in the chapter :—

The epithets used of the king in this chapter are “Naradeva”,⁵ ‘Prthvipati’,⁶ ‘Rājana’⁷ and Rājā.⁸ All these epithets,⁹ along with many others, were current in the days of Vidura Nīti also,¹⁰ which, according to me, belongs to III cent. A.D.^{10a} The epithets ‘Mahārāja’¹¹ and ‘Rājana’¹² were used by the

5. Verse 18.

6. Verse 57.

7. Verses 67, 120, 126.

8. Verses 81, 116.

9. Verse 129.

10. In Viduranīti (MBH X Bk. V chs. 33-40) the following epithets are used for the king :

(a) Maharaja : 33/6, 71; 36/68.

(b) Raja Verse following 33/15 (found only in the southern version); 33/53, 80.

(c) Rajan : 33/39, 47, 58, 63, 64, 82, 89; 34/5, 35, 59, 77; 35/6; 36/55, 67, 70, 72; 37/15, 20, 45, 51, 64.

(d) Mahipati : 34/51.

(e) Narendra : 36/74; 37/21.

(f) Rajendra : 33/4; 34/86; 35/39; 37/1; 39/19 .

(g) Naradhipa : 33/7, 14.

(h) Rajasttam : 35/12.

10a. See Tiwari : Vidura Nīti — A Cultural and Political Study (*Jour. Ind. Hist.*, 1958, Dec.).

11. *Epigraphia Indica* X/107.

12. *Ibid.*, X/104.

Kushan kings also. And their use continued in the pre-Gupta and the first half of Gupta periods as well. Kālidāsa used ‘Narapati’ and ‘Rājana’ along with other grandiloquent ones, viz., ‘Samrāta’, ‘Cakravarti’, ‘Apratistha’, ‘Ashyavikrama’, ‘Bhaṭṭāraka’,¹³ etc. The latter ones are neither found in Vidura Nīti or in the chapter under study. This suggests that both of these are pre-Kālidāsa in time. Kālidāsa, according to me, belongs to the middle of V century A.D.¹⁴ Vidura Nīti falls in III cent. A.D. So the present chapter should fall between III cent. A.D. (the time of Vidura Nīti) and middle of V cent. A.D. (the time of Kālidāsa),

13. Saletore : *Life in the Gupta Age*, p. 231.

14. The time of Kālidāsa can be convincingly fixed with the aid of the mythological clues. Kālidāsa mentions Rāma as an incarnation of Viṣṇu in *Raghuvamśa* (X/44). Rāma was deified in IV cen. A. D. (Tiwari : *Indian Iconography and Mythology* (Anand, 1957), pp. 13-14). *Raghuvamśa* also mentions the banishment of Sītā, the birth of Lava and Kuśa in the hermitage of Vālmikī, the Aśvamedha sacrifice of Rāma, the fight between the forces of Rāma on one hand and Lava and Kuśa on the other, the descent of Sītā in the netherworld. This mythology flourished in the period later than *Uttarakāṇḍa* of Vālmikī *Rāmāyaṇa*. *Uttarakāṇḍa* mentions the exile of Sītā, birth Lava and Kuśa in the ‘āsrama’ of Vālmikī, the Aśvamedha sacrifice of Rāma and the descent of Sītā in the lower regions but not the fight between Lava and Kuśa with the army of Rāma. *Uttarakāṇḍa* was added Vālmikī *Rāmāyaṇa* in about the end of IV IV or the beginning of V cen. A. D. (Tiwari : *The Time of Uttarakanda Bk. VII Val. Rām.*) Jou. Ori. Institute, Baroda, IV/2-3, pp. 149-56). The story of this fight is for the first time mentioned in *Padma Purāṇa*. So the time of the interpollation of this episode in *Padma P.* should be subsequent to that of *Uttarakāṇḍa*. As Kālidāsa was only the reproducer of this episode and not its creator (as he could not have done so), his time should be subsequent to both *Uttarakāṇḍa* and the interpollation of this episode in *Padma P.* Hence I believe that the time of Kālidāsa should be fixed in cir. II half of cen. A.D. (rather towards the lower end than the upper). In other words, his time *mainly* falls in the reign of Skandagupta and his successors. V. Smith (*The Early History of India* (Oxford, 1924), p. 212 n. 1) also holds that Kālidāsa began his career in the days of Chandragupta II and continued to flourish under Kumargupta and possibly even upto the accession of Skandagupta. I would suggest that it should be *slightly* modified as suggested above. Similarly, the slight modification in the view of Hoerule (Jou. R.A.S., 1909, p. 112) (which places the time of Kālidāsa in I half of VI cen. A.D.) would come near to the correct time of this poet. So it might be said that Kālidāsa began his career about the close of the reign of Kumargupta and continued his literary activities under Skandagupta and his successors. ‘Kumārsambhava’, as such, possibly, belongs to the period of the beginning of his career. ‘*Raghuvamśa*’ belongs to a later date.

i.e., in cir. II half of IV cent. A.D. The word 'Kumāra'¹⁵ used for the prince in this chapter was also in use since the Kushan rule.¹⁶ And as such does not contradict this conclusion.

The ministers are indiscriminately called 'Mantri',¹⁷ 'Āmātya'¹⁸ and 'Pradhāna'¹⁹ in this chapter. All these words are used as synonyms. No distinction between Mantri and Āmātya suggested by Arthasāstra is maintained here. Kautilya held that Mantri meant 'the chief minister' and Āmātya simply 'a minister'.²⁰ In Vidura Niti also the word 'Āmātya' is used eight times²¹ and 'Saciva' only once.²² However, here again the distinction between these two words is almost nil.²³ So it can be safely inferred that by the time of Vidura Niti the words 'Mantri' and 'Saciva' had come to be treated as interchangeable. This inference is corroborated by Amarakośa also which says that 'Dhīśacava' was called 'Mantri', and other 'Karmasacivas' were Āmātyas'. In other words, 'Mantri', 'Saciva' and 'Āmātya' were gradually becoming synonyms after the Mauryas and more correctly after Kautilya. However, one thing to be seriously noticed is that the word 'Saciva' in Vidura Niti had not been used in the present chapter. Kālidāsa uses the word 'Āmātya' only^{24 & 25} So the chapter under study falls after Vidura Niti but precedes Kālidāsa in time. This again suggests the second half of IV cent. A.D. as the time of this chapter. This conclusion is further supported by the use of the word 'tīrtha' in this chapter.²⁶ Kautilya used it for the first time.²⁷ Kālidāsa was the last person to use this word in the description of an *actual* administration.²⁸ So the time of the chapter under study necessarily falls in pre-Kālidāsa period.

15. Verses 34, 77.

16. Indian Antiquary XXI/225.

17. Verses 27, 45, 87.

18. Verses 24, 28, 37, 44, 107.

19. Verse 51.

20. Kautilya: Arthasāstra I/10.

21. Ch. 34/56, 57; 35/39; 36/32; 37/23, 53; 38/20; 39/37.

22. 38/19.

23. Even Kautilya uses them as synonyms (vide Arthasāstra I/7 & 8).

24 & 25. Saletore, *op. cit.*, p. 253.

26. Verse 38.

27. Arthasāstra I/12.

28. Raghu. XVI/68.

Circumstantial evidence:

There are two circumstantial clues to support this conclusion—viz., (1) the somewhat higher tone of public and private morality than found in Vidura Niti and (2) the absence of any reference to camel corps in military organisation. The perusal of Vidura Niti convinces a person that it was the product of a period when rank public and private immorality corroded the life of the people from top to bottom. The fact that it belongs to III cent. A.D. helps to find out that it was all due to the great social and moral transition which was taking place at that time. The society of Vidura Niti characterises a period when the Buddhist's hegemony was slowly coming to an end and the Brahmanical revival was steadily taking place. The periods of great transitions are always the periods of great confusion in all respects. The institutions described in the chapter under study suggest their origin in a period when society was politically, economically and morally stabilized. And none except the Guptas can claim to have restored social, religious and political stability to India, lost after the fall of the imperial Mauryas. So the chapter under examination should be fixed in a period when the Guptas had succeeded in consolidating their own position and also the Brahmanical religion. This suggests that its time should come somewhere about mid-Gupta period. And again, the absence of any reference in the present chapters to camel corps in the military units, in use in the days of Harṣa,^(28a) might also be taken to indicate its pre-Harṣa origin, i.e., its birth in Gupta period.

So I suggest that the nucleus of the political institutions described in the present chapter may be regarded as having its physical basis in the Gupta institutions of about the end of IV cent A.D. However, it is far from the mind of the author to be very dogmatic about this period though it is clear that he believes that this period cannot be stretched *very much* either way.

(2) Political institutions in Ch. I of Lokapālasabhāparva

King:

Training and qualifications: The king was trained for his exalted office right from his childhood. Teachers skilled in

28a. Saletore, *op.cit.*, p. 262.

Dharma and 'Śāstras' coached him along with principal warriors.²⁹ This clearly points out the change in the mode of education of the princes. We know that Kṛṣṇa³⁰ and Dronācārya³¹ went to the 'āśrama' of their 'gurus' for instruction and other students, both rich and poor, were there to receive education along with them. Similarly, the Pāṇḍavas and the Kauravas also received instruction at the hands of Dronācārya,³² possibly at his residence. The instance of the refusal of Eklavya by Dronācārya³³ and the admission of other princes in the school³⁴ point to the possibility that all people could not have joined this school. And again, the self-mutilation of Eklavya, contrived by Dronācārya³⁵ for the benefit of Arjuna,³⁶ proves that everything possible was done to prevent others from competing successfully with the princes. The provision of the education of the prince along with eminent warriors in the chapter under study is the mid-way between the mode of education of Krishna in a public school and the seclusion and comparative loneliness in which Candrapida of Bāṇa Bhaṭṭa³⁷ received his education. Nothing is known about the syllabus covered by the prince in his school. However, the reference to (Dharma) Śāstras,³⁸ economics,³⁹ politics,⁴⁰ ethics⁴¹ archery,⁴² mechanics,^{42a} knowledge of different poisons,⁴³ use of various weapons,^{43a} subjects contained in books dealing with horses, elephants, chariots⁴⁴ etc., suggest that they might have formed the subjects of prince's tuition. The list of subjects given

29. Verse 34.

30. Cf. Sudāmā.

31. MBH I/129/42, I/130/8, 44.

32. *Ibid.*, I/131/4.

33. *Ibid.*, I/132/32.

34. *Ibid.*, I/131, 11, 30. The only exception to this rule is the presence of Karna in this schol (*Ibid.*, I/131/11).

35. I/131/56-58.

36. *Ibid.*, I/131/60.

37. Bāṇa Bhaṭṭa: *Kādambarī* (Tr. Bidding), p. 60.

38. Verse 34.

39. Verse 117.

40. cf. Nāgarikasutra in verse 122.

41. cf. the six qualities of a king, referred to in verse 21, one of which was mastery in ethics.

42. cf. reference to Dhanurvedasutra and Yantrasutra in verse 122.

43. cf. Verse 123.

44. cf. Verse 121.

by Bāṇa Bhaṭṭa for the education of Candrāpīda⁴⁵ though imposing is unconvincing. All of them could not have been covered by the pupil during his pupilship.

Even after attaining kingship the ruler was required to listen to the discourses of learned elderly persons, experts in religious lore and economics.⁴⁶ The king was expected to possess six qualities,⁴⁷ viz., oratory, capacity to talk without coming to point, mastery in logic, knowledge of history, foresight and mastery in ethics.⁴⁸ He was also to collect treatises dealing with elephants, horses, chariots,⁴⁹ archery, machines and political science.⁵⁰ He was to keep himself interested in all types of studies⁵¹ and give money to learned persons according to their merits.⁵²

Things king was expected to avoid :

The king was enjoined to avoid the following 14 vices,⁵³ viz., atheism falsehood, anger, pride, late doing of things, avoiding the company of learned persons, attachment to five sense organs, tendency to take decisions alone on State matters, advising with fools and those ignorant of practical politics, delay in starting actions already decided upon, failure to maintain the secrecy of state policy, failure to celebrate festivals and making war on all the enemies at the same time.^{53a} At another place the king is further enjoined to give up vices, viz., too much sleep, lethargy, fear anger, harshness and late doing of things.⁵⁴ The fact that the 7 vices,^{54a} viz., attachment to ladies,⁵⁵ drinking,⁵⁶ dice, hunting, severity in speech, extravagance, engagement in unjust gains, mentioned in Vidura Niti,⁵⁷ are omitted here is very striking.

45. Bāṇa Bhaṭṭa, *op.cit.*, pp. 60-61.

46. Verse 117.

47. Verse 34.

48. MBH (Gita Press edi.), p. 677, n. 1.

49. Verse 121.

50. Verse 97.

51. Verse 122.

52. Verse 54.

53. Verses 108-10.

54. Verse 126.

54a. Mārkaṇḍeya, P., *Vidura Niti* 33/91-92.

55. *Vidura Niti* 33/91, 104.

56. *Ibid.*, 33/92; 34/43.

57. *Ibid.*, 33/91-92.

(iii) *King and Dharma :*

It was the duty of the king to practise Dharma.⁵⁸ However, he was neither to sacrifice money for Dharma nor sacrifice Dharma for money nor sacrifice both money and Dharma for enjoyments.⁵⁹ The practice of Dharma consisted in following the ancestral traditions, based on three Vedas⁶⁰ about the respective functions of Brahman, Kṣatriya and Sudra.⁶¹ The observance of ancestral traditions was incumbent on a king as it was regarded as a means of increase in age and fame and also for the attainment of Dharma, Artha and Kāma.⁶² The king was expected to respect the Pīpal tree, ascetics, gods and his own caste-fellows.⁶³ It was expected that he should trace out, praise and honour publicly his benefactors.⁶⁴

(iv) *King and Brahmins :*

The Khoh copper-plate of Mahārāja Hastin (475-76 A.D.) records that he was the giver of thousands of cows, and elephants, and horses, and gold, and many lands; who was earnest in paying respect to (his) spiritual preceptor, and (his) father and mother; was extremely devoted to the gods and Brahmins.⁶⁵ Similarly in LSP also, along with his devotion to gods,⁶⁶ the king was enjoined to serve Brahmins.⁶⁷ The Brahmins were to be paid after being fed in his own presence with delicious and nourishing food by the king.⁶⁸ Puṇḍarikā and Vājapeya sacrifices were to be performed by the king⁶⁹ with the help of learned, wise and simple-hearted Brahmins on suitable occasions suggested by

58. *Ibid.*, 34/28.

59. Verse 19.

60. Verse 98.

61. Verse 18. cf. Abhijñāna Śākuntala (Surat, 1950), V/II/6 and Fleet: Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum (1837), I/232.

62. Verse 103.

63. Verse 101.

64. Verse 120.

65. Fleet, *op.cit.*, I/97.

66. Verse 101.

67. Verse 97.

68. Verse 99.

69. Verse 100.

them⁷⁰ (cf. Allahabad Inscription of Samudragupta⁷¹) because the fruition of the Vedic knowledge was believed to lie in sacrifices.⁷² The king was expected to give Brahmins grain, fruits and milk products for their religious rituals.⁷³ The king was also advised to get rid of mental distress by sharing the company of elder persons much in the same way as he relieved his physical ailments through medicine and dietetic regulations.⁷⁴ The saints were to be honoured like Brahmins, as one's own ancestors.⁷⁵ Nārada Samhitā also enjoins upon the king to honour the aged and the wise.⁷⁶

(v) *Daily routine of king :*

The king was expected to engage in activities pertaining to Dharma, Artha, Kama at the time prescribed for them by the *śāstras*,⁷⁷ viz., to perform religious rituals in the morning, to look after monetary matters in noon and to enjoy in night.⁷⁸ After 3 hours past in night he was to sleep for 6 hours⁷⁹ and enjoy at will.⁸⁰ However, he was not to lock himself in enjoyment after receiving distressing news.⁸¹ He was not expected to sleep at any other time.⁸² He was to wake up three hours before daybreak and then meditate on important matters.⁸³ He was never to waste his pre-noon time in drinking, dice or the company of ladies.⁸⁴ This suggests that, contrary to the admonition of Vidura Nīti, at any other time the king could do all these three things. At noon the monetary matters were to be looked into by summoning into royal presence both the accountant and the cashier

70. Verse 41.

71. Fleet, *op. cit.* I/12-15.

72. Verse 113.

73. Verse, 118. See also Khoh ins. of Mahārāja Hastin.

74. Verse 90.

75. Verse 97.

76. Nārada Samhitā III/2/33.

77. Verse 20.

78. MBH, p. 676, n.1 (quotation from Daksasmṛti is cited in its support in this note).

79. Verse 86.

80. Verse 17.

81. Verse 85.

82. Verse 29.

83. Verse 29, 86.

84. Verse 70.

with their registers.⁸⁵ As the daily routine of Candrāpida suggests, the crown-prince waited upon the king at noon, possibly, to assist him in these matters.⁸⁶ Nothing is mentioned about the items which engaged the king in the evening and the first quarter of the night. It is worth noting that the division of time suggested here does not agree with that of the Arthaśāstra.⁸⁷

(vi) *Royal Court:*

After finishing his bath and other morning duties, the king, bedecked with fine clothes and ornaments, appeared in the court with his ministers.⁽⁸⁸⁾ Several warriors, clad in apparels and well ornamented, were to be present around the king with drawn swords.⁸⁹ People with auspicious articles were always to be at hand near the king.⁹⁰ The clothes, perfumery, etc., to be used by the king were to be guarded by dependable persons, along with eatables for the royal consumption.⁹¹ As Kālidāsa refers to king attending the court of justice early in the morning,⁹² it appears that one of the business transacted in the court was the administration of justice.

(vii) *Royal family:*

The king was to protect the ladies of the royal harem, satisfy them by consolidations and assurances but neither trust them completely nor disclose any secrets to them.⁹³ They were to be treated simply as useful objects for enjoyment and begetting sons.⁹⁴ However, the fact that these ladies and princes-royal were powerful enough to tyrannize over the people can be inferred from the admonition that the king was to see that they did not do so.⁹⁵

85. Verse 73.

86. Bāṇa Bhaṭṭa, *op.cit.*, p. 74.

87. Kautilya, *op.cit.*, Bk. II/19.

88. Verse 87.

89. Verse 88.

90. Verse 102.

91. Verse 67.

92. Śāk., VI/7/9-10.

93. Verse 84.

94. Verse 113.

95. Verse 77.

Ministers of State

(i) *Qualifications:*

The ministers were regarded as one of the Prakṛti, i.e., elements of the state.⁹⁶ An elderly, dependable, pure-hearted, farsighted, descendent of a noble family, bearing love for the king was to be appointed as a minister.⁹⁷ He was to have keen memory, be brave, controlled in his senses, clever,^{98 & 99} without guile, follower of traditional policies and knower of the subtleties of time and place.¹⁰⁰ It was believed that the success of a king depended upon good advice which came from a good minister.¹⁰¹ The statement that a single capable minister could get unbounded wealth for his master or a prince¹⁰² suggests two things: (i) there were more than one minister, and (ii) sometimes ministers acted as regents for princes.

(ii) *Duties:—*

Ministers were expected to run the administration justly,¹⁰³ love their sovereign and be ever-ready to sacrifice their lives in the battlefield.¹⁰⁴ Unjust ministers, due to absence of the company of persons skilled in śāstras pocketed the wealth of honest persons by implicating them in false charges¹⁰⁵ and sometimes even inflicted death penalty on them to expropriate them of their riches.¹⁰⁶ This clearly corroborates the account of Dandin that some officers tried to grab the wealth of the accused by unfair means. And again, it is a clear evidence of the fact that ministers had judicial duties which empowered them to inflict capital punishment on the accused. It is reported that ministers received false complaints of theft from interested people against poor

96. Verse 23.

97. Verses 26-27.

98 & 99. Verse 37.

100. Verse 87.

101. Verse 27.

102. Verse 37.

103. Verse 45.

104. Verse 51.

105. Verse 105. cf. Dandin's account of Balabhadra and Ratnavallī (Dasa-kumāracarita: Rider Tr., pp. 176-77).

106. Verse 105.

persons who grew rich in a short time.¹⁰⁷ This again is in agreement with the account in *Sākuntla* that the State had to undertake investigations into the incomes of the people.¹⁰⁸

Other Officers and Employee of the State

At one place fourteen officers are referred to,¹⁰⁹ viz., provincial governor, commandant of the fort, chariot-in-charge, elephant-in-charge, cavalry-in-charge, infantry-in-charge, 'adhikari' (?), harem-in-charge, grainery-in-charge, 'śāstri', record-keeper and 'asu' (?).¹¹⁰ At another place 18 'tirthas' of the state are mentioned.¹¹¹ They were chief minister, Purohita, crown-prince, commander-in-chief, minister-in-charge of expenditure, headguard, Kotwal, mason-in-chief, chief priest, master of ceremonies, bearer of royal sceptre, commandant of the fort, administrator of the frontier region and forest-in-charge.¹¹² Persons to guard the articles of the royal use,¹¹³ weapons-in-charge,¹¹⁴ accountant,¹¹⁵ spies,¹¹⁶ policemen,¹¹⁷ village 'pañcas',¹¹⁸ town 'pañcas',¹¹⁹ state physician¹²⁰ and royal astrologer¹²¹ are also mentioned. The state physician was to be an expert in *Astāṅgacikitsā*,¹²² viz., an expert in the examination of pulse, stool, urine, tongue, eyes, colour of the skin, voice and temperature.¹²³ The royal astrologer was to be deft in reading of palms and soles, in the movements of the stars and their effects and capable of foretelling the evils and the

107. Verse 107.

108. Śāk. VI/1/1ff.

109. Verse 21.

110. MBH, p. 677, n. 3.

111. Verse 38.

112. MBH, p. 678, n.e.

113. Verse 67.

114. Verse 68.

115. Verse 73.

116. Verse 38.

117. Verse 83.

118. Verse 81.

119. Verse 82.

120. Verse 91.

120. Verse 91.

122. Verse 42.

122. Verse 91.

123. MBH, p. 672, col. 2, note.

removal thereof.¹²⁴ The fact that the king is advised to bribe the officers of the enemy¹²⁵ required him to watch his own officers from receiving bribes.¹²⁶ No officer was to be allowed to become powerful enough to act according to his own will, disobey the royal commands, control the entire war potential personally direct all the affairs of war.¹²⁷

Service rules:—

The king was to assign important work to chief persons, medium grade of work to medium type of persons and low grade of work to low type of persons.¹²⁸ The servants were to be paid adequately in the form both of salary and food.¹²⁹ Their payments were not to be inordinately delayed because offended servants were regarded as a source of great harm.¹³⁰ Extra resourcefulness of a servant resulting in a better work entitled him to both extra payment and some special honour.¹³¹ Greedy, thieves, enemies and those devoid of practical sense were not to be appointed.¹³² The statement that state employee was to be dismissed only after proper scrutiny of his conduct¹³³ allows an inference that there was great security in the state service for the employees.

Administration

The word 'Prānta' is used once in this chapter,¹³⁴ 'Pora' also once¹³⁵ and 'Rāṣṭra' twice.¹³⁶ This means that the state was called 'rāṣṭra' which was divided into 'Prāntas' which had several 'Poras', i.e., cities. Village was the basic unit of administration and five brave, wise and skilled persons were appointed by the king to carry on the administration of the village in an efficient manner.¹³⁷

124. Verse 42.

125. Verse 60.

126. Verses 21, 39.

127. Verse 52.

128. Verses 43, 75.

129. Verse 49.

130. Verses 49-50.

131. Verse 53.

132. Verse 76.

133. Verse 74.

134. Verse 82.

135. Verse 94.

136. Verses 94, 104. Viduranīti refers to 'Rāṣṭra' 3 times (ch. 33/43, 45; 37/30) and 'Rājya' 5 times (35/10, 11, 12, 27; 37/23).

137. Verse 61.

Similar arrangement was made for cities and border villages.¹³⁹ The police parties with army units visited accessible and inaccessible places in the kingdom to liquidate thieves and other anti-social elements.¹³⁹ It was a special responsibility of the king to protect the 'rāṣṭra', kingdom, from fire, snakes, epidemics, and 'rākṣasas'.¹⁴⁰

Finance

(i) Income:—

There were eight recognized sources for augmenting the state income,¹⁴¹ viz., extension of agriculture, protection to trade, construction of bridges, capturing of elephants, working of mines, taxes and rehabilitation of deserted areas. In other words, the land revenue formed only a part of the state income.¹⁴² The interest on the loan advanced to agriculturists was another source of income.¹⁴³ So was, possibly, war booty.¹⁴⁴ That proceeds from state enterprises also profited the treasury can be inferred from the advice to the king to invest money in undertakings which cost less and promised good returns.¹⁴⁵ The taxes were called 'Śulka' and the tax-collectors were known as 'Sulkopagīvi'.¹⁴⁶ The king was not only to guard the traders from the capricious tax-collectors¹⁴⁷ but also was to guard himself against the tendency to over-tax the people because, like chaste ladies insulting adulterous persons or pious beggars insulting sinful patrons, the subjects disrespected an over-taxing king.¹⁴⁸

(ii) Expenses:—

The maintenance of the king,¹⁴⁹ members of the royal, teachers, elders, traders, masons, poor persons in the state,¹⁵⁰ dependents

- 138. Verse 82.
- 139. Verse 83.
- 140. Verse 124.
- 141. Verse 22.
- 142. MBH, p. 677, n.4.
- 143. cf. Verse 79.
- 144. cf. Verse 65.
- 145. Verse 31.
- 146. Verse 115.
- 147. Verse 116.
- 148. Verse 46.
- 149. Verse 17.
- 150. Verse 72.

of persons who died or courted risk in the service of the king,¹⁵¹ blind, deaf, naimed, those without relatives, 'sanyāsins',¹⁵² stipends to scholars,¹⁵³ the 'Dakṣiṇā' to Brahmins¹⁵⁴ (cf. the Khoh inscription of Mahārāja Hastin¹⁵⁵ and the salary of the state servants were the charges upon the state treasury.¹⁵⁶ The Allahabad Inscription of Samudragupta also affirms that miserable, poor, beggars, afflicted, etc., were supported by the state.¹⁵⁷ Charity also formed an appreciable item of expenditure as it is clearly laid down that fruition of money lay in both enjoyment and charity.¹⁵⁸ Construction of tanks¹⁵⁹ and bridges¹⁶⁰ was also another source of expenditure. It is clearly laid down that king was not to stop the stipends of state-dependents through greed or other base reasons.¹⁶¹ However, the entire expenditure was to be limited to ¼ or ½ of the net income and never to exceed beyond ¾ of the state proceeds.¹⁵²

Agriculture and Trade

(i) Agriculture:—

It was the duty of the king to keep agriculturists satisfied.¹⁶³ For their benefit it was incumbent upon him to build tanks in all the parts of the state to prevent the destruction of the seeds i.e., crops of the agriculturists due to their abject dependence upon the vagaries of the monsoons.¹⁶⁴ In times of need each farmer was to be given some loan at 1% interest.¹⁶⁵ The state lands i.e., khālśā lands were to be cultivated by dependable, selfless and here-

- 151. Verse 55.
- 152. Verse 125.
- 153. Verse 54.
- 154. cf. Verse 99.
- 155. Fleet, *op.cit.*, I/97. See also Śāk. VI/1/8-9.
- 156. Verse 50.
- 157. Pub. Fleet, *op.cit.*, I/12ff.
- 158. Verse 113.
- 159. Verse 78.
- 160. The building of bridges was regarded as a means of increasing the state income (MBH, p. 677, n.4).
- 161. Verse 93.
- 162. Verse 71.
- 163. Verse 77.
- 164. Verse 78.
- 165. Verse 79.

ditary farm hands,¹⁶⁶ and this is a clear clue to infer that though theoretically the king might have been regarded as the lord of all land within his state in actuality his right extended to the khālsā lands only. In other words, the agriculturists were the owners, and not merely possessors, of their lands for all practical purposes. The king was required to look after the 'vārtā' within his state,¹⁶⁷ i.e., to look after agriculture, animal husbandry and trade.

(ii) Trade:—

The protection of trade was one of the chief recognized methods of increasing the state income and the king was required to pay great attention to trade along with agriculture and cattle-rearing. The traders were to be given money and grain¹⁶⁸ (in times of distress). Traders from distant lands¹⁶⁹ brought their wares for sale¹⁷⁰ and the king was required not only to protect them from capricious and avaricious officers¹⁷¹ but also to see that these officers collected only just dues from the traders.¹⁷¹ These traders, like all other people within the state, were required to keep themselves free from vices and remain devoted to the king.¹⁷² Slaves also formed an article of trade and the king was advised to purchase a learned man against a thousand fools.¹⁷³

Masons and Labourers

The importance of masons can be judged from the fact that they formed an important part of the equipment of the fort¹⁷⁴ and that the mason-in-chief was one of the eighteen 'tīrthas' of the state.¹⁷⁵ It was one of the important duties of the king to patronize them by not only offering them wealth and grain¹⁷⁶ (in the times of distress) but also by assigning them work to keep

- 166. Verse 33.
- 167. Verse 80.
- 168. Verse 72.
- 169. Verse 115.
- 170. Verse 116.
- 171. Verse 115.
- 172. Verse 23.
- 173. Verse 35.
- 174. Verse 36.
- 175. MBH., p. 678, n.1.
- 176. Verse 72.

them engaged at least during the whole period of monsoons.¹⁷⁷ This agrees with the statement in the Allahabad Inscription of Samudragupta that the state patronized art.¹⁷⁸ The state was also required to keep a special watch on the labourers in the state and never distrust them because the progress and richness of a state depended mainly on their co-operation.¹⁷⁹

Army

(i) Composition:

The army was called 'Bala'¹⁸⁰ and the commander-in-chief was called 'Senāpati'.¹⁸¹ The army was composed of four 'balas',¹⁸² i.e., units or wings, viz., infantry, cavalry, elephant corps and chariot corps. Each of these wings was further divided into groups and each such group was placed under a group leader.¹⁸³ That the army was not merely a military tool but was also a moral instrument is noticeable from two facts; firstly the person at its command, i.e., Senāpati, was not only to be brave and courageous but also wise, patient, pure, Kulīna (i.e., one coming from a respectable family), dexterous and joyful;¹⁸⁴ and secondly, the prominent warriors of the army were trained, along with the princes-royal, by persons deft in Dharma and Śāstras.¹⁸⁵ The army establishments consisted of 8 'aṅgas',¹⁸⁶ i.e., organs or component units, viz., cashier, store-keeper, physician, spies, 'Pācaka'(?), servants, clerks and guards.¹⁸⁷

(ii) Forts:—

The construction and protection of forts was one of the chief recognized method of increasing the income of the state¹⁸⁸ and

- 177. Verse 19.
- 177. Verse 119.
- 178. See note 155 above.
- 179. Verse 32.
- 180. Verses 48, 49, 60, 64, 94.
- 181. Verse 47.
- 182. Verse 64.
- 183. Verse 48.
- 184. Verse 47.
- 185. cf. verse 34.
- 186. Verse 64.
- 187. MBH., p. 680.
- 188. cf. *Ibid.*, p. 677, n.4.

the commandant of the fort was included amongst the seven elements¹⁸⁹ and the eighteen 'tirthas' of the state.¹⁹⁰ However, nothing is known about the description of the place regarded topographically suitable for the construction of forts. The king was enjoined to see that the forts were full of wealth, grains, weapons, water reservoirs, defensive and offensive machines, mason and archers.¹⁹¹

(iii) War:—

The king was advised to fight his enemies one by one and not to wage war on all of them together at the same time.¹⁹² Before commencing hostilities the king was, firstly, to secure his own kingdom against the enemy activities and, secondly, to use 'sāma', 'dāma', 'daṇḍa' and 'bheda' policies towards the enemies to prevent them from forming a general coalition against him. The principal warriors of the opposite camp were to be bribed and won over.¹⁹⁴ Similarly, the greedy but unpaid, egoistic but insulted, provokable and provoked, coward and terrified members of the enemy army were also to be won over.¹⁹⁵ At a suitable time the soldiers were to be paid in advance before the war.¹⁹⁶ The hostilities were to be commenced when unfavourable symptoms afflicted the enemy. These symptoms were of two types: (i) Human and (ii) Divine. The human symptoms arose out of fools, thieves, enemies, people dear to the king and from subjects terrified by the greed of their sovereign. The divine symptoms were fire, flood, disease, famine and epidemics.¹⁹⁷ The attack was to be delivered after seducing the loyalty of the subjects of the enemy¹⁹⁸ either at the time of famine or harvesting season.¹⁹⁹

189. cf. *ibid.*, p. 678, n.5.

190. cf. *ibid.*, p. 678, n.1.

191. Verse 36.

192. cf. verse 109.

193. Verse 62.

194. Verse 60.

195. cf. MBH, p. 680, n.3.

196. Verse 59.

197. cf. MBH, p. 680, n.3.

198. cf. verse 66.

199. Verse 65. cf. Märk, P., 27/18

(iv) Field Strategy:—

In the battlefield the army was to be arranged on principle of 'twelve groups'.²⁰⁰ The army units were to be dispersed in the following manner: before the king there were two batches of the enemy of the enemy, two batches of the friends of the enemy of the enemy, two batches of the friends of the friends of the enemy of the enemy. These six batches were called 'Vijigīṣu'. Just behind 'Vijigīṣu' two batches were stationed: one of them was called 'Pārṣnigrāha' which protected the back of the front six-group formation and the other one was called 'Ākranda' which encouraged them to fight well. 'Ākranda' and 'Pārṣnigrāha' were supported by two batches—one for each—and were called 'Āsāra', one at the flank of 'Vijigīṣu' and other at the extreme and thus two units were posted and were called 'Madhyama' and 'Udāsīna' respectively. All these units numbered 12 and this whole unit was called Pārṣnimūla.²⁰⁰ As for making war, so also for making peace, king was to wait for suitable occasion.²⁰¹

Dealings with enemy and neighbour States

A king had to take two lines of action while dealing with his enemies: (a) to guard his own secrets and (b) to weaken and eliminate the enemy. As the king was advised not to decide state matters himself,²⁰² similarly he was asked not to advise with too many persons to keep the decisions secret and prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy²⁰³ before their purpose was served.²⁰⁴ He had to watch his own ministers and foil the attempt of the enemy agents to obtain the state secrets through them.²⁰⁵

The king was always to strive to make himself endeared to the neighbouring potentates.²⁰⁶ The friends, neutrals and ene-

200. cf. MBH, p. 680, n.1.

200a. cf. verse 59.

201. Verse 30, 108.

202. Verse 30. See also Märk, P., 27/6.

203. Verse 30. See also Märk, P., 27/6.

204. Verse 34.

205. Verse 24. See also Märk, P., 27/7.

206. Verse 96.

mies were to be treated by the king according to their merits.²⁰⁷ Without the knowledge of the enemy and with great caution and industry the king was to watch all the moves of his enemies.²⁰⁸ The 18 'tirthas' of the enemy state were always to be watched upon through spies.²⁰⁹ The king who had controlled his own senses was alone regarded capable of undertaking subjugation of his enemy who was a slave to his own senses.²¹⁰ An enemy once weakened was never to be allowed to regain his former power either through diplomacy or military action or both.²¹¹ Even the use of poison was allowed to extirpate the enemy.²¹² An enemy who sought refuge with the king due to fear or loss of wealth or defeat was to be protected like one's own son.²¹³ This advice directly contradicts the advice of Vidura to Dhṛtarāstra that the enemy once under control was never to be spared alive.²¹⁴ And again, this reflects the practice of Samudragupta who during his southern march, subdued his enemies but did not extirpate them.

Justice

It is clearly stated that thieves, the greedy, princes and ladies of the royal family troubled people.²¹⁵ It was suspected that bribe induced police to let off thieves, caught red handed with stolen articles.²¹⁶ Even innocent persons after their release offered bribe to officers.^{216a} State officials implicated honest persons in theft charges for their money and sometimes inflicted capital punishment on them for this end.²¹⁷ Officers were addicted to drinking.^{217a} False complaints alleging theft were lodged by interested persons against honest persons who grew out into riches from

207. Verse 25.

208. Verse 39.

209. Verse 38.

210. Verse 61.

211. Verse 95.

212. Verse 95.

213. Verse 56.

214. MBH, V/38/29.

215. Verse 77. See also Śāk. VI/1/27-28.

216. Verse 106.

216a. Śāk. VI/1/60-61.

217. Verse 105.

217a. Śāk. VI/1/65-66.

poverty in short time.²¹⁸ The king was advised to act like 'Yama-rāja' with the guilty,²¹⁹ i.e., to act most impartially and dispense evenhanded justice.^{219a} The punishment was to rest on the sanctions of the Vedas²²⁰ and the king was not to irritate his subjects by harsh punishments.²²¹

King and his Subjects

The behaviour of the king with his subjects was to be intimate and indiscriminatory so that the latter may trust him as their father and mother.²²² He was not to cause anger or sorrow to any one.²²³ The persons coming to seek favour or petitioning against the forfeiture of their stipends were not to be disregarded by the king.²²⁴ He was expected to be specially vigilant to foil the attempt of his enemies to bribe his subjects into a hostile combination against their sovereign.²²⁵ The conclusion amounts to the advice of Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa that a king should secretly watch over his ministers, family-members and subjects through spies²²⁶

218. Verse 107.

219. Verse 89.

219a. Mārkaṇḍeya, P., 27/24.

220. Verse 123.

221. Verse 45.

222. Verse 57.

223. Verse 102.

224. Verse 92.

225. Verse 94.

226. Mārkaṇḍeya, P., 27/26.

The International Extensions of Political Conspiracy as Illustrated by the Ghadr Party

BY

JOHN W. SPELLMAN

One of the striking features of the Indian independence movement was the prevalence of terrorist conspiracies. This was certainly not a new weapon in the arsenal of political revolutionary methods. The American, French, Irish, Russian—indeed practically all violent revolutions have used this technique in varying degrees. However I think that India gives us the first major example of what has now become practically a *sine qua non* of revolutions—international conspiracy. Hitherto, the existence of terrorist conspiracies has not assumed either the importance or the extensions in political theory that it has since.

In India, both religious objectives and political aspirations combined with various other factors to produce these movements. One suspects, however, that in many cases, religion was a disguise calculated to recruit members for the more naked political goals.

It was in the Poona district of the presidency of Bombay that terrorism had its first well-defined beginnings. Ganapati and Sivaji festivals had been partially responsible for the great Bombay riot of 1893 between the Hindus and Muslims. This was not without political overtones. Balgangadhar Tilak, a Maratha Brahman, had found in Sivaji a historical figure who had defended Hinduism from a foreign power—the Muslims. The analogy was clear enough. Just as Sivaji had defended Hinduism from foreigners (Muslims) in his day, so too would earnest Hindus defend Hinduism from foreigners (English) in the present day. Damodar and Balakrishna Chapekar, two Chitpavan Brahman brothers, founded "The Society for the Removal of Obstacles to the Hindu Religion" in order to give military training to Hindus.

In 1897, there was a violent outbreak of plague in Poona. Among the measures introduced by the government to deal with the plague was a system of house to house visitations and the

compulsory evacuation of plague-infested houses.¹ These regulations undoubtedly imposed hardships on many people and in his newspaper, *Kesari*, Tilak made a number of accusations against the government and, in particular, Mr. Rand, the Plague Commissioner. His campaign was violent and inflammatory. Intense alarm and resentment grew steadily and Mr. Rand, together with a British officer who happened to be in the carriage following, was murdered in the streets of Poona.² Tilak, who had advocated political violence, was sentenced to imprisonment for printing seditious matter and the murderer and his accomplices were executed, but two brothers who gave information which led to the arrest of the assassins were subsequently murdered, and the life of a police officer who took part in the investigation was unsuccessfully attempted.³

There was a general lull in extreme political activities until about 1905 when Shyamaji Krishnavarma, also a Bombay man, a graduate of Balliol and a barrister, went to London where he founded the India Home Rule Society and became its President. In his paper, *The Indian Sociologist*, he openly advocated assassination as a political weapon. Close liaison was maintained with the secret society in Nasik founded by Ganesh Savarkar and plotting began. Krishnavarma offered scholarships to Indian students going to India and Vinayak Savarkar, a graduate of Bombay University became one of his recruits. In 1899, Savarkar brothers were leaders of the Mitra-mela, a society started in that year for the purpose of celebrating Ganapati festivals. In 1906, Krishnavarma opened the "India House" which became the London centre for terrorist conspiracies.

Lectures were delivered on the construction of bombs and by the use of this information Sir William Curzon-Wyllie was murdered in London by Madan Lal Dhingra, a young Punjabi member of the organization, who was later executed. Krishnavarma stated that he regarded the youth as a martyr for Indian Independence. Meanwhile, Ganesh was tried for sedition in India by Mr. Jackson,

1. *Terrorism in India*—an address by Sir Charles Tegart from United Empire Journal, Vol. xxiii, London, 1932, p. 660.
2. *Idem*.
3. *India As I Know It, 1885-1925*, Michael O'Dwyer, London, 1925 p. 129.

District Magistrate of Nasik. Shortly after the trial, Jackson attended a farewell party given in his honour, and farewell it was, since he too was assassinated.

Suspensions were quite naturally aroused in London authorities after such events and *The Indian Sociologist* became proscribed literature. Krishnavarma moved to Paris and began to renew operations there. Two other members went to Pondicherry where they issued a revolutionary journal and the result of one of their terrorist plots was the murder of Mr. Ash, District Magistrate of Tinnevely, Madras. Several copies of manuals for the preparation of bombs and explosives were found by the police in various searches in India. During the investigation of Jackson's murder, the Nasik conspiracy revealed thirty-eight terrorists while a link established between the Nava Bharat Society and the Abhinava Bharat Society in Gwalior produced forty-one more.⁴ Other political assassinations took place and in 1909, in what was known as the Ahmadabad Bomb Case, the lives of Lord and Lady Minto were threatened.

But why this particular method? Not all the officials whose lives were either taken or attempted were disliked, even by the assassins themselves. A partial answer can probably be seen in a pamphlet found on a member of the India House group who arrived in Bombay in 1910.

Terrorize the officials, English and Indian, and the collapse of the whole machinery of oppression is not very far... this campaign of separate assassinations is the best conceivable method of paralysing the bureaucracy and arousing the people.

Bengal is a special case and, although terrorism and secret conspiracies here reached one of the highest peaks anywhere in India and even penetrated the Congress machinery, the systems of organization and political objectives were virtually the same as elsewhere—even if more centralized and efficient. Terrorist leaders themselves have published various records of the activities in Bengal. Because it is less well known, our attention will therefore be focused on the activities of the Ghadr party with special

4. *The Indian Political Craze*, K. Gopalakrishna Choudari, Bezwada, 1922, p. 20

reference to the international implications of terrorist conspiracies as illustrated by this group.

The exact details of Ghadr activities in India itself are still under a cloud of official secrecy in terms of British documents. It may be that the party was in existence in India in 1907, although we have no concrete evidence to prove this point. In that year, Sir Denzil Ibbetson, then Lieutenant-Governor, stated that in the Punjab, "Everywhere people were sensible of a change, of a 'new air' which was blowing through men's minds, and were waiting to see what would come of it." "The new ideas", he said, "were confined to the educated classes, and among them, in the main, to the pleaders, clerks and students". He emphasized that the situation was "exceedingly dangerous and urgently demanding remedy". But probably this situation was more the result of factors such as the Arya Samaj and Lala Lajpat Rai than of Ghadr forces.

The Calendar of the University of the Punjab records that in 1905, Har Dayal, M.A., of Government College, Lahore, was awarded a scholarship of £250 for three years. With this state scholarship, he entered St. John's College, Oxford, and after being there a short time, resigned his scholarship as a protest against the British government. At the invitation of Krishnavarma, he left London for Paris about September 1909 and became editor of *Bande Mataram*, a monthly organ of Indian independence, published nominally from Geneva.⁵ He became dissatisfied with this arrangement and left Paris in September, 1910. After travelling through Honolulu, Martinique and the Philippines, he settled in California in 1911. Upon his arrival there, Har Dayal received an appointment as lecturer in Sanskrit and Hindu Philosophy at Stanford University and held that position from the Autumn of 1911 until the Spring of 1912. He was then asked to resign although the details of his trouble are not known.⁶ He was an anarchist who believed in revolution, not only in India, but revolution everywhere. He became secretary of the San Francisco Radical Club and founder of the Bakunin Institute of California.⁷

5. Shyamaji Krishnavarma, Indulal Yajnik, Bombay, 1950, p. 274.

6. *The Hindu Conspiracy, 1914-1917*, Pacific Historical Review XVII, 1948, Giles T. Brown, p. 300. Brown suggests it was for 'overplaying his relationship to the University'.

7. Yajnik, *op. cit.*, p. 316.

After his resignation, he was able to devote more time to organizing revolutionary movements in the United States. In the Spring of 1913, he presided over the organizational meeting of the Pacific Coast Hindustani Association. The avowed purpose of this meeting in Oregon was to drive the British out of India, and in pursuance of this objective, to establish a press in San Francisco—to be called Ghadr—and send literature and a paper all over the world. Every Indian in the United States was asked to give the names and addresses of friends and relatives living in India to compile a mailing list.⁸ The first issue of the *Ghadr* paper shouted:

A new epoch in the history of India opens today, the first November, 1913, because today there begins in foreign lands, but in our country's language, a war against the English Raj What is our name? Mutiny. What is our work? Mutiny. Where will the mutiny break out? In India. When? In a few years. Why? Because the people can no longer bear the oppression and tyranny practised under British rule, and are ready to fight and die for freedom. . . . time is gliding on. . . . The whole world is waiting to see when these brave men will rise and destroy the English. Serve your country with body, mind and wealth. Give this advice to all, and follow it yourselves. The time is soon to come when rifle and blood will take the place of pen and ink. Pray for this rising, talk, dream, earn money, eat for it alone, make soldiers of yourselves for its sake. . . .⁹

There were about eight thousand Indians on the Pacific coast at that time and it was not long before practically every Indian in America became associated with this organization in one way or another.¹⁰ A fairly wealthy Sikh, Jawalla Singh, established scholarships to bring Indian students to the United States for 'education' and then to return to India for work against the British. The practice of entering a country as a student in order to pursue revo-

8. *United States vs. America vs. Franz Bopp et. al.* Reporters Court. Transcript (Mss) Vols. 1-40, 60-75, p. 1222 ff.

9. *Ibid.* 13. *The Seventh Report on Un-American Activities in California—1953*, translates Ghadr (Gardar) as traitor, but this is clearly incorrect as a glance at *Platts Hindustani Dictionary*, p. 769 will show. Most of this report is very unreliable anyway, although it does show how low scholarship can go.

10. *Ibid.* p. 1562.

lutionary activities seems to have been an effective system for many such organizations.

But Har Dayal was not to remain very active much longer. Yajnik, the biographer of Krishnavarma, says of Har Dayal, "While his open and often indiscreet political propaganda remained unchallenged by the American authorities, already very friendly to the British government, his dissertations on his new social philosophy and particularly on free love led to his arrest on the 15th April, 1914".^{10a} This hardly seems likely in view of the evidence that he was arrested on March 16, 1914, by the Immigration authorities of the Department of Labour as an anarchist with a view to being tried for deportation.¹¹ He was released on bond and, according to the court records, fled from the United States in March, 1914 (rather than April, as Yajnik suggests) directly to Switzerland.¹² His full name, Har Dayal Mathur, provided the alias of 'Matthews' that he sometimes used, although his other alias of 'Israel Aaronson' is less easy to trace.¹³

The Ghadr Yuganter Asram had been founded by Har Dayal before he forfeited bond and this took its name from a group in Calcutta whose literature had been proscribed by the British. Yuganter means change of time or evolution, and it was here at 1017 Valencia Street in San Francisco that the Ghadr party really made its start. Ram Chandra, who had been Har Dayal's chief aid, became the leader of the Ghadr staff, with Munshi Ram, Godha Ram, Sundar Singh Galli, Gopal Singh, G. B. Lal and Naranjan Das as the other staff members.¹⁴ Travelling secretaries and travelling presidents were collecting agents in various towns, the duties of whom were to preach to the people, collect money and send it to the Asram. Meetings were held at Sacramento, Oxnard, Fresno, and many other places in California as well as throughout the entire West Coast. These meetings had an average attendance of 400 to 500 people, and when at Fresno, Ram Chandra

10a. Yajnik. *Op. Cit.*, 316.

11. Court, *Op. Cit.*, 13.

12. *Idem.* See also *Propaganda of the Gadar Party*, Mark Naidis, Pacific Historical Review, Vol. XX, No. 3, August, 1951, p. 252.

13. Court, *Op. Cit.*, 1336.

14. *Ibid.*, 994 ff.

shouted to the crowd, "Go on, my brothers, this is the chance for you. Give all your money to me in the Asram and you go to India and fight and go to jail there," \$800 was collected.¹⁵

These returning immigrants to India had set policies to follow, most of which were on the lines of other secret societies already in operation. Har Dayal had already set up some rules for the Ghadr group in California, among which were that no one could become a member of the Ghadr Party unless he was recommended by one or two members of the Ghadr staff. Anyone working less than six months in the Asram could not be told confidential matters relating to the business of the group. Anyone who exposed these secrets or confiscated money was to be killed. Both sexes were allowed as members, but no marriages were to be performed by any authority. (Har Dayal's belief in free love.) The managing committee were to go outside, plead the cause to the people and collect money. Mail was not to be opened by anyone other than the secretary or editor.¹⁶

Principles of other revolutionary groups were illustrated by a document found in Calcutta which stated,

The history of the Russian revolutionary movement shows that those who organize the masses for a revolutionary outbreak ought to keep in mind the following principles:—(1) A solid organization of all revolutionary elements of the country, allowing the concentration of all forces of the party where they are most necessary. (2) A strict division of different branches or departments, *i.e.*, persons working in one department ought not even to know that which is done in any other and in no case should one control the direction of two branches. (3) A severe discipline, especially in certain branches, (military and terroristic) even of complete self-sacrificing members. (4) A strict keeping of secrecy. (5) A skilful use of conspiring means, *i.e.*, paroles, ciphers, etc. (6) A gradual developing of the action, *i.e.*, the party ought not at the beginning to grasp all branches, but to work gradually; for instance—(a) organization of a nucleus recruited among educated people, (b) spreading ideas among the masses through the nucleus, (c) organization of technical means (military and terroristic), (d) agitation and (e) rebellion.¹⁷

15. *Ibid.*, 1063.

16. *Ibid.*, 1007 ff.

17. *Sedition Committee Report, 1918*, A. T. Rowlatt, Calcutta, 1918, p. 96.

What were the methods of recruitment used by these groups? A pamphlet of an organization called the "Indian Liberating League" gives some of these in detail. Under a section titled 'Different processes and places of recruiting', the pamphlet lists the following:—by public oration, by press publication and by individual coaching. This might be done in schools and colleges, places of public amusement, hostels, theatres, family ceremonies and the like. The type of recruits desired is listed in order as, first, boys before they reach maturity. Second, youths before their marriage. Third, married young men. Fourth, aged and worldly men. One should try to enlist, (again in order of preference) students, young men who will venture anything, even at the risk of their own lives, those who will help with money only, and those who have genuine sympathy only. All these groups should be classified into various circles.¹⁸

The Ghadr party tried to follow these methods as far as possible. Cipher codes were used frequently. Various members would each have a particular book and would correspond by referring to a certain page, line and word number in that book. Written signs had to be duplicated upon recognition by a confidant. Pass-words were used, such as, 'The English are good and the Germans are bad' to which the reply was, 'The Germans are good and the English are bad'. A system of pre-arranged numbers used to designate certain materials were used in telegraphic communications. For example, 22, 23, 26, 27, 34 (Friend third) 36, (White Land) would mean, according to the code of the Ghadr party, Brownings, Browning ammunition, Rifles and Rifle ammunition are being sent by the Germans to the Punjab.¹⁹

In the early part of 1914, Tarakanath Das, an associate of Har Dayal, had been distributing in the United States and Canada, copies of Russian Anarchist bomb manuals which he had obtained through Surendra Nath Kar and Harnam Singh of Victoria and, which they in turn, had received from the chemist Surendra Mohan Bose, a revolutionary in Paris.²⁰ "The aim of the present work", runs the opening sentence, "is to place in the hands of a revolu-

18. *Ibid.*, 117.

19. Court, *Op. Cit.*, 341, ff.

20. *Ibid.*, 7009.

tionary people such a powerful weapon as explosive matter". The book illustrated and suggested methods of preparation of explosive material, bomb shells, and the relative advantages of each. Attention is directed to the methods of preparing explosives with the minimum danger to the manufacturer. There is ample evidence that this manual and others like it circulated throughout the Ghadr movement and that effective use was made of its contents.²¹

The declaration of war by Great Britain on Germany on August 4, 1914, made an immediate difference in the work of the Ghadr party. As Ram Chandra said, "We don't need to beg our countrymen, these labourers, because I have a good treasurer and I can get as much money as I want from the Germans. They are supplying all the money we need nowadays."²² This is not to say that the party had been ineffective previously. In December 1912, when Lord Hardinge's life had been attempted and one of his attendants killed, the Rowlatt Commission suggested that the evidence seemed to implicate the Ghadr party.²³ In the summer of 1913, three Sikh members had gone from Canada to the Punjab in order to arouse public opinion against what were considered as the injustices of Canadian immigration laws, but it was felt that these were advance agents of the Ghadr movement.²⁴ In any case, after warnings by the government officials, they returned to Canada in 1914.

With the outbreak of the war, at least five men went to Berlin and under the general supervision of Zimmermann, Foreign Minister, and Von Weisendonk, Secretary in charge of the Indian section of the Foreign Office, formed the Berlin India Committee which included, among others, Har Dayal, Barkatullah, Bhagwan Singh, Pillai and Tarakanath Das as members. A rebellion in India would have not only forced British troops to India in order to quell it, but would have also prevented Indian regiments from joining the British Expeditionary Force in France. Both Bhagawan Singh and Barkatullah, formerly a professor at Tokyo University, had left Japan and conspiracies there in May, 1914 in order to help Ram Chandra in California.

21. *Ibid.*, 6438, ff.

22. *Ibid.*, 1021.

23. Rowlatt, *Op. Cit.*, 143.

24. O'Dwyer, *Op. Cit.*, 191.

A number of meetings had been held and the Asram on Hill Street and the printing press on Valencia Street were both busy. The staff lived at the Asram and received food and two dollars per month. Publications were issued in Urdu for the most part, of which twenty-five hundred copies per week was the usual number distributed through the mails to all parts of the world. Papers were also printed in the Gurmukhi and Nagari scripts and in various other languages of North India.²⁵ After meetings, money was collected and this often amounted from five hundred to one thousand dollars, although thousands more came from Canada and other places outside California. Then those who wished to return to India and fight, went into a separate room and signed up. Thus, the beginning of the war found the Ghadr party fairly well established, not only in America, but as we shall see, in Europe and Asia as well.

During the Autumn of 1914, the passenger slips show that various groups of Indians left America from time to time. On August 29, 1914, the *Korea* sailed with 62; on September 5, the *Siberia* sailed with 2 Hindus; on September 12, the *Chinyo Maru* left with 3; on September 19, the *China* sailed with 11; on September 26, the *Manchuria* with 24; on October 21, the *Tenyo Maru* with 109; on October 24, the *Mongolia* with 141 and on October 31, the *Shinyo Maru* left with 6 more.

But it is not to be supposed that the number²⁶ sailing as indicated on the passenger slips constituted the total number of Indians returning to India. We have seen that on August 29, the *Korea* sailed out of San Francisco with 62 Indians on board. 61 of whom were Ghadr members. This ship was to sail to Yokahama, Kobe, Nagasaki, Manila, Hong Kong, Singapore and then to Calcutta. Recruits were taken on at these intermediate places and a total party of over three-hundred arrived at Hong Kong. Here they learned that regulations forbade more than twenty persons going to India on any one ship. They managed, however, to get permission from the Hong Kong authorities to get their own ships and the *Tosha Maru* and *Shinyo Maru* were accordingly outfitted—over two hundred Indians being on the former and one-

25. Court, *Op. Cit.*, 397, ff

26. *Ibid.*, 6437.

hundred and sixty-three on the latter. Once aboard, they began organizing themselves for work in India. There were three top leaders, under whom were ten or so lesser leaders each having ten or twelve men under him. Some were assigned to print and distribute more literature. The general policy was to instruct men to attack police stations, obtain arms, seduce troops, disrupt post office arrangements, telegraphs or any other government services of a public nature, break open jails, free the prisoners and kill government officials while obtaining recruits along the way. Traitors to the cause were also to be killed.²⁷ The Government, however, was informed that this ship was on its way to Calcutta and that a rebellion was being planned. Police and soldiers surrounded the ship before it even landed. Of those cases investigated by the government, one hundred were imprisoned, six hanged, two convicted in conspiracy cases, six more were later arrested, two of the leaders having turned approvers. The rest, however, divided into the prearranged groups and went to the Punjab to continue their work.²⁸

One of the most notable incidents involving the Ghadr movement was the riot at Budge-Budge on September 19, 1914. Gurdit Singh, a Sikh from Amritsar, who had emigrated to Singapore fifteen years before, managed through a German agent at Hong Kong, to charter a Japanese ship, the *Komagata Maru*, in order to transport Indians from Hong Kong, Shanghai, Moji and Yokahama to Canada, where wages were higher. There were about four thousand Indians in Canada at this time, most of whom were from the Punjab and members of the Ghadr party, although there were also many loyal to the British Government. Only a few of the passengers on board had complied with the Canadian immigration laws, but notwithstanding this, Singh told his recruits that if they were denied admission into Canada, they would return to India and expel the British, the British being held responsible for the Canadian laws. A goodly supply of Ghadr literature was on board and this, no doubt, kept the passengers in the proper spirit should a return to India be needed. The Canadian Government, because immigration papers were not in order, refused landing to all but

27. *Ibid.*, 1245, ff.

28. Rowlatt, *Op. Cit.*, 150.

a few. But those on board decided to remain anyway and when police came, managed to defeat the authorities in a gun-fight. A government ship prepared for an attack and on July 23, without further fight, the *Komagata Maru* left with the passengers feeling that the British had discriminated against them because they were Indians. Since war broke out on the return voyage, the ship was not allowed to dock at Hong Kong or Singapore and those who did not want to return to India were now forced to do so because of circumstances.

They arrived at the mouth of the Hoogly River on September 27, and finally docked at Budge-Budge. The Government had been informed that Gurdit Singh and his followers were in a bad mood and they certainly were. A special train (as well as a body of police escorts) greeted them and was prepared to take the passengers to the Punjab. This offer was rejected and a march on Calcutta was prepared instead. The police attempted to turn them back and a riot occurred in which members of both sides were killed—the police losing eighteen.²⁹ This action by the government, quite naturally, suggested to the Sikhs in the Punjab and in other parts of the world, that the British were being oppressive. The final months of 1914 in the Punjab were filled with terrorism committed largely by the Ghadr movement, and although they concentrated a great deal on the seduction of troops from the army, they met with no great success.³⁰

One more shipping expedition will serve to show the extensions of this international conspiracy. We have seen that the German Foreign Office took a keen interest in the activities of the Ghadr movement and had not only set up its own committee in Berlin, but was largely financing the American (and, as I will later show, European and Asiatic) branches as well.

A coded cable was sent on December 27, 1914 by Zimmerman to Count Von Bernstorff, German Ambassador to the United States, which read:—

A confidential agent of the Berlin Committee, Heramba Lal Gupta, is shortly leaving for America in order to organize the importation of arms and the conveyance of Indians (plot-

29. *Ibid.*, 148.

30. Teggart, *Op. Cit.*, 661.

ters) now resident in the United States to India. He is provided with definite instructions. You should place at his disposal the sum he requires for this purpose in America, at Shanghai and Batavia, viz. 150,000 marks...

A following cable directed Bernstorff to "Take steps to have such Indians as are suitable for this purpose instructed in the use of explosives by some reliable person".³¹

Through Von Papen, German military attaché, ten car-loads of freight containing eight thousand rifles and four million cartridges were ready in January, 1915. Two ships were then bought by the Ghadr party with German money, the *Annie Larsen* from Martinez and Company in San Diego and the *Maverick*, an oil tanker from one of the Standard oil Companies. The total cost of this to the German Government was \$212,853.³² The arms were loaded on the *Annie Larsen* and on March 8, 1915, she sailed ostensibly for a Mexican port, but in fact to the Island of Socorro in the South Seas where she was to meet the *Maverick* and there transfer the munitions to the oil tanks of that ship as a precaution should the *Maverick* later be searched on her way to the coast of India. Near Karachi, she was to be met by fishing boats which were to land the arms and a huge supply of literature written by Ram Chandra and other members of the Ghadr staff.³³

When the *Annie Larsen* reached Socorro, there were no signs of the *Maverick*. A whole month passed and still no ship. The *Annie Larsen* had exhausted her supply of fresh water and attempts to strike a well proved futile. The Island was infested with mosquitoes, and, the captain, with not much in the way of provisions or comforts and suffering from the hardships imposed by the inhospitable climate, decided to sail for Mexico. Ironically enough, the *Maverick* docked at the Island a few days later. Instead of being greeted by the *Annie Larsen*, however, a British warship was there and sent aboard a searching party. Before the search, the crew managed to burn five suit-cases full of Ghadr literature. Among those things burned were Ghadr newspapers, copies of an article on India by William Jennings Bryan, an American presiden-

31. *The Enemy Within*, Henry Landau, New York, 1937, 29 ff.

32. Court, *Op. Cit.*, 6558.

33. Landau, *Op. Cit.*, 30.

tial candidate, Ghadr di Gunj, a book of revolutionary poems and songs, and copies of Fatwas, declarations of a holy way by Muslims. The *Annie Larsen* was later seized by American officials at Washington and the *Maverick* had to be sold at a considerable loss at Batavia, Java.

Once again, Ghadr and German plans ended in a fiasco. But it would appear that had the *Maverick* made a successful journey, the consequences for Britain might have been serious. In Bengal alone, we are told, ten thousand volunteers were prepared for a revolution under the direction of a council of six leaders. Arrangements had also been made in Bombay, Madras, Karachi, and presumably the Punjab itself.³⁴ It is not impossible that such numbers may be an exaggeration since revolutionists tend to magnify the importance and size of their conspiracies and some evidence of the terrorists themselves does not measure up to the few available British documents. But this is not to suggest that the government felt the threat negligible. The Rowlatt Commission put it this way:—

The records before us conclusively prove that the revolutionary organizations are secret organizations and conspiracies which have spread into different parts of the province, entered homes, schools and colleges, and have reduced their secrecy of operations almost to scientific methods. They have pledged their members to the closest secrecy of their movements on pain of instant death by murder in the event of disclosure. That is one of their rules and every attempt has been made to give effect to it.³⁵

But the failure of the *Maverick* expedition was only a temporary set back. In October, 1915, we find Har Dayal writing to New York members asking for Anarchists or I.W.W.'s to go to Holland, where a centre had been organized in Amsterdam. He also wished to contact prominent anarchists in Spain, Denmark, France, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, Italy, Germany, Austria and other European countries.³⁶

A sub-committee had been formed in Constantinople under an Egyptian conspirator, Farid Bey. Plans were formulated whereby

34. Court, *Op. Cit.*, 220, ff.

35. Rowlatt, *Op. Cit.*, 7.

36. Court, *Op. Cit.*, 1336, ff.

it was intended to seize the Suez canal and to go down through Persia and Afghanistan to the Western border of India and attack from that side.³⁷ As far back as November 16, 1914, it was reported that a Fatwa printed by the San Francisco Ghadr party for a "decree for a Holy War (Jihad) against England, Russia and France" was read in Constantinople to a crowd of nearly sixty thousand at the Masjid-i-Fateh (the mosque of the Conqueror). The decree, read by the Sheikh-ul-Islam, contained some interesting Questions.

Is it also incumbent on the Muhammadan subjects of Russia, France and England and of all other countries who at the present time together with England, France and Russia, the enemies of Islam against the Caliphate, to engage in this Holy War and fight against their rulers? Answer. Yes.

Will not the wrath of God descend on those who refuse to fight and will not participate in the Holy War when all Muhammadans have been ordered to fight and will not God punish them Answer. Yes.

More such questions follow with always the same answer, and the conclusion was that "It is the duty of every Muhammadan that he should sacrifice his life and wealth and join in the holy War against England, Russia and France, now, at once."³⁸ So far as I know, this did not produce any notable effects.

In Siam, another branch of the Ghadr establishment was set up. This included Atma Ram from Shanghai, Santokh Singh from the United States, Bhagwan Singh, also from the United States (although in justice to him it must be added that he had a part in almost every branch and moved from country to country with remarkable agility), and Sohan Lal Pathak from Manila. Douwes Dekker, who had been introduced to Har Dayal by Krishnavarma, had been invited by Pillai of the Berlin Committee to go to Bangkok furnished with funds from Germany to start a press business there. He was to receive news from a Berlin source and make up reports favourable to Germany and distribute them from Bangkok to India. Other literature printed in Berlin would be sent to an agent in Holland who would send it to another agent in Java and

37. *Ibid.*, 17.

38. *Ibid.*, 37, 22, ff.

from there it would be directed to Dekker in Bangkok.³⁹ Dekker agreed to this plan and was given money by the German Consulate in Rotterdam. After a visit to New York and San Francisco, he travelled to Japan, meeting leaders of the movement in all places. In Japan, Dekker decided that not enough money was in the deal for himself, so the plan fizzled out.⁴⁰

But at Pakho, just north of Bangkok, plans went better. Recruits managed to dig a number of tunnels and to bury arms and ammunition in vast quantities therein. From all parts of the country a considerable number of men were gathered. They intended to march from Siam through a portion of Indo-China into Yunnan and then descent upon Burma and there seize the outposts, murder, destroy, loot, anything to upset control.⁴¹ The group went first to Manila where they were to meet a German ship which would provide more arms and munitions. They were then to separate and proceed to Burma as outlined. Once again, the ship failed to show up. The United States authorities would not allow them to ship the arms they had on a vessel called the *Henry S.* and when the boilers in the ship blew out there was more trouble, with the result that most got arrested instead of carrying out plans.⁴²

But that the British authorities were disturbed about this scheme, there is no doubt. Evidence from the Third Lahore Conspiracy Case supported the findings of the Mandalay Special Tribunal that revolutionaries — at least three of whom they said were from Canada — engaged in a plot to invade India by way of Burma and that this conspiracy had been initiated by the leaders of the Ghadr party in San Francisco in conjunction with the Germans.⁴³

A customs officer in the Philippine Islands upon detaining one 'Amar Singh' (later turning out to be none other than Bhagwan Singh), found in his bag a range finder, rifle range, telescope, data about various armies, some maps of Asia, wigs, moustaches, detective badges, police badges and a compass. He naturally became

39. *Ibid.*, 521, ff.

40. *Ibid.*, 6483.

41. *Ibid.*, 21.

42. *Ibid.*, 23.

43. Rowlatt, *Op. Cit.*, 159.

suspicious about such an odd collection of personal effects, especially since the man in question had been detained in the Philippines in February 1915, for preaching sedition among the Moslems. Singh, either feeling talkative or imagining the officer to be an old friend, related that arms had been sent to Afghanistan by the German Government and that a revolution started, these would be brought across the border. A secret arsenal was running in India and mutiny had been planned among the British Indian troops to take part in this general revolution. Specific garrisons at Hong Kong and Singapore were to rise against their officers and take charge.^{44 & 45} In point of fact, after the Ghadrists left Singapore, there was an uprising there in which the soldiers did shoot down a number of officers. Singh also related that they had about a million rifles, imported from different countries, in India, as well as nine-hundred cannon of different calibre, and plenty of funds.

Work in Shanghai, while not exceptional, did not produce any great blunders, either. Over three thousand copies of Ghadr papers were delivered there. The organization was headed by Wagel as president, Kishen Chand as secretary, Mueller, treasurer, Atma Ram, record keeper and Shiv Dyal Kapur (who turned approver for American authorities) as post-box keeper. This group provided, as we have seen, a number of recruits for ships going to India and made things much easier for those members stopping off there. In addition, they also provided munitions and explosives for the tunnel arsenal in Pakho, Siam.⁴⁶

Tarakanath Das, the bomb and explosive expert, was still travelling in Germany, Holland, Switzerland, Sweden, Roumania and Asia Minor engaged in spreading revolutionary propaganda.⁴⁷

Dr. Chandra Kanta Chakravarty had lived in New York as a Ghadr sympathiser for several years prior to 1915. In that year he was summoned to Berlin by the Berlin Indian Committee and returned to New York in the latter part of January 1916. A mes-

44 & 45. Court, *Op. Cit.*, 1433, ff.

46. *Ibid.*, 303, ff.

47. *Ibid.*, 7009.

sage sent to the German Embassy at Washington on January 21, 1916, explains what had transpired in Berlin.

Dr. Chakravarty will return to the United States and form a working committee of only five members, one of whom should be himself and another Mr. Ram Chandra. In addition to sending more Indians home from the new American committee, he will undertake the following: (1) An agent will be sent to the West India Islands, where there are nearly one hundred thousand Indians, and will organize the sending home of as many as possible. They have not yet been approached by us, and there are not such difficulties in the way of their going to India as are encountered by our countrymen from the United States. (2) An agent will be sent to British Guiana with the same object. (3) A very reliable man will be sent to Java and Sumatra. (4) It is proposed to have pamphlets printed and circulated in and from America. The literature will be printed secretly and propaganda will be carried on with great vigour. (5) An effort will be made to carry out the plan of the secret oriental mission to Japan. Dr. Chakravarty is in a position to get letters of introduction to important persons in Japan as well as self-conduct for himself and other members of his mission.⁴⁸

Chakravarty apparently did more efficient work than some of the members of the San Francisco branch. In any event, another message from Berlin to Chakravarty dated July 13, points out that the primary objective was to produce revolution in India during the war. It suggests that men should also be recruited from Trinidad, British Guiana, and East Africa, including Zanzibar and gives the name of an agent in Trinidad, where if possible, a revolution should also be started which would enable the rebels to seize the government and set up an independent Hindustani Republic — but only if this did not jeopardize work in India.

Plans were also made for more work in Japan, but it would appear that authorities there were becoming suspicious and Chakravarty was cautioned not to go on a mission himself. A certain Rajakushalpal Singh had gone to India with a letter from Zimmerman during Chakravarty's visit to Berlin. He had apparently met with much success and formed a secret committee of five princes and five leaders. The Berlin Committee was jubilant and

48. *Ibid.*, 6533.

ready to send more arms to India. But this time, stated the telegram, the German Government insisted that things be arranged scientifically.⁴⁹ The blunders committed by the California Ghadr were causing Berlin to lose confidence in them. "Ghadr men", the committee complained, "cannot be sent home. They will ruin our work everywhere. They do not understand how to work."⁵⁰

Taraknath Das had returned from Europe through America and gone to China where various internal rebellions were taking place. A letter from Chakravarty to the Berlin Committee casts an interesting light on the Chinese political situation at this time as well as showing the extent to which the movement was working. The letter is dated September 5, 1916.

Li Yuan Hung is now the President of China. He was formerly the Southern revolutionary leader. W. T. Wang was then his private secretary. He is now in America and is starting for China. He says that Li Yuan Hung is in sympathy with the Indian revolution and would like English power weakened. Some of the prominent people are quite eager to help India directly and Germany indirectly, without exposing herself (sic) to any great risk, on three conditions. The first: Germany to make a secret treaty with China that in case China is attacked by any power or powers, Germany will give her military aid. It will be obligatory for five years after the discontinuance of the present way; and there would be an understanding that China should get one tenth of all arms and ammunition she will receive for and deliver to the Indian revolutionaries and the Indian border. In return, China is to prohibit the delivery of arms and ammunition in the name of the Chinese government and from China shipped through private sailing boats and by coolies to any near port or any border place as directed....⁵¹

But Germany was apparently not inclined to make any such treaty and let the matter drop. The foot-note to this is that on August 14, 1917, less than one year later, China declared war against Germany.

At the close of 1916, Chakravarty recounted the results of his work to the Berlin Committee. A Pan-Asiatic League and Oriental Society had been organized and its journal, *The Oriental*

49. *Ibid.*, 6540.

50. *Ibid.*, 6539.

51. *Ibid.*, 1866.

Review, was being prepared for publication. A secret understanding had been brought about with the Japanese and Chinese governments whereby "an atmosphere of more than passive sympathy" could be expected in the future. The name of England in America had become, he maintained, synonymous with tyranny. Two hundred eighty thousand copies of nine different pamphlets had been distributed and eighty thousand reserved for future use. An immigration law restricting Indians to the United States and deporting those who could not earn a living, had been postponed. Fifty-eight men had been sent to India from the West Indies, and others to Japan, England, China and the West Indies. Two thousand pistols and ten thousand bullets had been smuggled into India and the West Indies had been organized for revolution.⁵²

In such an organization as this movement was, and in consideration of the temperament of the men involved, it was not difficult to foresee that internal strife would appear. A vast amount of money was coming with liquid ease from Germany. Collections were still being made all over America and anywhere else, possible and this also provided a large capital reserve. A telegram from Zimmerman to Bernstorff stated that sixty-five thousand dollars had been a partial payment to the Indians in 1916,⁵³ while Chakravarty had received from fifty to sixty thousand dollars for his own activities⁵⁴ and had thus become an effective power. Ram Chandra controlled the San Francisco headquarters with dictatorial secrecy. A school had been set up in Stockton, California where Indians coming to America might be educated in the ways of the movement. Ghadr funds paid for this, although teachers received no pay at all. But where was the money going? Ram Chandra would not account for it and the party showed signs of rifts. A building had been erected on Wood Street in San Francisco for sixty-three hundred dollars. Bhagwan Singh, in Manila, had collected seventeen hundred dollars and instead of giving it to Ram Chandra, was living as he thought proper for him, in luxury.⁵⁵ This did not help matters and two factions were slowly

52. *Ibid.*, 1877.

53. *Ibid.*, 6556.

54. *Ibid.*, 7011.

55. *Ibid.*, 1012.

crystallising. With Bhagwan Singh in the lead, charge upon charge was heaped against Ram Chandra. He was called a grafter, loose-mouthed, and was, in the main, cited as responsible for the weaknesses in the organization. Certainly it is true that Ram Chandra was guilty of indiscretion in his speeches and writings. Chakravarty complained to the Berlin Committee that, "if he were not honest, it would be nothing less than unintentional betrayal of many of our secrets, including plans and names of people concerned."⁵⁶ Chakravarty was also engaged in this inter-party quarrel and shortly received a blow on the head which landed him in the hospital for a while. But what about the money? Was Ram Chandra dishonest in that respect? From March 1915, to August 1915, the total deposits in his personal account (as distinct from the party's account) amounted to twelve thousand, eight hundred and forty dollars.⁵⁷ An average of eight hundred dollars was spent per month for the expenses of the Asram.⁵⁸ It seemed clear that things were not as they should be. Chakravarty wrote to Berlin, "The Ghadr party is also in the process of breaking up.... among those labouring men very few are available for any purpose, the best elements are gone, the rest drunk and talkative. They accused Ram Chandra of getting millions from Germany and giving them nothing."⁵⁹ There seems little doubt that Ram Chandra had acted dishonestly and kept large amounts of money from the party.

Accordingly, the party split and Bhagwan Singh led the rival faction against Ram Chandra. On January 19, 1917, the Articles of Incorporation of the Ghadr Party showed Ram Chandra, G. B. Lal and H. Sharman as the incorporators. Bhagwan Singh started his own paper with Santokh Singh, Nidhan Singh and Gopal Singh.

Until April 6, 1917, when she declared war against Germany, the United States had announced a policy of neutrality. It was quite clear that the activities of the Ghadr movement were any-

56. *Ibid.*, 6542, ff.

57. *Ibid.*, 1563. In addition to this sum mentioned by the bank clerk, Preston alleged that at the time of arrest Ram Chandra had \$9000 at the house on Wood Street. p. 20.

58. *Ibid.*, 3589, ff.

59. *Ibid.*, 1868.

thing but neutral. Thus, on August 6, 1917, the United States government was prepared to prosecute the Ghadr members and the Germans who had aided them in violating the Neutrality Act of the United States. One hundred five defendants were named in the indictment, and the case of *The United States of America vs. Franz Bopp et. al.*, a case which lasted from November 11, 1917 until April 23, 1918, proved to be fraught with difficulties.

"We will show you", said John W. Preston, United States District Attorney, "that the object and purpose of this conspiracy reached the entire world; that it was to engage the assistance of every Hindu and every sympathizer in every neutral country practically in the world."⁶⁰

On the last day of the trial, all the witnesses had been called, the government and the defence had summed up their sides and Judge Van Fleet called for the noon adjournment. The usual confusion of disorder of people leaving a room resulted and in the disturbance, Ram Singh, one of the defendants who felt that Ram Chandra had acted dishonestly, shot Ram Chandra in the back as he too was leaving.⁶¹ Singh raised his gun in a threatening manner which prompted United States Marshal James Holohan to shoot him in turn. Two defendants were thus removed from the considerations of the jury.

It was not very long after the charge of the judge that the jury returned a verdict of guilty against all the defendants except one American who seemed to have been innocently involved. Sentences of from one to two years in addition to fines of from two to ten thousand dollars were imposed on officials of the German consulate. The Ghadr members were dealt with less severely and received from two to eighteen months in prison.⁶²

The Ghadr movement continued in one way or another until Indian independence in 1947. How many other movements like

60. *Ibid.*, 17.

61. Brown, *Op. Cit.*, p. 309, See also Judge's remarks, Court, p. 6971. The Senate Report has an absurd account of an imaginary melodrama, p. 214, which is consistent with the many other errors contained in their written nonsense.

62. Landau, *Op. Cit.*, 33.

it were also in existence, we shall probably never accurately know. But there can be little doubt that these terroristic conspiracies played a significant—even if not obviously dominant—role in the independence movement of India. But perhaps of equal importance, apart from the effectiveness of such organizations, is the extent to which international agents were used in the pursuance of a revolutionary objective. Ignoring the moral issues, it is virtually the same technique adopted by communism in its quest for certain objectives. It would not be surprising, if, in the political revolutions to come, the technique first used to such an extensive scale by groups in India were to become one of the more important techniques of revolutionary political action.

Early Contacts of Islam with India

BY

SRI RAM SHARMA

About the time Harsha was ruling in India, an upheaval took place in neighbouring Arabia which was to have far-reaching effects on the history of the world. Muhammad, born in 570 in the Quarish tribe of Mecca, claimed prophethood in his own right about 611 A.D. and set about his reforming task with a zeal not often paralleled in the history of the world. In place of the contemporary worship of images and many deities, he offered salvation through the worship of one God and belief in his prophet Muhammad. He cut down the sexual promiscuity of his times by permitting only four legally wedded wives at a time. He promised equality and brotherhood to all who joined the charmed circle of Islam. He based his claim to prophethood on a series of polished 'divine' messages which laid down the law for all and sundry. He preached uncomplaining submission to God's will so that a man could ride untroubled all sorts of weathers, fair and foul, and count it fortunate that he died fighting for his faith. Mecca at first refused to take a humble son of its own seriously and exasperated by his vehement claims drove him out. Muhammad turned to Medina and from there ultimately succeeded in winning over his townsmen of Mecca. He combined in his person prophethood and royalty and when he died in 622, Arabia lost a great leader.

Islam sought for no successor to prophet Muhammad—prophethood would be worth nothing if it could be easily transmitted to others. The religious edifice of Islam was complete in the *Quran*; where lacuna was discovered, in civil or criminal law *Hadis*-memory of how the prophet had acted under similar circumstances—helped in laying down the law. It is well to remember that though the religious beliefs of the Muslims are based on the *Quran*, their daily life has been governed more by the *Hadis*. As the entire religion thus came to turn round the

prophet, Islam set up no ordained priests and established no organized church, fallible or otherwise.

Though there was no apostolic succession, the burden of the newly founded Muslim state had to be carried on after the Prophet's death. Later on two main schools came to be founded on the question of succession; the Shi'ahs claimed that Ali, a cousin and son-in-law of Muhammad, should have been recognized as his legitimate successor, the Sunnis asserted that the elevation of the first four temporal deputies — Khalifa — of the Prophet was lawful. Though ultimately both Shia and Sunni ruling dynasties came to be founded in various parts of the world, enough of the original doctrine of 'election' remained in tact to confound the princes. Immediately after the Prophets' death, the seniormost of his 'companions' was 'elected' his temporal deputy and leader — Imam — of the Muslim. Three more of these companions followed suit. When Ali succeeded to Khilafat, his right thereto was disputed. The end of the civil war that followed found Islam divided among the Shias and the Sunnis.

The main development under the early Khalifas was the establishment of Muslim authority over the whole of the Arabian peninsula and then to the neighbouring countries. For sometimes, the doctrine of one single ruler for *all* the Muslim territories was tenaciously held and actually practised but it soon degenerated into the sort of polity which we later saw in the Maratha empire claiming to be ruled by a Peshwa — the office curiously implying the deputyship of the Raja — who allowed his generals to make conquests far and wide in his name. Persia, the Middle East, Egypt Northern Africa and finally Spain soon accepted Muslim authority.

A curious — to modern eyes — result of these conquests was the coextensiveness of the Muslim conquests and Muslim faith. Sooner or later everywhere except in Spain there was almost a wholesale conversion of the inhabitants of these countries following upon their conquest. But at first 'non-believers' could not be entirely eliminated; the Muslim governments needed an army of accountants and professional men. If driven too hard, the non-believers could cross over to other non-Muslim countries—as the Parsis did and settled in India. The Muslim governments expect-

ed the ultimate conversion to the faith of all its non-believing subjects.

Against the sharp and swift Muslims conquests elsewhere, the Indian career of Muslim arms was an extremely slow business. In 712 A.D. a part of Sind was conquered by the Arabs. It remained under Muslim domination for some time but failed to act as a spearhead of India's conversion to Islam. The next Indian clash with Muslim arms occurred three centuries thereafter in 995, when Jayapala, ruler of Kabul, North Western Frontier and the Punjab sought conclusions with his Muslim neighbour Subktagin. Jayapala was driven back, but it took Subktagin's son and successor ten years of hard campaigning to establish his power in the plains of the Punjab and Multan. The Ghaznavid province of Lahore got embroiled in the quarrels between the Ghoris and the Ghaznavids in Kabul till Lahore was ultimately conquered and occupied by Muhammad Ghori in 1186. Prithviraj of Delhi and Ajmer got uneasy at the establishment of a new strong power in his neighbourhood and moved his armies northwards to challenge Muhammad Ghori. Prithviraj vanquished Muhammad Ghori at Taraori in 1191. The Ghori army fled headlong from the battle field after its leader was all but killed in battle. Muhammad Ghori returned next year as the head of a much bigger army but so wary was he of the might of his Rajput foe that, when politely advised by Prithviraj to remember last year's defeat, he thought it necessary to pretend that he would not proceed any further till he heard from his brother in Ghor whose agent he was. Prithviraj believed him; Muhammad Ghori moved his armies under the cover of the night. But the initial advantage which this surprise attack gave the Ghoris soon wore out. Muhammad Ghori now played his trump card. Twelve thousand of his soldiers who had been kept in reserve now joined the fray. The battle raged long and furiously till Prithviraj was killed. It was now the turn of the Delhi army to flee. Panipat gave Muhammad Ghori the right to consolidate his power in the Punjab.

In the years that followed fortune now favoured the home forces now the invaders. The thirteenth century saw the invaders advance further on all sides till the whole of northern India excluding the major portion of Rajputana had been conquered. The fourteenth century saw the expansion of the kingdom of Delhi

into the south. In the then existing state of communication it was difficult to rule the whole of India, north and south of the Vindhya, from one centre. Muhammad Tughluq thought this could be remedied by moving the capital from Delhi in one corner to a central place like Daulatabad. But he only went farther and fared worse. The contemporary methods of administration broke down under the weight of the mighty empire and what the Khiljis had gained the Tughluq's lost. Timur's invasion in 1398 delivered a *coup de grace* to the tottering kingdom of Delhi. The rulers who followed still styled themselves the rulers of the world — Shah-i-Alim — but, as a wag had it, they held sway only over the small area between Delhi and Palam — 'the present aerodrome for Delhi'. The rest of the country was governed by the Rajput rulers of Rajputana and the Punjab, the Hindu princes of Vijayanagar and further south and a large number of local Muslim dynasties dotted all over India. Thus during the Sultanate, the first kingdom of Delhi lasted for about a century and the empire of Delhi but another half a century. The second kingdom of Delhi which Bahlol Lodhi founded in 1451 was much smaller at first. Unlike the earlier kingdom of Delhi it shared authority in northern India with Muslim dynasties except in Rajputana where the Rajputs reasserted themselves.

The Sultanate period which roughly covered the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries is not a period of ever-expanding Muslim authority in India much less a continuous period of conquest. The Muslim conquest begun in 712 was not complete even in 1526. Several Hindu dynasties had only turned low before the storm for a very short period and reverted thereafter to their independent status. What was still more significant, more than three centuries of Muslim rule at Delhi had not succeeded in converting a substantial section of the population of the country.


It is this that requires explanation in dealing with the contact of Islam with India. We see no easy, swift and complete conquest of the country as we find elsewhere in the world. India was not easily conquered by the virile races from the northwest! As any map would show none of the invaders came from the north-west of the Punjab — the area they had to enter at first. Soldier to soldier, a Rajput, a Punjabi warrior or a Gujarati horseman was a match against his opposite number in the armies of Islam. Muslim

domination was not established in India because Hindu soldiers of a warmer(?) climate were any the less hardy than their opponents. Hindu armies were not defeated because all the classes in the country did not feel it their duty to fight for the defence of their country. Mahmud in 1008 had to fight in the Punjab against what looks like a mass resistance movement. The Hindu women who are said to have sold their ornaments to furnish the sinews of war do not seem to have been all Rajputs. Except probably in 1193 at Taraori, the Hindu armies were seldom outnumbered by the invaders. In the eleventh and the twelfth centuries war was nowhere in the world a popular concern. Thus the caste system does not seem to have played any large part in weakening the resistance that could have been offered to the invaders. Nor can the existence of several states, big and small, by itself, could have provided a cause for the defeat of the home forces. It is arguable that the invaders might have found it difficult to establish themselves if the whole country had been under the sway of a single ruler. But the story of the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth and the fourteenth century easily disproves the assumption that a government of Delhi would have necessarily defended the country any the better.

It is again necessary to eliminate certain other causes which are usually offered as an explanation. Howsoever badly elephants may have behaved in a particular battle, their value as an engine of destruction was never in doubt. The invaders soon set themselves the task of employing them as plentifully as had the Indian rulers. As yet there was no artillery to frighten them off the field and lead to slaughter among their owners. The weapons of defence and offence which were used by the invaders and the home forces were again almost the same. Spears, swords, daggers and bows and arrows were used by both. The defensive armour was then worn by men of high birth alone. The descriptions of the contemporary defensive armour do not indicate any superiority on either side.

The invaders had one advantage over the home forces. Their horses were much better adapted to warfare and were more useful as mounts adding more to the weight of the attack by their riders.

Another factor that made for the success of the invaders was the inspiration which motivated the early soldiers like soldiers



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of Islam everywhere, they were fired by their iconoclastic and missionary zeal. India did not yield much fruit in conversions. But rich plunder was as good a substitute particularly when it could be combined with the destruction of shrines. The Hindu rulers of India had discovered that temple fortresses were the best means of preserving their riches from greedy hands. Their sanctity would keep all rivals away. As naturally these temple fortresses—at Kangra, Somnath and elsewhere—became sure magnets to draw the attack of the invading forces, as they richly rewarded them. The early Muslim practice of dividing all the spoils of war between the soldiers keeping only one fifth of the booty for the commander may probably have further encouraged the soldiers to follow leaders who could easily promise them fair rewards. The very difficulties and dangers of such early expeditions resulted in a natural selection which must have placed only the toughest of the soldiers in the early expeditions to India.

It should be further remembered that in India, as elsewhere, the invaders could choose their time of attack, not so the defenders. The invaders felt no compulsion to be always on the march; the defenders had to fight whenever they were attacked. In many battles fought early and late during the establishment and expansion of the rule of the Turks in India, the offensive was taken by them only when they seem to have been previously assured of a smooth passage for their arms.

Another cause to which the 'easy' success of the invaders has been ascribed is the alleged disunion and even treachery among the rulers in India. While there is some evidence of such acts occasionally, they do not figure as a major factor in engagements. The classic story of the feud between Prithviraj and Jaichandra and the latter's invitation to Shihab-ud-Din Muhammad Ghori stands discredited. There may have been some bad blood between the rulers of Ajmer and Qanoj but the contemporary Muslim accounts do not bear out the story as told in the *Prithviraj Raso*. Shihab-ud-Din Ghori left Ghor without telling his soldiers where he was leading them. This would have been impossible had an emissary of Jai Chand been leading them to India. The interval between the first and the second battles of Taraori is not enough to have allowed all that is alleged to have taken place therein, Samyukta's search for a husband from among the assembled guests

of his father, Prithviraja's marriage to her, Jai Chand's discomfiture and sending of an emissary to Ghazni to invite Shahab-ud-Din. The conquest of Uchh in 1175 is said to have been made possible by the desire of the Rani to revenge herself on her husband. Instead of disunity in the ranks of the Indian rulers, we find in the eleventh and twelfth centuries they very often offered organized resistance to the invaders. Mahamud had to deal with a confederacy of Indian rulers when he attacked the Punjab in 1008; Muhammad Ghori was similarly opposed in the battles of Taraori in 1191 and 1192, at Ajmer in 1197 and near Abu later on.

It has sometimes been suggested that Indian rulers were slow to recognize the foreign danger and waited patiently to be attacked in their capital cities rather than venture forth boldly to meet the enemy on their frontiers. But news of an invading army could not then be speedily received. By the time a ruler learnt that an invader had entered his dominions he had little time to venture forth to his frontiers and fight the enemy. But Indian rulers did not always wait for their enemies to advance, into their territory. Jai Pal attacked Subaktgin in his own dominions, Prithviraj met Shahah-ud-Ghori at Taraori nearer to the frontiers of Ghazanvid kings of the Punjab than to his own. Bhim of Gujarat challenged Aibak and Muhammad Ghori at Ajmer and Abu.

It should however be remembered that the path of an established ruler at Delhi or elsewhere was not as plain as it is sometimes supposed to be. When during the Sultanate, Mughals tried invading India through Qandahar, very often the rulers of Delhi met their armies in the interior rather than at their own frontiers. Even such a wide awake ruler as Ala-ud-Din Khilji had to meet them, at least once, outside the walls of Delhi. It seems difficult for us today to realize how defective and difficult means of communication were in the medieval times in India as elsewhere.

A detailed study of the battle fought in the middle ages in India proves that neither the Indian rulers nor the Indian soldiers deemed themselves in anyway inferior to the foreigners who invaded the country. Mahamud had to fight against the rulers of the Punjab eight times in a decade before he could occupy the Punjab. Muhammad Ghori's success at Taraori did not give him access even to Delhi. Here again fierce battle raged for about

ten years before the Ghoris could settle down in security at Delhi. At Ajmer again there was no time submission to the enemy; repeated risings in the area went on for a decade. The Indian rulers never considered themselves soundly beaten when fortunes of battle went against them. They were almost always eager to try conclusions again and did not easily give in.

It should be further remembered that in the centuries we are dealing with, battles were trial of strength between two leaders in India as elsewhere. The disappearance or death of the leader would bring an engagement to an end. When Muhammad Ghori was wounded, his army ran away and 'did not draw rein for forty miles'. When Prithviraj or Jai Chand was killed in the battle field, their armies acknowledged defeat. Shihab-ud-Din Ghori's slave could take his wounded master off the field; no Ghori could organize the army for trying fresh conclusions with the Rajputs.

It is usually the difference in leadership and strategy and tactics employed on the battle field that play the decisive part in these engagements. Mahmud Ghazni and Muhammad Ghori were great military leaders, as successful in their campaigns outside India as in India. They displayed a method of warfare different very largely from the traditional methods of fighting prevalent among Indian rulers. This visualized an engagement as a duel between the soldiers of the two armies under well recognized rules of sport. The outsiders knew no rules, or if they did, they were different! Sudden attacks, feints, shamming defeat and flight, keeping a considerable part of the army in reserve for use at critical moments took the Indian armies by surprise and vitiated their value as fighting machines. They were too slow to learn new tricks of trade. The Rajput chivalry usually disclaimed running away from the battle-field in order to fight another day. They took a battle as a ritual wherein Jauhar played its due part — men flinging themselves on the enemy in order to meet certain death and women preferring death to the horrors of anticipated dishonour. It is wrong to hold that the invaders had always their way. They had to fight for every square inch of the territory they cared to occupy.

Much has been said about the religious beliefs of the opposing armies playing a part in the engagement that were fought. The Muslim submission to God's will may be claimed to have influenced

the conduct of the soldiers on the battle field; it does not however seem to have restrained Muhammad Ghori's soldiers at the first battle of Taraori. The Hindu belief in astrology did however play its part occasionally in bringing about their discomfiture. Dahar lost the first battle of Sind when a missile struck the flag staff of the temple of the protecting deity of the city. His son Jaisingh lost his country finally to the enemy when his astrologers told him not to fight as the stars in the sky were against him. Bakhtiar Khilji's task of conquering Gaur was made easier, it is said, because the astrologers had told Lakshman Sen that he was destined to lose his state when strange looking, garlic smelling strangers entered his capital. The Hindu belief in Ahimsa is sometimes held responsible for the defeat of the Hindus. We know however that, whatever the theory, the most painstaking of the world's conquerors was Chandra Gupta Maurya who is reputed to be Jain. The Buddhist Asoka showed no reluctance in expanding his empire into central Asia. The devoutest of the Vaishnava rulers never neglected their armies.

The Hindu tolerance may probably have made it easier for the masses to accept their Muslim rulers once they had established themselves. This does not seem to have happened at the time of the original conquests, though it may have come into play later on when the Muslim rulers were discovered to be a much less disturbing element in the country than they could have been expected to be.

It was India's misfortune that against a Mahmud, Muhammad Ghori, Qutb-ud-Din or Bakhtiar Khilji she did not have enough Anang Pals, Bhims and Prithvirajas. The tactics that were employed in Kamrup by the rulers and the ruled alike — the scorched earth policy, enticing the invaders into difficult country in the interior and then punishing them for their audacity — cost the Muslim armies all but 100 of their 10,000 soldiers. Bhim of Gujarat had enough self confidence to decline to give battle to Muhammad Ghori at Anahawada and by his 'splendid' inactivity to compel him to retreat.

The organization of government may have possibly played a significant part during the early years. It is possible to hold that had the popular association in central government continued,

instead of the astrologers advising Jaisingh not to face the enemy, the Brahman leaders may have inspired popular resistance to the invaders as they did against Alexander near Montgomery. But monarchy and feudal organization of government combined together gambled with national fortune. It was not the caste-system which prevented the masses from fighting for their country because that was the duty of the warrior caste. It was the ignorance of the countrymen of all that was going on elsewhere that proved the undoing of the Indian Government. Centuries of peaceful rule had enervated the rulers and when they were faced with self-made generals who had proved themselves elsewhere they were found wanting. It was peace that had weakened the Indian princes and not their internal quarrels.

Revenue System of Sher Shah

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"The land revenue system of Upper India" Mr. Moreland wrote in 1926, "presents a fundamental continuity from the period when the sacred law of Hinduism was formulated, down to the changes introduced in the 19th century."¹ That this tradition continued unbroken through the Sur era, is indicated by a critical appraisal of the material available; and though Sher Shah modified it and reformed it, he made no attempt to alter the fundamentals on which it was based, namely, the method of assessment, the mode of payment and the share taken by the state from the cultivator's produce.

Generally it has been believed that Sher Shah adopted the measurement method and enforced it as the basis of assessment throughout his dominions, superseding other systems.² If by the word "jarib", used frequently by the chroniclers and translated as "measurement" by modern writers, more or less inaccurately, it is meant that Sher Shah ordered a general mensuration and on this basis assessed land revenue, the belief can have some basis.

1. "Sher Shah's Revenue System" by W. H. Moreland: *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* for 1926, p. 448.

2. No attempt has been made, here, to explain the various modes of revenue assessment and the terms appertaining thereto as "jarib", "muq'i", "ghalla-bakshi", "nasq" and "ra'y", for they have adequately dealt with by earlier writers. For definition of these terms, refer, "Some Aspects of Muslim Administration" by Dr. R. P. Tripathi (Allahabad 1936) pp. 357-360; "Provincial Administration of the Mughal" by Dr. P. Saran (Allahabad 1941) pp. 453-6; "Sher Shah's Revenue System" by Dr. P. Saran (*Journal of the Bihar & Orissa Research Society*, Vol. XVII. I, pp. 137-140; "Assessment and Collection of Land Revenue under Akbar" by Dr. S. R. Sharma (*Indian Historical Quarterly* Vol. XIV. pp. 36); "Farhang-i-Kardani" by Prof. S. A. Rashid. (*Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission*, Vol. XIX pp. 71-4); and finally, Moreland, *op. cit.*

If, however, this word "jarib" is translated to prove that the entire system of revenue administration was changed radically to supplant systems other than "Measurement" and the method of payment changed from kind to cash, then the observation is hardly tenable.

Firstly, Sher Shah did not and had he wished it even, could not abolish old existing systems of revenue administration. It was a task beyond the five-year rule granted to him. Akbar waited, and gathered experience of nineteen years before he could reorganise his revenue system on a fresh basis. Till that time he adopted the prevalent schedules of Sher Shah, only demanding cash in place of kind³ which incidentally proves that the basis of payment till then was in kind.

Hasan Khan mentions three systems of revenue administration prevalent in the country.⁴ He furnished details of only one, according to which a person called "Malguzar" is held responsible for an allotted area from which he collected land revenue, paying a fixed sum in lieu thereof to the state. Due care was taken by the state to prevent over-charging and oppression.⁵ This system bears a close resemblance to the "Zemindari" and "Malguzari" system till recently prevalent in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh before reorganization. Obviously in such areas, where this system was prevalent, "jarib" or "Measurement" was not enforced in its sense of cash payments directly realised from individual cultivators by the state. The two other systems, which go by default in Hasan Khan's account, were also clearly old-established ones, which were not interfered with, by Sher Shah

3. "X" "Ain-i-Akbari" translated by Blochmann, Vol. I. p. 294.

4. "Daulat-i-Sher Shahi" by Hasan Khan. English Translation of the Farman only by Dr. R. P. Tripathi. Unpublished. Referred hereafter as "Daulat". Farman X.

5. "The first is that we make one person from the village responsible for the payment of government dues. He is expected to collect the dues from the various pieces of land and farms and to pay a fixed sum. But (in some case) some power of coercion shall have to be conceded inevitably. Therefore it is necessary that government officials should be instructed to look to the protection and security of the people so that none of the malguzars should stretch out his hands for oppressing the subjects in any place. Both the Hindu and Musalmans should obey these orders." Daulat Farman X.

except for regularizing the procedures and mapping out the land and classifying the tenures and ownerships under which a particular piece of land was held.⁶

Lastly, there were exceptional areas where new ideas could not have been and were not introduced. In Multan, for instance, the traditional assessment and administration were allowed to continue.⁷ It would have been scarcely possible to realise any revenue from trans-Jhelum area (Ghakkarland) or Rajputana. In Malwa, the zemindari system was allowed, though the land might have been mapped, for Shujaet Khan is reported to have been rebuked by Sher Shah for withholding lands allotted to his lieutenants.⁸

Therefore though Sher Shah might have had a decided preference for the system of Measurement, he did not press his choice except in areas where the system could be worked without handicapping the cultivator. The peasant enjoyed the freedom of choosing any of the prevalent method of assessment, though his rights over his land were clarified and the field mapped. He was freed from the vexatious extortions of the *muqaddams* and other petty functionaries, the *amin* contacting him directly to assess his revenue according to the system he preferred.⁹

Sher Shah was no doubt trying to extend the sphere of king's authority and therefore desired a wider application of Measurement. Islam Shah continued the work of his father and under him the administration became more centralized than ever.¹⁰ So it seems to have been Islam Shah who was responsible for what

6. "The tenth farman was issued regarding the measurement of the cultivated and uncultivated land of the dominion. Ahmad Khan Tangi (or Bangi) who was the soul of this system of management and whose rank commanded a good reputation in administration, accomplished this work with the help of able and learned Brahmins, and prepared a register in which were entered the rights of owners and the measurement of all arable and other pieces of land. The land was divided into several classes and the rate for every one of them was fixed." Daulat Farman X.

7. "Tarikh-i-Sher Shahi" by Abbas Sarwani, Allahabad University MSS, hereafter referred to as Abbas, p. 191; Dorn, "History of the Afghans", I, p. 135.

8. Abbas pp. 232-236.

9. Abbas Alld. Mss. p. 216; 10 Ms. fol. 106a.

10. Ain I. p. 296, lines 5-6.

'Abu'l Fazl calls, freeing Hindustan from the systems of ghalla-bakshi and muqtei.¹¹ He had more time than his father, he was more disregarding of the established usages, the nobles as a land-owning power collapsed under his rule and their place was taken by the king's bureaucracy.

The above observation also apply to the second problem, namely, the mode of payment. The system was based on the produce reaped and the basis of assessment was grain or other produce. The schedule of Sher Shah given in the A'in has kind as its basis and not cash as Akbar's later schedules have.¹² The state's share could be converted in cash by selling it according to market rates or the cultivator if he chose, for the time being, could pay cash in lieu of his share of his produce. This was encouraged by the state.

The third question, viz., the amount of the share which the state took is the most complicated. Dr. Qanungo and Dr. Qureshi believe that Sher Shah took one-fourth of the produce while Dr. Saran and Mr. Moreland are of the opinion that the state's share was one-third.

Dr. Qanungo adduces the following arguments for his statement:

a. Makhzan-i-Afghanan has it that Sher Shah wrote to Haibat Khan to take $\frac{1}{4}$ th of the produce from Multan.

b. 'Abu'l-Fazl writes, "The revenue levied by Sher Khan which at the present day is represented in all provinces as the lowest rate of assessment". Later, 'Abu'l-Fazl writes that Akbar raised the land revenue to $\frac{1}{3}$ rd. Hence in Sher Shah's times, it must have been only $\frac{1}{4}$ th.¹³

Mr. Moreland refutes the arguments given above:

a. The above passage (Makhzan quoted by Dr. Qanungo) is found in page 135 of Part I of Dorn, who writes that Sher Shah who was naturally elated at the conquest of the region, "excluded

11. 'A' in I. p. 296; lines 5-6.

12. 'A' in I. p. 294; also A 'n XIV & XV and 10 year and 19 year rates.

13. "Sher Shah" by K. R. Qanungo pp. 373-4; A 'in tran. by Jarrett Vol. II. pp. 63 & 66.

"exempted Multan from all public charges, except a fourth of the produce which was to be levied". A more literal translation of the Ms. used by him (No. 60 in Morley's Catalogue of the R.A.S.), would be, "(he) ordered that a fourth share should be taken from the country of Multan, it being exempted from all "takalif". The last word has a wide range of meaning from troubles to taxes but in this context it means cesses or miscellaneous imposts. Multan thus received specially favoured treatment and the fact that the revenue demand there was fixed at one-fourth does not justify the inference that the same fraction was taken from the rest of the kingdom.

b. In the second argument, Dr. Qanungo has relied on Jarret's version of the 'A'in, but had he referred to the original, he would have found that this version is rather loose; the text says, "In all provinces at the present day less than that is not indicated", the word "that" referring to a Schedule of Sher Shah's assessment rates: in other words, the assessment when the A'in was written, were not Sher Shah's; they might have been equal or greater and the passage cannot be used to prove that they were greater. No statement to the effect that they were raised by Akbar to one-third appears on page 66 of Jarret nor can Mr. Moreland find them elsewhere.

Continuing, Mr. Moreland uses the words of Abbas as given in Elliot's translation and which are not found in any of the available Mss., and the Schedule of Sher Shah given in the 'A'in to prove that Sher Shah claimed one-third of the gross produce as the king's share and assessed the claim by measurement on the basis of an average yield determined separately for each crop.¹⁴

Dr. Saran agrees with Mr. Moreland in his conclusions and suggests that the text of 'A'in at this passage clearly says that the "ráy" "of Sher Shah found acceptance". So whatever rates were prevailing and were approved by the Emperor were those which had come down from Sher Shah's time. Hence Akbar's rate at this time were equal to those of Sher Shah. Dr. Saran then discusses the meaning of the word "ray" and comes to the conclu-

14. Moreland *op. cit.* pp. 452-459; also "Agrarian System of Moslem India" (Cambridge 1929) pp.

sion, on basis of the Schedule, that Sher Shah claimed one-third of the produce.¹⁵

Dr. Qureshi gives the following reasons for his opinion that Sher Shah charged one-fourth of the produce as land-revenue.

a. The passage in Elliot (to which Mr. Moreland refers) is based on some exceptional Ms. of 'Abbas Sarwani and is not supported by the versions of the available ones.

b. A critical study of the passage in 'A'in shows that Abu'l-Faql is referring to Sher Shah's figure of average produce as the lowest available in the kingdom at the time.

c. The favour to Multan lay in exempting it from a number of taxes and not in the reduction of land revenue.

d. There is clear evidence to show that it was Akbar who first demanded a third as land revenue. Timur demanded a third in some of his dominions and Babur demanded a hundred and thirty instead of a hundred. Sher Shah's demand was not exceptional and it was raised by Akbar which 'Abu'l-Faql seeks to justify by saying that Akbar abolished various other taxes including the jiziyah.¹⁶

There are three passages in the authorities which furnish a clue to the revenue demand of Sher Shah. Hasan Khan writes, "The principle (regarding revenue assessment) is that the government demand should be less than the income accruing from the land so that they (the cultivators) might not be afraid of government demand and tax if there is scarcity of water or insufficiency of rains. Rather he arranged that every one of the landholders and payers of revenue should pay 2½ per cent of their tax to the public treasury so that it might be spent in case of accidents or heavenly punishments".¹⁷

This is general. It indicates only the principle of revenue assessment and the fact that 2½ per cent of the revenue was held as a reserve for exigencies.

15. Saran, (cited in footnote 2, page 1. pp. 147).

16. Qureshi "The Administration of the Sultanate of Delhi" by Dr. I. H. Qureshi (Lahore, 1944). pp. 118-119.

17. Daulat Farman X.

The second passage is the one in Elliot's rendering of Tarikh-i-Sher Shahi, to which Mr. Moreland refers. It runs as follows, having for its context, a discussion of the pargana officials under Sher Shah: ".....; and he ordered the governors to measure the land every harvest and collect revenue according to measurement in proportion to the produce, giving one share to the cultivator and half to the mukkaddams and fixing the assessment with regard to the kind of grain in order that mukkaddams and chautharies should not oppress the cultivators who are the support of the prosperity of the kingdom."¹⁸ The word "governor" and the continuing "giving one share to the cultivator and half to the mukkaddams" has no equivalence in the available Mss. of Tarikh-i-Sher Shahi. It has led Mr. Moreland to label it as an "incorrect gloss" though he remarks that it accords with the Schedule in the 'A'in.

The passage is in fact rather confusing. It postulates the universal prevalence of the system of ghalla-bakshi or division of grain as the basis of revenue administration, for such a rule of thumb could not operate under measurement.¹⁹ Though the former system may have extended over considerable areas it could not have been the only one. It is with caution therefore that the passage may be used to represent the revenue which the state realised from areas where the malguzari and the ghalla-bakshi systems prevailed.

Therefore, it also does not deserve the scorn with which Dr. Qureshi treats it for even if it comes from an exceptional Ms., it equates with what Hasan Khan writes regarding "malguzari" and what Abu'l-Faql gives with reference to Sher Shah's Schedule.

This schedule is the third important piece of information. Jarrett²⁰ translates it as follows: "Of the first two kinds of land,

18. Elliot IV. pp. 414-415.

19. Moreland op. cit. 449. "Measurement was based on the area sown; a charge of certain weight of each kind of grain or its equivalent in cash was made on each unit of the area sown and the assessment for the area was complete when the crop areas had been measured, though in practice, it was found necessary to make allowances when the crops failed."

20. A'in, Blochmann Edition I p. 294.

there are three classes : good, middling and bad. They add together the produce of each sort and a third of this represents the medium produce, one-third of which is exacted as the royal dues. The revenue levied by Sher Khan, which at the present day is represented in all provinces as the lowest rate of assessment, generally obtained; and for the convenience of the cultivators and the soldiery, the value was taken in ready money."²¹

Dr. Qureshi considers the translation to be incorrect. In the first place, he thinks the stops to have been wrongly read, the passage being read without a stop, which translates as : "Of the first two kinds of land, the good, the middling and bad produce should be added together and a third of this represents the medium produce. . . ." For the second part, he believes that the translation of the word "ray" as "revenue" is wrong since it is only recently that the word has figuratively come to mean this. Its older connotation was that of "produce" and it is in this sense that it has been used by Abu'l-Faql. The correct translation of the latter portion therefore is, "The (figures of mean) produce adopted by Sher Shah, lower than which cannot be found throughout the provinces, were accepted and for the convenience of etc., etc." 'Abu'l-Faql is referring here of the classification of land by Akbar into polaj, parauti, chachar and banjar. It appears that the first part of Dr. Qureshi's emendation is correct, for as he writes, his interpretation of finding the average produce is more logical. His second verification is doubtful. How is it possible for the figures of "mean produce" to have been "lower than which cannot be found throughout the province" unless the years concerned had been those of exceptional scarcity? And such does not appear to have been the case in the reign of Sher Shah. It cannot be supposed that the figures had been deliberately altered to provide a lower level than actual. It appears therefore that Abu'l-Faql is using the word "ráy" in the sense of revenue and means that, "The revenue levied by Sher Khan, lower than which cannot be found throughout the provinces, was accepted and for the convenience of etc., etc."

21. A'in Trans. II. P. 63.

'Abu'l Fazl goes on to give tables which are apparently those of Sher Shah. These were generally accepted as the basis of land revenue before the 19-Year Settlement. Until then, Akbar's only modification was to demand cash instead of kind. The full and fresh evaluation which resulted in the 19-Year Settlement and for which also Abu'l-Faql gives figures, changed this state of affairs.²²

The estimate here clearly is of one-third. It was due to this fact that Akbar did not raise the land demand except in some cases where he imposed extra cesses.²³ It is also obvious that Sher Shah also charged the same fraction (one-third) of the produce as land-revenue.

Multan, it is certain was a special case and was treated as such. It cannot be held up as an example for the rest of the kingdom.²⁴ For here the Langah tradition was ordered to be continued by Sher Shah and the revenue balance was not altered to bring it into line with other provinces. It is difficult therefore to accept Dr. Qureshi's statement that the respite granted to Multan consisted only of cesses.

Lastly, as Dr. Qureshi himself states, Sher Shah's demand was not unusual. Babur demanded a hundred and thirty instead of a hundred and as this tradition could hardly have been disturbed by Humayun, it is scarcely possible that Sher Shah would have cut down this most fruitful source of state income. I have failed to discover the statement in the 'A'in to which he refers in saying that Akbar raised a demand to a third;²⁵ even if such a statement exists, and Akbar did raise the demand, it does not follow that Sher Shah's demand was a fourth which was raised to a third by Akbar. The difference might have been insignificant and what is more likely, the rates might have dropped in the chaos that followed the death of Islam Shah.

22. A'in-i-Abkari, Bibliotheca Indica Text, edited by Blochmann, Vol. I. pp. 294-295; also Ains XIV & XV for 10-Year and 19-Year rates.

23. A'in, Blochmann Text, Vol. I. p. 298 ff.

24. Abbas p. 191; Dorn, I. p. 135.

25. A'in Blochmann Text I. pp. 300-301.

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Jawaharlal Nehru and India's Freedom Movement

BY

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Jawaharlal, the agent of India's historic destiny, was not cast out by high birth and opulent surroundings for the role of a nation-builder. A Harrow-and-Cambridge scholar, he had all that riches could provide, and he should normally have led the life of a well-to-do and high-brow lawyer. But, it is a strange phenomenon that such a man on his own initiative deliberately chose a path of trials, tribulations, renunciation and repeated jail-goings in the cause of the motherland. How can Nehru then be regarded as a product of his times? The verdict of history will be that he is one of the makers of the age and a daring path-finder.

Nehru did not grow up into a spoiled child even though he was the only son of his well-to-do parents. Even though he passed the days of his sheltered childhood in anglicised atmosphere, he began to dislike the alien rulers even in his younger days. He had no particular animosity against individual Englishmen, but he knew that the ruling race was unjust and oppressive to the Indian people. This is borne out by the fact that, as a boy of ten, he felt an instinctive sympathy for the Boers in the Boer War.

At the age of fifteen he went to England for education, and after this he should have become an Englishman in all but name. But, he was so intelligent and mentally alert that he did not cease to take interest in politics which fascinated him always. The news of political developments in India stirred him tremendously, even though he got meagre enough accounts of India from the British newspapers. For meritorious progress at school he got Trevelyan's Garibaldi books as prize. The subject interested him so much that visions of similar exploits in India came before him, of a grand struggle for freedom, and in his mind India and Italy got curiously mixed together. In short, he became mentally

at least an extremist of the school of Tilak and Aurobinda Ghosh. That is why when he heard that his father had joined the moderates he was not pleased.

When he was back home, he gradually leaned to aggressive activity against foreign rule. He started by joining Tilak and Mrs. Annie Besant and during the World War I he began to rebel against too much submission that was in the air. The moderate policy of keeping away from the Congress at this time caused much indignation in his mind, and he considered their opposition to be undignified and unbecoming. His first meeting with Gandhiji which was about the time of the Lucknow Congress during 1916 was a great event in his life for it was destined to mould the youthful patriot's future life and career. Nehru was afire with enthusiasm when the Satyagraha Movement began even though his father was dead against the new-fangled trend of jail-going. Ultimately the son triumphed and the father, despite his initial reluctance, yielded gracefully. Nehru became an enthusiastic political follower of Gandhiji, and an unquestioning faith in the latter's political insight grew gradually in his mind. Then followed a close political partnership between the Guru and the disciple which finally brought freedom to India. The Non-Co-operation Movement found Nehru almost at his best. He was in a kind of intoxication of excitement and optimism. He had no doubts or hesitation. The path seemed to be clear. And he marched ahead as a bold crusader for the cause of his Master. Jail-going had no terrors for him. And, there was no feeling to avoid getting into trouble with the government. Gandhiji's stress on the religious side often troubled him, but Nehru could judge everything on the political and ethical plane and did not mind the eddies and backwaters when he was certain that the main direction was correct. In any case, he had no doubts that though Gandhiji was incomprehensible at times he was a glorious leader who knew and understood the masses and was a symbolical expression of their ardent hopes and aspirations.

The famous statement which Nehru made before the Court of the District Magistrate of Allahabad on May 17, 1922, breathes noble sentiment and sums up his articles of faith as a soldier of freedom. He made it clear that his weapons were not the old time one of force and coercion. The weapons which Gandhiji

had put in people's hands were those of love and self-sacrifice. "We are fighting", he said with eloquence, "for our freedom, for the freedom of our country". "I shall go to jail again most willingly and joyfully", he went on to say, and finally concluded by saying "To suffer for the dear country! What greater good fortune could befall an Indian unless it is a death in the cause or for the realisation of our glorious dream".

India has been blessed with a Gandhi but also with a Jawaharlal Nehru. Both were complementary to each other and both have advanced the cause of India's freedom in different ways. The greatest follower of Mahatma Gandhi, Nehru, is yet a liberator in his own right. If Gandhi gave the idea, Nehru gave the colour and shape and the concrete form of India's independence. And, there is no doubt that Gandhiji forged the weapon which Nehru wielded with will and ability. Nehru is the best interpreter and spokesman of Gandhiji's thought and it was the two together in a brilliant partnership that led India's fight for freedom. Gandhiji was the Lord Krishna and Nehru the Arjuna of the great Indian Mahabharata conflict of the twentieth century.

Why did Nehru accept non-violence in this struggle for independence? With his rational and historical sense Nehru could not simply have done otherwise. Terrorism made no appeal to him, for he regarded it as a sign of political immaturity. He had no doubt that it formed a tragic and futile weapon and no nation had really benefited by it. Non-violence, he was convinced, was to be the salvation of India and, indeed, of the whole world. Violence, he thought, had had a long career, and had been weighed repeatedly and always found wanting. Violence must go from excess to excess and ultimately it would perish in the flames it kindled and be reduced to ashes. But, like Gandhiji Nehru was also clear that non-violence could not mean cowardice or weakness. Nehru made his choice because Gandhiji represented to him the age-old soul of India more than the cult of violence that western ideologies idolised and worshipped. He chose the path of non-violence and suffering in the spirit of a true votary and assumed thereby the proud position of the vanguard in the army of freedom which believed that freedom would be valueless and tainted, if it came through resort to foul means.

It was at the Madras session of the Congress in December, 1927 that Nehru moved his historic resolution on India's independence. The resolution which was a bold and unexpected statement of India's future goal reads thus: "The Congress declares the goal of the Indian people to be complete independence". For the first time, the Congress ceased to equivocate, and it said frankly and publicly under Nehru's leadership that India wanted complete power to rule herself. And, it is to the credit of Nehru that he outlined this new goal. He was no weaver of phrases or trafficker in eloquence. He literally meant that the Congress must change its programme radically. With his ideal clear-cut and its approach firmly fixed national independence was, according to him, an essential requisite of all progress, and without it there could be no really political, economic or social freedom. But, the inter-nationalist in Nehru was apparent from his warning that independence, if it meant an addition to the warring nations, would be a dangerous thing. He wanted independence to be a step towards a world commonwealth of nations in which India should assist in the fullest measure to bring about peace and world harmony.

In 1928, when the question was debated by the All-Parties Conference at Lucknow as to whether India should have Dominion Status or complete independence, Nehru again gave the clear lead. He pointed out that the conception of Dominion Status represented an ideology of a past age utterly out of touch with the reality of the present day. To talk of this ideology would be to delude the nation for the only goal meant for the country was full and complete independence, and it would be a bad policy and worse tactics to agree to Dominion Status even for a while and even as a temporary compromise.

In 1929, Mahatma Gandhi who had so far been rather lukewarm about the independence creed at last gave it his blessings in the Lahore session of the Congress. This enabled the Congress to unfurl the flag of independence on the banks of the river Ravi at midnight of December 21, 1929 and in the early hours of first January, 1930. This was indeed a glorious day in the political career of Nehru. He had positively changed the outlook of the Congress and had given it a new orientation altogether. The word 'Swaraj' in the Congress constitution was henceforth to mean complete independence.

Temporary failures did not discourage him, but were incentives to greater efforts. He searched his mind for an explanation of that failure, and by means of this self-questioning—he wished to keep on the correct path. It was under the guidance of Mahatma Gandhi that he converted the Congress from an inane body weakly functioning among the richer classes into a competent national organisation with its roots in the Indian genius and the common men who live in it. He had the genius to feel the new spirit of mass-awakening, and was able to break the mental inertia that had so far cramped the vast masses. He could sense that political freedom was not far off, because he realised that his own mind had become free. He knew very well that it is very much more difficult to break the chains which bind the mind than the bonds which bind the body. He always felt that the world-forces had come upon him and that he was to be an agent of historic destiny. He viewed the Indian struggle as a part of a bigger fight for independence, and the force that moved him seemed to him to be moving countless people all over the world and forcing them into activity. If all Asia was responsive to the new spirit, India was bound to play a not insignificant part in modern history. This shows that very few of the Indian leaders possessed the world sense which characterised Nehru's outlook on Indian struggle. He could never miss the vital connection between world events and our national problem.

As a soldier of freedom, Nehru took his stand with the socialist and nationalist forces of the world in order to rise above the tide of world-imperialism. He saw the world divided into two blocs—the Imperialists and Fascists on the one side, the Socialist and anti-imperialist on the other. The British Empire represented the strongest and oldest imperialism and this was the real argument for India's freedom and for the end of India's connection with this Empire. After all there could be no connection between India's freedom and British imperialism. So, if India remained within the imperialist fold, whatever name or status and whatever external appearance and power India might have, India would have remained a slave to the reactionary forces and to the imperialist bloc.

What was his indictment of the British rule in India? Firstly, he said that it cramped the soul of the people. Secondly, he con-

sidered it largely responsible for our terrible economic poverty. Thirdly, he held that it gave us only a fare of the fiercest repression and deprivation of civil and even personal liberties. Fourthly, he thought that India's intellectual and moral decadence was also due to the presence of the policemen's baton and the soldier's bayonet which made the country a vast prison-house and detention camp. Lastly, British rule, according to him, perpetuated our social and economic problems and weaknesses which could not be solved so long as the British connection lasted.

Nehru was always indignant of our national shortcomings — the spirit of occasional disunion and the petty conflicts and disagreements amongst the political leaders. He tried to discourage them as best as he could and he reminded everybody that we should not forget at any time the bigger ideal we stood for and we should not fight over trivial matters. He constantly told his contemporaries that we must not lose touch with the masses and be deprived of the life-giving energy that flows from them. Mass backing alone could be a corrective of the difficulties of the middle-class leadership which is often confused and looks in diverse directions at the same time, even though it is from the middle-classes primarily that revolutionary leadership comes. Though middle-class leadership could not be done away with it must, he argued, look more and more towards the common man and get inspiration and strength from him. The Congress was not only to be for the masses, as it certainly was, but also of the masses; only then would it be for the masses in the real sense of the term, for only then their needs and aspirations vague as they were could find expression in the Congress.

The real problem for him was how in India's struggle for freedom he could join together all the progressive forces in the country and make a broad front of all the mass elements and the great majority of the middle-classes that stood for freedom. If the Congress favoured the upper classes alone it would betray the national interests it claimed to represent and lose the very justification for its continuance.

Nehru saw as no other leader saw it, that the only key to the solution of India's problems lay in socialism and this socialism he viewed in its scientific and economic sense. To Nehru socialism was more than an economic idea. It was a way of life and as such

it immensely appealed to him. He saw no way of eradicating economic backwardness, the large-scale unemployment, the political subjection and the misery of the masses except through socialism. He was aware that this meant drastic changes both in the political and social structure of the vested interests in all spheres. It was ultimately to mean the replacement of the present profit system by a higher ideal of cooperative service — which would amount to a change of philosophy of life, completely different from the existing capitalist order. But, Nehru was always clear on the point that there could not be a slavish imitation of the Soviet system which he personally admired. He held that every nation must have its socialist system after its own way and fit it in with its own genius.

He worked for Indian independence not only because the patriot in him could not put up with foreign rule but also because it appeared to him to be the inevitable step to a socialist rebuilding of society. But, he realised that the majority in the Congress might not be prepared to go thus far and so he was prepared to slow down the pace of advance. In any case he was not willing to force the issue in the Congress and thereby create difficulties in the way of India's nationalist struggle against the British rule. He was always ready to cooperate gladly and with all the strength in him with all those who worked for independence even though they did not feel much attracted to the socialist idea. The object was to convert the Congress slowly, if not all at once. The Congress was in the British period a broad popular front representing a variety of ideologies. It was to remain thus for a long time to come. That is why Nehru could with his passion for socialism and rapid industrialisation cooperate with Gandhiji for the village uplift, Khadi and untouchability-removal programmes. But, these appealed to him no more than temporary acceptance of a transition stage rather than a permanent solution of the country's problems.

He opposed the Act of 1935 tooth and nail, even though he was willing to seek election on the basis of a detailed political and economic programme with the nation's demand for a Constituent Assembly in the forefront. He was convinced that India's political and cultural problems could be solved through such a Constituent Assembly provided it was elected on adult franchise and mass basis. A Constituent Assembly was the only proper

and democratic means for the improvement of India's situation, he held. When the question was fiercely debated as to whether office must be accepted after election Nehru warned the Congress of its dangers. He maintained that it was always risky to accept responsibility without power even in democratic countries; it was far worse with a reactionary constitution hedged in with safeguards and reserve powers. He emphasised that would lose much and gain little by acceptance of office in terms of the Act of 1935. He strongly condemned the Communal Award for this and democracy could never go together. As for the federal part of the constitution, Nehru would not simply look at it even though he might start the provincial legislatures for some time.

As a soldier of freedom, Nehru always experienced the thrill of mass feeling, the power of influencing the common man. Unlike Gandhiji he kept religion outside politics. He took to the crowd as the crowd took to him, and yet he never lost himself in it, even though the crowds loved and adored him. His sentiments and languages were noble but they were never those of a rabble-rouser. From his higher mental perch he never ceased to feel how different he was from those thousands who idolised him, different in outlook, in taste and in aspirations. In order to be sure that the people really liked him for what he was, he was often frank, critical and even rough and rude in his criticisms and denunciations. Still the people put up with him and he remained their hero and darling.

On a survey of Nehru's contributions to the freedom struggle, it would appear that Nehru powerfully influenced it and gave it a new orientation. Firstly, he introduced the independence creed which even Gandhiji had not at first approved. Secondly, he gave the Indian freedom movement a world background and perspective which could not have been possible under Gandhiji. Thirdly, though no pioneer in the socialist field in India Nehru was the first Congress leader who popularised the socialist thought of the Marxian kind. Fourthly, he organised a broad-front against all kinds of communalism and casteism. Lastly, it was Nehru who first gave a concrete shape to the idea of national planning after the Soviet model of the Five-Year-Plan. Nehru's name in modern Indian history will live for ever as that of a great patriot and architect of freedom.

The Tariff Walls in the North-east Frontier—in the Early Days of the Company

BY

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The external trade of Assam with Bengal, during Pre-British days, was subjected to customs duties, which were levied at Kandahar, commonly known as the Hadira Chokey,* at the mouth of the river Manas, a tributary of the Brahmaputra. The Chokey was entrusted by the Assam Government to an official, the Duaria Barua¹ who had to pay according to Francis Hamilton, an annual rent of Rs. 45,000/-. The duties were reported have been fixed at 10% *ad valorem*, but fluctuated from time to time at the hands of different Baruas. There was no law to prevent the merchants, protected as they were by a *Rowana* (permit), from proceeding far into the province; yet 'the trouble and expenses' on the way, the difficulties in procuring ready payment and the delays and the vexations at the gateway itself, induced them to transact the whole traffic through the Baruas, who had thus enjoyed an exclusive privilege to trade with Bengal.² 'The high rates of duties demanded by the Duaria Baruas, the non-fulfilment of their contracts or their refusal to carry on trade with particular individuals led to constant frictions with the Bengal merchants'.

After British occupation, the Chokey was placed in-charge of a merchant from Bengal, who received a commission of 10% on the collections, according to a scheduled tariff besides permission to raise contributions of rice and money to maintain the

* This was also known as Kandar, Kangrar or Assam Chokey. Vide Hamilton, B, *An Account of Assam*, page 42.

1. Sometimes, this office was held simultaneously by more than one Duaria Barua. In 1809, according to Hamilton, Kamal and Parsuram, two Rarhi Brahmins occupied this post.

2. Hamilton, B: *An Account of Assam*, pp. 42-43; Bhuyan, S. K. : *Anglo-Assamese Relations*, pp. 50-52, 339-342.

searchers, *majhees* and *choukidars*.³ It was farmed out, subsequently, to an Assamese for a sum of Rs. 15,983-0 and the farmer was authorised, like the predecessor, to collect the requirements of his establishment.⁴ Mr. Scott, the Agent to the Governor-General, North-East Frontier, clearly perceived, as early as 1826, that the existence of Kandahar with its attendant evils was a standing menace to the commercial traffic with Assam.⁵ With a view to encouraging foreign investors and traders, in his despatch of 28th February, 1927, he urged on the Government of Bengal to abolish, altogether, the customs *chokies* of the North-East Frontier, including Kandahar. The representations which the Agent repeated in the succeeding years failed to rouse the authorities at Fort William and, therefore, without waiting for their orders, in 1829, Mr. Scott abolished the duties on a number of indigenous commodities exported from Assam⁶ and this was, of course, regularised in December, 1830, by the Government of Bengal and the exemption list, too, it appears, subsequently augmented.⁷

The duties levied at Kandahar were such as to deter even the most enterprising speculator to have commercial relations with Assam. The rates stood, in 1831-34, as follows:—

On Exports

Lac	..	8 annas per maund	
Munjit*	..	Do.	
Pepper (long)	..	1 rupee	Do.

3. The rates, which were fixed, stood as follows:

- (a) Searcher eight annas for laden boat
one seer of rice per boat.
....four annas per empty boat.
- (b) Ghat *Majhee*two sers of rice per boat.
- (c) Choukidar....half a seer of rice per boat. Revenue Consultations, Bengal, 1835; 7 March, no. 89: Bogles to Robertson 23 February, 1833.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*, No. 81; Jenkins to the Secy. Govt. of Bengal, 14 August, 1834.

6. Revenue Consultations, Bengal, 1835; 7 March No. 81.

7. *Ibid.*; Commodities free from duties:—

- (a) Exports.—Cotton, Silk, molasses, honey, tobacco mustard seed, seed, paddy, gold-silver and precious stones.
- (b) Imports—Cotton, shells, brass *battas*, precious stones, rice, dolls, gram, wheat, cocoanut oil, shoes, European and Chinese goods.

Elephant teeth	..	10 rupees	Do.
Wax	..	5 rupees	Do.
Elephant	..	10 rupees each	

Copper, brass and iron wares, Bhutia blankets, silk-thread and cloth, rattan, ivory ware, rhinoceros' horn, beads, mats, poppy-seeds, musks, yak-tails—all 10% on the Goalpara value.

Salt	..	8 annas per boat of 99 maunds
Spirits	..	8 annas per gallon
Pepper (black)	..	One rupee per maund

Copper-steel-brass and iron wares, cotton-silk-woolen goods, carpets, spices, sugar, candles, mustard oil, garlic, butter, tumeric, drugs, perfumes, furnishers, umbrellas, paper and writing materials, etc. — all 10% on the value.⁸

No consideration, whatever, was shown as to the quality and price of the article bought for foreign markets.⁹ The work of appraising proper value, of course, bristled with difficulties and provided ample scope for corruption. The detention for search, the forfeitures, the penalties besides unauthorized exactions, common to the customs *chokies* in Bengal, were practised, unblushingly, at Kandahar. What was worse, the *Rowanas* granted at Kandahar would not protect the merchandize from further levies up or down the river Brahmaputra.¹⁰ Inland transit duties were collected at every conceivable check-posts—at about a dozen places nearabout and beyond Kandahar,¹¹ at the *Garrow Khats*, the *Naga Khats* and the river-ghats of Cachar and Manipur.

The local authorities after the death of Mr. Scott, in September 1831, reversed his policy and sought to retain the chokey at Kandahar from a 'Political point of view' affording, as they viewed, some check on the river dacoity and also to the exportation of children which was previously rife along this frontier.¹²

8. *Ibid.*; Nos. 81 and 90.

9. Thus Elephant teeth of inferior quality valued at 30/- per maund was taxed at the same rate with the excellent variety @120/- per maund. Revenue consultations Bengal, 1835; 7 March, No. 84. Vide the petition of the Merchants.

10. *Ibid.*

11. These were as follows: Gawalpara; Moheah(?) Dhubri, Nagarbera, Dobapara, Samkota, Nowgong, Bohotee(?) and Bengabhellenga.

12. Revenue consultations, Bengal, 1835; 7 March, No. 89; Bogles to Robertson; 23 February, 1833.

Impressed by such considerations, Mr. Robertson, who succeeded the late Agent, in 1832, brought the chokey under the direct control of the Principal Assistant of the six Parganas,* although, he strongly advocated that the Rowanas granted by its collector should cover the goods from further duties within or outside the province.¹³ Captain Jenkins, who followed Mr. Robertson, in April 1834, as the Commissioner of Assam, suggested that the tariff duties of Regulation XV of 1825 be adopted at Kandahar as the scale on which collections are to be made, lest the merchants be subjected to the illegal exactions by the unscrupulous officers.¹⁴ The divergent views held by the local officials, lack of effective public opinion and the indecision of the authorities in Calcutta, thus, left the merchants, local or foreign entirely at the hands of the customs officials. The delays, repeated exactions and occasional oppressions, in all stages of the journey of the commodities, from the producer to the consumer, doubtless, discouraged merchants, impeded trade and did incalculable harm to the industrial and agricultural activities of the undeveloped North-east Frontier.

The representation made by successive Commissioners, ultimately, drew the attention of the Supreme Government. Lord William Bentinck, the Governor-General, in a minute, dated 6th August, 1833, analysed fully the anomalous position confronted by the merchants trading with Assam, 'the duties now levied in Assam' he observed, 'in addition to the customs paid in the provinces and that the Rowanas at Dacca, Calcutta and elsewhere do not cover commodities imported into these provinces nor the local Rowanas protect their export the exports and imports of Assam are (consequently) subject to much heavier duties than it is politic to levy'.¹⁵ The Governor-General, though highly sympathetic, wavered to arrive at a final decision of the Assam Chokies, in particular, because the subject of inland transit duties, as a whole, was then under consideration of the Supreme Government. The question was, however, mooted again in July, 1835, when the Governor-General in Council felt it inexpedient to drag this matter any further. 'If the investigations' it was remarked 'now making into the subject should lead to the establishment

13. *Ibid.*; Robertson to the Secy. Govt. of Bengal, 17 June, 1833.

14. *Ibid.*, No. 81, Jenkins to the Secy., Govt. of Bengal, 15 August, 1834.

15. *Ibid.*, No. 91, Vide the Minute, 6 August, 1833.

of a better system, Government will then consider how far it may be expedient to extend the mitigated rules into Assam in the meantime, he (Governor-General) can only anticipate benefit from encouraging the growth of an habitual and unrestricted intercourse with that province'.¹⁶ Accordingly, the Commissioner was directed to abolish Kandahar and all other Chokies in the neighbourhood of Goalpara and 'to leave the trade to and from with Bengal perfectly free, until, otherwise hereafter provided.'

Kandahar, the gateway of Assam, thus, became free. Innumerable toll-gates still fettered the trade along the border of the southern hills and in Upper Assam, which was then ruled by the Ahom Prince Purandar Singha. In the South-East corner of latter's territory, Jenkins reported,¹⁷ in the vicinity of salt wells, there situated 20 to 30 *hats* (markets), mostly resorted to by the Nagar. 'Of the articles brought to barter for salt, the Raja takes here $\frac{1}{4}$ to $\frac{1}{6}$ according to the kind of articles and the manager of *haut* (the *Hatkhowa*) taxes $\frac{1}{2}$ of that for himself; another $\frac{1}{5}$ is again taken at the wells. Of the salt purchased, out of four lumps, (the buyer) has to give the Raja one piece and a half to the Manager. Articles that cannot be divided are valued at the same or lesser proportion of the value taken. Thus about 50% is taken on trade upwards and near 40% on the trade downwards'.¹⁸ The retention of *Naga hat* duties, even after the resumption of the territory of Raja Purandar, in October 1838, was,¹⁹ indeed, an ill-conceived measure. In the Cachar-Manipur frontier, the hill-men were made to pay such odious duties that many had to forgo the few luxuries, which they bartered at the hill marts and, consequently, the traffic on the border dwindled to such an extent that some of the toll-gates had to be closed, altogether.²⁰ On the west, the Garrows, who had been subjected invariably to illegal exactions were besides forced

16. *Ibid.*, No. 86; Vide the Extract from the political Department.

17. Political Consultations, India, 1838; 28 March No. 46.

18. *Ibid.*

19. Political Consultations, India, 1838; 28 November, No. 114.

20. To procure bettlenut, salt, tobacco and dried fish, the hill-men, previously, bartered cotton, timber, rattan, ivory and bamboes at the *hats* situated at Bikrampur, Borkhola, Kiling ghat, phara ghat, Ticul(?) and Oodabari. In addition, there were river-ghats, which were farmed out, at Lakhipur, Banskandi, Burdawn, Jaynagar, Jatrapur and Syal Tek; Revenue Consultations, Bengal, 1836; 7 March, No. 89.

to bring their bulky but less costly loads of cotton down to the *hats*, where to avoid harassments at the hands of hat holders they had to undersell their commodities; although, these mountaineers could dispose of their goods even at spot, which had always been accessible to eager customers from Bengal.²¹

The main 'political object', for which these check-posts were maintained—as the only means to bring the turbulent highlanders under control—was defeated. The retention of these *hats*, with their illegal exactions, vexations and delays, effectively checked the intercourse between the dwellers of the hills and plains and provided a perennial source of trouble to the British Government. Captain Jenkins, who held, of course, a different view and advocated, as far as practicable, a policy of rapprochement between the two peoples, never failed to draw the attention of the Government of Bengal to this anomalous state of affairs;²² In spite of his reminders and the nice sentiments occasionally expressed by the authorities in Calcutta—'that every facility should be afforded for the highlanders and lowlanders' 'our object is to cultivate friendly intercourse with the Garrows, Nagas and other hill-tribes'²³—the *hats* and their odious duties continued to exist even after the abolition of the inland customs *chokies* of the North-east Frontier. However, in the middle of 1839, the Deputy Governor of Bengal took a serious view of the whole situation,²⁴—'that the retention of these customs-gates militates against the spirit of the Act XIV of 1836' 'it operates as a great impediment to the attainment of the primary object for which these (*hats*) were set up.' When the Board of Revenue, too, endorsed the same opinion, the Supreme Government resolved, finally, to abolish the hill-hats and authorized the Commissioner of Assam 'to allow the Garrows and other hill-tribes to dispose of their articles, free of duties, at places most convenient to them' on the understanding that 'if disturbances should occur, in consequence of the withdrawal of these restrictions, the propriety of reimposing these and other restrictions will become a matter for consideration.'²⁵

21. Revenue letters from Bengal, 1839; 4 December, No. 15.

22. *Ibid.*

23. Revenue Consultations, Bengal, 1836; 7 March, No. 91; Vide the Minute, 6 August 1933.

24. Revenue letters from Bengal, 1839; 4 December No. 15.

25. *Ibid.*

An Intercepted Letter of Keir Hardie to Bal Gangadhar Tilak

A proposal to hold a session of the Indian National Congress
in London

BY

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While the Indian National Congress was trying to educate the Indian people about the supreme necessity of having their self-government, a group of men in Great Britain who were friendly to India felt the importance of educating the public opinion in that country in favour of the movement for the political emancipation of India. Foremost among them was Sir William Wedderburn, one of the architects of the Indian National Congress and twice the President of that august body.¹ Presiding over the Allahabad session of the Congress in 1910, Wedderburn said, "Let me remind you of the twofold character of the Congress work. There is first the work in India: the political education of the people, having for its first object to create solidarity of the Indian public opinion, founded on the widest experience and wisest counsel available. This part of the work has been in great part accomplished.What is now wanted is a vigorous propaganda in England, in order to bring the appeal effectively before the High Court of the British nation. The work to be done is of a missionary kind and must be mainly directed to influencing the British people in whom the ultimate power is vested.What is wanted is a systematic, continuous and sustained effort to bring before the English public the Indian view of Indian affairs".²

The idea of Wedderburn found a staunch advocate in the late James Keir Hardie,³ the first Socialist member to be elected to

1. Bombay Session, 1899, and Allahabad Session, 1910.

2. "Indian National Congress", G. A. Natesan, Madras, 1917, pp. 1005-06.

3. J. Keir Hardie (1856-1915), M.P., from 1900 till his death.

the British House of Commons and the first Chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party. Keir Hardie came to India in 1907-08, and in the course of an extensive tour in this country he gathered personal knowledge of the men and affairs in India. A man of the people, Keir Hardie could easily realize the role of the Indian leaders in the political movement. He acquired great respect for the Indian patriot Bal Gangadhar Tilak, who in the words of Lord Minto, the Viceroy and Governor-General of India (1905-1910) "was recognized throughout India as the leader of sedition".⁴ Impressed by the personality of Tilak and the influence he exercised over the Indian National Congress, Keir Hardie in 1911 wrote from England to Tilak about the importance of educating British public opinion about India and her aims and aspirations.

But the letter never reached the great Indian leader. In 1908 Tilak was sentenced to imprisonment for six years on a charge of publication of seditious articles, and in March 1911 when the letter was addressed to him, Tilak was serving his sentence at the Mandalay jail in the far off Burma. The letter was intercepted on its arrival at Bombay and as the result of a triangular correspondence between the Government of Bombay, the Government of India and the Government of Burma it was decided not to deliver the letter to the "convict". The Government of India read into the letter more than what was written. In their opinion Keir Hardie must have anticipated the interception of the letter and Lord Hardinge,⁵ the then Governor-General, and his Council came to the conclusion that the letter was "probably written so as to create a grievance over its being intercepted".⁶

Almost half a century has passed by since the letter was written. Many events have happened since then. Both Tilak and Keir Hardie as also Lord Minto and Lord Hardinge are no longer in the land of the living. None of them were destined to see the emergence of an independent India, for which Tilak lived

4. "India Minto & Morley, 1905-1910", Mary, Countess of Minto, p. 247.

5. Baron Hardinge of Penshurst (1858-1944), Viceroy & Governor-General of India, 1910-1916.

6. Home : Poll-B : Progs., July 1911, No. 17-19.

and died and which the friends of India like Keir Hardie might have visualized. The fact remains that the British public opinion and particularly the Labour Party, of which Keir Hardie was the first representative in the House of Commons, played a large part in the enactment of the Indian Independence Act of 1947 which transferred power over India from the people of Great Britain to those of India and Pakistan.

The letter of Keir Hardie to Tilak which so long lay hidden in a dark corner of the Archives of the Government of India may speak for itself about the emphasis put by Keir Hardie on the importance of holding a session of the Indian National Congress in London to educate public opinion of Britain on Indian questions. The following is the text of the letter:—

House of Commons Library

March 31, 1911

My dear Mr. Tilak,

I have many times intended writing to you but some how one's good intentions often get pushed aside by the pressure of necessities of the moment. I have been hearing of you indirectly through our mutual friend Mr. G. S. Khaparde.⁷ I expect you are finding the time hang heavily on your hands, unless you are allowed a good deal of latitude in the way of doing some useful studies.

You have of course heard of the result of the General Election and how the Labour Party was returned two stronger than it was in the last Parliament. We are now 42 members in the House of Commons. Some of these are beginning to take quite an intelligent interest in India and its problems. I never miss an opportunity of driving home the point that the only solution for the difficulties of the situation in India is such a measure of self-government as will make the people of India masters in their own households. I am quite aware, as you know, that this state could not be attained immediately, but that is the real goal towards which every friend of India should be diligently striving. Every extension of power has justified the belief that

7. A Congress leader of Amraoti, Berar, and a co-worker of Tilak.

the more these powers are extended the greater will be the proof of the fitness of the people to attend to their own affairs and the greater also the disproof of the carefully nurtured fallacy that India needs a strong controlling hand to keep its different sects and races from cutting each other's throats.

I have been strongly urging upon the heads of the Indian Congress Movement the advisability and importance of holding their next Congress here in London. The presence of men like yourself and your colleagues in Conference assembled would go far to break down prejudice, and were the Congress followed by a series of big demonstrations in our most important industrial centres the effect could not fail to be excellent. I do not know how far you agree with me that next to the education of the people of India concerning their political rights and duties the next important thing is the education of the people of this country concerning India and her aims and aspirations. There is no reason why the two things should not go on side by side and the Congress and the meetings would aid both objects.

I do not know if there is anything else I can add except that whether the Congress be held here or not, I trust that after your release you may be able to come here upon a visit. Should that happen I should be greatly delighted to renew the acquaintance in which I found so much to respect and admire, and with all good wishes for your health and well-being I beg to remain.

B. G. Tilak, Esq.

Yours sincerely,
J. Keir Hardie^{8*}

8. Home: Poll-B: Proceedings, July 1911, No. 17-19. Interception of a letter addressed by Mr. J. Keir Hardie, M.P., to Bal Gangadhar Tilak.

* Read at the Indian History Congress, Trivandrum Session, 1958.

Dungarpur Succession, 1846

BY

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With the establishment of British ascendancy in India towards the end of the administration of Lord Hastings, British relations with the Indian States entered upon a new phase. During the period of Lord Amherst, the work left unfinished by his predecessor was completed and the idea of annexing the dependent states of British creation on the failure of natural-born male heirs was conceived and applied as an experimental measure in certain very small but not very unimportant states. However, the period before Lord Dalhousie was marked by hesitation and restraint in the application of the idea of escheat. Annexations on that score were effected only in exceptional cases where promptings of British interests made them unavoidable and imperative. Fear of unpopularity and adverse reaction against British rule in India imposed an effective check on the application of that policy as a regular routine. Although very few states were annexed on that pretext by 1848, there was hardly any case of succession after 1834 in which lapse remained wholly unthought of and the pros and cons of it were not properly adjudged. One instance of this kind was the case of Dungarpur in Rajputana where succession question engaged the attention of Lord Hardinge in 1846.¹

Jaswant Singh, the titular Maharawal of Dungarpur expired on the 19th December 1845 at Brindaban.² About twentyfive years before that melancholy event, having no male issue, he had adopted Dalpat Singh, a collateral and a member of the royal house of

1. Foreign Department letter from Fort William to the Home Government, 5th November 1847. No. 15.

2. A letter from Edward Thornton, Magistrate of Muttra, to Lt. Coll. T. Robinson, Political Agent in Mewar, 19th December, 1845.

Partabgarh, as his son and heir presumptive of his state.³ Since then Dalpat Singh virtually ruled over Dungarpur in de facto capacity in the name of Jaswant Singh, who was deposed and removed from the state by the British Government but was allowed to take abode at Brindaban where he passed the rest of his life. It was, however, conceded that in the case of a son being born to him, he would become the natural lineal successor to the throne and that Dalpat Singh would be assigned some jagir for his maintenance.⁴ But in 1845, a year before the death of Jaswant Singh, Dalpat Singh acquired the throne of Partabgarh, on the chance death of its ruler and his son, by virtue of being the eldest surviving descendant of the ruling family of that state.⁵ Consequently, after the death of Jaswant Singh without a son of his own, succession question cropped up in Dungarpur. It seemed as though the two small principalities would be united into one political unit under a common ruler.⁶

The British authorities had no objection to a scheme of this kind. It was presumed that nobody would dispute this union, as the late Maharawal had long ceased to enjoy real power and Dalpat Singh had wielded power and authority for more than twenty years.⁷ Tranquillity prevailed in the state and there seemed to be no danger of a breach of peace. Lt. Col. T. Robinson, the British Political Agent in Mewar, therefore, reached Dungarpur to regularise succession and to give the existing arrangement a de jure status. He was given full discretionary authority by the Governor-General to effect an appropriate political and administrative arrangement which could be congenial to the peace of the realm and enjoy the approbation of the Government of India, the Court of Directors and the Chiefs of Dungarpur.⁸

On reaching Dungarpur, when Col. Robinson started investigations he was surprised to find strong objection to the proposed

3. A letter from Robinson, Political Agent in Mewar to Maj. C. Thoresby, Officiating Agent to the Governor-General for the States of Rajputana, 24th December 1845.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*

6. Despatch from Thoresby to the Secretary to the Government of India, 9th January 1846.

7. A letter from Robinson to Thoresby, 24th December 1845.

8. Letter from Thoresby to Robinson 29th December 1845.

political union of the two states under Dalpat Singh, the ruler of Partabgarh.⁹ The idea of the merger of Dungarpur with any state and the consequent loss of its political status were highly repugnant to the Rajput dignitaries of the state who wished to maintain their state as a separate entity.¹⁰ Hence, the entire case was opened afresh for discussion and decision. Three alternatives occurred to Robinson for a possible solution. Firstly, nominal unification of the two principalities of Partabgarh and Dungarpur under Dalpat Singh's rule and maintenance of two separate autonomous units of administration.¹¹ Secondly, permission to the state to adopt a new successor, and maintenance of it as a distinctly separate political entity.¹² Thirdly, escheat of the state to the British Government in the manner of other heirless principalities, and assumption of its administration by the paramount power.¹³

When the succession question was being discussed in this manner, the deposed Maharawal Jaswant Singh offered the strongest opposition to the proposal for merger. He made an attempt to recover his lost authority and to regulate succession in his own way. He adopted Hanwant Singh, son of the Thakur of Mungla as his new successor. But he was unsuccessful and his attempt to emerge from oblivion resulted in his removal to Brindaban where he remained under close watch as a British pensioner till his death in December 1845.

In ordinary course and under unchanged circumstances, on the failure of the contingency of a son being born to the Maharawal, Dalpat Singh's claims to succession were undoubted and undisputed. All things were in his favour. He enjoyed the support of the paramount power.¹⁴ His adoption was not disputed by any claimant. Under the title of a Regent he had shown his merits

9. Despatch from Thoresby to The Secretary to the Government of India, 6th February 1846.

10. *Ibid.*

11. A letter from Robinson to Thoresby, 28th January 1846; A letter from Fort William to the Home Government Foreign Department, 5th November 1847 Con. No. 15.

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.*

14. A letter from Robinson to Thoresby, 28th January 1846.

as a talented and successful administrator. He had managed the affairs of Dungarpur with credit to himself and to benefit of the state. All sections of people bore the mark of satisfaction under his rule. There was no opposition to him on that account. He would have administered the state with change in his designation from Regent to Rawal. But as he had already become the ruler of Partabgarh in an unthought of contingency, the situation was materially altered. Now he could have become ruler of Dungarpur also if it was finally decided to unite the two principalities under him. On this point the high dignitaries of Dungarpur held an entirely different view.¹⁵ Fear of the state losing its entity haunted their imagination as they did not like to cast their lot with the state of Partabgarh. Patriotic sentiment as well as self-interest worked in their minds to crystallize into a strong opposition against the proposed merger. Their contention was that having become the ruler of Partabgarh Dalpat Singh had lost his claims to the throne of Dungarpur.¹⁶ Union of the two states was never envisaged and provided for in the deed of adoption. He should not have accepted the rulership of Partabgarh. His acceptance of it virtually annulled his adoption as heir presumptive to the Dungarpur Raj. There was no law, usage or custom in Rajputana whereby the same individual could be entitled to hold sovereignty of two separate states.¹⁷ He could become the ruler of Dungarpur only by relinquishing his new position which was not possible. They, therefore, suggested that under the new and unforeseen circumstances a fresh adoption should be made for the throne of Dungarpur.¹⁸

On the validity of these objections Col. Robinson was unable to offer any decided opinion as he was not aware of any precedent of exactly the same nature or even analogous to it.¹⁹ He, therefore, submitted the matter to his superior officer Maj. C. Thoresby, the Officiating Agent to the Governor-General in Rajputana, who collected pertinent information from the official documents. He

15. A Durkhawst from the Thakurs of Dungarpur to Robinson, 18th January 1846.

16. A letter from Robinson to Thoresby, 28th January, 1846.

17. *Ibid.*

18. A Durkhawst from the Thakurs of Dungarpur to Robinson, 18th January 1846.

mentioned that when Dalpat Singh was adopted as heir and appointed as Regent, the Court of Directors had not altogether lost sight of a probable contingency of his becoming a ruler of Dungarpur at some future date. Nor had they failed to visualise the circumstances in which he became the ruler of Partabgarh. Having given due consideration to the problematical issue they were inclined to favour under special circumstances an arrangement by which two small and friendly principalities might be united under one sovereign.²⁰ They were quite positive in their view that there was no objection to a union on the score of policy if there existed none 'in point of right'.²¹ With this remark they approved on principle the incorporation of the two contiguous states under one head, if it could be effected without a sacrifice of the rights of the incumbents or the claims of the expectants and without any breach of peace.²²

Col. Robinson was not aware of any other claimant to the throne whose rights would be infringed if that state was merged in the neighbouring principality of Partabgarh and ceased to exist as a separate political entity. He knew that there was no lineal descendant of Jaswant Singh to claim his inheritance whose pretensions would conflict with those of Dalpat Singh, unless his adoption was declared void by reason of his subsequent accession to the gaddi of Pratabgarh.²³ Notwithstanding all this knowledge and reasoning, he held a definite opinion that recognition of Dalpat Singh as a ruler of both the principalities, even without the infringement of the rights of any individual, would prove to be an utterly unpopular measure and excite more discontent and dissatisfaction among the chiefs and *Thakurs* of Dungarpur than what would happen if the state were declared an escheat to the British Government.²⁴ Even the idea of nominal unification with separate autonomous administrative units created fears in their minds that it might be used in future as a step towards the complete merger of their state. Therefore, the first alternative was not likely to meet the approbation of the people.

20. *Ibid.*

21. *Ibid.*

22. *Ibid.*

23. *Ibid.*

24. *Ibid.*

This impression of Robinson was based on the feelings and sentiments of the influential personages of Dungarpur and on the well-known fact that though Dungarpur was inferior in value as a territorial power it had always claimed precedence over Partabgarh in point of rank and station because the rulers of Dungarpur were descendants of the senior branch of the reigning family of Udaipur as compared to those of Partabgarh who descended from the junior stock.²⁵ Moreover, he felt that no class of people in India were more sensitive in matters of rank and precedence or more tenacious in maintaining the dignity of their position, when once recognised, than the Rajputs. He, therefore, feared that it might be highly revolting to the Rajput sense of pride and feeling to witness the absorption of their principality into one of avowedly inferior rank and pretensions. To this notion of dignity of their ruling house the Rajputs of Dungarpur were fanatically attached, although, due to frequent failures of male issues and numerous adoptions made to fill the vacancies hardly any blood relationship could be traced between any of those states. However false, this sense of pride undoubtedly existed in Dungarpur.²⁶

Although Dalpat Singh's doption was perfectly regular and had met with the general concurrence of the people of that state, yet, as it was not then anticipated that he would be reclaimed by his own family and as no provision was made for such a contingency, the arguments of the Dungarpur Chiefs were not without weight. In the absence of a precedent of that kind, where the same individual inherited two distinct and separate principalities, this new contingency was not considered admissible. Hence the adoption of Dalpat Singh stood annulled. This point attracted the attention of the Court of Directors who observed in their despatch, "We are of opinion that it would have been ascertained what according to the Hindu Law would have been the effect of this adoption and the subsequent reclamation".²⁷

To this Robinson replied that all writers on Hindu Law admitted that any person once adopted into another family ceased to have any claim on the inheritance of his own.²⁸ This practice was

25. *Ibid.*

26. *Ibid.*

27. *Ibid.*

28. *Ibid.*

violated in this case as Dalpat Singh became the ruler of Partabgarh which was his original inheritance. This deviation from the rule in this case was permitted by the Governor-General at the earnest solicitations of his octogenarian grand father Savant Singh who sent a representation to him that subsequent to his grandson's adoption by the Maharawal of Dungarpur, he had the misfortune to lose all his offsprings and since his grandson Dalpat Singh was the only surviving lineal descendant he should be assured that his grandson would be permitted to succeed to his birth right and that his Raj would not be allowed to pass on to a stranger at his death, which would be certain unless Dalpat Singh's reclamation was effected.²⁹ Under these peculiarly stressing and strange circumstances Savant Singh's petition was acceded to. In view of all this Dalpat Singh's succession to the principality of Dungarpur seemed to be highly anomalous and was destined to create many complications. Active consideration was, therefore, given to the second alternative of selecting a ruler for Dungarpur.³⁰

Believing that it had been the policy of the British Government to leave to the petty Rajput principalities the choice of their rulers and that with the exemption of this question of succession there had always prevailed good understanding and cordial relations between Dalpat Singh and the Chiefs of Dungarpur, Robinson thought that there would be no difficulty in effecting a compromise between the two conflicting view points.³¹ He, therefore, unofficially suggested to Dalpat Singh, through one of his confidential servants whether with his knowledge of the feelings and sentiments of the Chiefs of Dungarpur it would not be advisable for him to relinquish all his claims on the state of Dungarpur and remain contented with the Regency during the minority of a boy of the late Rawal's kith and kin or, failing that, any other boy whom the chiefs might conveniently select as a successor to the Raj. Robinson was sure that to this arrangement the Chiefs of Dungarpur would agree. Even then he did not give any assurance to Dalpat Singh that the proposed arrangement would be acceptable to his Government because he had no authority to make

29. *Ibid.*

30. A despatch from Thoresby to the Secretary to the Government, 6th Feb. 1846.

31. A letter from Robinson to Thoresby, 28th January, 1846.

overtures of that kind and the final decision on the matter lay with the Governor General.³²

Dalpat Singh was quick to catch the hint. He did not want to complicate the issue. He was inclined to accept any reasonable proposal emanating from the representative of the paramount power. He, therefore, readily agreed with the suggestion and promised to communicate with the Chiefs of Dungarpur on the course suggested by Robinson.³³ On the 27th January 1846, he proposed to adopt a good and well-behaved young boy from amongst the relations of the deceased Rawal to be placed on the gaddi of Dungarpur and to continue to administer the affairs of that state in the usual capacity of Regent, if the arrangement was acceptable to the paramount power to whom he owed his position.³⁴ Similarly, on the 18th January 1846, the *Thakurs* of Dungarpur sent a joint representation to the Political Agent requesting him to ask Dalpat Singh to adopt a boy for succession to the gaddi of Dungarpur.³⁵ On receipt of this mutually agreed arrangement, Robinson transmitted the copies of the two communications to his Government and asked for instructions.³⁶ In the forwarding note he expressed his opinion that the proposed arrangement would prove most satisfactory and would obviate the possibility of any local disturbance.³⁷

The third alternative was not altogether unthought of. On examination it was found much more hazardous. It would have unnecessarily aroused suspicions and resentment in Rajputana. In it were involved the dangers of internal turmoil and external disapproval. The idea of lapse, therefore, did not go beyond the state of contemplation³⁸ and examination and was ultimately given up.

32. *Ibid.*

33. *Ibid.*

34. A Kharita from Maharawal Dalpat Singh to Robinson, 27th January 1846.

35. A Darkhwast from the *Thakurs* of Dungarpur to Robinson, 18th January 1846.

36. A letter from Robinson to Maj. Thoresby, 27th January 1846.

37. *Ibid.*

38. A letter from Sutherland to the Under-Secretary to the Government of India, 23rd June 1846.

Connected with this issue of succession, a claim was advanced by the Maharaja of Udaipur which surprised Robinson. He received a Kharita, dated the 29th December 1845, from the Maharaja Swarup Singh of Udaipur³⁹ addressed to the Governor General in which he had put forward the claims of the members of his royal family for adoption as heir to the gaddi of Dungarpur on the plea that late Rawal of that State had descended from a branch of the house of Udaipur and that he himself had favoured an arrangement of that kind prior to the adoption of Dalpat Singh. In that letter the Rana of Udaipur suggested that in the interest of justice, equity and popularity of the British Government in Rajputana and for its friendship with the Rajputs, he should be allowed to name a successor to the throne of Dungarpur.⁴⁰ But Robinson considered these claims as untenable on the ground that the two states had long ceased to have any ties of consanguinity and that neither the Chiefs of Dungarpur nor Dalpat Singh had ever made any reference to the claims of the house of Udaipur.⁴¹ The claim was, therefore, rejected as preposterous.

Ultimately, on the 15th June 1846, the Governor General was disposed to favour the adoption of an heir to the gaddi of Dungarpur by Dalpat Singh in accordance with the usages of Rajputana from amongst the nearest kins of the late Rawal.⁴² But before giving final decision he wanted to be very clear about the future so that no complications could arise again. He, therefore, desired the Agent to the Governor General in Rajputana to express his views whether, subsequent to the death of the adopted heir without an offspring, the state should revert to Dalpat Singh or he would be authorised for the second time to adopt an heir, or the state would become an escheat to the British Government like the other states to which no heirs existed.⁴³ In this way, the matter dragged on for sometime without a final decision. However, Sutherland, the Agent to the Governor

39. Kharita from Maharaja Swarup Singh of Udaipur to the Governor General Sir Henry Hardinge, 29th December 1845.

40. *Ibid.*

41. A letter from Robinson to Maj. Thoresby, 28th January 1846.

42. A letter from the Under-Secretary to the Government of India to Lt. Coll. J. Sutherland, 15th June, 1846.

43. *Ibid.*

General for the states of Rajputana forwarded the letter of the 15th June to the Political Agent in Mewar for his guidance⁴⁴ and sent reply to the queries made by the Governor General.⁴⁵ He found no reason why recourse to a second adoption should not be had if the first adopted child died before or after attaining maturity.⁴⁶ He could not think of a plea on which lapse would ever be justified. The state was connected with the East India Company by a treaty which did not postulate escheat and there was no want of collateral heirs to the throne.⁴⁷ Even if the Paramount Power had a right to apply the principle of lapse and there was an occasion for it also, he considered it highly undesirable and inadvisable to burden the British Government with the administration of Dungarpur.⁴⁸ Acquisition of this state was not considered to be economically advantageous to the East India Company.⁴⁹ Robinson also held similar views.⁵⁰ The idea of escheat was, therefore, entirely dropped and a path of least resistance was adopted. The second alternative became the declared policy of the Government.

During the pendency of the question of succession the Governor General did not like the conduct of his Agent in Rajputana on the matter of procedure.⁵¹ He felt surprised to learn that J. Sutherland acted upon the despatch of June 15 as if it contained a final decision on the subject and thereby committed the paramount power to a course of policy which was by that despatch made contingent on certain points on which opinion was sought.⁵² Although the Government was not placed in any inconvenient position by the conduct of the Political Agent, yet the Governor General's sentiments were communicated to him that he had acted precipitately in treating his intention as his

44. A letter from Sutherland to Robinson, 23rd June, 1846.

45. A letter from Sutherland to the Under-Secretary to the Govt. of India, 23rd June 1846.

46. *Ibid.*

47. *Ibid.*

48. *Ibid.*

49. *Ibid.*

50. A letter from Robinson to Sutherland, 30th June 1846.

51. Letter from the Secretary to the Government of India to Lt. Col. J. Sutherland, 9th July 1846.

52. *Ibid.*

final order which he should not have done.⁵³ However, he agreed with the views of the Political Agent about the future of the state provided they were acceptable to the Chiefs of Dungarpur, and sanctioned the adoption of a successor to the Gaddi from among the nearest of kin of the late Rawal.⁵⁴ The Maharaja of Udaipur was informed of the decision.⁵⁵

In accordance with the decision of the paramount power and in keeping with the Rajput usage Maharaja Dalpat Singh of Partabgarh adopted Udai Singh for the Dungarpur gaddi. He was the second son of Jaswant Singh, the Chief of Sablee, and was about seven or eight years of age.⁵⁶ This arrangement was made with complete concurrence of the Chiefs and nobles of the principality who expressed their satisfaction with the arrangement sanctioned by the Governor General.⁵⁷

This incident shows that the Governor General was watchful of the activities of his Agent and was not ready to approve any unauthorised move or premature action on his part. Correspondence on the question of succession indicates the slow evolution of the principle of lapse and its application only in exceptional cases where the British interests prompted it as the only fruitful alternative.

The new political arrangement did not prove salubrious to the administration of Dungarpur. Maladministration became the inevitable outcome of the exercise of functions of the regency by Dalpat Singh from Partabgarh. The regency under him was, therefore, dissolved in 1852 and the administration of the state was entrusted to an Indian Agent appointed by the British Government for the remaining period of the minority of Udai Singh.

53. *Ibid.*

54. *Ibid.*

55. *Ibid.*; A letter from Sutherland to Robinson, 20th July 1846.

56. Letter from Sutherland to the Secretary to the Government of India, 7th Oct. 1846. Letter from Robinson to Sutherland, 3rd October, 1846; Kharita from Maharwal Dalpat Singh to Robinson, 27th Sept. 1846.

57. Letters from the Chiefs of Dungarpur, 27th Sept. 1846.

Raja Ram Mohan Roy—His Life and Achievements

BY

MISS NONDITA CHATTERJEE, M.A.

Life

Raja Ram Mohan Roy was born in the village of Radhanagar in the district of Hoogly on 22nd May, 1772. He belonged to a respectable Brahmin family which was honoured with the title of "Roy Roy" by the Nawab of Bengal. Realising the boy's intellectual capabilities, Raja Ram Mohan's father gave him excellent education from the beginning. He studied Persian at Patna and Sanskrit at Banaras and acquired mastery over these extremely rich classical languages. After completing his education he had to leave his father's home for his attacks on meaningless rituals. He travelled all over India and visited Tibet. Having finished his tour of India he came back to Bengal and entered the service of the East India Company as a clerk. Here the Raja started the study of English in 1796 and studied the Bible. Study of English brought a turning point in his life and in the history of India. He decided to lead his countrymen who were buried deep in superstitions, meaningless rituals and illiteracy, towards light. Ram Mohan left his job in 1814 to start his august work of reformation and reconstruction of the Hindu Society. The Raja was bold, honest and had a great heart. He rose like a lion, attacked fearlessly the age old meaningless ceremonials and started a movement which gave birth to the Indian Renaissance and sowed the seeds of Modern India. The Mughal Emperor of Delhi appointed Ram Mohan as his envoy, conferred on him the title of Raja and sent him to England to plead his cause with the British Sovereign. This God-fearing man of cosmopolitan sympathies reached England in 1831 where he was already known as the mouthpiece of India. Public honours came quick on him. At the Coronation of George IV, the Raja was honoured with a place among the foreign ambassadors. He visited France in 1832 and was received by Louis Philippe. But all this incessant strain

told on the Raja's health. He fell ill and passed away at Stapleton Grove, Bristol, in 1833.

The study of Vedanta, Koran and Bible gave him the key to the treasures of the Hindu, Islamic and Christian theologies. The Raja brought about a concord among these heterogeneous and hostile forces and thus laid the foundation of a new age and became the father of Modern India.

Study of Koran had made him a monotheist. Study of Vedanta confirmed his views. He started an association at Calcutta, (i) for spreading monotheism, (ii) to put an end to idol-worship, (iii) to stop the intelligentsia of Bengal from becoming christian. He founded a society at Calcutta for meditation and worship which was named as Brahmo-Samaj in 1830 and which brought about a revolution in the field of religion, education, society and emancipated women.

Ram Mohan started expressing his views by writing books, pamphlets and in newspapers, etc., in Persian, Bengali and English and thus became the father of Bengali-prose and father of Indian Journalism. His Bengali Journal "The Sambad Kaumudi" first appeared in 1821, "Mirat-ul-Akbhar" was his Persian newspaper. In 1829 he became the proprietor of an English Paper "The Bengal Herald". He published "Bangaduta" in 1829 in Bengali and Persian. Ram Mohan fought against the Press Act of 1823 for he wanted freedom of Press and expression and had realised its importance in the national life of India. In 1823 Ram Mohan made a brilliant defence of the freedom of Press in India in his "Memorial to the Supreme Court" and "Appeal to the King in Council". Freedom of Press was granted to the Indians after the Raja's death.

Ram Mohan realised the necessity of giving education to both men and women of this country. He was a patriot and hated the British rule and slavery. But he knew that the people must learn English to achieve freedom and for the awakening of India, because through English, people would get access to Western Science. Therefore he protested vehemently when the Committee of Public Instruction recommended the opening of a Sanskrit College at Calcutta. The Raja yielded to none in his admiration for the fathomless treasures of ancient philosophy and reli-

gion. But he was not an Utopian visionary. At a time when the British people themselves were against imparting the knowledge of Western Science to the Indians, the Raja's fight for the introduction of English, is unique. Twelve years before Lord Macaulay's famous minute 1835 the Raja, in his letter to Lord Amherst in 1823, pleaded for the introduction of English language in the schools for Indian boys. Macaulay pleaded for the establishment of schools where English language could be taught and cheap clerks for the Company and slaves for the British Empire could be produced. The Raja laid emphasis on the teaching of Western science which would enlighten India and bring about her political emancipation in the course of time. Ram Mohan took a prominent part in the famous controversy between the "Orientalists" and the "Anglicists" and the Raja triumphed. For the direct and indirect beneficial results of Western Education, we are indebted to the Raja as much as Lord Macaulay, Lord William Bentinck and David Hare. Ram Mohan wanted to establish girls' schools too. A girls' school was opened only after his death by an English Lady—his admirer.

It was in the field of social reform that Ram Mohan took a very bold step and was successful in abolishing an age old practice. A custom prevailed that women of high caste used to burn themselves alive on the pyre of their deceased husbands, even against their will. In 1811 when Ram Mohan saw his sister-in-law becoming Sutte on the pyre of her husband, he felt miserable and determined to abolish this practice and took rest only when Lord William Bentinck, the Governor-General, enacted a law which abolished the practice of Sutte in 1829.

Ram Mohan, the patriot, fought for the women's right to property, widow-remarriage, abolition of child-marriage, polygamy and caste-system. He said that caste-system must be removed for the sake of political advantage.

He pleaded the cause of the ryots who were oppressed by the Zamindars and even urged some English landlords to settle in India to provide a model to the Indian Zamindars who were greatly benefited by the permanent Settlement of 1793.

The Raja was a patriot and a true nationalist. He wanted India to be a free country and even represented her in foreign

countries. Ram Mohan was a true ambassador of India, both cultural and political and made many friends for India in England and in Europe. The Raja's nationalism was not narrow. It was as broad as the sky. Raja, the humanist, could not be unsympathetic towards any nation or country. He was very happy when he heard the news of the French Revolution of 1830. He even stopped his connection with his European friends, temporarily, when he heard the news of the overthrow of the constitutional Government in Naples in 1821 and how the despots of Europe were crushing the ideologies of the French Revolution of 1789.

Ram Mohan was born in a period which is perhaps the darkest age of India. There was devastation and destruction everywhere. People were illiterate and had lost that quest for knowledge and faith in national capabilities which lead men from ignorance to knowledge — from darkness to light. They had forgotten the glory of the past and had no ambition to build a glorified future. Ram Mohan stands in history as a bridge between the past and future. The Raja in his effort to build new India became the pioneer of Indian Renaissance. By starting all those movements which brought about the regeneration of Modern India, he became the Father of Modern India. He embodied the new spirit of "Risorgimento" he embodied its spirit of enquiry, its thirst for science, its large human sympathy, its reverent but critical regard for the past and disinclination for revolt. His efforts for reformation and regeneration of India could be compared with that of Erasmus in Germany. Some compare Ram Mohan with Luther and Calvin, the pioneers of the reformation movements in the West. But Luther and Calvin were only religious reformers where as the Raja was a religious as well as a social and political Reformer. He fought against the corrupt practices of the Hindu religion and society and clearly recognised the interdependence of political advancement and social and religious progress. His political programme was intimately connected with the social uplift of the nation. He started all those movements which brought about the regeneration and reformation of India. Therefore he is called the pioneer of the Indian Renaissance.

The Raja came in such a period of Indian History when a vast gap was made between the Hindus and the Europeans. between

the ruler and the ruled and there was no understanding between the Orientals and the Occidentals.

The Raja worked as a bridge between the two and also tried his best to make his English friends understand India. He assimilated in himself Hindu as well as Western Culture and thus laid down the foundation of Modern Indian Culture which is a synthesis of the East and the West.

The greatest glory that Raja Ram Mohan Roy's name has acquired in history is his being called the Father of the Indian Renaissance. At a time when India stood in urgent need of regeneration and upliftment, the advent of the Raja marked an epoch in her history. He was a student of History and knew to what a great height Indian culture and civilisation had reached in the past. He had full faith in the genius of his countrymen. The degraded condition of his countrymen mortified the Raja and therefore he launched his reforming and renaissance movement and his efforts were crowned with success.

The Capuchins in Madras

BY

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The history of Christianity in Madras in the centuries following St. Thomas is still comparative darkness and one has to wait till the Portuguese arrival in Madras in the mid-sixteenth century for this darkness to be lifted. San Thome begins once more to be the centre of Christian activity only round about 1517 A.D., when Diogo Fernandes, "a virtuous old man of good conduct" who figures chiefly in the excavation of St. Thomas' tomb in San Thome, arrived at the place. From this period onwards numerous missionaries, both secular and regular, belonging to various organisations, landed and worked in Madras. The Theating, The Jesuits, the Franciscans, and a few Dominicans have laboured in Madras throughout the XVII and XVIII centuries and among them the Capuchins¹ were larger in number and worked longer in point of time. They were the missionaries who had to bear the brunt of the struggle with the English East India Company, which was Protestant at heart and in politics opposed to the great Catholic nations of the time, the Portuguese and the French. The lot of the Capuchins was cast with this company of merchants and how they existed and preached in this trying situation form interesting study.

The history of the Capuchins in India is, however, yet unwritten. What is proposed here is but a silhouette study culled from a cursory survey of the English records of the period belonging to Fort St. George. From very early times the community at the Madras fort consisted of a good number of Portuguese settlers,

1. Chief among the permanent offshoots of the Franciscans the Capuchins branched off as a separate Order, round about 1520 under the lead of Matteo di Bassi and were constituted as an independent order in 1619. Their name is drawn from their peculiar hood (Capuche).

who were Catholics, and whose religious interest was allowed to be looked after by a Portuguese Priest. Suddenly this supervision by the Portuguese yields place to Capuchin supervision in the person of Father Ephraem de Neveos who, bound for the further east, arrives at the Fort in Madras and is invited by the English merchants to accept the position of a pastor in place of the Portuguese priest who was already doing the office—Very strange happening for which the records do not vouch with the date or the cause. It is obvious however that the English Company could not like the Portuguese. Both their religion and their imperial projects caused the latter to be disliked by the former, and it is also just possible that the company had already known Father Ephraem. This event must have happened in or a little before 1654, since we find in that year the Protestant pastor at the Fort, Rev. Isaacson, complaining against the aggressive character of Ephraem and his companion Zenon.

The Ephraem episode created not a little stir in ecclesiastical circles; appeals and representations were made to both the Governor in Madras and the Home Board of the East India Company; and while the latter was of the opinion that the Company would do well not to enter into religious controversies the merchants in Madras felt that they could not be blind to commercial and possible political interests that were involved in all these matters. Ephraem and his companion were treated well by the English Company which helped them to build a church within the Fort. This Church dedicated to St. Andrew, one among the first churches in Madras, was thus built and consecrated in 1675.

Ephraem apparently lived up to a ripe old age. In 1693 he was given the assistance of Fr. Michael and later on he petitioned to the company and got its approval for the appointment of another named Fr. Lewis de Olivera as his second Assistant. These had still another assistant by name de Mello who officiated at Fort St. George without any licence. Now Fr. de Mello was a Portuguese while the others were French by nationality and the former sought to bring Fr. de Olivera to look before the Bishop of San Thome, whereupon the English Company expelled Fr. de Mello from the fort.² This pro-French policy continued for some time.

2. P. C. 1-11-1694.

The growth of the French Power along the coast, however, caused a change in the policy of the English Company. From the dawn of the XVIII century the French were growing in alarming proportions and the English company began to develop a pro-Portuguese policy. 1699 the last year of the XVIII century saw the appointment of Fr. de Saa a Portuguese national and a nominee of the Bishop of San Thome in the Fort. We know that in 1721 one Fr. Thomas was in charge of St. Andrews in the fort and he was responsible for changing the whole style of the church and the living quarters by its side. An unpublished document dealing with the eastern voyages of Chevolier Hebert of the French Navy, who was in Madras in 1721, gives the following account of St. Andrews and Fr. Thomas.³

"They (the English) have permitted Padre Thomas, a Capuchin, a man of the best character, wit and ability to build near the castle a church both handsome and lofty, which ornaments the town and does honour to its founder, all the more that it is the English themselves who have paid the cost".

Fr. Thomas died in 1742 and a small controversy ensued with regard to his successor. Fr. Severini was appointed by the Government of Fort St. George to succeed Fr. Thomas and be the superior of the Capuchins in Madras. Severini had continued in office for two years when Fr. Renatus, brother of the one who had preceeded Severini as a Superior, was appointed with authority from Rome not only as the Capuchin superior but as the "Apostolic Missionary and the Guardian of the Missions in the India and Persia".⁴ The English Company hated this title and much more the source from which it came and could recognise only their nominee, Fr. Severini. The Board of Directors in England wrote meaningfully approving this decision.⁵

"The Church must never be independent of the State, nor the French suffered to intermeddle in our affairs are maxims of such true policy that we entirely approve your proceedings as to Fr. Severini".

3. MSS. Preserved in the National Library at Paris.

4. P. C. 10-2-1744.

5. Despatch 7-2-1745.

It is to be said to the glory of Rev. Renatus that he saved the Capuchins from this difficult situation by accepting to abide by the decisions of the local Government.⁶ For some time the Capuchins were on the high tide of popularity with the English Company. Fr. Severini undertook the project of running of a Female Orphan House,⁷ and placed in safe deposit with the company 6,000 pagodas at 6% per annum for this purpose.

In 1746, however, came the fall of Madras before the French arms. The Fort was surrendered by the English to the French and Severini retired with his orphans to Pulicat. The English still kept their love for him; but this could not go on undiminished for any length of time, especially in view of the local opinion freely expressed along the coast that the French had been helped by the Roman Catholic Missionaries in Madras during the recent attack on the fort. In 1748 Madras was returned to the English; the Capuchins were sent out of the fort their church here having been confiscated. The English took over another Capuchin church also which was in Vepery. The Armenian, Petrus Usan, who claimed to have built it represented to the English merchants both at Madras and in London, that they could not in justice take over what belonged to him. But this was of no avail. On the other hand the Home Board ordered the demolition of St. Andrews in the fort: "You are therefore immediately on the receipt of this; without fail, to demolish the Portuguese Church in the White Town at Madras and not suffer it to stand on pretence; of settling the Danish missionaries in it, its usefulness for warehouses, store-houses or any other purposes whatsoever".⁸

As the end of 1782, the Roman Catholics had only 5 Churches in Madras—besides the two old Churches at Little Mount and St. Thomas Mount and the highly venerated one of San Thome. The one at Luz and the other at Mile End, possibly the residence of the Fisher folk along the beach. The last two only were managed by the Capuchins, the others being under Portuguese management. By 1758 we find the Capuchins building another church in Muthialpet, but almost as the building was completed it was taken by the

6. P. C. 28-4-1744.

7. *Ibid.*, 17-2-1745.

8. Despatch dated 23-8-1751.

English company to be used as a Hospital for soldiers during the French war that broke out for a second time in that very year. The English occupation however, did not end with the war. It continued till 1772 for a period of nearly 25 years. Nor did the handing over come off of its own accord. The Madras Capuchins were at the end of their tether and as early as 1769 they sent out a deputation to the Directors of the Company in England to represent their grievances and Mr. John Baptiste Saur de Colmart was chosen for this purpose.

We are not in a position to know the antecedents of de Colmart. He must have been a Frenchman of consequence with a great deal of political pull, as otherwise the Directors of the English Company would not have agreed to the rather tall demands that de Colmart made. The Directors agreed to pay a compensation of 15,000 pagodas for the damages caused to the Capuchin Churches in Madras, to allow them build a new Church and to recognise their right to nominate their superior and other members of their Body.

In the meanwhile events in India also fortified the Capuchin position in Madras. Of these the first in point of importance was the abolition of the Jesuits in 1773 by which the Church of the "Mother of God" (now in Mandaveli) which was for some time under the Jesuits passed into the hands of the Capuchins. To add further strength to their position a Capuchin Bernard of Mailapore, had become the Bishop at San Thome. Though other outward reasons were given it was to offset the favour of the Capuchins that Sir Archibold Campbell who was then Governor of Madras, introduced a system of control by which four representative Catholics of Madras called 'Syndics' were to manage the temporal affairs of the Roman Catholic Church. The four were to be selected by the Governor from a panel of eight proposed by the Bishop and the names of the first four who occupied this position were Raphael, de Souza, de Fries and Joannes.⁹

In 1789 the superior of the Capuchins of Madras died and they petitioned the Government to appoint Fr. Ferdinand, a German, in his place. The Government agreed without consulting

9. P. C. 13-3-1787.

the Syndics. This was the beginning of fresh trouble to the Capuchins, the Government and the Syndics themselves. They levelled the charge of financial mismanagement against the new superior and the Government requested the Bishop of San Thome to enquire into the matter. When Ferdinand heard of this he resigned his office as superior and all the bonds together with other financial documents representing a money value of 54,100 pagodas were handed over to the Syndics. Soon, however, a petition signed by some Roman Catholic representatives reached the Government representing them to reinstate Fr. Ferdinand and suggested that two syndics should be appointed every year, two retiring every year so that there would be always new blood in the committee of management.¹⁰ This was accepted and Ferdinand was reinstated. But he did not live long to continue in the office. The year 1800 saw the death of both Ferdinand and the Bishop of San Thome.

The XIX century opened well for the Capuchins. The English Company had by then found its feet in India and its Government in Madras had become a *fait accompli*. The Missionaries increased in number and they were of both varieties, Protestant and Catholic. In these circumstances it was easy for the English Government to leave Christianity to itself. In the increasing responsibilities of civil administration, the English could not also find time to interfere in religious controversies. For sometime thus it was smooth sailing for the Capuchins. We find the English records of the time of Governor Munro and others referring to financial help rendered to them by Government not only in the city of Madras but also in interior regions like Malabar and South Canara where they were helped in putting up churches and to use the words of a Capuchin petition to the Company from the former region, "the Governor himself became their advocate".

10. *Ibid.*, 21-7-1792; also of 24-7-1792.

Pāli, Pāli and Pāli *

BY

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Some of the natural caverns in the hills and rocks lying in out of the way places in the southern-most districts of the Madras State namely Tirunelveli, Ramanathapuram, Madurai and Tiruchirappalli, as also in some other parts of the Tamil country were in ancient times made fit for human habitation and used by the Buddhist, Jaina Ājīvika monks for their religious exercise and contemplation. Many of these monuments, which are in fact the oldest in South India so far known, have close resemblance to similar early monuments in Ceylon and suggest that they must have come into existence at the same time shaped probably by the same hands, and for the same purpose. They may roughly be assigned to the third and second centuries B.C. with the help of the inscriptions in the Brāhmī script engraved on the rocks near some of the caverns or in the caverns themselves. Among the places where such caverns with inscriptions exist are Viraśikhāmaṇi, Varichchiyūr, Aykuḍi and Ariṭṭāpaṭṭi in the Tirunelveli District, Marugāltalai, Āṇaimalai Kongarpuliyankuḷam, Kīlakkuḍi, Muttuppaṭṭi, Kīlavaḷavu, Vikkiramangalam, Karungālakkuḍi and Tirupparāṅkunṇam in the Madurai District, Śittannavāśal, Ummāchatram, Puḡalūr and Śivāyam in the Tiruchirappalli District, to mention only a few.

The language of the inscriptions is mainly Tamil, with an occasional admixture of Prākṛt words. There are a few words in them, the interpretation of which have baffled scholars. One among them is the term *pāli* which is found thrice in the inscriptions at Kīlavaḷavu, Karungālakkuḍi and Ariṭṭāpaṭṭi. There are differences of views among scholars about the meaning and import of this word, as also the relation between it and the words *pāli* and *pāli*.

Let us consider the significance of the term *pāli* (with the cerebral *l*) found in the three inscriptions mentioned above. The word in the inscription at Kīlavaḷavu reads *pāli-y*, while the record at Ariṭṭāpaṭṭi reads *pāliya*. The latter may be read as *pāli-y*, *y*

* A paper submitted to the 46th session of the Indian Science Congress held at Delhi in January, 1959.

being the suffix at the end of words in several Tamil inscriptions of the early period upto about the tenth century A.D. K. V. Subrahmanya Ayyar who has made a study of these Brāhmī Inscriptions thinks that the word *pāli-y* with the expletive use of *y* at the end is a Tamil word meaning an excavation in stone set apart for the residence of monks, and that it is not unlikely that it is connected with the Prākṛt word *pālya* as suggested by Krishna Sastri another scholar who has worked upon some of these Brāhmī inscriptions. He supports his interpretation by quoting extracts from the Tamil *Nighaṇṭu* where we find readings like *pāli tāpatan karaṇḍai polliye munivar vāsam* and *pugalun karpāli karaṇḍai*.¹ *Pāli*, *tāpatam*, *karaṇḍai* and *paḷli* in the first quotation denote the abode of sages, while the meaning of the second quotation is 'Karaṇḍai denotes a *pāli* made of stone'.

Though the word for which the meaning stone excavation has been suggested by him is *pāli* with the palatal *l* and the word in these label inscriptions is *pāli* with the lingual *ḷ* the two words were obviously not different and probably meant the same thing.

Evidently the word *pāli* or *paḷi* stands for *paḷli*, with the double or second *l* dropped. This feature which is common in Prākṛt is met with in Tamil literature frequently. The word *paḷli* is taken to mean different things. According to Tamil epigraphy it denotes a Jaina or Buddhist temple, and *paḷlic-candam* denotes the land or village, gifted, obviously as tax-free to such religious institutions. The devotional literature of the Śaivas and Vaiṣṇavas also uses the word to mean a temple. It is also used to denote the hermitage or cell of a recluse of the Jaina or Buddhist religion. But etymologically the word means a bed, a sleeping place or even sleep. Very probably the word originally indicated the bed or sleeping place and later on came to denote the residence of monks, which in course of time came to include also the places of worship which were made in their compounds or very near them.

Thus the words *paḷli*, *pāli* and *pāli* are all closely connected. A verse in the *Periyapurāṇam* which describes the destruction of the Jainas at Madurai says that "all the *pāli* where the *Amaṇar* were gathered and the *paḷli* where the *Arugar* resided in both the urban and suburban areas in the city were uprooted". It is a known fact that the word *Amaṇar* (Śramaṇar) denotes the Jainas in general and the word *Arugar*, their Lord, *Arhat*. Thus according

1. *Proceedings of the Third All India Oriental Conference*, p. 291.

to the *Periyapurāṇam* the word *pāli* would refer to the place where the Jainas gather and *paḷli* their temple. The *Nāḷāyiradivya Prabandham* refers to the *Vāṇavarkōṇ-pāli* and the commentary known as the *Īḍu* on the *Tiruvāy-moḷi* mentions an *Aiyaṇ-pāli* which means the temple of *Aiyaṇār*. In Tamil literature the word *pāli* is also used in the sense of a hermitage or abode of saints and seers and sleeping place. It may be taken from the above pieces of evidence that in Tamil the words *paḷli* and *pāli* convey the same idea or meaning. Obviously these two words denoted the institutions of different religious sects namely the Jainas, the Ājīvikas and the Buddhists. Thus it may be concluded that the word *paḷli* (*pāli*) originally meant a bed or sleeping place used by the monks, and in course of time came to designate their residence and later still, by extension, it came to denote the hermitage of the monks and and the temple attached to it.

Then with regard to the word *Pāli*. There is no unanimity of opinion among scholars with regard to the interpretation of the word. Childers in his *Pāli Dictionary* gives the following meaning for the word: a 'series' 'row', 'line' etc., and for the word *Pāli-bhāṣa*: the language of the (Buddhist) sacred texts. Macdonell gives it the meaning dyke. Buddhaghosa uses the word to denote a line to mark a boundary. Thus according to them a language known as *Pāli* is not known. But Walleser who has examined the meaning of the term is not inclined to accept the above, but thinks that it was a language and derives the term from the word *Pāṭali* or *Pāṭal-igrāma* "When the Buddhist Bhikkus assembled soon after the death of the Buddha and which for a long time was the centre of Buddhist life". He assumes that it was originally known as *Pāṭalibhāṣa* or the *bhāṣa* of *Pāṭali* or *Pāṭaliputra* (or *pura*) and as a result of phonetic changes, (1) shortening of the final vowel, (2) dropping of the intervocalic *ṭ* with contraction and (3) cerebralising of *ḷ*) the word became *Pālibhāṣa*. According to him therefore *Pālibhāṣa* was the language of *Pāṭaliputra*. Further he connects the term *Pāli* with the term *pāli* which has the cerebral *ḷ* and holds that it is more likely that the latter is an expression which comes straight from the native commentaries of Ceylon.² Linguistically the suggestion of Walleser does not seem to be sound

2. *Sprache und Heimat des pali Kāṇons* No. 4. referred to in *Indian Historical Quarterly* Vol. IV. (1928, pp. 773-5). See also, *I.H.Q.*, Vol. VI, pp. 377-9.

It may be asked how *Pāli*, which was predominantly used in Western India, became associated with a town in Magadha "unless one maintains that *Pali* was the name of the language in which was written the Buddhist primitive canon some of whose linguistic features did penetrate in the *Pāli* Canon." If *Pāli* is derived from *Pāṭali* (*putra*), it must be really very old. But as Childers points out "the term *Pāli* as a name for the Buddhist scriptures was of late introduction, probably dating from the second or first century after Christ".

V. Pisani has tried to derive the word *Pāli* secondarily from the word *Pāli-bhāsa*. He considers the word *Pāli-bhāsa* to be a *vrddhi* derivation from *paribhāsa* meaning teaching, rule, definition. Thus *paribhāsa* or its *prākṛitised* form *Pālibhāsa* meant the language in which the rules of the faith were written, (i.e.) the language of the Canon.³

Probably the word *Pāli* was known as *pāli* in Tamil. The commentary on the *Yāpparukalakkārikai*, a work on Tamil prosody mentions *pālittiyam* as a grammatical work on the *Prākṛt*. It will be evident from this that the word *pāli* denoted a *Prākṛt* language in the tenth century when the commentary seems to have been written. Is it possible that the early Buddhist literature got the name *pāli* and *Pāli*, because it was exclusively the language of the monks who resided in the *pālis*?⁴

3. Dr. S. K. Belvalkar *Felicitations Volume*, pp. 189-191.

4. The term *Pālidhvaja* occurs in some inscriptions of the western *Chālukyas*. It was the banner of the Kings of the dynasty and was the insignia of their supreme dominion or overlordship. It is believed to be a particular arrangement of flags in rows (*pāli* meaning a row) and is said to have been acquired by Vijayāditya Satyāśraya after 'causing the lord of all the region of the north'. (See *Indian Antiquary*, Vol. IX, p. 129; *Epigraphia Indica*, Vol. V., pp. 203-5). According to the *Ādipurāṇa* of Jina Sēnācārya, the preceptor of the Rāṣṭrakūṭa king Amoghavarṣa I (814-870) it did not mean any particular kind of flag, but denoted a peculiar arrangement in rows of ten kinds of flags such as those of garlands, cloths, peacocks, lotuses, geese, eagles, lions, bulls, elephants, and wheels. In each direction a hundred and eight flags of each kind—or in other words a thousand and eighty flags in all were ranged in lines. Thus the total number of flags in the four directions was 4320. (See *Indian Antiquary* Vol. XIV, pp. 104-05). Fleet suggests that the *Pālidhvaja* was the banner of the sword edge. (*Indian Antiquary* Vol. VII, pp. 111 and 245.). See for a discussion of the whole question the author's *South Indian Polity*, p. 86 and n). The word *Pālidhvaja* however does not seem to have any connection with the terms considered in this paper.

Reviews

THE SEPOY MUTINY, 1857: A Social Study and Analysis—Hara-prasad Chattopadhyaya, M.A. (History & Politics) Agents: Bookland Private Ltd., 1, Shankar Ghose Lane, Calcutta, 6, pp. iii-235. Price Rs. 15/-.

The causes, spread, and ultimate failure of the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 had been and will ever remain a topic of absorbing interest to students of modern Indian History. Scholars beginning from Kaye and Malleson have sought to explain meticulously the various social, economic and political factors that ultimately led to the sudden flaring up of discontent in extensive regions of North India from Bengal to Delhi. The work under review is a valuable contribution to the subject on these lines. The learned author has made a painstaking study in collecting the various social and economic changes that took place in pre-1857 days. These changes, however beneficial for the country in the long run, were not always acceptable to the classes concerned. Then, the policy of Lapse inaugurated and applied by Lord Dalhousie naturally caused great resentment among the ruling classes of the country. Three great leaders of the Mutiny at least, viz., Zinat Mahal of Lucknow, Rāni Lakshmi Bai of Jhansi and Nana Sahib of Cawnpur fought along with the mutineers not definitely out of any patriotic feeling for the country as such, but because their own interests were seriously jeopardised by the policy of Lord Dalhousie.

The author has given us a full and critical description of the religious, social and military background of the Mutiny. He has also pointed out that "the discontent and disaffection born of the reforms in the social and economic spheres did not directly lead to the outbreak of the Mutiny. It was the discontent and estrangement of the sepoys that led ultimately to the upheaval of 1857". In this connection he has made a detailed study of the British army-administration and pointed out its many bungleings and shortcomings. The Bengal Army created problems of caste and community for the administration, while the special privileges awarded to it to the exclusion of the other two Presidency armies of Bombay and Madras, and the ultimate withdrawal of these privileges actually fomented mutiny in the Army.

The role of the army in the disturbances of 1857 has been very fully and ably dealt with by our author. There is no doubt that the uprising of 1857 was military in its inception. But it is perhaps a little too much to say that 'in fact there would have been no revolt in India in 1857, had not the initiative been taken by the disaffected sepoys of the Indian army' and that 'The Mutiny gave them (a certain percentage of the landed and territorial aristocracies such as the Princes, land-owners, chieftains and talukdars) an opportunity to strike a blow towards recovering their former status, power and privileges of which they were deprived by Government' (P. 93). The latter statement may be accepted as a fact with certain reservations and the author is aware of them, for he states that the mutiny took the character of a general movement in parts of North-Eastern India, viz., in Oudh and Bihar.

It has been shown by the author that both Hindus and Muslims supported the cause of the Mutiny and at places jointly deserted it. On the whole the movement was not influenced by any communal considerations.

In the treatment of a controversial topic the author has taken a commendable stand on ascertained facts and is not swayed by any pre-conceived opinion. But perhaps he has over-emphasised the view that the Mutiny was a mere revolt of the army against the military administration. It had admittedly its wider and popular aspect. For it is undeniable that at many centres the mutineers received a popular backing, the ready help and active participation of the civilian population in their cause. The fundamental question that arises is: Should the outbreak of 1857 be regarded as a national movement and ultimately as India's war of liberation? In Oudh and parts of Bihar it seems to have assumed that colour. But elsewhere the people were not so conscious of its national implications. Further, as has been pointed out by the author himself, there was no connected plan of action or a common organisation behind the mutiny. But, on the whole, the fact remains that not a negligible part of the people in the North were behind the mutineers in their general stand against British rule as foreign rule.

RADHA KUMUD MOOKERJEE

AŚOKAN INSCRIPTIONS, edited by Radhagovinda Basak, M.A., Ph.D.; published by Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1959; pages xxxi + 162, with 2 Plates and 1 map; price Rs. 15 or 28 s.

Dr. Radhagovinda Basak is one of the few serious students of Indian epigraphy. He has brought out this edition of the inscriptions of the great Maurya emperor Aśoka, who flourished in the 3rd century B.C., in order to help the post-graduate students of Indian and foreign universities. Although a few books of this kind are now available to the students of ancient Indian history, there is no doubt that Dr. Basak's work will be welcomed by the class of readers for whom it is intended.

The book under review has a short introduction dealing with such topics as the geographical distribution of Aśoka's inscriptions, Aśoka's administration, the Dharma preached by Aśoka and the language of the epigraphs. The book contains the texts of most versions of the various edicts of Aśoka printed in Devanāgarī characters together with their Sanskrit renderings and English translations. There are also some explanatory notes on difficult words occurring in the records. The two Plates appended to the book illustrate the letters of the Brāhmī alphabet used in the inscriptions of Aśoka. The map shows the distribution of Aśoka's epigraphs including the bilingual Graeco-Aramaic inscription recently discovered at Kandahar in Afghanistan.

The inscriptions of Aśoka are being studied for more than a century now. But there is still no unanimity among scholars on the interpretation of many passages of the epigraphs. Fresh study of the inscriptions is therefore always welcome. We are glad to find that Dr. Basak has offered new interpretations of some words and passages occurring in the records of Aśoka. But it may not be possible for the readers to agree with all his suggestions. The nature of the study is such that no unanimity among scholars on all points of interpretation is possible in the present state.

We feel that in some respects the usefulness of the book could have been enhanced. The inclusion of a table of Kharoshthī characters used in Aśoka's edicts found in the north-western part of his empire would have benefited the students of the subject, while students of foreign universities would have appreciated the

inclusion of transcripts of the inscriptions in Roman characters along with those in Devanāgarī. The learned author may consider these questions in the second edition of the work.

Dr. Basak has generally avoided discussions of the views of different scholars on the interpretation of Aśokan records. Thus in the Kalsi version of Rock Edict IV the passage *hini cha mā alochayisu* has been Sanskritised as *hāniḥ cha mā ārochayeyuh* and translated into English as 'not to speak of their decrease or diminution' (pp. 18-20). In a nexplanatory note on the verb *alocha-yisu*, it is said, "Cf. *lochetayvā* of G[irnar], *lochesu* [of] S[hahbazgarhi] and *anulochayisu* [of] M[ansehrat]. Pāli *ārocheti* means 'to tell, inform, announce' and also 'to explain, speak to, say to'. The word has nothing to do with *ālochanā* in the sense of discussion or beholding. Cf. the double consative form *ārochāpeti* in Pāli which means 'to be caused to be told or announced, to make known, to publish' (p. 21). But it has not been indicated that the verb in question has often been associated with Sanskrit *ruch*, 'to like, to long for', and the passage has been understood in the sense that no decrease should be approved or countenanced. See Hultzsch, *Corp. Ins. Ind.*, Vol. I, p. 8, etc; my *Inscriptions of Aśoka*, p. 42.

In some cases, Dr. Basak has briefly referred to others' views, with which he does not agree, not only without any discussion but even without any reference. Thus, with reference to the statement in Rock Edict I that two *mayūras* and one *mṛiga* were daily killed in Aśoka's kitchen for the preparation of curry, he has the following note on the words *majulā* and *mṛige* (sic. *mige*) occurring in the Kalsi version: "Here in the edict we should not take the first word *majulā* (= Skt. *mayūrau*) and the second *mṛige* (=Skt. *mṛigaḥ*) to represent generally all kinds of animals and birds as interpreted by some scholars" (p. 5). He follows certain earlier writers in translating the passage *duve majulā eke mige* (Sanskrit *dvau mayūrau ekah mṛgaḥ*) as 'two peacocks and one antelope' (p. 4; cf. Hultzsch, *op.cit.*, p. 2, etc.) without any further discussion and without any reference to the works in which *mayūra* has been taken to mean 'a bird in general' and *mṛiga* 'an animal in general'. We feel that the two views should have been presented to the readers more clearly (cf. Barua, *Aśoka Edicts in New Light*, p. 88). As regards the interpretation of *mayūra* and *mṛiga* in

the senses of 'a peacock' and 'an antelope' respectively, we are inclined to point out that it is apparently against human nature to take the same dish day after day. It is not easy to understand how peacock's flesh, which is not regarded as a special delicacy in India and elsewhere in the world, could have been taken by one regularly every day without break in preference to the recognised delicacies among birds.

There are several other cases where we are inclined to disagree with the learned author's interpretation. By way of illustration, we may refer to his explanation (pp. 11 ff.) of the word *parisā* (Sanskrit *parishad*) in the last sentence of Rock Edict III stating that the *Parishad* would direct or order the *Yuktas* in certain respects (in the matter of calculation of all expenses of the touring officials of Aśoka, in the opinion followed by Dr. Basak). He understands the *Yuktas* in the sense of royal officers of the lower rank and the *Parishad* to mean 'the assembly of followers of the religious instructions inculcated by the touring officers'. If the followers of the religious instructions were ordinary subjects of the king, as they no doubt were, I do not understand how they could enjoy any power in directing or ordering a group of royal officers in respect of the calculation of state expenses. The word *parisā* = *Parishad* should better be understood in the sense of the Council of Ministers (*mantri-parishad*) as is now the opinion of the generality of scholars (Hultzsch, *op.cit.*, p. 5, note 7). It was no doubt the business of the ministers to direct the royal officers serving under them in the various departments of administration.

It should however be pointed out that such differences of opinion do not detract from the value of Dr. Basak's work and that we have no hesitation in recommending the book to the students of early Indian history and culture.

D. C. SARKAR

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